

Allies of Convenience: How NGOs and the United States Cooperate to Control  
Intergovernmental Organizations

By  
Andrew C. McWard

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The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:

Lisa Martin, Professor, Political Science

Mark Copelovitch, Professor, Political Science and Public Affairs

Tana Johnson, Associate Professor, Political Science and Public Affairs

Jon Pevehouse, Professor, Political Science

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*For my parents.*

## Abstract

While nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) now hold an arguably prominent position in global governance, we know little about why NGO participation varies widely within international institutions and even less about the impact this participation has. This project investigates the determinants and impact of NGO participation in intergovernmental organizations. I use a combination of statistical analyses and qualitative process-tracing based on recently de-classified reports. To supplement analyses across international organizations, I draw from over 1000 archival documents to create an original dataset of NGO participation within the World Bank from 1982 – 2011. I find that NGOs and the United States form an “alliance of convenience” in which each actor independently achieves their aims. When the United States begins to lose control over an organization, American officials work with NGOs to change the organization’s rules and provide nonstate actors increased access to the institution. NGOs act independently after gaining access and dilute the influence of other actors. This dilution generates increased opportunities for political intervention from powerful member states. The result is an increase in American structural power that simultaneously advances the normative interests of NGOs.

# Contents

Abstract . . . . .	ii
Acknowledgements . . . . .	vi
<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>1 Understanding NGO Participation in Intergovernmental Organizations</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Why NGO Participation? . . . . .	6
1.2 The Literature on NGO-State Relations . . . . .	10
1.3 The Argument in Brief . . . . .	15
1.4 Contributions and Implications . . . . .	16
Understanding NGO Participation . . . . .	16
Institutional Change and the Maintenance of Hegemonic Control . . . . .	18
Empirical Contributions . . . . .	22
1.5 Chapter Outline . . . . .	23
<b>2 How Hegemonic Preferences Shape NGO Participation – A Theory</b>	<b>25</b>
2.1 Controlling Intergovernmental Organizations . . . . .	29
2.2 How NGOs Reverse the Loss of Control Across Organizations . . . . .	35
Dilution through Access . . . . .	35

Control Through Dilution . . . . .	40
2.3 Preferences on Participation . . . . .	44
US Preferences . . . . .	44
NGO Preferences . . . . .	48
Other Member States' Preferences . . . . .	51
2.4 Hypotheses . . . . .	54
2.5 Alternative Explanations . . . . .	55
2.6 Conclusion . . . . .	57
<b>3 Forming the Alliance: The Determinants of Nonstate Access Across Institutions</b>	<b>60</b>
3.1 Analyzing Change in Access . . . . .	63
3.2 Measuring Risk and Uncertainty . . . . .	66
Specialization . . . . .	66
Membership Affinity . . . . .	69
3.3 Other Covariates . . . . .	72
3.4 Model Estimation . . . . .	73
3.5 Main Results . . . . .	74
3.6 Alternative Measures of Risk . . . . .	84
3.7 Robustness Checks . . . . .	88
3.8 Discussion . . . . .	90
3.A Chapter 3 Appendix . . . . .	92
<b>4 The Alliance in Motion: Qualitative Evidence from the World Bank</b>	<b>108</b>
4.1 American Influence at the Bank in Decline (1970 – 1979) . . . . .	114
4.2 The Informal Role of NGOs (1973 – 1981) . . . . .	117
4.3 Formalizing Informality: NGO Access (1981 – 1993) . . . . .	120

4.4	Creating the Inspection Panel (1992 – 1993)	124
4.5	After Access	132
4.6	Discussion	136
<b>5</b>	<b>The Alliance in Action: Quantitative Evidence from the World Bank</b>	<b>139</b>
5.1	Measuring American Influence	143
5.2	Examining World Bank Enforcement	145
	Data Collection	147
5.3	Analyzing the Determinants of NGO Participation	153
	Dependent and Independent Variables	153
	Model Estimation	156
	Results	157
5.4	Analyzing the Impact of NGO Participation	160
	Dependent and Independent Variables	160
	Model Estimation	163
	Results	164
5.5	Empirical Extensions	170
	Divided US government	170
	The Collective Influence of the “G5”	171
5.6	Discussion	172
5.A	Chapter 5 Appendix	174
<b>6</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>182</b>
6.1	Contributions and Implications	183
6.2	Future Work	185

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# List of Figures

1.1	Typology of NGO Participation . . . . .	4
1.2	NGO Participation & Loan Disbursements in the World Bank . . . . .	8
1.3	Domestic NGO-State Dynamics . . . . .	11
1.4	NGO-State Dynamics in Foreign Aid . . . . .	13
1.5	NGO-State Dynamics in Intergovernmental Organizations . . . . .	14
1.6	American Economic Strength Over Time . . . . .	21
2.1	Causal Pathways . . . . .	28
2.2	Risk and Uncertainty in Delegation . . . . .	31
3.1	NGO Proliferation and Access to International Organizations Over Time . . . . .	64
3.2	NGO Access to International Organization Bodies with US Membership . . . . .	65
3.3	Average Levels of Delegation and Pooling Across Sample . . . . .	77
3.4	Marginal Effects from Interactions with US Preference Divergence . . . . .	81
3.5	Marginal Effects from Interactions with G4 Preference Divergence . . . . .	83
3.6	Mean Variable Trends Across Sample . . . . .	86
3.7	Marginal Effects of NGO Protest and Treaty Distance . . . . .	98
4.1	US “No” Votes in the World Bank . . . . .	111
5.1	NGO Participation in World Bank Lending Operations . . . . .	148

5.2	NGO Participation in the World Bank Over Time, 1982 – 2011 . . . . .	150
5.3	Depth of Participation . . . . .	151
5.4	Type of Participation . . . . .	152
5.5	Marginal Effects of NGO Participation . . . . .	169
5.6	Influence of Divided US Government on Project Disbursements . . . . .	177
5.7	Influence of Divided US Government on Project Performance . . . . .	177
6.1	US Security Council Vetoes, 1946 – 2021 . . . . .	186
6.2	Arria Formula Meetings, 1992 – 2021 . . . . .	187

# List of Tables

2.1	Summary of Theoretical Argument . . . . .	27
2.2	Summary of Actor Roles and Hypotheses . . . . .	45
3.1	Effect of U.S. Risk on Access in Non-Decision-Making Bodies . . . . .	75
3.2	Effect of U.S. Risk on Access in Decision-Making Bodies . . . . .	76
3.3	Effect of U.S. Risk on on Delegation and Pooling . . . . .	79
3.4	Effect of U.S. Risk on Access, Conditional on NGO Protest . . . . .	80
3.5	Effect of G4 Risk on Access . . . . .	82
3.6	Body-Level Fixed Effects, Non-Decision-Making Bodies . . . . .	92
3.7	Body-Level Fixed Effects, Decision-Making Bodies . . . . .	93
3.8	Body-Level Fixed Effects with Interaction Terms . . . . .	94
3.9	Depth of Access . . . . .	95
3.10	G5 Measure . . . . .	96
3.11	Alternative Risk Measures . . . . .	97
3.12	Cochrane-Orcutt Procedure . . . . .	99
3.13	First Difference . . . . .	100
3.14	Lagged Models . . . . .	101
3.15	Lagged Models with Interaction Terms . . . . .	102
3.16	Tobit Models . . . . .	103
3.17	Tobit Models with Interaction Terms . . . . .	104

3.18	Additional Control Variables . . . . .	105
3.19	Heckman Models, Selection Equation . . . . .	106
3.20	Heckman Models, Outcome Equation . . . . .	107
4.1	The Alliance of Convenience and the Creation of the Inspection Panel . . . . .	126
5.1	Effect of Civil Society Interests on NGO Participation in World Bank Projects . . . . .	158
5.2	Effect of U.S. Influence on NGO Participation in World Bank Projects . . . . .	159
5.3	Effect of U.S. Risk on the Depth of Participation . . . . .	161
5.4	Effect of NGO Participation on Project Disbursements . . . . .	165
5.5	Effect of NGO Participation on Project Disbursements . . . . .	166
5.6	Effect of US Influence on Project Disbursements . . . . .	168
5.7	Estimation with Human Rights Control . . . . .	174
5.8	Estimation with Human Rights Control and Interaction Terms . . . . .	175
5.9	Divided US Government . . . . .	176
5.10	Effect of US Influence on World Bank Evaluations . . . . .	178
5.11	Effect of G5 Influence on NGO Participation . . . . .	179
5.12	Effect of G5 Influence on Project Disbursements . . . . .	180
5.13	Effect of Individual G5 Influence on Project Disbursements . . . . .	181

## Chapter 1

# Understanding NGO Participation in Intergovernmental Organizations

“I want you to know that I have made it clear to my staff here and to all of our ambassadors around the world that I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs, who are such a force multiplier for us. . . . Needless to say, cooperation between governments and NGOs is not the same as co-opting you. Always, we must respect your independence.” – *Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, October 2001*

Four years after the devastating Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004, Indonesia’s recovery had stagnated. Its progress on the World Bank’s Aceh Infrastructure Reconstruction Project—the country’s best chance to restore a fully functioning water drainage system to the city of Banda Aceh—remained inert after an already significant two year delay. The World Bank funds its projects in repeated disbursements over time to encourage the efficient use of funds; the Indonesian government risked losing the project’s original \$300 million commitment due to the perceived implementation failures. But then a new participant, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Muslim Aid, entered the scene. Muslim Aid joined the project in 2008

as a co-recipient of the World Bank's loan and became the project's main implementer. Muslim Aid successfully completed the project's tasks and signaled its promise. By 2010, the project's objectives were satisfied after the World Bank granted an additional loan.

But an NGO's participation does not guarantee success in the World Bank. Just one year after the above project's completion, India completed its own infrastructure project, seven years behind schedule. Initially funded by the World Bank, the now infamous Mumbai Urban Transport Project became known as the "world's most delayed road project" by the organization's staff. The delays were so severe that the Bank eventually withdrew its funding and left the project's completion to the Indian government alone. The project's initial design and early implementation called for a high degree of local NGO participation. But the Indian government resisted their collaboration, generating mistrust and miscommunication among the various project implementers.

The difference in each government's interaction with NGOs, and this interaction's eventual impact, is stark. Indonesia gave significant agency to Muslim Aid, an international NGO based in the United Kingdom, to implement the project. But India resisted assistance from local actors in the same period. Why did two of the world's largest democracies act so differently toward civil society collaborators? In both cases, the World Bank mandated the inclusion of NGOs. This participation should have been expected; the Bank's 1989 Operational Directive 14.70 called for NGOs to be included in all aspects of a lending operation. Why did a similar supply of NGOs not meet the same demand?

This puzzle becomes more clear when we examine the wide variety of nonstate activities within and across intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). NGOs can provide technical assistance, particularly in organizations that emphasize development. The World Bank itself recognizes 6 activities NGOs can contribute to lending operations alone: project identification, design, monitoring, implementation, financing, and evaluation. Such participation may only include keeping a careful eye on IGO activities, while other forms include close and

active NGO involvement. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reported that 49% of its 2017 NGO participation constituted collaboration while the remaining 51% centered around information sharing and an active IGO-NGO dialogue (Inter-American Development Bank 2018, p. 15). This participation can be significant. In response to COVID-19, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, an accredited NGO inside the World Health Organization (WHO), pledged up to \$100 million to aid in the organization's operations.<sup>1</sup>

Other examples take the form of lobbying and advocacy. NGOs can use their expertise and knowledge to try and influence policies and decisions. In the World Trade Organization, NGOs may submit *amicus curiae* briefs to the Appellate Body, offering private, third-party perspectives and legal interpretations. The biannual Civil Society Policy Forum, held between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, invites civil society organizations to publicly comment on these organizations' past, present and future work. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) allows all accredited civil society organizations to attend meetings, with their contributions to the discussion varying from simply observing, to circulating written policy recommendations.<sup>2</sup>

Regardless of whether NGOs engage in one of the broad categories of either technical assistance or lobbying—exemplified by the common organizational categorization of either “service” or “advocacy” NGOs—the specific activities of NGOs operating with and within IGOs varies widely. Yet NGO participation can vary across multiple theoretical dimensions

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<sup>1</sup><https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2020/02/Bill-and-Melinda-Gates-Foundation-Dedicates-Additional-Funding-to-the-Novel-Coronavirus-Response>

<sup>2</sup>Part of this wide variation may emerge from the expansive definitions often used to describe NGOs. The United Nations Charter merely defines an NGO as “not” a governmental organization. This definition was later narrowed via Resolution 1296 which set the criteria required for NGOs to maintain consultative status with the UN via the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Notably, the resolution required NGOs to have a “recognized international standing,” with operations traveling across countries and regions, thereby limiting the definition to only include international NGOs (INGOs) (Otto 1996, 110). For the purposes of this dissertation, I maintain a more expansive definition that gives room for a range of potential non-state actors: non-profit entities that are formally independent from any state government.



as well. First, NGOs may participate or not. And second, as in the anecdote above, their participation may aid or not aid the task at hand.




Figure 1.1: Typology of NGO Participation

From this, I propose a simple typology to better understand the dynamics of NGO participation on a conceptual level (see Figure 1.1). First, NGOs may be granted more or less *access*. Access refers to the institutional rules that formally specify the degree of NGO participation allowed. Organizations may grant NGOs complete access or no access at all. But substantial variation exists between these two levels. The World Bank first formally allowed NGOs “in” via Operational Policy Note 10.05, promoted their inclusion in all aspects of lending operations via Operational Directive 14.70, and granted significant independent monitoring abilities via the creation of the Inspection Panel.

Second, NGOs may contribute to either cooperation or conflict within the organization. As with Muslim Aid in the above example, NGOs can provide important assistance not found within the normal operations of an organization. But the mere presence of NGOs does not guarantee effective cooperation. India purposely shut out local collaborators during the Mumbai Urban Transport project, even though said NGOs were selected by the World Bank staff for the project. Notably, the typology does not clarify for *whom* the cooperation or conflict affects. This question is elaborated upon below.

This typology, and subsequent foundation for this dissertation, rests on the expectation that the dynamics for nonstate access to an IGO are *related* to the dynamics of nonstate impact in that same IGO. An organization's member-states approve the level of access granted, and these interests may carry over to later activities. And this says nothing of NGOs themselves, who maintain their own interests and incentives toward access and their participation within an organization. In short, if we believe that invested actors in an organization have political incentives to support or reject access, then similar incentives should travel to the subsequent impact.

This dissertation thus investigates the dynamics of NGO participation across and within intergovernmental organizations. Participation varies in both the degree of access afforded to nonstate actors and the patterns of said NGO activities that emerge after access. Moreover, it is unclear who benefits the most from this participation. Specifically, my dissertation asks the following questions:

1. What are the determinants of NGO participation in intergovernmental organizations? What determines which organizations will include access for NGOs, and how does this access change over time? And after gaining access, what determines the areas in which NGOs are most likely to participate?
2. What is the political impact of NGO participation? Which actors benefit the most from including NGOs in IGO activities?

The answers to these questions have significant implications for international relations. NGOs are now recognized as key actors in international cooperation. Their position within intergovernmental organizations holds the potential to significantly alter policy, but we know little about the general patterns and impact of their participation (Vikberg 2023). Moreover, the necessity of member state approval in providing nonstate access mandates the consideration of state incentives. State political interests frequently bias international organizations'

policy outcomes (Vreeland 2019). Examining the impact of institutional developments can better inform policy makers and scholars about the various methods of political control and subsequently suggest methods to counteract such biases.

To briefly preview the main argument, I find that NGOs and the United States form an “alliance of convenience” in which each actor independently achieves their aims. When the United States risks losing control over an organization, American officials work with NGOs to change the organization’s rules and provide NGOs with increased access to the institution. NGOs act independently after gaining access and dilute the influence of other actors. The result is an increase in American structural power that simultaneously advances the normative interests of NGOs.

## 1.1 Why NGO Participation?

The above research questions emphasize two topics of NGO participation that have received little attention in the current literature. First, the potential for NGOs—and nonstate actors more broadly—to be a source of *both* increased cooperation *and* increased conflict in global governance. And second, how NGOs interact with other actors in global governance. Taken together, these topics highlight the relationships, both positive and negative, that stem from NGO participation.

Many studies recognize the importance of NGOs for global governance outside and within intergovernmental organizations, often citing their rapid proliferation in the late 20th century and continuation into the early 21st. Earlier studies debated on whether the introduction of these new actors would constitute a significant change (Reimann 2006; Tarrow 2005) or a continuation (Raustiala 1997; Sending and Neumann 2006) from the current, state-led trajectory of global governance. But in either case, the proposed change is invariable. Here, the proliferation of non-state actors is associated with an increased presence—and *presumed*


impact—diffused across international institutions in a broad, uniform fashion.

Organizational Ecology (OE) theory provides a more recent lens to view non-state actors within a larger system of governance. Here, groups of private actors fill “niches,” understood as added resources, that contribute to a larger institutional environment (Abbott, Green, and Keohane 2016). Overlapping niches may generate competition and limit the creation of new organizations (Bush and Hadden 2019; Morin 2020), but other actors may also accept new niches into their existing activities, a process known as mutualism (Green and Hadden 2021). Mutualism under OE shows how NGO participation can change existing IGO practices, a phenomenon most clearly seen in global environmental politics (Allan and Hadden 2017). But the context surrounding the adoption of new niches remains unclear.

This context is crucial to understand given the variation in NGO participation. Participation first varies by the access institutional rules grant to non-state actors. While access to IGOs exhibits a general trend upward, significant variation exists across organizations, including those in the same issue-area (Tallberg et al. 2013, 2014). If the “niches” NGOs provide were only based on technical prowess, we would expect a more uniform increase. States do not simply accede to nonstate participation over time; they pursue their own interests (Ruhlman 2014). These interests also vary across organizations: the United States strongly supported increased access to the World Bank, culminating in the Inspection Panel’s creation in 1993, only to oppose access to the UN General Assembly three years later in 1996.

The variation in participation continues after access is granted to non-state actors. Once they are “inside” an organization, NGOs may participate in a number of different activities. These participation patterns—and their impact—exhibit considerable variation within institutions, even when accounting for issue-area and policy stage (Vikberg 2023). The variation continues when examining member states’ relations toward participation. Figure 1.2 displays the proportion of World Bank projects involving civil society by borrowing country on the X-axis, separated by region. While the Bank’s rules governing access explicitly encourage

Figure 1.2: NGO Participation & Loan Disbursements in the World Bank



NGO coordination, the frequency by which such coordination occurs varies greatly across states.

Figure 1.2 also displays the average percentage of the original loan commitments that are disbursed to borrowing countries in the World Bank on the Y-axis. The World Bank uses loan disbursements to enforce its project implementation; borrowing countries receive a greater share of their original loan disbursement if projects are implemented efficiently and effectively.<sup>3</sup> And similar to the proportion of NGO participation, the extent to which loans

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<sup>3</sup>Disbursed amounts can exceed the original loan commitment, hence why some country averages exceed 100%.

are fulfilled varies across states. However, one cannot observe a clear relationship between the proportion of NGOs and percentage of loans disbursed. Thus, while scholars and policymakers frequently suggest that NGOs provide useful technical assistance to organizations Tallberg et al. 2013; Lall 2017, it is not immediately obvious that participation leads to a more successful project implementation across World Bank member states. What explains this variation in NGO participation across singular member states and what is its effect on a state's relationship to the IGO?

OE theory emphasizes variation in the structural environment of nonstate actors. It assumes that both preferences of the involved actors *and* the impact of new niches will remain consistent. Thus, while the framework is valuable for understanding why a certain area may experience more or less competition, it remains limited in its understanding of the variation in NGO relations with other IGO actors. Steffek (2013) outlines different incentives through which NGOs can “push” into an organization or IGOs can “pull” NGOs in. This “push and pull” framework acknowledges the variety of preferences each actor holds and how this may lead to varied access levels. Johnson (2016) provides a framework for understanding the next step of NGO participation: the potential for conflict and cooperation between NGOs and IGOs after access. Crucially, Johnson highlights how IGO bureaucrats may cycle through different phases of NGO relations over time; the benefits and costs of NGO participation are not invariable.

This dissertation builds from Steffek and Johnson's frameworks in two important ways. First, my typology and expected variation expects a connection between access and its consequences; the conditions under which access is granted should influence its later impact.<sup>4</sup> In doing so, the push and pull factors from Steffek can be connected to the prospects for

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<sup>4</sup>Applied to niches from organizational ecology theory, this typology would expect the context surrounding the creation of new niches to influence their later competition and/or mutualism.

cooperation found in Johnson.

Second, whereas Steffek and Johnson focus on the relationship between NGOs and IGO bureaucrats, I stress the relationship between NGOs and IGO member states. This emphasis highlights an additional source of variation found within broader questions of NGO participation. While IGO bureaucracies can be seen as singular entities with their own preferences (Johnson 2014), member states collectively pool their authority within IGOs. States may therefore hold varying preferences toward NGO participation. Determining which state preferences win out in contests surrounding participation is important for understanding the role of participation more broadly. The next section briefly reviews the literature on NGO-state relations.

## 1.2 The Literature on NGO-State Relations

NGO-state relations refer to the interactions between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental organizations in a particular state. NGOs and governments may interact in a variety of ways, including through direct funding, advocacy, and collaborative efforts to address policy problems. NGOs may even provide services that the government is unable to provide itself. Such relationships can be beneficial for both sides, as NGOs can provide technical expertise and additional financial resources to the state government while also contributing to their mission. Yet the relationship can also be detrimental, as governments can strictly regulate civil society activities while NGOs may advocate for, or contribute to, regime change. This section will briefly overview the literature on the political relationship between NGOs and states, examining how differing contexts—domestic, transitional, and multilateral—expand the necessary theoretical framework and require additional attention to various actors.

In their landmark study, Keck and Sikkink (1998) find that independent civil society

actors can impact national politics and cause meaningful political change, even in the most repressive conditions. In their now famous “boomerang model,” domestic activists incite change by leveraging transnational civil society networks. International NGOs (INGOs), hearing from these domestic actors, pressure state governments and intergovernmental organizations to come from behind and sanction the regime in question. Since this seminal work, political science scholars centered in both International Relations and Comparative Politics have recognized the importance of NGOs and investigated the dynamics by which NGOs and states interact.

Beyond its novel argument and findings, the study’s framework provides two notable features. First, the core relationship concerns domestic civil society and their respective state governments. To put it simply, the actions of domestic activists constitute the independent variable, whereas a change in government policy constitutes the dependent variable. Second, the precise mechanism by which this relationship generates an effect depends on a host of other actors: INGOs, powerful states, and intergovernmental organizations.




Figure 1.3: Domestic NGO-State Dynamics

Most studies concerning NGOs focus on their relationship to the state governments under which they operate. Regimes respond to domestic political threats with repression (Davenport 1995), a tactic most often employed by autocracies but also used by democracies (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007; Christensen and Weinstein 2013). Governments, fearing the boomerang effect, will impose restrictions on domestic civil society organizations (Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020), particularly after their peer regimes expe-



rience international punishment (Glasius, Schalk, and De Lange 2020). But even the most repressive governments recognize certain social benefits of civil society organizations (Teets 2014). NGOs will adjust their strategies and organizational characteristics to best operate under a given regulatory environment (Murdie 2014; Heiss 2019), a pattern that governments similarly exhibit in their repression tactics, depending on their goals at the time (Chaudhry 2022). Taken together, this literature’s relationship of interest can be summarized as a push and pull between the government’s regulations and civil society’s strategies to work within them. Here, domestic governments are the key component of an NGO’s institutional environment. Figure 1.3 visualizes this relationship.

Other studies more fully consider the transnational element of civil society networks by examining the influence of international donors. Donor governments may choose to funnel foreign aid through NGOs, bypassing the recipient government, to better achieve developmental outcomes (Dietrich 2013). A donor’s preference for such “bypass aid” may depend on its domestic political economy (Dietrich 2016, 2021), but recent work shows that political adversaries are more likely to be bypassed (Allen, Ferry, and Shammama 2023a). Such international forces can incentivize recipient governments to regulate domestic civil society and restrict foreign funding sources (K. E. Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015; K. Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016). In response, NGOs can retain their agency—and avoid domestic restrictions—by selecting international funding sources with fewer political stipulations (Bush 2015). By adding the additional variable of foreign donors, these perspectives elongate the NGO-state relationship represented above (see Figure 1.4).

Determinants for NGO access to IGOs can also be separated into “push” and “pull” factors, the former referring to NGO demands to join an organization and the latter focusing on IGO needs (Steffek 2013). But most systematic studies of NGO and nonstate access more generally have focused on the “pull” side, with IGOs granting access to achieve specific policy tasks (Abbott and Snidal 2010; Abbott et al. 2015), provide legitimacy for democratic




Figure 1.4: NGO-State Dynamics in Foreign Aid

organizations (Grigorescu 2007, 2015), fill institutional gaps in preexisting structures of global governance (Green 2014; Abbott, Green, and Keohane 2016) or a combination of the above (Tallberg et al. 2013, 2014). Such “supply-side” explanations provide crucial evidence for the important policy benefits NGOs can provide. But incorporating the demand-side is necessary to understand the full variation in observed access. If one views NGOs as interest groups in global governance (Bloodgood 2011), it is important to understand state policymakers’ demand for lobbyists in conjunction with lobbyists’ own demands (Lucas, Hanegraaff, and Bruycker 2019).<sup>5</sup>

A complete understanding of participation’s demand requires careful attention to the collective nature of an organization’s membership. Member states collectively delegate authority to an intergovernmental organization, but this “collective principal” may vary in its affinity (Nelson and Tierney 2003). Moreover, states differ in their power and subsequent ability to control an organization (Stone 2008, 2011). Thus, an organization’s “hegemon” may hold different preferences vis-a-vis other member-states (Malis, Rosendorff, and Smith

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<sup>5</sup>Reimann (2006) provides an important framework to understand the complex interaction between NGOs, IGOs and states. Her argument rests in the normative demands of each actor, whereas my focus will emphasize the material gains.

2022). This dissertation’s conceptual framework underscores the intervening influence of the hegemon, beyond the normal relationship between an organization and its member states. Figure 1.5 visualizes this framework, specifying the role NGOs may play to elevate hegemonic influence. The “Contributions” section below examines the place of hegemonic power in international relations and identifies this perspective’s omission from studies on international organization.




Figure 1.5: NGO-State Dynamics in Intergovernmental Organizations

Often, the United States takes the role of a hegemonic power within an international organization. But surprisingly, American attitudes toward NGO participation vary widely. While the United States was the biggest government advocate for granting civil society access to the World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO), it has previously opposed nonstate access to the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council. Why has the United States promoted NGO participation in some organizations while blocking it in others? This is a crucial question for understanding the larger patterns of nonstate participation in global

governance. Various actors and interest groups can support the integration of NGOs in IGOs, but member states have the final say over NGO access (Pallas and Uhlin 2014; Vabulas 2013). And as the most powerful member-state in many organizations, the United States can serve as a singular gatekeeper toward said access.

### **1.3 The Argument in Brief**

This dissertation makes the following arguments about the role of NGOs, the hegemon and other member states within intergovernmental organizations:

1. The hegemon's risk calculation toward other member states in an intergovernmental organization determines its preferences on NGO participation.
2. NGOs gain access to an organization by coordinating with the hegemonic power.
3. NGOs act independently after gaining access to an organization and operate in areas away from the hegemon's direct influence.
4. Adversaries of the hegemon resist NGO cooperation and exclude themselves from the benefits of participation.

Specifically, I argue that the United States forms an "alliance of convenience" with NGOs that solidifies American influence over the organization in question. As their name suggests, "nongovernmental" organizations are independent actors; even powerful states cannot directly command them and be subject to their criticism. Hegemonic powers like the United States are therefore normally resistant to increased access. This attitude changes when the United States risks losing control over an organization. As risk increases, the United States coordinates with NGOs to change an organization's rules and grant formal non-state access

to an institution. Participation provides insurance, for a price, against negative outcomes associated with risk.

NGOs act independently after gaining access; their participation is not directly coordinated by any one state. Instead, NGOs work toward their organizational mission, choosing areas that bring increased attention and financial resources to their work. These incentives indirectly prompt NGOs to work in areas that are outside the United States' explicit reach. Adversaries, normally insulated from American influence, suddenly find themselves dealing with human rights monitoring missions and nonprofit development work catalyzed through intergovernmental activities.

When acting through intergovernmental activities, NGOs dilute the normal process of governance by adding an additional actor inside the organization—providing new information, preferences and tasks—which presents the United States with additional opportunities to intervene against unfavorable policies. This opportunity for intervention starkly politicizes other member states' NGO relations. American allies do not risk the United States intervening against their interests; they welcome the support and resources nonstate participation provides. Adversaries, meanwhile, face a trade-off regarding participation. They may either resist NGOs and forgo their benefits, or they may accept NGOs and risk intervention from the United States. In either case, the benefits of participation helps allies and harms adversaries.

## **1.4 Contributions and Implications**

### **Understanding NGO Participation**

This paper makes several important contributions. Scholars have long recognized the importance of NGOs and the design of international organizations, but most studies have emphasized select IOs and cases (Tallberg et al. 2013, 18). This study adds to the field's

burgeoning—but still nascent—understanding of NGO participation in global governance from a broad comparative perspective. Moreover, this dissertation’s novel conceptualization perspective highlights the essential connection between the access granted to NGOs and their later behavior within an organization. In bridging these two crucial variations, the project provides a more comprehensive understanding of participation.

The argument also emphasizes the role of the IGO member-states and their preferences toward NGOs, an under-theorized relationship in the literature (Pallas and Uhlin 2014). Prior studies theorized that nonstate proliferation in global governance would constitute an increase in state power (Raustiala 1997; Sending and Neumann 2006). This study suggests that, under certain conditions, this perspective can apply to NGO participation within IGOs, but with proper agency given to each actor. The NGO-state relationship is built on mutualism. The alliance of convenience allows NGOs to simultaneously advance their own agendas while extending the influence of the United States and its allies. The dissertation thus adds to the broader literature examining NGO-state relations.

However, the mutually beneficial NGO-state relationship is not uniform. Some member-states will benefit more than others from the introduction of non-state actors into an organization. Certain states will demand participation while others work to resist it. This complicates our traditional understandings of principal-agent models of international organizations by examining how differences in the collective principal, rather than between the principal and agent, can lead to meaningful change in institutional design. In addition, the novel idea of dilution adds to our understanding of how third parties may alter the traditional P-A relationship. In particular, the distinction between the organization’s “hegemon” and other member-states within the collective principal should be seen as an important distinction (Malis, Rosendorff, and Smith 2022). The introduction of third parties provides an additional level of control for the United States.

I also show how the introduction of third parties is impactful. While numerous studies

have shown the importance of NGOs to particular cases (Joachim 2003; Sundstrom 2005), few studies have systematically investigated the impact of NGO participation. I find that NGOs have a meaningful effect that is conditional upon larger political dynamics. My arguments and findings thus counter two broad perspectives on the influence of NGOs in global governance. First, I contest explanations that suggest NGOs have little to no impact on the activities of international organizations (Dany 2014; Moloney 2022). And second, I question over-estimations of NGO influence that expect their introduction to overturn existing patterns of international order (Reimann 2006; Tarrow 2005).

## **Institutional Change and the Maintenance of Hegemonic Control**

While prior systematic studies highlight the technocratic benefits of NGOs (Abbott et al. 2015) or social pressures (Sommerer and Tallberg 2019), my perspective emphasizes the political incentives underlying non-state participation. In doing so, my explanation stresses the role of power and process in institutional design, and provides an answer to when states will choose to change an institution over alternative options (Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013). International organizations operate in evolving environments, which can prompt institutional change (Lipsky 2017). But while the makeup of an organization can change dramatically, my explanation emphasizes the ways in which institutional rules can change in tandem to maintain invested interests. And while powerful actors may be able to work outside an institution's formal rules in crucial times (Stone 2011), I propose that formally integrating informal means of control can provide important systemic benefits. The changing landscapes of global governance may represent a consolidation, rather than an upheaval, of the *status quo*.

The transition of hegemonic power in the international system has a long history in the discipline of International Relations. The classic works on the effects of such "power transitions" largely concern themselves with questions of war and conflict (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy

2010; Powell 2006; Wohlforth 2011). Keohane's seminal (1984) study connected the question to international regimes, finding that international cooperation continues in the absence of hegemonic stability. Recent investigations of great powers' influence on international organizations treat institutional design as a static entity, designed to exclude adversaries for the foreseeable future (Lascurettes 2020). Mukherjee (2022) provides an important temporal reevaluation, examining how rising powers work to change current international regimes to better suit their interests. My argument examines the other side of the power transition calculus as applied to international organizations; how do *status quo* powers attempt to retain their influence when rising powers and divergent preferences emerge. In doing so, I take a cue from later works of PTT that examine how *status quo* powers preemptively strike (Copeland 2000) and retrench (MacDonald and Parent 2018) when faced with the prospect of decline.

Applying this framework to international organizations provides an answer to how the United States manages to retain its control over international organizations. As the most powerful member-state in some of the world's most important IGOs, the United States often wields unparalleled influence within organizations and the larger global order. This near-hegemonic status dates back to at least the end of World War II, when the United States designed post-War institutions with specific rules to wield said power. However, how the United States maintains this influence is not obvious. While institutional rules can protect American influence, existing rules can be changed to reflect the growing power of other member-states (Lipsey 2017). IGO bureaucrats can insulate new organizations from the command of member-states (Johnson 2014). And decision-making may depend on the alignment of preferences among the most powerful member-states, rather than the United States alone (Copelovitch 2010a, 2010b). Indeed, all IGOs respond to a collective principal of member-states. As memberships grow larger and more diverse, IGOs may operate outside the preferred prerogative of its members (L. Martin 2006). Due to its already powerful position,



the United States often has the most to lose from these institutional developments.<sup>6</sup>

Delegation models of international organizations may suggest that the United States will seek to amend the original contract and “re-delegate” to the organizational bureaucracy when it experiences a decline in control over an IGO (Hawkins et al. 2006). However—due to the collective nature of international delegation—the conditions that make the US more interested in re-delegating simultaneously cause said re-delegation to be more difficult. While reform is always possible under a collective principal, it often comes at a high cost (Nielson and Tierney 2003). And many IGOs were created in a unique economic context that is now unavailable (Kahler 2022). As the US’ GDP declines relative to the international community and its fellow member states (see Figure 1.6), it may find it more difficult to change institutional rules. Thus, the US faces a “dynamic delegation problem,” whereupon the risks associated with collective delegation increase as the original delegation agreement persists.

At the same time, it is not entirely obvious why American influence must always be threatened by the changing landscapes of global governance. The United States, due to its unique status, may be able to take advantage of certain developments in the international order. This project investigates the American relationship with one such development: the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in intergovernmental organizations. At face value, the introduction of new, independent actors into an IGO could be seen as another threat toward the continued dominance of the United States. And yet, American policymakers frequently laud the benefits of collaborating with NGOs. Indeed, NGOs and other nonstate actors are participating ever more frequently within IGOs (Tallberg et al. 2013, 2014). But even with the proliferation of nonstate actors exhibited in the 1990s,

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<sup>6</sup>Due to America’s unrivaled status, U.S. officials may be more sensitive to unfavorable IGO policies. As Stone (2011) states, “Only American elites seriously question the significance of international organizations, because only the United States is able to exercise attractive unilateral options,” (3). The ability to control an organization should therefore be most prescient in the minds of U.S. officials, compared to the delegations of other member-states.




Figure 1.6: American Economic Strength Over Time

NGO participation continues to exhibit wide variation across institutions, particularly across separate institutional bodies within larger organizations.

The connection between nonstate actors and the political interests of hegemonic powers provides a novel mechanism of state control over intergovernmental organizations. While the proposed mechanism should not be seen as an exhaustive explanation, it helps to further flesh out the theoretical logic used in prior studies. For example, in his seminal work, Stone (2011) uses formal theory to detail how hegemonic powers can only suspend the formal organizational rules and intervene politically in crucial cases, due to the legitimacy costs that frequent interventions would incur. Moreover, the bureaucratic coordination required to exert pressure on foreign actors is high (McKeown 2009; Myrick and Weinstein 2022). But rigorous empirical work often finds that US political interests are frequently supported,

more often than overt interventions might reasonably produce (Dreher and Nathan M. Jensen 2007; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a, 2009b, 2015; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Kilby 2006, 2009; Vreeland and Dreher 2014). This dissertation does not contest these findings. Rather, it suggests an additional logic of informal governance. In doing so, I follow recent work that builds out the theoretical mechanisms by which powerful states can reasonably control international organizations (Clark and Dolan 2021; Kersting and Kilby 2021; Reinsberg and Westerwinter 2021).

## **Empirical Contributions**

Empirically, this dissertation provides two major contributions to the study of international organizations. First, I collect original data on NGO participation on World Bank lending operations. Thus, in addition to providing evidence to test the main theoretical argument, I also provide new descriptive patterns for understanding NGO participation. The presence, depth, and impact of NGOs in the World Bank can now be examined across time and space. This effort presents one of the first efforts to systematically examine nonstate behavior *within* an organization. To date, only a few studies provide original quantitative data on nonstate participation and none concern the World Bank (Landolt and Woo 2017; Squatrito 2018; Vikberg 2023). Chapter 5 describes this contribution in greater detail.

Second, this dissertation presents new measures that quantitatively examine an individual state's relationship to other members in an organization. These novel measures allow me to uniformly operationalize American control across organizations, which further distinguishes this study from other delegation studies that tend to emphasize singular organizations (Copelovitch 2010a; Clark and Dolan 2021; Vreeland and Dreher 2014; Stone 2011) or treat member-states as a collective whole (Hawkins et al. 2006; Hooghe et al. 2017; Johnson 2014). Studies that do break apart the collective principal remain theoretical in scope (Malis, Rosendorff, and Smith 2022). The descriptions and employment of these new

measures can be found in Chapter 3.

## 1.5 Chapter Outline

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical logic behind the proposed argument and central hypotheses. I first ground my argument in a principal-agent framework that examines how the United States, acting as an organization's hegemon, accepts a certain degree of risk toward delegation. This balance of risk versus reward determines the shift in U.S. preferences toward NGO access. I then elaborate upon the concept of dilution and explain why it favors American/hegemonic interests and serves as the foundation for the alliance of convenience. Finally, I provide my assumptions on the preferences surrounding the alliance of convenience for the three main actors in my theoretical story: NGOs, the United States, and other member states in the organization. The variation in each actor's preferences correlates to the expectations surrounding the three main hypotheses on institutional access, the determinants of participation, and the impact of participation.

I test the argument in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 3 quantitatively tests the predictions surrounding access and the impact of participation at the organization level. Using the TRANSACCESS dataset and novel measures of state control, I use time-series analysis to show that increased access to an organization follows an increase in US risk, a pattern that does not travel to other state principals to the same degree. Here, initial evidence of NGO-State coordination is also uncovered: US risk is most impactful when coupled with outside civil society protest against an organization.

Chapter 4 presents a process-tracing case study of NGO participation in the World Bank. This approach properly tests the theory's assumptions surrounding the sequencing of decision-making. Using newly declassified documents and collected archival evidence, the chapter traces the preferences and negotiations that surrounded the decision to change the

Bank's rules at various points in time. The process-tracing approach allows me to precisely identify the causal mechanisms behind these rule changes. And the detail provided by the historical documentation provides crucial insights into the preferences of different actors at the time.

Chapter 5 quantitatively tests the predictions concerning the patterns and impact of participation that emerge after access within the World Bank. This chapter presents an original dataset of NGO participation in World Bank lending operations. The data collection process and descriptive data patterns are briefly described first. I then conduct rigorous quantitative tests with the data to show how American geopolitical interests can indirectly pervade the decision-making of NGOs and other member-states. The result is an unequal distribution of participation benefits between US allies and adversaries.

Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the main arguments and findings. I elaborate upon the project's contributions, which include implications for policymakers in both government and nonprofit sectors. I then highlight areas for future study.

## Chapter 2

# How Hegemonic Preferences Shape NGO Participation – A Theory

“When you deal with NGOs you can predict the script but you can’t amend it.”  
– *Kenneth Piddington, World Bank Environmental Department Director (1988-1991)*

In 1993, the World Bank created the Inspection Panel, an accountability mechanism that provided significant powers to individuals and NGOs. Through the panel, such actors could submit complaints and open up formal investigations into the activities and impact of Bank projects. International NGOs advocated strongly for the mechanism, but their support alone was not enough to overcome fierce resistance among the Bank’s executive board. Only with the help of the United States, the Bank’s largest shareholder, were NGOs able to achieve their goal of increased access to the institution. The new Clinton administration threw its diplomatic heft toward the reform, pressuring Bank staff and later its state allies on the Board to support the Panel’s creation. As later observers would note, “The United States... was the principal force behind the panel.” (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 34).

Four years later, a network of NGOs again pushed for increased access to another promi-

ment international organization, the United Nations General Assembly, via a coordinated advocacy campaign. But rather than support the campaign, the US attempted to halt any significant access increase via an ECOSOC draft resolution (E/1997/L.51) that summer. Later that spring, the US vetoed the UN Global Conferences, the biggest gathering of civil society under the UN auspices and began to threaten NGOs with a secret draft resolution that would impose maintenance costs upon NGOs operating within the UN (Paul 1999). Why did the United States, under the same Presidential administration, shift from the biggest state advocate of NGO participation in the World Bank to its biggest opponent in the UN General Assembly?

This chapter develops a theory of NGO-member states relations within existing intergovernmental organizations. I begin with a brief overview of principal-agent delegation models of international institutions and their explanations for how states work to control organizations. I frame a state's participation in an international organization and the subsequent effects as a risk calculation. All member states assume some degree of risk when they collectively pool their authority to delegate to an intergovernmental agency. However, powerful founding members like the United States can face a "dynamic delegation problem" whereupon the degree of risk increases as the organization changes alongside the larger geopolitical landscape.

Hegemonic powers can mitigate this risk by forming an "alliance of convenience" with NGOs to increase nonstate access to an organization. While normally hesitant to invite independent third parties, the hegemon amends this view when it begins to lose control over an organization. The hegemon's push for access can be compared to the purchase of an insurance policy. Insurance is costly and unnecessary in a low risk environment. But as risk increases, insurance benefits grow. Once "purchased," access provides day-to-day peace of mind for the hegemon and its ability to control the organization. And should catastrophe strike, the hegemon can invoke the insurance policy to directly support its interests.

After gaining access, NGOs subsequently “dilute” the organization by inserting their individual preferences, information and tasks. Like adding gears to a machine, this dilution can increase the organization’s efficiency, but also creates additional points for an operation to stall. This provides opportunities for the United States to intervene against unfavorable policies and alter the risk calculation for other member states. American allies—unafraid of intervention—welcome dilution. Adversaries, in contrast, resist dilution and subsequently lose out on the benefits participation brings. Table 2.1 summarizes the argument while Figure 2.1 presents the causal logic.<sup>1</sup>

Table 2.1: Summary of Theoretical Argument

		<b>Member State Relationship to the Hegemon</b>	
		<b>Ally</b>	<b>Adversary</b>
<b>Hegemon’s Risk of Losing Control over Organization</b>	<b>High Risk</b>	NGO Cooperation	NGO Conflict
	<b>Low Risk</b>	Limited NGO Access	

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I specify how states control organizations, followed by the conditions under which said control is most likely to erode. I then detail the alliance of convenience—a scenario where each actor’s independent interests align—and explain how it serves to reverse the control loss incurred by the United States. This leads to separate predictions on the level of NGO access granted alongside the determinants and impact of NGO participation after gaining access, drawn from the different preferences held by the United States, NGOs, and other member states.


These three groups—the hegemon, other member states, and NGOs—constitute the main actors contributing to the “alliance of convenience.” The hegemon is the most powerful

<sup>1</sup>This table and visualization are inspired by Arjona (2016, 42).



member state in an organization. As the most powerful member, the hegemon has both the means and the desire to control the organization to a greater degree than other member states. Other member states are classified as either allies or adversaries to the hegemon. Allies seek to gain increased benefits from the organizations via their positive relationship with the hegemon. Adversaries seek to gain the benefits of membership without incurring any hegemonic interference. NGOs can participate in organizational activities, but this participation is not guaranteed. Their presence tilts the balance in organizational control. The preferences and role of each actor are elaborated upon throughout this chapter.

Figure 2.1: Causal Pathways



As the title of this dissertation suggests, the hegemon is presumed to be the United States, given its status as the world’s largest economy and strongest military power. This follows recent work detailing the influence of powerful states vis-a-vis other member states and IGO actors (Malis, Rosendorff, and Smith 2022) and seminal work that assumes the US to be the most influential actor in most scenarios (Stone 2011).<sup>2</sup> Under certain conditions, the theory’s predictions would apply to other states. France and Germany exert disproportionate influence over the European Union, which the US is not a member of. It also does not exclude the sharing of hegemonic interests between multiple powerful states.<sup>3</sup> I test this possibility in the later empirical chapters. However, for theoretical parsimony, the “hegemon” is referenced in the singular and often used interchangeably with the United States.

## 2.1 Controlling Intergovernmental Organizations

How do states control international organizations? A principal-agent framework, applied to intergovernmental organizations, provides a useful lens. Under this framework, member-states (the principal) collectively delegate policy tasks to an international organization’s bureaucracy (the agent). Traditionally, principal-agent theory highlights two interrelated problems that complicate delegation: uncertainty and specialization (Hawkins et al. 2006, 24–25)). Member-states can be uncertain about the agent’s efforts (24).<sup>4</sup> Undesired actions conducted under the agent’s autonomy can be punished by member-states, a strategy of control called “sanctioning” (30). However, agents working on specialized tasks are better

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<sup>2</sup>Instead of “hegemon,” Stone opts for the term “leading state,” but directly references the United States most frequently.

<sup>3</sup>Copelovitch (2010a, 2010b) shows how the shared “G5” preferences influence IMF lending.

<sup>4</sup>Specifically, buffering refers to bureaucrats’ attempts to avoid monitoring by member-states. Two buffering strategies exist: dualism, in which bureaucrats couple member-state pleasing practices with other, less desirable actions, and ceremonialism, in which bureaucrats provide only superficial reports to member-states that appear desirable but shroud the actual work being done (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006, 210).

insulated from principal monitoring efforts, given the cost of monitoring in such a context (Hawkins et al. 2006, 25).

Intergovernmental delegation arrangements are also defined by the “collective” nature of the principal. Member states must delegate authority multilaterally and divergence between them exacerbates agency problems (Nielson and Tierney 2003).<sup>5</sup> The sharing of authority to generate collective decision-making is known as “pooling,” a related but conceptually and empirically distinct concept from delegation (Hooghe and Marks 2015). Contests within pooling arrangements are fierce. Single member-states can unilaterally influence the agent (Urpelainen 2012). This possibility leads member-states to employ control mechanisms toward the IO agent and other members of the collective principal (Kleine 2018).

These two different sets of relations, that of member states to the agent and member states to each other, generate different problems for singular states. Agency slack tends to stem from hidden information and hidden action allowing the IO to “shirk” or “escape” control. In contrast, “states may have perfect and complete information about others and the IO and still not see their preferences enacted into policy,” (D. A. Lake 2007, 232). Here, the IO agent may properly reflect the collective principal’s directive, but certain member states disagree with the directive itself. This dissertation uses the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” to distinguish a member state’s perspective toward pooling and delegation, respectively.

I frame member-state relations within an organization as a risk calculation. IO membership and activities come with potential benefits and costs. In the World Bank, a hegemonic power like the United States may desire increased developmental aid for its allies, but must also accept some degree of aid for its adversaries. Under Knight’s (1921) classic definition,

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<sup>5</sup>Nelson and Tierney identify two other agency problems: the “multiple” principals of legislatures and executives that member-states maintain and the “long chain” of delegation from IOs to the ultimate principal, national citizens.

risk involves known outcomes and probabilities; in other words, risk can be calculated.<sup>6</sup> A collective principal, with its public membership, allows its members to make such a risk calculation.

The *risk* of member-state relations and preferences can be distinguished from the *uncertainty* of bureaucratic behavior. As stated above, IO agents have an incentive to shroud their true activities from the collective principal, thus increasing uncertainty (Hawkins et al. 2006, p. 24). Here, the emphasis is instead on the known risk assessments that stem from public knowledge of other member-state preferences. Figure 2.2 visualizes the presence of risk and uncertainty in a delegation arrangement between a collective principal and IO agent.




Figure 2.2: Risk and Uncertainty in Delegation

Divergence within the collective principal (risk) and between the principal and the agent (uncertainty) are interrelated. Preference divergence within the collective principal can give bureaucratic agents more room to move in gaining autonomy and achieving their own preferences (L. Martin 2006). Inversely, the uncertainty and specialization from delegation arrangements may provide opportunities for individual member states to maintain undue

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<sup>6</sup>Knight explicitly distinguishes risk from uncertainty. With uncertainty, exact probabilities are not known.

influence over particular aspects of the agent’s policy tasks (Kleine 2013b). This chapter assumes a consistent degree of uncertainty from the agent, but uncertainty remains important.<sup>7</sup> I do not expect this theory’s predictions to play out in informal intergovernmental organizations, which do not maintain delegation arrangements (Vabulas and Snidal 2013). Uncertainty provides the ecosystem in which risk can grow.

States pool their authority and accept a degree of risk—defined as any divergent preferences of the collective principal—to reap the benefits of delegation.<sup>8</sup> However, the preferences of the collective principal are subject to change through new member states and geopolitical realignments. A greater heterogeneity among the membership hinders the principal’s ability to re-delegate in order to control the agent (Nielson and Tierney 2003; L. Martin 2006). This divergence may be preferable for some member states who seek to carve out “fiefdoms” over particular policy areas (Kleine 2013b). But the hegemon maintains broader political interests as it seeks to control the organization as a whole (Malis, Rosendorff, and Smith 2022; Stone 2008, 2011). Thus, as member-state preferences change, the risk of losing control over an organization is likely to increase for the hegemon.

For example, the UN Security Council aligned closely with the United States until the 1970s. Before then, the US never once used its formal veto power in the UN Security Council.<sup>9</sup> This is not to say that unfavorable resolutions never came to the floor of the UNSC. But the US could use its various means of control to prevent such proposals from

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<sup>7</sup>Chapter 3 empirically investigates how the specialization within formal organizations increases the need for the alliance of convenience.

<sup>8</sup>All collective delegation arrangements require some level of risk acceptance from principals. In delegating to an international organization, the state principals must grant a degree of autonomy to the bureaucracy and accept some potential agency slack. Moreover, the hegemon must accept a degree of influence from other member-state principals. Otherwise, delegation would be tantamount to unilateralism. Risk can be managed, but never eliminated.

<sup>9</sup>A veto differs from a simple “no” vote. The former blocks a resolution that would have otherwise passed; the latter joins the majority in blocking a resolution. The United States voted “no” on numerous occasions during this time, but never to block a resolution that was set to pass.

coming to a (close) vote and avoid using its veto. This was the preferred American strategy. As Padelford (1948, 223) states,

“When other great powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain, find their national interests at issue they can usually persuade other permanent members to go along with them either in casting a multiple negative vote sufficient to stop a proposal without the stigma of exercising a sole veto (or near-sole veto), or to join in introducing and passing a resolution more suitable to their desires.”

This alignment with the other security council members did not persist. American delegates deployed their UNSC veto-power 65 times in the 1970s and 1980s after withholding such an action for the body’s first 25 years. Similarly, the United States never cast a formal “no” vote on the World Bank’s executive board until 1971, but had voted against hundreds of proposals by 1980. U.S. officials can clearly become dissatisfied with an organization’s activities. The possibility of risk increasing over time generates a “dynamic delegation problem,” whereupon the original delegation agreement becomes less favorable over time due to divergent preference among the collective membership.

The dynamic delegation problem is twofold. First, as suggested above, more adversarial states among the collective principal will lead to less favorable policies for the hegemon. Second, any major reforms to the delegation arrangement become more difficult as the collective principal’s preferences diverge. The US can maintain its veto in the UNSC, but American proposals for reform have yet to be enacted.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, the American vote share in the World Bank provides an effective veto over any amendments to the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, but this only provides the power to block proposals, not successfully prompt them. And even when reforms are enacted, they may not suit the hegemon’s preferences.

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<sup>10</sup>Most recently, on September 21, 2022, President Biden called for an increase in the number of UNSC members, including additional permanent positions. As of the time of writing, the UNSC has not enacted these reforms.

Despite strongly advocating to reform the UN Commission on Human Rights, the US voted “no” on the resolution to replace the institution with the Human Rights Council, due to concerns over the Council’s prospective membership (Lauren 2007; Freedman 2013, 56).

The dynamic delegation problem should not apply across all organizations. Organizations exhibit wide variation in the characteristics of collective principals. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintains strict membership requirements and even the most critical US officials have taken little action against the organization (Sperling and Webber 2019).<sup>11</sup> Organizations with more cohesive memberships also allow for the hegemon to lead major reforms with less cost; the United States managed to successfully renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (USMCA) from 2017-2020. Risk, and the hegemon’s inability to reform an organization, is not universal.

Other organizations, however, do present a more arduous context. The hegemon’s options in the face of such risk are limited, as the factors generating risk should simultaneously impede significant alterations to the original delegation agreement. With traditional methods of control unavailable, I propose that—to mitigate risk—the hegemon’s allies itself with NGOs to grant increased access to nonstate actors and dilute the normal governance process. The rest of this chapter explains the logic and expectations related to this “alliance of convenience.”

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<sup>11</sup>Notably, as my argument expects, NATO does not provide any significant role for NGOs (McNamara 2019).

## 2.2 How NGOs Reverse the Loss of Control Across Organizations

After losing control of an organization, I argue that an “alliance of convenience” forms between NGOs and the hegemon. The hegemon is normally reluctant to accept this access, but this perspective changes after the conditions for losing control emerge. Here, the hegemon can benefit from the dilution—defined as added information, preferences and tasks—that NGOs bring into an organization. Once inside, NGOs operate independently; the dilution they provide is not overtly directed. This allows NGO participation to extend beyond the normal reaches of the hegemon’s influence. In addition, dilution inserts additional access points along the normal process of governance, which facilitates hegemonic intervention against unfavorable policies. Absent this intervention, however, NGOs are allowed to operate as they please within the rules of the organization. Both parties thus benefit, albeit independently, from the alliance.

### Dilution through Access

The dilution that comes from NGO access is undirected, but not unpredictable. NGOs have mission statements, annual goals, and years of experience advocating for particular policy outcomes. One can safely expect advocacy NGOs, such as the Bank Information Center and the Bretton Woods Project, to call for greater accountability within the IGO, since that’s precisely what they were calling for before they were granted access. It is no surprise that Oxfam International advocates for a rights-based approach to development in the World Bank, since that approach is core to the work they conduct individually. As Kenneth Piddington, the first director of environmental affairs at the World Bank once stated, “When you deal with NGOs you can predict the script but you can’t amend it.” (R. Wade 1997, 677). US policymakers—and those of other member-states—should be aware of



NGO activities and can subsequently envision how their participation will dilute the normal nature of IGO governance.

Faced with increased risk, I argue that the hegemon subsequently seeks to dilute the organization in question with NGO participation. Dilution waters down the risk of delegation by adding additional steps to the governance process. This lessens the influence of all prior actors—including the United States—but diminishes risk by increasing the chances of catching unfavorable policies. Unlike shadow bureaucracies (Dijkstra 2015), NGOs are not commanded nor controlled by any other actor. Rather, the logic of dilution is similar to the classic oversight mechanism of “fire alarms,” whereupon independent actors alert the principals to any problem with the agent (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). But unlike fire alarms, the new actors take an active role in the agent’s formal activities. Here, the process is like adding gears to a machine. Additional gears do not generally slow down a machine’s operation. New, smaller gears may add to the machine’s speed or force. But they also create additional opportunities for the gears to become stuck, halting the entire operation.

I divide dilution into three separate, but compounding components. First, NGOs bring in a substantial amount of new information. Second, NGOs add new voices and preferences. And third, NGO access requires the creation of new bureaucratic tasks. In total, these mechanisms provide more opportunities for the United States to block unfavorable policy and advance its own interests.

### **New Information**

NGOs bring a substantial amount of new information into an IGO as they maintain their own networks and expertise. Indeed, as the orchestration literature describes, NGOs often have expertise and technical skills that IGOs and states do not possess, or do not wish to expend resources on. World Bank staffers would often discuss policy papers with (usually Washington-based) NGOs before most executive directors would even see drafts. Some

executive directors even received their first copies of important policy reports from NGOs themselves (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 34). At the same time, the information NGOs provide also has the potential to compete with the normal information provided from an organization’s bureaucrats. One World Bank executive director – when describing the 1988 Narmada dam project in India – said, “When I hear what NGOs say about this project and then what the operations people [World Bank staff] say, it sounds like they are talking about two different projects.” (R. Wade 1997, 699).

This information spread extends across IGOs. Pallas and Urpelainen (2012) and Vabulas (2013) argue that NGOs are deployed to monitor when states cheat on international agreements. This monitoring can check staff behavior as well (McNamara 2019). The Organization for American States (OAS) allows NGOs to distribute written reports among member-states before meetings; this often includes areas in which the NGO has a certain expertise. But the information may not necessarily prove to be more accurate and unbiased, but it can often differ from the information provided by bureaucrats or collected by member-states themselves.

NGO access thus dilutes IGOs with a substantial amount of new information, which member-states must then navigate through.<sup>12</sup> This provides a unique advantage to the United States. With its resources and global standing, the United States usually has a large information advantage over other member-states (Stone 2011). American officials should therefore be less affected by the proliferation of new information that comes with NGO access. American officials may even coordinate with NGOs to disseminate particular information. When provided with an early draft of a major position paper, the American executive director to the World Bank would often call NGOs together to debrief them (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb

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<sup>12</sup>Such additional information may not be accurate. NGOs may incorrectly gather information and third parties can lie about behavior they observe (Lake and McCubbins 2006, 350).

1997, 366).<sup>13</sup> The United States can also monitor the behavior of NGOs if so desired, given its relative abundance of resources. For a time, the Department of the Treasury provided Congress with regular reports of NGO activities in the World Bank (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 368). In short, NGOs inundate IGOs with information, which the United States, as the most powerful member-state in the organization, can leverage to its advantage.

### **New Preferences**

NGOs bring new preferences into an organization. Whereas an international financial institution (IFI) may have only cared about economic growth and stability before NGO access, NGOs, once they are allowed in, bring in new preferences on topics like human rights and environmental protections. Suddenly, the IFI must contend with a host of new considerations that dilute the normal process of governing. And while NGOs have preferences on how existing IGO policy sways, they also aim to reform the IGO's governing practices, particularly in the area of accountability (Buntaine 2015, 2016). NGOs were arguably the strongest voice, alongside the United States, to advocate for the creation of the World Bank's Inspection Panel in 1993 (R. Wade 1997). After the Cold War, NGOs in the UNSC promoted "peacebuilding" as an approach to international security, a US prerogative at the time (Graubart 2008). NGOs give UN special rapporteur missions a larger audience to entertain, thus necessitating additional deliberations on the mission's design and implementation. Before gaining access, the preferences of NGOs could be heard, but did not need to be addressed. After access, an IGO's member-states and bureaucratic staff must, at the very least, consider these preferences.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Often, the American executive director would be the only state representative to receive this early report.

<sup>14</sup>Even if said preferences are not directly incorporated into IGO policy, NGO access necessitates the creation of additional institutions (e.g. NGO dialogue committees) and positions (e.g. NGO liaison). See the below subsection for detail into this mechanism.

New preferences need not be aligned with American interests to provide the desired dilution. NGOs will, at times, critique U.S. policies and its outsized influence within an organization (e.g. large vote shares on executive boards; informal governance interventions). But dilution does not require a specific direction or focus. Rather, dilution stems from the cacophony of NGO voices advocating for new preferences. At times these preferences will coincide with the United States' own preferences; at other times they will differ. Regardless of how often preferences align or diverge, these new voices will hamper the normal governance process in the IGO. The logic here is similar to that of veto players: adding players makes policy making more difficult, especially with wide preferences and low cohesiveness among them (Tsebelis 1995, 2002).<sup>15</sup> In the WTO, NGO and US interests clashed over the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, with NGOs supporting the public health interests of developing economies. But NGO lobbying prolonged talks and allowed the United States to form the "August 30 Solution," a compromise for all involved parties (Murphy 2010, 123). WTO unanimity rules would have allowed the US to walk away unilaterally, but added NGO preferences allowed a favorable multilateral solution to emerge.

### **New Tasks**

Beyond providing additional information and preferences, NGO participation also brings about a number of new tasks that must be conducted within the organization. Organizations often establish forums and committees to hear NGO concerns and hire new staffers to coordinate between actors. Often, staffers attempt to monitor and screen the behavior of NGOs. Such actions require additional time and resources from IGO staff. A World Bank project in Senegal was delayed by 12 months as staff searched for a suitable NGO consultant

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<sup>15</sup>Of course, veto-players wield the ability to block policy-making entirely. Dilution is more akin to placing hurdles on a track; they may significantly slow down a runner, but rarely do they stop the race entirely.

before settling on the World Wildlife Fund (World Bank 2008).

The tasks delegated to NGOs are not always completed efficiently or effectively. Another World Bank project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo initially included 5 international NGOs to collaborate in areas most susceptible to corruption, but disagreements with the government caused the arrangement to dissolve, leading to a substantial delay in implementation (World Bank 2009). Such scenarios compound the cost of accommodating NGOs. And even when NGO collaboration leads to more efficient outcomes, said collaboration requires an additional step in the normal governance process. By requiring additional policies and actions to successfully incorporate their participation, NGOs continue to dilute the normal governance process.

NGO-related tasks can also grant substantial powers to non-state actors, causing further dilution. This depends on the specific rules granting access. For example, nonstate actors in the International Labour Organization carry limited voting power. And the World Bank's Inspection Panel allows NGOs to call for formal investigations into a project's implementation, which can lead to substantial reforms. Even when substantial reforms do not occur, the deliberation process takes time. A formal Inspection Panel complaint into a 2010 Egyptian project did not lead to any significant changes, but it did require a 4-month investigation into the project's implementation (World Bank 2010).

## **Control Through Dilution**

NGOs thus dilute the normal channels of influence within an IGO, which opens up additional opportunities for intervention. The logic here is similar to Ehrlich's (2007) work on access points in trade policy, which describes how certain institutional features allow protectionist lobbyists more or less access; more access points equates to less costly protectionist lobbying. Here, the hegemon deliberately changes institutional features to create NGO dilution. This dilution makes intervention against certain IGO policies less costly for member-states.

Dilution is not explicitly biased toward interventions from certain member states, as NGOs operate independently. However, the United States should benefit the most from these additional intervention opportunities, given its already exceptional ability to exert control (Stone 2011).<sup>16</sup> Intervention is not a costless endeavor; invoking an insurance policy after an accident often raises one's later rates. But it is certainly cheaper than deciding to pay for an accident out of pocket which, in the case of intergovernmental organizations, may entail re-negotiating the original delegation arrangement.

Specifically, it is the added information, preferences and tasks that come from NGO practice that grants the hegemon the opportunity to intervene against unfavorable policies.<sup>17</sup> Added information can confuse other member-states on the Bank's executive boards by generating rival stories and presenting more perspectives to sift through. NGO preferences hamper policies by adding additional critiques and issue-areas to address. And the added bureaucratic tasks that must be created to accommodate NGOs can significantly delay policy by creating extra steps in the governance process and diverting resources away from prior initiatives. This dilution generates additional access points through which actors can influence the governance process. The hegemon, with its already unmatched influence over policy stands to benefit the most from these added access points.

The cancellation of the World Bank's Chinese Western Poverty Reduction project in 2000 shows how the added information, preferences and tasks NGOs provide can allow the United States the opportunity to intervene and amend previously enacted policy. In 1999, Bank staff fast-tracked the project to the executive board to take advantage of China's

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<sup>16</sup>Indeed, it is precisely the potential cost of dilution that prevents the United States from employing it universally. Purchasing insurance is not a costless endeavor; a low risk environment would disincentivize the US from bringing in NGOs to an organization.

<sup>17</sup>Such intervention can take various forms. Weighted vote shares in the IMF and World Bank allow the US to block rule changes, and unanimity requirements in the WTO have allowed the US to block the Appellate Court's decision-making since 2019. And even when rules do not allow explicit sanctioning, the US can use its unrivaled financial contributions as leverage (Graham and Serdaru 2020).

newly graduated status from IDA loans. The board subsequently approved the project, despite strong US opposition. Meanwhile, a group of NGOs filed a complaint on the project through the Bank's Inspection Panel, automatically forcing an investigation. NGOs then held multiple meetings with Bank leadership to promote their preference against the project's continuation while they used their networks to gather additional information about the project's negative environmental and social impact, distributing this information among the Bank's membership. During this time, the US executive director and Treasury Department lobbied executive board members—particularly the European states—to oppose the project. The vote-buying worked, and the board reconvened and voted to cancel the project a year after its initial approval (D. Clark 2003).

The above anecdote shows how NGO involvement can provide the US with additional means of controlling organizations. Notably, the US did not impose its will unilaterally through a temporary suspension of the rules as the informal governance literature might suggest. Rather, the American delegation used the additional time, information and preferences NGOs provided to lobby other member-states for a new vote. The Western Poverty project was a highly politicized case, but the same strategy can apply on a smaller scale. For example, while the Bank's executive board has little formal control over project implementation, any increases in the originally allotted loan disbursements—a common occurrence for lending operations—requires board approval. And as one Congressional report on multilateral development banks stated, “they [the Treasury] are highly dependent upon notification and/or feedback from NGOs to identify projects with potential problems, and to document the nature of problems in the field,” (Sanford and Fletcher 1998, 35).

A de-classified 1957 Bureau of Budget study stressed that simply increasing bilateral interactions provided an effective method of asserting control over an organization but that, “U.S. Delegations find it very difficult to contact a large number of delegations in a limited time at international conferences or to spend the requisite time with them to be persuasive,”

(McKeown 2009, 277). NGO dilution can rectify this deficit in resources. Projects with NGO involvement should allow the US more opportunities to approve loan increases for allies and block increases for adversaries, using the same methods of control normally available to it (e.g. vote-buying). Interventions like this require resources. The United States can better navigate NGO dilution, relative to other states, as it can field the largest and best equipped delegations (McKeown 2009), a crucial ability to accommodate the added preferences, tasks and information NGOs supply.<sup>18</sup>

Crucially, the *opportunity* for intervention may be enough to reassert control. The American delegation to an organization cannot be expected to intervene in all activities with NGO participation. To expend such resources would counter the benefits gained from delegating to an organization in the first place (Hawkins et al. 2006, 13). Again, invoking an insurance policy is not costless; when one purchases an insurance policy to mitigate risk, they do not expect to invoke the policy regularly, if at all. Consistent attempts by the principal to interfere in the activities of agents produce negative effects, particularly in unpredictable environments where one might expect more risk (Honig 2019). However, the *threat* of intervention, prompted by dilution, may prompt other member-states to conduct a risk calculation of their own that avoids constant monitoring and frequent interventions.

Whereas member-states could previously extract individual gains from an organization (Kleine 2013b), NGO dilution, and the increased possibility of hegemonic intervention, erodes this ability. Montal and Pauselli (2023) show how NGO monitoring incentivizes adjudicators to maintain higher compliance standards in the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. I expect dilution to similarly shine a spotlight in other organizations. Thus, just as IGO bureaucrats often work to preemptively “please the principal” to avoid

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<sup>18</sup>This assumption matches that of shadow bureaucracies, which only powerful states have the resources to deploy (Dijkstra 2015).



direct intervention from the United States (Clark and Dolan 2021), other member-states may preemptively adjust their policy to avoid intervention as well. From the perspective of the organization's hegemon, the presence of an insurance policy provides peace of mind for their investment, regardless of how often they claim the policy.

## 2.3 Preferences on Participation

The above section outlined how the alliance of convenience can facilitate member state intervention in IGO activities due to the dilution it introduces. This section details the preferences of the main actors in the theory: the hegemon (the United States), other member states, and NGOs. Unlike NGO-state relations outside international organizations, contestation within the collective principal presents the opportunity for conflict between the hegemon and other member states. If dilution truly facilitates intervention, then states should have preferences on when this intervention is most useful and likely. In short, the Hegemon favors dilution when it begins to lose control of an organization. Other member states fear intervention based on their political relationship with the Hegemon. And NGOs seek to complete their mission within the constraints imposed upon them. The remainder of this section elaborates upon these preferences and outlines the resulting predictions. Each actor's role in the alliance of convenience broadly aligns with a specific prediction (see Table 2.2).

### US Preferences

My argument places the United States as the main driver of NGO participation within organizations it belongs to. This may appear surprising, as all member-states seek to influence IGO policy and the mechanisms of informal governance are not unique to the United States or US-centric institutions (Kleine 2013a). But several factors suggest that the alliance of convenience best applies to US policy. First, the United States remains the most powerful

Table 2.2: Summary of Actor Roles and Hypotheses

<b>Actor</b>	<b>Main Role</b>
The United States/Hegemon	Institutional design (Hypothesis 1)
Nongovernmental Organizations	Location of Participation (Hypothesis 2)
Other Member States	Impact of Participation (Hypothesis 3)

country in the present international system by a significant degree (Brooks and Wohlforth 2023). This influence travels to an institution's rules, if not by powerful voting rights, then by its financial contributions (Graham and Serdaru 2020). Outside the formal rules, informal governance often favors the US as well (Stone 2011). When it comes to hegemonic interests toward intergovernmental organizations, the US is the usual suspect.

The United States also has much to lose from increased NGO participation. As the most powerful member-state in its respective IGOs, US officials can expect the US to be a frequent target of NGO critiques. For example, it is the only Western nation to receive repetitive nonstate reports on its human rights record in the Human Rights Council (Freedman 2013, 171). Letting such voices into an organization may diminish the US' legitimacy or work to erode its already privileged position. Indeed, the United States initially designed the UN to afford less formal access than the prior League of Nations (Pickard 1956, 72). And US officials have been careful to insulate the UNSC—where the US wields its powerful veto—from increases in formal access, conceding to increased ECOCOC access only after guarantees were received about maintaining the status quo in the UNGA and UNSC (Willett 2000). Thus, the US, more so than other states, has incentives to both block and promote NGO access in an organization, depending on the context. Again, the alliance constructed between the US and NGOs is one of convenience; when NGO participation is inopportune,

the US should work to limit access. If an organization already presents favorable outcomes with minimal intervention, American officials have little reason to risk a departure from the norm.

In addition, the United States should feel comfortable coordinating with NGOs when their risk calculation favors an increase in access. The United States government views NGOs as governing partners, affording them far greater status and responsibilities than other developed democracies like France or the United Kingdom (Stroup 2012).<sup>19</sup> For example, American lending agencies are more likely to use NGOs as “bypass actors” to deliver foreign aid that circumvents recipient governments (Dietrich 2021). This comfort extends beyond the U.S. executive branch; Congress will work through NGOs to gather information on executive branch activities, a practice that has carried over to monitoring IGOs (Daugirdas 2013).<sup>20</sup> Thus, we should expect various US actors and NGOs to coordinate together and promote access when risk increases for the United States.

Finally, pre-existing US attitudes toward international organizations aid the alliance of convenience’s overall efficacy. The US is a consistently skeptical member-state in many organizations, arguably due to its ability to deploy unilateral policy options.<sup>21</sup> Thus, while

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<sup>19</sup>For example, the United States frequently uses NGOs to dispense foreign aid. About 30% of American government development assistance is channeled through NGOs and other private organizations (Stroup 2012, 37).

<sup>20</sup>This chapter emphasizes just two actors, but the preferences of the United States could be disaggregated domestically. At times, Congress may prefer NGO participation *over* the express wishes of the U.S. executive branch. Even so, it is the executive branch that must advocate for rule changes in IGOs; NGOs may lobby for access through Congress, but the executive must choose to accept or deny this access. Here, Congress may act as a mediator for the alliance of convenience by providing an avenue for NGO lobbying to occur. The executive branch then decides when said access is most opportune. Thus, the alliance of convenience is most likely to form when the conditions for control loss are present and the need for dilution is high. Indeed, NGO participation is not the ideal *status quo* for the U.S. government. If it were, NGO access would be widespread across organizations it can more firmly control. Conversely, NGOs do not gain full access to all IGOs as they might prefer. In short, a loss of control felt by the United States generates the conditions whereupon all parties can mutually benefit.

<sup>21</sup>Stone (2011, 3) goes as far as to say, “Only American elites seriously question the significance of international organizations, because only the United States is able to exercise attractive unilateral options.”

the dynamic delegation problem should affect all state principals, the United States may be disproportionately affected. In addition, American skepticism fuels the effects of NGO dilution, as its threat to punish should be the most acute in the eyes of bureaucrats. While all states seek to promote their interests, the US maintains the most leverage with its (often genuine) threats to exit, halt financial contributions, or otherwise hamper the normal functioning of an organization.<sup>22</sup> Thus, while other powerful states may also benefit from the alliance of convenience, I identify the US as the most likely beneficiary.

In short, the United States' common position as an organization's hegemonic power places it in a unique position regarding participation. As the most powerful member state in most of its organizations, the US simultaneously has much to lose from allowing new actors in and the most to gain from the dilution they bring. Thus, American preferences toward access follow its risk calculation toward an organization. When the risk of losing control over an organization is low, the US has little reason to buy the costly insurance of increased access. But when the degree of risk increases, access provides peace of mind over the delegation arrangement.

The purchase of this "insurance" (i.e. access) is not cheap. Beyond the potential for NGOs to contest US interests after gaining access, other member states in the organization have their own reasons to contest participation (see section below). And an organization's bureaucracy may not prefer participation consistently (Johnson 2016). Thus, the United States must expend a significant amount of political capital to form the alliance of convenience. This may entail lobbying allied member states and putting pressure on the bureaucracy. In addition, the United States should have an easier time promoting access in *conjunction*

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<sup>22</sup>This assumption does not preclude the possibility of other states benefiting from the alliance of convenience. Bureaucrats may work to please a number of member-state principals in the face of NGO dilution. It merely suggests that the US stands to gain the most under the circumstances in which the alliance is most likely to be deployed.

with NGO activism. NGOs can use their outside influence and “push” themselves into IGOs (Steffek 2013). While this dissertation maintains that the success of such pressure is often conditional on the hegemon’s acquiescence, I do not assert that such pressure is inconsequential. Successful coordination between the US government and outside NGO pressure may facilitate changes to access. The next section details NGO preferences toward access and the resulting participation.

## NGO Preferences

While NGOs are the obvious subject of participation, their preferences should also prove influential, particularly regarding participation’s determinants. The benefits of participation should prompt a consistent preference for increased access among a significant number of NGOs. But after access, resource constraints may limit the extent to which participation can occur. Organizational goals in the context of resource constraints should subsequently incentivize NGOs to participate in the areas furthest away from American influence. I elaborate upon these points below.<sup>23</sup>

NGOs themselves have strong incentives to participate within prominent IGOs for both financial and operational reasons. Working inside an IGO brings additional contracts, connections and status, all of which can be leveraged to obtain greater funding, a great concern for many NGOs (Cooley and Ron 2002; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). At the same time, IGO participation presents NGOs with a chance to make substantial progress toward their mission (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Steffek 2013). A World Bank contract allows development NGOs to operate on a larger scale than normal. A human rights NGO can bring greater

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<sup>23</sup>While the variation in an NGO’s size and transnational—as opposed to a strictly national—scope can greatly influence its individual activities (Stroup and Wong 2017), I do not stress the many distinctions between different NGO types. The feature of dilution stems from the independence of newly introduced, third-party actors. I assume that all participating NGOs, both local and international, maintain similar levels of organizational independence.

attention to its reporting by presenting information directly to the Human Rights Council. And many NGOs, particularly those involved in advocacy operations, wish to increase IGO oversight and organizational performance. Participation thus allows the chance for NGOs to improve the IGO from the inside. The Bank Information Center, a watch-dog for international financial institutions, does just this by participating in World Bank civil society forums and monitoring development projects around the world. In short, I follow Mitchell and Schmitz's (2014) argument that NGOs act with "principled instrumentalism," and assume they desire participation for both material and normative ends.<sup>24</sup>

After access, the areas in which NGOs can participate are subject to both organizational and environmental constraints. Beyond their organizational goals, NGOs face resource constraints and stark competition (Bush and Hadden 2019). Even if an NGO—or its network—wished to collaborate on every IGO activity, it would be unlikely to do so effectively. When it comes to the depth of participation, NGOs must make choices. Fruttero and Gauri (2005) find that NGOs choose the location of their activities based on "pragmatic and organizational concerns."

Büthe, Major, and e Souza (2012) track private development aid coming from American NGOs and find that it is most tightly linked to states with the greatest humanitarian need, not areas where NGOs have the most to gain politically. Thus, while foreign aid is known to reflect the political interests of donor states (Alesina and Dollar 2000), NGO participation is more likely to be driven by humanitarian need, organizational self-interest, or the feasibility of participating in a given state. While not apolitical, NGO practice should remain

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<sup>24</sup>It is important to acknowledge that NGOs are not monolithic and may hold vastly different preferences. Organizations will have different objectives and thus adopt different strategies toward IGO interactions (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2017). Indeed, Anderl, Daphi, and Deitelhoff (2021) establish a typology of NGO preferences on IGO participation, from those pursuing involved participation and others who reject any form of cooperation with the organization in question. However, my argument does not assume that all available NGOs will readily seek access or actively engage in participation. Rather, I merely assume that many will.

independent from the direct influence of geopolitics.

Moreover, NGO independence and motivations may cause their subsequent practice to occur in countries the furthest away from American influence. Development aid and the World Bank provide one example in context. Strategic interests have historically determined American foreign aid, compared to the economic and humanitarian interests that drive the aid donations of other powerful states (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Dollar and Levin 2006), a pattern that persisted across both Democratic and Republican administrations around when NGOs were first integrated into the World Bank (Lebovic 1988). The United States also ties its aid to ideological voting in the UNGA (Kegley Jr and Hook 1991; Wang 1999), a practice not replicated by other G7 states (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008). Thus, to the extent to which NGOs generally avoid geopolitical incentives, their participation in World Bank development projects may diverge from American foreign aid and ideological preferences the most. This pattern is already found in NGO activities outside IGOs (Büthe, Major, and e Souza 2012).

This independence provides the bedrock for the alliance of convenience formed between NGOs and the United States. NGOs are not explicitly directed to work in particular countries or on particular activities. While NGOs may, in theory, submit formal reports on all countries participating in the HRC's Universal Periodic Review, they tend to target democracies with more human rights violations (Landolt and Woo 2017). Even IGO projects designed with NGO collaboration in mind cannot command or require participation; in 1993, multiple World Bank projects in Brazil failed to include civil society due to a lack of NGO interest. This independence provides a unique advantage for the United States, as I expect NGOs to participate in areas outside the normal reach of American influence. This allows the United States the ability to monitor IGO policy across a greater number of scenarios and states. NGOs, in turn, benefit by choosing the projects best suited for their interests.

This compliments American strategy well. Bush (2016) finds that the United States

already engages with political “salient” countries—those that share shared UN voting records and receive American military aid—on a direct, bilateral basis.<sup>25</sup> Such relations can thus occur outside the multilateral delegation to an IGO and serve as a legitimate outside option. But as Bush’s findings suggest, this engagement is not available to for countries of lesser salience. Thus, the risk that comes from the loss of control described above is most pressing for American relations with less salient states. Here, the independence of NGO action, and its tendency to go where U.S. relations are weak and risk is high, provides a crucial ingredient for the alliance of convenience’s efficacy.

## Other Member States’ Preferences

While the United States, as the main shareholder in many organizations, may incur the most risk regarding delegation, all state principals must assess the risk versus reward provided by IO participation. An autocratic regime may improve its moral image by participating in the Human Rights Council, but said participation can also draw attention to its rights violations. Relations with their fellow member-states can determine the degree of risk. Wary of unilateral influence (Urpelainen 2012), states monitor the behavior of other members of the collective principal (Kleine 2018). The most powerful states may even employ costly “shadow bureaucracies” to monitor a state’s behavior alongside the officially sanctioned IGO mission (Dijkstra 2015). Indeed, powerful states can suspend an organization’s normal rules and intervene informally to aid allies and harm adversaries, an ability less powerful states are cognizant of (Stone 2008, 2011). In short, other member-states with poor US relations can expect a greater degree of risk compared to American allies.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>The US is also more likely to “bypass” direct aid to less politically salient countries (Allen, Ferry, and Shammama 2023b).

<sup>26</sup>It is important to note how such relations can change over time. Other member-states should be most concerned with their individual gains from an organization. Thus, I assume that states will compare their



The politicization of NGO participation, and subsequent risk, should be observable to other member states. After access, the US can choose when to coordinate with NGO preferences. As P. J. Nelson (1995) writes of their relationship in the World Bank,

“policy on which NGOs secured US support—environment, resettlement, transparency, and accountability—is peripheral to US economic priorities. . . . But the US government has shown little support for the NGOs’ position on any issues related to international monetary policy or trade. The global financial policy issues at stake are more central to US foreign economic policy, and NGOs find themselves generally in opposition to US government positions.”

Similarly, the US refused to let NGO petitions alter its neutral approach to investment reform in the WTO (Murphy 2010, 146). These anecdotes show public willingness of the US to break with NGOs when it doesn’t serve the national interest. But examples of close US-NGO coordination, such as the above Western Poverty Project in China, the outcome is also visible to all member states.

If adversarial member states believe the alliance of convenience can facilitate intervention in support of the US, they may have an incentive to limit participation near their own IGO activities. In domestic contexts, states are strategic about the repressive strategies employed given their political goals (Chaudhry 2022). Regimes will also observe the fates of peer regimes and repress civil society preemptively if they fear a threat (Danneman and Hencken Ritter 2014; Glasius, Schalk, and De Lange 2020). Such repression is often widespread: both activist and more service-oriented NGOs can be subjected to said repression (Springman et al. 2022), and repression against politically oriented NGOs can negatively influence the abilities of other NGO types (Heinzel and Koenig-Archibugi 2022).

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current position to that of their past, rather than how they stand relative to other states. Chapter 4 will measure this preference via within-unit analyses.

Beyond the domestic context, local NGOs use international organizations to move around domestic restrictions and influence policy back home (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Henry et al. 2019; Henry and Sundstrom 2021). I therefore assume that the above incentives and abilities to repress NGO activities domestically can transfer to state-NGO interactions within the context of an IGO's activities. The exact nature of this relationship will depend on the organization. In the World Bank, NGOs work directly with the borrowing government to implement a project. In the Human Rights Council, NGOs monitor state policy and share their findings by submitting formal reports to the UN organ. But regardless of the context, the member states can work to hinder an NGO's activities. These conflicts are meaningful; in the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, the endorsement of a disputing party is the biggest determinant in the consideration of NGO *amicus curiae* briefs (Squatrito 2018).

However, the politics of IGOs present a crucial distinction from purely domestic NGO-state relations. While states can fully restrict civil society on domestic projects, they cannot reject NGO participation outright if an IGO activity demands it. NGOs can "leap-frog" over the initial regulatory hurdle. For a 1994 project, the Philippines managed to replace the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) with a domestic NGO, even though the WWF provided the initial project design (World Bank 2004). But the government could not reject the project's design and domestic NGO participation. This resistance can detract from the benefits a state receives from an IGO. On a 1998 World Bank project, Bolivia's initial reluctance to work with NGOs impeded its early implementation (World Bank 1998).<sup>27</sup> Thus, resistance to involved civil society necessitates a degree of resistance to the IGO itself and the benefits it can provide.

The abilities and incentives to resist NGO participation generates a stark political divide

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<sup>27</sup>Here, the actions of the state prove most crucial. A similar project in Ghana was delayed by 2 years, not because of government intransigence, but because no willing NGO partner could be found. However, once Bank staff secured a contract, the project met its goals successfully (World Bank 2018a).

within an organization. Allies, fearing no intervention, have low risk and little to lose from welcoming the NGO participation mandated by an organization's institutional design. In fact, accepting NGOs may provide increased benefits via the additional expertise and support (Abbott et al. 2015; Tallberg et al. 2013, 2014). Adversaries, in their desire to prevent outside intervention, resist participation and diminish the positive gains NGOs can bring. This diminishes the benefits of participation. However, such a cost may be preferable to an adversarial state that fears a more extreme intervention from the United States. The logic is similar to findings that regimes will reject bypass aid when it threatens their political control (K. Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016). In short, I expect dilution to increase the risk of NGO cooperation for adversarial member-states.

## 2.4 Hypotheses

Each actor's preferences toward participation present several observable implications (see Table 2.2). I derive three hypotheses that stem from the above logic. First, we should expect to see NGOs gain access to an organization after the United States loses control over said organization (H1), conceptualized as an increase in risk over the original delegation arrangement. Given the cost of changing institutional rules, I expect these efforts to be most successful when NGOs simultaneously apply pressure to the organization in question (H2). If NGOs are brought in to expand American influence into areas it previously did not control, then we should expect them to participate the most in said areas to reduce the expected risk (H3). Finally, said participation should subsequently work to support American preferences over the organization (H4). In sum, the alliance of convenience expects participation to both follow and manage risk for the US.

The above logic leads to the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** NGOs gain more institutional access to an intergovernmental organization when the risk of the United States losing control over the organization increases.

**Hypothesis 2:** The positive effect of increased risk on access is greater when NGOs pressure the organization.

**Hypothesis 3:** NGOs are more likely to participate in IGO activities that present a higher risk to the United States.

**Hypothesis 4:** NGO participation aids (harms) United States allies (adversaries).

## 2.5 Alternative Explanations

The above argument does not present a complete explanation of NGO participation. Many factors contribute to the decisions that allow NGOs inside an organization and the subsequent patterns of behavior such actors exhibit. Abbott et al. (2015), McNamara (2019), and Pallas and Urpelainen (2012) follow the rational design perspective by emphasizing the ways in which NGOs and other nonstate actors can solve cooperation problems. Here, NGOs are brought in and operate based on the particular expertise and functions they bring to an organization. These features may even diffuse across international organizations (Sommerer and Tallberg 2019). Such explanations do not directly contest my logic above. Diffusion processes may facilitate the alliance of convenience's establishment and implementation while organizations with policy gaps for NGOs to fill may also prove more susceptible. These arguments present alternative mechanisms that do not necessarily contradict my own.

However, several competing explanations exist that do directly contest the alliance of convenience and its underlying logic. Similar to my argument, these explanations fall within

the “distributive rationalist” perspective that emphasizes power disparities in institutional design (Voeten 2019). First, the influence of NGOs alone may be sufficient to gain access to an organization. Civil society networks frequently lobby to gain access to IGOs and better influence their policies. Indeed, the alliance of convenience is predicated on NGOs providing this push for access. But instead of the United States providing the crucial opening for NGOs to enter, arguments that stress the power of nonstate actors emphasize the legitimacy they provide to organizations (Grigorescu 2007, 2015), often due to the increased influence they have gained alongside their proliferation (Raustiala 1997; Joachim 2003; Tarrow 2005).<sup>28</sup> Or—to the extent that American approval is required—it is civil society’s lobbying of American government officials that provides the crucial push, rather than the strategic incentives of the government itself (R. Wade 1997).

The second alternative explanation questions the proposed target of the alliance—rival member states—in place of bureaucratic autonomy. Bureaucrats desire autonomy from member-state control (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Johnson 2014; Lall 2017). Rather than employing the alliance of convenience to hedge against the interests of rival member-states, the United States may be more concerned with increasing bureaucratic autonomy. Here, bureaucrats have both the incentives and the ability to change policy in response to NGO participation. In the face of increasing bureaucratic autonomy, the alliance incentivizes bureaucrats to preemptively align policies with American preferences to avoid any punishment that dilution may facilitate, effectively “biasing” the bureaucracy toward the member-state with the most outside options (Johns 2007; Clark and Dolan 2021).

Third, rather than encouraging the United States to establish the alliance of convenience, the “loss of control” felt by the United States may empower bureaucrats to push for increased

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<sup>28</sup>This perspective may also expect the United States to push for NGO access due to domestic lobbying from civil society groups, rather than the preferences of the executive branch.

access against the wishes of the United States and other member states. Indeed, while the NGO-bureaucrat relationship is often conflictual, it can also, at times, be quite cooperative (Johnson 2016). Lall (2017) finds that partnerships between bureaucrats and non-state actors can increase bureaucratic autonomy from member-state principals. Here, the advent of NGO participation may exacerbate any loss of influence the United States feels and create more unfavorable policy outcomes. To a lesser degree, bureaucrats may also promote participation for self-interested—but less opportunistic—reasons whereupon coordination with member states is implicit (Andonova 2017). While not highlighted in my theoretical explanation, the role of bureaucrats is crucial to many principal-agent explanations of international organizations.

The final competing explanation contests a crucial theoretical mechanism, rather than its predicted outcomes. The dilution that comes from the alliance of convenience stems from its wide range of participants; the United States does not impose limits on the types of actors allowed in. But NGOs may aid US policy preferences through preferences alignment, rather than the dilution I expect. Here, the United States pushes for access to particular NGOs that are most ideologically similar. Thus, it is the increase in friendly voices—rather than an increase in all voices—that incentivizes the United States to push for access and subsequently benefit from resulting participation. Such a perspective is common among adversarial member-states to the US. For example, Cuba once alleged that NGOs with accreditation to the UN Human Rights Council were under American control and part of a coordinated diplomatic campaign to bolster US interests (Freedman 2010).

## 2.6 Conclusion

This chapter’s theory views NGOs and the United States as allies of convenience. The “convenience” of this alliance is key; it forms when each actor’s independent interests align.

Indeed, dilution is not a perfect mechanism for the United States to control organizations. NGO participation will, at times, harm the interests of major shareholders (Pallas and Urpelainen 2012; Vabulas 2013). And more generally, NGOs dilute the influence of all involved actors, including the United States. Moreover, NGOs can advocate for their continued presence upon gaining access; once they are let in, they are unlikely to leave willingly. This is precisely why NGO participation matches a loss of control within the organization. If the United States perceives a manageable level of risk, there is no reason to take a chance on NGOs. In other words, if the risk of an accident is minimal, there is little incentive to purchase a costly insurance policy. This follows Martin's (2021) proposition that working through informal means can represent a second-best policy option for powerful states, rather than a first-choice preference.

U.S. officials do not force NGOs to enter an organization, nor do they command them upon entering. Rather, NGOs lobby to gain access for themselves; American officials subsequently push for this access when the inevitable dilution that comes from civil society participation is deemed favorable. While NGOs can directly influence IGO policy-making, notably through geographic proximity (Dörfler and Heinzl 2022), I suggest that NGOs can best influence an organization's institutional design in collaboration with the United States. Overall, the United States maintains a relatively cooperative, rather than conflictual, relationship with NGOs (Stroup and Murdie 2012). This allows them to establish a favorable "political opportunity structure" which affords increased influence over the IGO (Joachim 2003). In short, NGOs can realize their demands for access by working with the US, but the US will only prove cooperative when the benefits from dilution outweigh the risks.

After access, I expect the incentives of NGOs and other member states to largely determine the dynamics of participation. NGOs operate with limited resources and must choose areas and activities that will maximize their organization's mission; due to their independence, IGOs cannot force NGOs to participate in a given activity. In contrast, other

member-states cannot outright reject an IGO mandate to involve NGOs, assuming the necessary supply is found. They can, however, limit their involvement and interactions with civil society after participation is determined.

These preferences and abilities may lead to a doubly disadvantageous situation for political adversaries of the United States. First, NGOs, in their desire to have the greatest impact, will participate in areas the furthest away from American influence. Thus, adversaries will find themselves engaging with NGOs more frequently within an IGO. Second, the risk of intervention will incentivize adversaries to limit meaningful civil society interactions. This hampers the IGO effectiveness and curbs the benefits of IGO membership. Through these practices, NGO participation tilts the structural advantage back to the United States.



## Chapter 3

# Forming the Alliance: The Determinants of Nonstate Access Across Institutions

“Every group in the world with an axe to grind is going to Seattle to demonstrate. I’ll have more demonstrators against me than I’ve had in the whole 7 years I’ve been President. I’m kind of looking forward to it. I’ll tell you why. I told them all I wanted them to come. I want all the consumer groups to come. I want all the environmental groups to come. I want everybody who thinks this is a bad deal to come. I want everybody to get all this out of their system and say their piece of mind. And I want us to have a huge debate about this.” –  
*President Bill Clinton, November 10, 1999*

During the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Seattle, activists and civil society groups staged the largest protest against an multilateral economic organization in the United States. This “Battle of Seattle” presaged an increase of NGO access to the WTO, specifically within the independent Appellate Body. Since 1998, many NGOs had advocated for the submission of third-party *amicus curiae* briefs to the appellate

body for consideration. As the protests raged, the acceptance of *amicus curiae* briefs was debated by WTO members, although most were against. The G15 of developing economics released statements promoting the exclusion of NGOs and their briefs from the body. The European Commission argued that such influence is inadmissible given the present WTO rules (which should not be changed). The WTO secretariat—while seeking to improve the organization’s institutional image—discouraged NGO participation as a solution to the WTO’s legitimacy critiques. Yet the NGOs had one strong voice of support: the United States government. In 2000, the dual pressure from NGOs and the United States convinced the Appellate Body to allow unsolicited briefs from NGOs to be considered in deliberations.<sup>1</sup>

Did the above coordination follow an increase in risk for the United States? In this chapter and the next, I test my argument with a series of quantitative tests. The argument’s scope covers both the dynamics surrounding institutional design and the resulting patterns of behavior. This chapter focuses on the institutional design side, analyzing the determinants of access granted to nonstate actors. I employ the TRANSACCESS dataset to examine the degree of access granted to 50 intergovernmental organizations from 1970-2010. Here, access serves as the dependent variable. The next two chapters delve more deeply into the World Bank to examine the patterns and impact of participation after access is granted.

Specifically, I test the following hypotheses in this chapter:<sup>2</sup>

**Hypothesis 1:** NGOs gain more institutional access to an intergovernmental organization when the risk of the United States losing control over the organization increases.

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed description of the various preferences toward nonstate access at this time, see Charnovitz (2000).

<sup>2</sup>Large-N comparisons across organizations are not appropriate for testing the other theoretical predictions. Hypothesis 3 requires data on the precise activities of NGOs after access. Examining participation’s impact (Hypothesis 4) requires a deeper dive into a singular institution, given the wide variation in policy outcomes that different organizations deliver. These hypotheses are tested in later chapters.

**Hypothesis 2:** The positive effect of increased risk on access is greater when NGOs pressure the organization.

The preferences of the United States stand at this chapter’s core. In theory, this dissertation’s predictions could apply to any hegemonic power within an organization. A “hegemonic power” need not be the same state or even a singular state, as certain actors can leverage unparalleled influence as a group. However, I view the US as the most likely candidate in this dissertation. Chapter 2 supported this US-centrism on theoretical grounds, although the possibility of other hegemony benefiting from participation was considered. This chapter continues the emphasis on the US in the empirical analysis.

As the world’s largest economy by GDP and strongest military power, the United States is the most powerful state in any organization it is a member of. For a large portion of IGOs, the hegemon’s role is most clearly filled by the US. This is not to say the expectations for the alliance of convenience could not apply to France and Germany in the European Union or the United Kingdom in the Commonwealth of Independent Nations. But only the influence of the US singularly applies across a large number of institutions, thus facilitating a large-N quantitative analysis. This chapter’s data sample therefore only includes organizations the US is a member of, although I include empirical tests to examine the possibility of the US working alongside other powerful member states.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I first detail the TRANSACCESS dataset and explain how it measures nonstate access. I then describe original measures created to operationalize an individual state’s risk regarding a particular IGO. The resulting quantitative tests examine the impact of these risk measures alone and interacted with NGO protest toward an organization. Overall, the chapter provides support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b, showing how the theoretical argument explains the determinants of access. The chapter also describes original measures and new data that may be used in future studies of international

organizations.

### 3.1 Analyzing Change in Access

NGOs are a growing force in global governance. As Figure 3.1 shows, the annual creation of new, internationally focused NGOs increased throughout much of the 20th century, with a peak in the early 1990s. And the access NGOs (and other transnational actors) have in IGOs appears to follow a similar pattern, with a slowly increasing average followed by a sharp increase in the 1990s.<sup>3</sup> But the story becomes more complicated when access is conceptualized as a spectrum. Organizations may grant NGOs complete access or no access at all. But substantial variation exists between these two levels. Figure 3.2 shows the moving average paired with the level of access individual bodies within organizations provide.<sup>4</sup> While the average does suggest an upward trend, individual organizations continue to vary dramatically on the level of access granted. What explains the continued variation in access across intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)?


This study seeks to understand changes in NGO participation over time. NGO participation within intergovernmental organizations can manifest itself in various ways, including debates within the organization's discourse and aiding in logistical operations. This study concerns itself with the institutional design as it relates to NGO participation: the level of access granted to NGOs. NGO access can be measured both on a binary scale (is access granted or not) and on a spectrum (the degree of access granted). For example, the World

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<sup>3</sup>Data on NGO proliferation was collected from the Yearbook of International Organizations database. Qualifiers were used to select NGOs that prioritize a consistent international presence. Data from Sommerer and Tallberg (2017) were used to create the plot detailing NGO access at the IGO-body level. The time unit for both series is annual from the years 1950-2010.

<sup>4</sup>Data from Sommerer and Tallberg (2017) were used to create this plot detailing NGO access at the IGO body level.

Figure 3.1: NGO Proliferation and Access to International Organizations Over Time




Bank's Central Projects Note 10.05 established a formal procedure for engaging with global civil society in 1981. Since then, the Bank has adopted additional rules that further determine the level of access NGOs are granted. Here, emphasis is placed on the degree of access; the greater their access, the more NGOs can theoretically make up for a loss of control. Moreover, this chapter is principally concerned with *changes* in the level of access, as the U.S should seek to change the rules when its risk of losing control increases.

Data for the dependent variable are taken from the TRANSACCESS data set, which constitutes the most comprehensive data on NGO participation to date (Tallberg et al. 2013, 2014; Sommerer and Tallberg 2017).<sup>5</sup> Using a random sample of 50 IOs and 298 IO bodies,

<sup>5</sup>Tallberg et al. 2014 use this data to study "transnational actors" (TNAs) which includes NGOs alongside

Figure 3.2: NGO Access to International Organization Bodies with US Membership



the data set measures both the *Depth* and *Range* of NGO access to intergovernmental institutions from 1950-2010. *Depth* is defined as the degree of access NGOs are granted, whereas *Range* refers to the restrictions on which organizations are allowed access. These measures are then combined into an overall access score. IGO fixed-effects specifications are included in all main models to account for the change in access *within* IGO units and properly model my dynamic expectations.<sup>6</sup> This index (*Access*) constitutes my primary dependent variable, with the IGO-body-year as the unit of analysis.

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MNCs. Theoretically, my argument on NGO access remains the same for both NGOs and MNCs, and Tallberg et al. acknowledge that the UN definition of NGO, “is close to that of TNAs in substantive terms” (2014, 761).

<sup>6</sup>For models in which fixed-effects specifications are not appropriate, I modify the original index to measure the change in access over time within organizational bodies, grouped by the organization. Grouping this measure by organization includes the access of newly created bodies; as a robustness check I later group this measure by the organizational body to provide a more restrictive index.

## 3.2 Measuring Risk and Uncertainty

This project highlights the role risk plays in incentivizing the United States to push for increased NGO access. In chapter 2, I conceptualized risk as a state's preference divergence from the collective principal of an international organization (i.e. its relationships toward other member states). The public knowledge of IGO membership and its preferences allows for a risk assessment to occur, in which policymakers determine the probability that policy outcomes do not match their preferences due to the membership of an organization. Risk can therefore be conceptualized and measured as a state's degree of *membership affinity* within an organization.

Risk is distinct from uncertainty. Following the classic distinction detailed by Knight (1921), uncertainty does not provide enough information to make an accurate probabilistic assessment regarding outcomes. As outlined in chapter 2, this definition matches the activities of an agent (i.e. an IGO's staff) due to the shroud of *specialization* that conceals much of their day-to-day activities. While risk is the emphasis of the proposed argument and subsequent empirics, my theory expects uncertainty to exacerbate any potential loss of control and alter policymakers' risk calculations. In short, risk should be at its greatest in areas of greater uncertainty. Empirically, membership affinity best matches risk while agent specialization best matches uncertainty. This section describes how each concept is measured and analyzed together.

### Specialization

I begin with specialization. A common emphasis within any principal-agent framework, all forms of delegation to an organization require some degree of agent specialization. Otherwise, there is little material benefit for principals to delegate in the first place. However, the degree of specialization can vary across agent activities and institutions. For example, the WTO's

General Council pools member-state authority into a main decision-making body with minimal bureaucratic oversight, whereas the WTO's Appellate Body is highly specialized and insulated from direct member-state influence. Some scholars measure specialization as a function of overall IGO autonomy (Hooghe et al. 2017). However, this approach treats organizations as a single unit when the rules governing access often vary by sub-organizational body (Tallberg et al. 2014).

The above discussion also suggests a distinction between US efforts to promote NGO access in decision-making bodies versus non-decision-making bodies. As stated above, the loss of control affects American influence in areas where they maintain no formal influence. But the United States always maintains some formal influence in decision-making bodies as a member-state of that organization. This influence can range from its UNSC veto-power to singular vote in the UNGA. But even in the UNGA, the United States can turn to the strategy of vote-buying to push a resolution through. Thus, while the introduction of NGOs in decision-making bodies may still aid the United States in some instances, the need to expand its influence is not as pressing.

Indeed, informal modes of NGO participation may serve American interests better in decision-making bodies. The United States can exert its outsized influence in decision-making to call NGOs into a session when their presence may prove useful. For example, the UNSC's "Arria Formula" brings NGOs into contact with member-states on an informal, *ad hoc* basis. When Russia vetoed a meeting to discuss the Syrian human rights situation in 2018, the United States invoked the Arria Formula to meet outside the formal session.<sup>7</sup> NGOs like Amnesty International were able to attend and critique Russia's move.<sup>8</sup> In contrast, the more granular activities in non-decision-making bodies—organized by bureaucrats—demand

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<sup>7</sup><https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13255.doc.htm>

<sup>8</sup><https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/a-new-low-for-the-un-security-council-as-russia-takes-syrian-human-rights-off-the-table/>



formalized access if dilution is to have an extensive impact; prior to formalization, the World Bank's informal collaboration with NGOs constituted just a fraction of total lending operations (P. J. Nelson 1995).

In addition, the potential costs of formalized NGO access should be greater in decision-making bodies. As theorized, the US holds fewer options to control non-decision-making bodies in the first place; its control loss stems from the realization that its prior lack of influence is no longer acceptable. From this perspective, the US has less to lose from NGOs gaining access to non-decision-making bodies relative to decision-making bodies where it still retains some formal influence over policy. And crucially, granting NGOs access to decision-making bodies provides them with a voice over future rule changes. NGOs are unlikely to accept reductions to their decision-making power without contestation. In contrast, NGOs involved in enforcement are limited to specific operations and functions, which curbs their influence over rule changes. While NGOs in the WTO's General Council—a decision-making body—have sometimes aided US priorities, like establishing core labor standards, they have more frequently—and more effectively—hampered US interests on other issues, like the adoption of TRIPS and the campaign against a WTO investment regime (Murphy 2010). But the United States has consistently advocated for NGO access in the WTO's appellate body, even though the majority of member-states opposed this move (Steffek and Ehling 2008; Steffek 2012; Cortell and Peterson 2006, 277).

I therefore treat the distinction between decision-making bodies and non-decision-making bodies as the most meaningful indicator of specialization. Decision-making bodies include and require member-state voices and approval for the body's decisions. In non-DM bodies, there is no in-unit procedure for member-states to influence policy. Rather, such influence must trickle down from the policies adopted in DM bodies. This distinction accurately proxies specialization in two ways. First, there is always at least one degree of separation between a DM and non-DM body. Second, member-states can directly observe policies

adopted in a DM body as they are necessary participants in its activity.

To empirically measure agent specialization, I leverage the TRANSACCESS dataset's information on decision-making bodies to limit the main statistical analysis to non-decision-making bodies. This approach keeps the analysis consistent with the main dependent variable. Finally, conducting the principal analyses on a data subset allows for a later comparison across subsets to further test the theory's assumptions. Analyses that include decision-making bodies are listed later, where I would expect the alliance of convenience to occur to a lesser degree or not occur at all. In addition, I carry out tests on the entire sample absent any delineation between bodies; the results can be found in the Appendix, which are similar to the non-decision-making body subset.

## **Membership Affinity**

My primary independent variable is the risk of losing control over an organization. Given that the decision-making body distinction within the dependent variable proxies for specialization, the independent variables largely serve to proxy American risk towards an organization, conceptualized as membership affinity among the collective principal. Membership affinity is, admittedly, a broad conceptualization, so several measures are included. Using IGO membership data from Pevehouse et al. (2019), I create four separate measures for the degree of affinity: preference divergence, similar treaty portfolios, security cooperation, and shared IGO ties among the organization's membership.

The measures collect average indices for every organization-year in the sample based on an organization's membership. Since states join organizations as a whole, not individual bodies, the measure varies by the IGO-year, not the body-year. Even bodies that draw from a subset of the larger membership, like the UNSC, require representation that's comparable to the larger membership. These general measures allow me to uniformly operationalize American membership affinity and control across organizations, which further distinguishes

this study from other studies of delegation and control that tend to emphasize singular organizations (Copelovitch 2010a, 2010b; Clark and Dolan 2021; Vreeland and Dreher 2014; Stone 2011) or treat member-states as a collective whole (Hawkins et al. 2006; Hooghe et al. 2017; Johnson 2014).

Ideological preferences among the membership constitute the main measure for risk (*Preference Divergence*). Heterogeneous preferences among an organization’s membership can hamper successful delegation (Hawkins et al. 2006; L. Martin 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003). L. Martin (2006, p. 144) specifically states that—when preferences diverge—“there is more likely to be a wide range of proposals that could gain majority approval. This gives the staff room to maneuver.” Thus, with divergent preferences, the United States becomes less assured of activities occurring outside its formal influence. Using United Nations General Assembly voting data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), I calculated the average ideal point distance from the United States for each organization’s membership in a given year. Increases in the variable *Preference Divergence* indicates an increase in risk.

In addition, new political leaders tend to adjust their country’s voting behavior after coming to office (Dreher and Nathan M Jensen 2013; Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll 2015). However, while these qualifications should caution against an over-reliance on UNGA voting measures, they should not discount the measure’s usefulness as a proxy. Regardless of whether votes are bought, their proximity to the United States’ own record indicates a country’s degree of comfort toward US foreign policy priorities. And a recent change in leadership should be considered in a state’s overall preferences and its subsequent relations with other delegations. Indeed, recent studies continue to use a state’s UNGA voting record as a general proxy for its preferences (Chelotti, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov 2022).

Moreover, UNGA ideal point distances are more appropriate for my theoretical context than many other studies examining IGO control. Copelovitch and Powers (2021) critique of the use of UNGA ideal point distances for studies concerning the IMF. They identify

the potential misuse of such a measure to proxy “geopolitical importance to the US” when it more accurately describes “close to the US.” This is a valid concern for IMF-focused studies, but this chapter’s emphasis on ideological preferences in fact demands a measure of “closeness.” I therefore proceed with UNGA ideal points as the primary measure of US risk for this chapter’s analysis. Section 3.6 describes the creation and use of alternative measures for shared interests among member states.

The uniformity of this measure allows for the empirical analysis to move beyond the United States. While I emphasize that the alliance of convenience should work best for the United States, it holds that other state principals will also desire control over intergovernmental organizations. These principals, particularly the most powerful, may also benefit from NGO dilution. I therefore amend the above independent variables so they apply to France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom who—along with the United States—constitute the G5. While this group is not always the *most* influential in every organization (e.g. the Permanent 5 in the UN Security Council), the G5 is broadly influential due to its financial power and frequent collaborations. I also average each state’s index together to account for the group’s collective incentives (Copelovitch 2010a, 2010b). Finally, I generate the same measures for China, a prominent member state in many organizations that often does not share the same preferences as the United States and its allies.

Finally, Hypothesis 1b expects an interactive effect to occur between the American risk calculation and NGO activism surrounding an organization. In other words, an increase in risk should prove more impactful when coupled with NGO pressure on an organization. I create the *NGO Protest* measure by modifying the protest index from Tallberg et al. (2014) to be a binary indicator for whether any significant protest occurred against a particular organization in the preceding year.

### 3.3 Other Covariates

I account for potential confounders with the inclusion of several control variables. Prominent IGOs with greater resources may attract NGOs while simultaneously maintaining larger, more divergent memberships. Since accurate and uniform data on IGO resources over time are not available, I proxy IGO prominence and resources by logging the overall GDP among an organization’s membership (*IGO Size*). While other studies use an organization’s total membership to proxy IGO resources (Pratt 2018; R. Clark 2021), measuring GDP accounts for material differences between organizations.<sup>9</sup>

NGOs have gained a strong influence alongside their proliferation (Raustiala 1997; Tarrow 2005). Indeed, the “supply” of NGOs has increased over time, particularly since the 1970s (Reimann 2006). I control for the broad influence of NGOs using Tallberg et al.’s measure of NGO quantity across time and against organizational contexts (Tallberg et al. 2014, 760–761). *NGO Supply* proxies this by indexing the number of transnational actors operating in a given year and region.

Nonstate actors also have the power to legitimate organizations, particularly through democratic norms of accountability and transparency (Grigorescu 2007, 2015), and may gain access through the democratization of IGOs (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). I therefore include *Democratic Membership* to measure the average level of democracy among an IGO’s member-states. The variable is lagged one-year to account for sudden shifts in an IGO’s democracy-level.

Furthermore, IGOs do not operate independently (Pratt 2018), similar institutional contexts may reduce member-state uncertainty (Copelovitch and Putnam 2014), and NGO access may increase across organizations through a diffusion process (Sommerer and Tallberg

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<sup>9</sup>Membership size is included as a control in Table 3.18 in the Appendix.

2019). I use data from Sommerer and Tallberg (2019) to measure *Diffusion*—the number of partnerships an IGO has with other organizations—and account for possible diffusion processes across time and institutions.

Finally, the United States may not feel a loss of control via risk and uncertainty, but institutional power. Graham and Serdaru (2020) find that weighted vote shares and earmarked financial contributions serve as control “substitutes.” To measure financial power across institutional contexts, I use an original variable that measures the US share of the organization’s total GDP (*US GDP Percentage*) to account for this influence and roughly proxy the determinants of both weighted vote shares and financial contributions.

### 3.4 Model Estimation

I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to test the proposed hypothesis. While not purely continuous, the indexed nature of the dependent variable is largely appropriate for OLS estimation. However, the data are left-censored at zero, which could lead to bias. Tobit and Heckman selection models can account for such left-sided data censorship. To facilitate interpretation and estimate fixed-effects specifications, I report OLS models for the main results and include alternative models in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the organization-level.

Fixed-effects are included at the organization-level in all OLS models. Beyond providing a more conservative test of the relationship, this within-unit specification measures the change in the dependent variable over time. This is crucial to include as my theory explains institutional change within organizations.<sup>10</sup> Unit fixed-effects also account for institution-specific legacies that may predispose certain organizations toward accepting more or less

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<sup>10</sup>I reconstruct the dependent variable to measure change in access over time, absent any unit fixed-effects, for models where fixed effects specifications are not appropriate

access. To further test the relationship I swap IGO fixed-effects for body fixed-effects, which are presented in Appendix Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8. The results are similar, but I present the former in the main results since the primary variation in the independent variables are found at the organization-level. Furthermore, body-level fixed effects discount the creation of new IGO bodies that are born with significant access levels. Year fixed-effects specifications are also included to account for the influence of general temporal trends.

Autocorrelation is a concern for most analyses based on panel-data. Serial correlation occurs when the past value of access determines its future value. Given that future access levels are likely to be influenced by the prior level of access, such a concern is pertinent here. Indeed, a Breusch-Godfrey test suggests the possibility of serial correlation. I therefore follow the advice of Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2014, p. 77) and implement the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure in the Appendix Table 3.12. Given the often stagnant nature of institutional rules, I do not include a lagged version of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation to avoid negatively biasing the coefficient estimates that may reduce the explanatory power of the independent variables.

### 3.5 Main Results

The results presented in Table 3.1 are consistent with my theoretical expectations. *Preference Divergence* is positive and statistically significant with access. This suggests that increases in US risk are associated with a positive change in NGO access while decreases in risk are associated with a decrease in NGO access. Models 3 and 4 use the *Range* of access as the dependent variable. As a reminder, the greater the range of access, the more NGOs are allowed to participate. These results are shown here to test the theory's dilution mechanism; if the United States truly seeks to dilute the normal process of governance, it should push for indiscriminate access. In contrast, alternative explanations that suggest the United

States supports access to increase favorable preferences would expect the range of viable participants to be quite limited. The direction and significance of the relationships remains, supporting the dilution mechanism. An analysis of the depth of access yields similar results (see Table 3.9 in the Appendix).

Table 3.1: Effect of U.S. Risk on Access in Non-Decision-Making Bodies

	Overall Access		Range of Access	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.568*** (0.098)	0.466*** (0.108)	0.333*** (0.057)	0.305*** (0.061)
IGO Size		-0.162 (0.827)		0.119 (0.567)
Diffusion		-0.422 (0.292)		-0.257 (0.193)
U.S. GDP Percentage		0.082 (2.157)		0.226 (1.404)
Democratic Membership		0.043** (0.018)		0.027** (0.012)
NGO Supply		0.170 (0.271)		0.031 (0.174)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2034	2034	2034	2034
Adj. R-squared	0.700	0.702	0.701	0.702

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

Table 3.2 presents the same model estimation limited to decision-making bodies in the relevant organization. The bivariate results in Models 1 and 2 are positive and significant, albeit with a smaller coefficient. This suggests that impact of risk applies to decision-making bodies to a lesser degree. The strength of the prior results in comparison highlight the importance of specialization and the interaction of uncertainty and risk in delegation. These results suggest the impact of risk is heightened in areas of increased uncertainty where



the US maintains less influence. This interpretation is further supported by the robustness checks in this chapter’s Appendix, which show the results for decision-making bodies do not hold to more robust specifications.

Table 3.2: Effect of U.S. Risk on Access in Decision-Making Bodies

	Overall Access		Range of Access	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.204*** (0.065)	0.192*** (0.062)	0.113** (0.046)	0.102** (0.043)
IGO Size		-0.697 (0.726)		-0.539 (0.517)
Diffusion		-0.238 (0.255)		0.043 (0.163)
U.S. GDP Percentage		1.287 (2.085)		1.103 (1.474)
Democratic Membership		0.021 (0.016)		0.019* (0.011)
NGO Supply		-0.062 (0.264)		-0.021 (0.219)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1133	1133	1133	1133
Adj. R-squared	0.696	0.701	0.729	0.735


\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

A placebo check further accounts for general temporal trends, organizational particularities, and the possibility that increased risk forces the United States to accede to increased access, rather than push for it (Table 3.3). Here, one switches out the original dependent variable with data collected under similar circumstances, but where no theoretical relationship is expected. Obtaining similar results with the new dependent variables would draw skepticism to the original findings. Using data from Hooghe et al. (2017), I change the dependent variable to *Delegation* and *Pooling*, two other prominent institutional design fea-

tures that are frequently compared to access (Tallberg et al. 2020).<sup>11</sup> Similar to access, these two design features have experienced upward trends over time (see Figure 3.3). Thus, the placebo check tests if increases in risk are simply correlated with general developments in global governance. Furthermore, if we assume bureaucrats prefer increased delegation and pooling from member-states to insulate their own activities (Johnson 2014), then positive correlations would also suggest that bureaucrats can take advantage of an American control loss and increase access against the wishes of the US. However, the effect of American risk is either insignificant or negative for both delegation and pooling. These findings support the theoretical importance of the original correlations found in the main results.

Figure 3.3: Average Levels of Delegation and Pooling Across Sample



The above results support the proposition that access is granted when the United States

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<sup>11</sup>The nature of these data demand that the analyses be kept at the IO-level.

begins to lose control of an organization. But what of NGO demands for access and their role in negotiating institutional design? To test Hypothesis 1b, which expects effective collaboration between NGOs and the US, I re-estimate Model 2 as an interactive effect between *US Preference Divergence* and *NGO Protest*, running separate models for decision-making bodies and non-decision-making bodies. Figure 3.4 shows the marginal effect on access as US preferences increasingly diverge from an organization's overall membership.<sup>12</sup> As my theory expects, there is a positive interaction between protest and American risk on changes in access for non-decision-making bodies, but no significant relationship on access for decision-making bodies. These findings suggest that NGO demands for access rely upon the present US risk calculation to succeed. Moreover, the interaction is substantively meaningful. The horizontal dotted line indicates the median effect of preference divergence. As indicated by the above results, the median effect is positive, yet the interactive effect grows larger at the highest levels of preference divergence. This provides support for Hypothesis 2, showing that more access is granted when risk increases alongside NGO protest.

These results provide initial support to Hypothesis 1b: US risk is more greatly associated with increased access when NGOs simultaneously pressure an organization. In other words, the alliance of convenience is most effective when US and NGO interests more closely align. However, this conditional finding does not identify the precise mechanism by which NGO pressure increases access. Two theoretical explanations for the present result exist.

The first assumes the hegemon—in this chapter the US—maintains an effective veto over other actors' attempts to increase access, but must expend significant political capital to increase access itself. Here, NGO pressure aids US efforts to increase access; without this help, the US would not achieve the same degree of institutional change. The second sees NGOs as more opportunistic. Here, NGOs capitalize upon any effort to increase access and

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<sup>12</sup>The `interplot.medline` package was used to create the figure (<https://tompepinsky.com/research/code/>).

Table 3.3: Effect of U.S. Risk on on Delegation and Pooling

	Delegation		Pooling	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Preference Divergence	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.038*** (0.009)	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.048*** (0.005)
IGO Size		-0.200*** (0.030)		-0.713*** (0.024)
Diffusion		-0.007 (0.005)		-0.036*** (0.008)
U.S. GDP Percentage		-0.497*** (0.082)		-1.965*** (0.064)
Democratic Membership		-0.002*** (0.001)		-0.009*** (0.0005)
NGO Supply		0.054*** (0.009)		0.381*** (0.008)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2767	2595	2767	2595
Adj. R-squared	0.959	0.989	0.977	0.998

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

subsequently achieve a greater degree of access than the US would prefer.

My theory expects a simple linear relationship between the hegemon's risk and nonstate access. As such, both mechanisms align with my general expectations. I assume changing an organization's institutional design requires a concentrated effort. The additional pressure from NGOs should aid in this endeavor, no matter the specific actor driving the change. But as the name suggests, the alliance of convenience supports each actor's individual, not mutual, interests; the US should agree to more institutional carve-out than it may prefer provided the overall increase in access is preferable. Thus, even if NGO pressure goes "too far" in reforming an organization, the basic strategy and outcome remains the same.<sup>13</sup> NGOs

<sup>13</sup>Chapter 4 examines the precise nature of US-NGO interaction qualitatively.

Table 3.4: Effect of U.S. Risk on Access, Conditional on NGO Protest

	Overall Access			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.373*** (0.110)	0.289** (0.114)	0.172** (0.074)	0.163** (0.066)
NGO Protest	-0.561*** (0.146)	-0.445*** (0.154)	-0.137 (0.161)	-0.089 (0.169)
IGO Size		-0.289 (0.831)		-0.753 (0.726)
Diffusion		-0.387 (0.292)		-0.223 (0.255)
U.S. GDP Percentage		0.143 (2.169)		1.204 (2.106)
Democratic Membership		0.032* (0.018)		0.019 (0.016)
NGO Supply		0.177 (0.272)		-0.061 (0.285)
Preference Divergence * Protest	0.290*** (0.065)	0.246*** (0.068)	0.064 (0.061)	0.051 (0.062)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2034	2034	1133	1133
Adj. R-squared	0.703	0.704	0.696	0.701


\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

can influence access decisions, provided American interests align.

I now probe this paper's US-centrism, as other state principals desire control over inter-governmental organizations and should experience variation in risk (Hawkins et al. 2006). Hegemonic power can be coordinated, and the most powerful state principals may benefit from NGO dilution collectively. The Group of Five (G5) include France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These states are influential due to their collec-

Figure 3.4: Marginal Effects from Interactions with US Preference Divergence



tive financial power and international collaboration (Copelovitch 2010a).<sup>14</sup> Because the G5 hold similar preferences, the US measure for preference divergence may be capturing larger G5 relations, rather than the US alone. To capture the G5’s preferences, the independent variable is amended to measure the mean membership affinity between the countries. I create two separate measures, one with and one without the United States. I proceed with the latter (the “G4”) for the main results to examine if the other members of the G5 are influential without the US. The complete G5 measure provides similar results, which can be found in Table 3.10 the Appendix.

Table 3.5 presents the results. Models 1 and 2 indicate that the G4 measure provides

<sup>14</sup>While this group is not always the most influential in every organization (e.g. the P5 in the UN Security Council), the G5 are broadly influential due to their large economies and subsequent financial contributions to IGOs. I therefore assume them to be the most *broadly* influential group of countries across my current sample of institutions.

Table 3.5: Effect of G4 Risk on Access

	Overall Access			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence			1.032*** (0.340)	0.896*** (0.337)
G4 Preference Divergence	0.434*** (0.114)	0.321*** (0.123)	-0.626* (0.361)	-0.604 (0.368)
IGO Size		-0.755 (0.895)		-0.849 (0.896)
Diffusion		-0.398 (0.295)		-0.398 (0.294)
U.S. GDP Percentage		-1.041 (2.311)		-1.516 (2.314)
Democratic Membership		0.048** (0.019)		0.044** (0.019)
NGO Supply		0.121 (0.294)		0.142 (0.293)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1951	1951	1951	1951
Adj. R-squared	0.704	0.707	0.706	0.708

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

similar results to the US-specific measure used above. Models 3 and 4 present horse-race regressions between the US and the rest of the G5. Here, the US variable retains its positive significance while the G4 variables' coefficients change to negative and lose significance at conventional levels. I therefore caution against interpretations that discount the unilateral influence of the US.

However, the G5 may prove more influential in a different context. Hypothesis 1b expects NGO pressure to facilitate any attempts by hegemonic powers to change institutional rules that increase access. Unlike the US, which maintains enough unilateral influence to change institutional rules absent NGO pressure, the other members of the G5 may require outside

help. To test the Hypothesis 1b's application to the G5 as a whole, I repeat the interaction models conducted in Table 3.4 with the G4 measure. These models retain the same battery of controls used in prior regressions and the measure for US ideal point distance.

Figure 3.5: Marginal Effects from Interactions with G4 Preference Divergence




Figure 3.5 visualizes the results for both non-decision-making and decision-making bodies. Unlike the results presented in Table 3.5, these models are similar to the US-specific results in Figure 3.4. As membership preferences diverge from the G4 mean, the effect of NGO Protest on Access becomes positive. As with the US results, the interaction effect is larger than the median value of preference divergence, suggesting the interactive effect is substantially meaningful compared to preference divergence alone. As expected, the interaction does not exhibit any relationship when applied to the sample of decision-making bodies.

The impact of NGO Protest is indistinguishable from zero at the lowest end of preference divergence. This contrasts with the US-specific results presented in Figure 3.4. These show



a negative relationship between NGO Protest and low US preference divergence. The lack of a negative effect suggests non-US G5 countries accept access when their risk increases, but do not actively insulate organizations from access at low levels of risk, compared to the US.

These results suggest that while US preferences appear to be the main driver of access, outside NGO pressure can be successful when other powerful states experience an increase in risk. In other words, NGOs seek any and all opportunities to gain access. This may include an emphasis on the United States, given its frequent status as the leading state in an organization. But it may also include other powerful states as well. In advocating for the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, NGOs mostly coordinated with US officials, but also lobbied the governments of Japan, France, and the United Kingdom (R. Wade 1997). Moreover, this chapter’s sample only included organizations with US membership. The theory’s prediction beyond the US may apply more cleanly when American hegemony is absent, like in the European Union. Unfortunately, the limited number of organizations like this inhibit quantitative testing across institutions.

### **3.6 Alternative Measures of Risk**

The above analysis relies upon UNGA ideal point distances to measure a membership’s distance from the US. This section presents three alternative measures that also provide an accurate proxy for risk: treaty distance, shared IGO membership, and formal security cooperation. Skeptical of UNGA voting affinity as a measure of state control, Copelovitch and Powers (2021) suggest variables that capture similarity in treaty and IGO membership portfolios. Similar to a state’s formal vote on a UN resolution, a state’s membership in a binding treaty provides a strong signal of its preferences. Lupu (2016) provides an index of “treaty distance” between two states based on the treaties each is a party to, creating

ideal points similar to those used in the above UNGA measure. I use these data to create a variable capturing the average treaty distance from the US for an organization's total membership in a given year. A greater treaty distance suggests more divergent preference from the US.

The next measure for (dis)affinity, shared membership in international organizations, follows the second suggested measure of Copelovitch and Powers (2021). IO membership is an important indicator of state preferences. States may join and form organizations to lock-in domestic policies (Moravcsik 2000; Poast and Urpelainen 2018). Thus, in coming together with other states to cooperate, IO membership serves as an important screening mechanism for mutual interests (Gray 2013). And continued membership in an organization can change state behavior. IGOs converge member-states interests over time (Bearce and Bondanella 2007), a phenomenon that does not depend on the type of organization (Greenhill and Lupu 2017). And even when one accounts for selection effects, shared membership causes states to more closely align their preferences (Egel and Obermeier 2023). We can thus expect shared IGO membership to increase affinity between states (Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Lupu and Greenhill 2017).

I therefore expect the United States to be less concerned about the preferences of states that it shares relatively more membership ties with. US partners in NATO also share membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development alongside the near-universal memberships of the World Bank, the IMF and the UN. But the number of overlapping memberships does not travel to all member states in the WB, IMF and UN. To measure IGO membership ties, I use Greenhill and Lupu's data on IGO membership networks to count the average number of shared IGO memberships the United States holds with states within a particular organization.

Security coordination presents another measure of risk. US Security partners share at

least some core geopolitical goals and the US, by aiding said states in defense, military technology, and intelligence, must not deem the government an overt threat in that moment. Thus, greater security coordination among the membership should reduce US risk. In addition, security partners are not always ideologically aligned; measuring security coordination allows for a more material measure of risk, compared to the “symbolic” nature of UN voting records.

To proxy security coordination, I use data from Kinne (2020) to index the average number of bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) the United States maintains with IO members. While the creation of normal alliances has stagnated in the post-World War 2 era, DCAs have proliferated, particularly since the 1980s (Kinne 2018). DCAs thus present a more appropriate measure for security priorities during the time period analyzed. And as mentioned above, their proliferation presents a general upward trend, similar to the pattern exhibited by NGO access. However, we expect increased DCA cooperation to be negatively associated with access. The nature of this variable thus guards against time trends as a common cause explanation.

Figure 3.6: Mean Variable Trends Across Sample




Figure 3.6 displays the mean trends for three independent variables across IGOs in which

the United States is a member, compared to the average trend in membership. Each variable displays an upward trend over time, similar to the general trend of NGO proliferation and participation. This holds two implications for the larger empirical design. First, the analysis should control for a general time trend and increase in the number of NGOs. Second, while each variable exhibits a similar upward trend, the expected relationship is not the same across all measures. An increase in UNGA ideal point distance and treaty distance measures an increase in risk. In contrast, an increase in DCAs or IGO ties across the membership measures a decrease in risk. The theoretical predictions do not match the predictions resulting from trends as the common cause.

Table 3.11 in the Appendix displays the results for these alternative measures. Both *DCAs* and *IGO Ties* are negatively significant, further supporting the theoretical prediction that increases in risk are associated with a positive change in NGO access while decreases are associated with less NGO access. Notably, both measures maintain upward averages over time. If general temporal trends were driving the results—a significant confounder given the upward trend also exhibited by access (see Figure 3.1)—we would expect both variables to be positively significant. However, the negative coefficients suggest that the alliance of convenience remains insulated from such trends.

In contrast, *Treaty Distance* does not exhibit the hypothesized effect. As treaty distance grows from the US ideal point, the theory would expect a positive effect on access. However, the coefficient is negative, although Model 1 does not obtain statistical significance at a conventional level. Two data features may explain the unexpected direction of these results. First, in creating the measure, Lupu (2016) limits the sample to universal treaties that all states can join.<sup>15</sup> Second, Lupu finds the data largely measure economic interests. Such

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<sup>15</sup>This is in contrast to the IGO ties measure, which does include all possible IGOs, regardless of membership limitations.

subsets are not present in the other measures for risk.

However, the interaction results between *Treaty Distance* and *NGO protest* alter the above findings (see Figure 3.7 in the Appendix). Similar to the interaction presented in the main results, the effect of NGO protest is negative at low levels of treaty distance. The effect becomes positive as treaty distance from the US increases. In addition, the relationship exhibits a positive trend in decision-making bodies but is not significant. As Hypothesis 1b expects, these results suggest NGO pressure can influence access rules when coupled with US risk. In particular, changing an organization's rules to increase access may prove more difficult than blocking undesirable reforms. Thus, when it comes to the measure of treaty distance, NGO protest is required to successfully alter the institution's design.

### 3.7 Robustness Checks

A series of robustness checks further tests the proposed relationship. The results remain broadly similar for all specifications. The tables can be found in the Appendix for this chapter. As stated above, I follow Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2014, 77) and implement the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure in Table 3.12 to account for serial correlation. I then switch out the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure for a first difference estimator in Table 3.13. And while reverse causality is not a significant concern, I also lag the main independent variable by 1 and 3 years to account for long periods of negotiation over institutional design, although I maintain that changes in access frequently occur in one year or less.<sup>16</sup> Tables 3.14 and 3.15 display the results. Indeed, while a one-year lag maintains its positive significance, the three year lag is not significant at the .05 level. This further supports the theoretical proposition that the United States reacts quickly in response to increasing risk and is not

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<sup>16</sup>Chapter 4 provides a detailed description into the timeline for changing access rules.

simply following broader trends.

Issue-area dummies are included in Table 3.18 to account for variations in risk being affected by the underlying cooperation problem (Koremenos 2016). Moreover, Hooghe and Marks (2015) show how an institution’s policy scope can influence institutional design decisions. Issue-area dummies do not necessarily capture the policy scope of an organization, as organizations and bodies working on the same issue can vary on the tasks they conduct. I include three variables from Tallberg et al. (2014) that capture the degree of a body’s technical complexity, connection to local activities, and emphasis on monitoring state compliance, respectively. Finally, I include additional controls that account for an organization’s membership size and its membership’s overall preference affinity.<sup>17</sup> The results are similar to those presented in the main analysis.

As mentioned above, Tobit models and Heckman selection models are estimated to account for left censoring in the dependent variable (Table 3.16).<sup>18</sup> To replace the IGO and year fixed effects estimates for these models, I model the outcome variable as the change in access over time and include a binary indicator for periods after 1990, a common structural break in NGO influence (749). Heckman models are best fitted with a valid exclusion condition in the first stage. However, given that the selection outcome (open body) is closely related to the dependent variable (Access), finding a variable that influences the former but not the latter is difficult. To partially fulfill this condition, I include the variable *Technical Complexity* from Tallberg et al. (2014) in the selection model. Technocratic need presumably influences whether a body has the possibility for participation, as some bodies simply do provide any tasks non-state actors can aid in. This technocratic need should not influence

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<sup>17</sup>I exclude such controls from the main analysis due to potential multicollinearity with the independent variable.

<sup>18</sup>Vance and Ritter (2014) argue that many political scientists mistakenly use Heckman models when hurdle models constitute the more appropriate two-stage design. While I believe Heckman models remain appropriate here, I have previously estimated hurdle models that provide similar results.

any later change in the degree of access, as a body’s primary function is unlikely to change.<sup>19</sup>

The two step designs not only support the above results—thus mitigating concerns resulting from the data’s left-censorship—but also provide insight into the theory’s emphasis on specialization. The Heckman selection probit first measures whether a body is open or not. The outcome equation then estimates the effect of the independent variables on any change in access *after* the initial access is granted.<sup>20</sup> The results for non-decision-making bodies are similar to the original estimates, but the measures become insignificant for decision-making bodies in the second stage. Moreover, the interaction between Preference Divergence and NGO Protest becomes negatively significant when applied to decision-making bodies. This matches the theoretical expectations and highlights the importance of specialization for risk calculation.<sup>21</sup> The increase in access for decision-making bodies observed above is largely due to the initial bouts of access, which is not followed by subsequent increases.

### 3.8 Discussion

What determines nonstate access to intergovernmental organizations? I identify US risk toward an organization’s membership as a key determinant of access. Statistical tests across a large sample of international organizations provide evidence that increases in access follow an increase in risk, as measured by UNGA voting ideal point distances averaged across an institution’s membership. In addition, the relationship is stronger when NGOs simultaneously

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<sup>19</sup>To reiterate, this variable does not provide a strong exclusion restriction, but it does fulfill the need to include additional variables in the selection model.

<sup>20</sup>The selection and outcome equation results are included in Tables 3.19 and 3.20. Models 1 and 2 account for access in non-decision-making bodies, while Models 3 and 4 cover access across decision-making bodies.

<sup>21</sup>For example, if IO bureaucrats were exploiting the United States’ loss of control to encourage access to effectively build interorganizational alliances, we might expect access to increase in all bodies, regardless of decision-making status (Lall 2017).

apply pressure to an organization from the outside.

These results provide evidence for the theory's expected sequencing. The hegemonic power only forms the alliance of convenience when it risks losing control over an organization. Otherwise, it should seek to insulate the organization from outside actors. As the above results indicate, the NGO pressure is negatively associated with access when US risk is low. The success of NGO efforts to gain access are dependent upon the hegemon's political interests. This is not to say NGOs are not influential. Some of the model specifications presented suggest their role is instrumental in pushing a change in access across the line.

Hegemonic risk should be highest in areas of great uncertainty. The theoretical importance of this combination is born out in this chapter's results as well. Decision-making bodies exhibit less substantive change in access when faced with increased risk across all models. The most robust specifications find no significance at all. The Heckman selection model's insignificant results and negative interactive effect are particularly illuminating. Organizations may grant minimal access to decision-making bodies, but the degree is limited and not increased in later periods. In short, NGOs can gain significant access with regard to day-to-day activities, but only perfunctory access to decision-making channels.



### 3.A Chapter 3 Appendix

Table 3.6: Body-Level Fixed Effects, Non-Decision-Making Bodies

	Access		Range	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.553*** (0.060)	0.360*** (0.062)	0.326*** (0.044)	0.305*** (0.061)
IGO Size		-0.012 (0.521)		0.119 (0.567)
Diffusion		-0.273** (0.124)		-0.257 (0.193)
U.S. GDP Percentage		-0.064 (1.313)		0.226 (1.404)
Democratic Membership		-0.005 (0.012)		0.027** (0.012)
NGO Supply		0.690*** (0.176)		0.031 (0.174)
Body fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2034	2034	2034	2034
Adj. R-squared	0.918	0.920	0.870	0.702

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

Table 3.7: Body-Level Fixed Effects, Decision-Making Bodies

	Access		Range	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.173*** (0.060)	0.160*** (0.060)	0.071 (0.048)	0.102** (0.043)
IGO Size		-0.760 (0.585)		-0.539 (0.517)
Diffusion		-0.243 (0.158)		0.043 (0.163)
U.S. GDP Percentage		1.115 (1.787)		1.103 (1.474)
Democratic Membership		0.018* (0.010)		0.019* (0.011)
NGO Supply		-0.028 (0.217)		-0.021 (0.219)
Body fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1133	1133	1133	1133
Adj. R-squared	0.873	0.879	0.838	0.735

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

Table 3.8: Body-Level Fixed Effects with Interaction Terms

	Access	
	Model 1	Model 2
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.244*** (0.068)	0.128** (0.063)
NGO Protest	-0.354*** (0.115)	-0.094 (0.082)
IGO Size	-0.134 (0.506)	-0.818 (0.603)
Diffusion	-0.252** (0.123)	-0.226 (0.160)
U.S. GDP Percentage	-0.181 (1.268)	1.029 (1.862)
Democratic Membership	-0.012 (0.013)	0.016 (0.011)
NGO Supply	0.666*** (0.169)	-0.025 (0.224)
Interaction	0.179*** (0.047)	0.054* (0.032)
Body fixed effects?	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes
N	2034	1133
Adj. R-squared	0.921	0.879

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

Table 3.9: Depth of Access

	Depth of Access			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.310*** (0.070)	0.184** (0.074)	0.297*** (0.041)	0.184** (0.074)
IGO Size		0.376 (0.597)		0.376 (0.597)
Diffusion		-0.256 (0.187)		-0.256 (0.187)
U.S. GDP Percentage		1.639 (1.533)		1.639 (1.533)
Democratic Membership		0.020* (0.011)		0.020* (0.011)
NGO Supply		0.396** (0.166)		0.396** (0.166)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	No	No
Body fixed effects?	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2034	2034	2034	2034
Adj. R-squared	0.706	0.709	0.894	0.709

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

Table 3.10: G5 Measure

	Overall Access			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence			1.189*** (0.426)	1.048** (0.424)
G5 Preference Divergence	0.457*** (0.114)	0.349*** (0.122)	-0.783* (0.452)	-0.755 (0.460)
IGO Size		-0.746 (0.895)		-0.849 (0.896)
Diffusion		-0.393 (0.294)		-0.398 (0.294)
U.S. GDP Percentage		-1.054 (2.311)		-1.516 (2.314)
Democratic Membership		0.049** (0.019)		0.044** (0.019)
NGO Supply		0.097 (0.293)		0.142 (0.293)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1951	1951	1951	1951
Adj. R-squared	0.705	0.707	0.706	0.708

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

Table 3.11: Alternative Risk Measures

	<b>Overall Access</b>		
	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
Treaty Distance	-0.366* (0.200)		
Security Cooperation		-0.036*** (0.011)	
IGO Ties			-1.710*** (0.371)
IGO Size	-0.055 (0.882)	0.049 (1.068)	-2.048** (0.995)
Diffusion	-0.449 (0.308)	-0.350 (0.317)	-0.277 (0.295)
U.S. GDP Percentage	-0.123 (2.230)	0.872 (2.398)	-4.032 (2.527)
Democratic Membership	0.005 (0.019)	0.007 (0.019)	-0.053* (0.029)
NGO Supply	0.723*** (0.241)	0.806*** (0.275)	0.287 (0.304)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1888	1670	1709
Adj. R-squared	0.700	0.703	0.724

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)




Figure 3.7: Marginal Effects of NGO Protest and Treaty Distance

Table 3.12: Cochrane-Orcutt Procedure

	Overall Access		Range of Access	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.394*** (0.082)	0.346*** (0.083)	0.271*** (0.060)	0.238*** (0.060)
NGO Protest		-0.269*** (0.083)		-0.154** (0.060)
IGO Size	-0.080 (0.548)	-0.004 (0.557)	0.087 (0.399)	0.229 (0.405)
Diffusion	0.137 (0.126)	0.142 (0.125)	0.066 (0.091)	0.067 (0.090)
U.S. GDP Percentage	-1.158 (1.359)	-0.930 (1.387)	-0.466 (0.986)	-0.057 (1.007)
Democratic Membership	-0.073*** (0.016)	-0.077*** (0.016)	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.042*** (0.011)
NGO Supply	1.610*** (0.202)	1.574*** (0.203)	0.865*** (0.147)	0.857*** (0.148)
Interaction		0.115*** (0.035)		0.074*** (0.025)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2034	2034	2034	2034

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1



Table 3.13: First Difference

	Overall Access		Range of Access	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.376*** (0.082)	0.327*** (0.083)	0.272*** (0.059)	0.239*** (0.060)
NGO Protest		-0.283*** (0.083)		-0.154** (0.060)
IGO Size	-0.279 (0.550)	-0.207 (0.559)	0.071 (0.398)	0.213 (0.405)
Diffusion	0.136 (0.125)	0.141 (0.125)	0.066 (0.090)	0.067 (0.090)
U.S. GDP Percentage	-1.607 (1.361)	-1.393 (1.389)	-0.499 (0.985)	-0.089 (1.006)
Democratic Membership	-0.079*** (0.016)	-0.083*** (0.016)	-0.039*** (0.011)	-0.042*** (0.011)
NGO Supply	1.693*** (0.204)	1.658*** (0.204)	0.864*** (0.147)	0.857*** (0.147)
Interaction		0.119*** (0.035)		0.074*** (0.025)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2014	2014	2014	2014
Adj. R-squared	0.218	0.222	0.228	0.231

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table 3.14: Lagged Models

	Overall Access		Range of Access	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence (one year lag)	0.196** (0.099)		0.140** (0.068)	
U.S. Preference Divergence (three year lag)		0.077 (0.080)		0.065 (0.055)
IGO Size	-0.480 (0.858)	-0.669 (0.861)	-0.089 (0.589)	-0.230 (0.592)
Diffusion	-0.475 (0.300)	-0.488 (0.300)	-0.289 (0.206)	-0.297 (0.206)
U.S. GDP Percentage	-0.486 (2.242)	-0.887 (2.249)	-0.148 (1.540)	-0.441 (1.545)
Democratic Membership	0.032* (0.018)	0.032* (0.018)	0.021* (0.013)	0.020 (0.013)
NGO Supply	0.394 (0.267)	0.463* (0.263)	0.164 (0.183)	0.203 (0.181)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2033	2031	2033	2031
Adj. R-squared	0.700	0.700	0.700	0.700

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table 3.15: Lagged Models with Interaction Terms

	Overall Access		Range of Access	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence (one year lag)	0.054 (0.104)		0.050 (0.072)	
U.S. Preference Divergence (three year lag)		-0.010 (0.085)		0.004 (0.058)
Protest	-0.408** (0.160)	-0.217 (0.157)	-0.219** (0.110)	-0.139 (0.108)
IGO Size	-0.496 (0.865)	-0.492 (0.869)	-0.050 (0.594)	-0.084 (0.596)
Diffusion	-0.467 (0.299)	-0.521* (0.300)	-0.282 (0.205)	-0.318 (0.206)
U.S. GDP Percentage	-0.121 (2.271)	-0.051 (2.279)	0.241 (1.560)	0.217 (1.564)
Democratic Membership	0.021 (0.019)	0.020 (0.019)	0.014 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)
NGO Supply	0.394 (0.268)	0.487* (0.264)	0.177 (0.184)	0.225 (0.181)
Interaction	0.239*** (0.067)		0.143*** (0.046)	
Interaction		0.160** (0.066)		0.111** (0.045)
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2033	2031	2033	2031
Adj. R-squared	0.703	0.702	0.703	0.702

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table 3.16: Tobit Models

	Change in Overall Access		Change in Range	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.425*** (0.037)	0.187*** (0.062)	0.322*** (0.025)	0.093** (0.043)
IGO Size		-0.105 (0.230)		0.114 (0.158)
Diffusion		0.780** (0.390)		0.291 (0.268)
U.S. GDP Percentage		2.112*** (0.408)		1.537*** (0.281)
Democratic Membership		-0.056*** (0.010)		-0.049*** (0.007)
NGO Supply		0.313*** (0.059)		0.197*** (0.041)
Post-1990		-0.016 (0.099)		-0.012 (0.068)
logSigma	0.057*** (0.020)	0.018 (0.020)	-0.323*** (0.020)	-0.359*** (0.020)
Constant	-0.361*** (0.088)	0.674 (6.818)	-0.319*** (0.060)	-5.034 (4.683)
N	2034	2034	2034	2034
Log Likelihood	-2659.367	-2591.819	-2112.837	-2051.695
AIC	5324.735	5201.637	4231.673	4121.390
BIC	5341.588	5252.197	4248.526	4171.950

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table 3.17: Tobit Models with Interaction Terms

	Change in Overall Access		Change in Range	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.187*** (0.062)	-0.201** (0.080)	0.093** (0.043)	-0.169*** (0.055)
Protest		-2.042*** (0.230)		-1.390*** (0.159)
IGO Size	-0.105 (0.230)	0.356 (0.235)	0.114 (0.158)	0.424*** (0.161)
Diffusion	0.780** (0.390)	0.946** (0.392)	0.291 (0.268)	0.404 (0.270)
U.S. GDP Percentage	2.112*** (0.408)	3.004*** (0.416)	1.537*** (0.281)	2.141*** (0.286)
Democratic Membership	-0.056*** (0.010)	-0.072*** (0.011)	-0.049*** (0.007)	-0.060*** (0.007)
NGO Supply	0.313*** (0.059)	0.233*** (0.061)	0.197*** (0.041)	0.143*** (0.042)
Post-1990	-0.016 (0.099)	-0.063 (0.099)	-0.012 (0.068)	-0.042 (0.068)
Interaction		0.813*** (0.094)		0.552*** (0.065)
logSigma	0.018 (0.020)	0.003 (0.020)	-0.359*** (0.020)	-0.373*** (0.020)
Constant	0.674 (6.818)	-12.438* (6.959)	-5.034 (4.683)	-13.880*** (4.781)
N	2034	2034	2034	2034
Log Likelihood	-2591.819	-2550.731	-2051.695	-2011.759
AIC	5201.637	5123.461	4121.390	4045.518
BIC	5252.197	5185.257	4171.950	4107.314

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table 3.18: Additional Control Variables

	Overall Access			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.478*** (0.106)	0.360*** (0.109)	0.355*** (0.076)	0.290*** (0.078)
Protest		-0.443*** (0.155)		-0.364*** (0.102)
IGO Size	-2.547** (1.222)	-1.627 (1.239)	-1.904*** (0.720)	-1.344* (0.748)
Diffusion	-0.584** (0.263)	-0.528** (0.263)	-0.395*** (0.135)	-0.360*** (0.134)
U.S. GDP Percentage	-5.162* (2.821)	-3.258 (2.862)	-4.099** (1.635)	-3.103* (1.693)
Democratic Membership	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.020)	-0.031** (0.016)	-0.032** (0.015)
NGO Supply	0.246 (0.254)	0.194 (0.257)	0.772*** (0.183)	0.693*** (0.175)
Membership size	0.008*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Membership affinity	2.315*** (0.889)	2.508*** (0.885)	1.316* (0.718)	1.590** (0.685)
Technical Complexity	0.110*** (0.023)	0.110*** (0.023)	2.992*** (0.230)	2.959*** (0.239)
Local Operations	0.222*** (0.038)	0.226*** (0.037)	1.013*** (0.107)	1.013*** (0.112)
Compliance Monitoring	0.327*** (0.031)	0.327*** (0.031)	3.557*** (0.231)	3.524*** (0.240)
Interaction		0.234*** (0.067)		0.171*** (0.044)
Issue-area dummies?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
IGO fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	No	No
Body fixed effects?	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1957	1957	1957	1957
Adj. R-squared	0.725	0.727	0.921	0.922

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by the organization (in parentheses)

Table 3.19: Heckman Models, Selection Equation

	Heckman Models (Selection Equation)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.051 (0.079)	-0.216** (0.105)	0.564*** (0.127)	0.047 (0.148)
Protest		-1.823*** (0.288)		-2.732*** (0.403)
IGO Size	-0.625** (0.289)	-0.028 (0.303)	0.381 (0.384)	0.910** (0.412)
Diffusion	0.375 (0.493)	0.756 (0.504)	-0.800 (0.729)	-0.909 (0.747)
U.S. GDP Percentage	1.405*** (0.511)	2.350*** (0.534)	6.264*** (0.825)	7.275*** (0.870)
Democratic Membership	-0.043*** (0.014)	-0.059*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.021)	0.016 (0.022)
NGO Supply	0.619*** (0.077)	0.478*** (0.081)	0.299*** (0.096)	0.179* (0.102)
Post-1990	-0.257** (0.124)	-0.298** (0.127)	-0.096 (0.170)	-0.219 (0.176)
Technical Complexity	0.232*** (0.033)	0.180*** (0.034)	0.655*** (0.082)	0.661*** (0.087)
Interaction		0.638*** (0.120)		1.157*** (0.162)
Constant	15.066* (8.584)	-1.957 (8.973)	-17.515 (11.411)	-32.285*** (12.231)
N	2034	2034	1133	1133
$\rho$	1.014	1.210	-1.158	-1.168

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table 3.20: Heckman Models, Outcome Equation

	<b>Heckman Models (Outcome Equation)</b>			
	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
U.S. Preference Divergence	0.221*** (0.062)	-0.179* (0.107)	-0.133* (0.076)	0.143 (0.090)
Protest		-2.094*** (0.480)		1.784*** (0.340)
IGO Size	0.004 (0.236)	0.337 (0.283)	-0.924*** (0.258)	-1.349*** (0.271)
Diffusion	1.243*** (0.407)	1.363*** (0.502)	1.035** (0.440)	0.807* (0.435)
U.S. GDP Percentage	2.073*** (0.427)	3.332*** (0.634)	-1.986*** (0.606)	-2.687*** (0.640)
Democratic Membership	-0.055*** (0.011)	-0.075*** (0.015)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.014)
NGO Supply	0.251*** (0.085)	0.312*** (0.100)	0.279*** (0.063)	0.369*** (0.063)
Post-1990	0.041 (0.105)	-0.078 (0.133)	0.045 (0.116)	0.115 (0.115)
Interaction		0.849*** (0.181)		-0.655*** (0.137)
Constant	-2.329 (6.920)	-12.805 (8.464)	29.236*** (7.790)	41.275*** (8.170)
N	2034	2034	1133	1133
$\rho$	1.014	1.210	-1.158	-1.168

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1



## Chapter 4

# The Alliance in Motion: Qualitative Evidence from the World Bank

“Of course, I don’t think anybody disagrees that the normal procedure ought to be that management should raise complaints with the Board—I mean—the Board should raise complaints with the management.”

[Laughter]

“Wishful thinking.”

*Ernest Stern, World Bank Managing Director  
August 27, 1993 Executive Board Meeting*

In 1993, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) formed two separate campaigns to gain access to the World Bank. One, the “Fifty Years Is Enough” campaign, coincided with the Bretton Woods institutions’ first half-century and deployed a broad assortment of NGOs. Protesters descended on the 1994 annual meeting in Madrid, Spain. NGO leaders staged conspicuous protest tactics like sit-ins alongside targeted lobbying of member-state executive

directors. This campaign demanded “openness, full public accountability and the participation of affected populations in the decision-making standard procedures at the World Bank and the IMF,” (Cleary 1996, 89). But despite its large size, it failed to provide nonstate access to the Bank’s decision-making procedures.

The second, smaller campaign also demanded accountability and access for affected parties but stopped short of demanding access to the Bank’s decision-making. Here, NGOs called for the creation of an independent accountability mechanism with access to non-state actors. Moreover, this second campaign streamlined its strategy by focusing almost exclusively on the United States’ ability to pressure the World Bank (R. Wade 1997). This led to the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel, which granted unprecedented access to NGOs and local actors. Why did the second campaign succeed where the first failed, and why did the United States aid a critical campaign against an institution where it was the largest shareholder?

This dissertation’s argument holds that NGO pressure on an IGO can be associated with increased access, but only when conducted in conjunction with the organization’s hegemonic power. It is therefore the variation in hegemonic preferences that matters most for determining when increased access will occur. Specifically, I expect the hegemon to push for access to counter an increase in risk. The argument suggests a clear temporal sequence: the hegemon should first recognize increased risk, subsequently push for access, and then cease this promotion once participation mitigates the risk.

Chapter 3 provided evidence for this sequence quantitatively. But a quantitative approach cannot identify the precise mechanism by which an increase in risk is associated with an increase in access. Rather than prompting the hegemon to act, the increase in risk may provide opportunities for other actors, like IGO bureaucrats or NGOs, to successfully push for access against the hegemon’s wishes. Under my theoretical framework, the hegemon must therefore exert a significant amount of political capital to achieve the change in institutional

design. Specifically, the alliance of convenience expects explicit coordination between the hegemon and NGOs when the former recognizes the risk and subsequent value in increasing access. In examining this mechanism, the chapter tests the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** NGOs gain more institutional access to an intergovernmental organization when the risk of the United States losing control over the organization increases.

**Hypothesis 2:** The positive effect of increased risk on access is greater when NGOs pressure the organization.

This chapter will test these hypotheses by tracing the process by which NGOs gained access in the World Bank. As one of the most prominent IGOs, the World Bank is deserving of special attention to uncover if the proposed theory applies to an “important” organization. Moreover, the case presents the chance to detail the preferences the United States held toward NGOs. As it is often the most powerful member-state in many organizations, ensuring the United States’ preferences are consistent with the theory is crucial for its broad applicability.

In the World Bank, the United States assumes the hegemonic role, but this position is frequently contested (Xu 2017). As the largest shareholder, the United States’ vote share provides a singular veto over major institutional reforms and, as a senior Bank official once commented, “no major Bank initiative has gone forward without the support of the United States.” (GAO 2016, 60). However, this ability to block certain initiatives does not equate to absolute control over the organization. The Banks’ multilateralism inevitably leads to outcomes that go against the preferences of the United States.

Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of executive board proposals the US voted “no” on, the frequency of which indicates an interesting chain of events. Prior to 1971, the US never once rejected a proposed project. This changes over the next decade as the US begins to mount

opposition, rejecting approximately 10% by the decade’s end. The Treasury Department ceased the publication of voting records from 1981 to 2004. The missing data showcases an intriguing gap in which the US went from opposing a large portion of all proposals to only rejecting a small amount in the 21st century.




Figure 4.1: US “No” Votes in the World Bank

This dissertation’s theoretical framework views the US government as a unitary actor but this assumption often does not reflect the reality of US decision-making with regard to international organizations and, for this chapter’s purposes, the World Bank. Congress exercises influence over financial contributions and the executive director’s behavior, regardless of the executive branch’s preference (CRS 2012, Congress). Meanwhile, the Treasury Department is often accused of jealously guarding its influence over MDB policy and opposing attempts to spread decision-making across agencies (CRS 2011, 2015). This chapter’s process-tracing approach can test the extent to which US policy internally aligns on issues of IGO control and NGO access. The failure of different government branches and agencies to align would suggest that the preferences of the United States are not a primary determinant of access.

The case of the World Bank provides a “hard test” for the above assumption on US

decision-making due to Congress' proclivity for unilateral influence. Legislatures can be a crucial determinant of international cooperation (Lisa L Martin 2000), and Congress plays a particularly important role for the World Bank, compared to other IGOs (Daugirdas 2013). For one, Congress clearly takes an interest in Bank policies, as shown by numerous pieces of legislation that mandate how the US executive director can vote on loan proposals.<sup>1</sup> But Congress also wields the "power of the purse" and controls US contributions to the International Development Association's triennial replenishment.<sup>2</sup> It is therefore possible that any US pressure is largely due to Congressional preferences, rather than collective government policy.

Indeed, the dissertations' argument hinges on the assumption that the United States will actively work to achieve certain goals regarding access. A 1982 Treasury report outlined the process by which the US is able to achieve policy goals in MBDs, which McKeown (2009) later formalized into a coherent checklist of five factors promoting favorable outcomes: the US expends political capital; the US commitment is clear, strong and unified; other major donors support the proposal; Bank management supports the proposal; and Congress is actively involved. These factors highlight the importance of internal consistency alongside favorable external conditions (other donors and Bank management).<sup>3</sup> In testing Hypothesis 1a, this chapter will examine the extent to which these factors are present during periods of change in access. In testing Hypothesis 1b, this chapter will examine the extent to which NGOs influence this policy process.

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<sup>1</sup>Such legislation can also include "voice and vote" mandates which dictate what the US executive director should advocate for outside their formal vote.

<sup>2</sup>Unlike the IBRD, which gathers funds from international capital markets, the IDA relies upon member-state contributions.

<sup>3</sup>This approach follows that of Nielson and Tierney (2003) who examine US influence at the Bank through the alignment of both multiple principals (i.e. different domestic stakeholders) and the collective principal (i.e. other member-states).

To properly test the above hypotheses, a process-tracing approach examines “diagnostic” pieces of evidence that can support or reject alternative hypotheses (Bennett 2010, 208). Evidence in support of alternative explanations will weaken support for my argument and may include: instances of the US resisting access after recognizing increased risk; Bank management increasing access against US wishes; NGO lobbying eclipsing the influence of US officials in regard to the US’ own position and the eventual change in access; and US internal inconsistencies surrounding the level of access. In contrast, evidence of US officials recognizing a loss of control and expending political capital to increase access will provide support for my explanation. US officials should also stop pushing for increased access when the observed risk diminishes. Finally, the presence or absence of coordination between NGOs and US officials will test Hypothesis 1b.

To find evidence for or against my argument, the process-tracing analysis proceeds in three parts. The first tests the argument’s precise sequencing. Here, I examine if the United States recognized or perceived a loss of control over its preferences in the World Bank. This coincides with an examination of the informal role NGOs held within the World Bank prior to their formal admission and whether the United States appreciated their utility in this role. I then examine the formalization of NGO participation, which includes the initial access granted in 1981 in addition to its reinforcement in 1989 and 1993. If my argument is supported, we should find that the United States recognized a loss of influence and subsequently pushed for the formal introduction of NGOs. The chapter’s second part focuses on the debate surrounding the creation of the Inspection Panel, the final bout of formal access provided. This tests the argument’s precise mechanism: the presence of coordination between US officials and NGOs. The chapter’s final part examines the US position toward the Bank after access. This showcases how the US felt it had established control and mitigated unacceptable risk within the organization.

## 4.1 American Influence at the Bank in Decline (1970 – 1979)

American development policy entered the 1970s with multilateralism on its mind. The 1970 US Task Force on International Development recommended an increasing portion of American aid be channeled through the World Bank and related institutions (Presidential Task Force on International Development 1970), a proposal President Nixon agreed with (Nixon 1970). And yet, the 1970s brought a sharp decline in American influence at the World Bank, the preeminent multilateral development bank. A growing membership and changing economic power-levels diminished the United States' weighted vote shares in both the IBRD and IDA, which dipped below 30% for the first time, to 24.5% and 25.3%, respectively. The American Executive Director frequently found himself outvoted as he cast “no” votes for human rights concerns, competition with American producers, and attempted relations for expropriation against American firms, many of which were dictated by Congressional statute.<sup>4</sup>

Beyond the loss of voting power, the United States increasingly had trouble monitoring the Bank's activities. The Treasury Department—overwhelmed by the volume of loan proposals put forth by the Bank's staff—struggled to formulate policy positions on Executive Board votes (Schoultz 1982, 544). And information on proposed loans was often transferred to the American Executive Director orally, without the required written information to properly evaluate a loan (Government Accountability Office 1973, 25). Much less was known about a project's implementation once it was approved. The US Executive Director and other government officials received no reports on a progressing project's performance beyond dis-

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<sup>4</sup>By 1981, the United States had voted against 112 loan proposals due to human rights concerns in the borrowing state. None of the 112 proposals were denied by the Bank's executive board.

bursement and procurement information. According to a 1973 GAO report, monitoring was “sporadic and informal” and reporting to the United States on the “efficiency of operations, success or failure of World Bank and IDA projects, results achieved, etc., is virtually nonexistent (37). That same report also lamented the under-utilization of external monitoring mechanisms such as USAID country-missions, which often maintained little coordination with Bank projects in their own target country (Government Accountability Office 1973, 44).

This stood in stark contrast with the Bank’s practice throughout the 1950s and 1960s—when bilateral aid was the predominant force in development-lending—of working closely with USAID missions in project implementation (Gwin 1997, 218–219). The Treasury Department did, however, respond to the report by saying USAID missions could be utilized to informally influence development projects at various stages of the loan process, although they hoped to make this influence more widespread (Government Accountability Office 1973, 44). But the situation did not improve; in 1977 the Assistant US Treasury Secretary complained that IDA projects, in particular, were “done solely” by the Bank’s staff without proper approval or oversight from the Executive Board (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1977, 105). The United States found itself without the ability to properly monitor projects, just when the Bank was approving more loans to ill-favored countries.

And while the vote-shares and control over project implementation slipped from the United States, attempts to work outside the formal rules did not always meet with success. In the early 1970s, Secretary of State William Rogers directly pressured Bank President Robert McNamara to take two loans to India off the Executive Board agenda.<sup>5</sup> McNamara refused, and the United States was outvoted on the loans once the Board met (Lewis, Webb, and Kapur 1991, 51). And when the United States did manage to successfully exert informal

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<sup>5</sup>At the time, the United States favored Pakistan.



influence, other countries readily critiqued the endeavor. In 1978, Congress was outraged by the US Executive Director's failure to stop a \$60 million loan to Vietnam.<sup>6</sup> McNamara, in an effort to placate a hostile Congress from taking harmful action toward future IDA replenishments, signed a letter that promised a freeze on any future loans to Vietnam. Officials in the US Treasury drafted the letter to ensure it met American preferences (Brown 1992, 189).<sup>7</sup> This act met unanimous protest from the rest of the Bank's Executive Board, who saw it as an attempt by the United States to overtly politicize the Bank (W. Clark 1981, 181). The informal action of the United States proved effective in its singular aim, but the immediate condemnation prevented the strategy's systematic deployment.

In short, the United States faced an eroding influence over loan approvals and project monitoring throughout the 1970s. An evolving membership and subsequently reformed vote share increased the number of disapproved projects, which made the monitoring of implementation all the more critical, despite the diminished USAID influence. Moreover, the sheer amount of World Bank lending—part of which was brought about by an increase in borrowing member-states—increased substantially which made monitoring more difficult. This led some officials to worry about the Bank eclipsing American bilateral development lending while the United States subsequently lost its influence over how Bank funds were used (Lewis, Webb, and Kapur 1991; Gwin 1997). As Gwin (1997) clearly states of the period, “In the view of senior Treasury officials, the Bank was out of control,” (217).

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<sup>6</sup>The United States presented the sole “no” vote against the loan.

<sup>7</sup>McNarama disputes that he signed the letter under pressure from the United States (Lewis, Webb, and Kapur 1991, 61).

## 4.2 The Informal Role of NGOs (1973 – 1981)

Around the same time the United States observed its diminishing influence in the World Bank, it began to appreciate the benefits that came from informal NGO collaboration. NGOs operated within the World Bank on an *ad hoc* basis years prior to their formal accession in 1981. NGOs first worked on World Bank projects in 1973 and eventually attached themselves to 91 different projects by 1981 (P. J. Nelson 1995, 75). Moreover, some select NGOs began to push for broader policy changes within the World Bank as a whole. Specialist workshops involving NGOs began in the mid-1970s to discuss policy formulation on various topics, such as forestry, energy management and poverty reduction (Cleary 1996, 70). Notably, these workshops often covered environmental concerns, which NGOs often stressed but the Bank had done little to address previously.

The United States' own development policy promoted the use of NGOs during this time. The 1973 Foreign Assistance Act specified that development aid should be channeled through NGOs "to the maximum extent possible," (93rd U.S. Congress 1973, 715). And just as NGOs were informally pressing the Bank to address environmental concerns, the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 dictated that "United States assistance to multilateral development banks should promote sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment," (95th U.S. Congress 1977). Actors within the government already appreciated (or were directed to appreciate) the role of NGOs in development.

These broad statutes translated into actual American practices in overseeing projects at the Bank. Projects with explicit USAID intervention in the 1970s—through either co-financing or joint implementation—tended to be the projects with the early NGO participation mentioned above. This pattern is not particularly surprising, given that USAID already worked closely with international and local NGOs in the provision of bilateral aid. An education project in Liberia, approved in 1976, used USAID-financing to pay for CARE to

construct the majority of primary school units related to the project (World Bank 1983a). Similarly, a USAID-financed Bank project in Kenya included the Agricultural Cooperative Development International (ACDI), an American-based NGO, as a consultant (World Bank 1985a). But USAID-NGO coordination extended to local NGOs as well. The Yogyakarta Rural Development Project in Indonesia, approved in 1979, relied upon the Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera-Association for Indonesian Welfare (YIS), an Indonesian NGO, to provide training and technical assistance to local villages (World Bank 1979). USAID co-financed the project with the IDA and conducted two pilot programs prior to the project's official start (World Bank 1990). Notably, Indonesia had recently been re-admitted to the IDA in 1978 at the United States' urging (Department of the Treasury 1982, 179).

Given this experience, American agencies, specifically the Treasury and USAID, would have been keenly aware of what NGO participation in the Bank entailed. Officials in these agencies would have directly observed the benefits NGOs could provide to allied borrowing states, such as Liberia and Indonesia. And the monitoring capabilities of NGOs would have been evident too. CARE was heavily involved in a 1976-81 education project in Haiti (World Bank 1983b). And while USAID was not directly involved in this project, the United States certainly appreciated oversight on the project's implementation, given the corruption concerns the Carter administration continued to voice toward the Duvalier regime. In short, the most powerful state in the organization was not ignorant of informal NGO participation.

The United States' new preferences toward human rights, the environment, and poverty-focused lending, as they regard multilateral development, matched some of the concerns NGOs were informally bringing to the World Bank throughout the 1970s. As theorized, these added preferences could serve to dilute the Bank's normal governance process and insert additional areas for American monitoring and intervention. Indeed, the Treasury Department called for the increase of NGO participation as part of the United States' strategy for MDBs in the 1980s while implicitly acknowledging the potential for NGOs to "increase

the MDBs' operational costs associated with project appraisal and supervision." (Department of the Treasury 1982, 170). Such costs might explain the Bank's cautious approach toward NGO integration at this time (P. J. Nelson 1995, 130). Here, it was the United States, not the World Bank bureaucracy, that suggested the formal integration of NGOs.

Perhaps surprisingly, the general influence of NGOs at this time was questionable. NGOs had not yet begun to "proliferate" as they would in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nor was there a general consensus among NGOs that participation within the World Bank was the ideal strategy. According to Cleary (1996, 72), NGOs, up until the 1990s, were split between "reformists" who wanted to change the World Bank from the inside and "revolutionaries" who wanted to continue critiquing the Bank externally. Again, the US Treasury implicitly acknowledged that NGOs may "hesitate to collaborate with the MDBs, fearing the loss of their policy and operational independence," in their strategy report for the 1980s (Department of the Treasury 1982, 170).

The United States clearly benefited from the *ad hoc* role NGOs played in the World Bank throughout in the 1970s, not the least of which was because it could, through USAID, finance and direct NGO collaboration on certain projects. Moreover, the added preferences of NGOs matched the added initiatives the United States wanted to introduce, including more accountability and concern for the environment. Thus, while the informal role of NGOs may not have proven pivotal in directly influencing the Bank, American delegates and officials likely saw their increased participation as a boon to be brought forth in a time of declining influence. And this decline showed no institutional signs of abating; the United States' vote shares would diminish again in 1980. It is therefore no surprise that the United States approved of Central Projects Note 10.05 in 1981, which formally specified the role NGOs would play inside the World Bank, and the creation of a formal World Bank-NGO Committee, which was established in 1982.

### 4.3 Formalizing Informality: NGO Access (1981 – 1993)

The adoption of Central Projects Note 10.05 in 1981 represents only the initial turn toward formalizing the role of NGOs within the World Bank. But CPN 10.05 and the NGO Committee only provided minimal access to NGOs. The formal access granted to NGOs deepened in 1989 and 1993, with the adoption of Operational Directive 14.70 and the establishment of the Inspection Panel, respectively. The United States did not stand by while this formal access was determined. As the American vote share was again reduced in 1980 and 1990, the United States explicitly pushed for more formal access to be granted to NGOs.<sup>8</sup> Notably, these crucial years of NGO consolidation within the Bank did not include many of the common explanations given for NGO participation.

Whereas NGOs had proven useful for projects the United States had a keen interest and involvement on, the newly gained access of the 1980s allowed NGOs to participate in projects without the direct encouragement of the United States. In 1988, NGOs uncovered substantial misinformation with relation to the Narmada Dam project in India, approved in 1985. Here, NGOs were directly involved in the monitoring of the project, a position they had not held with earlier large-scale energy projects of the 1970s.<sup>9</sup> Critical of the project since its initial implementation, both international and local NGOs expressed serious concern over the project's environmental impact and resettlement & rehabilitation plan (World Bank 1995, 26). As my theory suggests, NGOs provided information that executive directors would not have normally had. Internationally-focused NGOs informed their home country's executive

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<sup>8</sup>Reforms in 1970, 1980 and 1990 reduced the United States' vote shared in the IBRD and IDA by 15.2% and 14.1%, respectively.

<sup>9</sup>For example, NGOs were critical of the 1977 Singrauli power plant project, another large-scale Indian World Bank project, but held little concrete information (Marston 2011).

director of the project's implementation, often feeling as though "Bank staff gave them ever hopeful, rosy reports with emphasis on selected areas of progress while they received very different reports from NGOs." (Wyss 1993, 6). In addition, NGO action diluted the Bank's implementation by forcing corrective actions, which included a commissioned independent review of the project. The review recommended the Bank step back from the project before continuing, which the Bank did through a detailed action plan to rectify the identified problems (Guhan 1997, 354). Overall, NGO monitoring led to a substantial increase in negative information toward the Bank's and borrower's performance. The onslaught of unfavorable information brought about by internal reviews that in turn delayed the project's implementation.

While NGOs enjoyed their newfound access, the United States promoted new policies. In 1985 the Reagan administration unveiled the "Baker Plan," named after Treasury Secretary James Baker, for international debt relief. The Plan promoted increased commercial lending to developing states under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank. The United States simultaneously pushed the environmental agenda laid out by various NGOs, but some borrowing-countries viewed this as a "double-game" by which the United States criticized the Bank's environmental policies as a cover for the unrestricted flow of lending the Baker Plan required (R. Wade 1997, 671).<sup>10</sup> And while this perspective may discount the United States' genuine environmental concerns, the added environmental measures NGOs called for provide a quintessential example of dilution. In fact, the United States appeared to even select which NGO issues received the most attention. Throughout this time, NGO proposals on environmental assessments, investigation panels and information disclosure received US support and subsequent attention from the World Bank staff.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, the United

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<sup>10</sup>The United States executive director cast the first "no" vote out of environmental concerns in 1986, with regard to an electric power sector loan to Brazil.

<sup>11</sup>As my theory would expect, this attention could dilute the normal process of Bank governance by slowing

States did not support other NGO issues, such as structural adjustment and debt relief, which received little to no genuine dialogue in the World Bank, despite many NGOs pushing reforms on these issues far more (P. J. Nelson 1995, 64–65).

Indeed, the United States continued to push for both increased NGO participation and environmental monitoring in the late 1980s. In 1987 Congress passed 22 U.S.C. 262m-5 which called on the American executive directors to “vigorously promote participation by borrowing country NGOs at all stages of preparation for loans that may have adverse environmental or sociocultural impacts.” (Government Accountability Office 1998, 16). And the 1989 Pelosi Amendment specified that international financial institutions must allow for public inspection of a project’s environmental impact 120 days before approval if it is to have US support. In particular, it stressed the importance of NGO monitoring in implementing this measure. The timing coincided with the Bank’s adoption of Operational Policy Note 14.70 in August 1989. The Note deepened the expected collaboration between NGO and the World Bank by specifying and elaborating upon the ways in which NGO-Bank collaboration could and should occur. As Charles Dallara, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the US Treasury put it, “Our insistence on the participation of non-governmental organizations and affected communities in the project cycle will also yield fruits in the form of improved project design and better prospects for implementation success.” (One Hundred First Congress 1990, 43). Overall, the United States was a principal driver in the increased participation of NGOs at the Bank, for reasons beyond specific environmental concerns.

While the United States supported an increase in NGO participation, through both Congressional statutes and Executive direction, Bank staffers recognized the present and

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down staff activities. In 1994, for example, the development of sector specific performance indicators were delayed by six months to give NGOs an opportunity to comment on drafts (Government Accountability Office 1994, 32).

potential roles NGOs held, but did not appear to actively push for increased participation. A 1985 Bank report on early NGO participation recommended that NGOs participate more fully on certain projects, without necessarily increasing the number of projects that included participation, stating, “NGO involvement is not an end in itself but a means to enhance certain important aspects of a project.” (World Bank 1985b, 11–12). Similarly, a 1989 internal review recognized several NGO benefits, but did not include increased access or participation as one of its many policy recommendations. Instead, it emphasized the need to increase Bank “awareness” of NGOs by involving NGOs earlier in project development and strengthening Bank-NGO dialogues (Salmen and Eaves 1988). Thus, while the Bank was not outright opposed to increased NGO access during this time, it clearly struck a more cautious tone when compared to the preferences put forth by the United States. The Bank continued to review its collaboration with NGOs, providing more in-depth reviews with the 1995 “Working with NGOs” report and an official OED review on “NGOs in Bank-supported Projects” in 1998, which generally lauded the positive impact NGOs held (Operations Policy Department 1995; Operations Evaluation Department 1998). Such recommendations, however, appeared after 1993, the year in which NGOs received the greatest boost in institutional access with the creation of the Inspection Panel.

The United States continued to push for more NGO participation up until the establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel, which included the final institutional carve outs for NGOs; after its establishment, formal NGO access has stagnated within the organization (Sommerer and Tallberg 2017).<sup>12</sup> Congress continued to push for NGO inclusion with the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which urged the World Bank to create institutional mechanisms that would cement its relationship with NGOs and local groups

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<sup>12</sup>The Inspection Panel was created alongside reforms for another World Bank body, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) which also included a substantial access to nonstate actors. Together, these institutions represent that final formal push for access.



affected by Bank projects (Government Accountability Office 1998, 25). The establishment of the Inspection Panel—an independent entity that allows NGOs and local actors to submit formal complaints on adverse project outcomes—was controversial at the time. Bank staff and borrowing countries were incredulous, whereas the United States was its main proponent, supported by NGOs who wanted further accountability from the Bank. Prior to the Panel’s creation, US officials continued to acknowledge the risk in the Bank; internal reviews highlighted the failure of the US to achieve favorable loan outcomes in the 1990-1993 period (GAO 1994, 19). The following section details the process behind the Inspection Panel specifically.

#### **4.4 Creating the Inspection Panel (1992 – 1993)**

This section presents an in-depth case study to uncover the mechanisms by which NGOs were granted additional access to the World Bank via the Inspection Panel’s creation. While quantitative analyses can identify the conditions and sequencing under which access is likely to change, they cannot pinpoint the granular process by which institutional rules are amended, particularly the complex interaction I expect to occur between NGOs and the United States. The Inspection Panel is an independent accountability mechanism that can receive civil society complaints regarding project implementation. Created in 1993, the Panel offers a quintessential example of dilution; with no case limit and access provided to a variety of outside actors, a flood of complaints is theoretically possible (Woods 2001, 93). And while affected parties have only filed 157 cases at the time of writing, the possibility of overburdening the Bank with cases was a frequently cited concern prior to its creation. Moreover, the threat of complaints incentivized staff members to “panel-proof” projects before implementation, adding another task for their portfolio (R. Wade 1997, 729).

What do I expect to find regarding US strategy and NGO coordination? A 1981 Treasury

Report details American control across multilateral development banks, with an emphasis on the World Bank and the conditions under which the United States can best achieve its objectives. Specifically, the United States is more likely to achieve a significant policy objective when: 1. The US commitment is clear, strong, unified; 2. The US expends political capital; 3. Other major donors support the proposal; 4. Bank management supports the proposal; and 5. Congress is actively involved (Department of the Treasury 1982; McKeown 2009, 282).<sup>13</sup> If my argument is supported, NGOs will facilitate the fulfillment of the above conditions on the path to creating the Inspection Panel. Evidence against my proposed mechanisms would include the complete exclusion of NGOs from the above conditions, or factors that change the drivers of access, such as the Bank staff bringing NGOs in, or the complete capitulation of the Executive Branch to NGO and Congressional demands. In short, the alliance of convenience requires close coordination between NGOs, Congress, and the various Executive Branch actors alongside sustained pressure from the United States overall.

Indeed, US pressure was both a necessary and sufficient condition for reform at the Bank, at least from the American perspective. In April 1993, Patrick Coady, the outgoing Executive Director under the Bush administration stated his view clearly:

“Without US leadership, it’s hard for the Bank to change. The Bank resists change. Unless there is some force applied, nothing happens. I think that this is often interpreted by many others—other Directors, other countries—as a form of heavy-handedness. Such feelings are nothing new. There has been a long history of tension between the US and the Bank’s other member countries.”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>As the report details, the first of these must be present in virtually every American initiative to have a chance of success, acting as a necessary condition. Combinations of the other factors subsequently increase the chance of success, acting as sufficient conditions (see Table 4.1).

<sup>14</sup>Patrick E. Coady, interview by William Becker and David Milobsky, April 19, 1993, interview 1, transcript, World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories.

As the following case will reveal, this statement applied well to the Panel’s creation, albeit with close NGO coordination. NGOs lobbied members of Congress, which had the dual effect of creating a unified US front and convinced the Bank’s management to accept the change. NGOs then shared their preferences with Treasury and White House officials, but the Executive Branch was careful to mediate NGO concerns with US interests. Crucially, access was only guaranteed when Executive Branch officials lobbied other donor states by expending significant political capital. As Table 4.1 summarizes, NGOs and US officials simultaneously constructed a unified American front in support of increased access, while each group separately influenced different factors that would increase the probability of success.

Table 4.1: The Alliance of Convenience and the Creation of the Inspection Panel

<b>Factors Promoting Outcome</b>	US Commitment Clear, Strong, Unified	US Expends Political Capital	Other Donors Support Proposal	Congress Actively Involved	Bank Management Supports Proposal
<b>Executive Branch Coordination</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
<b>Significant NGO Activity</b>	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes (via Congress)

Prior to the Inspection Panel’s establishment, a regular NGO-US government dialogue had formed within the Bank. When provided with an early draft of a major position paper, the American Executive Director to the World Bank would often call NGOs together to debrief them (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 366). During the Inspection Panel’s formation,

prominent NGOs were meeting with various US agencies monthly on the activities of the various multilateral development banks, and on a more regular–yet informal–basis with Treasury Department officials and the US Executive Director’s office (Department of the Treasury 2018b, 18). However, NGO influence on the Executive Branch was often curbed. While Treasury and White House officials listened intently on NGO concerns regarding the environment, they did not support other NGO issues, such as structural adjustment and debt relief, which received little to no genuine dialogue in the World Bank, despite many NGOs pushing reforms on these issues far more (P. J. Nelson 1995, 64–65).

The drive to form an independent accountability body for the World Bank began in the spring of 1992 and moved quickly over the next year and a half. The Bank accepted its first outside inquiry into its implementation with the Morse Commission, an independent review team that investigated the disastrous project performance of the Sardar Saraovar project in India’s Narmada Valley. The Commission released its report on June 18, 1992, detailing the poor policymaking from Bank staff with particular attention given to its negative environmental impact (World Bank 2018b). That same day, the Environmental Defense Fund, flanked by supporting NGOs, called for the creation of a permanent appeals mechanism that would hear complaints from non-state actors (World Bank 1992; Udall and Lammers 1992). In October, the US Executive Director stated his extreme dissatisfaction with the Bank’s performance to the Executive Board, yet the Board still voted to continue the project’s implementation (D. Clark 2003, 5).

One month later, the Wapenhans Report, commissioned by Bank President Preston, issued another substantial critique of the Bank’s performance, detailing the “approval culture” that had formed among Bank staff and incentivized getting projects out the door without proper attention given to their design and implementation (Wapenhans 1992). On February 10, 1993, the executive directors of Chile, Germany, Malaysia and the Netherlands submitted a memo in response to the report that outlined a new evaluation unit to be housed within

the Bank.<sup>15</sup> A staff report analyzing the proposal concluded that there was no need for such a unit, proposing an *ad hoc* procedure of complaints instead (Shihata 1994). Neither proposal included space for non-state actors.<sup>16</sup>

Meanwhile, NGOs directly sought to change the Bank's accountability from the outside. Two separate campaigns were planned. The first, "Fifty Years is Enough," campaign began in the fall of 1993—to culminate with the 50-year anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions—and brought together a wide range of NGOs into a broad protest that often vacillated between different tactics and objectives, with much disagreement across groups (Cleary 1996, 89). A second, more focused campaign set a principal goal of establishing a permanent accountability mechanism and emphasized a dialogue with the United States. Led by the US-based Environmental Defense Fund and Center for International Environmental Law, this campaign lobbied Congress to leverage its approval of the next IDA replenishment, gaining a valuable ally with Representative Barney Frank, chairman of the relevant Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy (D. Clark 2003, 7). Congress made good on the replenishment threat, and Bank staff reversed their initial skepticism and drafted a proposal that was secretly shared with members of Congress prior to its presentation to the Board (R. Wade 1997, 727).<sup>17</sup>

While the Bank staff now supported increased access, the Executive Board needed to approve any major reforms. The Board met the following July to discuss various proposals

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<sup>15</sup>Aside from the largest shareholders, most Executive Board Directors speak on behalf of a larger country-bloc. However, for the sake of readability, I have opted to only reference the nationality of the appointed director at the time.

<sup>16</sup>Separately, on February 15, US President Clinton issued a Presidential Review Directive to evaluate American environmental policy, to include a thorough review of US control over multilateral development banks completed by the Treasury Department (A. Lake 2010).

<sup>17</sup>World Bank President Preston circulated the official memo supporting the creation of an accountability mechanism on June 10, 1993, the same day the IDA's replenishment was approved by Congress (D. Clark 2003, p. 8).

for the accountability mechanism, and while it was clear a body of some sort would be created, access to NGOs was contested, much less guaranteed. Borrowing states stood firmly opposed to increased access and the subsequent “demand-driven” nature of complaints that could arise. Kuwait stressed “the serious risk of inviting complaints from a flourishing array of NGOs seeking to further all sorts of agendas,” (World Bank 2018e, 100). The United States responded with an endorsement to involve “affected parties,” (108–109). But other donor states remained skeptical. The Netherlands expressed concern over NGOs using the new body as a personal tribunal. Germany added, “And, we have to limit access. It would not be fruitful to permit each and every interested party. Otherwise, we might be taken hostage by outside forces,” (180). By the meeting’s end, the vast majority of the Board, in both members and voting power, remained opposed to or, at best, skeptical of increased access through the Panel.

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration formed its strategy. In the face of growing uncertainty over Bank activities, a draft Treasury report commissioned by Clinton’s National Security Council provided several policy options to strengthen US oversight, including the incorporation of NGOs to “evaluate the extent to which the MDBs are fulfilling recent policy commitments, meeting US legislative benchmarks, and accomplishing their mission to finance sustainable development,” (Department of the Treasury 2018b, 22). By July 26, White House officials had designated this as a top priority in their draft comments, stressing the importance of encouraging development banks to “make greater use of NGOs, particularly local ones, in developing, implementing, and monitoring projects,” and sponsoring the establishment of an independent inspection panel at the World Bank (Council on Environmental Quality 2018a, 6). However, the Treasury report did not endorse all NGO priorities—carefully recording if NGOs supported or opposed certain policy choices—and reiterated that fully appeasing NGOs would lead to a loss of legitimacy among the Bank’s membership, who may perceive the US as acting only on its own behalf due to domestic NGO pressure

(Council on Environmental Quality 2018a; Department of the Treasury 2018b, 9).

By August 2, Bank staff had compiled a draft proposal based on the July executive board discussion, with another meeting to be held in late August. NGOs reviewed the proposal and Jim Barnes—of Friends of the Earth—messed Eileen Claussen, Special Assistant to the President Clinton and Senior Director for Global Environmental Affairs, on August 12 to meet on the proposal (Council on Environmental Quality 2018c). A meeting was set for August 23, just three days before the next executive board meeting on the topic. But NGOs continued to pepper the Executive Branch with communiqués. High-level Treasury officials Susan Levine and Jeffrey Shafer met with NGOs twice the second week of August to discuss next steps (Council on Environmental Quality 2018b). On August 20, Lori Udall, of the Environmental Defense Fund, sent Claussen comments—compiled with several other influential groups—on the proposal, asking that “The Clinton Administration should insist on improvements to the existing proposal, as outlined below. The Clinton Administration should use all diplomatic channels to work with other member governments to revise the current proposal,” (Council on Environmental Quality 2018d, 6).

Yet this pipeline of NGO contact represented just one aspect of the American strategy. After being called by Barbara Bramble, of the National Wildlife Foundation, Aimée Christensen, then an “Intern for International Issues,” sent a memo to Claussen. Christensen, who briefed memoranda for President Clinton, had an ear to all relevant Executive Branch actors. Mark Rentschler, Assistant Director for Sustainable Development for Treasury, remained skeptical of what could be accomplished by meeting with NGOs, since it was not the preferences of the United States that held back access, but other member-states on the Board (Council on Environmental Quality 2018b). The administration had David Harwood, of the State Department, send cables to “urge other board members to work with us,” (1). NGOs sent Harwood last-minute informational reports, and he had to move quickly to give country representatives time to respond by the next Board meeting on August 26. Meanwhile,

Treasury officials deployed their own lobbying effort, although they were constrained since the Senate had not yet confirmed an executive director, which led to the interesting phenomena of high-level Treasury Officials, like Levine and Shafer, conducting the diplomatic ground-work themselves (Council on Environmental Quality 2018a, 1).

The influence of this work was evident by the Board's discussions on the topic, although the requisite votes were not yet assured. On August 26, many borrowing states remained firm in their opposition to access: Saudi Arabia was "not comfortable with the perception that Executive Directors could be viewed on equal footing with outside audiences," while Algeria was reluctant to accept complaints from any "third parties," (World Bank 2018c, 40). The United States was firm on the present proposal's carve-out for outside complaints but reassured the room that access would not elevate said actors to the Board's level (21). This rhetoric appeared effective; the following day, India cited the previous discussion as evidence for the importance of including affected parties in the mechanism. Other states also came around, albeit with conditions. France acknowledged the difficulties that would arise from direct access but acceded to the proposal with certain limitations. Japan and Russia agreed. And yet, despite such progress, access was not guaranteed. China wished for the Board to retain exclusive complaint powers, and the Central African Republic did not see why NGOs could not simply lodge complaints through their country's respective Board member (World Bank 2018d).

One final bout of lobbying from the Executive Branch secured access. On September 1, Shafer—then Assistant Secretary of International Affairs for the Treasury and acting Executive Director to the Bank—wrote to US officials in the State Department, USAID, and the White House to say that, while other member-states had previously blocked the transparency initiative in the Bank, an "intensive Treasury Department lobbying effort with other members of the Board" had made significant gains, and positive progress on the Inspection Panel's adoption was expected by late September or early October (Department



of the Treasury 2018a, 1–2). The prediction proved accurate. Enough votes were secured once the United Kingdom reluctantly gave its vote in exchange for American support to host the 1997 General Summit in Hong Kong (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 34). On September 22, the Executive Board narrowly adopted IBRD 93-10 and IDA 93-6, officially creating the Inspection Panel with substantial access for third-party complaints.

The US continued its support for access in other areas alongside the Inspection Panel's creation. In 1991, the White House explicitly instructed the US delegation to push for access in the negotiations over the creation of the Bank's new Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Clinton Presidential Records 2012a, 3).<sup>18</sup> The White House continued to receive communications from and hold calls with NGOs in conjunction with other government agencies throughout the negotiations, which continued into 1993 (Clinton Presidential Records 2012c). The NGO-government coordination continued to be interrelated; White House officials received NGO memos the same week they conversed with Treasury officials. In mark-ups of Treasury memos, White House officials stressed the inclusion of NGOs as a priority in the new institution (Clinton Presidential Records 2012b, 1). Alongside the Panel's creation, the GEF restructuring represents the final bout of formal access provided to NGOs.

## 4.5 After Access

The US exhibited a change in posture after the reforms of the early 1990s. This shift entailed two significant developments. First, in contrast to the doubt of the 1970s and 1980s, reports suggest the United States now recognized only limited risk and believed its interests were supported. And second, the US amended its preference for increased access to increased transparency. Often, this new preference for transparency did not involve changes

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<sup>18</sup>The GEF officially became a separate institution under the World Bank in 1994. Thus, the negotiations—and US preference for access—cut across two different presidential administrations.

in institutional design to the Bank. Rather, it entailed directing the Treasury department to increase its monitoring and reporting requirements. This also stood in contrast to the earlier crises involving the US' inability to monitor Bank activities. In short, we can observe the US leaning into its intervention capabilities while simultaneously maintaining a more optimistic outlook on Bank policy.

A 1994 GAO report reviewed the early 1990s Bank reforms. In addition to participation, the reforms included increased monitoring for the purposes of improving project performance, something the US explicitly pushed for alongside other donor states (Government Accountability Office 1994, 16). The emphasis on performance outcomes signaled increased US attention toward project implementation, an area where NGOs have more influence.<sup>19</sup> A later CRS report identified the crucial role NGOs play in such monitoring for the US, stating that “The Treasury and other agency staff... are highly dependent upon notification and/or feedback from NGOs to identify projects with potential problems, and to document the nature of problems in the field,” (Sanford and Fletcher 1998, 35).

This post-reform period marks a shift in the US risk assessment and switch from its prior support of access. The shift on risk is indicated by a 1995 report on American business participation on project procurement, which lauded the US' strong position in various MDBs (Government Accountability Office 1995). This stood in stark contrast to the last report concerning procurement which warned of rapidly diminishing opportunities for US firms (Government Accountability Office 1974). Meanwhile, the US deprioritized NGO interests on access. A general report on World Bank reforms acknowledged NGO dissatisfaction with the Inspection Panel, but made no recommendations for further reforms (Government Accountability Office 1995, 16). In a private briefing with the Treasury, cabinet secretaries

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<sup>19</sup>The next chapter quantitatively compares the effect of participation in project implementation compared to other stages of the loan process.

remarked that, on certain MDB issues, “NGOs overestimate how far the U.S. can or should push,” (Department of the Treasury 2017, 18).

A landmark GAO report further solidified the comfortable US position toward the Bank in 1996. Identifying a period of discontent in the 1980s, the report found most US lending priorities were achieved in the recent post-Cold War era (Government Accountability Office 1996, 17). While acknowledging the necessary compromises that stem from a multilateral environment, the report concluded that “many analysts agree that U.S. views on the overall direction of the Bank’s operations have generally prevailed,” (62). The report’s main recommendation called upon the Treasury Department to increase its oversight over project performance and, if necessary, its intervention in Bank policy, stating:

“To ensure that Bank reforms have the desired impact, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury monitor and periodically report to the Congress measurable indicators of progress, such as the extent to which (1) the Bank allocates financing to those countries that make Bank-advocated policy and market reforms, (2) projects substantially achieve policy and market reform objectives, (3) project design problems decrease, and (4) implementation problems are identified and resolved early in the project cycle. If the indicators do not show satisfactory progress, the Secretary should report on the actions being taken by the Department to improve progress,” (64).

The US posture shift continued into the presidential administrations of the 21st century. The 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act (PL 108-199) instructed the Treasury Department to pursue transparency goals in the World Bank. The Treasury pursued this directive with regard to individual projects, individual countries and the Bank as a whole (Department of the Treasury 2005, 1–2). NGOs, particularly local groups, were instrumental in alerting the Treasury to necessary interventions on specific projects (Department of the Treasury 2010). The Bush administration later leveraged the 14th IDA replenishment negotiations to push for more performance requirements and transparency initiatives in the IDA (Weiss

2007).<sup>20</sup> A seven year investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee found that IFIs, including the Bank, supported US interests although further transparency initiatives were still recommended (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2010). Three years later, the Treasury Department reported positively on recent Bank reforms related to transparency and openness (Department of the Treasury 2013).

While the push for increased transparency does not maintain a direct link to NGO access, it stands to reason that said changes would, if anything, only increase the effect of NGO dilution, given the weight both the Bank management and Treasury Department give to NGO monitoring and reporting throughout lending operations. In particular, the US calls for the Treasury Department to increase its own monitoring in the name of transparency suggests a rejuvenated penchant for intervention.

Indeed, the American focus on transparency and accountability did not neglect the importance of NGO participation. As mentioned above, NGO participation was critical to the Treasury Department's monitoring operations. And while the US did not push for any formal rule changes regarding access, it did advocate for increased NGO participation within the already existing rules. In 2001, a Congressional Research Report emphasized the legislation mandating the US executive director to promote "More participation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in project planning, implementation, and assessment and more cooperation on environmental issues. More staff assigned to borrower countries and more staff coordinating directly with NGOs," (Sanford 2007, 5).

This pattern of the US supporting increased transparency to bolster prior increases in access continued into more recent Bank reviews (Department of the Treasury 2019; Gov-

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<sup>20</sup>Often calls for further transparency ask for increased reporting requirements from Bank management and borrowing countries, although these initiatives also apply to the Treasury Department. For example, the Bush administration ordered the Department to resume publishing the US ED's executive board voting record.

ernment Accountability Office 2022). In contrast to prior periods, no documentation after the Inspection Panel’s creation suggested increases in access to non state actors. Rather, the various US agencies with ties to the Bank continue to suggest different variations on transparency initiatives, usually revolving around creating new information sharing procedures from either the Bank’s management or the Treasury Department’s oversight.<sup>21</sup> While the specific “asks” vary over time, the preference for more transparency has been a constant. The result is a posture that seeks to capitalize upon previous institutional changes without making substantial reforms. And the World Bank has remained the United States’ favored multilateral lending institution for providing foreign aid throughout the 21st century (R. M. Nelson 2020). In short, after the final change in access, the US ceased its support for new increases while supporting transparency initiatives. This support coincided with the consistent viewpoint that US interests in the Bank remained secure.

## 4.6 Discussion

The US has maintained a dynamic relationship with the World Bank and the role of NGOs within it. As the US assessment of the Bank soured in the 1970s and 1980s, US officials recognized the importance of informal NGO participation in project performance and monitoring. This led to a decade of reform in which the United States advocated for formal NGO access to the Bank. This effort was not preordained. Bank management and other member states initially resisted. Their acquiescence required the expenditure of political capital from the US executive branch, threats from Congress, and outside pressure from NGOs themselves.

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<sup>21</sup>The distinction between the US preference for access in time T and transparency at T+1 aligns with prior research examining the relationship between NGOs and transparency initiatives in IGOs. Grigorescu (2007, 2015) finds that NGOs activities are generally correlated with increased transparency, but NGOs themselves do not appear to cause said transparency. As shown in this chapter, NGOs clearly play a role in implementing transparency initiatives. But they are less influential in the adoption of said initiatives.

The growth in access ceased when the US perception of the World Bank's activities improved.

These findings provide evidence against two crucial alternative hypotheses that quantitative methods, like those used in chapter 3, have difficulty rejecting. The first concerns the agency of IGO bureaucrats and assumes they hold a preference for increased access, possibly due to the inter-organizational alliances that can form and the increase in resources that can stem from them (Lall 2017). Here, bureaucrats capitalize on any hegemonic loss of control to push for NGO access *against* the wishes of the hegemon. In this scenario, the increase in US risk leads to access because the loss of control gives bureaucrats more room to maneuver around US preferences. However, the empirical record outlined above finds that while bureaucrats eventually accepted access, this only occurred after substantial pressure from the United States, notably Congress.

The second explanation concerns the influence of NGOs and their ability to lobby US officials. As currently specified, the alliance of convenience identifies US-NGO coordination as a crucial pathway by which access is increased. However, this mechanism assumes NGO lobbying serves to largely support the independently formed hegemonic preference for access that emerges after an increase in risk. Alternatively, NGO lobbying may instead alter US preferences. Here, US support for access is driven by NGO demands, not an increase in risk. As described above, NGOs, particularly those based in the United States, did maintain a direct line of access to several US government officials. However, this lobbying link did not lead to an unqualified preference for access from the US. After the Inspection Panel's creation, the US ceased its support for significant access changes, despite a consistent NGO preference for further reforms.

The qualitative process-tracing approach also allowed for the examination of US decision-making's inner-workings. While different executive branch agencies contribute to US foreign policy, this dissertation's theoretical framework views the United States as a unitary actor. This chapter showed how this assumption is largely correct, if only as a matter of necessity:

the empirical evidence showcased how the various domestic actors must be in alignment if the US is to successfully change an IGO's rules.<sup>22</sup> The degree of coordination required provides further evidence against the proposition that NGO lobbying alone can drive changes in access. NGO participation cannot simply be a US preference for access to change; it must be a US priority.

In sum, the qualitative evidence presented here supports the theoretical mechanisms concerning the predictions surrounding access (H1 & H2). As chapter 3 showed quantitatively, access follows risk in the World Bank, but this result does not appear to be a consequence of bureaucrats or NGOs taking advantage of the US' weakened position. Rather, the US exerts a significant amount of political capital to change the institutional rules for its own benefit. However, this chapter did not address the *impact* of access. Where do NGOs participate once they are allowed inside an organization? And does their participation harm or help US interests? The US may perceive the World Bank as a less risky investment after access, but it is not yet evident if the resulting participation actually changes political outcomes. The next chapter continues the empirical focus on the World Bank to test this proposition quantitatively.

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<sup>22</sup>This finding matches that of Myrick and Weinstein (2022), who find that overcoming gridlock within the foreign policy bureaucracy is the main determinant of successful human rights diplomacy.

## Chapter 5

# The Alliance in Action: Quantitative Evidence from the World Bank

“While government-NGO collaboration can enhance the quality of Bank-supported operations, it may not be possible in every country situation.” – *World Bank Good Practice Note 14.70*

Shortly after the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, the World Wildlife Fund prepared to use World Bank funds to lead a major biodiversity project in the Philippines. The WWF designed the project, but the government insisted the project use domestic NGOs before the WWF could begin implementation. The recently formed network “NGOs for Integrated Protected Areas Incorporated” (NIPA) implemented the project instead. The switch proved calamitous. As the project’s completion report stated,

“The decision to implement the project through a new consortium of Filipino NGOs rather than an already proven international NGO should have been accompanied by the realization that such a change in management responsibility could not be successful without significant changes to the project design.” (World Bank 2004, 12)



The project's original design called for NGO collaboration, which the Philippines could not remove. The Philippines did, however, limit the WWF's participation. This decision led to poor project performance and the failure to achieve all development objectives. Why did the Philippines make such a costly decision regarding the involvement of NGOs?

This dissertation argues that hegemonic powers like the United States can minimize the risk an IGO's activities entail by introducing NGOs into the organization. Chapter 3 provided evidence that NGO access follows an increase in risk for the United States. Chapter 4 focused on the World Bank to trace the process by which the United States recognizes and responds to said risk via NGO participation. However, the quantitative results from chapter 3 and qualitative results from chapter 4 cannot provide systematic evidence regarding participation's determinants and impact *after* access. If the alliance of convenience truly reduces American risk, we should expect to see NGO participation associated with US political interests. This chapter continues the emphasis upon the World Bank to test the argument's claims on the impact of participation. Specifically, the following hypotheses are tested:

**Hypothesis 3:** NGOs are more likely to participate in IGO activities that present a higher risk to the United States.

**Hypothesis 4:** NGO participation aids (harms) United States allies (adversaries).

The World Bank provides a valuable case for analyzing the dynamics of NGO participation systematically. The different components of the Bank's lending process—from a loan's initiation, to its borrowing conditions, and finally to enforcement of said loans via the disbursement of funds—provides distinct opportunities for NGOs to participate more or less meaningfully. In the case of project enforcement, different development projects provide a consistent unit of analysis through which I can collect granular data on NGO participation.

As the chapter will describe, the variation in Bank's participation is far from uniform.

With regard to my theoretical explanation, the World Bank provides the ideal case to study participation's connection to US influence. While the World Bank is a multilateral institution, the United States holds significant influence over the organization. The US maintains the largest vote-share on the executive boards for the IBRD and IDA, retaining veto-power over any significant institutional changes.<sup>1</sup> US officials frequently cite the World Bank as its preferred multilateral lending arm for foreign aid (Nelson and Weiss 2011; R. M. Nelson 2020). The Treasury Department's own reviews indicate that the World Bank supports US interests to a greater degree than other multilateral development banks (Department of the Treasury 1982, 2005, 2010). If NGOs do not aid US interests in the World Bank, they are unlikely to aid them in other international organizations.

This chapter proceeds to quantitatively test the theory's predictions throughout World Bank project implementation, also known as the "enforcement" stage of the loan cycle. I first outline the independent variable that will proxy American influence across the various analyses. The chapter then details project implementation, the area in which NGOs are expected to have the greatest impact. This section first describes the data collected for the analysis and then proceeds to test the relevant hypotheses regarding both participation's determinants and impact.

The implementation of loans provides a clear role for participating NGOs. The expected dilution provided by the alliance of convenience should be at its greatest extent. As one Congressional report on multilateral development banks stated, "they [the Treasury] are highly dependent upon notification and/or feedback from NGOs to identify projects with potential problems, and to document the nature of problems in the field," (Sanford and Fletcher

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<sup>1</sup>This veto power does not transfer to votes approving development loans, which only require a simple majority.

1998, p. 35). In addition, my theory expects the threat of intervention to preemptively prompt borrowing states to cooperate or conflict with participating NGOs. Unlike informal governance expectations, the alliance of convenience does not require explicit intervention from the US in every case. NGO participation on World Bank enforcement, regardless of overt member states intervention, should lead to politicized outcomes that favor the United States.<sup>2</sup>

These expectations loosely follow Stone's (2011, 134) expectations on the use of informal governance in the International Monetary Fund, in which loan enforcement is expected to be most affected by American influence. I differ from Stone in two ways. First, I expect the threat of intervention to be stronger in the World Bank's enforcement due to the length of long-term nature of development projects; the additional time for completing projects, sometimes upwards of ten years, provides more opportunities for monitoring and intervention from invested member states. Second, I hold no expectation that NGOs will find a meaningful role in conditionality decisions and therefore do not expect my argument to apply as the informal governance literature does.

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<sup>2</sup>The theory's predictions should not apply equally to each component of the Bank's lending operations. The initiation of loans are voted upon by the relevant executive board in which member states are formally limited to their ascribed vote share. While powerful states can "buy" votes, projects are predominantly crafted and presented by Bank staff, which leaves little room for lobbying maneuvers. Rather, powerful countries like the US tend to "advocate" for certain policies and countries prior to a loan's presentation, although this is no guarantee of satisfaction (R. M. Nelson 2012). Thus, while NGOs do advocate for certain lending decisions and will often coordinate with the US executive director on loan approvals (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 366), this aspect of the Bank's policy process does not afford the most non-state influence. Regarding conditionality, the literature expects little to no opportunity for direct member state influence over the Bank's loan conditionally, except in retrospect punishment toward the organization's staff (Clark and Dolan 2021). NGOs, presumably, hold less influence than member states and I therefore do not expect dilution to occur in conditionality decisions to the same extent as loan initiation or enforcement.

## 5.1 Measuring American Influence

This chapter presents two separate analyses on the determinants and impact of participation in the World Bank. While the position of NGOs and other variables differ between these analyses, the importance of US influence as an explanatory variables remains consistent. Thus, while the predictions regarding the effect of US influence will change for each outcome, the measures used to proxy for US influence will remain the same. To test my hypotheses regarding the relationship between participation and US influence, I again turn to the use of UNGA ideal point distance as a measure of state preferences.

Ideological (dis)similarity constitutes my main measure of US preferences *vis-a-vis* World Bank borrowing countries. UN voting provides a uniform measurement of US political relationships with other states as all World Bank members participate in the UNGA and certain member-states are not granted more or fewer votes per resolution. I use data on UN ideal point estimates from (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017), which measures the distance in ideological UN voting and is more appropriate than using UN vote alignment alone as it accounts for “important” votes and changes in voting practices over time. It is important to note that as an ideal point *distance*, a score further from the US indicates that country as a greater adversary.

UN ideal point distances are particularly suited for measuring political relationships within the World Bank. While other measures of US influence exist, they are often specific to the organization in question. For example, other studies have used economic measures like sensitivity to domestic financial sectors (Copelovitch 2010a, 2010b) and aggregate trade (Stone 2011) to examine geopolitical influence within the International Monetary Fund. Since the IMF can halt financial contagion, it follows that the US would prefer it to favor countries with closer economic relations. In contrast, the World Bank provides long-term developmental lending that lacks the immediacy of IMF lending. Furthermore, the United

States has long held that the World Bank should lend the most to the world's poorest countries, not states it maintains a close economic connection with (Congressional Research Service 2007).

In addition, UN voting provides a pure proxy in that its patterns should not influence a state's participation in the World Bank itself. The empirical evidence for explicit multilateral "vote buying" only applies to the UN Security Council (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a). Thus, while bilateral aid flows may influence UNGA voting (Carter and Stone 2015), multilateral aid should not hold the same influence. Meanwhile, while other economic measures like bilateral foreign aid may proxy for American development interests, its proximity to actual developmental outcomes may confound a state's geopolitical position within the Bank. Indeed, bilateral and multilateral aid often serve as substitutes, either for domestic (Milner and Tingley 2013) or geopolitical reasons (Dreher et al. 2022). For these reasons, I follow other studies of US influence in the World Bank and use UN ideal point distance as my main independent variables (Clark and Dolan 2021; Kilby 2009, 2013).

There is evidence that countries receiving large World Bank adjustment loans (a small proportion of total projects implemented) vote in line with G7 countries (Dreher and Sturm 2012). While it is unclear if this is the result of explicit "vote-buying" by the G7, it draws attention to potential endogeneity concerns. Such concerns are problematic for studies that expect US interests to directly influence Bank policy choices, like loan approval and conditionality decisions. In contrast, this chapter emphasizes the borrowing state's project implementation. Here, the theoretical mechanism expects borrowing states to alter *their own* behavior based on their political relationship to the US. If a state amended its UNGA voting behavior to receive a favorable loan, that vote remains a viable signal into that state's political relationships. In other words, the theoretical expectations are not concerned with the pathway by which borrowing states become more or less aligned with the US.

The above discussion highlights the utility of UN ideal point distance as an indicator

of US preferences and suggests theoretical reasons for why other proxies, like economic relations, are not suitable for the World Bank's context. UN ideal point distance also avoids empirical problems that may arise with other indicators. Previous chapters used security arrangements, treaty distance, and IGO membership ties to proxy the degree of risk for a given organization. Applied to IGOs, these indicators provide significant variation over time as an organization's membership changes. However, when applied to individual countries, these measures lack the within-unit variation required to test my theory's expectations. Moreover, data limitations in some alternative variables reduce the sample size by several hundred observations, a large amount for a dataset that only maintains approximately 1,000 observations total.<sup>3</sup>

## 5.2 Examining World Bank Enforcement

The approval of loans—both in number and in size—is only the first step in the Bank's allocation of resources. After approval, loans are disbursed over time to ensure the proper implementation of projects by the borrowing state. Providing the total lump sum at once may create a moral hazard problem and disincentivize proper achievement of loan objectives. Thus, the bank “enforces” its loans through the gradual roll-out of disbursements. In theory, a positive performance begets more disbursements, while a poor performance prompts a freeze. In practice, loan disbursements can vary on a number of other metrics. For example, a lackluster project may end up receiving more disbursements than its original loan commitment to save it from failing entirely.

Analyzing enforcement allows for the clear observation of participation on individual

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<sup>3</sup>The scale of missingness for these variables is large enough to where one cannot reasonably assume they are missing at random. Moreover, missingness greater than 5-10% of the sample is generally problematic. Listwise deletion is, therefore, not appropriate.

lending operations. NGOs maintain a clear role on the implementation of lending operations, one that is not explicitly provided in loan approval and conditionality decisions. While NGOs can influence the loan approval process (R. Wade 1997; R. H. Wade 2009), their role is informal and not observable beyond anecdotal evidence. But NGOs are formally tied to individual lending operations, maintaining clear contracts and roles in projects they are associated with. Here, individual projects constitute the unit of analysis.

I also expect the alliance of convenience's dynamics to be at their strongest throughout the enforcement stage of the project cycle, compared to the design or approval stage. The United States' ability to intervene on behalf of its national interest should be at its greatest, compared to loan approval and conditionality decisions (Stone 2011, 179). Development projects are long-term lending operations, with some taking upwards of ten years to be finished. The elongated nature of enforcement decisions should provide the United States with plentiful opportunities to intervene both formally—via board approval of additional disbursements—and informally, by placing pressure on the Bank staff to influence disbursements. For example, while the US was unable to block IBRD loans to Iran from 2000-2003, the loan's actual disbursements proved to be far lower than originally promised. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury William Schuerch's testimony on this case hints at the US' ability to intervene:

“If I were going to be aggressive, I could try to assert that the United States has been successful behind the scenes in order to stop the disbursement or slow it down substantially. There are \$390 million or so of undisbursed resources out of the (then) \$432 million that has been approved. ... I think if you were to ask that question of bank management, they would tell you that Iran is a particularly difficult place to do business in, and they are having trouble getting started and starting up programs,” (Weiss and Sanford 2012, 2).

According to my theory, participation facilitates the hegemon's ability to intervene. Borrowing states, aware of this possibility, should be most likely to update their risk calculation

during a project's implementation and work more or less effectively with NGO partners.

## Data Collection

For this chapter, I collected a random sample of World Bank lending operations from 1982-2011.<sup>4</sup> To account for the non-stationary quantity of Bank projects over time, the sample randomly collected 10% lending operations per year. Collecting a random sample is compelling for several reasons. First, as described below, the collected information requires hand-coding to avoid missing key instances of NGO participation and to accurately assess the depth of type of NGO participation. Given that the World Bank has completed over 10,000 lending operations, collecting a universal sample is infeasible for this particular project. Most crucially, a random sample eliminates sample-selection bias from the Bank's universe of operations, such as selecting projects based on their size, sector or prior knowledge of NGO participation. Random sampling also avoids subjective bias throughout the data collection, like selecting certain countries based on their perceived political importance. The collected data—while not universal—does include a variety of project types across sectors, loan size, board approval date, time to completion, and borrowing country.

Using published Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) reports that describe each completed project in detail, I coded whether the project in question involved NGOs or similar civil society organizations. ICR reports present a useful and rigorous data source. First, they are consistent in their information. Every completed project includes an ICR report, with a similar structure and presented information.<sup>5</sup> Second, they are comprehensive.

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<sup>4</sup>The data collection began in 1982 since NGO access was only formalized the year before with Central Projects Note 10.05. And because projects can take up to 10 years to be completed, the dataset ends in 2011 to avoid any selection bias. By ending in 2011, I can ensure that all projects have the same information available through the ICR.

<sup>5</sup>One exception is the official name of the reports, which were previously entitled “project completion reports” (PCRs) However, the change is merely aesthetic; the structure and content is identical for both



While ICR reports can be biased regarding their assessment of project performance (Malik and Stone 2018; Kilby and Michaelowa 2016), they leave no stone unturned regarding the activities described. We can thus be confident that ICR reports accurately include any information regarding the extent of NGO participation.




Figure 5.1: NGO Participation in World Bank Lending Operations

The included information details the types of NGOs used, including specific organizations if they played a particularly prominent role. It also includes information on the number of organizations used and the tasks these organizations worked on. Notably, ICR reports include assessments on whether the NGO operated as originally expected. Sometimes NGOs end up taking a larger role in the project implementation than was originally designed. Other times, the NGO portion of a project is downsized or eliminated entirely if the performance of collaborators falls short of what Bank officials expected.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 detail expectations surrounding the determinants and impact of NGO participation within international organizations. However, as previously described, NGO participation is anything but uniform. Beyond varying across time and space (i.e.

lending operations), it also varies in the tasks and activities that NGO engage in. Even when excluding the lobbying activities that NGOs partake in, these activities vary substantially with regard to NGO implementation. I therefore conceptualized different types and a spectrum of NGO participation in the World Bank to guide the data collection and inform the later quantitative analyses.

First, it is necessary to code whether NGOs were involved in a lending operation at all, regardless of their activities. I coded whether the project in question involved NGOs or similar civil society organizations. Some scholars and organizations refer to civil society organizations (CSOs) as an overlapping, but distinct entity vis-a-vis NGOs. Empirically, I do not distinguish between the two, as my theoretical expectations remain the same for both. “NGO” therefore refers to all formal civil society organizations that may be involved, and any inclusion of these actors is counted in the binary scale. Figure 1 displays how the level of binary NGO participation has varied over time. NGOs were included in less than 20% of projects included in the sample when their access was first formalized, but this quickly grew throughout the 1990s until NGOs were included in a majority of projects throughout the 2000s, although this number occasionally dips below 50%. These data patterns roughly match the World Bank’s own numbers regarding NGO participation over time. Figure 5.2 shows the sample’s trend of participation over time.

The binary (1/0) measure of NGO participation presents a coarse measure of participation. To further capture the dynamics of participation, I coded projects with NGOs based on the *Depth* of participation. I define depth as the number of roles NGOs play in a lending operation. This requires careful attention to the different tasks NGOs might conduct within a specific organization. I use the Bank’s original framework for NGO collaboration, Central Projects Note 10.05, which lists six different roles NGOs can provide on projects: monitoring, identification, design, financing, implementation, and evaluation. This typology has remained consistent throughout the Bank’s work with NGOs and has traveled to other




Figure 5.2: NGO Participation in the World Bank Over Time, 1982 – 2011

multilateral development banks.

Monitoring entails NGOs observing and reporting on the borrowing state’s implementation and implementing agencies. Identification gathers NGO advice on choosing projects to implement. Design follows identification; it includes NGOs in the project’s formal design. Financing, while rare, allows NGOs to contribute their own funds to a project’s loan. Implementation, the most common form of participation, occurs when NGOs directly aid in a project’s activities. Finally, evaluation gathers NGO comments for the ICR report, which may influence the performance ranking assigned to a project. Projects with NGO participation are then coded 1-6 for the number of activities involved NGOs engage in. Figure 5.3 visualizes the initial patterns found in the data on the depth of participation. Most projects included in the sample only include one or two tasks, with very few entailing all six levels.

Only varying participation by depth does hold certain disadvantages, however. Namely, numerous or many tasks do not necessarily equate to meaningful participation. For example, an NGO may be involved in the identification and design of a lending operation (two degrees of depth), but not influence the project’s actual implementation and performance. In contrast, an NGO may carry out a majority of the implementation, thus having a large




Figure 5.3: Depth of Participation

role, but not formally be included in any other task (only one degree of depth).

I therefore coded projects based on *Type*, a coarse three-level distinction that measures the prominence of NGOs on a given project, while remaining agnostic toward the number of tasks conducted. The three types are *Information*, *Limited Collaboration*, and *High Collaboration*. Figure 5.4 displays the frequency of each type in the collected sample. Limited collaboration was assigned to the most projects, with information and high collaboration constituting roughly equal portions of the remaining projects.

Information refers to projects where NGOs monitor and/or evaluate a project, but do not directly contribute to the project’s implementation. Here, NGOs may uncover information that would not have been previously known to Bank staff or other interested parties, like the Bank’s executive board. For example, in an Azerbaijani project, Ictimai Ray—a local NGO—fielded three surveys throughout the project, including an “end-of-project” survey to gather additional information on its implementation and effectiveness (World Bank 2011). After an earlier project in Colombia, Bank staff admitted that supervising NGOs provided information they themselves could not have found (World Bank 2001).

Limited collaboration occurs when NGOs are directly involved, but do not command




Figure 5.4: Type of Participation

the project's trajectory. Often, this means that NGOs do not have full information of a project's operations. For example, an Ethiopian project approved in 2007 had to conduct information sessions that informed implementing NGOs about the project's progress (World Bank 2012a). But limited collaboration often involved significant NGO influence, albeit without their participation in the formal decision-making of a lending operation.

In contrast, high collaboration occurs when NGOs are directly involved and have significant influence over the project's decision-making. Here, NGOs are often leading the project themselves. Approved in 2005, an Indonesian project involved NGOs to this extent. Here, NGOs filled roles related to planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation and when NGOs were not available to fill these roles in a certain setting, the project stalled. Moreover, NGOs acted as a watch-dog over the project and altered government actors to relevant problems (World Bank 2012b).

## 5.3 Analyzing the Determinants of NGO Participation

### Dependent and Independent Variables

My primary dependent variable is *NGO Participation*, or the presence of one or more NGOs in a given World Bank lending operation. The unit of analysis is the World Bank project. Later analyses expand the outcome variable to include the different types and depth of participation. I begin with this binary measure to capture the broad modes of involvement that NGOs can maintain. I conclude this section's analysis with the depth of participation. Analyzing the determinants of depth allows me to test if my explanatory variables are correlated with more meaningful participation.

Hypothesis 2 expects that NGOs will participate in areas that present the highest risk for the United States. In other words, NGOs will participate outside the scope of American influence. However, NGOs are not formally directed toward such areas. Rather, this prediction—and the alliance of convenience altogether—is predicated on the idea that NGOs act independently and choose their participation. The selected independent variables thus measure both the incentives and constraints that NGOs face in selecting projects to participate in while also including measures that account for associations with American influence.

NGO independence can be envisioned in the terms of demand and supply. NGOs have their own demands for participation. Following my assumption that NGOs act with “principled instrumentalism” (Mitchell and Schmitz 2014), we would expect them to choose projects and countries where their work can have the greatest impact. During a 1996 project in Kenya, Bank staffers expected NGO to act as partners to disseminate positive information about the project. But the local NGOs had no interest in participating; rather, they critiqued the project from the outside (World Bank 2003). One measure of this NGO preference is the

UN Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI—which rests on a 0-1 scale—measures a country's life expectancy, education levels, and GDP per capita. Büthe, Major, and e Souza (2012) find that NGOs prefer to work in countries with lower HDI levels. Thus, to make greater progress toward their mission, we may expect NGOs to independently choose to work on World Bank projects occurring in countries that rest lower on the HDI.

However, NGO demands constitute just one aspect of civil society participation. In addition to demand, participation must also be supplied. States routinely crack down on the domestic operations of civil society, often focusing on long-term administrative crackdown (Chaudhry 2022). Such repression can apply to both advocacy and service-oriented NGOs (Springman et al. 2022), which are more likely to work on World Bank projects. If civil society activity is restricted within a country, then NGOs will have a more difficult time operating on Bank projects within said country, regardless of their preferences. The design for a 1993 project in Türkiye originally included NGOs as an implementer, but potential partners—due to fears about their freedom to operate—could not come to a working agreement with the government (World Bank 2002). Even staff preferences cannot overcome such shortages; Bank staff desired NGOs for a 2005 project in Rwanda, but could not find capable partners (World Bank 2013). In short, the independence of NGOs is shaped by the permissiveness of a country's domestic environment.

I use two variables to measure the permissiveness of a borrowing country's domestic environment: democracy and civil society repression. Both measures come from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2020). For democracy, I use V-Dem's "polyarchy" index: its broadest democracy measure that emphasizes electoral competition. The variable is placed on an interval scale of 0-1. The measure is appropriate for the hypothesis as we would expect democracies to provide a more favorable environment for NGO activities and welcome NGOs onto lending operations more willingly. But V-Dem's

indexed (0-4) measure of civil society repression, where a higher number is associated with less repression, measures how a borrowing state approaches NGOs specifically. I therefore use *Civil Society Repression* as the main variables measuring domestic civil society conditions and largely use *Democracy* as a control variable for other analyses.

I measure US influence through two variables: UN voting scores and foreign aid. As discussed above, while UN voting scores are an admittedly rough proxy for geopolitical alignment, they constitute a widely used measure in the academic literature, particularly for studies that emphasize the World Bank. Using data from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), I employ their recommended measure of ideal point distance, which captures the ideological distance two states are from each other in UN General Assembly voting records. For the main analysis I only employ the ideal point distance from the United States (*UN Ideal Point Distance*), although Table 5.13 in the appendix includes additional variables for other powerful lender like France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.

Bilateral foreign aid—formally Official Development Assistance (ODA)—presents another measure of geopolitical influence, as we would expect states that receive more aid from the US to maintain stronger American ties. From the perspective of recipient countries, bilateral aid provides similar outcomes to multilateral aid (Findley, Milner, and Nielson 2017). However, multilateral aid may serve as a substitute from the donor’s perspective. Dreher et al. (2022) find the US uses multilateral channels to hide domestically contentious aid. The US holds closer political ties to bilateral aid recipients, but maintains an interest in the multilateral aid recipients. Dilution works best where bilateral aid is not present. To measure US ODA commitments, I use data from AidData. *US Aid* measures the logged foreign aid commitments to a country in constant 2011 US dollars. As with UN voting, measures for the rest of the G5 are included in the Appendix.

I account for potential confounders with the inclusion of several control variables. Using the World Bank’s own data, standard controls for the borrowing country’s *GDP*, *GDP*



*per capita* and *Population* (all logged) are included to account for the country's economic size influencing orchestration decisions and its domestic environment; economic and/or developmental opportunities may attract more NGOs and while independently maintaining a particular domestic environment for civil society participation. V-Dem's *Corruption* measure (0-1) is also included in the main models; corruption may drive bureaucratic decisions to employ NGOs for monitoring countries that also happen to be further from US preferences. Finally, I also include the (logged) size of a project's original *Loan Commitment*, as the World Bank may reward participatory democracies with larger loans and better funded projects may attract NGO participation.

## Model Estimation

To initially test the predictions of Hypothesis 1, I estimate logistic regression models. Logit models are appropriate given the binary nature of the dependent variable. To account for heteroskedasticity, I cluster standard errors at the country-level. Crucially, the variation of interest occurs within units. As a country's HDI index improves, NGOs should be less inclined to participate in said county's projects. Similarly, NGOs will be less able to participate in projects if a country ramps up its repression of civil society over time. As a reminder, the "supply" of NGOs refers to a country's domestic environment. Indeed, a majority of NGOs who work on Bank projects are strictly domestic or local, and therefore lack the ability to work in other countries. In short, NGOs are not picking and choosing between countries. To appropriately model the change within units, I estimate country fixed effects for all models.

I employ Poisson and hurdle models for the estimations where *Depth* is the outcome variable. *Depth* is coded as a count variable, so Poisson models are generally appropriate. Such an estimation does not account for potential selection effects. As Figure 5.3 shows, a majority of projects only include one activity for NGOs, with subsequent increases in depth diminishing significantly in frequency. Poisson models may indicate that US risk is associated

with more depth, but the results may be more indicative of a simple binary effect. To better test if US risk is associated with deeper participation, I also employ hurdle models—also known as two-part models—to examine the relationship between variables after a project is determined to include any NGOs or not (i.e. an initial binary measure). Hurdle models are more appropriate than Heckman models in this context. As Vance and Ritter (2014) outline, greater levels of participation could not logically exist without an initial degree of participation.

## Results

Table 5.1 displays the variables measuring NGO incentives and constraints. Models 1 and 2 display the estimations that include *HDI* while Models 3 and 4 include *Civil Society Repression*. The results provide initial support for the theoretical assumptions regarding the independence of NGOs. *Civil Society Repression* is statistically significant and positively associated with the binary measure for NGO participation. To reiterate, V-DEM's civil society repression score is higher the lower the level of repression. The relationship holds under unit fixed effects, suggesting that countries are more likely to implement projects with NGOs as they lessen restrictions on civil society. A favorable domestic environment for NGOs appears to be a strong factor in the chances for NGO participation.

*HDI* is negatively significant in Model 3, lower levels of development are associated with a greater chance of project participation. This result follows Büthe, Major, and e Souza (2012) and suggests their findings may travel to NGO behavior in multilateral contexts. However, this result does not travel to the unit fixed effects specification, suggesting that projects do not receive more or less participation as a country moves along the HDI scale. This suggests NGOs favor certain countries over others, but are not sensitive to changes within singular country contexts. It is also possible that the HDI index exhibits little change within countries. In any case, the initial results suggest NGOs constraints are a bigger determinant

Table 5.1: Effect of Civil Society Interests on NGO Participation in World Bank Projects

	NGO Participation			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Human Development Index	-1.908*** (0.598)	0.985 (2.215)		
Civil Society Repression			0.300*** (0.056)	0.606*** (0.116)
Corruption	0.821** (0.398)	-1.112 (1.800)	1.517*** (0.341)	1.824* (1.026)
GDP	0.034 (0.075)	0.085 (0.103)	0.093 (0.065)	0.047 (0.086)
GDP per Capita	0.100 (0.074)	0.136 (0.118)	0.183*** (0.066)	0.245** (0.103)
Population	-0.059 (0.087)	-0.125 (0.162)	-0.086 (0.074)	-0.196* (0.117)
Loan Commitment	-0.219*** (0.059)	-0.278*** (0.079)	-0.225*** (0.054)	-0.212*** (0.074)
Constant	3.731*** (1.367)		1.245 (1.180)	
Country fixed effects?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	744	744	968	968

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

of participation than NGO incentives.

Table 5.2 displays the results for US influence and its relationship to participation. Models 1 and 2 include *UN Ideal Point Distance*. Models 3 and 4 include *US Aid*. *UN Ideal Point Distance* is positively associated with participation in both model specifications, suggesting that projects occurring within ideological adversaries to the United States are more likely to attract NGOs across and within states. In Model 4, which includes unit fixed effects, *US Aid* is negatively significant with the binary measure for participation, suggesting that more ODA from the United States is associated with a smaller likelihood of NGOs joining a project in that borrowing country. Notably, this measure is only significant for the country

fixed effects specification, suggesting that NGOs are not choosing across countries; rather, they are less likely to join projects as foreign aid increases within a particular country. Similar to the results in Table 5.1, this relationship follows the findings of Bütthe, Major, and e Souza (2012) who argue that NGOs purposely avoid countries receiving large amounts of foreign aid, instead choosing to work their help can have the most impact.

Table 5.2: Effect of U.S. Influence on NGO Participation in World Bank Projects

	NGO Participation			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
UN Ideal Point Distance	0.493*** (0.123)	0.976*** (0.266)		
US Aid			-0.056 (0.044)	-0.218*** (0.081)
Corruption	2.011*** (0.386)	2.155* (1.107)	2.112*** (0.397)	2.180** (1.079)
Democracy	2.843*** (0.383)	4.176*** (0.733)	2.582*** (0.374)	4.214*** (0.742)
GDP	0.041 (0.067)	-0.005 (0.088)	0.056 (0.070)	-0.054 (0.093)
GDP per Capita	0.181*** (0.069)	0.227** (0.104)	0.171** (0.074)	0.283** (0.115)
Population	-0.027 (0.077)	-0.175 (0.121)	-0.110 (0.078)	-0.177 (0.121)
Loan Commitment	-0.276*** (0.056)	-0.229*** (0.075)	-0.229*** (0.060)	-0.224*** (0.079)
Constant	-0.797 (1.285)		1.408 (1.409)	
Country fixed effects?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	948	948	873	873

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

Table 5.3 presents the results analyzing the relationships between US risk and the *Depth* of participation. Models 1 and 3 display the standard Poisson estimations while Models 2 and 4 display the results from the hurdle model's outcome equation. *UN Ideal Point Distance*

is associated with greater depth across both specifications. As a borrowing country's ideal point diverges from the US, its projects are more likely to include a greater number of tasks for NGOs. This correlation extends the results above to indicate that the association between risk and participation includes a number of meaningful tasks for NGOs. The alliance of convenience's reach beyond US influence does not result surface-level activities from non-state actors.

In Model 3, *US Aid* is negatively associated with increased levels of *Depth*. This matches the results above, again suggesting that NGOs gravitate to countries where US foreign aid is minimal. The relationship is not statistically significant to the hurdle model's specification. Given the negative relationship between US foreign aid and the binary measure for participation, this result is expected; there should not be an effect on depth if the initial level of participation cannot be reached. Model 3's significant result should be interpreted as explaining the variation between no participation and any participation.

## 5.4 Analyzing the Impact of NGO Participation

### Dependent and Independent Variables

To measure participation's impact, I employ two measures of project success. First, I use the percentage of the originally disbursed project loan as the paper's second primary dependent variable. The disbursement percentage is ideal for estimating the impact of NGO participation for several reasons. First, unlike loan and conditionality decisions, disbursement decisions are made throughout the project's life. Disbursements can be diminished or increased, depending on the project's trajectory and influence by the involved actors. Notably, all actors involved in orchestration—states, bureaucrats and the NGOs themselves—have a chance to shape disbursements. Conditionality decisions, by contrast, are largely determined by the bureaucratic staff (Clark and Dolan 2021). And measuring the disbursement per-

Table 5.3: Effect of U.S. Risk on the Depth of Participation

	Depth of Participation			
	Poisson	hurdle	Poisson	hurdle
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
UN Ideal Point Distance	0.601*** (0.126)	0.299*** (0.090)		
US Foreign Aid			-0.157*** (0.041)	-0.003 (0.032)
Democracy	3.039*** (0.398)	0.302 (0.268)	3.279*** (0.426)	0.344 (0.290)
Corruption	1.953*** (0.543)	0.521* (0.289)	2.042*** (0.537)	0.815** (0.317)
GDP	0.022 (0.044)	-0.016 (0.048)	0.025 (0.046)	0.021 (0.053)
GDP per Capita	0.093* (0.055)	-0.058 (0.050)	0.161*** (0.062)	-0.032 (0.055)
Population	-0.091* (0.048)	-0.059 (0.047)	-0.083 (0.051)	-0.086* (0.048)
Loan Commitment	-0.174*** (0.035)	-0.111*** (0.036)	-0.173*** (0.036)	-0.089** (0.039)
Constant		1.690* (0.890)		1.882* (1.047)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	949	949	874	874

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

centage, rather than the total amount, implicitly controls for a project's size and borrowing state's economy, which can vary significantly. Crucially, the data on disbursement percentages were hand-coded based on individual ICR reports within my collected sample, which accurately reflect the level of disbursements.<sup>6</sup>

Second, a project's performance presents an important measure into the lending oper-

<sup>6</sup>The World Bank's own collected data on disbursements does not always account for changes in disbursements from the original loan.

ations success. Given that countries use the World Bank to improve their development capabilities, improving the performance of lending operations would presumably be a favorable outcome for borrowing states. However, performance ratings are known to be subject to the biases of Bank staff and geopolitical influence (Kilby and Michaelowa 2016). I thus use Malik and Stone’s (2018) “objective” measure of project performance that codes actual project outcomes on a continuous 1-4 scale, not simply the assigned evaluations given by the lending operations assigned task managers and OED office.<sup>7</sup> While this measure reduces the sample size, it constitutes the only available measure that does not rely on ratings subject to the Bank staff’s own biases. Of course, the potential biases of Bank evaluation constitute an important outcome on their own, as NGOs may lobby staff to improve a project’s performance evaluations. I therefore include the Bank’s official evaluation scale as a secondary measure (see Table 5.10 in the Appendix).

Hypothesis 3 expects the United States’ indirect influence to shape the impact of NGO participation. The initial regression analysis therefore includes an interaction between NGO participation and ideological similarity as the moderating variable. UN ideal point distances from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017) are again used to measure ideological similarity. The different types of participation conceptualized and measured above—information, limited collaboration, and high collaboration—are employed to better examine which conditions can affect project outcomes.

The same controls included in the former analysis are also included for the analysis on impact: borrowing state *GDP*, *GDP per capita*, *Population*, alongside the project loan size. V-Dem’s *Corruption* index is included again, as donor states may divert multilateral aid

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<sup>7</sup>Malik and Stone’s (2018) measure also considers a project’s performance throughout the entire project, giving equal weight to all objectives achieved. Meanwhile, the Bank’s own performance metrics are only given at the project’s completion, which complicates the separation of disbursements from performance, as one may affect the other and vice versa.

away from corrupt states (Ferry, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider 2020). US adversaries may be punished by participation for their corruption levels, not their political relations. The V-Dem’s polyarchy measure *Democracy* is also included again, as democracies are more likely to be ideologically similar to the United States in UN voting (Voeten 2021, 38).

I add a measure of the borrowing country’s human rights for certain models, included in Appendix Tables 5.7 and 5.8. Zvobgo and Graham (2020) find NGOs screen and submit human rights complaints to the World Bank that are more likely to succeed. Adversaries may be harmed in project implementation due to NGO complaints about rights violations, which could correlate with their UN ideal point distance. I use the CIRI Human Rights Data Project’s *Empowerment* index which covers rights most relevant to developmental projects.<sup>8</sup> I exclude this specification from the main results due to multicollinearity concerns and reduction of the sample size, although the results are similar.

## Model Estimation

To initially test the predictions of Hypothesis 1, I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. While not purely continuous, the indexed nature of both disbursement percentages and performance evaluations are largely appropriate for OLS analysis. However, OLS estimates are sensitive to bias from outliers. Occasionally, policymakers will significantly reform projects from their original scope, which can lead to massive increases in loan disbursements, sometimes upwards of 200%. To avoid this bias, I limit the sample to only include projects with disbursement percentages under 200%. As with the analysis for participation’s determinants, the main variation of interest occurs within country units. Here, the predicted negative effects toward US adversaries are self-imposed; adversaries purposely

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<sup>8</sup>This index covers freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, workers’ rights, and electoral self-determination. It measures the fulfillment of these rights collectively on a 0-1.2 scale.



shut out civil society collaborators as their relationship with the US is depleted. Unit fixed effects specifications are included across all models to examine the effect of within country changes.

## Results

Table 5.4 examines the singular effect of participation and its various types. The Models 1-4 include variables measuring any participation, information activities, limited collaboration, and high collaboration, respectively. Notably, only *High Collaboration* is significant, exhibiting a positive effect on project disbursements where the substantial participation of NGOs is associated with an almost 8% increase in disbursements. In short, these results suggest that when participation is meaningful, it may be impactful. Less meaningful forms of participation appear to have no substantial effect. This provides a healthy dose of skepticism regarding the impact of NGOs, given that high collaboration only constitutes about 25% of participation in the sample.

However, the results in Table 5.4 do not account for the alliance of convenience. Table 5.5 reexamines the effect of participation with an interaction term between each participation measure and *UN Ideal Point Distance*. Here, *High Collaboration* does not exhibit a statistically significant effect on project disbursements. Rather, *Limited Collaboration*, when interacted with *UN Ideal Point Distance*, has a negatively significant effect on disbursements. This suggests that US adversaries receive fewer disbursements on projects where NGOs maintain an important, but not commanding role. Participation as a whole also shows a negative coefficient for the interaction term, although it is not significant at conventional levels and is most likely driven by the effect of *Limited Collaboration*.

The significant distinctions found between participation types matches this dissertation's theoretical expectations. Limited collaboration best captures the concept of "dilution" as NGOs are most likely to have an invested stake in a project's success and be instrumental

Table 5.4: Effect of NGO Participation on Project Disbursements

	Percentage of Original Disbursement Fulfilled			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Any Participation	0.029 (0.019)			
Information		-0.027 (0.029)		
Limited Participation			0.013 (0.024)	
High Participation				0.074*** (0.028)
Democracy	0.188*** (0.070)	0.215*** (0.069)	0.207*** (0.069)	0.187*** (0.069)
Corruption	-0.019 (0.106)	-0.006 (0.106)	-0.006 (0.106)	-0.038 (0.106)
GDP	0.008 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)
GDP per Capita	0.008 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)
Population	0.008 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)
Loan Commitment	0.033*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.008)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	944	944	944	944
Adj. R-squared	0.934	0.933	0.933	0.934

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

Table 5.5: Effect of NGO Participation on Project Disbursements

	Percentage of Original Disbursement Fulfilled			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Any Participation	0.192** (0.094)			
Information		0.036 (0.150)		
Limited Participation			0.339*** (0.125)	
High Participation				0.061 (0.163)
UN Ideal Point Distance	0.038 (0.027)	0.027 (0.026)	0.035 (0.025)	0.017 (0.026)
Democracy	0.204*** (0.070)	0.224*** (0.069)	0.207*** (0.069)	0.195*** (0.069)
Corruption	-0.008 (0.114)	0.016 (0.114)	0.022 (0.114)	-0.016 (0.116)
GDP	0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)
GDP per Capita	0.011 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)
Population	0.008 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.009 (0.012)
Loan Commitment	0.034*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.008)
Interaction	-0.052* (0.030)			
Interaction		-0.020 (0.047)		
Interaction			-0.103*** (0.039)	
Interaction				0.003 (0.049)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	927	927	927	927
Adj. R-squared	0.934	0.934	0.934	0.934

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

to its success when they are included as collaborators. While monitoring NGOs (*Information*) may alert the United States and other actors to certain issues throughout a project's duration, these NGOs would have less reason to either lobby for a project's continuation or interfere with the normal implementation process. Meanwhile, NGOs involved in high collaboration projects are intrinsic to the project itself; borrowing states cannot as easily exclude them during implementation.

Table 5.6 focuses on *Limited Collaboration* and presents initial quantitative evidence into the mechanism driving the above correlations. Models 1 and 2 replicate the results on project disbursements while Models 3 and 4 examine the effect on project performance. Models 2 and 4 include the interaction term. Notably, *UN Ideal Point Distance* is statistically insignificant alone, supporting prior results from Malik and Stone (2018) that find geopolitics does not pervade World Bank implementation. In contrast to their findings, the interaction term is negative and significant for both project disbursements and performance.

Taken together, these results suggest that the impact of participation on performance is associated with its impact on disbursements. Poor performance in implementation leads to lower disbursements on average. I estimate Poisson models to examine the interaction effect on the World Bank's official evaluation, which includes evaluations provided by a project's Task Manager or the later evaluation conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group. The results can be found in the Appendix (Table 5.10). No significant relationships related to the independent variables are present, further suggesting the effect on disbursements is associated with actual performance outcomes, not directives from the Bank.<sup>9</sup>

Properly interpreting the significance of interactive effects through regression tables is difficult. I account for this by displaying the results as a marginal effect plot in Figure

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<sup>9</sup>Such directives can occur. Malik and Stone (2018) find Bank staff provide performance ratings to justify increased disbursements not based on actual performance.

Table 5.6: Effect of US Influence on Project Disbursements

	Project Disbursements		Project Performance	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
UN Ideal Point Distance	0.025 (0.025)	0.035 (0.025)	-0.042 (0.123)	0.007 (0.123)
NGO Participation		0.339*** (0.125)		1.310*** (0.454)
Democracy	0.221*** (0.069)	0.207*** (0.069)	1.194*** (0.363)	1.157*** (0.360)
Corruption	0.013 (0.114)	0.022 (0.114)	-0.475 (0.514)	-0.419 (0.510)
GDP	0.010 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.049 (0.045)	-0.043 (0.045)
GDP per Capita	0.012 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	-0.047 (0.062)	-0.042 (0.062)
Population	0.008 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.084* (0.049)	-0.080* (0.049)
Loan Commitment	0.032*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.048 (0.033)	0.058* (0.033)
Interaction		-0.103*** (0.039)		-0.365*** (0.141)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	928	927	478	478
Adj. R-squared	0.934	0.934	0.948	0.949

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1


Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

5.5 and inspecting them visually. The X-axis displays the range of values for UN Ideal Point Distance and presents a histogram that shows the frequencies of these values. While few observations include an ideal point distance above 4—the greatest ideological distance a country can achieve—a plurality of values rest between 3 and 4, suggesting that many countries maintain a more adversarial relationship with the US.<sup>10</sup> The Y-axis displays the

<sup>10</sup>The histograms are slightly different for the models examining disbursement percentage and project performance. This is because the latter includes fewer observations given the shortened temporal scope of Malik and Stone's (2018) data. However, the pattern is similar, which lends further support to the results

change in disbursement percentage (left) and project performance (right).

Figure 5.5: Marginal Effects of NGO Participation



As the coefficients in Table 5.6 indicated, the level of disbursements and performance slopes downward as ideal point distance increases. A closer ideological proximity to the US is associated with more disbursements and the successful achievement of project outcomes. This effect becomes indistinguishable from zero as ideological distance increases before taking a negative effect at the highest levels of distance. I use the `Interplot.Medline` package to pinpoint the median value for the moderating variable. The failure of the confidence band to cross this level would cast doubt on the significance of the results (Pepinsky 2018). The slope of the confidence bank clearly indicates that the relationship is statistically significant from zero and is robust across a common value in the data. Moreover, the relationship is substantively important. Countries at the highest levels of ideological divergence receive

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traveling across samples.

10% less of their original loan commitment. This is a significant amount, given that loans are ostensibly approved to be disbursed in full.

## 5.5 Empirical Extensions

### Divided US government

I next extend the analysis to incorporate elements of US domestic-policy making that may influence its policies in the World Bank. Specifically, I separate the models based on whether the United States was experiencing a time of divided government or not. Kersting and Kilby (2021) find that the observable implications of the vast informal governance literature—namely, that World Bank lending decisions benefit US allies and harm adversaries—are driven by periods of divided government in the US. Under a divided government, the President has less control over bilateral aid and must offset this with increased pressure on multilateral lending mechanisms. I would expect a similar mechanism to occur with my own results; periods of increased political pressure from the United States should drive the alliance of convenience as well.

Divided government is defined as years in which the President's party does not control both the House of Representative and the Senate. The year refers to the year in which the project was approved by the Bank's executive board. While projects are implemented over a number of years after approval, we would expect US political preferences to be present at the loan's inception. Table 5.9 displays the results for this additional test of the argument. Model 1 shows the relationship between the interacted effect and disbursement percentage during periods of divided US government. Model 2 shows the same relationship during periods of unified government. Models 3 and 4 replicate this estimation for project performance. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 displays the marginal effects plots. The results replicate Kersting and Kilby's results for the collected sample: the interaction effect is stronger during periods of

divided government.

## **The Collective Influence of the “G5”**

Hegemonic power in IGOs does not necessarily rest with one state. For example, the collective preferences of the G5 influence IMF lending decisions (Copelovitch 2010a, 2010b). Given the similar memberships and internal rules of the Bretton Woods institutions, I test if the G5 also maintains exerts collective influence via nonstate participation in the World Bank. I generate the mean UN ideal point distances of Germany, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States and re-run the chapter’s main models on the determinants and impact of participation with the new measure. The results, which includes analyses examining the effect of individual G5 members, are included in the Appendix (see Tables 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13).

In short, the G5’s collective measures are not associated with the determinants of participation, although the impact of participation displays similar results when using the G5 mean. Adversarial borrowing states receive fewer disbursements and achieve fewer project outcomes when NGOs are involved via limited collaboration, although the statistical significance is slightly less. Moreover, a similar relationship is found when including individual ideal point distances for France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. These results are robust to the inclusion of the US ideal point distance as a separate control variable.

These results suggest that while G5’s collective influence does not extend to the determinants of participation, it does influence participation’s impact. This fits with the theory’s general predictions, particularly as outlined in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2. I expect NGO incentives to determine the location of participation while other member states influence its effect. NGO incentives correlate with US preferences and aid flows. But borrowing states, when considering whether to collaborate with NGOs on projects, consider the influence of all G5 members. In short, while US interests may drive the alliance of convenience, other



donor states may also benefit from its impact.<sup>11</sup>

## 5.6 Discussion

This chapter presented quantitative evidence for the alliance of convenience's application to the World Bank. The enforcement of lending operations—where projects are implemented by a borrowing country and loan disbursements are rolled out over time—provides the empirical context. NGOs can take an active role in this phase of the project cycle, but significant variation persists with regard to their participation. I created an original dataset of NGO participation from a random sample of Bank projects from 1982-2011.

While the Bank's own rules encourage NGO involvement for most projects, combination of country-level incentives and constraints are associated with the likelihood of a project including NGOs or not. Countries with less civil society repression are more likely to implement projects with NGO partners. NGOs appear to prefer working in countries that receive less US foreign aid and are in need of greater developmental assistance. From the perspective of the United States, these structural conditions cause participation to occur where it is needed most. As countries diverge from the United States politically, they are more likely to maintain projects with NGO involvement. Participation is associated with higher degrees of risk.

Participation's impact depends on the type of participation and the borrowing country's political relationships. Projects with significant participation, whereupon the project is as much an NGO project as it is a Bank project, are associated with more loan disbursements. Indeed, the alliance of convenience is defined by the independent benefits it provides to both

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<sup>11</sup>Model 5 in Table 5.12 displays the effect of China's UN ideal point distance. Here, NGO participation is associated with increased disbursements for states further away from China ideologically. My explanation suggests such countries lean into participation to extract the benefits without the fear of Chinese intervention.

the United States *and* NGOs. When leading a project, NGOs should be able to effectively achieve successful outcomes.

In contrast, the benefit from limited NGO collaboration are politicized. Here, US adversaries are more likely to receive less of the original loan commitment and achieve fewer project outcomes. This crucial interactive effect speaks to previous findings that suggest NGOs do not exert much, if any, influence over Bank policy (Moloney 2022), or that geopolitical interests do not travel to project enforcement (Malik and Stone 2018). This chapter replicates these findings when these two variables are not interacted.<sup>12</sup> But directly examining the interaction between NGOs and geopolitics highlights the complicated relationships that emerge from the alliance of convenience.

In short, adversarial states are both more likely to work with NGOs *and* be excluded from participation's benefits. This ostensible paradox follows this dissertation's theoretical predictions: NGO dilution mitigates hegemonic risk.

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<sup>12</sup>The singular effect of high participation provides an important caveat to this.

## 5.A Chapter 5 Appendix

Table 5.7: Estimation with Human Rights Control

	Percentage of Original Disbursement Fulfilled			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Any Participation	0.031 (0.020)			
Information		-0.033 (0.030)		
Limited Participation			0.016 (0.025)	
High Participation				0.078*** (0.029)
Democracy	0.260*** (0.078)	0.290*** (0.077)	0.279*** (0.077)	0.264*** (0.077)
Corruption	0.052 (0.117)	0.066 (0.117)	0.066 (0.117)	0.029 (0.117)
Human Rights	-0.110** (0.056)	-0.114** (0.056)	-0.111** (0.056)	-0.117** (0.055)
GDP	0.010 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)
GDP per Capita	0.011 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)
Population	0.012 (0.012)	0.010 (0.012)	0.011 (0.012)	0.011 (0.012)
Loan Commitment	0.029*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	877	877	877	877
Adj. R-squared	0.934	0.933	0.933	0.934

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

Table 5.8: Estimation with Human Rights Control and Interaction Terms

	Percentage of Original Disbursement Fulfilled			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Any Participation	0.211** (0.097)			
Information		0.017 (0.151)		
Limited Participation			0.387*** (0.129)	
High Participation				0.067 (0.165)
UN Ideal Point Distance	0.045 (0.028)	0.031 (0.026)	0.040 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)
Interaction	-0.058* (0.030)			
Interaction		-0.016 (0.048)		
Interaction			-0.117*** (0.040)	
Interaction				0.003 (0.049)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	876	876	876	876
Adj. R-squared	0.934	0.933	0.934	0.934

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

Table 5.9: Divided US Government

	Disbursement Percentage		Project Performance	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
UN Ideal Point Distance	0.436** (0.180)	0.129 (0.423)	1.499*** (0.543)	0.991 (1.200)
NGO Participation	-0.002 (0.034)	0.086 (0.114)	-0.050 (0.159)	-0.019 (0.342)
Democracy	0.145 (0.091)	-0.184 (0.548)	0.784* (0.442)	0.927 (1.552)
Corruption	-0.087 (0.142)	-1.761** (0.693)	-0.324 (0.654)	-0.121 (3.122)
GDP	0.007 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.030)	-0.041 (0.064)	-0.105 (0.090)
GDP per Capita	0.003 (0.015)	0.024 (0.037)	0.045 (0.088)	-0.011 (0.114)
Population	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.137** (0.056)	0.121 (0.181)
Loan Commitment	0.038*** (0.011)	0.024 (0.026)	0.042 (0.043)	0.108 (0.073)
Interaction	-0.121** (0.055)	-0.069 (0.134)	-0.385** (0.166)	-0.335 (0.386)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	635	313	324	160
Adj. R-squared	0.918	0.856	0.949	0.951

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)




Figure 5.6: Influence of Divided US Government on Project Disbursements




Figure 5.7: Influence of Divided US Government on Project Performance

Table 5.10: Effect of US Influence on World Bank Evaluations

	Original Evaluation		IEG Evaluation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
UN Ideal Point Distance	0.244 (0.173)	0.269 (0.175)	0.256 (0.178)	0.286 (0.179)
NGO Participation		0.596 (0.650)		0.888 (0.672)
Democracy	0.327 (0.509)	0.332 (0.509)	0.055 (0.536)	0.015 (0.538)
Corruption	-0.168 (0.729)	-0.110 (0.729)	-0.490 (0.778)	-0.462 (0.781)
GDP	0.024 (0.063)	0.032 (0.064)	-0.028 (0.068)	-0.030 (0.069)
GDP per Capita	0.134 (0.087)	0.129 (0.087)	0.112 (0.094)	0.118 (0.094)
Population	0.057 (0.070)	0.062 (0.070)	-0.065 (0.075)	-0.064 (0.075)
Loan Commitment	0.059 (0.046)	0.065 (0.046)	0.069 (0.049)	0.073 (0.049)
Interaction		-0.121 (0.201)		-0.277 (0.209)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	488	488	454	454
Adj. R-squared	0.949	0.950	0.941	0.941

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

Table 5.11: Effect of G5 Influence on NGO Participation

	NGO Participation	
	Model 1	Model 2
UN Ideal Point Distance G5	0.606* (0.355)	
G5 Foreign Aid		-0.094 (0.173)
Corruption	1.882 (1.439)	3.782*** (1.450)
Democracy	3.376** (1.344)	3.889*** (0.945)
GDP	0.404 (0.688)	-1.016 (0.653)
GDP per Capita	0.006 (0.107)	-0.037 (0.116)
Population	0.114 (0.118)	0.168 (0.141)
Loan Commitment	-0.123 (0.162)	-0.046 (0.139)
log1p(Commitment)	-0.294*** (0.082)	-0.185** (0.089)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes
N	710	653

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)



Table 5.12: Effect of G5 Influence on Project Disbursements

	Project Disbursements		Project Performance	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
UN Ideal Point Distance G5	-0.003 (0.034)	0.007 (0.035)	-0.113 (0.134)	-0.069 (0.134)
NGO Participation		0.199** (0.089)		0.746** (0.317)
Democracy	0.477*** (0.138)	0.474*** (0.138)	1.394** (0.546)	1.414*** (0.542)
Corruption	0.046 (0.167)	0.079 (0.167)	-1.112* (0.621)	-0.980 (0.619)
GDP	0.019 (0.011)	0.018 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.052)	-0.009 (0.052)
GDP per Capita	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.036 (0.068)	-0.031 (0.068)
Population	0.014 (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)	-0.080 (0.059)	-0.078 (0.059)
Loan Commitment	0.026*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.034 (0.034)	0.041 (0.034)
Interaction		-0.091** (0.043)		-0.314** (0.153)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	726	726	411	411
Adj. R-squared	0.934	0.935	0.951	0.952

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

Table 5.13: Effect of Individual G5 Influence on Project Disbursements

	Project Disbursements				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Germany	0.010 (0.052)				
Japan		-0.085* (0.047)			
France			-0.132* (0.071)		
United Kingdom				-0.180*** (0.050)	
China					-0.083*** (0.027)
Germany*Participation	-0.085** (0.041)				
Japan*Participation		-0.079* (0.043)			
France*Participation			-0.092** (0.037)		
UK*Participation				-0.084** (0.036)	
China*Participation					0.097** (0.041)
Country fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	726	927	927	927	878
Adj. R-squared	0.935	0.934	0.935	0.935	0.933

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Standard errors clustered by borrowing country (in parentheses)

# Chapter 6

## Conclusions

In Chapter 1, I identified the different relationships member states of intergovernmental organizations can hold with non-state actors. Namely, member states may act more or less cooperatively with NGOs participating in the organization's activities. While new to the study of IGOs, the spectrum of conflict to cooperation in NGO-state relations maintains a prominent place in the larger Political Science discipline. This dissertation set out to investigate how NGO participation in IGOs—a relatively understudied topic in International Relations—follows and diverges from the findings and frameworks of prior studies. What determines participation in international institutions? What is the political impact of participation? Which actors benefit the most from including nonstate actors in IGO activities?

The collection of different actors operating within IGOs provides a clear distinction from most frameworks of NGO-state relations. Here, the state is a collective force: member states pool their authority and delegate to an intergovernmental agent. Contention within this “collective principal” can be fierce. The most powerful member states can wield unequal leverage over IGO policy. This unique aspect of IGO delegation holds potential for NGO participation. In this dissertation, I argue that hegemonic powers, a position most commonly held by the United States, can use participation to retain control over intergovernmental

organizations.

Chapter 2 elaborates upon this argument. Participation represents a second best option for hegemonic control. NGOs are independent actors. Their participation presents a degree of unpredictability to organizational politics and they will, at times, harm the interests of the most powerful states. But this independence and unpredictability serves to “dilute” the normal governance of an IGO. NGOs provide a new opening for state intervention as they insert their preferences, information and tasks into an organization. Together, the United States and NGOs form an “alliance of convenience,” an arrangement where each actor’s independent interests align.

I subject this theoretical argument and its predictions to extensive empirical testing in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In both quantitative and qualitative analysis, I find that NGO participation follows an increase in risk for the United States. The United States works to change institutional rules and increase access as an organization’s state membership diverges from its preference. Notably, NGOs aid in this endeavor; such efforts are more successful when NGOs simultaneously pressure the organization. Indeed, US officials will coordinate with civil society leaders. Once inside, NGOs are able to act beyond the normal reach of US influence. This behavior extends the opening for hegemonic intervention and other member states update their own risk calculations. Namely, US allies cooperate with NGOs on policy while adversaries attempt to shut them out. This pattern politicizes participation’s benefits and tips the scale of IGO resources toward US allies.

## 6.1 Contributions and Implications

The argument and its supporting evidence provide several important contributions to the broader study of international relations. This study adds to our understanding of nonstate participation in intergovernmental organizations. Internationally focused NGOs have grown

more numerous in recent decades. Even local organizations can find pathways to influencing the upper-echelons of global governance (Henry and Sundstrom 2021). And yet, we know little about the systematic patterns behind this participation and even less about its political impact. The argument presented here provides a comprehensive explanation regarding this variation.

The proposed argument also highlights the continued influence of states in global governance, even in the face of increased non-state actors. In following non-IGO studies' emphasis on state influence in regard to civil society relations, this dissertation provides a state-centric framework less common to investigations that examine NGOs in global governance (Pallas and Uhlin 2014). Specifically, I recognize the importance of contention between member states and examine how state differences and competition foster various attitudes and incentives toward access and participation. I propose the most powerful states and their allies can disproportionately benefit from participation patterns.

This dissertation also provides several empirical contributions. I created several novel quantitative measures of state control to examine differences within an organization's collective principal. Such measures may be used in future studies to examine the preferences of different member states and add to the literature on contests within pooling arrangements (D. A. Lake 2007). This dissertation also draws heavily from the World Bank's context to test the argument. In doing so, I created an original dataset of NGO participation on Bank lending operations. While the argument proposed here emphasizes the geopolitical effects of NGOs, the variation in their participation likely holds many other implications for Bank policy.

The argument and its contributions hold several policy implications. Principally, I highlight an additional avenue by which powerful actors can "extract rents" from an organization. Such behavior is presumably not an official IGO policy, but it may generate negative perceptions toward the institution. Today, organization staffers frequently support non-

state participation in the name of openness and transparency. But the actual impact of participation may not provide the legitimacy these staffers seek. IGOs should tailor their recommendations and closely examine the inequalities that can arise from access and participation. Geopolitical alignments determine the prospects for competition versus cooperation between organizations (R. Clark 2021), and the failure to adapt to changes in state power can generate more institutional competition (Pratt 2021). New evidence comparing the World Bank to the relatively new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank shows how this competition could unsettle the influence of the traditional liberal international order (Qian, Vreeland, and Zhao 2023).

## 6.2 Future Work

This dissertation provides initial evidence toward the proposition of an “alliance of convenience,” but there are additional considerations that should be left to future research. This dissertation holds implications for all non-state actors, but focuses on NGOs specifically. The variation in non-state actors should be further explored. For one, I assume international NGOs and local NGOs exhibit similar behaviors, but organizations can vary widely in their goals and subsequent behavior (Stroup and Wong 2017). The differences between NGOs and other non-state actors, like multinational corporations, may also generate alternative predictions (McNamara 2019). Future work should examine how this dissertation’s expectations travel to variations in non-state actor type.

This dissertation also emphasized variation within pooling arrangements (i.e. differences within the collective principal of member states) and the subsequent risk that occurred. I recognized, but did not emphasize, the delegation to the IGO agent and the uncertainty that follows. These factors were considered in the dissertation’s inclusion of specialization as an important scope condition. But a more thorough perspective will directly account

for the variation in bureaucratic preferences toward NGOs (Johnson 2016). Delegation arrangements include complicated interactions within the state principal and toward the IO agent. Future explanations should incorporate both elements to a greater extent.

This dissertation also draws heavily from the World Bank’s institutional context to gather qualitative and quantitative evidence. But the theoretical expectations extend across international organizations. Chapter 3 provided evidence for this proposition as it relates to the determinants of access, or the formation of the alliance of convenience. But the dissertation did not present systematic evidence into how NGOs operate after gaining access beyond the World Bank. Given the wide variation in functions across institutions, it is difficult to conduct cross-IGO comparisons regarding the determinants and impact of participation after access. But future research can follow the example set by the World Bank chapters and examine participation dynamics within other specific organizations.




Figure 6.1: US Security Council Vetoes, 1946 – 2021

To an extent, the World Bank served as a “most likely” case as the United States is known to be a dominant player in the institution. But the US cares about the policies of other organizations as well. Examining the extent to which NGOs aid US interests in

organizations with different rules and avenues for US influence would be an important test of this dissertation's theory.




Figure 6.2: Arria Formula Meetings, 1992 – 2021

For example, in the UN Security Council, the demands of the United States and the rest of the “P5” are not guaranteed, as intense bargaining competitions occur over UN Security Council resolutions (Allen and A. Yuen 2022) and the oversight of peacekeeping operations (Allen and A. T. Yuen 2014). As Figure 6.1 shows, the US’ own behavior toward the organization has changed significantly over time regarding its use of the veto. Meanwhile, a variety of non-state actors can influence the UNSC through the informal “Arria Formula,” which is subject to its own variation in the patterns of participation. Figure 6.2 shows the number of Arria Formula meetings over time, separated by whether the topic in question concerned specific countries or more thematic initiatives. This timeline provides just a hint at the variation in nonstate participation left to explore within the UNSC. Further exploring the connection between US preferences and nonstate participation in the UNSC would provide an interesting test of the theory and its application to a significantly different institutional



context.<sup>1</sup> And this is to say nothing of the many other international organizations that provide diverse participation opportunities for NGOs.

In sum, empirical explorations into other organizations would provide two important additions to this dissertation's findings. First, they would provide greater confidence that the theory's predictions extend to organizations other than the World Bank. And second, they would allow for the possible expansion of this dissertation's theoretical scope conditions. For example, evidence collected from prominent organizations without American membership, like the African Union or European Union, can test whether other states can benefit from participation as this dissertation has suggested the US can. Indeed, while I focus on the US for both theoretical and empirical reasons, the general expectations should hold for any state that holds hegemonic or near-hegemonic power.

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<sup>1</sup>Notably, the Arria Formula is not an officially sanctioned form of participation. Thus, while this dissertation stresses the formal rules governing access, its expectations may travel to more informal contexts like the Arria Formula.

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