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



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Who's Who In Korea

(Revision of 15 Oct 47 Edition)

1 January 1948

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Le Thi Nam Chau Mlle Nam-Chau 白南秋

B. [illegible], U. Union College, Nanking, 1947; Chairman of Temporary Supporting Committee of Public Peace, Peace, Director of General Affairs, Military Government, Kyeonggi Province, 1947-47 Secretary-General, Tai-yu Hsueh-she, Inaugurated Democratic Party; Join Interim Legislative [illegible]

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PAK, Yŏl 朴烈

P. about 1904, Kyŏngsang Pukto; studied at Nihon University Tokyo until 1922; was closely associated with Japanese and Korean anarchists and Communists in Japan; leader, Black Current Association (Heukdo Hwoy), 1923; failed in attempt to assassinate Japanese Emperor, and sentenced to life imprisonment, 1924; released October 1945; organized Korean Leader in Japan; anarchist, but joined the Communists; established liaison with Right after return to Seoul, 1946; head of New Korea Construction Institute in Japan, 1946-47; still in Japan; pro-Communist; head of Patriotic Corps; ordered him to return to Korea by Korean Democratic Party, but he refused.

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following UN committees - Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Features for Dealing with Enemy Property; member of the Coalition Committee, June 1945; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1945; member, Liaison Department and Policy Committee, New Democratic Independence Party, October 1947.

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CHANG, Taik Sang (cont) 張澤相

Preparatory Society for National Congress; member, Special Committee Emergency National Assembly; Chief of Kyonggi Provincial Police Department, 1945; member of the Hankook Democratic Party; Chief of Metropolitan Police, Seoul, appointed 12 January 1946; Assistant Director of National Police, appointed 18 September 1946; Standing Committee-man, Supporting Society for Dai Dong Youth Corps, August 1947.

CHANG, Yawn Sang CHANG, Yon-sang 張連松

B. about 1907, Hamgyong, Puksu; attended Japan Univ in Tokyo, about 1930; has no political affiliations; appointed member of NLA, December 1946; member of the following NLA committees - Chairman of Transportation and Communication, Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations, one of sponsors of anti-trust ordinance resolution passed by NLA on 20 January 1947. Chairman, Korean Cultural Association.

CHANG, Chin Ch'u C. 'Ol, C. in-ch'ol

B. 6 April 1900, G. political Science and Economics Department, Seoul University, graduated from Chun Ang Law Factory, 1930; vice-chairman, Provisional Committee for Organization of Law and Ordinance, 1946; Chairman, Commerce and Industry Association, 1945; member, Democratic Party; elected to NLA from Cholla Namdo, October 1946; member of following NLA committees - Interior Affairs and Petitions; Drafting Administrative and Organizational Regulations; one of sponsors of anti-trust ordinance resolution passed by NLA on 20 January 1947.

CHANG, Ki Yong 張基榮

B. [illegible] graduated Seoul Imperial University; joined Communist Party since 1925; arrested by Japanese and Russian appointed to Korea in 1945, was elected member of NLA, Kyonggi Chapter, chief secretary of the Korean Communist Party, 1945; politically inactive, anti-Rhee, pro Communist, attended Communist Conference in September 1946, provincial overall Communist Party Committee, Provincial Labor Council, Provincial Farmers Council, Provincial Women's Union, Provincial Democratic Youth League, Central Committee, Korean People's Party.

CHANG, Ki Young 張基英

B. [illegible] graduated Chosen Christian College; Christian minister, Chairman of Hankook Democratic Party, elected to NLA from Kyonggi Province, Chairman, Financial and Economic Committee, sponsor of anti-trust ordinance resolution passed by NLA on 20 January 1947.

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CHAWNG, Choo Kyo CHONG, Chu-kyo 鄭 周 教

B. 2 November 1918; attended Kangnung Primary School; after liberation was Chief of General Affairs, Communist Party Branch in Kangnung; later quit Communism and joined National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; manager of Kangnung Branch of Minju Ilbo (Democratic Daily); wealthy; elected to ILA. from Kangwon Do in December 1946 re-election; member of Fiscal and Economic Committee, ILA.

CHAWNG, I Hyowng CHONG, I-hyong 鄭 伊 衡

B. 16 September 1897; G. Ko-Sam Middle School, 1911; studied Chinese classics; member of Saw Book Hak Hai before independence movement of 1 March 1919; Secretary, Tong Ui Pu (Department of Internal Security) in Manchuria, 1921; CO of 1st Platoon Chung Ui Pu in Manchuria, 1924; Staff Officer, Korean Revolutionary Army, 1925; captured by Japanese in 1926 and imprisoned until 15 August 1945; organized Association of Released Political Prisoners; Central Executive Committee, Alliance of Fighters for Independence, 1946; appointed member of ILA. December 1946; member of following ILA. committees - Chairman, Committee on Drafting Laws dealing with Collaborators, Traitors, War Criminals and Profiteers, Food and Price Control Measures, Internal Affairs and Police; member of the Coalition Committee, 1947; Liaison committee member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

CHAWNG, In Soo CHONG, In-su 鄭 寅 普

B. about 1892; studied Chinese and Chinese literature in Peking, 1912-13; taught Chinese and Korean Literature at Chosun Christian College, Seoul; considered an outstanding classical scholar; minor staff member, Emergency National Assembly 1946; member, Representative Democratic Council, and worked on drafting constitution; closely linked to Dr. Rhee, Syng Man and opposed to Dr. Kim, Kyu Sik; appointed vice-chairman of re-formed National Association for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, September 1946; President, Kookhak University, 1946; vice-chairman, China-Korean Cultural Association, 1946.

CHAWNG, In Hwa CHONG, In-hwa 鄭 仁 果

B. about 1896, North Korea; G. Korean Eastern College, Pyongyang, and Princeton Theological Seminary; Executive Secretary, Sunday School Association of Korea; Later Secretary of the Korean Presbyterian Church for many years; arrested and imprisoned by Japanese, 1937; member, Korean People's Civil Mobilization Union (Chairman, Christian Party or University Club); co-vice-chairman, Social Democratic Committee, Federation of All Political and Social Organizations for US-USSR Joint Commission, 1947.

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CHAWNG, Kwang-Cho CHONG, Kwang-cho 鄭 廣 朝

B. more than 65 years ago, Seoul; educated in Japan son-in-law of Son, Byung Hi, one of 33 signers of 1919 independence declaration; no political affiliation, but considered moderate leftist; head of Tchawn Do Kyo (religious group); appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Education and Welfare, Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations; member, Advisory Committee, Korean Red Cross, 1947.

CHAWNG, No-Sik CHONG, No-sik 鄭 魯 湜

B. Cholla Namdo; G. Waseda University, Japan, Participated in Sam Il movement, 1919; was linked to An, Chai Hong, Chang Duk Soo and Kim, Sawng Soo in Japan; jailed by Japanese about 1936 staff member of Hankook Democratic Party, 1945; left party and became chairman of Finance Department, Democratic People's Front, February 1946; vice-chairman of South Korea New Democratic Party (Yenan Independence Alliance), 1946; was an alternate for Paik Nam Un on Coalition Commitee, resigned August 1946; Central Executive Committeeman, South Korea Labor Party, December 1946; elected vice-chairman, Democratic People's Front at reorganization meeting, January 1947.

CHO, Bong Am CHO, Pong-am 趙 奉 岩

G. Moscow University; active in Communist underground and arrested twice by Japanese; prominent in Inch'on Communist Party and Democratic People's Front, 1945-46; letter criticising policy of Pak, Heun Yung published in press, May 1946; expelled from Party, June 1946; attended meetings of Coalition Committee for short time, September 1946; reportedly dropped due to former Japanese connections: co-vice-chairman, Special Political Committee, Council of All Political Parties and Social Organizations for US-USSR Joint Commission, appointed May 1947; named as representative of the Korean Independence Front to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

CHO (CHOUGH), Pyung Ok CHO, Pyong-ok 趙 炳 玉

B. about 1894; Ph.D., Economics, Columbia University; active in 1929 student movements and imprisoned by Japanese; assistant professor at Chosun Christian College, about 1934; imprisoned again; prominent member of Hankook Democratic Party; Director of National Police, IG, 1945-to date.

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CHO, Chin Koo CHO, Chin-ku 趙 軫九

B. 26 June 1896; G. Songdo Middle School, 1919, Chosun Christian College, 1923; taught school until 1925; manager of Tong Il rice cleaning mill in Wonju Erp, 1936 to date; member, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; elected to ILA from Kangwon Do, October 1946; when election nullified, won seat in re-election, December 1946.

CHO, Han Young CHO, Han-yong 趙 漢用

B. unknown, Cholla Namdo; G. Peking National University; member, special diplomatic committee, People's Front, to negotiate with US-USSR Joint Conference, 1946; member, Counter-Measure Committee, People's Party, 1946; tendered resignation as Assistant Secretary, People's Party, August 1946; rejoined People's Party as Chief of Organization Bureau; Secretary, Foreign Affairs Department, Democratic People's Front.

CHO, Hi Yawng CHO, Hi-yong 趙 喜英

B. about 1916; G. Posung College, Seoul, about 1940; staff member, Democratic People's Front; chairman, Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance, 1946; one of thirteen vice-chairmen, Democratic People's Front, 1947; member, Standing Committee, Democratic People's Front, 1947.

*CHO, Man-sik CHO, Man-sik 曹 晩植

B. about 1880; G. Law School, Meiji University, Japan; resides in Pyongyang; member, Board of Trustees, YMCA, and active in Presbyterian Church; in business as a merchant; famous for refusal to cooperate with Japanese and known as the "Korean Gandhi"; chairman and founder, Chosun Democratic Party (North Korea), 1945; voted out of Northern Chosun Democratic Party, 5 February 1946; still in Pyongyang; named as representative of Chosun Democratic Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission by South Korea branch of party, June 1947.

CHO, So-ang CHO, So-ang 趙 素昂

B. 1386; G. Waseda University, Japan; joined Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, 1919; membership in Korean Congress; minister, Foreign Affairs, Provisional Government; appointed delegate to UNO meeting in San Francisco but did not attend; chairman, Diplomatic Association; chief of Financial Administration, Korean Independence Party; member Representative Democratic Council of South Korea; one of nine executive members, vice-chairman of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Foreign Policy Committee, Korean Independence

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CHO, So-ang (cont) 趙素昻

Party, 1946; lecture tour of provinces, May-June 1946; active in Association for Aiding Korean Representative's Diplomacy, which supported Dr. Rhee's mission to U.S., December 1946; elected to IIA from Seoul, declined position, December 1946; one of the leaders in anti-trusteeship movement, named vice-chairman, Anti-Trusteeship Committee, January 1947; elected chairman, Emergency National Assembly (National Congress), February 1947; elected vice-chairman and member of the Central Standing Committee Korean Independence Party, May 1947.

CHO, Sung Hwan CHO, Song-hwan 曺成煥

B. 1875, Seoul; G. Korean Army Academy; formed Shin Min Hei (New People's Association), a secret independence movement in 1910; founded Kimyong School in Pyongyang, 1911; elected councillor, Provisional Government, Shanghai, and appointed Chairman, Military Affairs Committee, 1919; went to Siberia, 1920; returned to China, 1922; hold post of War Minister several times in Provisional Government; formed Kwang Bok Army in Chungking with Lee, Bum Suk and Lyoo, Dong Yul; one of 12 secretaries of state, Provisional Government; consultant, Dr. Rhee's GHQ for Korean National Unification, June 1946; chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, September 1946; active in Association for Aiding Korean Representative's Diplomacy which supported Dr. Rhee's mission to U.S., December 1946; refused vice-chairmanship of Anti-Trusteeship Committee re-formed by Kim Koo, January 1947; listed as a member of council set up by National Congress for formation of the New Korean National Provisional Government, March 1947; elected advisor to NSAKI, May 1947; elected Chairman of the Supporting Society for the Dai Dong Youth Corps, August 1947; Chief of General Affairs Department, Preparatory Committee of the All Korea Revolutionary Representatives, appointed 29 August 1947.

CHO, Wan Ku CHO, Wan-ku 趙晩九

B. 1880; G. Law College, Seoul; went to Vladivostok in 1910 where he became director of a newspaper; later went to Shanghai and joined Korean Provisional Government; head, Financial Affairs, Provisional Government; committee member, Kwang Bok Military Committee; chairman, Commerce and Industry, Hankook Democratic Party; one of twelve Secretaries of State, Provisional Government; committee member, Representative Democratic Council; one of nine executive members, and head of "Secret Service Dept", Korean Independence Party, 1946; appointed to IIA, declined seat, December 1946; elected chairman, Emergency National Assembly, December 1946; prominent in anti-trusteeship movement, December 1946-January 1947; replaced as chairman, Emergency National Assembly by Cho, So Ang, February 1947; elected member of the Central Standing Committee, Korean Independence

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CHO, Wan Ku (cont) 趙 脘 九

Party, May 1947; one of persons responsible for the 23 June Anti-Trusteeship Demonstration 1947.

CHOI - see TCH'EI

*CHOO, Yawng Ha CHU, Yong-ha 朱 寧 河

B. 1911; occupation, clerk; Chairman, Department of General Affairs, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; Second vice-chairman, member Political and Executive Committees, North Korean Labor Party, 1946; chairman, Central Election Committee, Democratic People's Joint Front, North Korea, 1946; vice-chairman, North Korean Labor Party, and representative at North Korean People's Conference, 1947.

HA (HAR), Kyawng Dawk HA, Kyong-dok 河 敬 德

B. 1895; G. Harvard University, B. S. 1925, M.A. 1927, Ph.D. 1928; underground leader during war; director, Korean YMCA's survey in Seoul, 1930; taught Sociology and Psychology at Chosun Christian College from 1932 on; editor, Korean Times, 1945; editor, Seoul Shinmun, since 1945; moderate leftist, appointed member of ILA December 1946; appointed member of following committees of ILA, Education and Welfare, Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws, Liaison, January 1947; one of four Korean delegates to Pan-Asian Conference, New Delhi, March 1947.

HA, Man Bok HA, Man-pok 河 萬 濮

B. 1911, Chinyang Gun; studied Chinese literature for 10 years, is master of Chinese language; engaged in trade for ten years; opened Sasang Rubber Factory which lasted three years; has been farming since; merber Hankook Democratic Party until May 1946; now member of National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees-Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Food and Price Control Measures; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

HA, Pil Won HA, P'il-won 河 弼 源

B. 1898; G. Waseda University, Japan; old time leader in Communist Party circles; imprisoned by Japanese 1927-33; prominent in Lee, Yung's Chang Anp'a; active in Korean People's Republic, Central People's Committee, Communist Party, and Democratic People's

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HA, Pil Won (cont) 河弼源

Front since August 1945; attended anti-Pak Communists meeting, 28 September 1946, presided over by Yoon, Il; Central Executive Committeeman, Socialist Labor Party, 1946; ousted from Socialist Labor Party, December 1946.

HA, Sang Hoon HA, Sang-hun 河相熏

B. 21 July 1890, Inch'on; G. Middle School, Seoul; taught at same school for two years; started rice business in Inch'on; leader of four underground organizations during Japanese occupation; one of organizers of Hankook Democratic Party, Inch'on; vice-chairman, same party, Inch'on, 1946; elected to ILA from Kyonggi Do, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Legislative and Judicial, Internal Affairs and Police; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

HAM, Sang Hoon HAM, Sang-hun 咸相勳

B. about 1896, Hwanghai Do; G. Waseda University; connected with Dong-A Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo for a number of years; reported to have been a member of the Central Committee, Association for Expediting National Mobilization, a councilor of the Patriotic Assembly of Speech and Press and a councilor of the Corps for Patriotism During War, under the Japanese; one of the founders of all Korea Literary Men's Association, 1946; vice-president, Emergency National Assembly, 1946; Director of Information Section, Representative Democratic Council; chairman Propaganda Section, Hankook Democratic Party, 1947.

HAM, Te Yong (Tai Yung) HAM, T'ae-yong 咸台永

B. 1873; G. Law Academy, Seoul; acting director, Bureau of Judicial Affairs, Nationalist Party; advisory of the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; member, Korean Representative Democratic Council, 1946.

*HAN, Bin HAN, Pin 韓斌

B. about 1902, Vladivostok; G. Philosophy, Vladivostok Far Eastern College; student, Lenin University, Moscow; law student First National University, Moscow; took part in Korean Independence Movement, 1919; helped establish Manchuria Youth League and Manchurian Farmers' League, 1923; returned to Korea, 1925; jailed by Japanese for political activity, 1925-31; escaped to China, 1931; went to Yenan, 1941; joined Korean Independence Alliance, 1942; vice-chairman of Alliance, 1943;

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HAN, Bin (cont) 卓韋 斌

arrived in Seoul, 28 January 1946; member, Judging Committee and Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front; returned to Pyongyang, March 1946; member, Executive Committee, New Democratic Party (former Yenan Independence Alliance); reported successor to Tch'ei, Yong Kern as head of Police Bureau, Interim People's Committee, November 1946; not mentioned in re-organization of North Korea People's Committee, February 1947.

HAN, Chul (Tch'awl) HAN, Ch'ol 卓韋 哲

G. Japanese university; active in labor movement and jailed by Japanese; chairman, Transportation Worker's Union, 1945; Secretary, All-Korea Labor Union (Chawn Pyawng), 1945-46; committee member, Democratic People's Front, 1946; attended convention of World Federation of Trade Unions in Prague, summer of 1947.

*HAN, Hi-chin HAN, Hi-chin 韓韋 熙軫

B. 1900; G. Seoul Law College, 1925; Pyongyang Railroad Bureau, 1925; head, Public Health Department, Ch'ongjin Railroad Bureau, 1941; head, Industrial Department, 1943; Hamhung RR Bureau early 1945; director, Transportation, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1945-46; dismissed as Director, Transportation Bureau by Kim, Il Sung, August 1946.

HAN, Kil Soo HAN, Kil-su 卓韋 吉洙

B. 1900, Chong Do; family went to Hawaii, 1905; G. Salvation Army Training College, San Francisco, 1920; resigned from Salvation Army, 1926; entered real estate business in Hawaii; worked for Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu; member, Korean Revolutionary Party; representative of Korean Federation and Sino-Korean People's League, Washington, 1942-46; now living in California

*HAN, Sawl Ya HAN, Sol-ya 韓韋 雪野

B. about 1900; G. Hamhung Higher Common School, university course in Japan; worked on a newspaper in Seoul; Editor, People's Daily News, Hamhung, 1946; Chairman, North Korean Artists' League, 1946; President, North Korea News Agency; Chief, Cultural Department, North Korean Labor Party; Chief, Bureau of Education, North Korean People's Committee; named as representative, North Korean Writers' and Pressmen's Union to consult with Joint Commission, July 1947; left North Korea on observation trip to Russia September 1947.

HAN, Si Dai (Dae) HAN, Si-dae 韓韋 始大

B. about 1886 in Hwanghai Do; came to US about 1904; lived in Los Angeles and owned a farm; member of Korean National Association, 1944; chairman of United Korean Committee, Los Angeles, 1945; came to Korea about December 1945, as ranking member of a group of representatives of United Korean Committee in America; closely linked to the late Jacob Dunn; wealthy; financial backer of New Progressive Party; left Korea for US about November 1946; sent message from Los Angeles expressing moral support of ILA, December 1946.

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H.W, Kan Yang H.N, Kan-yong 韓偘鏞

B. about 1892, Hwanghai Do; had been in Manchuria for more than 20 years; engaged in independence movement; member, Korean Independence Party; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Petitions and Discipline, Drafting of Laws Dealing with Collaborators, Traitors, War Criminals and Profiteers; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

HAW, Kyo HO, Kyu 許珪

B. about 1885, Kyongsang Namdo; attended Korean Foreign Language School, studied French, about 1908; head, General Affairs Socialist Democratic Party, 1946; moderate leftist; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Drafting of Laws Dealing with Collaborators, Traitors, War Criminals and Profiteers.

HAW, Sawng Taik HO, Song-t'aek 許成澤

B. about 1895; middle school; jailed by Japanese for labor movement activity; chairman, Council of Seoul Labor Union and Council of All-Korea Labor Union (Chawn Pyawng), 1945-46; active Communist collaborator; head of Strike Fighting Committee during September-October 1946 RR strike; Central Executive Committeeman, South Korean Labor Party; one of 13 vice-chairmen of reorganized Democratic People's Front, elected January 1947; sentenced to one year in prison, March 1947; named as representative of the Council of All-Korea Labor Union to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

HONG, Cherng (Jeung) Sik HONG, Chung-sik 洪增植

B. about 1896; was active on Dong-A Ilbo; jailed by Japanese for 5 years; president Chosun Inmin Po, 1945-46; head of Seoul Political Law School, closed in April 1946; member, Judging Committee, Democratic People's Front, 1946; given suspended sentence for agitation against MG rice program early in 1946; arrested again, September 1946 for violation of Proclamation #2; freed after serving three months in prison, November 1946; General Secretary, Democratic People's Front, 1947; arrested for violation of Proclamation #2, August 1947, tried, found not guilty; re-arrested, September 1947.

HONG, Dawk Yoo HONG, Tok-yu 洪悳裕

B. about 1888; Chinese scholar; old-time member of Communist Party; arrested by Japanese several times; labor union leader; chairman, Organization Department, Democratic People's Front, 1946; Central Inspection Committeeman, South Korean Labor Party, elected December 1946; Standing Committeeman of Democratic People's Front, reorganized January 1947.

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*HONG, Ki Choo HONG, Ki-chu 洪箕疇

B. 1898; G. Pyongyang Theological Seminary; worked as a teacher; chairman, Pyongan Namdo People's Committee, 1945-46; prominent in North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; member Pyongan Namdo People's Committee, 1947; vice-chairman, North Korea People's Committee, 1947.

HONG, Myung Hi HONG, Myong-hi 洪命憙

B. about 1889; G. Taese Middle School, Tokyo; wrote Declaration of Independence for March 1st Movement, 1919; lecturer at Chosun Christian College; was managing editor, Oriental Daily News; was president, Shi Dai Daily News; renown Korean scholar, versed in Chinese classics; respected, with reputation for personal integrity; chairman of Relief Society, 1945; named by leftists without his consent to positions in the Chosun Literary League and Anti-Fascistic Cooperative Fighting Committee, 1946; residing in Seoul; appointed to ILA but declined seat on grounds that he had not been consulted beforehand, December 1946; reported organizing the Democratic Unification Party, December 1946; president, Democratic Unification Party, 1947; member Korean Literary Men's League; named as representative of Korean Literary Men's League to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

HONG, Nam-P'yo HONG Nam-p'yo 洪南杓

B. 1888; was reporter, Manchuria Daily News; afterwards staff member, Contemporary Daily News; joined Communist Party about 1921; fled to China; returned to Korea and served a long prison term; member, Judging Committee, Democratic People's Front; one of the vice-chairmen, Anti-Fascistic Cooperative Fighting Committee; member, Central Executive Committee, Communist Party, 1945-46; member, Central Committee, South Korean Labor Party, elected December 1946; one of 13 vice-chairmen of reorganized Democratic People's Front, 1947; chairman, Central Inspection Committee, South Korea Labor Party, 1947.

HONG, Soon Chul (Tch'awl) HONG, Sun-ch'ol 洪淳徹

B. 26 July 1894, Taegu; principal, Taegu City Bok Myung Girls' High School; manager, Onyang Oven Factory; Director of Economics, Chamber of Commerce of Chungchong Namdo; chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, Chungchong Namdo Branch; elected to ILA from Chungchong Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA Committees - Fiscal and Economic, Legislative and Judicial; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA., 20 January 1947.

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HONG, Sung Ha HONG, Song-ha 洪性夏

B. 15 January 1898; G. Economics Department, Joong Wang University, Tokyo; Professor of Economics, Posung College, Seoul, 1922-September 1938, opened printing shop in Seoul, 1938, continued until 1944; head of Labor Department, Hankook Democratic Party, September 1945, representative to Provisional National Assembly from Kyongsang Namdo, February 1946; Economics Committee, Representative Democratic Council, 1946; named by Dr. Rhee to Propaganda Section, GHQ for Korean National Unification, June 1946; head of Youth Section, Hankook Democratic Party, 1946; changed his political views from left to right since emancipation; elected to ILA from Cholla Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Industry, Labor and Agriculture; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

HUH, Hun HO, Hon 許憲

B. about 1885, Hamgyong Namdo; G. Meiji University Law School, Japan; served as defense attorney in March 1st Case, 1919; former director, Bo Sawng College; imprisoned for Student Revolt, 1929; freed but barred from practicing law; travelled through Europe and America; arrested twice by Japanese upon return; Secretary of Justice, Korean People's Republic, 1945; member of Judging Committee and one of four chairmen, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front, 1946; one of five leftist members of Coalition Council, July 1946; defense attorney at Communist counterfeit trial, September 1946; took charge of Communist Party when Communist leaders, Pak, Heun Yung and Lee, Kang Kook went underground to escape arrest, September 1946; maneuvered Communist element of New Democratic Party into Labor Party, November 1946; re-elected one of six chairmen, Democratic People's Front, January 1946; re-elected one of six chairmen, Democratic People's Front, January 1947; chairman, South Korea Labor Party; advisor to Anti-Japanese Compaign Society, 1947; named as representative of South Korea Labor Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

HWANG, Bo Ik HWANG, Po-ik 黃保翼

B. 11 February 1895; student of Chinese literature, 1901-07; G. Primary School, Yosu, 1909, Yung Heung Middle School, Mokpo, 1913; teacher, Yung Shin School, 1913; Christian pastor in Posong area, 1916; G. Pyongyang Seminary, 1925; studied theology in Tokyo for two years at Japanese Theological Seminary; chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence in Posong; elected to ILA from Cholla Namdo, October 1946; elected chairman of Education and Social Welfare Committee, member of Legislative and Judicial Committee; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

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HWANG (WHANG), Chin-Nam HWANG (WHANG), Chin-nam 黃鎭南

B. about 1894 in U.S.; G. University of California, attended universities of Paris and Berlin; wife is French born; came to Shanghai as English interpreter for noted An, Chang Ho, 1919 where first met Lyuh, Woon Hyung; returned to U.S. about 1922; travelled to France, Germany; worked in Korean Provisional Government, Shanghai; taught, Hamnam Medical College; returned to Korea about 1943 and acquired land holdings near Hamhung; fled to Seoul upon Russian entry, August 1945; staff member, People's Party; close advisor and Secretary to Lyuh, Woon Hyung; one of 28 originally appointed to Representative Democratic Council; declined position in RDC, 15 February 1946; member, Investigation Committee of Joint Korean-American conference, October 1946; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; appointed to ILA December 1946; expelled from Socialist Labor Party for joining ILA, December 1946; appointed member of following ILA committees - Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Petitions and Discipline, January 1947; principal leader behind movement to resurrect former People's Party, January 1947; elected chairman, Committee for Foreign Affairs and National Defense, ILA, April 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

HWANG, Chul Sung HWANG, Ch'ol-song 黃喆性

B. 4 May 1895; G. Chung Tong Middle School, Seoul; chief of National People's Assembly (Kuk Min Hway) in Chechen; considered to be Chechen's most respectable man; officially has no political affiliations; elected to ILA from Chungchong Pukto, October 1946; member of the following ILA committees - Qualifications, Petitions and Discipline; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA 20 January 1947.

HWANG, Hyawn Sook (Mrs.) HWANG, Hyon-suk 黃賢淑

B. 1898; G. Yokohama Theological School; head, General Affairs, Women's Nationalist Party; member, Representative Democratic Council of South Korea; vice-director National Women's Association.

HWANG, Sin Dawk (Esther) HWANG, Sin-tok 黃信德

B. 1896; G. Sungie Girls' School, Pyongyang; G. from social work course in Nippon Girls University in Tokyo; correspondent, Dong-A Ilbo; schoolmaster, Chunang Girls' School; member, Patriotic Women's Association for Acceleration of Korean Independence; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; one of four women members of ILA; member of the following ILA committees - Legislative and Judicial, Education and Welfare; one of sponsors for anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

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*HYAWN, Tch'ang Hyawng

B. 1905; G. Primary School, Sunch'on Gun; headed Farmer's Union, Manchuria, 1924; entered Chinese Communist Party, 1930; returned to Korea, 1934; was arrested by Japanese, then released; joined Korean Communist Party, 1945; organized and headed Pyongyang Laborer's Association, October 1945; chairman North Korea General Bureau of All Korea Labor Union; member, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946.

KANG, Chin (Jin) 姜進

B. about 1904 in Russia; G. Russian middle school and Chinese university; active in Communist underground, Manchuria 1930; jailed by Japanese, 1930-45; active in Central People's Committee, Democratic People's Front, and Communist Party, 1945-46; joined with five other prominent Communists in anti-Pak, Heun Yung press statement, August 1946; suspended from party; led anti-Pak Communists into Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; quit Socialist Labor Party, December 1946, since party did not carry out merger with South Korean Labor Party; member, Standing Committee, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; member of Public Relations Section Committee, Democratic People's Front, 1947.

*KANG, Chin Kawn KANG, Chin-kon 姜鎭乾

B. 1885; founded Hyawb Sawng Middle School in Seoul, 1908; went to Manchuria, 1910; participated in Korean Independence movement, 1919; arrested and imprisoned by Japanese 1919-37; prominent in farmers' movement in Ch'engjin; chairman, Farmers' Association of North Korea, 1946-to date; member, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; chairman of the committee for the establishment of the North Korea Farmer's Bank, April 1946; elected one of the Standing Chairman, First People's Assembly, North Korea February 1947; named as representative of the North Korea Farmer's Association to consult with the Joint Commission, June 1947.

KANG, Ik Hyung KANG Ik-hyong 姜益亨

B. 1889; served 3 years in Pyongyang prison because of activities in Korean independence movement, 1921-24; resumed activities upon release; Christian minister in Kumchan and member of Hankook Independence Party; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Pukto October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Qualifications, Industry, Labor and Agriculture; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

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KANG, Soon KANG, Sun 姜舜

B. 1895; sentenced to three years imprisonment by Japanese, 1920; joined Korean Communist Party, 1925; went to China in 1933; there served the Korean Independence Movement; member Shanghai Communist Party (Korean); returned to Korea, September 1946; joined Coalition Committee, September 1946; chairman, Industrious Mass (Labor Masses) Party; appointed to ILA, December 1946; appointed member of the following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Industry, Labor and Agriculture, January 1947; named as representative of Industrious Mass Party to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

*KANG, Yang Ook KANG, Yang-uk 康良煜

B. 1893; pastor; G. Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Pyongyang; connected with Japanese Church, 1942-45; General Secretary, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; temporary head, then vice-chairman, Chosun Democratic Party, 1946; Kim Il Sung's secretary; vice-chairman, North Korean Christian League, November 1946; elected Secretary-General, First People's Assembly, North Korea, February 1947.

KIM, Boong Choon KIM, Pung-jun 金朋濬

B. about 1886; in China, 1919-1945; a prominent member, New Korea Democratic Party (Chungking); a secretary of state, Provisional Government; principal, Shanghai Insung School; member, Representative Democratic Council of South Korea; one of 5 right wing members of Coalition Committee, 1946; one of three vice-chairmen, newly formed Progressive Party, September 1946; signed coalition agreement of seven principles, October 1946; member of Joint Korean-American Conference, October 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Liaison, chairman of committee on Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws; chief of Planning Department of Coalition Committee, 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

KIM, Chang Kun KIM Ch'ang-gun 金昌根

B. 27 January 1907; G. Middle School, Tokyo; Seoul Theology School; vice-chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, Taejon Branch; elected to ILA from Chungchong Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Qualifications, Fiscal and Economic, Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

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KIM, Chi Kan KIM, Chi-kan 金志侃

B. 1880; G. in agriculture, Tokyo Imperial University; worked for Korean independence in China; chief of Pyongwon-gun Committee, Chosun Democratic Party; chief of Chinnamp'o Committee Chosun Democratic Party; appointed to Interim Legislative Assembly, December 1946; lone member of ILA from Chosun Democratic Party; member of following ILA committees - Industry, Labor and Agriculture, Measures for dealing with enemy property.

KIM, Chul (Tch'awl)Soo KIM, Ch'ol-su 金徹洙

B. 4 May 1896, Sangbook Myun, Kyongsang Namdo; studied Chinese literature until 12 years of age; attended Pusan Commercial School, 1908-11; studied at Tokyo English Language School and Keiyo University until 1917; spent 14 months in prison on charge of working for Korean independence during his stay in Japan, grew up as a rich man's son; upon return to Korea from Japan, engaged in several business endeavors; member of Central Committee, Seoul Young Mon's Federal Association of Korea, 1922-24; moved to Pusan in 1945; present positions: editor of Liberal Press, director of Pusan Brewing Company; owns farm and tile shop in Yongsang; chairman, Hankook Democratic Party, Kyongsang Namdo Branch; named by Dr. Rhee to Youth Section GHQ for Korean National Unification, June 1946; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Namdo, October 1946; member, Committee for Dealing with Enemy Property; resigned from ILA and accepted position of Governor of Kyongsang Namdo, February 1947.

KIM, Chul (Tch'awl) Soo KIM, Ch'ol-su 金轍洙

B. about 1891; old-time leader of Communist Party; imprisoned by Japanese; brother of Kim, Kwang Soo, member Central Executive Committee, Communist Party; member, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front, 1946; joined with five other prominent Communists in an anti-Pak, Heun Yung press statement, 5 August 1946; suspended from Party; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; unsuccessful leftist candidate to ILA from Cholla Pukto, October 1946; insisted on dissolution of Socialist Labor Party and withdrew from that Party, January 1947.

KIM, Chun Hai KIM, Ch'on-hae 金天海

B. 1900, Kyongsang-Namdo; due to poverty went to Japan to work; organized the Korean Labor Union of Japan; participated in Japanese Communist movement; imprisoned, released on 15 August 1945 after 18 years if imprisonment; important staff member of Japanese Communist Party.

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KIM, Dan Ya (Tan Ya, Tai Yun) KIM, Tan-ya 金團冶

B. 1899; G. Taegu Middle School, participated in March 1st Movement, 1919; imprisoned by Japanese, 1920-22; active Communist Party Underground, 1925; fled to Russia; G. Lenin University, Moscow, 1928; committee member, Far Eastern Department Komintern.

KIM, Den (Ten) KIM, Ton 金墩

B. 1886; attended Posung College, Seoul; formerly member of Korean Revolutionary Party, director in charge of Diplomatic Affairs; spent 30 years in Manchuria engaged in Korean independence; new member, New Progressive Party; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Petitions and Discipline, Fiscal and Economic.

KIM, Do Hyun KIM, To-hyon 金道鉉

B. 1879; Secretary of Internal Affairs Department, Chungchong Namdo; chief of Aweol Myun; principal of Kongjin Primary School (a private school), Cheju-do; chief of a "monetary guild"; elected to ILA in second elections in Cheju-do, February 1947; chairman, Korean Independence Party, Cheju-do, March 1947.

KIM, Do Yawn KIM, To-yon 金度演

B. 1892; G. Political Economy Course, Keiyo University Tokyo; received Ph.D. in Economics from Washington University; held position in Yun-Hi College as lecturer; manager, Korean Industrial Enterprises Company; chairman, Hankook Trading Society; served Central Labor Question Intervention Committee of MG; member Representative Democratic Council, February 1946; chief of Planning Board, Hankook Democratic Party, February 1946; elected to ILA from Seoul, October 1946; when election nullified, won again in reelection, December 1946; chairman, Fiscal and Economic Committee member, Industry, Labor and Agriculture Committee, Liaison Committee; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; President, Korean-American Trading Association, 1947; appointed member of Standing Committee, Korean People's Representatives, August 1947.

*KIM, Doo Bong KIM, Tu-pong 金科奉

B. March 1889; G. Choongang Middle School, Seoul; served as part-time teacher, Seoul Bosawng and Himoon Middle Schools; executive member, Dai Han Independence Political Party, 1923-28; chief clerk, Society for Study of Revolutionary Theory of Various Parties, 1928-32; a noted Korean scholar; organized Chosun People's

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KIM, Dan Ya (Tan Ya, Tai Yun) KIM, Tan-ya 金團治

B. 1899; G. Taegu Middle School, participated in March 1st Movement, 1919; imprisoned by Japanese, 1920-22; active Communist Party Underground, 1925; fled to Russia; G. Lenin University, Moscow, 1928; committee member, Far Eastern Department Komintern.

KIM, Den (Ten) KIM, Ton 金墩

B. 1886; attended Posung College, Seoul; formerly member of Korean Revolutionary Party, director in charge of Diplomatic Affairs; spent 30 years in Manchuria engaged in Korean independence; new member, New Progressive Party; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Petitions and Discipline, Fiscal and Economic.

KIM, Do Hyun KIM, To-hyon 金道鉉

B. 1879; Secretary of Internal Affairs Department, Chungchong Namdo; chief of Aweol Myun; principal of Kongjin Primary School (a private school), Cheju-do; chief of a "monetary guild"; elected to ILA in second elections in Cheju-do, February 1947; chairman, Korean Independence Party, Cheju-do, March 1947.

KIM, Do Yawn KIM, To-yon 金度演

B. 1892; G. Political Economy Course, Keiyo University Tokyo; received Ph.D. in Economics from Washington University; held position in Yun-Hi College as lecturer; manager, Korean Industrial Enterprises Company; chairman, Hankook Trading Society; served Central Labor Question Intervention Committee of MG; member Representative Democratic Council, February 1946; chief of Planning Board, Hankook Democratic Party, February 1946; elected to ILA from Seoul, October 1946; when election nullified, won again in reelection, December 1946; chairman, Fiscal and Economic Committee member, Industry, Labor and Agriculture Committee, Liaison Committee; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; President, Korean-American Trading Association, 1947; appointed member of Standing Committee, Korean People's Representatives, August 1947.

*KIM, Doo Bong KIM, Tu-pong 金科奉

B. March 1889; G. Choongang Middle School, Seoul; served as part-time teacher, Seoul Bosawng and Himoon Middle Schools; executive member, Dai Han Independence Political Party, 1923-28; chief clerk, Society for Study of Revolutionary Theory of Various Parties, 1928-32; a noted Korean scholar; organized Chosun People's

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KIM, Doo Bong (cont) 金枓奉

Revolutionary Party, 1935-37; principal, Yenan Political School, 1940; first president Yenan Independence Alliance 1942-46; vice-chairman, N. Korea Interim People's Committee, February 1946; chairman, Korean-Soviet Culture Association, April 1946; chairman, New Democratic Party (former Yenan Independence Alliance), February-August 1946; party merged with North Korea Communist Party as North Korea Labor Party, August 1946; chairman North Korea Labor Party, 1946-to date.

KIM, Hak Bai KIM, Hak-pae 金鶴培

B. 1904 in Hamgyong Namdo; G. Law and Political University in Tokyo; member of Socialist Labor Party, expelled when he joined ILA, December 1946; appointed member of ILA; member of Laboring Masses Party; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Measures for Dealing with Enemy Property; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

KIM, Hak Kyoo KIM, Hak-kyu 金學圭

B. unknown; general; relative of Kim, Koo; commander, Third Detachment, Kwang Bok Army, Hq. Chungking; member, Provisional Government; head of the Korean police, Shanghai, late 1945; transferred to Shantung Province, January 1946; head of Manchurian Branch of Korean Independence Party with headquarters in Mukden, 1946; reported to be managing a military training school in Manchuria sponsored by Kim, Koo, June 1947.

KIM, Helen (Kim, Hwal-Lan) 金活蘭

B. about 1900; G. Ewha College, did graduate study in America, took doctor's degree in Education, and returned to Korea; Dean of Ewha College for number of years, now President; attended meetings of the Insitute of Pacific Relations, Jerusalem World Conference of Religion, General Conference of Methodist Church, YWCA Conference in Hankow (1947), and other important national and international meetings; member of the Executive Committee of the YWCA; speaks fluent English and Japanese; has written and published a book on present-day problems of Korean women.

KIM, Ho (Charles) 金乎

B. 1883; G. Public Middle School; taught for eight years; was in China, 1912; went to U.S. and remained there 32 years; member, Korean National Association, 1942; chairman, United Korean Committee in America, 1943; member, Korean Nationalist Association 1944; returned to Korea after liberation; one of directors of Diplomatic Association, February 1946; vice-chairman, New Progress Party, 1946; appointed member of ILA,

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KIM, Ho (Charles) (cont) 金乎

December 1946; chairman of ILA Committee on Measures for Dealing with Enemy Property; member of following ILA committees - Industry, Labor and Agriculture, Drafting of Laws Dealing with Collaborators, Traitors, War Criminals and Profiteers; named head of the New Progressive Party, April 1947; member of the Coalition Committee, June 1947; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947; resigned from New Progressive Party and joined new Democratic Independence Party, September 1947.

*KIM, Il Sung KIM, Il-song 金日成

B. 1913; G. Japanese Military Academy, Seoul; original name was Kim, Sung Chu (Ke); "General"; decorated by Soviets; General Secretary, North Korea Branch of Communist Party; chairman, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; party merged with North Korea New Democratic Party (Yenan Independence Alliance), August 1946; vice-chairman, North Korea Labor Party, 1946; elected to Interim People's Committee, November 1946; chairman, reorganized North Korean People's Committee, February 1947; representative of North Korea Labor Party for US-USSR Joint Commission meeting in Pyongyang, July 1947.

KIM, Ik Dong KIM, Ik-tong 金益東

B. 1893; President, Samsung Industrial Company, Ltd; Managing Director, Oriental Bill Company, Ltd.; chief of Business Bureau of Sidae Ilbo Company (press company); appointed member of Interim Legislative Assembly, February 1947, to replace one of five initial appointees who refused to serve; member, Korean Independence Party; lawyer for the royal family; appointed member of a five man committee to revise the Pro-Japanese and National Traitor bill, May 1947; elected chairman, Finance Committee, Korea Independence Party, May 1947.

KIM, Jun Yun (Chun Young) KIM, Chun-yon 金俊淵

B. 1895; G. Seoul Higher Common School, Okayama High School, 1917, Law Department of Tokyo University, 1920; specialized in law and economics at Berlin University, 1923; returned to Korea, 1927; chief of editorial bureau of Dong-A Ilbo, 1927; arrested and imprisoned in connection with Communist Case, 1928; released, 1935; became chief editor of Dong-A Ilbo, 1935, resigned two years later; became president and manager of Hi Tong Hoong Oop farm; elected vice-chairman, Preparatory Committee for the National Congress, 1946; member of the committee set up by the Emergency National Assembly for the drafting of the

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KIM, Jun Yun (cont) 金俊淵

new constitution; member of the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea; committee member for drafting the constitution of the Korean Representative Democratic Council; one of nine elected as General Secretary of the Hankook Democratic Party, 1946; member of special committee for the study of economic problems set up by the Representative Democratic Council, 1946; member, Central Standing Committee, Hankook Democratic Party, 1947.

KIM, Kern KIM, Kun 金槿

B. about 1899; educated in Russia and China; active in Manchuria Communist movement; jailed by Japanese, 1930-45; member Central Executive Committee, Communist Party, 1946; joined with five other prominent Communists in anti-Pak, Heun Yung press statement, 5 August 1946; suspended from Party; member, Socialist Labor Party; with Kim, Chul Soo, insisted on dissolution of Socialist Labor Party and withdrew from that party, January 1947; member of South Korea Labor Party.

KIM, Ki-Yong 金麒鎔

B. 1906; G. Agriculture Department, Hokkaido Imperial University, Japan; engaged in agricultural and mining enterprises; member, Laborers' and Farmers' Department, People's Party, 1945; Chief Secretary, All-Korea Farmer's Alliance, since December 1945; arrested for obstructing MG grain collection, July 1946; named as representative of the All-Korea Farmer's Alliance to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

KIM, Koo KIM, Ku 金九

B. 1876; leader, Korean Provisional Government; replaced Dr. Rhee as president, Provisional Government, 1943; came to Korea, November 1945; prominent leader, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; vice-chairman, Representative Democratic Council; chairman, Central Executive Committee, Korean Independence Party, 1946; leading figure in anti-trusteeship movement from December 1946; chairman Anti-Trusteeship Committee, January 1947; implicated in 1 March attempt to establish Provisional Government, 1947; re-elected chairman, Central Executive Committee Korean Independence Party, May 1947; resigned as Chairman, General Labor League for Korean Independence (No Chong) and member, Central Committee, Laborers' and Farmers' Party for Korean Independence, May 1947; one of responsible persons, Anti-Trusteeship Demonstration, 23 June 1947; leader, with Rhee, Syng Man, of Korean People's Representatives, July-August 1947.

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KIM, Kuk Tai KIM, Kuk-T'ae 金局泰

B. 1884, Pusan; G. Tokyo Higher Commercial School, 1908; taught Commerce at Posung College; chairman of organization for promoting independence in Korea, 1921; chief of Kyongsang Namdo Police Department, October 1945-March 1946; editor of Korean Daily News in Pusan, 1946; elected to ILA from Kyongsang, October 1946; has no political affiliations; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Transportation and Communication.

KIM, Kwang Hyun KIM, Kwang-hyon 金光顯

B. 1912; G. Middle School, Taegu, 1931, Soong Sil University, Pyongyang, 1936, Kobe Juo Seminary, Japan, 1941; was pastor in several churches; chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, Andong Branch, 1946; chairman, GHQ for Korean National Unification, Andong Branch; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Pukto, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Qualifications, Education and Welfare; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

KIM, Kwang Soo KIM, Kwang-su 金光洙

B. about 1899; brother of Kim, Chul Soo; educated in Japan; journalist; jailed by Japanese; prominent in Communist Party and Democratic People's Front, 1945-46; Editor of Communist Weekly "Kun Kuk" (National Construction), 1946; Central Executive Committeeman, South Korean Labor Party, 1946; member Standing Committee, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; member, Committee, of Diplomatic Section, Democratic People's Front 1947; arrested by police as one of leaders connected with strikes of 21-22 March 1947; arrested again in August on charge of violating Ordinance #2.

KIM, Kyu-Sik 金奎植

B. 29 January 1881; G. with honors, Roanoke College, U.S., 1903; won scholarship for M.A. study, Princeton University, but did not attend; returned to Korea, 1904; engaged in religious and educational work; went to China to work for Korean Independence, 1913; naturalized as Chinese citizen, January 1916; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Education and Minister of Publicity consecutively of Korean Provisional Government; elected vice-chairman, Korean Provisional Government, 1944; attended Paris Peace Conference; organized Korean Commission to Europe and America, Washington, 1920; represented Korea at Far Eastern Revolutionary Congress, Moscow, 1922; in Siberia, 1923-24; returned to China and engaged in educational work; held professorships at Futan University, Chungsi University, Peiyang

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KIM, Kyu Sik (cont) 金奎植

University (Tientsin), Szechuan University (Chengtu); was president, Williams College (Shanghai); speaks eight languages fluently; returned to Korea November 1945 from China; resigned presidency, Korean Revolutionary Party, January 1946; vice chairman, Representative Democratic Council, 1946; leader of right-wing members of Coalition Committee from July 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; elected chairman of Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, December 11, 1946; elected Co-Chairman, with Lyuh, Woon Hyung, of the Counter-Measure Committee for the Present Situation, 3 July 1937; named as representative to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission by seven organizations, June 1947; on leave from the Legislative Assembly because of ill health, July-August 1947; formed National Independence Federation, October 1947.

*KIM, Moo Chung KIM, Mu-chong 金武亭
(Tch'ei, Moo Chung)

B. 1905; "General"; G. Seoul Choongan High School, 1919; G. Artillery Department, Northern Army Academy, China, 1926; joined Chinese Communist Party, 1925; commissioned Artillery Lt. Colonel, 1927; appointed Regimental Commander, Chinese Communist Army, 1930; entered Military Staff College, Eighth Army Headquarters, 1936; first Commander-in-Chief, South Korea Volunteer Army, Chindoong, 1941; prominent in Yenan Independence Alliance, 1942; commanded Korean Volunteer Army under Yenan Communist forces, 1943-45; prominent leader of North Korean Communist Party; member, North Korea Interim People's Committee, February 1946; head of Leaders Department, North Korea Branch of Korean Communist Party, 1947; chief of all security forces, North Korea, 1947.

KIM, O Sawng KIM, O-song 金午星

B. about 1903; G. Keijo Imperial University, Seoul; head of Propaganda Section, People's Party; chairman, Propaganda Department, Democratic People's Front, 1946-to date; publisher, Chosun Inmin Po (Korean People's Times); member, Central Committee, South Korean Labor Party, December 1946; Standing Committeeman, reorganized Democratic People's Front, February 1947.

KIM, Pup In (Bub Rin) KIM, Pop-nin 金法麟

B. 23 August 1899; G. middle school, 1919, Philosophy Department of Paris University, 1926, Buddhism Department of Koniazawa University, Tokyo, 1932; Professor, Central Buddhism College, Seoul, 1928-30; head of Korean Buddhists' Central General Affairs Society, 1945-46; member of Emergency National Assembly and Representative Democratic Council, 1946; member, Central Executive Committee, Hankook Democratic Party, resigned November 1946; appointed member of

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KIM, Pup In (Bub Rin) (cont) 金法麟

IL4, December 1946; member of following IL4 committees - Education and Welfare, Qualifications, January 1947; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by IL4 on 20 January 1947; member, Advisory Committee, Korean Red Cross, 1947.

KIM, Pyung No (Lo, Rho) KIM, Pyong-no 金炳魯

B. 1895; educated in Law School in Japan; one time head of Posung College, Seoul; former chief of Justice Department, Hankook Democratic Party, resigned from Party, 1946; chairman, Legislative Committee, Emergency National Assembly, 1946; endorsed 7 principles of coalition, October 1946; Director of Department of Justice, SKIG, 1946-to date; member of six men committee to reorganize Military Government, April 1947.

KIM, Ryu Sik KIM Ryo-sik 金麗植

B. 1888; Ph.D., Iowa State University and American University, Washington, D. C.; former editor, New Korean Daily News; founded Kwang-Shin Commercial School; councillor, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; member Representative Democratic Council of South Korea; one of vice-chairman of New Nationalist Party; party merged (in part) with Korean Independence Party, April 1946; member, Central Executive Committee, Korean Independence Party; expelled from Independence Party, August 1946; joined New Progressive Party; became chief of Foreign Affairs of this party, January 1947; in split of New Progressive Party remained with party, July 1947.

KIM, Sam Yong 金三龍

B. 1908; active in Communist Party and jailed by Japanese; member, Central Executive Committee, Communist Party, 1945-46; close supporter of Pak, Heun Yung; member, Central Committee, South Korea Labor Party, December 1946.

KIM, Sang Dawk KIM, Sang-dok 金尚德

B. 1892; G. in political economy, Waseda University, Tokyo; escaped to China, 1919; taught in Korean Revolutionary School; Director of Department of Culture, Korean Provisional Government; member, Central Standing Committee, Korean National Revolutionary Party, 1945; returned to Korea with Kim, Koo on 23 November 1945; Principal of Kyongsin Middle School, Seoul; withdrew from Korean National Revolutionary Party with Dr. Kim, Kyu Sik, February 1946; member, Central Executive Committee and

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KIM, Sang Dawk (cont) 金尙德

vice-chairman, Seoul Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, 1946; member of Political Economy Section GHQ for Korean National Unification, June 1946; unsuccessful candidate to ILA from Seoul in reelection runoff, December 1946; one of seven presidents, People's Alliance, 1947; appointed member of ILA to replace one of five initial appointees who declined to serve, February 1947.

KIM, Sei Yong 金世容

B. about 1894; attended Seoul Medical College; arrested by Japanese; fled to Vladivostok; entered university in Moscow; moved to Shanghai, then Korea; member, Korean Rehabilitation Alliance, 1942; active in the Korean People's Republic and Central People's Committee, 1945; head, Political Department, People's Party, 1946; staff member, Democratic People's Front, 1946.

KIM, Seung Soo KIM, Song-su 金性洙

B. about 1889; G. Law School, Waseda University, Japan; founder of Dong-A Ilbo, 1919; wealthy; was president of Bo Sawng College, Seoul, 1936-1946; Councillor, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; chairman, Hankook Democratic Party; consultant of Dr. Rhee's GHQ for Korean National Unification, July 1946; elected to ILA from Seoul, October 1946; when Seoul election nullified, defeated in re-election by Cho, So Ang; prominent in anti-trusteeship movement of December 1946-January 1947; vice-chairman, Anti-Trusteeship Committee, January 1947; named as representative of the Hankook Democratic Party to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

KIM, Suk Hwang (Sawk Whang) KIM, Sok-hwang 金錫璜

B. about 1895; was in Shanghai with Kim, Koo in 1919; returned to Korea before the war; vice-chairman of the Committee for Acceleration of the Great Korean Provisional Government; treasurer, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, 1947; leader of terroristic group called the Kim Suk Hwang Group; head of the Special Action Group of the Provisional Government; arrested in connection with 23 June 1947 anti-trusteeship demonstration, released; vice-chairman, Preparatory Committee of All-Korea Revolutionary Representatives, August 1947.

KIM, Sung Sook KIM Song-suk 金星淑

B. 1890; one of twelve secretaries of State, Korean Provisional Government; vice-president, Association

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KIM, Sung Sook (cont) 金星淑

for Unification of Political Parties; member, Korean National Emancipation League; was Chairman, Production and Economic Committee, Emergency National Assembly; withdrew from Emergency National Assembly and joined Democratic People's Front; one of eight vice-chairmen, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front; toured Cholla Pukto with An, Ki Sawng, March 1945; arrested for agitation against MG and violation of Proclamation #2, April 1946; sentenced to 6 months in prison and released 7 September 1946; vice-chairman, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; member, Laboring People's Party, 1947; chief, Planning Department, Council of all Political and Social Organizations for US-USSR Joint Commission, May 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

KIM, Tai Choon KIM, T'ae-chun 金台俊

One of four chairmen, All Korea Literary Union, February 1946; a Communist fellow traveller; member of the New Democratic Party, 1946; Central Executive Committee-man, South Korean Labor Party, 1946; one of 13 vice-chairmen, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; member, Supporting Society for Establishment of Anti-Japanese Movement, January, 1947; elected one of 11 chairmen, General League of All Korean Cultural Groups, February 1947; arrested by police in connection with 21-22 March strikes, 1947.

*KIM, Tal Hyun KIM, Tal-hyon 金達鉉

B. 1885, Ham Nam Ko Won; G. Suwon Agricultural Higher School; teacher of Yang Zung Middle School; imprisoned for six years for participation in March 1st Movement; vice-chief of North Korea Tchawndo Kyo Political Friends Party, 1946; chairman, North Korea Tchawndo Kyo Political Friends Party, 1947; vice-chairman of the First People's Assembly, North Korea, 1947; named as representative of the Political Friends Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, Pyongyang, July 1947.

*KIM, Tchaik (Chak) KIM, Ch'aek 金策

B. unknown; chairman of the Pyongyang Military School; holds rank of colonel in the Russian Army; vice-chairman of North Korean People's Committee, 1947; one of the Standing Chairmen, First People's Assembly, North Korea, 1947; named as representative of the North Korea Society of People's Air Fleet to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, Pyongyang, July 1947.

KIM, Tch'ang Sook KIM, Ch'ang-suk 金昌淑

B. about 1875; imprisoned seven years by Japanese; advisor, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; member, Representative Democratic Council of South Korea; resigned from Representative Democratic Council and from Emergency National Assembly because of political disagreement, October 1946.

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KIM, Won Bong KIM, Won-bong
(KIM, Yak San) (not to be confused with the following)

B. 1894; G. Hwangpao Military Academy; founder of "Dare to Die Society", 1926; "General"; State Councillor, Korean Provisional Government; founder of Korean Volunteer Corps, 1937; leader First Detachment, Kwang Bok Army, China; Chief Military Affairs, Provisional Government; a prominent leader, Korean Revolutionary Party, 1944-46; was a member of Emergency National Assembly but joined Democratic People's Front; one of five left-wing members of Coalition Committee under Lyuh, Woon Hyung, July 1946; quit Coalition Committee after it suffered temporary setback, July 1946; named honorary chairman of Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance, December 1946; re-elected to one of six chairmanships, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1946; chairman, Counter-Strike Committee, Democratic People's Front, March 1947; arrested for connection with March strikes; acquitted, 10 April 1947; reportedly connected with organization of Korean Democratic Patriotic Youth Alliance, successor to disbanded Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance, June 1947.

KIM, Won Bong KIM, Won-bong 金元鳳
(not to be confused with the above)

B. 1909; G. Kyonggi Middle School 1932; Chairman, Taejon Branch, Korean Independence Party; joined Interim Legislative Assembly as elected member from Chunchong Namdo, April 1947.

KIM, Yak Soo KIM, Yak-su 金若水

B. 1892; member of Korean Communist Party, 1925; member constitution drafting committee, Emergency National Assembly; vice-chairman, Military Affairs, Hankook Democratic Party; quit Hankook Democratic Party, October 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; member of the following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Food and Price Control Measures; joined in formation of People's Alliance; expelled from People's Alliance, May 1947; member, Korean Republican Party; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

KIM, Yong Choong KIM, Yong-chung 金龍中

B. about 1895; attended a university in U.S.; chairman, Korean Affairs Institute in Washington, D.C., 1946-to date; president of the Washington Association for Introduction of Korean Affairs; publishes Voice of Korea; made six-weeks' visit to Korea June-July 1947.

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KIM, Yong Mo KIM Yong-mo 金溶模

B. 1869; Christian minister; has no political affiliations but linked with Korean Independence Party; imprisoned by Japanese on suspicion of aiding Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Pukto, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Education and Welfare, Petitions and Discipline; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

KIM, Yong Moo KIM, Yong-mu 金用茂

B. 1890; Muan Gun, Cholla Namdo; G. judicial course, Chuo University, Tokyo, 1921; manager of the Oriental News, 1930; president of Posung College, Seoul, 1935; member of committee set up by the Emergency National Assembly for the drafting of the new constitution; Chief Judge of the Supreme Court, SKIG, 1946-to date; political affiliation, Hankook Democratic Party.

KIM, Young Kyoo KIM, Yong-gyu 金永奎

B. 10 November 1890; student of Chinese classical literature; spent nine months in Japanese prison for breaking Peace Preservation Law; Chief of Police, Chungchong Pukto after 15 August 1945; resigned in 1946; man of considerable personal wealth; Chairman, Koesan Branch, GHQ for Korean Unification; elected to ILA from Chungchong Pukto, October 1946; member of the following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Measures for Dealing with Enemy Property; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; member NSAKI.

KO, Hwang Kyung (Evelyn) KO, Hwang-Kyong 高凰京

B. 1907; G. Doshisha University, Japan, won a Barber Scholarship at University of Michigan, majored in sociology, took Ph.D.; returned to Korea, taught social science at Ewha College; head of home economics department; with sister, conducted small orphanage for Korean children in Seoul; has written articles for newspapers and magazines; head of the Women's Bureau, SKIG; attended the Pan-Asian Conference, New Delhi, March 1947; speaks fluent English and Japanese.

KO, Kwang Pyo KO, Kwang-P'yo 高光表

B. 25 July 1908; G. Choong Wan Middle School, Seoul, 1926; Rikkyo University Preparatory School, Tokyo, 1929-32, studied economics at Rikkyo University, April-September 1932; obtained control of Kwangju Mu Teung Stocking Company in September 1939; still operates it; advisor to Kwangju City Government, March,

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KO, Kwang Pyo (cont) 高光表

1946; vice-chairman, Kwangju Branch, Hankook Democratic Party; wealthiest man in Kwangju; elected to ILA from Cholla Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Petitions and Discipline, Industry, Labor and Agriculture; reprimanded for long absence from ILA, April 1947; chairman, Cholla Namdo Branch of Hankook Democratic Party, July 1947.

KO, Tch'ang Il KO, Ch'ang-il 高昌一

B. 1893; G. Far Eastern University, Vladivostok, 1916; vice-president, Korean National Congress in Russia, 1918; representative of same congress to Paris Peace Conference, 1919; speaks Russian language fluently; member, Emergency National Assembly, February 1946; one of seven men selected to represent Democratic Council at US-USSR Joint Commission; named by Dr. Rhee to Labor and Agriculture Section of GHQ for Korean National Unification, June 1946; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Drafting of Laws Dealing with Collaborators, Traitors, War Criminals and Profiteers; not affiliated with any party.

KOO, Cha Ok (Jah) KU, Cha-ok 具滋玉

B. about 1900; training at YMCA Training College, Springfield, Mass.; Secretary, YMCA, in Korea, 1936; Governor of Kyonggi Do; member of the International Friendly Society; elected one of Standing Directors of the Supporting Society for the Dai Dong Youth Corps, August 1947.

KWAN, O Chik KWON, O-chik 權五稷

B. 1905; G. university, Russia; arrested by Japanese for Communist activities, imprisoned 1928-36, 1938-45; president and publisher, Hai Bang Ilbo, 1945-46; member, Central Executive Committee, Communist Party, 1945-46.

KWAN, Tai Suk KWON T'ae-sok 權泰錫

B. about 1885; has lived in China about 8 years; linked with Lyuh, Woon Hyung in early days of National Founding Preparatory Committee; vice-chairman and party financier, New Nationalist Party, 1946; with some elements of party joined Korean Independence Party, April 1946, and appointed head of Investigation Department; resigned from Korean Independence Party and formed Democratic Korean Independence Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

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LEE, Bong Koo YI, Pong-gu 李鳳九

B. 1894, Seoul; G. Waseda University, Japan; Lawyer in Tokyo, 1931-38; lawyer in Korea, 1938-to date; head of Department of Diet Laws of the committee for the constitution and election laws which was formed by Emergency National Assembly, February 1946; vice-director, Dai Dong News Company, 1946; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Legislative and Judicial, Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws.

*LEE, Bong Soo YI, Pong-su 李鳳洙

B. 1892; G. Commerce Department, Meiji University Tokyo; participated in March 1st Movement, 1919; imprisoned several times by Japanese, connected with Dong-A Ilbo and banking enterprises; appointed director of Finance Bureau, North Korea, November 1945; Director of Finance, North Korea Interim People's Committee and North Korea People's Committee, 1946-to date.

LEE, Bum Suk YI, Pom-sok 李範奭

B. 1895; general; noted guerilla fighter; commander, Second Detachment, Korean Restoration Army with Headquarters in Sian, China, 1942-1945; went to Shanghai, January, 1946; arrived in Korea, 5 June 1946; appointed an advisor to Korean Constabulary, July 1946; organized and heads the Korean National Youth, sponsored by MG.

LEE, Chang Tch'awl (Chul) YI, Chong-ch'ol

B. 1900; G. Law College of Seoul, 1926; no party affiliation; joined Interim Legislative Assembly as elected member from Chungchong Namdo, April 1947.

LEE, Chawng Chun YI, Ch'ong-ch'on 李青天

B. about 1893; marshall; attended Japanese Military Academy, Tokyo; fought against Japanese in Manchuria, 1921-22; Chief of Special Korean Section, Loyang Military Academy; commander, Korean Restoration Army; moved from Chungking to Nanking, April 1946; listed as member Reinforced Council established by National Congress, March 1947; returned to Korea with Dr. Rhee, Syng Man, April 1947; elected member of Central Standing Committee, Korean Independence Party, May 1947; organized Dai Dong Youth Corps (corbining 19 youth groups), 7 August 1947.

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LEE, Chawng Yoon YI, Chong-yun 李廷允

B. 1905; educated in Russia; participated in March 1st Movement, 1919; active as youth leader under Japanese; imprisoned 1930-32; prominent member Chang Anp'a and Communist Party, 1945-46; joined with five other prominent Communists in Anti-Pak, Heun Yung press statement, 5 August 1946; expelled from Party.

LEE, Chong Hyawn YI, Chong-hyon 李宗鉉

B. about 1905; G. Christian College, Pyongyang; General Secretary, Chosun Democratic Party; member Emergency National Assembly; arrived in Seoul from Pyongyang, December 1945; prominent in Seoul Hq. of Chosun Democratic Party, 1946-to date; appointed chairman of the committee to investigate North Korea and elected one of 33 members of the Standing Committee, as representative of Pyongyang, of Koreen People's Representatives, July 1947.

LEE, Chong Hyawng YI, Chong-yong 李鍾栄

B. about 1885; arrested by Japanese in Manchuria; editor, Dai Dong Press; president, Popular Party; Dai Dong Press suspended for 3 weeks, for inciting terrorism, May 1946; appointed propaganda chief for National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, June 1946; arrested and jailed for bribery, September 1946; no longer editor of Dai Dong Shinmun; member of the Korean People's Representatives, July 1947.

LEE, Chong Kun LEE, Chong-kun 李琮根

B. 1894; G. Tokyo Oriental College, Philosophy Course; member, National Society for Accleration of Korean Independence; elected to ILA from Kyonggi Do, October 1946; at time of election was serving as advisor to Governor of Kyonggi Do; member of following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Qualifications.

LEE, Choo Ha LEE, Chu-ha 李舟河

B. 1905; G. grammar school; jailed twice by Japanese for Communist agitation; vice-chairman, People's Committee, Wonsan, 1945; moved to Seoul and assumed active role in South Korea Communist Party, 1946; member, Central Executive Committee Communist Party; jailed for illegal activities, October 1946; elected to membership of Central Executive Committee, South Korean Labor Party, in absentia, December 1946.

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LEE, Choo Hyawng (Hyung) LEE, Chu-hyong 李周衡

B. 6 January 1906 in Miryang Gun, Kyongsang Namdo; G. Seoul University, 1932; studied law, literature and majored in Korean history; was advisor to Kyongsang Namdo Military Government 1945; chairman, Kyongsang Namdo Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, to August 1946; at present member of Hankook Democratic Party; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Transportation and Communication, Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws, January 1947; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; on plea of ill-health, resigned from ILA, July 1947.

LEE, Erng Chin (Eung Jin) LEE, Ung-chin 李應辰

B. about 1900, Kyonggi Do; head of Tch'awndo Kyo Political Friends Party; appointed to ILA December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Legislative and Judicial, now member of Coalition Committee, June 1947; Liaison Committee member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

LEE, Hwal (Whal) YI, Hwal (Whal) 李沽

B. 1897; G. Economics Course, Waseda University, Tokyo, and Oxford University, England; member, General Affairs Section, Hankook Democratic Party; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Pukto, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Food and Price Control Measures; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

LEE, Hyawn Sang YI, Hyon-sang 李鉉相

B. 1904; G. middle school; in Shanghai, 1927; imprisoned by Japanese for Communist activities, 1928-32, 1934-39, 1941-44; joined Communist Party, 1945, and became member of Central Committee; active in Communist Party and Anti-Fascistic Cooperative Fighting Committee, 1945-46; arrested in September 1946; escaped when released to hospital for alleged illness, October 1946; elected member, Central Executive Committee, South Korean Labor Party, in absentia, December 1946.

LEE, Il Woo LEE, Il-u 李一雨

B. 1885; studied law at Meiji University, Tokyo, 1908-10; chairman, Young Men's Association, Yongil Gun, 1919; chairman, Yongil Branch, National Society

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LEE, Il Woo (coht) 李一雨

for Acceleration of Korean Independence, April 1946; occupation, fish merchant; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Pukto, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Industry, Labor and Agriculture, Food and Price Control Measures, Qualifications; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

LEE, In Dong LEE, In-dong 李仁同

B. 1909, Seoul; began work as press worker, 1925; member Standing Committee, Printing Workers' Labor Union, 1928; imprisoned 1930-34; again involved in labor movement; imprisoned, 1939-45; chairman, Printing Workers' Labor Union, 1945; member, Executive Committee, All-Korea Labor Union (Chawn Pyawng), 1946; member, Central Executive Committee, Communist Party, 1946; vice-chairman All-Korea Labor Union, elected February 1947; representative to the general meeting of the World Labor Federation, Prague; returned after post-convention tour in Russia and North Korea, July 1947; arrested by police, 18 September 1947.

*LEE, Kang Kook LEE, Kang-kuk 李康國

B. about 1904; G. Keijo Imperial University; old time Communist Party member; visited and studied in Germany; Secretary, People's Republic, 1945; chief secretary, Central People's Committee, 1945; chairman, Democratic People's Front convention (15-16 February 1946); member of Communist Party Central Executive Committee; was one of five left wing members of Coalition Committee, July 1946; quit Coalition Committee, August 1946; went to North Korea; appointed chief, Bureau of Foreign Affairs, North Korea People's Committee, February 1947; member, North Korea Labor Party.

LEE, Kap Soo LEE, Kap-su 李甲洙

B. March 1895; G. Okayama Medical College, 1917; studied at medical department, Kyoto Imperial University; eminent neurologist and surgeon; served in medical department of Keijo Imperial University; lecturer, Keijo Imperial University, 1931-43; also lecturer, Ehwa College for Girls and Seoul Dental College; at present, professor; joined Interim Legislative Assembly, February 1947; to replace one of five initial appointees who declined to serve.

LEE, Kap Sung LEE, Kap-song 李甲成

B. 1888; G. mission school, Taegu; business manager for Severence Drug Company; signer of Korean Declaration of Independence 1919; one of the organizers of the New Nationalist Party, December 1945; resigned party,

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LEE, Kap Sung (cont) 李甲成

1946; as a rightist active in unification movements; head of Society for Promotion of Korean Industry, August 1946; writer; Director Central YMCA; Director, Central Office of New Korea Company; elected to ILA from Seoul to replace Cho, So Ang, February 1947; named as representative of Yung Woo Association to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

LEE, Kawl So LEE, Kol-so 李傑笑

B. unknown; vice-chairman, General Affairs, People's Party, 1946; representative, Democratic People's Front.

LEE, Ki Suk LEE, Ki-sok 李基錫

B. about 1901; was engaged in underground activities, Communist agitation and labor agitation for which he served a six year prison term under the Japanese; member, Central People's Committee, 1945; staff member, People's Party, 1946; reported staff member, Korean Communist Party; vice-chairman, South Korean Labor Party, December 1946; chief of Finance Department, Democratic People's Front, 1946-47.

LEE, Koo Hoon (Hwon) LEE, Ku-hun 李龜壎

B. 1919; G. Tokyo Agricultural College; arrested twice by Japanese; member of Central Executive Committee of Communist Party, 1946; vice-chairman, All Korean Farmer's Union, 1945-46.

LEE, Kwan Koo LEE, Kwan-ku 李寬求

B. unknown; G. japanese university; an outstanding writer; spent 20 years in prison; was editor of Chosun Ilbo at time of arrest by Japanese; cooperated with An, Chai Hong, Seoul Shinmun, 1946; at one time belonged to Hankook Democratic Party; appointed member of ILA, February 1947, to replace one of five initial appointees who declined to serve.

LEE, Kwan Sool LEE, Kwan-su 李觀述

B. about 1904; G. Tokyo Higher Normal School and Kwangto Higher Normal School; also Seoul University; one time teacher, Tong Duk Girls Higher Commoh School; jailed, 1941; member, Central Executive Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Committee; head, Communist Party Finance Department; arrested 6 July 1946; tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for counterfeiting activities.

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LEE, Kyu Kap LEE, Kyu-kap 李奎甲

B. unknown; Christian minister; leader, Christian organization, Vladivostok; chairman, Executive Committee, New Korean Nationalist Party; elected one of 33 members, representing Seoul, of Standing Committee of Korean Peoples Representatives, July 1947; elected an Inspector, Supporting Society for the Dai Dong Youth Corps, August 1947.

LEE, Man Kyu LEE, Man-kyu 李萬珪

B. unknown; medical man turned educator; teacher in a Methodist Mission School; member of Judging Committee, Democratic People's Front; vice-chief, Inspection Committee, Korean People's Party; member of Preparatory Committee of Socialist Labor Party, November 1946; chief of the Culture Department of the Democratic People's Front, 1947; member of the governing group of the Laboring People's Party, elected May 1947.

*LEE, Moon Hwan YI, Mun-hwan 李文煥

B. about 1902; G. Port Arthur Technical University, Nam Hai Engineering School, Kan To Shu, Japan; chief of General Electrical Bureau of Seoul until August 1946; chairman, Bureau of Industry, Interim People's Committee, North Korea, 1946; economic advisor to the Planning Department and the Central Committee of the North Korean Labor Party, 1947; chief, Industrial Bureau, North Korean People's Committee, 1947.

LEE, Nam Kyoo LEE, Nam-kyu 李南圭

B. 29 February 1901; studied Chinese literature, 1908-18; attended Seung Il Private School in Kwangju, 1918-20; attended Choong Tong Middle School, Seoul, 1920-22; Pyongyang Seminary, 1922-24; Christian pastor, 1925-42; took up duties of pastor again in October 1945; vice-chairman, General Youth's League for Acceleration of Korean Independence, 1946; elected to ILA from Cholla Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Qualifications; leading sponsor of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA, 20 January 1947; suspended from ILA, returned May 1947; elected one of 33 members of Standing Committee, as representative of Cholla Namdo, of the Korean People's Representatives, July 1947.

LEE, Oon LEE, Un 李沇

B. about 1889, Haeju, Hwanghae Do; G. Japanese Imperial University, specializing in agriculture; imprisoned because of his following of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and participating in the 1919 Korean Independence Movement; chairman, Department of General Affairs of National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; central figure of the Institute for

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LEE, Oon (cont) 李雲

North western Korea; member of the Standing Committee and chairman, Department of Welfare, Hankook Democratic Party, 1947.

LEE, Si Yung LEE, Si-yong 李始栄

B. 1867; one of three charter members, Provisional Government; executive treasurer and a secretary of state, Provisional Government; well known backer of Kim, Koo; returnod to Korea 23 November 1945; chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, 1945-46; prominent in Korean Independence Party, 1946; announced resignation from all public positions due to his age, August 1946; elected chairman, Chinese-Korean Culture Association, November 1946; elected advisor to NSAKI, May 1947; issued second statement resigning from all positions, July 1947; elected a member of the National Affairs Committee, National Congress, September 1947, but declined to serve.

LEE, Sawn Kern LEE, Son-kun 李瑄根

B. about 1902, Kawsong; G. Waseda University, Japan; newspaperman, editor of the Chosun Ilbo under An, Chai Hong; in business in Manchuria during the war; chairman, Central Executive Committee of the All Korean Young Men's Association for the Acceleration of Independence, 1946; chief editor, Han Sung Ilbo, 1947; member of the Coalition Committee, 1947; named as representative of the Korean Youth Party to consult with the Joint Commission, June 1947; Director of the Planning Department of the Dai Dong Youth Corps.

*LEE, Soon Kern (Keun) LEE, Sun-kun 李舜根

B. 1900; G. Economics, Waseda University, 1932; arrested and jailed for six years by Japanese; worked in Taegu underground, 1938; arrested again, 1939; member, Central People's Committee, Korean People's Republic, 1945; moved to Pyongyang, November 1945; Director of Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; prominent member, North Korea Farmer's Alliance, 1945-46; member North Korea Labor Party, 1947; chief, Agriculture and Forestry Bureau, North Korea People's Committee, 1947.

LEE, Soon Kern YI, Sun-kum 李順今

B. about 1898; G. Politics and Economics, Waseda University, Japan; wife of Pak, Heun Yung and sister of Lee, Kwan Sool; was active in Communist underground; imprisoned five years by Japanese; member, Executive Committee, All-Korea Women's Union 1945-46; member, Central Executive Committee, Communist Party, 1945-46.

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LEE, Soon Tak LEE, Sun-t'aek 李順鐸

B. unknown; G. Kyoto Imperial University, economics; member, Central Executive Committee, Hankook Democratic Party, withdrew October 1946; president of Commercial School of Yawnhi College; delegate to committee on Investigating Living Conditions; Representative Democratic Council, May 1946; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Industry, Labor and Agriculture, Liaison; member, People's Alliance; professor, Chosun Christian College, 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947; member of the Propaganda Committee, Preparatory Committee of Democratic Independence Party, September 1947.

LEE, Won Saing LEE, Won-saeng 李源生

B. 7 February 1873, Sosan Gun; G. Posung College, Law Seoul; clerk, Seoul City Office; manager, Seoul Shinmun; member, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; elected to ILA from Chungchong Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Legislative and Judicial, Drafting of Laws Dealing with Collaborators, Traitors, War Criminals and profiteers; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

LEE, Won Soon LEE, Won-sun 李元淳

B. about 1892; high school education, in Hawaii; successful business man; member of Korean Committee for Morale Section of Civilian Defense, organized January 1942; a leading official of the Korean National Association under the Korean Provisional Government, October 1942; chairman of the United Korean Committee in Hawaii, December 1942; went to U.S. from Hawaii, 1942; treasurer of the Korean Commission in Washington, 1945; now in business in New York; represented Korea at the Stockholm Olympic Committee meeting; returned to Korea on a visit, September 1947.

LEE, Yong Chik LEE, Yong-chik 李容稷

B. about 1894; studied in America; member of the Korean Mission to America and Europe in 1919; superintendent of Korean Mission in Hawaii, 1931; chairman of the University Club of the Korean People's Civil Mobilization Union which gathered secret information on the Japanese military from 1931 until liberation; chairman of the Political Friends Association, April 1947; chief, Diplomatic Department and co-vice-chairman of the Special Political Committee, Council of All Political Parties and Social Organizations for US-USSR Joint Commission, May 1947.

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LEE, Yoon Yawng (Yun Yong) LEE, Yun-yong 李允榮

B. about 1881; Presbyterian Minister; vice-chairman, Chosun Democratic Party; chairman, Pyongyang Christian Association; arrived in Seoul, from Pyongyang, January 1946; active head of Chosun Democratic Party; chairman, Philantrophic Association 1946; elected chairman, Inspection Committee, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, 17 May 1947; member, Standing Committee, Korean People's Representaties, August 1947.

LEE, Yuh Sung LEE, Yo-song 李如星

B. about 1899; attended Waseda University, Japan; G. Political Science and Economics Department, Rikkyo University, Japan; joined Communist Party, 1922; reporter, Chosun Ilbo; staff member, Dong-A Ilbo; member, Rehabilitation Alliance, June 1945; director, Propaganda Bureau, Rehabilitation Commission, August 1945; member, Election Committee, People's Party; chairman, Magnified Committee, and head, General Affairs, People's Party; chairman, General Affairs, Democratic People's Front; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1945; quit December 1946; elected one of 13 vice-chairmen as independent member, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; leading member of the Laboring People's Party, 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

LEE, Yung LEE, Yong 李英

B. 1888; G. Seoul Private Osawng School, Kangyawng Technical School, Nanking China; imprisoned 1928-33 for Communist activities; leader, Old Communist Party (Chang Anp'a); joined with Pak, Heun Yung's Reconstruction Party (Chai Kern Pa) to form Korean Communist Party; prominent member, Korean Communist Party; vice-chairman, anti-Fascistic Cooperative Fighting Committee; attended anti-Pak Communist meeting in Seoul on 28 September 1946; member Socialist Labor Party, October 1946, quit December 1946; member Standing Committee, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; elected a member of the governing group, Laboring People's Party, May 1947.

LIM, Hwa YIM, Hwa 林和

B. about 1908; Seoul; has had no regular education; novelist and writer for the Hyung Dai Ilbo, 1946; member of the General League of All Korean Culture Groups, 1946; named as representative of the All Korean Labor Union (Chawng Pyawng) and General League of All Korean Culture Groups to consult with the Joint Commission, June 1947.

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LIMB, Ben C. YIM, Pyong-chik 林秉稷
(Lim, Byung Chik)

B. unknown; "Colonel"; Dr. Rhee's representative, American-Korean Commission, Washington, D.C.; chairman, Korean Residents' Committee, Washington, D.C.; arrived in London as Dr. Rhee's envoy, February 1947, and now back in U.S., acting as Rhee's appointed delegate to United Nations; not officially accepted in either role.

LYOO, Chung Ho YU, Chong-ho 柳鍾浩

B. 10 February 1895, Yesan Gun; education, Primary School; chairman, Sosan Gun Miho Young Men's Association; vice-chairman, Yesan Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; elected to ILA from Chungchong Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic Food and Price Control Measures; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

LYOO, Dong Yul YU, Tong-nyol 柳東悅
(Yu, Tong Yul)

B. about 1875, Pakchon, Pyongan Pukto; dispatched by Korean Government to Tokyo, and G. Japanese Military Academy; Battalion Commander in Korean Army previous to annexation by Japan; fled to China and joined Provisional Government group; Minister of Communication for Provisional Government, 1944; Chief of Staff for Provisional Government, 1945; active staff member of Chungking New Democratic Party, formed 7 February 1945; closely associated in China with Kim, Kyu Sik, Hong Chin, Kim, Boong Choon and Kim, Hak Kyoo; returned to Seoul with Kim Koo, 23 November 1945; appointed Director of Korean Constabulary for MG, June 1946; chairman of New Progressive Party, formed September 1946, resigned, December 1946.

LYOO, Lai Wan YU, Lae-wan 柳來琬

B. 12 May 1888; studied in Commerce and Industrial School, Kobe, Japan; no political affiliation, elected to ILA from Kyonggi Do, October; member of following ILA committees - Transportation and Communications, Industry, Labor and Agriculture; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

LYOO, Rim YU, Rim 柳林

B. about 1885; leader of Korean Anarchist Party; a Secretary of State, Korean Provisional Government; chairman, Agriculture and Labor Committee, Emergency National Assembly; formed and headed Independent Farmer Labor Party, May 1946; active in anti-trusteeship movement, December 1946-January 1947; made

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LYOO, Rim (cont) 柳林

statement that from beginning he denounced entirely Moscow Decision and ILA, 16 January 1947; elected vice-chairman, Emergency National Assembly, February 1947.

LYOO, Young Keun YU, Yong-gun 柳英根

B. 2 March 1881, Nonsan; self-tutored; farmer; pastor of Christian church; no political affiliations; elected to ILA from Kyonggi Do, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Transportation and Communications, Industry, Labor and Agriculture.

LYUH, Woon Hong YO, Un-hong 呂運弘

B. 1889; educated in Korea and U.S.; attended Wooster College, Wooster, Ohio and University of Southern California, Los Angeles; former manager, Singer Sewing Machine Company, Seoul; teacher of English, Posung College, Seoul; brother of the late Lyuh, Woon Hyung; close advisor to his brother, until he left party; staff member, People's Party, 1945; member, diplomatic committee, Democratic People's Front, 1946; resigned from People's Party, 9 May 1946, charging Communist domination; organized and headed Social Democratic Party June 1946; backed Coalition Committee, summer 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; appointed member of following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Qualifications, January 1947; president Dai Han Dok Lip Shinmun, January 1947; named as representative of Social Democratic Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

MOO, Chung Mu-chong 武亭
See KIM, Moo Chung

MOON, Chin Kyo MUN, Chin-kyo 文珍校

B. 1911; G. Chenam Tong Moon School, Literature, China Chenam Political Training School; chairman, Pochon Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; chief Pochon Branch, Dong-A Ilbo; elected to ILA from Kyonggi Do, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Transportation and Communications, Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

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MOON, Ern Chong MUN, Un-chong 文鎭鍾

B. 4 June 1910; G. Grammar School, 1924; attended Middle School, Seoul, 1924-28; active in anti-Japanese students society; jailed, 1931-39 and 1943; active in labor unions, 1943-45; head of Industrial Department, All-Korean Labor Union (Chawn Pyawng), 1945-46; head of Investigation Department, Council of All-Korea Labor Union, November 1946; arrested twice in March 1947, released on probation.

MOON, Kap Song MUN, Kap-song 文甲松

B. about 1906, Hamgyong Namdo; educated in Japan; active in North Manchurian Communist underground; arrested and jailed by Japanese, 1930-45; joined with five other prominent Communists in anti-Pak Heun Yung press statement, 5 August 1946; suspended from party; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; resigned, February 1947; member of Laboring People's Party, June 1947.

MOON, Moo Sool MUN, Mu-sul 文武術

B. 1884; G. Hong Tae School in Wonsan; attended Tai Sung Middle School; engaged in independence movement in Manchuria and Russia; considered moderate rightist but has no political affiliations; collaborated with Kan, Woo Ku who threw bomb at Governor Sato in Seoul Station, jailed eight years by Japanese; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Qualifications, Transportation and Communications.

MYAWNG, Chai Sai MYONG, Che-se 明淸世

B. about 1885, Yongbyong, Pyongan Pukto; imprisoned for five years after 1919 rebellion; at one time chairman, Korean Products Encouraging Society; leader of People's Republic Party, 1945; upon merger of People's Republic Party with the National Party, became vice-president, September 1945; as representative of National Party, cancelled signature on Joint Proclamation #5, January 1947; vice-chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; member, Central Standing Committee, Korean Independence Party, resigned May 1947; member, Standing Committee, and chairman of the Committee to plan Anti-Trusteeship Movement, Korean People's Representatives, August 1947.

O, Hah Yung (Oh) O, Ha-yong 吳夏英

B. 1878, Seoul; studied in U.S.; participated, March 1st Movement, 1919; sentenced to six years imprisonment by Japanese; associated with Dr. Rhee, Syng

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O, Hah Yung (Oh) (cont) 吳夏英

Man, 1919; committee member, Association for Unification of All Political Parties; a director, Diplomatic Association; advisor, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence and vice-chairman of Seoul Branch, 1946; chairman of 12 May 1946 anti-trusteeship rally in Seoul; charged with responsibility for 12 May disorders, arrested and fined, 12 May 1946; consultant, Dr. Rhee's GHQ for Korean National Unification, June 1946; appointed to Interim Legislative Assembly, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations; appointed member of committee to investigate living and working conditions of Koreans in Japan, May 1947; new member of the Coalition Committee, June 1947; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

O, I Sang (Oh) O, I-sang 吳伊尙

B. 1904; G. Fishery School, Pusan, 1923; chairman, Pusan Branch, ~~Hankook~~ Democratic Party; joined Interim Legislative Assembly as elected member from Kyongsang Namdo, April 1947.

O, Ja Il (Oh, Cha Il) 吳哉一

B. 1908; G. Law Course at Chue University, Tokyo; editor of the Dong-A Ilbo; landowner; chief director of the Tonghae Girls' School; chairman, Tonghae Branch of the People's Party, June 1946; chief of the plannings section of the Kyongsang Namdo Provincial People's Committee; vice-chairman of the People's Party and General Chief of Kyongsang Namdo Branch of the Preparatory Society for Establishment of Democratic People's Front, Pusan; at one time affiliated with South Korean Labor Party, but resigned; prominent member of Laboring People's Party, Pusan, 1947.

*O, Ki Sawh (Oh) O, Ki-sop. 吳淇燮

B. about 1900; G. Nippon University; Journalist and author; prominent in the North Korea Communist Party and North Korea Farmer's Union, 1945-46; chief of Propaganda Section, North Korean Interim People's Committee, 1946; Central Executive Committeeman, North Korean Labor Party, 1946; head of newly formed Labor Bureau, Interim People's Committee, September 1946; representative at North Korean People's Conference, February 1947; member, Political Committee, North Korean Labor Party, and chief of Bureau of Labor, North Korea People's Committee, 1947.

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O, Kwang Sawn (Oh) O, Kwang-son 吳光鮮

B. 1895; G. Lo-yang Military Academy, Loyang, China; served thirty years in Korean Army in China; Commander-in-Chief, Korean National Army Preparatory Corps, an organization of about one thousand officers and EM, became the home-land division of the Kwang Bok Army, Korea; disbanded, 1946; chairman of the Hankook Rehabilitation Young Men's Association (Kwang Bok), 1946; elected chairman of the Committee of National Defense, Korean Independence Party, 1947.

O, Soi Chang (Oh) O, Se-ch'ang 吳世昌

B. 1863; associated with Dr. Rhee, March 1st Movement, 1919; vice-chairman, New Korean Nationalist Party; chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, February 1946; member, Representative Democratic Council of South Korea; chairman of MG sponsored 15 August Celebration, Seoul, 1946 and 1947.

O, Yong Kook (Oh) O, Yong-kuk 吳龍國

B. about 1907; educated in Japan; no party affiliation; previous political posts were unimportant, highest having been that myun head; of moderate means; elected to IIA from Cheju-do in February 1947.

P - See also B

PAIK, Kwan Soo PAEK, Kwan-su 白寬洙

B. 1886, Pusan; Professor Law, Posun College, Seoul during the war; former president of Eastern Daily News; one of 28 members appointed to Representative Democratic Council, February 1946; Traffic Committee, Emergency National Assembly, February 1946; Commerce and Industry Section, Hankook Democratic Party, February 1946; General Affairs Department, Hankook Democratic Party, October 1946; elected to ILA from Cholla Pukto, October 1946; elected member of following ILA committees - chairman, Legislative and Judicial Committee, Transportation and Communications, Qualifications; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; appointed member of six-man committee to reorganize Military Government, April 1947; appointed to represent ILA at meeting with MG to discuss Election Law, July 1947.

PAIK, Nam Un PAEK, Nam-un 白南雲

B. about 1900; G. Tokyo Imperial University, Japan; former professor, Yawn Ii College; professor, Economics, Chosun Christian College, 1925-40; arrested by Japanese

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PAIK, Nam Un (cont) 白南雲

for study of Marxism, about 1940; president, Korean Academy; became chairman of Special Assembly Committee, Yenan Independence Alliance in Seoul, 6 February 1946; head, Law Department, Seoul University until resignation, June 1946; a director, Diplomatic Association; one of eight vice-chairmen, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front; made brief trip to Pyongyang for consultations with old friend Kim, Doo Bong, June 1946; one of five leftist members of Coalition Committee, July 1946; withdrew from Coalition Committee when it suffered temporary set-back, August 1946; tendered and then withdrew resignation as head of South Korean New Democratic Party (Yenan Independence Alliance), 5-10 September 1946; merged his New Democratic Party into Lyuh, Woon Hyung's Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; made trip to North Korea to confer with Kim, Doo Bong, October 1946; reportedly dismissed from vice-chairmanship, Democratic People's Front, November 1946; retired from politics, December 1946; reported elected to Standing Committee, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; vice-chairman, Laboring People's Party, 1947.

PAIK, Nam Young PAEK, Nam-yong 白南彔

B. 1896; Department of Sociology, Nippon University Tokyo; member, Hankook Democratic Party; President, Christian Religious Society; landowner; elected to ILA from Cholla Pukto, October 1946; member of the following ILA committees - Education and Welfare, Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

PAIK, Yong Hi PAEK, Yong-hi 白庸熙

B. 1874, Wanju Gun, Cholla Pukto; educated in Chinese classics; served as an official under Korean Government prior to Japanese entry; landowner and farmer; chairman, All Korea Farmer's Alliance, 1945-46; one of vice-chairmen, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front; prominent in Diplomatic Association; vice-chairman, along with Kim, Kwang Soo, Seoul People's Committee, 1946; unsuccessful leftist candidate to ILA from Cholla Pukto, October 1946; one of 13 vice-chairmen reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947.

*PAK, Chawng Ai PAK, Chong-ae 朴卣愛

B. about 1905; G. Soviet Normal School; teacher in Russia; wife of Kim, Yong Bawm; jailed with husband by Japanese for two years for Communist activity; chairman, North Korea Women's Union, 1945-to date; head, Women's Department, North Korea Communist Party, 1945-46;

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PAK, Chawng Ai (cont) 朴貞愛

prominent member, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; member, Executive Committee, North Korean Labor Party, 1946; elected one of Standing Chairman, First People's Assembly, North Korea, February 1947; representative to International Women's Assembly, Prague, May 1947; named as representative of the North Korean Women's Union (Democratic Women's League), to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, Pyongyang, July 1947.

PAK, Heun Yung PAK, Hon-yong 朴憲永

B. 1889; G. Lenin University, Moscow; went to Shanghai, joined Chinese Youngmen's Communist Party, 1920 and became director of organization, 1925; imprisoned in Shanghai by Japanese police for Communist activities; 1925-27; was in Russia, 1927-30; returned to Shanghai, 1930 and again jailed by Japanese police, 1931-36; came to Korea and organized Communist underground movement, 1936; General Secretary, Korean Communist Party, August 1945; one of 4 chairmen, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front, February 1946; made brief visit to Pyongyang, July 1946; elected vice-chairman of South Korea Labor Party in absentia, December 1946; one of six chairmen (in absentia); reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; present whereabouts unknown, believed to travel at will between North and South Korea.

PAK, Kun Dong PAK, Kon-ung 朴健雄

B. 1903 in Manchuria; G. Hwangpo Military Academy, China; active in Chinese Communist Party and Korean Volunteer Army; returned to Korea from Chungking, March 1946; staff member, Communist Party; anti-Pak, Heun Yung; joined Coalition Committee and became chief of Propaganda Section, September 1946; signed 7 principles of coalition, October 1946; member, Joint Korean-American Conference, October 1946; appointed to ILA December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Chairman, Industry Labor and Agriculture, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Drafting of Laws Dealing with Japanese Collaborators, Traitors, War Criminals and Profiteers.

PAK, Lak Chong PAK, Nak-chong 朴洛鍾

B. 1898; G. Seoul Middle School and Waseda University Japan, 1926; leader, Communist "January Association", 1924; organized Communist "M.L. Party"; in charge, Japanese branch, Korean Communist Party; ran a Communist printing shop for the Japanese Communist Party; returned to Korea,

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P'AK, Lak Chong (cont) 朴洛鍾

1928; imprisoned by Japanese, 1928-33; member, Central People's Committee, 1945; bonded manager of Chikazawa Press, 1945-46; member, Central Executive Committee, Communist Party, 1945-46; implicated in counterfeit ring and arrested, May 1946; sentenced to life imprisonment for counterfeiting, November 1946.

P'AK, Moon Kyoo P'AK, Mun-kyu 朴文圭

B. about 1905; G. and became assistant professor, Keijo Imperial University; versed in farmers' problems; member Central People's Committee, Korean People's Republic, 1945; member, Research Committee for land problems, Democratic People's Front; prominent member, Pak, Heun Yung's Communist "Reconstruction" faction; reported member, Executive Committee, Korean Communist Party, 1945-46; member, Central Executive Committee, South Korean Labor Party, December 1946; member, Standing Committee, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; arrested as one of leaders connected with strikes of 21-22 March 1947 and sentenced to three years in prison, April 1947.

P'AK, Serng Ho P'AK, Sung-ho 朴承浩

B. 7 January 1897, Kyonggi Do; G. Ri Hwa Middle School 1916, Tsuda Women's English School, 1920-24, in Tokyo; member, Dong-A Ilbo, 1935-41; vice-president, Seoul Family Women's School 1941-45; chairman, Patriotic Women's Association for Acceleration of Korean Independence, 1946; staff member, Women's Section, Dr. Rhee's GHQ for Korean National Unification, June 1946; appointed member to ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Industry, Labor and Agriculture, Food and Price Control Measures, Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by Assembly on 20 January 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for Establishment of Provisional Government (United Council), June 1947.

P'AK, Yong Hi P'AK, Yong-hi 朴容羲

B. 1885; G. from Bible School; after returning from abroad, studied theology; Presbyterian pastor; contributed to Nationalist movement; political prisoner of Japanese to July 1945; has a good knowledge of modern law and economics; one of 28 appointed members of Representative Democratic Council, February 1946; chairman, Cultural Committee, Korean Independence Party, 1946; appointed member of ILA, February 1947, to replace one of five initial appointees who declined to serve; appointed member, Advisory Committee, Korean Red Cross, February

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PAK, Yong Hi (cont) 朴容義

1947; in split in ranks of Korean Independence Party, sided with An, Chai Hong and younger group; elected member of the Central Standing Committee of the Korean Independence Party, May 1947, resigned from Party and became member of New Korean National Party; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

PARK, Myun Suk (Pak, Myawn Sook) PAK, Hyon-sok 朴賢淑

B. 1896; G. Chung Chin School in Pyongyang, 1906-10, Soong-I Girls School, 1910-15; was only feminine leader in Pyongyang during March 1st Demonstration, 1 March 1919; on account of her leadership was imprisoned by Japanese; after release, participated in YWCA work and Young Women's National League; designated one of important officers of Korean Rehabilitation Committee, headed by Cho, Man Sik, 16 October 1945; member of South Pyongan Provincial People's Committee; disapproved trusteeship, came to South Korea, March 1946; General Director, National Women's Association, September 1946; appointed to IIA, December 1946; took part in anti-trusteeship movement of December 1946-January 1947; member of following IIA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Qualifications.

RHEE, Syng Man YI, Sung-man 李承晩

B. about 1875; G. M.A., Harvard University, Ph.D., Princeton University under Woodrow Wilson; published Korea's first daily newspaper, 1897-1904; prominent in revolution, 1 March 1919; first president, Korean Provisional Government, April 1919-1942; in U.S., 1919-45; peace delegate, Philadelphia 5 April 1919; Washington representative, Korean Provisional Government, Chungking, 28 October 1942; chairman, Korean Commission in Washington, March 1944; appointed high advisor, San Francisco Conference, March 1945; returned to Korea, November 1945; leader with Kim, Koo, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; chairman, Representative Democratic Council of Korea; toured provinces, April-May 1946; formed GHQ of National Unification, July 1946; chairman, General Labor League for Korean Independence (No Chong), 1946; left Korea for U.S., 4 December 1946; power behind anti-trusteeship movement in South Korea from December 1946; carrying on international lobby for separate South Korea government, January 1947; returned to Korea from U.S. via China, April 1947; announced full non-cooperation stand on Joint Commission, 10 June 1947; leader of Korean People's Representatives, organizing for a general election, July-August 1947.

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SAW, Sang Choon SO, Sang-chun 徐商俊

B. 2 April 1906; G. Seoul University Law College, 1933; Lt. in charge of Police Affairs Section, Kangwon Do Police, 1934; vice-chief, Agriculture Section, Kangwon Provincial Government, 1938; chief of Chunchon Police Station, 1945; resigned February 1946; chairman, Kangwon Provincial Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, February 1946; chairman, Kangwon Provincial Branch General Youth's League for Acceleration of Korean Independence; elected to ILA from Kangwon Do, October 1946; when election nullified, won in reelection run off, December 1946; not appointed to any ILA committees; publisher of revived Dyun Dai Ilbo (Modern Daily News), January 1947; resigned from ILA, 16 July 1947.

SAW, Sang Il SO, Sang-il 徐相日

B. 1887; G. Posung College, Seoul, 1910; travelled in China while engaged in Korean Independence Movement; imprisoned by Japanese in 1919; chairman, Kwang Bok Young Men's Association, 1920; vice-chairman of Preparatory Committee for National Party, September 1945; chief of Organization Department, Hankook Democratic Party, Kyongsang Pukto, 1946; vice chief of Agriculture and Forestry Section, Hankook Democratic Party, 1946; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Pukto, October 1946; appointed merber of following ILA committees - Legislative and Judicial, Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations, January 1947; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; named as representative by Same Voice Association to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

SAW, Sechung SO, Se-ch'ung 徐世忠
(Sei, Tchoon)

B. 1887; G. Seoul High School before annexation; went to Manchuria; engaged in business; liaison between Korean revolutionaries inside and outside Korea, 1919; arrested many times; returned to Korea, 1923; upon return, worked on Chinese newspaper and opened Chinese and Russian Language Institute; a leader of the Emancipated Political Prisoners Organization, 1945; a president of the People's Alliance, 1947; member of the Executive Committee of the Ul Woo Hoi (non-political Korean group), 1947; Liaison Committee member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

SAWNG, Choo Sik SONG, Chu-sik 成周寔

B. about 1887; military man with Chinese training; State Councillor and also one of twelve Secretaries

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SANG, Choo Sik (cont) 成周寔

of State, Provisional Government; merber, Korean Revolutionary Party; withdrew from Emergency National Assembly and joined Democratic People's Front, 15 February 1945; a vice-chairman, Democratic People's Front; member Supporting Society for the Establishement of Anti-Japanese Movement, 1946.

SHIN, Ik Hi SIN, Ik-hi 申翼熙

B. 1890; G. English course in Foreign Language School; G. Political and Economic course, Waseda University in Tokyo; head, Home Affairs and Secretary of Interior, Korean Provisional Government; head, Administrative Bureau, Provisional Government; constitutional drafting committee, Emergency National Assembly, 1946; chairman, Legislative committee, Emergency National Assembly; staff member of Korean Independence Party, 1946; a vice-chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; dropped from revised officer list by Society's national convention, September 1946; elected chairman of Seoul Branch of NSAKI, October 1946; became publisher of Chayoo Shinmun, October 1946; with Cho, So Ang formed Diplomatic Representative's Association to support Dr. Rhee's mission to U.S. December 1946; elected to ILA from Seoul, December 1946; prominent in anti-trusteeship movement of December 1946-January 1947; appointed member of following ILA committees - chairman of Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Liaison, January 1947; elected one of two vice presidents, Korean Independence Party, May 1947; elected advisor to National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, May 1947; resigned from Korean Independence Party, 18 July 1947; selected co-vice chairman, Korean People's Representatives, August 1947.

SIN, Bul Chul SIN, Pul-ch'ul 申不出
(Bool, Tch'ool)

B. about 1905; studied literature, Meiji University, Japan; well-known professional comedian; has made frequent theatrical tours of South Korea, 1945-46; prominent staff member, Communist Party, 1946; leader, Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance, November 1946; reported to be on lecture tour in North Korea, December 1946.

SIN, Jung Mok SIN, Chung-mok 愼重穆
(Choong Mok)

B. 1 July 1901, Kochang; G. Waseda University, Japan; 15 years in public office; chief of General Affairs Department, Kochang Gun Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, 1946; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Transportation and Communications, Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

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SIN, Ki Awn - SIN, Ki-on 申基彦

B. about 1906; G. Central Political Institute, China; chief of Information, People's Party, 1946; member of Propaganda Section Coalition Committee, October 1946; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; expelled from Party when he joined ILA, December 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Internal Affairs and Police, Qualifications, vice-chairman, Liaison; appointed by Kim, Kyu Sik to investigate living conditions of Koreans in Manchuria, Peking and Shanghai, May 1947; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

SIN, Ooi Kyawng SIN, Ui-kyong 申義卿

B. 1897; National Korean Women's Association, 1919; Union Association of YWCA for Korea, 1922; G. Tong Puk Imperial University, Law Department, March 1930; taught Ewha College, 1930; General Affairs of YWCA, 1943; member, Women's Department, Central Executive Committee, People's Party, 1946; Temporary Executive Section, Seoul Branch, Democratic People's Front, April 1946; strong supporter of late Lyuh, Woon Hyung; appointed member of ILA December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Petitions and Punishment; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

SIN, Sook (Suk) SIN, Suk 申肅

B. 1884, Kyonggi Do; classical education, worked among Koreans in Manchuria, 1927-c. 1940; arrested and imprisoned six months by Japanese, 1931; lived in Mukden, c. 1940-1946; returned to Korea as representative of Korean Immigrant Association in Manchuria, November 1946; president of Korean Immigrant Association in Manchuria; life-long staff member of the Tchawndo Kyo; joined Interim Legislative Assembly as appointed member, April 1947; appointed by Kim, Kyu Sik to investigate living conditions of Koreans in Manchuria, Peking and Shanghai; new member of the Coalition Committee, June 1947; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

SIN, Suk Woo SIN, Sok-wu 申錫雨

B. 1893; G. Posung Law College, Seoul, 1909, Waseda University, Tokyo, 1914, in Political Science; actively served for Korean independence in Northern China, 1914-1919; participated in forming of the Korean Provisional Government; first president of the Korean

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SIN, Suk Woo (cont) 申錫雨

Association in China; captured by the Japanese Gendarmerie in Shanghai, served a year's sentence in Korea; owned and managed the Chosun Ilbo; promoted forms of anti-Japanese movements, 1923-1930; became general-secretary of Korea's highest literary society, Shin Kan Hwei, 1927; engaged in "underground operation" against the Japanese for the Chinese National Government, 1939-1945; presently occupied as advisor to the Chinese National Government; living in Shanghai.

SONG, Chong Ok SONG, Chong-ok 宋鍾玉

B. 19 July 1887; G. Korean Government School; was employee of Emperior Lee's government; Chrisitian; advisor to Chungchong Pukto Provincial Government; member, Korean Independence Party; elected to ILA from Chungchong Pukto, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Qualifications; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; submitted resignation to Assembly, 26 June 1947, rejected.

SONG, Ern Pil SONG, On-p'il 宋彦弼

B. 1902; G. university in Japan, 1923; active in Communist "January Association," Japan; returned to Korea; appointed leader, Korean Communist Young Men's Association; jailed five years; active in Communist Party and People's Committee, 1945-46; implicated in counterfeiting ring and arrested May 1946; sentenced to life imprisonment for counterfeiting, November 1946.

SONG, Ho 宋虎

B. 1896; served 33 years in China in the Chinese Army; was a Major-General; appointed Commander of the 1st Detachment of the Korean Independence Army, May 1945; member, Korean Independence Party, 1945; advisor, Personnel Section, Department of Internal Security, MG, 1945; appointed to command the Korean Constabulary after volunteering and graduating from the American sponsored Korean Constabulary Officers Training School; promoted to Brigadier General of the Constabulary by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, 1947.

SONG, Moon Ki SONG, Mun-ki 孫文岐

B. 29 February 1896, Masan; completed two years at Nippon University, Japan, 1918; returned to Korea, 1921; taught at Changshin School, 1921-24; manager of Masan sub-office Chosun Ilbo; chairman, Masan Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence:

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SONG, Loon Ki (cont) 孫. 汶岐

member, Hankook Democratic Party; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Transportation and Communications, Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

TAK, Tch'ang Hyawk T'AK, Ch'ang-hyok 卓昌赫
(Tak, Chai Pil)

B. 1905; registered name is Tak, Chai Pil, but has changed name; attended anti-Pak, Heun Yung Communist meeting, September 1946; chief of Propaganda Section Anti-Fascistic Cooperative Fighting Committee, 1946; chief, Organization Department, Labor (Industrious) Masses Party, December 1946; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Industry, Labor and Agriculture.

*TCH'EI, Chang Ik CH'OE, Ch'ang-ik 崔昌益

B. about 1901; G. Nippon University, Japan; one time son-in-law of Hu, Hun; active in Korean underground, 1926-27 jailed by Japanese, 1930-37; exiled to China, about 1937 and proceeded to Yenan, 1938; a vice-chairman, Yenan Independence Alliance, 1942-45 and of New Democratic Party 1946; Director General Affairs, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; member, Executive and Political Committees, North Korean Labor Party, 1946; representative at the North Korean People's Conference, February 1947; elected chief, Bureau of People's Investigation, North Korea People's Committee, February 1947.

TCH'EI, Chong Sup CH'OE, Chong-sop 崔鍾涉

B. 21 April 1882; studied Chinese literature; chairman, Kwangju Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; member, Hankook Democratic Party; elected to ILA from Cholla Namdo, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Petitions and Discipline, Drafting of Laws Dealing with Collaborators, Traitors, War Criminals and Profiteers; resigned from ILA on grounds of poor health, February 1947.

TCH'EI, Dong O CH'OE, Tong-o 崔東旿

B. about 1894; G. Law School in Seoul; prominent leader in Tchawndo Kyo; active in Manchuria, then Peking, in anti-Japanese movement; joined Chungking Provisional Government; vice-chairman, National Congress, Chungking;

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TCH'EI, Dong O (cont) 崔東昨

vice-chairman, Emergency National Assembly, 1946; assumed prominence as ENA leader and spokesman after illness of chairman Hong, Jin, May 1946; member of Representative Democratic Council; one of five right wing members of Coalition Committee, July 1946; signed agreement of 7 principles of coalition, October 1946; member Joint Korean-American Conference to investigate riots in South Korea, October 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; resigned acting chairmanship and vice-chairmanship of Emergency National Assembly, December 1946; elected 1st vice-chairman of ILA, December 1946; president, Great Eastern News, January 1947; member of following ILA committees - chairman of Petitions and Discipline, Legislative and Judicial, Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws; submitted, but withdrew, resignation as vice-speaker of ILA, June 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947.

TCH'EI, Ik Han CH'OE, Ik-han 崔益翰

B. about 1895, Kangwon Do; G. Economics, Waseda University, Japan; was in charge of "Masses News," Tokyo; active in Communist "January Association" and "M.L. Party"; was a prominent leader, Japanese Department, Korean Communist Party; active in March 1st Movement, 1919, and imprisoned 8 years; active in "2nd Communist Case," 1927; imprisoned 6 years; prominent in Chang Anp'a, 1945; Secretary, Korean People's Republic, 1945; chairman, Anti-Fascistic Cooperative Fighting Committee; chairman, Planning Department, Democratic People's Front, 1946; prominent in Korean Communist Party, 1945-46, member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; quit Socialist Labor Party, December 1946; member Standing Committee, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; member, Chairmen's Group, Laboring People's Party, June 1947.

TCH'EI, Ik Hwan CH'OE, Ik hwan 崔益煥

B. unknown; one of leaders Dai Dong Party, 1919; arrested by Japanese several times; released 15 August 1945; member, New Korean Nationalist Party; committee member, Representative Democratic Council; joined Korean Independence Party, along with some elements of New Nationalist Party, and appointed member of Central Committee, April 1946; president, Patriotic Enterprises Organization, formed May 1947.

*TCH'EI, Kyawng Dawk CH'OE, Kyong-dok 崔敬德

B. unknown; head of Hwanghae Do Communist Party, North Korea, 1946; chief, North Korean General League of Trade Unions, 1946; present at sixth meeting of the North Korean Democratic People's Joint Front, 1946;

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TCH'EI, Kyawng Dawk (cont) 崔敬德

elected one of Standing Chairmen, North Korean First People's Assembly, February 1947.

TCH'EI, Myawng Hwan CH'OE, Myong-hwan 崔鳴煥

B. 1883; G. Tokyo Higher Normal School; chief General Affairs Department, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, Kyonggi Do Branch, May 1946; member, Korean Independence Party; elected to ILA from Kyonggi Do, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Education and Welfare, Qualifications; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; elected chairman, Qualifications Committee, ILA, April 1947.

TCH'EI, Won Taik CH'OE, Won-t'aek 崔元澤

B. 1888; elected member Central Committee, Communist Party, 1927; active in Tokyo, then Manchuria, where he was secretary, Organization Department, Manchuria General Bureau of Communist Party; jailed, 1927-36; continued underground activities and arrested again, July 1945; chairman Seoul City People's Committee, 1945-46; twice arrested for agitation against MG, November 1945; prominent staff member Communist Party, 1945-46; chairman, Central Inspection Committee, South Korean Labor Party, December 1946- to date.

*TCH'EI, Yong Dal CH'OE, Yong-dal 崔容達

B. 1901; G. Law Department, Keijo Imperial University, 1930; held professorship, Bochawn College, 1931-38; imprisoned by Japanese off and on from 1938-45; head Peace Maintenance Department, Korean National Founding Preparatory Committee, August 1945; head, Peace Preservation Department, Central Committee, People's Republic, September 1945; moved to North Korea about December 1945; director of Justice, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; member, Central Inspection Committee, North Korean Labor Party, 1946; chief Bureau of Justice, North Korea People's Committee, 1947.

*TCH'EI, Yong Kern (Kun) CH'OE, Yong-gon 崔庸健

B. 1906; student, Osan Middle School, Pyongyang, attended Hwang-Po Military Academy, Nanking; ringleader, school strike, 1922-23; went to China about 1925; went to Russia about 1931; associated with 8th Route Army and Yenan Volunteer Corps; returned with Russians

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TCH'EI, Yong Kern (Kun) (cont) 崔庸健

to North Korea, 1945; prominent in Chosun Democratic Party as originally founded, November 1945; director, Public Safety(Police), North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; became chairman, Central Committee, Chosun Democratic Party, February 1946, replacing Cho, Man Sik; prominent in North Korea Communist Party; reportedly resigned his post as director of Police Bureau because of argument with Kang, Yang Ook, Chief Secretary of Interim People's Committee; then became commander of North Korean Volunteer Army, November 1946; Commander-in-Chief, People's Army, North Korea, 1947.

UEM, Hang Sup ON, Hang-sop 嚴恒燮

B. 1900; chief of Publicity, Korean Provisional Government; returned to Korea, 23 November 1945; prominent spokesman for Kim, Koo and Provisional Government group; chairman, Propaganda and Information Committee, Emergency National Assembly, chairman of Central Association of Korean Boy Scouts, 1946; one of nine executive members of reactivated Korean Independence Party, March 1946; head of Propaganda Department and member of Central Committee, Korean Independence Party, April 1946; founder and advisor, Philanthropic Fellowship, May 1946; president of new Minchoo Ilbo, Seoul, May 1946; appointed to ILA but declined, December 1946; member Central Executive Committee, Kim, Koo's Anti-Trusteeship Committee, January 1947; elected member of Central Standing Committee, Korean Independence Party, May 1947; arrested, and acquitted of charges in connection with 23 June Anti-Trusteeship Demonstration, 1947; resigned as chief of Korean Boy Scouts, August 1947.

WHANG - See HWANG

WON, Sei Hoon WON, Se-hun 元世勳

B. 1887; G. Yunghee Middle School, 1905 and Tai Dong Law College, 1909; primary school teacher, Manchuria, later president of Maritime District Primary School, Siberia 1915; vice-chairman and director, Finance Department, Korean National Congress, 1920; organized newspaper for revolutionist Party, 1926; arrested at Peking with Chan, Tso-lin and sent to prison in Korea, 1926-28; vice president, Hankook Democratic Party, 1945-46; member, constitutional drafting committee Emergency National Assembly; member Representative Democratic Council; one of right wing members of Coalition Committee; withdrew from Hankook Democratic Party due to differences over coalition agreement, October 1946; member, Joint

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WON, Sei Hoon (cont) 元世勳

Korean-American Conference to investigate riots in South Korea, October 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; appointed member of following ILA committees - chairman of Internal Affairs and Police, Measures for Dealing with Enemy Property, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, January 1947; honorary president, Seoul branch, and member, People's Popular Alliance; submitted resignation from Coalition Committee, May 1947; organizer of Korean Farmers' Party, June 1947; named as representative by People's Alliance, Korean Farmers Party and Han Nam Association to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

YANG, Chei Bak YANG, Che-pak 梁濟博

B. 7 July 1887, Cheju Do; G. Law College, Seoul, 1912; clerk in Kwangju District Court for 5 years; chairman, Inchon Branch, Hankook Democratic Party; elected to ILA from Kyonggi Do, October 1946; chairman of ILA committee on Food and Price Control Measures, also member, Legislative and Judicial Committee; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

YOM, Chawng Kwan YOM, Chong-kwon 廉正權

B. 1899; G. Keijo Imperial University; taught Taku Normal School and Yang Chung Middle School; member, Young Men's Department, People's Party, February 1946; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; expelled from Party when he joined ILA; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Fiscal and Economic, Education and Social Welfare; resigned from ILA, March 1947; connected with Counter-Measure Council for Relief of the Nation, formed and disbanded, August 1947.

YIM, Yung Sin (Louise Im) YIM, Yong-sin 任永信

Strong supporter and fellow worker of Dr. Rhee, Syng Man; chairman, Women's Nationalist Party; Bureau of Secretariat, Representative Democratic Council, February 1946; deputy head, Seoul Branch, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; appointed by Dr. Rhee to Women's Section GFO for Korean National Unification, June 1946; left for U.S. about September 1946 to act as Dr. Rhee's representative to America; attempted to place question of Korean Independence on agenda of UN General Assembly, October-December 1946; propagandizing anti-trusteeship to the American

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YIM, Yung Sin (cont) 任永信

public; Rhee-appointed delegate to UN General Assembly, 1947, not accepted officially.

YOO, Chin Hi YU, Chin-hi 俞鎭熙

B. 1891; G. Seoul Medical College; at one time was member of the Tuesday faction of Korean Communist Party, 1925, later member of Central Committee, Korean Communist Party; chief, Planning Department, Hankook Democratic Party, 1946; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; member of following ILA committees - Qualifications, Education and Social Welfare; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947.

YOO, Yawng Choon YU, Yong-jun 劉英俊

B. about 1893; Chinese educated (girl's middle school); G. medical college, Japan; medical practitioner; member Judging Committee, Democratic People's Front, February 1946; head (along with Lee, Byawng Nam), General Committee and Research Committee for Social Problems, Democratic People's Front, 1946; chairman, All Korean Women's Union, 1946-to date; member, Central Executive Committee, South Korean Labor Party, December 1946; vice-chairman, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; named as representative of the South Korean Democratic Women's Union (All Korean Women's Union), to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

YOON, Il YUN, Il 尹一

B. about 1907, Koje Island; moved to Wonsen about 1935; in Manchuria, July 1945; moved to Pusan, September 1945; chairman, People's Committee, Koje Island and Kyongsang Nando; arrested for subversive activities in April 1946, released in May; chairman, Kyongsang Nando Democratic People's Front, 1946; prominent member, Kyongsang Nando Provincial Communist Party, 1945-46; suspended from chairmanship of Provincial Communist Party for opposition to Pak, Heun Yung purge, August 1946; moved to Seoul and presided as chairman at a Communist Party Convention, in effort to oust Pak, Heun Yung, September 1946; returned to Pusan, January 1947; Pusan leader, Laboring People's Party, May 1947.

YOON, Ki Sup YUN, Ki-sop 尹琦燮

B. 1886, Kyongi Do; G. Posung Middle School; teacher 1910-11; teacher, South Manchuria Sin Heung Army School, 1911-20; also taught in Shanghai, vice-minister, Korean Provisional Government for about eight years;

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YOON, Ki Sun (cont) 尹琦燮

chairman, Legislative Council, Korean Provisional Government, 15 years; Executive Committeeman Korean Independence Party; Executive Committeeman, Korean Revolutionary Party; departed Shanghai, April 1946; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; expelled by Revolutionary Party for joining ILA, December 1946; elected 2nd vice-chairman, ILA and member of following ILA committees - Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Drafting of Laws Dealing with Collaborators, Traitors and Profiteers; submitted, but withdrew, resignation as vice-speaker of ILA, June 1947; member of Liaison Committee, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, formed July 1947; representative of ILA at conference of ILA and MG to discuss Election Law, August 1947; president, Korean Independent Federation.

YOON, Sawk Koo YUN, Sok-ku 尹錫九

B. 1901; during war was civil service man for Japanese Ministry of War and was director of airplane accessory plant in Kunsan; member Korean Independence Party; elected to ILA from Cholla Pukto, October 1946; member of following ILA committees - Industry, Labor and Agriculture, Measures for Dealing with Enemy Property; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; vice-chief, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; member of Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation formed July 1947.

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Report on the Occupation Area of South Korea Since Termination of Hostilities

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REPORT ON THE OCCUPATION AREA OF SOUTH KOREA SINCE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

PART I

POLITICAL

SECRET

Seoul, Korea

September 1947

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PART I - POLITICAL

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PART I - POLITICAL

1. Objectives of the United States.

a. International.

The United States is in Korea because of certain international commitments which would lead eventually to the establishment of an independent Korea, assuming good faith on the part of all signatories to these agreements. The agreements are:

(1) Cairo Declaration, 1943 - U.S., China and Great Britain pledged independence to Korea "in due course" (see Inclosure No. 1).

(2) Potsdam, 1945 - The Cairo Declaration was reaffirmed with the participation of the USSR (see Inclosure No. 2).

(3) Moscow, 1945 - The Moscow Conference (Section III on Korea) provided a definite method to bring about Korean independence. Its principal points were:

(a) Establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government with the "view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea."

(b) Establishment of a US - USSR Joint Commission (consisting of representatives from US and USSR Commands in Korea) which would assist in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government in consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations.

(c) Assignment of tasks to Joint Commission (with participation of Provisional Korean Democratic Government):

1. Working out of measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people,

2. Establishment of the national independence of Korea, and

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3. Submission of proposals following consultation with the Provisional Korean Democratic Government for joint consideration of the governments of US, USSR, UK and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a Four-Power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years. (See Inclosure No. 3).

b. Operational Agreement - 38° parallel:

The present 38° parallel barrier resulted from the operational agreement between the US and the USSR to permit their military forces to enter Korea for the purpose of accepting the surrender of the Japanese. This agreement was arbitrarily interpreted by the Soviet Union as creating a permanent delineation between military zones, passage through which was only possible by permission of the military commanders. (See Inclosure No. 4.)

c. Overall National Objectives:

U. S. political objectives are stated in the "Interim Directive regarding the Military Government of Korea" (War X82886 of 29 July 1947).

(1) Broad political objectives are:

(a) Establishment of an independent and sovereign Korea, free of foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United Nations Organization.

(b) National government so established shall be democratic and fully representative of freely expressed will of Korean people.

(c) Gradual assumption of responsibility for civil administration in the U.S. zone by U.S. civil officials.

(2) The most important principles enunciated by this directive are:

(a) Korea is to be treated as a liberated country.

(b) Progressive development of U.S. objectives will involve successive steps:

1. Present period of zonal administration.

2. Establishment of a Provisional Korean

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Democratic Government which will assist the Joint Commission in preparing Korea for self-government.

3. Creation of some form of trusteeship under the US, USSR, UK and China (up to 5 years) unless there is general agreement among the Four Powers that make these conditions unnecessary.

4. Complete independence of Korea at earliest possible date, with subsequent membership in U.N.

(3) In the political field in South Korea the following directives apply:

(a) Broaden the base for Korean participation in administration of South Korea, by electoral or appointive processes.

(b) Continue utilization of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.

(c) Make every effort to insure that all major political groups participate in elections.

(d) Institute a broad program of constructive and educational reforms.

(e) Continue to permit full freedom of expression by all political groups.

(f) Bar no Korean from appointive or elective post because of his political affiliations; however, as a general policy the selection of leaders who remained in Korea throughout the period of Japanese rule is to be encouraged.

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2. Progress Made During Occupation.

a. Liquidation of the Results of the Japanese domination in Korea.

(1) As a result of forty years' occupation and control by the Japanese of what initially was a backward and decadent Oriental monarchy - modern Korea to a very great extent had become a creature of Japanese political and legal institutions as well as a colony for Japanese exploitation. Little has survived in Korea of the ancient native governmental tradition - antiquated as it was - upon which it would be possible to develop a truly national state organization. Of necessity, Japanese institutions, are still the familiar background of an overwhelming majority of educated Koreans. At the same time, something of the corrupt medieval monarchy of old Korea, flavored with a dash of the Chinese war lord tradition, still survives in the national make-up particularly in the case of the less educated. The two backgrounds are likely to color all Korean institutions at least for the life of the present generation. The task of the occupation in introducing the American democratic tradition is handicapped not only by the Japanese political heritage but by the Soviet ideology as well. The task appears even more formidable when it is remembered that to a great majority of educated Koreans, most of the foreign ideas and doctrines were obtained only through the medium of the heavily censored and biased Japanese sources (or, more recently, through the medium of equally-biased Soviet disseminated pamphlet literature in the Korean language coming from the North). The Japanese domination resulted in many untoward conditions which will affect Korean politics for some time to come.

(a) Koreans were allowed only limited participation in local government and virtually no authority. They are largely inexperienced in self government.

(b) Koreans were allowed no share in national administration except through a puppet advisory body without

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any authority attached to the Governor General. All Koreans who have held any governmental office of importance under the Japanese are currently regarded as collaborationists and have disappeared from public life.

(c) Educational facilities were severely limited to the Koreans -- or sabotaged by them -- with the result that sixty per cent of the adult population was alleged to be illiterate in 1946, based on the ability to read the Chinese ideographs. Illiteracy is high of course, among the peasants.

(d) The Confucian tradition permeating Korean customs and manners was perpetuated, with the result that many elderly Korean leaders are venerated principally because of age rather than ability. North Korean leaders are comparatively young in the usual pattern of Communist dominated Soviet satellites.

(2) The picture would be incomplete without a mention of the human factor in politics. Although Koreans have been called the "Irish of the Orient", being sociable, fond of fun and drinking, of talking and fighting - they differ from the Irish by being afflicted with what appears to be a deeply rooted inferiority complex, doubtless engendered from systematic and prolonged humiliation at the hands of the Japanese. The results - evident in political life - are extreme sensitivity ("face"), instability verging on irresponsibility, proneness to mob psychology, and occasional bursts of unreasoning anti-foreign feeling.

(3) Since the problem of liquidating the results of Japanese domination impinges on the fields of public education, proaganda, jurisprudence, and public administration among many others, it can only be barely indicated in the present survey. Its existence, nonetheless, must be borne in mind if one is to understand the

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baffling paradoxes which are likely to be encountered at every step in any account of Korean political affairs.

b. Repatriation of the Japanese

(1) At the time of the liberation, nearly one million Japanese, including some 270,000 troops, resided in both zones of Korea. The majority of the Japanese civilians lived in the cities, where they constituted the top administrative, legal, scientific, educational and technical personnel of the country. Few Koreans were allowed to progress beyond the menial jobs in government and industry, and those, as a rule, were Japanese trained.

(2) Nevertheless, very early in the occupation the American Command discovered that the Koreans were unanimously clamoring for the removal of all Japanese residents in Korea without regard to individual preferences or qualifications. Although the American Occupation Forces came in under a directive to utilize the existing government until it could be replaced in an orderly manner, the Japanese had to be removed very rapidly because of the bitter objections of the Koreans.

(3) The first Japanese to be repatriated were the troops (179,278) in South Korea, whose evacuation was initiated on 28 September 1945 - only three weeks after the initial American landing - and completed, except for a few hundred stragglers, by 18 November. Groups of undesirable Japanese (including the so-called "thought police", Shinto priests, and geishas) were evacuated ahead of other civilians. The repatriation of civilians had begun prior to the American arrival, but was in full swing by October 1945. Most of about 500,000 civilians were out of the country before January 1, 1946. Government employees were among the last ones to go. Their evacuation was ordered on 13 November, with the railroad and communications employees being the last ones to be released. As much as the Command considered that the

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presence of Japanese technicians was essential for the proper operation and management of utilities, communications and certain key industries, the Koreans obdurately refused to work with them, and they had to be evacuated during 1946. Currently there remain in Korea 41 Japanese - all for humanitarian reasons.

(4) In the course of the evacuation, and for many months thereafter, the task was complicated by the influx of Japanese displaced persons from the Russian zone. Some 290,090 Japanese from the Russian zone have been evacuated to date by the American authorities. This added load was a result of the Soviet policy towards the Japanese in Korea. While the military prisoners were largely removed to labor camps in Siberia, the civilians were utilized in a like manner in the labor camps in North Korea. Competent technicians were eventually restored to their former jobs in North Korean industry, where some of them are still employed on contract basis. During the American Soviet conference of January/February 1946, an effort had been made by the Soviet representatives to secure American cooperation in removing Japanese civilians via Southern Korea. The Americans offered transportation facilities via rail and ship, but refused, because of the local shortages, to furnish food, as requested by the Soviets, from the point of departure in Northern Korea to the point of debarkation in Japan. No agreement had been concluded, but shortly after the termination of the Conference increasing hordes of hungry Japanese civilians stripped of their possessions, began crossing over to the southern zone, being in some instances pushed bodily over the border by the North Korean police. During the summer and fall of 1946, at the height of the cholera epidemic, Japanese women, children, and old men (largely dependents of Japanese industrial and transportation workers) were evicted from the Russian zone to the south at the rate of 5,000 to 12,000 a month. (See Inclosures 5 to 7, inclusive.)

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C. Refugees in the Political Scene.

(1) Between May 1944 and September 1946, the Korean population increased by 22% - or 3,490,160 persons. Of this total, not over 700,000 were added by excess of births over deaths - indicating that some 2,800,000 Koreans had entered South Korea up to one year ago. Since September 1946, an additional 165,000 Koreans entered through repatriation and refugee camps from Japan and from the Soviet zone. (See Inclosures 8 to 10, inclusive.)

(2) Of over 2,000,000 Korean repatriates processed by the U. S. Army, over one-half (1,109,256) came from Japan, the rest largely from the Soviet zone (512,522) and from Manchuria via the Soviet zone (303,830). Smaller groups came also from China and from various Pacific areas.

(3) Although the problem of the refugee is largely an economic and social one, the political implications are extensive, and can be barely mentioned.

(a) Refugees from Japan represented to a considerable extent Korean labor drafted for war duty in Japan. By and large, they have been leftist in orientation. Currently the largest organization of refugees from Japan is affiliated with the Communist-dominated People's Front, and it is believed that a majority of estimated 400,000 Koreans still residing in Japan are also leftist inclined.

(b) Refugees from North Korea (official total 512,000; actual total estimated to be over 1,000,000) and Manchuria (official total 303,000) represent largely the dispossessed classes, including farmers, small businessmen, intellectuals, and Christians - tend to be bitterly anti-communist in sentiment. Together with the refugees from China they participate in a

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variety of organizations of the rightist tinge. The refugees from Manchuria are said to include many Koreans expelled by the Chinese for collaboration with the Japanese, and a certain number of Koreans who were active in the underworld. It is frequently alleged that the terroristic extreme rightist youth groups frequently include a heavy representation of Manchurian refugees.

(4) Not infrequently, fifth columnists from Northern Korea, message runners for the Communists, and spies, came to South Korea in the guise of the refugees. Adequate control of the 160 mile long mountainous frontier is virtually impossible.

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d. Establishment of Democratic Government.

(1) U. S. Efforts to Unify Political Scene and Creation of South Korea Legislature.

(a) Efforts directed at the unification of Korean political factions involved two principal groups; Nationalists also known as rightists, leftist, including agents, followers and sympathizers of International Communism; and certain middle-of-the-road leaders and their followers with no particular organized support.

(b) From 1920 to 15 August 1945, political activity within Korea, from the point of view of popular support, was largely within the nationalist camp, the efforts of the Communists being retarded by factionalism. No direct attempt to coalesce the nationalists and the agents and followers of the Commintern is known. While there were occasional overt evidences of political activity, they were largely of an anti-Japanese nature. As both groups directed their activities against the Japanese regime, there was an implicit element of cooperation. However, the motivations of the two groups were distinctly different. The nationalists in Korea were largely interested in the removal of the Japanese and did little toward insuring their future control of Korea. On the other hand, the agents of the Commintern were not only interested in weakening the Japanese hegemony in the interests of Koreans -- as well as in the interest of the Soviet Union -- but also foresightedly attempted to create a skeleton foundation on which to build future Communist control.

(c) Similar efforts of the nationalists were carried on by exiles largely in China where the so-called Korean Provisional Government had been established under Dr. RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo after the abortive 1919 independence movement.

It is interesting to note, that the Korean Provisional Government at that time represented a fairly wide range of political thought from moderate left to extreme nationalism.

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Until 1933, the Korean Independence Party was the only official party within the Provisional Government. However, in 1933 the establishment of the Korean National Revolutionary Party, led by Dr. KIMM, Kiusic and KIM, Won Bong, and its inclusion into the party structure of the Provisional Government, formalized the element of coalition within the Government in exile. During World War II, the Korean National Revolutionary Party attempted to include the Korean Yenan (China) Independence Alliance within the Provisional Government in order to broaden the coalition factor and to prepare a representative government which would be available to administer the independent Korea promised at Cairo. This effort failed undoubtedly because of the Yenan group's adherence to Communist Party-line orders.

(d) With the end of World War II in August 1945, the Japanese in Korea apparently believed that Korea would be occupied by Soviet forces only. In order to facilitate relations with the Soviets and to insure the safety of Japanese in Korea during the interim period between the end of the war and the complete occupation of Korea, the Japanese Governor General invited LYUH, Woon Hyung, a man with Leftist sympathies and a broad but amorphous popular following, to form a temporary government. (Incidentally both KIM, Sung Soo, present head of the Han Kook Democratic Party, and SONG, Tin Woo both rightists, refused the Japanese offer). LYUH's reaction was to form, on 15 August 1945, with AHN, Chai Hong, a nationalist, the Preparatory Committee for the Rehabilitation of Korea. The Committee's membership, however, was largely of Leftist complexion.

(e) The Preparatory Committee evolved into the Korean People's Republic which was formally established in a convention of "People's representatives" on 5 and 6 September 1945 in Seoul. It was considered by its founders to be the "legal" government of Korea. Initially, the People's Republic was an amalgamation of

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nationalists, Communist Party-line followers, and moderate leaders. However, it was soon apparent that Korean Communists trained in Siberia were creating a Communist controlled government on the foundations of the old Communist underground. Aware of these facts, the nationalist elements began to secede (or were ousted) from the People's Republic.

(f) The leftist forces, through the People's Republic and its local organs of authority, the People's Committees, were in political dominance within Korea just prior to the arrival of American forces (8 and 9 September 1945), but the nationalist, or rightist, elements in Korea were not completely inactive. Under the leadership of the Hankook Democratic Party, which had existed surreptitiously within Korea during the war and was largely composed of educated businessmen and elders, a Preparatory Committee for the Korean National Congress, pledged to the support of the Korean Provisional Government in China, was formed as a preliminary move toward the establishment of a regime to compete with the Korean People's Republic.

(g) The almost complete lack of advance planning for the Korean occupation brought the XXIV Corps to South Korea without adequate knowledge of Korean political affairs or the assistance of competent political advisers. Moreover, it was not until February 1946 that anything resembling a political directive arrived from Washington to guide the American Command.

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(h) From the earliest days of the occupation, the Commanding General commenced a series of personal interviews with many of the political leaders of South Korea. It was soon evident that the only thing they all wanted was early and complete independence. It was equally evident, however, that they did not know how to establish effectively the political unity and stability necessary to independence. It was also plain that Korean political immaturity in an environment of political freedom would soon lead to extreme factionalism.

(i) Concurrent with these interviews, the Military Governor appointed an advisory council composed of eleven carefully chosen, prominent Koreans, mostly conservative but including LYUH, Woon Hyung. Because of Korean suspicion that the Council had been created as a sop to public opinion and constituted, in effect, an American circumvention of early Korean control of an independent government, none of the rapidly emerging Korean political parties were particularly enthusiastic about the Council. As a result, this initial attempt of the American Command to build some degree of political stability and unity upon which to create a democratic Korea did not succeed.

(j) The return of Dr. RHEE, Syngman, nationalist representative in the United States of the Korean Provisional Government in China, as a private citizen on 16 October 1945 strengthened the Nationalist cause. The reverence of the Korean people including, initially, the leftists, for his name placed him in a strong position to attempt political unity. With the encouragement of the American Command, Dr. RHEE began a series of unification efforts through his Central Council for Rapid Realization of Independence which was formed soon after his arrival. However, it was soon apparent that RHEE considered any group not in sympathy with his program as "communist" and this attitude, plus the dictates of the Communist Party-line, prevented his establishing a coalition movement.

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(k) The return of KIM, Koo and his Korean Provisional Government "cabinet" to Korea on 22 November 1945 (all as private citizens) further strengthened the nationalist cause. However, when KIM, Koo's group, including Dr. RHEE, made it plain that they would have nothing to do with the leftist Korean People's Republic, political lines in Korea, which had already been tentatively drawn, were clearly defined. Constant U. S. Military Government action was necessary against the Korean People's Republic which had continued in its attempts to assume governmental powers, largely on local levels, and had engaged in acts of terrorism to attain its ends. The official dissolution of the Korean People's Republic on 10 October 1945 emboldened the KIM, Koo - Provisional Government group which foolishly felt strong enough to attempt a coup d'etat to seize the government on 31 December 1945 and 1 January 1946 (see paragraph (n) below).

(l) With the announcement of the Moscow Agreement on 27 December 1945, the issue of trusteeship, about which all political furore was soon to revolve, was interjected into the Korean political scene. Announcement by State Department officials in Washington during October 1945 of a possible trusteeship for Korea had been violently attacked by all Korean groups. The Commanding General, before the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow, recommended that every effort be made to placate the Koreans. He specifically recommended that the word "trusteeship" be not used in view of the unfavorable connotations of the Korean equivalent "shintaku" which meant to the Koreans a protectorate such as was imposed upon them by the Japanese in 1905. When the Moscow Agreement became known in Korea through unofficial press and radio channels, the Command was officially uninformed and therefore not prepared to properly cope with the Korean outcry against the trusteeship provision.

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(m) At first all political groups, including the leftists, vehemently denounced the undefined trusteeship, but on 2 January 1946 the Communist Party-line adherents, obviously on direct orders from North Korea, suddenly changed their position and announced their complete, unequivocal support of the Moscow Agreement, including its trusteeship provision. The already clearly defined political lines assumed a more rigid character because of the trusteeship issue, with the result that any middle-of-the-road efforts to build a political organization would be more difficult than ever.

(n) One of the leading opponents of trusteeship, the KIM, Koo group, attempted to capitalize upon the nation-wide anti-trusteeship feeling and announced on 31 December 1946 that it was the legal government of Korea and would assume governmental powers. However, the Korean police force remained loyal and the Command was able to act swiftly and effectively and stop the abortive coup.

(o) Faced with the bitterly divided Korean political scene and the imminent opening of the US-USSR Joint Commission in March 1946, the American Command encouraged a representative group of Korean leaders to form the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea. The Council was planned as a small representative group wherein political unity might be found to the advantage of the Korean Democratic Provisional Government to be established by the Joint Commission. Overtures were made to all major groups, including the Communists, to recommend representatives. The Communists refused to comply and LYUH, Woon Hyung, leader of the moderate leftists, refused to sit in the Council because of his dislike of its largely rightist complexion. The Council was formally established on 14 February 1946 but with an all-rightist membership, including, however, a leading moderate, Dr. KIMM, Kiusic. The Council elected Dr. RHEE, Syngman to the chairmanship and KIM, Koo and Dr. KIMM, Kiusic to the vice-chairmanships.

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(p) With the unsuccessful adjournment of the Joint Commission on 9 May 1946, solution of the problem of political unification in South Korea assumed more pressing necessity. Through American initiative, a Coalition Committee, composed of five rightists and five leftists, began negotiations in June and July under the co-chairmanship of Dr. KIMM, Kiusic and LYUH, Woon Hyung. In an attempt to secure cooperation from the left, KIM, Koo and Dr. RHEE, Syngman, who were anathemas to the left, were purposely omitted from membership in the Committee. The rightist members were largely moderate in orientation.

(q) In the latter part of July 1946, the leftists (with the exception of LYUH, Woon Hyung), under the orders of PAK, Hun Yung, the Communist leader in South Korea, left the Coalition Committee, thereby destroying its complete usefulness. The withdrawal of the Communists was in keeping with their policy of noncooperation, embarrassment of the American Command and encouragement of disunity and chaos.

(r) It was clear that neither the extremist right nor left group would participate in any coalition effort which it did not completely control; however, the Coalition Committee was revived in the fall of 1946, with the frank realization of its reduced value, with the participation of moderate leftists and rightists under the co-chairmanship of Dr. KIMM, Kiusic and LYUH, Woon Hyung. It was hoped that the Committee would provide a vehicle for the evolution of a mass-supported, middle-of-the-road political movement which would weaken the extremes and establish a democratic-minded leadership to guide the largely neutral masses of the Korean people. However, both the extreme right under the leadership of Dr. RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo and the Communist dominated Democratic People's Front (which had been established in February 1946) were so confident of their power

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and so well organized, that the moderate Coalition Committee was unable to acquire appreciable organized support. Furthermore, as a middle-of-the-road movement, the Coalition Committee had avoided a clear-cut stand concerning trusteeship, the issue which had, more than anything else, distorted political values and had suited the platforms of both extremes. Essentially, the Coalition Committee's position concerning trusteeship was one of "wait and see." To the average Korean interested in politics, this position was too moderate and not in keeping with his explosive nature.

(s) The American Command was ready to assist the Coalition Committee in its campaign, but the plans of the Committee regarding a far reaching and hastily conceived land reform program made it difficult to extend to the Committee the full support it needed to launch organizational activities in local areas. However, several members of the Committee were assisted in gaining interests in a number of Seoul newspapers which, unfortunately, they failed to use effectively.

(t) On three occasions in the summer and fall of 1946, in an effort to support and encourage the Coalition Committee, the Commanding General issued special press releases commending the work of the Committee. Further official recognition of the importance of the Coalition Committee's efforts was given in the fall of 1946 when its members took part with American officials in the discussions of the Joint Korean-American Conference devoted to the principal Korean problems.

(u) As preparations for the establishment of the Assembly neared completion in the late fall of 1946, the Coalition Committee was called upon by the Commanding General to recommend 45 individuals for appointment to membership in the Legislative Assembly and 44 of the largely moderate-rightist and moderate-leftist representatives nominated by it were approved.

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(v) Throughout its 1946 history the effectiveness of the Coalition Committee was continually mitigated by the vacillation of LYUH, Woon Hyung who, as the member with the greatest popular support, was in a position to increase the Committee's power. LYUH, somewhat naively, actually attempted to win the Communist cominated groups to his banner. He failed, and as he became increasingly involved in the internal affairs of the left, his work with the Coalition Committee decreased. He finally refused appointment to the Interim Legislative Assembly.

(w) Although two members of the Coalition Committee, Dr. KIMM, Kiusic and TCH'EI, Dong Oh, were elected by the Legislative Assembly to the chairmanship and vice-chairmanship respectively, the influence of the moderates within the Assembly was vitiated by the fact that the 45 elected representatives were all from the extreme rightist groups. Nevertheless, until the reconvening of the Joint Commission on 21 May 1947, the Coalition Committee concentrated its efforts within the Legislative Assembly where, largely due to the efforts of Dr. KIMM, Kiusic, a series of major crises, which would have led to whole-scale withdrawals from membership of large numbers of the representatives, was prevented.

(x) Closely following the first anniversary of the Moscow Agreement, extreme rightist groups under the leadership of KIM, Koo (Dr. RHEE, Syngman was in the United States) re-opened their battle against trusteeship through the rightist controlled press, meetings and demonstrations. Realizing that a strong re-emergence of anti-trusteeship hysteria would destroy the modicum of success that the Command and the Coalition Committee had had in soft-pedalling the issue, that it would further hinder political unification, and that it might again weaken the efforts of the American Delegation of the Joint Commission should the Commission reconvene, the Chief Commissioner of the U. S. Delegation to the

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US-USSR Joint Commission issued a series of educational press releases in January and February 1947 concerning the Moscow Agreement and its trusteeship provision. While stressing the right of freedom of expression, the Chief Commissioner clearly pointed out that the United States Government intended to carry out the Moscow Agreement to the best of its ability. Moreover, he carefully explained that the terms of trusteeship were as yet undefined and that under the terms of the Moscow Agreement, the Korean Democratic Provisional Government to be established by the Joint Commission and the Korean democratic organizations would be consulted concerning the methods of aid and assistance (trusteeship) - thereby assuring that the nature of trusteeship would be evaluated in terms of Korean desires. The press releases helped to quell the anti-trusteeship activities, but they had little effect upon the die-hard extreme rightists such as the RHEE and KIM, Koo adherents.

(y) When it became evident in May 1947 that the Joint Commission would reconvene, the Coalition Committee expanded its activities and managed to align a large number of minor, moderate organizations behind its "All-Korea League to Support the Joint Commission". Moreover, a large portion of the right realized that its political future might depend upon cooperation with the Joint Commission - something which those who remained in the folds of Dr. RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo, were not prepared to do. By the middle of June, about four weeks after the re-opening of the Joint Commission, a major portion of the right, under the leadership of the Hankook Democratic Party, had banded together in a "United Council". The Council was specifically formed to support the Joint Commission and only reserved to itself the democratic right of freedom of expression, particularly in regard to any form of trusteeship which would seriously limit the sovereignty of Korea.

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(z) The support of the Joint Commission by the United Council encouraged the Coalition Committee to establish liaison with the Hankook Democratic Party leadership, apparently with the view to forming some type of working arrangement. However, to date nothing more than a liaison relationship between the two groups has been effected.

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(2) Oppositionist Activities of the Leftists.

(a) Along with other occupation policies, American efforts to unify Korean political forces were consistently opposed by the two opposite extremes, the extreme leftists united under the pro-Soviet leadership of the communists and the extreme nationalists united under the leadership of RHEE, Syngman. Both absolutist extremes held the balance of organized political power in South Korea, and bitterly opposed not only one another, but also any middle of the road groupings threatening their respective aspirations.

(b) Of the two extremes, the so-called Left were (and are) more consistently inimical towards the occupation and less amenable to cooperation with other political groups than the right. Nevertheless, in developing its activities, the Left - or rather, the Communist Party - skillfully utilized popular discontent, resulting from a dislocated economy and popular demands for reform, to attract a fairly large following among the farmers, workers, and impoverished intellectuals. The communists had the initial advantage of having been active in the underground, and of having built up a clandestine network of cells which overnight was transformed into an effective political organization. It was evident that from the very beginning the Leftists were in an advantageous position for fostering unrest and harassing the occupation.

(c) When the American forces landed in Korea in September 1945, they found that the Communists were about to assume the control over the leftist "Korean People's Republic." Apparently, however, either in expectation of Soviet occupation over all of Korea, or because they were powerless, Communists and fellow-travellers were not excluded from the temporary government.

(d) Communist activity began in Korea in the early twenties

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and was formalized in 1925 by the establishment of a small Communist Party affiliated with the Comintern.

(e) During the past decade, most of the active communists had been either jailed or driven underground. Shortly after the Japanese surrender, all political prisoners were released. The underground came out in the open, setting up People's Committees in the towns and cities, and Workers' Committees in factories. Korean People's Republic assumed control over most of the People's Committees (not all of which were Communist dominated) by September 1945. Concurrently, the Korean Communist Party itself was consolidated and reorganized, reportedly with the help of a political agent on the staff of the Soviet Consulate in Seoul. Local Communist leadership was reinforced by experienced operatives from Yenan and Siberia and the party engaged in a program of expansion and infiltration. In a short time it succeeded in obtaining a substantial degree of control of the People's Republic.

(f) Under its directives the American Occupation Force was not authorized to recognize a local government which had seized power from the Japanese but the American Command did make an attempt to persuade the Korean People's Republic to participate in a government under the occupation forces. The Communists, however, had no intention of assisting or cooperating with the Americans, and the attempt was abandoned. On 10 October the People's Republic was declared by the American Command to be "without any authority, power, or reality." Shortly thereafter, an All-Korean advisory group was set up by the Command, which utilized such prominent Koreans who were willing to cooperate with the Command. This group, of course, did not include Communists.

(g) This meant open disagreement between the Americans and the leftist elements. From then on the leftists waged political and economic war surreptitiously against the American occupation, and openly supported the Communist line. The Leftists engaged in

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a tremendous burst of organizational activity, featured by intimidation, extortion, and, to some extent, by direct subvention from outside South Korea. Between November and December 1945 there arose in South Korea a series of so-called "social organizations", constituted on bi-zonal basis, which aspired to represent the views of the bulk of the Korean population.

(h) These organizations were as a rule headed by communists elected by communist controlled conventions. The more important ones were the Federation of Farmers Unions, Federation of Trade Unions, General Alliance of Youth organizations, Alliance of Women's Organizations, of Educators and of various cultural and artistic groups.

(i) With the passage of time, it became obvious that the activities of all of these groups were directed principally at embarrassing the American Occupation. The largest of the "social organizations", the Farmers Alliance, optimistically claimed over 3,900,000 members, or virtually every adult farmer in South Korea. In its propaganda, the Alliance advocated outright free distribution of former Japanese owned, landlords', and collaborationists' lands to tenant farmers. In its practical operation, it tried to frustrate the governmental grain collection programs through terrorism and propaganda, and to incite violence against the local police authorities.

(j) Another of the organizations which caused considerable trouble to the occupation authorities was the All-Korean Council of Trade Unions, headed by professional revolutionaries, and engaged in fomenting strikes in key industries (power, transportation, communications, textiles). Repeated attempts of the Military Government to invite the cooperation of this Council in various arbitration and mediation schemes were rejected. The Council sponsored the following demands: Adoption of the North Korean Labor Law (based on its entirety in the labor provisions in the Soviet

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Constitution); and increase of the rice ration (while subscribing to the anti-grain collection slogans of the Farm Alliance). In 1947, this organization adhered to the World Federation of Trade Unions, although under no known criterion could it be described as a responsible, democratically-run labor organization.

(k) By 1947, some 70 similar organizations were claimed by the leftist front as the "truly democratic" bodies, "wholly upholding the Moscow Decision on Korea", and thus being the only ones entitled to a voice in the formation of a Provisional Government. Some of these were palpably fictitious or fraudulent and others gained considerable notoriety both among the Americans and the Koreans. Among the latter was the General Alliance of Youth Organizations (which was in fact the strong-arm squad branch of the Communist Party, acting as assault troops in riots, and also engaging in sabotage, extortion and occasional espionage; General Women's Alliance (headed by several former dancing girls); Educational Alliance (responsible for a wave of school strikes in South Korea, and for the closing of the National University in 1946); Society for Korean-Soviet Friendship; and many others, equally suspect as to the aims and methods.

(l) In February 1946, the Communist Party and other leftist groups, declined the invitation to participate in the Representative Democratic Council, which was being set up in preparation for consultation of the Korean leaders with the Joint Commission. In opposition to the Representative Democratic Council, there was established, on February 14, a Communist Front Coalition known as the Democratic People's Front. This was the group, in the Soviet view, which united the only true "democratic parties and social organizations" of South Korea on a platform of fully upholding the Moscow Decision on Korea and of being friendly towards the Soviet Union. This was also the only conceivable group of Koreans which could be relied on by the Soviets to obey the Communist Party

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line in unquestioningly defending the concept of a 5 year trusteeship for Korea.

(m) During the Joint Commission sessions of 1946 the Democratic People's Front, which had become the policy-determining agency for five political parties and a score of active "social organizations", developed a comprehensive propaganda campaign in support of the Soviet position in Korea. This consisted of:

1. Labelling all opposition groups as "pro-Japanese reactionaries intent on frustrating the Moscow Decision on Korea."
2. Discrediting the U. S. intentions in Korea, by describing them as "imperialistic."
3. Organizing demonstrations, parades, etc. in support of trusteeship.
4. Collecting political intelligence for the benefit of the Soviets.

(n) Following the adjournment of the Joint Commission, the Democratic People's Front groups engaged in a campaign of subversive activity designed to compromise American occupation through creating economic and political chaos. The Communist Party of South Korea led by PAK, Heun Yung, a Russian trained underground operator of long standing, controlled the Front both directly and indirectly through their control of the executive bodies of the various affiliated groups. The activities included infiltration of railroads, police, constabulary, and the coast guard; espionage against the American forces; fomenting of industrial and transportation strikes, rice riots and student disorders; and a vicious program of anti-Americans propaganda. Among many other lies the American were accused of dumping cheap goods in Korea, exporting Korean rice, and generally attempting to make South Korea an American colony. Farly in the campaign, the Communist Party lost much of its prestige when it was discovered that some of its high ranking

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officials were guilty of counterfeiting Korean paper currency in the printing shop of the official party newspaper. Notwithstanding this discovery, however, the Democratic People's Front was invited to take part in the Coalition effort sponsored by Dr. Kimm Kiusic. Not only did the Communists decline to participate (by making impossible demands), but they also succeeded in preventing most of the non-communist leftists, grouped around LYUH, Woon Hyung, from joining in the effort of drafting a unified program for reconstruction of Korea.

(o) In the fall of 1946, anti-American propaganda of the Communist Party forced the American authorities to issue a warrant for the arrest of PAK Heun Yung, the Communist leader who succeeded in escaping and is still at large. About three weeks later South Korea became the scene of a violent communist-led uprising which was expressed in rioting, including large scale attacks on provincial police stations (during which over 100 police were barbarously massacred), an attempted general strike, and a series of student disorders. The disturbances were suppressed, generally without the use of U. S. forces. Although most of the principal agitators escaped, some 39 of the major perpetrators were tried and condemned to death. These sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment. An inquiry into the causes of the disturbances indicated that the uprisings were led by persons unknown in the affected areas.

(p) The Communist Party and many of its allied organizations went underground and started perfecting its secret organization of cells and "storm groups." Early in 1947, the Communist Party emerged as "South Korean Labor Party", through a merger of extreme leftist parties. A parallel reorganization took place in the Soviet Zone somewhat earlier. The delay in the South was due to intense factionalism in the ranks of the Southern Communists, which necessitated extended parleys before the merger could be consummated.

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There was no doubt, however, that the two "labor parties" were the same local agencies of the Third International, operating from the same set of instructions and pursuing an identical propaganda line, indistinguishable from that of the Soviet news agency TASS. Evidence is fairly complete that the southern leftists received their party-line instructions from their northern counterpart.

(q) Prior to the Joint Commission sessions in 1947, the South Korea Labor Party made a desperate effort to attain respectability as a genuine political party, and even tried to convince the U. S. authorities that the party was eager to cooperate with the authorities. Similar toning down of activities took place in the ranks of the "social organizations", most of which changed their names in order both to make the people overlook their past records and to convey the impression that they were not branches of similar northern organizations. Later seizures of subversive literature, weapons, and explosives, and evidences of espionage, have dispelled any illusion that may have existed that the Communists had mended their ways. Their actions suggested a desire to avoid any grounds for challenge by the U. S. Delegation before the Joint Commission.

(r) The picture of the left flank of Korean politics would be incomplete without a brief mention of the minor leftist groups. In addition to a dissident group within the Communist Party itself, there exist in Korea several radical groupings, ranging from pure Marxian (of Trotskyite cast) to intellectual socialists of the Norman Thomas type. These groups have engaged in considerable jockeying for position, usually gravitating between the South Korea Labor Party and a rival leftist grouping headed by LYUH. Until the assassination of LYUH in July 1947, this latter grouping had several times succeeded in removing many borderline groups and leaders from the influence of communist leadership. Because of personal influence exercised by individual communists over LYUH, and also because of communist infiltration within his own organization, LYUH never quite

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succeeded in building a non-communist left wing party, willing to cooperate in a coalition, which was his avowed objective. Shortly before his death LYUH had perfected a strong provincial organization in support of a new non-communist leftist party, but this became split a few days after his assassination, with the majority faction rejoining the communist fold.

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(3) Oppositionist Activities of Rightists.

(a) Political strength of the rightists in Korea largely revolved around Dr. RHEE, Syngman, who returned to Korea from the United States on 16 October 1945, and KIM, Koo and his so-called Provisional Government which returned to Korea from China on 22 November 1945. In fact, during the first few months of the occupation, the Right was largely content to coast along on the strength of the names of the two top nationalist leaders and neglected basic organizational activities. Rightist organizational activities did not effectively extend to local areas until the summer of 1946. The right was, generally speaking, favorably disposed toward Americans: Both Dr. RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo had been returned to Korea through the good offices of the United States government; Dr. RHEE by long residence in the United States was familiar with American policy toward Korea; KIM, Koo and his Provisional Government, although it had been subsidized by the Chinese for its own political reasons, nevertheless had been influenced by Chiang Kai Shek's attitude of friendliness toward the United States; and many rightist leaders in Korea had, during the Japanese regime, received education and encouragement from American missionaries.

(b) However, extreme rightist ambitions and desire for absolute independence was fixed and determined even in the earliest days of the occupation. Closely following the announcement of the Moscow Agreement on 27 December 1945, the KIM, Koo group, capitalizing upon the nation-wide feeling against the trusteeship provision of the Agreement, attempted to seize control of the government. Orders signed by KIM, Koo were given to Korean Military Government employees directing them to obey and support KIM, Koo's Provisional Government. Although the attempt to usurp the power of the American Military Government was outwardly oppositionist in nature, it was actually more of a pro-independence movement rather than a specifically

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anti-American effort. With the cooperation of the Korean police, the American Command was able to quell the whole affair quickly and without violence.

(c) One of the earliest efforts to placate the nation-wide anti-trusteeship sentiment was the radio speech of Secretary of State Byrnes on 30 December 1945, who stated that "The Joint Soviet American Commission, working with the Korean Provisional Democratic Government may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship." But this statement was seized upon by the right and distorted to mean that the United States had no intention of setting up a trusteeship. No amount of careful explanation that the United States intended to carry out the provisions of the Moscow Agreement, and to establish some form of trusteeship (unless the Joint Commission and the Four Powers deemed it unnecessary) could dissuade the right from using the statement for their own partisan ends.

(d) The adjournment of the US-USSR Joint Commission in May 1946 emphasized the difficulties that American political policy encountered in South Korea with the extremists of both right and left. It was obvious that both the extreme right, under the leadership of Dr. RHEE and KIM, Koo, and the extreme, communist-dominated left, controlled by the party-line emanating from North Korea, were detrimental to the evolution of a democratic government in Korea. It was felt that the time was expedient to attempt again to realign the right behind more moderate leaders, resulting in the formation of the Coalition Committee, previously described.

(e) Although publicly supporting the Coalition Committee, both Dr. RHEE and KIM, Koo and their followers attempted to wreck the Committee. RHEE even went as far as to establish a "Headquarters for National Unification" which, in fact, was designed to supplant the Coalition Committee in the eyes of the Korean masses.

(f) About June, 1946, after the adjournment of the Joint Commission, Dr. RHEE first publicly began to speak of a separate

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government for South Korea. At the same time he commenced wide-scale organizational preparations to consolidate his political power to insure control of a separate government, assisted by RHEE controlled youth organizations.

(g) In August of 1946, the RHEE-KIM, Koo forces, realized that the American Command had no intention of setting up a separate government, but at the same time believed that they had the necessary support to make another attempt to put the Korean Provisional Government in power. However it was poorly conceived and very easily frustrated. A similar rightist plan, which was to be carried out in October 1946, was also stopped.

(h) With the aid of funds collected partly at least by forceful methods, Dr. RHEE, Syngman returned to the United States in December 1946 on a self-styled "diplomatic mission." His chief object was to discredit the Commanding General, General Hodge, on the grounds that the latter and his advisors were not following the policy of Washington - to set up a separate South Korean Government. While in the United States he even went so far as to publicly and covertly discredit the Commanding General whom he labelled a "Communist." He worked assiduously to secure official, governmental approval of his Separate South Korea Government scheme - with RHEE as first president, of course. In this attempt he had the assistance of "Colonel" Ben Limb, his Washington lobbyist representative and of a Washington lobby consisting of Americans, some of whom had been formerly associated with the Military Government. More men were J. Jerome Williams, Robert T. Oliver (of Syracuse University) and John W. Staggers. His propaganda agencies disseminated half-truths and outright lies in an effort to convince the Korean people that his mission to the United States had been successful. He returned to Korea in April 1947, but only his followers hailed his "mission" as a "great diplomatic success."

(i) In RHEE's absence KIM, Koo, who had been in nearly complete

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eclipse, moved to assert his hegemony over the right, attempting to unify the major rightist organizations under his leadership. Ostensibly, his efforts bore the approval of Dr. RHEE. In fact, should his efforts in the United States fail to achieve rightist ends, Dr. RHEE was prepared to notify KIM, Koo that pre-arranged wide-scale riots and demonstrations should be commenced in South Korea in order to embarrass the American Command. Throughthis "plan" it was hoped, the American Command would be forced to give up its governmental powers and allow the KIM, Koo Provisional Government - with Dr. RHEE at the helm - to take over the administration of South Korea. When it became apparent that the American Command would firmly resist any such attempt, RHEE halted the plan.

(j) KIM, Koo was ready to proceed with the riots and demonstrations. However, the RHEE forces in Korea had begun to look askance at the efforts of KIM, Koo, who, it was feared, was out to establish his own power to the possible exclusion of RHEE. The resultant disunity within the rightist ranks plus the firm and watchful American attitude prevented any untoward events except for a brief renewal of the anti-trusteeship campaign.

(k) With the imminent reconvening of the Joint Commission in May 1947, it became clear that the rightist forces loyal to Dr. RHEE and KIM, Koo would not participate in the work of the Joint Commission However a major portion of the right, aware of the Korean thirst for independence, would cooperate with the Joint Commission as the only hope of bringing about an early Korean Provisional Government. It is quite probable that many individuals, otherwise loyal to RHEE, are members of other organizations which have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission.

(l) On 23 June 1947, the last day for registration of parties with the Joint Commission for consultation, a small group of young

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men, under the orders of KIM, Koo, staged an anti-trusteeship demonstration before the headquarters of the Joint Commission. It was an opera bouffe attempt and the extreme rightists were quick to realize that this effort to prevent the Joint Commission from consulting with other rightists had failed. But the Soviet Delegation seized upon the demonstration as a pretext for the elimination of major rightist organizations from consultation with the Joint Commission. As KIM, Koo had ordered the demonstration in the name of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, it was the Soviet Delegation's contention that all member organizations of the Committee were guilty of active opposition against the Moscow Agreement, by reason of membership in the Committee, and that this membership constituted grounds for exclusion from consultation. Prior to the reconvening of the Joint Commission, Secretary of State Marshall, in correspondence with Foreign Minister Molotov, had stipulated that no organization be barred from consultation "because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." Mr. Molotov did not take exception to this position. In signing the declaration making them eligible for consultation, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had certified their good faith in cooperating with the Joint Commission. Nevertheless, the action of KIM, Koo had, in effect, assisted the Soviet Delegation's position and had furthered the Soviet Delegation's political strategy.

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e. Joint American-Soviet Conference January-February 1946.

(1) American-Soviet attempts to implement the Moscow Agreement on Korea began actually on 16 January 1946, when a conference of representatives of the two commands met in Seoul for the purpose of implementing paragraph 4 of the Moscow Agreement on Korea which provided for consideration of the "urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters."

(2) From the American point of view, the task of the conference was to overcome the administrative and economic hardships created by the division of Korea into two zones of military occupation prior to the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government. Although political topics were not to be discussed, they were clearly implicit in the nature of topics specified for discussion. The American proposals envisaged re-establishment of communications and transportation and resumption of normal flow of goods and persons between the two zones, as well as coordination in monetary and financial matters.

(3) The Soviet position was made clear at the very first meeting of the conference. The Soviets refused to discuss anything pertaining to the unification of the two zones. They regarded the conference as primarily a method for obtaining, on a barter basis, South Korean rice for North Korean electric current, fertilizer, and other raw materials and industrial products. Secondarily they wanted American aid in evacuating Japanese nationals. When it became evident that South Korea had no rice to spare, either for barter or for the Japanese refugees in transit to Japan, the conference adjourned without reaching agreement (except on minor matters included on the joint agenda.) Practically the only important fruit of the conference were agreements on exchange of mail and the supply of electricity from the North.

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f. 1946 Joint Commission Meetings

(1) With the Moscow Agreement as the only term of reference, the US-USSR Joint Commission convened in Seoul on 20 March 1946. Ensuing difficulties, which led to adjournment sine die of the Joint Commission on 8 May 1946, arose from the following factors:

(a) The Soviet Delegation had as its objective:

1. Creation of the future government of Korea on a basis of "wide unification of all the democratic parties and organizations supporting the Moscow Agreement."

2. Denying any participation in the future government to "reactionary and anti-democratic groups and certain elements whose object is to undermine the work of creating and firmly establishing a democratic system in Korea."

3. To create Korea as "a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union."

(b) To accomplish this objective the Soviet Delegation:

1. Attempted to define to its advantage such basic terms as "consultation" and "democratic" which were not defined in the Moscow Agreement on Korea.

2. Insisted on excluding from participation in the formation of the provisional government:

a. Korean democratic parties and social organizations and their leaders who do not fully support, without any reservation, the Moscow Decision.

b. Specifically those Korean democratic parties and social organizations and their leaders who voice opposition to "trusteeship."

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c. Insisted on including for consultation a sufficient number of parties and organizations of the Democratic People's Front of South Korea so that when the organizations of North Korea were added the Democratic People's Front would have a majority participating in the formation of the provisional government.

(c) The U. S. Delegation strongly resisted the attempt of the Soviet Delegation to read its own unilateral interpretation into the Moscow Agreement. The U.S. Delegation maintained that:

1. The word "democratic" as referring to parties and organizations does not apply exclusively to those belonging to schools of social thought favoring certain classes in the community over others, and that the word "democratic" can be applied only as in common usage throughout the world.

2. There is no provision in the Moscow Agreement that requires parties and organizations to be consulted by the Joint Commission to support the Moscow Agreement blindly and without reservation that this was a Soviet addition to the Moscow Agreement to suit their own strategy.

3. Koreans may freely express their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government, including their opposition to an as yet undefined concept of "trusteeship".

(2) In an effort to resolve the differences between the positions of the two delegations, an agreement was reached on 17 April 1946 and published as Joint Communique No. 5 which included a declaration to be signed by applicants for consultation, guaranteeing that they would:

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(a) Uphold the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea as stated in paragraph No. 1 of that Agreement;

(b) Abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of paragraph No. 2 of the Moscow Agreement; and

(c) Cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph No. 3.

(3) However, in working out the detailed application of Joint Communique No. 5, difficulties arose regarding the composition of the list of signatory parties and organizations to be consulted. The Soviet list for North Korea contained only Communist dominated Democratic People's Front parties; at the same time, the Soviet Delegation attempted to revise the U. S. list of signatory organizations in such a way as to substitute member organizations of the Communist dominated Democratic People's Front for various large and influential organizations suggested by the U. S. Delegation. Discussion culminated in Soviet repudiation of the agreement contained in Joint Communique No. 5. Because of a statement that Joint Communique No. 5 did not preclude the right of an organization to express opposition to trusteeship, made by the Acting Chairman of the Representative Democratic Council of South Korea, a body composed entirely of the principal rightist parties and organizations, the Soviet representative in Subcommission No. 1 insisted that member organizations of the Council should not be accepted for consultation with the Joint Commission. This contention was supported by the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission. No agreement concerning consultation could be reached. Failing agreement on the formation of a Provisional Government, the U. S. Delegation then attempted to initiate discussion concerning the unification of the two zones of occupation. The Soviet Delegation refused to discuss the matter until the issue of consultation had been clarified. In the same meeting (6 May 1946) the U. S. Delegation proposed that the Joint Commission adjourn pending clarification of consultation. This meeting was the last session of the Joint Commission in 1946.

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(4) In order to clarify the issue and place it on the record, on 7 May 1946 the U. S. Delegation sent a proposed draft agreement to the Soviet Delegation to the effect that no party or organization was to be excluded "because of the exercise of their right of freedom of expression in re trusteeship, the Moscow Decision, or any other political issue." The Soviet Delegation did not reply to the proposal.

(5) On the morning of 8 May 1946, the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, re-examined the U. S. and Soviet stands with the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation. The latter emphasized that "the main reason why the Soviet Delegation insisted on barring certain persons in consulting and taking part in consulting, General Hodge, it is clear that Russia is a close neighbor to Korea and, because of this, is interested in establishing in Korea a provisional democratic government which would be loyal* to the Soviet Union." In addition, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation requested that action on a unilateral press release proposed by the Commanding General, USAFIK, await reception of word from his superiors.

(6) In the evening of 8 May 1946, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation informed the Commanding General, USAFIK, that he had "received instructions from [his] Military Commander to terminate the work [of the Soviet Delegation] and go back [to Pyongyang]". The return of the Soviet Delegation to Pyongyang on 9 May 1946 marked the effective adjournment sine die of the Joint Commission.

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* Note. The Soviet interpreter used "friendly to the Soviet Union", but the American interpreter pointed out that on two occasions in the conversation the word used was not the usual word for "friendly", but connoted actual loyalty.

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g. Interim Negotiations regarding the Joint Commission, May 1946 - May 1947.

(1) On the day of the departure of the Soviet Delegation (9 May 1946) the Commanding General, USAFIK, in a letter informed the Commanding General of the Soviet Forces in Northern Korea that the American Delegation stood ready to resume the meetings with the Soviet Delegation at any time upon one day's notice. In subsequent exchange of letters he attempted to find a formula upon which agreement could be reached for reconvention of the Joint Commission. Throughout this correspondence the American Delegation insisted on safeguards to freedom of expression, while agreeing to exclude, by mutual agreement, those parties and individuals who after signing the declaration contained in the Joint Communique No. 5 would "foment and instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision." The Soviet Delegation protested that it nowhere denied that freedom, but insisted that applicants for consultation commit themselves to uphold fully and without reservations the Moscow Agreement and the work of the Joint Commission. The Soviet Commanding General also insisted that the American Delegation had arbitrarily narrowed the consultation by excluding some important leftist groups.

(2) In November, 1946, the Soviet Commanding General propounded the following specific proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

(a) The Joint Commission must consult with those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

(b) Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

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(c) Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and social organizations, by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.

(3) On December 24, these proposals were answered by the Commanding General, USAFIK, who suggested the following modifications:

Proposal No. 1 to be interpreted as follows:

Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

Proposal No. 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission, may after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

Proposal No. 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows: "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

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(4) . The Soviet Counter-proposal, dated 28 February 1947, insisted on a formula which would result in eliminating the majority of representative Korean leaders from consultation as representatives of Korean parties.

(5) At this time, the U. S. Department of State attempted to resolve the deadlock on Korea at a high governmental level. On 9 April, the negotiations between the two Commands were reviewed by the Acting Secretary of State in a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in which it was suggested that the Joint Commission renew its work on a basis of respect for the democratic right of the freedom of opinion.

(6) In the course of the ensuing exchanges, the Soviets proposed that the Joint Commission resume its work on May 20 of the current year on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, and stipulating that the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government be based on a wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The American Government insisted, in a letter of 2 May, that before orders could be given to initiate the preparations for opening the session of the Joint Commission on the date specified by Molotov, the Soviets would signify their concurrence with the principle of "respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion" as a basis for expediting the work of the Commission under the terms of the Moscow Agreement.

(7) In lieu of a direct answer, Molotov's reply of 5 May contained Soviet acceptance of the amendments to the Soviet proposals of 26 November, as stated in the letter of 24 December, 1946 of the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in South Korea.

(8) These were accepted in Secretary Marshall's note, with the stipulation that the proposals referred to were "identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of May 2, 1946" (referring to the guarantees of respect for

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the democratic right of freedom of opinion).

(9) The note went on to say: "I am instructing the American Commander in Korea to make immediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul."

(10) The Soviet answer, dated May 16, was again silent on the problem of the democratic freedom of expression; but merely noted that the statement concerning the instructions to the American Commander in Korea as agreement to the Soviet proposal to resume the work of the Commission on May 20. The Soviet Delegation arrived in Seoul on the date specified, but the second session of the Commission began actually on 21 May, exactly twelve and a half months after its adjournment in 1946.

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h. 1947 Joint Commission Meetings

(1) The Joint Commission reconvened on 21 May 1947 on the basis of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence. It was soon apparent that the Soviet Delegation intended to pursue the same strategy used in the 1946 meetings.

(2) In drafting a Joint Decision concerning consultation, the Soviet Delegation attempted to limit consultation to about 30 organizations, refused to establish criteria which would clearly define organizations eligible for consultation, and declared that organizations to be consulted must fully uphold the Moscow Agreement. However, at the insistence of the U. S. Delegation, the Soviet Delegation finally agreed to Joint Decision No. 12 regarding consultation which provided for the broadest possible consultation and included the text of the Marshall-Molotov agreement.

(3) In attempting to implement Joint Decision No. 12, an impasse developed along lines almost identical to those which led to the failure of the Joint Commission in 1946.

(4) The position of the Soviet Delegation was as follows:

(a) The fact that an organization is eligible for consultation does not mean that it must be admitted to consultation.

(b) The Soviet Delegation could exclude any organization from consultation unilaterally by failing to agree to its inclusion in the list compiled under Joint Decision No. 12.

(c) "Non-social" and "district and local organizations", and organizations "which do not fully uphold the Moscow Agreement", especially members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, should not be included in the list for consultation.

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(d) Signatures on the applications for consultation by member organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee were not given in good faith and, therefore, were invalid. Such organizations would be considered for consultation if they publicly withdrew from membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

(5) The position of the U. S. Delegation was as follows:

(a) In accordance with point number 1 of the agreed proposal for reconvening the Joint Commission (Marshall-Molotov correspondence), "signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

(b) Organizations signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 are automatically eligible for consultation and are automatically placed on the list for consultation provided in paragraph 5 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12. Organizations may be excluded from the list for consultation only by mutual agreement of the two Delegations as provided in point No. 3 of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence. Therefore, the arbitrary line of distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation" nullifies the agreements reached by Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov and by the Joint Commission and gives the Soviet Delegation the veto power over any applicant it dislikes.

(c) The Moscow Agreement on Korea does not define "social organization" and because of the Soviet Delegation's refusal to define basic terms, Joint Commission Decision No. 12 contains no definition of "social" --

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or any other term. However, the U. S. Delegation was willing to exclude from consultation, by mutual agreement, any organization which could not be considered "social" within the definitions to be found in the dictionaries of the world.

(d) District and purely local organizations are not barred from consultation by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov agreements, or Joint Commission Decision No. 12. However, to expedite the work of the Joint Commission, the U. S. Delegation made several proposals which, if accepted by the Soviet Delegation, would have eliminated a large number of truly local organizations from consultation.

(e) The U. S. Delegation was willing to exclude from consultation, by mutual agreement, fraudulent organizations provided that no such organization should be excluded where the sole claim of fraud was exaggeration of membership, a factor evident in some applications of both north and south Korean organizations.

(f) Organizations which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee are manifestly eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall-Molotov agreements if they have applied for consultation and have signed the required declaration. They remain eligible unless and until they are, by mutual agreement, excluded after indictment as provided by point No. 3 of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence. Failure of the Soviet Delegation to bring charges, supported by adequate evidence, against member organizations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations, while insisting arbitrarily on their exclusion, nullified the spirit and letter of point No. 3 of the Marshall-Molotov

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correspondence. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation's attempt unilaterally to deprive organizations of the right to initial consultation by omitting them from a list of organizations to be consulted constituted, in effect, an attempt to arrogate a veto power to itself. There is no provision in any of the agreements binding upon the Joint Commission which provides such a veto power, while there are two specific agreements which state that exclusion shall be by mutual agreement.

(6) Results and Conclusions

The specific results of the Soviet and U. S. positions outlined above become evident after a consideration of the following facts:

(a) Under the urging of their leaders, Dr. RHEE, Syngman and Kim, Koo, four extreme rightist groups, with a total claimed membership of 11,250,000, refused to participate in consultation with the Joint Commission.

(b) Of 460 groups which applied for consultation (excluding three applicants both delegations agreed to exclude for fraud), 38, all representing the Democratic People's Front, were from North Korea, while 422, representing all shades of political views, were from South Korea.

(c) These 460 groups can be roughly and approximately classified: People's Front - 136 groups, 27,296,000 claimed members, 41% of claimed membership; Moderates - 72 groups, 14,785,000 claimed members, 22%; Right - 252 groups, 24,920,000 claimed members, 37%.

(d) The Soviets submitted a list of 146 parties and organizations of both North and South Korea with membership in excess of 10,000 whose eligibility for consultation they were willing to discuss. This list failed

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to include 24 parties and organizations stated by the Soviets to b. members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Acceptance of this list would give the following political alignment:

1. People's Front and other leftists - 75 groups, claimed membership - 32,417,000.

2. Right and moderate - 71 groups, claimed membership - 18,587,000.

3. Eliminated right and moderate right - 24 groups, claimed membership - 15,286,000.

4. Eliminated left - none.

(e) Adding the 15,286,000 claimed membership of the 24 rightist groups proposed for elimination by the Soviets to the 11,250,000 of the KIM, Koo-Dr. RHEE, Syngman faction which eliminated itself by failing to apply, a total of 26,500,000 rightist or approximately 40% of total claimed membership of all Korea would be omitted from participation in the formation of the provisional government.

(f) Acceptance by the U. S. Delegation of the Soviet proposals would have driven from consultation, and from further support of the Joint Commission, the majority of the 71 rightist groups with claimed membership of 18,587,000. There would have remained only Democratic People's Front groups from which to form a government.

(g) While the Soviet Delegation consistently denied that it was their purpose to eliminate rightist parties and social organizations, the effect of agreement by the U. S. Delegation with their proposal would have resulted in a complete dependence by the Commission on the Communist-dominated Democratic People's Front for the formation of the provisional government. Even if

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the remaining right and moderate groups had continued to cooperate with the Joint Commission, the Democratic People's Front would have held a large majority.

(7) The following general results, contrary to the international commitments with respect to Korea, would eventuate should the U. S. Delegation accept the contentions of the Soviet Delegation:

(a) Direct violation of specific agreements binding upon the Joint Commission.

(b) Negation of the broad consultation principle embodied in the Moscow Decision on Korea, the Marshall-Molotov Agreements, and Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

(c) Denial of freedom of expression to representatives of political parties and social organizations.

(d) Unjust discrimination between major political factions in Korea, depriving nearly every influential nationalistic group of the Rightist and Centrist persuasion, which had applied for consultation, from its rightful place in the formation of their first democratic government; by the same token, instituting, contrary to the wishes of the Korean people, a complete domination of such a government by leftist groups led by the Soviet-oriented Communists.

(e) Recognition, in effect, of the paramount influence of the USSR in Korea in detriment to both the national interests of Korea and those of the other signatory powers to the Moscow Agreement.

(8) It is the opinion of the U. S. Delegation that the objectives of the Soviet Delegation's position were:

(a) To insure a Democratic People's Front control of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government similar to that established in North Korea.

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(b) To establish a Communist controlled satellite state on the border of the USSR which, in the words of the Soviet Chief Commissioner, at the opening meeting in March 1946, "will not become a base for attack on the Soviet Union", and which will outflank a hoped-for Communist Manchuria.

(9) To effect the realization of its objectives, the Soviet Delegation relied upon the following:

(a) Suppression of all opposition to the Democratic People's Front in North Korea through Soviet occupational policies with the result that only Democratic People's Front organizations could apply for consultation.

(b) Exclusion from consultation of major non-Democratic People's Front organizations in South Korea.

(c) Strategic aid to communist-dominated groups in South Korea (fifth column activities).

(10) Failing to obtain agreement as to consultation, the U. S. Delegation attempted to find a basis for the continuation and progress of the work of the Joint Commission in a series of proposals from 29 July 1947 to 12 August 1947. All the proposals were rejected by the Soviet Delegation.

(11) On 20 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation complained that the arrests of leftist leaders in South Korea, early in August, created conditions which impeded the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. He insisted that immediate measures be taken to restore "normal conditions." In reply, the Chief Commissioner of the U. S. Delegation stated that the government of South Korea has authority to protect itself and that the Soviet contentions that the arrests impeded the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement were absurd.

(12) On 26 August 1947, the Soviet Delegation presented counter-proposals to the U. S. proposal of 12 August 1947. They were

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rejected by the U.S. Delegation as they did not change the Soviet Delegation's position.

(13). Work on a joint report, suggested by Secretary of State Marshall and agreed to by Foreign Minister Molotov, commenced on 25 August 1947. It was soon evident that agreement was impossible on the sections presenting the position of the two Delegations. It was apparent that the Soviet Delegation sought to obscure the basic disagreements regarding consultation. In an attempt at compromise, the U. S. Delegation made the following proposals:

(a) That the reports of the two Delegations be submitted under a joint covering letter.

(b) That the joint report include the U. S. position as written by the U. S. Delegation, and the Soviet position as written by the Soviet Delegation, with both positions so labelled in the report.

As the Soviet Delegation refused both proposals, the U. S. Delegation proposed that both Delegations inform their governments that they were unable to agree on a joint report. This proposal was accepted.

(14) In the 60th meeting (17 September 1947), the Soviet Delegation presented a statement in which it declared that the U. S. Delegation had deliberately attempted to create the impression that the Joint Commission could not accomplish its task and claimed that it had not given proper consideration to the Soviet Delegation's proposal of 26 August 1947. In reply, the Chief Commissioner of the U. S. Delegation noted that he was sorry to see that the Soviet Delegation was still not ready to consult with all organizations eligible for consultation.

(15) The U. S. Delegation concludes:

(a) The Soviet objective was announced by the Soviet Chief Commissioner to the Joint Commission in March

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1946. This objective is:

1. To create the Provisional Korean Democratic Government by a wide unification of all "democratic parties and organizations supporting the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs";
2. Through such a government, to eliminate "reactionary, pro-Japanese, anti-democratic elements" and "to carry out radical measures of economic and political reform";
3. To establish a Korea "friendly to the Soviet Union so that in the future it will not become a base for attack on the Soviet Union."

(b) The Soviet government and its agents have followed the Soviet objective as above announced during:

1. The 1946 sessions of the Joint Commission;
2. The exchange of correspondence between the commanders;
3. The 1947 session of the Joint Commission.

(c) The Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, and Joint Commission Decision No. 12 constitute adequate and detailed terms for conducting consultation and for the implementation of the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

(d) The Soviet Delegation to the 1947 sessions of the Joint Commission shows no intention of divergence from the objectives announced by the then and present Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation at the opening session of the Joint Commission in 1946.

(e) Unless and until the Soviet government directs the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission to follow

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policies other than those announced by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation in 1946 as the Soviet objective, it will be impossible to draft any agreement with the Soviet government which will lead to successful evolvement of Korean independence through the medium of the Joint Commission.

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3. Present Situation and Problems.

a. Rightist Activity

(1) The objectives of the rightists at the present time, not including the more moderate or center elements, is to force the hand of the United States in order to accelerate the establishment of an independent South Korean government with complete power in the hands of Koreans. This applies with particular force to the RHEE-KIM, Koo forces and to a lesser extent the Hankook Democratic leader KIM, Sung Soo. These leaders view general elections as the key to their immediate problem and are preparing for, and are confident of, complete success in these elections.

(2) The principal rightist organizations, leaders and the general relation to the present scene are as follows:

(a) The Hankook Democratic Party, under the leadership of KIM, Sung Soo, is the best organized and best financed party. It is composed largely of wealthy Koreans, holds the strongest single bloc in the Legislative Assembly, and shares control of most of the important positions of Military Government, both in Seoul and in the provinces, with the RHEE-KIM, Koo elements.

(b) The Korean Independence Party, under the chairmanship of KIM, Koo, is the oldest of the existing parties and traces its continuity from its inception in China in 1931. It has recently come through a period of internal stress, which culminated in a three-way split. Two factions seceded from the party under the leadership respectively of AHN, Chai Hong and KWAN, Tai Suk. The remaining faction abstained from consultation with the Joint Commission.

(c) The National Representative Assembly, thoroughly dominated by RHEE, Syngman, is nominally not a political party but a rightist constituent assembly, called for the purpose of creating a government

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in the furtherance of Dr. RHEE's plans. Its 230 members claim to speak for all the people of both the southern and northern zones.

(d) The United Council is an organization of parties largely under the dominance of the Hankook Democratic Party, and at the same time being supporters of RHEE, Syngman. The Council was a device used for the purpose of bridging the gap between the non-consultation stand of RHEE and the pragmatic need of achieving rightist representation.

(e) The National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence was originally under the dominance of KIM, Koo and was taken over by Dr. RHEE in August 1946, and is undoubtedly the largest organization in South Korea. It is nominally not a political movement but a non-partisan patriotic organization. It is the only rightist group with genuine, large-scale popular membership in the provinces.

(f) The right wing youth groups are of varied complexion, ranging from the moderate Korean National Youth of LEE, Bum Suk, to quasi-criminal organizations such as the Tai Han Minjung and the Suh Puk (Northwest) Youth Association. They have long records of extortion, assault and murder, and they have been the object of much thought on the part of the police.

(g) The Korean National Youth, on the other hand, organized under the sponsorship of the Military Government, represents an effort to establish a youth movement upon a decent basis. At the

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present time it appears to be growing and may succeed in displacing the present pernicious influence of the other groups.

b. Leftist Activity.

(1) Leftist activity throughout Southern Korea is now primarily underground. It may be reviewed against the background of the dominance of the Communist Party over the left wing. The Democratic People's Front, with a claimed membership of some six million, includes not only the South Korea Labor Party and its related parties, but also the customary popular front phenomenon of a number of fraternal, professional and cultural groups, labor unions, and the like. As related elsewhere, the Communists, late in 1946, decided to abandon the name "Communist Party" for strategic reasons and to create instead a new party based upon a "merger" of the left. This is the South Korea Labor Party, ostensibly under the chairmanship of HO, Hun, but actually under PAHK, Heung Young, who apparently is the conduit for orders and instructions funneled through Pyongyang.

(2) Party policy shifts from time to time; in May and June of 1947, there was an effort to assume an outward indication of respectability and of deep devotion to the Joint Commission. Anti-American utterances were, temporarily and on the surface, discontinued. Present activities are primarily organizational, although it continues to campaign in its accustomed fields, spreading stories of American theft of farmers' rice, exploitation of Korean economy, and the like. Present apparent objective of party policy is the calling of a new general strike sometime in the fall of 1947, and the encouragement of mob violence wherever possible in the provinces. An interesting development of recent months has been the numerous stories of refugees escaping to the North, this being an obvious Communist move designed to rebut the influence of the tide of refugees actually coming in the other direction.

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c. Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.

(1) The Korean Interim Legislative Assembly was finally brought into being on 12 December 1946 as the culmination of the American efforts to effect some degree of political unity. The legislative assembly consisted of 90 members, holding indefinite tenure, and composed of 45 elected and 45 appointed members.

(2) The leftists in general refused to take part in the legislature, their propaganda taking the line that the legislature was the "tool" of Military Government to be used as a rubber stamp. As a matter of fact, their opposition stemmed from the usual leftist position -- no participation without complete control. LYUH, Won Hyung, the prominent leftist who was the somewhat reluctant co-leader with KIMM, Kiusic in the Coalition Movement, refused a seat in the legislature. The only leftists who accepted appointive seats in the legislature were third-rate "leaders" who were largely influenced by opportunism. No known Communists were offered appointments.

(3) The elective seats were distributed among the provinces in ratio of population. Although the election ordinance issued by Military Government did not so specify, the form of election chosen was an improvisation of a series of step elections, in which the village inhabitants chose representatives to county assemblies, which elected provincial delegates, who in turn chose the legislators from the province.

(4) Because of irregularities in the electoral procedure, the Commanding General ordered re-elections in the province of Kangwon and in the city of Seoul (which now has autonomy on the provincial level). The Legislature formally convened on 12 December 1946 and elected KIMM Kiusic chairman and CHOI Tong O and YUN KI Sup as vice-chairmen, all moderates and long-time exiles.

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(5) The rightist and conservative Hankook Democratic Party, with its legislative delegation of 21, originally had threatened to boycott the Legislature because of the rejection of its ultimatum against re-election in the disputed districts. The boycott was abandoned when the ultimatum was ignored, and the Democratic members attended the first meeting of the legislature, after being absent from the ceremonial opening session.

(6) Lines were drawn immediately by the Rightists, in the effort to take control of the Assembly from the moderate forces led by KIMM Kiusic. On no single issue, however, could the rightists coalesce sufficiently to obtain a clear majority for his unseating. Country members elected by the National Association for the Rapid Association for Independence, for instance, would not go along with the Democratic machine in its effort to suppress discussion of the pro-Japanese issue. Dr. RHEE, who attempted to influence the legislature through elected adherents, finally seized upon the trusteeship question as a means of attacking the KIMM leadership and the Military Command simultaneously.

(7) In December a resolution was proposed disapproving the policy of General Hodge as being contrary to Korean interests, and demanding a clear-cut declaration against trusteeship. This issue was carefully chosen for the maximum effect because of its unique place in the Korean political scene. Practically no Korean politician at that time had the courage to even discuss this question objectively, let alone oppose a resolution openly condemning trusteeship.

(8) The Commanding General visited the Legislature before a vote was taken, and after making a reasoned statement agreed to answer questions put forward by members. The political aspects of the resolution were so explosive however that no amount of reasonable and logical argument could dissuade the members and the resolution passed by a vote of 44 to 1. All but a handful of affirmative votes were cast by elected rightist members; the one "NO" vote was cast by AHN Chai Hong, the present Civil Administrator. (See Inclosure No. 1.)

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(9) KIMM Kiusic thereupon submitted his resignation to the Legislature. This device, which he has repeated subsequently, is accepted by Koreans as being in the nature of a bid for a vote of confidence. The Legislature rejected the resignation and proceeded to the consideration of its primary work, the enactment of its rules and regulations. This phase consumed two months of the Legislature's time.

(10) Early in February, new indication of the political immaturity of Koreans was provided in the debate on the proposal of General Helmick (Acting Military Governor) to employ Japanese technicians on a temporary basis. These technicians were urgently needed in vital posts in the Korean economic recovery program. As a matter of fact, the political necessity for eliminating Japanese technicians from South Korea before their successors could be trained was an additional factor deterring economic recovery. In spite of this, the Legislature treated itself to an emotional orgy, and one of the members gave a dramatic performance, with a threat to disembowel himself on the floor of the Legislature if a single Japanese technician re-entered Korea.

(11) The issue of "political prisoners" also took the time of the Legislature during the first months. A number of proposals were offered, designed to free individuals imprisoned for acts which in the absence of statutory enactment would not be regarded as offensive. These proposals, favored principally by leftists, had the support also of a small number of members of the conservative cast. These were not passed.

(12) There were, however, indications that the political education of the Koreans was making progress. This was made particularly evident in the case of the discussion of grain collections. After virtually every Korean had joined in the demand for cessation of compulsory collection of grain, the Legislature gave formal consideration to the problem, and eventually concurred in the necessity for

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collection, making a number of suggestions as to method. Of the suggestions, several were beneficial comments on procedure, and only two were impractical, these being proposals limiting compulsory collection to rice only, and abandoning the use of the police in collection.

(13) The Legislature has shown a tendency to divide on strictly partisan lines less frequently than might have been expected. On such issues as the abolition of prostitution, the vote has been unanimous. (It remains to be seen whether the Korean Legislature can repeal human nature more effectively than can the American Congress. In general, the issue of land reform has been approached in a non-partisan manner, with general consent as to the necessity of reform, and with no organized opposition. It seems probable that the Military Government plan will be enacted by the Legislature in the near future.

(14) This issue provoked the second of KIMM Kiusic's resignations. Ultimately, the matter was adjusted, satisfactorily to the contending factions, on the basis of a 23-year compromise. This was originally disapproved by the Acting Military Governor, but was subsequently sent back to the Legislature with only a suggestion that it be given careful consideration.

(15) There is no single issue upon which Koreans unite so completely as upon the desire to have control of former Japanese assets and property, held in trust by the United States until the solution of the reparations question. This has come up for debate on several occasions, despite the Military Governor's careful

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delineation of international legal necessities. The legislature unanimously presses for the present absolute right of control of all Japanese assets in Korea.

(16) In the passage of the first draft of the electoral bill, in June, the rightists joined with the followers of KIMM Kiusic in drafting legislation that would bar from franchise or office, for five years, certain categories of police officials who had served under the Japanese.

(17) The two principal bills passed by the Legislative Assembly deserve brief comment:

(a) Election Law.

1. The law as passed, embodies a compromise on the most disputed feature, the voting age. The rightists fought hard for a 25-year limitation, and the KIMM forces and their allies for a 21-year limit, the figure of 23 being finally accepted as a compromise. The rightist insistence on this provision apparently was based solely on self-interest, viz., success in the anticipated South Korea elections, the theory being that the majority of leftist votes will come from the younger members of the various Communist organizations.

2. The law does not specifically require an election within any immediate future period of time. It does provide that the "chief executive" shall announce the date eighty days ahead.

3. Chapter I, Section 2, Subsection a-4 bars from the franchise certain categories roughly defined as national traitors, pro-Japanese collaborators, and profiteers. This section is still ineffective, the separate bill on this subject not having been signed by the Military Governor.

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4. Chapter I, Section 6, provides that election expenses may constitute a charge upon the National Treasury.

5. Chapter IV, Section 15, in the effort to safeguard freedom of election, provides a limitation upon membership in election committees, no one party being permitted to hold more than one-third of the seats. This provision is well-intentioned but meaningless. Parties exist in such multiplicity that it would not be difficult to staff a committee with people predominantly of the same group but with different nominal designations.

6. Chapter VI, Section 28, provides that each voter must "without assistance write" the name of the candidates of his choice, which in effect, is a limitation on universal suffrage.

7. Chapter VI, Section 36, establishes the principle of a single election without a primary system (no runoffs) and with the possibility of choice by a small minority of voters. This is one of the most dangerous aspects of the law; with the proclivity of Koreans for political disagreement, the law gives a notable advantage to the followers of a disciplined, foreign-controlled minority.

(b) Anti-Collaborationist Law.

1. This is a bill to define, classify, and penalize certain categories of individuals, roughly grouped as national traitors, collaborators and profiteers. (The effort to insert also the phrase (war criminals" was dropped upon the insistence of American advisers who pointed out that this was not within the scope of the Legislature's activities.)

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2. In brief, the bill provides punishments up to and including the death sentence, without limitation of time, for pro-Japanese activity prejudicial to the people. Certain categories are barred from the franchise for five years.

3. The law contains many loose and dangerous clauses, one of the worst of which provides that the State may dissolve any organization which has any pro-Japanese members. This provision in the hands of an autocratic government would invite abuse.

4. The bill was passed by the Legislature on July 2; it has not been approved by the Military Governor and is therefore not in effect.

(c) Summary.

1. In considering the balance sheet of the Legislature in its first eight and a half months, it appears that substantial progress has been made in learning the procedure and mechanics of self-government. In review, recalling the violent opposition of the Communists to the existence of the Legislature, and the intransigeance of the rightists, who demanded sovereign powers, and considering also the untrained character of the community, without a parliamentary tradition, and almost literally without men schooled in legislative draftmanship, the legislative record is good.

2. There is a tendency to extremes of optimism or pessimism, evidenced on the one hand by the widely supported proposal to outlaw concubinage and to dismiss officials who keep concubines; and on the other hand by the rather large number of resignations, nine members having resigned thus far. This latter fact is attributed in part to what the

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Koreans consider as a lack of concrete and well-defined powers in the Legislature, and there is also the economic difficulty attendant upon legislators living in Seoul.

3. A certain amount of time has been wasted in fruitless debate and in political utterances designed for constituent consumption. This situation is not unknown in the legislative bodies of older and more established nations.

4. In summation, the principal gain thus far has been in acquainting Koreans with the parliamentary idea, and the legislators with parliamentary practices. These gains are not inconsiderable.

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4. Prospective Developments.

a. Future political action in South Korea will be greatly influenced by decisions reached concerning the recent proposal made by the United States Secretary of State in presenting the Korea problem to the United Nations. Should the United Nations evolve a solution which foresees a united, independent Korea in the near future, the cooperation of all political parties and organizations in this plan can be expected. Should Russia refuse to cooperate in the evolvement by the United Nations of a means of assuring an independent, united Korea in the not too distant future, political reaction will be dependent on other factors.

b. Should the United Nations fail, as mentioned under the second assumption, it is unlikely that the Russians will change to any material extent the policies now pursued in North Korea including maintenance of the iron curtain along the 38th parallel. The degree of political stability in South Korea under this assumption will depend almost directly on the policy adopted by the United States with reference to the future development of South Korea. Should a satisfactory "Grant-in-Aid" program be adopted and supported by the Congress, such program will go far in assuring reasonable political stability during the period that the leaders of political parties and social organizations observe the method of its initiation and implementation.

c. The following factors will have a direct bearing on future political developments:

(1) Frustration of the Koreans.

The failure of the Joint Commission, the acute longing of Koreans for independence and the feeling of frustration caused by long subservience to the Japanese, and by what they consider as failure on the part of Russia and the United States to carry out their promises to them, will cause discontent and dissatisfaction

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with any non-Korean government. Some unrest and possible disorders, therefore, can be expected to continue during any period that a government other than a sovereign Korean government is maintained over any part of Korea.

(2) Communism.

The policy of Russia to take over a united Korea as a satellite nation can be expected to lead them to continue to direct subversive activity by leftist groups of South Korea. As a matter of fact, there is in South Korea a considerable number of Korean Communists educated and trained by the Russians who, for personal gain and possibly in accordance with honest conviction, can be expected to continue by every means known to them to advance the interests of Communism. As previously stated in this paper, the Communist-controlled Democratic People's Front includes many parties and organizations with large following. They are well organized, ably and aggressively led, and can be expected to continue as an element hostile to any occupation policy pursued by the United States.

(3) United States Government over South Korea.

It is believed that the policies now pursued by Militar Government should continue without material change but with manipulation and improvement to meet conditions as they change. The more important of these problems are:

(a) Koreanization.

Effort should continue to have the Korean administrative governmental heads take over complete administrative control of their responsibilities. Conversely, the Americans now advising such officials should withdraw as rapidly as their Korean counterparts can assume responsibility to the ultimate status of a general inspector representing the interests of the United States.

(b) General Election.

As a development of "Koreanization", the South Korea Interim Legislative Assembly created by the United States

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Command assumed office on 12 December 1946. As previously stated, this Assembly was 50 percent elected and 50 percent appointed. It has been the consistent effort of the Commanding General, USAFIK, to replace this Interim Legislative Assembly by an all-elected Assembly. This action should be taken as rapidly as a well organized, properly supervised election can be assured under the law enacted by the Interim Legislative Assembly for this specific purpose. While the Koreans will probably resent and raise objection to American interference with the conduct of these elections, under the election law passed by the Interim Legislative Assembly it is essential that the Commanding General exercise such supervision and control over these elections as to avoid any charge being brought against him that through his failure unfair or manipulated elections were permitted.

(c) Land Reform.

It is a fact generally accepted by all political parties and organizations of South Korea that there should be some land reform. The Communists and their fellow travelers clamor for confiscation and free distribution of land. The policy of the American Command has been to leave the principles under which this question should be settled to the Koreans. The Interim Legislative Assembly has been encouraged to legislate on this subject. It now appears as though the Interim Legislative Assembly will shortly enact legislation under which a satisfactory solution of this matter may be achieved. If this is done it will go far to deflate one of the most troublesome propaganda issues of the Communists.

(d) Miscellaneous.

There are certain other policies, such as the collection and distribution of foodstuffs; fiscal and other policies aimed at controlling the inflationary cost of living; the organization, operation and control of the police force, the Constabulary and the Coast Guard, so as to assure greater security in South Korea; the

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operation of former Japanese property; and similar problems, the solution of which are closely tied in with political development. The policies presently followed concerning these and other issues are believed in general sound and will probably, with minor changes adjusted to conditions, continue to be followed.

(4) Soviet Influence.

As previously stated (paragraph 2d (2), page 21), Communist influence in Korea predates the occupancy by American troops. The Soviets have acquired a complete hold over North Korea, which it has completely Communized. It has organized, equipped, and trained a sizeable army of Koreans (estimated from 250,000-500,000). In addition, it has organized and trained a fairly efficient police force. The people are completely under the control of the Communist-dominated Democratic People's Front government which the Soviets have established. This government is in complete sympathy and constant contact with the Democratic People's Front government of South Korea. Common policy guides both governments in their efforts for unification and control over a united Korea. This condition will continue to exert influence over South Korea and to place obstacles in the path of smooth administration of the South Korean Government.

It is quite possible that the Soviets will shortly offer a joint withdrawal of forces. Should such an offer be made, it could be assumed to be but another maneuver by them to accomplish their ultimate objective; that is, a united Korea under a Communist-dominated leftist government. With this offer accepted, and it is believed that considerable pressure of world opinion will be exercised and may conceivably lead to its acceptance, it would not entirely remove the Soviet threat to a united Korea. The proximity of Soviet territory, the contiguous frontier, and the distance from the United States to Korea all work in the interest of the future objective of the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat to Korea, therefore, is real and will continue until the world issue is finally settled.

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5. Future Plans.

The future plans of the Commanding General, USAFIK, concerning the policies to be followed by him in governing South Korea are dependent on the solution of the problem of the future integration of North and South Korea and the creation of an independent Korea. Should the United Nations succeed in evolving a policy under which Korea could be united and its future independence provided, the future plans of the Commanding General, USAFIK, would naturally be based on the policies prescribed in any such agreement. Should the United Nations fail in its effort and should the Commanding General, USAFIK, be required to continue his responsibility over South Korea only, his plans will in general follow the "Prospective Developments" as outlined in the previous section.

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INCLOSURE NO 1.

"Extract from the Cairo Declaration"

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

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INCLOSURE NO. 2

"Extract from the Potsdam Declaration."

"(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."

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INCLOSURE NO. 3

MOSCOW AGREEMENT,

III - Korea

"1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission

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INCLOSURE NO. 3 (Cont'd)

shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks."

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INCLOSURE NO. 4

Extract from GHQ, AFPAC "Operations Instructions No. 4", August 15th, 1945.

"2 a. The United States Army Forces Pacific, by joint overseas operations in conjunction with the United States Pacific Fleet, will occupy JAPAN proper (exclusive of KARAFUTO) and KOREA (south of 38° North latitude), establish Military Government therein and impose the terms of surrender."

INCLOSURE NO. 4

SECRET

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INCLOSURE 5.

EVACUATION OF JAPANESE RESIDENTS IN SOUTH KOREA *

PROGRESS OF REPATRIATION: AUGUST 1945 — JUNE 1946



* THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE JAPANESE RESIDENTS NORTH OF 38TH PARALLEL AND MANCHURIA REPATRIATED VIA THE U.S. ZONE.

NOTE: OF THE 411 JAPANESE CIVILIANS REMAINING AS OF 30 JUNE 1946, 370 WERE EVACUATED BY 20 SEPTEMBER 1946; 41 JAPANESE STILL REMAIN IN SOUTH KOREA.

REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR. TOPO CO., CORPS SEPTEMBER, 1947

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

MOVEMENT OF JAPANESE REFUGEES FROM NORTH TO SOUTH KOREA



NOTE: A TOTAL OF 379 JAPANESE ENTERED SOUTH KOREA, 1 JANUARY - 31 AUGUST 1947, MAKING A GRAND TOTAL OF 288,365 BETWEEN 15 AUGUST 1945 AND 31 AUGUST 1947.

AVERAGE *

ENCLOSURE NO. 6

REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR. TOPO CO., CORPS SEPTEMBER, 1947

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

JAPANESE TROOPS IN SOUTH KOREA

PROGRESS OF EVACUATION: 27 SEPTEMBER 1945 — 20 JANUARY 1946



NOTE: EVACUATION OF THE 509 JAPANESE TROOPS REMAINING AS OF 20 JANUARY WAS COMPLETED BEFORE 5 MAY 1946.

INCLOSURE 7.

REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR. TOPO CO., CORPS SEPTEMBER, 1947

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KOREAN REFUGEES CROSSING 38° PARALLEL INTO SOUTH KOREA

15 AUGUST, 1945 – SEPTEMBER, 1947

(INCLUDES ONLY REFUGEES RECEIVED BY THE U.S. AUTHORITIES)

ESTIMATED MONTHLY TOTALS



INCLOSURE 8

* AVERAGE ESTIMATED FROM 437,000 TOTAL IN SOUTH KOREA AS OF 30 NOVEMBER, 1945.

** INCOMPLETE

REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR. TOPO CO. CORPS SEPTEMBER, 1947

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

REPATRIATION OF KOREANS FROM JAPAN AND OTHER PACIFIC AREAS EXCLUSIVE OF REFUGEES COMING BY LAND ACROSS 38°
(NOTE: OF 1,204,970 TOTAL AS OF SEPT. 20, 1947, 1,109,256 WERE FROM JAPAN.)

INCLOSURE NO. 9

AUG. SEP. OCT. NOV. * MONTHLY AVERAGE (AUG. 15-31, 1945) 382,692 REPATRIATES ENTERING SOUTH KOREA PRIOR TO 31 OCTOBER 45.

THIS TOTAL INCLUDED AN ESTIMATED 183,000-186,000 REPATRIATES VIA UNCONTROLLED SHIPPING FROM JAPAN.

REPRODUCED BY 69TH FINANCE TRANSPORTATION CORPS SEPTEMBER 1947

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KOREAN REPATRIATES AND REFUGEES IN SOUTH KOREA

BY AREA OF ORIGIN

(As of 20 September 1947)

Japan	1,109,256
North Korea	512,522
Manchuria	306,950
China	71,607
Pacific Ocean Areas	33,959
TOTAL	2,034,294

Note:

It is estimated that, in addition to the above, as of August 1947 there were approximately 1,000,000 unrecorded refugees and repatriates in South Korea who were believed to be largely from North Korea and Manchuria.

Inclosure No. 10

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URGENT RESOLUTION

According to the news release made by Public Information Department on 11 January 1947, Lieutenant General Hodge, Commanding General, USAFIK, sent a reply under the date of 24 December 1946 to General Chistiakov, Russian Commanding General in North Korea, concerning the re-opening of US-Soviet Joint Commission. In the letter there is one important factor which will determine the nature of future Korean Provisional Government. Hereby this Assembly proposes the following resolutions on behalf of thirty million people:

1. That regardless of the fact that Koreans strongly object to the provision for trusteeship on Korea in the Moscow Agreement, General Hodge understands that signing the 5th Communique of the Joint Commission means supporting the Moscow Agreement in full. This is a distortion of the general will of the people. We, hereby, point out the unreasonableness (of his contention) and oppose it strongly.
2. That the individuals, political parties, and social organizations are restricted and (in some cases) forbidden to express their will freely in regard to the enforcement of Moscow Agreement. This means that trusteeship is going to be imposed upon our people and that it is not only against the principle of freedom of expression which is guaranteed in the Atlantic Charter but also against General Hodge's own statement which he issued at the time of adjournment of the US-Soviet Joint Commission. We, hereby, point out (the violation of the freedom of expression) and strongly object it.

13 January 1947

44 Signatures

Inclosure No. 11

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Confidential

TAB B

A Report prepared for

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer

THE PRESENT ECONOMIC STATUS OF SOUTH KOREA

by

United States Army Military Government in Korea

in collaboration with

The Korea Economic Mission
Department of State

Seoul, Korea

August - 1947

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TH[illegible] PRESENT ECONOMIC STATUS OF SOU[illegible] KOREA

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I The Land

Korea is a mountainous peninsula attached to the mainland of Asia at a point which gives it a common boundary with Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces of Asiatic Russia. It is separated from China on the west by the Yellow Sea, and from Japan on the east by the Straits of Tsushima. Superimposed on a map of the United States at similar latitudes, Korea would extend from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to Charleston, South Carolina, with Seoul, the capital, falling near Richmond. Its area is slightly more than 85,000 square miles, or approximately the same as that of Great Britain. The peninsula is rimmed by more than 3,000 islands, mostly of insignificant size, and has a coast-line of some 5,400 miles. The east coast has few good harbors, most of which are north of the 38th parallel, and while south and west coast harbors are numerous, the high tides of the Yellow Sea limit their utility. The mountains of Korea are not high, since only Paktusan on the Manchurian border rises above 9,000 feet, but they extend through the length of the peninsula, sloping precipitously to the east coast, more gradually to the west, and gently to the south. As the southern terrain is more favorable to agriculture, the predominantly rural population of Korea is concentrated in the south. The mountains and rapid streams of the north have made possible extensive hydroelectric developments that were the foundation upon which the Japanese in the latter years of their regime built a very considerable industry.

The economy of Korea is primarily agricultural. Its climate, of the monsoon type, is in general favorable to rice culture, and this commodity has dominated both its domestic economy and its external trade. From 80% to 90% of the annual rainfall is received in the period from April through October, while more than half the total is concentrated in the so-called "rainy season" of July and August. Although this concentration of rainfall during the rainy season may be generally beneficial, it often happens that too much rain falls in a few days or hours with the result that disastrous floods destroy crops, roads, bridges and houses. The land is so seriously deforested and of such porous quality that it is incapable of retaining any large part of the rain that falls in the frequent deluges which mark the rainy season. Average annual temperatures in Korea are somewhat lower than in corresponding latitudes of the United States, ranging from the long, dry and cold winters of the northern interior where there are five months of frost and rather scanty crops are produced only on the valley floors, to the short, mild winters of the south which permit double cropping and cotton farming, and bamboo thickets are common.

II The People

1. Population - At the time of the last census, in 1944, the population of all Korea was nearly 26,000,000 comprising more than 25,000,000 Koreans, 700,000 Japanese, and 71,000 other nationals, most of whom were Chinese. Since that date, and especially since the end of the war, there have been extensive population movements in Korea, involving the repatriation of all Japanese south of the 38th parallel, the return to Korea of some 1,600,000 Koreans from Japan and other Pacific areas, as well as the arrival in South Korea of almost one million refugees from the North. These refugees until very recently had been arriving at the rate of approximately 60,000 per month, although recent tightening of border controls by the Soviets has tended to stem this influx.

Since most Korean repatriates have chosen to live in the American zone, South Korea now contains approximately 70% of the population of the country as compared with 64% in 1944. As of June 1947 it was estimated that the population of South Korea was slightly less than 20,000,000, while that of North Korea was less than 9,000,000. The population density, therefore, is about 329 persons per square mile, or seven times that of the United States

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and two-thirds that of Japan. If there is no change in the current rate of natural increase, about 1.7% per annum, and inflow of population approximately equals outflow, the population of all Korea in 1960 should be nearly 35,000,000 people. This is equivalent to the pre-war population of Poland.

2. Labor Force - Until the end of the war, the government and almost all elements of the economy of this primarily agricultural country were dominated by the 700,000 Japanese residents who constituted only 3% of the population. Nearly all the engineers and technical men who operated the industrial plants, mines, and public utilities of the peninsula were Japanese, and the government pursued a policy designed to perpetuate them in all significant positions of leadership, and to deny Koreans equality of opportunity in nearly every phase of political and economic life. Koreans were given little choice but to continue in agricultural pursuits, and two-thirds of the population was so engaged. The remaining third were employed in handicraft production, small shop-keeping, some few in the professional services, and many more served as unskilled or semi-skilled industrial laborers.

The partial industrialization of Korea which occurred in the years 1932 to 1945 was not accompanied by a corresponding growth in technical skills among the Korean people. The Japanese furnished scientific and managerial staffs while drawing upon the Koreans only for coolie labor or services calling for modest skills. Of the 188,000 Japanese males between the ages of 16 and 60 who were in Korea in 1944, 52,000 were managers, professional and technical men who provided the leadership for the government and economy.

In point of view of size, Korea has as large a labor force as it is likely to require in the foreseeable future, but at least temporarily that force has become seriously deficient in technical skills owing to the repatriation of all Japanese technicians and skilled laborers from South Korea, and of all but a few hundreds from North Korea. A study prepared by the Military Government in August 1946 estimated the number of Koreans male and female between the ages of fifteen and fifty-nine either gainfully employed or available for employment at 10,679,000 and projected the labor force to 1950 in the number of 11,192,000. Korea has at present a labor force entirely adequate in numbers and skills for the requirements of its agriculture, but dangerously lacking in the higher skills needed for efficient management of most of its industries, and many of its mines and public utilities, as well as transportation and communications facilities, nearly all of which were constructed and operated by the Japanese.

A report on the 1943 census of laborers and technicians in Korea published by the Government General of Chosen gives certain valuable indications concerning personnel which may be available to operate the country's industries and mines. In that year, while there were 513,000 Koreans, 27,000 Japanese and 10,000 other nationals among the laborers in all industries, there were 8,000 Japanese but only 1,800 Koreans classed as technicians or engineers in these same industries. Actually, a number of Koreans classified as technicians were physicians employed by industry. Of the 183,000 laborers in Korean mines, 179,000 were Koreans, and of the 3,400 engineers and technicians, 1,300 were likewise Koreans. From available information, it appears that the majority of these Korean mining engineers and technicians were engaged in gold and coal mining. Consequently, Korea would seem to be in a relatively better position with regard to trained personnel of all categories to rehabilitate its gold and coal mining than any other of its industries, with the possible exception of food processing, lumbering, and textile and ceramics production. The larger part of these Korean technicians are north of the 38th parallel where most of the mines are situated. Japanese held about one-third of all the 51,000 positions in the Korean railways, including nearly all

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supervisory posts and many of those calling for skilled operations such as shop foremen and trainmen. In the professions, Koreans were rather better represented since the Japanese appear not to have felt their dominance threatened by admitting Koreans in limited numbers to the practice of law and medicine, so long as they were excluded from the higher spheres of industry and government.

The history of the labor union movement in Korea under the Japanese was brief and violent. Between 1925 and 1930 a certain amount of union organization was admitted and activity was strongest among longshoremen and seamen. After 1931 organized labor went underground as a result of the government's reaction to labor agitation at time of the invasion of Manchuria. After the Japanese capitulation, workers in various plants formed committees to protect and manage plants which they conceived the defeat had transferred them. In November 1945, the Chun Pyung Labor Union was formed in Seoul and undertook to send organizers throughout the provinces of South Korea to establish unions in the factories. The Chun Pyung was controlled by Leftist political groups and its aims appear to have been primarily political rather than social and economic. In reaction to the Chun Pyung, extreme Rightist groups in April of 1946 formed the Tai Han Labor Union as a political counter-measure. Both organizations were formed outside the laboring groups proper and in scope are quite unlike labor unions as these are known in the West. Activities are generally political and terrorism is unfortunately one of the principle weapons of both federations. Police interference, as well has acted to check the development of legitimate labor union activities. Under the Japanese, labor disputes were handled by a special section of the police bureau and this tradition has been hard to eradicate. In general, police have tended to favor the Rightist federation. This has caused great ill feeling toward the police on the part of the Chun Pyung and has tended to make even more difficult the attainment of labor's legitimate objectives.

Legislation concerning labor has been passed both by the Military Governor in the form of ordinances and by the South Korean Interim Government in the form of law. The Military Governor's ordinance of 30 October 1945 declaring a national emergency provided for the protection of labor and provided furthermore that disputes involving industries declared essential should be settled by mediation boards whose decisions would be final and binding on all parties. The Military Governor actually declared public utilities and several other types of enterprises "essential" in the meaning of this ordinance. Labor mediation boards were established by an ordinance of 9 December 1945 but the practical effect of this ordinance to date has been negligible. An ordinance of 23 July 1946 established a Department of Labor in USAMGIK and officially recognized trade unions and collective bargaining. An ordinance of 7 November 1946 establishing maximum working hours provided for a basic work week of 48 hours, and payment of 50% overtime for hours worked in excess of 48, and declared work in excess of 60 hours per week illegal.

A Child Labor Law was originally promulgated by ordinance and on 16 May 1947 reenacted in modified form by the Legislature. The Child Labor Law declares work of children below the age of 14 in industrial and commercial enterprises illegal, and restricts the work of persons below the age of 18 in those enterprises considered dangerous to health. The Child Labor Law provides for establishment of labor inspection agencies; this provision, however, has not yet been implemented.

Safety and health conditions in Korean factories are on the whole highly unsatisfactory. Machines are imperfectly guarded and lack safety devices; plant hospitals are poorly staffed and equipped, and dormitories are deplorable. Social security and workmen's compensation do not exist in South Korea. The

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instability of the economy and political uncertainty have made the time inappropriate to attempt very far ranging reforms which would too deeply engage the credit of the eventual government.

3. Educational Status - The educational status of the Korean people may be inferred from the facts given above. While in 1944 the Japanese made up only 3% of the population of Korea, their numbers included 50% of all persons who had done graduate work in a university, 47% of all college, normal school and technical school graduates, 44% of all middle school graduates and 74% of those persons who had completed two years of middle school studies. Approximately 90% of all Koreans as of that year had had no formal schooling at all. At the same time the 1944 census indicates that of the 700,000 Japanese then resident, 73% had completed primary school, 30% were graduates of middle school, and 5% had been graduated from higher institutions. Although progress has been made during the occupation in repairing Korean educational deficiencies, it is clear that the need is still imperative to foster and extend training programs whereby Koreans may be enabled gradually to fill the gaps left by the repatriation to Japan of a relatively small but highly trained segment of the population.

Existing educational facilities are entirely inadequate to meet the special and urgent need that will face the country for many years to come. Since the end of the war there has been expansion in the size and number of schools in both zones of Korea, but growth has been mainly in primary education and instruction of illiterates, and has probably not been marked by any improvement in the quality of instruction. Prior to Japan's defeat, technical and vocational education had been developed only to a modest degree, and since the end of the war it has seriously retrogressed in southern Korea. Lack of educational materials and qualified instructors has joined with the traditional Confucian glorification of the scholar at the expense of the hand laborer to deter the development of a corps of trained personnel who might be able in time to carry on in the places left by the Japanese. Northern Korea appears to have fared better in this respect than the American zone. Although education in general suffers from the position occupied in the curriculum by communist propaganda, technical education may have progressed beyond its previous state. Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang is said to emphasize technical studies, and eleven in-service training schools have been created in large factories and mines. Moreover, hundreds of Japanese technicians remain in North Korea to continue at their jobs while training Korean replacements.

Education at all levels has been seriously hampered in South Korea by a shortage of teachers, text books, schoolhouses, equipment, and of adequate supervision. A primary task of education in the area is to decrease the enormous number of illiterates. Some considerable progress in this respect has already been made. This work has been rendered possible by the existence of an efficient phonetic alphabet which permits fairly rapid progress in simple reading and writing. Unfortunately, however, it has not been possible to provide new literates with reading materials which might have capitalized on their first enthusiasm for reading and at the same time have communicated to them the essential objectives of the American occupation.

Despite handicaps there has been considerable progress in improving elementary school attendance, with the result that more Korean children are now in the schools of South Korea than were in the schools of all Korea under the Japanese. Since it has not been possible to provide many new buildings, this increase has been accomplished by enlarging some existing schools and crowding as many as 65 to 75 pupils into a classroom. The 3,314 schools in South Korea average about 650 pupils per school and are staffed by somewhat more than 30,000 teachers. Approximately

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70% of children of primary school age are now enrolled. To accommodate the 1,000,000 children not now attending schools will require an additional 1,500 institutions and approximately 14,000 more teachers.

In the field of secondary education progress is much less marked. There are only 385 secondary schools in South Korea with an enrollment of 160,000, while the number of children of high school age in the area is approximately 2,000,000. Preparation for advanced vocational and technical training is bottlenecked by this shortage of facilities. To provide for even half of the pupils would call for an additional 1,600 schools and 25,000 to 30,000 new teachers.

Higher institutions are similarly few in number and restricted in facilities. To provide the teachers, professional men, engineers and technicians who will be required to direct the economy of South Korea as a whole, is beyond the capacity of existing educational institutions. For many years it will be necessary to send Koreans abroad to learn modern techniques in order that they may operate the country's industry and staff its schools. Meanwhile, local facilities, if properly supported with imported materials, supplies, and advisers can do much to improve the educational status of Koreans of the South, and so provide an essential foundation for the economically independent democracy described in the Moscow Decision.

Korea's human resources are adequate in numbers and potential abilities to sustain an efficient economy. However, Koreans have been denied the opportunity of training and leadership in technical fields for two generations and hence lack the skills necessary to maintain and operate their industries, mines, utilities and transportation and communications systems. This deficiency cannot be made good without the exploitation of every possible facility for technical education and the provision of competent supervisors and teachers from abroad.

4. Public Health and Welfare - The preservation of public health in South Korea has created heavy demands upon the Army Medical Corps due to a lack of qualified Korean medical personnel, shortage of hospital facilities, vaccines and all types of pharmaceuticals. Despite inevitable handicaps, however, it is felt that measures adopted have resulted in a decrease in the death rate in South Korea. During the period April 1943 to March 1944, the monthly death rate per thousand of population varied between 14 and 27, while under American occupation the monthly rate per thousand has fluctuated between 12 and 20. Principal causes of death in order of importance during the fiscal year April 1946 through March 1947 were (1) Pneumonia, (2) Measles, (3) Influenza, (4) Meningitis, and (5) Tuberculosis.

Heavy population movements during the Occupation have resulted in the outbreak of several serious epidemics. In 1945-1946 nearly 20,000 cases of smallpox were reported. A nationwide vaccination program had the effect of reducing smallpox cases in the following year by 99%. Typhus likewise was prevalent during the first six months of 1946 with 5,860 cases recorded. Innoculations and widespread use of DDT decreased the number of cases in the first six months of 1947 to 1,183. From May through December 1946, 15,748 cases of cholera occurred in South Korea resulting in 10,191 deaths. Innoculations and port quarantine have suppressed this disease in South Korea thus far in 1947.

Other diseases which are endemic in the population and of great social and economic importance, are tuberculosis which affects 12 to 14% of the population; venereal diseases by which 70% of the population is at some time attacked, and malaria from which virtually the entire population suffers at some time or other. Leprosy as well is common in South Korea with 25,000 to

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30,000 cases, of which only 8,000 are at present in isolation. The diseases listed in addition to others not named are responsible for an infant mortality of approximately 30%. It is estimated as well that about 50% of all children die before reaching the age of 5 years.

Hospital facilities and conditions in South Korea are notably poor. At the end of the war there existed 46 provincial and public hospitals with a capacity of 4,128 beds. The nursing profession is in very low estate, since before the war only Japanese nurses were permitted to occupy positions of responsibility. There are at present in South Korea only 728 graduate nurses, 624 student nurses, 110 public health nurses and 414 nurse's aides, a total of 1,044. Consequently, most of the nursing care of the sick must be administered by the individual's family. The population ratio for the graduate nurses is 1 : 26,665; for doctors 1 : 8,359; and for dentists 1 : 30,000.

In August 1945 there were in South Korea 314 Japanese and 259 Korean dentists. All Japanese dentists have been repatriated to Japan, while repatriation to Korea of Korean dentists has brought the present total to 501. In addition to the latter figure, 112 apprentices have been licensed for a period of 5 years to supplement the graduate dentists. For lack of facilities and equipment the Seoul Dental College has been unable to accept more than 80 of 242 applicants for instruction during the present year.

Veterinarians in South Korea number approximately 700. Although most of these men are inadequately trained and have worked in subordinate positions to the 400 Japanese veterinarians who were in Korea before the war, it is still unfortunately true that the livestock population which has decreased 75% during the past 9 years has still the opportunity of receiving rather more medical care than the human population. Preventive measures have been successful in stemming the spread from North Korea of various epizootic diseases which have ravaged the herds of the area. Rinderpest, a highly contagious and usually fatal disease of cattle, was effectively controlled by inoculation and quarantine of all cattle in a zone 15 miles south of the 38th parallel. The same measures have also excluded foot and mouth disease, contagious pleuro-pneumonia and other virulent animal plagues enzootic throughout the Orient.

Meat inspection service is almost lacking in South Korea due to a lack of trained inspectors. Dairy inspection likewise is inadequate, and pasturization is practiced in only one province of South Korea. To correct the existing sanitation deficiencies in the field of animal husbandry is a long-range operation which will necessitate expert foreign supervision.

Veterinary standards are, however, being raised by requiring veterinarians to have had four years of specialized professional courses in the university following 12 years of preliminary education. The newly established college of veterinary medicine in Seoul National University will hold its first classes in the Fall of 1947. The agricultural industry of South Korea will be enormously benefitted by the services of men trained in this school, since to rebuild the flocks and herds of Korea will demand advanced conservation methods.

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III Agriculture and Food

1. Agricultural Production - Throughout its history, Korea has been, as it remains, an agricultural country. Even when Korean industry was operating at maximum capacity under Japanese direction, no fewer than two-thirds of the total population was immediately dependent upon agriculture for a livelihood. Since only about 21% of Korea's total land area of approximately 50,600,000 acres is under cultivation, farms are necessarily small, with more than 3,000,000 farms averaging slightly over 3 acres each. Approximately one-third of the cultivated area, mostly south of the 38th parallel, is normally double cropped, producing rice in summer and fall, and barley, wheat or rye in winter and spring. Three-quarters of the cultivated acreage is usually planted to cereals, which comprise over 80% of the caloric intake of the population. Leguminous crops, principally soya beans, make up 14% of the planted acreage, while vegetables account for 6%, and non-food crops, chiefly fibres and tobacco, some 5%. Orchards occupy less than 1% of the cultivated area. More than 90% of the gross value of Korea's agricultural production is derived from planted crops, about 5% or 6% from livestock, and less than 1% from sericulture.

Rice is the principal Korean crop, and it has consistently represented more than half the total value of agricultural production. During the 1930's, the rice crop averaged about 100,000,000 bushels annually. 40% or more was exported each year to Japan, accounting generally for about one-third of the total gross value of exports. This particular development in agriculture was by no means voluntary on the part of the Korean people. It was directed by the Japanese for the sole purpose of making available to Japan as large quantities of Korean rice as possible. In line with Japanese policy, farm tenancy increased from less than 40% in 1910 to more than 75% in 1945. This facilitated grain collection, for landlords usually received their rentals in rice, and these averaged about 60% of the crop. Consequently, although Koreans far prefer rice to other grains, their per capita consumption was forced down from 3.62 bushels in 1915-1919 to 2.02 bushels in 1939-1945, a decline of 44% in approximately twenty years. It is clear that such heavy rice exports to Japan, in view of Korea's rapidly increasing population, could be made only at the expense of Korean dietary standards. Although the deficiency was partly made good by imports of Manchurian millet and soya beans, under-consumption became chronic. Rice exports, however, were sharply curtailed during the war years because of a decline in production due to shortage of commercial fertilizers; moreover, it became necessary to import an increasingly large volume of Manchurian foodstuffs.

2. Factors Limiting Agricultural Production in South Korea - A combination of factors, mainly a sharp decline in production and a very rapid increase in population, since the end of the war, has created in South Korea a food deficit area.

Production of grains and pulses has declined significantly in South Korea in recent years, due both to a decline in planted acreage and an even greater decline in yield per acre. To illustrate this trend, the following table, in which the average planted acreage and production for the years 1935 to 1939 is the base, shows comparable index figures for the years 1940-1944, 1945 and 1946.

Item	1940-1944	1945	1946
Planted acreage	97	86	79
Production, grains and pulses	94	74	71

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The main reason for this decline in agricultural production has been a shortage of commercial fertilizers, a result of the diversion of most chemical production to Japanese military use during the war and of the rigid division of Korea along the 38th parallel since September 1945. Since almost all Korean commercial fertilizer production capacity is located in the Soviet occupation zone, and since no fertilizers were imported into South Korea during the first year of American occupation, almost no commercial fertilizers were available in South Korea for application to 1946 crops. The decline in planted acreage is largely the result of a decline in double-cropping of the land. The farmers are reluctant to plant winter wheat and barley on already depleted soils which produce the more important rice crop in the summer and fall. Unfavorable climatic conditions, including unusually cold winters and a damaging flood in June 1946, were also major factors in the decline in production of grains harvested in the summers of 1945 and 1946.

Korea has had one of the highest rates of natural increase of population in the world, with the result that the population of the peninsula more than doubled between 1910 and 1940. In addition, almost 2,000,000 Koreans have returned to Korea from Japan, China, including Manchuria, and other Pacific areas since the end of the war. Almost all of these repatriates have chosen to settle in southern Korea. At the same time, a flood of Korean refugees, estimated to number about 1,000,000, have left their former homes in northern Korea and fled across the 38th parallel to live in the American occupation zone. These movements have increased the number of Koreans living south of the 38th parallel from 15,944,000 in May 1944, the time of the last Japanese census, to almost 20,000,000 at present. Before the end of the war, about 64% of Korea's population lived south of the 38th parallel, but available evidence indicates that almost 70% of the peninsula's inhabitants now live south of 38° north latitude. Thus at present hardly more than 30% of the population of Korea lives north of the 38th parallel, while an estimated 36% to 38% of Korea's food production is in that area. However, food exports from North Korea and preferential rationing to groups favorable to the government there have created an even more acute food position in the north than in the south.

3. Governmental Measures to Meet Agricultural Crisis - In order to meet this situation and to rehabilitate Korean agriculture, the Military Government developed the two following programs:

(1) a food import program to prevent starvation and to assure Korea's urban residents a bare subsistence diet until indigenous production could be increased to meet minimum food needs; and

(2) a fertilizer import program designed to restore the depleted soils and to increase agricultural production to levels at least as high as had been reached in the past.

a. Grain Collection and Importation. When the Military Government came into Korea in September 1945 it faced a tremendous administrative job with very limited personnel. It did not complete its occupation until mid-November 1945, three months after the end of the war. In the interim, former Japanese food controls had broken down and a free market in rice had been declared. When it became evident that controls must be reimposed upon cereals if starvation were to be prevented, a belated effort to collect the 1945 rice crop for rationing to non-self-suppliers was made during the period from February to April 1946. This compulsory collection program was largely unsuccessful, and resulted in the collection of only about 75,000 metric tons of rice. Due to this failure the Military Government was able to ration only one hop (150 grams and about 525 calories) to non-self-suppliers during the spring and summer of 1946, a period during which hunger was widespread and food riots not uncommon.

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A carefully laid plan for the collection of summer grains was launched in June 1946, but severe floods which destroyed about 20% of the total crop made it possible to collect only 87,428 metric tons, about one-sixth of the total production. In order to supplement indigenous production to meet the minimum needs of non-self-suppliers in South Korea, 180,848 metric tons of wheat, corn and flour were imported into South Korea from May through December 1946.

Development of a program for the collection of 1946 rice was given highest priority by the Military Government as one of the most important means to ease the food situation, stabilize the economy, and check the inflationary spiral. Full support was secured from all agencies of the Government, and this program succeeded in collecting a total of 548,000 metric tons of polished rice, or its equivalent, about 30% of the total 1946 production. This successful collection program, coupled with the importation of 275,962 metric tons of cereals purchased with appropriated funds during the first seven months of 1947, has enabled the Military Government to stabilize the food situation in South Korea through the issuance to non-self-suppliers of minimum staple rations averaging slightly over 300 grams (1050 calories) per person per day.

b. Agricultural Rehabilitation. The largest and most important item required to restore agricultural production to its pre-war level, to raise Korea to a subsistence level and to make eventual exports possible, is fertilizer. A detailed study of South Korea's fertilizer requirements was undertaken on the basis of maximum historical usage and standard rates of fertilizer application in Japan. The result of this study was a five-year fertilizer requirement program for South Korea for the fiscal years 1947 through 1951. These requirements were approved by SCAP and forwarded to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, where they were given final approval for procurement.

On the basis of these approved fertilizer requirements, the Department of Agriculture undertook to develop agricultural production goals for the crop year 1947. These goals were developed so that national and provincial officials of Military Government might have a substantial and coordinated basis for developing and executing a realistic plan of action to increase the production and harvest in 1947 of the agricultural crops most essential to Korea's economy. The basic objective was to bring about full utilization of available land and productive resources. The base established was the period 1936 to 1945, inclusive. Production areas and yield figures for this ten-year period were adjusted to the present agricultural position by taking into account irrigation facilities, receipt of fertilizers, and other limiting factors.

Recent analysis of the support given Korea's approved fertilizer requirements for the fiscal year 1947 reveals that, in reality, 36% of the nitrogen, 20% of the super-phosphate, and 52% of the potash required have been received. The percentage of fertilizers received, however, is high in comparison with receipts of other agricultural supply requirements, such as cement and equipment for irrigation and reclamation, seeds, insecticides and fungicides.

On the basis of actual fertilizer receipts during the fiscal year 1947, it is obviously impossible to realize agricultural production goals set for the 1947 harvest. While accurate estimates are not possible at this early date, it is presumed that the rice harvest this fall will be approximately 14,000,000 suk, an increase of 15% over last year's harvest.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that these deferments in achieving agricultural production goals set for South Korea, due in general to the lack of support of fertilizer and general agricultural supply programs, are only prolonging the necessity for

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large food imports in the fiscal years 1948 and 1949. This means that again in the fiscal years 1948 and 1949 large sums of appropriated funds, which could be expended to purchase other items urgently required for the rehabilitation of South Korea, must be spent to procure and transport food items.

4. Summary of South Korea's Present and Prospective Food Position - The rice year for Korea has been assumed to begin on 1 December and end on 30 November of the following year. The table below gives the number of persons in separate categories representing the estimated average population for the 1947 rice year.

Self-suppliers	12,100,000
Non self-suppliers	8,028,705
Total population	20,128,705

In order to meet the minimum requirements for rationing in South Korea during the 1947 rice year, an estimated 1,068,471 metric tons of polished rice is required as follows:

	Metric Tons
1946 rice collected	547,766
Estimated 1947 summer grain collection	75,000
Cereals imported: December 1946 - July 1947	275,962
Anticipated cereals imports: August-November 1947	169,743
Total	1,068,471

For the rice year beginning 1 December 1947, the average population for South Korea is estimated at 20,609,442 divided as follows:

Self-suppliers	12,354,835
Non self-suppliers.	8,254,607
Total population.	20,609,442

Distribution of a staple ration of 2.5 hop (375 grams or about 1312 calories) to the non-self-suppliers, plus a supplementary ration of two hop (300 grams, or 1050 calories) to heavy workers, will consume an estimated 1,140,000 metric tons of polished grains and pulses during the rice year 1 December 1947 - 30 November 1948.

Prospects for the 1947 rice crop appear bright, and the crop harvested this autumn may reach 14,000,000 suk, or slightly over 2,100,000 metric tons of polished rice. It is anticipated that as much as 650,000 metric tons, about 31% of the total production, may be collected to feed the non-self-suppliers. It is estimated that 130,000 metric tons of polished grains will be collected during the summer of 1948. Thus an estimated 780,000 metric tons of indigenous cereals should be supplemented by 360,000 metric tons of imported cereals to meet ration requirements of 1,140,000 metric tons. Allowing 10% for over-all losses in handling, milling, etc., total import requirements are estimated at 396,000 metric tons for the 1948 rice year.

In addition to cereals, South Korea is also deficient in salt and sugar. Not more than half of South Korea's annual requirements of 300,000 metric tons of salt can be produced locally, and imports of at least 150,000 metric tons per year are required. No sugar is produced in South Korea. Average annual sugar consumption in South Korea was 54,000 metric tons in the years 1940-1944.

5. Forestry - The problems of Korean agriculture are related to the critical question of forestry. Of the area classed as forest, fully two-thirds is thinly or poorly stocked, or actually denuded. Although a progressive reforestation program had been prosecuted

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by the Japanese during the first two decades of their regime, various war requirements after their seizure of Manchuria led to increasingly heavy lumbering until in 1944 the Japanese were overcutting more than 130% of normal allowable harvesting.

When Americans came to South Korea, they found the forests in poor and rapidly worsening condition. A look at the stripped and bare hills substantiated records in the Forestry Bureau which indicated that since 1933 the Japanese had been removing timber faster than it could grow. The division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel rendered the wood and fuel situation even more acute, for over two-thirds of southern Korean lumber and fuel-wood requirements were met from northern Korea.

The needs of the population of South Korea for fuelwood, lumber, railroad ties, telephone and telegraph poles, and other forestry products, made it inevitable that this overcutting of the forests continue. At the close of 1946, the Forestry Bureau estimated that 153,000,000 cubic feet of wood would have to be cut during 1947 to meet bare minimum needs. It was further estimated that during that time the forests would grow 113,000,000 cubic feet of wood, which means that 40,000,000 cubic feet more are to be cut than will grow. Also, because of shortage of fuel and fertilizers, it has become common practice to rake up and remove leaf litter from the forest floor for use in cities and on farms for fuel and compost.

Such overcutting and abuse of forests must result not only in rapid depletion of the resource but in an increase of floods and flood damage to agricultural land. The land area suitable to grow crops to feed 30,000,000 Koreans is so small that any diminution must have serious consequences.

Less noticeable but just as inevitable a consequence of quick runoff of water from the hills is the necessity of erecting expensive control structures, levees, dams and channels. Not only is there a resulting demand for new, larger, and more costly installations, but those that have been constructed are reduced in effectiveness by silting in. Similarly, irrigation facilities, installed to increase the output of farm land (usually harvests are doubled by irrigation) are also destroyed outright by washing or reduced in usefulness by silting. These factors constitute an added drain upon the economy of the country.

The problem of reducing the cut of timber could be solved in one of three ways. First, by access to forest resources of North Korea; second, by increasing production, transportation, and use of coal for fuel; a 1946 survey by the Forestry Bureau revealed that demand for fuelwood made up four-fifths of the total demand for wood; and third, by imports from the United States and elsewhere to meet South Korea's needs for wood until her own resources are restored. It is significant that the United States Army brings in its food, but does not supply its own lumber and fuel needs.

Harsh restrictions and further curtailment of the people's meager uses of wood might reduce the cutting to equal growth, but it is believed such acts would result in an increase of suffering, bitterness, and stubborn resistance. An ambitious reforestation program has been undertaken by the Military Government, but it will be many years before Korea's requirement of forestry products can be met from this source. Meanwhile, control of erosion with attendant wastage of Korean soil is rendered intolerably difficult by deforestation.

6. Fisheries - The waters about the Korean peninsula contain admirable fishing grounds that have favored the development of a valuable marine-products industry, which at the beginning of World War II ranked sixth in the world. As many as one-half million people have been employed by it, and in the late 1930's the annual catch was nearly 2,000,000 tons. Fully half the catch, however, was of sardines which by 1939 had moved from their schooling areas off the Korean east coast [illegible] a resumption of

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fishing on the previous scale include a shortage of boats and gear, and the fact that some of the best waters off the coast lie north of the 38th parallel. The 1946 catch in South Korea was less than 300,000 metric tons. Rehabilitation of the fishing industry will call for repair or replacement of boats, gear, canneries, agar, fish-meal and oil-processing plants, and ice and cold storage plants.

Supply requirements to rehabilitate the fishing industry have been included in all Civilian Supply Programs submitted to Washington, and numerous spot requisitions have been made upon SCAP. The goal in view is to permit fish consumption at the pre-war average rate of 47 pounds per person, as compared with 32 pounds at present, and to provide needed exports. Supplies actually received under these programs, however, are negligible.

IV Mineral Resources

1. General - Korea's mineral resources are extremely varied and their exploitation was of vital importance to Japan during the war. In many cases mining operations were carried well beyond economic limits and were made possible only by large government subsidies. Many marginal ores which in peacetime could not be profitably extracted, in wartime were mined as a matter of national necessity. The value of Korea's mineral output increased from slightly more than $12,000,000 in 1933 to $43,000,000, in 1947 and to nearly $95,000,000 in 1941. This increase of over 700% in 8 years was carried still further after Pearl Harbor until mineral production in Korea reached a peak in 1944. The abundance and variety of Korean mineral deposits are unfortunately not matched in general by the quality of the ores.

2. Iron and Steel - At Musan in northeastern Korea is located what is probably the largest iron ore deposit in the Far East, with reserves of about 1,200,000,000 metric tons of 35% magnetite ore. Production of iron ore in this and other mines increased from an average of 550,000 tons in the period 1934-1936 to a peak of 3,300,000 tons in 1944. Processing facilities developed or expanded during the war are estimated to have a capacity of approximately 850,000 to 900,000 tons of pig iron and from 350,000 to 400,000 tons of steel. Operation of iron and steel plants, however, was made possible only by large imports of bituminous coal from Manchuria and Japan.

3. Non-Ferrous Metals - For many years Korea vied with the Philippines for the position of leading producer of gold in the Far East. Because of Japan's need for foreign exchange, considerable subsidies were appropriated by the Japanese Government to encourage the output from deposits which could not be worked at the then current world price of gold. Korea is still relatively well supplied with native engineers and technicians who have experience in gold mining and consequently lack of qualified personnel should not be so important a limiting factor in the rehabilitation of gold mining as in many other industries. Although output of gold reached a peak of more than 26 metric tons in 1940, it is unlikely that production will ever again assume such large proportions. However, gold will continue to be an important export resource for Korea so long as its agricultural production is insufficient to pay for all the manufactures and raw materials which must be provided from abroad. Mines are fairly well distributed throughout North and South Korea.

Copper mining has generally been carried on in Korea as an adjunct of gold mining. Mining overhead has usually been met by the sale of gold found in the copper ores, which averages approximately 10 grams of gold per ton of copper ore. This ore is generally of poor quality, averaging only about 1.5%. Production of copper metal reached a peak in 1940 with 13,000 metric tons, principally produced in the mines of North Korea. During 1946 in the American zone a total of 8,000 tons of copper ore was produced;

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this is very far short of the requirements of the area, which are estimated at 6,000 metric tons of pure copper needed to rehabilitate electrical utilities.

Lead production has paralleled copper in remaining consistently lower than national requirements, although output reached 21,000 metric tons in 1944. Since local demand for lead in the post-war period will undoubtedly be smaller, certain quantities of lead should be available for export.

Zinc on the other hand was produced in considerably greater quantities than copper and lead, largely in the form of ore which was exported to Japan. Installed smelter capacity in Korea is approximately 36,000 metric tons of ore per annum, or approximately one-half the installed mining capacity. Under favorable conditions there may be a substantial quantity of zinc available for export within three or four years.

Korean tungsten was of enormous importance to the Japanese in their war effort and production of this metal increased 22 times in the period from 1934 to 1944, reaching a maximum of 8,402 metric tons of pure tungsten in the latter year. Only about 400 tons of 60% tungsten (WO_3) was mined in South Korea in 1946. During the present year production has been increasing and export demand for this metal has been such that the Military Government is doing all in its power to encourage production.

During the war, Korea attained the position of the most important graphite producer in the world with a production of 103,000 metric tons in 1944. Unfortunately, however, Korean graphite is generally of poor quality and the 1944 output consisted of 75,000 tons of amorphous and only 28,000 tons of crystalline graphite. There are few technical difficulties to obstruct a restoration of graphite production to the 1944 level, but the large unit volume and comparatively low cost per unit make it hard profitably to export Korean graphite to distant markets.

4. Coal - Korea as a whole, and South Korea in particular, is in an extremely unfavorable position in regard to coal resources. No bituminous deposits are known to exist and the anthracite and lignite veins are of inferior quality, ranging from poor grade anthracite to amorphous graphite. Analysis reveals that the fixed carbon content is generally from 60% to 80%, while volatile matter ranges from 3% to 5%, and ash from 10% to 25%. Most Korean anthracite tends to disintegrate into powder owing to its friable and graphitic character. Because of the low percentage of volatile matter and consequent poor combustion, it is necessary to briquette at least half of all anthracite mined in Korea, adding 10% bituminous coal and 2% pitch. Both the latter ingredients must be imported. There are some 35 known anthracite and lignite deposits in South Korea which are mined more or less extensively. These range from small outcroppings which are mined as a local enterprise to extensive producers for general distribution. Of the six leading coal and lignite areas, the largest is located in the Sam Chok district on the east coast, where six mines are in operation. This area produces approximately 50% of all coal mined in South Korea and is the most nearly modern in loading and handling equipment. It is served by a standard gauge railway whose terminal is at Mukko, on the Sea of Japan, at which point are located shiploading facilities. Reserves in this area and others in South Korea are estimated to total approximately 60,000,000 tons.

Anthracite coal production is increasing each month in South Korea and in July of 1947, totalled approximately 50% more than the same month of 1946. However, this increase in production brings the total output to somewhat less than 40,000 tons per month. Moreover, present loading facilities are believed to

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limit maximum distribution of anthracite to approximately 85,000 tons per month. Amounts of coal moved from the mines are also increasing each month as railway operations and marine service improve. Movements in July of 1947 were approximately three times as heavy as in July of 1946 and exceeded the amount mined by about 40%. If movements continue at the present rate, stockpiles accumulated by the Japanese which have remained at the mine for lack of transportation should be depleted in about six to eight months.

Regardless of anthracite production, Korea will continue to be dependent on outside sources for the bituminous coal needed to operate the railways and many industries. At the present time all imports of bituminous coal are made from Japan and during the first seven months of 1947 averaged 51,428 tons per month. In the past, imports were made primarily from Manchuria with lesser amounts coming from Japan. South Korea was unable to produce even the anthracite it required and was forced to call upon North Korea to supplement its inadequate production. During the war years all Korea used an average of nearly 3,000,000 metric tons of bituminous coal annually and 5,500,000 metric tons of anthracite coal. No accurate figures are available as to the breakdown between North and South Korea, but most of the heavy industries which are large consumers of coal are located in the North and the consumer goods industries of the South consume relatively small amounts of coal. Railway operations, however, brought South Korea's share of coal consumed to approximately 25% to 40% of the total. At the present time the railways of South Korea are utilizing approximately 50% of all coal imported or moved from local mines. Of this amount 90% is used for freight movements and 10% in passenger traffic. 15% of all coal available is used by military installations, and the remaining 35% is available to South Korean industry and for general distribution.

It is clear that without imported bituminous coal South Korea could not continue to operate its railways, coke and gas plants or metal smelters. Other essential users of coal are dependent upon locally produced anthracite. Present output of the mines is so far below consumption that Japanese created stockpiles will be depleted within six months, and local production must be increased at least 40% to maintain even the present industrial level. This can not be done without the means to rehabilitate present mining and loading equipment, to open additional coal veins, and to obtain experienced American mining supervisors who can raise Korean operating skill to the required level.

V Industry

1. Korean Industrial Establishment - During the first two decades of its control, Japan exploited Korea primarily as a source of raw materials and rice. From 1931 Korea became Japan's principal bridgehead on the Asiatic mainland, and Japanese economic policy was redirected towards converting it to an industrial producer of increasing importance. By 1938 Korean manufactures accounted for 37.4% of the national product as against agriculture's 45.8%. In that year, 7,000 factories, mostly very small, employed 183,000 workers, principally in the production of chemicals, textiles and processed foods. Cottage industries accounted for one-quarter of the yen value of manufactures, especially of processed foods and textiles. Important industrial concentrations were in the north, near hydroelectric power plants and the larger mineral deposits, and included among other installations the great manufacturing center at Hungnam in South Hamgyong Province where was situated the largest ammonium sulphate plant in the Japanese Empire, with an annual capacity of 450,000 metric tons.

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Among other notable industrial products of Korea were sardine oil of which 146,000 metric tons was produced in 1940; hardened oils, estimated at 90,000 tons in 1940; and cement, with an estimated annual capacity of 1,500,000 tons. The textile industry ranked with chemicals and food processing as the most important in Korea. Workers employed made up 22.5% of all factory laborers in the peninsula, and income represented 14.% of the total industrial product. Mills are located principally in the south, at Seoul, Inchon and Kwangju. In spite of its relative importance, however, the Korean textile industry produced less than half the local requirement, being especially deficient in cotton and wool capacity.

Although a few heavy industries were located in southern Korea, the principal industrial production in the area was of consumer goods. Individually of less importance than northern plants, collectively southern installations produced a greater variety and quantity of goods for domestic consumption, such as light bulbs, rubber shoes, rope, pottery, matches, wood products, cork, brick, glassware and printed matter. In the aggregate, however, it has been estimated that only one-quarter of the national industrial product, by value, was derived from south of the 38th parallel.

The present status of Korean industry is precarious. In both zones, recovery has been hampered by lack of trained personnel. Although about 500 Japanese have been retained in the north, industrial revival has been retarded by Russian removal of raw materials stockpiles and certain machine tools and electrical equipment. Incomplete information indicates that in the north electric generating capacity may have suffered considerably as a result of the war and Russian occupation, and that war industries have been largely dismantled, while other industrial facilities have been relatively little affected.

The prospects for Korean industry, even in the event of early unification, are not brilliant. Given adequate training programs and foreign assistance, Korea might within five or ten years after unification restore industrial production to a level approximating that of 1934-1938. A single generation could not suffice to inculcate in the population all those skills upon which an industrial society depends, and for many years those few Koreans who are now competent to occupy the highest managerial and engineering posts must be supplemented by foreign technicians. Moreover, much of the Japanese-built industrial plant is already lost. Wartime attrition and peacetime abuse, dismantling and neglect have markedly reduced the potential of these facilities. A good deal of Korea's capital equipment was specialized for war production or to complement Japanese home industry and much of it may not be salvageable for peacetime production. It seems not too pessimistic to estimate that of the industrial facilities existing in Korea during the period 1940-1944, as much as one-third may be discounted as effectively lost to ultimate use.

In the years following unification, the country will be fortunate if it is able to produce sufficient quantities of simple consumer goods to permit stabilization of the domestic economy and provide incentive to the farmer to release his grain for general distribution and for export. Fortunately, to produce such consumer goods will ordinarily not call for skills unlikely to be available. Maintenance of essential communications and railways, however, will involve industrial problems of far greater complexity. In this field and in production of chemical fertilizers, which will play a vital role in Korea's general recovery, foreign technical aid may be required for many years. Koreans in the south have already voiced their objection to readmitting the Japanese on any terms, and so have appeared to cut off the largest and most easily accessible source of technical instructors. This political and psychological barrier may be broken down in time and certain

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Japanese allowed to return under strictly enforced controls. Otherwise, the more expensive procedure of hiring foreign management may be necessary if the large plants of the north are to be replaced in operation.

Another serious deterrent to industrial recovery is certain to be encountered in a shortage of raw and processed materials which Korea will lack foreign exchange to import. However, the long-range prospects for Korean industry need not be altogether as unpromising as those for the immediate future. Although the country lacks bituminous coal, it has abundant water resources which may go far toward replacing it as a source of power. Mineral resources are varied, and the Koreans may learn in time to exploit them even more effectively than did the Japanese. The labor force is unlimited, for all practical purposes, and given adequate training and incentive, need not fall behind the Japanese in the long run. On the other hand, it would be a grave mistake to suppose that Korea possesses a ready-made industrial plant which could be quickly turned to full and efficient production. On the contrary, it has a dilapidated Japanese-built structure which in its best estate was hardly more than a segment of the island industrial system.

Household industry has been an invaluable aid in bridging this difficult period. Using native materials and simple tools, craftsmen have continued to produce textiles, certain chemicals and to process foodstuffs in about the usual volume. This production has done much to offset the breakdown of larger industries and will continue to be a valuable asset of the economy.

2. Present Status of South Korean Industry - Unlike the Russians, the American occupation force in South Korea repatriated Japanese industrial personnel, but did not remove any stocks of usable raw materials. In November 1946, 5,200 plants employing 122,000 workers were in operation. Equipment in general is badly worn and in need of repair or replacement; much of this machinery is Japanese and in many cases replacement parts can no longer be obtained. American supervisors and technicians are lacking, and experienced Korean personnel are totally inadequate to replace Japanese repatriates. The continued division of Korea, as well, has made it impossible to secure many raw materials without which production is severely restricted. General economic conditions also have discouraged production; inflation has tended to withdraw many materials from production and cause them to be held for speculative purposes. Finished goods as well have been subject to hoarding, and this has intensified already acute shortages. The over-all rate of factory production has probably not surpassed 20% of capacity since the beginning of the occupation.

The present status of selected industries is indicated in the paragraphs below:

(a) Ceramics and Cement. The ceramics industry is fortunate in depending principally upon indigeous raw materials and requiring only a few special imported chemicals for fluxes, and coloring. More than 500 plants are in operation although their production is curtailed in winter months due to freezing temperatures and attendant difficult of mining operations. Shortages of fuel and lack of experienced supervisors are also handicaps to production. The pottery industry is limited in general to the manufacture of earthenware dishes and low tension electrical insulators. Various types of glass products are manufactured and though of crude quality, they partially meet local demand for electric light bulbs, bottles and other containers. No window or plate glass is manufactured. Various refractory shapes and bricks as well as crucibles are manufactured and are of a fair quality. The only cement factory in South Korea at Sam Chok has been inoperative for the past year for lack of repair parts. This plant was reopened 1 August 1947 and production is expected to reach 5,000 tons per

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month. Even to maintain this level of production will require import of 150 tons of gypsum and 1,000 tons of bituminous coal per month. North Korea has seven large cement plants with capacity ample to meet all Korea's peacetime requirements providing bituminous coal is available.

(b) Food Processing. Manufacture of processed foods and beverages in South Korea is exceedingly small in comparison with the size of the population. Hardly more than 40% of existing plants are in operation at present. Canneries are closed for lack of containers, and other plants are shut down for lack of raw materials. Approximately 200 food processing plants employing more than ten workers each are operating under supervision of Military Government in producing soya sauce, bean paste, cider, flour, rice jelly, noodles, ice, biscuits, bread and candy. Production is restricted for lack of sugar, hydrochloric acid and oils.

(c) Heavy and Light Manufacturing. Machine shops in South Korea are operating at about 25% of wartime capacity. Vested plants numbering 1,250 and employing from 10 to 1,100 people each are now in operation under the supervision of the Department of Commerce. South Korea is without rolling mills, and heavy manufacture is limited to casting, forging and fabrication. The machine tool industry is extremely limited and lacks technicians and engineering supervision. Precision work is virtually impossible owing to installations which were either poorly made or have been insufficiently maintained. Light industry including forming, shaping and stamping of farm implements, pots, pans and hardware from light metals is in a much more advantageous position. One nail factory producing nails from wire stock is doing much to render South Korea self-sufficient in this commodity. It is hoped that the present machine tool deficiency may be partially remedied by equipment obtained from Japan as reparations. Even to maintain present modest operations in the machinery industry will call for an annual import of 800 tons of light gauge metal, 200 tons of bar stock, 200 tons of wire stock, 1,000 tons of tin plate and 20,000 tons of bituminous coal.

(d) Paper Mills. The 14 paper mills in South Korea were all in operation in June 1946, producing somewhat more than 1,000,000 pounds of paper per month. Paper manufactured is a cheap grade incapable of meeting more than the simplest requirements. The equipment of all plants has been put to abnormal usage and at present there is an acute shortage of pulp and scrap paper. Shortage of pulp has forced suspension of operations at the Hokusan plant which had been responsible for about 60% of all paper production in the area. Production in June 1947 was reduced below 700,000 pounds. Prior to the end of the war North Korea provided all pulp necessary to maintain South Korean plants in operation. Under present conditions, to produce minimum quantities of paper in South Korea will call for the annual importation of 10,000 tons of sulphite pulp, 1,300 tons of caustic soda and 1,300 tons of soda ash.

(e) Chemicals. The principal chemical industries of Korea are located in the North near hydroelectric plants. There are in South Korea, however, many smaller establishments manufacturing a great variety of chemical products. Approximately 80 such plants are producing organic chemicals including oils, soaps, paint pigments and mixed paints. The 8 major chemical plants in South Korea are at present extremely limited in their operations and are producing no fertilizer or acids. One establishment is producing small quantities of carbide and others are manufacturing rubber shoes and industrial rubber products in very small volume. Shortage of raw rubber, carbon black and processing chemicals is

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restricting operations of all facilities. To maintain operations in South Korean chemical plants while the materials of North Korea are unavailable will call for the annual import of approximately 800 tons of magnesium carbonate, 800 tons of calcium carbonate, 300 tons of nitric acid, 200 tons of linseed oil, 1,600 tons of soda ash, 400 tons of carbon black, 250 tons of sulphuric acid, and 1,000 tons of tanning extract, as well as 1,500 tons of rubber and 1,000 tons of pitch.

(f) Textiles. Although the status of textiles manufacture in Korea is unsatisfactory, considerable progress has been made in rehabilitating this industry during the occupation. As of 1 January 1947, 207,000 cotton spindles were in operation. At the present time approximately 253,000 are operable and by 1 July 1948, it is estimated that some 310,000 will be producing. The policy of the Japanese had been to provide Korea with more loom than spindle capacity in order that fairly large quantities of Korean cotton would have to be exported to Japan for spinning, and reexported to the profit of the Japanese manufacturer. Consequently, present loom capacity, unlike spinning capacity, is adequate to meet minimum requirements. Wartime movement of some spindle capacity to Korea from Japan in order to protect it from bombing has been a favorable factor in postwar rehabilitation of the textile industry.

Textile requirements of South Korea established by the National Economic Board have been based upon the modest allowance of 10 square yards per capita as compared with the United States average of from 60 to 80 square yards during the period 1938-1946. The stated requirement of 200,000,000 square yards of cloth will require 70,175,438 pounds of yarn and, on a two-shift basis, 354,422 spindles. Spindles presently operable can use only about 50,000,000 pounds of yarn and produce somewhat more than 143,000,000 square yards of cloth. The 50,000 spindles to be placed in production this year will call for an additional 10,000,000 pounds of yarn and produce an added 28,000,000 square yards of cloth. It appears, therefore, that maximum production, assuming spindles are kept in full operation, will still leave a deficit of more than 29,000,000 square yards of cloth. In addition to cloth requirements, 18,000,000 pounds of yarn is required for knitting and fishnet and sewing thread production, and the total deficiency in yarn becomes more than 28,000,000 pounds.

Cotton supplies in prospect unfortunately fall far short of requirements. Cotton financed by the 1947 deficiency appropriation plus domestic cotton collected and 3,000 bales of Egyptian cotton which is to be paid for with Korean tungsten, total somewhat less than 30,000,000 pounds. Under the 1948 budget 16,000,000 pounds of cotton has been requested, but not yet approved. If it is in fact provided, the total will still be less than 46,000,000 pounds and the anticipated shortage, 26,500,000 pounds. To date under the occupation only 5,500,000 pounds of cotton has been imported into South Korea.

Other textiles produced are of less importance than cotton, but still significant to the Korean economy. Silk cloth of inferior quality is being woven and the 8,000 power looms installed are capable of producing 86,000,000 square yards of cloth per year. If standards of the sericulture industry are improved, Korean silk may eventually find a significant place in the export trade. Meanwhile, it is possible to adapt silk looms to cotton production if that is required to meet local requirements. Some small quantities of hemp yarn and textiles are produced in South Korea as well as waste silk products. Wool capacity is extremely slight and raw wool is almost altogether lacking. Flax as well can be spun and woven in South Korea, but the raw material is provided entirely from the North.

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The textile industry of South Korea deserves all the support that it can be given. Its product is vital if any stabilization of the Korean economy is to be effected. In general, Koreans are capable of operating an efficient textile industry and if provided with adequate raw materials and necessary equipment and spare parts South Korea can in time become self-sufficient in this product. A well-integrated textile industry also promises much for the future of the economy of Korea in that the country may in time be able to compete with Japan in the Asiatic and Pacific export market on terms not too seriously unfavorable.

VI Service Industries and Utilities

1. General - The service industries and utilities of Korea were developed by the Japanese to serve the special purposes to which they put the peninsula, both as a bridgehead to the continent and as a source of raw materials and manufactures. In general it may be said that these utilities, if properly rehabilitated and maintained, are more than adequate to meet the country's needs for some years to come.

2. Railways - The railway system of South Korea is admirably designed to serve the entire area with the exception of the eastern half of Kangwon Province. It is standard gauge (4 feet 8½ inches) and is excellently engineered, the right-of-way being characterized by a profusion of concrete and masonry retaining-walls and structures not usually found on American lines.

The main line is double-tracked throughout, extending from Pusan on the southeast coast, northwestward to Antung on the Manchurian border. The branch-line which serves the southwest originates at Taejon on the main line, and runs west to Iri where it in turn divides into three branches which run, respectively, west to Kunsan, southwest to Mokpo, and southeast to Yosu. The Yosu and Mokpo branches are connected in the South by a line running from Song-Jong-Ni to Sunchon. As a military measure, the Japanese completed a single track alternate line from Pusan to Seoul which curves away from the main line somewhat to the east. These lines constitute the basic network which in turn is served by shorter feeder lines.

The railroad at present suffers from years of under maintenance resulting from wartime shortages of materials. The roadbed itself is well engineered and ballasted. South Korea has few timber resources and consequently the railway is at present in critical need of ties. There are approximately 7,000,000 ties in the railroad system of South Korea and since these were not creosoted they require replacement every seven years, at an annual rate of 1,000,000 ties per year. Efforts have been made to provide creosoted ties since this type has a life approximately three times as long as the natural wood. Rails, tie and fish plates are needed in quantity to replace badly worn sections.

The condition of rolling stock is equally poor from the standpoint of maintenance. Motive power has been considerably improved by the importation on loan of 101 locomotives of the 2-8-0 type. Of approximately 9,000 freight cars of all types, 7,000 are being operated, although many of these need repair.

Similarily, railroad communications are in need of rehabilitation. Many circuits have failed completely and at certain times of the year, especially during the rainy season and during extremely cold weather, operations are seriously hampered. Poles, wire and insulators are needed in quantity to put the lines in reasonable condition. Considerable quantities of replacement parts are needed to place the switchboards and central office equipment in suitable operating condition.

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Operating skills, especially on the higher level, are lacking. During the period September to December 1945, 17,500 Japanese railway employees were repatriated to Japan. This group of officials and technicians had occupied all the key posts in the system. The personnel strength of the railroad in South Korea as of September 1945 was 55,000; in other words, approximately one of every three employees was Japanese.

All locomotives in South Korea are designed to burn bituminous coal. Formerly, this coal was obtained from the open-cut mines near Mukden. Since no bitminous coal is mined in South Korea, the railroad has had to rely on uncertain and intermittent imports from the mines of Japan. Reestablishment of a dependable source of coal is one of the major problems facing the railway.

3. Marine Transportation - In order to survice, Korea must develop trade with her neighbors and the world, and most of this trade will be water-borne. There are some 251 ports in South Korea, but only eight have rail connections. Mukko on the east coast is important as the export terminal for Sam Chok, the largest anthracite coal mine in South Korea. In the same area are located also cement, carbide, and soap plants. Pohang to the south is important primarily as a fishing port. Pusan is the principal port for all of Korea. It is a modern port in every respect having four large piers capable of berthing approximately fifteen liberty ships simultaneously. Pusan is well served by railway spur tracks and marshalling yards. Masan to the west was developed to handle some of the overflow from the port of Pusan. Yosu, farther to the west, was developed by the Japanese primarily to increase their capacity to move troops and supplies to and from Korea. It is still closed to shipping because of mines laid by American forces during the war. Mokpo and Kunsan on the west coast are small ports, but they are well located to serve the richest agricultural area in Korea. Inchon, approximately 25 miles west of Seoul, can handle ships up to approximatel, 4,000 tons in its tidal basin. Any larger ships must be anchored in the stream and discharge by lighters. Large tidal ranges characterize the west coast ports and increase toward the north to approximatoly 35 feet at Chinnampo. It is believed that South Korea has ample port facilities to meet its requirements. Maintenance and repair are required, but the basic facilities are already provided. When it is independent, Korea will need a modest merchant marine. In anticipation, the Military Government is operating eight Baltic vessels and 12 LST's, which carry a large amount of coastal shipping and are providing Korean seamen with experience which will become increasingly valuable.

4. Highway Transportation - Highway transportation in South Korea suffers from poverty of roads, and worn out, obsolete vehicles. Some improvements have been brought about by the provision of surplus Army vehicles and parts obtained under the Foreign Liquidation Commission credit, but vehicles available are still far below minimum requirements. Although the rail system is good, it does not penetrate to all parts of South Korea, and to provide essential communications and move supplies requires constant effort to maintain roads and bridges, as well as to keep in operation an obsolescent automotive fleet which has been only partially supplemented by American vehicles.

5. Electric Power - In 1934, the electric supply of all Korea exceeded one billion KWH for the first time (1,444,055,000 KWH), with a peak of 309,604 KW. There was a continuous increase in load and peaks until 1943, when the maximum load was reached of 5.7 billion KWH, with a peak of 1,240,000 KW. No information is available now for loads north of 38° for any period. Loads for South Korea are available only since January 1945. These have varied from a high of 80,000,000 KWH in January 1945 to a low of 32,000,000 KWH in September 1945.

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South Korea has an anticipated peak demand for the coming winter months of 200,000 KW. For the prevention of disease and unrest only, it is estimated 130,000 KW will be required. Present generating capacity in South Korea for winter months is a possible 60,000 KW, if materials are delivered in time to be utilized for rehabilitation. The 50,000 KW additional received from North Korea will still be far from meeting disease and unrest requirements.

About 90% of all generation of electric power in Korea takes place north of 38° and is hydro-generation. At the present time South Korea depends on North Korean sources for 75% of its electric power in the winter months and between 50% and 60% during the wet summer months. North Korea has signified its willingness to furnish the South with more power to help meet demands, but at present it is unable to furnish additional power because existing transmission facilities limit the quantity of power that can be delivered. It is therefore highly desirable to furnish the necessary equipment to North Korea to permit the elimination of the transmission bottleneck.

In South Korea there are three steam plants that can be operated at all times of the year, but in their present condition, none can stand continual operation. Yong-Wol is the largest generating plant in South Korea. It can be utilized in any present emergency for a short period of time only, and is now off the line and under such repair and overhaul as available materials will allow. Coal from the adjoining mine is being stockpiled so as to assure an adequate coal supply for the winter months when it will be necessary to operate the plant. Rehabilitation is delayed by slow delivery of materials from Japan, but despite this limitation, much has been accomplished and South Korea can depend this winter on Yong-Wol for more power than it has delivered since 1945.

The Pusan steam plant is capable of operating and producing 12,000 KW, but is inoperative at present for lack of coal. During the rainy season the Pusan plant is not required, except for emergency use, but as the winter loads accumulate, it will be essential. At that time coal must be delivered or the power system will lose a potential 12,000 KW. There is not enough coal on hand in Pusan plant yards now to allow a test run of the plant before it is called on for continuous operation, nor enough coal to allow operation in any emergency.

The Tojin-Ri plant in Seoul stands by at all times when an adequate power supply can be assured without its use. Tojin-Ri can produce 30,000 KW, but will not stand continuous operation for long periods without a maintenance shut-down.

Other South Korean plants, Chung Pyung producing 38,000 KW, Unam, 5,000 KW, Sam Jin Gan, 12,000 KW, and Posong Gang, 3000 KW, are all hydro-electric and their production is reduced by one-half, or completely stopped, during peak demand winter months. At present, one of the generators at Chung Pyung is down for repair because of poor maintenance and lack of proper supervision.

Should all plants in South Korea be called upon to furnish capacity output on a continuous basis, the command would be embarrassed by power failures in a very short time, because lack of proper maintenance and shortage of materials and of supervisory personnel make capacity operation without major breakdowns virtually impossible.

The transmission and distribution systems of South Korea are now in poor repair in addition to being poorly engineered to meet present conditions. The system is not flexible enough to permit

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sectionalizing in case of emergency, and if it were necessary to limit power consumption by rationing, it would be impossible to divide the present distribution system into categories of priority consumers. The system is so constructed as to feed large areas and no subscriber within the area can be cut off. Both rehabilitation and revamping are necessary to provide a flexible transmission and distribution system for efficient and economical operation, with a minimum outage requirement to maintain the system.

Should Korea be reunited and again join all her facilities of power generation and transmission in one system, it will still be industrially and economically important that the rehabilitation discussed here should have been carried out. The entire system is near collapse from lack of attention; bottlenecks that now affect the delivery of power to South Korea will still hamper the industrial economy after Korea is united, unless present rehabilitation and corrective measures are followed through to completion. Should Korea, on the other hand, remain divided for an indefinite period it is imperative that as much generation capacity as possible be provided for the use of South Korea.

The statistics quoted above make it clear that under present conditions the plants of the South are not capable of furnishing in the winter months as much as one-half the power required to prevent disease and unrest. If North Korean power should cease to be available to the South, it is probable that all industrial production would have to be suspended, and electric energy reserved for military and emergency use.

6. Communications - The communications system of Korea was developed for use of the Japanese, and played little part in Korean life. Generally obsolescent, it is rather more extensive than the economy will require in the immediate future and probably beyond the capacity of Koreans to maintain in their present state of technical advancement.

VII Foreign Trade

1. Historical Development - Since Korea cannot maintain any degree of industrialization without external trade, this subject cannot be ignored in a consideration of the country's economy. From 1910 to 1945, Korea's external trade was almost wholly absorbed by the Japanese Empire, and during all except two years of this period, Korea was subject to an unfavorable balance of trade. However, except for the periods 1910-1915 and 1934-1939 when the Japanese were making heavy capital investments in Korea, unfavorable balances were such as might have been eliminated by careful planning and exclusion of luxury items intended primarily for consumption by Japanese residents and wealthy Koreans.

The total volume of Korea's external trade grew from ¥ 60,000,000 in 1910 to more than ¥ 2,400,000,000 in 1939, and the country came to occupy a high position among oriental trade areas, with a per capita foreign trade approximately equal to Japan's. Among the large categories of foodstuffs, textiles and fibres, minerals, manufactures, and miscellaneous items, Korea was consistently a net importer except for foodstuffs. Food exports, however, were seldom so large that they did more than offset imports of textiles and fibres.

The prime factor of Korea's external trade from 1910 to 1945 was export of rice to Japan. In 1936, of the 41 Korean products showing a net export balance, rice accounted for 63.9% by value. Although by 1939 the relative importance of rice exports had declined in favor of minerals and manufactures, of the 55 products showing a net export balance in that year, rice still made up

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one-third of the total money value. Until the years immediately preceding the war, fish and marine products ranked second to rice, averaging from 7.5% to 9% of all commodities showing a net export balance. Other exports individually were of minor significance. Korea's principal imports reflect its dependence on the outside world for fuels, heavy manufactures, machinery, automotive equipment, textiles and fibres and specialized products.

The volume of Korea's external trade is not to be taken as the index of a healthy economy engaged in exporting its natural surpluses and importing the ordinary requirements of its industries and consumers. In a country with so large a trade, it is reasonable to seek for a relatively high standard of living. While Korea's external trade was comparable to Japan's, the standard of living prevalent among the great majority of the people in the respective countries was very unequal. Exports were actually made far beyond permissible levels and principal imports were not goods intended for wide distribution among the Korean population, but rather materials designed to expand and support industry or else luxury items to be consumed by the Japanese and a small group of wealthy Koreans. Between 1910 and 1939 Korea's cumulative net import balance was nearly two billion yen. This debt was liquidated by Japanese acquisition of land and capital assets in Korea, and its magnitude in terms of real wealth can be gauged by the size and quality of Japanese individual and corporate holdings in Korea at the end of the war.

2. Present Status of Korea's Foreign Trade - Under current conditions, foreign trade in the ordinary sense of the term has been reduced to the merest trickle in South Korea. During the period 15 August 1945 through 30 June 1947, the value of goods entering or leaving the area was approximately $168,000,000. Of this sum, however, only about $25,000,000 can properly be called trade in that it represents the value of goods exchanged between Korea and the mainland of Asia as a result of the operations of private traders. The remaining $143,000,000 represents in the main commodities imported into South Korea by agencies of the United States Government as a part of the Civilian Supply Program and financed with appropriated funds of the War Department, or as shipments made under the $25,000,000 Foreign Liquidation Commission credit, plus small amounts of UNRRA supplies. Exports which enter into this figure are surplus government-owned minerals and marine products, to the value of some $5,000,000.

While it is manifestly impossible to establish a balanced trade in South Korea so long as the country remains divided, the Military Government is, however, doing all in its power to encourage such trade as will reduce the area's dependence upon American funds and give Korean manufacturers and exporters experience that should serve them well in more propitious times. Credits realized from South Korean exports, unless these are balanced in kind by imports approved as essential, will be used to purchase commodities similar to those making up the Civilian Supply list and certified for import by the Military Government. On 15 July 1947, Korea was declared open to small numbers of foreign businessmen who may wish to develop export and import possibilities within the framework established by the military authorities. Meanwhile, trade has been undertaken with Hongkong and Macao, and critically needed materials have been obtained by barter in exchange for Korean surpluses. Recent negotiations with the Egyptian government have led to an agreement to exchange 730 tons of tungsten concentrates for 3,000 bales of long-staple Egyptian cotton, the need for which has been discussed previously.

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Unfortunately, it appears impossible for the present to develop private trade in two areas which should offer Korea an excellent market. All dealings with Japan are restricted to a governmental level, and China has imposed conditions which make trade virtually out of the question. Until such time as normal trade can be conducted with these two countries, Korea's economy will suffer.

Reports from North Korea are to the effect that exports of rice, minerals and manufactures to Soviet-controlled areas have far surpassed imports, and that Soviet forces have lived off the land rather than import supplies for their own use.

3. Possible Evolution of Korea's Foreign Trade - While it is inconceivable that there can be any genuine, sizeable Korean foreign trade, as opposed to stripping, until the country has been reunited and an extensive rehabilitation program has been carried through, it has been estimated that if the division were eliminated by early 1948, it might be possible by 1951 to attain a total, balanced foreign trade of $168,000,000, at current price levels. This balance could be achieved, however, only by the exercise of national discipline and stringent trade controls. Korea has to import fuels, raw materials, machinery, automotive equipment and metal products if she is to continue existing even as a semi-modern state, and exports to pay for these commodities will not be abundant.

The considerations which should be paramount in planning the foreign trade of an independent Korea are the following:

1. The need to free the country from the threat of economic domination by Japan or any other nation through establishment of trade balances persistently unfavorable to Korea.

2. The necessity to create as soon as possible a favorable overall balance of trade, or at least a parity of exports and imports.

3. The desirability of encouraging Korean participation in multilateral trade.

4. Recognition of modified consumption patterns in an independent Korea, since it is unlikely that rice exports will ever again be as large as in the past, unless the price is so favorable that the farmer will willingly sell a larger portion of his grain. This would require that adequate quantities of consumer goods be available for distribution to farmers and that substitute grains be provided either from expanded local production or imports.

Needless to say, Korea's immediate economic prospects are not good. To maintain the country at the level reflected by the proposed 1951 foreign trade program will require favorable conditions, and concentrated effort to revive the fisheries and mines, not to speak of a governmental and national discipline which Koreans may be reluctant to accept. It is possible, however, that by 1960 the country might have at its service a considerable body of skilled workers and be in a position to undertake manufacture of textiles, chemicals and other commodities for sale abroad. Resumption of large-scale manufacturing may be expected to reduce food shipments, but should strengthen the overall export position of the country. Given world peace and reasonable prosperity, it is not out of the question that by 1960 Korea might attain a gross foreign trade as large as that of 1936. This would actually reflect a much higher standard of living for the ordinary Korean, with exports representing real surpluses of domestic production.

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VIII Economic Stabilization

Price and wage controls instituted in Korea by the Japanese Government during the China Incident were continued in effect after the war began in 1941. These were largely successful so that prices and wages in general had little more than doubled from 1937 to 1945, despite heavy deficit spending by the government during the war years.

In 1945, as Japan's situation grew more desperate, controls lost effectiveness and an increasing share of the country's goods changed hands in the black market rather than at official prices. In August 1945, panic swept the Korean peninsula as it became apparent that the Japanese Empire was defeated. Japanese officials and private business men knew that their occupation of Korea was at an end and set about to wind up their affairs. All civil servants were paid their full retirement allowance and employees of Japanese companies received or extorted huge bonuses from managers and directors. Japanese corporation officials divided all cash balances of their companies in the hope of returning some funds to Japan proper. Private individuals likewise withdrew bank balances and made every effort to reduce their assets to some form of wealth which might be successfully smuggled into Japan.

This tremendous drain on the banks was met by loans from the Bank of Chosen. Currency in circulation jumped from about 4½ billion at the beginning of August 1945 to 8.6 billion at the end of September. Prices soared to about twenty times the official level as all price controls and rationing collapsed, and the general price level rose to 40 or 50 times the 1937 average.

After American troops arrived in September 1945 and a degree of order was restored, a slight decline in prices occurred during September and October, especially since a good rice crop was in prospect. Since Military Government was not yet established in all rural areas, there were no means of duplicating elaborate Japanese economic controls and the government had no choice at the time but to permit the continuance of a free market. The rice crop, however, proved by no means as good as had been predicted; furthermore, industrial production had come to a complete standstill as Japanese managers and technicians left their posts. Refugees poured over the border from North Korea, and Koreans in Japan and China sought repatriation to their newly liberated country.

With an increasing population, little industrial production, diminishing stockpiles and no economic controls, it was inevitable that prices should again increase. They have, in fact, increased continuously since November 1945 except for a slight decline in the spring of 1947. By the end of 1945, Military Government was fairly well established throughout southern Korea and consideration could be given to the urgent need to control the supply and price of rice. Although a collection program was instituted, the harvest season had passed and it was too late for the government to gain control of a supply adequate to permit issuance of a minimum subsistence ration. During the winter and spring of 1946, urban residents were therefore dependent upon the open market for most of their food. By July 1946, prices were about two hundred times the 1937 level or about one hundred times the official Japanese prices of the previous July.

During the summer of 1946 plans for stabilization were formulated on a comprehensive scale. Until the adjournment of the Joint Commission in May 1946, it was generally assumed that Korea would be unified, and for that reason planning was short-run. No sweeping changes were undertaken which might prejudice a reintegration of the economy. By the summer of 1946, however,

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unification was no longer imminent and plans were made to rehabilitate the economy of South Korea. Plans included imports under the Civilian Supply Program, increased agricultural and industrial production, conversion of the currency, collection and rationing of rice, control of other essential consumer goods, revival of foreign trade, revision of the tax structure and reorganization of the government.

During the past year, few of these objectives have been realized. The most successful undertaking and the greatest single stabilizing factor was the grain collection program of 1946. From the beginning of 1947 to 1 June, a minimum subsistence ration of two and one-half hop or 5/6 pound, per person per day has been maintained for all non-self-suppliers. At least one hop of the daily grain ration has been rice. Since cereals make up 80% of the Korean diet, this means that the most important item in the cost of living is made available at a reasonable price. During the summer months, when garden crops are available, the ration has been reduced to two hop. Continuation of rationing is contingent on a successful collection program this fall and on importation of grain to make up Korea's food deficit.

The Civilian Supply Program is much less encouraging. Program No. 1 was only partially implemented and Program No. 2 was not implemented at all for lack of funds. Program No. 3 for the period 1 January to 30 June has been only partially carried out. Program No. 4 for Fiscal Year 1948 was at last report still in Tokyo. The supplies which have actually been delivered were until recently composed largely of vehicles and other equipment retained by the government, or medical supplies and foodstuffs which had to be sold at artifically low prices or given away in order to accomplish the objectives of the occupation. As a result the Civilian Supply Program has not had the anticipated deflationary effect on the economy. This salutary effect can be realized only as Military Government secures raw materials for local production of consumer goods and important items of general distribution such as salt and fertilizer.

As of 30 June 1947, under various approved civilian supply programs the Military Government had requested that South Korea be furnished with supplies, equipment and services in the amount of approximately $350,000,000. Goods worth $72,000,000 were to be provided by Japan, and the balance of $278,000,000 was to be supplied from United States sources. Principal commodities required to maintain essential services and insure a minimum ration to non-self-suppliers of food, were cereals, chemical fertilizers, coal, fibres, and railway and automotive equipment and supplies.

As of the same date, receipts of these urgent and approved requirements had totalled little more than 40% of the stated need. Shipments from Japan amounted to $21,500,000, principally in the form of bituminous coal, while machinery and spare part deliveries were negligible in comparison with requests made. From United States sources, deliveries totalled $120,500,000, including $25,000,000 worth of Foreign Liquidation Commission supplies.

Cereals delivered through 30 June 1947 amounted to 402,000 metric tons, an average of approximately five pounds per month during the occupation for each of the 8,000,000 non-self-suppliers of South Korea. Other commodities delivered during the same period were: salt, 26,280 metric tons; chemical fertilizers, 112,537 metric tons, and bituminous coal, 1,030,000 metric tons. Deliveries of cereals and fertilizers during July have appreciably raised the totals in these categories.

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Agriculture is the prime factor in South Korea's economy. The soil is already intensively cultivated and any increase in agricultural production to meet the requirements of a rapidly expanding population is contingent on fulfillment of the fertilizer import program. Agricultural production this year is expected to be about 15% above 1946, but about 10% short of the Department of Agriculture's production goals, largely because of the failure to import fertilizers in the quantities approved by SCAP and the War Department.

Industrial production, which is likewise an important factor in the stabilization program, has failed to increase as anticipated. Production of textiles, paper and other important commodities is actually below peak production realized in 1946. Continued separation of the industries of South Korea from the mines, forests and heavy industries of the North, makes South Korean industry completely dependent upon imports for survival. Yet South Korea now has only a few minerals, primarily tungsten, graphite and gold available for export, plus a small quantity of marine products and ginseng. Even these items, however, are dependent upon other imports. Salt is needed to preserve fish; chemicals, technicians and machinery are required to keep the mines running. Unless raw materials, replacement parts and technicians are received by South Korean industries, there is little hope for revival of production for either domestic consumption or export.

From a financial aspect, the great problem has been to restrict deficit spending by the government. From September 1945 to July 1946, currency circulation increased by only one billion won. With the 1946 summer grain collection program and rice collection program, circulation began to climb. Expenditures by the government for grain were augmented by a large increase in expenditures by the occupation forces as a result of the dependent housing program begun in the fall of 1946. The circulation reached a peak of 18,300,000,000 won at the end of January 1947 and then declined by more than a billion won during February and March. It is again increasing and now stands at about 18,800,000,000. The Military Government has made a continuous effort to spend money only for essential purposes. The tactical forces have likewise endeavored to keep purchases of goods and services in the local economy to a minimu. The national budget for 1947-48, the fiscal year 1 April 1947 to 31 March 1948, totals ₩ 17,680,000,000, as compared with original requests submitted by the various departments aggregating ₩ 45,000,000,000. By holding expenditures to items essential to the economy, by central procurement to prevent competitive bidding among government agencies and by a reorganization of government functions to eliminate unnecessary bureaus and duplication of functions, it is anticipated that national expenditures can be held down as planned.

Occupation costs are not a part of the budget of the South Korean Interim Government. At the present time, occupation expenditures average about ₩ 400,000,000 per month. The cumulative total since liberation is nearly 5 billion. In addition to the national budget and occupational expenditures, other official expenditures include emergency financing of such programs as rice collection and expenditures from the Property Custody Account and Civilian Supply account, neither of which is included in the general revenue account of the South Korean Interim Government.

At the present time, the total deficit incurred by American foreces in Korea is about ₩ 14,000,000,000 for the South Korea Interim Government and more than ₩ 4,000,000,000 for occupational expenditures. Since there is no government which can undertake to issue bonds to the public, these deficits have of necessity, been covered by borrowing from the Central Bank, a directly inflationary procedure.

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In order to reduce the gap between necessary expenditures and revenues, the rates charged by government-owned utilities, including the railway and the salt, tobacco and ginseng monopolies, have been drastically increased. This has not only eliminated a drain on the public treasury, but in the case of the Monopoly Bureau, results in a net annual revenue of over ₩ 4,000,000,000. Tax rates have likewise been increased on an ad hoc basis. Two tax experts from the United States Bureau of Internal Revenue are now working with Korean officials to hasten tax revisions which have been discussed since last Autumn. An overall revision in taxes and in the collection system should be well established during this fiscal year. As a result of these measures, it is conservatively estimated that the income of the government during the current fiscal year will exceed ₩ 15,000,000,000. This leaves a budgetary deficit of over ₩ 2,000,000,000 plus another four or five billion for occupational costs. The prospects, however, are decidedly better than in 1946, since the Property Custodian has undertaken to dispose of urban residences and small business holdings valued at more than ₩ 25,000,000,000, and since recent imports under the Civilian Supply Program have included more raw materials and consumer goods than heretofore. Balances in the Property Custodian and Civilian Supply accounts, therefore, should soon be sufficient to offset the total occupational expenditures, notwithstanding the fact that the full deflationary effect of sales of vested property will not be realized, since social welfare considerations make it necessary to provide for some extension of credit in order to prevent a concentration of property ownership in the hands of the great landlords and speculators.

At the present time, consumer goods prices are one hundred or two hundred times the 1937 level, or even more. However, wages and many raw materials, most of which are owned or imported by the government, are still within the planned stabilization level of fifty times the 1937 price. While much time has been lost, it may still be possible to stabilize prices and avoid a run-away inflation if Civilian Supply imports are delivered as scheduled, if the Fall rice collection program is no less successful than in 1946, requisitions for American technicians are filled with competent men, a thorough tax revision is inaugurated, and provided Korean officials to whom more and more responsibility is being delegated, recognize the need for economic controls and economy of expenditures, and continue to support these aims.

IX Conclusion

Such favorable predictions as are made here are based on the assumption that Korea may be reunited before the present cleavage has become irreparable. So long as South Korea remains cut off from the North, with an abnormal concentration of population, subnormal agricultural production, shortage of raw materials and of skills to process them, it must remain a dependency of the United States. It is out of the question that South Korea under such circumstances could become self-sustaining.

The factors which will most play upon Korea's evolution in the next months and years are not economic, but political. United States and Soviet policy towards Korea, joint and individual, will determine to what extent the land may fulfill the possibilities inherent in its physical resources. If no agreement is reached in the Joint Commission, the United States will have to face squarely the problem of determining what degree of responsibility it is willing to accept in maintaining the economy of South Korea. Operations thus far have been expensive and in the future are certain to become more costly. Stop-gap measures adopted to date have not solved any of the essential problems of restoring the Korean economy to satisfactory levels, and while no thoroughly

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effective procedures can be put into effect in a divided country, it is still possible by means of industrial rehabilitation and training programs and importation of raw materials to go much farther than existing limitations have permitted Military Government to go.

If it proves impossible to fulfill the terms of the Moscow Decision, the alternatives confronting the United States range on the one hand from abandoning South Korea altogether and allowing the Soviets to do what they will with it, to the opposite extreme of extending a kind of benevolent colonialism to the area. Neither extreme appears likely to be adopted, since the one would mean a probably unwise withdrawal from a critical, political and economic strategic site, and the other would call for more funds than Congress is apt to appropriate, as well as an administrative service which the United States does not possess. The problem resolves itself to one of determining the most generally acceptable conditions on which the United States may remain in South Korea. This is not the place to attempt the composition of a magic formula, but it is still possible to suggest certain elements which must be compounded in it. These are provision of adequate appropriations to permit rehabilitation of agriculture and selected industries, and vigorous prosecution of training programs in industry and government. In this way only can the United States wisely invest the funds it determines to expend on behalf of South Korea and ultimately, perhaps, realize a satisfactory return on them in the establishment of a relatively stable society which may stand in the Far East as a bulwark against ideological aggression. Moneys spent for relief purposes only will fulfill no long-range, basic aims, and may in time have to be supplemented by much heavier expenditures merely to permit the United States to hold its own in the area.

Dollars alone will not work a permanent transformation of the area, nor will the spending of relatively large sums for a few years make South Korea a self-sustaining entity. However, if the United States is willing not only to invest in the American zone from $100,000,000 to $200,000,000 annually for a period of several years, but also to accept the task of training Koreans of the South gradually to take over the management of their industries and government on conditions acceptable to the United States, it may be able to establish an equilibrium until such time as subsequent developments permit reunion of the country. Even to do this will be extremely difficult, for Koreans in the American zone must be firmly persuaded of the justice of American administration and aims; they must have hope for the future and reason to resist blandishments from the North. Otherwise the American position in Korea may rapidly become untenable.

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TAB C

THE PRESENT ECONOMIC STATUS OF SOUTH KOREA

(Addendum to Report Prepared
For Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer)

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THE PRESENT ECONOMIC STATUS OF SOUTH KOREA
(Addendum to report prepared for Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer)

I. Land Reform

1. Farm tenancy in Korea almost doubled during the thirty-five years of Japanese domination of the peninsula, with the agricultural land farmed by tenants increasing from about forty per cent of the total cultivated land in 1910 to almost seventy-five per cent by August 1945. Of the 3,046,001 farm households in Korea in 1943, about one-half rented all the land they farmed and about one-third rented a substantial part of their land, while only about one-sixth owned the land they farmed.

2. Farm rentals were usually paid in kind and were uniformly high, averaging about sixty per cent of the total crop. Rice fields offered the best return to landlords, and since most of the best rice fields were in southern Korea, farm tenancy was most prevalent in that part of the peninsula.

3. Shortly after the American Army arrived in Korea, the Military Government issued an ordinance establishing maximum farm rentals at one-third of the agricultural production. This action, which in effect almost doubled the tenant farmers share of his production at the expense of the absentee landlords, materially elevated the economic status of over half of the total population. In February 1946, the Military Government in collaboration with the State Department's Economic Mission developed a plan to sell former Japanese-owned agricultural lands. This program, which was to sell to tenant farmers the approximately 500,000 acres of paddy fields and 150,000 acres of dry fields formerly owned by the Japanese, was planned to be the first phase of an over-all, land-reform program also involving land owned by Korean absentee landlords. Although the program had wide support, its execution was postponed in 1946 because Military Government authorities decided

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that, on the basis of several public opinion polls, the Koreans preferred to wait for the establishment of a Provisional Government before proceeding with land reform. With the Joint Commission scheduled to convene in March 1946, it was then hoped that such a government for all Korea would be established during 1946. The plan provided for the transfer of ownership of former Japanese-owned farms to tenant farmers, with payment being in kind over a period of fifteen years. Annual payments were to be thirty per cent of the major crops (where double cropping was practiced, only payment on the major crop was to be required), but this figure was later reduced to twenty-five per cent per year.

4. Since the establishment of the Interim Legislative Assembly in South Korea in December 1946, the question of land reform has been fully discussed in legislative committees and several land-reform proposals have been drafted, but none has yet been considered formally by the Legislature as a whole. In a discussion of the problem of land reform on 2 September 1947, the Legislative Assembly voted 52 to 5 (with 6 abstaining) to consider a draft of a law for the disposition of former Japanese-owned land before considering redistribution of Korean-owned land.

5. There is a general agreement among most political groups outside the communist-dominated Democratic People's Front regarding basic principles of a land-reform program as follows:

a. Sale of individual farms to landless or part-tenant farmers, with recognition of the right of private ownership of farms.

b. Purchaser to make annual payments in kind, not to exceed twenty-five per cent of the crop, over a period of from twelve to fifteen years.

c. Compensation to Korean landlords for farm land taken for distribution, with payments being made over a period of from twelve to fifteen years from proceeds of sale of grain collected.

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d. Farm purchasers may not sell or mortgage land during the period of payment for farms. However, purchaser secures six per cent equity in his farm for each year of contract concluded, and safeguards are included to make it possible for purchaser or his heirs to complete contract without undue difficulty.

e. Elimination of absentee landlordism, with maximum agricultural-land holdings set at about five Chungbo (12.25 acres).

6. In addition, some Korean groups advocate a combination land-tax reform, as follows:

a. Institute five per cent agricultural production tax on all farms, with this new tax superceding land, household, and other taxes in rural areas.

(1) For farmers who now own their own farms, five per cent of their production would be turned in to the government collection program without payment, with receipts from sale through rationing channels going into government tax revenue fund.

(2) For farmers in process of purchasing farms under land-reform program, five per cent of twenty-five per cent payment would go to the government as taxes. In case of former Japanese-owned land, twenty per cent could go into blocked account until reparations settlement, and thereafter be considered as government revenue.

b. Such a five per cent production tax should bring at least 750,000 suk which would total about Won 1,800,000,000 at the present selling price of rice. This amount exceeds the present taxes collected from farmers.

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7. In the Soviet-occupation zone in northern Korea, a land-reform program was put into effect in March 1946. Under this program almost all the agricultural land-holdings of Korean landlords were confiscated without payment and, together with former Japanese-owned lands, were given "free-of-charge" to about 429,000 tenant farmers, 229,000 farmers who rented part of the land they tilled, and 9,500 landless farm laborers. Despite the fact that the provisions of the land-reform program stipulated that "certificates of ownership of the land" should be distributed, the exact status of the land is not clear, and apparently the People's Committees retain title, with the farmers having the right to utilize the land providing agricultural taxes are paid. Such taxes in 1946 were set at twenty-five per cent of the total production, to be paid in kind. Many reliable reports, however, indicate that considerably more than twenty-five per cent of the production was frequently collected as taxes. Agricultural taxes for 1947 were set at twenty-seven per cent of production for paddy fields, twenty-three per cent for dry lands, and ten per cent for poor farmland in mountainous regions. These same taxes apply to all farmers, both to those recently "given" farms, as well as to those who had been owner-operators.

II. Custody, Management, and Disposal of Former Japanese Property

1. Mission

By virtue of Ordinance #33, USAMGIK, dated 6 December 1945, title to all Japanese property in South Korea, except military equipment treated as booty of war, was vested in USAMGIK. The mission of the Property Custodian is therefore, viz:

a. To seek out such property, reduce it to possession and control, and establish and maintain records thereof.

b. To manage and operate such property so as to prevent its dissipation or diminution in value, and to contribute thereby to the economy of Korea.

c. To dispose of such property when and as directed by higher authority.

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2. Scope of Operations:

The Property Custodian is responsible for a substantial part of the capital wealth of South Korea. Vested property includes approximately 101,000 urban residences, 10,000 small business holdings, 2,000 industrial enterprises with a book value as of 1945 of over ¥1,000,000, and 650,000 acres of farm lands.

3. Organization:

The Office of Property Custody maintains a central office in Seoul, eight provincial offices, 42 district branch offices, and 133 "gun" or county offices. Present personnel numbers 73 Americans (officers, enlisted men and civilians) and 1,740 Koreans.

4. Operations:

a. Locating and Recording Property:

While a vast amount of Japanese property has been brought under control, it has become apparent that much is still hidden or undisclosed. Therefore, physical surveys of all provinces are presently under way, for the purpose of securing a comprehensive report of all such property. 350 Korean personnel are now employed on the project, and approximately 1,000 more must be recruited, trained and employed to carry it to completion. The survey will be completed by 30 June 1948.

b. Management of Property:

(1) Residential property is rented by the Property Custodian.

(2) Management of all industrial properties is entrusted to heads of departments, offices and agencies of SKIG, who act with the concurrence of the appropriate advisors. Audits and inspections of such enterprises are made by the Property Custodian, who is also responsible for financing them when unguaranteed loans will not be made by financial institutions.

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(3) Agricultural lands are managed by the New Korea Company, as agents of the Property Custodian. (See section on land reform for plans for disposal of agricultural property.)

(4) Forest lands are managed by the Bureau of Forestry, Department of Agriculture, South Korea Interim Government, as agent of the Property Custodian.

(5) Heretofore, juridical persons organized in Korea in which a substantial part of the stock was vested have been managed by appropriate departments of South Korea Interim Government, the same as wholly Japanese juridical persons. Plans are in process for recognition of Korean juridical persons, and management thereof by regularly elected Boards of Directors. It appears that such action will constitute a long step forward toward the re-establishment of a sound economy in Korea.

c. Property Disposal:

(1) The Property Custodian has been empowered to dispose of perishable property, urban residences, small business holdings and agricultural land. Perishable property, defined as movable property, the nature, condition or value of which will not justify hauling, servicing or storing, has in large measure been sold, and presents no problem. The Office of Property Custody is currently engaged in the task of implementing directives relating to the sale and disposition of urban residences and small business holdings. This program includes sale of about 80% of the 101,000 vested residences, excluding those utilized for

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military and other official use, and most of the 10,000 small business holdings.

(2) The plans for property disposal were worked out by a joint Korean-American Advisory Board on Vested Property, in conjunction with the Office of Property Custody. Korean advisory committees are being established in each province to advise and assist the Office of Property Custody in the selection of purchasers of vested assets and in reviewing current valuations of these assets.

(3) In the directive on the sale of urban residences, it is stipulated that only one house shall be sold to a family, that none shall be sold to a family which already owns a home, and that priority will be given to those legally occupying each residence. Sales will be for cash or on terms at current fair-market prices to the highest qualified bidder, except that sale may be made by direct negotiation to persons now lawfully occupying a residence and otherwise qualified. Proceeds from sales will be held in trust for the future Korean Government. Each contract will provide the sale is final insofar as the Military Government is concerned, but is subject to confirmation of the future Korean Provisional Government.

(4) Similar provisions regarding the sale of small business holdings have the objective of giving the widest possible ownership of small businesses, with priority being given to those persons who are now efficiently operating such businesses.

(5) Because of the continued shortage of qualified personnel, both American and Korean, and because

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of the magnitude of the task, this sales program is expected to proceed slowly and it is expected to take at least two years to be completed. Another factor which has caused delay in implementing the program is opposition of a substantial minority of the Korean people, based on the expressed fear that the proceeds of the sales will be used to discharge Japanese obligations for reparations, and will be lost to the Korean people.

III. Administration and Personnel

1. The major difficulty in the administration of government in getting industrial production under way, in the operation of utilities, in staffing the technical schools and colleges, and in providing the necessary accounting and auditing of fiscal operations has been the inability of Military Government to find Koreans competent to staff these activities. This difficulty stems from the following circumstances.

2. When the Americans entered Korea there were some 700,000 Japanese civilians and about 170,000 Japanese soldiers in South Korea. These were all repatriated to Japan in the early months of the occupation. Of the 188,000 Japanese civilian males between the ages of 16 and 60 who were in Korea in 1944, 52,000 were managers, professional and technical men who provided the leadership for the government and for the economy.

3. About 80 per cent of the managers and technicians of industry and about 65 per cent of the engineers and technicians in the mines were Japanese. The Koreans in these categories held positions in the less important plants and mines. The faculties of the technical schools and colleges were uniformly staffed with Japanese nationals. The same conditions prevailed in the agriculture experiment stations. After the repatriation of the Japanese

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nationals, South Korea found itself without the managerial and scientific know-how to carry on the operations for which facilities were present. The major task of Military Government in the past two years has been to train Koreans to fill this large gap in the economy.

4. Technical Education

a. Technical training in South Korea is in a state of chaos. The exodus to Japan of Japanese scientists and technicians who held practically all positions of importance has created a number of serious obstacles to the administration of the economy. For clarity this subject will be treated in two phases; namely, formal or long term training and practical or short term training.

b. Under the Japanese, formal technical training institutions were organized on a narrow vocational plane. In these schools, almost the entire time was spent on scientific practical matters with little emphasis devoted to cultural development. For this reason these schools were considered by the Koreans somewhat inferior to the colleges, universities and regular middle schools which emphasized the humanities almost to the exclusion of the physical and biological sciences.

c. Under the present plan of educational reorganization the regular middle schools will ultimately become all purpose schools to train personnel in all phases of Korean life to meet the needs of the community. This development is still in the theoretical stage and will require many years to complete. In the interim little help can be expected from this source.

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d. The forestry colleges, agriculture colleges, and technical colleges are even more poorly prepared to train the large number of technicians required by the economy. Lack of instructors, administrators and capital facilities, equipment and materials all spell a gloomy picture for the future. The lack of American advisory personnel in this field has further prevented the reconstruction and development of technical education.

e. Statistics on the technical training institutions presently operating in South Korea, and on the number of students in training in the middle schools and technical colleges is presented below:

Junior Middle Schools

Type	Number	Enrollment June 1947	Graduates as of October 1946
Agriculture	64	12,294	1,105
Fisheries	2	158	23
Technical	6	1,407	133
Total	72	13,859	1,261

Senior Middle Schools

Agriculture	53	23,475	NA
Fisheries	4	1,390	NA
Technical	19	15,004	NA
Total	76	39,869	

Technical Colleges

Fisheries	1	214	None
Agriculture	3	464	58
Technical	2	751	102
Total	6	1,429	160

f. Due to the present chaotic state of formal technical training and the inability of the schools to provide trained technicians for the Korean economy, Military Government has recently established a Board of Technological Training with funds to encourage the training of supervisors and foremen for industry, the utilities and agriculture. Since its establishment,

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this Board has authorized nine technical training projects involving about 1,000 persons who are at present receiving training in technical fields. In addition, 45 more projects are being considered and will be set up within the next four months. The numbers involved in these projects include 3,000 additional trainees.

g. The short-term courses now in operation are in agricultural production. Most of the 45 other projects yet to be gotten underway will have to do with training foremen in the fields of machinery, chemistry, mining, communications and public works.

h. Formal technical educational facilities in South Korea are woefully inadequate to meet the minimum needs of the economy. This is true with respect to competent teachers and physical facilities. The following alternatives have been considered in solving this difficulty:

(1) To recruit from Japan those Koreans who reside there and are competent to teach the physical and biological sciences and manage industrial activities. Such a program even if successful would only partially relieve the problem because there are not enough of such Koreans in Japan.

(2) To send Koreans to Japan for short and long-time courses in the various technical fields. Such an approach might be made to appear acceptable to the Koreans if such instruction were given under the supervision of SCAP.

(3) To bring Japanese instructors and technicians to Korea to staff our technical schools and colleges and to provide on-the-job training in factories,

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mines, and agricultural experiment stations. This approach would perhaps be least attractive to most Koreans, although it might be most effective in solving the problem. If undertaken it would perhaps have to be ordered by the Americans, and carried on under close political supervision of Koreans.

(4) To bring in enough American technicians to provide effective controls at all levels of productive management. This approach could perhaps be made highly successful in building up production if buttressed with a good rehabilitation program, but it would not solve the problem of providing the needed number of trained Korean technicians to man industry.

(5) To bring in American technical instructors to staff the technical schools and colleges. This is regarded as having many weaknesses, the language barrier being largely insurmountable.

(6) To send Koreans to the United States and Hawaii for formal instruction. To be effective, this approach would perhaps be very costly and time consuming and might be attended with some unfavorable results inasmuch as such students after several years in the States might not be too happy in returning to their former environment. This approach might, however, be used in giving promising college graduates graduate work preparatory to teaching in Korea.

These several alternatives should be considered separately and in combination in resolving one of South Korea's major problems.

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5. Technicians

a. One of the major difficulties that has consistently thwarted the administration of Military Government has been the lack of enough American technicians to maintain even a semblance of effective control of the economy. This has been and now is the case in the factories, mines, utilities, and grain collections, and at all levels of government where technical know-how is indispensable to successful administration. The lack of accountants and auditors has been such that no effective controls have been possible over fiscal operation of the government. The present situation is illustrated in the following tabulation:

Total Number of Technically Trained Employees
As of 15 September 1947

Positions	Present in Position	Not Present on Reqn.	Total
Statisticians	8	14	22
Financiers	17	5	22
Civil Engineers	9	7	16
Engineers (Industrial, Textile, Electrical, Chemical)	26	104	130
Taxation Specialist	1	3	4
Accountant & Auditors	12	80	92
Social Workers	19	6	25
Educators	21	12	33
Mining Technician	4	5	9
Nursing	5	2	7
Chemist	2	1	3
Attorneys	20	8	28
Metallurgist	2	3	5
Agriculturist Technician	24	11	35
Dentist	1	0	1
Doctors	4	0	4
Veterinarian	2	0	2
Customs Specialist	1	10	11
Police Supervisors & Technicians	22	5	27
Economist	7	4	11
Communications Technicians	4	5	9
Insurance Specialist	1	6	7
Comptrollers	4	4	8
Ordnance Technician	2	1	3
Biological Chemist	1	2	3
Budgetary Specialist	8	4	12
Totals	227	302	529

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b. A minimum of at least a thousand technicians is needed in South Korea if effective use is to be made of funds appropriated for a rehabilitation program. If such a number of technicians is to be recruited, or if the number be limited to the 302 now on requisition, the following obstacles will need to be removed.

(1) The major trouble in recruiting male employees is the acute housing shortage in Korea. Under present regulations, no married man below the rating of CAF-12 can be recruited for a job in Korea, inasmuch as CAF-12's and above have been determined as key positions. Under present conditions no person, regardless of grade or position, can reasonably expect to get a house within a year after his arrival in Korea.

(2) It is believed that some of the delay in Stateside recruiting is caused by the requirement of the Far East Command that all requisitions clear through it to the War Department, Washington, D. C. A great many times when Washington is queried regarding over-due requisitions, it is learned that such requisitions have not cleared the Far East Command.

(3) It is believed that the classification and wage scale applicable to Stateside employment is not adequate in Korea, even with the 25 percent overseas differential. It is necessary to offer additional monetary inducement over and above what is now available in order to keep requisitions filled. This is particularly true of classifications P-7, P-8 and CAF-14 and CAF-15 and also in the lower grade brackets because of the generally

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bad reputation of living and working conditions in Korea.

(4) In order to recruit personnel which is normal mentally and physically, a better screening must be done in the Zone of the Interior. Too many tempermental and emotionally unstable people are being employed, such as alcoholics, homosexuals, perverts, and borderline psychopathic cases. These types of mal-adjusted people are a liability rather than an asset. G-2 investigations should be completed before hiring. More thorough psychiatric examination should be given.

(5) A thorough training course should be worked out for recruiters and only the information furnished by this Command should be used in recruiting. Misinformation given to recruits for Korea has been the cause of many personnel problems here. Furthermore, many persons eligible for jobs in Korea and initially willing to come have turned down offers because of misinformation about working and living conditions in Korea. This has occurred in part because many civilians returning to the U. S. have complained that they were not given equal treatment with the military.

6. <u>Koreanization</u>

a. The administration of government in Korea, from the beginning of the American occupation to the present, has been beset and surrounded with so many difficulties as to make the undertaking often appear almost impossible. It first became necessary for purely political reasons to repatriate all the Japanese, thereby taking out of the economy every person who held a

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key post in government and industry, in addition to the thousands of technicians who gave scientific direction to governmental functions and industrial processes.

b. With the Japanese went the faculties of the schools and colleges, the scientists of the agricultural experiment stations, the managers, technicians and higher paid foremen of the industrial plants, utilities and mines, all officials of government who held any positions of importance, and lastly the far flung army of agricultural administrators, technicians and policemen who directed agricultural operations to the last detail, including food collection and distribution.

c. Koreanization began by recruitment and selection of Koreans to fill these vacant positions, the functions of which were considered necessary to the objectives of the occupation. These selections of necessity had to be made from a people inexperienced in all the tasks they were called upon to perform.

d. Since only a few Americans were available (and most of these inexperienced in governmental administration) they were placed in key positions and given Korean counterparts to train. The demobilization of the Army brought about a very rapid turnover in the American staff, contributing greatly to the difficulties of government. By the middle of 1946 it became apparent that American civilians would have to be recruited in considerable number if any continuity was to be achieved in governmental administration, and if technical direction was to be provided.

e, The maintenance of an adequate American staff to direct the functions of government was attended with many

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difficulties of recruitment. In the fall of 1946, the direction of governmental functions was turned over to the Koreans, leaving the Americans in the position of advisors. It was felt that by crowding administrative responsibilities onto the Koreans they would thereby more rapidly learn how to manage and direct their own affairs.

f. In support of this policy of Koreanization the Korean directors of the departments of government were vested with authority to make appointment to their staffs without concurrence by their American advisors. To strengthen the position of the directors and their subordinates still further and to provide them more fully with the atmosphere of independence the American advisors were physically removed to separate quarters, where this was possible, in March of this year.

g. These changes, attended by widespread public announcements, were well received and warmly welcomed by the Koreans generally, and particularly by the rightists and ultra-conservatives who had never been enthusiastic about American direction. Attending these changes came expressions from the Koreans that perhaps the management and direction of vested plants could equally well be turned over to them. This, however, was not granted. Custody Order No. 8 was released, retaining firm control and direction of vested plants in American hands, but necessary American personnel to provide such control and direction were not provided.

h. Custody Order No. 8 was rather coldly received by the Korean directorate and by the Korean vested plant managers who during their tenure had gained a certain proprietary interest in the plants and had formed

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associations to protect their rights. They were solidly supported by other influential groups who wished to see more authority granted to the Koreans. The outcome of this sentiment was Custody Order No. 9 which granted to the Korean directors and plant managers the initiative in what was to be done and not to be done in the operation of the plants and mines, subject to the concurrence of the American advisors, and the overall direction of the Property Custodian.

i. Under Custody Order No. 8 the management and control of vested plants and mines was the direct and sole responsibility of the American advisors, whereas Custody Order No. 9 delegated that responsibility to the Koreans subject to the concurrence of the American advisors on important matters. This matter is perhaps better understood by adding that the Property Custodian has delegated managerial responsibility for all plants and mines to the appropriate departments of government, which places the directors of the departments in control of the major industrial production facilities of the country.

j. Raw materials brought into South Korea through the Civilian Supply Program are channeled to the vested plants through the government departments. The same is done with replacement parts and other maintenance supplies. Accounting and auditing personnel, both Korean and American, is such in number that adequate fiscal control over these operations is not possible. The management and control of vested plants and mines have become Korean responsibilities subject only to overall direction of the Military Governor and Property Custodian, with concurrences on the part of American advisors on major questions.

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k. These rather drastic modifications of original policy were made at a time when the outlook in Korea was rather dark and there was little prospect of any economic aid except to relieve disease and unrest. These changes were also instituted on the theory that the Joint US-USSR Commission would succeed in its negotiations and a Provisional Government would be established, in which event it would perhaps have been well to have crowded responsibilities onto the Koreans even in advance of their ability to carry them out.

l. Recent events have changed the outlook considerably. A Provisional Government for a united Korea is not in sight. Over a series of years the cumulative cost to the American taxpayer of a relief program for South Korea on a level such as has been provided (about $137 million a year) would appear to be very much more costly than a substantial rehabilitation program which would undertake to make South Korea largely self-supporting in the course of five years.

m. If a rehabilitation program is to be instituted, it is possible that some modification of the present Koreanization policy may be necessary. If the United States is to assume responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of South Korea, Americans must maintain economic and technical supervision and control to insure that funds appropriated for such purpose are used in the most economic manner to reduce the burden on the American taxpayer to the minimum.

n. Any program for rehabilitation of the Korean economy must be based upon effective utilization of industrial plants and facilities existing in Korea at the time of surrender, most of which are vested under Ordinance 33. Experience has demonstrated that these facilities

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will be dissipated and lost to the Korean economy unless rehabilitated in the near future. This objective can be accomplished only by:

(1) Providing adequate American technical personnel

(2) Developing administrative procedures which will enable these technicians to furnish the knowledge and initiative necessary to bring about efficient utilization of Korean economic resources.

o. Such a move would need to be supported by making available to Military Government a production technician and two well selected enlisted men for each vested factory and mine which had been selected for rehabilitation. This would perhaps not call for more than 200 production technicians and 400 enlisted men. This would need to be further supported by enough accountants and auditors to assure effective fiscal controls, perhaps one for each plant and mine or a total of 200. The cost of such insurance for effective and economic use of appropriate funds would perhaps not exceed $4 million a year.

p. For the civilian administration as a whole, the Americans should be strengthened in every level of the administration, except the legislative. The Koreans should be left in nominal control at every level. The Americans should exercise their effective control as far as possible by diplomatic advice to their Korean colleagues, but when this fails then by direct order of the Military Governor.

q. The Koreanization policy is thoroughly sound. It is obvious that the basic objectives of the United States

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with regard to Korea cannot be achieved without teaching the Koreans how to exercise responsibility, but it is a question of how fast to crowd responsibilities on them in excess of what they can carry. If too heavy a load is thrown on them, our basic economic objectives may be seriously thwarted through the dissipation of United States appropriated funds.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

Introductory Statement

1. Before considering our alternative courses of action it is necessary to make the following assumptions:

a. That efforts to unite Korea will fail, and that the present relations between North and South Korea will continue indefinitely.

b. That the United States will have a continuing responsibility in South Korea for an indefinite period of at least five years' duration.

c. That the War Department will continue to be responsible for the occupation of South Korea.

d. That minimum economic aid must be provided to assure economic and political stability in South Korea.

e. That adequate U. S. personnel will be available and given appropriate authority to supervise the expenditure of U. S. funds under this program.

f. That there will be a world market for available exports at current prices.

2. In the light of these assumptions the United States Army Forces in Korea are faced with three alternatives in their economic administration of South Korea:

a. A continuation of the present aid and assistance that is calculated to prevent disease and unrest. This policy is not recommended because it is straight relief, does not attempt to make the economy self-supporting, and is likely to become increasingly expensive.

b. A substantial reduction in the present economic aid and assistance from the United States. This would lead to a reduction in standard of living and to a condition of economic and political instability that would jeopardize the position of the United States forces here. Rather than adopt such a policy it is believed that the United States Army Forces should be withdrawn from South Korea immediately.

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c. A rehabilitation program that is designed to so rehabilitate the economy that it will become more self-supporting and thereby reduce the economic aid and assistance required from the United States. This is the course of action that is recommended, and it is such a program that is herein discussed.

3. The rehabilitation program which is recommended as a course of action for the occupying authorities in South Korea may be briefly outlined as follows:

a. Production estimates have been made to provide a standard of living essential to provide economic and political stability to the occupation. (See appendices 1 to 7 inclusive.) This involves full exploitation of mineral resources and existing textile facilities, and the building up of a chemical industry able to provide the fertilizer needs of agriculture.

b. A plan has been formulated for maintaining the service industries necessary to support the rate of industrial activity contemplated (see appendices 8, 9, 10 and 11).

c. The imports needed to effect and sustain the program are set forth in appendix 12. Detailed analyses of the import requirements are set forth in appendices 13, 14, 15 and 16.

d. The export availabilities to be obtained from the increased production are set forth in appendix 17.

e. The foreign trade position that will eventuate under this program is set forth in appendix 18.

4. Attention is invited to the following features of this program:

a. It will cost the United States a net of $496,800,000 over the five-year period, 1949 to 1953. A disease and unrest program would cost $584,000,000. The rehabilitation program, therefore, involves a saving of $87,200,000 over the five-year period beginning with the fiscal year 1949.

b. It will stabilize the foreign trade position at an annual deficit of approximately $18,500,000. Under the disease and unrest

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formula the annual trade deficit would continue at approximately $113,000,000. By the expenditure of $496,800,000 between 1949 and 1953, there will be an annual saving of approximately $94,500,000 after 1953.

c. It will involve a marked change in the character of imports from the U. S. The principal features of this change are, first, heavy capital expenditures during 1949 and 1950, and, secondly, a shift from the food imports of a disease and unrest formula to the raw materials and supply imports for a revitalized industry under a rehabilitation formula.

d. It will result in increased production that will make available increased exports that are essential to making this economy more self-supporting.

5. The successful implementation of the rehabilitation program herein set forth is contingent upon:

a. Satisfactory solution in Washington of the problem of personnel requirements. The lack of adequate personnel, in both quality and quantity, has seriously hampered administration thus far.

b. Provisions for reasonably adequate dependent housing for civilian administrative and technical personnel. The lack of such housing in the past has seriously undermined morale in this Command, and has thwarted successful recruitment of personnel in the United States. This is occasioned by the present policy of the War Department requiring the procurement of building materials from sources within the theatre. Such materials are not available in the theatre except in very small quantities, and purchases are having a very detrimental effect on the economy. Procurement must necessarily be made from outside the theatre.

c. Active support in Washington in obtaining the necessary engineering talent to verify the needs herein set forth and to supervise the capital installations recommended.

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d. Active and consistent support for the program by top State, War, and Navy administrative officials and by the Congress of the U. S. A.

6. Although for the purpose of budgetary presentation we are indicating that this program will be started in the fiscal year 1949, any funds that can be furnished or obligated during 1948 will in the long run save the United States taxpayer money. The success of the rehabilitation program can be better assured by immediate action to avert further deterioration of the industrial plant. To that end, the engineering surveys incident to the program should be initiated without delay.

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Tab D

REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

APPENDIX 1 a

Agriculture - CROP PRODUCTION
ESTIMATES (1)

ITEM	SOUTH KOREA Fy 1936 (2) Met. Tons	Value	Fy 1946 (2) Met. Tons	Value	Fy 1947 (2) Met. Tons	Value	Fy 1948 (2) Met. Tons	Value	Fy 1949 (2) Met. Tons	Value	Fy 1950 (2) Met. Tons	Value	Fy 1951 (2) Met. Tons	Value	Fy 1952 (2) Met. Tons	Value	Fy 1953 (2) Met. Tons	Value
Rice (3)	2,131	106,550	1,957	215,270	1,837	275,550	2,160	324,000	2,268	340,000	2,406	360,900	2,526	378,900	2,626	393,900	2,701	405,150
Summer Grains (3) (Rye, Wheat, Barley, Naked Barley)	962.5	27,671	345	21,028	547	40,888	528	39,600	630	47,250	810	60,750	890	66,750	960	72,000	1,000	75,000
Other Cereals (3) (Millet, Sorghum, Oats, Corn, Buckwheat)	140	3,500	73	3,650	73	3,650	140	7,000	147	7,350	154	7,700	160	8,000	165	8,250	167	8,350
Legumes (Soy Beans, Other Beans, Peanuts, Peas)	273.3	13,665	138	13,800	134	20,100	160	24,000	200	30,000	230	34,500	250	37,500	270	40,500	300	45,000
Vegetables	711	35,550	565	56,500	647	64,700	700	70,000	735	75,500	772	77,200	803	80,300	827	82,700	835	83,500
Potatoes (Irish and Sweet)	268	8,040	649	45,430	480	31,200	525	34,125	551	35,815	579	37,635	602	39,130	620	40,300	626	40,690
Fruit	39.5	1,935	44	8,888	66	10,164	48	7,392	50	7,700	48	7,392	45	6,930	43	6,622	42	6,468
Fibers - Silk (Cocoon)	15.2	4,041	8.6	5,033	5.9	8,630	7.2	10,535	7.6	11,120	8.3	11,120	9.6	14,035	11.5	16,825	11.5	16,825
Cotton	54	11,880	67	33,902	60	39,600	118	77,880	119	78,540	120	79,200	122	80,520	142	93,720	143	94,380
Hemp	11	297	8.5	472	2	233	8.8	1,026	9.2	1,073	9.4	1,096	9.6	1,120	9.7	1,131	9.8	1,143
Ramie	.4	198	.1	8.9	.1	17	.1	17	.1	17	.1	17	.1	17	.1	17	.1	17
Industrial Crops: Tobacco	15.2	5,985	1.1	774	8.3	5,843	11.1	7,814	12.5	8,800	14	9,856	16	11,264	18	12,672	20	14,080
Sesame	1	1,623	1	1,409	1	1,500	1.4	2,100	1.6	2,400	1.6	2,400	1.6	2,400	1.7	2,550	1.7	2,550
Total Values	-	$220,935	-	$406,164.9	-	$502,075	-	$605,489	-	$645,565	-	$689,766	-	$726,866	-	$803,887	-	$826,603

NOTES: (1) Crop estimates are based on the assumption that a steady increase in most crops through 1953 will be realized through the increased application of fertilizers, completion of irrigation and flood control projects, and increased reforestation and soil conservation projects.

Percentages yearly increases in projected estimates are fairly constant, with the exception of summer grain production for FY 1949 which shows a 19% increase over FY 1948. This large increase is due to the unusually poor crop year in FY 1948.

(2) Amounts shown are in 1,000 Metric Tons; values in $1,000.

Estimated agricultural prices are based on U.S. Department of Agriculture Bulletin of 28 March 1947.

(3) All grains are shown in polished weight.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA
APPENDIX 1b

Agriculture - LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION ESTIMATES (1)

SOUTH KOREA

ITEM	FY 1936 Number	FY 1936 Value (2)	FY 1946 Number	FY 1946 Value (2)	FY 1947 Number	FY 1947 Value (2)	FY 1948 Number	FY 1948 Value (2)	FY 1949 Number	FY 1949 Value (2)	FY 1950 Number	FY 1950 Value (2)	FY 1951 Number	FY 1951 Value (2)	FY 1952 Number	FY 1952 Value (2)	FY 1953 Number	FY 1953 Value (2)
Cattle, Work	906,169	15,103	661,181	176,315	724,013	144,803	737,026	147,405	780,846	156,169	832,028	166,406	891,809	178,362	961,144	192,229	1,042,616	208,523
Cattle, Dairy	1,336	58	1,124	749	1,478	739	1,606	803	1,696	848	2,086	1,043	3,310	1,655	4,303	2,152	5,663	2,832
Horses	12,037	120	9,042	1,201	9,966	2,492	10,315	2,579	11,000	2,750	11,700	2,925	12,500	3,125	13,200	3,300	13,800	3,450
Ponies	21,000	105	25,000	1,667	28,000	2,800	28,050	2,805	29,200	2,920	30,500	3,050	32,100	3,210	33,300	3,330	34,800	3,480
Mules and Donkeys	2,650	13	100	6.7	100	10	100	10	120	12	150	15	185	19	220	22	260	26
Goats, Native	27,408	91	18,863	1,258	22,673	1,700	17,100	1,283	22,256	1,669	27,543	2,066	32,323	2,424	37,675	2,826	42,315	3,174
Goats, Milk	10,000	33	7,000	47	7,200	540	7,256	544	8,843	663	10,512	788	12,368	928	14,046	1,053	16,369	1,228
Sheep	510	8.5	3,546	142	3,600	180	5,260	263	7,101	355	9,316	466	11,235	562	13,411	671	15,517	776
Hogs	896,890	4,484	181,331	10,880	222,960	13,378	231,680	13,901	302,785	18,167	383,117	22,987	461,517	27,691	546,142	32,769	624,413	37,465
Chickens (3)	3,789,749	632	1,516,384	2,527	1,814,524	3,629	9,500,000	19,000	11,420,000	22,840	13,700,000	27,400	16,400,000	32,800	19,660,000	39,320	23,680,000	47,360
Ducks	7,297	1.2	1,000	1.7	800	1.6	1,200	2.4	2,615	5.2	3,236	6.5	3,878	7.8	4,398	8.8	4,803	9.6
Geese	2,500	.8	750	1.8	800	3.2	812	3.2	1,112	4.4	1,423	5.7	1,871	7.5	2,269	9.1	2,680	11
Turkeys	629	.4	50	.3	50	.3	50	.3	61	.4	75	.5	89	.5	105	.6	113	.7
Rabbits	68,810	11	12,356	21	24,405	49	36,216	72	37,538	75	38,675	77	39,723	79	40,235	80	41,347	83
Total Values	--	20,660.9	--	194,817.5	--	170,325.1	--	188,670.9	--	206,478	--	227,235.7	--	250,870.8	--	277,770.5	--	308,418.3

NOTES: (1) Rough estimates are shown as no authentic statistics are available.

(2) All values are shown in $1,000.

(3) Numbers of chickens for the years 1936, 1946, and 1947 do not include those consumed.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA
APPENDIX 2

FORESTRY PRODUCTION AND REFORESTATION (1)

ITEM	SOUTH KOREA FY 1936 Amount	Value (2)	FY 1946 Amount	Value (2)	FY 1947 Amount	Value (2)	FY 1948 Amount	Value (2)	FY 1949 Amount	Value (2)	FY 1950 Amount	Value (2)	FY 1951 Amount	Value (2)	FY 1952 Amount	Value (2)	FY 1953 Amount	Value (2)
CHARCOAL (1000 Metric Tons)	56	2,333	69	5,750	68	5,525	67	5,444	65	5,281	62	5,038	60	4,875	58	4,713	56	4,550
FUEL WOOD (1000 Cubic Meters)	5,154	33,905	5,911	43,209	5,750	37,829	5,635	37,072	5,520	36,316	5,290	34,803	5,000	32,895	4,800	31,579	4,600	30,263
LOGS AND POLES (1000 Cubic Meters)	926	14,656	384	6,075	500	10,249	548	11,233	550	11,274	555	11,376	525	10,762	500	10,249	475	9,736
REFORESTATION (1000 Acres)	-	-	-	-	-	-	250	-	250	-	350	-	550	-	550	-	550	-
Total Values		50,894		55,034		53,603		53,749		52,871		51,217		48,532		46,541		44,549

NOTES: (1) The heavy cutting of South Korea's forests during the war to obtain wood needed for Japan's war effort, and the continued heavy cutting by the Koreans since the end of the war, in large part to supply fuel, lumber, poles, and ties which would normally have been secured from North Korea, have resulted in denuding an estimated three million acres. A ten year plan has been prepared by the Bureau of Forestry, Department of Agriculture, to reforest this area and to do such further planting as future cutting will necessitate. The reforestation program, as outlined, is designed to meet the minimum requirements of South Korea; but a decrease in forestry production in the years 1948 through 1953 is inevitable, due to decrease in the growing stock. A slight increase in the production of logs and poles in the years 1948 through 1950 is possible because of plans to open up stands of timber which are at present inaccessible.

(2) All values are shown in $1.000.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA
APPENDIX 3

MARINE PRODUCTS
ESTIMATES (1)

ITEM	SOUTH KOREA FY 1936		FY 1946		FY 1947		FY 1948		FY 1949		FY 1950		FY 1951		FY 1952		FY 1953	
	Met. Tons	Value (2)	Met. Tons	Value (2)	Met. Tons	Value (2)	Met. Tons	Value (2)	Met. Tons	Value (2)	Met. Tons	Value (2)	Met. Tons	Value (2)	Met. Tons	Value (2)	Met. Tons	Value (2)
Fresh Fish	513,589	11,987	250,990	13,078	256,700	13,374	452,200	23,563	470,050	24,490	493,000	25,686	531,250	27,678	539,750	28,121	552,500	28,785
Shell Fish	14,103	410	29,528	1,540	30,200	1,570	53,200	2,766	55,300	2,876	58,000	3,016	62,500	3,250	63,500	3,302	65,000	3,380
Sea Weed	37,272	845	14,764	770	15,100	785	26,600	1,383	27,650	1,438	29,000	1,508	31,250	1,625	31,750	1,651	32,500	1,690
Total Values	—	13,242	—	15,388	—	15,729	—	27,709	—	28,804	—	30,210	—	32,553	—	33,074	—	33,855

NOTES: (1) Estimates are based on the successful exploitation of the Yellow and the South China Seas, and protection from encroachment on the part of other powers.

(2) Values are shown in $1,000.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

APPENDIX 4

TEXTILE PRODUCTION ESTIMATES

ITEM	1936 (1) Units	1936 (1) Value All Korea	1936 (1) Value So Korea	Fy 1946 (1) Units	Fy 1946 (1) Value	Fy 1947 (1) Units	Fy 1947 (1) Value	Fy 1948 (1) Units	Fy 1948 (1) Value	Fy 1949 (1) Units	Fy 1949 (1) Value	Fy 1950 (1) Units	Fy 1950 (1) Value	Fy 1951 (1) Units	Fy 1951 (1) Value	Fy 1952 (1) Units	Fy 1952 (1) Value	Fy 1953 (1) Units	Fy 1953 (1) Value
Cotton Yarn (pounds)	54,020	1,404	1,404	7,200	4,752	16,240	10,718	40,000	26,400	57,400	37,884	59,400	39,204	59,400	39,204	59,400	39,204	59,400	39,204
Cotton Cloth (yards)	206,360	1,857	1,85	18,600	18,600	27,700	27,700	92,000	92,000	129,800	129,800	152,000	152,000	152,000	152,000	152,000	152,000	152,000	152,000
Wool Yarn (pounds)	----	----	----	159	453	240	684	478	1,362	560	1,596	642	1,829	700	1,995	730	2,080	730	2,080
Wool Cloth (yards)	10	16	16	78	264	281	984	500	1,750	609	2,130	698	2,443	760	2,660	794	2,779	794	2,779
Silk Cloth (yards)	9,167	17,420	17,420	5,300	15,900	7,660	22,980	8,000	24,000	8,000	24,000	8,500	25,500	9,500	28,500	10,500	31,500	11,500	34,500
Hemp Yarn (pounds)	394	140	140	----	----	----	----	240	120	1,000	500	1,200	600	1,200	600	1,200	600	1,200	600
Hemp Cloth (yards)	20,135	11,276	11,276	----	----	----	----	480	360	2,000	1,500	2,400	1,800	2,400	1,800	2,400	1,800	2,400	1,800
Flax Yarn (pounds)	----	----	----	92	184	151	302	100	200	100	200	1,200	2,400	1,200	2,400	1,200	2,400	1,200	2,400
Linen Cloth (yards)	----	----	----	146	365	99	247	200	500	160	400	2,400	6,000	2,400	6,000	2,400	6,000	2,400	6,000
Spun Silk (pounds)	4,402	9,905	9,905	----	----	60	180	144	432	160	480	200	600	200	600	220	660	240	720
Rayon Fabrics (yards)	30,023	45,034	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
TOTAL VALUES	----	97,052	42,018	----	40,518	----	63,795	----	147,124	----	198,490	----	232,376	----	235,759	----	239,023	----	242,083

Note: (1) Units are shown in thousands, values are shown in thousands of dollars.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

APPENDIX 5

MACHINERY PRODUCTION ESTIMATES

ITEM	FY 1936 (1) ALL KOREA Met. Tons	FY 1936 (1) ALL KOREA Value	FY 1936 (1) SOUTH KOREA Value	FY 1946 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1946 (1) Value	FY 1947 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1947 (1) Value	FY 1948 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1948 (1) Value	FY 1949 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1949 (1) Value	FY 1950 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1950 (1) Value	FY 1951 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1951 (1) Value	FY 1952 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1952 (1) Value	FY 1953 (2) Met. Tons	FY 1953 (2) Value
Wooden Ships	20	1.3	.9	3	1.6	3.5	1.4	10	4	10	4	20	8	20	8	20	8	20	8
Rehabitation of Ships	20	1.3	.9	2	1	3	1.2	4	1.6	4	1.6	4	1.6	3	1.2	3	1.2	2	.8
Farm Implaments	.5	.08	.06	2.5	3.3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Machinery	6	2	1	.3	.8	1	2	1.8	3.6	2.9	5.8	2.9	5.8	3	6	4	8	5	10
Heavy, Metal Fabrication	60	8	.8	5	5.3	4	3.2	7.5	6	10	8	15	12	20	16	25	20	30	24
Miscellaneous Steel Fabricated Products	8	1.3	.29	.2	.2	.3	.2	.4	.4	.4	.4	.5	.5	.6	.6	.8	.8	1	1
Tools and Dies	12	8	.8	.01	.05	.03	.12	.08	.32	.08	.36	.1	.4	.1	.4	.1	.4	.1	.4
Household Utensils: Aluminum, Iron, and Brass	-	-	-	.5	.6	.6	.54	.65	.58	.7	.63	.7	.63	.7	.63	.7	.63	.7	.63
Nails	6	.06	.03	.5	.4	2	1.2	3	1.8	5	3	6	3.6	6	3.6	6	3.6	6	3.6
Hardware	-	-	-	.005	.01	.007	.01	.01	.02	.012	.02	.015	.03	.02	.04	.02	.04	.02	.04
Rail Rolling Stock; Rebuilding And Rehabiltation (1,000 of cars)	2	.1	.7	.4	.16	.6	.18	.9	.27	1.2	.36	1.2	.36	1.5	.45	1.5	.45	1.5	.45
Railroad Airbrakes (each)	2	.02	.01	.5	.04	.5	.03	.8	.04	1	.06	1	.06	1	.06	1.2	.07	1.2	.07
Miscellaneous Railway Accessories	2	.4	.02	.5	.8	1	1.2	2	2.4	3	3.6	3	3.6	3.5	4.2	3.5	4.2	4	4.8
Containers, Tin plated	1	.13	.06	.5	.53	1	.8	1.5	1.2	2	1.6	3	1.9	3.5	2.8	4	3.2	4.5	3.6
Total Values	-	22.69	5.57	-	14.79	-	15.08	-	25.23	-	32.43	-	40.48	-	45.98	-	52.59	-	59.39

NOTE: (1) In all cases Metric Tons are shown in thousands, and values are shown in Millions of dollars.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

APPENDIX 6

MINERAL PRODUCTION ESTIMATES
(In Metric Tons and Thousands of Dollars)

ITEM	FY 1936 ALL KOREA M.T.	FY 1936 ALL KOREA Value	FY 1936 SOUTH KOREA Value	FY 1946 M.T.	FY 1946 Value	FY 1947 M.T.	FY 1947 Value	FY 1948 M.T.	FY 1948 Value	FY 1949 M.T.	FY 1949 Value	FY 1950 M.T.	FY 1950 Value	FY 1951 M.T.	FY 1951 Value	FY 1952 M.T.	FY 1952 Value	FY 1953 M.T.	FY 1953 Value
Gold	20	24,690	6,173	.5	617.	1.5	1,852	4	4,938	5.3	6,543	6.7	8,271	8	9,876	9.3	11,481	10.7	13,209
Tungsten (60% WO_3)	1,767	2,893	2,459	200.	437.	800.	1,746	1,263	2,757	1,579.	3,447	.2,105.	4,595	3,368	7,352	4,210.	9,190	4,210.	9,190
Graphite	40,914	503	377	200.	4.3	3,000.	64	10,525	225	10,525.	225	15,800.	338	21,050	450	26,315.	563	26,315.	563
Lead	2,738	679	136	120.	40.	400.	132	1,330	439	1,330.	439	1,600.	528	3,330	1,099	4,000.	1,320	4,000.	1,320
Zinc	2,000	348	70	140.	32.	400.	93	800	186	1,000.	232	1,500.	348	2,500	580	3,500.	812	3,500.	812
Molybdenite	80	53	19	-	-	20.	18	80	71	100.	88	125.	110	200	176	250.	221	250.	221
Kaolin	24,712	306	92	-	-	1,000.	17	10,000	165	20,000.	330	30,000.	495	50,000	825	70,000.	1,155	70,000.	1,155
Silver	50	806	201	.6	13.	8.	172	16	344	20.	430	30.	644	50	1,074	80.	1,718	80.	1,718
Copper (Electrolytic)	2,500	878	132	300.	140.	400.	187	1,000	468	1,200.	562	1,600.	749	2,000	936	2,000.	936	2,000.	936
TOTAL VALUES		31,156	9,659		1,283.3		4,281		9,593		12,296		16,078		22,368		27,396		29,124

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA
APPENDIX 7
CHEMICAL PRODUCTION ESTIMATES

ITEM	FY 1936 (1) ALL KOREA Met. Tons	FY 1936 (1) ALL KOREA Value	FY 1936 (1) SOUTH KOREA Value	FY 1946 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1946 (1) Value	FY 1947 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1947 (1) Value	FY 1948 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1948 (1) Value	FY 1949 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1949 (1) Value	FY 1950 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1950 (1) Value	FY 1951 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1951 (1) Value	FY 1952 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1952 (1) Value	FY 1953 (1) Met. Tons	FY 1953 (1) Value
PAPER INDUSTRY:																			
Paper, Machine Made	.8	4	-	?	450	4	600	4.5	675	6	900	7	1,050	8	1,200	9	1,350	10	1,500
PROCESSED FOOD:																			
Flour	6	500	375	22	2,200	25	2,500	30	3,000	40	4,000	50	5,000	60	6,000	60	6,000	60	6,000
Noodles	1	150	112	1	250	3	750	4	1,000	6	1,500	8	2,000	10	2,500	10	2,500	10	2,500
RUBBER INDUSTRY:																			
Rubber Shoes	32	7,500	7,500	2	1,000	3	1,500	3.5	1,750	4	2,000	5	2,250	8	4,000	8	4,000	8	4,000
Bicycle Tires	.1	70	70	.02	20	.02	20	.03	30	.05	50	.05	50	.07	70	.08	80	.08	80
Automobile Tires	-	-	-	.02	20	.03	30	.05	50	.07	70	.1	100	.2	200	.3	300	.3	300
LEATHER INDUSTRY:																			
Leather Shoes	1	1,500	750	.4	1,200	.5	1,500	.6	1,800	.8	2,400	1	3,000	1.5	4,500	2	6,000	2	6,000
CERAMICS AND CEMENT:																			
Cement	600	6,000	-	2.5	50	3.5	70	25	500	50	1,000	75	1,500	75	1,500	75	1,500	75	1,500
Fire Brick	2	120	-	7.2	432	8	480	15	900	25	1,500	30	1,800	30	1,800	30	1,800	30	1,800
Common Brick	100	2,000	1,000	30	600	35	700	40	800	45	900	50	1,000	50	1,000	50	1,000	50	1,000
Pottery	1.5	1,500	1,125	.1	100	.15	150	.2	200	.3	300	.4	400	1	1,000	1.5	1,500	1.5	1,500
MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS:																			
Sulphuric Acid (2)	100	1,300	-	1.3	17	1	13	5	65	10	130	20	260	20	260	20	260	20	260
Fertilizer, Calcium superphosphate	40	1,200	-	2.6	78	1	30	10	300	20	600	125	3,750	150	4,500	250	7,500	250	7,500
Fertilizer, Calcium cyanimide	15	750	-	-	-	-	-	5	250	10	500	20	1,000	25	1,250	25	1,250	25	1,250
Fertilizer, Calcined alunite ore	-	-	-	1	5	2	10	10	50	20	100	30	150	40	200	40	200	40	200
Fertilizer, Potassium sulphate	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	750	50	1,500	50	1,500
Fertilizer, Ammonium nitrate	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	4,000	150	4,500
Coal, briquettes	205	1,300	650	75	750	100	1,000	150	1,500	200	2,000	200	2,000	200	2,000	200	2,000	200	2,000
Coke	300	2,500	250	20	160	25	200	35	280	50	400	70	560	70	560	70	560	70	560
Fats and oils	125	11,000	1,100	5	1,500	10	3,000	15	4,500	18	5,400	20	6,000	25	7,500	25	7,500	25	7,500
Insecticides and fungicides	.2	44	40	.02	4.4	.05	11	.06	13	.07	15	.1	22	.15	33	.15	33	.15	33
Carbide	50	7,000	-	7.8	1,092	3.5	1,190	10	1,400	11	1,540	12	1,680	12	1,680	12	1,680	12	1,680
Matches (3)	10	600	450	3	180	4	240	7	420	10	600	15	900	15	900	15	900	15	900
Soap	10	2,000	500	1.2	240	1.5	300	2	400	4	800	7	1,400	10	2,000	10	2,000	10	2,000
Total Values	-	47,038	13,922	-	10,348.4	-	14,294	-	19,883	-	26,705	-	35,872	-	45,403	-	54,413	-	56,069

NOTES: (1) Metric tons are shown in thousands, and values are shown in thousands of dollars

(2) In addition to that utilized in fertilizer production.

(3) Weights shown are in thousands of match tons.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

Appendix 8

Transportation

1. General.

a. The rehabilitation program proposed herein for South Korea will involve the movement of increasing tonnages of supplies into Korea (see Incl. 1) and the gradual build-up of a moderate volume of exports.

b. The transportation system of South Korea will be called upon to perform that task in addition to handling an increasing volume of domestic traffic arising from the rehabilitation of agriculture and industry. In order to reduce costs to the American taxpayers, it is contemplated that delivery will be taken on a certain percentage of the imports at ports in the United States. Shipments will be brought to Korea in Korean bottoms, unloaded and distributed by the transportation system. The major portion of the distribution within Korea will be accomplished by the railroad system with delivery being accomplished from the railhead to final destination by the utilization of available trucks, ox carts, and in some cases by manhandling.

2. Marine Transportation.

a. To meet requirements in the field of marine transportation, both ocean-going and coastal shipping, it is contemplated that additions will be made to the present merchant marine. It is not contemplated in the level of activity visualized that Korea will become a major factor in the maritime world, however, it is proposed that she will have a small fleet sufficient for her minimum needs. (See Incl. 2.)

b. The ports and port facilities of South Korea are adequate to handle the proposed tonnages. While requiring normal maintenance

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and some rehabilitation, the necessary facilities are, in general, now in existence.

3. Rail Transportation.

a. In order to handle and distribute the planned tonnages and requirements under the import-export program and to handle increasing domestic traffic, continued vigilance in railroad maintenance is imperative.

b. The tie replacement program must be continued. A creosoting program for ties has been instituted as a long-range measure of economy. Rails and accessories will continue to be needed over a period in order to overcome war-time neglect. Imports of unit construction bridges, surplus from Army stocks, will be required in moderate amounts to serve as reserves for the repair of recurrent flood damage. Cement is likewise needed for this purpose. Continued attention must be given over the period to railroad communications and signal equipment; principal items involved are poles, wire, insulators, switchboards, and other central office equipment. There is also a crying need for paint. From necessity, Korea has gone without paint for years and is paying the price in increasing costs of maintenance and replacements. Our rehabilitation plans include the use of considerable quantities of paint.

c. It is believed that the motive power situation on the railroad is now, in the main, adequate for the proposed program. With the receipt of ten Diesel Electric switch engines now on order and the shipment to us of spare parts from Japan for the rehabilitation of locomotives of Japanese manufacture, it is felt that sufficient power will be available to accomplish the needs of the program.

d. Goals have been set for the rehabilitation of approximately 3,000 non-operable freight and passenger cars. The principal items needed for the accomplishment of this program are wood and steel. With the receipt of 500 box cars and 500 gondola cars now

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on order, there should be sufficient rolling stock to barely meet the needs of the program insofar as they can be determined at the present time. Any unforeseen increases in traffic will require the additional import of approximately 1,000 freight cars. Sufficient passenger cars are now on hand to meet all foreseeable requirements.

e. Continued operation of the railroads is dependent on an adequate coal supply. This subject is treated at length elsewhere, but is repeated here for emphasis to indicate the critical nature of the problem. The railroads are the largest single users of coal.

4. Highway Transportation.

a. The roadnet in South Korea is extremely primitive. This results in increased time in transit for freight, increases in maintenance costs, and decreased life of vehicles.

b. There are in South Korea five to six thousand Japanese manufactured trucks averaging from eight to ten years in age. Their useful life has been exhausted, and each month sees additional numbers being scrapped. The backbone of highway transportation is approximately 3,600 surplus Army vehicles in operation with approximately 1,600 additional vehicles deadlined for parts. This program will require the replacement of Japanese trucks with an equivalent number of surplus Army vehicles and putting into operation of the present deadlined vehicles.

c. Bus transportation in South Korea is likewise in a decrepit state with most busses averaging from ten to twelve years in age. Need exists for approximately 500 busses to replace those worn out.

d. Private transportation is a critical need. One of the principal factors preventing the rehabilitation of Korea is the inability of the people to get readily from their homes to their

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places of work. Tremendous numbers of man hours are lost daily due to this deficiency. The condition of the roads does not warrant the type of vehicle engineered for the American highway, but it is considered that this need can be met by the import of jeeps from surplus stocks.

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INCLOSURE 1

ESTIMATED TONNAGES OF SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT TO BE MOVED TO SOUTH KOREA UNDER PROPOSED REHABILITATION PROGRAM

Fiscal Year 1949	-	2,300,000 Tons
Fiscal Year 1950	-	2,100,000 Tons
Fiscal Year 1951	-	1,800,000 Tons
Fiscal Year 1952	-	1,300,000 Tons
Fiscal Year 1953	-	1,300,000 Tons

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INCLOSURE 2

All programs heretofore planned for relief or rehabilitation in South Korea have of necessity included the allocation of a very large percentage of total appropriated funds for ocean freight charges. Estimates for ocean freight charges range from 25 to 40 percent of all monies set aside for South Korea. For example, in the proposed State Department Grant-in-Aid Program of approximately 600 million dollars, about 150 million dollars were set aside for this purpose. The purpose of this paper is to suggest means whereby appropriations can be reduced by the substitution of Korean goods and services for American dollars previously set aside for transportation charges.

It is estimated that the average cost of shipping one ton of freight from San Francisco to Pusan is a minimum $20 if this service is provided by an American shipping company. It is not suggested that Koreans will be able to perform shipping services for themselves as efficiently as is the case with American companies. It is suggested, however, that the expenses of these services may well be shifted from the American taxpayer to the Korean who benefits under American grant-in-aid programs.

The following program is based on the utilization of surplus Liberty ships for Korean shipping, built for wartime operations, now rusting and rotting in the harbors of the United States. It is understood that there is at present an unusable surplus of these vessels in the United States and that all the needs of Government agencies and private shipping companies have been met.

Table 1, below, shows comparative charges against appropriated funds for the movement of one ton of freight by: (A) American Shipping; (B) Korean Shipping with amortization of the cost of a Liberty over a period of five years; and (C) Korean Shipping without amortization. For purposes of calculation, the cost of one Liberty ship is assumed to be $500,000, and that it is capable of making

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five round trips a year between San Francisco and Pusan. It is contemplated that delivery of vessels will be taken in American ports; that ships will be operable and manned by American crews for the first voyage to Korea; and that the first out-bound voyage from San Francisco will include a payload of cargo. It is also contemplated that subsequent voyages to and from the United States can be accomplished with key American personnel consisting of a Captain for each ship, a First Mate, Chief Engineer, and a radio operator who would supervise Korean crews. In the calculations outlined below, provision has been made for paying in American dollars the expenses involved in employing this American personnel for the full five year period under discussion. It is obvious, however, that economies in personnel costs can be effected year by year as Koreans attain necessary sea experience under the tutelage of skilled Americans.

Table 1

COMPARATIVE UNITED STATES OCEAN FREIGHT COSTS PER TON FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO PUSAN:

A. American Shipping .....$20.00 per ton

B. Korean Shipping, amortization over 5 year period.....$10.29 per ton 1/

C. Korean Shipping, excluding amortization.....$ 7.62 per ton 2/

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1/ Cost per Liberty.....$500,000

First Voyage expenses:

Food	$ 4,000
Wages	$21,000
Bunkers	$18,000
United States Port Charges	$ 7,000
Stores	$ 5,000
Insurance	$ 4,000
Stevedoring, 7500 tons general cargo	$16,000
Total Expenses	$ 75,000

Subsequent Voyage expenses:

Wages and subsistence of American personnel	$ 7,400
Bunkers	$18,000
United States Port Charges	$ 7,000
Insurance	$ 4,000
Repairs	$ 4,000
Stevedoring, 7500 tons general cargo	$16,000
Total Expenses	$56,400

$56,400 times 24 voyages equals..$1,353,600

Total cost for one ship for 25 voyages over five year period..$1,928,600

Average cost per voyage.....$ 77,144.00

Cost per voyage divided by 7500 tons, capacity of a Liberty Ship, equals.....$ 10.29 p/

2/ Total Cost as in 1/, above, minus purchase price of Liberty Ship.....$1,428,600.00

Average Cost per Voyage.....$ 57,144.00

Cost per Voyage divided by 7500 tons, capacity of Liberty Ship, equals.....$ 7.62 p/

This report contemplates the importation of tonnages ranging as high as 2.3 million tons in 1949 with reductions being effected to about 1.3 million tons in 1953. If this grant-in-aid program is to be approved and these tonnages firmed-up, a substantial

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number of Liberty ships should be made available to carry out the provisions of the program.

Calculations on the number of Liberty Ships required can be made as follows:

Cargo capacity, one ship per voyage	7,500 tons
Cargo capacity, one ship five voyages per year	37,500 tons
Minimum tonnage projected for any one year during five year period	1,300,000 tons
Number of ships required to move minimum tonnage	34 plus

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that steps be taken immediately to effect the procurement, repair, and crewing of 5 Liberty Ships to initiate support for the proposed rehabilitation program for South Korea. Based on actual operating experience with these five ships, additional recommendations will be made, if justified, for the placing in service of 30 additional vessels.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

Appendix 9

Communications

1. Present Condition.

a. The Department of Communications operates both the Postal Service and electrical communications such as the telephone, telegraph and radio systems which were constructed and operated by the Japanese during their control of Korea. In consequence of the pressure of war and lack of maintenance facilities for a number of years, the Japanese failed to provide adequate maintenance and replacement in the communications system. In consequence, the entire plant was in need of major overhaul and replacement at the conclusion of the war. Since the American occupation, due to scarcity of materials and technical personnel, the deterioration of the communications plant has been scarcely more than suspended.

b. Radio communications which provide ship-to-shore and some radio range facilities are operable at a low level of efficiency. The point-to point system of sixteen stations consists mostly of obsolescent power and radio equipment.

c. The telegraph net uses, for the most part, the wire circuits of the telephone system. It is poorly organized and service is unsatisfactory. The system, however, is sufficiently comprehensive that moderate improvement in efficiency can furnish adequate service for the Korean community.

d. The telephone system has suffered most during this period of inattention with the consequence that it cannot be estimated at more than 25% efficiency when compared with its maximum capability under the Japanese. The condition of the system has made it necessary to curtail subscriber lines to a number capable of service through the remaining operable central office equipment. It is believed that the present telephone plant, by continual maintenance and replacement of worn out plants, can be made to service strictly

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Korean needs for a year or so. It cannot be made to service foreign advisory personnel who expect a high level of telephone service.

e. It must be especially noted that American personnel in Korea are served by military exchanges, maintained and operated by military personnel. The maximum extent of assistance from the Korean system consists in the use of physical circuits by military personnel, using their own terminal equipment.

f. It has been impossible to secure the necessary civilian technical personnel required to operate and rehabilitate facilities or conduct training of Korean operative employees. The loss of approximately 5,000 Japanese administrative, supervisory and technical communications employees through repatriation, has left the communications facilities at the lowest ebb of technical performance.

g. It is concluded, therefore, that for Korean use the present plant can be made to perform only limited service, but it is without value for use of Occidentals.

2. Rehabilitation Requirements and Prospects.

a. To provide an estimate of need in communications requires either direct knowledge or an assumption of its future employment. It is, therefore, assumed that the telephone plant in Korea will, over the next few years, be required to service American and English-speaking Korean personnel with an efficiency approaching that of American telephone service. To provide such service requires:

1st - large scale replacement and rehabilitation of equipment.

2nd - technical and engineering personnel to accomplish the work, and

3rd - that an adequate force of qualified workmen and instructors be maintained on the job.

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This is necessary, not only to insure operation of the equipment but to progressively train Korean assistants who would eventually replace the Americans. In the training of Korean personnel, it is not believed that theoretical training can be made effective but that "On the Job" training, with each employee required to develop a small skill, would prove valuable over a period of years. At this point, it must be noted that the language barrier dictates use of Japanese or many interpreters.

b. On the minimum level it is not believed that replacement of telephone plant outside the larger centers of population would be required. Inasmuch as the advisory personnel will be in those centers, the scale of replacement should be such that it would provide adequate service for them and a reasonable level of service for the Korean business community. Such an installation program should be engineered to include both central office and outside cable and aerial distribution plant. Such a project, if performed with American materials and American personnel, might be expected to approach ten million dollars in cost.

c. One additional facility which has been in operation is the Seoul-Pusan section of the Tokyo-Mukden underground cable. This cable forms the axis of long distance communications in Korea and has been maintained in service only with the greatest effort. Substantial replacement of storage battery and power plant equipment should be provided.

3. Summary.

a. The present plant cannot provide adequate communications due to lack of technicians and worn out equipment.

b. A new central office and distribution plant will solve only a small portion of the problem.

c. Competent engineers and technicians are absolutely essential to install new equipment.

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d. After installation, an adequate force of specialists must be maintained to insure operation and collateral training of Korean personnel on the job until they are qualified to take over.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

Appendix 10

Public Works

1. Highways:

a. On entering Korea in September 1945, American occupation forces were confronted with nine thousand (9,000) miles of national highways and provincial roads, plus one thousand (1,000) miles of city streets which were practically impassable, having been ravaged by floods or worn out from heavy war traffic. No maintenance work had been accomplished for a period of several years.

b. Because of the lack of highway communications, many outlying centers of population are completely isolated during portions of each year and "farm to market" movement of products is severely limited.

c. Structural materials required to repair and maintain highways and bridges are practically non-existent in South Korea. Absolute minimum repairs and rehabilitation requiring imported materials call for repairing 275,000 linear yards of highway bridges and 8,000,000 square yards of asphalt patching on main arterials through the thirty-six (36) major cities of South Korea.

d. To provide minimum road maintenance and rehabilitation, considerable shipments of heavy construction equipment have been received in Korea by the Public Works Dept. Spare parts must be imported for this equipment to insure its continued operation as no parts are available in Korea.

2. Flood Control:

a. In South Korea three hundred eleven (311) rivers and streams present flood control problems. Seven hundred thousand (700,000) feet of levees have been constructed to protect 1,500,000 acres of rice land yielding an annual crop valued at 1.5 billion yen. To complete the levee enclosure there will be future construction of 1,250,000 feet of levees to protect 2,190,000 acres of rice land.

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b. This work can be greatly expedited by the use of heavy equipment, further importation of which will be required. Such use entails continued importation of spare parts and fuel for the equipment.

3. Waterworks:

a. Adequate water supply and efficiently functioning water distributing systems are vital to the health and welfare of the Korean people. Most of the existing plants were designed to produce less than fifty (50) gallons per capita per day. Neglect, plant deterioration, and distributing system leakage bring the average per capita supply down to about seventeen (17) gallons per day. Chlorinators must be replaced and continuing amounts of both liquid and powdered chlorine must be imported.

b. In terms of needed materials practically all elements of both plants and distributing systems depend upon imports. Pumps, pipe, fittings, cement, lumber, meters, all are urgently needed to rehabilitate the systems.

c. Improvement in water supply would have the secondary, but important, result of raising morale among American soldiers and civilians.

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S E C R E T

REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

Appendix 11

UTILITIES

1. Before the occupation, the electric power generating system in Korea operated as a country-wide unit. Power generated in the South helped supply the grid which drew most of its available energy from the hydro-electric plants in the North. Many of the plants now in use in the South have previously operated only on a stand-by basis. Their present operation provides only from one-fourth (1/4) to one-third (1/3) of the power now being consumed in South Korea.

2. The power agreement signed in 1947 with the Soviet Command in North Korea would indicate that South Korea may continue to purchase energy in increasing amounts as the generating plants in North Korea are rehabilitated with equipment from South Korea, supplied as part payment for energy consumed in South Korea. The modest capital investment contemplated herein for new power facilities is largely predicated on a continuance of this agreement.

3. It is proposed to complete by 1952 additional generating plants in South Korea largely to assure the continuance of fertilizer production, and, together with present plants, provide approximately fifty percent (50%) of the estimated demand for all activities. In addition, the present generating, transmission, and distributing plants and systems require rehabilitation to reach capacity and to provide the necessary transmission and distribution facilities.

ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRIC POWER

Fiscal Year	Consumption (1)	Source (1) South Korea	North Korea
1936	2,337	466	1,871
1946	690	230	460
1947	800	267	533

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Fiscal Year	Consumption (1)	Source (1) South Korea	North Korea
1948	920	307	613
1949	1,050	350	700
1950	1,200	400	800
1951	1,320	430	890
1952	2,100	1,166 (2)	934
1953	2,100	1,166	934

Notes: (1) Amounts shown are in millions of KWH.

(2) 100,000 KW generating plants completed.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

Appendix 12
Summary Statement of Program

Starting with Fiscal Year 1949
(in $1,000,000)

CATEGORY	(1) 1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Grain and Food	30.0	25.1	15.7	3.3	2.0	1.2
Grains & Pulses	25.8	21.2	12.0	----	----	----
Salt	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.1	.8	----
Sugar	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Agriculture	15.4	44.5	46.8	24.5	14.9	7.2
Fertilizer	14.5	28.5	30.5	14.9	8.0	1.3
Agricultural Supplies	.1	1.6	1.3	.3	.3	.3
Forest Products	.2	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Irrigation	.3	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Fisheries	.3	9.4	10.3	4.6	1.9	.9
Petroleum & Products	4.7	5.5	6.0	6.2	6.2	6.2
Medical Supplies and Equipment	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0
Industries & Utilities	16.3	101.3	63.6	50.5	43.9	42.1
Textiles	6.0	14.9	16.2	15.6	15.3	15.3
Machinery	.2	.8	.8	.6	.3	.3
Utilities	.2	20.2(2)	7.0(2)	3.1	1.6	1.0
Public Works	.6	.8	1.5	.6	.4	.4
Mining	1.0	14.5	12.5	9.5	7.5	6.0
Chemical Industries	.1	27.5(3)	4.4	4.1	3.3	3.3
Transportation	2.2	15.6	15.2	14.0	13.2	13.5
Communications	1.0	5.0	4.0	1.0	.3	.3
Electric Power	5.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Civilian Pay and Travel	5.5	11.0	11.0	9.0	7.0	5.2
Transportation	17.5	38.0	35.6	19.9	11.4	11.4
Educational Activities	1.2	6.5	5.5	4.5	3.3	2.1
GRAND TOTALS	92.7	233.4	185.7	118.9	89.7	76.4

(1) 1948 figures are allocations made to Korea out of GARIOA appropriations.
(2) These figures include expenditures of $14,500,000 for rehabilation of existing electric power installations, and supporting electric power installations for fertilizer plants. Won expenditures not included.
(3) This figure includes Capital Expenditure for fertilizer plants. Won expenditures not included.

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APPENDIX 13

CLASSIFIED BY CATEGORY
(In Millions of Dollars)

		1948	1949				1950				1951				1952				1953			
		Total Dollars	Materials and Supplies	Repairs & Repl. Parts	Capital Investment	Total Dollars	Materials and Supplies	Repairs & Repl. Parts	Capital Investment	Total Dollars	Materials and Supplies	Repairs & Repl. Parts	Capital Investment	Total Dollars	Materials and Supplies	Repairs & Repl. Parts	Capital Investment	Total Dollars	Materials and Supplies	Repairs & Repl. Parts	Capital Investment	Total Dollars
113.	Grain and Food	30.0	24.7	-	.4	25.1	15.1	-	.6	15.7	2.7	-	.6	3.3	2.0	-	-	2.0	1.2	-	-	1.2
	Grains and Pulses	25.8	21.2	-	-	21.2	12.0	-	-	12.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Salt	3.0	2.3	-	.4	2.7	1.9	-	.6	2.5	1.5	-	.6	2.1	.8	-	-	.8	-	-	-	-
	Sugar	1.2	1.2	-	-	1.2	1.2	-	-	1.2	1.2	-	-	1.2	1.2	-	-	1.2	1.2	-	-	1.2
123.	Agriculture	15.4	36.2	4.2	4.1	44.5	38.0	2.9	5.9	46.8	20.1	1.5	2.9	24.5	12.96	-	1.9	14.9	6.3	-	.9	7.2
	Fertilizer	14.5	28.5	-	-	28.5	30.5	-	-	30.5	14.9	-	-	14.9	8.0	-	-	8.0	1.3	-	-	1.3
	Agricultural Supplies	.1	1.5	-	.1	1.6	1.3	-	-	1.3	.3	-	-	.3	.26	-	-	.3	.3	-	-	.3
	Forest Products	.2	3.1	-	-	3.1	3.0	-	-	3.0	3.0	-	-	3.0	3.0	-	-	3.0	3.0	-	-	3.0
	Irrigation	.3	.9	-	1.0	1.9	.8	-	.9	1.7	.8	-	.9	1.7	.8	-	.9	1.7	.8	-	.9	1.7
	Fisheries	.3	2.2	4.2	3.0	9.4	2.4	2.9	5.0	10.3	1.1	1.5	2.0	4.6	.9	-	1.0	1.9	.9	-	-	.9
133.	Petroleum and Products	4.7	5.5	-	-	5.5	6.0	-	-	6.0	6.2	-	-	6.2	6.2	-	-	6.2	6.2	-	-	6.2
153.	Medical Supplies and Equipment	1.9	1.3	.2	-	1.5	1.4	.1	-	1.5	1.0	-	-	1.0	1.0	-	-	1.0	1.0	-	-	1.0
163.	Industries and Utilities	16.3	36.2	24.1	41.0	101.3	38.2	20.5	4.9	63.6	36.6	12.15	1.8	50.5	35.3	7.53	1.1	43.9	34.8	7.3	-	42.1
	Textiles	6.0	13.6	1.1	.2	14.9	15.3	.8	.1	16.2	15.2	.4	-	15.6	15.1	.2	-	15.3	15.1	.2	-	15.3
	Machinery	.2	.3	.5	-	.8	.3	.5	-	.8	.3	.3	-	.6	.3	-	-	.3	.3	-	-	.3
	Utilities	.2	-	2.4	17.8	20.2	-	2.2	4.8	7.0	-	1.3	1.8	3.1	-	.5	1.1	1.6	-	1.0	-	1.0
	Public Works	.6	.7	.1	-	.8	1.4	.1	-	1.5	.6	.05	-	.6	.4	.03	-	.4	.4	.03	-	.4
	Mining	1.0	6.1	8.4	-	14.5	5.8	6.7	-	12.5	5.3	4.2	-	9.5	5.0	2.5	-	7.5	4.5	1.5	-	6.0
	Chemical Industry	.1	4.2	.3	23.0	27.5	4.1	.3	-	4.4	3.9	.2	-	4.1	3.2	.1	-	3.3	3.2	.1	-	3.3
	Transportation	2.2	9.3	6.3	-	15.6	9.3	5.9	-	15.2	9.3	4.7	-	14.0	9.3	3.9	-	13.2	9.3	4.2	-	13.5
	Communications	1.0	-	5.0	-	5.0	-	4.0	-	4.0	-	1.0	-	1.0	-	.3	-	.3	-	.3	-	.3
	Electric Power	5.0	2.0	-	-	2.0	2.0	-	-	2.0	2.0	-	-	2.0	2.0	-	-	2.0	2.0	-	-	2.0
413.	Civilian Pay and Travel	5.5	-	-	-	11.0	-	-	-	11.0	-	-	-	9.0	-	-	-	7.0	-	-	-	5.2
423.	Transportation	17.5	-	-	5.0	38.0	-	-	10.0	35.6	-	-	-	19.9	-	-	-	11.4	-	-	-	11.4
513.	Educational Activities	1.2	4.5	1.0	1.0	6.5	3.5	1.0	1.0	5.5	3.5	.5	.5	4.5	2.5	.3	.5	3.3	1.9	.1	.1	2.1
	Grand Totals	92.5	108.4	29.5	51.5	233.4	102.2	24.5	22.4	185.7	70.1	14.15	5.8	118.9	60.0	7.83	3.5	89.7	-	7.4	1.0	76.4

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By NARS, Date

REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

APPENDIX 14

ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS

	FY 1949 (1) Metric Tons	FY 1949 (1) Value	FY 1950 (1) Metric Tons	FY 1950 (1) Value	FY 1951 (1) Metric Tons	FY 1951 (1) Value	FY 1952 (1) Metric Tons	FY 1952 (1) Value	FY 1953 (1) Metric Tons	FY 1953 (1) Value
113. Grains and Foods										
New Salterns and Salt mfg. facilities		.4		.6		.6		-		-
123. Agriculture										
Agricultural Supplies		.1		-		-		-		-
Irrigation Projects		1.0		.9		.9		.9		.9
Fisheries:										
Additional Vessels		3.0		5.0		2.0		.3		-
New Canneries and Processing Plants		-		-		-		.7		-
163. Industries and Utilities										
Textiles:										
Cotton Industry		.1		.06		-		-		-
Silk Industry		.05		.02		-		-		-
Wool Industry		.05		.02		-		-		-
Utilities:										
Electric Generation for Proposed Fertilizer Production		10.0		-		-		-		-
Generation		3.0		1.9		.66		.4		-
Transmission		.9		.5		.23		.15		-
Distribution		3.0		1.9		.66		.4		-
Miscellaneous Utilities		.9		.5		.25		.15		-
Chemical Industry:										
Fertilizer -										
Nitrogen Fixation Plant		13.0		-		-		-		-
Tricalcium Phosphate Plant		7.0		-		-		-		-
Potassium Sulphate Plant		3.0		-		-		-		-
423. Transportation										
Thirty (30) Liberty Ships		5.0		10.0		-		-		-
513. Educational Activities										
Koreans to U. S.		1.0		1.0		.5		.5		.1
GRAND TOTALS	24.5	51.5	5.8	22.4	2.9	5.8	1.8	3.5	.5	1.0

Note: (1) Metric Tons are shown in thousands, and values in millions of dollars.

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

Analysis of Materials & Supplies Requirements

Appendix 15

MT - 1,000's
$ - 1,000,000

		1949		1950		1951		1952		1953	
113.	Grains and Food	MT	$	MT	$	MT	$	MT	$	MT	$
	Grains and Pulses	275.	21.2	120	12.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Salt	230.0	2.3	190.0	1.9	150	1.5	80	.8	0	0
	Sugar	7.0	1.2	7.0	1.2	7.0	1.2	7.0	1.2	7.0	1.2
123.	Agriculture										
	Fertilizer										
	Ammonium Nitrate	341.0	22.2	350.0	22.4	180	10.0	100	6.0	0	0
	Phosphate Rock	75.0	.4	100.0	.5	205	1.0	260.0	1.3	260.0	1.3
	Fused Tricalcium Phos.	140.0	3.5	183.0	4.6	100	2.5	20	.5	0	0
	Potassium Sulphate	68.0	2.4	86.0	3.0	50	1.4	7	.2	0	0
	Agriculture Supplies										
	Seeds		.06		.01		.01		.01		.01
	Chemicals (except fertilizer)		1.44		1.29		.25		.25		.25
	Forest Products										
	Veneer Stock	.8	.03	.8	.03	.8	.03	.8	.03	.8	.03
	Ship Timber	4.6	.3	4.6	.3	4.6	.3	4.6	.3	4.6	.3
	Box Boards	10.4	.4	10.4	.4	10.4	.4	10.4	.4	10.4	.4
	Bldg. Lumber	18.0	1.07	18.0	1.07	18.0	1.07	18.0	1.07	18.0	1.07
	Furniture Stock	1.6	.2	1.6	.2	1.6	.2	1.6	.2	1.6	.2
	Wheel Stock	2.2	.3	2.2	.3	2.2	.3	2.2	.3	2.2	.3
	Telephone Poles	20,000 Poles	.5	20,000 Poles	.5	20,000 Poles	.5	20,000 Poles	.5	20,000 Poles	.5
	Misc. Forest Products		.3		.2		.2		.2		.2
	Irrigation										
	Cement	30.3	.9	30.0	.8	30.0	.8	30.0	.8	30.0	.8
	Fisheries										
	Manila or Sisal Fibre	.7	.9	.7	.9	.3	.5	.2	.32	.2	.32
	Steel for Rope	.4	.15	.4	.15	.2	.07	.2	.07	.2	.07
	Tin Plate	1.1	.5	2.2	.95	1.1	.4	1.1	.5	1.1	.5
	Dye Extract	.14	.07	.14	.07	.07	.02	0	0	0	0
	Preservative (Sugar)	.2	.03	.2	.03	.08	.01	.08	.01	.08	.01
	Misc. Fishing Gear - nets. etc.	2.0	.55	1.0	.3	.3	.1	0	0	0	0
133.	Petroleum and Petroleum Prod.										
	Gasoline	73.0	1.9	80.0	2.05	82.0	2.15	82.0	2.15	82.0	2.15
	Kerosene	23.0	.5	25.0	.6	25.0	.6	25.0	.6	25.0	.6
	Diesel Oil	55.0	.9	60.0	1.0	62.0	1.1	62.0	1.1	62.0	1.1
	Grease	4.5	.1	4.7	.15	4.7	.15	4.7	.15	4.7	.15
	Lube Oil	12.0	1.4	12.2	1.5	12.2	1.5	12.2	1.5	12.2	1.5
	Navy Special Fuel	83.0	.7	83.0	.7	83.0	.7	83.0	.7	83.0	.7
	Electric Power from North Korea		2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0

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M. Tons - 1,000's
$ - 1,000,000's

Analysis of Materials & Supplies (Con't)

	1949 M.T.	1949 $	1950 M.T.	1950 $	1951 MT.	1951 $	1952 M.T.	1952 $	1953 M.T.	1953 $
153. Medical Supplies and Equipment. (drugs, chemicals, hospital supplies and equipment)	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
163. Industries and Utilities										
Textiles--										
Lint cotton	15.0	10.55	17.0	12.25	17.0	12.3	17.0	12.3	17.0	12.3
Bleaching and Dyeing (for cotton)	.002	.25	.002	.25	.001	.15	.001	.1	.001	.1
Dyes (for silk)	.001	.05	.001	.05	.001	.03		.01		.01
Wool Yarn	.8	2.25	.8	2.25	.8	2.25	.8	2.25	.8	2.25
Scoured Wool	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5
Machinery--										
Carbon Steel	.35	.03	.3	.03	.3	.03	.3	.03	.3	.03
Special Steel	.15	.03	.2	.04	.2	.04	.2	.04	.2	.04
Pig Iron	6.0	.11	6.0	.1	6.0	.11	6.0	.11	6.0	.11
Tin Plate (see fisheries)	.1	.05	.1	.05	.1	.05	.1	.05	.1	.05
Aluminum	.3	.06	.3	.06	.3	.06	.3	.06	.3	.06
Special Wire	.03	.02	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01
Utilities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Public Works										
Cement	20.0	.315	20.0	.31	10.0	.17	1.0	.016	1.0	.016
Asphalt	13.0	.33	20.0	.5	14.4	.36	10.0	.284	10.0	.284
Structural Steel	0	0	3.0	.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lead Wool	.025	.025	.025	.025	.025	.025	.025	.025	.025	.025
Chlorine HTH	.025	.01	.063	.025	.063	.025	.063	.025	.063	.025
Chlorine	.075	.012	.075	.012	.075	.012	.075	.012	.075	.012
Dynamite, fuses, etc.	.03	.008	.1	.028	.03	.008	.03	.008	.03	.008
Mining										
Bituminous Coal for Industry (see trans.)	25.0	4.5	25.0	4.5	25.0	4.5	25.0	4.5	25.0	4.5
Mining Materials (reagen ts, dynamite etc.)	.4	1.6	.4	1.3	.2	.8	.2	.5		0
Chemical Industries										
Paper Industry										
Sulphite Pulp	7.5	.970	7.5	.97	7.5	.97	3.7	.49	3.7	.49
Soda Ash	.3	.007	.3	.007	.15	.004	.08	.002	.08	.002
Caustic Soda	.7	.041	.7	.041	.7	.041	.7	.041	.7	.041
Chemicals	.3	.037	.3	.037	.15	.023	.1	.015	.1	.015
Paper for Monopoly Bureau	.8	.3	.8	.3	.8	.3	.8	.3	.8	.3
Processed Foods										
Salt	1.5	.05	1.5	.05	1.5	.05	1.5	.05	1.5	.05
Sugar	.7	.115	.7	.115	.7	.115	.7	.115	.7	.115
Hydrochloric Acid	.4	.02	.4	.02	.4	.02	.01	.006	.01	.006
Hardened Oils	.05	.02	.05	.02	.05	.02	.05	.02	.05	.02

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ANALYSIS OF MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES (Cont'd)
Appendix 15

M. Tons - 1,000's
$ - 1,000,000's

	1949		1950		1951		1952		1953	
	M.T.	$	M.T.	$	M.T.	$	M.T.	$	M.T.	$
163 OTHER SUPPLIES (Cont'd)										
Rubber Industry										
Rubber (Chinese Prime)	.75	.26	.75	.26	.75	.26	.75	.20	.75	.20
Rubber (good & fine)	2.5	.88	2.5	.88	2.5	.88	2.5	.88	2.5	.88
Processing Chemicals	.6	.12	.6	.12	.6	.12	.6	.12	.6	.12
Ceramics and Cement Industry										
Gypsum	5.0	.15	5.0	.15	5.0	.15	5.0	.15	5.0	.15
Chemicals (fluxes, coloring, etc.)	.01	.001	.01	.02	.01	.001	.01	.001	.01	.001
Leather Industry										
Raw hides (cow, untanned)	1.0	.15	1.0	.15	1.0	.15	1.0	.15	1.0	.15
Tanning extract	.010	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
Waffle bark	.030	.002	.03	.002	.03	.002	.03	.002	.03	.002
Yosabushi bark	.2	.002	.2	.002	.2	.002	.2	.002	.2	.002
Misc. Chemicals	.02	.008	.02	.008	.02	.008	.01	.004	.01	.006
Chemical Industry										
Carbonates (Mg & Ca)	1.5	.15	1.5	.15	1.0	.10	.5	.05	.5	.05
Oils and Fats	.8	.48	.8	.48	.5	.30	.5	.3	.5	.3
Nitric Acid	.4	.04	.4	.04	.4	.04	.4	.04	.4	.04
Paraffin	.26	.05	.26	.05	.26	.05	.26	.05	.26	.05
Salt (tech)	1.0	.035	1.0	.035	1.0	.035	.5	.02	.5	.02
Linseed oil	.04	.015	.04	.015	.04	.015	.04	.015	.04	.015
Soda ash	.35	.009	.35	.009	.35	.009	0	0	0	0
Pitch, Coal Tar	.27	.016	.27	.016	.27	.016	.27	.016	.27	.016
Naptha, solvent	.07	.019	.07	.019	.07	.019	.07	.019	.07	.019
Pigments	.05	.035	.05	.035	.05	.035	.05	.035	.05	.035
Sulfuric acid	.09	.002	.09	.002	.09	.002	0	0	0	0
Hydrochloric acid	.2	.013	.2	.013	.2	.013	.1	.01	.1	.01
Misc. chemicals	.43	.183	.25	.04	.2	.13	.1	.087	.1	.04
Transportation & Communications										
Coal, bit, for RR (See Mining)	600.0	9.0	600	9.0	600	9.0	600	9.0	600	9.0
Pitch, coal tar for briquettes for R.R. (see chemicals)	30.0	.3	30	.3	30	.3	30	.3	30	.3
513 EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES.										
Textbook materials & supplies	1.0	3.0	.7	2.0	.5	2.0	.4	1.2	.2	.9
Laboratory supplies & Equipment	.6	.6	.6	.6	.5	.5	.1	.3	.1	.1
Visual Education materials	.05	.1	.05	.1	.05	.1	.05	.1	.05	.1
Education materials & equipment	.01	.2	.01	.2	.02	.3	.01	.3	.01	.2
Misc. sports, music, etc.	.01	.1	.01	.1	.01	.1	.01	.1	.01	.1
Public Information (film, libraries, magazines, pictures, exhibits, etc.)	.05	.5	.05	.5	.05	.5	.03	.5	.01	.5
GRAND TOTAL	2204.0	108.4	2130.9	102.2	1768.3	70.1	1308.8	60.0	1308.8	51.4

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA
OF REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS

APPENDIX 16

	1949 Met. Ton	1949 Value	1950 Met. Ton	1950 Value	1951 Met. Ton	1951 Value	1952 Met. Ton	1952 Value	1953 Met. Ton	1953 Value
123. Agriculture:										
Fisheries										
Rehabilitation of canneries and factories		2.0		1.5		.5		0		0
Repairs to existing fleet		2.0		1.0		1.0		0		0
Repairs to buildings and equipment		.15		.35		0		0		0
Experiment Station		.05		.05		0		0		0
153. Medical Supplies and Equipment										
Repair and Replacement parts laboratories		.2		.1		0		0		0
163. Industries and Utilities										
Textile										
Cotton industry repair and replacement parts		.83		.6		.3		.165		.165
Silk industry repair and replacement parts		.15		.15		.1		.025		.025
Wool industry repair and replacement parts		.1		.03		.01		.010		.010
Hemp and ramie repair and replacement parts		.1		.03						
Machinery Industry repair and replacement		.5		.5		.3		0		0
Utilities (electric)										
Generation		.9		.8		.48		.2		.33
Transmission		.27		.28		.18		.07		.17
Distribution		.9		.8		.46		.2		.33
Misc. Utilities		.21		.315		.14		.03		.17
Public Works repair and replacement parts		.1		.075		.05		.03		.03
Mining repair and replacement parts		8.4		6.7		4.2		2.5		1.5
Chemical Industries repair and replacement parts										
Paper industry		.05		.03		.03		0		0
Processed foods industry		.05		.05		.05		0		0
Rubber industry		.05		.05		.05		0		0
Ceramics and cement		.03		.03		.01		0		0
Leather industry		.03		.03		.01		0.		0.
Chemical industries		.130		.13		.08		.1		.1
Transportation repair and replacement equipment		6.3		5.9		4.7		3.9		4.17
Communications repair and replacement equipment		5.0		4.0		1.0		.3		.3
513. Educational Activities										
Transportation repair and replacement parts		.2		.2		.2		.2		0
Shop Equipment repair and replacement parts		.3		.3		0		0		0
Buildings repair and replacement parts		.5		.5		.3		.1		.1
Grand Total	14.7	29.5	12.8	24.5	7.1	14.15	3.9	7.3	3.7	7.4

NOTE: Metric Tons shown in thousands, and Values in millions of dollars.

APPENDIX 16

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA

EXPORT AVAILABILITIES
(In Metric Tons & Thousands of Dollars)

APPENDIX 17

Item	1936(1) M.T.	1936(1) Value	1946 M.T.	1946 Value	1947 M.T.	1947 Value	1948 M.T.	1948 Value	1949 M.T.	1949 Value	1950 M.T.	1950 Value	1951 M.T.	1951 Value	1952 M.T.	1952 Value	1953 M.T.	1953 Value
Minerals																		
Gold							3	3,703.6	4	4,939.2	5	6,172.7	6	7,408.8	7	8,643.3	8	9,878.3
Tungsten							1,200	1,800.0	1,500	2,250.0	2,000	3,000.0	3,200	4,800.0	4,000	6,000.0	4,000	6,000.0
Graphite							10,000	500.0	10,000	500.0	15,000	750.0	20,000	1,000.0	25,000	1,250.0	25,000	1,250.0
Lead Ore							1,000	330.0	1,000	330.0	1,200	396.0	2,500	825.0	3,000	990.0	3,000	990.0
Zinc Ore							800	144.0	1,000	180.0	1,500	270.0	2,500	450.0	3,500	630.0	3,500	630.0
Molybdenite							80	80.0	100	100.0	125	125.0	200	200.0	250	250.0	250	250.0
Kaolin							5,000	150.0	10,000	300.0	15,000	450.0	25,000	750.0	35,000	1,050.0	35,000	1,050.0
Silver							8	282.2	10	352.8	15	529.2	25	882.2	40	1,411.2	40	1,411.2
Copper (Elect.)							500	165.0	600	198.0	800	264.0	1,000	330.0	1,000	330.0	1,000	330.0
Sub-Totals	17,310.		2,489.		3,518.		18,591	7,154.8	24,214	9,150.0	35,645	11,956.9	54,431	16,646.0	71,797	20,554.5	71,798	21,789.5
Marine Products																		
Laver							576	2,300.0	1,000	4,000.0	1,250	5,000.0	1,500	6,000.0	1,500	6,000.0	1,500	6,000.0
Agar Agar							100	400.0	300	1,200.0	450	1,800.0	450	1,800.0	450	1,800.0	450	1,800.0
Whale Meat							1,500	450.0	1,500	450.0	2,000	600.0	2,000	600.0	2,000	600.0	2,000	600.0
Shark Fin							50	150.0	50	150.0	100	300.0	100	300.0	100	300.0	100	300.0
Mackerel							5,000	1,500.0	6,000	1,800.0	7,500	2,225.0	7,500	2,225.0	7,500	2,225.0	7,500	2,225.0
Dried Shrimp							500	350.0	750	515.0	1,000	700.0	1,000	700.0	1,000	700.0	1,000	700.0
Other Products							1,000	500.0	1,500	750.0	2,000	1,000.0	2,000	1,000.0	2,000	1,000.0	2,000	1,000.0
Sub-Totals	21,793.		630.		730.		8,726	5,650.0	11,100	8,865.0	14,300	11,625.0	14,550	12,625.0	14,550	12,625.0	14,550	12,625.0
Agricultural Products																		
Apples							4,500	180.0	4,500	180.0	6,000	240.0	6,000	240.0	6,000	240.0	6,000	240.0
Ginseng							12	2,000.0	24	4,000.0	30	5,000.0	36	5,000.0	42	5,000.0	48	5,000.0
Raw Silk							100	80.0	150	120.0	200	160.0	200	160.0	200	160.0	200	160.0
Cereals							—	—	—	—	—	—	50,000	5,000.0	100,000	10,000.0	150,000	15,000.0
Sub-Totals	65,382.		100.		100.		4,612	2,260.0	4,674	4,300.0	6,230	5,400.0	56,236	10,400.0	106,242	15,400.0	156,248	20,400.0
Manufactures																		
Hdwe. and Light Mfg.	18,380.						750	185.0	1,000	250.0	2,000	500.0	3,000	750.0	3,000	750.0	3,000	750.0
Handicrafts	--						750	520.0	1,000	700.0	1,500	1,050.0	2,000	1,400.0	2,000	1,400.0	2,000	1,400.0
Textiles	11,279.						—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sub-Totals	29,659.		—		--		1,500	705.0	2,000	950.0	3,500	1,550.0	5,000	2,150.0	5,000	2,150.0	5,000	2,150.0
Miscellaneous	38,051.		300.		300.		700	350.0	1,000	500.0	1,500	750.0	2,000	1,000.0	2,000	1,000.0	2,000	1,000.0
GRAND TOTALS	172,195.		3,519.		4,648.		34,129	16,119.8	42,988	23,765.0	61,175	31,281.9	132,217	42,821.0	199,589	51,729.5	249,596	57,964.5

Note: (1) Values shown in this column are for "All Korea", those shown in columns for 1946 to 1953, inclusive, represent figures for South Korea only.

Appendix 17

REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR. TOPO CO., CORPS SEPTEMBER, 1947

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REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR SOUTH KOREA
Appendix 18

FOREIGN TRADE POSITION
(In millions of dollars)

A. UNDER A REHABILITATION PROGRAM

	FY 1936	FY 1946	FY 1947	FY 1948	FY 1949	FY 1950	FY 1951	FY 1952	FY 1953	FY 1954
Imports (1)	221.2	24.	96.1	92.5	233.4	185.7	118.9	89.7	76.4	76.4
Exports (2)	172.1	3.5	4.6	16.1	23.7	31.2	42.8	51.7	57.9	57.9
Net Deficit	49.1	20.5	91.5	76.4	209.7	154.5	76.1	38.0	18.5	18.5
Accumulated deficit from 1 July 1949	-	-	-	-	209.7	364.2	440.3	478.3	496.8	515.3

Notes: (1) For details of import requirements see Appendix 12

(2) For details of export availabilities see Appendix 17

(3) These figures are based on the disease and unrest allocations to South Korea for 1947 and the United States Bureau of Budget's estimates for 1948.

APPENDIX 18.

B. UNDER THE PRESENT RELIEF PROGRAM

	FY 1936	FY 1946	FY 1947	FY 1948	FY 1949	FY 1950	FY 1951	FY 1952	FY 1953	FY 1954
Imports (3)	221.2	24.0	96.1	92.5	137.0	137.0	137.0	137.0	137.0	137.0
Exports	172.1	3.5	4.6	16.1	17.0	18.0	20.0	22.0	24.0	24.0
Net Deficit	49.1	20.5	91.5	76.4	120.0	119.0	117.0	115.0	113.0	113.0
Accumulated deficit from 1 July 1949	-	-	-	-	120.0	239.0	356.0	471.0	584.0	697.0

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TAB "E"

FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS

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TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF FOREIGN TRADE FOR KOREA FOR THE YEAR 1936

CATEGORY	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	TRADE BALANCE
Foodstuffs	$23,484,000	$87,175,000	$63,691,000
Textiles	41,848,000	11,279,000 (-)	30,569,000
Minerals	34,409,000	17,306,000 (-)	17,103,000
Manufactures	65,503,000	18,380,000 (-)	47,123,000
Miscellaneous	56,025,000	38,051,000 (-)	17,974,000
Totals	221,269,000	172,191,000	(-) 49,078,000

In 1936, Korea's imports were valued at $221,000,000, exports at $172,000,000, leaving an unfavorable balance of trade of $49,000,000. During 1936, Korea's food exports represented 75% of all products showing a net export balance, with a value of $87,000,000, and representing about 50% of the value of all exports.

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TABLE 2

CIVILIAN SUPPLY IMPORT PROGRAMS, SOUTH KOREA
(Fiscal Years 1947-1948)

PROGRAM I - For Period 1 January 1946 to 30 June 1946:

Japan	$ 24,790,870	
GARIOA	169,935,794	
		$194,726,664

Partly Implemented

PROGRAM II - For Period 1 July 1946 to 31 March 1947

GARIOA	94,071,000

Not Implemented

PROGRAM III - For Period 1 January 1947 to 30 June 1947

Japan	$ 47,429,089	
GARIOA	108,649,379	
		$156,078,468

Partly Implemented

Total Programs I, II, and III	$444,876,132

PROGRAM IV - For Period 1 July 1947 to 30 June 1948:

Budget Estimate	$214,000,000
Budget submitted to Congress	137,000,000
Tentative cash allocation to South Korea	92,748,440

Source: National Economic Board, USAMGIK

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TABLE 3

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, SOUTH KOREA
(Sept. 1945 thru July 1947)

IMPORTS

GARIOA and Diverted	$95,470,000	
Foreign Liquidation Commission	25,000,000	
UNNRA	500,000	
From Japan (thru April 1947)	21,590,000	
Private Trade	2,340,000	
Total		$144,900,000

EXPORTS

USAMGIK to U.S.C.C.	3,500,000	
USAMGIK to Japan	2,870,000	
USAMGIK to Hong Kong	500,000	
Private Trade	1,340,000	
Total		$ 8,210,000
Excess of Imports over Exports		$136,690,000
Imports per Dollar of Exports		$17.65

Source: National Economic Board, USAMGIK

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TABLE 4

PRINCIPAL IMPORTS, SOUTH KOREA
(Sept. 1945 thru July 1947)

FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS			
Wheat	243,000	MT	$24,300,000
Flour	57,000	"	5,700,000
Corn	25,000	"	2,500,000
Barley	86,000	"	8,600,000
Rice	35,000	"	4,900,000
Salt	34,000	"	700,000
Prepared Foods	-		3,100,000
Total	480,000	"	$49,800,000
FERTILIZER			
Ammonium Nitrate	91,000	"	8,500,000
Potassium Sulphate	13,000	"	1,000,000
Ammonium Sulphate (Japan)	2,500	"	200,000
Superphosphate (Japan)	51,000	"	1,300,000
Total	157,500	"	$11,000,000
COAL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS			
Bituminous Coal (Japan)	1,000,000	"	10,000,000
Gasoline	10,000,000	gal.	2,500,000
Kerosene	5,500,000	"	1,400,000
Diesel Oil	6,500,000	"	1,700,000
Oil	5,700,000	"	2,300,000
Total			$17,900,000
MACHINERY AND TRUCKS			
Trucks	1,800	each	1,600,000
Tractors	50	"	400,000
Tank cars and trucks	35	"	100,000
Locomotives	101	"	7,070,000
Total			$9,170,000
MISCELLANEOUS			
Cement	28,000	MT	1,300,000
Cotton	10,059	bales	1,800,000
Pitch, asphalt	10,130	MT	1,500,000
			$4,600,000
Major Items - Grand Total			$92,500,000

Source: National Economic Board, USAMGIK

NOTE: The above imports are exclusive of items procured from proceeds of FLC loan of $25,000,000.

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TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF $25,000,000 FOREIGN LIQUIDATION COMMISSION LOAN BY CATEGORY, SOUTH KOREA, 1946 - 1947

1.	Vehicles and Parts	25%
2.	Heavy Engineering Equipment	20%
3.	Medical Supplies	20%
4.	Clothing	15%
5.	Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation, General Items and Navy (12 LST's, 15 Smaller Craft)	20%
	Total	100%

Source: USAMGIK Services of Civilian Supply

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TABLE 6

PRIVATE TRADE, IMPORTS, SOUTH KOREA

SEPT. 1946 THRU JUNE 1947

Group 1/	Name of Article	Sept - Dec 2/	Jan - June	Total
2	Grains, Flours, Starches	$ 90,384.70	$ 32,619.57	$ 123,004.27
3	Comestibles	173,686.93	462,239.67	635,926.60
4	Skins, Hairs Furs	8.33	111.33	119.66
5	Oils, Fats, Waxes	34,712.11	256,071.28	290,783.39
6	Drugs, Chemicals, Medicine	47,103.13	287,008.52	334,111.65
7	Dyes, Pigments, Coating	3,831.34	20,887.53	24,718.87
8	Yarns, Thread, Twine	3,778.91	17,370.08	21,148.99
9	Tissues and Manufactures	5,554.03	64,000.66	69,554.69
10	Clothing and Accessories	2,144.26	65,497.52	67,641.78
11	Pulp, Paper and Manufactures	2,507.53	395,824.43	398,331.96
12	Minerals and Manufactures	4.67	---	4.67
13	Glass and Potteries	52,707.24	102,026.31	154,733.55
14	Ores and Metals	947.51	135.00	1,082.51
15	Metals and Manufactures	1,338.81	31,380.67	32,719.48
16	Vehicles and Machinery	9,090.16	8,022.67	17,112.83
17	Miscellaneous Articles	471.28	170,495.55	170,966.83
	TOTAL	$428,270.95	$1,913,690.81	$2,341,961.76

SOURCE: Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce, USAMGIK

1/ Groupings follow Korean tariff.

2/ Figures are based upon conversion of yen to dollars at the rate of ¥300 to $1.00.

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TABLE 7

PRIVATE TRADE, EXPORTS, SOUTH KOREA

SEPT. 1946 THRU JUNE 1947

Group 1/	Name of Article	Sept - Dec 2/	Jan - June	Total
2	Grains, Flours, Starches	$	$ 231.00	$ 231.00
3	Comestibles 3/	117,567.25	409,181.95	526,749.20
4	Skins, Hairs, Bones, Furs 4/	5,633.33	32,375.67	38,009.00
5	Oils, Fats, Waxes	20,000.00	---	20,000.00
6	Drugs and Chemicals, Medicines	6,135.01	337,762.97	343,897.98
8	Yarns, Thread, Twine		60,000.00	60,000.00
9	Tissues and Manufactures	1,001.52	3,032.54	4,034.06
10	Clothing and Accessories		2,563.07	2,563.07
12	Mineries and Manufactures		9,259.27	9,259.27
14	Ores and Manufactures		134,564.34	134,564.34
15	Metal and Manufactures		94,489.07	94,489.07
17	Miscellaneous Articles	100,000.00	6,666.67	106,666.67
	TOTAL	$250,337.12	$1,090,126.54	$1,340,463.66

SOURCE: Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce, USAMGIK

1/ Groupings follow Korean Tariff.

2/ Figures are based upon conversion of yen to dollars at the rate of ¥300 to $1.00.

3/ Marine Products Principally.

4/ Furs

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TABLE 8

USAMGIK SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN

During 1945 $ 35,715.00
During 1946 359,692.15

January - August 1947

Commodity	Amount	Approximate Price per Unit	Approximate Total Value
Talc, Grade A	600 MT	$ 12.00	$ 7,200.00
Magnesia Clinker	5,978 MT	42.30	252,869.40
Mica	19,318 Lbs	.01	193.18
	55,100 Lbs 1/	.20	11,020.00
Pig Iron	7,500 MT	35.00	262,500.00
Lead Base Bullion	300 MT	250.00	2/75,000.00
Amorphous Graphite	3,072 MT	15.50	47,616.00
	2,000 MT 1/	15.50	31,000.00
Crystalline Graphite	2,057 MT	100.00	205,700.00
Laver	1,145,717 Bundles	1.20	1,374,860.40
Apples	20,000 Cases	3.00	60,000.00
Copper	300 MT	473.86	142,158.00
Tungsten	5 MT 1/	1,400.00	7,000.00

Total January - August 1947 $2,477,116.98

Total to Date $2,872,524.13

SOURCE: Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce, USAMGIK

1/ In process of being delivered at Pusan. Shipping space ordered.

2/ Shipped to Japan with understanding that gold and silver recovered would be returned to Korea.

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TABLE 9

USAMGIK SHIPMENTS TO U.S. COMMERCIAL COMPANY

Commodity	Amount
Tungsten	680 MT
Copper	1,000 MT
Lead Ingots	1,500 MT
Lead Bullion	300 MT
Agar Agar	18 MT

Value: Approximately $3,500,000

SOURCE: Bureau of Foreign Commerce,
Department of Commerce, USAMGIK

TABLE 10

USAMGIK SHIPMENTS TO HONG KONG

Commodity	Amount
Nails	40 MT
Ferro-tungsten	25 MT
Ginseng	3,000 Keun

Value: Approximately $500,000

SOURCE: Bureau of Foreign Commerce,
Department of Commerce, USAMGIK

TABLE II

TENTATIVE GARIOA CASH ALLOCATION TO SOUTH KOREA,
FISCAL YEAR 1948

Civilian Supply Import Program IV: Breakdown of Allocation by Project

		Metric Tons	
Project 113 -	Purchase of Grains, Food & Kindred Products	508,000	$30,000,000.00
Project 123 -	Purchase of Agriculture Supplies and Fertilizer	342,627	14,755,198.50
	Cost of Transportation for Project 123		5,139,405.00
Project 133 -	Purchase of Petroleum and Petroleum Products	233,600	4,750,000.00
Project 153 -	Purchase of Medical Supplies and Equipment	1,050	1,898,163.88
Project 163 -	Purchase of Other Supplies, Services and Equipment	87,090	9,375,033.33
Project 413 -	Pay of Employees - Korea		5,000,000.00
Project 415 -	Travel of Employees		500,000.00
Project 423 -	Transportation of Civilian Supplies - Korea	829,740	12,446,100.00
Project 433 -	Incidental Operating Expenses - Korea		862,580.80
	Programmed	1,172,367	$ 84,726,481.51
	Reserve		21,958.49
Spot Reqn. -	Materials for Pusan Marine Maintenance Depot, committed		3,000,000.00
	Electrical and Other Materials to Implement Power Agreement with North Korea, committed		5,000,000.00
	Total, tentative allocation		$ 92,748,440.00

TAB "E"

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Part II - Economics

INDEX OF CHARTS

1. Bank of Chosen Notes in Circulation

2. Index of Open Market Wholesale Prices in South Korea

3. Index of Open Market Retail Prices in South Korea

4. Comparative Price Changes in Selected Public Utilities and Controlled Commodities, August 1947

5. South Korea Production Trends in Grains and Pulses

6. Population in South Korea

7. South Korea Cereals Position

8. Application of Commercial Fertilizer in South Korea

9. Land Tenure in South Korea as of December 1945

10. Sources of Electric Supply for South Korea

11. Comparative Costs of South Korea Rehabilitation vs Disease and Unrest Programs (Cumulative)

12. Foreign Trade Position of South Korea

13. Actual and Estimated Imports for South Korea

14. Actual and Estimated Exports for South Korea

BANK OF CHOSUN NOTES IN CIRCULATION



PREPARED AND REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

INDEX OF OPEN MARKET WHOLESALE PRICES IN SEOUL, KOREA*

AUGUST 1945=100



CHART 2

PREPARED AND REPRODUCED BY 69 TH ENGR TOPO CO

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

INDEX OF OPEN MARKET RETAIL PRICES IN SEOUL, KOREA※

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

CHART 3

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NND 760280

COMPARATIVE PRICE CHANGES IN SELECTED PUBLIC UTILITIES AND CONTROLLED COMMODITIES AUGUST 1947



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SOUTH KOREA

PRODUCTION TRENDS IN GRAINS AND PULSES
(COMPRISE ABOUT 84 PER CENT OF PRESENT
KOREAN CALORIC IN TAKE)
(UNIT - METRIC TONS)



CHART 5

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By NARS, Date

POPULATION IN SOUTH KOREA



TOTAL
POPULATION
20,300,000



SELF
SUPPLIERS
12,200,000



NON-SELF
SUPPLIERS
8,100,000



EQUALS 2,000,000 PERSONS

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CHART 6

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SOUTH KOREA CEREALS POSITION

(1 JULY 1947-30 JUNE 1948)

MINIMUM CEREALS REQUIREMENTS-2,866,000 METRIC TONS

SELF-SUPPLIERS
12,200,000





1,714,000 METRIC TONS

NON-SELF-SUPPLIERS
8,100,000





1,152,000 METRIC TONS

427 M.T.

725 M.T.

INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION

IMPORTED CEREALS

PREPARED AND REPRODUCED BY 69 TH ENGR. TOPO. CO.

CHART 7

0761

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APPLICATION OF COMMECIAL FERTILIZER IN SOUTH KOREA

(UNIT-METRIC TONS)



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By NARS, Date

LAND TENURE IN SOUTH KOREA, AS OF DECEMBER, 1945



CHART 9

PREPARED AND REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR. TOPO. CO. Chart No. 3

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By NARS, Date

SOURCE OF ELECTRIC SUPPLY
FOR SOUTH KOREA
MILLION K.W.H. PER MONTH

ESTIMATED PEAK K.W.H.
MARCH 1948
AT LEAST 80,000,000

1945 1946 1947 1948

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | 1 2 3

62,400,000

73,000,000

MILLION K.W.H.

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

RECEIVED FROM NORTH OF 38°

STEAM GENERATED

HYDRO

CHART 10

REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR. TOPO CO., CORPS SEPTEMBER, 1947

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COMPARATIVE COSTS OF SOUTH KOREA
REHABILITATION VS DISEASE AND UNREST PROGRAMS (ACCUMULATIVE)



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By NARS, Date

FOREIGN TRADE POSITION OF SOUTH KOREA
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)



CHART 12

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ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED IMPORTS FOR SOUTH KOREA (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)



CHART 13

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ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED EXPORTS FOR SOUTH KOREA

(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Roll 13

Target 3

Report of the Military Governor on the Holding of Elections in South Korea on May 10, 1948, Leading to the Establishment of a Korean National Assembly and Government Under the Observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

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Copy No 1

UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA

Report of the Military Governor of the holding of elections in South Korea on 10 May 1948, leading to the establishment of a Korean National Assembly and Government under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. (UNTCOK)

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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6A	SKIG Ltr dtd 7 Apr 48 re Temporary Control of Paper Supplies.
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10	SKIG Ordinance No. 180 dtd 31 Mar 48 (Changes in Criminal Procedure).
11	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/W.41, 27 Mar 48, (Compilation of Proclamations, Official Statements, Policies, Ordinances, etc., Affecting Civil Liberties in South Korea.)
12	USAMGIK Proclamation of the Rights of the Korean People dtd 5 Apr 48.
13	Ltr from CG, USAFIK to CG, USAMGIK dtd 24 Mar 48 re UNTCOK Ltr Concerning Freedom of Elections in South Korea.
14	Ltr from CG, USAMGIK to Provincial Governors and Mayor of Seoul re Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly dtd 27 Jan 48.

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15	Speech of Military Governor to Ass't. Chief Judges, all District Courts Chief Prosecutors, all District Courts Chief Judges, All Branch Courts Chief Prosecutors, all Branch Courts.
16	Press Statement of 3 Mar 48 by Dr. P. O. CHOUGH, Director, Dept. of Police.
17	Address delivered through Seoul Central Broadcasting Station, 27 Mar 48 by Dr. P. O. CHOUGH, Director, Dept. of Police.
18	Address delivered through Seoul Central Broadcasting Station, 2 Apr 48 by Dr. P. O. CHOUGH, Director, Dept. of Police.
19	Address of Military Governor to Leaders of the Youth Association, 26 Mar 48.
20	Press Statement, 9 Mar 48, by Dept. of Police after Round-Table Conference with Youth Leaders.
21	Instructions by Dr. P. O. CHOUGH, Director, Dept. of Police, Issued at Youth Leaders Conference, 25 Mar 48.
22	Pardon by Military Governor, 31 Mar 48.
23	Memorandum by US Liaison Officer of the Principal Factors Motivating a Change in the Election Date.
24	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/58, 25 Mar 48, (Ltr From National Election Committee to UNTCOK).
25	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/58/Add.2, 29 Mar 48, (Ltr from CG, USAFIK to UNTCOK re Change of Election Date).
26	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/58/Add.4, 5 Apr 48 (Ltr from CG, USAFIK to UNTCOK re Postponement of the Election Date).
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41	CCAO, Chungchong Nam Province, Consolidated Report of Election Observation Teams.
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45C	Threatening Letter Sent to DAC - (Interpreter for CCAO) Attached to Incl 45. (Kyongsang Nam).
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46	Report of General Observation of MG Election Observation Teams, Cheju Island.
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46C	Log of Election Activities, Kuja Myun (Mr. Bernheisel).
47	SKIG Office of Chief Advisor Ltr dtd 11 June 48 to CG, USAMGIK, re Election Activities.
47A to 470	Photographs
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49	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/54, 19 Mar 48 (Report of the Subcommittee on Methods of Observation of Elections).
50	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/W.42, 27 Mar 48 (Time-Table and Facilities for Observation Groups).
51	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/W.42/Add.5, 16 Apr 48 (Revised Organization and Travel Itinerary of Observation Groups, Week ending 24 Apr 48).
52	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/W.42/Add.6/Rev.1, 3 May 48, (Organization and Travel Itinerary of Observation Groups, Period 7-11 May 48).

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53	Report from Bureau of Rail Transportation, USAMGIK, dtd 27 May 48, Giving Special Moves for UN Commission.
54	Ltr from National Election Committee to CG, USAMGIK, dtd 21 May re Reports on the Return of the General Election.
54A	CG, USAMGIK Ltr to National Election Committee dtd 24 May 48 re Invalidation of the Elections.
55	Registration and Voting Data on National Election in South Korea.
56	USAMGIK Executive Order No. 14, 3 Mar 48, Creating National Election Committee.
57	CG, USAMGIK Ltr to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, SKIG dtd 15 June 48.
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69	Address by Mr. Hung-Ti CHU dtd 31 May 48 at Opening Session of National Assembly.
69A	Address by Mr. Henri Costilhes dtd 31 May 48 at Opening Session of National Assembly.
70	SKIG Executive Order No. 23 dtd 22 June 48 Establishing Election Review Board.
71	Ltr from National Assembly dtd 3 June 48 to CG, USAFIK Appointing Liaison Committee.
72	Ltr from CG, USAFIK dtd 7 June 48 to Chairman, National Assembly Appointing Officials to Act as Liaison.
73	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/78, 11 June 48, (Ltr to UNTCOK from Chairman, National Assembly).
74	Ltr from UNTCOK to National Assembly dtd 25 June 48.
75	UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/84, 26 June 48, (UNTCOK Resolution Adopted at 39th Meeting, 25 June on Elections of 10 May 1948)

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PREAMBLE

The U. S. Army Military Government in Korea, with its Korean counterpart, the South Korean Interim Government, both headed by the Military Governor, is the Government of the area in Korea south of the 38° parallel occupied by the United States Forces. As such it conducted the elections held in South Korea under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and the terms of reference as embodied in UN Resolutions of 14 November 1947 and 27 February 1948. (Inclosures Nos. 1 and 2)

Prior to 10 May 1948 there had never been an election held in Korea under accepted democratic procedures. The entire machinery for conducting such an election had to be constructed from the ground up, including the inculcation of the people themselves in the significance and purpose of elections, the balloting and registration system, the election law and regulations, the informational program on election steps and procedures, the education of Korean officials, etc. An election was held in South Korea in the fall of 1946 to select half of the membership of the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (the other half was appointed), but this election could hardly be called "democratic" in all of its features. The voting was done largely through the village headmen system in which the village chiefs cast the votes of all members of their communities to elect county representatives who in turn chose representatives of the next administrative level; the voting culminated in the selection of the assemblymen by the representatives on the provincial level.

Besides such additional difficulties as lack of facilities and paper, sparse transportation and communications, there was

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a definite, everpresent, threat and danger to public order from the Communists. Directed from Pyongyang in North Korea, a well-planned campaign of murder, arson, intimidation, rioting, and revolution was waged continuously and vigorously beginning 7 February 1948, in order to interfere with, disparage and/or halt the elections.

That in spite of all difficulties the people of South Korea carried out efficiently an honest, fair election on 10 May 1948 is a tribute to a people who have long thirsted for their independence and had never ceased to dream of the day when Korea would again regain its sovereignty, particularly during the long 40 years of Japanese domination.

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KOREA
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

BOUNDARIES
- INTERNATIONAL
- PROVINCIAL
- KUN (GUN)

CAPITALS
- NATIONAL
- PROVINCIAL
- KUN (GUN)

OTHER POPULATION CENTERS
- PU(FU) AREA
- PU(FU)
- ŬP (YU)

NOTES: A combination of symbols denotes combined administrative functions. Data for provinces, gun, and to, 1946, as of 1945 with later additions where possible.

One name is omitted where it is the same as the name of the gun capital. (Because of limited space, the suffix, -kun (-gun), is omitted.)

GLOSSARY

KOREAN	JAPANESE	ENGLISH
-chado	-shima	archipelago
-dan	-tō	cape or point
-do, -to	-tō, -jima, -jima	island
-got	-ki, -saki, -zaki	cape or point
-gol	-kei	pass or col
-hanyŏ	-kaikyō	strait or channel
-kun	-gun	county
-kundo	-gunshō	archipelago
-man	-wan	bay or gulf
-mo	-ko	mountain(s)
-suro	-sui	channel or strait
-ul	-iri	inlet
-yŏlto	-retto	island chain

RELIABILITY OF DATA

DATA	CLASS	GRADE	BASIC
BOUNDARIES		GEC	A
CAPITALS		GE	A
POPULATED AREAS		GEH	GE
CHEFTS		GE	A
CITIES		GEH	A

Quantitative & Qualitative Data
- G - Reliable
- GH - Generally Reliable
- U - Unreliable

Coverage of Data
- C - Complete
- I - Incomplete

Location of Data
- A - Accurate
- AE - Not Entirely Accurate
- GA - Only Approx. Accurate

QUANTITATIVE DATA: The letters G, GH, and U are an estimate of the reliability of the data which accompanies it. The first letter indicates confidence in the accuracy of the data, the second letter indicates confidence in the completeness of the data, and the third letter indicates confidence in the location of the data.

SEA OF JAPAN
EAST CHINA SEA
YELLOW SEA
MANCHURIA
U. S. S. R.
TSUSHIMA-KAIKYŌ
CHŌSEN-KAIKYŌ
CHEJU-HAEHYŏP (SAISHŪ-KAIKYŌ)
MAEMUL-SUDO (MAIKOTSU-SUIDŌ)
Tongjosŏn-man (Higashi-Chōsen-wan)
Sŏjosŏn-man (Nishi-Chōsen-wan)
KYŪSHŪ
TSUSHIMA
To-dong (Ta-do) (TAKESHIMA)
KYŎNGHŬNG (EIKŌ)
KYŎNGSŎNG (KYŌJŌ)
HAMGYŎNG-PUKTO (KANKYŌ-HOKUDŌ)
HAMGYŎNG-NAMDO (KANKYŌ-NANDŌ)
HAMJU (KANSHŪ)
P'YŎNGAN-PUKTO (HEIAN-HOKUDŌ)
P'YŎNGAN-NAMDO (HEIAN-NANDŌ)
HWANGHAE-DO (KŌKAI-TŌ)
KANGWŎN-DO (KŌGEN-DŌ)
KYŎNGGI-DO (KEIKI-DŌ)
CHUNGCHŎNG-PUKTO (CHŪSEI-HOKUDŌ)
CHUNGCHŎNG-NAMDO (CHŪSEI-NANDŌ)
CHŎLLA-PUKTO (SENRA-HOKUDŌ)
CHŎLLA-NAMDO (SENRA-NANDŌ)
KYŎNGSANG-PUKTO (KEISHŌ-HOKUDŌ)
KYŎNGSANG-NAMDO (KEISHŌ-NANDŌ)
KAESŎNG (KAIJŌ)
KWANGJU (KŌSHŪ)
PUSAN (FUZAN)
PUCHŎN (FUSEN)
YŎSU (REISUI)
MOKP'O (MOKUHŌ)
INCHŎN (JINSEN)
TAEGU (TAIKYŪ)
OKKU (YOKUKŌ)
KORYŎNG (KŌNEI)
QUELPART
SEOUL (KEIJŌ)
PYONGYANG (HEIJŌ)

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ORGANIZATION CHART

U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA

1 JANUARY 1948



1] PROVINCIAL ADVISERS AND GROUP COMMANDERS ARE THE SAME INDIVIDJALS.

2] ORDINANCE NO. 90 STATES THAT N.F.A. AND N.P.A. WILL CONFORM ITS POLICIES, PLANS, AND PROGRAMS TO THOSE OF N.E.B.

3] ADVISOR TO NATIONAL POLICE

PREPARED BY: STATISTICS DIVISION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC BOARD.

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ORGANIZATION CHART

SOUTH KOREA INTERIM GOVERNMENT

1 JANUARY 1948



PREPARED BY : STATISTICS DIVISION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC BOARD.

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I - PREPARATORY PHASES

1. Technical and Administrative Arrangements.

a. About 5 December 1947, the Office of Administration (Lt. Colonel A. W. Melchior, Advisor) was informed that the responsibility for administering any elections in South Korea, conducted either locally or nationally, would very likely be assigned to it. Responsibility of the Office of Administration would include establishment of a budget, payment of all expenses, accounting for funds, procurement of supplies, arranging for all printing requirements in connection with the election, and distribution of all materials to the provinces. (Inclosure No.3)

b. Numerous conferences were immediately held with Brigadier General John Weckerling, U.S.A., who had been designated as the U.S. Liaison Officer with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, or UNTCOK, (as well as the Military Governor's representative in matters concerning the elections); the Korean provisional election committee; and various departments and agencies of the Military Government; and individuals concerned with planning for the election. The first thing that became apparent was a shortage of time for the original UN plan envisioned 31 March as the election date.

c. Statistics.

(1) One of the most pressing requirements was statistical data which influenced plans for division of the country into electoral districts and other factors. The Census Division (Mr. A. Jamin, Advisor) worked in close cooperation with the U.S. Liaison Officer and other agencies concerned in procuring and tabulating proper data. Central Files produced Ordinances, Proclamations, Public Acts, and other data such as information concerning the status of split counties (guns) along the 38th Parallel, and change of status of guns, cities, etc. This information was incorporated in Appendix I to

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Ordinance No. 175. (Inclosure No. 30)

(2) The first problem in connection with statistical data was to determine the number of eligible registrants. The last official census of South Korea was taken in 1946 and was long out of date because of (a) the influx of great numbers of refugees and (b) natural increases in population. The Census Division at this time was engaged in tabluation of a national registration which was only one-third complete. However, sufficient useful data of importance was available. The last historical age data available was for 1944 but the age structure of the present population had altered considerably since that time. The population of South Korea as of 1 April 1948 was finally estimated at 19,947,000. The potential number of people eligible to register was estimated as 49.3% for persons of 21 years of age and over, or 9,834,000 possible registrants. (See Inclosure No. 4)

d. Budget, Disbursement and Accounting Procedures.

(1) A budget was next sought and procedures for expenditures, allocation of funds, and accounting, were adopted. Prior to the arrival of the UNTCOK, very little information was available as to the number of registration forms, poll registers, locks, registration ballots, ballot boxes, laws, etc., that might be required. Later numerous conferences were held with all agencies concerned, and as statistical data became available, a basis for a reasonable estimate was established. Study of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly election expense and the cost of the national registration indicated no reliable basis for estimation of the cost of the national election. The number of election officials, the number of persons to be placed on salary, the amount of salaries, were unknown. As information became clearer, estimates for supplies, transportation, etc., began to take shape. This involved the cost of paper, estimate of the amount to be used, amount and cost of transportation,

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labor, and the amount and cost of incidental supplies, which of course had to be based on the number of voting districts, electoral districts, etc.

(2) It was decided, in order to control expenditures, that the existing governmental organization, down through the provinces, would be used in handling funds. The Office of Administration would allocate the money for the National Election, as approved by the Military Governor, to the provincial governors who would in turn sub-allocate it to the various provincial disubrsing agencies requiring funds, and maintain strict accounting in accordance with existing regulations. (See Inclosure No.5 for sample instructions).

(3) Directives were issued as the money was allocated, placing a good deal of responsibility for control of the expenditure of election funds upon the Provincial Chief Civil Affairs Officers. The utilization of existing provincial facilities such as transportation, office space, equipment, and personnel, in order to avoid excessive expenditures, was continually urged upon the provincial officials and committees.

(4) On 21 January 1948, a letter from the Military Governor, Subject: "Preparation of the Flection under UNTCOK" was issued as authority to proceed with preparatory steps for the election. The Office of Administration was authorized Korean Won 25,000,000 as an advance allocation for the national election budget. This was used primarily for importing such critical materials as paper.

(5) The National Election Committee, which grew out of the Korean Provisional Flection Committee, was formally appointed on 3 March 1948, and estimates could be finalized for money needed for payrolls and other expenses.

e. Estimates of Critical Items.

(1) Paper. Paper was the most critical item in the

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election plans. About the middle of December a rough estimate of 450 tons of paper of six different types was received from the Korean Provisional Flection Committee for use in printing ballots, registration forms and poll registers. It was determined, however, that only two types of paper could be made available, either by import or locally.

(2) Ballot Boxes. First estimates indicated that approximately 7,000 ballot boxes would be required. An effort was made to determine the cost of the ballot boxes, as well as the time that would be required to complete them. These efforts continued through February and March, but a great many uncertainties still existed because the United Nations Commission had not made final decisions on many important factors affecting the election.

f. Procurement.

(1) The most vital requirement was paper, and a survey indicated that paper was neither available in Korea nor Japan. Fortunately, however, two hundred and thirty tons of Swedish newsprint were discovered and purchased in China. In the meantime, arrangements were made to open the Puksan Mill at Kunsan, where sufficient pulp was available to manufacture approx-500 tons of paper. A "freeze" order on all government import of paper was secured and an order issued directing that the entire output on the Kunsan Mill be turned over to the Office of Administration. (Inclosure No. 6). Flectrical priorities were procured and the necessary shipping arrangements were effecte to get the paper from the mill to Seoul. As fast as the paper was received either from import or from the Kunsan Mill, it was stored in printing plants selected to do the printing, and the excess stored in warehouses. Precautions had to be taken to protect paper from theft and destruction.

(2) Concurrently, a ballot box sample was designed

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according to the description received from the Election Committee, and submitted for approval. A box was finally approved by the UNTCOK. Due to the length of time to manufacture these boxes, contracts were concluded in February for what was then supposed to be an adequate number, 7,000. Later changes in voting districts finally brought the quantity procured to 13,729. The number of voting districts was never constant, and considerable supervision was essential to determine the quantity needed and to prevail upon the manufacturers to turn them out in time. The decision to manufacture the boxes in Seoul was reached because the production time remaining did not permit manufacture within the provinces; it was also considered necessary to keep the work under close central supervision in order to have the boxes available at the proper time. This decision involved added shipping difficulties.

(3) Two locks were used for each ballot box, and very few were available in the Korean market, necessitating purchase in Japan. Considerable difficulty was encountered in getting locks from Japan but they arrived in time to be dispatched to the various voting districts.

(4) Certain crude furniture was required for the election, such as tables, chairs, etc., and this was manufactured and delivered.

(5) The first requirement for printing was to furnish stationery for the election committees, both on the national and provincial levels. The tissue type required by all election committees necessitated importation of eight tons of tissue paper from Japan, by both water and air. Carbon paper was not available in Korea, and this was also procured from Japan, the majority of it by air.

(6) The printing of stationery, procurement of paper, locks, stencils, and carbon paper, and manufacture of ballot

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boxes, were initiated before an official UNTCOK decision on an election had been made. This action was risked in order to have these items available in time to be of use in the election. It was almost certain that all items could be resold, except possibly the ballot boxes, and considerable salvage was believed possible in the event they were not used for an election. The 12,000,000 envelopes to be used to enclose the ballots, could have been resold profitably on the Korean market if this action became necessary. First information from Japan indicated that the envelopes could be manufactured except for the glueing, which necessitated setting up a procedure in Seoul for glueing, and also for the purchase of glue. However, it later developed that Japan was able to supply the envelopes with glueing.

(7) As the actual election date drew near, and candidates registered, there was almost complete unanimity within the UN Commission and Korean political circles that stationery should be supplied. Furthermore, paper had unexpectedly become available in quantities considered in excess of any possible requirements in connection with the election. Accordingly, a proposal was submitted to the Military Governor to supply 200 pounds of paper per candidate, it being estimated that 100 tons would cover the requirement. This proposal was approved and approximately 350 candidates took advantage of this allotment.

(8) Imports amounted to 22,000 locks for ballot boxes; 12,000,000 envelopes to enclose ballots; 80 quires of stencils; 40 boxes of carbon paper; and 230 tons of newsprint. Manufactured locally were 500 tons of newsprint and the 13,729 ballot boxes. Procured locally were 6,000 locks; 32,822 colored pencils; 384,000 large envelopes; 790,000 small envelopes; 80 gallons of printers ink; furniture and miscellaneous office supplies, including one Korean typewriter for the United Nations. While this list may appear insignificant when viewed in the light of

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a similar situation in the United States, the supplies described were not only extremely scarce in Korea, but vital to the success of the election.

g. Printing.

(1) The first meeting in connection with the printing requirements for the election was held on 3 January with the U.S. Liaison Officer and his staff. Tentative requirements for poll registers, registration blanks, election law, election rules, etc., were discussed. Considerable study was given to these requirements with a view to planning a printing routine. The first item to be printed was 3,850 stationery tissue tablets and 13,265 bond type stationery tablets.

(2) A system was set up to insure that no forms or any printed matter could be distributed without being checked for errors. As soon as material was received from the National Election Committee it was immediately hand carried to printers who had forms set and proofs made, which were hand carried to the Election Committee, proofs returned for further correction, and a clear proof again returned to the Election Committee for review. When the run was started, the first numbers of the run were again referred to the Election Committee to insure that no errors had been made.

(3) In meeting printing requirements, there was so little time that all concerned were required to work seven days a week, and often in shifts twenty-four hours a day. In the case of the voluminous election law, approval of which was long delayed, the Korean printers were required to work without interruption in order to get the law into the hands of the using committees in time for the registration phase. Electrical priorities were secured (Inclosure No. 7), and special security measures taken to insure prompt completion of the work. A survey of the provinces indicated that a minimum of seven days was required to distribute, throughout the provinces, materials

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received. Every effort was made to insure ten days, and all schedules were set up on that basis.

(4) Another requirement that had to be met in the printing plants was the breakdown, packaging, and labeling of the many forms that were printed, in quantities to permit of rapid distribution from the provincial level. Accurate knowledge as to the number of voting districts, number of registrants, number of electoral districts, etc., had to be known. This was sometimes difficult to secure in advance of final approval of the Election Law by the UN Commission. However, a safety factor of about twenty per cent over estimated requirements was used in all computations. Only four requests for additional forms were received, and in every case it was found that the reason lay with faulty distribution within the province concerned.

(5) Three runs of poll registers were made, two after the initial distribution, for the purpose of providing duplicates within the province, and a third copy for filing with the National government. This was done to prevent loss of records in the event of sabotage or attack on polling places.

(6) While election registration forms, poll registers, election laws, election rules, stationery, election schedules, etc., were being delivered to the provinces, a study was being made as to the most satisfactory plan for printing of the ballots. It was at first planned to print the ballots in Seoul, due to the fact that high speed rotary presses were available, and also to permit close supervision. However, the problem of assembling lists of candidates from the voting districts and transmission to Seoul for printing, which precluded any possibility for proof-reading within the district of the candidate, made this plan impracticable. Accordingly, a survey was made of all the printing plants throughout South Korea which indicated sufficient printing plants existed within each province to permit printing

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of provincial requirements within the time restrictions.

(7) The Office of Administration, in coordination with the Election Committee and the U.S. Liaison Officer and his staff, submitted several designs of ballots to the UNTCOK, and finally secured approval of the type of ballot to be used. Complete instructions as to the method of printing the ballots, and smaple ballots, were immediately dispatched to all provinces. Paper for the ballots was sent to all provinces, and printing ink where it was required. To insure proper printing of the ballots within the provinces, and to prevent excessive printing charges, Mr. A. J. Theodore was sent by air to each provincial capitol, where he inspected supplies, printing plants and factories, checked printing costs, and thoroughly briefed all concerned. Printing of the ballots was accomplished very satisfactorily within the provinces. (See Inclosure No. 8 for samples of election forms).

h. Shipping.

(1) Delivery of supplies (paper, election forms, printed matter, stationery, etc) required constant supervision and planning, including security. All shipments were accompanied by American personnel. As shipments became available at Seoul, the provinces were notified of approximate time of arrival, and arrangements made for transportation and personnel to receive materials at the station. A survey made with the Department of Transportation revealed that scheduled trains would be adequate to make the most expeditious delivery of materials. All materials were delivered to provinces within forty-eight hours after availability for distribution, according to plan. As printed supplies were picked up from the plants, they were further broken down by province, and loaded accordingly, so that as the trains moved over the route, the least amount of time was necessary to unload the requirement for each province. The problem of delivery was considerably complicated by the fact

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that the same crews had to receive supplies, such as carloads of paper and other materials, warehouse them, and pick up materials being manufactured or printed as well as to dispatch them. This required considerable coordination and the use of varied additional types of transportation, such as trucks, oxcarts, etc. Shipment to Cheju Do and other islands was done by water and by air.

(2) The shipment of bulky ballot boxes required approximately 80 railroad cars. Wherever possible, drop shipments were made, and necessary coordination established. As time schedules were set up, telephone communication was planned with each province. In some cases this was not possible, due to failure of communications, but to insure close coordination, station to station calls were made as the train progressed. Remarkably little confusion was experienced.

(3) The following items were bundled and delivered within the time limit set in each case to all provinces, using rail, air, water, and truck transportation: (See Inclosure No. 9)

13,729	ballot boxes
11,716,000	copies of registration blanks
229,625	copies of election laws
3,850	stationery tablets (tissue)
384,000	large envelopes
42,000	election schedules
19,300	digest of election laws
22	printing instructions
8,937,000	ballot envelopes
32,822	colored pencils
5,000	election pamphlets
15,000	lists of candidates
27,514	locks
4,053,000	poll registers
229,625	copies of election rules
13,265	stationery tablets (bond)
709,000	small envelopes
8,160	educational items (from Women's Bureau)
2,200	sample ballots
1,577	reams of newsprint
80	gallons of ink
119,000	bond tablets
1,000	election posters
1,000	revised lists of candidates

(4) It is worthy of note that no loss of materials, procured, manufactured or printed, was sustained in the prepara-

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tion and delivery to the provinces. Some losses were sustained, through violence, after complete delivery of items was made.

2. Budget for Election Expenses.

a. The establishment of a budget for election expenditures presented considerable difficulty particularly from the Korean point of view. There was no precedent for voluntary duty on the part of Koreans involved in election and pre-election work. The Korean National Election Committee presented budgetary estimates ranging from Korean Won 4,000,000,000 to 9,000,000,000 depending on the length of time certain election officials were to be employed. To approve such estimates would have been ruinous to the Korean economy and would have given impetus to the already steadily mounting inflation. The Korean note issue during the spring was well over the Won 30,000,000,000 mark because of the necessary advances to be allocated in the rice collection program. An increase of any considerable proportion to the note issue could not be undertaken, and accordingly, the Military Governor limited all budgetary estimates for the payment of salaries and committee costs to Korean Won 500,000,000. (Inclosures Nos. 9A and 9B) This figure was to be in addition to expenditures for such items as paper, stationery, ballot boxes, etc. which would be paid for by the Office of Administration. The Koreans apparently accepted the greatly reduced budget with good grace.

b. When the election date was announced, a meeting of the provincial governors and chief civil affairs officers was held in Seoul on 16 March. The Office of Administration outlined the procedure in handling of funds to be used for the national election. An arbitrary allocation of Won 5,000,000 was made on 16 March to each province and the City of Seoul, in order to provide initial funds with which to commence operations, as the time for completion of the preparatory phases was short.

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c. Requirements for several publicity and educational campaigns planned by different agencies had to be met. In order to avoid duplication of effort and expenditure, the Military Governor directed that all such projects would be cleared through the Office of Civil Information and approved by Mr. J. L. Stewart, the Director. It was also arranged that estimated budget requirements would be submitted to the Office of Administration for approval and inclusion in the election budget, so that coordination of all departments was effected.

d. About the middle of March the budget requirements became much clearer, and the final requirements for salaries and other expenses for election committees, both national and provincial, could be foreseen with reasonable accuracy. The budget was then framed in coordination with the Department of Finance (Mr. A. C. Loren, Adviser). The principal authorizations were:

Salaries	W426,072,000 (Incls 9A & 9B)
Per Diem Expense	W 61,395,000
TOTAL	W487,467,000
Cost of transportation, printing, ballot boxes, locks, envelopes, office supplies, newsprint and other paper, educational information programs, and miscellaneous requirements.	W336,331,000

Both these amounts were approved by the Military Governor. The overall amount of the National Election Committee budget was broken down into allocations for each province and the City of Seoul. A directive covering the allocation and expenditures was prepared and issued to all concerned on 8 April. The initial allotment of W5,000,000 to each province and the City of Seoul was deducted from the newly allocated amount, so that the total allocated to all committees to and including 8 May actually amounted to W437,467,000.

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e. Subsequent requests for funds were received from the National Election Committee to cover expenses for rent of polling places, local publication of notices, transportation, etc., for allocation to the provinces, totalling W122,760,000. Several conferences with the Military Governor and the National Election Committee resulted in reducing this amount to W28,000,000 which was approved. This amount was broken down for allocation to the provinces, and a directive covering the allocation of these funds was prepared and issued on 15 April. Included in this directive was a strong statement to the effect that no further funds would be allocated, and that every available government resource would be used in order to keep expenditures down. The final budget amounted to W851,798,000.

f. As of 27 May 1948 the status of the budget of the Office of Administration for transportation, supplies, printing, etc., was as follows: Total allocation, W336,331,000. Expenses, W25,990,002. Unexpended balance, W89,340,998. Practically all bills have been paid but it is probable that payment for printing of ballots in some of the provinces will have to be made from Office of Administration funds on hand. Income from sale of supplies which were surplus to the needs for the election was W68,557,045. Estimated value of stocks on hand to be disposed of is W15,705,000. The amount of money unexpended from allocations to the provincial election committees, if any, is unknown at this time, as complete accounting of provincial funds will not be possible for some time. Authorizations of W100,000 to each of twenty-one committee men who were assassinated amounted to W2,100,000.

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g. Summary:

Total Budget	Korean Won	851,798,000
Office of Administration Unexpended Balance		89,340,998
		762,457,002
Income from Sale of Surplus Supplies		68,557,045
		693,899,957
Value of Surplus Supplies Yet to be Sold		15,705,000
		678,194,957
Less Grants to Families of Assassinated Committeemen		2.100,000
		680,294,957
Contingencies		5,000,000
COST OF ELECTION		Won 685,294,957 or
		U.S. $1,957,986 at a rate of exchange of Won 350 to one U.S. dollar.

ALLOCATIONS BY PROVINCES AND OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

	Funds Allocated
City of Seoul	W27,656,000.00
Kyonggi-Do	63,818,600.00
Kang Won-Do	30,409,600.00
Kyong Sang Pukto	92,570,600.00
Kyong Sang Namdo	69,439,700.00
Cholla Pukto	63,422,500.00
Cholla Namdo	71,385,500.00
Chung Chong Pukto	30,083,200.00
Chung Chong Namdo	58,138,600.00
Cheju Do	8,542,700.00
Office of Administration	336,331,000.00
	W 851,798,000.00

3. Measures Taken For Attainment of "Free Atmosphere" For Elections.

a. The final result of the UNTCOK's deliberations on the attainment of a"free atmosphere" for elections in South Korea was a letter dated 17 March to the Commanding General signed by the Chairman(Mr. K. P. S. Menon). The Commission letter, in brief, reminded the Commanding

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General of the Commission's resolution to observe elections on 9 May 1948 "provided the Commission has ascertained that the elections will be held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected." The Commission arrived at the conclusions and recommendations shown below together with the action taken by the Commanding General to meet the Commission's wishes: (Paragraphs are numbered to correspond to Commission's letter.)

A. The question of law--

1. "....it is difficult to determine to what extent the free atmosphere required for the elections is insured by the existing laws and regulations."

The Commanding General informed the Commission that the ordinance had already been signed by the Military Governor (Inclosure No. 10).

2. The Commission reminded the Commanding General of a proposed ordinance entitled "Changes in Criminal Procedure" and recognized that this ordinance was "an important step forward....in guaranteeing civil liberties."

3. The Commission recommended that "a compilation of existing laws and regulations which....provided that 'democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected.'"

The Commanding General called attention to the peculiar status and powers of the occupation zone and said: "Of necessity such an occupational government is in effect a government of application to meet existing transitional conditions rather than government based on constitutional law." However, the compilation requested by the Commission was

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The Commission suggested that this compilation might later form "the basis for a proclamation of the U.S. authorities on this subject."

4. The Commission gave its opinion that the above-mentioned freedoms include "the right to vote or not to vote and to advocate either point of view by peaceful and legal means."

made up and furnished to the Commission. (Inclosure No. 11)

A proclamation entitled "Proclamation on the Rights of the Korean People" was issued by the U.S. authorities on 20 March 1948 (Inclosure No. 12).

The Commanding General in his reply called attention to local developments and foresaw "a definite possibility or even probability that the freedom to oppose any and all elections, if carried to the point of license by organized pressure and terrorism now developing may act to nullify completely the effort to hold any effective elections, free or otherwise." He stated his view that an additional conference on this subject between him and the Commission take place.

B. <u>The question of enforcement</u>--

5. The Commission discussed the enforcement of laws by the Police without definite conclusion.

6. The Commission stated its "genuine concern" about the "possible role the police might play during the elections" and

The Commanding General stated that "every effort is being made and will be made to exercise proper control over and direct the activities of the police toward free elections." He issued comprehensive instructions to the Military Governor. (Inclosure No. 13)

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that "the results of its observations (of the police) will be an important factor in determining whether it is able to report to the General Assembly that the elections were held in a free atmosphere."

7. In addition, the Commission recommended "such action as may bring about a re-orientation of the police force as to their attitude toward a free atmosphere for elections."

The Commanding General warned the Commission that "under the present circumstances of realistic operation I see no other course than to continue the police force as a strong centralized element of government and use it under careful guidance without disrupting it, since it is the one effective agency I have for law enforcement and for maintenance of law and order that are so essential to keep any vestige of a free atmosphere for elections." The Military Governor and the Director of the National Police also issued appropriate instructions (See Inclosure Nos. 14-18 inclusive.)

8. The Commission had been informed by "the highest authority" that the activities of "some of the youth groups might adversely affect free elections."

9. Therefore recommends that leaders be informed that the activities of their organizations are "under scrutiny of the UN Commission" and that the attitude of these groups will be an important factor

The Commanding General brought to the attention of the Commission the fact that he, the Military Governor and the Director of the National Police had all issued instructions for the strict control of youth groups and that pledges had been secured from the youth leaders. (See Inclosures Nos. 13 and 19-21 inclusive.)

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in the final report of the Commission.

10. The Commission further recommends that the activities, particularly the police, warn the youth groups that unlawful activities on their part will not be tolerated and that the authorities "strictly control the behavior of the youth organizations."

11. The Commission also recommends that registration of youth groups be made compulsory and that they declare their political or non-political status.

12. The Commission also recommends that members of youth groups be not allowed to congregate in the vicinity of polling places.

C. Freedom of Information

13. The Commission recommends that the U.S. authorities conduct "a strenuous and active campaign of impartial dissemination of information about the elections."

Instructions were issued by the Commanding General to the Military Governor who took the necessary implementation steps.

The Commanding General issued instructions to the Military Governor to prevent assembly of youth groups in the vicinity of polling places. (Inclosure No. 13.)

A very comprehensive program of information prepared by the Office of Civil Information, was presented to the Principal Secretary of UNTCOK (See Inclosure No. 32). This program was effectively implemented.

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14. The Commission recommended that "available" newsprint be distributed on an equitable basis instead of "the ability of certain groups to buy out the market."

The Commanding General stated in reply that every effort would be made to respect the Commission's wishes but pointed out that the available supply was no more than was required for official uses already recommended by the Commission in connection with the elections. It was also pointed out that the paper in the free market was not under governmental control. The Commanding General promised to comply with the Commission's request.

15. The Commission recommended that "if the radio stations are being put at the disposal of political candidates and parties" that it be done on an equitable basis without consideration of ability to buy time.

D. The question of political pressures--

16. The Commission gave it as its opinion "that participating in illegal meetings, distributing handbills, unless accompanied by a criminal act or incitement to criminal acts, are to be considered as political offenses."

On March 31, 1948 the Military Governor pardoned 3,140 persons, serving sentences, awaiting sentence or on parole in response to the Commission's recommendations. (Inclosure No. 22)

17. On the other hand, "political activity accompanied by crime, such as arson, counterfeiting, etc. cannot be considered as purely political offenses."

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18. The Commission recommended that those "imprisoned for political offenses without committing any acts of violence or fraud, should be released without any reservation."

19. In the case of those mentioned in Par 17 above the Commission recommended that "the authorities should extend a pardon to them, provided their release will not be a danger to public security."

In connection with pars 18 and 19, the Commission suggested a conference between it and the Commanding General.

The Commanding General offered to discuss the categories of political prisoners to be released.

4. Adoption of Election Date, Election Law and Regulations.

a. Decision of Election Date.

(1) Paragraph 2, Part II of the United Nations Resolution of 14 November 1947, recommended "... that the elections be held not later than 31 March 1948 ..." It was recognized by UNTCOK before its arrival in Seoul that holding the elections by this date would be impossible and there never was any discussion with the U.S. authorities proposing that this deadline be met.

(2) Influence of Planting Season: On the 19th of January, the U.S. Liaison Officer sent a "Spring Agricultural Calendar" prepared in the Department of Agriculture (Major C. M. Tatum, Adviser) to UNTCOK and in an accompanying note said: "It is suggested from the viewpoint of agriculture that the first week in May is the very latest period during which elections should be held." The planting season was recognized by

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both the U.S. authorities and UNTCOK as being the greatest influence in the establishment of an election date. Mr. Petrus J. Schmidt, the Principal Secretary, on 20 February remarked to the U.S. Liaison Officer: "We were exceedingly glad to get, when we first arrived here, a calendar giving the planting schedule. This more than anything else helped to push the work along. It was the thing I needed to convince the delegates that they must reach some decision by the first of March."

(3) An earlier election date would have interrupted spring plantings in Kyonggi and Kangwon Do; a later one would have affected seeding farther south and transplanting in the north. Inasmuch as initial plantings and the subsequent transplanting of rice are dates that must be closely adhered to, the proper timing of the election undoubtedly contributed to its success. Due to the timeliness and because the election itself was carried through with a minimum of unrest there was only slight interference in the regular agricultural routine. Fisheries in Cheju Do were most affected, with production only 30 to 40% of normal.

(4) The selection of the actual date on which elections were to be held was carefully coordinated between UNTCOK and the U.S. Command. The agreement to hold elections not later than 10 May 1948, with the understanding that the U.S. authorities would select 9 May as the specific date, was reached on 29 February. At the same time, however, the U.S. Liaison officer carefully warned Mr. Schmidt, the Principal Secretary of UNTCOK, that the selection of this date was conditional upon the U.S. authorities receiving promptly UNTCOK comments on the Flection Law and Regulations, without which it was impossible to proceed with essential election preparations.

(5) On 29 February UNTCOK published UN Press Release 33 which contained the statement, "...United Nations Temporary

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Commission on Korea will discharge its duties, that is to say, observe elections in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission not later than 10 May 1948."

b. Proposed Postponement of Election Date.

(1) Even though the election date had definitely been decided upon, the United States Army Military Government in Korea and other U.S. authorities could not proceed with essential election steps because of delay in UNTCOK in approving the Election Law. It became increasingly apparent for technical and administrative reasons that it would be advisable to postpone the elections for a short time. Although the election date was agreed upon by the U.S. authorities and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea on 29 February, it was not until 18 March that the Election Law and Regulations (under which the Election was to be conducted) was approved by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. This was a heart breaking delay and prevented going forward with a number of vital preparations. A memorandum of some factors motivating a request for postponement of elections was prepared at that time by the U.S. Liaison Officer. (Inclosure No. 23)

(2) On 25 March 1948, the National Election Committee wrote a letter to UNTCOK, a copy of which was sent to the Military Governor, recommending that the elections be postponed from 9 May to 24 May 1948 because of lack of time to carry out the Election Law (Inclosure No. 24).

(3) On 29 March the Commanding General, USAFIK, wrote UNTCOK, on the recommendation of the Military Governor, proposing the postponement of the elections until 24 May 1948, bringoug out in considerable detail the reasons for requesting such postponement (Inclosure No. 25) including the fact that the Election Law was not finally approved by UNTCOK until 18 March, or nearly three weeks after the announcement of elections.

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The following day the Chairman, Mr. J. L. Paul-Boncour, wrote the Commanding General informing him "that it is the wish of the UNTCOK that the elections should still be held on 9 May 1948 as adopted in its Resolution of 12 March 1948." The letter went on to say that the "U.S. military authorities will therefore have the opportunity to present their views" before a "Main Committee which had been established to receive, examine, and discuss such considerations or requests as may be submitted to it with regard to implementation of electoral procedures." Attached to the above letter was a detailed "Statement of Facts" defending the position of the Secretariat of UNTCOK but completely ignoring the fact that the reason for requesting postponement was the delay caused by UNTCOK itself.

(4) However, because of possible disastrous effect of an open disagreement between UNTCOK and the U.S. Command, particularly when Korean public opinion was concerned, the Commanding General decided not to press further his request for postponement. He replied briefly to the UNTCOK on 2 April that "regardless of difficulties encountered, all plans and efforts on their part (all agencies concerned with election arrangements) shall be directed at the completion of the election by the date previously announced." However he added that "unless (there was) specific objection on the part of the UN Commission, I shall shortly announce May 10th as the new date for the elections." The later action was considered essential because of the scheduled occurrence of an eclipse on 9 May and its possible effect on elections because of the superstitions of the Koreans. There also was considerable objection to Sunday elections from Christian groups. (Inclosure No. 26). The Commanding General, however, declined to be drawn into an argument concerning the responsibility for delays in the Election Law. The UNTCOK replied on 3 April

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concurring in the one day postponement (Inclosure No. 27).

(5) On 5 April, Executive Order No. 20, South Korean Interim Government was issued announcing the change in the date of the election from 9 May to 10 May 1948 and UNTCOK in its Press Release 53 concurred in the change (Inclosures Nos. 28 and 29).

c. Election Law and Regulations.

(1) The Department of Justice (Major J. W. Connelly and Mr. Denny F. Scott, Advisors) had considerable work in connection with the preparation for the election of Representatives of the Korean People which was held 10 May 1948. The Election Law and the Regulations thereto were prepared by the U.S. Liaison Officer and his staff, but the Department of Justice having practical experience with the Korean Courts and with Korean political currents were called in to several conferences for advice as to the practicality of certain provisions. The Department was also called into a conference the Military Governor had with the National Election Committee to discuss the Election Law while it was in preparation. The Election Law was issued as Ordinance No. 175 through the Department of Justice. (Inclosure No. 30).

(2) Prior to this time an informal "Korean Election Committee" (which was later to become the National Election Committee) prepared tentative "Regulations for Implementing the Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People" (Inclosure No. 31). These Regulations (with the Election Law) became permanent when finally approved by the UNTCOK on 18 March and constituted the legal vehicle under which the 10 May elections were held.

(3) On 1 April 1948, USAMGIK Ordinance No. 179 "Provisions for Temporary Family Registers" was prepared by the Department of Justice in order to facilitate the registration of

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refugees from North Korea (Inclosure No. 34). It also became known that many persons who had failed to register their residences were afraid to register to vote because of fear of incurring punishments for having failed to register their residences. To override this difficulty, the Department of Justice prepared Executive Order No. 19 "Temporary Suspension of Penalties in Residence Registration Ordinance" which was approved by the Military Governor on 31 March 1948 (Inclosure No. 35).

(4) The principal stesp in the elections of 10 May under Ordinance 175 were as follows:

TIME SCHEDULE OF ELECTION

Actual Date	No. of days in relation to Election Date
1 March	E Day minus 71 - Chief Executive announces date of election
2 March	E Day minus 70 - (at least) Chief Executive organizes National Election Committee
10 March or earlier	E Day minus 60 (or more) Fligibility of voters by residence
30 March	E Day minus 41 - Electoral District Election Committees announce date, time of election and location of polling places
30 March - 9 April	E Day minus 41/30 - Registration of voters
30 March - 16 April	E Day minus 41/24 days - Registration of candidates
15 April - 21 April	E Day minus 25/19 days - Public display of poll register
18 April	E Day minus 22 days - Electoral district election committees determine place of candidate on ballot and symbol assigned to each candidate
22 April - 24 April	E Day minus 18/16 days - Decision on objections to poll register
25 April - 29 April	E Day minus 15/11 days - Request for review of decision of voting district election committee
30 April - 2 May	E Day minus 10/8 days - Electoral district election committee decides on review

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5 May	E Day minus 5 days - Announcement of place where ballot boxes are opened
7 May	E Day minus 3 days - Submission of names of election observers
8 May	E Day minus 2 days - Submission of photographs of candidates; poll registers final
10 May	E Day
11 May - 25 May	E Day plus 1/14 days - Period for invalidation of elections by Military Governor
23 June	E Day plus 44 days - Last day for by-election in case of invalidation of elections

(5) Basis of Election Law and Regulations.

(a) While the Flection Law as finally adopted was a compromise of views between the UNTCOK and the U.S. authorities, it was largely derived from Public Act No. 5, an election law passed by the South Korean Interim Legislature in 1947. Having been written and approved by a Korean Legislature, it was advisable to adopt as much of this law as was feasible as a basis for discussion with the UN Commission.

(b) The principal points of difference between the SKILA Law and the tentative Election Regulations on the one hand, and the final texts of the Election Law and the Election Regulations on the other, are as follows:

	/1/ SKILA LAW	FINAL ELECTION LAW
		21
Age qualification of voters:	23	
Disqualification of voters:	/a/ Convicts excluded for five years from voting.	Persons actually serving prison terms, except persons punished for political crimes.
	/b/ Collaborationists and "profiteers" covered by traitor's law.	No disqualification of voters for collaboration or profiteering, except for members of Japanese Diet and Koreans who accepted Japanese peerages.

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	/c/ Mental incompetents, partial and full, and drug addicts.	Judicially adjudicated incompetents and weak-minded quasi-incompetents.
Qualification of candidates:	/a/ 200 signatures to nominating petition.	200 signatures to nominating petition.
	/b/ Disqualification of persons covered by special categories and by traitors law as collaborationists and profiteers.	Disqualification of persons covered by definite categories as collaborationists.
Election Districts:	/a/ Voting districts: administrative districts on the PU, KU, EUP and MYUN level. Establishment of voting-sub-districts (sub-districts) population of 3000-7000.	Maximum population: 2000. Establishment of election districts on the EUP, MYUN, and DONG level discretionary.
	/b/ Electoral districts: Administrative units (Gun, PU, and KU), irrespective of size.	Administrative units (GUN, PU, and KU) with population between 150,000. Sub-division of administrative units with population exceeding 150,000 into two or more electoral districts.
	/c/ Representation of electoral districts: Electoral districts with population between 150,000, one assembly member; those above 150,000, one additional member for population of additional 100,000 and major parts thereof.	One assembly member for each electoral district.
	/d/ Special electoral district: Korean citizen with family register (HOJUK) in North Korea and residence in South Korea free to register and vote in "special electoral district." Determination of number of seats to be assigned to special election district in discretion of National Election Committee (36 seats suggested).	No special election district.

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Election Committees:	/a/	National Election Committees: Chairman elected from among members.	Judge of Supreme Court appointed by Military Governor.
	/b/	Provincial Election Committees: Chairman elected from among members.	Chairman: A judge to be recommended by chief judge of district court.
		All election officials on provincial level to be appointed by Provincial Governor.	All election officials on provincial level to be appointed by National Election Committee on recommendation of Provincial Governors and Chief of District Court.
	/c/	Electoral District Election Committees (GUN, PU, and KU): All election officials to be appointed by administrative head of administrative unit Chairman to be elected from among members. No review of appointments.	Chairman appointed by Chief of District Court; half of the members appointed by administrative head, half of the members appointed by chief of district court. Review of appointments by Provincial Election Committee.
	/d/	Voting District Election Committees: No review of appointments.	Review of appointments by Electoral District Election Committees.
	/e/	Alternates: No provision concerning appointment of alternates.	Appointment of alternates for each election official.
Literacy Test:	/a/	Registration: Registrant must sign his name on registration form. (Literacy requirement in effect.)	Registrant may mark registration form in presence of two witnesses. (No literacy requirement).
	/b/	Balloting: Write-in ballot (Literacy requirement in effect.)	Voter marks with check candidate of his choice (No literacy requirement).
Validity of election:	/a/	Supreme Court decides on motion of defeated candidate.	Election Review Board (Chairman, judge appointed by Chief Justice; two judicial members appointed by Chief Executive; two members elected by National Assembly, decides on motion of defeated candidate.

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/b/	No invalidation of election by Military Governor.	Military Governor may within two weeks after election invalidate election of candidates in case of violence and gross violations of Election Law.

	/2/ DRAFT OF ELECTION REGULATIONS	ELECTION REGULATIONS AS ADOPTED
Freedom of Campaigning:	Granted exclusively to persons eligible to vote. Right of canvassing restricted to candidates.	No restrictions.

5. Information Program.

a. It was fully realized that the success of the South Korean election depended to a considerable extent on a campaign of familiarization and popularization. The Koreans had never taken part in an election conducted entirely in accordance with democratic procedures. Registration was largely a police function. "Voting" as such, was an unfamiliar device, the voice of the people being expressed in the past through the village headmen or the "block chief" in the cities. The nomination and campaigning of multi-party candidates was known only to the comparatively few politically conscious persons in South Korea. The preparation of a very comprehensive plan for the indoctrination of the South Koreans was the responsibility of the Office of Civil Information - OCI - (Mr. James L. Stewart, Adviser). This plan was presented to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and informally approved by that body (Inclosure No. 32).

b. The Department of Education (Mr. Robert E. Gibson, Adviser), the Department of Communications (Colonel Wm. D. Hamlin, Adviser) and the Air Officer, XXIV Corps (Lt. Colonel R. A. Morehouse) contributed to the success of the general over-all program.

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c. OCI.

The following facts and estimates show the extent of OCI participation in the National Election by the implementation of the program described in Inclosure No. 32. All figures cover the period from 1 March to 9 May inclusive, unless otherwise indicated.

(1) Printed Matter Distributed

(a)	Leaflets and Pamphlets	3,502,700*
(b)	World News - 12 issues	10,325,000
(c)	Magazine Servicing Articles	1,327,700
(d)	Adult Education	144,400
	TOTAL	15,299,800

*4,700,000 were airdropped.

(2) Visuals and Posters

(a)	Panels	155 sets
(b)	Posters	81,000

(3) Radio Broadcasts

15 - minute daily commentary	30
30 - minute weekly news review	10
15 - minute specials (Mitchell)	8
TOTAL	48

Other media through which the election and democratic processes were publicized included the distribution of 1215 radio receivers and 90 public address systems.

One hundred fourteen (114) regular speakers addressed an estimated 278,130 persons, starting the latter part of March and continuing through April and the first week in May. Three special speakers addressed an estimated 121,730 persons, making a total estimated figure of 408,860.

The "Silver Train" carrying the stage production, "Father's Native Village" and a special speaker who addressed audiences during intermission, travelled a total of 2,900 miles and presented a total of 39 performances to estimated audiences totaling 59,700 persons.

A special motion picture production titled "The People Vote" was made by OCI and reviewed by an estimated 8,000,000

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persons. The fiscal office reports a cash outlay of 4,069,296 won including the production cost of the 45 - minute instruction movie film, "The People Vote."

Eight freight cars and 38 baggage cars (not all fully utilized to capacity) were required to move the output of materials. In addition to regular motor vehicles consisting of 26 trucks, jeeps and trailers, an additional fleet of 30 vehicles was used during most of the period. This fleet was supplemented by "K" (alloted for South Korea Interim Government use) trucks at various times. Each vehicle is estimated to have been driven an average of 2,000 miles in disseminating information by speakers and in printed form.

Most of the material used emanated from the Production Section of OCI Headquarters in Seoul, augmented by materials furnished by the New York Field Office, and disseminated mostly through ten branch OCI offices. This does not include the activities undertaken by branch managers in preparing additional posters, visual displays, and other printed material.

The production division required 22 tons of newsprint for nine special leaflets and four adult education and eleven magazine servicing articles at a cost of 4,752,000 won. Printing costs were 552,120 won, or a total of 5,304,120 won. Eleven issues of World News required thirty-three tons of newsprint at a cost of 7,128,000 won with 513,500 won for printing costs of a total of 7,641,500 won. The total cost for newsprint and printing of all pre-election publications was 12,945,620 won. 15,299,800 pieces of printed material cost less than 1 won each for production, and gave a fraction slightly over 2 pieces of printed material for each qualified registrant and voter.

d. Department of Education.

This Department formulated a comprehensive plan of familiarization through the schools (Inclosure No. 33).

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e. Department of Communications.

The role of this Department was largely in the distribution of mail matter of candidates permitted under the Election Regulations. Immediately prior to the election the Department of Communications handled 352,967 pieces of mail in connection with the elections, of which 242,612 were handled free, and 110,355 were paid for. Those paid for consisted mainly of post cards which were cheaper for the candidate to buy including postage than to buy similar cards in the open market. In the Seoul area, 3,615 free telegrams were handled in connection with the election and it is estimated that approximately 7,000 such messages were handled throughout South Korea.

f. Air Office, XXIV Corps.

The Air Section provided the means of timely distribution to the people in the innumerable outlying villages in South Korea. World news and messages of instruction as to the mechanics of the coming elections were dropped by air every week.

Quick transportation to out of the way points was furnished for members of the UN, MG election workers and the security forces.

Several special airplane trips were made, 4 tons of election materials were air lifted and over 100 UN observers and election committeemen were transported to Ongjin, Kangnung, Cheju-Do and Pusan.

Statistics:

(1) Leaflet Drops--6

Number of aircraft	Miles Flown
12 C-47s 48 L-5s	44,200

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(2) Passengers-- 83 (C-47s) plus 41 (L-5s)

Number of aircraft	Miles flown
28 C-47s	12,470
41 L-5s	10,716

(3) Freight--Ballot boxes, election materials, etc.

Number of aircraft	Weight	Miles Flown
18 C-47s	8209	3,660

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II - REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS

6. Registration and Elections in Seoul and the Provinces.

a. Observation Procedure by U. S. Personnel

The Chief Civil Affairs Officers in the City of Seoul and the provinces were made responsible for U. S. observation of the elections. 411 officers and equivalent grade DAC personnel were placed on this duty under the control of Chief Civil Affairs Officers during two phases:

I - Pre-election Observations, and

II - Election Day and Ballot Tabulation

The Chief Civil Affairs Officers were directed to maintain accurate chronological records of their observations and to forward these records to the Military Governor (Inclosure No. 36). Small groups of UN observers (average of 2 and not over 3 in each group, except in Seoul) were attached to each provincial capital and the City of Seoul during the actual election phase only.

b. Results of U. S. Observation

The general picture of the observations of the pre-election and actual balloting phases of the South Korean elections on 10 May was one of quiet efficiency and orderliness except in North Cheju Island and at isolated areas throughout the country. The great majority of the reports emphasized the efficiency of the election committees and the honest conduct of the elections under the Election Law and Regulations. The only threat to honest, free and fair elections was from the Communists who conducted a vigorous campaign of revolution and murder in an effort to halt the elections. (See par. 7 below.) But Communist power to interfere had steadily waned since 7 February when the campaign started and during the 8/10 May week-end casualties and attacks had materially diminished. There follows pertinent extracts from reports of the Chief Civil Affairs Officers commenting on the registration and election in their areas:

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(Complete reports are attached as Inclosures Nos. 37 to 46, inclusive)

(1) City of Seoul (Lt. Colonel James E. Wilson, Chief Civil Affairs Officer)

Following are pertinent and interesting extracts:

"The Chief Civil Affairs Officer made innumerable stops at voting places in all parts of the City and was impressed by the orderly manner in which voting was carried on. The Korean Mayor and the CCAO hurried to several places where bombings were reported and were impressed again by the large numbers of voters who returned to the lines in spite of the attempts to intimidate them and to keep them from voting.

"At several points the CCAO met various members of the UN inspection Committees who expressed satisfaction with conditions and amazement at the large number of the early vote.

"It was particularly noted that every phase of the Election Law was faithfully and cheerfully complied with. The impression was gained that in a few seeming slip-ups, the omission was that of ignorance and unfamiliarity with procedure rather than an attempt to violate the law.

"During the counting, the CCAO inspected all counting places and was again impressed with the orderly, calm, judicious procedure. The UN was observed in several places and all expressed satisfaction with the general picture. One exception was the Syrian delegate who felt the Election was proceeding in too orderly a manner and was therefor suspect. However, most of the other UN members seemed to view all proceedings with great satisfaction.

"In all, the entire registration and voting was carried out with minimum disturbance and disorder."

A complete detailed report of observation of elections in the City of Seoul is attached as Inclosure No. 37.

(2) Kyunggi Province (F. J. Connaughton, Adviser, Home Affairs)

Inclosure No. 38 contains (a) a brief report of the observations in Kyunggi Province and (b) typical extracts of a more detailed report prepared in chronological form. The following are brief extracts from the former:

"Ballot boxes, printed ballots, locks, election laws, pencils and paper shipped to election districts by truck, plane, ship and ox-cart. All of this work was handled by the facilities of this province without incident.

"Full arrangements were made with the secretary of the United Nations Commission for the delegates to observe the registration and election.

"The undersigned accompanied the delegates on their various trips throughout Kyunggi Province and in every incident heard

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romarks passed by individual delegates expressing their surprise and pleasure with the ease and intelligence with which the registration and election officials handled their jobs."

(3) Kangwon Province (Lt. Colonel Earl Sutton, Chief Civil Affairs Officer)

The elections in Kangwon Province paralleled those of other areas, being conducted freely, honestly, fairly and efficiently.

The following is extracted from the report of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the province:

"As reflected by the chronological logs maintained by each election observer it is evident that the rules and regulations governing election procedures were strictly complied with at all election levels.

"Representatives of the United Nations Commission visited voting districts, electoral districts and the Provincial Election Committee of Kang Won Province during the registration period and on the voting day.

"a. The many pertinent questions put to voting committee members by the United Nations representatives were satisfactorily answered. Their inspections of voting places revealed that a free atmosphere existed.

"b. Upon departure, the representatives implied that they were pleasantly impressed and did not make any adverse comments.

"The undersigned worked closely with the various election committees and is of the opinion that the Koreans were genuinely interested in the conduct of an honest free election and did so accomplish in an exemplary manner in Kang Won Province."

See Inclosure No. 39 for report of a typical election district by a U. S. observer.

(4) Chung Chong Puk Province (Lt. Colonel Roland E. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, who was succeeded by Lt. Colonel Marcus Tague during the actual conduct of the elections)

Attached as Inclosure No. 40 are the reports of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and an observer in one of the electoral districts in this province. Both reports indicate the same high order of excellency that characterized the conduct of the elections elsewhere in South Korea.

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(5) Chung Chong Nam Province (Colonel George H. Cushman, Chief Civil Affairs Officer)

There was some disorder during the election in Chung Chong Nam Province although the election in general was quiet and orderly. The following extracts from the report of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Chung Chong Nam Province briefly summarizes the conduct of elections in that province. Attached as Inclosure No. 41 is a report of the observation of the election in four counties (guns) of Chung Chong Nam Province. In one gun there was a complaint from a candidate who alleged election irregularities. He was properly informed by the U.S. representatives to lodge his complaints with the election committee concerned.

"The election in Chung Chong Nam on 10 May 1948 was completed, as a whole, quietly and in good order. My plan to insure adequate coverage of the election included sending two American observers into each electoral district.

"In Puyo Gun a voting district was attacked during the early hours of 10 May and the Ballot Box and Ballots kidnapped. An extra box and extra ballots were secured and the voting proceeded without any loss of time.

"In Sochon Gun a voting place was attacked before opening hour. The Police on guard killed one attacker, wounded another, and captured two more.

"In Puyo Gun another voting place was attacked about 0230 on 10 May and blown up with dynamite. By 0700 another place had been secured and the voting proceeded in an orderly manner.

"As a whole, the election was well conducted and orderly. All Koreans were seemingly much interested and the voting was early, most polling places being 95% completed by noon. An unusually large number of voters were women."

(6) Cholla Puk Province (Colonel Wm. J. T. Yancey, Chief Civil Affairs Officer)

The election in Cholla Puk Province was generally quiet and orderly with no major irregularities noted. The following extract from the Chief Civil Affairs Officer describes the situation in this province:

"In general, all observers expressed surprise and pleasure at the knowledge of the election laws by all Korean officials, the excellence of their performance and the orderliness and enthusiasm of all the populace. The only attempts at serious disorders

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were instigated by communist agitators. In practically all cases the latter did not progress beyond the attempt stage due to the prompt action of the police, and they were in no case able to interfere seriously."

Attached as Inclosure No. 42 is the report of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

(7) Cholla Nam Province (Colonel Timothy H. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer)

Cholla Nam Province is one where constant Communist activity prevails and it is no surprise that some violence was reported on the day of the election. In general, however, the overall situation could be described as quiet and orderly. In an area where Communist intimidation was anticipated necessary precautions had to be taken to protect election officials and establishments. Yet it does not appear from the report of the observation team of either the U.S. or the UNTCOK that unduly repressive or restrictive measures were taken by the authorities. The following extract from the report of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer is quoted:

"All observers without exception, were impressed with the honesty, sincerity, and singleness of purpose of the election officials both at the Voting District and Electoral District levels. Observers were of the opinion that this election was as well or better handled than any they had observed in the States. Most election officials appeared to be conversant with all phases of the election laws and regulations and went about their work efficiently and with a minimum of confusion."

Attached is a complete report of the same officer as Inclosure No. 43.

(8) Kyong Sang Puk Province (Colonel Alexander Adair, Chief Civil Affairs Officer)

Kyong Sang Puk is normally politically disturbed because of the relatively strong Communist and Leftist influences in this area. Intimidation of voters by the Communists was, therefore, to be anticipated and consequently, strong reaction by the Rightists through the police and youth groups to prevent interference with the elections. In general, however, the elections were conducted in comparative quiet and order. See extracts from the report of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer below:

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"In practically all cases, American Observers, and also Mr. Manet of the UNTCOK, indicated that all Korean election officials were sincere in their efforts to conduct a free and fair election.

"The reasons for the non-voting of a small segment of the eligible voting population appeared to be, in order of priority:

"a. Those who were afraid to vote due to intimidation by Communists.

"b. Those who were against the election.

"c. Those who for business or personal reasons were away from their voting districts on 10 May.

a

"No incident was noted whereby any individual was forcing or attempting to force a person to vote.

"A very few instances of armed police being inside the voting place were observed.

"All observers were impressed with the extremely large amount of women voters who turned out.

"In several instances, American Observers stated that the arrival of Americans at a voting place tended to reassure the voters that nothing would happen to them if they voted, consequently a greater number of voters turned out.

"In practically all instances, the self-protection units were used in a proper manner."

Attached as Inclosure No. 44 is the report of the Civil Affairs Officer less the voluminous log of events in the areas except in one typical area.

(9) Kyongsang Nam Province (Colonel F. E. Gillette, Chief Civil Affairs Officer)

In Kyong Sang Nam Province it was greatly feared that serious violence and opposition to the election would occur, largely instigated by the Communist South Korea Labor Party. While these fears were justified the election as a whole was carried out fairly and honestly and in comparative calm. There were 32 cases of violence on 9/10 May in which five persons were killed and 21 injured. Extracts from the report of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer tell this story well:

"There was an initial indifference on the part of a good many people toward the election, due to the following causes: (a) The opposition of Kim Koo and KIM Kiu Sic. Their followers and many other citizens and government officials opposed the elections and indicated that they would not vote; (b) Suspicion of motives behind the election. In many former Japanese elections

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Koreans had been forced to vote for Japanese-supported candidates. (c) Loss of face by head-men. In all former elections the head-men voted to decide minor matters of local interest. With the coming of universal suffrage which gave the vote to the women and all younger adult members of families, the headmen lost face and many felt that the women and younger people did not have the experience and were not qualified to vote.

"This indifference and opposition seemed to melt away shortly after the onset of the education campaign. Many people came to feel that Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic were traitors and had sold their country in order to further their own selfish ambitions. The conviction was also aroused that the election was actually to be honest and conducted under a free atmosphere. Before the registration was over, it was evident that public interest in the election as an initial step toward independence was rising throughout the Province. By the time of the election, a wave of popular patriotic feeling had completely eclipsed the opposition of Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic and only the real Communists and their followers continued the opposition. There was little campaigning on any issue other than that of independence, and few people seemed to care for whom they voted as long as they had the opportunity to elect a representative who would help to form a Korean Government.

"It cannot be claimed that there was no intimidation, no force, used to influence people to register or to vote. This is impossible in our own country. However, all cases reported in this Province were discovered to be purely local in nature and little evidence was forthcoming regarding actual occurrences. It is believed that the police made a genuine attempt to carry out the intent of the election law. They carried on a Province-wide education campaign, but on investigation it was found that this was purely for the purpose of inducing the people to vote, and was not directed toward the support of any one candidate. The Chief of Police investigated throughout the Province to supervise this assistance on the part of the police to the election committees, and government officials, and reported that great progress had been made. It was rumored that some individuals had registered under the impression that their ration cards would have been forfeited if they had failed to do so. Discussion of this subject with many block leaders brought out the fact that such threats would have been unnecessary because the Korean people were generally used to carrying out the instructions of the block leaders and cooperating with them. No evidence was discovered by any of the inspection teams regarding bought votes, intimidation or coercion. This free atmosphere was confirmed by the attitude of the people on Election Day.

"Reports of American Inspection Teams were unanimous in their expression of gratification and even surprise over the great interest on the part of the entire population in the election, the careful planning on the part of all officials for the conduct of the elections and the meticulous observance of every detail of the Election Law by the election committees.

"All opposition except that evidenced by the South Korea Labor Party had disappeared. The Korean people seemed determined to vote, they seemed to know how to vote and they appeared to gain great satisfaction from the knowledge that they had helped contribute some small part toward Korean independence.

"There were 11 cases of violence on the 9th of May in which 4 people were killed, 8 injured, and 12 ballot boxes and ballots or registration lists destroyed. The latter were all replaced

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before election day. On 10 May there were 21 cases of violence, in which 1 person was killed, 13 injured and 14 ballot boxes destroyed. Even the destruction of the boxes or the threat of continued violence did not deter the voters and the election was continued. In no area were sufficient ballots destroyed to warrant a recommendation for a re-election.

"There was no question in the minds of any of the American inspectors but that a free atmosphere existed. Voters, when questioned regarding this, indicated that they would not have voted (or would have turned in blank ballots) if the election had been forced. The voting was honest and secret and in general surpassed in this respect the results obtained in what are called "democratic" countries."

Attached as Inclosure No. 45 is an excellent report of the election campaign in this province.

(10) Cheju Island

On the island of Cheju, long the scene of bitter family vendettas, the Communists apparently made their greatest effort to disrupt the elections. Trained agitators and specially armed groups were sent to Cheju from other provinces to interfere and halt, if possible, the registration and balloting.

Casualties on Cheju Island were considerable. For the entire period of the Communist subversive effort beginning 7 February 1948 to 14 May (Communist subversive activities still continue on a diminishing scale on Cheju) the figures were:

Election officials	- Killed 4 (More than any other province)
Police	- Killed 12 Wounded 25 (Second highest total among provinces)
Families of Police	- Killed 6 Wounded 3 (Highest total among provinces)

Additionally 42 persons were killed and 60 wounded by Communists in indiscriminate attacks on Cheju Island. The Communists were well armed, principally with Japanese weapons, and the mountainous areas of the island, afforded excellent concealment and bases for launching raids on villages. There was considerable intimidation of both election officials and voters and in some cases complete destruction of balloting places, particularly in North Cheju. In some cases almost the entire village population

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either left voluntarily or by force on Election Day.

Despite a vigorous campaign by the Communists, excellent comparative results were obtained. In the three electoral districts in Cheju (2 in North and 1 in South Cheju) a total of 69.8% were registered and 86.6 of actual registrants voted. (Inclosure No. 55). In North Cheju the voting was ligher, however, than in any other area in South Korea:

North Cheju	No. of Registered Voters	No. of Actual Voters	Voting Districts	Districts Where Votes Could Not Be Counted
Electoral District "A"	27,560	11,912	73	42
Electoral District "B"	20,917	9,724	61	29

(Inclosure No. 54)

In view of the situation prevailing on Cheju, the Military Governor, on recommendation of the National Election Committee, invalidated the voting in the two electoral districts of North Cheju. Elections in these areas were postponed indefinitely. (See Inclosure No. 46 for detailed report of U.S. observers).

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(11) Report of Chief Adviser and USAMGIK Liaison Officer (Colonel Wm. F. Center, Acting Chief Adviser, and Lt. Colonel Charles G. Duffy, Liaison Officer)

Attached as Inclosure No. 47 is a report of the Office of Chief Adviser, South Korean Interim Government, which coordinated the various overall steps within the responsibility of the United States Army Military Government in Korea and the South Korean Interim Government. This office, through Colonel Duffy, also acted as liaison link between the U.S. Liaison Officer with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and the United States Army Military Government in Korea and also between the latter and the National Election Committee. (For photographs of Election Day balloting and other election activity, see Inclosures Nos. 47A to 47O.)

7. Communist Efforts to Disrupt and Prevent Elections.

a. Beginning on 7 February 1948, the Communists began an intensive, comprehensive effort to disrupt and prevent the 10 May elections in South Korea and to force the UNTCOK to leave Korea. That effort included murder, arson, violence, strikes, demonstrations, bribery, incitement to riot and revolution, intimidation, and propaganda. There was no doubt that the entire campaign was planned in Pyongyang and directed from Voroshilov (Eastern Siberian Military Headquarters) and Moscow.

b. The attempted 7 February general strike and the consequent disturbances and rioting were a prelude to the overall plan. This effort generally failed although it represented almost a maximum Communist effort.

c. The PYONGYANG Radio in North Korea trumpeted the major official themes of the campaign:

"The armies of both U.S. and U.S.S.R. should withdraw at once."

"The 10 May election means the permanent division of Korea."

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"The United States intends to colonize Korea as part of an imperialistic plan."

"Pro-Japs and national traitors should be destroyed."

Subsidiary propaganda was to be spread by Communist agents as follows:

(1) A Korean People's Republic was already established in North Korea.

(2) An army of thousands of picked soldiers has been set up in North Korea while South Korea has very feeble national defense power.

(3) KIM, Il Sung (North Korea Communist leader) will conquer South Korea by force within a short time.

(4) The practical action to be taken was: "Grasp the chance now that the people are restless, and assail the police stations, killing policemen and rightist leaders. Tell the people that if they do not oppose the general election, they will be punished as traitors."

d. Riots and disturbances were to be fomented at meetings (1) denouncing the U.N. Commission, (2) insisting that both occupation forces withdraw and (3) urging transfer of the political power to the people. Women would be sent to the administrative authorities to demand food. Food would be stolen and distributed to the people. When the Police and Dai Dong Youth Party interrupted meetings, the Communists were to crush them completely. When the people were ready to assault government and public offices, the leaders were to disappear to evade responsibility but the assault would not be stopped. Fighting was to be continued so that it would paralyze peace and order.

e. Special instructions were issued in connection with the above efforts:

(1) For propagandizing, assaulting and destructive purposes, strangers from other districts were to be used.

(2) Leaders were to be either poor farmers or people who

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displayed the "revolutionary spirit" in the fight of February 7th. (1948)

(3) The Constabulary was to be bribed and induced to clash with the police.

f. Although the Communist efforts were well planned and vigorously executed, the elections were carried out in most of Southern Korea quietly and efficiently. (On Cheju Island and in the Southern provinces the Communists made major efforts to stop the election and create chaos and revolution, particularly on Cheju). During the election week-end of 8-10 May there were 57 attacks on voting booths, 7 policemen killed, 1 candidate wounded and 5 election officials killed besides numerous other killings and incidents involving sabotage of industry and communications, strikes, etc. But the entire campaign of the Communists from 7 February through 14 May totalled many more:

Election offices attacked	134	
	Killed	Wounded
Election officials and candidates	17	65
Police and their families	56 (49 policemen)	142 (128 policemen)
Communists and rioters	261	123

(See Inclosure No. 48 for complete details).

The Communists aided by family vendettas and isolation of Cheju Island, succeeded in disrupting the elections there sufficiently to cause the Military Governor to order new elections. The Communists made a powerful effort on Cheju Island and apparently brought in numbers of trained agitators and quantities of arms and ammunition from other areas and from North Korea itself. The effort continues and may be played up on Communist radio broadcasts as the "Greece of the Orient."

g. One of the most quieting influences on the election was the organization of the "Community Protective Corps (Hyang Boh Dan) with the approval of the South Korean Interim Government shortly before the election solely to guard against the anticipated

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Communist disruptive attacks and interference with the elections. This vigilante-type body of men was organized from citizens and members of youth groups and armed with clubs. It was dissolved on 22 May 1948 by Mr. AHN, Chai Hong, Civil Administrator of SKIG, with the approval of the Military Governor. The body served a good purpose although (inevitably) there were a few reports of excesses committed by some members of the Corps.

h. Korean Constabulary (Brig. Gen. W. L. Roberts, Adviser)

(1) The entire Korean Constabulary was alerted for possible action and immediate movement.

(2) Every American Adviser was directed to be physically present with the unit to which he was assigned, from 081800 May 1948 to 121800 May 1948. Other instructions directed the safe-guarding of weapons and ammunition. An American duty officer was present at this Headquarters night and day from 080800 May to 121800 May. American advisers in the field established liaison with Civil Affairs Officer of each province, who called out Korean Constabulary for special guards in many provinces.

(3) Twenty-two (22) platoons were alerted to guard as many prisons; in some cases where unit was not close to prison earmarked for guard, the unit did not move out to a closer area near the prison, but still remained on an alert status.

(4) The Korean Constabulary also assumed the respon-sibility of guarding four (4) Hydro plants and four (4) Thermal plants.

(5) Four (4) Platoons from 4th Regiment were sent to isolated places for security reasons.

(6) On Cheju Do Island, the Korean Constabulary assisted in guarding the voting boxes.

8. UN Observation of Elections.

a. Methods of observation: The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea adopted certain "Methods of Observation of Elections" (UNTCOK Document A/AC.19/54, Inclosure No. 49) as a

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guide to the accomplishment of its task. The Commission proposed to observe the elections centrally, by permanent liaison with the National Election Committee, and in the provinces through field observer groups. The Commission also decided that "an appropriate liaison be established between the Commission's own agencies of observation and those of the United States." The Commission's teams were so small, however, that UN observation was confined largely to observation of the work of the Chief Civil Affairs officers and local election committees in the provinces and to limited tours throughout the City of Seoul. During the registration phase, however, Communists and dissident groups arranged to meet the Commission to present their complaints. Additionally, many "documents" alleging unfair elections were also received by the Commission chiefly from Communists and Communist-front organizations.

b. Phases: The following successive stages of the election were actually observed by the UN Commission:

1. Registration of voters (5-10 April),
2. Display of poll registers, appeals, and registration of candidates (19-24 April),
3. Election day (10 May), and
4. Post election period.

c. Organization and Itinerary: Detailed organizations and itineraries of observations are included in the following UNTCOK Documents:

A/AC.19/W.42 (Inclosure No. 50)
A/AC.19/W.42/Add.5 (Inclosure No. 51)
A/AC.19/W.42/Add.6 Rev. 1 (Inclosure No. 52)

d. Results of observation of registration of voters, display of poll registers, appeals, and registration of candidates.

(1) Week April 5/10, 1948

(a) The impression received by UNTCOK as a result of observation of pre-election steps and procedures during the

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weeks 5/10 and 19/24 April,as indicated in their conversation with U.S. representatives, was favorable. Only a very few specific alleged faults discovered as the result of UNTCOK observation were brought to the attention of the U.S. Liaison Officer and these were promptly answered.

(b) The Military Governor appeared before the Main Committee, UN Commission, on 17 April.

Several very general points were raised by members of the Commission:

1. Freedom of the press and assembly during elections.

2. Definition of role of "dong" (block or ward) leaders and village headmen during elections so as to prevent undue interference.

3. Possible intimidation of potential candidates by youth groups.

4. Police methods.

The Military Governor gave what apparently were satisfactory replies to all questions.

(c) A very comprehensive and detailed, but informal, round-up of all delegates' opinions was made by the U.S. Liaison Officer. The consensus was that the observation of the registration by the Commission between 5 and 10 April showed that the overall impression was very favorable.

(2) Week April 19/24, 1948

The U.S. Liaison Officer replied to a few specific cases cited by Mr. I. F. G. Milner, Secretary, Main Committee, on 30 April 1948, as the result of UNTCOK observations during the week 19/24 April. Four additional memoranda were addressed to the U.S. Liaison Officer between 30 April and 7 May covering alleged deficiencies largely reported by the Communist "Democratic People's Front" and other Communistic front organizations in the form of documents, etc. Complaints usually involved alleged intimidation, threats, coerced registration, interference of police,

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threat of withholding ration cards, etc. None of these cases could be proved.

e. Results of observation of election: The final conclusion of the Commission on the results of the Commission's observations of the election in South Korea on 10 May 1948 were to be tabulated in Shanghai and included in its final report to the UN General Assembly. Informal conversations with the delegates and the principal members of the secretariat on their return to Seoul on 11-12 May indicated that almost all regarded the election as

(1) Fairly and honestly conducted,

(2) Surprisingly well arranged and managed,

(3) Legal, in accordance with the law, and

(4) Conducted in the democratic tradition.

There was one exception--the Syrian delegate, Mr. Mughir, who as temporary chairman, issued a press release on 13 May, apparently without consulting other delegates. Mughir's statement exaggerated a few faults but conceded that "on the whole, however, the elections were conducted very smoothly and on a fairly good level of organization and efficiency." The statement went on to comment on the "remarkable" efficiency that "This...should give rise to a certain degree of caution and reservation in our appraisal of that efficiency."

f. Transportation Facilities:

(1) The Department of Transportation (Lt. Colonel A. J. Cornelson) provided special and regular passenger trains for the use of the UN Commission. Freight transportation was provided for shipment of paper, ballot boxes, printed matter and motor equipment. Attached as Inclosure No. 53, is a schedule showing that 14 special trains, 34 additional cars, and 135 freight cars were provided for the transportation of the personnel of the Commission and materials for the election.

(2) The Bureau of Marine Transportation provided "The City of Ongjin" which was used by UN observers between 6 and 12 May to proceed to important island communities off Korea.

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9. Official Results of the Election

a. Report by National Election Committee:

The National Election Committee reported the official results of the 10 May election by letter to the Military Governor on 21 May as required by the Election Law (Inclosure No. 54). 198 "new members of the National Assembly" were declared elected by the Committee. At the same time the Committee recommended that the elections in two electoral districts -- North Cheju (Puk Cheju) Districts A and B -- be invalidated in accordance with Section 44 of the Election Law. Voting was held in less than 50% of the voting districts due to activities and violence of subversive elements.

The Military Governor on 24 May approved the recommendation of the National Election Committee and ordered re-elections to be held in the electoral districts affected on 23 June 1948. (Inclosure No. 54A)

b. Strength of Political Groups in Assembly:

ELECTED CANDIDATES' DECLARED PARTY AFFILIATIONS		NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE ESTIMATES OF ACTUAL EFFECTIVE VOTING STRENGTH	
Hankook Democratic Party	28	Hankook Democratic Party	76
NSAKI (Dr. RHEE)	55	NSAKI (Dr. RHEE)	61
Korean Independence Party	1	Korean Independence Party	17
United Young Men's Party	12	United Young Men's Party	16
Korean National Youth Corps	6	Korean National Youth Corps	10
Chosun Democratic Party	1	Chosun Democratic Party	0
Minor Parties	10	Moderates	10 1/
Non-Partisan	85	Miscellaneous	10
		Non-Partisan	0
	198 2/		200 3/

1/ Includes three former Communists.
2/ Two candidates will be elected in a supplemental election on 23 June in the 2 northern districts of CHEJUDO.
3/ Estimated before the CHEJU DO elections were voided.

c. Registration and Election Statistics:

(1) 7,837,504 persons registered for the 10 May election in South Korea of an estimated population of 19,947,000 as of 1 April 1948. Of the latter figure it is estimated that 9,834,000 were eligible voters. The percentage of registration, therefore, was 79.7%.

(2) There were 7,036,750 voters who went to the polls on 10 May 1948 or 92.5% of those registered. (Inclosure No. 55)

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III - NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTFE AND ELECTION REVIEW BOARD

10. National Election Committee

a. The National Election Committee (Korean) was established by Fxecutive Order No. 14 dated 3 March 1948 (Inclosure No. 56). The Committee's powers were clearly set forth in the "Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People", USAMGIK Ordinance No. 175 (17 March 1948) (Inclosure No. 30). The powers and responsibilities of the Committee, in general, were the organization of subordinate election committees, the general supervision of the election and the consideration of appeals in case of protests or complaints.

11. Election Review Board.

a. The "Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People" -- Ordinance No. 175, Section 50 (Inclosure No. 30) provides for the establishment of an "Election Review Board" with final jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the validity of elections. It further provides that the Chairman of the Flection Review Board shall be designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Two members each were to be named by the Military Governor and the National Assembly.

b. On 10 June 1948 the Military Governor requested the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to nominate the Chairman (Inclosure No. 57). Parallel action was taken prior to that date on an informal basis with the Liaison Committee of the National Assembly to have that body name two members from the Assembly.

c. The National Assembly at its 15th session on 19 June nominated the following:

CHANG, Myun
SUH, Soon Yung

d. On 18 June the Chief Justice, Mr. KIM, Yung Moo nominated himself as Chairman of the Election Review Board. Mr. KIM

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made this nomination orally to the Military Governor through the adviser of the Department of Justice.

e. On 23 June the Military Governor announced by Executive Order No. 23 the formal establishment of the Election Review Board (Inclosure No. 70).

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IV - ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

12. Convocation of National Assembly.

a. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, convoked the first meeting of the National Assembly in Seoul on 31 May 1948 by proclamation dated 25 May 1948 (Inclosure No. 58). The date of the first meeting of the National Assembly was declared a National Holiday by Declaration No. 7 issued by the Military Governor. (Inclosure No. 59) There were two meetings held on 31 May, one during the morning beginning about 1000 which elected Dr. RHEE, Syngman as permanent Chairman, and an afternoon session open to the public, during which the official opening ceremonies were held.

b. Inclosures Nos. 60 to 65, both inclusive, show scenes at the first meeting of the National Assembly.

c. Addresses were made by the following:

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea (Inclosure No. 66).

Dr. RHEE, Syngman, Chairman (Inclosure No. 67).

Major General W. F. Dean, Military Governor (Inclosure No. 68)

CHU, Hung-ti, representative of the UNTCOK Secretariat in Seoul (Inclosure No. 69).

Henri Costilhes, "Chief of the Liaison Group" of UNTCOK in Seoul (Inclosure No. 69A).

Dr. Philip Jaisohn, revered Korean revolutionary leader of the last century, now an American citizen, also spoke extemporaneously but no record was kept of his remarks. No official message was sent by UNTCOK from Shanghai to the National Assembly.

The elected "representatives of the Korean people", prior to the formation of the National Assembly, sent a committee on Saturday, 29 May, to the UNTCOK at Duk Soo Palace and invited the Commission to participate in the formal opening session of the National Assembly.

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d. Two representatives from the Island of Cheju Do were not present because of the invalidation of elections in two electoral districts (Inclosure No. 54A).

e. Dr. RHEE as Chairman of the National Assembly wrote identical letters to the U.S. Military authorities and to UNTCOK on 3 June 1948, nominating a Liaison Committee of five members hoping that "you will contact these members whenever you wish to consult with us in whatever matter deemed to be necessary." The Commanding General on 7 June nominated three representatives to serve in a liaison capacity with the National Assembly (Inclosures Nos. 71 and 72).

f. On 9 June 1948 the National Assembly Liaison Committee paid a formal call on Mr. George S. Patterson, the then Chairman, and Mr. I. F. G. Milner, Principal Secretary, UNTCOK. The purpose of this call, according to members of the Liaison Committee to the U.S. Liaison Officer was to notify the UNTCOK of the formation of the National Assembly and of the Liaison Committee.

g. On 11 June 1948 Dr. RHEE sent a letter to UNTCOK formally notifying that body of its establishment as a National Assembly. The letter pointed out the basis for the establishment of the National Assembly (Inclosure No. 73).

h. There was a period during June when the Korean people were becoming increasingly discouraged because of the apparent reluctance of the UNTCOK to "recognize" the National Assembly as such, which had been brought into being under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and as a result of the 10 May election. On 25 June, however, the UNTCOK replied to Dr. RHEE's letter (Inclosure No. 74) and noted "that a National Assembly was constituted on 31 May 1948 by the elected representatives of the Korean people. Further, the UNTCOK accepted an invitation to visit the National Assembly

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during one of its official sessions. The UNTCOK made only one condition; that the introductory remarks or other speeches of the presiding officer or members be submitted to the UNTCOK in advance. Agreement between the UNTCOK and the National Assembly was amicable.

i. During this time the UNTCOK also adopted a resolution which declared in part "Having previously declared that there existed in that part of Korea a reasonable degree of free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly were recognized and respected;

"Having taken into account the reports of its observation groups that such a free atmosphere existed during the elecions;

"Having satisfied itself that the electoral procedures which it recommended had on the whole been correctly applied;

"RESOLVED TO RECORD its opinion that the results of the ballot of 10 May 1948 are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea." (Inclosure No. 75). The contents of this paper were read on the floor of the Assembly by the Chairman of UNTCOK, Dr. Miguel Pena A. Valle (El Salvador) on 30 June 1948.

SUMMARY

The establishment of the National Assembly and the formation of the Election Review Board completes the work of the U.S. Army Military Government and the South Korean Interim Government in the holding of elections in South Korea under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and under the Election Law.

The Election Review Board is empowered to hear complaints of defeated candidates but present indication are that challenges of the validity of elections will be extremely few. If

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any challenges are received, hearings will be extended and time consuming, but lacking any important bearing on the conduct of the elections.

It is therefore concluded that in the interest of timliness that the present report be completed and submitted as of 30 June 1948 and that the report of both the National Election Committee and the Election Review Board be submitted at a later date.

W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

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United Nations *Nations Unies*

GENERAL ASSEMBLY **ASSEMBLEE GENERALE**

UNRESTRICTED
Assembly resolutions adopted on 14 November 1947
ENGLISH AND FRENCH

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE[1]

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTEES SUR RAPPORTS DE LA PREMIERE COMMISSION[1]

Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its hundred and twelfth plenary meeting, held on 14 November 1947.

Résolutions adoptées par l'Assemblée générale au cours de sa cent-douzième séance plénière, tenue le 14 novembre 1947.

The problem of the independence of Korea

I

Inasmuch as the Korean question which is before the General Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself and concerns its freedom and independence, and

Recognizing that this question cannot be correctly and fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population;

The General Assembly

1. *Resolves* that elected representatives of the Korean people be invited to take part in the consideration of the question;

2. *Further resolves* that in order to facilitate and expedite such participation and to observe that the Korean representatives are in fact duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees by military authorities in Korea, there be forthwith established a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to be present in Korea, with right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea.

II

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea;

Believing that the national independence of Korea should be re-established and all occupying forces then withdrawn at the earliest practicable date;

Recalling its previous conclusion that the freedom and independence of the Korean people cannot be correctly or fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the Korean people, and its decision to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (hereinafter called the "Commission") for the purpose of facilitating and expediting such participation by elected representatives of the Korean people:

[1] These resolutions will be finally numbered and assembled as part of the *Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly.*

Question de l'indépendance de la Corée

I

Etant donné que la question coréenne qui est à l'examen de l'Assemblée générale intéresse avant tout le peuple coréen lui-même, qu'elle touche à sa liberté et à son indépendance, et

Reconnaissant que cette question ne peut être résolue d'une façon correcte et équitable sans la participation de représentants du peuple coréen;

L'Assemblée générale

1. *Décide* que des représentants élus du peuple coréen doivent être invités à participer à l'examen de la question coréenne;

2. *Décide* d'autre part qu'afin de faciliter et de hâter cette participation et afin d'observer que les représentants coréens seront en fait et dûment élus par le peuple coréen et non pas simplement nommés par les autorités militaires de Corée, il soit créé sans délai une Commission temporaire des Nations Unies pour la Corée, qui exercera ses fonctions en Corée et qui aura le droit de se déplacer, d'observer et de procéder à des consultations dans toute la Corée.

II

L'Assemblée générale,

Reconnaissant les aspirations urgentes et justifiées du peuple coréen à l'indépendance;

Convaincue que l'indépendance nationale de la Corée doit être rétablie et que, par la suite, toutes les forces d'occupation doivent être au plus tôt retirées de son territoire;

Rappelant sa précédente conclusion, selon laquelle la question de la liberté et de l'indépendance du peuple coréen ne peut être résolue d'une façon correcte et équitable sans la participation de représentants du peuple coréen, et sa décision de créer une commission temporaire des Nations Unies pour la Corée (ci-après nommée "la Commission") afin de faciliter et de hâter cette participation des représentants élus du peuple coréen:

[1] Ces résolutions recevront ultérieurement un numéro et seront réunies en un volume qui fera partie des *Documents officiels de la deuxième session de l'Assemblée générale.*

Inclosure No 1

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UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

27 February 1948

Press Release No.32

The following cable, containing the text of the Resolution adopted by the Interim Committee, was received today.

"The Interim Committee adopted today the following United States resolution by 31 votes to 2 with 11 abstentions:

WHEREAS the Chairman of the United Nations Temporary Commissio on Korea accompanied by the Assistant Secretary-General have consulted the Interim Committee on the following questions:

1. Is it open to or incumbent upon the Commission under the terms of the General Assembly Resolutions of 14 November 1947, and in the light of developments in the situation with respect to Korea since that date, to implement the programme as outlined in Resolution II in that part of Korea which is occupied by the armed forces of the United States of America?

2. If not,

   a) should the Commission observe the election of Korean representatives to take part in the consideration of the Korean question, as outlined in Resolution I of 14 November 1947, provided that it has determined that elections can be held in a free atmosphere?

   b) and should the Commission consider such other measures as may be possible and advisable with a view to the attainment of its objectives?

THE INTERIM COMMITTEE BEARING IN MIND the views expressed by the Chairman of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea,

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Temporary Commission on Korea should be held in a free atmosphere wherein democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected. In this connection, the Interim Committee took note of the assurance given by the representative of the United States that the authorities of the United States in Korea would co-operate to the fullest extent to that end. The National Assembly to which representatives are to be elected would be a stage in the formation of a Korean Government, the form of which is to be determined by the Korean people themselves. In reaching this conclusion, the Interim Committee noted that the representatives constituting a National Assembly would be entirely free to consult with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and carry such negotiations as they wishes with any other Korean groups which might not have participated in the elections regarding the form of Government to be established and the participation of groups therein. The Interim Committee entertained the hope that in these consultations and negotiations, Korean representatives in the National Assembly would be able to secure through their efforts full co-operation in their government of all Koreans. The Interim Committee was confident that all peaceful methods of persuasion would thus be used to the greatest possible extent for the attainment of Korean unity. The Interim Committee recognized that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea itself has the authority and discretion to discharge its duties in Korea wherever and to the extent that circumstances permit.

The official reply of the Interim Committee, including the above resolution and note will be handed over to Mr. Menon

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together with summary records of the meetings.

It should be noted that, among others, France, United Kingdom, El Salvador, Philippine Republic, India and China voted for; Australia and Canada voted against; Syria abstained.

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1. *Decides* that the Commission shall consist of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic;

2. *Recommends* that the elections be held not later than 31 March 1948 on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot to choose representatives with whom the Commission may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people and which representatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a National Government of Korea. The number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate to the population, and the elections should be under the observation of the Commission;

3. *Further recommends* that as soon as possible after the elections, the National Assembly should convene and form a National Government and notify the Commission of its formation;

4. *Further recommends* that immediately upon the establishment of a National Government, that Government should, in consultation with the Commission: (*a*) constitute its own national security forces and dissolve all military or semi-military formations not included therein; (*b*) take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of north and south Korea, and (*c*) arrange with the occupying Powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within ninety days;

5. *Resolves* that the Commission shall facilitate and expedite the fulfilment of the foregoing programme for the attainment of the national independence of Korea and withdrawal of occupying forces, taking into account its observations and consultations in Korea. The Commission shall report, with its conclusions, to the General Assembly and may consult with the Interim Committee (if one be established) with respect to the application of this resolution in the light of developments;

6. *Calls upon* the Member States concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfilment of its responsibilities;

7. *Calls upon* all Members of the United Nations to refrain from interfering in the affairs of the Korean people during the interim period preparatory to the establishment of Korean independence, except in pursuance of the decisions of the General Assembly; and thereafter, to refrain completely from any and all acts derogatory to the independence and sovereignty of Korea.

Hundred and twelfth plenary meeting,
14 November 1947.

1. *Décide* que la Commission sera composée des représentants des Etats suivants: l'Australie, le Canada, La Chine, le Salvador, la France, l'Inde, la République des Philippines, la Syrie; la République socialiste soviétique d'Ukraine;

2. *Recommande* qu'il soit procédé, au plus tard le 31 mars 1948, à des élections au scrutin secret auxquelles participeraient les adultes, afin de choisir des représentants avec lesquels la Commission pourra se consulter en vue de la réalisation à bref délai par le peuple coréen de la liberté et de l'indépendance; ces représentants, se réunissant en assemblée nationale, pourront constituer un Gouvernement national coréen. Le nombre des représentants de chaque circonscription ou zone électorale doit être proportionnel à la population, et les élections doivent se dérouler sous la surveillance de la Commission;

3. *Recommande* en outre que l'assemblée nationale se réunisse aussitôt que possible après les élections, constitue un Gouvernement national et informe la Commission de la formation de ce gouvernement;

4. *Recommande* en outre qu'aussitôt après la création d'un Gouvernement national, celui-ci, en consultation avec la Commission, *a*) constitue ses propres forces nationales de sécurité et dissolve toutes les formations militaires ou para-militaires qui n'en feront pas partie; *b*) se charge de toutes fonctions gouvernementales assumées par les autorités militaires et civiles de la Corée du nord et de la Corée du sud; *c*) prenne des dispositions avec les Puissances occupantes en vue du retrait total et dans le plus bref délai possible et, si possible dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours, de leurs forces armées stationnées en Corée;

5. *Décide* que la Commission facilitera et hâtera l'accomplissement du programme ci-dessus, qui vise à l'indépendance nationale de la Corée et au retrait des forces d'occupation, en tenant compte des observations qu'elle aura faites et des consultations auxquelles elle aura procédé en Corée. La Commission fera rapport et présentera ses conclusions à l'Assemblée générale; elle pourra consulter la Commission intérimaire (au cas où celle-ci serait créée) quant à la façon d'appliquer la présente résolution, à la lumière des événements;

6. *Invite* les Etats Membres intéressés à prêter toute assistance et tout concours à la Commission dans l'accomplissement de sa tâche;

7. *Invite* tous les Membres des Nations Unies à s'abstenir, sauf s'ils agissent en application des décisions de l'Assemblée générale, d'intervenir dans les affaires du peuple coréen au cours de la période intermédiaire qui précédera la proclamation de l'indépendance de la Corée, et à s'abstenir entièrement par la suite de tout acte portant atteinte à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de la Corée.

Cent-douzième séance plénière,
le 14 novembre 1947.

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SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
SEOUL, KOREA

MGOCA 000.1 11 March 1948

TO: All Departments and Agencies of the South Korean Interim Government

1. The Office of Administration, South Korean Interim Government, is hereby designated as the Government agency charged with responsibility for the administration of the general election which will be held pursuant to the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted 14 November 1947, and which will be carried out under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

2. The Office of Administration as responsible for establishment of a budget, payment of expenses and accounting for funds. It is also responsible for procurement of necessary supplies, for printing and other supply requirements. All materis pertaining to expenditures and procurement will be referred to that office for action.

/s/ WILLIAM F. DEAN
WILLIAM F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

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TOTAL POPULATION OF SOUTH KOREA AS OF 1 APRIL 1948

(Koreans Only)

1/	Sept. 1946	19,369,270
2/	Refugees entering South Korea Sept. 1946 through March 1948	228,369
3/	Natural increase at 1.8% per annum	523,240
	Total Population	20,120,879

1/ Source: Department of Public Health and Welfare
2/ Source: Office of Foreign Affairs
3/ Source: Department of Public Health and Welfare.

	(000)
Total	20,121
Seoul City	1,247
Kyunggi Do	2,575
Choong Chung Puk Do	1,147
Choong Chung Nam Do	1,992
Cholla Puk Do	2,093
Cholla Nam Do	3,058
Kyungsang Puk Do	3,260
Kyungsang Nam Do	3,300
Kang Won Do	1,167
Cheju Do	282

SOUTH KOREA: NATIONAL ELECTION 1948
Potential Registrants, Number of Actual Registrants, and Percentage Registered by Province

Province	Possible Registrants (000)	Number Registered (000)	% Registered
Total 1/	9,834	7,837,504	79.7
Seoul City	616	568	92.2
Kyunggi Do	1,269	1,085	85.4
Choong Chung Puk Do	565	462	81.8
Choong Chung Nam Do	982	794	80.9
Cholla Puk Do	1,032	802	77.7
Cholla Nam Do	1,508	1,106	73.3
Kyungsang Puk Do	1,607	1,228	75.4
Kyungsang Nam Do	1,627	1,288	79.2
Kang Won Do	575	468	81.3
Che Ju Do 1/	53	37	69.8

1/ Excludes Puk Che Ju Gun where elections were invalidated.

Inclosure No. 4

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
SEOUL, KOREA

15 April 1948

MGFIN 110.01

SUBJECT: Election Funds

TO:

1. Letter, this headquarters, dated 16 March 1948, subject as above, authorized you to obligate national government funds not to exceed ₩5,000,000.00 won to defray expenses incidental to the forthcoming election.

2. Letter, this headquarters, dated 8 April 1948, same subject, authorized you to obligate additional national government funds not to exceed won for the same purpose.

3. You are herewith authorized to obligate an additional won to defray expenses incident to the forthcoming election. This makes your total authorization won.

4. No further funds will be allocated.

5. These funds have been allocated for general expenses and there is no stipulated amount for any one purpose. You will take immediate action to insure that expenditures are kept to the absolute minimum. With the concentrated, patriotic effort of all concerned, I am confident that it will not be necessary to obligate all the funds allocated.

6. It is the direct responsibility of governors and chief civil affairs officers to make available to the election committees all resources, including transportation, supplies, personnel and other facilities to the limit available in order to save time and money. Every effort will be made to improvise, supply materials on loan, and to use every expedient possible to avoid expenditures. It is expected that little, if any, money will be expended for transportation, communications, and railroad fares.

7. Korean civil service personnel, who may be spared, should be placed on temporary duty with the election committees. I am certain that patriotic citizens will be happy to render their services gratis. I am equally confident that citizens who have facilities suitable for use in the election will be happy to furnish them without charge as their patriotic duty.

8. Tactical units have been instructed by the CG, USAFIK, to assist in the election, particularly with transportation.

9. Governors and chief civil affairs officers will, without delay, establish and maintain close contact with their respective provincial election committees and will exercise close supervision of expenditures, and, utilizing all government facilities required, will give the election committees every possible assistance.

W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

AHN, CHAI HONG
Civil Administrator

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY WITHOUT KOREAN TRANSLATION.

A. W. Melchior
A. W. MELCHIOR
Lt Col., Inf

Inclosure No 5

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Seoul, Korea

7 April 1948

MGADM 462

SUBJECT: Temporary Control of Paper Supplies

TO : National Economic Board
Department of Commerce
Office of Administration

1

1. All production of the Kunsan Paper Mills will continue to be routed to the Office of Administration until further notice.

2. That part of letter, this Hq. dated 8 January 1948, subject, "Temporary Control of Paper Supplies", in conflict with the above is rescinded.

BY DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR:

/s/ C. G. Helmick
C. G. HELMICK
Major General, United States Army
Deputy Military Governor

Inclosure No. 6A

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Seoul, Korea

8 January 1948

MGNEB

SUBJECT: Temporary Control of Paper Supplies

TO : Adviser and Director, Department of Commerce
Adviser and Director, Office of Administration

1. It is hereby directed that all imports of paper and all supplies thereof produced in vested plants in South Korea be channelled to the Office of Administration until approximately four hundred (400) metric tons of paper have been accumulated for use in the forthcoming United Nations General Election. When the necessary stocks of paper have been accumulated by the Office of Administration, that office will notify the Department of Commerce that further diversions may cease.

2 If it should become necessary, in order to meet local needs, to release from time to time supplies of paper which are being accumulated by the Office of Administration, such releases shall be made by order of the National Economic Board.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ C. G. Helmick
C. G. HELMICK
Brigadier General, United States Army
Deputy Military Governor

Inclosure No. 6B

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
APO 235 Unit 2

23 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Adviser, Department of Commerce

It is directed that the entire production of the Puk San Paper Plant at Kunsan be reserved for use in the coming National Election.

It is also directed that steps be taken to insure sufficient electrical power, estimated as 1250 KVA, be made available for twenty-four hours a day, for six days a week, until the requirement is met - a period of approximately thirty days.

The furnishing of power to this plant is considered a Class 1 priority.

FOR THE MILITARY GOVERNOR:

/s/ C. G. Helmick
C. G. HELMICK
Brigadier General, United States Army
Deputy Military Governor

cc: NEB
General Weckerling
Col. Melchior
Electric Power Board

Inclosure No. 6C

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Emergency Electric Power Board

Seoul, Korea

EMERGENCY ELECTIC POWER ORDER NO. 6 7 April 1948

1. During the period 14 April 1948 through 10 May 1948 the use of electric power by printing establishments designated by the Chief Civil Affairs Officers in their respective provinces to print ballots for use in the coming election will be in Priority I.

2. Chief Civil Affairs Officers are directed to notify the representatives of the Electric Power Company of the establishments engaged in printing ballots as soon as practicable.

EMERGENCY ELECTRIC POWER BOARD

/s/ A. C. WALKER
A. C. WALKER
Chairman

A CERTIFED TRUE COPY LESS KOREAN TRANSLATION A. W. Melchior
A. W. MELCHIOR
Lt. Col., Inf.

Inclosure No 7

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



Inclosure No 8A

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

蔡채	申신	徐서	鮮선	尹윤	朴박	金김	崔최	李이
貴귀		致치	于우 一일	長장	福복	玉옥	泰태	福복
男남	革혁	遠원	聲성	壽수	돌乭	順순	山산	童동

Inclosure No 8

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

帝제	黃황	白백	趙조	洪홍	許허	南남	卜복
						宮궁	
悟오	愛애	大대	富부	秋추	德덕	貞정	
突돌	花화	根근	榮영	蘭란	三삼	植식	鶴학

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

番號	登錄 番號	登錄 日字	本籍（道別）	住所	生年月日	姓名	性別	投票用紙領收印	備考

選擧人名簿（選擧委員會）

Inclosure No 8C

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



Inclosure No 80

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

注意事項

一、本籍、住所、姓名、生年月日及居住期間은戶籍簿또는寄留簿에依하여確認하도록할것

二、年齡計算은選擧期日現在로할것

三、「右登錄人」欄에는登錄人이自署捺印(拇印도無妨함)하되自署가不能한境遇에는登錄事務從事員이登錄人姓名을代書하고登錄人이반드시拇印한後代書者는立會人一人과더부러署名捺印하여야함

四、選擧欠格事由가있을때에는當該欄에그要旨를記載하고當該選擧委員會委員長檢印할것

五、登錄番號는一個登錄所를通하여連續番號로하되洞里別로編綴할것

一九四八年三月十七日公布

南朝鮮過渡政府法令第一七五號

國會議員選舉法

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

國會議員選擧法

第一章 總 則

第一條 國民으로서滿二十一歲以上의男子는性別、財産、敎育、宗敎의區別이업시國會議員의選擧權이있음

國民으로서滿二十五歲以上의男子는性別、財産、敎育、宗敎의區別이업시國會議員의被選擧權이있음

投票에關한事項은別에定하는바에依함

第二條 左의一에該當하는者는選擧權이없음

一、禁錮以上의刑에處한者

二、禁錮以上의刑에處한確定判決이있은後그刑의執行을終하지아니하거나또는執行을받지아니하기로確定된者

三、自由刑의宣告를받고그執行中에있거나또는執行을받지아니하기로確定된者

四、日本政府로부터公權을停止당한者

五、日本帝國議會의議員으로除名된者

第三條 左의一에該當하는者는被選擧權이없음

一、本法第二條의規定에依하여選擧權이없는者但同條第二號에該當한者中政治犯은除外함

二、一年以上의自由刑의宣告를받고그執行을終了하거나또는執行을받지아니하기로確定된後三年을經過하지아니한者但政治犯은除外함

三、日帝時代에何任官以上의官吏、憲兵、警察官吏로在職한者

四、日帝時代의中樞院의顧問、參議로서參與한者

五、日帝時代의道、府、邑、面의諮問機關의議員이된者

六、日帝時代에高等官으로서三等級以上의職位에있던者、또는勳四等以上의勳章을받은者但技術官及敎育者는除外함

第四條 官公吏로在職中國會議員을兼任하는때에는官公吏를辭職함

第五條 地方自治團體의議員은國會議員을兼任하지못함

第六條 選擧委員會委員은그關係區域內에서는被選擧權이없음

第七條 國會議員選擧에關한費用은國庫負擔으로함

第二章 選擧區域及議員數

第八條 各選擧區는一人의國會議員을選擧함

第九條 本法에서選擧區라함은左와如함

一、人口十五萬未滿의府、郡及이에준區

二、人口十五萬以上의府、郡及이에준區의一部로서本法第十條에依하여行政官廳의選擧區로定한區域

三、行政區域인島(以下島는郡의名稱에包含함)

第十條 人口十五萬乃至二十五萬未滿의府、郡及이에준區는比例한人口에二個區域으로分함

人口二十五萬乃至三十五萬未滿의府는比例한人口에三個區域으로分함

人口三十五萬乃至四十五萬未滿의府는比例한人口에四個區域으로分함

第十一條 本法第十條에依하여行政官廳의定한選擧區의名稱區域及人口는別表와如함

法制處注 別表는此를規定하지않음

第十二條 各選擧區는投票區로比分함

各投票區는人口二千以下로하며各面一個區를原則으로하되交通의便宜其他事情에依하여面의一部를區域으로하거나또는數面을合하여一個投票區로할수있음

投票區는道選擧委員會가此를定함

投票區의設置는選擧人名簿調製開始前에此를公告하여야함

第十三條 國會選擧委員會는投票區選擧委員會를設置하여야함

投票區選擧委員會는投票區의設置가確定된때에此를設置하여야함

第十四條 選擧區及投票區는一九四六年八月二十五日人口調査에依하여此를定함

第三章 選擧人名簿

第十五條 選擧人名簿는選擧日前四十日부터十日以內에選擧區選擧委員會가調製함

選擧人名簿調製에必要한事項은別에定하는바에依하여道選擧委員會가此를定함

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By

選擧人으로 하여금 投票所에 臨하여 投票케 함

第十六條 投票區選擧委員會는 그 區域內의 選擧日前 六十日以來 居住하는 選擧人의 住所, 姓名, 生年月日, 性別, 登錄日字等을 記載한 選擧人名簿를 作成하여 選擧日前 二十五日부터 七日間 選擧人으로 하여금 投票所에서 一般人의 縱覽에 供하고 選擧日前 二日에 이를 確定함

第十七條 選擧人은 選擧人名簿에 姓名의 誤記或은 脫漏가 있거나 選擧權이 있는 者가 登錄되어 있음에도 縱覽期間內에 當該 選擧委員會에 異議를 提出할 수 있음. 當該 選擧委員會는 前項의 異議에 對하여 三日以內에 審議決定하여야 하며 選擧人은 前項의 決定에 對하여 異議가 있을 때에는 五日以內에 選擧區選擧委員會에 再審을 要求할 수 있음

選擧區選擧委員會는 前項의 再審要求에 對하여 三日以內에 審議決定하여 再審要求者 及 關係者에게 書面으로 通知하여야 함

第四章 選擧委員會

第十八條 行政首班의 法律第五號第十三條에 依하여 組織한 國會選擧委員會는 本法에 依한 國會選擧委員會로 함

國會選擧委員會는 委員十五人으로 組織하고 大法院 大法官이 그 委員長이 됨

第十九條 國會選擧委員會는 各道 及 서울市選擧委員會를 組織하고 그 委員은 任命한 各道 及 서울市選擧委員會는 委員長 一人, 委員十人 及 候補委員長 一人, 候補委員十人으로 此를 構成하고 委員長 及 候補委員長은 當該 區域에 所在하는 高等法院, 地方法院 또는 地方法院支院의 法官 中에서 互選함

各道 地方法院長은 該 區域住民의 法曹 資格 있는 國會選擧委員會에 推薦한 國會選擧委員會는 推薦된 法曹 中에서 各道 及 서울市選擧委員會 委員長 及 候補委員長을 選任함

各道 地方法院長 及 서울市長은 各自 個別的으로 該 區域住民이 마련한 選擧權 있는 國民 二十人의 姓名 或 所屬政黨이 있는 境遇에는 各其 所屬政黨을 表示한 列名表를 國會選擧委員會에 提出함

各 列名表의 推薦은 同一 政黨所屬者 가 三分之一을 超過하지 못함

國會選擧委員會는 推薦된 者 中에서 二十人을 選擇하여 道 또는 서울市選擧委員會 委員 十人 及 候補委員 十人을 選任하되 同一 政黨所屬者가 各道 또는 서울市選擧委員會 委員의 三分之一을 超過하지 못함

第二十條 各選擧區에 選擧區選擧委員會를 設置함

各選擧區選擧委員會는 委員長 一人, 委員八人 及 候補委員長 一人, 候補委員八人으로 此를 構成함

各選擧區選擧委員會의 委員長 及 候補委員長은 當該 選擧區所屬道의 地方法院長이 此를 任命함

選擧區所屬行政區域(府, 郡, 區)의 管轄地方法院 또는 支院의 最高位 法朝官 及 同行政區域의 最高行政官은 各々 當該區域住民四人을 各々 當該選擧區選擧委員會의 委員으로 任命하고 各々 當該區域住民四人을 同委員會의 候補委員으로 任命함

同一 政黨所屬者는 各選擧區選擧委員會의 三分之一을 超過하지 못하며 候補委員의 三分之一을 超過하지 못함

第二十一條 各府, 郡 及 서울市의 區의 長은 選擧日의 各自所管選擧區選擧委員會의 委員長, 候補委員長 及 委員 또는 候補委員으로 任命할 者 全部의 姓名, 所屬政黨 及 各其 略歷을 當該道 또는 서울市選擧委員會 及 當該 選擧委員會에 提出함

當該道 또는 서울市選擧委員會는 選擧日의 前項의 任命을 終了하고 任命日부터 十日以內에 選擧區選擧委員會의 委員長, 候補委員長, 委員 또는 候補委員을 解任하고 道 또는 서울市選擧委員會가 任意로 任命할 것을 決定할 수 있음

任命日부터 十日以內에 解任되지 아니하는 者로 任命을 確定함

第二十二條 各投票區에 投票區選擧委員會를 設置함

各投票區選擧委員會는 委員長一人, 候補委員長一人, 委員八人 及 候補委員八人으로 此를 構成함 各投票區選擧委員會의 委員長, 候補委員長, 委員 及 候補委員은 投票區所屬行政區域(邑, 面, 洞)의 長이 此를 任命함 但 一政黨所屬者는 委員의 三分之一을 超過하지 못하며 候補委員의 三分之一을 超過하지 못함

邑, 面 及 洞의 長은 選擧日의 各自所管投票區選擧委員會의 委員長, 候補委員長, 委員 또는 候補委員으로 任命할 者 全部의 姓名, 所屬政黨의 有無 所屬政黨 及 各其 略歷을 當該選擧區選擧委員會, 道 또는 서울市選擧委員會 及 國會選擧委員會에 提出함 選擧區選擧委員會는 選擧日의 三日以內에 如斯히 投票區選擧委員會의 委員長, 候補委員長, 委員

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By
NARS, Date

第二十八條 選擧區選擧委員會는議員候補者登錄後三日以內에議員候補者의住所、姓名、年齡、職業及所屬政黨또는團體名等을新聞紙上에發表하고可能한限 〃라디오〃 또는放送하며當該選擧區選擧委員會全體에서 또는所管投票區選擧委員會全體에서 各投票區의揭示板에公示하고可能하면 〃라디오〃 또는放送하므로써此를公告함

第二十九條 各級議會議員候補者는自由로選擧에關한宣傳을할수있음

各級選擧委員會는各級議會議員候補者의選擧運動에關係있는公務員其他一般公務員을選擧運動을할수없음

第六章 選擧方法及當選人

第三十條 國會議員의選擧는本法을施行한全地域을通하여同一日에一票制로行함

選擧區選擧委員會는選擧日四十日前에投票日時及投票所를新聞紙上에發表하고可能한限各投票區의揭示板에公示하고可能하면 〃라디오〃 또는放送하므로써此를公告함

投票所는選擧人名簿所에同一하여야함 但天災其他選擧의支障故로投票所를變更할때에는選擧區選擧委員會는選擧當日의前項에規定한時間과同一한方法으로此를公告함

第三十一條 投票는午前七時에開始함 投票所는午後七時에閉鎖함 但그때에投票所에들어가기를待機하고있는選擧人은午後八時까지出票入所케함

午後七時에投票所에있는者及前項에依하야午後八時까지投票所에入所한者는投票할資格이있음 投票管理者는午後八時以後의投票를받지아니하며午後八時까지投票所에入所한者의投票가끝난後에此를封鎖함 投票函封鎖後에는投票할수없음

第三十二條 選擧는單記無名投票로行함

第三十三條 各選擧區選擧委員會에서作成하여國會選擧委員會委員長이副署하고公印을捺印한投票用紙는本法第三條의規定에依하여投票所에서使用하여야함

各投票所에서使用한投票用紙는國會選擧委員會에서作成하여그區域을管下에印刷하고公式으로交付한候補者의姓名上에記號를附하여選擧人이選하는候補者를表示할수있도록候補者의姓名下에適當한空間을두어야함 候補者의姓名은國文으로記載함을原則으로하되必要한境遇에는國文及漢字를併記할수있음

投票用紙及封筒에는番號其他의記入을하지못함

選擧區選擧委員會는議員候補者登錄期間終後二日以內에議員候補者또는其代理人等의參席한가운데에서投票用紙에印刷한候補者姓名의順序를抽籤에依하여定하고各候補者에게通知함 記號는一號、二號、三號의

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第三十四條　選舉人은本人이投票所에서投票用紙에本人의姓名을記入하고이를投票函에投入함으로써投票함

投票用紙에姓名을記入함에있어서는選舉人은候補者中에서投票하고자하는候補者一人의姓名을記載하고그住所를附記하여야함

投票用紙에記載한候補者의姓名이不明또는二人以上의候補者를記載한投票는無效로함

第三十五條　各選舉區選舉委員會는選舉區內各投票區의投票를點檢하고選舉區選舉委員會를設置한市町村에있어서는市町村選舉委員會에投票의點檢을行하게하여야함

投票의點檢은投票所에서投票用紙의公示가끝난後投票用紙의效否에關하여異議가있을때에는投票立會人의意見을聽取하고選舉區選舉委員會또는市町村選舉委員會가이를決定

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第四十四條 軍政長官은左의一에該當한境遇에는國會選擧委員會와協議하여選擧日後二週日以內에그選擧區의選擧의無效를宣布할수있음

一、天災地變또는暴動으로因하여選擧區의全投票區의選擧가實施되지못한때

二、어느投票區의投票函이違法으로開函되었거나紛失되었을때

三、選擧가選擧委員會委員또는職員의違法、虛僞또는不當한行爲로因하여選擧結果에實質的影響을끼친證據가明確한때

選擧人의集團은前項各號의一에該當한事由를具하여國會選擧委員會또는軍政長官에게陳情할수있음

軍政長官은第一項各號의一에該當한事由에依하여選擧의無效를決定할때나또는어느選擧區의選擧가無效로된때에는三十日以內에再選擧를命하여야함

第四十五條 投票區選擧委員會는投票終結後選擧人名簿其他選擧에關한一切書類를當該投票區所屬府、邑、面또는서울市의區의長에게引渡하여國會議員任期中保管케함

第四十六條 選擧區選擧委員會는投票計算을마친後遲滯없이選擧錄을道또는서울市選擧委員會에送致함

選擧區選擧委員會는選擧完了後投票를有效無效로區別하여選擧에關한一切書類와같이府尹、郡守또는서울市區廳長에게引渡하고國會議員任期中保管케함

道및서울市選擧委員會는各選擧區選擧委員會의選擧錄全部를받은後遲滯없이國會選擧委員會에選擧報告書를提出함

第七章 國會議員의任期及補闕選擧

第四十七條 國會議員의任期는第一回開會時부터二年으로함 但그前이라도權限이있는者가國會의解散을決定한境遇에는例外로함

第四十八條 國會議員의闕員이생겼을때에는補闕選擧를行함

行政首班은國會議長으로부터闕員發生通知를받은後七十日以內에補闕選擧를實施하여야함

補闕選擧의選擧日은적어도五十日前에公布하여야함

補闕選擧의選擧日이總選擧日로부터六箇月以內인境遇에는總選擧時에作成한選擧人名簿에依하여此를行함

第四十九條 補闕選擧에關하여는本章에規定한外에本法規定全體를準用함

第八章 選擧에關한爭訟

第五十條 本法第四十四條에依한軍政長官의權限을除外하고選擧에有效無效에關한問題는左記五人으로構成하는選擧審査委員會에提出하여야함

一、行政首班이任命한大法官二人

二、國會에서選擧한委員二人

三、大法院長이指名한委員長一人

第五十一條 當選을失한者는當選의效力에關하여異議가있을때에는選擧委員會設置日부터十四日以內에同委員會에訴請할수있음

選擧審査委員會는選擧가本法또는本法施行細則에違反되고選擧의結果에異動을미친다고認定한境遇에限하여그選擧의無效를裁決함

選擧에關한爭訟에關하여는本章에規定한것外에民事訴訟에關한規定을準用함

第五十二條 選擧審査委員會委員長은選擧에關한訴請이提出되었을때에는此를行政首班、國會選擧委員會및關係選擧區選擧委員會에通知함 同委員長은裁決書의謄本을行政首班、國會選擧委員會、關係選擧區選擧委員會및國會議長에게送附함

第九章 罰則

第五十三條 左記의一에該當한者는五年以下의懲役또는拾萬圓以下의罰金에處함 但情狀에依하여懲役及罰金을併科할수있음

一、詐欺의方法으로選擧人名簿에登錄하거나 또는投票한者

二、投票또는棄權의條件으로金錢、物品、饗應、其他財産上의利益을受授또는그受授를約束하거나 地位或은榮譽上有利한條件을提供또는그提供을約束한者

三、暴行、脅迫、逮捕、監禁또는其他의方法으로投票또는立候補를妨害하거나棄權을强要한者

四、本法第三十四條에依하여證言할때故意로虛僞의陳述을한洞·里長、班長또는其他의證人

五、選擧를妨害할目的으로各級選擧委員會의委員또는其他公務員에게暴行또는脅迫을加하거나投票函또는投票關係書類를奪取하거나破壞한者

六、投票所及其附近에서示威또는多數喧騷하여選擧進行또는投票의自由를妨害한者

七、銃砲、刀劍、棍棒、其他兇器를携帶하고投票所에亂入한者

八、選擧委員會의委員또는其他公務員으로서選擧法規에違反되는行爲를敢行한者

第五十四條 本章의罪를犯하여處刑된者는刑의執行終了後三年間그選擧權及被選擧權을剝奪함

第五十五條 本章의罪에關한公訴時效는一年을經過하고로써完成함

附 則

第五十六條 行政首班은本法施行에關하여必要한細則을制定할수있음

第五十七條 本法은一九四八年三月十七日公布施行함

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國會議員選舉法施行細則

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國會議員選擧法施行細則(案)

第一章 總綱

第一條 本細則은國會議員選擧法(以下選擧法이라稱함) 第五十六條의規定에依하여此를制定함

第二條 選擧法第一條에서國民이라함은左의各號의一에該當하는者를指稱함

一 朝鮮에戶籍을가진者

二 朝鮮人兩親사이에서出生한者

三 朝鮮人을父親으로하여出生한者로서他國의國籍또는市民權이없는者

第三條 選擧法第二條各號의一에該當與否는選擧法第十五條의規定에依한選擧人登錄開始日現在로함

第四條 選擧法第七條에서議員選擧에關한費用이라함은左의費用을指稱함

一 各級選擧委員會의事務費用及選擧執行에必要한費用

二 第四十四條의規定에依한郵便料

第五條 選擧日公布後에行政區域의變更이있어도選擧에關한區域에는變動이없음

第六條 投票區選擧委員會는選擧人登錄開始日前에投票區마다各一箇登錄所(投票所)를設置하고此를揭示와新聞紙上으로公告하여야함

登錄所(投票所)는可能한限學校、農會建物其他建物에設置함

第七條 選擧區選擧委員會는늦어도選擧日五日前에開票의場所를公告하여야함

第二章 選擧에關한區域

第八條 前條의規定에依하여異議가있을때에는選擧法第十七條의規定에依함

第九條 選擧人登錄은附錄第二號樣式에依하여此를作成하여야함

第十條 選擧法第十六條에서『居住하는選擧人』이라함은戶籍또는寄留簿에登錄된者로서當該地에生活의本據를가진者를指稱함

第十一條 選擧人名簿는附錄第二號樣式에依하여此를作成하여야함

第十二條 選擧人名簿를作成할때에는登錄한選擧人의選擧權의有無를公簿其他明確한證憑에依하여審査決定함 登錄人이選擧權이없다는明確한證憑이없을때에는選擧人名簿에記載함

第十三條 前條의規定에依한審査의結果로選擧權이없다고決定된者는選擧人名簿에記載하지않고遲滯없이當該登錄人에게그理由를書面으로通知하여야함

前項의決定에對하여異議가있을때에는選擧法第十七條의規定에依함

第十四條 選擧法第十七條의規定에依한異議를提出하거나再審을要求하는그理由書를提出하여야하며可能한때는證憑書類를添附하여야함

再審의要求는異議를決定한選擧委員會를經由하여야하며그要求를받은選擧委員會는遲滯없이關係書類를選擧區選擧委員會에送附하여야함

第十五條 選擧委員會는異議또는再審에對하여理由가있다고決定한때에는遲滯없이選擧人名簿를修正하거나修正하게하고此를公告하여야하며決定한때에는遲滯없이關係人에게書面으로通知하여야하며理由가없다고決定한때에는遲滯없이當該異議人에게그理由를書面으로通知하여야함

前項의通知書는本人또는그同居人에게送達하여야함

第十六條 選擧人名簿의縱覽時間은每日午前九時로부터午後四時까지로하고縱覽期間中은公休日이라도縱覽시켜야함

第十七條 選擧人名簿에登錄된後그投票區域外에住居를移轉한者는그登錄된投票區投票所에서投票하여야함

第十八條 各官公署는選擧에關한證憑書類의請求가있을때에는遲滯없이作成交付하여야함

第八條 選擧法第十五條의規定에依한登錄票는附錄第一號樣式에依하여作成하되署名(代署인때에는捺印)捺印欄以外의事項은選擧人이自書하지않으

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第四章 選擧委員會

第十九條 各級選擧委員會委員의姓名은公告하여야함

第二十條 各級選擧委員會本部는第六條의規定을保留하고다른決定이없는限各其關係있는行政廳에附置함

前項의다른決定을하였을때에는遲滯없이上級選擧委員會에報告하고此를公告하여야함

第二十一條 各級選擧委員會는各其委員長이召集하되定員三分之一을超過하는委員의要求가있을때에는此를召集하여야함

第二十二條 各級選擧委員會委員長은各其委員會를代表하고그行政事務를執行함

第二十三條 各級選擧委員會의委員長及委員은自己또는自己의祖父母、父母、配偶者와子女、孫、孫女、兄弟姉妹、親叔姪及各其配偶者의選擧에關한事件에對하여는그議事에參與하지못함 但그委員會의承認을얻어會議에出席하여發言할수있음

第二十四條 各級選擧委員會의委員은名譽職으로하되手當及旅費를받을수있음

前項의手當及旅費에關한規定은國會選擧委員會가行政首班의同意를얻어此를定함

第二十五條 各級選擧委員會의幹事、書記의定員報酬及旅費에關한規定은國會選擧委員會가行政首班의同意를얻어此를定함

第二十六條 各級選擧委員會의幹事及書記는各其委員會의決議에依하여그委員長이任免하되關係行政機關의職員에對하여그兼職을委囑할수있음

第二十七條 國會選擧委員會의職務는左와如함

一 道及서울市의選擧委員會의委員長及候補委員長、委員及候補委員의任命審査와職責違反에依한그解任及再任命

二 下級選擧委員會에對한一般選擧事務의指揮監督

三 選擧에關한一般監察

四 登錄用紙、選擧人名簿用紙의作成、配付와投票用紙及封套의印刷의監督

五 選擧法規를施行함에必要한規定、指令의制定實施

六 選擧에關한豫算의編成及施行

七 其他選擧法及同施行細則을施行함에必要한諸般措置

第二十八條 道及서울市選擧委員會의職務는左와如함

一 所管選擧區選擧委員會의委員長及候補委員長、委員及候補委員의任命審査와職責違反에依한그解任及再任命

二 下級選擧委員會에對한一般選擧事務의指揮監督及選擧의監察

三 國會選擧委員會에對한選擧에關한各種報告

四 其他所管選擧에必要한措置

第二十九條 選擧區選擧委員會의職務는左와如함

一 所管投票區選擧委員會及設置될수있는邑、面、洞級의選擧委員會의委員長及候補委員長、委員及候補委員의任命審査와職責違反에依한그解任及再任命

二 投票區의劃定

三 選擧人名簿에關한再審의決定

四 國會議員候補者의登錄事務

五 開票事務、當選人決定及選擧錄作成

六 下級選擧委員會의選擧事務에關한指揮監督及選擧의監察

七 上級選擧委員會에對한選擧에關한各種報告

八 選擧에關한一切公告及通知

九 其他所管選擧에必要한措置

第三十條 投票區選擧委員會의職務는左와如함

一 選擧人登錄事務及投票事務

二 選擧人名簿作成及其異議에對한決定

三 投票函及投票所의設備及其所在地의公告

四 投票錄의作成及投票函의管理送致

五 上級選擧委員會에對한選擧에關한各種報告

六 其他所管選擧에必要한措置

第三十一條 邑、面、洞級의選擧委員會가國會選擧委員會에依하여設置된때에는그職務는左와如함

一 下級投票區選擧委員會에對한援助、指示及監督

二 上級選擧委員會에對한選擧에國한各種報告

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三 其他國會選擧委員會가 指示한 職務

第三十二條 選擧區選擧委員會는 그 選擧區內에 發刊되는 新聞이 없는 境遇에는 選擧法第二十八條、第三十條、第三十五條 및 本細則 第六條에 規定한 事項을 그 當該區域內에서 가장 많이 購讀된다고 認定하는 新聞紙에 發表하여야 함

第三十三條 各級選擧委員會는 政府機關에 對하여 選擧에 必要한 協助를 要求할 수 있음

第五章 議員候補者 및 選擧運動

第三十四條 議員候補者의 登錄을 함에는 當該選擧區에 本籍또는 住居를 가지지 않어도 無妨함

第三十五條 議員候補者 登錄의 申告는 書面으로써 하되 議員候補者 및 推薦人의 署名、捺印 (推薦登錄일 때에는 議員候補者의 承諾書) 職業、住所、生年月日 및 所屬政黨 또는 團體가 있을 때에는 그 名稱을 記載하여야 함

議員候補者를 推薦하는 者는 當該選擧區內에 選擧人 登錄을 한 者라야 하며 그 選擧委員會의 登錄證明書를 添附하여야 함

第三十六條 議員候補者가 辭退하려고 할 때에는 書面으로 理由를 附하여 그 登錄된 選擧區選擧委員會에 本人이 가서 申告하여야 함

第三十七條 議員候補者의 登錄 또는 辭退가 있을 때에는 當該選擧區選擧委員會는 遲滯없이 그 議員候補者의 居住하는 府、邑、面 또는 서울市의 區의 長에게 此를 通知하여야 함

議員候補者가 死亡하였을 때에는 그 議員候補者의 居住하는 府、邑、面 또는 서울市의 區의 長은 遲滯없이 當該議員候補者가 登錄된 選擧區選擧委員會에 通知하여야 함

第三十八條 議員候補者가 辭退하였거나 死亡한 것을 알았을 때에는 當該選擧區選擧委員會는 遲滯없이 그 登錄을 抹消하여야 함

第三十九條 議員候補者는 그 登錄을 한 後 遲滯없이 選擧事務所의 所在地와 選擧에 關하여 自己를 代理하는 者 一人의 姓名、住所、職業、所屬政黨、團體名을 當該選擧區選擧委員會에 書面으로 申告하여야 함

第四十條 選擧法第二十九條의 公務員에는 立法議院議員은 包含하지 아니함

第六章 公共營造物의 使用

第四十一條 公會堂 其他 公衆의 使用을 目的으로 하는 公共營造物은 議員候補者의 使用申請에 依하여 特別한 支障이 없는 限 通例에 依한 使用料를 받고 此를 許可하여야 함

前項의 許可申請은 當該營造物이 所在하는 投票區選擧委員會를 經하여 그 營造物管理者에게 提出하여야 함

第四十二條 官公立學校는 授業 또는 諸行事에 特別한 支障이 없는 限 議員候補者의 選擧公開演說場으로 當該學校長은 그 使用을 許可하여야 함

前項의 許可申請은 當該學校가 所在하는 投票區選擧委員會를 經하여 當該學校長에게 提出함

第四十三條 前二條의 規定에 依한 使用許可를 할 때에는 左의 標準에 依하여야 함

一 使用日時가 同一한 때에는 使用申請의 到着順位에 依하되 同時到着일 때에는 使用回數가 적은 議員候補者에게 먼저 함 但 共同使用을 許可할 수 있음

二 使用許可는 一回分式 그 때마다 하여야 함

第七章 無料郵便

第四十四條 議員候補者는 選擧運動을 하기 爲하여 左記郵便物의 一種을 그 選擧區內에 있는 登錄한 選擧人에게 一回에 限하여 無料로 送付할 수 있음

一 重量十그람까지의 同文無封 (半開封) 의 書狀

二 私製葉書

第四十五條 前條의 無料郵便을 提出하려고 할 때에는 當該選擧區內에 있는 郵便局의 一을 指定하여 左의 事項을 記載한 申請書에 當該選擧區選擧委員會의 認證書를 添附하여 當該郵便局에 提出하여야 함

一 指定郵便局名

二 提出期日

三 郵便物의 種類 및 其 通數

四 議員候補者의 姓名 및 住所

第四十六條 選擧無料郵便物에는 그 表面 左便上部에 『選擧』라고 表示하여야 함

第八章 選擧方法 및 當選人

第四十七條 投票用紙는 附錄第三號樣式에 依하여 作成하여야 함

選擧法第三十三條의 規定에 依하여 投票用紙에 印刷된 議員候補者 姓名 우에

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所에 參席한 選擧人의 面前에서 投票函을 열고 그 狀況을 보인 後에 투표를 하게 하여야 함

投票管理選擧委員會委員長은 委員 一人을 指定하여 投票時間中 選擧人이 正當한 投票函에 投票 外의 投票 其他 투표를 넣는 것을 監視하게 하여야 함

第五十五條 選擧法第三十四條에서 決定할 사항은 同法第十七條의 規定에 依한 決定書로 指揮함

第五十六條 投票所에는 投票管理選擧委員會委員 過半數가 立會하여야 함

第五十七條 選擧法第三十四條第二項의 決定은 投票錄에 記載하여야 함

第五十八條 投票用紙를 받은 選擧人이 選擧法第三十九條第一項의 規定에 依하여 選擧를 棄權하였음에도 投票管理選擧委員會委員長은 그 投票用紙를 回收하고 그 事由를 投票錄에 記載하여야 함

第五十九條 投票가 끝난 後에 投票管理選擧委員會委員長은 卽時 在所한 選擧人 面前에서 投票函을 열고 그 投票口와 틈바구멍을 各各 封印하여야 함

第六十條 投票가 끝난 後 投票用紙가 있을 때에는 그 枚數를 明記하여 封한 後 選擧管理選擧委員會에 送致하여야 함

第六十一條 投票管理選擧委員會는 投票錄을 作成하여 投票의 關한 顚末을 記載하고 委員長 及 立會한 委員이 這署捺印하여야 함

第六十二條 投票錄에는 左의 事項을 記入함

一 投票의 經過概要

二 選擧人名簿上의 總選擧人數

三 投票用紙交付數

四 남은 投票用紙數

第六十三條 開票할 때에는 選擧管理選擧委員會委員長은 各各 다른 場所에서 開票事務에 從事하는 者 二人으로 하여금 同一 議員候補者의 得票數를 各各 計算케 하여야 함

選擧人은 指定된 場所에서 開票하는 것을 參觀할 수 있음

第六十四條 前條의 計算의 결과 選擧管理選擧委員會委員長은 投票管理選擧委員會委員長 立會하에 各 議員候補者의 得票數를 朗讀하고 그로 各 議員候補者의 總得票數를 調査하여야 함

第六十五條 投票의 效力에 關하여 疑義가 있을 때에는 選擧管理選擧委員會委員長은 立會한 委員의 多數決에 依하여 此를 決定함

記載된 第一順位者에게는 一, 第二順位者에게는 二, 第三順位者에게는 三, 以下 此 順位數에 依하여 以上의 例에 依함

第四十八條 投票管理選擧委員會는 投票用紙에 選擧委員會의 印章을 捺印하고 投票開始前에 投票錄에 記載된 投票用紙의 總數가 正當함을 確認한 後 投票開始를 宣言하여야 함

第四十九條 投票所는 附錄第四號規格에 依하여 二重의 투명으로 製作하고 各其 투명의 內側에 投票用紙의 記號를 記載하여야 함

第五十條 投票管理選擧委員會는 一個 또는 數個의 揭示板을 設置하고 各議員候補者의 姓名을 揭示하여야 함

前項의 各其 揭示板은 適當한 均等한 面積으로 配定하여야 함

管理選擧委員會는 그 揭示板의 大小 及 材料에 關하여 詳細한 規定을 公布함

各投票管理選擧委員會 及 各投票管理選擧委員會는 選擧法第三十五條에 依하여 選擧人이 그 候補者를 知하기 爲하여 投票用紙의 標記를 揭示하는 것 外에 其他 出版物에는 『見本』이라는 文字를 記載하여야 함

第五十一條 選擧運動을 爲한 演說, 宣傳文書 等은 選擧當日에는 投票所 入口로부터 百米 以內의 區域內에 此를 設置 揭示 또는 撒布하지 못함

第五十二條 各投票管理選擧委員會委員長은 投票時間中 投票用紙의 總數와 投票所에 入口의 數에 依하여 投票管理選擧委員 一人을 配置하여야 함

各投票管理選擧委員會는 選擧人이 投票用紙에 標하는 것을 選擧關係公務員이나 選擧人의 其他 人의 보지 못하도록 投票用紙에 標하는 場所를 設備할 責任이 있음

投票用紙에 標하는 場所에는 筆記用具 其他 毒筆 及 鉛筆을 備置하는 以外에 아무 物品도 두지 못함

選擧管理選擧委員會는 選擧法第三十五條의 規定에 依한 候補者 가 選擧當日 前二日까지 提出하지 아니한 때에는 投票管理選擧委員會는 候補者의 姓名 及 其 記號를 同 場所에 規定한 場所에 表示함

選擧管理選擧委員會는 候補者가 提出한 候補의 標旗를 投票所 入口에 揭示함으로 12Cm × 16.5 Cm를 超過하지 못하고 投票用紙에 標하는 場所에 揭示함으로 4 Cm × 6.5Cm를 超過하지 못함

選擧法第三十四條의 規定에 依하여 選擧人이 投票用紙에 그 候補者를 選하기 爲하여 ○, ×, ㅣ, ㅡ, V 또는 此와 類似한 標로써 하여야 하며 그 外의 文字 또는 物形을 記入한 投票는 無效로 함

第五十三條 公務員 其他 人의 看護를 받는 者가 選擧人 投票 또는 投票함에 要한 時間은 休憩하는 것으로 하지 못함

第五十四條 投票管理選擧委員會委員長은 投票開始前 委員過半數 立會下에 投票

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第六十六條　開票時에投票의無效를決定하였을때에는그때마다宣布하여야함

第六十七條　選擧法第四十三條第一項의抽籤經過는選擧錄에記載하여야함

第六十八條　選擧區選擧委員會는開票가끝난後遲滯없이選擧錄三通을作成하고委員長以下立會한委員이連署捺印하여야함

第六十九條　選擧錄에는左의事項을記入함

一　開票經過의概要
二　選擧人名簿에依한選擧人總數集計
三　投票用紙交付數集計
四　投票總數集計
五　無效投票數
六　議員候補者別의得票數
七　當選人決定

第七十條　選擧法第四十三條의規定에依하여投票를要하지아니할때에는當該選擧區選擧委員會는遲滯없이그뜻을公告하여야함

第七十一條　選擧法第四十三條의規定에依한無投票當選人은選擧日午前九時에當該選擧區選擧委員會에서決定公告함

再選擧를할때에는元選擧時에作成한選擧人名簿에依함

第九章　選擧事犯

第七十二條　選擧法第五十三條의選擧事犯에關하여搜査에着手하였을때에는檢察官또는司法警察官吏는國會選擧委員會에遲滯없이通報하여야함

第七十三條　選擧法第五十三條의選擧事犯에關하여는所管法院審判官의令狀에依하지아니하면檢察官또는司法警察官吏는公訴提起前이라도勾引、勾留留置또는逮捕를할수없음　但公安에緊急한危害가있을때에는例外로하되遲滯없이所管法院審判官의令狀을받어야함

第七十四條　選擧法第五十三條의選擧事犯中議員候補者及其共犯에關한第一審裁判權은地方審理院合議部에屬함

第七十五條　選擧法第五十三條의選擧事犯에關한判決이確定되였을때에는當該法院長은遲滯없이그判決書謄本을添附하여行政首班、國會選擧委員會及關係選擧區選擧委員會에通知하여야함

附　則

第七十六條　本細則은一九四八年三月二十二日公布施行함

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Province	Ballot Boxes	Locks for Ballot Boxes	Regis-tration	Poll Regis-ter Three issues	Elec. Laws	Elec. Rules
SEOUL	750	1,740	686,000	329,000	17,000	17,000
KYUNGGI DO	1,672	3,344	1,493,000	840,000	27,940	27,940
KANG WON DO	802	1,604	706,000	103,000	12,410	12,410
KYONGSANG PUKTO	2,485	4,906	1,908,000	581,000	34,910	34,910
KYONGSANG NAMDO	1,825	3,638	1,912,000	582,000	34,770	34,770
CHOLLA PUKTO	1,700	3,370	1,211,000	402,000	22,385	22,385
CHOLLA NAMDO	1,900	3,760	1,768,000	567,000	32,410	32,410
CHUNG CHONG PUKTO	810	1,582	719,000	242,000	12,530	12,530
CHUNG CHONG NAMDO	1,560	3,120	1,146,000	390,000	21,225	21,225
CHEJU DO	225	450	167,000	17,000	3,045	3,045
NAT'L ELEC-TION COMM.					5,000	5,000
DEPT OF EDUCATION					6,000	6,000
TOTAL	13,729	27,514	11,716,000	4,053,000	229,625	229,625

Inclosure No. 9

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Province	Stationery Tablets, Tissue	Stationery Tablets, Bond	Envelopes, Large	Envelopes, Small	Elec. Schedule	Women's Bureau Eight Items	Digest Laws
SEOUL	250	764	21,000	38,800	2,300	830	1,000
KYUNGGI DO	390	1,679	47,500	87,700	5,400	930	3,000
KANG WON DO	150	714	22,800	42,000	2,400	830	1,000
KYONGSANG PUKTO	610	2,054	70,800	130,800	7,200	930	3,000
KYONGSANG NAMDO	610	2,064	51,700	95,600	6,900	930	3,000
CHOLLA PUKTO	300	1,379	43,800	80,900	5,300	830	2,000
CHOLLA NAMDO	1,480	1,989	53,500	98,800	5,300	930	3,000
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	150	714	22,500	41,500	2,500	830	1,000
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	300	1,234	44,000	81,300	4,200	950	2,000
CHEJU DO	70	174	6,400	11,600	600	170	300
NAT'L ELEC COMMITTEE	540	500					
DEPT. OF EDUCATION							
TOTAL	3,850	13,265	384,000	709,000	42,100	8,160	19,300

Inclosure No. 9

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Province	Sample Ballots	Printing Instr.	Ballot Paper (Rms.)	Ballot Envelopes	Ink (gal)	Date Completed	26-29 Apr Colored Pencils
SEOUL	100 ea.	2	225	630,000		5 Apr 48	2,211
KYUNGGI DO	290 ea.	2	208	1,252,000		5 Apr 48	4,682
KANG WON DO	120 ea.	2	85	530,000		10 Apr 48	1,965
KYONG SANG PUKTO	330 ea.	2	220	1,350,000		10 Apr 48	4,216
KYONG SANG NAMDO	330 ea.	2	220	1,450,000	25	10 Apr 48	4,000
CHOLLA PUKTO	220 ea.	2	140	890,000	15	10 Apr 48	4,608
CHOLLA NAMDO	290 ea.	2	203	1,350,000	25	10 Apr 48	5,625
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	120 ea.	2	77	510,000		10 Apr 48	2,361
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	190 ea.	2	180	875,000	15	10 Apr 48	2,710
CHEJU DO	30 ea.	2	19	100,000		10 Apr 48	444
NAT'L EIEC-TION COMM.		2				1 Apr 48	
DEPT OF EDUCATION						1 Apr 48	
TOTAL	2,020	22	1,577	8,937,000	80		32,822

Inclosure No. 9

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Province	26-29 April Bond Pads 100 shts.	Election Pamphlet "Things to Know"	Election Posters
SEOUL	6,000	500	100
KYUNGGI DO	15,000	500	100
KANG WON DO	6,000	500	100
KYONG SANG PUKTO	20,000	500	100
KYONG SANG NAMDO	20,000	500	100
CHOLLA PUKTO	15,000	500	100
CHOLLA NAMDO	17,000	500	100
CHUNG CHONG PUKTO	6,000	500	100
CHUNG CHONG NAMDO	12,000	500	100
CHEJU DO	2,000	500	100
TOTAL	119,000	5,000	1,000

Inclosure No. 9

選舉事務指針

附選舉法規質疑解答

國會選舉委員會

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

選擧事務指針에 關한件

選擧法令運用實施의 遺漏가 없게하기爲하야 左記各項의 選擧指針을 作成하였으니 所管各選擧委員會에 迅速히 指示하여 選擧事務遂行에 支障이 없도록 하게 하시압

一、年齡算定에關한件

選擧法第一條第一項에「滿二十一歲에達한者」라함은 選擧日부터起算하여 二十一年前의 選擧日에應當하는日字以前에出生한者를意味함 卽一九四八年五月九日現在에 滿二十一歲에達한者라함은 一九二七年五月九日以前에(五月九日을包含함)出生한者를意味함

選擧法第一條第二項에(滿二十五歲에達한者)도前記의例에依함

二、投票區의名稱에關한件

選擧法第十二條에依하여 投票區를 設置할때에는邑、面、洞(서울市及各府의)單位로連續番號로名稱을附할것임卽何面第一投票區、第二投票區…何洞第一投票區、第二投票區……와如함

要라되오放送(公知事項)新聞談話

三、寄留屆失期에對한過料處分停止에關한件

지난三月三十一日附 行政命令第十九號로 寄留屆怠慢者에對한 罰則(過料)規定은 今般總選擧 實施期間中에는 適用하지않기로 公布된바 此法令은 事實上 選擧日前六十日以來居住함에도 不拘하고 寄留屆出의法定期間(十四日以內)을 經過하여過料處分을當할까 念慮하여 그屆出을하지못하야 選擧權을 行使할수없는 弊端을防止하기爲한것이니一般選擧人에게 그趣旨를周知徹底케하여 寄留屆을勵行하도록 하시압

四、洞의意義에關한件

選擧法第十二條、第十三條、第二十二條、等에서「邑、面또는洞」이라고規定되여있는洞은 서울市의區의洞또는各府의洞을意味하는것이고 邑、面의洞을意味하는것은아님 그러나選擧法第三十四條、第五十三條第四號에洞、里長이라고함은市、府、邑、面의洞長、里長을總括한것임

五、邑、面、洞級選擧委員會에關한件

選擧法第十三條에規定된邑、面、洞級의 選擧委員會는現在의狀態에있어서는 이를設置하지않을方針임

六、選擧法第十五條에文字를解得하는證人에關한件

選擧法第十五條에文字를解得하는證人二人이라함은 選擧人이 自署不能이므로 그姓名을代書한 選擧事務從事員인代書人과當該選擧委員會가 選任한文字를解得하는 立會人을指稱한것임 但證人二人의署名捺印은選擧人登錄票用紙의備考欄에하거나 右登錄人欄에하거나 何者를擇하여도無妨하지만登錄票用紙가이미印刷配付된關係로右登錄人欄에署名捺印함이便利함

七、選擧法第十六條解釋의件

選擧法第十六條에依하여 投票區選擧委員會가 그區域內에選擧日前六十日以來居住하는選擧人의名簿를作成함에있어서 그投票區가所屬하는邑、面또는洞(서울市及各府의)內에서居住를移轉한者는 그區域內에繼續하여 居住할것으로解釋할것임

八、異議또는再審決定通知에關한件

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選擧法第十七條에依하여 投票又는區選擧委員會 또는 選擧委員會의 決定에 對하여 不服이 있을 때에는 決定한 날로부터 三日以內에 再審의 要求를 할 수 있다。

委員會에 異議를 提出하고

各種様式及書式

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0274

投票所配置圖



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(第一號樣式)

國會議員候補者登錄申請書

議員候補者 姓名
職業
住所
生年月日
所屬政黨團體

右者를 檀紀 年 月 日施行하는 國會議員選擧에 議員候補者로 推薦狀을 添附하여 登錄을 申請함

檀紀 年 月 日 右 姓名 ㊞

選擧區選擧委員會委員長 貴下

國會議員候補者推薦狀

議員候補者	姓名		
職業			
住所			
生年月日			
所屬政黨團體			

右者를 檀紀 年 月 日施行하는 國會議員選擧에 議員候補者로 推薦함

推薦月日	住所	所屬政黨團體	職業	推薦者姓名	推薦當該選擧委員會選擧人名簿登錄證明者印

(第二號樣式)

國會議員候補者推薦登錄申請書

議員候補者 姓名
職業
住所
生年月日
所屬政黨團體

右者를 檀紀四二八一年五月九日施行하는 國會議員選擧에 議員候補者로 推薦하고 本人의 承諾書를 添付하여 登錄을 申請함

檀紀四二八一年 月 日

右 推薦登錄申請者 姓名 ㊞

選擧區選擧委員會委員長 貴下

議員候補者承諾書

議員候補者 姓名
職業

推薦月日	住所	所屬政黨團體	職業	推薦登錄申請者姓名	推薦登錄申請者姓名印

住所
生年月日
所屬政黨團體

右者 檀紀四二八一年五月九日施行하는 國會議員選擧에 議員候補者로 推薦함을 承諾함

檀紀四二八一年 月 日

右 姓名 ㊞

推薦者姓名
外人

貴下

國選委指令第五號

西紀一九四八年三月二十九日

國會選擧委員會委員長 盧鎭嵩

各道及서울市選擧委員會委員長 貴下

選擧事務用印章에關한件

標記의件에關하여左記와如히決定하였아오니管下各選擧委員에周知시키심을要望하나이다

記

一、選擧委員會及委員長職印은別記規格에依하여彫刻할것
但이미職印을彫刻한選擧委員會에서는別記規格에合致되지않을지라도有效하게使用할것

二、選擧法第三十四條第五項에依하여投票用紙에捺印할때에는委員長의私印을使用할것

印章規格



1. 選擧委員會印 3cm×3cm
2. 選擧委員會委員長印 2cm×2cm

國選指令第六號

檀紀四二八一年三月三十日

國會選擧委員會委員長 盧鎭嵩

各道及서울市選擧委員會委員長 貴下

各級選擧委員會委員選任報告書式決定의件

選擧法第二十二條第三項의投票區選擧委員會委員選任報告書式을 別紙와如히決定되었아기各投票區選擧委員會委員은勿論各級選擧委員會委員도此書式에標準하야報告하시압

投票區選擧委員會委員選任報告

一、委員長

姓名	生年月日	住所	略歷 所屬政黨 또는團體	備考

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By NARS, Date

二、候補委員長

姓名	生年月日	住所	略歷	所屬政黨 또는 團體	備考

三、委員

姓名	生年月日	住所	略歷	所屬政黨 또는 團體	備考

四、候補委員

姓名	生年月日	住所	略歷	所屬政黨 또는 團體	備考

何道(市)何選舉區第 投票區選舉委員會委員長候補委員長委員及候補委員右와如히選任되얐음을報告함

檀紀 年 月 日

何道(市)何 郡(府) 面(邑) 長
路 街
區 洞

各道及서울市選舉委員會委員長 貴下

(備考) 各道、서울市及選舉區選舉委員會委員選任報告도此樣式에準할것

國選指令第八號

檀紀四二八一年四月 日

國會選舉委員會委員長 盧 鎭 昺

各道及서울市選舉委員會委員長 貴下

選擧法第十七條의異議申請及決定通知書式決定의件

選擧法第十七條第一項第三項의選擧人의異議(再審)申請書式及同條第二項第四項의決定通知書式別紙와如히決定되얐압기此에依하야各々作成하시압

追而 細則第十三條第二項의申請書式도法第十七條第一項(第三項)의異議(再審)申請書式에依하야作成하시압

前記法第十七條第二項、第四項의決定에있어서異議(再審)提出이理由있다고決定한時에도必히申請者에게通知하시압

選擧法第十七條第一項(第三項)의異議(再審)申請書

登錄番號第 號

登錄人姓名

年 月 日生 性別 職業

本籍 道 郡(府) 路 面(邑) 里 番地 號
市 區 街 洞

住所 道 郡(府) 路 面(邑) 里 番地 號
市 區 街 洞

一、異議(再審)申請理由

右와如히異議(再審)提出하오니審査(再審)하심을要請하나이다

檀紀四二八一年 月 日

異議(再審)申請人

住所

姓名 何 某 (印)

何選擧委員會委員長 貴下

備考

一、申請人은選擧委員會의通知其他證憑書類를添附할것

二、施行細則의第十三條第二項의申請書式도本書式에準하야作成할것

選擧法第十七條第二項(第四項)의決定通知書

登錄番號第 號

登錄人姓名

年 月 日生 性別 職業

本籍 道 郡(府) 路 面(邑) 里 番地 號
市 區 街 洞

住所 道 郡(府) 路 面(邑) 里 番地 號
市 區 街 洞

一、決定事項

右와如히決定의얐음을通知함、萬一右決定에異議가있을때에는 月 日까지再審을提出하시압

檀紀四二八一年 月 日

何選擧委員會委員長 印

何 某 貴下

備考

一、決定事項欄에는決定理由를具體的으로記入할것

國選指令第七號

檀紀四二八一年三月三十日

國會選擧委員會委員長 盧 鎭 昺

各道及서울市選擧委員會委員長 貴下

有權者及登錄人數調査報告의件

有權者及登錄人數를別紙樣式에依하여登錄終了卽時로調査報告할것을指令함

別紙 有權者及登錄人數報告

選擧區名	投票區數	人口數 男	人口數 女	人口數 計	有權者數 男	有權者數 女	有權者數 計	人口數에對한比率	登錄人數 男	登錄人數 女	登錄人數 計	有權者數에對한比率	備考
		人	人	人	人	人	人	%				%	
計													

右報告함

檀紀 年 月 日

何道(市)選擧委員會委員長 印

國會選擧委員會委員長 貴下

備考

一、人口數及有權者數는登錄開始日現在로概數를記入할것

二、選擧區選擧委員會는本樣式에準하야投票區別로本報告를作成하야道及서울市選擧委員會에二部를提出하고道及서울市選擧委員會는그中一部를國會選擧委員會에報告할때添附할것

三、人口數에比하야有權者數가有權者數에比하야登錄人數가過少할때에는그理由를備考欄에詳記할것

投票錄樣式

檀紀何年何月何日執行
國會議員選擧

何道何郡何面投票區投票錄

一、左의 委員은 投票所를 열 時刻까지에 投票所에 參會하였음

委員長 姓名

委員 姓名

委員 姓名

二、投票所는 午前七時에 열었음

三、投票所의 入口와 投票用紙에 標하는 各場所에는 各議員候補者의 寫眞에 그 姓名과 記號를 表示하여 貼付하였음

四、委員長은 委員姓名을 指定하여 投票時間中 選擧人이 正當하게 投票函에 投票封套를 넣는것을 監視케 하였음

五、左의 參觀人은 投票開始時刻까지에 投票所에 入所하였음

議員候補者姓名代理人 住所 姓名

議員候補者姓名代理人 住所 姓名

議員候補者姓名代理人 住所 姓名

議員候補者姓名代理人 住所 姓名

六、委員長은 投票開始前에 委員過半數立會下에 投票所에 參會한 選擧人의 面前에서 投票函을 열고 그 空虛함을 보인 後 속두꺼운 잠겼음

七、選擧人을 選擧人名簿에 對照하고 그 署名 또는 拇印을 받은 後 委員長은 選擧人面前에서 投票用紙에 捺印하여 封套一枚와 投票用紙一枚式交付하였음

八、委員長은 投票에 標하는 場所의 入口에 全投票時間中 委員姓名、委員姓名二人을 配置하였음

九、左의 選擧人은 選擧人名簿에 登錄되지 않었지만 選擧人名簿에 登錄될것을 確認하는 決定書（通知書）를 持參하였으므로 投票서 졌음

住所 姓名

住所 姓名

十、左의 選擧人은 何事由에 依하여 委員會의 決定으로써 投票를 拒否하였음

住所 姓名

住所 姓名

十一、左의 選擧人은 過失로 因하여 投票用紙를 汚損하고 再交付를 請求하므로 그 事實을 確認한 後 汚損한것과 交換하여 投票用紙를 再交付하였음

住所 姓名

住所 姓名

十二、左의 選擧人은 投票前에 投票所外에 退出코저 하였음으로 投票用紙를 回收하였음

住所 姓名

住所 姓名

十三、左의 選擧人은 投票所에서 喧騷하고（演說討論을 하고）（投票에 關하여 協議를 하고）（投票에 關하여 勸誘를 하고）投票所의 秩序를 紊亂케 하므로 委員長이 이를 制止하여도 그 命令에 服從하지 않으므로써 投票用紙를 回收하고 投票所外로 退出시켰음

住所 姓名

住所 姓名

十四、委員長은 投票所外로 退出을 命한 外의 左의 選擧人에 對하여 投票所의 秩序를 紊亂할 憂慮가 없다고 認定하여 投票를 세웠음

住所 姓名

住所 姓名

委員長이 投票所로 退出을 命한 左의 選擧人은 最後에 入場하여 投票하였음

住所 姓名

住所 姓名

十五、委員姓名은 一旦參會하였으나 午前（後）何時何分何事로 退出하고 候補委員姓名은 午前（後）何時何分부터 參會하였음

十六、午後七時에 投票所入口에 入所를 待機하고 있는 選擧人이 없음으로 委員長은 投票所를 閉鎖할 時刻이 온것을 宣告하고 投票所의 入口를 閉鎖하였음

十七、午後何時何分 投票所內에 있는 最後選擧人의 投票가 끝났으므로 卽時로 委員長은 委員過半數立會下에 在席하는 選擧人의 面前에서 投票函의 投票口와 안밖뚜껑에 各々封印하고 投票函을 封鎖하였음

十八、投票函을 封鎖한 卽時로 그 안빡뚜껑의 열쇠를 封套에 넣고 委員長과 立會한 委員이 封印한 後 投票函을 送致할 委員長（委員姓名）이를 保管함

十九、選擧人數左와 如함

選擧人名簿上의 選擧人總數 幾人

投票用紙交付數（選擧人數） 幾枚

選擧人名簿에 登錄된者 幾人

選擧人名簿에 登錄될것을 確認하는 決定書를 持參한者 幾人

二十、남은 投票用紙數 幾枚

남은 封套數 何枚

二十一、午後何時何分 投票事務를 完了함

二十二、投票所에 臨監한 上級選擧委員會의 委員 또는 職員左와 如함

職名 姓名

二十三、投票函을 送致할 委員及職員左와 如함

職名 姓名

職名 姓名

委員長은 이 投票錄을 作成하여 이를 朗讀하고 立會한 委員과 더부터 連署捺印함

委員長 姓名 印

委員 姓名 印

委員 姓名 印

委員 姓名 印

選擧錄樣式

檀紀何年何月何日開會 何道何選擧區選擧委員會選擧錄

國會議員選擧

一、左의 委員은 開票開始時刻까지에 參會하였음

委員長 姓名

委員 姓名

委員 姓名

二、開票에 立會한者左와 如함

議員候補者 姓名

議員候補者姓名代理人 姓名

三、何月何日午後（前）何時까지에 各投票區選擧委員會로부터 投

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By NARS, Date

呈書

十二、議員候補者中有效投票ノ最多數ヲ得タル左記ノ人ヲ當選人ト定ム

姓	名

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選擧報告書樣式其一

檀紀何年何月何日執行
國會議員選擧　何道(서울市)選擧委員會選擧報告書

一、檀紀何年何月何日管下各選擧區로부터選擧錄이到着되였으므로 何日午前(後)何時選擧報告書를作成하기爲하여委員會를開會하였음

二、左의委員은開會時刻까지에參會하였음

委員長　姓　名
委　員　姓　名
委　員　姓　名

三、選擧狀況左와如함

選擧人名簿上의選擧人總數　何　人
投票用紙를받은人員總數　何　票
投票總數　何　票
內
一、有效投票數　何　票
一、無效投票數　何　票
內
(一)　投票用紙가正規의것이아닌것　何　票
(二)　二人以上의議員候補者를指示한것　何　票
(三)　……

四、當選人及得票數左와如함

何選擧區　姓　名　何票(有效投票何票中)
何選擧區　姓　名　無投票當選
何選擧區　姓　名　何票(有效投票何票中)
何選擧區　當選人皆無　抽籤當籤(同數得票者一人)
何選擧區　當選人皆無　理由如斯

五、午前(後)何時選擧報告事務를完了하였음

六、管下各選擧區의選擧錄一通式計何通을添附함

委員長은이選擧報告書를作成하여朗讀하고參會한委員과連署捺印함

檀紀何年何月何日

委員長　姓　名　印
委　員　姓　名　印
委　員　姓　名　印

(備考　右樣式에例示한事項以外에當該選擧委員會에서重要하다고認定하는事項은記載할것)

選擧報告書樣式其二

檀紀何年何月何日執行
國會議員選擧　何道(서울市)選擧委員會選擧報告書

一、檀紀何年何月何日까지에管下何選擧區로부터는暴動(또는洪水)에依하여그管內全投票區의投票를行하지못한旨의報告가있고爾餘의各選擧區로부터는選擧錄이全部到着되였으므로卽日午前(後)何時選擧報告書를作成하기爲하여委員會를開會하였음

二、左의委員은開會時刻까지參會하였음

委員長　姓　名
委　員　姓　名
委　員　姓　名

三、選擧狀況左와如함

選擧人名簿上의選擧人總數(但事故發生한何選擧區의分은包含하지않았음)　何　人
投票用紙를人員總數(右同)　何　票
投票總數(右同)　何　票
內
一、有效投票數　何　票
二、無效投票數　何　票
內
(一)　投票用紙가正規의것이아닌것　何　票
(二)　二人以上의議員候補者를指示한것　何　票
(三)　……

四、當選人及그得票數左와如함

何選擧區　姓　名　何票(有效投票何票中)
何選擧區　姓　名　無投票當選
何選擧區　姓　名　何票(有效投票何票中)
何選擧區　當選人皆無　抽籤當籤(同數得票者一人)
何選擧區　當選人皆無　理由如斯

五、午前(後)何時選擧報告事務를完了하였음

六、管下事故發生한何選擧區를除外한各選擧區의選擧錄一通式計何通을添附함

委員長은이選擧報告書를作成하여朗讀하고參會한委員과連署捺印함

檀紀何年何月何日

委員長　姓　名　印
委　員　姓　名　印
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(備考　右樣式에例示한事項以外에當該選擧委員會에서重要하다고認定하는事項은記載할것)

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選擧法規質疑解答

年齡對照表

滿21歲 檀紀4260年 5月 9日生까지
西紀1927年 5月 9日生까지
昭和 2年 5月 9日生까지

滿25歲 檀紀4256年 / 西紀1923年 / 大正 12年 } 5月9日生까지

檀紀	西紀	李朝開國	大韓年號	日本年號	年齡	檀紀	西紀	李朝開國	大韓年號	日本年號	年齡
4260	1927			昭和 2	22	4220	1887	496		明治20	62
4259	1926			同 1	23	4219	1886	495		同 19	63
4258	1925			大正14	24	4218	1885	494		同 18	64
4257	1924			同 13	25	4217	1884	493		同 17	65
4256	1923			同 12	26	4216	1883	492		同 16	66
4255	1922			同 11	27	4215	1882	491		同 15	67
4254	1921			同 10	28	4214	1881	490		同 14	68
4253	1920			同 9	29	4213	1880	489		同 13	69
4252	1919			同 8	30	4212	1879	488		同 12	70
4251	1918			同 7	31	4211	1878	487		同 11	71
4250	1917			同 6	32	4210	1877	486		同 10	72
4249	1916			同 5	33	4209	1876	485		同 9	73
4248	1915			同 4	34	4208	1875	484		同 8	74
4247	1914			同 3	35	4207	1874	483		同 7	75
4246	1913			同 2	36	4206	1873	482		同 6	76
4245	1912			同 1	37	4205	1872	481		同 5	77
4244	1911			明治44	38	4204	1871	480		同 4	78
4243	1910	519	隆熙 4	同 43	39	4203	1870	479		同 3	79
4242	1909	518	同 3	同 42	40	4202	1869	478		同 2	80
4241	1908	517	同 2	同 41	41	4201	1868	477		同 1	81
4240	1907	516	同 1	同 40	42	4200	1867	476			82
4239	1906	515	光武10	同 39	43	4199	1866	475			83
4238	1905	514	同 9	同 38	44	4198	1865	474			84
4237	1904	513	同 8	同 37	45	4197	1864	473			85
4236	1903	512	同 7	同 36	46	4196	1863	472			86
4235	1902	511	同 6	同 35	47	4195	1862	471			87
4234	1901	510	同 5	同 34	48	4194	1861	470			88
4233	1900	509	同 4	同 33	49	4193	1860	469			89
4232	1899	508	同 3	同 32	50	4192	1859	468			90
4231	1898	507	同 2	同 31	51	4191	1858	467			91
4230	1897	506	光武元	同 30	52	4190	1857	466			92
4229	1896	505	建陽元	同 29	53	4189	1856	465			93
4228	1895	504		同 28	54	4188	1855	464			94
4227	1894	503		同 27	55	4187	1854	463			95
4226	1893	502		同 26	56	4186	1853	462			96
4225	1892	501		同 25	57	4185	1852	461			97
4224	1891	500		同 24	58	4184	1851	460			98
4223	1890	499		同 23	59	4183	1850	459			99
4222	1889	498		同 22	60	4182	1849	458			100
4221	1888	497		同 21	61						

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質疑應答의件

首題의件에關하여 各方面의質疑의 要領을綜合하여 別紙와如히 解答하였으니 所管各級選擧委員會와 關係方面에周知하여 選擧法令運用上遺漏가없도록 하시압

一、問 年齡算定의具體的方法如何 (江原)

答 三月三十日附年齡計算에關한件 通牒參照

二、問 自由利의 반무엇인가

答 自由利의 반身體에對한拘束利으로서 懲役、禁錮及拘留의 세가지가 있음

三、問 法第二條第三號後段에、自由利의 宣告를 받고 그執行을 받지 않기로 確定되지 아니한者 어떠한것인지 例擧하라 (江原)

答 設問에 該當하는者는 大概左의 네가지가 있다

1、執行猶豫期間中에 있는者

2、假出獄中에 있는者

3、自由利의 宣告를 받은後 保釋中에 있는者

4、自由利의 宣告를 받은後 逃走 또는 脫獄한者

五、問 政治犯의範圍如何 (江原)

答 包含하지 않는다

四、問 日本政府로부터 爵을 받은者라 함은 雙爵者를 包含하는意味인가 (江原)

答 ＵＮ委員團과 하ㅣ지將軍이 協議하여 決定指處할 일로 안다

六、問 政務官이 반무엇인가 過渡政府部處長은 政務官인가

答 政務官이 반 責任內閣制度의 閣員을意味한것으로 解釋하며 따라서 現在에는 政務官이 없다고 보다 (江原)

七、問 委員長과 候補委員長의 關係及正委員과 候補委員과의 關係如何

答 四月一日附選擧指針에關한 通牒第十二項參照

八、問 投票函送致關係에 있어 交通上遠距離를 考慮하고 더욱 이 暴行威脅等의 事態를 念慮하야 投票區選擧委員會에서 開函하여 投票한것을 封套속에 나어서 嚴密히 封緘送致할수 있을가? (江原)

答 不可、반듯이 投票函을送致하여야 한다

九、問 選擧人名簿等의 盜難、破損等을 念慮하여 執務時間外의 保管은 面事務所의 金庫로는 委員長의 私宅에 하여도 無妨한가 (江原)

答 選擧人名簿는 三通을作成하기로 되었으니 分散하여 嚴重히 保管하여도 無妨하다

十、問 投票區選擧委員會事務所가 投票所와 同一建物內의 別室에 設置되여도 無妨한가 (江原)

答 無妨하다

十一、問 法第三十三條中에「記號는 一劃 二劃 三劃等으로 함」이라 規定되었는데 이 議員候補者가 五、六名以上일때에는 如何한 記號를 할것인가 例示를 바란다 (江原)

答 議員候補者가 五人이면 ||||| 의 五劃、

가지 配當될것이요 六人이면 ||||||| 의 六劃

가지 配當될것이며 以下 그例에 依한다

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十二、問　法第三十四條第四項中の「委員の捺印」の捺印とは
委員個人（私人）の實の印を指稱するか　不然の時は
印を指稱するか（忠南）
答　私印を指稱せり
十三、問　同一所、部內の二個以上の選擧區に設置し得る
旨の選擧區選擧委員會の事務所を他の選擧區に設置し得る
旨を指稱せり（忠南）
答　同一行政廳內の各其附置する事務便利上　同一行
政廳內の附置する事務所を他の選擧區に兼務する
兼務區內の設置を要せず
十四、1、公務員の範圍如何
答　1、公務員の範圍は　次の如し
2、農會、金融組合、水利組合、敵產管理工場等の職
員を公務員とす
3、洞長、區長を公務員とす。（忠南）
答　1、公務員の規定は官吏、公吏法令の依する公
務の從事する職員、委員　其他の職員を包含す
2、農會、水利組合、金融組合、敵產管理工場等の
職員を選擧法にいう　包する公務員にいいう正
解釋せり
3、村を市制の洞會長を選擧法上公務員と主解
釋せり　邑、面の區長を公務員にいう
十五、問　法第二十九條第二項の「選擧事務の關係ある公務
員」の範圍如何
答　選擧委員會の　委員及其委員會の幹事、書記（專
任、兼任を包含）は法律上選擧委員會の委員長、候補
者を指稱せり
十六、議員候補者の推薦を二人以上を要する上（江原）
答　單純な推薦者は　其を又を選擧運動にいう　二
以上推薦者の名簿を印刷して選擧運動にいう（江原）
十七、問　二推薦者の名簿を印刷して公布宣傳を
叫ぶを選擧運動にいう
十八、選擧法に新聞公告を要する規定の交通不便の關係を
有する公告地に至ては效力を發生せざるか
答　新聞に公告とせざるとの如き場合に於ては
公告の効果は不足を要する事勿論、邑、面にては掲示板に依
る公告地に至ては效力を發生せざるか

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WAGES OF EMPLOYS OF ELECTION COMMITTEES

	CHIEF CLERKS			CLERKS			EMPLOYS			Cost Totals
	Total No.	Per Diem Pay	Cost	Total No.	Per Diem Pay	Cost	Total No.	Per Diem Pay	Cost	
National Committee	[1] A 8 B 7	300	88800 155400	A 15 B 15	250	138750 277500	A 5 B 5	200	37000 74000	264550 506900
Prov and Seoul Elec. Comm.	[2] A10	250	60000	A 20	200	96000	A 10	150	36000	192000
Elec. Dist.	[2] A200	200	960000	A 400	150	144000	A 200	150	72000	1176000
Voting Dist.	[2] B14000	200	134400000	28000	150	201600000	14000	150	100800000	436800000
TOTALS			135664200			202256250			101019000	438939450

[1] Basis of period of employment Mar 3 to May 15 -- 74 days

[2] Basis of period of employment Mar 29 to May 15 -- 48 days

A Wages of part time workers 50% of per diem pay
B Wages of full time workers

Inclosure No. 9R

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TRAVEL EXPENSES OF MEMBERS OF ELECTION COMMITTEES

No Railroad Fare Authorized

	No. of Committees, Chief Clerks and Clerks	Per Person Travel Days	Per Day Expenses	TOTALS
National Committee	60	7	1,000	420,000
Prov. and Seoul Elec. Comm.	150	5	1,000	750,000
Elec. Dist.	2600	5	600	7800,000
Voting Dist.	182,000	1	300	54,600,000
TOTALS	184,810			63,570,000

Inclosure No. 9B

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 180 31 March 1948

ORDINANCE NUMBER 176 SUPPLEMENTED

Pending legislative action on the subject matters hereof and the enactment of legislation pursuant thereto, the following shall govern:

SECTION I. *Purpose.* The purpose of this ordinance is to provide for integrating present criminal procedures into those provided by Ordinance Number 176, dated 20 March 1948 (*Changes in Criminal Procedure*).

SECTION II. *The effect of warrants issued prior to Ordinance Number 176.* A warrant issued by a court, public prosecutor, or judicial police pursuant to the Korean Criminal Act (*Governor General Act Number 11, dated 18 March 1912*), or the Criminal Procedure Code. prior to the effective date of Ordinance Number 176, shall continue to have legal effect until expiration, pursuant to such Act or Code.

SECTION III. *Computation of time.* The periods *thirty days* and *sixty days* appearing in Section XIX *c* of Ordinance Number 176, shall be construed, as to cases pending on the effective date of Ordinance Number 176, to run from such effective date.

SECTION IV. *The effect of records made pursuant to provisions of repealed law.* Records heretofore made pursuant to provisions of law repealed by Ordinance Number 176, shall continue to be legally admissible in evidence to the same extent provided in such repealed provisions of law.

SECTION V. *Procedure to secure warrants of restraint or search.* Applications for warrants of restraint or search shall be made as follows:

a. A public prosecutor shall apply to the court to which he is assigned.

b. A judicial policeman or other constituted authority shall apply to the public prosecutor, who shall submit the application to the court.

SECTION VI. *Authority of special judicial officers.* The chief judge of the district court may authorize the special judicial officer in any city, gun, or island where there is no court, to issue warrants of arrest and search under Ordinance Number 176, as representative of the appropriate judge. The chief judge shall give notice to the appropriate official of the names and location of the special

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judicial officers who are given such authority. In such places, the police officials or other constituted authority may apply for a warrant directly to the special judicial officer without the necessity of going through the prosecutor. In such places, the time within which a warrant must be obtained under Section VI of Ordinance Number 176 shall be forty-eight (*48*) hours.

SECTION VII. *Effective date.* This ordinance shall be effective on 1 April 1948.

APPROVED:

W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

SEAL
USAMGIK

RECOMMENDED:

AHN CHAI HONG
Civil Administrator

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SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 176

20 March 1948

CHANGES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES

Pending action on the subject matters hereof by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and the enactment of legislation pursuant thereto, the following shall govern:

SECTION I. The purpose of this ordinance is to provide for changes in the Criminal Procedure so that rights of the people to freedom from unlawful arrest and detention may be more adequately secured.

SECTION II. As used herein, the following terms shall be interpreted as indicated:

a. All words used in this ordinance to refer to restraint, restraint of body or restrained person, shall be deemed to include all forms of restraint such as koo in, koo ryu, oochi, chepo, kum sok, etc.

b. The competent court for hearing applications under Section XVII hereof shall be the District Court or the Branch Court having Jurisdiction over the place where the person named in the application is actually restrained. Any judge of such court may receive and make decision on such application. Special Judicial Officers shall not have the power to receive or make decision on such application.

c. The competent court for the issuance of warrants of arrest (koo sok yung jang) shall be the District Court or Branch Court. Special Judicial Officers shall not have the power to issue warrants of arrest.

d. In any case which is lawfully before a court, the question of what was reasonable fear, reasonable ground or necessary measures shall be determined by the court from all the evidence.

SECTION III. No person shall suffer restraint of body except pursuant to a warrant of arrest (koo sok yung jang) issued by a court, stating the name of the person to be arrested and the offense with which he is charged; *provided*, however, that no warrant of arrest shall be required in the following cases where prompt action is necessary:

a. When the suspect has no fixed residence.

b. In case of *flagrante delicto* as defined in Article 130 of the Code of

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Criminal Procedure, whether the suspect is on the scene of the offense or not, except that such arrest without warrant must be made within forty-eight (48) hours of the time the offense was committed.

c. In the case of an accomplice who has been discovered in the course of investigation of a flagrant offense, exce t that such arrest without warrant must be made within forty-eight (48) hours of the time the offense was committed.

d. When a convicted prisoner or a lawfully restrained person awaiting trial has escaped.

e. When an offender has been discovered as a result of examination of a dead body.

f. When there is reasonable fear of destruction of evidence by the suspect.

g. When there is reasonable fear that the suspect will flee.

h. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the suspect has committed an offense p nishable by imprisonment for one (1) year or more or by graver penalty.

SECTION IV. In addition to other powers given by law, prosecutors or police shall have the power to enter any building at any time, day or night, without a warrant where there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense punishable by imprisonment for one (1) year or a graver penalty has been or is being or is about to be committed therein, to take all necessary measures for the effectual prevention or detection of such offense and may then and there restrain all persons suspected of being concerned in such crime, and also may seize all property which there is reasonable ground to suspect has been stolen or used in the com ission of such offense.

SECTION V. No prosecutor, judicial police or other constituted authority shall make search or seizure without a search warrant (soo sak yung jang) issued by a court, except as provided in Section IV hereof; and *provided*, further, that property owned by, held by, or in custody of, persons subject to arrest without warrant, in accordance with the provisions of Section III, hereof, shall be subject to search and seizure without warrant within the time allowed by Section VI hereof for obtaining a warrant of arrest. The warrant of search (soo sak yung jang) he ein provided for shall describe the place to be searched and the thing to be seized in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

SECTION VI. In case a prosecutor, a judicial police or other constituted

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authority has restrained the body of a person without a warrant of arrest, under provisions of Sections III and IV hereof, he shall obtain from a court a warrant of arrest (koo sok yung jang) for such person within forty-eight (48) hours of such restraint in the city of Seoul and in a city, county or island where a court is located, or within five (5) days in a city, county or island where a court is not located. If he fails to obtain such a warrant of arrest within the prescribed time, the person restrained shall be immediately released. In such case, articles seized without a warrant of search (soo sak yung jang) shall be returned to the persons from whom they were seized. No person released under provisions of this Section shall be subject to restraint of body on the same facts except pursuant to a warrant issued by a court.

SECTION VII. The provisions pertaining to warrants of arrest (koo in jang) and warrants of detention (koo ryoo jang) in the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the warrant of arrest (koo sok yung jang) hereof, and the provisions pertaining to arrest (koo in) and detention (koo ryoo) in the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to arrest (koo sok) under warrant of arrest (koo sok yung jang) hereof. The provisions pertaining to warrant of search (soo sak yung jang) and warrant of seizure (ap soo yung jang) shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the warrant of search (soo sak yung jang) hereof, and the provisions pertaining to search (soo sak) or seizure (ap soo) in the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the search (soo sak) or seizure (ap soo) under warrant of search (soo sak yung jang) hereof.

SECTION VIII. When the body of a person has been restrained by the police, the judicial police officer shall complete his investigation and deliver the suspect to the prosecutor within ten (10) days from the date of actual restraint or release him unless prior to the expiration of such period of ten (10) days an order of extension has been obtained from a competent court. But if the completion of the investigation shall require more than ten (10) days, the judicial police officer may apply to the competent court, through the prosecutor, for an extension of the period of detention, giving reasons therefor. The court, if convinced of the necessity therefor, may order an extension of not more than ten (10) days. Not more than one extension may be granted. At the expiration of the time fixed by the court, the suspect must be delivered to the prosecutor or be released.

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SECTION IX The prosecutor shall institute public action against the suspect or release him within ten (10) days from the date he actually restrains the suspect or receives the suspect from the police, unless within that time he shall obtain an order from a competent court for an extension. On application by the prosecutor, giving reasons therefor, the court, if convinced of the necessity, may order an extension of the detention for a period not exceeding ten (10) days. Not more than one extension shall be granted. At the expiration of the extension, the prosecutor shall institute public action against the suspect or release him.

SECTION X. An order of extension under Sections VIII and IX hereof, shall state the date of expiration of the extension granted and shall be effective from the time the judge signs the same.

SECTION XI. When a suspect or an accused is arrested, he shall immediately be informed of the charge against him and the particulars thereof and shall be informed that he may provide legal counsel for himself, subject to the provisions of Section XIV hereof. If the arrest is made in the presence of a member of his family, or if a member of his family makes inquiry, such member of his family shall likewise be notified of the charge and the particulars thereof and of the right of the suspect or the accused to have legal counsel.

SECTION XII. When a person is under restraint of body, he may provide legal counsel for himself; or his legal representative, supervisor, lineal ascendants or descendants, spouse or family head may provide legal counsel for him independently. The designation of legal counsel shall be effective from the date of designation and shall continue to be effective through the first instance.

SECTION XIII Upon inquiry, the legal counsel for the suspect or the accused shall be informed of the charges against the suspect or the accused and the particulars thereof. He shall have the right to present evidence on behalf of the suspect or the accused to the judicial police officer, the prosecutor or the court.

SECTION XIV. Prior to institution of public action, interviews and written communications between the suspect and his legal counsel shall be permitted; *provided*, however, that the judicial police or the prosecutor, if there should be reasonable ground to fear that interviews and communications between the suspect and his legal counsel would result in destruction or fabrication of evidence or the escape of the suspect, may prohibit such interviews

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or communications. In the event such a prohibition is made, report thereof shall be made to the competent court, together with the ground of the prohibition. Legal counsel may object to the prohibition and apply to the court for an order of rescission of the prohibition. When the court receives such application, it shall decide upon the application within a period of two (2) days.

SECTION XV. After the case has been committed for public trial, legal counsel and the accused in detention shall not be forbidden to correspond with or see each other.

SECTION XVI. Should legal counsel not appear, or should no legal counsel have been appointed, legal counsel may be designated by the presiding judge after hearing the opinion of the public prosecutor in the following cases:

a. If the accused is under 20 or is at least 70 years of age.

b. If the accused is female,

c. If the accused is a deaf or dumb person.

d. If the accused is suspected of being a person of unsound or weak mind.

e. If such a course is otherwise deemed necessary.

SECTION XVII, *a.* When a person is restrained in his body by constituted authority or otherwise, he, his legal counsel or persons specified in Section XII hereof, may apply to the competent court for inquiry into the legality of the restraint. The application shall state all the pertinent facts and shall set out the following:

(1) The grounds on which it is claimed that the restraint is illegal.

(2) Whether or not a prior application has been made for release from the same restraint.

(3) If a prior application has been made, in what court the prior application was made and the action of the court thereon.

(4) If a prior application has been made, the reasons for the new application.

(5) If known, whether or not the person named in the application is restrained pursuant to a warrant issued by a court.

(6) If the person is restrained pursuant to a warrant issued by a court, the name of the court which issued the warrant and the alleged defects in the warrant.

b. The court which receives the application shall examine it at once.

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If the application shows on its face that the restraint is legal, the application shall be denied. If the application shows on its face that the restraint is prima facie illegal, the court shall fix a day for the hearing thereof, not more than seven (7) days from the date the application is received, and shall order the person who is restraining the person named in the application to bring such person before the court and show cause for continuance of the restraint. If before the day set for the hearing, the person who is restraining the person named in the application shall exhibit to the court a valid warrant issued by a competent court within the time limits provided in Sections VIII and IX hereof, the court may deny the application before the day set. If, after hearing, the reasons for the restraint and the objections of the restrained person thereto and such evidence bearing on the legality of the restraint as the court deems necessary, the court determines the restraint to be unlawful, it shall order the release of the restrained person, No person released under provisions of this Section shall thereafter be restrained in his body on the same facts except pursuant to a warrant issued by a court.

SECTION XVIII. If either party to a hearing under Section XVII hereof is dissatisfied with the decision of the court, he may within three (3) days make application to the next higher court, which court shall proceed as provided in Section XVII hereof; *provided*, however, that if the lower court has ordered the release of the restrained person, he shall be released immediately.

SECTION XIX. *a*. Courts shall be liberal in releasiug persons against whom warrants of arrest or detention have been executed on their giving reasonable bail, either before or after institution of public action. In fixing the amount of bail, the court shall take into consideration the circumstances of the case and shall fix an amount high enough to give the reasonable assurance that the suspect or accused will not attempt to escape.

b. Persons accused of offenses punishable by fine or by penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, shall be released on giving reasonable bail to be fixed by the court.

c. When a person has been detained for thirty (30) days after institution of public action without trial, the court, on application by or for him, must fix reasonable bail for his release unless the prosecutor shall show to the court good reason for denying bail. When the accused has been detained without trial for sixty (60) days after institution of public action, the court,

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on application by or for him, must fix reasonable bail for his release.

d. The provisions of paragraph *c.* of this Section will not apply to cases where the offense charged is punishable by death or by penal servitude or imprisonment for a term of fifteen (15) years or more.

e. Except as provided in this Section, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to release on bail shall apply.

f. In cases in which the accused has been declared innocent (moo choi), has been acquitted (myun so), or the prosecution has been dismissed (kong so ee kak) in the lower court, and the prosecutor has appealed to a higher court, liberation on bail previously granted shall not be revoked except for causes provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, if the liberation has not been previously granted, the court shall fix reasonable bail for release of the accused.

g. In cases in which the accused has appealed to a higher court from a conviction by a lower court, liberation on bail or revocation of bail previously granted shall be governed by the following:

(1) If the punishment fixed by the sentence is a minor fine, fine, detention or penal servitude or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, liberation on bail shall not be revoked except for causes provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, if liberation on bail has not been previously granted, the court shall fix reasonable bail for release of the accused.

(2) In cases where the punishment fixed by the sentence is penal servitude or imprisonment for more than six (6) months but less than fifteen (15) years, revocation of previous liberation on bail or approval of application for liberation on bail shall be discretionary with the court.

(3) In cases where the punishment fixed by the sentence is for death, penal servitude or imprisonment for life or for fifteen (15) years or more, liberation on bail shall be at once revoked and not thereafter allowed unless the higher court changes the sentence.

(4) If the prosecutor, suspect or accused is dissatisfied with the order of the court fixing or denying bail, he may appeal to the next higher court within three (3) days.

SECTION XX. The second paragraph of Article 471 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is amended so as to read as follows:

"Any person dissatisfied with a measure adopted by a judicial

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police officer concerning detention, seizure or restoration of articles under seizure may demand from the court having jurisdiction over the district in which such judicial police officer exercises his functions the cancellation or alteration of such measure."

The provisions of Article 471 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply not only to cases already covered thereby but also to cases of illegal seizure or illegal detention of articles and to cases of articles legally seized but not required as evidence in the trial of a case.

SECTION XXI. The Chief Prosecutor of each District Court shall assign one or more of the prosecutors attached to his office under his supervision to inspect the police jails and police stations and police substations in his province for the purpose of determining whether persons are illegally restrained therein. It is his responsibility that each police jail or police station or substation be inspected at least once each month. The prosecutor making the inspection shall question each prisoner who is restrained and inspect the records of restraint. If he shall find that any person has been restrained otherwise than as provided by law, he shall at once take jurisdiction of the case in the same manner as any other case which is turned over to him by the police. If he shall find that any law has been violated with respect to the restraint or treatment of persons, he shall investigate and prosecute in accordance with law. Any person who hinders the prosecutor in the performance of the duties imposed on him by this Section, shall be punished with penal servitude for not less than six (6) months nor more than seven (7) years.

SECTION XXII. *a.* Every person who shall unlawfully restrain a person's body shall be liable civilly to the person unlawfully restrained, in damages computed at one thousand won (W 1,000) for each day of illegal restraint. Any person who does not obey an order of a court made under this Ordinance and does not comply with provisions of Sections III, V, VI, VIII, and IX hereof, shall be punished with penal servitude for not less than six (6) months nor more than seven (7) years.

b. If any chief prosecutor of a district court, senior prosecutor of a branch court, chief of a police division, or chief of a police station fails to take appropriate action against subordinates directly under his control for violation of the provisions of this Ordinance, he shall be discharged immediately and shall not be eligible to any of the positions in the Department of Justice

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or in the Police Department for a period of two (2) years thereafter.

SECTION XXIII. The period of restraint referred to in Article 113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall run from the date of the warrant of arrest (koo sok yung jang) provided in this Ordinance. The provisions of Article 113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not authorize the restraint of a person beyond the periods specified in Sections VIII and IX hereof, unless public action has been instituted.

SECTION XXIV. The following laws and provisions of law are hereby repealed:

a. The Administrative Execution Act of July, 1914 (Governor General Act No. 23, July, 1914).

b. Articles 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 27, 38-2 and paragraph 10-2 of Article 1 of the Korean Criminal Act (Governor General Act No. 11, 18 March 1912) as amended.

c. All provisions of laws and regulations inconsistent with this Ordinance to the extent that they are so inconsistent.

SECTION XXV. This Ordinance shall be effective on 1 April 1948.

APPROVED:
WILLIAM F DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

RECOMMENDED:
AHN CHAI HONG
Civil Administrator

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USAMGIK

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United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Nations Unies
ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

RESTRICTED
A/AC.19/W.41
27 March 1948
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

COMPILATION OF PROCLAMATIONS, OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, POLICIES, ORDINANCES, etc., AFFECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SOUTH KOREA.

(Circulated by the Secretariat)

The Secretariat has received the following communication from the United States Liaison Officer which is circulated herewith for information purposes only.

24 March 1948

"TO: Mr. Petrus J. Schmidt
Principal Secretary
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea

SUBJECT: Compilation of Proclamations, Official Statements, Policies, Ordinances, etc. Affecting Civil Liberties in South Korea.

I attach for your information a compilation of proclamations, official statements, policies, ordinances, etc. affecting civil liberties in South Korea.

Copies of most of these documents have already been furnished to the Commission. However, the following documents are added in order to complete your records in that respect.

Inclosure No.1 - Proclamation No.1, GHQ, 7 September 1945.

Inclosure No.2 - Extract from Annex No.7 to Field Order 55 (Military Government) 29 August 1945.

Inclosure No.3 - Message to the People of South Korea by Lt Gen. J.R. Hodge, 9 September 1945.

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, U.S.A."

Inclosure No 1

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COMPILATION OF PROCLAMATIONS, OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, POLICIES, ORDINANCES, ETC. AFFECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SOUTH KOREA

I - DECLARATION OF POLICIES

The declaration of civil liberties in liberated Korea has a longer history than is generally appreciated. As a matter of fact, this history begins with the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, when the United States, the United Kingdom and China joined in declaring that "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea," they were determined that "in due course Korea would become free and independent." This multi-lateral pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945. The USSR subscribed to the Potsdam Declaration upon entering the war against Japan. Abolishing consequences of enslavement and establishing independence means much more than formal independence. The Moscow Declaration of December 1945 speaks of "creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles." Democratic principles include civil liberties. The US-USSR Joint Commission was to make recommendations prepared in consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. The United States did its utmost to establish a free, independent, democratic, united Korea, but was prevented in accomplishing this objective by the Soviet Delegation which insisted on a Communist-controlled government by the elimination from consultation of important rightist groups.

An occupational government necessarily must consider questions of military security, but its powers are subject to the directives of its own government and the principles of international law. From the very beginning the government of the US was mindful of the necessity of observing modern democratic principles including civil liberties consistent with military security. Early in the beginning of the occupation directives were issued to abrogate all Japanese orders and regulations which established and maintained discrimination against civil liberties on grounds of race, nationality, creed and political opinion. The formation and activation

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of democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion was insured. This included encouragement of development of democratic organization of labor, industry and agriculture. Freedom of religious worship was to be proclaimed. In brief, everything was to be done to insure freedom of opinion, speech, press and assembly. All persons unjustly held in custody were to be released. The Korean people were to be encouraged to develop all media of information and to enjoy freedom of speech and the press, subject only to such minimum controls and censorship as may be necessary for military security.

Immediate steps were taken to implement the policies so declared. Proclamation No.1 (General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Office of the Commanding General, Yokohama, Japan, 7 September 1945) (Inclosure No.1) assured the people of Korea "that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the instrument of the surrender and to protect them and their personal and religious rights" and "...that their property rights will be respected."

Policies of this command are illustrated by directives and statements, having in fact force of law, made by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, at the very beginning of the occupation. Only a few illustrations will suffice to indicate the care taken by this Command for the protection of civil liberties.

Field Order No.55, 29 August 1945, (Inclosure No.2) which was the governing instrument for the occupation of South Korea directed that:

> "Freedom of religion shall be proclaimed. The freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and representative government will be encouraged to the extent that the security of the military occupation and the attainment of its objects are not prejudiced. The dissemination of Japanese Militaristic, National Shintoistic, and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda in any form will be prohibited."

On 9 September 1945, in a message to the people of South Korea (Inclosure No.3), the Commanding General published a widely circulated and printed message to the people of South Korea (in both English and Korean) which said:

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"Policies of the government will be changed for your benefit just as rapidly as necessary arrangements can be made. Racial discrimination before the law, in trade, industry, and in schools will be ended. Freedom of religion, in speech and in thought will be yours. The press and radio will henceforth operate for the interests of the Korean people."

In his first speech to the Korean people, at the civil auditorium, 12 September 1945, the Commanding General reminded the Korean people that:

"General MacArthur had announced that the Korean people would have freedom of speech, press and religion."

The following excerpt from the statement of the Commanding General, 11 October 1946, is pertinent:

"Despite statements made by certain misguided persons or by those who are willing to make false statements for their own personal ends, there has been no censorship of Korean newspapers by the American Command in Korea, and it is not intended that censorship of the press be established. However, there has been and will continue to be official efforts to help and give guidance to the Korean press in establishing such a degree of responsibility on the part of the press that must be inherent in any workable system of a free press."

And again from the same statement:

"I wish to make it clear to all that the varying shades of political beliefs, ideologies, etc., in no way affect my official attitude toward any newspaper. The Americans do not fear any presentation of facts. Honest and constructive criticism of governmental policies based on actual facts are considered helpful and are welcome. In fact, this is one of the functions of a free press. However, slander and libel, publishing falsities on wild rumours as fact, publication of articles inciting the people to disorders or inflaming them to take direct action against the security of American personnel and property and the publication of articles advocating overthrow of the government by violence, do not come within the field allowed in freedom of the press in any country in the world and these things cannot be tolerated in South Korea."

In a statement by the Military Governor, 16 October 1945, the following appeared:

"In all its operations, the Military Government is guided by democratic principles and not by the politics of pressure groups. All people in Southern Korea are guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom of worship and freedom from official discrimination because of race, colour or creed."

In defining the functions of the Military Government, the statement by the Military Governor on 15 November 1945, says that one of these functions is declared to be:

"to maintain freedom of religion, freedom of speech and property rights."

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In another statement of 15 November 1945, the Military Governor declared that:

> "The Military Government does not presume to stifle nor to favour one newspaper over another. Such action would be grossly contrary to a free press, which all Korea wants and needs."

Upon the opening of Interim Legislative Assembly, December 12, 1946, the Commanding General, among other things reminded that Assembly that:

> "With the opening of this great Assembly, the people have for the first time a law making body, a body free to discuss and study the many Korean problems and devise ways and means according to the wishes and psychology of the people to make for better social and economic life. In addition to its legislative status, this body will be an open forum for free discussion of Korean affairs through which the Korean people can make known their wishes. As elected and selected representatives of the people, this Assembly takes on great responsibilities which I have full confidence that it will faithfully discharge."

II - DECLARATION OF US POLICY DURING MEETINGS OF US-USSR

The 1946 and 1947 meetings of the US-USSR Joint Commission and the records of the Hodge-Chistiakov (1946-1947) as well as the Marshall-Molotov (1947) correspondence are replete with instances of the insistence upon the part of the United States of guaranteeing to the Koreans the full exercise of the basic freedoms before, during and after, the sessions of that Commission. The Soviet Delegation insisted on barring from consultation all political parties and organizations which opposed at any time the trusteeship contemplated by the Moscow Declaration. There were political reasons behind this attitude, but it cannot be denied that the Soviet position was an attempted suppression of and infringement upon the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and expression. The right of all Koreans to be heard on the issue of the establishment and formation of their government was staunchly defended by the American Delegation and on such fundamental principles, the American representatives could not and would not yield.

III - STATEMENTS OF COMMANDING GENERAL ON ELECTIONS

As for direct bearing on the forthcoming election, the Commanding General on March 3, 1947, issued a special press release in which he declared that:

> "There will be a systematic dissemination of information to the public concerning the election, involving the maximum of radio, press, dropping of leaflets by plane, etc. Citizens are urged to inform themselves on

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all phases of the election and keep abreast of developments through the official informational releases which will be issued regularly. I particularly advise caution against listening to false prophets and against credulous acceptance of rumours. Plenty of both may be expected from elements seeking to destroy democratic processes in your country."

On March 12 1948, the Commanding General addressed a combined meeting of provincial governors and police chiefs at Seoul. An extensive quotation from this address is particularly pertinent:

"Responsibilities accruing to you Gentlemen in this phase of your nation's progress may be listed briefly as follows:

"1. Give all assistance to the election-educational programme to see that all the people throughout your area are informed of the details concerning general election and the regulations that govern it.

"2. Insure by every possible means that a free atmosphere exists for holding the general election, both before and during the election.

"3. Insure that all physical arrangements for the election that come within your scope are completed on time.

"4. Encourage and lead all Koreans to vote in the election.

"The principal item I wish to impress upon you is the absolute necessity for a free atmosphere for elections. This one feature is of more concern to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea than any other. Unless there are free elections we have gained nothing, because without free voting we will not have the will of the people expressed. Democratic processes depend entirely upon the full and free expression by the people at the polls to gain their representation in government. The primary duty of the U.N. Commission here is to observe the elections for the express purpose of determining if the representatives elected do in fact represent the will of the people. The U.N. Resolutions make this clear, and the spokesmen of the Commission have reiterated that feature. We cannot expect the U.N. Commission to approve any elections that do not produce true representatives of the Korean people.

"To insure our mutual understanding, let me briefly enumerate the principal factors involved in free elections. There will soon be published some regulations designed to insure these freedoms. The free atmosphere we speak of must include:

"1. Freedom of speech. This means individuals must be free to discuss in an orderly manner issues at stake and discuss the qualifications of candidates both publicly and privately without interference or pressure from officials or groups. This freedom includes the use of all types of campaign handbills and wall posters, providing they are not inflamatory to the extent of inciting disorders or overthrow of government.

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"2. Freedom of the press in the same manner as free speech.

"3. Freedom of assembly. Orderly assemblies and meetings indoors and outdoors must be encouraged, regardless of the political beliefs or followings of the participants. Leaders calling such meetings must of course be responsible that they are orderly.

"4. Freedom for candidates to campaign for election, regardless of their political beliefs. This means that candidates must be allowed free movement to campaign without any direct or indirect interference or pressure from officials, and must be given the same protection given to all other political or non-political citizens.

"5. Law and order must be maintained, but in so doing, all measures smacking of oppression or suppression because of political beliefs must be avoided. No Korean man or woman can be arrested merely for a political belief. On the other hand, political hoodlumism and terrorism cannot and will not be condoned if we are to keep a free atmosphere. Good judgment in maintaining this balance must be exercised."

IV - REPEAL OF VICIOUS AND TYRANICAL JAPANESE LAWS.

Ordinance No, 11, 9 October 1945, repealed a whole series of oppressive Japanese laws (See inclosure No's 4 to 10, both inclusive). These Acts are:

(1) Act of punishing political offenders;
(2) The preliminary imprisonment Act;
(3) Act of preserving public order;
(4) Publication Act;
(5) Decree for the protection of political offenders;
(6) Shinto Shrine Act;
(7) Judicial powers of police (This Ordinance also abolished the judicial power of police chiefs and it repealed all laws "the judicial or administrative enforcement of which would cause discrimination on account of race, nationality creed or political opinions.")

V - ORDINANCES AFFECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES

At various times during the occupation it became advisable to point up and emphasize some of the rights and liberties enjoyed by the people of South Korea. Although the basic rights were guaranteed by United States national policy, military proclamation, official statements and in actual practice, it was desirable that specific rights be restated and amplified. This was done in the form of ordinances, some of which were issued after the establishment and with the concurrence of the South Korea Interim Legislative Assembly.

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ORDINANCE No.6, 29 September 1945, declares there will be no racial or religious discrimination in the schools of Korea.

ORDINANCE No.11, herein before referred to, further provided that "no charge shall be proffered or sentence imposed or punishment inflicted against any person for an act unless such act is expressly made punishable by law in force at the time of its commission."

ORDINANCE No.28, 13 Novemb er 1945, established "That no person or group of persons will engage in any form of recruiting, training, organizing or equippi ; of any persons or any form of police, military or naval activities, or engage in any activities which are within the jurisdiction of police or armed forces except under the written authorization of the director of national defense or any agency delegated by him to grant such authorization."

ORDINANCE No.34, 8 December 1945, established Labor Mediation Boards in order to effectuate the policy of protection of labor and mediation of labor disputes.

ORDINANCE No.55, 23 February 1946, required registration of political parties and regulates such matters as accounting for party funds. It expressly provides: "No person shall be permitted to be a member of any political party who is disqualified by law from holding public office. No person of alien nationality shall be permitted membership. Secret membership affiliation is unlawful. No contributions or direct or indirect financial assistance may be lawfully accepted from any source other than from members of the party." This last provision was particularly designed to prevent corruption and contributions from corporations interested in influencing policies for their economic benefit. As a matter of fact, an amendment permitting contributions by corporations was asked for during the tenure of the late General Lerch and the request was rejected. The Ordinance is clearly designed to give the Government desirable if not necessary information and really requires no more.

ORDINANCE No.88, 29 May 1945, provided for licensing of newspapers and other periodicals. It contains no censorship provisions and is almost entirely designed to furnish the Government desirable or necessary information

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Licenses may be revoked only for the making of any false or misleading statement or omissions in the application for license; for failure to report any change in the information furnished in the application and for violation of law.

ORDINANCE No.97, 23 July 1946, declares public policy in labor matters, this policy being the development of democratic labor organizations and providing that "workers shall have the right through self-organization to perform and join labor unions, to be of aid to and receive assistance from other labor organizations, and to designate representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of their employment contract without interference from employers and their agents."

ORDINANCE No.115, 3 October 1946, established rules for licensing of films and the purposes were stated to be "to eliminate the former Japanese Government control of motion picture production and exhibition which restricted the scope of artistic entertainment in order to serve the aims of Japanese nationalistic propaganda and to achieve orderly administration of the motion picture industry in Korea under minimum controls, to assure the basic propriety and content of films exhibited". A series of former Japanese laws regulating motion pictures was repealed. There is a general provision "that all other laws, orders, ordinances, regulations, directives and instructions or parts thereof relating to the production, distribution or exhibition of motion pictures or censorship or licensing thereof are repealed." The licensing authority is the Department of Public Information.

ORDINANCE No.157, 25 November 1947, establishes a national police board with the power "to initiate major matters of police policy and pass upon matters of policy and practice referred to it by the Director of the National Police" and "to compel the attendance of police officials for questioning with reference to police action." Under the ordinance the Police Board consists of six members appointed by the Military Governor, two of whom shall be appointed on recommendation of the Civil Administrator from among the Directors of Departments and two upon recommendation of the Director of

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the Department of Justice from among the judiciary or prosecutors. The Director of the Department of Police shall be an additional member of the Board but shall have no vote."

ORDINANCE No.176, 20 March 1948, changes criminal procedures so that rights of persons to freedom from arrest and detention, may be more adequately safeguarded. It is very comprehensive legislation and provides that no person shall suffer restraint of body without warrant except when prompt action is necessary, and the exceptions are well defined. Where arrests without a warrant are permitted, the arresting authority must obtain from a court a warrant of arrest within 48 hours in the city of Seoul, and in a city, county or island where a court is located, or within five (5) days in places where there is no court. Prompt institution of prosecution after arrest is required. There are provisions for bail and counsel and for determination by court whether restraint is legal, or otherwise, and punitive measures for abuse powers. Prosecutors are required to inspect jails and police stations each month for the purpose of determining whether persons are illegally restrained therein.

The election regulations limit substantially the powers of police to arrest in all cases covered by the election law. Except in cases of clear and present danger, the police authorities are not authorized to arrest a person for the violation of the criminal provisions of the election law unless authorized to do so by warrant of arrest issued by a court. Violators of the election law arrested by the police on the grounds of a clear and present danger can be held in police custody only if the court legalizes the detention by warrant of arrest.

VI - ECONOMIC

Within the area of what is sometimes called "economic liberties" there also has been legislation. The establishment of labor mediation boards and an ordinance declaring public policy in labor matters have already been mentioned. However, Ordinance No.107, 14 September 1946, established a

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Women's Bureau which is entrusted chiefly with formulation of standards and policies pertaining to the promotion and welfare in the interest of Korean women and especially in improvement of conditions of working women. Ordinance No.121, 7 November 1946, regulates and limits maximum working hours in industry, commerce and governmental work so as to maintain and protect the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers. Public Act No.4, 16 May 1947, prohibited and regulates child labor.

At the very beginning of the occupation, by Ordinance No.9, 5 October 1945, tenants were freed from oppressive exactions of landlords by fixing maximum farm rents which now cannot exceed 1/3 of the total of the natural crops, produce and fruit of lands cultivated and tended by tenants. New contracts for farm rents exceeding a fixed maximum rent are declared unlawful and unenforceable in any court or other tribunal. Any attempt to circumvent this ordinance is declared a violation of the ordinance.

VII - INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

An integral part of the legal structure of any country are opinions interpreting laws. This has been a function of the opinion Bureau of the Department of Justice; that bureau has always interpreted the laws liberally in favor of civil liberties even in the absence of positive statutes or regulations covering the given case. This was done on the general principle that the policy of this government is to safeguard the various fundamental freedoms. Thus, we have the application of democratic principles in practice. Copies of opinions are available to the Commission.

VIII - SUMMARY

Government by military occupation represents, of course, special problems. From the foregoing, it is apparent that, even before the present situation arose, all the fundamental freedoms were proclaimed. This was done in a series of documents and announcements and not in a single document in the nature of a bill of rights; but that, of course, is a matter of form and not of substance. These freedoms are usually, though not always, embodied in a constitution; and it was always felt that a constitution is a task for

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the futu e Korean government. A military government can meet only the needs of the moment while it lasts; particularly in a liberated country a temporary government must leave permanent solutions to the people when they have established their independence. Nevertheless, that the United States Military Government and the succeeding South Korea Interim Government from the very beginning was solicitous of fundamental freedoms, cannot be denied.

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

10 Incls.

1. Proclamation No. 1
   dtd 7 Sept 1945
2. Field Order No. 5
   dtd 29 Aug 1945
3. CG, USAFIK message
   dtd 9 Sept 1945
4. to 10. inclusive--
   Acts in Ordinance No.11,
   9 Oct 1945.

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INCLOSURE No.1

Proclamation

No.1

G.H.Q. U.S. ARMY FORCES,
PACIFIC
Office of the Commanding
General,
Yokohama, Japan,
7 September 1945.

TO THE PEOPLE OF KOREA:

As Commander-in-chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, I do hereby proclaim as follows:

By the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, signed by command and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government and by command and in behalf of the Japaneses Imperial General Headquarters, the victorious military forces of my command will today occupy the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude.

Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Korean people are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the Instrument of Surrender and to protect them in their personal and religious rights. In giving effect to these purposes, your active aid and compliance are required.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, I hereby establish military control over Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the inhabitants thereof, and announce the following conditions of the occupation:

ARTICLE I

All powers of Government over the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority.

ARTICLE II

Until further orders, all governmental, public and honorary functionaries and employees, as well as all officials and employees, paid or voluntary, of all public utilities and services, including public welfare and public health, and all other persons engaged in essential services, shall continue to perform

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their usual functions and duties, and shall preserve and safeguard all records and property.

ARTICLE III

Persons will obey promptly all my orders and orders issued under my authority. Acts of resistance to the occupying forces or any acts which may disturb public peace and safety will be punished severely.

ARTICLE IV

Your property rights will be respected. You will pursue your normal occupations, except as I shall otherwise order.

ARTICLE V

For all purposes during the military control, English will be the official language. In event of any ambiguity or diversity of interpretation or definition between any English and Korean or Japanese text, the English text shall prevail.

ARTICLE VI

Further proclamations, ordinances, regulations, notices, directives and enactments will be issued by me or under my authority, and will specify what is required of you.

Given under my hand at YOKOHAMA
THIS SEVENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 1945

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
General of the Army of the United States
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces,
Pacific

INCLOSURE No.2

Extract from Annex 7 to Field Order 55, Military Government,
29 August 1945

Par 3 d. Freedom of religion shall be proclaimed. The freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and representative government will be encouraged to the extent that the security of the military occupation and the attainment of its objectives are not prejudiced. The dissemination of Japanese Militaristic, National Shintoistic, and ultra-nationalistic ideology and propaganda in any form will be prohibited

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The above is an extract from the official orders which guided the United States Forces in the establishment of the Military Government in South Korea and the governing of the people of South Korea since 8 September 1945.

INCLOSURE No.3

A MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTHERN KOREA
FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

On behalf of General MacArthur, Commander in Chief of Army Forces in the Pacific and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, I have accepted the surrender of Japanese Armed Forces in the southern province of Korea.

As Commanding General of United States Army Forces in Korea I am here to enforce the terms of that surrender.

I am here likewise to maintain law and order, to enhance your economy, to protect your persons and property, and to perform all the other obligations imposed on an occupying force under international law. You, the inhabitants of areas under my control, likewise have obligations. You must strictly obey the directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and all ordinances and orders I shall issue under his direction. You must preserve the peace, and otherwise conduct yourselves as honest and upright men. Do this and you need no fear. Violate my orders, harm my soldiers, or create disturbance and I shall be impelled to take appropriate action.

In order to apply the terms of surrender which have been signed, it will be necessary for me at first to operate through the machinery of the present government. I shall expect you to obey its officials who henceforth are under my orders.

Policies of the government will be changed for your benefit just as rapidly as necessary arrangements can be made. Racial discrimination before the law, in trade, industry, and in the schools will be ended. Freedom of religion, in speech and in thought will be yours. The press and radio will henceforth operate for the interests of the Korean people.

I know that you the Korean people have an ancient and honorable history. I know too, of the oppressions under which you have labored in past years.

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I know s ething of your aspirations, your longings and your desire for early improvement in your living conditions.

As to these, I counsel you to have patience. You have endured difficult years, but the problems those years created cannot all be solved in a few days. By your conduct in the months ahead, you can demonstrate to the democratic nations of the world and to me as their representative your capacities and abilities as a people and your readiness to accept an honored place in the family of nations.

JOHN R. HODGE
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
COMMANDING U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

INCLOSURE No.4

The "Act for Pu shment of Political Offenders" of the general Code of Korea made it a criminal offense punishable by penal servitude, or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, "to agitate, if such agitation was in the opinion of the law enforcing agencies motivated by the intent to induce others to disturb the public peace with a view to changing the Government." This act gave the Japanese authorities a free hand to suppress all kinds of political activities.

INCLOSURE No.5

"The Preliminary Imprisonment Act" also concerned public order and applied to persons who organized any association with a view to changing the existing form of Government, or any person or any officer of such an association. This Act provided for "preventive detention."

INCLOSURE No.6

"The Act of Preserving Public Order" of the General Code of Korea provided that "any person who organized any association with a view to changing the existing form of Government, or any person who was an officer of such an association, shall be punished by death or by penal servitude for life or for not less than seven years."

The law provided for precautionary confinement and fixed such confinement at two years, but this could be renewed by a decision of the court when deemed

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necessary. A person who had committed a crime provided for in the law could be placed under protective observation by a decision of an examination commiti after the execution of a sentence rendered against him had been suspended, or if public action had not been instituted against him because its prosecution was deemed unnecessary. Here again the term for protective observation was tw years, but it could be renewed.

INCLOSURE No.7

"The Publication Act" contained various severe restrictions upon freedom of the press.

INCLOSURE No.8

A decree for "Protection of Political Offenders" provides that the person who was supposed to have committed crimes against the "Act of Protective Observation of 'Thought' Criminals", even when the Public Prosecutor believed that a prosecution against him is not necessary, could be put under observatio for his "thoughts" and could be handed over to a special association or to a temple, or to an officer, who had to control his "thoughts" and who had to prescribe, as provided in the law, with whom he is permitted to have personal contact and where he is allowed to go. (Some times the provisions of these various laws overlapped.)

INCLOSURE No.9

"The Shinto Shrine Act" has not been translated but its purport is well known. Shintoism was a state religion and state supported. In Korea Christian were required to attend Shinto ceromonies if they desired to avoid persecution by the police.

The Public Order Act declared that any person who profaned not only the Imperial House, but also great Shinto Shrines, could be sentenced to life imprisonment.

INCLOSURE No.10

Prior to the abolition of the judicial power of police chiefs the police had jurisdiction to punish violators both of administrative regulations in general and of certain specific crimes by hard labor and imprisonment not

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exceeding three months: in addition, the police authorities could inflict prison sentences not exceeding one month for tho commission of all kinds of misdemeanors. Prison sentences could be inflicted in the absence of the accused. The law did not provide for public prosecutor nor for a defense counsel in this type of procedure. All the defendants could ask for was the review of sentence of the police by a regular court but such request had no suspensive effect. The judicial power of police has been transferred to special judicial officers appointed by the Director of the Department of Justice, on recommendation of the chief judge of the district court, with the proviso that such judicial officers are bound to hear evidence on behalf of the public prosecutor, of the accused and with the further proviso that the maximum punishment to be meted out in summary proceedings is restricted to 30 days. (see ordinance No.41 issued on 10 January 1946).

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

PROCLAMATION
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE

TO THE PEOPLE OF KOREA:

In view of the forthcoming historic elections to be held under observance of THE UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA to choose representatives of the Korean people with whom the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea may consult regarding the prompt attainment of freedom and independence of the Korean people, which representatives, constituting a national assembly, may establish a national government of Korea, it is deemed appropriate, in order to assure a free atmosphere, to enumerate the inherent liberties of the Korean people who will take part in such elections.

1. All persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection under the law, and no privileges of sex, birth, occupation or creed are recognized, the only exceptions admissible being those recognized by international law.

2. Personal liberty is inviolable, and any limitations upon it are not permissible, except by virtue of law duly enacted and promulgated.

3. Dwellings are inviolable, and the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure shall not be violated, and such seizures and search may take place only be virtue of provisions of the law.

4. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and without procedure prescribed by law.

5. No punishment may be imposed, except by virtue of the law in force at the time the act in question was committed.

6. Persons who had been arrested for the commission of any offense or otherwise deprived of their liberty, have the legal right to be promptly informed on what grounds such deprivation has been committed and by what authority, and they are entitled to the services of counsel.

7. All persons accused of crime shall be placed on trial without

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unreasonable delay and entitled to bail as provided by law. Cruel and unusual punishment may not be inflicted, and confessions induced by torture and duress of any kind are inadmissible in trial of offenders or legal proceedings of any kind.

8. Freedom of assembly and association, as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are recognized, including the use of all types of campaign handbills and wall posters; provided they are not inflammatory to the extent of inciting disorders or overthrow of government.

9. The rights of meeting and forming associations shall be regulated by law. All citizens and groups of citizens have the right to petition the government and all organs thereof for a redress of grievances.

10. All religions are equal before the law and there is freedom of religious practice not contrary to public order or morality. There is no state church, and the principle of separation of church and state is established.

11. Property rights are recognized, and any restrictions placed upon them may result only from law; expropriation for public use may take place only on payment of reasonable compensation adjudicated by an appropriate tribunal determined by law.

12. The rights hereinbefore enumerated may be suspended, but only temporarily and if necessary, only for reasons of grave national emergency or public safety.

Given under my hand at Seoul, Korea, on 5 April 1948.

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235

24 March 1948

Maj. Gen. William F. Dean
Military Governor, USAMGIK
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Dean:

I am inclosing herewith a copy of letter 17 March received from the United Nations Commission bearing upon the subject of freedom of elections in South Korea. I have discussed all of these matters with you daily and I feel sure that there is no divergence of opinion on methods of carrying out to the extent possible the recommendations made.

To insure that my ideas on this are generally on record and can be passed to other responsible agencies, I will comment on pertinent paragraphs of the recommendations made by the Commission. Also included for your information and guidance is a copy of my answer to the Commission.

With reference to paragraphs 1 and 3, we are now assembling the information requested. The ordinance you have just signed concerning "Changes in Criminal Procedure" together with the proclamation now in preparation, appears to meet the other recommendations of paragraphs 2 and 3. With respect to paragraph 4, I will attempt to get further understanding with the Commission on the extent to which opposition to elections under the definition of "peaceful and legal means" may go.

With respect to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, there is a strong inference of a threat that if we do not make drastic changes in the police force the Commission will automatically say that there is no free atmosphere for elections. However, in view of the continuing strong communist activity with subversive attacks and acts of violence, I stand by my decision that there will be no drastic changes in the organization and structure of the police force. This does not change my orders that any member of the police force found guilty of malfeasance in office shall be promptly removed. It is incumbent on all agencies who deal with the police to continue every effort to orient and guide them fully as to what is expected of them before and during the elections in the way of maintaining a free atmosphere. However, I do not want this carried to the extent of giving police the idea that the effectiveness of the police in maintaining law and order is in any way weakened during the period of the elections. In order that there can be no misunderstanding on the part of the police, it is directed that a special directive to the police be prepared covering their specific duties pertaining to the conduct of elections.

With respect to paragraphs 8 - 12, we must make every effort to guide and utilize youth organizations toward development of free atmosphere for elections and in addition to enlist their help to educate and persuade all of the people to support the elections. Present regulations require registration of all such groups of a political nature. It is directed that Military Government follow up and see that all youth groups are registered under Ordinance #55 under the assumption that they are political. Police will be definitely informed that members of youth organizations will not be allowed to congregate in the vicinity of the polling places other than for the purpose of voting.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Maj. Gen. Dean

24 March 1948

With reference to paragraph 13, it is desired that all facilities of government be used for the dissemination of information about elections and that a comprehensive educational campaign on an impartial basis be carried through.

With reference to paragraph 14, I desire that any newsprint under government control as may be determined surplus to official needs of the administration be made available as suggested.

With reference to paragraph 15, regulations will be established to insure equitable use and parcelling of any radio facilities to various political candidates and parties engaged in campaigning.

With reference to paragraphs 16 - 19, I shall try to get from the Commission a mutually agreeable and more clearly cut definition of political prisoners. In the meantime, I desire that the Department of Justice continue case-by-case examination of prisoners whose confinement and sentence might be the result of his political beliefs or legitimate actions connected therewith, or who may be released without detriment to law and order.

It is directed that you keep the UN Commission fully informed of steps taken to carry out the recommendations contained in their letter. Copies of all regulations, statements, ordinances, etc., pertaining to these recommendations should be furnished to Brigadier General Weckerling, together with progress reports or reports of completion of any phase for transmission to the Commission.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John R. Hodge
JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Seoul, Korea

Office of the Military Governor

27 January 1948

SUBJECT: Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly

TO : The Provincial Governors and the Mayor of the City of Seoul.

1. You are reminded that it has always been the policy of this Government that the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly be recognized, respected and safeguarded. It is especially important that these rights be protected during the period of preparation for a general election.

2. The Director of the Department of police has issued special instructions to all Police Chiefs, reminding them of the government's policy with respect to observance of democratic rights. These instructions provide for the granting of applictions for all public meetings and for non-interference with the distribution of newspaper articles, handbills and posters, unless they actually incite to riot or seditin n. If arrests appear necessary at any time, and no evidence of a criminal act is forthcoming, the arrested persons are to be released immediately. The instructions further remind the members of the National Police that they have no right to engage in political activities, except as a voter in an election.

3. You will insure that these principles are carried into effect.

APPROVED:

WILLIAM F. DEAN
Major General United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

RECOMMENDED:

AHN CHAI HONG
Civil Administrator

[redacted] No 24

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SPEECH OF
MILITARY GOVERNOR

TO

ASSISTANT CHIEF JUDGES, ALL DISTRICT COURTS
CHIEF PROSECUTORS, ALL DISTRICT COURTS
CHIEF JUDGES, ALL BRANCH COURTS
CHIEF PROSECUTORS, ALL BRANCH COURTS

It is a pleasure for me to meet with the Assistant Chief Judges of the District Courts, the Chief Judges of the Branch Courts, and the Chief Prosecutors of the District Courts and the Branch Courts.

The last time I attended a meeting of this kind you were holding your annual convention to discuss the work of the courts during the year 1947. Today you are looking forward to new problems which will face you in the near future. These are the problems of putting into effect the new Changes in Criminal Procedure provided in Ordinance No. 176 and the problems of discharging your official duties in connection with the forthcoming elections of members of a National Assembly under observance of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

These two types of problems are closely connected. The Changes in Criminal Procedures are the result of many conferences and much study for the purpose of eliminating from the administration of justice in Korea those oppressive practices which characterized the Japanese imperial regime, and introducing in their place new democratic practices intended to recognize the rights of the individual in a free democracy. Although it has taken many months to work out these important new changes and to fit them into the existing system of administering justice, they could not have been perfected and they could not have been put into effect at a more significant time in the long history of your country. These Changes in Criminal Procedure represent the same progressive spirit of democracy which underlies the highly important elections to be held in the near future and which is guiding you to your long cherished goal - a

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free and independent government.

I need not describe to you the various provisions of the new law. You have copies of it and have studied it. From this law you can see the many points which will arise during the election period with reference to the freedom of the individual to think, act, and express his opinions independently in his community without interfering with the rights of others. It is your duty to help to protect the rights of the individual under this new law.

My message to you is to put this new law into effect during the election period in such a way as to help the people of Korea to arrive at a realization of true democracy.

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A Special Conference of All Chiefs of National Police.

(A statement issued to the press conference, held at 1000, 3 March 1948, by Dr. P. O. Chough, Director, Department of Police).

In view of the importance of the General Election, which is a historic event in the process of our national reconstruction, a special conference of all chiefs of national police is called to be held on 12 March 1948, in order to have a serious discussion on the duties imposed on national police in connection with the election. At the conference, instruction will be given or discussion will be made from the point-view of national police concerning the measures for having a free and unfettered election with the application of the principles of democracy, and the topics are as follows:

1. The prohibition of police personnel from engaging in political activities.
2. Police regulations for enforcing the election law.
3. Measures for creating a free atmosphere.
   a. Controlling organized terroristic activities, especially of the Youth Groups.
   b. Guarantee of the freedoms of speech, assembly, etc.

THE END.

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THE DUTIES OF THE NATIONAL POLICE DURING THE GENERAL ELECTION

(An address, delivered through the Seoul Central Broadcasting Station, at 7:15 p.m., 27 March 1948)

My fellow countrymen! I deem it a privilege to address you on this auspicious occasion before the holding of the general election in the near future for which we have been waiting the last three years.

The independence of Korea which was internationally pledged and promised has been delayed for over two and half years by the stubborn and bitter opposition of a certain country. But through the kind efforts of the good Samaritan country, this problem was placed before the General Assembly of the United Nations - the incarnation of humanity and justice - and the resolution for complete independence of our country was adopted by majority vote. The United Nations Commission on Korea, dispatched to expedite and supervise the general election, is faithfully performing its mission. The United Nations Little Assembly decided to hold a general election, designating May 9th as the day. We were greatly rejoiced over it because this is the first step toward independence for Korea.

On the other hand, the obstruction and tenacity of a certain country, which wants to make Korea one of its satellites, or a second Mongolia, by means of the iron curtain of the 38th parallel, has made the unification of our country impossible. It is with sorrow and humiliation of a powerless people that we have to hold the general election only in the "accessible areas" and we certainly do not wish it if possible. A close examination of the present situation of Korea shows that the land is divided into two zones and the people, into right and left in thought.

The chaotic conditions in Korea, political, economic, and social, have reduced us to the distress which causes all kinds of domestic discord and troubles, and we are getting nearer, step

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This can be applied to our political life just as well. In other words, we must carry out this election successfully, which will be the basis for a future unified general election throughout all of Korea.

When the general election was announced, the Communists, the tool of Soviet Russia, and even some of the leaders of the National Camp (Rightists), partly due to their political ignorance and partly to selfish political ambition, were opposed to holding an election in the "accessible areas". According to their argument, this type of an election will make the 38th parallel stronger and our country will be divided permanently and the people separated forever. Therefore, they claim, the leaders of North and South Korea should meet together after the evacuation of both armies, and then conduct a general election throughout the country. It sounds quite plausible at the first hearing but it is still nothing but a narrowminded argument on impracticable principles, which will mislead the mass and bring troubles upon all generations to come. We must understand that under the present circumstances, holding an election in the accessible areas is the only way to make Korea a free and independent country. The accomplishment of this election will establish the Central Government of Korea which is the concentrated core of patriotism and which will resuscitate and unite our people politically. It will also enhance the prestige and power of our country, inasmuch as it will be recognized by at least the 46 countries which approved the resolution for our independence. Then, our country will be on the same footing with all other countries in the world and will be able to trade and enter into diplomatic relations with them. The Central Government will industrialize our country, save our people from distress, and strengthen our national defence. It will also call international attention to our condition, and disclose the devilish ambition of a certain country so that the ghastly 38th parallel may be demolished and the lost territory

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recovered.

This is the unification of our country true to the name. What would you call this election, if not the basis of complete independence? In spite of this self-evident fact, the Communists who play the role of a cat's-paw for a certain country, the opportunist political leaders, those who have had to change their political alignmen because of the self-contradiction, and those who have no prospects of a victory in the election are trying to hamper the election and if they succeed, it will be an irretrievable sorrow and loss to our people for thousands of years to come. Is that not a lamentable and abominable offence?

We must cooperate with the United Nations Commission in order to hold an orderly and peaceful election based on true democracy inasmuch as this election is the key to either the rise or fall of our country. We must create the atmosphere of freedom so that every one can take part in the election at his own free will under a free atmosphere and without interference of compulsion. The leftists who are planning to establish a Communist regime and several selfish political parties of the Nationalist Camp (rightist) will attempt to interrupt the election by threat or enticement with a whole bag of tricks. They may persuade people to abstain from voting, or compel people to vote for a certain person of their liking. Under these circumstances, a free election true to the name cannot be expected. A true election should be a reflection of the will of the people as to the kind of government they want, but an election held without a free atmosphere can not be expected to be such. The dictatorial elections of Italian Facism, German Nazism, and Soviet Communism, and the electoral system of black and white boxes in North Korea were all compulsory elections for a certain party or clique and certainly were not democratic in any way. How can you be assured of freedom and personal rights in such an election? Is it not a fact that the people vote as they dictated to by the

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ruling class of minority simply because of the coercion of the latter? How can you expect a truly democratic election worthy of the name from such electoral systems?

It is the duty of the National Police to assure and create the atmosphere of freedom, excluding every illegal activity with an end toward interrupting a just and free election. Firstly, since this general election was decided to be our national policy, all destructive activities against it, whether it be by leftists or rightists, are illegal, and as such, the subversive obstructors shall be sternly punished. Secondly, the National Police will stringently enforce all the electoral laws while the election is in process. We will check all mass terrorism or acts of violence against the election in order that all our fellow countrymen of voting age may cast a vote of discretion and freedom. We will attempt to assure the freedom of speech, assembly, and the press and we will make every available effort to create a free atmosphere for the people. Therefore, a policeman should not assist in benefiting any one party or clique except in the case of casting his own vote and he is not allowed to participate in any political movement.

Despite the serious efforts of the National Police in assuring a free atmosphere to hold a just election, some people, even the leaders of the Nationalist Camp and some spokesmen of the Government, criticise us by stating that "the National Police are trying to monopolize the election for a certain party, and are trampling on the rights of the people" or "the National Police is an unnecessary and unreliable hindrance to the election" or "South Korea is ruled by the Police." It is most regrettable that there are some people who are trying to impair the prestige of the National Police and weaken the confidence of the people in it. In such groups, are found the Communists of the South Korea Labor Party, dissenters of the Military Government, those who are obliged to change their political alignment, and those

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who have no hope of winning in the election, and all of them are trying to knock down the National Police for their selfish purposes.

In North Korea, they are training a strong army which is staring at us, hoping for an opportunity of conquest, and their influence has gradually permeated into South Korea. But we are not prepared for our national defence and South Korea has been the hot-bed of Communistic intrigue and destruction. These stern facts necessitate our having a powerful National Police and it is true that we are training for a stronger police force. There is no reason to blame us for it.

Contrary to all the slanders and calumniation, I, as the head of the National Police, proclaim with self-confidence that our National Police is not inferior to the other advanced countries in the world in its system, ideals, discipline, and execution of its duties as a democratic police. We are self-confident and prepared to create the atmosphere of freedom so that a just and peaceful election may be held in an orderly way.

Lastly, I want to call your attention to the following important points:

First: An election is the reflection of the will of the people. That is to say, an election is the procedure of establishing the kind of government you want. To go to the extreme, the majority vote of the people will determine whether a rightist or a leftist government will be established.

Secondly: If you should abstain from voting, or even if you do vote, if you do it without a clear understanding, reflection and confidence in the present and future of Korea, it will incur danger and tragedy to our country. Therefore, please understand thoroughly that this election is the key of the rise or fall of Korea and make desperate efforts to let every one vote so that the country which is staring upon South Korea with greedy eyes will not find any pretext of minority vote. I trust that about

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90% of the people will vote - allowing 10% for the Communists and sick people - and thereby establish the Central government which will arouse international opinion and attempt to defeat the foreign policy of the country. Then we can recover our lost land and obtain unified complete independence for our country.

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THE ATMOSPHERE OF FREEDOM AND THE POLICE

(An Address, delivered by Dr. P. C. Chough, Director of National Police Through Seoul Broadcasting Station at 2115, 2 April 48)

My dear fellow countrymen! And my thirty thousand colleague policemen! It gives me a great pleasure to speak to you again on this important occasion before the holding of the general election in the near future, which is the first step toward independence for Korea.

What is democracy? To define it in an easy way, a democratic nation is a nation whose people obey the laws enacted by majority vote of the representatives elected by the free election of the people. From this definition, every citizen has two responsibilities: one is to exercise his right by casting a free vote and the other is his duty to obey the laws. In this sense, a citizen of a democratic nation is a ruler on one hand and a subject on the other. Therefore, in the capacity of the ruler, we elect a president and others to govern the people in accordance with the laws enacted by our representatives. Then, in the capacity of the ruled, we obey the enactments and the orders of those we elected. The people of a democratic nation ought to know how to vote and how to obey. He who casts an honest vote and obeys faithfully is a good citizen. The two qualifications of a citizen of a democratic nation, election and obedience, can be summed up as obeying the laws, for without law and order no nation can exist, especially as a democratic nation. Even in a despotic monarchy or in a class absolutist country, the first duty of the citizen is to obey the laws. The difference is that in a democratic country, the laws are not made by any one individual or class but by the majority vote of representatives who were elected by the people at their own free will. For instance, in our country, the laws were made by the king and in Soviet Russia and her satellites, the laws are made by the Communist Party, which is a minority of the people. The people in general are only allowed to vote for or against the laws made by the Communist Party and for or

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against the commissar candidates nominated by the same Party. Furthermore, the people do not cast their vote in a free atmosphere, because they know that if they vote against the desire of the Government, they will be sternly punished. This is what is called class al Lutism, but in Soviet Russia, it is disguised by the word "democracy". They cry for wine and sell vinegar. Certainly it is nothing but deception and blasphemy on democracy.

I stated above that democracy can be summed up in two phrases - free election and absolute obedience to laws. It is the duty of the police to see to it that the people carry out their responsibilities faithfully. We are going to hold the general election before not very long. Whether it can be carried out in the atmosphere of freedom, without any unlawful acts, depends in the first place upon the patriotism and political training of the people and in the second place on the efforts of the National Police. A policemen must understand the principles of democracy thoroughly and must see to it that the election is carried out in the atmosphere of freedom and that no illegal elements hamper the election. He should also be on the alert to observe whether a candidate or any other force is trying to influe the success of the election by means of threat, allurment, bribery, favoritism, illegal word or act. This is the only way that a fair and just election can be expected.

The police who observe the laws faithfully are the friends, protectors, and servants of the people. All of you have a badge on your breast which has the two words, inscribed thereon, "kindness" and "service" and this must be the guiding spirit of the National Police. If any of you should forget the spirit of service to your own benefit and pleasure, you debase the dignity and spirit OF THE NATIONAL POLICE. When you hear someone call you "a grateful policeman", or "a reliable policeman", or "a pleasing policeman", it does not only please you but also promotes the reliability of the people upon the National Police, and consequently, it will play an important role in helping the people observe the laws better. If the Police

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are patriotic enough to be determined to maintain peace and order and are ready to die in the pursuit of their duties, the people will feel morally uplifted and will try to increase the output in factories and at farms. Then, it will be a good country to live in.

Free atmosphere is absolutely necessary for the general election because without that, true representatives who reflect the will of the people can not be elected. What are the causes that demolish the free atmosphere? They are: (1) The interference of the Communists, (2) Some of the rightists who are opposed to the general election, (3) Parties or individuals who exert pressure by threat, bribery, by the relationship of land owner and tenant or that of employer and employee, on the voters in order to attain their political ambition. The police should be always on the alert in observing whether such activities ever take place. Whenever such illegality is found, it is the duty of the police to expose the crime and turn over the case to the judicial authorities. The leftists or radicalists are apt to slander or calumniate the Interim Government, the United States of America, of the United Nations Commission with groundless rumors to hamper the general election and to try to disturb the peace by inciting the people. In such cases, it is the duty of the National Police to nip them in the bud by vigilant supervision. Free atmosphere in the true sense of the word can be had only when peace is assured and maintained and we must adopt a prudent policy to maintain peace and order by preventing all kinds of underground destructive intrigues and riots. Some of the people, political parties and young people's organizations who will cooperate in the general election are liable to forget the principles of democracy and trespass on the right and freedom of the voters and the candidates by using threat or coercion for the purpose of electing their own candidates. They will not use open speech but will attempt to make the majority of the people submit themselves to the will of their parties or organizations. Such acts are as unlawful as the underground activities of the other extremes, and they should be exposed and sternly punished. Democracy is a statecraft which presupposes

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the conflict of opinions. In a democratic country, there are always more than two political parties, each having diverse views and each trying to win more people to its side by advocating special policies. There is nothing illegal or immoral in this, on the contrary, it tends to better the government by mutual criticism and polishing up. For example, in America, there are two political parties - Democrat and Republican, and in England, there are Conservative, Liberal, and Labor Parties. Therefore, the fact that there are more than two diverse political part es in Korea is by no means an unfortunate or an unwelcome phenomena. It depends upon how they compete. The only legal means for political party competition is discussion, that is to say, the proper means for political competition is to let the people know political opinions either by speech or press and wait for the people's judgment.

When the people have heard the political opinions, and examined the character, knowledge, and merits of the political parties, they determine by vote which party is right. The political party which obtains the majority vote wins the confidence of the people and takes up the reins of government until the next election period. This is the normal course of government of a democratic country. Such is the government we want to establish and this general election is the birth of it. Some people say that the rivalry of the political parties is wrong and that all of them must be unified. But if there is only one political party in the country, it will be a one-party absolutism or class dictatorship. The Fascist Party in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and Communism in Soviet Russia and her satellites are examples. There the minority rules the majority of the people which is an anti-democratic government and worse than absolute monarchy bec use most of the people become slaves. The government we are trying to establish is not such a one-party absolutism or class dictatorship but a country of freedom and equality where every individual can have a voice in the enactment of laws and elect representatives by vote of his own free will. What is the criterion for judging whether an individual or a political party is democratic or

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autocratic? That means the way they fight politically, that is, whether they fight by means of discussion or by force and intrigue.

Now, you will clearly understand what the police who are supervising the general election are trying to do. They are trying to protect the people from plot and force.

The law is just like a big dam. If there is a small leakage in the dam, it will cause a break and if it reaches two or three feet wide, all the water inside it will flow over the whole area. In the same way, whether or not the merit of the police is nullified depends upon whether an individual policeman devotes his attention to his duty at the moment of importance. This shows how sacred and important the duty of a policeman is! There is one thing a policeman ought to know in creating the atmosphere of freedom, and that is taking a strict neutral standpoint. As an individual, he can uphold the political view of a certain political party and oppose that of another party, but as a policeman, he should not take such an attitude. The police are the police of our entire country and not of any one political party or clique. A policeman ought to have the reliance of all parties and organizations and at the same time, he should equally restrain all their illegalities, giving preference to no one, since all are equal in the eyes of the law. A policeman ought to place himself on the legal side and suppress the illegal side. Therefore, a policeman, in an individualistic capacity, can cast a vote for the party he favors, but in police capacity, he must strictly take the neutral attitude. For instance, when there are two candidates of opposite factions in a certain police district, the place and time when and where an opinion can be expressed for or against the candidates is only when he casts his vote at the poll. If he, in the capacity of a policeman, should praise one of them in public and attack the other, or condone one man's unlawful acts and be harsh one the other, he degrades the strict neutrality of a policeman. If this should occur, the people will lose confidence in the police, and, consequently it will debase the dignity of the law and that will

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be detrimental to the country. For this reason, the policeman should cultivate the virtue of drawing the line between public and private matters. The duty of the police is to create the atmosphere of freedom so that the people can vote at their own free will, and not to make the people vote for or against a certain political party. The criterion for execution of the duties of a policeman is the law and not private opinion or views. The right of judging which of the two parties is right is in the hands of the people, and not in the hands of the police. Maintaining peace and order and creating the atmosphere of freedom for the people so that they can vote freely is the unique and sacred duty of a patriotic and democratic police.

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ADDRESS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR

TO

THE LEADERS OF THE YOUTH ASSOCIATION

I am very happy to meet with the leaders of the various youth associations in Korea. I have always been interested in your associations because they are composed of the young men and women who are bound together by common ideals and who have pledged themselves to work together to attain those ideals. You represent a large proportion of the whole population of Korea and through your activities will help to shape the destiny of your country in the coming years. Even now, today, and in the next few weeks, you can be a tremendous force in the progress of your country toward the goal of independence and freedom, which you, and your fellow Koreans, have been striving for so long. But force, if it is not intelligently applied and wisely directed, can often lead to disastrous results. It is about this which I wish to speak to you today.

One of the characteristics of youth is idealism and a burning desire to achieve the ideal against all opposition. That kind of thing is very fine provided the ideal is the best, and provided the means used to achieve that ideal are proper. However, youth is often intolerant of views of others which are in conflict with those of youth; and youth in its impatience will often give little heed to views of others. I know this because, when I was a young man, I felt intolerant towards those who did not agree with me, and I was impatient with them. I have now become tolerant of other people without sacrificing my own ideals. Human experience shows that, if we are patient and listen to views of others, we can often improve ourselves and learn something of great value.

In the forthcoming elections you will have an opportunity to demonstrate your ability to actively assist the Korean people in their exercise of the full right of the franchise in a free atmosphere.

One of the most important duties of citizenship is to take part in civic affairs. You can do this by encouraging people to vote. In the forthcoming elections it is highly important that the views of

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United Nations Assembly on whether a fair election has been held and whether there was free atmosphere preceding and during election time so that all eligible voters had an opportunity to express their choice freely without any interference whatscever.

As leaders of the various youth organizations you have a great responsibility. You have the duty of controlling the activities of the other members of your organizations, in such a way that you will be a constructive force and not a destructive force interfering with the processes of a free election. You must remind your members that threats, use of force, or any other unlawful acts interfering with a free election or restricting the rights of fellow citizens will not be excused and will not be tolerated on the ground of the youthfulness of the offenders but will be fully punished under the law. You must remind them also that, even if they escape punishment, they will endanger the progress of their country by committing acts which might prevent the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea from recognizing the validity of the election.

I have confidence in your leadership and feel sure that you can guide the activities of your fellow members into constructive work in encouraging fellow Koreans to vote but not in interfering with them in any way whatsoever. I wish you great success in your constructive program.

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United Nations Assembly on whether a fair election has been held and whether there was free atmosphere preceding and during election time so that all eligible voters had an opportunity to express their choice freely without any interference whatsoever.

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YOUTH GROUPS REPRESENTED AT MEETING CALLED BY DR. CHOUGH BYUNG OK, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL POLICE, AT THE NATIONAL CAPITOL, 26 MARCH 1948

1.	United Young Men's Association Dai Dong Chung Nyun Dang	20
2.	Korean Young Men's Association for National Construction Chosun Kawnkoo - Tchawng Nyawn Hway	30
3.	Korean Young Men's Christian Association Chosun Ki Dok Tchawng Nyawn Hway	1
4.	Dai Han Chung Hway Korean Justice Party	5
5.	Northwest Young Men's Association Saw Book Chung Nyun Hway	6
6.	Korean National Youth Inc. Skig Chosun Min Jok Chung Myun Dang	3
7.	Dai Han Kook Chung, Hway National Young Men's Association	2
8.	Korean Labor Association Dai Han No Chung	2
9.	All Korean Student's League Chung Kook Hak San Hong Tun Hway	1
10	Chang Yi Tan Democratic Justice Assn.	2
11.	Korean Independence Young Men's Party Dai Han Dok Lip Chung Nyun Dang	2
12.	Great Korean Young Men's Party Dai Han Chung Nyun Dang	1
13.	Catholic Young Men's Assn. Federation of Tehawn Choo Kyo Yaw Cha Tchawng Nyun Hway Yawn Highway	1
14.	Tong Bang Young Men's Assn. Oriental Young Men's Assn.	1
15.	Korean Established Young Men's Assn. Kunkook Chung Nyun Hway	1

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A Round-Table Conference with the Youth Leaders. (A statement released, by the PRO of the Department of Police, concerning the press conference held at 1000, 9 March 1948.)

Facing the impending general election, the Public Relations Office of the Department of Police, held a Round-Table Conference with the leaders of the Youth Groups, at the Director's Office, at 1400, 8 March 1948, with a view of being helpful in creating a free atmosphere for holding the election. There were present about 40 leaders, representing 16 Youth Associations. At the meeting, Director Chough pointed out the historic importance of the general election in the way of completing our national inderendence and unification, and he, further, emphasized the fact that the election must be carried out as a free and unfettered one in a state of peace and order so that, internally, a national government that will truly express the will of the nation may be established and that, through a successful conclusion of the election, the political capabilities of our people may be proven to the world. All those who were present concurred unanimously with the views of the Director, and they fully pledged themselves to cooperate patriotically in the election and to exert their best effort to create, through self-discipline and self-control, a free environment under which a fair election will be elected.

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INSTRUCTIONS BY DR. CHOUGH, PYONG OK
Director of Korean National Police,
At the Youth Leaders Conference in Seoul
Held on 25 March 1948

As it is known, the General Election, to be held on coming May 9, is the only method and the best chance to accomplish our sovereign inderendence on the way of our rehabilitation. I sincerely request everyone of our nation, every adult who has the right of voting, not only to support the General Election wholly and fully, but also to attend to the historical and sacred task, casting a sacred vote willingly.

We, however, are faced to the political confusion, which make it difficult for the good citizens to discriminate the right and wrong, by the reactionary obstructive tactics of some nationalists under the good name of the Unified Government, to say nothing of the leftists who absolutelv oppose the General Election.

The National Police, cooperating with the organs concerned, the patriotic organizations and especially you, patriotic youth organizations who include the majority of the adults, will exert itself in enlightening and leading the nation to bring about successful fruition of the General Election. Particularly, appealing to your patriotic soul, I sincerely request you, all the youth organizations, to prohibit every word and action which may adversely influence a free atmosphere.

According to the draft on the free atrosphere submitted by the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea, it is proposed at section 10, par. 2, that "in order to insure that the members of the youth organizations would not hinder the normal progress of the Election, (1) attentions should be called to the leaders of such organizations by the authorities concerned, particularly by the Police, that the unlawful actions of such organizations as well as of any other citizens shall not be permitted, and

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5. Possession of weapons, terror, violence, threatening, arrest or confinement of any individual or organization by any member of youth organization are strictly forbidden.

6. Actions buying off votes by money, goods, entertainment, violence or threatening, or forcing abstention from voting, are strictly forbidden.

7. As the struggles between factions will undoubtedly be open, realizing the political confusion, you should through your training and discipline exercise reserve.

8. Though we cannot help being indignant against reactionaryism from the viewpoint of justice to the nation, members of your organizations should be fully and thoroughly awake to obtain the moral fruits of serenity, composure, perseverance and deliberation by viewing with superiority the international conditions and social realities.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
南朝鮮過渡政府
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR
軍政長官室
Seoul, Korea

PARDON BY MILITARY GOVERNOR
軍政長官의 恩赦

To all law enforcement officials, police, prosecutors, prison
各 法令 施行 官公吏, 警察, 檢察, 刑務官
officials and election officials:
選挙委員 貴下

BY VIRTUE OF THE POWER AND AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO ME BY THE
在 朝鮮 美國 陸軍司令官이 本官 에게
COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA, AND VESTED IN
委任하아 朝鮮軍政長官으로서의 本官에게 帰屬된
ME AS MILITARY GOVERNOR IN KOREA,
權限에 依하아

I do hereby grant full pardon to the persons named hereon for the
本官은 左記 各人의 服役中의 刑, 執行
offenses for which they are now serving sentence or are under suspended
猶予中의 刑, 執行 停止中의 刑, 又는 現在
sentence or for which they have been conditionally released or for which
拘束의 理由가 되는 緊急 事件의 起訴 犯罪
they are now detained awaiting trial, under investigation or awaiting
捜査中의 犯罪, 捜査 또는 犯罪 를 對한
investigation. I do hereby remit any unpaid fine and any unexecuted
金的으로 赦免함. 本官은 左記 各人에 対하아, 未納의
portion of any sentence imposed upon them, including suspended sentence.
罰金, 科料 未執行의 刑(執行猶予中의 刑을 包含)을 免除함.
I do hereby order their immediate and unconditional release and the dis-
本官은 茲에 左記 各人을 即時 無條件으로 釋放 할 것을 命하며
missal of any charges under which they are now being held.
現在 拘束의 理由가 되는 罪相을 免除할 것을 命함.

I do further order that the pardon herein granted shall restore to
本官은 또한 左와 如히 命함. 茲에 與한 恩赦에 依하아
them their full civil rights and entitle them to register for voting, and
左記 各人은 그 全部 公民權을 復權하며 國会 議員 選挙法
to become candidates in the forthcoming elections to be held under the
에 依하아 施行될 今般 選挙에 選挙人 登録 及 國会 議員 候補者
Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People, regardless
登録을 할 資格을 回復하되 그 有罪 判決 及 現在 拘束 又는
of their conviction, and regardless of any delay in their application to
執行猶予에 依하아 登録이 遅延된 境遇에는 그러한 欠格
register occasioned only by their present detention or suspended sentence,
判決에서 遅延에 不拘하고 登録할 資格이 有하며 其他 法令
but subject to other provisions of law.
規程에 依하여야 함.

Issued this 31st day of March 1948.
一九四八年三月三十一日

W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea
美國陸軍少將 軍政長官

Inclosure No 22

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ORDER NO. 16

NAME 名姓	CASE NO. 事件番号	PRISON 刑務所	NAME 姓名	CASE NO. 事件番号	PRISON 刑務所
OH HUNG SOON 吳 행 순	957	Chunchon	LEE TAL SUP 李 달 섭	1066	Chunchon
CHOI YONG SOOK 崔 용 숙	"	"	PARK SE WON 朴 세 원	"	"
KIM MYUNG OK 金 명 옥	"	"	KIM RYONG CHUN 金 룡 전	"	"
LEE HWA SOON 李 화 순	"	"	SIN SA MAN 申 사 만	"	"
KIM CHONG OK 金 종 옥	"	"	SON CHIN SOOL 孫 신 술	272	Kyungju
KIM IN SOO 金 인 수	"	"	SON BYUNG HO 孫 병 호	317	"
KIM CHONG HO 金 종 호	"	"	CHUNG YUN SANG 鄭 윤 상	"	"
LEE HYO WOO 李 효 우	"	"	LEE HO HYUK 李 호 혁	"	"
LEE KEE HONG 李 기 홍	"	"	KO KWANG UK 高 光 욱	455	"
KON ON CHANG 곤 온 장	"	"	PAK YONG CHUN 朴 용 건	"	"
KIM TONG SIK 金 동 신	1037	"	MAENG HWAN GIL 明 한 길	"	"
KIM TONG MAN 金 동 만	"	"	PAK CHONG BOK 朴 종 복	"	"
KIM CHONG KIL 金 장 길	"	"	SHIN SUN RAN 신 선 란	"	"
CHOI MAN SUK 崔 만 석	"	"	PAEK POK GIL 白 福 吉	"	"
KIM CHANG SOO 金 장 수	"	"	KIM MAN DOK 金 만 德	"	"
LEE HAN SOO 李 한 수	1042	"	CHUNG TON HYON 鄭 東 헌	"	"
LEE YUN SOO 李 윤 수	1043	"	YI HAE SONG 李 海 송	39	Yong Dong P.S.
JU PUENG HI 朱 풍 희	"	"	KIM IN BAE 金 인 배	"	"
CHOI KEE SO 崔 기 소	1046	"	YIM YU YONG 金 윤 용	"	"
LEE SOO TAL 李 수 달	"	"	KIM SONG YONG 金 송 용	57	"
KIM CHONG KU 金 종 구	1066	"	CHONG IK SUN 鄭 익 선	"	"
KIM CHANG SOO 金 상 수	"	"	KIM YONG HWAN 金 용 환	353	Sudaemun

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MEMORANDUM BY THE U. S. LIAISON OFFICER

Of the Principal Factors Motivating a

Change in the Election Date

On 12 March 1948 United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea submitted to this Command a document called "Recommendations presented by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea on the election law and the election regulations". This document contained no less than 74 detailed recommendations. On the basis of these recommendations the KILA Law and the draft of the Election Regulations was completely redrafted. With the exception of one recommendation concerning the disenfranchisement of so-called "collaborators" all recommendations of UNTCOK were incorporated into the Final text of the election law and the election regulations. After numerous conferences the Election Liaison Committee and the secretary of sub-committee 3 of UNTCOK reached on 18 March 1948 an agreement concerning the text of the election law and the election regulations. In the following days these documents were translated into Korean. Accordingly less than 7 weeks were at the disposal of the National Election Committee and the agencies of Military Government in charge of the administrative problems of the election to prepare the election and to carry out an extensive educational program.

Since the election law provided that registration of voters shall be accomplished during a period of 10 days beginning 40 days before the day of election (Section 15) the following steps had to be taken within a period of less than 10 days:

1) establishment of electoral districts in accordance with Section 10 Election Law;

2) division of the electoral districts into voting districts in accordance with Section 10 Election Law;

3) organization of the National Election Committee, 10 provinical election committees, 200 electoral district election

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committees and approximately 10,000 voting district election committees including the appointment of almost 100,000 election officials in accordance with the highly complicated provisions of Sections 15-23 Election Law;

4) printing of 10,000,000 registration forms and several thousand poll registers and distribution of these documents to approximately 10,000 voting district election committees; (Appendix I and II Election Regulations);

5) determination of registration places and public announcement of registration places by posters and newspapers in accordance with Section 6 Election Regulations;

6) distribution of copies of the Election Law and the Election Regulations to the election committees on the provincial, district and village level;

7) instruction of the administrative heads and election officials on all levels of government.

On the basis of a provincial text of the election law certain measures such as the printing of the registration forms and poll registers and their distribution, the determination of the registration places and the instruction of the heads of the administrative agencies had started prior to the final approval of the text of the election law and the election regulations. Nevertheless it appeared more than doubtful whether it was possible to open the registration places on 30 March 1948 and to carry out the provisions of the election law concerning registration in the 10 days period beginning on 30 March. It should be noted that UNTCOK had insisted on the division of GUN, PU and KU with a population exceeding 150,000 into two and more electoral districts, a recommendation which resulted in the creation of approximately 80 electoral districts which did not correspond to established administrative units. The establishment of voting districts with a population of not more than 2,000 resulted in considerable difficulties in rural areas and made the public announcement of registration places by posters and newspapers virtually impossible.

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Even more serious was the situation in the field of registration of candidates and the preparation of ballots. In contrast to the KILA Law the Election Law provided for the right of each person whose registration as a candidate had been rejected by the electoral district election committee to appeal his case to the National Election Committee. In addition the Election Law had replaced the write-in ballots by ballots on which the names of the duly nominated candidates and a symbol for each candidate had to be printed. Accordingly different ballots must be prepared and printed for each electoral district. The printing of such ballots cannot begin before the names of the duly nominated candidates have been reported to the election agency in charge of supervising the printing of the ballots. Under normal conditions the names and symbols of the various candidates will be known 22 days prior to the election; in cases of appeal the final list of the candidates nominated in the electoral district concerned may be ready only about two weeks before the election. It was felt that these periods are too short to guarantee the distribution of ballots to each polling place prior to the day of election.

Inclosure No. [redacted]

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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A/AC.19/58
25 March 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

LETTER FROM THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

Seoul, Korea
25 March 1948

M. Jean-Louis Paul-Boncour
Chairman, United Nations Temporary
Commission on Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Paul-Boncour:

The National Election Committee, realizing the sincere craving of all Koreans for Independence and for their own Government has been working wholeheartedly, day and night to insure a free Election on May 9, 1948.

In spite of our efforts and the thorough cooperation of Military Government we feel, with sorrow in our hearts, that a short postponement of the election will be necessary for reasons stated hereafter.

All concerned realize the acute necessity for proper information to reach the most remote villages. The National Election Committee, after much work and serious thought, regrets to report the following schedule:

Printing of Election Law and Regulations completed	March 25
Breakdown and packaging for distribution - 2 days	March 27
Laws and Regulations delivered to all places (remote villages) - 10 days	April 6
Local Committees to get familiar with Law, etc. and insure correct information to the public - minimum 3 days	April 9
Start of Registration	April 10
Based on law setting registration as 40 days before election - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Election Day	May 20

In view of the above facts and with due consideration to printing and distribution difficulties actually encountered to date plus forseeable practical difficulties in the future, a period of grace should be added to the above schedule.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

With much regret we ask your generous assistance in obtaining a change of Election Day from May 9, 1948 to May 24, 1948.

Sincerely yours,

Ro Chin Sul
Chairman,
National Election Committee

Copy to:
Major General W.F. Dean,
Military Governor

- - - -

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

RESTRICTED

A/AC.19/58/Add.2
29 March 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

CHANGE OF THE ELECTION DATE.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION.

29 March 1948

M. Jean-Louis Paul-Boncour
Chairman, United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
Duk Soo Palace
Seoul, Korea.

My dear M. Paul-Boncour:

With reference to your letter of 27 March 1948, I find it urgently necessary, for reasons indicated below, to change the date of the forthcoming election of representatives of the Korean people, to be held under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

1. From the very beginning it was believed by this Command that at least 80 days would be required between announcement of the date set for an election and the election itself to complete essential arrangements, based on the assumption that Public Act No.5 of 3 September 1947 would be used as the framework for the necessary election legislation. In a letter addressed to the Principal Secretary of the Commission on 27 February 1948, my Liaison Officer, Brigadier General Weckerling, anticipating announcement of election on 1 March, stated that "I would suggest that in order to accelerate completion of preparation for elections in South Korea that 20 May be established as the election date."

After the announcement of the date of 1 March 1948, General Weckerling called attention to the necessity of going forward

[redacted]

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with certain technical preparations immediately, for otherwise the entire election program would be vitiated, and emphasis was again laid on the assumption that the KILA would be applied to the election.

However, there was an unexpectedly long delay in approving an election law. So many changes were recommended by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea that the complete redrafting of the law was necessary. The discussions of the last of these changes between my Liaison Officer and the Legal Counsellor of UNTCOK took place as late as 18 March 1948, the evening before Mr. Marc Schreiber's departure from Korea. During these 18 days most of the essential technical preparations could not go forward prior to announcement of the final details of the law by the Military Governor.

To quote only one example: As a result of the recommendation of UNTCOK, writing-in ballots are replaced by printed ballots. The printing of the ballots now prescribed cannot be undertaken until after the nomination of the candidates has become final. Taking into consideration that in accordance with the changed election law, each electoral district will have its own ballot and the limited printing facilities of this country, the distribution of the ballots could not be accomplished in time if the original date of May 9th were adhered to.

2. It is vital to the interest of the new Korean nation that the largest possible number of voters cast their ballots. This requires an extensive education campaign as well as the opportunities for the various groups of the population to nominate candidates and for the candidates to present their case to their constituents. In the time now allowed these opportunities would be greatly curtailed, thus detracting from the democratic nature of the election. Since the revised law and election regulations

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have just been promulgated, the instructions to the various election committees, including the voting district election committees on the village level, would reach these committees too late to enable them to familiarize themselves with the important details concerning functions which are entirely new to them. In order to avoid unfairness due to lack of knowledge, this fact alone makes imperative a reasonable postponement.

3. One of the reasons previously advanced for the date of May 9 was the desirability of holding the election before rice planting season. It now develops that the planting season is so advanced that a postponement will not interfere to any considerable extent with agricultural labors. The winter of 1947 in its latter stages was the mildest in the last 30 years and I am informed by the agricultural authorities that it will enable farmers to complete preparations sooner than usual.

4. The National Election Committee and the Military Governor after preparing the necessary schedule of activities and preparations, both urgently recommended a change in the date of election from 9 May 1948 to 24 May 1948. The reasons given by the National Election Committee were made known to you in the letter dated 25 March 1948, addressed to you by the Chairman of that Committee.

5. Although the Chinese Delegate, Dr. Liu, Yu-Wan on 1 March 1948 at a meeting at the Seoul Stadium, announced, after consultation between the Commission and this Command, that elections were to be held not later than 10 May 1948, I must recall to you that this date was only reluctantly agreed to by me because of Mr. Menon's statement in the United States (heard in Korea on 28 February) suggesting that elections be held during the first week in May. Also, my agreement was given before we

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encountered the delay in obtaining the recommendations of the Commission on the Election Law.

I am convinced that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea will see the wisdom of the short postponement and will realize that such postponement is being suggested only for the most compelling reasons and only after its necessity became apparent in the interest of ensuring that the first democratic election in the history of Korea is a success.

In view of the foregoing, I request that the Commission advise me at an early date as to its attitude in this matter, in order that I may adjust my final decision to the realities of the situation while at the same time be coordinated with the desires of the Commission.

Sincerely,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant-General, U.S. Army

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

RESTRICTED

A/AC.19/58/Add.4
5 April 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION DATE.

LETTER FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Commanding General
Seoul, Korea

2 April 1948

Honorable Bahadur Singh
Chairman, UN Temporary Commission on Korea
Seoul, Korea

My dear Mr. Singh:

I acknowledge the receipt of letter, dated 30 March 1948, signed by M. Jean-Louis Paul-Boncour, as Chairman of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, answering my letter of 29 March 1948, and note that it is the wish of the Commission that the Korean election be held "on the date of 9 May 1948 as adopted in its Resolution of 12 March 1948". I have informed all agencies concerned with election arrangements of the attitude of the Commission, and that, regardless of difficulties encountered, all plans and efforts on their part shall be directed at the completion of the election by the date previously announced.

However, while noting the decision of the Commission in this matter, I feel that a one-day postponement of the election, i.e. to May 10, 1948, would not contravene the wishes of the Commission as expressed in its original formula that the election should be held "not later than 10 May 1948". Action to this end will avoid holding the election on a day when there will occur in this area during the middle of the day a total eclipse of the sun, which fact was not known to me at the time the date of 9 May was agreed upon. I am reliably informed that such an occurrence is considered an ill omen by many Koreans, particularly in the rural districts, which might operate to keep an appreciable number of voters from participation.

Therefore, unless such action is subject to specific objection on the part of the UN Commission, I shall shortly announce May 10th as the new date for the election.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

RESTRICTED

A/AC.19/5[illegible]/Add.5
5 April 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION DATE

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA
TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

3 April 1948

Dear General Hodge,

I desire to refer to your letter of 2 April 1948 and to advise you that the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, after consideration of the issues raised, decided at its thirty-first meeting this morning to concur in your proposal for a one-day postponement of the election, i.e. from 9 to 10 May 1948.

In making this decision the Commission presumes that any legal implications affecting electoral procedures which may arise from the postponement will be taken into account by the responsible authorities.

Yours very sincerely,

I.J. Bahadur Singh
Chairman
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
Commanding General
United States Army Forces in Korea
SEOUL

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UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

Press Release No. 53

6 April 1948.

At its thirty-first meeting held on 3 April, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, after considering the issues raised in a letter from the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, decided to concur in the proposal of the Commanding General to postpone the date of elections from 9 to 10 May 1948.

In making this decision the Commission presumed that any legal implications affecting electoral procedures which might arise from the postponement would be taken into account by the responsible authorities.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Seoul, Korea

EXECUTIVE ORDER
NUMBER 20 **5 April 1948**

CHANGE OF DATE FOR ELECTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

SECTION I. The day for election of representatives to the National Assembly has been changed to Monday, 10 May 1948. Therefore, in order to avoid the necessity of re-registration of persons who registered on 30 Mareh 1948, their registration shall be regarded as having been made within the period of registration prescribed by Section *15* of the *Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People* (*Ordinance Number 175, dated 17 March 1948*).

SECTION II. This Executive Order shall be effective on the date appearing hereon.

W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

SEAL
USAMGIK

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

南朝鮮過渡政府
朝鮮서울

行政命令第二十號

國會議員選擧日變更

第一條 國會議員選擧日은一九四八年五月十日로變更되었음
그리므로一九四八年三月三十日에登錄한選擧人의再登錄을必要치않게하기위하야該登錄은國會議員選擧法(一九四八年三月十七日軍政法令第一七五號)第十五條에依한選擧人登錄期間內에한것으로함

第二條 本令은公布와同時에此를施行함

一九四八年四月五日

朝鮮軍政長官
美國陸軍少將 다불유·에모·린

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DECLASSIFIED
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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 175

17 March 1948

LAW FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE

Pending action on the subject matters hereof by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and the enactment of legislation pursuant thereto, the following shall govern:

CHAPTER I. GENERAL RULES

Section 1. Any citizen twenty-one or more years of age has the right to vote for representative to the National Assembly regardless of sex, property, education or religion.

Any citizen twenty-five or more years of age has the right to be elected as a representative to the National Assembly regardless of sex, property, education or religion.

Age shall be counted as of the date the election is held.

Section 2. Persons to whom any of the following categories are applicable are not eligible to vote:

(*1*) persons who have been declared incompetent by a decision of a court of justice;

(*2*) weakminded persons who have been placed as quasi-incompetent under guardianship by a decision of a court of justice;

(*3*) persons who are serving prison sentences, or who are under suspended sentence or under a sentence not yet executed;

(*4*) persons who accepted peerages fron the Japanese government;

(*5*) persons who were members of the Japanese Imperial Diet.

Section 3. A person is not eligible to be elected:

(*1*) if he is ineligible to vote in accordance with Section 2 of this law; provided. however, Section 2, Number (*3*) does not apply if the sentence was imposed for a political offense;

(*2*) persons who have received a sentence of one or more years penal servitude or imprisonment; provided, however, that if three or more years have elapsed since the completion of sentence, or since the time when final

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decision was made not to execute the sentence or if the sentence was imposed for a political offense, the person concerned will not be included in this category;

(*3*) persons who under the Japanese regime held ranks of "HANNINKAN" or higher in the Civilian Police Force, or who served as "KEMPEI" or "KEMPEI-HO" in the Japanese Military Police, Force, or persons who held positions in the police in charge of "thought control," or those who acted as a spy for the police in charge of "thought control" under the Japanese regime;

(*4*) persons who were advisors, members, or vice chairman of the Central Advisory Council under the Japanese regime;

(*5*) persons who were members of an advisory or deciding council of PU or DO (Province) under the Japanese regime;

(*6*) persons who held positions of the third class or higher of the "KOTOKAN" or who received a medal (KUN) of the seventh class or higher; provided, however, that educators and technical officials are not included in this category.

Section 4. Government officials shall not, while in office, hold membership in the National Assembly in addition to such position except *Jungmukwan*.

Section 5. The members of local self-governing bodies shall not, while in office, hold membership in the National Assembly in addition to such position.

Section 6. The members of election committees shall not be eligible to be elected representatives to the National Assembly within the districts concerned.

Section 7. Expenses incurred in the election of National Assembly members shall be defrayed by the national treasury.

CHAPTER II. ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND REPRESENTATION

Section 8. Each electoral district shall be represented by one delegate.

Section 9. Electoral districts in the meaning of this law are:

(*1*) GUN, PU and KU of the City of Seoul; provided that their population does not exceed 150,000.

(*2*) Those sectors of GUN, PU and KU of the City of Seoul with a population exceeding 150,000 which for the purpose of this election have been established by the Chief Executive as electoral districts in accordance with Section 10 of this law.

(*3*) DO (island) which form administrative units on the level of GUN

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and PU. NOTE: wherever the term "GUN" is used in the following sections of this law, it shall include DO (island) in the meaning of Section 9 (3) of this law.

Section 10. GUN, PU and KU of the City of Seoul with a population between 150,000 and 250,000 will be divided into two sectors of approximately equal population: PU with a population between 250,000 and 350,000 will be divided into three sectors of approximately equal population; PU with a population between 350,000 and 450,000 will be divided into four sectors of approximately equal population.

Section 11. Names, boundaries and population of the electoral districts established by the Chief Executive in accordance with Section *10* of this law are set forth in Appendix I which forms a part of this law.

Section 12, Each electoral district shall be divided into voting districts; each voting district shall have a population of not more than 2,000. Each voting district shall form a part of one EUP, MYUN or DONG respectively.

Voting districts shall be established by the electoral district election committees on the basis of detailed recommendations to be prepared by the chiefs of the administrative units (GUN, PU and KU of the City of Seoul) concerned.

The establishment of voting districts shall be published before the beginning of voters registration.

Section 13. The National Election Committee is authorized to order the establishment of election committees on the EUP, MYUN and DONG level wherever such election committees are deemed necessary to assist, instruct, and supervise the election committees of the voting districts.

Section 14. Electoral districts and voting districts will be established on the basis of the census of 24 August 1946.

CHAPTER III. POLL REGISTERS

Section 15. Registration shall be accomplished by signing the registration paper, or by making thumbprint upon the registration paper before two witnesses who are literate, in the registration place designated by the chairman of the electoral district election committee, sometime during a period of 10 days beginning 40 days before the date of election.

Each voter shall register at only one registration place.

Section 16. The election committee of the voting district shall prepare

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poll registers indicating the name, address date of birth, sex, date of registration, and other pertinent data with respect to all voters who have been in residence in that district since the date sixty days prior to the date of the election concerned. The registers shall be open to the public at the registration places for a period of 7 days beginning 25 days prior to the date of the election. The poll registers shall become final on the 2nd day before the date of election.

Section 17. When there are incorrect recordings or omissions, or when a person who has no right to vote is registered in the poll register, each voter may object to the election committee concerned during the Period of public notification.

Examination and decision in regard to these objections shall be made within 3 days by the election committee concerned.

In case objections to the foregoing decision be raised, the voters may request, within 5 days, the electoral district election committee to review this decision.

The election committee of the electoral district shall on a request for review in accordance with the preceding paragraph review and decide each case within 3 days and shall notify in writing the person who asked for review and other persons concerned.

CHAPTER IV. ELECTION COMMITTEES

Section 18. The National Election Committee organized by the Chief Executive in accordance with Public Act No. 5, Section *13*, shall be constituted as National Election Committee.

The National Election Committee consists of 15 members and is under the chairmanship of a Justice of the Supreme Court.

Section 19. The National Election Committee shall organize election committees in each province and in the City of Seoul and appoint its members. Each provincial election committee and the City of Seoul election committee shall consist of one chairman, ten members and an alternate chairman and ten alternate members. The chairman and the alternate chairman shall be judges of an appellate or district court located in the province (City of Seoul) concerned.

The Chief Judge of the District Court in each province and the City of Seoul shall recommend to the National Election Committee the names of three judges who are residents of such provinces (City of Seoul). The National Elec-

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tion Committee shall select and appoint from among the judges recommended the chairman of each provincial election committee and his alternate (City of Seoul Committee).

The Chief Judge of the District Court in each Province (City of Seoul) and the governor of each province (Mayor, City of Seoul)—each acting inpependently— shall submit to the National Election committee a list of twenty respectable citizens who are residents of such province (City of Seoul), and indicate the party affiliation – if any – of each of them. Not more than one-third of the persons recommended on each list shall belong to the same political party. The National Election Committee shall select from the persons recommended 20 persons and appoint 10 persons members of the provincial (City of Seoul) election committee and 10 persons their alternates; provided, however, that not more than one-third of the members and not more than one-third of the alternates of each provincial (City of Seoul) election committee shall belong to the same political party.

Section 20. There shall be established in each electoral district an electoral district election committee. Each electoral district election committee shall consist of one chairman, 8 members, one alternate chairman and 8 alternate members The chairman and the alternate chairman of each electoral district election committee shall be appointed by the Chief Judge of the District Court in the province (City of Seoul) to which the electoral district belongs.

The highest ranking Judge of the District Court of the Branch Court which has jurisdiction over, and the highest administrative official of the administrative district (GUN PU, KU of the City of Seoul) to which such electoral district belongs shall each appoint four residents of such a district, members, and four residents of such a district, alternates, of the electoral district election committee concerned. Not more than one-third of the members and one-third of the alternates of each electoral district election committee shall belong to the same political party.

Section 21 The administrative head of each GUN, PU and KU of the City of Seoul shall without delay submit to the provincial (City of Seoul) election committee concerned and the National Election Committee the names of all persons within his district who have been appointed chairman, alternate chairman, member and alternate member of an electoral district election committee and indicate their party affiliation if any and also give a brief personal

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history of each.

The provincial (City of Seoul) election committee concerned shall without delay review such appointments and within ten days from the day of appointment may at its own discretion decide to recall the chairman, alternate chairman, members and alternate members of such electoral district election committees and to replace them by appointees of its own choice. All appointments not recalled within ten days shall be final.

Section 22. There shall be established in each voting district a voting district election committee.

Each voting district election committee shall consist of one chairman, one alternate chairman, eight members and eight alternates. The chairman, alternate chairman, the members and the alternate members of each voting district election committee shall be appointed by the head of the administrative district (EUP, MYUN, DONG) to which the voting district belongs. Not more than one-third of the members and not more than one-third of the alternates shall belong to the same political party.

The administrative head of each EUP, MYUN and DONG shall without delay submit to the electoral district election committee concerned, to the provincial (City of Seoul) election committee concerned and to the National Election committee the names of all persons within his district who have been appointed chairman, alternate chairman, member or alternate member of a voting district election committee and indicate their party affiliation, if any, and also give a brief personal history of each.

The electoral district election committee concerned shall without delay review such appointments and within ten days from the day of appointment may at its own discretion, decide to recall the chairman, alternate chairman, members and alternate members of such voting district election committees and to replace them by appointees of their own choice. All appointments not recalled within ten days shall become final.

In case the head of a MYUN, EUP, or DONG fails to appoint within reasonable time one or several election officials (chairman, alternate chairman, member or alternate member) of a voting district election committee, the election committee of the electoral district to which the voting district belongs shall appoint without delay such election officials.

Section 23. Section 22 applies *mutatis mutandis* to the establishment of

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election committees on the MYUN, EUP and DONG level wherever such election committees have been organized in accordance with Section *13* of this law.

Section 24. A candidate for election is not eligible for appointment to the election committee in the electoral district in which he is a candidate.

Each type of election committee may employ several secretaries and/or clerks.

Section 25. Each election committee shall act in accordance with laws and regulations and in accordance with the orders and instructions of *higher* election committees and shall render various reports on its activities to the higher election committees and shall supervise the activities of the lower election committees

Upon request, each election committee shall show its various records and documents to a court

Any chairman, alternate chairman, member or alternate member of any election committee, other than the National Election Committee, who fails to act in accordance with laws and regulations and in accordance with the orders and instructions of higher election committees may be removed by the next higher election committee, which shall replace any person so removed with a person of its own choice. Any chairman or member of the National Election Committee who fails to act in accordance with the laws and regulations may be removed and replaced by the Chief Executive.

Section 26. The quorum of each election committee shall be a majority of its members, and all the actions of the committee shall be determined by majority vote of the members present. In case of a tie in voting, the chairman of the committee shall decide.

CHAPTER V. CANDIDATES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

Section 27. A person who wishes to stand for election to the National Assembly shall register with the election committee of the electoral district sometime between the date of the beginning of voters registration and a date to be determined by the National Election Committee and submit at the same time, a recommendation signed by two hundred or more registered voters.

In case of recommendation of one person by another to be a candidate, the person making the recommendation must secure the signature of two hundred or more registered voters and the written consent of the person being

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recommended and register with the election committee of the electoral district.

In case an electoral district election committee reaches the conclusion that a person who applied for registration as a candidate is ineligible to be elected for one of the reasons set forth in section 3 of this law, it shall without delay refer the case to the National Election Committee with a report stating the reasons. Simultaneously, the electoral district election committee shall transmit to the applicant a copy of this report.

The National Election Committee shall decide the case referred to above as a matter of first priority. The National Election Committee shall hear the applicant on his request at a public meeting. The applicant may introduce documentary evidence and summon witnesses.

The chairman of the National Election Committee shall notify the Chief Executive, the chairman of the electoral district election committee and the applicant of its decision.

The registration of a candidate who is registered in two or more electoral districts shall be invalid.

Section 28. Election committees of electoral districts shall give public notice of the name, address, age, occupation, and party or organization affiliation, if any, of every candidate within three days after each candidate's registration by publishing his name in newspapers, announcing it over the radio if possible, and by message to all voting district election committees which form part of the electoral district concerned.

Election committees of electoral districts shall give public notice immediately of the withdrawal or death of any candidate in the same manner.

Section 29. Registered candidates may freely conduct campaigns for election.

Members of each election committee, public officials connected with election matters and any other public official may not take part in campaigns.

CHAPTER VI. ELECTION PROCEDURE AND SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES

Section 30. The election of representatives to the National Assembly shall take place on the same day throughout the area in which this law is applicable.

The election committees of the electoral districts shall make official announcements of the date, time of the election and the location of the polling places

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40 days before election by publishing such facts in newspapers, posters in each voting district, and announcement, if possible, over the radio.

Polling places shall be the same places in which the voters register; however, when any polling place must be changed on account of a calamity or other unavoidable emergency, the electoral district election committee concerned shall immediately give public notice in the same manner as prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

Section 31. Balloting shall begin at 7:00 A. M. The polling places shall be closed at 7:00 P. M; provided however, that voters waiting for admission to the polling place at that time shall be admitted to the polling place until 8:00 P. M.

Voters who were present at the voting place at 7:00 P. M. and voters admitted to the polling place until 8:00 P. M., in accordance with the preceding paragraph, shall be entitled to vote.

The ballot boxes shall be closed after the last voter entitled to vote has cast his ballots. No ballots shall be cast after the boxes are closed.

Section 32, The voting shall be accomplished by the casting of secret, unsigned ballots each of which shall designate one candidate only.

Section 33 Only uniform ballots to be prepared by each electoral district election committee and to be printed under the supervision of the National Election Committee, and uniform envelopes to be prepared by and to be printed and officially stamped under the supervision of the National Election Committee, shall be used at each polling place.

The ballots to be used at each polling place must conform to a standard form to be prepared by the National Election Committee. Each ballot shall consist of the printed names of the duly nominated candidates of the electoral district for which the ballot is prepared, a symbol before the name of each candidate and a suitable space after the name of each candidate in which the voter may indicate by a mark the candidate of his choice. The names of the candidates shall be printed in Korean, as well as in Chinese letters. The ballots and envelopes shall not be numbered or otherwise marked.

The electoral district election committee shall determine by lot in a meeting to be held not later than 2 days after the time registration of candidates has elapsed at which the candidates and their representatives may be present, the order of the names of the candidates on the ballot and shall

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determine in the same meeting the symbols assigned to each candidate. Such symbols shall be for instance, *one stroke, two strokes, three strokes,* etc.

Section 34. Upon presenting himself at the polling place and upon identification as a registered voter, the voter shall sign or thumb-print the poll register in the presence of at least one member of the voting district election committee.

In case of doubt as to the identity of any voter, the election committee of the voting district shall decide the question. In such case, the head of the DONG or PAN in which the voter resides may be called upon as a witness. Persons whose names are not registered on the poll register connot vote; provided, however, that a person may vote who brings with him the notification of a decision rendered by the election committee of the electoral district or voting district certifying that the person shall be registered on the poll register.

The chairman of the voting district election committee shall hand to each voter one envelope and one ballot after the chairman has put his seal on the ballot form in the presence of the voter.

In a separate room provided for this purpose, in which the voter shall be alone, he shall mark the ballot and put the marked ballot into the envelope. The voter shall then, in front of the chairman and members of the election committee, place the envelope containing the marked ballot into the ballot box. In the case of a voter who spoiled a ballot form, the chairman shall hand to such voter only one other ballot form; provided that the spoiled ballot form is returned to the chairman.

A blind voter may be accompanied to the ballot room by a member of his family or another person of his choice who may assist him in marking the ballot and putting the ballot into the envelope. The chairman may invite one of the members of the election committee to be present during the marking of the ballot.

In the absence of the chairman, his alternate or a member of the election committee specifically designated by the chairman for this purpose shall perform the functions as assigned to the chairman of the voting district election committee in this section.

Section 35. Each electoral district election committee and each voting district election committee shall give suitable publicity to the official ballot to be used in such electoral district for the general information of the voters by

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reproducing it on posters and in newspapers generally.

At the entrance of each polling place and in each room where the marking of the ballot takes place, photographs of the candidates, to be furnished by such candidates, shall be placed in the same order as the candidates are placed on the official ballot. The photograph of each candidate shall bear in Korean, as well as in Chinese letters, the candidate's name and the symbol assigned to him.

The secrecy of voting is guaranteed. The voter shall be under no obligation to disclose the identity of the candidate for whom he has voted.

No legislative, executive or administrative agency and no court shall ever question a voter as to the candidate for whom he has voted.

Section 36. One representative of each candidate duly nominated in the electoral district to which such voting district belongs shall be authorized to stay in the polling place during the whole time of voting; provided that the candidate submitted three days before the date of voting, the name of such representative, to the chairman of the voting election committee concerned. Not more than five representatives of duly nominated candidates shall be admitted to each polling place. In case that more than five duly nominated candidates submitted the names of representatives to the chairman of a voting district election committee, such chairman shall in a special meeting, determine by lot the names of the five representatives who are admitted to the polling place. Duly admitted representatives of candidates may watch the election procedure at the place designated by the voting district election committee; they are not authorized to interfere in any way with the election procedure, render speeches or otherwise take any steps which may influence the voters.

Section 37. Voters shall stay in the polling place no longer than is required to perform the acts prescribed in Section 34 of this law. They shall leave the polling place immediately after they cast the envelope in the ballot box. No voter and no duly admitted representative of candidate shall carry a weapon while on the premises of the polling place.

Section 38. Except when entering the polling premises as voters, members of the police force shall not be authorized to enter the polling place unless they are called by the chairman of the voting district election committee to preserve the order of the polling place. When preserving the order of the polling place, the police shall act under the direction of the chairman of the voting district

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election committee concerned and shall leave the polling place immediately after being dismissed by the chairman.

Section 39. The chairman of the voting district election committee concerned may restrain speech, discussion, electioneering, clamor at the polling place, the waiting hall, and the area immediately adjacent to the polling place. He may expel from the polling place any person who disobeys such restraining orders.

A voter who has been expelled from the voting place in accordance with the preceding paragraph, may vote at the end of the voting day. However, when the chairman of the voting district election committee concerned finds that there is no longer any danger of disturbance of the polling place, he may, at his discretion, admit such person to the polling place.

Section 40. The ballot boxes shall be locked after the last voter who is entitled to vote has cast his vote.

The voting district election committees shall convey the ballot boxes and the records to the election committee of the electoral district to which such voting district belongs. The voting district election committee shall proceed with conveying the ballot boxes and records immeditely after the voting has been closed.

Section 41. Immediately after the election committee of a voting district has conveyed its ballot box to the headquarters of the election committee of the electoral district, the chairman of the election committee of the electoral district shall take the ballot box in his custody. The chairman of the election committee of the electoral district shall order that the ballot boxes shall be opened and shall ascertain whether the number of ballots counted corresponds with the number of registered voters who received ballots according to the poll records.

The candidates or their representatives may be present at the opening of the ballot boxes. Applications for presence at the opening of the ballot boxes shall be made at least two days before the date of opening.

At the time of the opening of ballot boxes, the chairman of the election committee of the electoral district shall announce the opening. In the presence of more than half of the members of the election committee of the electoral district, the chairman of the election committee of the electoral district shall clearly show that the ballot boxes are closed and sealed; then he shall open the boxes and examine the ballots.

Section 42. The following types of ballots shall be null and void:

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(*1*) Ballot other than the regular official ballot;

(*2*) Ballot on which the name of no candidate is marked;

(*3*) Ballot on which the names of more than one candidate are marked;

(*4*) Ballot on which it cannot be told which name is marked;

(*5*) Ballot on which the voter records other matters than a mark behind the name of the candidate of his choice;

(*6*) If any envelope shall be found containing two or more ballots, both of them shall be null and void;

(*7*) Ballot not placed in an official envelope.

Section 43. The candidate who receives the greatest number of valid votes shall be elected. In case of tie, the chairman of the electoral district election committee concerned shall decide the winner by lot, at a public meeting at which the candidates or their representatives may be present.

In case only one person was duly registered as a candidate in an electoral district, such candidate will be elected automatically, without election vote.

After the winner has been determined, the election committee of the electoral district shall, without delay, inform the successful candidate of his election, and give public notice of the results of the election.

Section 44. Within a period of two weeks after the date of the election, the Military Governor may, after consultation with the National Election Committee, declare the election in any of the electoral districts null and void if:

(*1*) the election could not be held in all voting districts of such an electoral district on account of a calamity or violence; or

(*2*) If the ballot boxes of one or more voting districts of such an electoral district were opened illegally or were lost; or

(*3*) If there is clear evidence that the election results within such electoral district have been substantially affected by irregularities, fraud or improper actions of election officials.

Any group of voters has the right to bring to the attention of the National Election Committee and the Military Governor all facts prescribed in paragraph *1* of this section.

If the Military Governor, after consultation with the National Election Committee, decided to nullify the elections in any electoral district for one of the reasons set forth in this section or in the event any election in any electoral district becomes null and void, he shall order that a new election take place

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within a period of not more than 30 days.

Section 45. After the voting has been closed, the election committees of the voting districts shall deliver the poll register and other documents pertaining to the election to the heads of MYUN, EUP, PU and KU of the City of Seoul to which such voting districts belong. The heads of MYUN, EUP, PU and KU of the City of Seoul shall have those records in their safe-keeping during the term of the elected representatives of the National Assembly.

Section 46. After completion of the ballot tabulation, the election committees of the electoral districts shall deliver their election records without delay to the appropriate provincial or Seoul City election committee.

The election committees of the electoral districts shall separate and identify valid and invalid ballots after the completion of the election, and shall deliver them, together with all pertinent documents, to the heads of PU, GUN or KU of the City of Seoul, who shall keep them during the term of the elected representative of the National Assembly.

As soon as the provincial and Seoul City election committees receive all the election records from their respective electoral districts, they shall submit the reports on the election without delay to the National Election Committee.

CHAPTER VII. TERM OF OFFICE AND BY-ELECTIONS

Section 47. The term of office of members of the National Assembly is hereby limited to two years from its opening session, unless a general dissolution of the National Assembly is decided upon before such time, by a competent authority.

Section 48. When a vacancy occurs, a by-election shall be held to fill it.

The Chief Executive shall hold the by-election within seventy days after receipt of notification from the chairman of the Assembly that the vacancy exists.

The date of the by-election shall be announced at least fifty days before it is to be held.

If the by-election is held within six months after general election day, the poll registers which were used for the general election shall be used for the by-election also.

Section 49. Besides the regulations stated in this chapter all provisions of this law are applicable to by-elections.

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CHAPTER VIII. LITIGATION CONCERNING ELECTIONS

Section 50. Without the prejudice to the powers of the Military Governor, acting in consultation with the National Election Committee to invalidate an election in accordance with Section 44 of this law, questions relating to the validity of election shall be submitted to an Election Review Board of five members: two justices of the Supreme Court, appointed by the Chief Executive; two members elected by the National Assembly; with a chairman designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Section 51. Any defeated candidate may raise the question of the validity of an election before the Election Review Board within fourteen days after the Election Review Board has been established.

The Election Review Board shall declare the election void if such election is found by the Election Review Board to involve violation of the provisions of this law and the provisions of the regulations promulgated in pursuance thereof and such violations may have caused a change in the result of the election.

In addition to the regulations contained in this chapter, pertinent provisions of ordinary civil procedure shall be applicable to election cases.

Section 52. The chairman of the Election Review Board shall inform the Chief Executive, National Election Committee and the electoral district election committees concerned of the election cases filed with it. The chairman of the Election Review Board shall send copies of its decisions to the Chief Executive, the National Election Committee, the electoral district election committees concerned and the chairman of the National Assembly.

CHAPTER IX. PENAL REGULATIONS

Section 53. Any of the following violators of the law shall be punished by penal servitude for not more than five years, or a fine, of not more than 100,000 won, provided that both penal servitude and fine may be imposed in case that special circumstances require it:

(*1*) Any person who either registers on the poll register or votes by fraudulent means;

(*2*) Any person who gives or receives or promises to give or receive money, goods, entertainment, or any other property gain, or gives or promises to give position of honor on favorable terms for the promise of votes or the abandonment of right to vote as a condition;

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(3) Any person who tries to prevent anyone from voting or being a candidate, or forces anyone not to vote by the use of violence, threats, arrest or confinement, or any other method;

(4) Any head of a DONG or PAN or any other person who deliberately makes false statements when heard as a witness in accordance with Section 34 of this law;

(5) Any person who, for the purpose of hindering the election, uses violence or threats against the election committee members or public officials or captures or destroys the ballot boxes or the election records;

(6) Any person who interferes with the free exercise of the right to vote or with the election process in general, by mass disturbances or demonstrations at or near the polling place;

(7) Any person who forces entrance into the polling place carrying firearms, a sword, cudgel, or any other weapon;

(8) Any member of an election committee or public official who violates any laws or regulations pertaining to the election.

Section 54. Any person who has been punished for the crimes described in this chapter shall be deprived of the rights to vote and to be elected for a period of three years from the date on which he completes the serving of his sentence.

Section 55. The statute of limitations for public prosecution with respect to the offenses described in this chapter shall be one year.

Supplementary Rules.

Section 56. The Chief Executive may enact such detailed regulations as may be necessary to carry out this law.

Section 57. This law shall be effective on the 17th day of March 1948.

WILLIAM. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

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REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE LAW FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE

CHAPTER I-GENERAL RULES

Section 1. These regulations have been formulated in accordance with Section *56* of the Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean people (*which shall be called "Election Law" hereinafter*).

Section 2. A *citizen* in the meaning of Section *1*, Election Law, is any person who meets any of the following requirements:

(*1*) Any person who is registered in a Korean HOJUK (family register);

(*2*) Any person born of Korean parents;

(*3*) Any person born of a Korean father and not possessing a foreign citizenship.

Section 3. The status of persons to whom any of the categories set forth in Section *2*, Election Law, is applicable shall be determined as of the date of registration as provided in Section *15*, Election Law.

Section 4. "Expenses incurred in the election of assembly members", as defined in Section 7, Election Law, mean the following:

(*1*) *Office expenses of election committees and other expenses necessary in the conduct of elections;*

(*2*) *Expenses covering postage as provided in Section 44.*

CHAPTER II-ELECTION DISTRICTS

Section 5. After the official announcement of the date of election, any change in administrative districts shall have no effect on election districts.

Section 6. The election committees of each voting district shall establish a registration place (*polling place*) in each voting district and publicly announce them by posters and newspapers prior to the date of registration. Wherever possible, such registration places (*polling places*) shall be established in a school, a building of the Korean Agricultural Association, etc.

Section 7. The election committees of the electoral districts shall publicly announce the place at which the ballot boxes shall be opened not later than five days prior to the date of election.

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CHAPTER III-POLL REGISTER

Section 8. Registration papers prescribed in Section *15*, Election Law, shall be prepared in accordance with the form attached in Appendix 1. Except for signature (or thumbprint if substituted for signature) the registration papers may be filled by people other than the voter.

The National Election Committee shall provide the election committees on all levels with copies of the Election Law and the Regulations. At the special request of a voter, each voting district election committee shall give an opportunity to such voter to check during office and voting hours, a copy of the Election Law and Election Regulations.

Section 9. When signing the registration paper, the voter shall exclusively use either Chinese or Korean characters or a mixture of both. If registration is accomplished by a thumbprint, this fact must be recorded on the registration paper in the column "Remark" and two witnesses have to sign this entry.

Section 10. A voter "Who has been in residence in a district," as defined in Section 16, Election Law, means a person who has his HOJUK in such district or who registered in KIRU-PU of such district and made his home there.

Section 11. Poll registers shall be prepared in accordance with the form attached in Appendix II.

Section 12. At the time at which the poll register is established the qualification of each registered voter shall be examined and decided on the basis of clear and definite evidence, wherever possible on the basis of official documents. Unless clear and definite evidence has been received that a registrant is ineligible to vote, he shall be recorded in the poll register.

Section 13 If anyone is denied the right to vote on the basis of the examination provided in the preceding section, he shall not be recorded in the poll register and shall be informed immediately of the reason in writing.

If the person affected objects to the decision, he may present an objection in accordance with Section 17, Election Law.

Section 14. An objection or request for review made in accordance with Section 17, Election Law, must state in writing the reasons for it, and wherever possible documentary evidence should be attached.

Request for review shall be presented through the election committee which decided on the objection. The latter shall forward without delay all

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pertinent documents to the election committee of the electoral district.

Section 15. When the objection or request for review is decided in favor of the objector, the committee shall without delay revise the poll register or shall direct its revision and shall announce such decision publicly. When the objection or request for review is decided against the objector, he must be notified without delay in writing.

The notification must be served either directly to the objector or to a person living with him.

Section 16. Poll registers shall be open for public inspection from 9 A. M. to 4 P. M. daily, including public holidays during the period of such inspection.

Section 17. A person who moved from the place where he has been registered shall return to vote to the polling place of the voting district where he is registered.

Section 18. If any documentary evidence concerning election is required of a public office, it must be prepared and presented without delay.

CHAPTER IV-ELECTION COMM TTEES

Section 19. The names of the members of election committees of all levels shall be publicly announced.

Section 20 Without prejudice to Section *6*, the headquarters of election committees of all levels may be located at the office of the corresponding administrative agency unless otherwise determined by the election committee concerned.

If a special location is determined, the superior committee must be notified without delay and the change must be duly publicized.

Section 21. Election committees of all levels shall be summoned by the respective chairmen. When more than one-third of the members requests a conference, the committee must be convened.

Section 22. The chairman of the election committees of all levels shall represent their respective committees and perform necessary administrative functions.

Section 23. The chairman or a member of an election committee of all levels shall not participate in the discussion of election matters which affect himself, his grandparents, parents, spouse, children and grandchildren, brothers

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and sisters, nephews, nieces, paternal uncles and aunts and their respective spouses. He may, however, have a voice in such matters if permission is given by the committee.

Section 24. Membership of election committees of all levels is honorary with appropriate allowances and travel expenses only.

The provisions concerning allowances and travel expenses shall be issued by the National Election Committee with the approval of the Chief Executive.

Section 25. The provisions concerning number, pay and travel expenses of secretaries and clerks of election committees of all levels shall be determined by the National Election Committee with the approval of the Chief Executive.

Section 26. Secretaries and clerks of election committees of all levels shall be appointed and removed by the respective chairmen in accordance with the resolution of the election committee concerned. However, officials and employees of the corresponding administrative agency may be appointed to such positions while in their regular offices.

Section 27. The duties of the National Election Committee are as follows:

(*1*) To appoint the election officials (*chairman, alternate chairman, members, and alternate members*) of the provincial election committees and to recall and replace them for violation of their duties;

(*2*) To instruct and supervise the subordinate election committees in all matters relating to the election;

(*3*) To inspect in general the election;

(*4*) To prepare and distribute registration papers and poll registers and to supervise the printing of ballots and envelopes;

(*5*) To issue and enforce rules and regulations necessary to put the Election Law and this regulation into effect;

(*6*) To prepare and carry out a budget for the election;

(*7*) To take such additional steps as are necessary to carry out the Election Law and this regulation.

Section 28. The duties of DO (*province*) and Seoul City election committees are as follows:

(*1*) To review the appointment of the election officials (chairman, alternate chairman, members and alternate members) of electoral districts concerned and to recall and replace them for violation of their duties;

(*2*) To instruct and supervise the subordinate election committees

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in all matters relating to the elections and to inspect the election;

(*3*) To prepare and present various reports concerning the election to the National Election Committee;

(*4*) To perform such additional functions as are necessary to conduct the elections within their jurisdiction.

Section 29. The duties of the election committees of the electoral districts are as follows:

(*1*) To review the appointment of the election officials (*chairman, alternate chairman, members and alternate members*) of the voting district election committees concerned and the election committees on the MYUN, EUP and DONG level, wherever established, and to recall and replace them for violation of their duties;

(*2*) To divide the electoral districts into voting districts;

(*3*) To decide on the request for review concerning registration in the poll register;

(*4*) To register candidates for representatives of the National Assembly;

(*5*) To open ballot boxes and to determine those elected and to prepare records of the election;

(*6*) To instruct and supervise the subordinate election committees in all matters relating to the election and to inspect the election;

(*7*) To prepare and present various reports concerning the election to the higher election committees;

(*8*) To issue public announcement and notices concerning the election;

(*9*) To perform such additional functions as are necessary to conduct the election within their jurisdiction;

Section 30. The duties of the election committees of voting districts are as follows:

(*1*) To administer all matters relating to the registration of voters and voting;

(*2*) To prepare the poll register and to decide on the objections to the poll register;

(*3*) To prepare ballot boxes and polling places and publicize their location;

(*4*) To prepare voting records and to safeguard ballot boxes and deliver them to the election committees of the electoral districts;

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(*5*) To prepare and present various reports concerning the election to the higher election committees;

(*6*) To perform such additional functions as are necessary to conduct the election within their jurisdiction.

Section 31. The duties of the election committees on the MYUN, EUP and DONG level, when established by the National Election Committee, are as follows:

(1) To assist, instruct and supervise the subordinate voting district election committees;

(2) To prepare and present various reports concerning election to the higher election committees;

(3) To perform such additional functions as are assigned to them by the National Election Committee.

Section 32. When no newspaper is published in an electoral district, the electoral district election committee shall publish the items prescribed in Sections *28, 30, 35,* Election Law, in the newspaper or newspapers which, in its opinion, are most widely circulated in the district.

Section 33. Election committees of all levels may request all governmental agencies for necessary assistance in matters relating to the election.

CHAPTER V-CANDIDATES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNING

Section 34. A person who registers as a candidate need not be a resident of that particular district nor have his BONJUK in that particular district.

Section 35. The application for registration of a candidate for the National Assembly shall be in writing and include the following: the name and signature of the candidate and those who recommend him (*in case of a recommended registration, the consent of the candidate*), their occupation, address, date of birth and party or organization affiliation, if any.

Those who recommend a candidate must have registered on the poll register in the electoral district concerned and must attach a certificate of registration of the election committee concerned.

Section 36. A candidate who desires to withdraw his candidacy shall submit in person to the election committee of the electoral district where he is registered a written statement of his withdrawal and the reasons therefor.

Section 37. When a candidate registers or withdraws, the election com-

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mittee of the electoral district concerned shall immediately notify the head of the City of Seoul, PU, EUP or MYUN where such candidate resides.

When a candidate dies, the head of the city of Seoul, PU, EUP or MYUN where such candidate resides shall immediately inform the election committee of the electoral district where such person is registered as a candidate.

Section 38. When the election committee of the electoral district concerned learns of the withdrawal or death of a candidate, it shall immediately cancel his registration.

Section 39. After registration, each candidate shall without delay report in writing to the election committee of the electoral district concerned the location of his election office, and name, address, occupation, party or organization affiliation of a person who will represent him in all matters relating to the election.

Section 40. The term "*public official*" as used in Section *29*, Election Law, shall not include members of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.

CHAPTER VI-USE OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS

Section 41. Unless special circumstances make it impossible, public buildings such as public halls and similar buildings dedicated to public use shall be at the disposal of any candidate upon his application at the regular rental rate.

Such application shall be presented to the manager of the building through the election committee of the voting district where the building is located.

Section 42. Unless schooling or other regular functions would be specially interfered with, the principal of every non-private school must permit the use of the school building as a place of public-election addresses of candidates.

The application for the use of a school building shall be presented to the principal of the school through the election committee of the voting district where the school is located.

Section 43. Permission for the use of buildings prescribed in the preceding two sections shall be granted in accordance with the following standards:

(*1*) When in several applications the use of the building is desired for the same time of the same day, the application first received shall have priority; when such applications are received at the same time, use shall be awarded to the candidate who has used public buildings less frequently, provided

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that the joint use of a building may be permitted;

(*2*) Not more than one permission for use of a public building shall be granted at each time.

CHAPTER VII - MAILS FREE OF CHARGE

Section 44. For the purpose of his election campaign, each candidate may mail free of charge one of the following types of mail to the registered voters of his electoral district, but not more than once:

(*1*) Letters of the same content in open or half-open envelopes, weighing not more than 10 grams;

(*2*) private postcards.

Section 45. A candidate who wants to mail one of the types of mail mentioned in the preceding section shall apply to a postoffice in the electoral district concerned with a certificate of the election committee of the electoral district giving the following information:

(*1*) The postoffice the candidate desires to use;

(2) The date on which the mail will be delivered to the postoffice;

(*3*) Number and type of mail;

(*4*) Name and address of the candidate.

Section 46. Franked election mail must be marked "*election*" on the upper left hand corner.

CHAPTER VIII - ELECTION PROCEDURE AND SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES

Section 47. Ballots shall be prepared in accordance with the form attached in Appendix III.

when the electoral district election committee determines the symbols before the name of each candidate in accordance with Section 33, Election Law, it shall assign *one stroke* to the candidate whose name has been placed first on the ballot, *two strokes* to the candidate whose name has been placed second on the ballot, etc.

Section 48. The election committee of each voting district shall keep the ballots under its seal until the voting begins.

Section 49. The ballot box shall be made in accordance with instructions set forth in Appendix IV. Each ballot box must have double lids and be under

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lock and key.

Section 50. Each voting district shall establish one or several sign boards and allocate to each candidate running in the electoral district adequate and equal space on each sign board. The National Election Committee shall publish detailed regulations concerning the size and material of the sign boards.

Each electoral district election committee and each voting district election committee shall print the word "*sample*" on handbills, posters and other publications which reproduce the ballot for purposes of the information of the voter in accordance with Section *35*, Election Law.

Section 51. On the day of the election no posters and sign boards for the purpose of campaigning will be permitted within 100 meters distance from the entrance of each polling place, nor shall any pamphlets or handbills be distributed within that distance.

Section 52. The chairman of each voting district election committee shall during the whole time of voting post at least one member of the election committee at the entrance of the separate room (*booth*) in which the ballots are marked. Each voting district election committee is responsible that the place where the voter marks the ballot is so arranged that no election official and no voter or other person may observe the marking of the ballot. The place where the ballots are marked will be provided only with tables, chairs, and writing materials.

When a candidate fails two days prior to the election, to furnish the voting district election committee with photographs as prescribed in section *35*, Election Law, the voting district election committee shall display only the name and the symbol assigned to such candidate at the entrance of the polling place and in the balloting room. The photograph to be furnished by each candidate for display at the entrance of each polling place shall not exceed *12 × 16.5 cm.*, the photograph for display in the balloting room shall not exceed *4 × 6.5 cm.*

The mark to be used by a voter to indicate the candidate of his choice shall be a cross, a circle, a stroke or similar symbol. Ballots filled by a voter with pictures or words are invalid.

Section 53 Time necessary for registration of voters and voting shall not be deemed to be absence from the usual duties of public officials and persons employed by others,

Section 54. Immediately before balloting commences, in the presence of more than half of the members of the committee and of voters who are present in the

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polling place, the chairman of the election committee of the voting district shall open the ballot box and show it to be empty and then lock the inner lid.

The chairman of each voting district election committee shall designate a member of the committee to observe during the whole time of voting the ballot box, to see that each voter properly casts the envelope into the ballot box.

Section 55. The "*notification of decision*," provided for in Section *34*, Election Law, means the notification made in accordance with Section *17*, Election Law.

Section 56. More than half of the members of the election committee of the voting district shall be present at the polling place during the period of voting.

Section 57. Decisions concerning questions dealt with in Section *34*, paragraph *2*, Election Law, shall be noted in the voting record.

Section 58. When a voter who has received a ballot is ordered to leave the polling place in accordance with Section *39*, paragraph *1*, Election Law, he shall return the ballot to the chairmen of the voting district election committee and such fact shall be noted in the voting record.

Section 59. When the balloting is over, the chairman of the election committee of the voting district shall without delay lock the lids of the ballot box and place his seals on both in the presence of voters.

Section 60. After the balloting is over, the unused ballots shall be counted and forwarded in closed envelopes to the election committee of the electoral district.

Section 61. The election committee of the voting district shall prepare a voting record describing the procedure of the voting with signatures and seals of the chairman and the members of the committee who have been present at the polling place.

Section 62. The following shall be recorded in the voting record:

(*1*) Outline of the procedure of voting;

(*2*) Total number of voters recorded in the poll register;

(*3*) Number of the ballots distributed;

(*4*) Number of unused ballots.

Section 63. When the ballots are being counted, the chairman of the election committee of the electoral district shall examine each ballot and have two persons engaged in the work of opening the ballots, separately compute the ballots each candidate has received. Voters may observe the opening of the ballot boxes at a designated place.

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Section 64. After the computation prescribed in the preceding section has been completed, the chairman of the election committee of the electoral district shall announce the votes each candidate has received in each voting district and thereafter he shall announce the total number of votes received by each candidate.

Section 65. When the validity of a ballot is in question, the decision shall be made by the chairman of the election committee of the electoral district with the concurrence of the majority of the members of such committee present.

Section 66. The invalidation of each vote shall be announced at such time as it is decided.

Section 67. The drawing of a lot as prescribed in Section *43*, paragraph *1*, Election Law, shall be recorded in detail in the election record.

Section 68. After the counting of the ballots has been completed, the election committee of the electoral district shall without delay prepare in three copies a record of the election, with the signatures and seals of the chairman and the members present of the election committee.

Section 69. The records of election shall contain the following:

(*1*) Outline of the procedure of the ballot box opening;
(*2*) Total number of voters recorded in the poll register;
(*3*) Total number of ballots distributed;
(*4*) Total number of ballots cast;
(*5*) Number of invalid ballots;
(*6*) Number of votes each candidate received;
(*7*) Determination of the candidate elected.

Section 70. In case actual voting is not necessary in accordance with Section *43*, Election Law, the election committee of the electoral district concerned shall immediately make announcement to this effect.

Section 71. The candidate elected without actual voting in accordance with Section *43*, Election Law, shall be determined by the election committee of the electoral district concerned at 9A. M. of the day of the election and such fact shall be announced publicly. When a second election takes place, the poll register prepared at the general election shall be used for such election.

CHAPTER IX-PROCEDURE IN CASE OF VIOLATION OF ELECTION PROVISIONS

Section 72. The police authorities and public prosecutors shall immediately

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report to the National Election Committee when they have started investigations concerning violations of Section *53*, Election Law.

Section 73. Except in case of a clear and present danger to the public peace, no person shall be arrested, confined or otherwise detained prior to commencement of prosecution by the police or public prosecutor for violation of Section *53*, Election Law, without a writ of a court; but even if a person is arrested in case of clear and present danger, a writ of a court must immediately be secured.

Section 74. Criminal cases against candidates and their accomplices for violation of Section *53*, Election Law, shall be tried in the first instance before a collegiate court of the district court.

Section 75. When a judgment is rendered in accordanee with Section *53*, Election Law, the chief judge of the court concerned shall without delay forward a copy of such judgment to the Chief Executive, the National Election Committee, and the election committee of the electoral district concerned.

SUPPLEMENTARY RULES

Section 76. These regulations shall be effective as of 22 March 1948.

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A/AC.19/W.45
3 April 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES OFFICES CONCERNING THE ELECTIONS

(Circulated by the Secretariat)

The Principal Secretary has received the following letter from the United States Liaison Officer concerning the program and activities of the Office of Civil Information, United States Army Forces in Korea, and the Department of Public Information, United States Army Military Government in Korea, in publicizing the elections scheduled for 9 May.

This letter is circulated for information purposes only.

2 April 1948

Mr. Petrus J. Schmidt
Principal Secretary
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
Duk Soo Palace
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Mr. Schmidt:

I - GENERAL

This report covers the program and activities of the Office of Civil Information, United States Army Forces in Korea, and the Department of Public Information, United States Army Military Government in Korea, in publicizing the elections scheduled for 9 May. Both offices have been working in close cooperation with the National Election Committee. In general, the publicity efforts of the Committee are being channeled through DPI and OCI.

Major efforts of the Office of Civil Information in regard to the election have been purely informative in nature; that is to say, to spread the word of the fact of the election and election procedures into all areas. In conjunction with the

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Subjects have included: "Description and Use of the Ballots," "The Necessity of Registering," "How and When to Register for the Elections," "Who is Qualified to Vote in May?".

Dr. Jaisohn Speech Hours - Dr. Jaisohn began devoting his regular Friday evening broadcasts to the coming elections several weeks ago. His general theme has been an appeal to the Koreans to vote.

Adult Education Hours - Saturdays 1830-1845 Hours. A program sponsored by the Department of Education to educate the Koreans on the democratic methods of elections and voting.

Lessons in Democracy - Tuesdays 1945-2000 Hours. Program written by Dr. Hahn, professor of Philosophy at Seoul University

Round-Table Discussion - Thursdays 1830-1900 hours. Half-hour discussion program made up of five leading Seoul citizens. Last two weeks the program has been devoted to the elections.

Military Government Hour - Tuesdays 1830-1900 Hours. Broadcast of 23 March 1948 dealt with an explanation of Public Law #5. Broadcast of 30 March 1948 was a drama showing the democratic way of voting.

Evenings News Commentary - Mondays through Fridays at 2130-2145 Hours. Prepared by OCI.

News Behind the News - Saturdays 1930-2000 Hours. The week's news in review interpreted for Korean interests, prepared by OCI.

There are approximately 175,000 radio receiving sets in South Korea, fairly well scattered throughout the peninsula. The relative scarcity of the sets makes their value great, and the number of listeners per set is believed very high on the basis of reliable reports. Korean officials place the figure of regular listeners to Station HLKA and its ten satellite stations at about one million daily.

Public Address Systems - In order to spread the election news, OCI and DPI have distributed approximately 80 public address

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No. 38 - An American statement outlining reasons for holding the election; Return of UNTCOK members from New York.

No. 39 - Complete instructions for registering, including extensive statement by National Election Committee on registrations; instructions given provincial governors and police chiefs by General Hodge.

No. 40 - Further details about registration; General Dean's remarks to meeting of provincial governors and police chiefs on principles of freedom which must be allowed voter and necessity for non-interference with voters in exercising their civic duties.

No. 41 - (Now going to press) Thumb-nail outline of reasons for holding election and how citizens should proceed to register and vote -- the who, what, when, where, why of the election; extensive story announcing that registration is now being carried out; special,headings urging Koreans to "Register Now".

Issues Nos. 37 through 39 were given normal circulation of 300,000 copies each. Issue No. 40 was doubled to 600,000. Issue No. 41 is being increased to 1,500,000 copies which should give a saturation distribution. Also, to gain attention of Koreans, Issue No. 41 is being printed on both sides in black and red, the red being used to emphasize necessity of registering now.

Air Drops - About half the issue is distributed by air drop carefully charted to reach the most inaccessible spots. About 25% is given direct distribution to villages and outlying places by courier service of the 6th and 7th Divisions. The balance is distributed through the ten branch offices of OCI, some through the message centers and some by jeep and truck. (Inclosure No. 2 is one of the briefer handbills.)

In addition to World News a special air drop of 600,000 copies of a pamphlet was made. This air drop contained

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of registration and voting was written in colloquial Korean by a bureau chief of DPI. The inside pages of the Farmers' Weekly this week are devoted to this essay; and the circulation of the weekly has been jumped from the usual 300,000 to 750,000 copies.

Adult education classes -- A separate field for dissemination of election material has been the popular and numerous adult education classes conducted in most areas of South Korea. Two articles on voting techniques and the meaning of the franchise have been distributed to every adult class - approximately 36,000. Additionally, extra copies of Farmers' Weekly have been diverted to the adult classes. The Department of Education on 29 March called in Seoul the 150 leaders in this mass education movement. DPI provided 150,000 extra copies of Farmers' Weekly featuring election news which these teachers will use as text-book material in their classes during the next two months. A separate election fund was made available by the Military Governor for election publicity in adult education classes. It is believed that publicity on the vote directed to those Korean adults just learning to read for the first time will be extremely valuable, inasmuch as these people will participate in the vote as a means of illustrating to their fellowmen their proficiency in the newly acquired art of reading and writing.

Fifty thousand copies of a colored poster encouraging the people to vote have been prepared by DPI for dissemination throughout South Korea. (Inclosure No. 5) Additionally, a single sheet picture poster illustrating the proper way to vote is being prepared in 32,000 copies for posting on bulletin boards. (Inclosure No. 6).

The production and publication of election material has not been confined to Seoul alone. Provincial DPI and OCI offices have done considerable amount of regional printing and poster work. OCI in Pusan, for example, has produced 50,000 posters

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General Hodge's complete statement on reasons for holding the election, the text of Resolution II which the Interim Assembly favored, and a statement by the Interim Assembly.

If registration lags, or if other impediments arise, we will be prepared to issue additional air drops on short notice. Also, for the balance of the campaign straight through the election day it hardly need be said that World News will give its fullest and most prominent attention to the subject.

A special air drop on registration was made on 31 March, 1 and 2 April when approximately 800,000 leaflets were dropped. Sample of this leaflet is attached.

Special election messages - In preparation now are special election messages to Koreans groups -- those engaged in fisheries industry, in agriculture, in education, in general industry, and for the women. These will outlining reasons why it is to the best interests of these groups to participate fully in the election. For example, in the fisheries industry -- the fact that establishment of valuable fishing grounds must be determined by international treaties and only a permanent Korean government can accomplish this.

Each recent issue of the Farmers' Weekly has stressed the need and opportunity of the forthcoming election. This publication, which is larger in size than the World News and leaflets for air drops, has gone in heavily for publicity regarding the UN Commission. Biographical sketches of Dr. Menon, Dr. Hoo, Mr. Paul-Boncour and Dr. Liu have already been used. The editorial purpose, of course, is to popularize the election through humanizing UN personalities.

The current issue of Farmers' Weekly deserves special mention. At the request of the National Election Committee, an excellent essay on the election describing the reasons for holding it, the prestige of the United Nations, and the method

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systems to various counties in South Korea to be placed in prominent out-door spots. These PA sets have radios and at specified times each day are tuned to the Korean Broadcasting System to get election news and instructions.

On 31 March, an American survey was conducted in the remote border area between Kyonsang Namdo and Cholla Namdo. Villagers had heard of the election by radio; county chairmen were preparing registration and voting procedures and the self-styled "intellectuals" of the area had decided to participate in the election as a patriotic duty, despite the fact that certain political leaders in Seoul are opposing the election.

Most of HLKA's programs are written in Korean. A sample "elections" broadcast of OCI's "News Behind the News" is attached to this report. (Inclosure No. 1).

III - PRESS, POSTERS AND PAMPHLETS

Major publications featuring election news are: World News (OCI) and Farmers' Weekly (DPI). (See Inclosures No's 3 and 4).

The last five issued of World News have given most prominent attention to the election. Typographically, the election stories have been given predominance over all other news. Special efforts have been made to keep the material simplified so that it will not serve only as information, but will form a guidance to all Koreans, even of the lowest educational level, as to how to proceed to register and to vote. We have recognized the election news as the most important project for OCI.

Following is a summary of material in the issued of World News affecting the elections :

No. 37 - General Hodge's announcement of the date of the elections; action by the Interim Assembly in calling for an election.

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National Election Committee and the Department of Public Information, South Korean Interim Government, (of which the director, OCI is adviser) a comprehensive program has been adopted to popularize the thought of an election in the minds of the people. The main avenues of publicity have been 1) radio; 2) specialized publications; 3) posters.

As is well known, Station HLKA, Seoul, is one of the powerful medium-wave stations in Eastern Asia. The programs of the Seoul broadcasts form a topic of lively discussion in unregimented South Korea. It is known from increasing reports from the North that the people who dare to listen to the South Korean station appreciate its program greatly and hold its authenticity in high regard. The escape of an announcer of Radio Pyongyang to South Korea recently has given much encouragement to the personnel of Station HLKA, for his comments are categorical to the effect that the Seoul station is held in wide respect throughout North Korea.

II - RADIO

The Korean Broadcasting System has carried the following programs since March 1, 1948 to publicize the coming Korean elections; National Election Committee Hour - a program sponsored by the Korean National Election Committee to explain in detail the qualifications necessary to vote and regulations governing the elections. Broadcasts are usually round-table discussions among the election committee members. Their schedule is :

Sundays	1930-2000 hours
Mondays	1945-2000 hours
Tuesdays ...	1930-2000 hours
Wednesdays .	1930-2000 hours
Thursdays ..	1945-2000 hours
Fridays	1930-2000 hours
Saturdays ..	2000-2030 hours

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attractiveness and importance of voting. By 9 April, according to current plans, 27 theatrical troupes will be wandering through the Korean country-side giving at least one performance a day, two when possible. The corrected English translation of the play is not available at this time but will be submitted separately. Each troupe will be composed of approximately 18 actors, actresses and stage hands. This program constitutes the biggest theatrical venture of its kind in Korean history. Enthusiasm of the participating members is reported as quite high, although there is the possibility of some extreme Leftist opposition to the players giving performances in the field.

Exhibition trains -- OCI also has an exhibition train which has just returned from a two-week tour of South Central Korea. The current drama being staged by this mobile unit is devoted to civic responsibility without particular reference to the franchise A special lecture given between the acts was prepared, however, so that the estimated 25,000 persons who saw the play during its recent run all received a strong message concerning the importance of the election.

Speaker program -- OCI's speaker program has regularly consisted of between 40 to 50 speakers travelling continuously throughout South Korea. For purposes of spreading the word of the election, Captain C.H. Braden has just completed two field trips on which he hired 113 deputy speakers whose full time will be utilized between now and the election in emphasizing to the people the need for participating in the program. These speakers use halls when halls are available; they travel to village market places; they engage local leaders in conversation. The Department of Public Information too has been allocated special funds for word-of-mouth campaigns. Each country in South Korea has a DPI representative. He has been authorized to hire extra help during the month of April in order to spread the word of

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the election.

Special Newspaper Project -- Seventeen daily newspapers in Seoul have formed a "Publicize the Election" committee. A special allotment of newsprint has been made to this committee for special election editions which will be distributed by each newspaper member of the committee. First issue of the election special is scheduled for 10 April. OCI is lending assistance in this cooperative venture which will do much to illustrate to the literate public that the majority of Korean editors and publishers are strongly backing the election.

OCI Centers -- In six cities of South Korea (Pusan, Chunchon, Chonju, Kwangju, Chongju and Inchon) the Office of Civil Information has established information centers. These centers feature pictorial displays and libraries. Special assistants have been hired during the current period to publicize the election to the thousands of people who throng to the centers daily.

V - MOTION PICTURES AND SLIDES

A Korean-produced, OCI-directed documentary film on the importance of the vote has just been completed. This film will be shown in theaters and, in its 16-mm form, to outdoor audiences throughout South Korea prior to the election. Outdoor audiences in Korea in good weather regularly average 3,000 persons.

Separately, the Department of Public Information's motion picture section is producing slides urging the citizens to vote. These slides will be turned over to every theatre with a motion picture projector in South Korea for use before and after the feature pictures.

Such are the main lines of activity in publicizing the election. It is believed that the cumulative effect of the program will be immense and that, as a result, the people of

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Korea will not merely participate heavily in the election but will gain a lasting insight into the democratic processes of government and of Democracy itself.

VI - SUMMARY

The above is both a plan and a report of current activities. The volume and variety of information concerning the election and election procedures will be progressively increased and widened as the campaign proceeds. In general, however, the news disseminating media and vehicles described above will be utilized to the fullest to bring to all the people of South Korea complete information of the election and its procedures. From time to time I shall give you copies of the more important posters, radio talks, speeches, etc....

In this connection I refer to Section C, paragraph 13 of the letter of Mr. K.P.S. Menon, then Chairman of UNTCOK, dated 17 March 1948, to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, and the reply of General Hodge to Mr. Jean-Louis Paul-Boncour, succeeding chairman, particularly the statement that "an educational campaign on a non-partisan basis would be extremely desirable." For your information, no other basis was ever considered, in fact it is inconceivable that any other basis would be attempted by the United States Command.

I wish to re-emphasize the position of the Commanding General that he is most anxious to do everything in his power to meet the required standards of the UNTCOK for the conduct of elections, as well as to assist further in acquainting the Commission with local conditions.

Sincerely

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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Enclosure No 38

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7 inclosures

1. Radio-Script.
2. Air Drop--Notice of Registration.
3. Farmers' Weekly
4. World News
5. Poster Urging Registration of Voters.
6. Poster with clear photographs showing most important voting procedures.
7. Distribution plan of CCI and DPI. "

Note from the Secretariat :

The inclosures are available for Delegates in the offices of the Secretariat (reading room, Duk Soo Palace).

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HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Education
Seoul, Korea

GENERAL ELECTION FAMILIARIZATION PROGRAM

1. Introduction. This program is established so that voters in the approaching general election may exercise their right of vote understandingly and in accordance with their personal desires. The program will be given first priority at all levels in the educational system of South Korea.

2. Objectives. Specific objectives of the program are as follows:

a. To familiarize all potential voters with the ballot which will be used in the approaching election.

b. To familiarize all potential voters with the rules and regulations which will govern the approaching election.

c. To familiarize potential voters with the techniques of voting.

d. To familiarize all potential voters with the significance of the approaching election.

e. To establish the following concepts in the minds of voters:

(1) Elections are held so that all eligible voters may express their will in the determination of government.

(2) All eligible voters have a right and an obligation to cast their vote in an election.

(3) Each voter has an obligation to become familiar with the issues and personalities involved in an election.

(4) Each voter has an obligation to mark his ballot in accordance with his personal decision as to how the nation will be served best from among the issues and personalities covered by the ballot.

3. Responsibility.

a. Final responsibility for the General Election Training Program will devolve upon individual teachers in public elementary and middle schools.

b. The Department of Education will hold a conference to which the chiefs of provincial bureaus of education, the chiefs of the social section in provincial bureaus of education, and the two adult education directors in each gun or comparable administrative unit will be invited. At this conference, information and methods of teaching relative to the objectives listed in paragraph 2 above will be brought to the attention of all personnel through a training program.

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. Provincial chiefs, Bureau of Education, gun soos or comparabl administrative officials will have supervisory responsibilities in their respective areas in regard to the implementation of this program.

d. Bu and gun adult education directors under the supervision of their administrative chiefs will be responsible for transmitting information and methods to the principals in their areas.

e. Elementary and secondary school principals will have the following responsibilities:

(1) To schedule training classes for all eligible voters within their areas. Such classes will be held at times which are most convenient for voters. An effort will be made to harmonize the election training program with the regular school program but in case of conflict, the Election Training Program will be given priority. Enough classes will be scheduled to provide training for all voters. Classes will be offered more than once so that voters who may be unable to attend a given meeting may have a second opportunity. Special attention will be given to the convenience of women in scheduling the General Election Familiarization Program.

(2) To provide teachers for these classes.

(3) To provide facilities for the classes, including light and heat as may be necessary.

(4) To provide teaching materials for the program, using supplies which belong to the school.

(5) Through regular supervisory channels, to supervise the teachers who are in charge of classes.

(6) To ccoperate with other principals where areas overlap.

(7) To give thorough and wide publicity to the training program, giving special emphasis to the day and hours at which classes will be held.

(8) To ascertain that instruction is non-partisan in nature.

(9) To make reports on the course.

f. Teachers in the General Election Familiarization Program will be responsible for accomplishing the objectives listed in Paragraph 2 above.

4. Class activities. It will be necessary for individual teachers to harmonize class activities with local conditions. In general, however, it is recommended that classes be conducted with a minimum amount of formality, that students be given an opportunity to mark hypothetical ballots or to witness a demonstration of a hypothetical election, and that students be given an opportunity to understand the principles which underly democratic elections.

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5. Teaching aids. Teachers will be expected to use all of the teaching aids which are available and which will help to obtain the objectives. In addition to normal teaching aids they should use sample ballots, published regulations for the general election, and published pamphlets on the principles of democratic elections.

6. Financial support. Government paid officials will perform their duties connected with this program without additional remuneration. All school buildings, supplies, and equipment which may be necessary for conducting this program will be utilized without expectation of reimbursement.

7. Reports. All school principles will report, upon completion of the course, through regular channels, giving the following information:

a. Total number of classes offered by the school.
b. Total number of women who attended the classes.
c. Total number of men who attended the classes.
d. Total number of persons who attended the classes.

Provincial chiefs, bureau of education, will consolidate their reports and forward them to the Director of Education, South Korean Interim Government.

8. Budget. The following budget is proposed.

a. National conference for provincial (20 persons), gun and bu (312 persons) officials, totalling 332 in number.

(1)	Transportation	(332 . 2500)	₩830,000.00
(2)	Food and lodging	(332 . 2500)	830,000.00
(3)	Miscellaneous		10,000.00
(4)	Sub-total		1,670,000.00

b. Mimeographing

(1)	Sample ballots	200,000 @ ₩3 *	₩600,000.00
(2)	Election law pamphlets	200,000 @ ₩9 **	1,800,000.00
(3)	Sub-total		2,400,000.00

* 400 reams of legal size paper.
** 1200 reams of legal size paper.

c. Total - 4,070,000.00

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SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 179

1 April 1948

PROVISIONS FOR TEMPORARY FAMILY REGISTERS

Pending action on the subject matters hereof by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and the enactment of legislation pursuant thereto, the following shall govern:

SECTION I. The purpose of this ordinance is to provide, until North and South Korea shall be unified, measures for temporary family registers for persons now residing in Korea, South of Thirty-Eight Degrees North Latitude (hereinafter referred to as *South Korea*) whose family registers are presently in Korea, North of Thirty-Eight Degrees North Latitude (hereinafter referred to as *North Korea*).

SECTION II. *a.* Any person who on 15 August 1945 had his family register in North Korea and who now or hereafter resides in South Korea, may designate his existing place of residence in South Korea as his provisional permanent domicile, and apply to the competent authority for initial entry in the family registration books.

b. The application mentioned above shall state expressly the permanent domicile in North Korea, and a copy or extract of material facts from the family registration book and the matters set forth in Section 11 of Government General Order Number 154, dated December, 1922, (*Korean Family Registration Order*) shall be submitted therewith. If the copy or extract required cannot be supplied, a certificate of the facts made by two persons over twenty years of age having knowledge of the facts, shall be submitted with the application.

c. Heads of pu, ku, eup, or myun, upon the receipt of applications pursuant to the above, shall compile the temporary family registers in conformity with Sections *3* to *6*, inclusive, of the Korean Family Registration Order.

SECTION III. *a.* Heads of pu, eup, and myun having jurisdiction thereof, shall compile temporary family registers in conformity with Section 29 of Governor General Instruction Number 15, dated March, 1923 (*Enforcement Procedure for the Korean Family Registration Order*), in behalf of those persons

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having permanent domiciles in South Korea on 15 August 1945, and whose family registers are located in North Korea and not available to them for use.

b. Any person coming under the foregoing subsection, may apply for a family registration, with the provisions of Section *II* hereof to apply *mutatis mutandis*.

SECTION IV. *a.* The family registers compiled in accordance with Section III and IV hereof, shall have legal effect as family registers under the Korean Family Registration Order until family registers in North Korea shall be available again, after North and South Korea are reunited.

b. The acts notified in domestic relations, based upon the temporary family registers created pursuant to Sections *III* and *IV* hereof, shall have the same legal effect as though based upon the original family registers, insofar as not inconsistent with the original family register.

SECTION V. Any person who makes a false statement, application, or certificate under Sections *II* and *III* hereof, shall be punished upon conviction by not more than ten (*10*) years' penal servitude or fine of not more than two hundred thousand won (*W 200,000*).

SECTION VI. This ordinance shall be effective on the date appearing hereon.

APPROVED:

WILLIAM F DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

SEAL
USAMGIK

RECOMMENDED:

AHN CHAI HONG
Civil Administrator

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 19

30 October 1945

Reprinted Copy

SECTION

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SECTION I DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

After four long years of war, from which they emerged victorious, American Forces landed upon your shores the friends and protectors of the Korean people. They came for the avowed purpose of requiring the complete and permanent eviction of all Japanese military forces from Korea and eliminating all Japanese militaristic and nationalistic ideology. In addition to that objective, the Military Government was instructed to take steps to effect complete political and administrative separation of Korea from Japanese social, economic, and financial control; to facilitate development of a sound Korean economy and to work towards the restoration of a free, independent and responsible Korea. The program of Military Government included taking over all Japanese property as rapidly as possible for the benefit of the Korean people, relieving labor from the condition of absolute servitude under which it had existed for the last forty years, returning to the farmers the lands which had been wrested from them by Japanese guile and treachery, and giving to the farmer a fair and just proportion of the fruits of his sweat and labor, restoring the principles of a free market, giving to every man, woman and child within the country equal opportunity to enjoy his just and fair share ot the great wealth with which this beautiful nation has been endowed.

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Upon the arrival of the American Forces the Americans found that to support the war Japan drained food and other living commodities from Korea until she was weak from starvation. Production of consumer goods had all but ceased. There was a wholesale embezzlement of Government funds. The currency had been deliberately inflated.

Law and order was immediately established. All seized property that could possibly be of benefit to the Korean people was preserved for their use. Grain was moved to areas where starvation existed.

Because of the long continued exploitation of Korea's wealth and the oppression of her people, and the fact that the people had been prohibited from carrying out during the years of Japanese oppression those pursuits of life and happiness which are normal to a rich and aggressive race, the people have not been able to produce goods fast enough to prevent widespread malnutrition, disease, and suffering during the coming winter. In addition, certain groups, with the sole idea of acquiring the wealth of the Korean people for themselves, have prevented labor from returning to employment, children from returning to school, and farmers from selling the produce of their lands. Such conditions have created within Korea an emergency which for the sole protection of the people can only be met by extraordinary measures which will inure to their benefit. As all of the people know the American Nation is a powerful nation. Its people, however, are gentle with the true gentleness that comes only through an appreciation of their own good fortune and in their desire to protect others against adversity. At this time the representatives of the American people in Korea foresee that their friends, the Korean people, are threatened in their security and right to be warm and well fed during the coming winter. Facilities, raw materials, and labor are available within the country which, if utilized properly, will prevent suffering. Rigid emergency controls are therefore hereby established, in order to prevent such conditions from existing which will harm the people. Such temporary measures will be withdrawn as quickly as the emergency ceases.

SECTION II PROTECTION OF LABOR

The right of any individual or group of individuals to accept employment and to work unmolested shall be respected and protected. Any interference with this right is unlawful.

In the interest of preventing suspension or reduction of output in industries which are declared by the Military Government of Korea to be essential to the people's livelihood, disputes arising over terms and conditions

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of labor will be settled by a mediation board set up by the Military Government of Korea whose decision will be final and binding on all parties. Until the matter is presented to the Labor Mediation Board and a decision is reached, production will continue.

SECTION III PROTECTION AGAINST PROFITEERING

To aid in assuring an equitable distribution of commodities necessary to the livelihood of the people, at a price within the financial resources of the people, the hoarding of essential commodities and/or their sale at an excessive price, which would result in profiteering at the expense of the people, is hereby declared unlawful.

SECTION IV PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC AGAINST ACTS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE

The following acts are hereby declared unlawful:

a. Knowingly making any false statement orally or in writing to any member of or person acting under the authority of USAFIK or the Military Government of Korea in a matter of official concern or in any manner attempting to defraud the Military Government of Korea.

b. Since the program of the Military Government of Korea is for the people's welfare, the obstructing, attempting to obstruct, or contravening any orders or announced program of the Military Government of Korea whether by acts, conspiracies, intimidation, corruption, or bribery of any person.

c. Prejudicing the people's welfare by directing or participating in acts of discipline, threats, coercion, or any other form of intimidation or victimization (including boycotting) against any person cooperating in any form directly or indirectly with USAFIK or the Military Government of Korea.

SECTION V REGISTRATION OF NEWSPAPERS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS

In order that freedom of speech and freedom of the press may be preserved and safeguarded without being perverted to unlawful and subversive purposes, the registration of every organization engaged in printing of books, pamphlets, papers or other reading materials in Korea south of 38° North Latitude sponsored, owned, directed, controlled, or managed by any natural or juridical person is hereby ordered. Such registration will be accomplished within ten (10) days after the effective date of this order or in the case of new publications not less than ten (10) days before publication, by

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filing in duplicate by registered mail addressed to the Military Government of Korea, Capitol, Seoul, the name of the organization; the places where printed and published; the names of the persons employed in the printing and publishing; the name of each person sponsoring, owning, directing, controlling, managing or otherwise influencing the organization, its activities or operations or the material printed and published; an accurate description of every form, printing and publishing, used or proposed to be used by the organization, including exact facsimiles of the format, character and size of each type of printed matter; the financial backing, capital, funds, property, and assets of the organization including the amount of critical essential supplies on hand and intended future sources in such detail as to reflect the financial ability of the organization to operate and maintain the news and editorial services proposed to be rendered, the name and address of each person financially interested in the organization or enterprise.

SECTION VI PENALTY

Any person violating the provisions of this ordinance shall, upon conviction by a Military Occupation Court, suffer such punishment as the court shall determine.

SECTION VII EFFECTIVE DATE OF ORDINANCE

This ordinance is effective immediately.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General United States Army
Military Governor of Korea

Date of publication: 28 December 1945.

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IMMEDIATE ACTION

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
APO 235 Unit 2

1 April 1948

SUBJECT: Election Procedure Observation by American Personnel.

TO : All CCAO's

1. Each CCAO will be directly responsible for maintaining constant observation of election procedures within his jurisdiction. This observation will be in two phases.

a. Phase I - Pre-election Observations

(1) The CCAO's, by use of presently available officer and equivalent grade DAC personnel, will maintain constant observation of the following:

(a) Dissemination of election information to the public.

(b) Conduct of parties, groups, youth organizations, etc., who participate in election, to include electioneering methods, programs and platforms, any intimidation of electorate.

(c) Same as (b) but as applied to those who oppose the election.

(d) Operation of Voting District, Myun, Gun, Electoral District and Provincial Election Committee. (Reference Chapter IV, Regulations for Implementing the Law.)

(e) Continuous check of registration procedure during prescribed period to include all echelons listed in (d) above. (Reference Sections 15 & 16 of Election Law).

(f) Immediately after Registration period, check for implementation of Sections 16 & 17 of the Election Law.

b. Phase II - Election Day and Ballot Tabulation

(1) Each CCAO, by use of presently available officer and equivalent grade DAC personnel, plus additional personnel to be furnished by CG, USAMGIK, will maintain the following:

(a) Two observers in each Electoral District to separately spot-check voting districts throughout the Electoral District. (Reference: Sections 30-40 of the Election Law.)

(b) One observer with each Provincial Election Committee. (Reference: Sections 30-40 of the Election Law.)

(2) The same observers as in b. (1) (a) will report to the Electoral District Headquarters at the close of election and will observe the opening of the ballot boxes, the tabulation of ballots, etc. (Reference: Sections 41-46 of the Election Law).

2. Every effort will be made to visit each voting district within your province at some time during Phases I and II listed in par 1 above.

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3. An accurate chronological Provincial log of all observations will be maintained. Logs will be consolidated at Provincial level and will be forwarded to USAMGIK, on call, after the election period.

4. It is directed that American personnel DO NOT interfere with the operation of election procedures. In the event of violations of the law and/or the regulations, the violation and/or discrepancy will be called to the attention of the chairman (or his representative) of the election committee concerned. A report of such violation, etc, will be made to the next higher election committee and to the CCAO concerned.

/s/ W. F. Dean
W. F. DEAN
Maj. General, United States Army
Commanding

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SEOUL

HEADQUARTERS
40th MILITARY GOVERNMENT COMPANY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER
CITY HALL SEOUL, KOREA

1. Registration Period.

Upon announcement of a National Election to be held on/or about 9 May 1948 by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and subsequent orders from the Commanding General, USAFIK, the City of Seoul began setting up the necessary machinery to take care of the education of voters, handling of publicity, instruction of Election Committees required in such an operation.

Upon the long awaited announcement came many comments. Throughout the City posters appeared both praising the election and damning the election; the majority of posters were of praise.

The Department of Public Information, National, allocated paper to the City of Seoul for an educational and publicity program to instruct the citizens of Seoul in the Election. The City of Seoul published approximately seventeen pieces of promotional material, specimens appended. This educational material was published for a program which had to be completed in a very short time and an excellent job was done by both Korean and American officials in this phase of the program, in that very few if any Koreans had ever heard of elections, free or otherwise, by the general public.

Some difficulty was encountered in that the Koreans could not realize that posters were of any value outside of town and district offices. Radio programs were instituted with an excellent coverage in Seoul by all channels, re radio, newspaper, handbills, civic organizations, posters, etc.

The City of Seoul formed instruction teams to canvass the City speaking to groups of men and women and instructing them in the proper procedures for registration and casting of their ballots. Out of the ten Electoral Districts, including 737 voting Districts, these instruction teams made at least one talk in each voting district, particular emphasis being paid to the female population. These teams were made up of City employees and were supervised by City Election Committee members.

The City Election Committee through the District's Election Committees, established registration polls throughout the City. As stated above, 737 polls were established, the majority of these being in private citizen's homes and offices. Each registration poll was clearly marked by signs and posters.

The City Election Committee appointed several teams to spot check registration polls during the registration period. These teams made reports in Korean, through Korean channels, to the National Election Committee.

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Lt. Col. James E. Wilson, appointed ten American observers from his officer and civilian staff. Each observer was to cover a district of the City assigned to him, with an interpreter and one American soldier. The assignment of the ten Electoral Districts of Seoul were as follows:

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Dong Dai Moon District B - Mr. Peter J. Carroll
Dong Dai Moon District A - Capt. Wm. B. Keller
Choong No Koo District B - Mr. Ed Gray
Choong No Koo District A - Mr. H. Stevens
Su Dai Moon Koo - Mr. Lucius Smith
Choong Koo - Capt. Thomas Johns
Seung Dong Koo - Mr. C. W. O'Leary
Yong San Koo - Lt. H. Noruk
Ma Po Koo - Miss Mildred Weber
Yung Dong Po Koo - Mr. C. Leonard

During the daily American observation of the registration polls, 263 out of the 737 polls were covered. Various reports received from the UN Commission stated that the people were being forced to register under threat of withdrawal of their rice rations. Special teams were sent out to uncover such tactics but no evidence was uncovered. It is possible that in one or two small isolated cases that this might have happened, but it is very doubtful that it could have been widespread.

Twelve (12) polls were attacked during the registration period. The culprits were in most cases apprehended by the Police. In all cases, registration was voluntarily and spontaneously effected by the registrants as soon as the news of the attacks and subsequent loss of records became known.

The following is a digest of outstanding incidents reported by the American observers during the registration period.

DONG DAI MOON DISTRICT B. Registration quiet and orderly throughout the District. Peace Preservation Parties in the form of youth groups evident at a few polls. No more than six members present at any one poll. Nothing unusual during registration period.

DONG DAI MOON DISTRICT A. In several registration polls in this district the Youth Organizations had formed protective teams for the polls, and in one or two instances their flags and slogans were present in the polls. The City Election Committee was informed of all infractions of the law and corrective action ensued, being at times a day or so later. Comment of observer: "Most people seem to register in the morning hours. None in the afternoon and evenings when polls are subject to attacks."

CHOONG NO KOO DISTRICT B. In this district there appeared on several public walls and billboards on 2 April 1948, posters reading, "Emergency alert for Korean personnel from 1 April until after the Election. It is expected there may be riots, fighting fires, etc. and each citizen is asked to report to the police immediately any evidence of violence of any sort", signed Chief Chang. These were ordered down immediately as no such order had been issued by the National Government but their purpose was served before being torn down, credit to Chief Chang for some fast slick thinking. One registration office moved from Dai Dong Youth Headquarters to a more suitable office site.

CHOONG NO KOO DISTRICT A. Youth guards present at most polls during registration. Two polls stoned one night, otherwise quiet and everything usual.

SU DAI MOON KOO. An admitted extremely "left" section of the City. Youth guards were present at most of the polls in this area. These guards appearing after one poll was attacked. Early registration was extremely heavy in this district and several new polls had to be set up. The only district in which one or two polls

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reported that all women did not register as they were "ashamed" to visit the polls. When asked an explanation of "ashamed", they replied "old customs". Many polls received anonymous letters threatening the registration officials. One of the polls attacked in this area was attacked by a sword wielding individual.

YOUNG SAN KOO. A very quiet district of the City comparable to the Choong Koo District. No unusual incidents.

MA PO KOO. The second of the admitted "left" areas of the City. Populated by a rather poor class of working people and river front rabble rousers. A case of house to house canvassing by Election Officials in an effort to get 100% registration was reported by one of the American observers in this area. No undue pressure was brought upon the registrants, the report continued. Many people in this area are illiterate and difficulty was encountered in putting across to them the necessity of registering and the importance of voting. Police were nervous and on a constant alert in this area.

YONG DONG PO. Relative quiet district during registration. No complaints received from registrants, and only one complaint received from Election Committee, that of having their posters removed during the night which is believed to be normal practice of theft throughout Korea.

CHOONG KOO. The central district of the City. The registration in this area was very quiet and orderly and no incidents or unusual happenings occurred. The presence of the Police, Election Committee, and UN, in and around this district at all times had a very quieting effect on voters, rioters, rightists and leftists.

SEUNG DONG KOO. Slightly "Pink" area of the City. Two registration polls attacked and reports made to the UN Commission that registration was forced. Special observation teams put into this area, but no evidence of forced registration was uncovered in and around the polls. It was impossible for teams to enter into all homes and search out conditions there as to forced registration. The Students Association and one other youth league plastered many walls with placards telling the Korean public that they, the youths, would protect them from the ever present "Red Danger".

II. <u>UN OBSERVATION AND COMMENTS</u>.

Report on UN teams covering the Choong No Koo District B, Choong Koo, and Su Dai Moon Districts. The report turned in by the American observer who accompanied this team stated that the team had its own interpreter and seemed very interested in the proceedings of the registration. Quote from closing paragraph of American observer's report. "The UN Commission was quite interested. However, the Philippine delegate kept wanting to go home although the others seemed to feel it was good for them to be seen going around."

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, at the request of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the UN, arranged inspection tours for two teams from the UN. Guides and interpreters were provided. Plans originally called for these teams to take cross sections of the City chosen for their political, business, residential and socialogical aspects as well as geographical location. In other words the UN wanted to cover all aspects. However, one team made a rather abortive tour, and the other made its visits so long at each place that only a half dozen spots were checked.

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III. INTERIM PERIOD.

The period following registration of eligible voters and before Election Day was set aside for all individuals interested in running in the Election to register as candidates. In nine of the ten electoral districts of the City of Seoul, this was accomplished without difficulty. In the Dong Dai Moon A District, Syngman Rhee was one of the first candidates to register. During the last day in which candidates could register Mr. Danny Choi entered his name as a candidate. The City Election Committee refused to take Mr. Choi's name as a candidate, stating that he had not registered as such during the proper time. Mr. Choi took his case to the National Election Committee who admitted him as a candidate for the Election. One week before Election Day, Mr. Choi's name was withdrawn from the ballots by order of the National Election Committee who stated that Mr. Choi had forged names on his application for candidacy.

No delay, except on the one ballot on which S. M. Rhee and Danny Choi were running, was encountered in the printing of the ballots. The printers Seoul Shin Moon Co. and Kong In Sa Co. were very cooperative and did an excellent job in the printing of the ballots.

During this interim period an intensified campaign of Election publicity was put into effect by the National Department of Public Information and City of Seoul Department of Public Information. Posters were placed in strategic points throughout the City and a sound truck was dispatched into the City urging the people to go out and vote on 10 May 1948, Election Day.

Also during this period, individual candidates turned out in truly Stateside style of electioneering. Posters, placards, and bands were used. Many of the candidates equipped themselves with portable public address systems and toured the City making stump speeches outlining their platforms. Even though it was felt by this headquarters that in some cases these individual electioneering parties would be subject and would receive attacks from opposing parties and groups, such attacks did not take place.

During this Interim Period, the District offices in the City of Seoul in connection with "M" Div. Police, set up the "Peace Preservation Parties". These parties began a nightly patrol of the City enforcing curfew and making checks on the security of election polls. The members of the Peace Preservation Party were recruited from the ranks of various youth organizations within the City and included men from all walks of life and all political parties, as brought out by the fact that some of these members later attacked polls and attempted to destroy the ballots cast therein. Upon apprehension by the police of such members, they were proven to be "leftist".

IV. ELECTION AND BALLOT COUNT.

The City of Seoul was divided into ten (10) Electoral Districts, and these electoral districts were further broken down into 737 voting districts, each voting district having one poll in it. These polls were set up in public buildings, private business offices, and in many cases in open lots under tents. Each poll was set up along a pattern set by the National Election Committee.

Rope aisles leading up to a table where registrant presented his or her registration slip and received one ballot and one envelope. The aisle then led to a booth inclosed on three sides with a poster displaying all candidates names, pictures, and

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place and mark on the ballot. Each of these booths was equipped with a pencil for the marking of the ballots. The ballot was marked in the booth, placed in an envelope and then the voter walked over to the ballot box and placed the ballot in the envelbpe into the box. There were present in the poll the following people, voters and election committee members only. Election Committee members in all cases made it a point not to touch the ballots after they were handed to the voters, and under no excuse would an Election Committee member approach the booths while a voter was in them marking his ballot. At all polls, Peace Preservation Party members were present around the outside of the poll or polling area - and were called in only when a disturbance was evident or had taken place.

During the voting period several incidents occurred. They were as follows:

	Time	District	Incidents
8th	2130	Song Tong	Somebody attempted to set fire to Mr. Kim Pyong Yong's house, (Local chairman of Election Committee) by throwing a beer bottle full of gasoline. No damage.
9th	0530	Song Tong	Hwang Hak Dong Office was attacked same as above. No damage.
	1915	Chong No	Tai Dong Newspaper bombed by home-made grenade. No damage.
	2030	Chong No	Members of Hywan Bo Dan caught 2 men, found home-made bombs. Seized by Police.
	2030	Chung Boo & Yong San	Same incident occurred in each of these districts. No damage.
	2245	Ma Po	Police arrested 3 men. (Chun Pyong & Tai Han & Tai Dong Youth). They stated they had been ordered to attack railroad station and damage locomotives and tracks
10th	0030	Tong Dai Moon	Police questioned and arrested 4 men who had been instructed and given plans to attack voting station #2 of this district between the hours of 0900 and 1200, 10 May. They were then to meet in the Bong Chong at 1500. Police seized 1 stick dynamite; 23 caps; 1 box gunpowder; 17 home-made bombs; 1 bottle gasoline; 2 knives; 9 iron bars; 150 pieces iron and 1 bag sulphur.
	0800	Song Buk	Police arrested 2 members of South Korean Labor Party at Shin Sul Dong Polling booth, who planned a disturbance.
	0830	Tong Dai Moon	Someone attempted to start a fire with American cigarettes and matches at the Lay Chi Dong Polling booth.
	0840	Chung Boo	About 6 men attacked the Kwang Hi Dong Polling booth with homemade grenade, destroyed 1 house, injured 1 civilian. Police arrested 4, killed 1 and wounded 1

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	Time	District	Incidents
10th	0900	Chung Boo	2 men attacked Chang Chung Dong Polling booth. 1 man had pistol when he attacked. Police arrested 1 man without pistol and killed him when he attempted escape. 1 civilian injured accidentally at that time. Later he died in hospital.
	0915	Chong No	Infringement of the election rules. Canvasser of Candidate Choi, Ki Sul, distributed some handbills near Ik Sung Dong #1 Polling booth.
	0950	Chung Boo	Police found 1 unexploded homemade grenade near To Dong Polling booth #2. No arrests.
	1230	Chung Boo	Police arrested 3 mobs at To Dong Polling booth #1, who attacked with bombs which did not explode.
	1230	Tong Dai Moon	Group entered Chong No 5 Ka Polling booth #1, 3 arrested. Explosives confiscated.
	1230	Chong No	2 men threw hand grenades in Nai Ja Dong Polling booth #2, arrested 2. No damage.
	1300	Chung Boo	5 men entered with bottles of gasoline for attempted arson in To Dong Polling booth #1. All arrested.
	132[illegible]	Su Dai Moon	2 men attacked Chung Chong No. 3 Ka Polling booth #3 with homemade grenades. Child injured. 2 arrested.
	1320	Chong No	Homemade bomb exploded in back yard of Su, Yung Ki's house. (Dong Office Clerk) No damage.
	1330	Chong No	2 men threw homemade hand grenade in home of Han, Bong Soo, #47 Ok In Dong. 2 arrested by Chong No Police. 1 slightly wounded.
	1330	Tong Dai Moon	Police arrested 2 men near Tong Dai Moon Polling booth #4 for planning an attack on polling booth with homemade grenades.
	1330	Chong No	While Choi, Sung Hak, 23, was testing a homemade bomb it exploded and he was injured. He had planned to attack election offices. Chong No Police arrested him.
	1400	Song Tong	2 mobs attempted to burn the Sang Wang Sib Ni Dong Polling booth #7 with 2 bottles of gasoline. Were arrested.

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	Time	District	Incidents
10th	1515	Chong No	A homemade grenade was thrown into Hang Hung Dong Polling booth #1 but it exploded outside of the office. No arrest has been made.
	1530	Yong San	Kang, Shin Chul, a member of the SKLP and 5 of his followers attempted to attack 3 election offices with hand grenades and nitrate bottles. They were arrested before they could follow through on their plans.
	1615	Yong San	A colored soldier driving by the front of 2 Ka, Wong Hyo Bo Polling booth in a car fired in the office and one civilian was seriously wounded. M.P.'s arrested him.
	1800	Chong No	A member of Peace Preservation Guard questioned a suspicious appearing man at So Jik Dong Polling booth. The man fled. Police chased and caught him. The man suddenly grabbed the policeman's carbine and dealt him a blow on the right cheek with his left hand. The policeman wrested the rifle from him and shot him in the stomach. The man died later at the hospital.
	1900	Song Dong	Someone threw poison into the well of Kim Chu Suk's house at Ching Dang Dong #103.
	1900	Yong Dong Po	An ex-Korean constabulary man and 3 other soldiers fought with members of Peace Preservation Guard at front of Yang Pyong Dong Polling booth. A member of the guard was beaten by the ex-soldier.

Further incidents noticed by American observers were:

In Ma Po Koo a few boxes were locked and sealed before 1900 hours, 10 May 1948, but in each of these cases it was determined that all registrants had voted as these polls had a small number of registrants. During the count in this area, the boxes were inspected closely and no cases of tampering were uncovered. The majority of invalid votes were blank or marked in more than one place.

In Tong Dai Moon B District all was orderly and nothing unusual happened in the counting and opening of the boxes except in one case a box did not have a hasp and it was not possible to lock it. However, it was tied with a rope and sealed with paper and stamped by the Election Committee.

In Choong No B District one ballot box was sealed and locked before 1900 hours, 10 May 1948. Election Committee Chairman of that poll stated that all who wanted to vote had done so, and the box had been locked and sealed 30 minutes before the designated time.

In Sung Dong District the voting and count of the ballot was very orderly and no unusual or illegal happenings occurred.

In the Su Dai Moon District no unusual or illegal activities occurred. Count of the ballot was very orderly and regular.

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In the Yong Dong Po District of the City the American observers had only high praise of the election in general and the work of the Election Committee.

In the Chong No A District everything, including the casting of ballots and the counting of ballots was without incident or infractions of the Election Laws.

In the Choong Koo District the casting of ballots and counting of ballots was carried off without infraction of election laws or unusual happenings.

The Young San District Election Committee conducted the Election in that district without violation of the Election Law and without incident.

The Tong Dai Moon A District had only one candidate. Therefore, ballots were not cast by the voters in that district according to Election Law.

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer made innumerable stops at voting places in all parts of the City and was impressed by the orderly manner in which voting was carried on. The Korean Mayor and the CCAO hurried to several places where bombings were reported and were impressed again by the large numbers of voters who returned to the lines in spite of the attempts to intimidate them and to keep them from voting.

At several points the CCAO met various members of the UN inspection Committees who expressed satisfaction with conditions and amazement at the large number of the early vote.

It was particularly noted that every phase of the Election Law was faithfully and cheerfully complied with. The impression was gained that in a few seeming slip-ups, the omission was that of ignorance and unfamiliarity with procedure rather than an attempt to violate the law.

During the counting, the CCAO inspected all counting places and was again impressed with the orderly, calm, judicious procedure. The UN was observed in several places and all expressed satisfaction with the general picture. One exception was the Syrian delegate who felt the Election was proceeding in too orderly a manner and was therefor suspect. However, most of the other UN members seemed to view all proceedings with great satisfaction.

In all, the entire registration and voting was carried out with minimum disturbance and disorder.

/s/ James E. Wilson
JAMES E. WILSON
Lt. Col. USAF
Chief Civil Affairs Offic

Inclosure No. 37

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

HEADQUARTERS
7th Military Government Group
Office of Home Affairs
Kyunggi-Do

14 June 1948

SUBJECT: Observation of Korean Election.

TO : Lieutenant Colonel C. G. Duffy,
Office of Civil Administration.

Following the promulgation of election laws and on instructions received from headquarters, Kyunggi Province officials immediately met with the appointed Korean registration and election committees. A working plan of action was outlined and put into immediate effect.

Committees were charged with their respective duties and police chiefs consulted about security.

The Provincial Public Information Section was notified in regards to its press and radio releases-advertising and the distribution of election posters and loud speakers.

Registration and voting polls were setup throughout the cities, counties and farming regions and full instructions given in regard to registering and voting in accordance with the laws enacted for this purpose.

A general conference was held with United States Army Officers and Department of Army Civilians and each person was given a set of general rules, election laws and a log with full instructions in regard to observing registration and the voting of the Korean populace on the 10th of May, 1948.

Teams were organized by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of this province and arrangements made for sleeping and meals. Korean interpreters were delegated at this time for each team.

Ballot boxes, printed ballots, lock, election laws, pencils and paper shipped to election districts by truck, plane, ship and ox-cart. All of this work was handled by the facilities of this province without incident.

Full arrangements were made with the secretary of the United Nations Commission for the delegates to observe the registration and election.

Rail and vehicle transportation provided as well as facilities for lunch, and other conveniences.

The undersigned accompanied the delegates on their various trips throughout Kyunggi Province and in every incident heard remarks passed by individual delegates expressing their surprise and pleasure with the ease and intelligence with which the registration and election officials handled their jobs.

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Officers and DACs observation reports completed and forwarded to higher headquarters.

Any and all incidences were made note of and immediately reported to authorized officials.

/s/ F. J. Connaughton
F. J. CONNAUGHTON
Advisor, Home Affairs
Kyunggi Do

Inclosure No. 38

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS Date

PUCHON KYUNGGI PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TIME	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
8 May 48	1000 a.m.	Chung Su Dong	Capt. Earnst C. Asbury, QMC USAFIK Capt. Delmas O. Robinette, QMC USAFIK	All ballot boxes were physically present and were locked on the inside Locks were present for the outside. Information was satisfactorily disseminated to the public. There were no parties, groups, youth organizations in evidence in any of the areas, neither was there any evidence of intimidation of electorate in evidence. There was no evidence of coercion to force registration or voting through definite physical violence, or specific threats of such violence, or through seizing or threatening to seize ration cards. There was no evidence of threats or sabotage on the part of committee or others. Voting places were set up satisfactorily insuring a satisfactory amount of privacy on the part of the voter.
8 May 48	1030 a.m.	Un Wan Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1045 a.m.	Sa Chang Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1100 a.m.	Man Su A Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1130 a.m.	Man Su B Dong		
8 May 48	1145 a.m.	Su San Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1155 a.m.	Do Rim Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1245 p.m.	No Heun A Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1310 p.m.	No Heun B Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1330 p.m.	Ko Chian Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1400 p.m.	Nam Chian Dong	" "	
8 May 48	1430 p.m.	San Chion Ree	" "	
8 May 48	1445 p.m.	Quia Su Ree	" "	
8 May 48	1520 p.m.	Mo Sun Ree	" "	
8 May 48	1550 p.m.	Poul Ree	" "	
8 May 48	1620 p.m.	Cho Un Ram Ree	" "	
8 May 48	1645 p.m.	Tol Sheik Ree	" "	
8 May 48	1720 p.m.	Moo Ge Ree	" "	
8 May 48	1810 p.m.	Qua Rim Ree	" "	
29 April 48	0915 a.m.	Suwon	Lt. J. Yates, 97th M.G. Group	Everything in order. No trouble expected.
29 April 48	1015 a.m.	Anyong Myun	" "	Everything in order. No trouble expected.
29 April 48	1200noon	Suwon Gun	" "	Everything in order. No trouble expected.
30 April 48	1000 a.m.	Suwon	" "	" "
2 May 48	1015 a.m.	Suwon	" "	" "
2 May 48	1230 p.m.	YonGin Gun	" "	" "
2 May 48	1430 p.m.	Suwon	" "	" "
4 May 48	1000 a.m.	Suwon	" "	" "
4 May 48	1100 a.m.	YonGin Gun	" "	" "
4 May 48	1310 p.m.	Ansung Gun	" "	" "
4 May 48	1430 p.m.	Pyonteik Gun	" "	" "
6 May 48	1700 p.m.	Suwon	Lt. J. Yates, Lt. J. Waldron 97th MG	Investigated report of attacks by communists on myun office and police box. Report rendered to Col Anderson.

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KYUNGGI PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TIME	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
8 May 48	0930 a.m.	Ou Jung Dist City Hall #1	William A. Haynes Jr., Capt CE 599 Engr Base Depot, APO 901	Made arrangements with election officials to pick up boxes on 10 May. One official was asked to go along with observer to physically check boxes in the polling places. This was done and all boxes were found at the polling places, further arrangements were made with each polling place regarding picking up the boxes on 10 May. No irregularities were noted.
8 May 48	1000 a.m.	" " #2	" " "	
8 May 48	1130 a.m.	" " #3	" " "	
8 May 48	1200noon	" " #4	" " "	
8 May 48	1500 p.m.	" " #5	" " "	
8 May 48	1530 p.m.	" " #6	" " "	
10 May 48	0918 a.m.	" " #1	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	0930 a.m.	" " #2	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	0955 a.m.	" " #3	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	1015 a.m.	" " #4	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	1030 a.m.	" " #5	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	1050 a.m.	" " #6	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	1400 p.m.	" " #1	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	1420 p.m.	" " #2	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	1450 p.m.	" " #4	" " "	No discrepancies noted.
10 May 48	0930 a.m.	Sen Chion Ree	Earnst C. Asbury Capt, QMC USAFIK	Polls being conducted orderly 703 votes
10 May 48	1000 a.m.	Quia Su Ree	" " "	Polls being conducted orderly 797 votes
10 May 48	1030 a.m.	Me Sun Ree	Earnst C. Asbury Capt, QMC USAFIK Delmas O. Robinette Capt, QMC USAFIK	Polls being conducted orderly 707 votes
10 May 48	1100 a.m.	Poul Ree	Earnst C. Asbury Capt, QMC USAFIK Delmas O. Robinette Capt, QMC USAFIK	574 votes, Ballot box sealed at 1355 100% voting completed
10 May 48	1130 a.m.	Cho Un Ham	Earnst C. Asbury Capt. QMC USAFIK Delmas O. Robinette Capt. QMC USAFIK	Polls being conducted orderly, 667 votes
10 May 48	1200noon	Tol Sheik	Earnst C. Asbury Capt. QMC USAFIK Delmas O. Robinette Capt. QMC USAFIK	Polls being conducted orderly, 611 votes

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KYUNGGI PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TIME	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
7 May 48	1200noon	Suwon	Lt. J. Yates, 97th M.G. Group	Everything in order. No trouble expected.
9 May 48	1600 p.m.	Suwon	" "	" "
10 May 48	0700 a.m.	Mae Song#3	" "	First vote cast at 0709. Laws carried out thoroughly.
10 May 48	0730 a.m.	Be Bong#1	" "	Everything proceeding in orderly manner.
10 May 48	0755 a.m.	Woom Dock#3	" "	" "
10 May 48	0805 a.m.	Woom Dock#1	" "	" "
10 May 48	0830 a.m.	Mado	" "	" "
10 May 48	0845 a.m.	Song San#1	" "	" "
10 May 48	0905 a.m.	Song San#5	" "	" "
10 May 48	0925 a.m.	Song San#6	" "	" "
10 May 48	1000 a.m.	Sou Shin#3	" "	Orderly. 90% completed.
10 May 48	1035 a.m.	Song San #1	" "	Orderly. 82% completed.
10 May 48	1050 a.m.	Mado #1	" "	Orderly. 75% completed.
10 May 48	1115 a.m.	Um Dock #3	" "	Orderly. 92% completed.
10 May 48	1125 a.m.	Um Dock #1	" "	Orderly. 93% completed.
10 May 48	1250 p.m.	Um Dock #2	" "	Orderly. 95% completed.
10 May 48	1345 p.m.	Be Hong #1	" "	Orderly. 98% completed.
10 May 48	1405 p.m.	Be Hong #3	" "	Orderly. 93% completed.
10 May 48	1430 p.m.	Be Hong #4	" "	Orderly. 97% completed.
10 May 48	1450 p.m.	Mai Song #3	" "	Orderly. 98% completed.

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DUKTO

KYUNGGI PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TIME	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
10 May 48	0700 a.m.	Shindo#1	Mr. H. B. Howat, Dept of Finance	Voting secret, orderly & quiet. Well planned and conducted.
10 May 48	0740 a.m.	Shindo#2	" "	Orderly and legal. Well conducted.
10 May 48	0820 a.m.	Shindo#3	" "	Same as above.
10 May 48	0905 a.m.	Shindo#4	" "	While shaking down ballots in box, one section of box cracked.
10 May 48	1030 a.m.	Shindo#5	" "	Very orderly and well conducted.
10 May 48	1315 p.m.	Shindo#6	" "	Very well organized, no discrepancies.
10 May 48	1415 p.m.	Balance of day spent rechecking previous voting points.		

Observed counting of ballots for entire period of counting proceeded with order and speed and was double checked by parties of opposing interests. It appeared to be an honest and accurate job of tabulation. I saw no disorder whatsoever. The balloting was secret, orderly and legal. This is my considered judgment based on my observations.

10 May 48 0645 a.m. Duk to Myun. Mr. Herbert F. Dill, Trans. Adv OCC

Fifteen of the seventeen voting places in the Myun were visited. Voting places #14 and 16 were inaccessible. No disturbances or other trouble was noticed or reported at any of the points.

With the following exceptions, all rules and regulations were being followed.

With the exception of #2; armed police were either within the polling place or within less than 100 yrds of the entrance. They were present at the request of the election committee. There was no evidence of the police attempting to exert pressure but were merely acting as guards.

At polling place #10 no booths were provided for marking the ballots. At the time visited approximately 90% of the ballots had been cast.

Starting at 1400 accompanied by the Myun Chang, voting places in the Sung In Myun were visited. Voting place No. 1, 2, 4, and 5 were inaccessible but the other 21 were visited.

As at the time visited, the voting was from 84 to 100% completed in the various polls the voting was light. It was apparent, however, that all regulations regarding checks, pictures of candidates booths, etc. had been met. In most places, however, police were within 100 yards of the polling places.

Mr. H. F. Dill
Trans. Adv OCC

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PYANGTAEK KYUNGGI PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TIME	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN

The Gun Su received us very cordially and after securing sleeping quarters, conducted us to the Gun office. After giving us a brief outline of the system he and his committee had laid out for the election, he accompanied us to several voting districts. Everything was found to be in readiness with guards watching the premises.

On Monday the 10th at 0630 o'clock, we visited the first district, a polling place in Pyantaek, where already about fifty people were in line awaiting the opening of the polls. At 0700 promptly, the voting started, all of the requisites being complied with. The first to cast a ballot was a man of probably 26 or 27 whose duty, together with officials and candidates' representatives, it was to examine the ballot box in compliance with the election procedure as laid down by order of the Military Governor. Everything was conducted in a very orderly and efficient manner with no evidence of interference within or about the polling place; a condition which we discovered to prevail at every district visited.

At 1900 most voting places had closed and the task of transporting the ballot boxes began. At this time we were waiting at the Gun office and the first box arrived at about 1930. By truck it came, guarded zealously by police and accompanied by district officials. The office was surrounded by police who were to remain throughout the night and the following day. As each new box arrived, the crowd outside had grown to large proportions, ever remaining enthusiastic but orderly. A public address system had been installed, and as each box was counted the result was announced to all. 92% of all over 21 years of age had registered to vote. Of this number, 97.36% voted, with only 1.27% invalid ballots thrown out, which means that in this Gun 89.57% of all people over 21 had voted.

Inclosure No. 38

Wm. P. Shober, DAC
Dept. of Finance, USAMGIK

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer
Kang Won Do

1 June 1948

SUBJECT: Election of Korean National Assembly Representatives, Kangwon Province

TO: Commanding General, Hq. USAMGIK APO 235 Unit 2

ATTENTION: Advisor to the Civil Administrator.

1. For the records of the Civil Administrators Office, The Log, Journal and Journal File of those activities within Kang Won Province pertaining to the election is transmitted herewith.

2. As reflected by the chronological logs maintained by each election observer it is evident that the rules and regulations governing election procedures were strictly complied with at all election levels.

3. Representatives of the United Nations Assembly visited voting districts, electoral districts and the Provincial Election Committee of Kang Won Province during the registration period and on the voting day.

a. The many pertinent questions put to voting committee members by the United Nations representatives were satisfactorily answered. Their inspections of voting places revealed that a free atmosphere existed.

b. Upon departure, the representatives implied that they were pleasantly impressed and did not make any adverse comments.

4. The undersigned worked closely with the various election committees and is of the opinion that the Koreans were genuinely interested in the conduct of an honest free election and did so accomplish in an exemplary manner in Kang Won Province.

/s/ Earl Sutton
EARL SUTTON
Lt Col Inf.,
Chief Civil Affairs
Officer

Inclosure No. 39

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

KANG WON PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TITLE	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
6 Apr 48	Advisor Elec Comm	ChunChon City and ChunChon Gun	Capt. C. N. Linen, 100th M.G. Gp.	Inquiry as to the number of registrations that have been made to date in four voting districts selected at random. Koreans were asked to explain what information had been given to them about registration, how to fill out the required form. All contacted were well posted as to procedure. One voting district has in the rear part of office a flag which represented one of the political organizations. This was called to the attention of the chairman of the voting district who in turn took corrective action. Poll registers were properly kept and the registration forms were properly filled out, and adequately secure.
8 Apr 48	Advisor Elec Comm	ChunChon	Capt. C. N. Linen, 100th M.G. Gp.	Accompanied four (4) members of the UN to the Electoral district at Chun Chon, Electoral District at Chungsong Gun, and to five voting districts selected at random by the spokesman of the UN Commission. In so far as is known, all places visited were complying with the law and Regulation.

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KANG WON PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TITLE	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
9 May 48	Samchok	Booth #28	Gungchon	Schoolhouse. Very satisfactory
	"	" #34	Imwonjin	" "

All of the above booths were checked over on their arrangements by the county chairman and had done an excellent job of lining up the flow of voters thru the booths. All seemed to be well acquainted with their duties and very serious about the election.

10 May 48 Samchok B #15, 17, 18, 16, 9, 19, 13, 12, 20, 21, 22, 26, 28, 31. The listed booths were checked in the order shown. They were checked while the voting was in progress and were all very well organized. There was no interference with voters by either police or constabulary. The people were quiet and orderly at all booths. Pictures of all candidates were in evidence at all booths. Some booths had one or two of the small pictures in the stalls missing but the first stall would have all pictures and the next two stalls would have two in each. The issue of ballots and procedure thru the booths was very well arranged. The majority of the voters had finished before noon and all booths visited during the afternoon were deserted except for the committee. They all had to remain open for ten to thirty voters who remained on the poll register.

Just before noon the county officials heard that the UN Commission would be in Samchok that day. This occupied their major attention for the rest of the day. The UN Commission consisting of Jean Paul-Boncour, Ministre Plenipotentiary, French, Welle Irene Michaux, French Foreign Office, French delegate, and Albert Grand, United Nations Information Officer. The party arrived at 11:00 p.m. and were put up over night in the Korean Hotel, Tebek Hotel. During the evening 51 ballot boxes arrived in the Provincial HQ. The Electoral Committee had dispersed except for two members who remained on guard. The Police had a very good guard mounted around the HQ. One of the observer team and a patrol of four soldiers were on duty all night at the electoral HQ watching the Ballot boxes.

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KANG WON PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TITLE	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
8 May		Samchok	Duane P. Turner 100th M.G. Group	Arrived in Samchok at 12:00 noon. Arranged billet for 19 tactical soldiers, 2 interpreters, 2 jeep drivers and Captain Smith and Turner with the help of Samchok Gun su in a Hotel belonging to the Oriental Chem. Co. That afternoon our plans were explained in detail to the Gun Su, the Police Chief and the local Korean Constabulary Officer.
9 May 48		Samchok & polling Booths to the South. Made this inspection trip with the county Electoral Committee chairman, Pahk Bo Yang, and an English speaking committee member, Kim Nam Su.		
		Samchok Booth #19		Well organized. Pictures not up yet. Screens around the ballot marking tables not up yet. The members of group knew their job and were getting set up to do it.
		" " #18		In good order and getting set for operation.
		" " #17		Well arranged and almost ready to operate.
		" " #12		Outdoor courtyard. Canopy over tables. Well organized.
		" " #13 (Obun)		Very satisfactory arrangement and almost ready to operate
		" " #20 (Nangbang)		Schoolhouse. Tables arranged and getting the screens and pictures up. Competent group.
		" " #21 (Kyoga)		Organized and well arranged.
		" " #22 (Kyoga)		Satisfactory
		" " #23 Fishing Village		Village building well arranged and ready to operate.
		" " #26 Tongmak		Schoolhouse. Very satisfactory.

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NND 74009

KANG WON PROVINCE

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

DATE	TITLE	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
11 May 48		Samchok	Duane P. Turner 100th M.G. Group	

The UN Commission interviewed the American Observers during the morning regarding our impressions of the election which were very favorable. Mr. Boncour said that what he had seen in Uichin the day before had been favorable. The Commission went to electoral HQ and watched the counting of the ballots and thought the system was very good. They left for Kangnung at 11:30 a.m. The first ballot box required 1½ hours to count. Samchok had 102 ballot boxes and they were all in the HQ before noon. Counting procedure was speeded up and by 1:00 p.m. they were counting at the rate of 2-3 boxes an hour. At 8:45 p.m. 29 boxes had been counted and the standing was as follows

1.	No Ee Gn	1,090
2.	Kim Chung Yol	5,126
3.	Im Yong Soon	4,383
4.	Kim Gin Koo	3,725
	defectives	305

12 May 48 Samchok At 6:00a.m. 53 boxes counted

1.	2,857
2.	7,564
3.	7,102
4.	11,403

The 102 boxes were finished before 6:00 p.m.
Final results as follows

1.	No Ee Gn	7,803
2.	Kim Chung Yol	15,42[illegible]
3.	Im Yong Soon	15,026
4.	Kim Gin Koo	904

Departed for Kangnung with tactical troops at 6:30 p.m. arrived Kangnung at 9:30.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

HEADQUARTERS
104th HQ AND HQ DETACHMENT, MILITARY GOVERNMENT GROUP
APO 7 Unit 1

28 May 1948

SUBJECT: Election Observer Logs

TO : Commanding General, USAMGIK, APO 235 Unit 2
(ATTN: Office Civil Administration)

1. Attached as inclsures are the data sheets of the observers who worked in Chung Chong Pukto during the recent election period.

2. The undersigned had little to do with the election. Observers returning from their electoral districts reported to the former Chief Civil Affairs Officer and Major Thornal was handling the detail election reporting. Both of these officers have departed from this command.

3. I did observe several voting places in Chong ju and vicinity. My observations proved conclusively to me that the election was well organized, polling places were in order and supervised adequately. The whole election was a surprise to me not only in the number who actually voted but also in the conforming to the election laws as set forth. The plan for the election was well executed. Everyone involved should be proud of the manner in which the Korean people have taken the initial step in the establishing of their democratic government.

/s/ Marcus Tague
Lt Col, FA
Commanding

24 Incl.
1-5 Chronological Logs
6 Memorandum Report
7-24 Chronological Logs

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

CHUNG CHONG PUKTO

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATION

DATE -TIME -PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
May 10-1948 Chung Won Gun 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.	Frank E. C. Williams DAC Agri Dept. K A A	
7:00 to 7:15 Sa Chu Myun Kaeshin Lee		Building was ready, but no committee, no box, no voters. One man stated that it was early, all had gone to breakfast.
7:35 - 7:50 Potai Lee		Saw ballot box opened, many voters ready to vote. All in good order and voting done as per rules.
8:20 - 8:30 Sa Choo Lee		Voting done under tent on hillside, for lack of an adequate building. All in order and every one eager to vote. Women being given the first chance to vote. One man tried to get a ballot for use as information on outside, but was quickly but politely refused by the chairman.
8:45 - 9:00 Poon Pyung		Proper distance given by all civilian guards and police. Everything in order. Booths crude, inexpensive and adequate.
Nam EE Myun 9:20 - 9:30 Andong Lee		Proper watchers, at box, on road and all in the proper distance. Carried on in house and yard of home. Everything in order.
9:40 - 9:50 Tai Ryun		At public school all in proper order and crowds ready to vote. Vigiliant committee with road blocks at least 100 yards from school.
10:00 to 10:15 Chuk San		At Myun office, all in fine order, a police

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

CHUNG CHONG PUKTO

CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ELECTION OBSERVATION

DATE-TIME-PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
May 10-1948 Chung Won Gun 7:A.M. to 5:30 P.M.	Frank E. C. Williams DAC Agri. Dept. K A A	
Chuk San (cont'd		followed me in, but was told kindly to go out to his proper distance. Several others were also told to go out of the voting room. All carried on in perfect order and crowds at voting place.
Poo Koo Myun, Soo Ri Nai 10:45 - 11:00		Voting held at home with booths made of paper pasted around stick frame. Adequate but crude. As usual the crowd was large but well behaved, and all was in order. Two blind men voted, with proper aid.
Poo Kang Myun office 11:45-12:00		Many had voted, all in order, few straglers, at noon hour 750 to vote and half had done so.
Poo Kang, home of chairman 12:00 - 12:10		701 had voted out of 805 reg. voters. Lunch time and only now and then one came to vote. Everything in order.
Mai Poo, No Ho Ri 12:15-12:30		Large vigilant Comm. within 150 yds. at either end of village. There had been an alert for two days. The voting committee were sitting on mats in yard under tent. All was in order and display of the proper photos, etc.
Hyun Do Myun Sun Dong Lee 1:00 p.m. - 1:15		674 of the 744 persons had voted. Old man 80 yrs. old voted. One man came on donkey from out the mt village to vote.
Tuk Chi Lee 2:00 p.m.-2:15		Walked in to village 737 of the 762 had already voted. No word of any outward actions. All in order.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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DATE	TIME	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
		Nam Ill Myun Pyung Chon Lee		639 of the 679 had voted, only few around the voting place, and all at proper distance.
		Hyoo Chon, and Kwang Gi		Only 74 were left to vote out of 1360 registered voters. Were told that all had been in order all day.
		Ka San Lee		Walked a mile into the mts to see this place. Comm. were so glad that some one had come to visit them and their set up. 48 left of 701 voters to vote.
May 10 and 11, 12th	1948 Chung Won Gun office May 10; 7:30 to 9:00 p.m.			The Gun Committeemen decided that it was best to collect ballot boxes using available police and others and begin morning of 11th to count ballots. This was done after consultation with higher authority.
May 11; 7:30 to Midnight	at Chung Won Gun Offices			First ballot box of the 1st districts 55 boxes was opened A.M. after much indicision. First box took two hours time for counting deciding as to the ballots to be thrown out etc. Remember this is the first ballot counting in Korea. The next boxes took from 1 hr down to two boxes every 45 minutes, after the committee got to going well with two boxes at a time.
May 12 - 12:15 to 5 A.M.				Counting ballots continued, all hands working well. By 5 A.M. 38 boxes of bllots had been counted. To this time, 24,525 ballots cast had been counted and only 878 were thrown out. Of the registered total of 26,602 for these 38 boxes 25,525 had voted. This means more than 95% voted

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DATE	TIME	PLACE	NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF OBSERVER	REMARKS TO INCLUDE ACTION TAKEN
				Remarks on the Voting set up and scene.

1. It was a great sight to watch the Korean men and women coming over the counry hill and field paths as any market or festive day.
2. All places were most well carried on and the earnest and faithful attitude displayed at all the voting places. All committeemen were very helpful.
3. All police and vigilant committee men at proper distance from place of voting. I had my driver go to at least 100 yds from poles while he waited for me.
4. The slots in most cases were too small and there seems to have been no need for the envelope.
5. The time for closing should have been 4 or 5 p.m. All the voting could have been done early and the boxes brought in in daylight.
6. Chung Ju city and Chung Won County used a very fine method for the voting procedure. A small round hollow bamboo tube was at each booth near which a pad of red INCHEE was placed. The voter only needed to dab the tube into the INCHEE and place the circle below the number of sticks representing the candiate.
7. In every case the proper photos were displayed in a good manner and the proper information was given to the voter. I heard no improper talk or information given to voters. I had no translator.
8. The whole time was a most inspiring, enlightencing and satisfactory experience, even to one who has boen a long time in the Land of the Morning Calm. Surely people who can carry out such a voting program from the instructions given for weeks before up to the voting and collecting of the boxes, and the counting of the ballots, can be entrusted with the rule of their own country. It may take several years to settle down, but they have made a good start.

/s/ F. E. C. Williams
May 12, 1948

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CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF ELECTION OBSERVATION TEAMS

TAEDUCK COUNTY:

At 0700 hours 10 May 1948, Captain George E. Knipe and 2nd Lt. James Shellnut started an inspection of the election procedures in Taeduck county, Chung Chong Namdo province. At 0745 the observation party reached the 2nd voting district of Yu Chon Myun. The voting in this district was going smoothly and there were no occurrences prejudicial to good voting procedure. No suggestions were made as everything seemed to be in good order. The party left Yu Chon Myun and proceeded to the 2nd voting district of Ka Su Won, arriving at 0805. Everything seemed in order at this voting district and there had been no unusual occurrences during the voting period; no corrections were made there. The election party left Ka Su Won at 0810 and proceeded to Ka Kok, arriving there at 0815. Ka Kok is the 9th voting district. The voting here as in other places was being done in proper form. In all the voting districts so far visited, the people were very orderly and seemed intensely interested in getting their ballot cast. In most of the places where voting was taking place, the people were lined up early in the morning. The election party left Ka Kok at 0820 and proceeded to Ki Sung, the 8th voting district. Ki Sung as an exceptionally well organized voting district and deserves special comment. There were no unusual occurrences in Ki Sung and the election party left there and proceeded at 0845 to the 7th voting district at Ki Sung and since everything seemed in order, we left there and proceeded to Chin Jam 1st voting district at 0907. We arrived at Chin Jam at 0945, stayed until 0950, and left. There were no unusual occurrences at Chin Jam. The next voting district visited was Nam San, 5th district. There were no unusual occurrences here either and everything seemed in order. We left Nam San at 1040 and proceeded toward Taejon. We stopped for lunch upon reaching Taejon, and after lunch proceeded to Uchon, arriving there at 1348. At Uchon, 6th district, there was no one voting and the election committee chairman informed the party that 96 per cent of the registered voters had already voted. The committee chairman also said that there had been no unusual occurrences and that voting had been very orderly. We left Uchon and proceeded to Yusong at 1350. The party arrived in Yusong at 1356. This was the 1st voting district of Yusong and there were few people voting. The committee chairman here, informed us that 95 per cent of the registered voters had already voted and that there had been no unusual occurrences. We left Yusong at 1400 and proceeded to Tan Dong arriving there at 1413. This was the 1st voting district and 99 per ceht of the registered voters had already voted. We left Tandong and proceeded to Ku Juk at 1415 arriving there at 1420. There were no unusual occurrences and 97 per cent of the registered voters had voted. We left Ku Juk at 1422. The next voting district visited was the 2nd district of Tan Dong. There were no unusual occurrences and 99 per cent of the registered voters had voted. We left there at 1430. The next district visited was the 1st district of Hoi Tuk. There were no occurrences here and 99 per cent of the registered voters had voted. The next district visited was the 4th district of Puk Myun at 1636. There were no occurrences here; we left at 1640. At 1645 we visited 2nd district of Pak Myun and there were no occurrences; we left at 1650. At 1655, visited 1st district Puk Myun. 99 percent had finished voting.

At 2000 visited Taeduk county office. No ballot boxes were brought in yet.

At 2100 visited Taeduck county office; 23 ballot boxes in.

At 2330 last ballot box was brought in making a total of 58.

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11 May 1948

First ballot box opened at 0715. Ballot boxes were brought in view of all witnesses, was shown to be sealed. The box was opened and enveloped ballots taken out. Envelopes checked against registration for voting to see that there were no more than were registered who cast votes. The envelopes were then opened and the ballots were counted. Each counter's count was checked by another counter.

12 May 1948

Last ballot box was counted at 0900. Totals and results announced at 0945. Results were as follows:

Oh, Hi Sung	3,229
Kang, Chang Hun	6,005
Lim, Biong Un	3,064
Song, Won Yong	4,038
Song, Ul Yong	7,016
Han, Yong Chin	2,323
Song, Chin Baik	7,609
Hong, Ki Hak	1,657

YONGGI GUN:

Election Observation Team arrived at Chochiwon at 1500 9 May 1948. Met with Chairman of Election Committee (Pak Mun Soon) and Chief of Home Affairs, Yonggi Gun, and discussed route of inspection for next day. Discussed plans for safeguarding of ballots and voting places against attack and also discussed voting procedure. The preparations made by the people concerned seemed to be adequate. Met with the Police Chief (Capt. Hohn) and was assured that ballots would receive the maximum safeguard available.

On Monday 10 May 1948 visited the following voting places in the Gun at the time noted. Comments on voting places and conduct of voting are the same for all places and will be placed at the end of the paragraph:

0800 - Shin An Dong
0830 - No Chong Ni
0850 - Chung Song Ni
0925 - Mi Gong Ni
0940 - Chong Do
0950 - Un Nai Dui (2 voting places)
1030 - So Chong Ni
1045 - Tai Kong Ni
1310 - Chung In Dong
1325 - Poong Am
1340 - Yongi (Town)
1405 - Chung Chong Ni
1420 - Yon Whai Ri
1450 - Yong Poi Ri
1550 till 1900 - Visited polling places in Chochiwon.

Polling places were all orderly and reported no disturbances. Police not in evidence at polling places but Peace Preservation Corps out in force. PPC enforced the 100 meter boundary. No polling place had booths completely covered but all were adequate. In all places candidates' representatives were present and reported all well. Found that most people voted before noon and only a few stragglers voted after 1400. Was accompanied by Gun Soo on inspection trip.

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Upon return to Chochiwon conferred with Police Chief and Gun Soo on final check of safeguarding of ballot boxes during the night. Suggested boxes be guarded at Police Station and suggestion was accepted and followed by Election Committee. Also suggested that counting start at 0600, 11 May 1948. This suggestion was also followed.

Arrived counting hall at 0710, 11 May 1948 and found counting in full swing. Heavy police guard about counting area and only authorized persons were present. Considerable discussion was held over the validity of votes marked with other than circle chop. After receiving instructions from CCAO that other marks could be considered valid the committee still refused to validate votes marked with thumb print or voter's own chop. As committee was final authority, their decision was considered final.

At 0900, 12 May 1948, Mr. Yun Chang Suk called on us to complain. Mr. Yun was second in the voting and his complaint was that the winner had coerced people into signing his petition at a rice distribution point. He showed us a copy of the Tong Bong Times dated 28 April that stated some candidates had used coercion but article did not name any particular persons. Mr. Yun also charged that Mr. Chin Hun Sik had distributed handbills within 50 meters of the polling place while the voting was in progress. Mr. Yun also charged that a member of the Chomi Myun election committee had campaigned for Mr. Chin Hun Sik. Advised Mr. Yun to lodge a formal complaint with the election committee.

The Yonggi Gun election observation team consisted of Captain Edward C. Haynes and Captain George M. Laser.

KONGJU GUN:

The election observation committee (Lt. Col. Robert S. Larson and Mr. Philip L. Heaton) observed the election 10 May 1948 in Kongju Electoral District "A" and the counting of ballots. We returned to Taejon at about 2300 hours, 12 May 1948, bringing the results with them.

During the election day the following voting districts were visited and in each case, the district election committee chairman was contacted:

	Voting District	Time	Chairman
a.	SUNG RI	0830	Lin Sung Hang
b.	SONG HUNG RI	0900	Pak Yung Sik
c.	SAM KOK RI	0920	Yun Pil Chung
d.	EEIN RI	0945	Kang Wee Pong
e.	KU AM RI	1006	Hong Lee Suk
f.	CHU PONG RI	1025	Hah Chil Song
g.	TAI BONG RI	1050	Sin Kap Sang
h.	CHU MI RI	1110	Chong Yong Kie
i.	KIM HAK DONG (Kongju City)	1135	Cho Nam Sul
j.	MAH AM NI	1335	Pah Sun Ho
k.	PAN JUK DONG (Kongju City)	1520	Ee Tu Hah
l.	WHANG DONG " "	1530	Kim Kuhn Teh
m.	CHUNG DONG " "	1550	Pyun Kyung Han
n.	SAN SUNG DONG " "	1600	Kim Wan Jeh
o.	SO HANG NI	1625	Chong Chang Suh
p.	WHA UNG RI	1645	Chun Ung Pong
q.	WOOL AM RI	1700	Ee Sung Yul
r.	KUM DAY RI	1725	Chung Jong

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In each of the above places the Ballot Boxes were checked for security, the booths were checked as to whether the voters had secrecy for the marking of the ballots, etc. In no case were there any unruly elements or any uneasiness observed. The people were very quiet and orderly about their voting.

At 2030, 10 May 1948, the committee went to District A Electoral headquarters to observe the bringing in of the ballot boxes. The boxes were brought in from the entire District under heavy police guard (this being the only time police were conspicuously in evidence during the entire day) and all had arrived at headquarters by 2130. When they were brought in the boxes were checked and records signed for by clerks of the committee. No incidents occurred during this phase and the Electoral District Chairman had planned to begin counting ballots on the morning of 11 May 1948 at 0900.

Ballot box opening and ballot counting began promptly at 0900 11 May 1948. In addition to the election committee, representatives of each of the five candidates were present. The procedure was as follows: Sealed Ballot Box was brought in, seal inspected, first lock opened, top opened, second lock and seal inspected and then the box was completely opened. The Ballots were then removed and the empty ballot box was shown to all the committee members. The Ballots were then checked for number against the record of voting and whether each was enclosed in an official envelope. Upon verification the ballots were then removed from the envelopes and tabulated. The chairman of the committee called each ballot aloud so that tabulators and representatives could hear. Each ballot was checked for official seal and for marking. Several ballots were voided for non-marking and faulty marking, these were later rechecked by the committee for final decision. Final results were then tabulated and ballots bound for file and future reference. This same procedure was followed for each of the following 86 ballot boxes. The counting was completed at 1930 hours 12 May 1948 with the following results:

Candidate No.	Name	Votes	Party
I	PAK, Chung Sik	4,991	Est. Korean Gov't
II	KWAN, Teh Hun	3,881	Independent
III	YAM, Oo Ryung	5,207	Taidong Youth
IIII	KIM, Myung Dong	10,676	Independent
IIIII	CHUNG, In Kak	3,[illegible]	Independent
	Discarded Ballots	481	
	Total Vote Cast	28,886	
	Total Registration	29,916	
	Percentage of Vote Cast	96.5%	

Comments as a result of observations:

ABSENCE OF POLICE--Noticeably absent from anywhere in the vicinity of polling places, the police were seen only at regular police boxes during the entire period of voting. This is to be commended in view of the heretofor opinion that they must be actively involved in all important functions.

EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION OF POLLING PLACES--The expediency with which individual voters were handled, the similarity of the polling place layout, the ingenious improvising of voting booths, and the evidence that all committees were well informed and instructed bring great credit upon the entire organization in Kongju Gun. It is amazing that these people can do so much in 60 days.

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EARLY VOTING--As a result of visiting several of the polling places it is estimated that the bulk of votes were cast prior to 1100 hours on election day.

PROTECTION OF BALLOT BOXES--The Hyang Bo Dan (Self-protective organization) was conspicuous near each voting place. All members wore arm bands and were quietly waiting around. When the polls closed, the plan had been made to have 20 members of this organization carry the Ballot Box to an assembly point where they would be picked up by a truck carrying a heavy police guard. This plan was successful.

It is believed by these observers that their visiting 18 voting places in all corners of the District covers a cross section of the election procedure in District A, Kongju Gun.

DISTRICT "B" KONGJU GUN

Captain John L. McGraw and 1st Lt. James Barrett comprised the election observation team in District "B" Kongju Gun. The team arrived in Kongju at 1430 9 May 1948 and immediately had a conference with Mr. Sim, Cha Uk, Chairman of voting district "B", and Mr. Son, Yong Du Gun Soo of Kongju Gun. This conference was held in the Gun Soo's Office. Mr. Cho, Yun Chang, teacher of English in the Kongju Boys Agricultural Middle School acted as interpreter. Mr. Sim stated that voting District "B" included all of Kongju Gun North of Kum Gang River and was comprised of seven myuns with a total of one hundred and twenty-eight (128) voting places. Mr. Sim said that Headquarters for voting district "B" was in the Kongju Boys Agricultural Middle School located on the north side and across the river from the town of Kongju. Mr. Sim said that voting district "B" thirty-four thousand three hundred and three (34,303) people had registered to vote which was 98% of the voting population. Mr. Sim said seven candidates were running and that the District Election Committee, total sixteen members, and all the local Election committees were ready for the election. Both the Gun Soo, Mr. Son, and Mr. Sim said they expected no disturbances during the election, that adequate preparation had been made to safeguard the voting places and to insure an orderly election. They said they would be assisted in maintaining order by the Police, members of the Fire Department and by committees of an organization known as the Hyang Bo Dan, a Youth Protective organization. Mr. Sim and Mr. Son said that preparation also had been made to safe-guard the transportation of the ballot boxes from the voting places to district "B" Headquarters in the Agriculture school after the polls were closed.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

H E A D Q U A R T E R S (Cholla Puk)
96th MILITARY GOVERNMENT GROUP
APO 6 unit 2

28 May 1948

SUBJECT: Observation of Korean Election.

TO: Military Governor of Korea,
APO 235, unit 2.
Attn: Lt. Col. Duffy.

1. Attached hereto is file on election observation as required by paragraph 3, Immediate Action Letter, Hq. USAMGIK dated 1 April 1948, Subject: Election Procedure Observation by American Personnel.

2. a. Number Electoral Districts in Province - - - - - 22

b. Number Electoral Districts requiring observation 21

c. Number Polling Places in the 21 districts - - - 1414

d. Number Polling Places visited by American observers 1102

e. Number visited by representatives Prov. Elec. Comm. 312

3. MAJOR IRREGULARITIES: None.

4. MINOR IRREGULARITIES:

a. During early part of observation several polling places were not properly marked but in each case this was called to the attention of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and the Provincial Election Committee and immediately corrected.

b. Three polling places were visited during Phase 1, that did not have the Poll registers immediately available for inspection. This was a misunderstanding on the part of the local officials and in all cases were corrected on the spot.

c. In three polling places the Poll Register was stolen or removed by unauthorized persons but was replaced by Electoral District Committee.

d. There were many cases where the officials at polling places did not understand what a voting booth actually was or how to prepare one. This was explained by Provincial Committee and polling booths were properly prepared in each voting place.

e. One man was caught trying to vote a second time. He was turned over to the police and Provincial Election Committee informed.

f. In all polling places the observers reported poll registers were inspected during phase 1, but no objections as to registrants were made.

5. a. One letter on alleged complaints which was submitted to representatives of United Nations Commission during the election was received from the Military Governor. Copy of letter and answer thereto attached marked Incl 1.

Inclosure No. 42

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b. A letter from the Military Governor dated 20 May 1948, Subject: Complaints Received concerning conduct of the Elections, was received and investigation is now underway. This was a complaint submitted to representatives of United Nations by Lun-Sok-Ku. Investigation reveals that all information he had was hearsay and since he was a successful candidate he wishes to withdraw his complaint.

These complaints by the United Nations Committee came as a surprise, since on every occasion of visit the senior member was asked by the CCAO as to the results of the visit. In all cases the senior member of the committee furnished the information that only minor irregularities including part of those indicated in above mentioned letters were noted, that no corrective action was indicated, and that generally the results were very pleasing.

6. In general, all observers expressed surprise and pleasure at the knowledge of the election laws by all Korean officials, the excellence of their performance and the orderliness and enthusiasm of all the populace. The only attempts at serious disorders were instigated by communist agitators. In practically all cases the latter did not progress beyond the attempt stage due to the prompt action of the police, and they were in no case able to interfere seriously.

/s/ Wm. J. T. Yancey
WM. J. T. YANCEY
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

2 Incls.
1-Ltr of Complaint fr Mil. Gov.
2-Observation file.

Inclosure No. 42

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
APO 235 Unit 2

6 May 1948

SUBJECT: Complaints Received Concerning Conduct of the Elections.

TO: Chief Civil Affairs Officer
Province of Cholla Pukto
96th Mil Govt Gp
APO 6 Unit 3

1. At its fifth meeting on 27 April 1948, the Main Committee of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, after considering a number of complaints submitted to it regarding conduct of the elections, decided that specific complaints substantiated by some concrete evidence should be listed and forwarded to the Military Governor. A verbatim copy of the complaints that pertain to the Province of Cholla Pukto follows:

Chon-ju, Cholla Pukto

In an interview on 23 April 1948, Mr. Yi Chol Sung, Independent candidate, stated that election posters had been torn down during his campaign and that the police had disturbed his meetings. On 18 April, when he was making a speech at the Sangmoo theatre, the police had interfered with the meeting.

2. Please investigate these matters and take corrective action where necessary. A report of facts revealed by your investigation and action taken will be submitted to this headquarters to enable me to give a report and accurate reply to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

/s/ W. F. Dean
W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor.

Inclosure No. 12A

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 96th MILITARY GOVERNMENT GROUP, APO 6 UNIT 2
13 May 1948

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, U S A M G I K, APO 235 Unit 2, US Army.

1. Statements of Mr. Yi, Chol Sund, Mr. Paik, Nam Tu, and Mr. Cho, Pyung Hoo are attached hereto.

2. The alleged police interference appears to be a misunderstanding. This theater is public property and was being guarded by a policeman, who had not been notified that this candidate had authority to use the theater. It is considered that the policeman was primarily performing his duty and not interfering unnecessarily.

3. The tearing down of posters and the use of slanderous handbills will be investigated further and appropriate action taken

/s/ Wm. J. T. Yancey
WM. J. T. YANCEY
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Inclosure No. 42B

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

HEADQUARTERS
101st MILITARY GOVERNMENT GROUP (Cholla Nam)
APO 6 UNIT 2

24 May 1948

SUBJECT: Report on Korean National Election in Cholla Namdo Province.

TO: Commanding General, USAMGIK, APO 235 UNIT 2

1. The following report of observations of the National Election as it pertains to this Province is submitted for your information.

2. With the announcement that the National Election would be held on 9 May 1948, the officer personnel of this Group and officers from the 20th Infantry Regiment were assigned to one or more Electoral Districts, provided with report forms, and charged with the responsibility of visiting and checking with the Committee of each voting district of the assigned Electoral District. The enclosed check forms were used throughout the pre-election period, and were found to be invaluable to the observers as well as a source of information with which to further the plan for the election from the Provincial Headquarters. Each officer was furnished a copy of the election laws and regulations. During the period of registration and while the poll registers were open for examination all available transportation was used by the officer observers for visits to the voting districts in the Province. A majority of the voting districts were visited and poll registers checked. In addition, the undersigned visited each Electoral District of the Province and conferred with District officials. One officer of this Group was assigned duty with the Provincial Election Committee and co-ordinated the overall program of pre-election observation.

3. The Provincial Election Committee, 29 Electoral District Committees, and 1845 Voting District Committees were promptly organized in the Province and were furnished complete instructions as to their duties and responsibilities. Without exception, as found by later checks, these Committees were composed of men of high calibre with a sincere interest in their part in the election. Checks by officer observers proved that they had thoroughly familiarized themselves with their duties as election officials. In a few scattered instances violations of the law pertaining to the use of youth groups and police were noted, but promptly corrected when called to the attention of the election officials. In every case the reason for their use was reported as due to having received threats against the lives of the members or damage to election material. The Provincial Public Information Section was particularly active in disseminating election information and maximum use was made of radio, speaker groups, newspapers, hand bills, posters and pamphlets. This program was coordinated with the local branch of the Office of Civil Information in order to avoid duplication and to extend the coverage limited by lack of personnel and transportation facilities, both in Public Information and Civil Information.

4. outh groups as such, were not noticeably active in the lection and but few reports of intimidation during the period of registration were received. Organization for the support of the individual candidates were active both in promoting the registration and the vote. Campaign posters, public address systems and newspapers were used--radio was not available for personal

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campaigns although full use was made to inform the voters as to the proper registration and voting procedures. Electoral and Voting District Committees were active during the registration period in encouraging the voters to register, and to vote. As a result of the program 95% of the qualified voters of the Province registered for the election and in many Districts 100% of those eligible registered and voted.

5. Operation of the Provincial, Electoral and Voting District Committees was in accordance with the election laws and regulations. Officials of the Provincial, Gun and Myun Governments cooperated in every way with the election officials in providing office space, clerical assistance, and transportation. Particular credit should be given to KIM, Chong Sul, Chief of the Local Affairs Section, Provincial Bureau of Home Affairs, for his efficient handling of the distribution of election material to the election Committees. This project was handled with dispatch and in a highly satisfactory manner. Registration and polling places were generally satisfactory although changes in location were necessary in several cases due to unsuitable location and for reasons of security. During the registration period several Districts were located at or near police boxes and Youth Group Headquarters. This was corrected prior to actual voting. Booths were provided on a basis of one per two hundred registrants and in most instances provided privacy for the voters. Where law violations were noted in this connection the attention of the Committee was called and correction made. Registration and voting places were well marked during the registration period but many signs were removed at the close of the period of poll register examination and replaced at the beginning of the voting. This action was reported as necessary because of threats to burn the polling places. Poll registers were prepared in triplicate as required, one copy being retained in hiding by the District Committee, one kept in the Myun safe and one in the Gun safe. In several instances the registers were kept at police boxes, although this practice was discouraged. Several registers were lost by attacks against the voting District Committees but voters were not prevented from registering, examining or voting because of such action. Attacks against voting places in which ballot boxes and ballots, both marked and unmarked were lost, occurred during election day and are covered later in this report. An officer from this group supervised the receipt and distribution of election material, and on election morning every polling place was provided with sufficient boxes and material to start the balloting. Official ballots were prepared by printing plants in Kwangju and were satisfactory. A 30% overage was printed and distributed. Extra ballot boxes were made available to the Electoral District Committee in case they were needed as replacements.

6. United Nations Groups visiting this Province during the pre-election period were extended every opportunity of inspecting voting places and interviewing election officials and candidates. They gave the impression to the undersigned that their observations were very favorable.

7. Fifty-two teams, plus one observer with the Provincial Election Committee, operated in the twenty-six Electoral Districts of this Province where elections were held. Three Districts (Kwangju Pu, Yongam and Yonggwang Guns) had only one candidate standing for election. Personnel comprising the teams was drawn from officers, D/A civilians and Enlisted men of the 101st Military Government Group, 33rd Military Government Company, 20th Infantry Regiment, the Transportation Corps activities in Sunchon, Yosu and Mokpo, and a special detail of officers, D/A civilians and Enlisted men stationed with Headquarters USAMGIK.

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Each team included one officer or civilian, an armed driver and a Korean interpreter. Each observer was furnished a folder of instructions and forms pertaining to his duties. The folder contained the following:

Memorandum of Instructions (Copy enclosed)
Reference Check List (Copy enclosed)
Myun Spot Check List by voting district (Copy enclosed)
Official Ballot for assigned Electoral District
Extracts from Election Law
Extracts from Election Regulations

Vehicles included quarter-tons, three-quarter tons, and in one case a converted three-quarter ton ambulance, drawn from the transportation pool of this group, the Provincial Government, the 20th Infantry Regiment, and those shipped down for the purpose from Seoul. Although considerable mechanical failure was experienced due to the fair condition of most of the vehicles and the impassable road conditions due to rain, the observers were able to visit a representative number of Voting Districts, and to return to the Electoral District Headquarters to observe the counting of the ballot. Each team carried emergency rations and fuel, and refilling points were maintained at Yosu, Sunchon, Mokpo and Changhung. The last of the fifty two teams to clear the Provincial capital left at 0530 Hours 10 May 1948 in threatening weather which later became a general rainstorm throughout the Province. Because of lack of water transportation and rough weather complete coverage of the island voting districts of the Province was impossible, although such districts in Muan Electoral District number two were well covered by observers in Korean Coast Guard boats, police boats were generally not available because of their use for security and patrol purposes.

8. Observers report that the voting started at 0700 on election day with long lines awaiting the poll opening, and stood in the rain for their turn to vote. In many instances voting was complete before noon of election day and but few remained open after dark to accommodate the late voters. In most of the voting districts, Community Protection Associations (Hyang Bo Dans) had been organized by the election officials to assist the police in preventing disorders, and to insure orderly voting, and were generally successful throughout the day. In many districts threats against the lives of the election officials and any who voted were made, but no serious disorders occurred which prevented voting. The Hyang Bo Dan groups were armed with bamboo spears. Both the police and the latter were sometimes too much in evidence in or near the voting booths but there was no report of attempt made to instruct or influence the voters. Organized Youth Groups were inactive on election day.

9. Incidents noted by observers teams during tour of the polling places which are of interest, or required correction are as follows:

a. Several hundred voters lined up at polls in the rain awaiting election officials at 0800. Reason given for late arrival--late breakfast.

b. Many voting districts were closed when checked by observers. All eligibles had voted or were accounted for as absent

c. Police in polling place trying to keep out of the rain. Did not interfere or influence voting but withdrew when called to attention of committee.

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k. In several cases ballot box locks had not been provided, or were broken when received. Voting proceeded after boxes were inspected and sealed with paper seals.

e. Voting places were attacked during the night preceding the election and ballot boxes, ballots and booths destroyed. Electoral District Committees replaced boxes and ballots and a voting place was set up in time for voting in all but four Districts

f. Sample ballots in voting booths had been thumbprinted or marked under one candidate. District Committee withdrew the sample ballot or marked the other candidates identically.

g. Committee members were assisting voters by placing marked ballots in box. Corrected.

h. Committee members assisting voters to mark ballots. Corrected to Committee advising voters how to mark ballots according to law.

i. Two voting districts located in same place, one other than place of registration, reportedly for security reasons. Separate voting procedures were observed and all registrants advised of change.

j. District 7, Dolsan Myun, Yosu Electoral District Number 2 ballot box and ballots destroyed by attack prior to opening of voting place. An adequate home made box was secured and voting opened as scheduled. 559 ballots cast from 582 registered.

k. One voting district short fifteen envelopes, Chairman permitted voting after conference with Committee members, and candidates' representatives. Chairman accompanied box to Electoral District Headquarters after balloting was completed and explained his action, which was confirmed.

l. Candidates pictures not always posted. Reason given was lack of photo facilities and in one instance candidate did not wish to be photographed.

m. One district of Sang Kum Myun, Sunchon Electoral District Number 1, reported village leader killed the night before the election and others threatened if they voted. Polls opened under Hyang Bo Dan protection and at 1745 Hours all available voters, 409 out of 458 registrants had voted.

n. One ballot box from Yongsan Myun, Changhung Electoral District was punctured by rifle bullet while being transported with others to the Electoral District Headquarters. Many ballots were damaged but Committee was liberal in accepting properly marked ballots. Only one ballot from the box was declared void.

o. Messengers with ballots and envelopes were waylaid on their way from Electoral District Headquarters to voting districts and ballots and envelopes destroyed. Prompt dispatch of replacement material resulted in opening on time.

10. Most of the ballot boxes were returned promptly to the Electoral District Committee and within a few hours after the balloting closed. All were in on the morning of 11 May. Some districts began the count upon arrival of the first boxes at 2030 hours while others waited for the arrival of all boxes. One district (Kohung) did not begin the count until the morning of 11 May because of insufficient lighting. All boxes were locked in

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a cell at the local police station under guard. Observers noted no tampering with seals or locks when presented for opening. Candidates or their representatives were present at the time of the ballot count and were consulted when invalid ballots were found. A group of teachers and students from the Tamyang Girls Middle School attended and observed the ballot counting procedures in that District. The Voting District Chairman or his representative delivered the ballot box with marked ballots and envelopes together with unused ballots and envelopes to the Electoral District Committee. In several instances, the entire Voting District Committee came with the Chairman, and all stayed until the counting was completed. Spectators were permitted to the limits of space available without interfering with the work of the Electoral District Committee. The press was welcomed and given special seats for close observation.

11. A typical ceremony in the office of the Electoral District Committee at the beginning of the ballot count included:

a. Singing of the National Anthem.

b. Silent prayer and respect to the Flag.

c. Reading and explanation of the election laws and regulations as they pertain to the ballot count by the Chairman.

d. Chairman inspects seals and locks on box.

e. Official in charge of opening breaks seal and empties ballot on table and shows box to be empty.

f. Team shake ballots out of envelopes.

g. Team arranges ballots for each candidate and places questionable ones in separate piles on Chairman's desk.

h. Committee counts and clerks tabulate votes for each candidate.

i. Whole Committee examines and passes on the validity of questionable ballots. In some districts a secret vote was taken on the question of validity.

j. Validated ballots counted and tabulated.

k. All ballots and envelopes returned to ballot box and again locked.

l. Chairman announces results of count over public address system or posts same on bulletin board.

12. At the beginning of the count a small (1000) ballot box took one hour to count. As the Committee became more experienced, this was cut to less than one-half hour.

The use of envelopes to contain the ballots slowed the counting procedure and many officers recommended that their use might be eliminated at future elections. Invalid ballots were given close examination and in every instance where an observer examined the ballot in question, the decision of the Committee was confirmed. No complaints were made by any candidate or his representative to the Electoral District Committee with respect to the Ballot counting procedure. No disorders within the Electoral District Headquarters at anytime was reported.

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13. All observers without exception, were impressed with the honesty, sincerity, and singleness of purpose of the election officials both at the Voting District and Electoral District levels. Observers were of the opinion that this election was as well or better handled than any they had observed in the States. Most election officials appeared to be conversant with all phases of the election laws and regulations and went about their work efficiently and with a minimum or confusion.

14. A report of major disturbances or disorders is enclosed.

/s/ Timothy H. Murphy
TIMOTHY H. MURPHY
Colonel Cml C
Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

7 Inclosures:

1. Report of Incident in Chungae Myun, Muan Electoral District No. 1
2. Report of Incident in Hyun Kyung Myun, Muan Electoral District Number 1.
3. Report of Incident in Montang Myun, Muan Electoral District No. 1
4. Report of Incident in Haejae Myun, Muan Electoral District No. 1
5. Report of Incidents at Yunkang Dong, Changsong EUP, Changsong Electoral District.
6. Report of Incident at Chinwon Myun, Changsong Electoral District.
7. Report of Incident at Ok Chun, Samgae Myun, Changsong Electoral District.

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REPORT OF INCIDENT IN CHUNGAE MYUN, MUAN ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO. 1.

At 1400 Hours, 10 May 1948, a mob of six armed with rifles and home-made bombs attacked the polling place of Voting District Number 5 at Kurori and burned the ballots, ballot box and voting place. Due to transportation difficulties and fear of further attacks the Voting District Committee made no attempt to secure replacement ballots and box and set up a new voting place. Registration of this district was 487.

(Incl. #1)

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REPORT OF INCIDENT IN HYUN KYUNG MYUN, MUAN ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO. 1

In Voting Districts five and six of Hyun Kyung Myun at about 0900 Hours, 10 May 1948, Community Protection Association group organized for the protection of the voters and for keeping order turned on the police and election officials and destroyed or burned the ballots, ballot boxes and voting places, disarmed the police and fled. The election officials either through lack of time and transportation or fear of return of the attackers made no attempt to replace the voting equipment and no election was held in these two Districts. The registration is recorded as 655 for Number 5 and 627 for Number 6. All eligibles had registered in the two Districts.

In Voting District 2 of Hyun Kyung Myun, an identical attack came about 1400 hours after balloting was completed and the Committee was preparing to deliver the box to the Electoral District Committee.

Registration for this District was 527, 100% of those eligible.

The Electoral District Election Committee has not recommended a re-election, because of the fact that KIM, Yong Hyun received 17,873 votes, while the nearest competitor received only 8,907 votes. The 1,641 votes lost in Hyun Kyung and Chungae Myuns could not have altered the outcome.

(Incl. #2)

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REPORT OF INCIDENT IN MONTANG MYUN, MUAN ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO. 1

Officer observer made a special visit to Voting District Number 10, Montang Myun, Muan Electoral District Number 1, at the request of the representative of Mr. Chung, Kyoo Sung, Number four candidate on the ballot. Arrived at 1445 Hours on 10 May 1948, and found voting district closed, Chairman and members of the Committee were asleep and had been drinking. Explanation given was that all registrants had voted but they did not know how to get ballot box to Electoral District Headquarters.

Photograph display favored Mr. KIM, Yong Hyun. Mr. Chung's representative claimed that only members of the KIM family were allowed to vote. A check of the balloting in this District shows 298 eligible to register, 254 actually registered, but 293 voted. All votes but one were cast for KIM, Yong Hyun. Report of this incident has been made to Provincial Election Committee.

(Incl. #3)

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REPORT OF INCIDENTS IN HAEJAE MYUN, MUAN ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO. 1

On 10 May 1948, in Voting District Number 6, a mob of thirty persons armed with a pistol and two carbines attacked the residences of the District Chairman and one of the Committee and kidnapped both. The officials were taken to Kangsan Mountain about three Kilometers from the village, beater and threatened with death if they conducted an election in the District. The officials returned to the village, opened the polling place and supervised the balloting without further trouble. Registered voters numbered 551. There were 510 ballots cast.

On 10 May 1948 in Voting Districts Number 7, 8, and 9 of Haejae Myun, several groups of three or more roamed the valleys and roads of the Districts blocking the roads to voters on their way to the polls and threatened to kill them if they voted. Police reinforcements were sent into the Myun and the groups broken up. Result of voting in these Districts are: Number 7, registered 454, voted 424; Number 8, registered 711, voted 627; Number 9, registered 261, voted, 234.

(Incl. #4)

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REPORT OF INCIDENTS AT YUNKANG DONG, CHANGSONG EUP, CHANGSONG ELECTORAL DISTRICT

At 0700 Hours, 10 May 1948, the special guard employed for election day killed two policemen in Yunkang Voting District and destroyed the ballot box. Police reinforcements arrived and order was restored. Gunsu brought a public address system and talked to the voters who had fled to the hills. A replacement ballot was installed and the voting began at noon. Out of 280 registrants, 221 voters cast their ballots and the District was orderly.

(Incl. #5)

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REPORT OF INCIDENT AT CHINWON MYUN, CHANGSONG ELECTORAL DISTRICT

At 0330 Hours 10 May 1948, a mob of 30 people attacked a police sub-station on their way to the Myun Office to destroy the Myun ballots and ballot boxes. One member of the mob and one member of the Hyang Bo Dan were killed, and six members of the latter group were wounded.

A few windows were broken in the Myun office, but no ballots or boxes were lost.

(Incl. #6)

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REPORT OF INCIDENT AT OK CHUN, SAMGAE MYUN, CHANGSONG ELECTORAL DISTRICT

At 0430 Hours, 10 May 1948, a mob of about eighty armed people appeared near Ok Chun Voting District, fired shots in the air, and warned the people not to vote or they would be shot. Fifteen policemen were dispatched to this Myun for election duty to supplement the twenty "firemen" and about two hundred forty members of the Hyang Bo Dan. Voting started at Ok Chun Voting District late, but proceeded without interruption, except that two shots were fired about 1000 hours from a ridge 300 yards east of the voting place. Police returned two shots. No further disturbance.

(Incl. #7)

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HEADQUARTERS
99th Military Government Group
APO 6 Unit 1

(Kyongsang Puk)

NNBHA

ERP mlh

18 May 1948

SUBJECT: American Observation of National Election

TO : The Commanding General, USAMGIK
APO 235 Unit 2

1. In accordance with directives of the Commanding General, USAMGIK, which prescribe that two (2) American Officers, or DAC's of comparable commissioned status, will observe the Korean National Election in each of the Election Districts of this province on 10 May 1948 and also that American personnel will observe as much of the election procedure prior to election day as possible, the following indicates the action taken in Kyongsang Pukto.

2. This part of the National Election will be broken down into three (3) phases, each of which will be discussed separately.

a. First Phase (Registration 30 March to 9 April)

(1) To carry out the requirements as pertain to this phase of the election, the following personnel and transportation were available.

(a) Personnel: Furnished by:

(1) Military Government Agencies in Province.....18
(2) First Infantry Regiment..... 6
TOTAL.....24

(b) Transportation: Furnished by:

(1) Military Government Agencies in Province per day..... 6
(2) 1st Infantry Regiment, per day for 4 days..... 6

(2) The above personnel, using the small amount of transportation available each day, contacted and observed at the following, during this registration phase.

(a) Provincial Election Committee.....Daily
(b) Of the 33 Election Districts, 30 were visited at least.....Once
(c) Of the 2,446 Voting Districts:
130, each day for 4 days.....Once
237 others.....Once

The above indicates that, with the very small amount of transportation available, Americans, in addition to contacting practically all Election District Election Committees, actually physically visited 15% of the voting districts of this province during the registration period at least once, and, in an appreciable number of the cases, more than once.

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(3) The results of the American Observation of the Registration phase are attached hereto as enclosure #1. (not included) All information included in enclosure #1 (not included), which indicated the need of corrective action, was, in addition to being reported to the District Election Committee concerned on the same day as noted, was reported to the Provincial Election Committee for necessary action, upon return of the American to Taegu. In most cases, the Provincial Election Committee was most prompt in taking corrective action.

c. Second Phase (Interim) (10 April to 9 May)

(1) To carry out the requirements as pertain to this second phase of the election, the following personnel and transportation were available.

(a) Personnel: Furnished by:

(1) Military Government Agencies in Province.....18
TOTAL.....18

(b) Transportation: Furnished by:

(1) Military Government Agencies in Province, per day..... 5

(2) The above mentioned personnel, using the small amount of transportation available per day, contacted and observed at the following, during this phase of the election:

(a) Provincial Election Committee.....Daily
(b) Of the 33 Election Districts, 28 were to have actual voting (as the remaining five (5) each had only one (1) candidate), and of the 28, 25 were visited.....At least once
(c) In conjunction with (b) above, 32 voting districts were also visited.....once

(3) The results of the American Observation of the Interim Phase of the National Election are attached hereto as enclosure #2 (not included). All information included in enclosure #2, which indicated the need for corrective action, in addition to being discussed with the District Election Committee concerned on the spot, was also reported to the Provincial Election Committee on the following day for necessary action. In practically all cases, this committee took immediate corrective action.

c. Third Phase (Election Day) (10 May)

(1) To carry out the requirements as pertain to this phase of the National Election, the following personnel and transportation were available.

(a) Personnel: Furnished by:	Cor DAC	EM
(1) Mil Govt Agencies in Province	29	33
(2) USAMGIK.....	33	0
(3) USAFIK (OCI).....	1	0
(4) 1st Infantry Regiment.....	0	32
TOTAL	63	65

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(b) Transportation: Furnished by:

(1) Mil Govt Agencies in Prov (army vehicles).....15
(2) 6th Inf Div, Pusan (drawn on M/R by 99th).....28
(3) USAFIK (OCI-furnished by 1st Inf Regt)..... 1
(4) 1st Infantry Regiment.....14
(5) Korean Circle "K" vehicles.....2
TOTAL.....60

(2) The above personnel, using the transportation indicated above, (with the exception of four (4) being utilized by the UNTCOK Observation Group in this Province) contacted and observed at the following some time during the period 0700 to 2000, 10 May.

(a) Provincial Election Committee
(b) All District Election Committees in whose districts actual voting took place (28 each)
(c) 1,203 Voting Districts of the 2,156 required to be open for voting.

(3) The results of the American Observation of this final phase of the election are attached hereto as inclosure #3 (extracts from typical area only). In many cases, when information was received at the Provincial Capital, during the day, on which corrective action was necessary, the facts were presented to the Provincial Election Committee, who took immediate corrective action in all such cases, so as to insure proper methods of voting during the remainder of the period.

3. Comments made by UNTCOK, Kyongsang Pukto Observation Group:

a. Upon arrival in Taegu, the Observation Group divided into two parties. One, consisting of Mr. Boncour and three (3) others, immediately departed for Kyongju and did not return to Taegu but returned to Seoul via the coast route by vehicle. Consequently, this headquarters knows of no comments made by this group. The other party, consisting of Mr. Manet and two (2) others, remained in Taegu. Their comments were as follows:

Mr. Manet: "I can understand the high percentage of voters--it is the social pressure on the people in these small towns."

"This polling place is about as perfect as it could be."

"In this polling place there was a misinterpretation in the election law but the election official used very sound judgment in his decision." (This had to do with mistaken idea by one official that voters were supposed to sign their ballots, and another election official decided as it was a secret ballot that could not be done--one vote was ruined.)

Commented favorably on practically all polling places visited.

Commented favorably on the election officials in every case.

Was pleased that police were keeping close watch on polling places. Said it was necessary in view of pre-election disturbances to protect the voters. Actually stated that policy had changed from not wanting the police around to wanting their protection for voters.

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Stated that the Indian delegate had told him informally that the Korean election was being conducted better than in his own land (India).

Repeatedly stated that his job and the Americans' was the same. We had the same interest. Mr. Blokh in all cases concurred with Mr. Manet and said about the same things simply reworded.

Mr. Shinn (Korean interpreter) made one comment to the effect that he was from North Korea and was very bitter against the communists, and did not personally think the election should have been held at this time.

During 10 May, the group kept in touch with headquarters and made a point of visiting any trouble spots reported such as one bombed polling place where Mr. Manet was pleased that 70% had voted prior to the bombing and the people continued to vote and ended with 90% Also a village where rioters in the mountains had scared the villagers from the polls so that no one had voted until the police restored order in the early afternoon and when we arrived shortly after the police a long queue of voters were busy casting ballots. Mr. Manet stated that it would have been better to close the polls at five to make it easier to bring the boxes in before dark. He stated that he was satisfied all who wanted to vote did so prior to seven and was favorably impressed with the way the boxes were sealed at the polling places and immediately hauled off to the police headquarters.

Another side comment by Mr. Manet was to the effect that ignorant people (especially women) would have to be shown the technique of voting and in doing so the election official could put his finger on a favored candidate but also stated each candidate had a right to be represented in each polling place.

4. Summary of American Observation:

a. In practically all cases, American Observers, and also Mr. Manet of the UNTCOK, indicated that all Korean election officials were sincere in their efforts to conduct a free and fair election.

b. Main reasons for declaring certain ballots invalid were, in order of most frequent appearance:

(1) Ballot on which the name of no candidate is marked. Section 42, Election Law.

(2) Ballot on which the voter recorded other matters than a mark behind the name of the candidate of his choice. Section 42, Election Law.

(3) Ballot on which it cannot be told which name is marked. Section 42, Election Law.

(4) Ballot on which more than one candidate is marked. Section 42, Election Law.

(5) Failure on the part of the chairman of the voting district Election Committee to put his seal on the ballot in accordance with the provisions of Section 34, Election Law.

c. The reasons for the non-voting of a small segment of the eligible voting population appeared to be, in order of priority

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(1) Those who were afraid to vote due to intimidation by communists.

(2) Those who were against the election.

(3) Those who for business or personal reasons were away from their voting districts on 10 May.

d. No incident was noted whereby any individual was forcing or attempting to force a person to vote.

e. A very few instances of armed police being inside the voting place were observed.

f. All observers were impressed with the extremely large amount of women voters who turned out.

g. In several instances, American Observers stated that the arrival of Americans at a voting place tended to reassure the voters that nothing would happen to them if they voted, consequently a greater number of voters turned out.

h. In practically all instances, the self-protection units were used in a proper manner.

/s/ Alexander Adair
ALEXANDER ADAIR
Colonel Inf
Commanding

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OBSERVERS' ELECTION LOG (Taegu) OBSERVER: MR. HITCHCOCK

ARRIVED	VOTING PLACE	DONG	DISTRICT	REMARKS	DEPARTED
0700	Election Hqs District #2	Nae Dang	2	Only one member of election committee and custodian present. Office locked. Policeman on duty outside. No one knew whether this would be a voting place or not.	1735
0750	"	Soo Chang	"	Voting place just being set up. Policeman on duty outside. No one waiting to vote. Voting district Chief obviously worried about his personal safety. Self-protection units (hereafter SPU) apparently afraid to report for duty inasmuch as they were supposed to be present at 0600 but have not yet arrived. SPU appointed by dong chief and assigned to local police box for further assignment to Voting District Chief (hereafter VDC) for ultimate control by VDC) and by dang chief. Voting booth (hereafter VB) was merely table in corner, reasonably secret but not absolutely so for there was no curtain. Recommended curtain. Forty in line to vote before departure.	0820
0830	"	#5 Won Dae	"	Policeman outside. SPU on duty also. SPU appointed by dang chief and not under control of police nor a particular party or private organization (hereafter, SPU appt OK). Procedure and arrangements OK (hereafter, PAOK). Already voted (hereafter V)-100. Total eligible to vote (hereafter T)-602. In line to vote (hereafter L)-100. Estimate time for completion of voting (hereafter ETCV)-1600. Only one table for both checking registration and issuing of ballots but saw no reason to suggest a change since everything was progressing smoothly and rapidly VB secret.	
0850	"	#3 Won Dae	"	SPU members of election committee. Recommended correction and this recommendation accepted by VDC (hereafter, RCA). VB not completely screened but reasonably secret. RCA. V-7. L-60, ETCV-1300. Each candidate had two observers to insure that no coercion was used. No evidence of either coercion to vote or coercion to vote for a particular candidate (hereafter NEC). SPU appt OK. PAOK.	0900

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ARRIVED	VOTING PLACE	DONG	DISTRICT	REMARKS	DEPARTED
0905	Election Hqs District #2	#4 Won Dae	2	Dynamite thrown here at 0800 but did not explode. Everyone jittery but operations not halted. V-40. T-700. L-10. ETCV-1900. VB secret. PAOK SPU appt OK. Woman voter stated that police and SPU told everyone to vote but did not advocate any particular candidate. Otherwise, NEC.	0920
0925	"	#2 Won Dae	"	VB not completely screened but screens were being prepared. V-20. T-778. L-60. ETCV-1900. SPU appt OK. NEC. PAOK.	0940
0945	"	#1 Won Dae	"	VB not screened. RCA. Police and SPU inside voting place with permission of VDC but without there being any disorders. RCA. V-100. T-700. L-100. ETCV-unknown. SPU appt OK. NEC. PAOK.	1005
1015	"	#2 Roh Gook	"	Voting completed before arrival. V and T-191. VB not secret and no attempt was made to keep voting secret. This dong is a small village isolated across the river and about one mile from main road to Taegu City proper. Voting was held in back yard of wealthy man's home. Looked as though voting could be easily controlled by pressure of landlord on poor farmers. Nevertheless NEC. SPU appt OK. Showdown concerning what really happened here will come with the counting of the ballots of this district.	1030
1035	"	#1 Roh Gook	"	This voting district even more isolated than preceding place. VB is big room to which only one voter was admitted at a time. Two members of the election committee were present permanently in VB to help people with their ballots but they made no attempt to see voter mark his ballot when explanations were finished. Recommended that such explanations be made outside VB. RCA. V-130. T-609. L-150. SPU appt OK. NEC. PAOK otherwise.	1050
1120	"	#1 Pyung Ni	"	VB secret. SPU appt OK. V-40. T-655. L-20. PAOK. NEC. ETCV-1600. Gwun Yung To, Detective No. 10, Police Div "E", was investigating in an unnecessarily brutal manner a young couple passing through the village. Though this incident happened within view of the voting place, it had no connection with the voting. This incident will be separately reported to American Adviser to the Police Div.	1140

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ARRIVED	VOTING PLACE	DONG	DISTRICT	REMARKS	DEPARTED
1300	Election Hqs District #2	#6 Nae Dong	2	Same place as visited at 0700. VB not screened but VDC does not permit anyone to watch voting. My recommendation to screen VB not acted upon. VDC says there are not screens available, which statement can hardly be believed. This is the first case in which VDC did not appear to be doing everything he can to keep vote secret after being given suggestions. VDC says even the local leftists came to vote. V-500. T-700. L-30. ETCV-1900. SPU appt OK, except as noted PAOK.	1320
1340	"	#2 Pyung Ni	"	V-230. T-268. L-2. This voting place was in the middle of a plain on top of a hill. (for best defense against communist bands in the surrounding mountains). Very isolated. Police inside by invitation of VDC but without existence of disorder. RCA. SPU not assigned by request of police because they were considered inadequately trained for the mountain warfare necessary to defend this site. No such trouble had been experienced. Not sufficient envelopes had been delivered. Insufficient ballots had been delivered. VDC believed that he had solved the latter matter by cutting in half all the official ballots and making new ballots out of the blank half. Suggested he write a letter to the Election District committee about this and offered to deliver it for him, which we did. VB not secret. Nevertheless, NEC and except as noted PAOK.	1400
1420	"	Ee Hyun	"	Finished before arrival and so did not continue to this place.	1420
1425	"	Chung Ree	"	V-440. T-491. L-0. ETCV-1900. Police inside but VDC stated that this was only because no one was voting at the time and that it was raining outside. SPU appt OK. NEC. Booth not completely screened but VB reasonably secret. Otherwise PAOK.	1435
1440	"	Sam Ni	"	Finished before arrival and so did not continue to this place.	1440
1520	"	Sung Danf	"	V-600. T-754. L-0. ETCV-unknown. NEC. SPU appt OK. PAOK VB secret.	1600

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ARRIVED	VOTING PLACE	DONG	DISTRICT	REMARKS	DEPARTED
1830	#2	#6 Nae Dong	2	This place visited previously at 0700 and at 1330. V-626. T-722. (T given above at 1300 was approximate). L-0. At 1900 took ballot box with two members of voting district committee to Nae Dong Police box. Here ballot box was sealed with paper strips upon which the VDC placed toh-jahng.	1920

In each case above, except that of #6 Nae Dong, VDC was very cooperative and seemed to honestly be trying to do a good job. All errors seemed unintentional. Although many voters did not seem to have decided for whom to vote before arrival at poll and all voters seemed anxious to vote. NEC in each case was determined by my interpreter, whom I know well and know to be loyal. He separated himself from me and quietly asked several "honest-looking" people, one at a time, whether any coercion had been used. He felt that the answers he received were honest. Much of the voting might have been done purely on the basis of which candidate had the best photograph of himself at the polls for these photographs were studied carefully, especially be the women. The proportion of women in line was greater than would be expected, in most cases being greater than that of men. Having served in Korea for over two years, and being therefore familiar with educational and informational conditions in Korea, I am convinced that the election in this election district was as fair a one as could be expected, for the first of its kind, that the election was fair in fact, and that the balloting for the most part was as secret as the voter cared for it to be. Report on the counting of the ballots will follow on completion of this step.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE COUNTING OF BALLOTS ----- (1) Observed the counting of ballots from this district in the Taegu Public Meeting Hall from 1000 to 1800 11 May 1948. No real system was used during the first few hours, the entire contents of a ballot box being dumped on the table, some nine or ten persons removing ballots from envelopes, ballots and envelopes becoming mixed up in the process, separate piles of ballots being arranged by four or five members of the committee, ballots cast for each candidate eventually ending up in a single pile, and ballots finally being checked for authenticity and being counted. Each of the three candidates from this district had his representative present at the counting. I insured at hourly intervals that each of these representatives was given every opportunity to observe unrestrictedly and that each was satisfied about the accuracy of the count. At no time did any of these representatives complain about the counting of the ballots or about his inability to observe properly. The counting became more and more systemitized. Four times throughout the day I suggested that ballots be taken from the ballot boxes individually and tallied individually. Though I felt that the confusion that would have been avoided by such a procedure would more than compensate for any slowness in the procedure, the election committee chief thought otherwise and rejected each of my suggestions. At 1800, I went off-duty and Mr. MacClure, the other American observer for the district, came on. He was present at the completion of the tabulation of ballots at about 0630 12 May 1948. (2) At 1300 13 May 1948 the Chief of the Election Committee of this Election District gave me the final tabulation as follows:

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Votes cast for Pak Sung Ha	----	6,253
" " " Suh Sang Il	----	11,777
" " " Son In Sik	----	8,790
Blank ballots cast	----	840
Ballots disqualified for other reasons	----	1,160
Total ballots cast		28,820

On 14 May 1948, however, his clerk gave me amended figures as follows, the reason for which I do not yet know:

Votes for Pak Sung Ha	----	6,253
" " Suh Sang Il	----	11,777
" " Son In Sik	----	8,890
Blank ballots cast	----	848
Ballots disqualified for other reasons	----	1,150
Total ballots cast	----	28,918

This latter total is 86.6% of the total 33,381 registrations reported by the district at the end of the registration period. (3) The count at #2 Roh Gook Dang indicated that some close supervision had been given each voter inasmuch as there were no blank ballots and no disqualified ballots (every other voting place in this district had several blank and/or disqualified ballots). The relatively even distribution of votes (PAK-57, SUH-90, and Son-34) indicated, however, that the voter was able to select his choice freely. The count at #6 Nae Dong Dang indicated that my earlier suspicions were unwarranted (PAK-135, SUH-321, and SON-136, Blank-15, Disqualified-19). The election district election committee showed good judgment in accepting the ballots from #2 Pyung Ni Dang, though the insufficient official ballots had been cut in half to make enough ballots. (4) The only evidence of coercion was in the count at #2 Roh Gook Dang and then only to the extent mentioned above. It is very gratifying to note that there was no "land-slide", that votes were apparently cast freely, and that voters were free to cast a blank ballot and free to disqualify their ballots by error. Believe that Korean officials, civil and police, and Korean election committees have earned the world's respect for the fair and proper manner in which this election was conducted despite the ease by which they could have confused and coerced the uneducated Korean public. (5) 15 May 1948 Chief of Election Committee changed figures again to the following and stated that this was final: PAK--6,251; SUH--11,777; SON--8,890; Blank--844; Disqualified for other reasons--1,154; Total--28,916. Chie stated that errors made previously were due to all checkers not agreeing before final figures were released. All checkers now agree. Total registration was 33,381.

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OBSERVERS' ELECTION LOG — OBSERVER: MR. MacCLURE

ARRIVED	VOTING PLACE	DONG	DISTRICT	REMARKS				DEPARTED
0700	2nd Dist Hq	Ne Dang	2	Lee Jing (Guide) No curtain on booth. 1 member present, poorly informed.				
0720	Ballot Box Arrived			Voted	Registered	Committee members present	Ballot Box	General 0722
0740	Tae Sing Dong		2	0		1	O.K. No shield	
0745	Say Mun Lo	Long Ma Lo	2	0		0	O.K.	
0800	Tae Shing 2nd		2	0		3 members	O.K. No shield	
0803	Si Jang Buk Ro		2	0		0	O.K. No shield	Chief Assassinated
0807	Sae Sing Dong 1st		2	28		8	O.K.	
0825	Naedong Dong 5th		2	150		18	O.K.	200 to vote
0830	Naedong Dong 4th		2	10		10	O.K.	24 incline
0850	Naedong Dong 3rd		2	100	630	7	O.K.	50 to vote
0900	Naedong Dong 2nd		2	20	703	5	O.K. No shield-Police in booth	
0924	Naedong Dong 1st		2	17	172	12	O.K. No shield-Police in booth	
0938	Tae Shing Dong 3rd		2	300	594	8	O.K. No shield	
0955	Tae Shing Dong 4th		2	350	772	6	O.K.	100 in line Police in booth
1010	Tae Myong Dong 4th		3	100	960	16	O.K.	
1016	Naedang Dong 8th		2	100	775	9	O.K. No shield-Deputy of candidates advising votes	
1048	Naedang Dong 10th		2	250	477	8	O.K. No shield-50 in line. Group of ballots in crowd.	

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ARRIVED	VOTING PLACE	DONG	DISTRICT	REMARKS				
				Voted	Registered	Committee members present	Ballot Box	General
1125	Naedang Dong 9th		2	300	629	14	O.K.	1 man telling people how to vo
1210				A lunch is prepared.				
1250				Same eaten.				
1305	Tae Pyong Soo 1st St		2	Up till noon voting proceeding proficiently.			O.K. No shield	
				200	220	5		
1323	Tae Pyong Soo 3rd		2	700	977	18	O. K. No shield	
1330	Tae Pyong Soo 2nd		2	350	577	18	O. K. No shield	25 to vote
1343	Tae Hong Dong		2	262	301	18	No shield	Police
1355	So Ya Dong		2	330	446	8	No shield	Police
1400	Tae Gyo Dong 1st		2	330	489	8	No shield	Police
1412	Tae Gyo Dong 2nd		2	269	427	5	No shield	Police
1420	So Sang Soo 1st		2	337	457	6	No shield	
1430	Tal Song Dong 2nd		2	659	783	11	20 lined to vote	
1436	Tal Song Dong 1st		2	560	697	17	8 lined to vote	
1443	Tal Song Dong	3	2	450	677	5	O.K. Police	
1455	Tal Song Dong	4	2	457	644	9	O.K. Police	
1507	Tal Song Dong	5	2	380	559	2	No shield	Police
1521	Kel Song Dong	1st st	2	183	218	8	O.K. Police	
1530	Taeshing Dong	5	2	750	837	12	No shield	Police
1545	eshing Dong	6	2	542	575	8	No shield	

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ARRIVED	VOTING PLACE	DONG	DISTRICT	REMARKS			Ballot Box	General
				Voted	Registered	Committee members present		
1600	Nedang Dong	6	2	619	729	5	O.K. Police	
1620	Bisang Dong	3	2	660	864	18	No shield	
1635	Bisang Dong	4	2	480	568	14	O.K.	
1700	Bisang Dong	2	2	690	732	8	No shield	
1708	Bisang Dong	1	2	420	460	18	Police	
1730	Bisang Dong	5	2	778	798	18	O.K. Police in voting place	
1755	Bisang Dong	Police box	7 2	The ballot box of the 6th Bisang Dong voting place. Taken to 19th police station.				
1800	Bisang Dong	7	2	570	742	9	O.K. Police	
1820	Bisang Dong	8	2	566	664	18	No shield Police	
1840	Nedang Dong	7	2	528	582	19	They had finished when we arrived.	
1850		19th police station No policeman knows about noted members of the 6th that the place of Bi Biung Day committee had left. We were then told that the ballot box of the Bisang Dong was taken to the 19th police station. Reported at Second District Headquarters.						

GENERAL REMARKS: The election was rather slow in getting under way. First (6) six voting places had not a single vote cast by 0800. At headquarters No 2 only one member of the board was present at 0700. H was not well informed as to his duties and was also decidedly hazy as to the various voting places under his jurisdiction. After 0900 the voters arrived rapidly regardless of a heavy downpour. 1020 our Jeep slid into a ditch on its side. Koreans looked on but refused to assist us to get it out. Apparently afraid of the communists. However, with the aid of a few small boys and several planks we were soon on our way again, no damage was done. Twenty (20) out of forty three (43) booths had no screen provided. (17) seventeen out of (43) booths had policemen inside. All were armed. At No. 43 one was sound asleep on the floor, four others were inside. Nearly each one said the Chief gave him instructions to stay in booth. At No. 16 a group of six men had (58) fifty eight ballots about (75) seventy five feet away from booths, busy marking them and placing in the envelopes. The ballots were taken away from them and turned over to the chairman of the Board, with the suggestion that he place them in bundle making a record of the same with witnesse. At No. 9 one individual was passing

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out literature. He was seated at the entrance - removed. At No. 17 one individual was at the screen telling voters exactly where to mark the ballot-(whom to vote for). We also found him at No. 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21. He was instructed to stay away from the interior of the booth. We did not see him again. At 32 two shots were fired close to the booth just as we were leaving. We saw no disturbance nor what the shooting was at or for. At No. 15 one individual (who claimed to be a deputy for a candidate) was sitting at edge of screen instructing people which one to vote for. He was placed on other side of the booth away from screen and instructed not to get closer. At noon I lost my first guide - He complained of sickness. I picked up another one but also lost him within one hour. He was useless anyway. This was at No. 19 after several people apparently attempted to persuade both he and my interpreter not to go with us further. I put the interpreter in the jeep but our guide disappeared. As we proceeded to the next booth the interpreter Mr. Chang Yan Yar suddenly said that the rest of the booths were in places when the jeep could not reach yet he had just said a moment before that he did not know where any of them were located. He was told that we would walk if necessary. We finally reached every booth on our list. At Naedong number 2 voting was peaceful and well administered for the first attempt. Women turned out in large numbers. We were well received at all places. Driver was excellent, giving almost the utmost cooperation. Jeep was in bad mechanical condition stalling frequently. An apparent lack of proper instructions being given to the voters caused considerable confusion and many ballots were discarded in final count due to wrong markings. The size of the ballot sheet was larger than necessary, much time folding at the booths and unfolding at the checking centers could be climinated by reducing its size to one fourth. Booth number 1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 35, 37 and 43 had not provided shields for ballot markers. At booth number 11, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, 39, 42 and 43. Armed policemen were inside. Chairman at each place advised of regulations. At booth number 8, 29 persons were in line to vote, at number 11, 20 persons, No. 13, 100 persons, number 16, 50 persons, number 20, 25 persons, number 26, 10 persons and number 27, 8 persons.

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HEADQUARTERS
98TH MILITARY GOVERNMENT GROUP (Kyongsang Nam)
APO 6

14 May 1948

SUBJECT: Report on Election

TO: Commanding General, USAMGIK
APO 235 Unit 2

1. This report is designed to give in condensed narrative form an outline of the steps taken in preparation for and in the conduct of the election of 10 May 1948 in this Province. Since the experiences of most of the Korean officials, the American inspection teams, and the election committees were quire similar in all areas, only sample reports are included in covering their activities. All unusual or outstanding occurrences have been extracted from all reports and are included herein. Other reports are available if required.

PREPARATION PHASE.

A. Participation by Korean Officials.

Practically all Korean officials on all levels were organized into instruction and inspection teams for the purpose of assisting the election committees and instructing the public regarding election procedures. Beginning 1 April 1948 this activity was stepped up and in fact very little other business was done in any of the Provincial or Gun or Bu offices. Speaker teams penetrated even to the most remote villages. Radio time was allocated to government officials, election committees and candidates. Newspaper articles were written by officials and large numbers of handbills and posters were distributed. While there was some duplication of effort on various levels, including National, this was, under the circumstances, an advantage. (See attached Incl. #1 for sample report of inspection team.)

B. Activities of OCI.

While directed from Seoul, in accordance with plans and policies of Mr. Stewart, the local OCI office added considerable material to the large amount distributed. Activities of OCI were coordinated with those of the Provincial Government in the use of radio, newspapers and handbill distribution.

C. Inspection Trips of American Advisors.

While the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, the Advisor of the Home Affairs Bureau, and the Advisor of the Public Information Section were particularly concerned with the dissemination of information and the implementation of the election directives, all other advisors were used in some capacity to assist in the program. All Gun and Bu election committees, and the majority of the Myun offices were visited by American teams both before and after the registration period.

Two visits of groups of inspectors from the United Nations Commission were made in this Province prior to the election. They seemed well pleased with the results obtained at the time of their visit.

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D. Reaction of the People.

The only active opposition to the election from the beginning was by the Communist Party (South Korea Labor Party). Numerous instances of violence and intimidation had been reported. These incidents were reported to the Department of Police by the Provincial police and are in their files. (See attached Incl. #2a and b, for typical propaganda material and 2-c for report of one incident).

There was an initial indifference on the part of a good many people toward the election, due to the following causes: (a) The opposition of Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic. Their followers and many other citizens and government officials opposed the elections and indicated that they would not vote; (b) Suspicion of motives behind the election. In many former Japanese elections Koreans had been forced to vote for Japanese-supported candidates; (c) Loss of face by head-men. In all former elections the headmen voted to decide minor matters of local interest. With the coming of universal suffrage which gave the vote to the women and all younger adult members of families, the headmen lost face and many felt that the women and younger people did not have the experience and were not qualified to vote.

This indifference and opposition seemed to melt away shortly after the onset of the education campaign. Many people came to feel that Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic were traitors and had sold their country in order to further their own selfish ambitions. The conviction was also aroused that the election was actually to be honest and conducted under a free atmosphere. Before the registration was over, it was evident that public interest in the election as an initial step toward independence was rising throughout the Province. By the time of the election, a wave of popular patriotic feeling had completely eclipsed the opposition of Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic and only the real Communists and their followers continued the opposition. There was little campaigning on any issue other than that of independence, and few people seemed to care for whom they voted as long as they had the opportunity to elect a representative who would help to form a Korean government.

E. A Free Atmosphere.

It cannot be claimed that there was no intimidation, no force used to influence people to register or to vote. This is impossible in our own country. However, all cases reported in this Province were discovered to be purely local in nature and little evidence was forthcoming regarding actual occurrences. It is believed that the police made a genuine attempt to carry out the intent of the election law. They carried on a Province-wide education campaign, but on investigation it was found that this was purely for the purpose of inducing the people to vote, and was not directed toward the support of any one candidate. The Chief of Police investigated throughout the Province to supervise this assistance on the part of the police to the election committees, and government officials, and reported that great progress had been made. It was rumored that some individuals had registered under the impression that their ration cards would have been forfeited if they had failed to do so. Discussion of this subject with many block leaders brought out the fact that such threats would have been unnecessary because the Korean people were generally used to carrying out the instructions of the block leaders and cooperating with them. No evidence was discovered by any of the inspection teams regarding bought votes, intimidation or coercion. This free atmosphere was confirmed by the attitude of the people on Election Day.

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ELECTION DAY.

Reports of American Inspection Teams were unanimous in their expression of gratification and even surprise over the great interest on the part of the entire population in the election, the careful planning on the part of all officials for the conduct of the elections and the meticulous observance of every detail of the Election Law by the election committees.

All opposition except that evidenced by the South Korea Labor Party had disappeared. The Korean people seemed determined to vote, they seemed to know how to vote and they appeared to gain great satisfaction from the knowledge that they had helped contribute some small part toward Korean independence.

There were 11 cases of violence on the 9th of May in which 4 people were killed, 8 injured, and 12 ballot boxes and ballots or registration lists destroyed. The latter were all replaced before election day. On 10 May there were 21 cases of violence, in which 1 person was killed, 13 injured and 14 ballot boxes destroyed. Even the destruction of the boxes or the threat of continued violence did not deter the voters and the election was continued. In no area were sufficient ballots destroyed to warrant a recommendation for a re-election. (See attached Incl. #3 for summaries of incidents on 9 May and 10 May from police reports).

There was no question in the minds of any of the American inspectors but that a free atmosphere existed. Voters, when questioned regarding this, indicated that they would not have voted (or would have turned in blank ballots) if the election had been forced. The voting was honest and secret and in general surpassed in this respect the results obtained in what are called "democratic" countries.

The number of void ballots, due either to improper voting, to writing on the ballot or to failure to indicate any choice, varied from 1% to 6%, with an average of around 3%. This, added to the total number of eligible voters who did not register (3%) and who registered but failed to vote (2%) makes the maximum Communist population (including Fellow-Travelers) less than 10% in this Province. This is far removed from the 30%-40% estimated in some quarters as being Leftist strength prior to the election, and indicates the swing to the Right that has taken place during the past six months. Many of the candidates were true Independents and while the majority are supporters of Rhee Syngman, as expected, it is believed that the elected representatives from this Province represent the thought and the will of the people. Nothing further could be asked of a democratic election and this result justifies all the hard work and effort on the part of the Americans and the SKIG officials during the past two and a half years. Our attempts to bring some semblance of democratic thought to a nation held for forty years under the heel of a dictator and with a history of four thousand years of despotism has borne fruit. It is a record of which the American people may well be proud. This thought was voiced by Mr. S. H. Jackson (Australia), member of the UN Commission. who inspected the election procedures in this Province and who indicated that he was well pleased with everything that he had seen and heard.

A final word must be added in appreciation of the efforts of the officers and men of the 6th Infantry Division in assisting in every way possible in the conduct of the elections, in furnishing protection to Military Government Inspection Teams and in giving moral support in troubled areas to the patriotic Korean people who were trying to carry out their democratic responsibilities in the fact of Communistic violence. Major General Orlando

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Ward was most cooperative in his offers to do anything we desired and to render any assistance needed. His understanding of and interest in the Korean people and their problems has been an inspiration to all of us. Likewise the cooperative attitude and practical assistance of Colonel Gunby, Commanding Officer of the 6th Division Artillery helped to make our work easier. The fine work of the 6th Infantry Division patrols throughout the Province in checking and reporting progress prior to the election, in distributing educational material throughout the countryside, and in furnishing assistance and protection during the election itself, is greatly appreciated.

The assistance of the officers and men and Department of the Army civilians of the 11th Medium Port and the 790th Railway Operating Battalion as well as several national level officers and civilians on duty in Pusan who served as members of Election Day Inspection Teams, is also appreciated. It is believed that all of these individuals not only contributed materially toward the accomplishment of the mission of the United States Army in Korea, but that they themselves benefited through the experience gained in close contact with Korean officials and citizens determined to make the election a success. The entire operation was overwhelmingly successful and this success was due to the hard work, interest and enthusiasm of Koreans and Americans alike, all working together toward a common goal. Truly, history was made in Korea on that memorable day and all concerned may well be proud of their contribution.

/s/ F. E. Gillette
F. E. GILLETTE
Colonel, Infantry
Chief Civil Affairs Officer

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SAMPLE REPORT OF INSPECTION TEAM.

"Summary--

All candidates are announced. There is no leftist candidate anywhere.

Registration is done under free atmosphere. No intimidation and no interference is reported.

All districts are wanting election expenses. They are trying to minimize the expenses. The Provincial Government will be able to save a part of the fund allocated by the National Government if it is managed well.

Transportation for collecting ballot boxes is a problem. Shortage of vehicles and gasoline makes it difficult for the electoral districts to take care of the job.

For publicity, speaker teams are sent out to myun and villages.

Yangsan Gun

They have made 3 lists of registered voters, and 1 is used for public inspection, another is placed at the myun office, and the third at the electoral district election committee. They are expecting to receive all lists of registered voters from all voting districts (one copy from each voting district) by tomorrow.

Many members of election committees are resigning in order to participate in campaigning for the candidates. About ten members have already submitted resignations, and more members are expected to follow.

It is satisfactorily planned to insure secret voting.

Attitude of the people in the district toward the election is favorable. There is no pressure by any group. No restrictions on meetings and speeches.

There is little effect by Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic's policy of non-participation in the election.

The election committee is operating satisfactorily. When we were there, they had just finished a meeting with the local voters to instruct them how to vote. They put up signs indicating name and district of the voting district, and date and time of election and public inspection of the register.

Ulsan Gun

There has been no opposition or interference. There seems to be a minority of objectors. Attitude of people toward the election is generally enthusiastic.

The Gun is planning to mobilize about 20 vehicles, including 4 from the Gun, 10 from the coal mine, 5 from private companies, 1 from FAA, 1 from monopoly bureau. At least 1 truck to each myun will be assigned to collect ballot boxes and to attend to other business. The Gun needs about 26 drums of gasoline and 1 drum of engine oil for this purpose.

Campaigning of the candidates has been started. On 23 April there will be a public meeting to announce political views of 6 candidates in the electoral district A.
(Encl. #1)

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Voluntary protective groups, young peoples' organizations (Taedong), fire fighter groups will take responsibility for guarding polling places and protect ballot boxes, and the police will stay in background.

Election procedures are carried on efficiently. The myun-master impresses us as an energetic and efficient man.

They received an instructive bulletin published by the National Election Committee which includes a diagram of model polling place and other instructions, and are planning to follow them.

They will have a problem in collecting ballot boxes. Their voting districts are scattered all over the Gun; electoral district A includes the central parts of the Gun and district B takes in the surrounding parts. (Division of districts by the National Election Committee is not done well.) They will have transportation difficulties, and will need gasoline and engine oil. They are even requesting the provincial government to dispatch vehicles to meet the emergency need.

Miryang Gun

They are still getting registrations. (This is wrong.) Actual registration started from 4 April to 7 April according to the dates on the registration forms. They started late because they received the registration forms late. They received the forms on 3 April.

Very poorly managed. Only one of the members of the election committee was present, and he is very inefficient. He even explained how he will arrange the polling place on the election day, saying that he would place a table at the center of the room for the voters to mark their ballots. We instructed him that he should prepare secret booths for marking the ballots.

The polling place had no signs to indicate the number of voting districts, date and place of election. We instructed him to put up such signs.

No chairman and member of the election committee at No. 14 voting district was present at the polling place when we stepped in, and the register of voters was left on a desk not attended. (This is bad).

Method of registration--The members of the election committee and Ban-jang in the district were going around visiting individual homes to get registrations, in addition to those done at the registration place. (This practice is irregular, although the intention is to get as many registrations as possible.)

There are some leftists in the district, but no one refused to register. No pressure was applied in registration.

The chairman of the election committee is poorly selected; he is low in intellect. They do not follow national plans closely. They have set their own dates for registration and public inspection of the register.

Reaction of the people toward the election is generally favorable. There were some handbills opposing the election distributed in the Gun. The members of the election committee think that the handbills are made by some left groups, such as the Democratic Front, the National Labor Union, Women's Alliance, and the Farmers Union. Last night there were some torches lit on hills to express sentiment opposing the election.
(Incl. #1)

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Political meetings are not restricted; permit is not required in order to have public meetings for election campaign, except notifying the police.

There is some influence of Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic among some minority intellectual group, but little effect to general public.

During the past two years the leftist activities in Miryang were more serious than in some other Guns in the province. The leftist influence may have been penetrated among the official circles that the government officials either have lost their incentive or are afraid to take positive steps in conduct of government administration.

The future attention of the American personnel and the Korean officials should be concentrated on such Guns as Miryang. We have mentioned to Mr. Su Sang Whan, Chief of Home Affairs Bureau, that he and his staff should pay attention to Miryang."

(Incl #1)

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ANTI-ELECTION HANDBILL DISTRIBUTED AT ARBOR DAY CEREMONY IN PUSAN.

Do not have a registration for election.

Deer fellow citizens, Men of Traitor, Lee Rhee Syngman forced the people to have a registration, saying that government would not distribute any grains or rice and they will be put in jail if they don't have registrations, but this is a red lie (black lie). If you have a registration, our country will be a colony of United States forever.

(Incl #2A)

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THREATENING LETTER SENT TO DAC - (Interpreter for Chief Civil Affairs Officer)

To Kei Won Chung:

We Young People Dead Band of Rescuing the Country and Crushing the Separate Government suggest the following three main points for the welfare of 30,000,000 people;

1. To join the separate government is betrayal of the country. And you should secede from it right away and issue your statement of seceding.

2. Crush the secret plot of separate government and make both troops of U. S. Army and Soviet Russia to be withdrawn and join the work of establishment of People's Republic, in unifying the South and North of Korea.

3. If you do not make a seceding statement of crushing the separate Government, you are a traitor. Therefore we are going to give you a knife of justice.

King of Hades is thirsty of your blood. We who are understandable about your mistake broadly and teach the way of rebirth and caress the conception of co-living give you the period of self-examination for a while. But, if this kind of note will be sent to you thrice, your eyes cannot see the beauty of the present world forever.

By Pusan Kukco Dan Jung Bun-shai
Ch'ung-nyun Kyul-sa Dai
(Young People Dead Band of Rescuing the Country and Crushing the Separate Government in Pusan.)

Incl #2B

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PRE-ELECTION INCIDENT OF VIOLENCE.

The following information is received by an official telephone written by Ulsan Gun-master.

1. Date and time of the event -
1900 27 April 1948

2. Details of the event -

Several objectors of the election came to No. 2 voting district Bumso-myun, Ulsan-gun, but they did no harm. They proceeded to No. 3 voting district in the same Myun. A group of them attacked the house of Mr. Pak Yong Dae, Chairman of the voting district election committee, and they shot him with a '38 type rifle and beheaded him with a Japanese sword, and ran away.

3. Records of the voting district are preserved. The criminals are under a strict search.

/s/ Kwon Sung Ki
/t/ Kwon Sung Ki
Chief, Local Affairs Section

(Incl #2C)

Inclosure No. 45D

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE
9 MAY 1948

On 9 May at Puk Sang, Kochang Gun, at 1:00 a.m., five hundred persons attacked and destroyed part of Police Box and killed Patrolman Pak Ki Ho. Three attackers were killed.

On 8 May at Ih Chun, Kochang Gun, at 2000 hours, four hundred persons attacked the Police Box with rifles and shotguns, burned building and records, seized one Japanese rifle and unknown quantity of ammunition; also burned part of Myun office and destroyed all records. Chairman of Election Committee, Kang Yong Duk and four residents were badly beaten. Mob seized and burned five ballot boxes and contents, which were replaced. There were fifty arrests.

SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE
10 May 1948

On 9 May, at 2100 hours, an unknown man threw a dynamite bomb into the home and polling place of Chairman Song Bok Yun, No. 31 polling place Chung election area, Pusan. Two panes of glass broken, only damage.

On 9 May at 2230 hours two unknown masked men broke into the home and polling place of Chairman Suk Ke Su, No. 55 polling place, Chung election area, Pusan. Suk absent, wife threatened and all election documents seized but recovered by guards of Native Protective Society. The guards pursued the men but did not apprehend them.

On 9 May at 2000 hours, several unknown persons attacked No. 7 polling place, Ung Nam Myun, Chang Yong Gun, and one ballot box, six hundred envelopes and four photos of delegates were destroyed. Attackers burned box and material but all was replaced.

On 10 May at 1100 hours at the 11 polling place, Wul district, Pusan, six men armed with clubs and pistols attacked and beat four election officials and stole election register. Four of the six attackers arrested, one of whom had a pistol.

On 9 May at 2030 hours several unknown persons threw a hand grenade which failed to explode into No. 1 polling place, Chinju Bu, Chinju Gun. No arrest.

On 9 May at 0810 hours, Kim Yong Tae, 21 years, 492 He Hung Dong, Pusan, representative SKLP entered No. 53 polling place, Kap Election District, Pusan, to vote and escaped with registration book. Not apprehended.

On 9 May at 0400 hours, 30 men entered the house of Chairman of Election Committee, name unknown, No. 3 polling place, Jang Na District, Chang Yong Gun, and escaped with all election documents. No details.

On 10 May at 0400 hours 10 SKLP men attacked the polling place at Bon Ho Ric, Sam Nang Jin Myun, Milyang Gun, and destroyed 1 ballot box and office equipment. All replaced. No arrests.
(Incl #3)

Inclosure No. 45E

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

On 10 May at 1240 hours at No. 2 polling place, Mu Kung Ri, Chil Sun Myun, Haman Gun, Chairman Ju Sang Yul and four election officials were attacked by twenty men armed with spears and seized and burned two copies of the registration book, all envelopes, and one ballot box. All replaced. No arrests.

On 10 May at 1150 hours at No. 12 polling place, Byung District, Pusan, two men pretending to vote seized and destroyed register. One arrested.

On 10 May at 0800 hours 50 men opposed to elections entered house of Chairman An Jong Gu, No. 4 polling place, Chil Buk Myun, Haman Gun, after threatening him damaged one ballot box. Box replaced. No arrests.

On 9 May at 1030 hours 20 men with axes and spears entered polling place, Wun Dang Ri, Ju Po Myun, Kimhae Gun, and partially destroyed ballot box which was replaced. No arrests.

At 0410 hours on 10 May, thirty men armed with spears and clubs entered house and beat Chairman Ha Dong Sam, No. 6 polling place, Sam Tong Myun, Namhae Gun; escaped with one copy of register, ballot box and 790 ballots. All replaced. No arrests.

At 0900 hours on 9 May, 100 men, some with shotguns and pistols entered the polling place at So Jung Ri, Puk Sang Myun, Kochang Gun, and burned building. They beat and severely injured Ku Chief Kim Je Yong. All escaped to mountains. Polling place and ballots replaced. No arrests.

At 0200 hours on 10 May, 50 men entered No. 4 polling place, Ke Sung Ri, and No. 3 polling place, Sin Dang Ri, Ke Sung Myun, ChangYong Gun. They threatened guards who left. They then burned ballots and ballot boxes. All replaced. No arrests.

At 0300 hours on 10 May 20 men burned No. 2 polling place, Yu Uo Myun, ChangYong Gun, with loss of ballots and ballot boxes. All replaced. No arrests.

On 10 May at 1700 hours, 30 men armed with spears attacked the polling place at Kwang Gae Gi, Kae Sung Myun, ChangYong Gun. After seriously wounding Patrolman Lee Jin Ck they seized one carbine, twelve rounds of ammunition, one ballot box, ballots and other documents. All recovered except carbine and ammunition. No arrests.

On 10 May at 1100 hours at I Yun Ri, Sang Nam Myun, Milyang Gun, three men armed with imitation pistols set fire and destroyed part of polling place, ballot box and ballots, and escaped. All replaced. No arrests.

On 10 May at 1150 hours one man threw a gasoline bomb into No. 10 polling place, Kimhae Up, Kimhae Gun, and escaped into the woods. Two members of election committee slightly burned. No extensive damage. No arrest.

On 10 May at 1130 hours at No. 1 polling place, Ung Yang Myun, Kochang Gun, five men with two shotguns attacked and burned one ballot box and ballots. Police pursued them to mountain and shot in chest Kim Ke Sow, of SKLP and confiscated one shotgun and quantity of ammunition. One arrest.
(Incl #3)

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SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE
9 MAY 1948

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Inclosure No. 45E

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Communications
Seoul, Korea

GENERAL OBSERVATION OF
MILITARY GOVERNMENT ELECTION OBSERVATION TEAM
Cheju Island

By Captain Speer, Captain Taylor, and Lieutenant Bernheisel

1. In compliance with orders, Office of Chief Advisor, above-named officers departed Seoul 1000 5 May 1948 and arrived Cheju at 1500 same day. Area assignments were made by CCAO on 6 May. In accordance with plans made by local election officials, Cheju Island was divided into two Electoral Districts, one on the northern half of the Island and two on the southern half.

2. Lt Bernehisel was assigned Kuja Myun as his area of observation, and Capt Keily of the 59th Military Government Co was assigned Chochan Myun, both being in the northeastern part of the Island. On 7 May these two officers spent the entire day visiting local voting places within their respective areas. Ballots were delivered to the respective Myun offices. Pre-election observations in the two Myuns represented a marked contrast to one another. The Myun Chief, Chochan Myun, appeared to be in a hopelessly confused state of mind as to prescribed pre-election procedures. It appeared that he had done nothing to organize his Myun. Later developments and subsequent information gathered brought to light reasons for prevailing conditions in this area. In brief, this Myun appeared to be completely dominated by subversive elements of the population. On the evening preceding the election anti-election handbills had been widely distributed in many areas of the Myun. Road blocks had been erected, and telephone lines had been torn down in numerous places. Election day resulted in a zero score for this myun. On the other hand, Kuja Myun, directly to the East had been excellently organized for Election Day. A spot check of numerous voting places and conversations with local election committees revealed an air of absolute confidence in the successful outcome of the voting on 10 May. The Myun chief had done a remarkably find piece of work and was confident of the successful fulfillment of election procedure in his area. Certain occurrences in and around voting place number eight (Kua Myun), located off the main road back in the hills, on the evening preceding election day marred what otherwise would have been a perfect voting record for the entire Myun. Here a number of houses were burned and two people were reported killed. The ballot box however had been well hidden and was not destroyed, but there was no voting here on 10 May.

3. To recapitulate the pre-election phase in Kuja Myun represented a compliance with all conditions prescribed by REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THELAW FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE: (1) Election information appeared to have been widely disseminated. (2) Ballots and ballot boxes had been distributed in ample time before election day. (3) The home guard had been well organized and throughout it stood by to assist the police in preserving order, but conditions were such that this group did not have to engage in anything but peaceful activities. (4) Posters were prominently displayed and in most cases pictures of candidates were posted in each voting place. However, an almost complete lack of the above conditions characterized the pre-election phase in Chochan Myun for reasons mentioned above.

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SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Communications
Seoul, Korea

REPORT OF ELECTION OBSERVATION - CHEJU DO

1. The undersigned arrived Cheju-Do at 1500, 5 May 1948 for the purpose of observing the general election to be held 10 May 1948.

2. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer made the assignments of voting districts on 6 May 1948. The Myuns of Aewol, Hanrim and Chuja being assigned to Captain Speer, the reporting officer.

3. On 7 May 1948 a visit was made to the Myuns of Aewol and Hanrim and the following was observed:

a. Approximately five miles west of Cheju a large roadblock was encountered and cleared for passage of vehicles.

b. About one half mile further along the route another roadblock, smaller than the first, was encountered. Many subversive handbills were found pasted to rocks and scattered in the area. Some of these bills were picked up and subsequently turned over to the local Civil Affairs officers. After clearing the roadblock, the inspection trip was resumed. The two villages immediately following the roadblocks were found to be deserted, the inhabitants having fled into the hills. At the following village, a small police detachment reported that they were being fired on by snipers. The inhabitants of this village remained in their homes. No further roadblocks were encountered but handbills were noticed at various points along the route The village of Aewol was found to be almost normal as both police and Constabulary were in the town. The Voting Committee reported all ballot boxes had been received and would be distributed Sunday 9 May 1948. Arrangements were made with local police and Constabulary for safekeeping of ballots to be brought the next day, 8 May 1948. The visit to Hanrim Myun was uneventful and they reported no subversive activities.

4. On 8 May 1948 the ballots, pencils, posters and other necessary papers were packaged for delivery to the Voting District Committees. Roadblocks and handbills were again encountered and the police reported harassing rifle and machine-gun fire. No difficulties were encountered and ballots were delivered to the Committees at Aewol and Hanrim. The ballots for Chuja Myun were delivered by Coast Guard cutter directly from Cheju, however, they would be returned to Hanrim Myun for counting.

5. 9 May 1948 a visit was made to Aewol and Hanrim Myuns to check on distribution of ballot boxes and ballots. All ballots and boxes for unprotected villages directly to the east of Aewol were returned to the Voting Committee as all inhabitants had been driven into the hills by subversive elements. In the immediate vicinity of Aewol and in villages having police detachments or Constabulary, the distribution of ballot boxes and ballots proceeded normally.

6. 10 May 1948 balloting commenced at scheduled time, however, only 32% of registered voters cast their vote in Aewol Myun. Hanrim Myun cast a much higher percentage of votes - some 70% of the total registered. Three voting places were visited in the vicinity of Aewol and two in Hanrim. Balloting was normal and procedures were being conducted per instructions given the committees. No loitering, electioneering or molesting of voters

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was observed. Voting places closed at the specified times and ballot boxes were immediately dispatched to the Central Committee at Hanrim for counting. Counting commenced upon receipt of local boxes in Hanrim and continued all during the night. The ballot boxes from Chuja Myun were transported to Hanrim Harbor by Coast Guard cutter and arrived approximately 1000 11 May 1948. They were immediately dispatched by jeep, accompanied by a member of the Chuja Committee, to Hanrim Central Committee. All counting of ballots was completed by 2000 11 May 1948 and a report was sent to the Central Committee at Cheju.

7. On 12 May 1948 a visit was made to Hanrim for the purpose of returning all ballots to the Central Committee in Cheju for storage. During this visit, roadblocks were again encountered but it was noted that the villagers to the east of Aewol were returning to their villages. When questioned about their whereabouts, they merely replied in the hills and would say nothing further.

8. No further visits were made to the Voting Districts of Cheju.

9. Arrived Seoul 1700, 15 May 1948.

Captain T. J. SPEER

Inclosure No. 46A

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOU[illegible] KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMEN[illegible]
Department of Communications
Seoul, Korea

REPORT ON ELECTION OBSERVATION - CHEJU DO
By Captain Herbert W. Taylor

1. Lieutenant George Wibel, Lieutenant William Sabotay and the reporting officer were assigned the South Gun of Cheju-Do as their area of observation of the elections to be held on 10 May 1948. To carry out this mission, two vehicles, a jeep and a 3/4 ton trucks, two drivers and three interpreters were assigned.

2. The plan called for this group being divided into two teams. Team No. 1 consisted o Lt. Sabotay, driver and interpreter in the jeep, taking the western route around the Island and the other team, Team No. 2, consisting of Lt. Wibel, myself, driver and interpreter, taking the eastern route and distributing ballots to various Gun headquarters enroute. Team No. 2 was to set up headquarters at SagwiPo and Team No. 1, prior to and during the election would set up headquarters at MosulPo and join Team No. 2 at SagwiPo on the evening of the day of election, after ballot boxes had been turned in.

3. At 0830 hours on 8 May 1948, both teams departed as planned. At 1330 on 8 May 1948, Team No. 2 arrived at SagwiPo and billeted at a local hotel. The ballots had been distributed and no trouble was reported nor was any trouble anticipated during the election period by the election officials in the Gun headquarters we had visited. All ballots, pencils, papers, etc., had been distributed as planned.

4. On 9 May 1948, Lt. Wibel made visits to various election headquarters in surrounding areas. Reporting officer remained at headquarters. No trouble was reported during that day.

5. On 10 May 1948, due to the shortage of transportation, one vehicle only being available, Lieutenant Wibel departed at 0630 for a tour of polling districts outside of immediate SagwiPo area. The reporting officer, at the same time, departed for observation tour of the two polling districts in SagwiPo proper. Polling district No. 1 was observed at 0650. Ballot boxes were examined by polling officials and were empty in accordance with regulations. The balloting started at 0700 and was conducted in accordance with regulations. Only one representative of candidates was present at that time. At 0730, reporting officer visited polling district No. 2 at SagwiPo and their election was conducted in accordance with regulations. As a matter of fact, this officer considers the election very well conducted at this place. During the remainder of the day, reporting officer visited between these two polling districts via foot, and no discrepancies were noted at either of these two polling districts during the day of the election.

6. The other two representatives for candidates at polling district No. 2 reported in at 2230.

HERBERT W. TAYLOR
Captain Sig C

Inclosure No. 46B

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

OG OF ELECTION ACTIVITIES
Kuja Myun

Observer: Lt Bernheisel

Preface: This outline of election day activities is characterized by an absence of unusual occurrences for reasons mentioned above. Total polling places were 18. Total visited 14. Total reported registrations 8,734, or 96% of the eligible voters. All voting reported to have commenced at 0700 hours. Voting completed in entire Myun by 1600 hours.

(1) Arrived Kuja Myun at approximately 0930. Visited voting place number two at 0945. One hundred fifty had voted at time of visit. Reported registrations 687, or 98% of eligible voters. Everything normal.

(2) 1000 hours visited number four. Registration 369 or 98%. Procedure normal.

(3) 1010 hours visited number three. Reported registration 350 or 100%. No unusual occurrences.

(4) 1030 hours visited number ten located at Sehwa (Myun office) 561 registered or 90%. 270 had voted at time of visit. Procedure normal.

(5) 1050 hours. Visited number twelve. Reported registration 577 or 96%. 400 had voted at time of visit. No unusual occurrences.

(6) 1100 hours reported registration 278 or 98%. 200 had voted at time of visit. Normal.

(7) 1110 hours. Visited number fourteen. Registration 534 or 98%. 270 had voted at time of visit. Normal.

(8) 1140 hours. Visited number sixteen. Registration 634, or 90%. 250 had voted at time of visit. Normal.

(9) Remaining five voting places were visited in due course. No unusual occurrences at time of visit. Voting places number 17 and 18 were located on a small island off Cheju and consequently were not visited. A report on occurrences at number 8 voting place was received just before noon. Observer broke his trip through the Myun to report back to Cheju in order to get help. Police were subsequently dispatched to scene of trouble which had occurred the previous evening.

(10) Considerable uneasiness was displayed by local election committees at the end of the voting on the afternoon of the 10th. Reported threats of trouble from the outside caused them to fear for the safety of ballot boxes. Previous arrangements had been made with the constabulary by Cheju Do officials to have the ballot boxes picked up as soon as possible after voting was completed. Observer promised to do what he could to have them picked up. On the morning of the 11th he accompanied a truck from MG Company headquarters to pick up ballot boxes, but on the way into Kuja Myun a constabulary truck was met carrying all ballot boxes into Election headquarters in Cheju City.

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(11) During the afternoon of the 11th and on the 12th of May this observer assisted in observing the counting of ballots of the three voting districts: Cheju Eup, Chochan Myun, and Kuja Myun. After considerable delay, brought about no doubt by uncertainty as to just how to proceed, committee officials proceeded in a systematic fashion to count the ballots. Except for some oral interference on the part of candidate representatives and others this phase of the election procedure was completed in a normal fashion.

Charles K. Fernheisel, DAC
Hq, USAMGIK

Inclosure No. 46C

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Office of the Chief Advisor
Seoul, Korea

AGOCA 000.1 11 June 1948

SUBJECT: Election Activities.

TO: Commanding General
United States Army Military Government in Korea
APO 235 Unit 2
Attention: General J. Weckerling

1. On 8 March 1948 this office was interjected into the election picture by an IOM from the Military Governor. This IOM called for immediate action toward necessary preliminary steps to implement existing election directives.

2. Radio and phone messages were immediately dispatched to all provinces calling for a meeting of the Chief Civil Affairs Officers, Korean Governors and District Court Judges at 0900, 12 March 1948, in Seoul at Headquarters, USAMGIK.

3. a. 12 March meeting held as scheduled.

b. From 8 March to 12 March those portions of the Election Law approved by the UN were hastily mimeographed in English and Korean for distribution at the 12 March meeting.

c. Arrangements were made for special train and air transport of the Chief Civil Affairs Officers and the Korean Governors to their home stations during the afternoon of 12 March.

4. Intermittent conferences were held with the National Election Committee, the Office of Administration and this office relative to an election budget. On 5 April a compromise budget was approved by the Military Governor.

5. Many conferences were held with personnel of Gen. Weckerling's office and representatives of the United Nations between 8 March and 17 March relative to final approval of an election law. The law was finally approved and signed on 17 March 1948. During this period arrangements were made with the office of Administration for the hasty printing in Korean of the Election Law and the Rules and Regulations. Also, plans were made for rapid distribution of these vital documents to the lowest echelon. It was agreed that the copies in English would be mimeographed. Necessary arrangements for this were made with AG, USAMGIK, who rendered superior service at this time. Plans were coordinated with the Office of Administration for the printing and distribution of registration forms and poll registers.

6. On 31 March 1948 memorandum was prepared for the Military Governor's approval, "Election Procedure Observation by American Personnel". This was approved, published and distributed on 1 April 1948.

7. During the period 30 March through 9 April, this office furnished speakers to instruct meetings, called by various SKIG agencies, in the requirements of the election law.

8. On 5 April arrangements were made for the publishing and distribution of executive order No. 20, changing the date of the election from 9 May 1948 to 10 May 1948.

Inclosure No. 47

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9. On 27 March 1948, a meeting was held at Hq, USAFIK for the purpose of coordinating various U.S. agencies concerned with the contemplated UN Observation Groups' trips throughout South Korea. The real burden of these trips fell upon the Department of Transportation, SKIG, and it can be said that they came through with flying colors. This office was charged with the necessary coordination and issued required instructions to the various provinces and agencies. The United Nations Observation groups made two trips to the Provinces, one from 5 April through 10 April, the other 19 April through 24 April. Similar instructions prevailed for both trips, to wit: complete freedom of movement, best available quarters and facilities, no formal receptions or entertainment, required transportation to be furnished on call, etc. Reports received from the UN upon their return and from the Provinces were most favorable.

10. Registration started on 30 March 1948. At this time preliminary plans were coordinated for the printing and distribution of ballots and the final distribution of ballot boxes and locks to the lowest echelons. Everything called for in this vital phase was completed by 7 May 1948. The Office of Administration, SKIG, is to be commended for their superior performance.

11. Throughout the whole period from 8 March to 10 May, Election Day, the various SKIG agencies concerned were contacted regularly and informal progress reports received almost daily.

12. The Military Governor's plan for American observation of the election required 411 Americans. Of that number approximately 200 were already located in the various Provinces. All departments and agencies of the South Korean Interim Government were required to furnish the balance (211) of American personnel needed on a percentage basis in direct ratio to American personnel assigned to them. An orientation meeting of this personnel was held at USAMGIK on 26 April 1948. At this meeting the Election Law was explained and a detailed description of their duties given. On 3 May 1948, a final meeting of the personnel selected for election duties was held. Arrangements for their transportation, issue of field equipment and early morning mess prior to departure were explained. Copies of travel orders and the pertinent parts of the Election Law and the Rules and Regulations were issued to each observer. Also a check list and a question sheet mimeographed in both Korean and English were issued each observer as a guide and help to the expected language difficulties.

13. 4 May through 9 May: The preparation of orders for UN Election Observers and the coordination of their billeting, transportation and actual observation was predominant throughout this period. The actual movement of American and UN observers took place concurrently.

14. From Election Day through the 17th of May this office was chiefly concerned with receiving election results from the Provinces and making them available to Department of Public Information for release to the many foreign correspondents present for this period.

15. Throughout the whole election phase, this office was responsible for coordination of the activities of the many SKIG agencies concerned. Lt Col Charles G. Duffy was designated as Liaison Officer between the Military Governor and the National Election Committee, assisted by Captain James McMahon, he was also given full responsibility for Military Government coordination and implementation of all phases of the election. The whole-hearted cooperation and all-out enthusiasm of all agencies of USAMGIK and SKIG made a huge success of what at first seemed an impossible job within the prescribed time limits.

/s/ Wm. F. Centner
WM. F. CENTNER
Colonel USAF
Acting Chief Advis

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

FARMERS IN THE COUNTRY AREAS READ POSTERS
SHOWING ELECTION PROCEDURES.

Inclosure No. 47a



FARMERS IN THE COUNTRY AREAS READ POSTERS
SHOWING ELECTION PROCEDURES.

Inclosure No. 47a

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NARS, Date
By

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



ENTRANCE TO A POLLING PLACE IN SEOUL. NOTE DISPLAY OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF CANDIDATES WITH NAMES IN LARGE IDEOGRAPHS.

Inclosure No. 47b

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ENTRANCE TO A BALLOTING PLACE. VOTERS HAVING REGISTRATION CHECKED.

Inclosure No. 47c



ENTRANCE TO A BALLOTING PLACE. VOTERS
HAVING REGISTRATION CHECKED.

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By NARS, Date



ENTRANCE TO BALLOTING PLACE.

Inclosure No. 47d

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



ENTRANCE TO BALLOTING PLACE.

Inclosure No. 47d

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



INTERIOR OF A PALLOTING PLACE.

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NARS, Date
By



INTERIOR OF A BALLOTING PLACE.

Inclosure No. 47e



VOTERS BEING CHECKED FOR REGISTRATION.

Inclosure No. 47f

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

VOTERS BEING CHECKED FOR REGISTRATION.

Inclosure No. 47f

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By _____ NARS, Date _____



VOTER HAVING BEEN CHECKED FOR REGISTRATION RECEIVES A BLANK BALLOT. (NOTE WOMAN IN BACKGROUND MARKING HER BALLOT).

Inclosure No. 47g



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VOTERS RECEIVING BLANK BALLOTS AFTER ENTERING
POLLING PLACE AND BEING CHECKED FOR REGISTRATION.

Inclosure No. 47h

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By _____ NARS, Date _____



VOTERS RECEIVING BLANK BALLOTS AFTER ENTERING
POLLING PLACE AND BEING CHECKED FOR REGISTRATION.

Inclosure No. 47h

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



WOMEN VOTERS BRINGING THEIR CHILDREN TO THE BAILOTING PLACES HAVING THEIR REGISTRATION CHECKED.

Inclosure No. 471



WOMEN VOTERS BRINGING THEIR CHILDREN TO THE BALLOTING PLACES HAVING THEIR REGISTRATION CHECKED.

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VOTERS PREPARING BALLOTS. MANY CHILDREN ACCOMPANIED THEIR PARENTS TO THE POLLING PLACES.

Inclosure No. 47j

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KOREAN WOMAN PLACING HER BALLOT (ENCLOSED IN AN ENVELOPE) INTO THE BALLOT BOX.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____



KOREAN WOMAN PLACING HER BALLOT (ENCLOSED IN AN ENVELOPE) INTO THE BALLOT BOX.

Inclosure No. 47k



MISS HELEN KIM, PRESIDENT OF EWHA COLLEGE,
CASTS HER VOTE.

Inclosure No. 47 1

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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

MISS HELEN KIM, PRESIDENT OF EWHA COLLEGE,
CASTS HER VOTE.

Inclosure No. 47 1

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

VOTERS PREPARING THEIR BALLOTS. NOTE DISPLAY OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF CANDIDATES WITH ASSIGNED SYMBOLS.

Inclosure No. 47m

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By NARS, Date



VOTERS PREPARING THEIR BALLOTS. NOTE DISPLAY OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF CANDIDATES WITH ASSIGNED SYMBOLS.

Inclosure No. 47m

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BROADCAST OF ELECTION RESULTS.

Inclosure No. 47n

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



BROADCAST OF ELECTION RESULTS.

Inclosure No. 47n

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



ELECTION RETURNS BEING POSTED IN FRONT OF CAPITOL.

Inclosure No. 47o

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Inclosure No 48

CRIMINAL INFORMATION-INTELLIGENCE SECTION

DETECTIVE BUREAU OF THE NATIONAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS

TABLE OF ANTI-ELECTION ACTIVITIES, 7 FEBRUARY TO 14 MAY 1948

Classification			Div DM	DA	DB	DC	DD	DE	DF	DG	DH	DJ	DR	Total
Election offices, attacked			24	14	2	11	10	43		6	14	10		134
Public institutions, attacked	Suppressed		3	7	8	6		56	39	45	28	27	1	220
	Prevented			7	5	4	2	29	3	15	6	9	1	81
Police attacked			2	14	4	2		11	4	1	14	20		72
Casualties	Election officials	Killed	1				3	3		1	3	4		15
		Wounded	7	2		5	13	19	1	4	10			61
	Candidates	Killed					1	1						2
		Wounded				3			1					4
	Police	Killed	1	1		1		12	3	13	6	12		49
		Wounded	3	3	9	9		22	9	34	14	25		128
	Rightists	Killed					1	5	2	1	1	1		11
		Wounded		4	1			25	1	1	6	9		47
	Families of Police	Killed							1			6		7
		Wounded		1				2	5	1	4	3		16
	Bystanders	Killed	2	2	2		2	29	2	6	20	42		107
		Wounded	15	12	8	32	11	142	21	36	50	60		387

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			DM	DA	DB	DC	DD	DE	DF	DG	DH	DJ	DR	Total
Casualties cont'd	Rioters	Killed	3	16	6	4		53	27	36	58	58		261
		Wounded		4		3		35	19	24	27	11		123
Arson	Election offices		1	2		3	6	12	1		4	1		32
	Election facilities						4				1			5
	Police offices			1	2	1		4	2		2	4		16
	Public offices			1	2	2		3		2	2	3	3	18
	People's residences		4	2	11	27	7	20	3	1	36	42		153
Misc. Destruction	Election facilities		1	4	2	4	3	3	1	18	2	3		41
	Police offices		1		1	1			5	4				12
	Public offices			2		1		4		5	6	3	1	22
	Private residences		2			4	5	38	1	1	6	12		69
	Roads and Bridges			2	2			5	5	5	18	10	1	48
Arms	Rifles:	Stolen				10		14	5	26	8	4	1	68
		Recaptured				10		11	5	25	4	3		58
	Carbines:	Stolen		6	2	1		11	2	8	11	7	2	50
		Recaptured				1		6	2	7	2	1		19
	Pistols:	Stolen						1			1			2
		Recaptured						1			1			2
	Ammunitions:	Stolen		67	20	10		343	40	591	421	117	10	1619
		Recaptured				10		297	7	183	196	117		810

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		DM	DA	DB	DC	DD	DE	DF	DG	DH	DJ	DR	Total
Railroad equipment and facilities damaged	Locomotives						1					70	71
	Railroad car and freight car											11	11
	Tracks						1	2	1			61	65
Communications damaged	Telephone lines cut	4	61	45	82	19	116	26	46	57	46	39	541
	Telephone and telegraph poles destroyed		52	10	37	8	55	4	24	180	7	76	543
	Communication tools damaged	5							4			4	13
	Power lines cut			10								5	15
Election documents, stolen		12	4	2	10	9	36	3	1	26	13		116
Election officials, threatened		2			12	3	28	1	15	6	6		73
Candidates, threatened		1	1		7	4	1	5	5				24
Strikes against election		3	11	2	2		9	8		4		5	44
School strike against election		7	1	2	1	2	27	4	6	24	1		75
Demonstrations against election		8	10	5	11	3	111	9	49	12	23		241
Spreading of handbills		1	15	33	60	8	84	16	30	15	13		275
Signal-fires		22	30	54	149	63	290	154	45	10	51	5	877

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RESTRICTED

A/AC.19/54
19 March 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON METHODS OF OBSERVATION OF ELECTIONS

1. The Sub-Committee, consisting of the representatives of China, France, Philippine Republic and Syria, was established at the 25th meeting of the Commission in order to examine and report on methods of observation of the elections. The Sub-Committee met twice under the chairmanship of the representative of France and presents herewith its report to the Commission.

2. The Sub-Committee had as its basis of work the working paper on possible methods of observation of the elections prepared by the Secretariat (document A/AC.19/W.36), the accompanying working paper on the observation of elections in Greece and Japan (document A/AC.19/W.37) and a paper prepared by the Secretariat on the provisional time schedule for the election (document A/AC.19/W.14/Add.2). The Sub-Committee refers the Commission to these documents for detailed background information.

3. Scope of observation

At the outset the Sub-Committee took note of the limited staff available both to the Commission and to the Secretariat and agreed that any plan for observation must be based on this fact. Due account was also taken of the difficulties of transport, communications and accommodation which would confront any observer groups working in the provinces, particularly in areas situated at any distance from the provincial capitals.

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In accordance with information received from the United States authorities the Sub-Committee regrets that in view of the lack of adequate air-fields, the normal use of air-transport is to be discouraged and that the observer groups of the Commission will as a general rule travel by train to the provincial capitals and thence undertake local trips by jeep.

4. Subject to the above consideration the Sub-Committee agreed with the view of the representative of the Philippine Republic that the conduct of the elections should be observed in each of the provinces (including the islands of Choju-Do and Wool Lyong Do, if practicable) and during the most significant stages of the election process in each case.

5. In these circumstances the Sub-Committee is of the opinion that an essential element in the Commission's observation of the election will be the receiving and examining of complaints concerning the conduct of the election in any area. The Sub-Committee suggests that, in addition to requesting information on complaints received by the National Election Committee, the Commission should indicate its readiness to receive complaints or information concerning the conduct of the elections from any quarter. The Commission should undertake special examination of complaints when deemed necessary.

6. Having in mind the considerations of paras. 3 and 5 the Sub-Committee recommends that observation of the elections should be undertaken (a) centrally by liaison with and observation of the work of the National Election Committee, and (b) in the provinces by direct observation through field observer groups.

7. <u>Free atmosphere for elections</u>

The Sub-Committee recognizes that observation should consist not only in examining the extent to which the requirements of

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the election law and regulations are complied with . The Sub-Committee considers that political and other activities occurring during the election period are important from the viewpoint of determining whether elections are to be held in a free atmosphere. Such political aspects would include activities of political parties and organizations; youth organizations; conduct of the police; extent of and reasons for non-participation in the elections both by individual voters and political organizations; attitude of the police and other authorities towards such non-participation; extent to which candidates are un-opposed; and the general public reaction to the elections. In this respect the Sub-Committee draws attention to the recommendations concerning a free atmosphere for elections adopted by the Commission (document A/AC.19/52).

8. Relations with the United States authorities

The Sub-Committee took note of the requirement of Resolution 1 of the General Assembly of 14 November 1947 whereby the Commission is to observe that the Korean representatives "are in fact duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees by military authorities in Korea". The Sub-Committee accordingly endorsed the view of the representative of France that the Commission should establish a procedure whereby it could observe and report on the methods used by the United States authorities in fulfilling their responsabilities concerning the conduct of the elections, especially in the provinces. The Sub-Committee has requested information from the United States Liaison Officer to the Commission concerning plans which the United States authorities may have for observing and controlling the conduct of the elections.

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9. Having in mind the above consideration the Sub-Committee recommends that appropriate liaison be established between the Commission's own agencies of observation and those of the United States authorities (see para. 16).

10. Question of an expert consultant

The Sub-Committee examined the suggestion made by the Chairman of the Commission at the 25th meeting for the appointment of an expert consultant to assist the Commission during the period of observation. The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that the Commission should be able at any time to exercise effective control over members of the staff assisting it and that, if a consultant were appointed, it would not be possible to ensure such control. As an additional consideration of a practical kind the Sub-Committee noted that there was now insufficient time in which to make suitable arrangements for an expert to be selected and attached to the Commission. On the suggestion of the representative of Syria the Sub-Committee agreed, that should the Commission deem it necessary, non-political Korean experts might be consulted on specific questions

11. System of reporting

The Sub-Committee recommends that the Commission should establish an appropriate uniform system of reporting by groups engaged in the observation of the elections. It is recommended that a questionnaire be drawn up based upon relevant provisions of the election law and regulations and the political aspects of the election referred to in para. 7, which as far as possible would indicate the more important factors to be taken into account in observing the elections.

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12. Stages of observation

The principal steps of the electoral process, with a list of the functions to be carried out by the responsible authorities at each stage, are provisionally set out in document A/AC.19/W.14/Add.2. The Sub-Committee considers that, both centrally in Seoul and in the provinces, the attempt should be made to observe each of the important successive stages of the elections:

(a) The period of registration of voters (30 March to 8 April);

( ) The period during which poll registers may be examined (14 to 20 April), appeals made and candidates registered (see document A/AC.19/W.14/Add.2);

(c) Polling day;

(d) The post-election period.

13. Organization of the Commission for observation

In considering the organizing of the Commission for observing the election the Sub-Committee had in mind both limited staffing resources and the structure of the existing sub-committees.

14. Main Committee: The Sub-Committee recommends that for purposes of observing the elections the Commission should merge the existing sub-committees into one Committee on which a representative of each member of the Commission would be entitled to sit but whose membership might rotate in accordance with the willingness of members to undertake periodic duties with the field observer groups. The functions of this Committee would include:

(a) Maintenance of permanent liaison with the National Election Committee in Seoul;

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(b) General observation of the work of the election committees;

(c) The receiving and examination of complaints and general information concerning the conduct of the elections

(d) The analysis of reports received from the Commission's observer groups;

(e) The obtaining and analyzing of information concerning attitudes of Koreans towards participation in the elections;

(f) The examining of and reporting to the Commission on conditions relating to a free atmosphere for the holding of elections;

(g) The planning and co-ordination of the activities of the field observer groups in accordance with the general directions of the Commission.

15. The Sub-Committee recognizes that in the discharge of the above responsibilities the proposed Committee might wish to set up sub-committees under specific terms of reference and special groups for the examination of complaints (para. 16).

16. Field observer groups: The Sub-Committee recommends that the Commission establish in the first instance two or three field observer groups to observe the conduct of the elections in selected areas in accordance with a co-ordinated plan. The functions of such field observer groups would include:

(a) Observation on the spot of the activities of selected provincial and local election committees;

(b) Examination of the extent to which the provisions of the electoral law and regulations had been complied with in the areas observed;

(c) Hearing and examination of complaints received in the areas observed or as directed by the main Committee;

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(d) Observation of the political aspects of the election campaign in selected areas from the viewpoint of determining whether a free atmosphere for the election exists, with special regard to the conduct of the police and youth organizations;

(e) Observation, as circumstances permit, of the work of observer groups or agencies established by the United States authorities, by the attaching, where practicable, of a Commission observer to United States observation groups.

17. The Sub-Committee recommends that the field observer groups might as a general rule consist of two members of Commission delegations, together with appropriate Secretariat staff.

18. Facilities

The Sub-Committee took note of information conveyed orally to the Secretariat by the United States Liaison Officer concerning the availability of services and facilities required for observation of the elections. According to this information the United States authorities, upon advice as to detailed requirements, will furnish in all provincial capitals such transport, accommodation and communication facilities as the Commission may need, together with office space and appropriate security measures. The Sub-Committee presumes that provision of these facilities includes their cost.

19. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Secretariat be authorized to consult with the United States authorities in detail concerning the above and other facilities in the light of methods and principles of observation approved by the Commission.

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A/AC.19/W.42
27 March 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

TIME-TABLE AND FACILITIES FOR OBSERVATION GROUPS

(Prepared by the Secretariat)

At its twenty-seventh meeting, the Commission decided that the conduct of the elections should be observed in each of the provinces (including the islands of Cheju-Do and Wool Lyong Do, if practicable) and during the most significant stages of the elections, (document A/AC.19/56).

The Commission further decided to establish in the first instance two or three Field Observation Groups to observe the conduct of the elections in selected areas in accordance with a coordinated plan.

Annex I -- "Train Itinerary for United Nations Observation Groups" - indicates the suggested schedules for three groups during the first week starting on Monday, 5 April, namely, the Main Committee as Group I (Seoul) and two Field Observation Groups.

Under the scheme outlined all the provincial capitals will be visited.

The suggested train itinerary, together with a request for transportation and other essential facilities was communicated to the United States Liaison Officer by the Principal Secretary on 25 March (Annex II). A reply to this communication was received on 27 March from the United States Liaison Officer, in which he informed the Principal Secretary that "Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Korea will make the necessary transportation and other facilities available for the United Nations Observation Groups generally as requested in your memorandum of 25 March 1948".

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The United States Liaison Officer had previously informed the Principal Secretary of the various types of railroad facilities which could be made available to the United Nations (Annex III). These facilities are referred to in the memorandum noted above (Annex II).

As a general rule an observation team will consist of the following personnel: 2 representatives; 1 secretary; 1 précis writer; 1 Korean interpreter; 1 secretary-typist.

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ANNEX I

TRAIN ITINERARY FOR UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUPS

GROUP I (Main Committee)

1. City of Seoul . . . . . Monday, 5 April

2. Kaesong - Kyonggi-Do
Approximately 1 1/2 hours from Seoul.
Self-powered car. Leave in morning
and return in evening . . . . . Tuesday, 6 April

3. Inchon - Kyonggi-Do
Approximately 1 1/4 hours by auto from
Seoul. United Nations transportation. . . Wednesday, 7 April

4. Chunchon* - Kangwon-Do
Approximately 2 hours from Seoul.
Self-powered car. Leave in morning
and return in evening . . . . . Thursday, 8 April

5. Cheju* - Cheju-Do
Approximately 2 1/2 hours by PLANE
from Seoul. Leave Seoul . . . . . Friday morning, 9 April
Return . . . . . Saturday afternoon, 10 April

The above itinerary will enable the group to visit two provincial capitals and the city of Seoul, and two important towns in Kyonggi Province (Inchon and Kaesong). Only one night, 9 April, will be spent away from Seoul.

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GROUP II

1. Leave Seoul 0800 . . . . . Monday, 5 April
Arrive Chochiwon 1057 . . . . . " " "
Then proceed immediately by train or jeep
to Chongju* - Chung Chong Pukto.
Remain in Chongju and vicinity on Monday.

2. Leave Chochiwon 1017 . . . . . Tuesday, 6 April
Arrive Taejon* - Chung Chong Namdo 1130 . . . " " "
Remain in Taejon or vicinity on Tuesday
afternoon and Wednesday morning.

3. Leave Taejon 1210 . . . . . Wednesday, 7 April
Arrive Iri 1500 . . . . . " " "
Then proceed immediately by train or jeep to
Chonju* - Cholla Pukto.
Remain in Chonju and vicinity on Wednesday afternoon
and Thursday morning.

.../...

* Provincial capital

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4. Leave Iri 1530 . . . . . Thursday, 8 April
Arrive Songjongni 1850 . . . . . " " "
Proceed next morning . . . . . Friday, 9 April
by train or jeep to Kwangju* - Cholla Namdo.
Remain in Kwangju and vicinity on Friday
morning and afternoon.

5. Leave Songjongni 0616 . . . . . Saturday, 10 April
Arrive Seoul 1825 . . . . . " " "

- - - - -

GROUP III

1. Leave Seoul 0800 . . . . . Monday, 5 April
Arrive Taegu* - Kyong Sang Pukto . . . . . " " "
Remain in Taegu and vicinity until 1538 . . . Wednesday, 7 April

2. Leave Taegu 1538 . . . . . " " "
Arrive Pusan* - Kyong Sang Namdo 1800 . . . " " "
Remain in Pusan and vicinity until night . . . Friday, 9 April

3. Return to Seoul by night train if possible
on Friday or as scheduled:
Leave Pusan 0800 . . . . . Saturday, 10 April
Arrive Seoul 1800 . . . . . " " "

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*. Provincial capital

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ANNEX II

25 March 1948

TO: Brigadier General John Weckerling
United States Army Liaison

FROM: Petrus J. Schmidt
Principal Secretary

SUBJECT: Transportation and other facilities for
United Nations Observation Groups

In connection with our joint discussion, I am transmitting herewith a schedule of trips developed by the Secretariat for the purpose of observing election procedures and practices during the week ending 10 April 1948.

Observation Group No. 1 will use the self-powered motor car as specified in paragraph f. of your memorandum dated 23 March 1948. In addition, facilities for a noon meal should be arranged at Kaesong and Chunchon.

The trip to Inchon will be made in United Nations vehicles and here also a noon meal should be provided.

The trip to Cheju-Do must of necessity be by plane and all necessary facilities for food and billeting should be provided.

Observation Group No. 2 will use one compartment sleeper and one dining car as specified in paragraphs c. and e. of your memorandum. These cars would be attached to regularly scheduled trains as specified in the attached timetable and would be held at the station during lay-over periods. It will be necessary to have a proper mess provided on the diner, sufficient for a five or six day trip, and it will also be necessary that billets be made available during overnight stays so that both male and female members of the observation groups may have bath facilities.

Observation Group No. 3 will need the same type facilities as specified for Observation Group No. 2.

The Commission requests that local transportation be made available at each provincial capital visited in order to have access to local areas. These cars should meet the train upon arrival and be at the disposal of the observation group during its stay in that area.

In addition, may we suggest that the Command arrange for proper credentials for each observation group which should include credentials prepared by the United States military authorities and by the National Election Committee. In addition to identifying the group, these credentials should instruct military and civilian officials to make all necessary facilities available to United Nations observation groups.

During scheduled trips, it is requested that security measures for the protection of property on trains be provided by the authorities.

Each observation group will consist of six to nine persons and the personnel of each group will be composed of representatives and secretariat staff. The secretariat staff will include one or two female members.

The Commission presumes that provision of these facilities includes their cost.

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ANNEX III

RAILROAD FACILITIES

1. The following types of railroad facilities can be made available to the United Nations:

.. Space on military coaches attached to regularly scheduled trains to points indicated on time-table schedule printed below.

(1) United Nations personnel desiring passage on these coaches may obtain travel orders published by AG Section, this headquarters to serve in lieu of tickets.

(2) Cost to United Nations would be figures at $ .01 per individual per kilometer plus berth accommodation if desired.

b. Maximum of four (4) compartment sleepers, each containing sixteen (16) berths (no dining facilities). Can seat sixty (60) persons in daytime. Cost per kilometer per car, $ .39. (Example: Seoul to Taejon and return $137.20).

c. Maximum of five (5) compartment sleepers, each containing eleven (11) berths (no dining facilities). Can seat sixty (60) persons in daytime. Cost per kilometer per car, $ .39.

d. Maximum of ten (10) standard, open berth type, sleepers, each containing twenty-eight (28) berths (no dining facilities). Can seat fifty-six (56) persons in daytime. Cost per kilometer per car $..39.

e. Dining cars attached to either b, c or d above, fully equipped and serviced except for rations and possibly mess supervisor. Cost based on flat rate per trip. Example: Seoul to Taejon and return $116.50.

. Maximum of one (1) self-powered motor car, carrying twenty (20) persons, no dining facilities and is not powerful enough to haul a dining car. Cost per car per kilometer, $ .36. Example: Seoul to Taejon and return, $126.00.

2. Cars listed in paragraph 1 b,c,d or e above to be attached to regularly scheduled trains and left at desired locations until mission is completed, then returned to Seoul in same manner. No additional charge if car remains standing overnight.

3. Arrangements for any of the type facilities above can be made through Transportation Office, this headquarters, Attention: Major Colwell, Washington 254.

... /...

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

500th TRANSPORTATION RAILWAY GRAND DIVISION
PASSENGER SECTION

17 February 1948

The following is a time-table schedule of all trains carrying military cars:

SOUTHBOUND		NORTHBOUND			
#1	STATIONS	#2	#35		#36
0800	Lv. Seoul	Ar. 1800	0530	Lv. Seoul	Ar. 1825
0806	Ar. Yongsan	Lv. 1754	0537	Ar. Yongsan	Lv. 1816
0809	Lv. Yongsan	Ar. 1751	0540	Lv. Yongsan	Ar. 1813
0818	Ar. Yongdungpo	Lv. 1742	0555	Ar. Yongdungpo	Lv. 1759
0821	Lv. Yongdungpo	Ar. 1739	0558	Lv. Yongdungpo	Ar. 1756
0831	Ar. Sihung	Lv. 1729	0611	Ar. Sihung	Lv. 1745
0841	Lv. Sihung	Ar. 1719	0612	Lv. Sihung	Ar. 1744
0910	Ar. Suwon	Lv. 1651	0705	Ar. Suwon	Lv. 1658
0915	Lv. Suwon	Ar. 1646	0715	Lv. Suwon	Ar. 1653
1014	Ar. Chonan	Lv. 1546	0855	Ar. Chonan	Lv. 1517
1019	Lv. Chonan	Ar. 1541	0910	Lv. Chonan	Ar. 1507
1057	Ar. Chochiwon	Lv. 1503	1007	Ar. Chochiwon	Lv. 1415
1100	Lv. Chochiwon	Ar. 1500	1017	Lv. Chochiwon	Ar. 1410
1148	Ar. Taejon	Lv. 1419	1130	Ar. Taejon	Lv. 1310
1203	Lv. Taejon	Ar. 1404	1210	Lv. Taejon	Ar. 1235
1401	Ar. Kunchon	Lv. 1211	1500	Ar. Iri	Lv. 0942
1406	Lv. Kumchon	Ar. 1206	1530	Lv. Iri	Ar. 0912
1523	Ar. Taegu	Lv. 1046	1850	Ar. Songjongni	Lv. 0616
1538	Lv. Taegu	Ar. 1031	1910	Lv. Songjongni	Ar. 0556
1704	Ar. Samnangjin	Lv. 0900	2140	Ar. Mokpo	Lv. 0330
1709	Lv. Samnangjin	Ar. 0855			
1800	Ar. Pusan	Lv. 0800			

Motor Car with Military Compt.

#801	STATIONS	#804
0715	Lv. Seoul	Ar. 1915
1040	Ar. Chunchon	Lv. 1605

Motor Car with Military Compt.

#803	STATIONS	#802
1625	Lv. Songdong	Ar. 1015
1935	Ar. Chunchon	Lv. 0705

One Military Coach

#201	STATIONS	#202
1747	Lv. Seoul	Ar. 0834
1914	Ar. Munsen	Lv. 0701
1915	Lv. Munsen	Ar. 0700
2000	Ar. Kaesong	Lv. 0615

#1303	STATIONS	#1302
One Military Coach		
1715	Lv. Seoul	Ar. 0835
1753	Ar. Chungyungni	Lv. 0755
1758	Lv. Chungyungni	Ar. 0743
1837	Ar. Uijongbu	Lv. 0703
1845	Lv. Uijongbu	Ar. 0658
1925	Ar. Tongduchon	Lv. 0620

NOTE: THIS SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE.
THIS SCHEDULE SUPERSEDES SCHEDULE DATED 13 FEBRUARY 1948.

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Inclosure No 50

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

RESTRICTED

A/AC.19/W.42/Add.5
16 April 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

REVISED ORGANIZATION AND TRAVEL ITINERARY OF OBSERVATION GROUPS
(Week ending 24 April 1948)

(Adopted by the Main Committee at its Third Meeting)

The following revised plan for the observation of the election programme during the week ending 24 April 1948 is circulated herewith for the guidance of observation groups.

I. Organization

GROUP I (Main Committee)

Representatives

Mr. Liu Yu-Wan (China)
Mr. T. Ssutu (China)
Mr. M.A. Valle (El Salvador)
Mr. H. Castilhes (France)
Mr. R. Luna (Philippines)

Secretariat

Mr. F.J.Schmidt (Principal Secretary)
Mr. J. Engers (Secretary)
Mr. A. Blokh (Precis Writer)
Mr. G. Globa (Precis Writer)
Miss I. Glance (Secretary-Typist)

GROUP II

Representatives

Mr. G. Patterson (Canada)
Mr. Wang Gung-Hsing (China)
Mr. H. Lindo (El Salvador)

Secretariat

Mr. R.S.Hausner (Secretary)
Mr. C.Campbell (Precis-Writer)
Miss M.Allard (Secretary-Typist)
Mr. Hurh, Hyun (Interpreter)

GROUP III

Representatives

Mr. O. Manet (France)
Mr. B. Singh (India)
Mr. Y. Mughir (Syria)

Secretariat

Mr. G. Lucas (Secretary)
Mr. A.Balinski (Precis Writer)
Miss A.Smith (Secretary-Typist)
Mr. Shin (Interpreter)

GROUP IV

Representatives

Mr. S.H. Jackson (Australia)
Mr. J.L. Paul-Boncour (France)

Secretariat

Mr. I. Milner (Secretary)
Miss M.Montague (Precis Writer)
Miss J.Stieren (Secretary-Typist)

Inclosure No 51

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

II. Travel Itinerary

Group I (Main Committee)	Monday - Saturday 19 - 24 April inclusive
1. City of Seoul	
2. Seoul and environs (provincial matters - Kyonggi-Do	
(United Nations Transportation)	
Group II	
1. Leave Seoul 0700	Monday 19 April
Arrive Chonan, Chung Chong Namdo 1036	"
Visit Chonan, Onyang, and Yesan	"
2. Leave Chonan 1019	Tuesday 20 April
Arrive Chochiwon 1057	"
Leave Chochiwon 1120	"
Arrive Chongju, Chung Chong Pukto 1150	"
Visit Chongju and vicinity	"
3. Leave Chongju 0800	Wednesday 21 April
Arrive Chungju, Chung Chong Pukto 1000	"
Visit Chungju and vicinity	"
Leave Chungju 1600	"
Arrive Chongju 1800	"
4. Leave Chongju 1010	Thursday 22 April
Arrive Chochiwon 1040	"
Leave Chochiwon 1100	"
Arrive Taejon, Chung Chong Namdo 1148	"
Visit Taejon, Kongju and vicinity	"
5. Leave Taejon 0450	Friday 23 April
Arrive Iri 0800	"
Leave Iri 0820	"
Arrive Chonju, Cholla Pukto 0910	"
Visit Chonju and vicinity	"
6. Leave Chonju 1730	Friday 23 April
Arrive Iri 1830	"
Leave Iri 1845	"
Arrive Taejon 2230	"
Leave Taejon 2300	"
Arrive Seoul 0700	Saturday 24 April

Transportation and facilities will be similar to those furnished to Observation Group II during the first week of observation.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Group III

1.	Leave Seoul 0800	Monday 19 April
	Arrive Taegu Kyongsang Pukto 1523	"
	Visit Taegu and vicinity	Monday and Tuesday 20 April
2.	Leave Taegu 1538	Tuesday 20 April
	Arrive Masan, Kyongsang Namdo 2000	"
	Visit Masan and vicinity	Wednesday 21 April
3.	Leave Masan 1745	Wednesday 21 April
	Arrive Pusan, Kyongsang Namdo 2010	"
	Visit Pusan and vicinity	Thursday 22 April
4.	Leave Pusan 0800	Friday 23 April
	Arrive Seoul 1800	"

Transportation and facilities will be similar to those furnished to Observation Group III during the first week of observation.

Group IV

Leave Seoul (Kimpo Airport) by air 0930	Tuesday 20 April
Arrive Kwangju, Cholla Namdo 1045	"
Visit Kwangju, Mokpo and Sunchon	Tuesday - Friday 20 - 23 April
Leave Kwangju by air 1445	Friday 23 April
Arrive Seoul (Kimpo Airport) 1600	"

Lodging facilities will be furnished in Kwangju.

NOTE: Confirmation of the return trip from Kwangju to Seoul on Friday 23 April will probably not be received from the United States authorities until Saturday, 17 April 1948.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

RESTRICTED

A/AC.19/W.42/Add.6/Rev.1
3 May 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

ORGANIZATION AND TRAVEL ITINERARY OF OBSERVATION GROUPS
(Period 7-11 May 1948)

(Adopted by the Main Committee at its Sixth Meeting)

The following revised plan for the observation of the election programme during the period 7 to 11 May 1948 is circulated herewith for the guidance of Observation Groups.

The Main Committee agreed that the period of observation be extended for an additional day beyond the time schedule given below should any Observation Group consider it advisable to do so.

I. Organization

Group	Locality	Representatives	Secretariat*
1 (Main Committee)	City of Seoul Seoul, Kyonggi-Do Chunchon, Kangwon-Do	Mr. Liu Yu-Wan (China) Mr. M.Valle (El Salvador) Mr. M.Barthelemy (France) Mr. R.Luna (Philippines) Mr. Y.Mughir (Syria)	Mr.P.J.Schmidt Mr.I.Milner Mr.J.F.Engers Miss Marion Montague
2	Chongju, Chungchong Pukto	Mr.G.Patterson (Canada)	Mr.C.Campbell
3	Taejon, Chungchong Namdo	Mr. B.Singh (India)	Mr.G.J.Lucas
4	Chonju, Cholla Pukto	Mr. T.Ssutu (China) Mr.Tang Gung-Hsing (China)	Mr.A.Palinski
5	Kwangju, Cholla Namdo	Mr. H.Lindo (El Salvador)	Mr. H.Liao
6	Taegu, Kyongsang Pukto	Mr.O.Manet (France)	Mr.A.Blokh
7	Pusan, Kyongsang Namdo	Mr.S.Jackson (Australia)	Mr.A.Gottesman Miss J.Stieren
8	Cheju, Cheju-Do	Mr.H.Costilhes (France)	Mr.G.Globa
9	East Coast	Mr.J.L.Paul-Boncour (France)	Miss I.Michaux

* It is anticipated that a sufficient number of interpreters will be made available by the United States authorities in the Provinces in order to meet the Commission's requirements.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

II. Travel Itinerary*

Group I (Main Committee)

1. City of Seoul) Saturday-Monday
2. Seoul, Kyonggi-Do) 8 - 10 May
)

(United Nations Transportation)

3. Chunchon, Kangwon-Do — Monday 10 May
(one or two representatives and Secretariat members)

Leave Seoul 0715 (via self-powered railroad car)
Arrive Chunchon 1040
Leave Chunchon 1605
Arrive Seoul 1915

Group 2

1. Leave Seoul 0800 (via train) — Saturday 8 May
Arrive Chochiwon 1057 --
Proceed to Chongju by auto
Arrive Chongju 1200

2. Leave Chongju 1400 (via auto) — Tuesday 11 May
Leave Chochiwon 1503 (via train)
Arrive Seoul 1800

Group 3

1. Leave Seoul 0800 (via train) — Saturday 8 May
Arrive Taejon 1148

2. Leave Taejon 1419 (via train) — Tuesday 11 May
Arrive Seoul 1800

Group 4**

1. Leave Seoul 0800 (via train) — Friday 7 May
Arrive Iri 1500 --
Proceed to Chonju by auto.
Arrive Chonju 1630

2. Leave Chonju 0815 (via auto) — Tuesday 11 May
Leave Iri 0942 (via train)
Arrive Seoul 1800

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* Seats will be reserved on regularly scheduled trains, and automotive transportation will be made available by the United States authorities at Provincial capitals (except Seoul) for Groups 2-9 inclusive.

** Change trains at Taejon, northbound and southbound.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Group 5*

1. Leave Seoul 0800 (via train) — Friday 7 May
Arrive Songjongni 1850 --
Proceed to Kwangju by auto.
Arrive Kwangju 1930

2. Leave Kwangju 0530 (via auto) — Tuesday 11 May
Leave Songjongni 0616 (via train)
Arrive Seoul 1800

Group 6

1. Leave Seoul 0800 (via train) — Friday 7 May
Arrive Taegu 1523

2. Leave Taegu 1046 (via train) — Tuesday 11 May
Arrive Seoul 1800

Group 7

1. Leave Seoul 0800 (via train) — Friday 7 May
Arrive Pusan 1800

2. Leave Pusan 0800 (via train) — Tuesday 11 May
Arrive Seoul 1800

Group 8

1. Leave Seoul (via auto) 0800 — Friday 7 May
Leave Kimpo airport (by air) 1000**
Arrive Cheju-Do 1200

2. Leave Cheju-Do (by air) 1300*** — Tuesday 11 May
Arrive Kimpo airport 1500
Arrive Seoul 1615

Group 9

To be arranged by United States authorities.

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* Change trains at Taejon, northbound and southbound.

** Scheduled flight.

*** Special flight.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE
SEOUL, KOREA

21 May 1948

Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, U.S. Army
Military Governor, USAMGIK
Capitol Building
Seoul,, Korea

Dear Gen. Dean:

Re Reports on the return of the Gen. Election

I report to you the new members of the National Assembly, elected on 10 May 1948 as per attached herewith. Also the resolution passed by the Committee on the North Che Ju Electoral District, A.B.

I trust you will receive your due consideration and appropriate action.

Sincerely yours,

RO CHIN SUL
Chairman
National Election Committee
Seoul, Korea

XXIV CORPS COMMENT:

Party affiliations in the following tables are given in accordance with National Election Committee designations.

XXIV CORPS equivalents are as follows:

NEC	XXIV CORPS
H.K.D.P.	H.D.P. (HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY)
C.D.P.	C.D.P. (CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY)
I.R.R.P.	N.S.A.K.I. (NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE ACCELERATION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE)
T.D.Y.G.	U.Y.M.P. (UNITED YOUNG MEN'S PARTY)
M.Z.Y.G.	K.N.Y. (KOREAN NATIONAL YOUTH, INCORPORATED)
DAI SUNG HAI	DAI SUNG ASSOCIATION
CHUN DO HAI	TC'HAWN DO KYO

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE
SEOUL, KOREA

19 May 1948

Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, U.S. Army
Military Governor, USAMGIK
Capitol Building
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Dean:

Re the Invalidation of the Elections made
in some Electoral Districts of Che Choo Do.

I take pleasure in recommending you that the elections made in the Electora District A and the Electoral District B of Puk Che Choo shall be invalid in accordance with Section 44 of the Election Law for the following conditions:

I. Electoral District A .... 73 Voting Districts Number of the voting district which the voting was made. 31

1. Number of the voting district which the voting could not be made.

2. Number of the registered voters. 27,560
Number of the voters which participated in the voting. 11,912

3. Elected Members
First: Mr. Yang Ki-chin 3,647 votes
Second: Mr. Kim Si-hak 3,479 "
Third: Mr. Kim Choong-hee 2,147 "
Fourth: Mr. Moon Dai-u 1,693 "

II. Electoral District B .... 61 Voting Districts

1. Number of the voting districts which the voting was made. 32
Number of the voting districts which the voting could not be made. 29

2. Number of the registered voters. 20,917
Number of the voters who participated in the voting 9,724

3. Elected Members
First : Mr. Yang Byung-jik 3,774 votes
Second : Mr. Park Jang-hee 3,190 "
Third : Mr. Kim Duk-joon 691 "

I trust this will receive your due consideration and appropriate decision.

Sincerely yours,

RO CHIN SUL
Chairman
National Election Committee
Seoul, Korea

Encl. 2

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

LIST OF THE ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

1. Seoul City

Electoral District	Name	Age	Number of Votes	Occupation	Party of Affiliation
Choong Ku	Yoon Chi-yung	51	28,496	Chief Secretary Korean Democratic Council	H.K.D.P
Chongno A	Rhee Yun-yung	59	20,497	Vice-Chairman Chosun Democratic Party	C.D.P.
Chongno B	Chang Myun	50	23,188	Member of KILA	None
Tong Dai Moon A	Rhee Sung-man	74		None	I.R.R.
Tong Dai Moon B	Rhee Yung-chun	53	14,659	Doctor	H.K.D.P
Sung Dong Ku	Rhee Chung-chun	61	41,532		T.D.Y.C
Suh Dai Moon Ku	Kim Do-youn	55	31,182	Member of KILA	H.K.D.P
Ma Po Ku	Kim Sang-don	48	20,056	Farmer	None
Yong San Ku	Kim Dong-won	65	19,183	Merchant	H.K.D.P
Yong Dong Po Ku	Yoon Jai-wook	39	14,296	Doctor	T.D.Y.C

2. Kyonggi Do

In Chun Pu A	Kwak Sang-hoon	53	26,907	Chief, Branch of the press.	None
In Chun Pu B	Cho Bong-am	50	17,620	Author	None
Kai Sung Pu	Rhee Sung-dock	49	14,328	Ginseng	None
Ko Yang Gun A	Suh Sung-dal	57	8,762	None	I.R.R.P
Ko Yang Gun B	Choi Kook-hyun	50	9,022	Chief Assistant, Business Dept., Kyung Hyang Press	None
Kwang Choo Gun	Sin Ik-hee	57		Chairman of KILA Director of Cha Yoo Press	I.R.R.P
Yang Choo Gun A	Kim Duk-yul	39	11,215	Farmer	None
Yang Choo Gun B	Rhee Chin-soo	49	7,800	Chairman, Directors Board, Seoul Pharmaceutical University	None
Po Chun Gun	Suh Chung-hee	72	8,270	Farmer	H.K.D.P

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DECLASSIFIED
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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Electoral District	Name	Age	Number of Votes	Occupation	Party of Affiliation
Ka Pyung Gun	Hong Ik-pyo	32		Farmer	None
Yang Pyung Gun	Yoo Rai-wan	60	6,658	Member of KILA	None
Lyuh Choo Gun	Won Yong-han	71	21,967	Clergyman	T.D.Y.C
Ree Chun Gun	Song Chang-sic	49	10,383	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Yong In Gun	Min Kyung-sic	29	22,463	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Ahn Sung Gun	Kim Yung-ki	44	23,467	Businessman	I.R.R.P
Pyung Taik Gun	Choi Suk-wha	37	10,979	Farmer	None
Soo Won Gun A	Hong Kil-sun	43	22,520	Salaryman	T.D.Y.C
Soo Won Gun B	Kim Woong-shin	42	17,848	Salaryman	None
Shi Hung Gun	Rhee Jai-yung	35	13,528	Businessman	None
Boo Chun Gun	Rhee Yoo-sun	46	14,238	Merchant	I.R.R.P
Kim Po Gun	Chung Choon	34	14,002	Y.M.C.A.	None
Kang Wha Gun	Yoon Jai-koon	39	15,761	Farmer	None
Pa Choo Gun	Kim Woong-kwon	51	15,059	Employee of the Press	None
Chang Dan Gun	Cho Choong-hyun	54	2,792	Farmer	None
Kai Poong Gun	Shin Kwang-keun	52	15,106	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Youn Baik Gun A	Kim Kyung-bai	53	8,540	Farmer	None
Youn Baik Gun B	Shin Hyun-jin	55	17,111	Publisher	H.K.D.P
Ong Chin Gun A	Oh Taik-kwan	60	33,011	Clergyman	H.K.I.P
Ong Chin Gun B	Kim In-jae	35	32,358	Relief Service	T.D.Y.C
3. Choong Chung Pukto					
Chung Choo Pu	Park Ki-woon	37	7,693	None	None
Chung Won Gun A	Hong Soon-ok	54	14,455	Official Doctor	None
Chung Won Gun B	Rhee Man-kun	56	14,926	Farmer	None
Bo Un Gun	Kim Kyo-hyun	60	13,384	Educator	None
Ok Chun Gun	Chung Koo-cham	56	12,561	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Young Dong Gun	Park Uoo-kyung	54	10,419	Farmer	None
Chin Chun Gun	Song Pil-man	58	17,676	Farmer	H.K.D.P
Koi San Gun	Youn Byung-ho	54	40,319	Farmer	None
Un Sung Gun	Rhee Eui-sang	58	29,966	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Choong Choo Gun	Kim Ki-chul	30	29,457	Publisher	T.D.Y.C
Jai Chun Gun	Yoo Hong-yul	42	30,519	Farmer	None

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Electoral District	Name	Age	Number of Votes	Occupation	Party of Affiliation
Tan Yang Gun	Cho Chong-sung	46	9,347	Farmer	None
4. Choong Cung Nam Do					
Dai Chun Pu	Sung Rak-su	44	17,203	None	I.R.R.P
Dai Duk Gun	Song Chin-baik	44	7,609	Farmer Secretary	I.R.R.P
Youn Ki Gun	Chin Hun sic	47	7,986	I.R.R.P.	I.R.R.P
Kong Choo Gun A	Kim Myung-dong	46	10,676	Farmer	None
Kong Choo Gun B	Shin Bang-hyun	57	8,415	Farmer	None
Pon San Gun A	Yoo Chin-hong	59	10,729	Farmer Director	I.R.R.P
Pon San Gun B	Choi Woon-kyo	49	11,895	Agricultural Association	None
Boo Yuh Gun A	Nam Goong-hyun	37	13,718	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Boo Yuh Gun B	Kim Ih-soo	43	11,438	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Jae Chun Gun	Rhee Hoon-koo	33	17,535	Chairman Korean American Association	None
Bo Yung Gun	Rim Suk-kyu	42	12,226	Farmer	T.D.Y.G
Chung Yang Gun	Rhee Chong-kun	41	13,111	Public Scribe	I.R.R.P
Yae San Gun	Yoon Byung-koo	38	14,270	Farmer	None
Suh San Gun A	Rhee Chong-rin	66	12,335	Presbyterian	None
Suh San Gun B	Kim Dong-choon	44	13,452	Farmer	None
Tang Chin Gun	Kim Yong-jai	37	13,006	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Ah San Gun	Suh Yong-kil	37	13,453	Professor	None
Chun Ahn Gun	Rhee Byung-kook	67	19,590	None	I.R.R.P
Hong Song Gun	Son Chai-hak	48			I.R.R.P
5. Cholla Pukto					
Chun Choo Pu	Shin Sung-keun	42	17,037	Merchant	None
Koon San Pu	Yoon Suk-koo	57	18,728	Member of KILA	None
Ree Ree Pu	Bai Hun	53	6,578	Salaryman	None
Wan Choo Gun A	Yoo Choon-sang	39	6,684	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Wan Choo Gun B	Rhee Suk-choo	45	7,607	Farmer	Dai Han Independence Agricultural Leaguo

Encl. #4

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Electoral District	Name	Age	Number of Votes	Occupation	Party of Affiliation
Chin Ahn Gun	Oh Ki-yul	60	10,218	Farmer Chief Educat.	None
Kum San Gun	Chung Hai-chon	46	17,735	Dept., I.R.R.P.	I.R.R.I
Moo Choo Gun	Shin Hyun-don	45	15,691	Doctor	I.R.R.I
Cheng Soo Gun	Kim Bong-doo	43	10,850	Businessman	None
Im Sil Gun	Jin Jik-hyun	48	10,636	Lawyer	I.R.R.
Nam Won Gun	Rhee Chung-ki	34	24,918	Salaryman	M.Z.Y.(
Soon Chang Gun	Ro Ik-whan	35	23,703	Pressman Secy.General	H.K.D.I
Chung Up Gun A	Rah Yong-keun	50		H.K.D.P.	H.K.D.
Chung Up Gun B	Kim Chong-moon	42	16,815	Farmer	H.K.D.
Ko Chang Gun A	Kim Young-dong	42	8,317	Businessman	None
Ko Chang Gun B	Baik Kwan-soo	60	19,161	Member of KILA	H.K.D.
Boo Ahn Gun	Cho Jai-myun	49	19,098	Farmer	I.R.R.I
Kim Jai Gun A	Cho Han-paik	41	13,752	Salaryman	None
Kim Jai Gun B	Hong Hi-chong	55	13,239	Farmer	M.Z.Y.(
Oh Kang Gun	Rhee Yo-han	51	20,453	Farmer	I.R.R.
Ik San Gun A	Baik Hyung-nam	34	12,569	Farmer	T.D.Y.(
Ik San Gun B	Rhee Moon-won	42	11,539	Salaryman	None
6. Cholla Namdo					
Kwang Choo Pu	Chung Kwang-ho	52		Farmer	H.K.D.
Mok Po Pu	Rhee Nam-kyun	40	10,361	Member of KILA	I.R.R.
Kwang Choo Gun	Park Chong-nam	33	20,817	None	None
Dan Yang Gun	Chang Keun-sic	45	11,839	Farmer	M.Z.Y.(
Kok Sung Gun	Suh U-suk	60	18,679	Member of KILA	H.K.D.
Koo Ye Gun	Kim Chong-sun	50	14,799	Farmer	H.K.D.
Kwang Yang Gun	Kim Ok-choo	33	13,978	Farmer Chief, Branch	None
Yuh Soo Gun A	Kim Moon-pyung	43	13,932	of Press	I.R.R.I
Yuh Soo Gun B	Whang Pyung-kyu	41	11,818	Fisher	None
Soon Chun Gun A	Whang Doo-yun	44	14,677	Farmer	Tai Ha Labor League
Soon Chun Gun B	Cho Ok-hyun	46	14,911	Farmer	I.R.R.

Encl. 2

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Electoral District	Name	Age	Number of Votes	Occupation	Party of Affiliation
Koo Hoong Gun A	Oh Suk-choo	61	15,829	Clergyman	I.R.R.P
Ko Hoong Gun B	Yoo Sung-kap	39	14,919	Educator	Tan Min Party
Bo Sung Gun	Phee Chang-rai	50	17,581	Publisher	H.K.D.P
Wha Soon Gun	Cho Kook-hyun	33	18,368	Farmer	Dai Sur Hai
Chang Hoong Gun	Kim Choong-ki	47	32,979	Farmer	None
Tang Chin Gun	Cha Kyung-mo	59	15,106	Farmer	None
Hai Nam Gun A	Song Bong-hai	61	17,192	Doctor	I.R.R.P
Hai Nam Gun B	Rhee Sung-hak	43	11,925	Farmer	T.D.Y.G
Yung Am Gun	Kim Choon-yun	53		Pressman	H.K.D.
Moo Ahn Gun A	Kim Yong-hyun	35	17,873	Farmer	H.K.D.
Moo Ahn Gun B	Chang Hong-dan	39	24,325	Salaryman	H.K.D.P
Bah Choo Gun A	Rhee Hang-bal	58	21,322	Pressman	None
Bah Choo Gun B	Kim Sang-ho	47	11,343	Plantation	H.K.D.P
Ham Pyung Gun	Rhee Sung-u	52	10,870	Farmer	None
Yung Kwang Gun	Jo Yung-kyu	36		Doctor	H.K.D.P
Chang Sung Gun	Kim Sang-soon	48	26,680	Salaryman	I.R.R.P
Wan Do Gun	Kim Chang-yul	51	10,764	None	None
Chin Do Gun	Kim Byung-Hai	32	13,032	Pressman	None
7. Kyung Sang Puk Do					
Dai Koo Pu A	Choi Yoon-dong	52	8,577	None	H.K.D.P
Dai Koo Pu B	Shu Sang-il	63	11,777	Member of KILA	H.K.D.P
Dai Koo Pu C	Bai Nam-chai	63	9,480	Member of KILA	H.K.D.P
Dail Sung Gun	Kim U-sic	59	11,804	Farmer	Chun Do Hai
Koon Ui Gun	Park Choon	44	6,952	Chief Director Seoul Consumers Corporation	None
Eui Sung Gun A	Chung U-il	50	9,304	Farmer	None
Eui Sung Gun B	Kwon Byung-ro	46	9,158	Doctor	I.R.R.P
Ahn Dong Gun A	Kim Ik-ki	33	14,088	Businessman	I.R.R.P
Ahn Dong Gun B	Chung Hyun-mo	55	19,787	Salaryman Government	None Educational Ass'n
Chung Song Gun	Kim Bong-cho	44	13,284	Official	
Young Yang Gun	Cho Hoon-young	47		Salaryman	H.K.D.P
Young Duk Gun	Oh Taik-yul	45		Mine owner	I.R.R.

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Electoral District	Name	Age	Number of Votes	Occupation	Party Affiliati
Young Il Gun A	Park Soon-suk	45	10,485	Clergyman	None
Young Il Gun B	Kim Ik-ro	44	13,545	Chief Branch of the Press	None
Kyung Choo Gun A,	Kim Chul	53	15,533	None	I.R.R.
Kyung Choo Gun B,	Rhee Suk	42	15,765	Farmer	I.R.R
Young Chun Gun A,	Chung Do-young	46		Farmer	I.R.R.
Young Chun Gun B,	Rhee Bum-kyo	61		Doctor	I.R.R.
Kyung San Gun	Park Hai-chung	33	17,599	None	None
Chung Do Gun	Park Chong-whan	40	20,565	Farmer	I.R.R.
Ko Yung Gun	Kim Sang-duk	56	13,049	Member of KILA	Min Tong
Sung Choo Gun	Rhee Ho-suk	34	24,400	Farmer	None
Kae Kok Gun	Chang Byung-man	49	10,779	Farmer	I.R.R.
Kim Chun Gun A	Kwon Tai-sui	42	14,703	None	None
Kim Chun Gun B	Rhee Byung-kwon	41		Farmer	None
Sun San Gun	Yook Hong-keun	49	15,903	Farmer	I.R.R.
Sang Choo Gun	Han Aum-hoi	49	15,384	Farmer	I.R.R.
Sang Choo Gun	Chun Chin-han	48	32,518	Chairman Tai Han Labor League	T.H.L.
Moon Kyung Gun	Cho Byung-man	47	12,203	Farmer	None
Foong Chun Gun	Park Sang-yung	31	17,773	None	H.K.D
Yung Shoo Gun	Choi Suk-hong	40	10,782	Farmer	T.D.Y.
Bong Wha Gun	Bai Choong-hyuk	28	11,741	Farmer	T.D.Y.
Wool Nung Do	Suh Ih-whah	54	3,538	None	None
8. Kyung Sang Nam Do					
Poo San Pu A	Moon Si-whan	50	26,472	None	M.Y.Y.
Poo San Pu B	Huh Chung	53	21,390	None	H.K.D.
Poo San Pu C	Han Suk-bum	51	11,012	Technist	H.K.D.
Poo San Pu D	Park Chan-hyun	32	12,023	None	None
Ma San Pu	Kwon Tai-wook	29	13,160	None	None
Chin Choo Pu	Rhee Kang-woo	59	7,313	Farmer	None
Chin Yang Gun	Whang Yoon-ho	35	18,027	Farmer	None
Eui Yung Gun	Ahn Choon-sang	50	9,939	Farmer	M.Z.Y.
Ham Ahn Gun	Kang Wook-choong	40	10,807	Social Service	M.Z.Y

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Electoral District	Name	Age	Number of Votes	Occupation	Party of Affiliation
Chang Won Gun	Koo Choong-hai	51	19,430	Farmer	None
Mil Yang Gun A	Rhee Choo-myung	43	12,436	Educator	I.R.R.P.
Mil Yang Gun B	Park Hai-kol	65	16,295	Lawyer	None
Yang San Gun	Chung Chin-kun	40	12,311	Farmer	None
Wool San Gun A	Choi Bong-sic	56	13,311	Farmer	None
Wool San Gun B	Kim Soo-sun	38	18,753	Publisher	None
Dong Rai Gun	Kim Yak-soo	59	17,971	None	Korea Republic Party
Kim Hai Gun A	Shin Sang-hak	35	10,399	None	None
Kim Hai Gun B	Jc Bong-kap	45	10,305	Farmer	None
Chang Won Gun A	Kim Tai-soo	44	9,596	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Chang Won Gun B	Choo Ki-bai	51	15,684	Director Education Assn.	None
Tong Yung Gun A	Kim Jai-hak	51	17,407	Businessman	H.K.D.P
Tong Yung Gun B	Suh Soon-yung	49	16,188	Judge	None
Ko Sung Gun	Rhee Koo-soo	36	11,321	Salaryman	None
Sah Chun Gun	Choi Bum-sool	44	16,688	Chairman Directors Board of the University	None
Nam Hai Gun	Park Yoon-won	40	16,260	Farmer	None
Ha Dong Gun	Kang Dal-soo	44	17,014	Farmer	Member of No 15 Club, Pus
San Chung Gun	Kang Ki-moon	39	17,766	Salaryman	None
Ham Yang Gun	Kim Kyung-do	45	18,533	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Euh Chang Gun	Pyo Hyun-dai	45	17,143	Farmer	I.R.R.P.
Hyup Chun Gun A	Rhee Won-hong	46	14,861	Lawyer	I.R.R.P
Hyup Chun Gun B	Kim Hyo-suk	54	9,589	Farmer	I.R.R.P
9. Kang Won Do					
Choon Chun Pu	Choi Kyu-ok	48	13,628	Doctor	I.R.R.P
Choon Shung Gun	Rhee Chong-soon	58	26,404	Farmer	I.R.R.P.
Hong Chun Gun	Rhee Jai-hak	45	35,130	Farmer	None
Hoing Sung Gun	Won Yong-keun	57	24,543	Farmer	I.R.R.P.
Won Choo Gun	Hong Bum-hee	32	24,001	Social Service	None
Yung Wol Gun	Chang Ki-yung	46	12,375	None	None

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Electoral District	Name	Age	Number of Votes	Occupation	Party of Affiliation
Pyung Chang Gun	Whang Ho-hyun	38	20,934	Farmer	I.R.R.P.
Sang Sun Gun	Choi Tai-kyu	29	7,757	Pressman	None
Kang Nung Gun A	Won Chang-kil	37	13,441		T.D.Y.G
Kang Nung Gun B	Choi Hun-kil	48	19,196	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Sam Chuh Gun	Kim Chin-koo	43	19,024	Farmer	I.R.R.P
Wool Chin Gun	Kim Myung-in	33	11,224	Lawyer	None
10. Che Joo Do					
Puk Che Joo Gun A					
Puk Che Joo Gun B					
Nam Che Joo Gun	Oh Yong-kook	44	12,888	Member of KILA	None

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
APO 235 UNIT 2

24 May 1948

SUBJECT: Invalidation of the Elections

TO: The National Election Committee
Seoul, Korea

1. The elections in Electoral District "A" and Electoral District "B" of North Cheju Do held on May 10, 1948, under the Law for the Flection of Representatives for the Korean People issued March 17, 1948, are hereby declared null and void and of no effect.

2. It is hereby ordered that a new election take place in these two districts on June 23, 1948, in accordance with Section 44, of the aforesaid Law, under the provisions of said Law and under the supervision and control of the National Election Committee.

3. This decision to nullify these elections was arrived at after consultation with the National Election Committee which took into consideration the fact that voting was held in less than fifty per cent of the voting districts of Electoral District "A" and Electoral District "B" of North Cheju Do on May 10, 1948, due to activities and violence of subversive elements. Under these circumstances the election in Electoral District "A" and Electoral District "B" of North Cheju Do on May 10, 1948, cannot be considered a true expression of the will of the people.

/s/ W. F. Dean
W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

Inclosure No. 54A

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREA INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Office of Administration
Census Division

Registration and Voting Data on National Election in South Korea

	Est.Pop. 1 Apr 48 (000)	Total Possible Registrants (000)	Total Actual Registrants	% Registered	Total Voters	% of Actl Registrants Who Voted
Seoul City	1,247	616	3/ 568,291	92.2	488,304 8/	92.8
Kyonggi Do	2,575	1,269	4/1,085,470	85.4	981,638 8/	96.6
Chungchong Pukto	1,147	565	461,885	81.8	444,632	96.3
Chungchong Namdo	1,992	982	794,392	80.9	760,694	95.8
Cholla Pukto	2,093	1,032	5/ 801,988	77.7	727,718 8/	96.7
Cholla Namdo	3,058	1,508	6/1,106,397	73.3	908,879 8/	93.6
Kyongsang Pukto	3,260	1,607	7/1,227,597	76.4	992,036 8/	92.1
Kyongsang Namdo	3,300	1,627	1,287,890	79.2	1,242,750	96.5
Kang Won Do	1,167	575	467,554	81.3	458,038	98.0
Che Ju Do 1/	108	53	37,040	69.8	32,062	86.6
Total South Korea	19,947	2/9,834	7,837,504	79.7	7,036,750 8/	95.2

1/ Data are for Nam Cheju Gun only.

2/ Based on the percentage of 49.3 as derived from 1947 National Registration (7½ million sample), who are 21 years of age and over.

3/ Includes 1 electoral district which had 42,021 registrants and "no contest".

4/ Includes 2 electoral districts which had 68,755 registrants and "no contest".

5/ Includes 1 electoral district which had 49,149 registrants and "no contest".

6/ Includes 3 electoral districts which had 135,292 registrants and "no contest".

7/ Includes 5 electoral districts which had 150,405 registrants and "no contest".

8/ Percentage derived exclusive of "no contest" data.

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BUREAU OF RAIL TRANSPORATION
Traffic Section - Passenger Sub Section

27 May 1948

DATE	SPECIAL MOVES FOR U N COMMISSION
Feb. 20	1 Engine, 5 Cars (Special Train) Seoul to Pusan
22	1 Engine, 5 Cars (Special Train) Pusan to Seoul
Mar. 20	Baggage Car #552 on Train #11, Seoul to Pusan
20	Baggage Car #533 on Train #35, Seoul to Kwangju
27	Baggage Car #532 on Train #35, Seoul to Kwangju
27	Baggage Car #318 on Train #11, Seoul to Pusan
30	Baggage Car #532 on Train #35, Seoul to Songjongni
Apr. 5	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Chochiwon to Chonju
5	Sleeper #84, Observation Car #45, Diner #6 on Train #11, Seoul to Chochiwon
5	Sleeper #73, Observation Car #41, Diner #7 on Train #1, Seoul to Taegu
6	Sleeper #84, Observation Car #45, Diner #6 on Train #1, Chochiwon to Taejon
6	Motor Car #76 (Special Train) Seoul to Kaesong and return
6	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Chonju to Chochiwon
7	Sleeper #84, Observation Car #45, Diner #6 on Train #653, Iri to Chonju
7	Sleeper #84, Observation Car #45, Diner #6 on Train #35, Taejon to Iri
7	Sleeper #73, Coach #41, Diner #7, on Train #1, Taegu to Pusan
8	Sleeper #84, Observation Car #45, Diner #6 on Train #35, Iri to Songjongni
8	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Chonju to Iri
8	Motor Car #76 (Special Train) Seoul to Chunchon and return
10	Sleeper #73, Coach #41, Diner #7 on Train #2, Pusan to Seoul
10	Sleeper #84, Coach #45, Diner #6 on Train #36, Songjongni to Iri
10	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Iri to Seoul
13	Baggage Car #512 on Train #35, Seoul to Kwangju
13	Baggage Car #552 on Train #11, Seoul to Pusan
19	3 Cars on Train #11, Seoul to Chonan
19	3 Cars on Train #1, Seoul to Taegu
20	3 Cars on Train #702, Samnanjin to Masan
20	3 Cars on Train #1, Taegu to Samnanjin
20	3 Cars on Train #1, Chonan to Chochiwon
20	1 Engine, 3 Cars, (Special Train) Chochiwon to Chonju
21	3 Cars on Train #1702, Masan to Samnanjin
21	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Samnanjin to Pusan
21	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Chungju to Chonju and return
22	3 Cars on Train #1, Chochiwon to Taejon
22	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Chonju to Chochiwon
23	Baggage Car #620 on Train #35, Seoul to Songjongni
23	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Iri to Chonju
23	1 Engine, 3 Cars (Special Train) Taejon to Seoul
23	3 Cars on Train #2, Pusan to Seoul
23	3 Cars on Train #1602, Iri to Taejon
23	3 Cars on Train #662, Chonju to Iri
23	3 Cars on Train #1601, Taejon to Iri
23	Motor Car #76 (Special Train) Seoul to Kaesong and return
25	Baggage Car #552 on Train #11, Seoul to Pusan
May 4	Baggage Car #418 on Train #11, Seoul to Pusan
4	Baggage Car #620 on Train #35, Seoul to Songjongni
22	Baggage Car #552 on Train #11, Seoul to Pusan
22	Baggage Car #620 on Train #35, Seoul to Songjongni

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Séoul, Korea

EXECUTIVE ORDER
NUMBER 14 3 March 1948

NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE

SECTION I. There is hereby created a National Election Committee, and the persons named below are hereby appointed as members of that Committee:

NAME:	*NAME:*
CHANG, Myon	LEE, Sung Bok
KIM, Bub Nin	PAIK, Lin Jai
PAHK, Seung Ho	HYUN, Sang Yun
YEE, Kap Sung	RO, Chin Sul
YUN, Ki Sup	CHOI, Kyu Dong
KIM, Chi Whan	CHOI, Too Sun
KIM, Dong Sung	CHYUN, Kyu Hong
OH, Sang Hyung	

Appointments to membership on the Central Election Committee, heretofore made in accordance with provisions of Public Act Number 5, dated 3 September 1947, Law for the Election of Members of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, are hereby confirmed as appointments to membership on the National Election Committee.

SECTION II. There are hereby conferred upon the National Election Committee, and the members thereof, all powers and duties conferred upon the Central Election Committee, and the members thereof, by Public Act No. 5, dated 3 September 1947, Law for the Election of Members of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. The National Election Committee will exercise such powers and perform such duties in accordance with the provisions of that Act, incident to the election to be held on 9 May 1948, pursuant to the Proclamation of Election of Representatives of the Korean People, issued on 1 March 1948, by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea.

SECTION III. The National Election Committee hereby established is authorized to employ a staff of assistants and to obtain through the appropriate agencies of the South Korean Interim Government necessary supplies and funds

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for the discharge of its functions, subject to the approval of the Military Governor and such regulations as he may prescribe.

SECTION IV. This Order shall be effective on the date appearing hereon.

WILLIAM F DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

SEAL
USAMGIK

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Seoul, Korea

15 June 1948

The Honorable Kim, Young Moo
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
South Korean Interim Government
Seoul, Korea

My dear Mr. Chief Justice:

The law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People issued on 17 March 1948 provides for the establishment of an Election Review Board with jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the validity of elections (Section 50). It further provides that the Chairman of the Election Review Board shall be designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Therefore, May I ask you to designate a person of your choice as Chairman of the Election Review Board and to notify me of his name and address?

Several defeated candidates submitted complaints to the United Nations Temporary Committee on Korea claiming that violations of the Election Law and Election Regulations occurred in the electoral districts in which they were candidates. The United States Liaison Officer informed the United Nations Temporary Committee on Korea that the complainants will have an opportunity to submit their complaints to the Election Review Board in accordance with Section 51 of the Election Law.

In order to comply with the Law and to decide questions raised by the complaints referred to, it is extremely desirable to constitute the Election Review Board without further delay, and I trust I shall have your designation at your earliest possible convenience.

Sincerely,

Signed
W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
在朝鮮美国陸軍司令部
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

Seoul, Korea

PROCLAMATION
国會에 関한 布告
ON NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

一. 一九四七年十一月十四日, 聯合国総會의 決議에 依한
1. In accordance with recommendations of the Resolution of the General
建議, 及一九四八年二月二十七日 聯合国 小総會의 決議에
Assembly of the United Nations, 14 November 1947, as amplified by Resolutions
依한, 同建議의 具体案에 準하야, 또는,
of the Interim Committee of the United Nations on 27 February 1948, and under
一九四八年三月十七日에 公布된 朝鮮国會議員(朝鮮人民
the Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People, issued 17
代表)選擧法에 依하야, 一九四八年五月十日에,
March 1948, an election was held on 10 May 1948 under the observation of the
聯合国臨時朝鮮委員団의 監視下에 選擧가 擧行
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to choose representatives with
되었으며, 同選擧는, 朝鮮人民의 自主独立의 即時達成에
whom the Commission may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom
関하야, 同委員団이 協議할 代表, 即国會를 構成하야
and independence of the Korean people, and which representatives constituting
政府를 樹立할 代表를 選出함이 그目的이었음.
a National Assembly, may establish a Government.

二. 国會選擧委員會는 各當選者에게 通知하였고
2. The National Election Committee having informed me that the successful
選擧結果를 公告하였음을 本官에게 報告하였으므로
candidates have been notified and public notice of the results of the election
having been given, I, John R. Hodge, Lieutenant General, United States Army,
在朝鮮美国陸軍司令官, 美国陸軍中將 본 本官,
Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, hereby authorize the
꽐 알, 하-지는, 茲에 国會選擧委員會委員長에게

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chairman of the National Election Committee to determine and publicly to
左外如한權限을賦與함。國會選擧委員會委員長은
announce the date on which the first meeting of the elected representatives
當選된 朝鮮人民代表(國會議員)가 國會創立總會를
of the Korean people shall be held in the capital city of Seoul, to call the
首都서울市에서 開會할時日을決定하야 此를公告하며
first meeting to order, and to designate the oldest member as temporary chair-
創立總會를 開會하고 最年長者를 臨時議長으로指名할것이며 同
man who shall preside over the meeting until such time as the National Assembly
臨時議長은 國會가 그議長을 選出하고 그自体의組織을 決定할
has elected a chairman and determined its own organization.
時까지 同會를 司會함。

3. The Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People,
三、一九四八年三月十七日에 公布된 國會議員選擧法第四十三
issued 17 March 1948, requires by Section 43 that the Election Committee of
條에依하면、各選擧區選擧委員會는 當選者에게 그當選을通
the Electoral District shall inform the successful candidate of his election.
知함을要함。如斯한當選通知는 當選者의 信任狀을構成
It is hereby provided that such notification of elections shall constitute
하야 各當選者가 國會에서 各自의議席에 就任할資格을
credentials of the successful candidates, and shall entitle them and each of
與하는 效에規定함。
them to assume their representative seats in the National Assembly.

四、一九四八年五月二十五日、首都서울市에서 署名함。
4. Given in the capital city of Seoul on this 25th day of May 1948.

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Commanding

존、알、하-지.
美國陸軍中將
在朝鮮美國陸軍司令官

DISTRIBUTION: "A"
PLUS: 150, Dept of Justice
PLUS: 60, Dept of Public Information

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Seoul, Korea

DECLARATION
NUMBER 7

28 May 1948

DECLARATION OF NATIONAL HOLIDAY

At the request of elected members of the National Assembly, the 31st day of May 1948 is hereby declared a National Holiday, to mark and commemorate the convening of the duly elected Representatives of the Korean people.

On this day, let all patriotic Koreans pledge themselves to cooperate with, to support, and to assist their Representatives in the weighty tasks which confront them in their coming deliberations, so that this Assembly may fulfill its mission of establishing a National Government in Korea.

W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

SEAL
USAMGIK

Inclosure No 59

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

南朝鮮過渡政府

朝鮮서울

宣布令第七號

公休日의宣言

當選된國會議員의要請에依하야一九四八年五月三十一日은當選된朝鮮人民代表의國會開會를祝賀目的으로玆에公休日로定함

本日을契機로하야韓國全般愛國者들은이國會가韓國中央政府樹立의使命을完遂하도록今後會議中에直面할重大한諸問題에있어서그들의代表者들을支持、贊助、協力할것을盟誓하을期함

一九四八年五月二十八日

朝鮮軍政長官
美國陸軍少將 다불유・에쓰・덴

Inclosure No 59

0661

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, USAFIK, delivering speech at opening session of Korean General Assembly, 31 May 1948 in the Assembly Hall of Capitol, Seoul. To Gen. Hodge's left is Maj. Gen. C.G. Helmick, Deputy Military Governor, and Monsignor Patrick J. Byrnes, Apostolic Delegate to Korea.

Inclosure No. 60

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, USAFIK, delivering speech at opening session of Korean General Assembly, 31 May 1948 in the Assembly Hall of Capitol, Seoul. To Gen. Hodge's left is Maj. Gen. C.G. Helmick, Deputy Military Governor, and Monsignor Patrick J. Byrnes, Apostolic Delegate to Korea.

Inclosure No. 60

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____



Dr. Syngman RHEE presiding at opening session of Korean General Assembly, 31 May 1948, in Assembly Hall of the Capitol in Seoul.

Inclosure No. 61

0664

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By _____ NARS, Date _____



Dr. Syngman RHEE presiding at opening session of Korean General Assembly, 31 May 1948, in Assembly Hall of the Capitol in Seoul.

Inclosure No. 61

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

Maj. Gen. W. F. Dean, Military Governor of Korea, speaking at opening session of Korean General Assembly 31 May 1948 in Capitol, Seoul. Maj. Gen. C. G. Helmick, Deputy Military Governor, shown at Gen. Dean's left.

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Maj. Gen. W. F. Dean, Military Governor of Korea, speaking at opening session of Korean General Assembly 31 May 1948 in Capitol, Seoul. Maj. Gen. C. G. Helmick, Deputy Military Governor, shown at Gen. Dean's left.

Inclosure No. 62



Hung Tai Chu, Chinese Delegation, UNTCOK, speaking for UN Commission on Korea to Korean General Assembly at opening session, 31 May 1948, in Assembly Hall, Capitol, Seoul; at Mr. Chu's right is Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General USAFIK.

Inclosure No. 63

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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By _____ NARS, Date _____



Hung Tai Chu, Chinese Delegation, UNTCOK, speaking for UN Commission on Korea to Korean General Assembly at opening session, 31 May 1948, in Assembly Hall, Capitol, Seoul; at Mr. Chu's right is Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General USAFIK.

Inclosure No. 63

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

Elected representatives of the Korean people in opening session of Korean General Assembly in Assembly Hall of Capitol, Seoul, 31 May 1948.

Inclosure No. 64

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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

Elected representatives of the Korean people in opening session of Korean General Assembly in Assembly Hall of Capitol, Seoul, 31 May 1948.

Inclosure No. 64

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NARS, Date
By



Dr. Syngman RHEE delivering opening address to first session of Korean General Assembly, 31 May 1948, Assembly Hall in Capitol, Seoul. Six persons seated in front of Dr. RHEE, left to right, are A.C. Bunce, Economic Advisor; J.E. Jacobs, Political Advisor; Lt. Gen. J.R. Hodge, Commanding General USAFIK; Maj. Gen. W.F. Dean, Military Governor; Maj. Gen. C.G. Helmick, Deputy Military Governor; and Monsignor Patrick J. Byrnes, Apostolic Delegate to Korea.

Inclosure No. 65

0672

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA, 31 MAY 1948.

MR. CHAIRMAN, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE, AND DISTINGUISHED GUESTS:

Today is one of the great days in Korean history. This convocation of the truly elected representatives of the Korean people marks the most important steps to date in democratic progress toward Korean independence. The people of my own nation as well as the thousands of Americans here in Korea who are giving their best efforts to help restore your independence and unification rejoice with the patriotic and peace loving Korean people on this momentous occasion. With you, we look forward with great hope and confidence to a sound and happy solution of your problems.

This assembly has been made possible, and came into being as a result of a resolution passed by 43 to 0 in the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization on November 14, 1947, which provided for the election wherein the Korean people have now chosen you as their representatives.

I point out that the deliberations of this body are on your own responsibility and you are in turn responsible to the wishes and the will of the Korean people who elected you. This Assembly is not an adjunct of, nor is it any part of the Military Government or of the South Korean Interim Government. It is a Korean Constituent Assembly elected to form a democratic government for the Korean nation and to inform the United Nations Commission of its formation. After that Government is formed and ready to operate, it will in consultation with the United Nations Commission take over the affairs of Government, and will be eligible to be recognized by the free nations of the world as a sovereign state.

Thus, the future of Korea now lies largely in the hands of the Koreans themselves. Great responsibility for that future rests with this Assembly of elected Korean Representatives. What you gentlemen do here in the next few days and weeks will determine in great degree the future of your nation. You have great problems ahead of you, problems of which you are all aware and of which you speak daily. They are problems that you yourselves must work out and solve.

You may be sure that the eyes of the entire world are upon you in all of your coming deliberations and that the world will judge your nation by the results you obtain through your decisions in this body. The Korean people demonstrated by their great plebiscite on May 10 that they have confidence in you as their elected representatives, to carry out the duties they delegated to you through their votes on that day in electing you to form a democratic Korean government as provided in the United Nations Resolution.

On behalf of the United States and of the American Command in Korea, as well as for myself as a personal friend of the Korean people, I extend to each of you and to all of you, best wishes and expression of confidence that you will not fail. The United States Command in Korea does not intend to dictate in your deliberations in the establishment of your government, but does stand ready and willing to do everything within its power to assist you in any way it can. May God speed you and God bless you in your all-important duties.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FOR RELEASE
(Translation)

Press Release No. 1
May 31, 1948

ADDRESS BY DR. SYNGMAN RHEE

At the Opening Session of the Korean Congress
May 31, 1948, 2 P.M.

Today we are assembled here to open the first Congress of the Republic of Korea. For this day, we must first thank Almighty God, and secondly the patriotic men and women who sacrificed their lives and thirdly our friendly nations, particularly the United States and the United Nations, for their great contributions which made this occasion possible. As members of the Legislative Assembly elected by, for and of the people of Korea, we are here to assume the authority and responsibility as their representatives in, first adopting a national constitution and re-establishing the independent democratic government. As the chairman of this Great Assembly, I have the nonor to formally declare to the world that this day the Republic of Korea is born again and further declare that this Assembly is the sole representative body of this nation.

On March 1st 1919, the representatives of the 13 provinces gathered in Seoul organized the Great National Assembly and declared to the nations of the world the establishment of the independent Republic of Korea and organized the Provisional Government of this Republic, thus laying the foundation of the democratic principle for our nation. Unfortunately, due to the world situation we were unable to achieve our aim. Our people, both at home and abroad, however, supported that government, giving up their lives and shedding their blood in order to uphold the principle and spirit of that memorable day of March First, 1919. Logically enough, this Congress which we open today is the successor of that Great General Assembly and the government which we are to organize will be the successor fo that Provisional Government established in Seoul at that time. Therefore, we hereby confirm that this is the day when that Republic of Korea is re-born after 29 years of our revolution. It is appropriate and proper to continue to hold that historical year of 1919 as our epochal national year and this assembly, as our National Congress representing the entire nation. Consequently the government born of this assembly will be the sovereign independent government of the entire nation.

We deeply regret that our brethern of the 5 Provinces in the North were not able to elect their representatives to participate with us in this Assembly. However, four and a half million refugees from the North participated in the national election and some of them have been elected as members of this House. And moreover, we have reserved a certain number of seats in this House for the Representatives freely elected by our people in the North to come and occupy them so that they will fully share the responsibilities and privileges with the rest of us. In this we count on their cooperation and concerted efforts and also on the support of the United States and the United Nations so as to achieve our common objective as speedily as possible. We hereby reassert that it is our firm unanimous determination that our people will either live together or die together in our struggle for the complete restoration of our country and that we will not yield one foot or one inch of our land to any nation or any group of nations.

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The main objectives of this Congress, as already made known, are to adopt a constitution based on democratic principles and to establish a government according to that constitution and to form a national defense force for the security and defense of our country and provide for the relief of our suffering people. We will regulate the prices of rice and other necessary commodities, put in effect a land reform program with fairness to all, protect individual freedom and equal rights regulated by law, protect lives and rights of our people residing overseas through international negotiations, promote the interest of public education, develop our industry, endeavour to open commercial relations with other nations on a fair and equal basis, safeguard the freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion, promote peace of the world through friendly negotiations with the Soviet Union for the just solution of the critical common problems of the two nations and to settle the political, economical and other urgent problems with Japan through negotiations whenever possible.

The duties and responsibilities of every member of this Congress are heavy and urgent and we cannot afford to indulge ourselves in petty discussions, and unnecessary debates on minor detail matters tending to waste valuable time; we must first take up the main problems as just announced in our program and take action one after another after due and full discussions on them.

When we have set up our government, the American Military Government will withdraw, for the Military Government authorities are fully ready to turn the administration over to our government. We hope our Government will request the Government of the United States to let us retain some of our American friends who have been serving in the central administration as well as those in the provincial governments who can be helpful to us either as advisers or technicians. The American forces of occupation, we hope, will remain for the security purposes until our government has organized our own security force. However, the United States Government will act in this matter in accordance with the decisio of the United Nations. Therefore, in cooperation with the United States and the United Nations, we will act according to our commo understanding and agreement. The only point, which must be clear understood, is that the remaining of the security forces shall not interfere with the exercise of our sovereign rights. There is no doubt that whenever we request the withdrawal of the American forces they will evacuate at once. It is a well known fact that the United States has no political or territorial interest in any part of the world. America's interest is in the establishment of democratic governments wherever possible for the sake of world peace and of commercial relations for mutual benefit and, therefore, what America expects from us is nothing more than the goodwill of our people. Although American forces may remain for the time being due to the international circumstances, they will leave Korea without delay whenever the Korean Government formally requests their withdrawal.

To the Korean communists we are willing to offer another and last opportunity to repent and join hands with us in our common efforts towards the complete restoration of our nation. If they accept this opportunity and sufficiently demonstrate their desire to cooperate in our national pro ram, we will forgive and forget the pas and regard them just as we do the rest of our loyal citizens in the North and South. If however they fail to utilize this opportunity and insist on their unpatriotic efforts to affiliate our nation with any of the foreign powers and continue to murder, burn and destroy in order to carry out that unpatrioti

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proposition, we shall have to deal with them strictly and sternly according to the law. They must realize that from now on no foreign influence could help them to secure pardon or release from due punishment for their crimes.

Any violator of law and order will have to pay the full penalty for his crimes. In order to live and let live and to enjoy the blessings of freedom and prosperity, they must observe law and justice; for otherwise they will not be allowed to enjoy the privileges of democracy.

To all my fellow citizens I wish to give the advice that if they are misled in believing that the establishment of the Congress and of the government will bring every individual citizen all that they need without work on their part, then they will soon be disappointed and disillusioned. Under the old monarchial rule, the people left all the affairs of the nation entirely in the hands of those in the government without any participation in it. But under a democratic government the people are rulers of the nation and, if rulers neglect their duties, the nation will again have to fall into jeopardy. From now on, every citizen, man and woman, must realize that he or she has an equal share of the responsibility, authority and power, and must exert all of their energy to work and struggle to consolidate and strengthen the foundation of the government, which will safeguard his or her individual rights and privileges, so as to make speedy progress towards the enlightenment and prosperity of our nation. There should be no one, regardless of sex or age, who has no work or duty to perform, and if there are any unpatriotic and subversive elements who try to obstruct or destory the progress of our nation, they should be strictly dealt with according to the law so that no loyal lawabiding citizen may suffer. People and government must strive together in carrying out the determination to stamp out all the evils of corruption and profiteering. We must disclose and purge all such practices which sap the vitality of the nation and whoever proved guilty either within government or without should be rigorously punished. I request every individual and organization to do their utmost for the solution of this most urgent question for the sake of us all.

Henceforth, the destiny of our Republic and the welfare of our people will be entirely in the hands of the individual citizens of Korea. If we fail, we shall suffer and have only ourselves to blame. If we succeed, we shall enjoy all the benefits and blessings thereof and all our friendly nations will willingly give us their warm and sympathetic support. I trust all the members of this Assembly will heartily join me in the full measure of devotion to the Cause of our nation. I know that all our people will revive the self-sacrificing patriotic spirit of 1919. Let us recall the solemn vow made in the Declaration of Independence and renew our determination "to continue our struggle to the last man and to the last moment." With this determination, let us pledge ourselves to the great tasks before us in the presence of Almighty God and of our 30 million fellow citizens.

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Major General W. F. Dean's speech at the opening of the National Assembly, 31 May 1948.

MR. CHAIRMAN, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE, AND DISTINGUISHED GUESTS:

Today is the day that we have all looked forward to. Ever since liberation the people of Korea have awaited the day wnen the duly elected representatives of the Korean people could meet and initiate the formation of an independent representative national government.

We Americans who have worked intimately with the Korean people have confidence in your ability to successfully accomplish the task for which you have been selected by the Korean people - the framing and adoption of a constitution - the establishment of a truly representative government.

As General Hodge has stated, this Assembly is in no degree a part of Military Government. But even so, I want to assure you that the Military Government stands ready to assist you in every way that you may desire, and looks forward to an orderly transition of its governmental functions to the government that you establish after that government is organized and after appropriate arrangements have been made.

On behalf of all American personnel in Military Government, I extend to each and every one of you heartiest congratulations and our prayers and earnest hopes for your complete success in the accomplishment of your important mission.

Inclosure No.68

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

31 May 1948

As a member of the United Nations Secretariat, I deem it a privilege and honour to bring to you greetings, congratulations and best wishes which, I am sure, all the members of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea would wish to share.

However, at the outset, I want to make it clear that I speak merely as an individual member of the United Nations Secretariat. What few remarks I can make here today should not be interpreted as in any sense representing the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. I regret that because of its decision to write the first part of the report to the General Assembly during this period in Shanghai, the Commission is not able to send a full representation on this auspicious occasion. In this connection, I wish to explain that it has been the general practice in the United Nations that a Commission often goes to write its report in another country, instead of doing so in the country to which the Commission is assigned to work. According to its resolution of 30 April 1948, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea will return to Seoul in the first week of June. I hope transportation difficulties between Shanghai and Seoul at present will not delay the members of the Commission for a single day. If it were physically possible, I am sure all the members of the Commission would like to be present in this hall on this eventful day of Korean history. However, I am glad to see that officials of the consulates whose Governments are represented on the Commission are representing their Governments here today. I refer to Mr. Costilhes, French Consul and a member of the French Delegation to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, and Mr. Su, Chinese Consul whose Government is also a member of the Commission. Indeed, Mr. Costilhes has a double function to perform today, as he is also representing

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

the Commission. Mr. Costilhes will greet you shortly as a representative member of the Commission.

As a citizen of China which signed the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, that "in due course Korea shall be free and independent," I am glad to say that your opening session today represents a gratifying vindication of the confidence placed in the Korean people by China, the United States and Great Britain, the signatory powers of the Cairo Declaration.

As you all know, the future of Korea is a matter of deep concern and of vital interest to China, the United States and many othe countries because it is of vital importance to the ause of peace and security in the Far East. From Cairo, Potsdam, Moscow, to Lake Success, China and other members of the United Nations have been working constantly toward Korea's independence and freedom. Perhaps I need not to repeat, to establish a national government and to attain the ultimate freedom and independence of Korea are the goals of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1947, which the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea has been trying to carry out. The Commission will make its report on its work to the General Assembly to be held in Paris in September. It is necessary that the report should be ready a few weeks before the meeting of the General Assembly so that there will be sufficient time to have this important document circulated to all the Member Governments of the United Nations. Naturally all your efforts, present and future, to accomplish the noble goal of freedom and independence, will be to the interest and concern of the Commission.

Mr. Chairman and honourable members, you have taken another important step towards democracy, liberty and independence. I wish you great success. May I join you in saying "Long live Korea, and the United Nations!"

Inclosure No

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ADDRESS BY MR. HENRI COSTILHES

Representative of UNTCOK, at opening session

National Assembly, 31 May

-----oooOoooo-----

Monsieur le President, Messieurs,

It is only by accident, and due to the absence from Seoul of the principal delegates of the UNTCOK, that I am here today, at their request, to welcome this new Assembly. Although I have not received from Shanghai the text of any special message, I am sure to be the faithful interpreter of the thoughts of the Commission in wishing you popularity and success.

Having been in this capital for the last nine months I have had the opportunity to appreciate your country and your people. Then I am certain that your nation can expect from you the utmost efforts towards the realization of its independence.

Before I end let me remember you a quotation of a great French writer of the eighteenth century, Montesquieu, who said, "In a state well organized, citizens are like fishes in a very big net in the high sea : although they are caught, they feel they are free." I hope this will be the result your Assembly shall achieve.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Seoul, Korea
南朝鮮過渡政府

EXECUTIVE ORDER
行政命令第二三号
NUMBER 23

22 June 1948
一九四八年六月二十二日

ELECTION REVIEW BOARD ESTABLISHED
選挙審查委员会의設置

Pursuant to Section 56, Ordinance Number 175 (Law for the Election of
一九四八年三月十七日附 法令第一七五號
Representatives of the Korean People), dated 17 March 1948, this Executive
(國会議員選挙法) 第五十六條에依하야
Order is promulgated in order to carry out the Law for the Election of Repre-
國会議员選挙法 施行에関한 本令을
sentatives of the Korean People:
公布함.

SECTION I. The Election Review Board, prescribed in Chapter VIII, Law
第一條 國会議员選挙法 第八章에
for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People, is hereby established,
規定된 選挙審查委员会를 一九四八年六月二十五日附
effective 25 June 1948.
로 設置함.

SECTION II. The Election Review Board will be composed of the following
第二條 選挙審查委员会는 左의 五人으로 構
persons:
成함.

KIM, Young Moo — Chairman, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
金用茂 — 議長, 大法院長

KIM, Chan Yong — Justice of the Supreme Court, appointed by the Military Governor
金贊泳 — 大法官 (軍政長官任命)

YANG, Dai-Kyung — Justice of the Supreme Court, appointed by the Military Governor
梁大卿 — 大法官 (軍政長官任命)

CHANG, Myun — Member, designated by the National Assembly
張勉 — 國会議員 (國会指名)

SUH, Soon Yung — Member, designated by the National Assembly
徐淳永 — 國会議員 (國会指名)

SECTION III. Membership of the Election Review Board is honorary, with
第三條 選挙審查委员会委员는 無給으로
appropriate allowances and travel expenses only. Allowances and travel
하되, 手当과 旅費를 支拂함. 手当 及 旅費는
expenses are determined by the Regulations issued by the National Election
一九四八年三月二十二日附 國会議员選挙法 施行

Inclosure No 70

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Committee in accordance with Section 25, Regulations for Implementing the Law
規則 第二十五條에 依하야 選挙委員会
for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People, dated 22 March 1948.
가 発布한 規則으로 決定함.

SECTION IV. The Election Review Board enacts its own rules and regula-
第四條 選挙審査委員会는 本令第五條
tions, subject to Sections V and VI of this Executive Order.
第六條의 規定에 依하야 內部細則을 制定함.

SECTION V. The meetings of the Election Review Board are open to the
第五條 選挙審査委員会의 会合은 公開
public.
함.

SECTION VI. Any defeated candidate may file a motion for review of the
第六條. 落選한 立候補者는 一九四八年七月
validity of the election in the electoral district in which he was duly nomi-
九日까지 申請書를 選挙審査委員会(서울
nated as a candidate, by submitting to the Election Review Board (Seoul,
本庁內) 에 提出하야 그가 立候補한
Capitol Building) not later than 9 July 1948 a written application stating:
選挙区에 있어서의 選挙의 有効無効의 審査를 申請한다는
申請書에는 左記事項을 記載함.

a. The name of the electoral district concerned
가. 関係選挙区名.

b. His own name and address and the name of the elected candidate
나. 本人의 姓名 住所 及 当選者의 姓名.

c. A brief summary of the alleged violations of the Election
다. 選挙法規 違反事実의 概要
Law and/or the Election Regulations.

The application may contain the name and address of witnesses and other evi-
申請書에는 証人의 姓名 住所 其他証拠를
dence tendered.
記載함.

W. F. Dean
W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor in Korea
朝鮮軍政長官
美国陸軍少将

DISTRIBUTION: "A"
PLUS: 150, Dept of Justice
60, DPI
12, CG, XXIV Corps
50, General Weckerling

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Seoul, Korea

3 June 1948

Gen. John R. Hodge, U.S. Army
Commanding General, USAFIK
Banto Hotel
Seoul, Korea

Dear Gen. Hodge:

We have the honor to inform you that the National Assembly has appointed following members as Temporary Liaison Committee members for contacting UN Temporary Commission on Korea, US Commanding General's Headquarters, Military Government Authorities and Foreign Consulates.

Mr. Yun Tchi-young
Mr. Chang Myun
Mr. Lee Hoon-ku
Mr. Kim Do-yun
Mr. Chang Ki-young

The above members can be reached through Phone White Horse 192.

Hoping that you will contact these members whenever you wish to consult with us in whatever matter deem to be necessary.

SYGNMAN RHEE
Chairman
Korean National Assembly

Inclosure No. [redacted]

0683

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

7 June 1948

Dr. Syngman Rhee
Chairman, Korean National Assembly
Capitol Building
Seoul, Korea

Dear Dr. Rhee:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 3 June 1948 in which you informed me that the National Assembly had appointed five of its members as a Temporary Liaison Committee for the purpose of contacting the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, United States Military Government authorities, Foreign Consulates and my Headquarters.

The following officials are designated to act as representatives of this command with whom the members of the Temporary Liaison Committee are invited to consult on appropriate matters.

Brigadier General John Weckerling, who is also my liaison officer with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, on matters pertaining to elections and all matters mutually involving Korea, the United States and United Nations. His office is at Duk Soo Palace, telephones: Washington 404, 406 and 407.

Major General William F. Dean, Military Governor, on all matters relating directly to functions of the Military Government and South Korean Interim Government. His office is in the Government Annex Building, telephones: Washington 245 or Whitehorse 6.

Dr. Harold J. Noble, on all matters not included in the foregoing and in arranging any needed conferences or contacts with other officials of the United States Command. His office is in the Mitsui Building and his telephone is Washington 82.

With best regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Inclosure No. 72

0684

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

United Nations **Nations Unies**

GENERAL ASSEMBLY **ASSEMBLEE GENERALE**

RESTRICTED
A/AC.19/78
11 June 1948
ORIGINAL:ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

ESTABLISHMENT OF A KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN, KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
THE CAPITOL
Seoul

June 11, 1948

Chairman
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
Duk Soo Palace
Seoul

Dear Sir:

I have the honour to notify you formally of the establishment of a Korean National Assembly in the capital city of Seoul on the thirty-first day of May 1948, by the representatives of the Korean people elected on 10 May 1948, under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

This notification of the formation of the Korean National Assembly is confirmatory of the informal notification of the proposed establishment of a National Assembly to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea through Mr. CHU, Hung-Ti, representing the Secretariat, on Saturday, 29 May 1948 by a Preparation Committee of representatives. An invitation to attend the opening session of the National Assembly was extended to Mr. CHU, Hung-Ti, and to Mr. Henri Costilhes, head of the Liaison Group.

This will also confirm the appointment of a temporary Liaison Committee by resolution of the National Assembly. This Committee was received by Mr. Patterson, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, Chairman, and Mr. Milner, the Principal Secretary, on 8 June 1948. The Committee will be available for any consultation with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea on all matters affecting the National Assembly.

The establishment of the Korean National Assembly was in accordance with Part II of the "Resolutions Adopted on Reports of the First Committee", United Nations, 14 November 1947, particularly paragraph 3 which states "that as soon as possible after the elections, the National Assembly should convene and form a National Government and notify the Commission of its formation."

/ The Interim

0685

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The Interim Committee after hearing the views of former Chairman K.P.S. Menon of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea stated on 27 February 1948 that it was resolved "in the light of developments in the situation with respect to Korea since that date (14 November 1947), to implement the program as outlined in Resolution II in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission."

With assurances of my great respect.

/s/ Syngman Rhee
SYNGMAN RHEE
Chairman
Korean National Assembly
Seoul, Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Duk Soo Palace,
Seoul,
25 June 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 11 June 1948 in which you notify the Commission formally of the establishment of a Korean National Assembly in the capital city of Seoul on the thirty-first day of May 1948, by the representatives of the Korean people elected on 10 May 1948, under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

The Commission takes note of the fact that a National Assembly was constituted on 31 May 1948 by the elected representatives of the Korean people and desires to express the earnest hope that these representatives will seek to promote early attainment of the independence and unification of Korea.

Your letter further refers to the Resolution of 14 November 1947 of the General Assembly of the United Nations and to the Resolution of the Interim Committee of 26 February 1948, which constitute the terms of reference of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

In this regard, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea desires to make reference to the letter of 10 June 1948 in which the then Chairman of the Commission, Mr. G. S. Patterson, advised you that the Commission is now ready for such consultation as the elected representatives may request concerning the further implementation of its terms of reference as defined in the Resolutions of the General Assembly adopted on 14 November 1947.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

/s/ Yu-Wan Liu

YU-WAN LIU
Chairman

Dr. Syngman Rhee,
Chairman,
Korean National Assembly,
Seoul

Inclosure No. 74

0687

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United Nations | Nations Unies | RESTRICTED

GENERAL ASSEMBLY | ASSEMBLEE GENERALE | A/AC.19/84
26 June 1948
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

ELECTIONS OF 10 MAY 1948
RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE SIXTY-NINTH MEETING, 25 JUNE 1948

THE UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA,

HAVING OBSERVED, in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of 14 November 1947 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the elections which were held on 10 May 1948 in that part of Korea accessible to the Commission;

HAVING PREVIOUSLY DECLARED that there existed in that part of Korea a reasonable degree of free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly were recognized and respected (document A/AC.19/68);

HAVING TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT the reports of its observation groups that such a free atmosphere existed during the elections;

HAVING SATISFIED ITSELF that the electoral procedures which it recommended had on the whole been correctly applied;

RESOLVES:

TO RECORD its opinion that the results of the ballot of 10 May 1948 are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Roll 13

Target 4

Inclosures, Nos. 1-29 and 1-33

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

THE JOINT COMMISSION ON KOREA

Inclosures (see Index)
1 to 29 Incl.

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By NARS, Date

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KOREA

JOINT COMMISSION

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APPLICATIONS FOR CONSULTATION WITH JOINT COMMISSION



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POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF 460 GROUPS

APPLYING FOR CONSULTATION

IN ALL KOREA

TOTAL CLAIMED MEMBERSHIP ALL GROUPS – 65,520,000

141 GROUPS PEOPLES FRONT 27,060,000 MEMBERS 42%	68 GROUPS MODERATES 13,500,000 MEMBERS 20%	251 GROUPS RIGHT 24,960,000 MEMBERS 38%

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SOVIET LIST

FOR CONSULTATION-SOUTH KOREA

(Parties and Organizations with membership in excess of 10,000)



RATIO

19 : 19

R = Rightist Groups	Approx.	11.3 Millions
MR = Moderate Right Groups	"	4.4 "
M = Moderate Groups	"	2.9 "
ML = Moderate Left Groups	"	5.3 "
PF = Peoples Front Groups	"	13.8 "

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SOVIET LIST

FOR CONSULTATION - NORTH & SOUTH KOREA
(Parties and Organizations with membership in excess of 10,000)



RATIO

18 : 32

R = Rightist Groups	Approx.	11.3	Millions
MR = Moderate Right	"	4.4	"
M = Moderate Groups	"	2.9	"
ML = Moderate Left Groups	"	5.3	"
PF = Peoples Front Groups	"	27.1	"

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GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE NORTH KOREA



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GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE SOUTH KOREA



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I N D E X

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

9 May 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I assume you are fully aware of the differences of opinion that have arisen within the Joint U. S. - Soviet Commission. I regret very much that any block to fast progress has arisen, but the American delegation cannot agree to exclusion of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and their leaders from consultation concerning the future of their nation because of expression of their political views on the Moscow Decision.

For your information as to my attitude on the subject, I am enclosing a transcript of the conference between General Shtikov and myself on 8 May 1946.

The Americans stand ready and willing to continue the work of the Commission in carrying out fully the Moscow Decision upon one day notice. All accommodations used by the Soviet Delegation remain open for their use.

If there remain other issues to be cleared up before the Commission reconvenes, I suggest that we meet for a personal conference at such place and time as you suggest. I will gladly come to Pyongyang for such a meeting, or I will be delighted if you would accept my long standing invitation to visit me in the Korean metropolis of Seoul.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

15 June 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

Although it has been more than one month since I wrote you suggesting that we meet to discuss and clear-up between us any misunderstood points of difference between our two delegations on the U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission, I have not had the honor of a reply.

As indicated in my letter, the American Command stands ready to resume negotiations in the Joint Commission at any time you suggest, in order fully to carry out the Moscow Decision in accordance with the principles of freedom of expression as enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. Therefore, I reiterate the invitation indicated in my letter of May 9, that you return your delegation to Seoul at an early date to resume negotiations for the complete fulfillment of the terms of the Moscow Decision in the cooperative spirit in which that Decision was made.

Should you decide to accept this invitation, I request advance notice of arrival of the Soviet delegation in order to rearrange for their housing and messing.

I will appreciate an early reply.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

12 July 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

Over two months have now elapsed since the discontinuance of the work of the Joint United States - Soviet Commission. Since I have received no reply from you to my letters of 9 May and 14 June, I must now amend the conditions for future meetings.

In my letter of 9 May I stated that the American delegation is now ready and willing to reconvene upon one day's notice. I must amend that stipulation and increase the period to ten day's notice. I am sure you will realize that the reason for this is the necessity for utilizing on other tasks temporarily the services of the personnel previously allocated to the Commission, and the necessity for using certain housing facilities which have remained vacant during the absence of the Soviet delegation.

The above condition of reopening the Joint Commission does not in any way change my views toward the desirability of reconvening as outlined to you in the above quoted letters.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
XXV SOVIET ARMY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

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6 August 1946

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

I have received your letter of 15 June 1946 pertaining to reconvening the Soviet-American Joint Commission in Seoul.

Having studied the material of the work of the Soviet - American Joint Commission, I have come to the conclusion that the stand taken by the Soviet Delegation in its negotiations, which took place in Seoul, was correct.

The Soviet Delegation was motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision of 3 Foreign Ministers on Korea, the only document in which is laid out the program of the Allies, foreseeing the creation of a democratic government in Korea and also the measures of assistance for developing Korea on democratic principles and the establishment of an independent Korean state.

As you know, the break in the work of the Joint Commission, fulfilling this decision, came about on the initiative and suggestion of the American Delegation.

Regretfully, your letter did not state whether the American Delegation in the Joint Commission will uphold the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and consult only with those parties and organizations and their representatives, which fully, without any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision.

Upon receiving your consent to resume negotiations on the basis of the above mentioned, I am ready at any time to send a representative of the Soviet Command to the city of Seoul for conducting negotiations in the Soviet-American Joint Commission for the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Respectfully yours

I.M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
The Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in North Korea

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

12 August 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

This is in answer to your letter of 6 August 1946 in regard to resumption of negotiations by the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission in Korea.

I note with interest your statement th t the Soviet delegation is motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. I take this opportunity to state that the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is and always has been the mission of the American Delegation, and is exactly what it will try to accomplish when the Commission reconvenes.

However, there are certain factors in this connection that I am impelled to point out. These are:

a. There is nothing the U.S. Delegation can read into the Moscow Decision that requres or implies that only those parties and organizations are to be consulted by the Joint Commission which fully, without any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision. Reading this interpretation into the Moscow Decision is purely unilateral.

b. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision or in the general usage of the word "democratic" throughout the world that restricts its application only to organizations or parties belonging to schools of social thought favoring certain classes in the community over others, which seemed to be the interpretation given in practice to the word by the Soviet delegation. The American delegation can apply the word "democratic" only as it is applied in common usage throughout the world, which normally would exclude only parties or organizations opposed to popular rule by elected representatives and to equal rights for all classes of the people.

c. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that prohibits Koreans in conferences with the Commission or elsewhere from expressing freely their wishes and desires in formation of their own government.

d. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that makes any predetermination of the terms of nature of the Four Power Trusteeship beyond the one provision imposing a limit of five years duration. On the contrary, the Moscow Decision states positively that "The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted Following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the ***(Four Powers)****for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years". I see no reason for the Joint Commission or the Korean people to enter into commitments concerning a Four Power Trusteeship before the Korean Provisional Government is formed.

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In view of the Soviet Delegation's interpretation of the Moscow Decision during the sessions last spring, that delegation might wish to restudy the Decision in the light of the views expressed above.

Since the Moscow Decision was made by our foreign Minister in good faith and is the only legal vehicle for setting up the independence of Korea, the U.S. Delegation has no alternative but to carry it out exactly and in full, and has no intention of making changes in the Decision or of asking for any repudiation. However, I can assure you that the U.S. Delegation cannot be a party to any arbitrary exclusive or punitive tactics in dealing with the accredited representatives of the Korean people on grounds not specifically stated in the Moscow Decision itself, and inconsistent with the world-accepted definition of the word "Democratic".

On the basis given above, I not only welcome but invite the Soviet Delegation to return to negotiations of the Joint Commission and suggest that you send your representative to Seoul at an early date to make preliminary arrangements.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
TH SOVIET ARMY IN NORTH K EA
Pyongyang, Korea

Restricted

26 October 1946

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General
Army Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

In your letter of 12 August 1946 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, you, speaking of the intentions of the American delegation to resume the discussions of the Joint Commission, at the same time have advised the Soviet delegation to restudy its position.

In answer to this, I must declare that the Soviet delegation is guided in its work by the terms of the Moscow Decision of the Three Foreign Ministers on Korea and intends to steadfastly adhere to this decision.

I again assure you that the Soviet Delegation is always ready to resume the work of the Joint Commission on the basis of strict fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

As far as the question of the discontinuing of the work of the Joint Commission is concerned, as you well know it was the American Delegation itself which time after time in the course of the discussions suggested that the work of the Joint Commission be suspended, and finally at its suggestion the work of the Commission was suspended 5 May 1946.

In your letter you state that "the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is and always has been the mission of the American Delegation".

I must however note that during the work of the Joint Commission the American Delegation did not, in fact, evince such a readiness and many times even declared that it did not quite understand the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Your assertion that the Soviet Delegation allegedly interprets unilaterally the Moscow Decision concerning the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the consultation on the subject with Korean political parties and social organizations is unfounded.

In the decision on Korea reached by the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, a series of measures were laid out which aim at the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for the development of the country on democratic principles and the speedy liquidation of the ruinous after-effects of long Japanese domination in Korea. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation, being guided by the aims and spirit of the Moscow Decision, deems that it would not be right to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling the Moscow Decision with those parties and organizations which are voicing opposition to this decision, or those, who for tactical considerations, although declaring their support of the decision, at the same time make such stipulations which convert their statement of support of the Moscow Decision into an empty declaration.

In regard to that part of your letter concerning the definition of the word "democratic", the Soviet Delegation would like to point out that in this question it is necessary to consider not the declarative announcements of the party, and not the names of separate parties and organizations, but the actual policies pursued by a given party.

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Inasmuch as the Moscow Decision has outlined the necessary measures for the democratic reconstruction of Korea, it is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the attitude of different parties and groups towards the Moscow Decision is the most important criterion of their true democratic nature and of their striving to see Korea a democratic state.

Thus, the position of the Soviet Delegation on the question of consultation of the Joint Commission with the Korean democratic parties and organizations fully corresponds to the Moscow Decision.

At the same time it is impossible not to note that there is an obvious contradiction between the interpretation in your letter of the word "democracy" and the actual position which the American Delegation assumed during the period of the work of the Joint Commission.

It is well known that the American Delegation has included in the list of political parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission on the question of the creation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, all political parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition against the Moscow Decision and only three democratic parties which upheld the Moscow Decision. It is completely obvious that the American Delegation, when it excluded from participation in consultation with the Joint Commission such democratic parties and organizations of mass character as the Korean National Revolutionary Party, the All-Korean Confederation of Labor, the All Korean Women's Union, the All-Korean Youth Union, the All-Korean Farmer's Union and a number of other organizations, was guided by other than their democratic principles.

As regards the freedom for the Koreans to express their position toward formation of the Korean Government or the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, the Soviet delegation has never anywhere made proposals directed against the freedom of expression by the representatives of Korean parties and organizations, wherever they may be, and it is accordingly understood that any party or group as well as any individual Korean citizen, can express similar ideas or present them to the Joint Commission.

I cannot agree with the interpretation set forth in your letter on the question of trusteeship because such an interpretation actually places in doubt the decision of the Moscow Conference on this question. As it is known the Moscow Decision states: "It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to also work out measures for helping and assisting (on trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

Thus, among the tasks of the Joint Commission is included the preparation of proposals dealing with the establishment of a trusteeship in regard to Korea with the stipulation that these proposals relating to Korea for a period up to 5 years will after consultation with the Provisional Korean Government, be submitted for joint consideration to the governments of the Four Powers.

From the above it is clear that the question of the establishment of the trusteeship as a measure which must aid in the democratic transformation of Korea has been definitely decided by the Moscow Conference and on this basis there must be prepared concrete proposals for the eventual working out of the agreement on trusteeship.

During the interruption in the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission many events have occurred in South as well as in North Korea.

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All these events testify that the Korean people are striving to unite their country, to have a democratic government, and to carry out their democratic transformation.

It is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the delay in the formation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government impedes the so necessary unification of Korea into a single state; it is having a negative effect on the economic and political situation of the Korean people and is holding back the realization of democratic transformation in all Korea.

The Soviet Delegation is greatly concerned that the negotiations of the Joint Commission, interrupted on the initiative of the American Delegation in May, 1946, have not yet been resumed and wishes to resume those negotiations as soon as possible on the basis of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

If after taking this into account, along with the foregoing statement, you will express your consent to resume the work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation will always be ready to resume that work.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in North Korea

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

1 November 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 25th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I thank you for your letter of October 26th, 1946, and agree with you that the continuation of the division of Korea into two parts works a great hardship on the Korean people. It also weakens the prestige of two great Allies who cooperated so fully to bring a victorious end to the bitterest war in history. Each added month of this division tends to make more difficult the implementation of the Moscow Decision on Korea made by the Foreign Ministers of the Allies last December.

For the purposes of reconciling the differences between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. delegations, which are not fully resolved in your letter, I propose that the following basis of agreement for reconvening the Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commission be accepted by both the Soviet and American delegations with a view to the early resumption of the sessions of the Joint Commission:

> It is agreed to interpret paragraphs 2 and 3 of the declaration in Communique #5 of the US-USSR Joint Commission, dated April 17th, 1946, to mean that such individuals, parties and social organizations shall not foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties, and social organizations which do foment or instigate such opposition shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties, and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.
>
> In consideration of this interpretation of the declaration published in Communique #5 of the Joint Commission, dated April 17, 1946, both Delegations agree that they will not oppose consultation with any individual, political party, or social organization which subscribes to and abides by the declaration published in Joint Communique #5.

In order to eliminate any possible future misunderstanding I believe it is advisable briefly to restate the position of the United States at this time.

(a) The United States has always favored the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision by the Joint Commission. This decision obviously includes the preparation of proposals "for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years" which "shall be submitted for the joint consideration" of the Four Powers "<u>following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government</u>." However, there is nothing in the Moscow Decision which predetermines the terms or nature of a Four Power trusteeship except that it shall be a method "for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress

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of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea" to be worked out "with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government," and a limitation placed upon its duration.

(b) The United States has always favored the exercise of freedom of speech in Korea. The United States believes that all Korean democratic parties and social organizations should be permitted to make known their desires in the formation of their own government. The representatives of the United States see a great difference between (1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision; and (2) the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government.

On the basis of the United States position herein stated and the suggested interpretation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the declaration in Communique No. 5 of the Joint Commission which I approved for the United States Delegation, the American Command proposes that the Joint Commission resume its work without delay and I again cordially invite the Soviet Delegation to return to Seoul at an early date for the purpose of resuming negotiations.

I shall be pleased to hear from you as early as possible in order that the necessary preliminary arrangements can be effected.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
25TH SOVIET ARMY IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

26 November 1946

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General
Army Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated November 1st, 1946.

It is with regret that I have to conclude that the conditions upon which you propose to renew the negotiations of the Joint Soviet-American Commission in substance do not differ from the position laid down in your previous letters, which, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Actually, you propose that the Joint Commission should consult with any person, political party or social organization which adheres to and abides by the declaration published in Communique #5, moreover, such persons, parties or social organizations must not and will not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

Thus, according to this formula, the Joint Commission must consult not only with democratic parties and social organizations which uphold the Moscow Decision, but also with those parties and organizations which are hostile to this decision. Furthermore, these latter parties and organizations are even given an opportunity to continue their activities directed against the Moscow Decision with the exception that they should not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

The acceptance of such a proposal would appear, rather as a call to reactionary parties and groups not to retreat from their hostile position towards the Moscow Decision, but merely to curtail temporarily their activities directed against this decision so that they may have an opportunity to take part in the consultations with the Joint Commission. I must remind you that it was precisely in such manner that these parties accepted your public announcement of April 27, 1946 which contained an analogous interpretation of the agreement embodied in Communique #5.

The result was that the parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition to the Moscow Decision agreed to sign the declaration, but on the very second day after the termination of the work of the Joint Commission, prominent leaders of these parties and organizations again returned to an active fight against the Moscow Decision and its supporters.

There is no doubt that participation by those elements in the consultations would be utilized by them with the aim of sabotaging the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and would only facilitate their activities in that direction.

I must again declare that if we are aiming at actual and complete realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, then in the

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opinion of the Soviet Delegation, it is impossible to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling this decision with those persons, parties and organizations who voice opposition to the above mentioned decision and who are aiming at sabotaging its fulfillment, but whom, for tactical considerations, may for the period of consultation with the Joint Commission temporarily and in part limit their activities directed against the Moscow Decision in order that they may renew these activities in full force as soon as consultation with the Joint Commission is terminated.

The foregoing in no way limits the freedom of Korean democratic parties, social organizations or individuals to express their position regarding the formation of the Korean government or other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

In my previous letter I have already directed your attention to the fact that the Soviet Delegation has never made proposals directed against the freedom of individuals, parties or organizations to express anywhere their views on these questions and it is accordingly understood that any party or social organization as well as an individual Korean citizen can express similar views or present them to the Joint Commission.

Desiring to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea as speedily and as definitely as possible, the Soviet side advances the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

1. The Joint Commission must consult with those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and social organizations, by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultations with the Joint Commission.

In the event you should agree to the foregoing proposals the Soviet Delegation is prepared, without delay, to arrive in Seoul for the resumption of the negotiations of the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

24 December 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov,
Commanding General of the Soviet
Forces in Northern Korea,
Headquarters, 25th Soviet Army,
Pyongyang, Korea.

Dear General Chistiakov:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 26 November 1946.

I have had attached to this letter a copy of your letter of 26 November 1946 with paragraphs numbered to facilitate reference.

From a careful reading of paragraphs II to VIII, both inclusive, the impression I receive is that the Soviet Delegation believes that proposals previously submitted by the United States Delegation appear to encourage "reactionary parties and groups" to continue hostile opposition to the Moscow Decision. I assure you that the United States Delegation has no such intention and desires to cooperate with you in preventing such hostile opposition. Paragraphs IX and X of your letter guarantee on the part of the Soviet Delegation complete freedom of expression to Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals "regarding the formation of the Korean government and other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea." The views expressed in these paragraphs are identical with the position assumed by the United States Delegation.

The last three paragraphs of your letter number 1 to 3, although apparently in conflict with paragraphs IX and X nevertheless provide a basis for further discussion.

In view of the closeness of our positions, I suggest that your proposals with the following modifications be made the basis for reconvening the Joint Commission.

Proposal No. 1 to be interpreted as follows:
Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

Proposal No. 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission, may after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

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Proposal No. 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows: "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

I trust that the basis proposed above will be acceptable to you and that you will notify me so that I may make the necessary preliminary arrangements for reconvening the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S.Army
Commanding, United States
Army in Korea

1 Incl.
Copy ltr of
Gen. Chistiakov
dtd 26 Nov 46

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HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET ARMY FORCES IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

28 February 1947

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

Confirming the receipt of your letter of December 24, 1946, it is with satisfaction I note that as a result of our correspondence the positions of both sides have actually drawn closer together.

1. I take note of your declaration that you are ready to accept as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission, the proposals set forth in my letter dated November 26, 1946. I agree with your interpretation of proposal #1, bearing in mind that the matter may not and must not be confined merely to expressions of good intentions to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on the part of those parties and organizations which will sign the declaration contained in Communique #5. Subsequent actions of these parties and organizations who have signed the above mentioned declaration, and consequently have accepted the obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, likewise must be consonant with that obligation.

2. In reference to paragraph #2 of my proposals, I should like to explain that the Soviet Delegation considers it expedient that parties and organizations which will take part in consultation with the Joint Commission be informed beforehand that they must not designate for consultation such representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

Bearing this in mind, and taking into consideration your observations, I propose the following wording for paragraph #2:

"A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION SIGNATORY TO THE DECLARATION CONTAINED IN COMMUNIQUE #5 HAS THE RIGHT TO APPOINT SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE WHO IN ITS OPINION CAN BEST PRESENT TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ITS VIEWS REGARDING THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION, AND WHO HAS NOT COMPROMISED HIMSELF BY ACTIVELY VOICING OPPOSITION TO THAT DECISION. HOWEVER, IF THE APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVE, FOR COMPLETELY VALID REASONS, BE CONSIDERED ANTAGONISTIC TOWARD THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION OR TOWARD EITHER OF THE ALLIED POWERS, THEN THE JOINT COMMISSION, FOLLOWING MUTUAL AGREEMENT, MAY DEMAND THAT THE PARTY HAVING MADE SUCH A STATEMENT (DECLARATION) SHOULD DESIGNATE ANOTHER REPRESENTATIVE IN HIS PLACE."

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3. I agree with your wording of proposal #3. I assume, however, that by the concept "individuals" shall be understood representatives of parties and social organizations invited to participate in consultations in accordance with the provisions set forth in paragraph #2 above.

I would deem it more expedient to substitute for the word "individuals" the words "and their representatives" with the result that the first sentence of your third proposal would be worded as follows:

"Parties and social organizations and their representatives invited for consultations." etc. according to the text.

The remainder of the wording of this proposal is accepted by me without change.

4. Concerning your observations regarding the alleged existence of conflict between paragraphs 9 and 10 of my letter, and the proposals set forth in that letter, I must say that I do not discern any such conflict.

I hope that agreement by us on the conditions of consultation will assure a speedy and successful resumption of the work of the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea.

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I N D E X

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TEXT OF MARSHALL'S LETTER TO MOLOTOV 8 APRIL 1947

I wish to call your attention to the situation in Korea. The representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States on the Joint (U.S. - U.S.S.R.) Commission in Korea have been unable to make progress towards the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government. It has been 19 months since the Japanese surrender, yet Korea has profited little. The country is divided into two zones. The Soviet Commander in Northern Korea has refused to permit freedom of movement and free economic exchange between these zones. This has precluded freely Chosen political amalgamation of the Korean people and had resulted in grave economic distress. The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following basic objectives:

1. To assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations.

2. To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

3. To aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state.

The United States, in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, declared its determination that in due course, Korea should become free and independent. The United Kingdom and the Republic of China were parties to the same declaration. The Cairo Declaration was specifically reaffirmed by the three powers in the Potsdam Declaration which defined terms for the Japanese surrender. The U.S.S.R. in its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, declared its adherence to these declarations. Upon the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea the areas respectively South and North of a line arbitrarily assigned for this purpose, the 38th degree parallel. This line of demarcation became in effect a boundary between zones of occupation. At the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. in Moscow in December 1945, the serious consequences of the bi-zonal division of Korea were discussed and an agreement regarding Korea was reached and published in Part 3 of the Communique of the Conference. The Republic of China subsequently subscribed to this agreement. March 20, 1946, the Joint (U.S. - U.S.S.R.) Commission appointed under the terms of the Moscow Agreement met and began its task, as outlined in the agreement, of assisting in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government as a 1st step in assuring the establishment of an independent and sovereign Korean nation. It was the hope of the Government of the United States that speedy action would be taken by the Joint Commission, a Provisional Korean Government would rapidly be established, the unfortunate results of the line of demarcation between the United States and the Soviet Forces would be overcome and Korea could be started on the way to attaining an independent and democratic government. Unfortunately the work of the Joint Commission became stalemated after a short time through failure to agree on the definition of the word "democratic" as it pertained to the representatives of the parties and social organizations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement to be consulted by the Joint Commission in its task of assisting in the formation of a provincial government. As it became evident that no agreement could be reached at the time, the Joint Commission adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946. The United States Commander in Korea has several times suggested to the Soviet Commander that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work. However, the Soviet Commander has insisted on a formula which would result in eliminating

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the majority of representative Korean leaders from consultation as representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and has reiterated this position in a letter to the American Commander as recently as February 28, 1947. It has therefore been impossible to agree upon a basis for reconvening the Commission. Now in April 1947, almost 16 months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real progress made toward the implementation of that agreement. In fulfillment of the intent of the agreement and declaration made at Moscow in December 1945, the Government of the United States desires to finish the work of establishing a free and independent Korea without additional delay. To this end I ask that our Governments agree to instruct our respective Commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. I further suggest that a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 be fixed for a review by the two Governments of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the United States, mindful of its obligations under the Moscow Agreement, has no alternative to taking without further delay such steps in its zone as will advance the purposes of that Agreement. I am furnishing copies of this letter to the British and Chinese Governments.

(Signed) Acheson

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TEXT OF MOLOTOV'S LETTER TO MARSHALL, 19 APRIL 1947

Dear Mr. Marshall:

In reply to your letter of April 8 on the question of Korea, I am communicating the following: At the Moscow Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in December 1945, an agreement was reached which determined the policy of the 3 powers with respect to Korea. A basis for this agreement were the proposals of the Soviet Government, to which the Government of the U.S.A. also agreed, having consequently abandoned its first intention not to establish a National Korean Government in Korea. The Moscow Agreement held the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government which could take all the necessary measures for the development of Korean industry, transport, agriculture and the national culture of the Korean people, to be a problem of primary importance. Having made these proposals the Soviet Government deemed that the unification of Korea under the leadership for the Korean National Government was the most important prerequisite for the restoration of Korea as an independent state and the establishment of basis for the development of the country on democratic principles. The Soviet Government continues to adhere to this point of view and insists on a steadfast implementation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, being certain that, on the basis of the execution of this agreement Korea could be successfully developed along democratic principles and would become an independent and prosperous state and an equal member of the United Nations. However, the legislative program provided for Korea by the Moscow Agreement has not yet been carried out. A Provisional Democratic Government has not been established. The work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, established for the purpose of collaborating in the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government was suspended as a result of the fact that the American Delegation on this Commission took a stand contrary to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Furthermore, the American Command in Southern Korea did not agree to a serious consideration of the proposals by the Soviet Command in Northern Korea on the question of an economic exchange between the two zones, which made it impossible to reach an agreement on this question.

In the course of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission during the period from March to May, 1946 the Soviet Delegation made every effort to effect the execution of the aforementioned agreement on Korea and first of all, provide for a prompt establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government and for the unification of Korea under its leadership. However, the Soviet Delegation met with not only difficulties in this connection, but also with direct counter-action on the part of the American Delegation, basing itself on the agreement of Korea, which provides that the Joint Commission, in formulating its proposals, should consult Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The Soviet Delegation insisted on a wide-scale attraction of such parties and organizations to consultation with the Commission. The American Delegation excluded participation by a whole series of large democratic organizations in Southern Korea and insisted on consultation with groups which had taken a stand in opposition to the Moscow Agreement, consultation with which, naturally could not facilitate the execution of this Agreement. The American Delegation included in the list of parties and organizations submitted by it for the consultation with the Joint Commission, 17 political parties and social groups of Southern Korea which took a stand against the Moscow Agreement, and only 3 democratic parties which supported the agreement. The American Delegation excluded sueh large democratic

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parties and social organizations as the All-Korean Labor Confederation, the All-Korean Peasant Union, the Korea National Revolutionary Party, The All-Korean Youth Union, etc., from participation in consultations. Deeming it impossible to agree to this position of the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation nevertheless did its utmost to find a way to reach an agreed decision. This, however, appeared impossible and the work of the Commission, on the suggestion of the American Delegation was curtailed.

The intolerance of the resulting situation is evident. As a result of this, as you know, it was necessary to take new measures in endeavoring to find a way out of such a situation. The Soviet Commander in his relations with the American Commander endeavored to find a basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. As a result of an exchange of letters, there has been a considerable reapproachment of the points of view of both sides, which fact was noted by both Commanders. It was expected that an agreement would soon be reached and the Joint Commission would begin its work very shortly. However, no reply has been received to date from the American Commander to the last letter of February 28, from the Soviet Commander and the proposed agreement was not reached. Disagreement of action was a serious obstacle for the opportune fulfillment of the program of measures proposed in the Moscow Agreement of Korea as a whole.

In connection with Northern Korea, during the period beginning with the capitulation of Japan, considerable progress was made in the field of democratic action, and also with respect to the restoration of national economy and culture. Wide democratic reforms have been made which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population. I have in mind, first of all, the introduction of an over-all electoral right; a law on equal rights for women; the establishment of local authority agencies and the peoples committee of Northern Korea on the basis of free democratic elections; land reform, as a result of which 725,000 landless peasant farmers and those having little land received more than 1,000,000 hectares of free land, which formerly belonged to Japanese colonists and their accomplices in Korea; the nationalization of former Japanese industries, the 8-hour work day, safeguarding of labor and social insurance; CIC educational reform, as a result of which the Korean language has been reestablished, the network of schools was increased and the number of students was increased, etc. However, such wide democratic reforms have been carried out only in Northern Korea, where there is only two-fifths of the population of Korea.

The Soviet Government, closely adhering their policy toward Korea to the program planned in the Moscow Agreement, believed the following to be points of primary importance:

Part 1. The establishment of Provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of a wide-scale of participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, in order to expedite the political and economic unification of Korea as a self-supporting state independent of foreign interference, which would do away with the division of the country into two zones.

Part 2. The establishment of democratic authority agencies throughout Korea by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right.

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Part 3. The aiding of Korean people in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture.

In connection with the steadfast aspiration on the part of the Soviet Government for the prompt restoration of Korea as a united sovereign state and elimination of difficulties arising from the fact that Korea to date had not been unified and does not have a national government. I propose that the Joint Soviet-American Commission resume its work on May 20 of the current year in the City of Seoul on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, and that the Commission present the result of its work on the elaboration of recommendations with respect to the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government for consideration by the two governments in July and August 1947.

I am sending copies of the present letter to Mr. Bevin and to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow.

I beg you, Mr. Secretary of State, to accept the assurance of my very highest consideration.

V. MOLOTOV

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By NARS, Date

TEXT OF MARSHALL'S LETTER TO MOLOTOV, 2 MAY 1947

Dear Mr. Molotov:

I have considered your letter of April 19, 1947, in which you accept our proposal to reconvene the US-USSR Joint Commission and suggest that the commission resume its work on May 20 of this year. I have also noted your statement that resumption of the commissions work shall be on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea.

In order to avoid any future misunderstanding with respect to the phrase "exact execution" I wish to make clear my interpretation of the phrase. In my letter to you of April 8, I stated that the Joint Commission should be charged with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. In making this statement I had and have in mind the well known position of the government of the United States and Korean representatives of Democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the commission.

You mention three points which the Soviet Government believes to be of primary importance in its policy towards Korea. Your statement concerning the importance of establishing a provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of wide scale participation of Korean Democratic parties and social organizations has from the beginning been accepted by the United States government as a basis to its policy of assisting in the establishment of a self governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations.

I interpret your second point with respect to the establishment of "Democratic Authority Agencies" throughout Korea as referring to local, provinicial and national government agencies chosen, as you state, by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electorial right.

I welcome the assurance contained in your third point with regard to the importance you attach to aiding in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture. The United States government has under consideration a constructive program for the rehabilitation of the economy of Korea and for its educational and political development.

In order that I may direct the United States Commander in Korea to make preparations for opening the sessions of the Joint Commission in Seoul on May 20, 1947, may I receive an early confirmation that we are mutually agreed as to the basis on which the commission shall resume its important work? I am furnishing copies of this letter to the governments of China and the United Kingdom.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, assurnace of my highest esteem.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

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TEXT OF MOLOTOV'S LETTER TO MARSHALL, 10 MAY 1947

Dear Mr. Marshall:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 2 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea. Your proposal, as I understand it, is to the effect that before the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission an agreement should be reached concerning the conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. This question was the subject of my exchange of correspondence between the Soviet and American Commanders in Korea as a result of which, as I already answered in my previous letter, the points of view of the two sides were brought considerably closer. The Soviet Commander in his letter of Nov 26, 1946, advanced the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case, such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.

The American Commander in his letter of Dec. 24, 46, agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following changes as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

"Proposal Number 1 to be interpreted as follows:

"Signing the declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for signing consultation.

Proposal Number 2 - I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

"Proposal Number 3 - It is suggested that it be reworded as follows: Individuals, parties and social organizations invited

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for the consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

With a view to expediting the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and the creation of a temporary Korean democratic government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander. I hope that there will thus exist no further reasons for postponing the convocation of the Joint Commission. In your letter you stated that the Government of the United States is at the present time considering a constructive program for the reconstruction of Korean economy and its cultural and political development. I presume that the Joint Commission, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement on Korea, after the completion of the work connected with the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government should consider with the participation of this government proposals from the American and Soviet sides concerning measures of aid and assistance for the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of the democratic autonomy, and the establishment of the state independence of Korea and present agreed recommendations on these questions. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China. Please accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurance of my highest consideration.

V. Molotov

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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TEXT OF MARSHALL'S LETTER TO MOLOTOV 13 MAY 1947

My dear Mr. Molotov:

I have received your letter of May 10 1947 and am pleased to note the agreement of your government to the reconvening of a Joint Commission on the basis of the proposals made in the American's Commander's letter of 24 Dec 46 to the Soviet Commander in Korea. Those proposals were authorized by this government and are identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of 2 May 1947.

I am instructing the Commander in Korea to make immediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul. A copy of this letter has been sent to the governments of the United Kingdom and China.

I convey renewed assurances of my highest consideration. State Department advises that exchange of correspondence referred to in your cable is unclassified.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

1726

TEXT OF MOLOTOV'S LETTER TO MARSHALL, 16 MAY 1947

Dear Mr. Marshall:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of reply dated May 13, 1947. Your statement that you are instructing the American Commander in Korea to make immediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul, I regard as your agreement to my proposal to resume the work of the Commission on May 20, 1947.

For my part, I inform you that the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission is prepared to arrive in Seoul by that date.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Govts of UK and the Chinese Republic.

Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my highest consideration.

V. M. MOLOTOV

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By NARS, Date

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TENTATIVE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF REPLIES OF MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPS TO JOINT COMMISSION QUESTIONNAIRES 5 and 6 REGARDING CHARTER AND PLATFORM FOR KOREAN PROVISIONAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

(Based upon as yet incomplete translations of replies of Political Parties and Social Organizations.)

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TENTATIVE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF REPLIES OF MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPS TO JOINT COMMISSION QUESTIONNAIRES 5 and 6 REGARDING CHARTER AND PLATFORM FOR KOREAN PROVISIONAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

(Based upon as yet incomplete translations of replies of Political Parties and Social Organizations.)

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People's Front	Moderate Groups	Right
(replies of North and South Korea Labor Parties, both essentially the same)	(as represented by coalition of moderate groups, under leadership of KIMM Kiu Sic)	(from replies of Hankook Democratic Party and 133 other righist groups)
ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT		
1. Centralized "Democratic People's Republic".	1. Centralized "Republic of Korea".	1. Centralized "Republic of Korea".
2. All-powerful Cabinet of 15 selected by Joint Commission on advice of Democratic Political Parties and Social Organizations.	2. Legislative Organ, selected by Korean Committee of Democratic Political Parties and Social Organizations with approval of Joint Commission. Representation 25% left, 50% neutral, 25% right.	2. President elected by universal secret ballot.
3. Present People's Committees retained in North Korea, and system extended to South Korea.	3. Legislature appoints Board of Presidents, Chief Executives.	3. President appoints Provisional Parliament and directly or indirectly all other officials of government.
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT		
1. Cabinet of 15 has full executive and legislative power.	1. Legislature appoints President, two vice presidents, Prime Minister, and State Affairs Committee.	1. President appoints State Affairs Commission, headed by Secretary of State and including 16 ministers, each a director of department.
2. Eventually Cabinet will draft constitution and select People's Congress which, in turn, selects President.	2. 15 ministers nominated by Legislature, appointed by Prime Minister.	2. Theoretical separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches. However, presidential appointive power and his power to implement laws by ordinances makes him supreme.
3. Cabinet appoints supreme court.	3. President appoints Chief Justice and Chief Prosecutor and other judicial officers upon nomination by Legislature.	3. President appoints judiciary.
		4. Provisional Parliament adopts election law, and thereupon Legislature is elected by universal secret ballot.

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People's Front	Moderate Groups	Right
LOCAL GOVERNMENT		
1. At present, Cabinet appoints Provincial Committees; Provincial Committees in turn appoint local committees.	1. State Affairs Committee nominates chief provincial officials who are appointed by the President.	1. Provincial Governors appointed by Secretary of State on recommendation of Minister of Home Affairs. County officials are appointed by Minister of Home Affairs. Township officials appointed by Provincial Governor.
2. Ultimately all People's Committees to be chosen by people through usual communist "election" procedures.	2. Provincial Affairs Committee composed of officials and local residents nominate most local leaders, whose appointments are confirmed by appropriate National Minister. Provides for general election of Provincial Congress at a later time.	2. Provincial and local consultative councils elected by popular vote, have power to ratify appointment of bureau chiefs on provincial, county & township levels.
PLATFORM		
1. Nationalization of industry, including mines, railroads, banks, utilities & major industries.	1. Major industries nationalized; medium industries partly nationalized; small industries privately owned.	1. Nationalization of mines, railroads, utilities & certain unspecified industries; semi-government operation of other major industries; remainder private.
2. Tenancy abolished; all land over 12.5 acres confiscated and distributed "free of charge" with State controlling land.	2. Tenancy abolished. Rights of private ownership recognized. Former Japanese land, plus land of Korean landlords, distributed "free," with compensation to ex-landlords. 20% of total land involved in transfers to be nationalized & utilized on collective basis by villages.	2. Private ownership of land upheld. Distribution to tenant farmers of all ex-Japanese farm land, plus all land over 12.5 acres of Korean landlords. Payment to landlords on graduated basis; farmers purchase land on installments, 25% of crop for period 10 to 15 years.

3. All three groups have outlined essentially similar progressive labor legislation, guaranteeing rights of workers and including social security legislation.

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American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

PRESS RELEASE BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN: 12 July 1947

In a hearty response to the Joint Commission's invitation to Koreans for consultation regarding formation of a Korean Provisional Government, 463 political parties and social organizations submitted applications. Of these applicants for consultation, 425 were from the American zone of occupation in southern Korea and 38 from Korea north of the 38th parallel.

Although Koreans both north and south of the 38th parallel were asked to submit applications under identical conditions, there is a sharp contrast between the lists of applicants from North and South Korea. All organizations in the North Korea list are members of the People's Front, and are affiliated with the North Korea People's Committee. The groups applying from southern Korea are almost entirely non-official and represent all shades of political opinion. More than two-thirds of the South Korean applicants are of right, middle-of-the-road, or moderate left political complexion. Less than twenty-five percent of the applicants are in the People's Front, both with regard to numbers of organizations and total membership.

Applicants from South Korea represent a broad cross-section of Korean society, including 39 political parties, 101 civil organizations, 54 cooperative, economic and business associations, 43 professional, scientific, and technical societies, 40 cultural groups, 35 labor unions, 34 young men's organizations, 31 religious groups, 19 relief and welfare agencies, 15 farmers' unions and agricultural organizations, and 14 women's organizations.

The North Korea list includes three political parties, 18 labor unions, five cultural groups, three religious organizations, two welfare groups, two civic organizations, and one each of

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the following organizations: farmers' union, consumers cooperative, women's, youth, and technical.

The single organization with the highest claimed membership applying was the Democratic People's Front of South Korea, with 6,217,819 members. The second highest was the Federation of Women's Associations in South Korea with 4,525,150 members. The group with the lowest membership was the Korean Patriots' Relief Association, with 22 members. The largest single political party registered in all Korea was the Hankook Democratic Party in South Korea, with a claimed membership of 865,706.

The largest religious groups to apply for consultation include the Central Headquarters of the Korea Buddhists, with 4,250,120 members and the Headquarters of the Chun Do Kyo, native religion, with 4,064,000 members. The largest individual women's organization to apply for consultation is the Women's Association of the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, with a claimed membership of 3,281,724. The largest farmers organization applying is the North Korea Peasants Alliance, with a claimed membership of 2,572,714. The largest economic group is the North Korea Consumers Cooperative Alliance with claimed membership of 2,751,798. The largest youth groups to apply is the Young Korea Party of South Korea, with 1,889,000 claimed membership.

Eighteen of the organizations applying for consultation have claimed memberships of more than one million. However, the bulk of those applying are relatively small, 291 having less than 10,000 members. There is considerable duplication of membership on the list; for example, membership is given for both individual political parties and coalitions of parties. There is additional duplication of membership because many

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individual Koreans are members of several of the various organizations applying for consultation. Claimed membership of all 463 organizations applying for consultation totals about 70,000,000, of whom about eighty per cent are from south of the 38th parallel, and twenty per cent from North Korea. Several fraudulent applications have been discovered; for example, one large youth organization registered under three different names.

The large number of applications stemmed in part from Soviet refusal to agree to any definition in Joint Decision No. 12 regarding political parties and social organizations, or to any limitation on applications with respect to membership or types of organizations. Social organizations applying include a wide variety of organizations, such as the North Korea Society of the People's Air Fleet, the Merchants Association for Dong Dae Moon Market, the Kyonggi Province Mid-Wives Association, and the Korean Young Men's Esperanto League.

Of the 463 organizations applying for consultation, 435 handed in answers to the Joint Commission questionnaires concerning the Provisional Charter and Political Platform of the Korean Provisional Government by the deadline of 5 July 1947. The Joint Commission is engaged in translation, tabulation and analysis of these answers.

This list of democratic parties and social organizations to be consulted by the Joint Commission will be published as soon as it has been agreed upon by the Joint Commission.

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July 15, 1947

PRESS RELEASE OF CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

The US - Soviet Joint Commission held its 42nd meeting, 1330, 14 July 1947, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea. General Brown was Chairman.

The Joint Commission has continued the discussion of a disagreement which arose in the 37th meeting and extended through to the 42nd meeting, on the list of parties and organizations to be invited for initial oonsultation. The basic issues involved in this disagreement are as follows :

I. Soviet Delegation's General Position:

1. That parties and organizations falling within the following categories should not be included in the list for initial consultation, specifically:

a. Those not classified by them as social organizations,

b. District and other purely local organizations, and

c. Those which it contends do not intend to support fully the Moscow Decision, especially members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations.

I. American Delegation's General Position:

1. That Soviet Delegation's proposals are contrary to:

a. Paragraph 1 of the three principles of the Foreign Ministers upon which agreement for reconvention of the Joint Commission was reached: "Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

b. Paragraph 5, Joint Commission Decision published in Communique No. 11, mutually

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agreed to and signed by the Chief Commissioner of each Delegation: "Subcommission No. 1, upon receiving the applications for consulation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration. . . ."

II. The Soviet Delegation's Specific Contentions are:

1. That industrial, mercantile and producers' organizations, such as Chambers of Commerce, Industrial Medical Institute, Buddhist Research Institute, Accountants' Society and societies organized for the study of politics and economics, are not in fact social organizations as the word "social" is used in the Moscow Decision.

II. The American Delegation's Specific Contentions are:

1. a. The Moscow Decision does not define the term "social organization."

b. The Soviet Delegation refused requests of the American Delegation to define the terms in the Joint Commission Decision.

c. The American Delegation served notice on the Soviet Delegation prior to final decision that after joint approval of the Joint Commission Decision No. 12, the American Delegation would not agree to amendment or change in the decision as finally agreed upon. Therefore, the term "social organization" must be interpreted as defined in the dictionaries of the world.

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2. A party or organization local in character which has no central zonal office is not eligible for consultation.

3. The good faith of a party or organization which signs the declaration and applies for consultation, and thus agrees to uphold the Moscow Decision, is challenged by the Soviet Delegation if such party or organization continues membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or a similar organization. Such party or organization is acceptable for consultation only if it publicly withdraws from membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization.

2. District and other purely local organizations are not barred by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall - Molotov agreement, or Joint Commission Decision. In order to eliminate small organizations, the American Delegation several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000 or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet Delegation.

3. a. Parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations are clearly eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall - Molotov agreement if they have applied for consultation and signed the required declaration.

b. They remain eligible unless and until they are by mutual agreement excluded after indictment as provided by paragraph 3 of the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers - namely "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission

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4. The fact that a party is eligible for consultation under the agreement of the Ministers, as published in Joint Commission Decision, does not mean that it must be admitted for consultation by the Joint Commission.

5. In order for a party to be placed on the list for consultation, it must be acceptable to both Delegations.

should not, after signing the declaration contained in communique No. 5, foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations, which, after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

4. The arbitrary line of distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation", nullifies the agreements reached by the two Ministers (quoted in 1. a. above) and by the Joint Commission.

5. The first paragraph of the agreement accepted by Mr. Molotov and rewritten into Joint Commission Decisions specifically states that all parties and social organizations which sign the application

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for consultation are eligible and must be accepted for consultation. The contention by the Soviet Delegation is an attempt to establish ar arbitrary veto power over consultation, which is implicit in the method of compiling the list proposed by the Soviet Delegation. There is no provision in any of the agreements reached which provides such veto power.

There are two basic issues involved in the differences outlined above:

The first issue is whether one delegation may unilaterally exercise veto power and exclude from consultation any party or social organization that it does not approve. The Soviet Delegation wishes to exercise such veto power. The American Delegation maintains that this is an arbitrary position and is contrary to the agreement of the Foreign Ministers. Furthermore, it is impractical in application because it could be used to exclude parties and social organizations to such a degree that consultation would not represent a fair sample of Korean opinion. The U.S. position is that exclusion from consultation can only be by mutual agreement of both delegations as specifically stated in the Marshall - Molotov letters. The U.S. Delegation has many times offered to review systematically the whole list of applicants and consider any and all objections by either delegation to various parties and organizations in order to make a decision as to which should be excluded through mutual agreement. The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly refused such proposals.

The second issue is in regard to membership of a party or organization in the so-called Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization. The Soviet Delegation has not brought specific charges

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against any one party that it has actually fomented or instigated active opposition to the Joint Commission or the Moscow Decision after signing the declaration, but has arbitrarily accused all the member parties of bad faith and imply that they are guilty even before they have been indicted. The U.S. position is that no party or social organization can be assumed guilty of acting in bad faith until it has been indicted and proven guilty of actions which do in fact incite and foment active opposition to the Joint Commission, the Moscow Decision, or either of the Allies.

The American Delegation has consistently upheld and will continue to insist on complete implementation of the Marshall - Molotov agreements which guarantee wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in consultation and freedom of expression of opinion by all Koreans.

The Joint Commission is continuing its meetings in an attempt to resolve these basic differences.

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31 July 1947

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION, MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

On July 15 the Chief Commissioner the American Delegation issued a statement to the Press. Since that time the issues presented in that release have continued to be the subject of Joint Commission meeting through July 29.

In the meeting of July 29 the Soviet Delegation rejected a proposal made by the American Delegation.

This American proposal, made on July 25, would give the Joint Commission an accurate listing of all applicant parties and the position of each delegation with respect to each of the parties. The American Delegation proposed specifically that Subcommission Number 1 be directed to reconvene and to consider the application of all parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission and to prepare:

(1) A list of all of those parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation;

(2) A list of those parties and social organizations appearing on the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) which <u>both</u> the Soviet and American Delegations are willing to exclude from oral consultation, with the reasons for exclusion;

(3) An additional list of those parties and social organizations appearing on the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) with which <u>either</u> delegation does not wish to consult, orally, together with a statement of specific objections in each case;

(4) To prepare a complete list of all representatives of parties and social organizations appearing in the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) and a list of those with which either delegation does not wish to consult, together with a statement

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of the specific objections in each case.

This American proposal would not prejudice the Soviet position in the Joint Commission nor would it assist the American position. It would, however, result in a clear factual picture of both positions.

This proposal was made after the Soviet Delegation had reintroduced without substantial modification a proposal which had been presented by them on 12 July and reiterated on many previous occasions. The Soviet Delegation has not since then manifested any willingness to alter this proposal in any way to effect a compromise with the many proposals which had been made by the American Delegation. In this Soviet proposal was contained a list of parties and organizations, each with a claimed membership of over 10,000, for consideration by Subcommission No. 1. However, the Soviet list did not include certain important parties and organizations, each with a claimed membership of over 10,000, which have qualified for consultation with the Joint Commission. It has been the Soviet contention that these parties and organizations being members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee could not be placed on the list for initial consultation.

The American Delegation has always been ready to exclude from oral consultation parties and social organizations that are fraudulent or duplicative, or which for just cause are indicted before the Commission and adequate and proper evidence is presented to prove the guilt of the accused parties.

The eligible parties and organizations can be removed from the list only by mutual agreement after indictment as provided by paragraph 3 of the agreement of the Foreign Ministers: "Those individuals, parties and social organizations, which after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Com-

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mission."

The American Delegation has always insisted on full and free consultation. It will not agree to the unilateral exclusion by the Soviet Delegation of parties and social organizations which are entitled to consultation. The American Delegation has agreed to review systematically the list of applicant parties and organizations with a view to excluding for cause those that may not be eligible for consultation. The Soviet Delegation has refused to review the list in this manner.

If we examine in detail the 12 July Soviet proposal, we find that the Soviet list eliminated 27 parties, 3 for fraud and 24 others which represent large and important groups of the rightists and moderates. The 24 parties eliminated have a claimed membership of over 15 million. The Soviet list includes for South Korea 118 parties and organizations which, from records available to the American Delegation, should be classified as follows:

A - SOUTH KOREA:

	Political Orientation				
	Right	Moderate Right	Moderate	Left Moderate	People's Front
Number of parties	44	18	9	6	41
Total Membership (in thousands)	12,483	4,029	2,882	4,609	14,450

If to the above tabulation are added the 28 People's Front groups with membership in excess of 10,000, included in the list from North Korea, the classification of Parties and Social organizations of all Korea would be as follows:

B - ALL KOREA:

Number of parties	44	18	9	6	69
Total membership (in thousands)	12,483	4,029	2,882	4,609	27,707

Examination of the tables above show that if the Soviet proposal is followed, and if the moderate are considered as right, there are 71 rightist parties in South Korea as against 47 leftist. Claimed

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membership of the 71 rightist parties is 19.3 million, and claimed membership of the 47 leftist parties slightly over 19 million. By adding the 28 parties and organizations of North Korea, each of over 10,000 membership, all members of the People's Front, we get actually 71 parties of the right, with a total claimed membership of 19.3 million, but an increase of leftist representation to 75 parties with a claimed membership of 32.3 million.

Furthermore, there is no assurance that further elimination of rightist parties and organizations would not be attempted by the Soviet Delegation.

Although the Soviets deny that it is their intention to eliminate the rightist from proper participation in the government, and also deny that they intend by such elimination to bring about a future government of Korea predominantly People's Front, acceptance of their proposal by the American Delegation would nevertheless inevitably lead to this result, because the People's Front groups would be given an overwhelming majority.

The only objective of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission is to establish a Korean Provisional Democratic Government that fully reflects the wishes of the Korean people. The position taken by the American Delegation is that no one faction shall dominate the creation of this government because no one group enjoys a majority support of the masses of the Korean people. It is highly undesirable, therefore, that either the extreme right or the extreme left have a dominating position in consultation with the Joint Commission.

At the meeting of July 29 the Soviet Delegation summarily rejected the proposal of the American Delegation without discussion and without stating proper cause. The balance of the meeting was taken up with general discussion.

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STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

7 August 1947

A Soviet proposal that representatives of 15 South Korean parties under Soviet suspicion be called before the Joint Commission for questioning marked the 51st Meeting of the Commission, August 5th.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov gave as his reason for the questioning of the representatives, a desire to have them clarify points in a letter which the representatives of the 15 organizations sent to the Commission when they learned that the Soviet Delegation desired to exclude certain organizations from oral consultation with the Joint Commission on the grounds that the parties opposed the Moscow Decision.

Major General Albert E. Brown, in an attempt to understand the Soviet view, inquired of General Shtikov what questions were to be asked. The Chief Soviet Commissioner replied only that he would ask questions designed to clarify the letter. General Shtikov stated he also desired to verify the signature in the letter.

The U.S. Delegation pointed out that the letter was a voluntary effort of these parties and social organizations to assist the Joint Commission to overcome the deadlock announced in the press over the Soviet refusal to consult with parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The U.S. Delegation has upheld the right of all parties and social organizations to be consulted which have signed the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, and no evidence against any of these parties has been produced. The American Delegation maintained that any questions which either Delegation desired to ask any representatives could and should be asked when the representatives appeared for oral consultation and not in special examination proceedings. The American Delegation, therefore, rejected the Soviet proposal.

The letter, which had been introduced during the 49th Meeting of the Joint Commission, on July 31st, is as follows:

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LETTER SUBMITTED BY THE MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE UNITED COUNCIL

28 July 1947

TO: Chief Commissioners
Soviet and American Delegations
US-USSR Joint Commission

Gentlemen:

This is on behalf of the member organizations of the United Council, to express our sincere appreciation of the hard and fine work that you and your colleagues have been rendering in the US-Soviet Joint Commission for the cause of Korean independence, and, at the same time, to offer to you our loyal cooperation in every possible way to a successful conclusion of the great and difficult task that is, we feel, both yours and ours also.

We are informed that one of the issues upon which the U.S. and the Soviet delegations have not been able to come to an agreement is the membership in the so called anti-trusteeship committee of some of our member organizations. The position of the Soviet delegation as reported in the press is that certain parties who were formerly active in the anti-trusteeship committee should be excluded from consultation with the Joint Commission.

It is true that the anti-trusteeship committee had been formed with a view to oppose in the future the trusteeship that is foreshadowed but not explained in the Moscow Decision. However the basic right of free expression of opinion has been guaranteed to the Koreans, as you will readily agree, in the official letters exchanged between General Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State and Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, prior to the reconvention of the Joint Commission at Seoul on May 21. Furthermore, we can assure you that the anti-trusteeship committee has never actively opposed or instigated active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission. This is well proved by its action that, in the early part of June, the committee called its member organizations together in a great conference for discussion on the matter

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of the participation in the Joint Commission and upon the finding that the organizations could not come to an agreement it was decided that the matter of participation in the Joint Commission should be left to the free choice of each individual organization affiliated with the anti-trusteeship committee and that there should be no active opposition between those organizations which will consult with the Joint Commission and those which will not.

Furthermore none of the organizations which applied for consultation participated in any way in the so-called June 23 demonstration.

Those organizations which are members of the anti-trusteeship committee and have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission are definitely of the opinion that they should fully cooperate with the Joint Commission in the formation of a provisional government which is its task in the first stage, and, after the formation of the provisional government, in the discussion of the measures of aid and assistance that is its task in the second stage by expressing their honest opinions, and by expressing even an honest expression of difference to any measure should it infringe upon Korean national sovereignty or interfere with Korean internal politics. Apart from these reservations of right the organizations have never instigated, nor will instigate, any active opposition to the work of the Joint Committee. An active opposition to it is indeed contrary to their own policy of consultation with the Joint Commission.

(Signed with Seal By)

Yi, Yun Yung - Vice Chairman of the United Council for the Establishment of Provisional Government.

Yi Yun Yung, Vice Chairman of the Chosun Democratic Party.

Duk, Soo Chong, The Democratic Party of Korea.

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Sim, Yi Sung, The Popular Party.

Son, Ta Ri, - The Tehundo Kyo Bokik Party.

You, Hong, - The 1919 Independence Declaration Memorial Association.

Ryu, Chin San, The General League of Youngmen's Korea.

Sun, Chung Hi, The Korean Military Affairs Association.

Esther Whong, Union of All Womens' Associations in Korea.

Pahk, Sang Ho, Women's Patriotic Association.

Choi, Yun Dong - The Kwang Bok Hoi.

Chun, Chin Han, - General Labor League for the Korean Independence.

Chal, Tak Ryong, The Korean Independent Young Men's Association.

Choi, Hueng Cho, - Korean Youngmen's Association.

Lee, Sun Keun, Young Korean Party.

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN
DELEGATION, US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

9 August 1947

The present failure of agreement in the Joint Commission and the letter recently written the Commission by certain members of the United Council has again raised the question of "Freedom of Expression." The opinions of the American Delegation on this question were presented to the Joint Commission and read into the records at its 52nd meeting. These views have been previously released to the Korean press by the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation. It appears advisable at this time that they be restated.

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

In the meetings of the Joint Commission in 1946 the Soviet Delegation took the position that those Koreans who did not fully support the Moscow Decision would not be accepted for consultation by the Joint Commission. They even insisted that objection to one word of the Moscow Decision was failure to fully support the Moscow Decision. The Commanding General, Soviet Forces in North Korea, followed this contention up to his letter of February 28, 1947, in reply to the letter of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, of December 24, 1946. During the exchange of letters between the Commanders, attempt was made to reach a formula which would define the limit of objection to the Moscow Decision beyond which a Korean could not go without being barred from consultation with the Joint Commission. The Soviet Commander of North Korea in his letter of 26 November 1946 recommended a formula to cover this matter. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, in his letter of December 24, 1946, recommended certain modifications to the formula proposed. The matter was taken up by the two Ministers, and they agreed to accept the formula proposed by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, in his letter of December 24, 1946. Under this formula a Korean representative of a political party or social organization, which party or organization signs the application for consultation, may freely express his opinion publicly or privately concerning the Moscow Decision, the future formation of his government or any words, phrases or thoughts involved in either, provided he does not instigate or foment active opposition against the Moscow Decision or either of the Allies.

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation has throughout the past several weeks attempted to return to his position of a year

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ago. He apparently has not understood the efforts of the two Commanders in Korea to resolve this difficulty and the decision reached by the two Ministers, which has in fact resolved the difficulty if it is faithfully followed. As a matter of fact, in the Subcommission No. 1 meeting of May 28, 1947, the Soviet representative, Mr. Tounkin, made the statement that the Soviet Delegation would not agree to consultation with any Korean who did not fully support the Moscow Decision and every paragraph of that decision. While this statement does not go as far as the intent of the Soviet Delegation to oppose those who object to a word contained in the Moscow Decision, it still goes a long distance back from the agreement by the two Ministers and in fact destroys the value of that agreement, returning the Soviets as it does to their original position of May 1946.

Furthermore, in the 43rd meeting on July 16, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation made the following statement: "The Soviet Delegation does not wish to speak with and consult those which carry on a fight against the Moscow Decision even if it is one word or one period in the Moscow Decision."

The Moscow Decision is so written that practically each provision contained in it is subject to wide interpretion. There is one word in this decision, however, to which a partial interpretion is given--that is the word "trusteeship." The Moscow Decision interprets trusteeship as "aid and assistance." It further guarantees to the Korean people independence. The Korean people are a proud race. They were subject to Japanese domination for 40 years. It is perfectly natural that they should crave full and complete independence. The Korean people naturally fear that in offering them aid and assistance as provided by the Moscow Decision, attempts will be made to control the government of the nation and to delay or destroy their independence. It is possible that control will be necessary. However, the Moscow Decision clearly envisages the extent of that

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control as that required to make effective the aid and assistance rendered. The aid and assistance rendered likewise being limited to that essential to assure that Korea is properly evolved during the period of aid and assistance into a full, free and independent nation. It is perfectly natural, the exact extent of the aid and assistance to be rendered not being defined, that Koreans should have different ideas as to the interpretion of the Moscow Decision on this point. Having these ideas, it is natural that they should express them. It is also natural that they should state their objection to any interference with the sovereignty of their nation. It is this right of any free man to express his thoughts in private or in public without being excluded from consultation that the United States Government has consistently insisted upon in its dealings with the Soviet Government concerning the establishment of a Provisional Government for Korea. It is this principle to which the Soviet authorities agreed after almost one year of exchange of views. It is this principle which the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation and the Soviet Delegation is now trying to destroy, thus repudiating the agreement signed by their Minister and their own signed agreement on Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

The American Delegation does not regard expression of opposition to "trusteeship" as fomenting and instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision. The Moscow Decision is a broad document which by direct statement or by implication covers all requirements included in the creation and evolution of a government over a reunited Korea. As previously stated, every loyal Korean craves independence for his country. All Koreans welcome the opportunity to secure that independence under the Moscow Decision. They fear and distrust but one concept of that decision--the unknown implication of the word "trusteeship." The Moscow Decision states in paragraph 1 the intent of the document--that is, "to reestablish Korea as an in-

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dependent state; to create conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea." Unquestionably those who wrote it had no intention by inserting in paragraph 3 the word "trusteeship", to vitiate the provision of the entire document. How then can discussion of and statement of opinions against fancied or exaggerated meanings of this word be considered as opposition to the document? Such a contention is untenable.

The American Delegation does not regard membership by a political party or social organization in an anti-trusteeship committee or any similar organization as a bar to its admission for consultation by the Joint Commission. It is perfectly natural that political parties and social organizations should join together in committees for the discussion and consideration of the aid and assistance to be rendered to their country and should call themselves anti-trusteeship or similar named committees. As long as these committees confine their activities to free expression of opinion and stop short of fomenting and instigating active opposition, they are permitted under the agreement of our Ministers to express their opposition.

As a matter of fact, paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision assigns to the Joint Commission the task, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations, to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. How can the Joint Commission expect any Korean who remains silent on this important matter to be of any assistance to the Joint Commission at the time when it must determine and resolve its responsibility under this requirement of paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision. The Joint

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Commission has recently broadcast throughout Korea an invitiation to all Koreans to freely express themselves as to the formation of their government, its charter and platform. This is an invitation to Koreans to think, discuss and present views on the future of Korea. After the Provisional Government is formed, one of the most vital and important topics involved in any such discussion, from the Korean point of view, is trusteeship. What are the Soviets trying to do? Goad patriotic Koreans to the point of actually fomenting and instigating active opposition so that they can discredit them from consultation with this Commission, or are they actually proceeding in good faith to attempt to evolve a Provisional Government and Korean independence under the provision of the Moscow Decision? Do they intend to follow the signed agreement reached by their Ministers?

There are different kinds of trusteeship. That exercised by the United Nations is one form known throughout the world. Before Japan annexed Korea it pretended to exercise another form, now hated and feared by all loyal Koreans. Trusteeship as prescribed in the Moscow Decision is not known nor can it be known until its definition is worked out as provided under the Moscow Decision. When Koreans say that they object to trusteeship, they are objecting to an imaginary concept or to the hated Japanese concept, not an actuality. It should be the effort of the Joint Commission to quiet the fears of the Koreans, to educate and guide them in a proper understanding of this term, and methods which will be employed in applying it, not to condemn them, to convict them without a hearing and to bar them from proper participation in what to them is the most vital interest of their life - the formation of a free and independent government for their country.

The American Delegation requests the Soviet Delegation to join with it in a sincere and honest effort to create a provisional government over a united Korea as provided for by the Moscow Decision and thus to demonstrate to the world that two great powers can unselfishly work together in the interest of a small, weak and dependent nation.

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PRESS RELEASE OF MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN, CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

14 August 1947

On 12 August 1947 the United States Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, wrote to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. V. M. Molotov, calling his attention to the deadlock that has existed in the proceedings of the US-USSR Joint Commission which has been meeting in Seoul to recommend to the Four Powers the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

General Marshall suggested in his letter to Mr. Molotov that the respective delegations of the Joint Commission be called upon to submit a report of their work to their governments by 21 August 1947 in order "that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations."

Verbatim copies of this letter, copies attached, were sent to the governments of the United Kingdom and China.

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LETTER MARSHALL TO MOLOTOV

12 August 1947

Dear Mr. Molotov:

In your letter of April 19, 1947, you suggested that the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea resume its work on May 20 in Seoul "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea" and that the Commission should present the result of its work for the consideration of the Soviet and United States Governments in July and August, 1947. According to all reports received from the American delegation to the Joint Commission, it has been impossible for the two delegations to agree on the issue of broad consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations. This situtation has continued without material change for more than one month and is a matter of great concern to the government of the United States.

You will recall that in my letter to you of May 2, I referred to your statement that the work of the Commission should be "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement" and that in order to avoid future misunderstanding I made clear my interpretation of that phrase. I pointed out that it had been the consistent and well-known position of the United States Government that "Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." In your reply of May 7 you did not take exception to this position. You accepted as a basis for reconvening the Commission the suggestion outlined by General Hodge in his letter to General Chistiakov of December 24, 1946, which was in accordance with the United States position described above. In further-

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ance of this policy the American delegation to the Joint Commission has maintained that there should be the widest possible participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and that in such participation there shall be no restriction on freedom of expression and opinion of all Koreans. In an effort to expedite matters the U.S. Delegation has several times offerred to limit oral consultations to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet Delegation.

The United States Government believes that, in justice to the Korean people whose hopes of independence have been so long postponed, there cannot be further delay. It is the desire therefore of this government that by August 21, 1947, the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations so that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations.

I am providing copies of this message to the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.

I have the honor to be, etc. . . .

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN DELEGATION,
MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

14 August 1947

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has received many questions concerning the work of the Joint Commission by members of the Press, the Korean public, and by parties and social organizations who have applied for consultation. The American Delegation would like to answer the more frequently asked questions in the following statement.

The position of the Soviet Delegation as the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation sees it is:

1. That political parties or organizations can only be placed on the list for consultation by mutual agreement of Subcommission No. 1, which means that the Soviets could by withholding approval to the inclusion on the list of any party dictate the makeup of the list. This is in fact a contention that the Soviets must hold the veto power.

2. That certain parties (almost all are rightist) must be denied consultation through the device of excluding:

(a) Parties alleged to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organizations,

(b) Those without zonal headquarters,

(c) Those not social.

The list of parties and organizations with membership in excess of 10,000 submitted by the Soviets as the parties and organizations which are not suspicious to them and with which they are apparently willing to consult omits 24 important parties each of which has a membership in excess of 10,000, all but one of these 24 are apparently rightist, and contain the most important rightist parties requesting consultation. The Soviet Delegation states that these 24 parties are omitted because they are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. In the first place, the American Delegation is unwilling to concede that mere membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee a basis for denying the right of consultation to any group. In the second place, as far as the American Delegation can determine, only 9 of these 24 parties were at one time members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The others are apparently eliminated arbitrarily; at least, the Soviets refused to state their reasons for their elimination. The Soviets have apparently also included on the list presented by them certain parties and organizations which were reported at one time to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. They do not explain why they are willing to consult with certain parties which were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee while they refused to consult with certain other parties which were also reported to be members of this committee. It is a reasonable conclusion that they were reserving the right to question these parties at a later date and deny them consultation in the improbable event that the American Delegation should accept the Soviet view. It is likely that there were other parties and organizations on the list submitted by the Soviet Delegation with which at a later date they would refuse to consult because of their "non-social" or "local" character.

The Soviet proposal to deny consultation to the 24 parties omitted from their list is apparently in furtherance of the plan to eliminate from consultation an important segment of Korean public opinion which holds different political views. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has many times asked the Soviet Delegation to produce adequate and satisfactory evidence upon which the American Delegation could determine the validity of the Soviet contentions. None has been produced.

The Soviet contentions are:

1. <u>That these 24 parties are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.</u> They have produced no evidence to substantiate this contention. They simply make the statement. They vaguely mention certain newspaper articles. The reliability of newspaper articles is doubtful. However, they have not even produced those newspaper articles nor read them into the record as evidence. When the Chief

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Commissioner of the American Delegation attempted to get the Soviet Delegation to discuss their reasons for excluding these 24 parties by discussing each party as a separate entity, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation not only refused to discuss the issue but even refused to answer the questions of the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation.

2. That the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is engaged in fomenting and instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation has produced no evidence to prove this contention. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has many times asked them for evidence.

3. That the 24 parties bear responsibility for an Anti-Trusteeship Committee demonstration on 23 June. They contend that this Anti-Trusteeship Committee demonstration was instigated and participated in by the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. They have offered no proof of this fact other than a statement that they have a letter signed by KIM, Koo. They have made no attempt to link any one of these 24 parties specifically with that demonstration.

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has written in to the record the results which approval of the Soviet proposal would produce. In effect it would change the three to two rightist majority of applicant parties in all Korea to an overwhelming leftist majority. It would actually at this early stage of the meeting of the Joint Commission assure an entirely unwarranted, definite leftist control over a united Korea, which in fact would mean domination by groups imbued with Communist Party principles. It is highly naive of the Soviet Delegation to expect that this could be accepted by the American Delegation. Should the American Delegation agree to any such political maneuver, it would be contrary to the role of the Joint Commission and such action would be condemned by the honest people throughout the world.

The right is not a unified group and some of the more extreme elements have revealed their political immaturity and instability by eliminating themselves from consultation through refusing to apply. These extremists continue their clamoring against an as yet undefined arrangement -- trusteeship; the maneuvers of this group are not the business of the Joint Commission, but of the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea. General Brown assures you that any attempt to disturb public order by the group will be promptly dealt with.

The American Delegation believes that all shades of public opinion among the Korean population which have applied for consultation should be given a hearing. However, if any parties and organizations are uncooperative with the Joint Commission or inimical to the best interests of Korea, then the American Delegation is willing to push aside these obstacles to the accomplishment of its most pressing task - the establishment of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. However, if the right is arbitrarily eliminated, a proper balance is restored only by arbitrary elimination of the extreme left also. Should both of these groups be eliminated, two of the largest segments of the people would have no voice in consultation.

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Soviet-American Joint Commission
Soviet Delegation
Seoul, Korea

TO: Chief Commissioner of U. S. Delegation,
Major General Albert E. Brown

25 August 1947

Dear General Brown:

I am forwarding to you a copy of the answer by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, dated 22 August 1947, to the letter of the Secretary of State of the United States, George C. Marshall, of 12 August 1947, regarding Korea.

ANNEX: Copy of letter on two sheets.

Respectfully yours,

Chief Commissioner of Soviet
Delegation of the Joint
Soviet-American Commission
Colonel General T. F. Shtikov

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DRAFT TRANSLATION

Dear Mr. Marshall:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter 12-8-47 regarding the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

As it is known the work of the Joint Commission was renewed on the basis of the three conditions of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations cited in full in my letter of 7 May 1947 and accepted by you in your letter of 13 May. The Soviet Delegation had been instructed to be guided by these very conditions in the questions relating to consultation.

According to these conditions the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Nevertheless, in order to participate in consultation parties and organizations affiliated with the Committee for Struggle against the Moscow Decision Regarding Trusteeship had also filed applications.

The Soviet government considers that such parties and organizations could be admitted to consultation only provided that such parties and organizations would officially sever their relations with the aforementioned Committee, and would declare that they would withdraw from that committee, without which no consultation should effected with them.

The Soviet government, which upholds the position of broad consultation with Korean democratic parties and organizations, does not feel that the Joint Commission should consult with such organizations which have in their ranks merely tens or hundreds of individuals. A great number of such organizations is present and the consultation with them could not be effective because of their non-authoritative character; furthermore, the consultation with such small groups would have delayed the work of the Joint Commission by many months and would lead to the deferment, by a long period of time, of the creation of the government of Korea.

The Soviet government considers that consultation may take place with such parties and organizations whose membership exceeds

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10,000 members.

As regards your reminder stating that no limitation of any kind of the freedom of word and opinion should obtain in the course of consultation, this must extend in the first place to the parties and organizations which cooperate with the realization of the Moscow Decision.

In the meantime currently the parties and organizations of South Korea which maintain the position of upholding the Moscow Decision are subjected on the part of American authorities in Korea to most severe limitations and harsh persecutions, which contradicts democratic principles and completely does not correspond to the decisions of the Moscow conference. The premises of such parties and organizations are seized by the police authorities, their leaders and members are being arrested and their printed organs are being suppressed.

The Soviet government feels such a state of affairs to be abnormal and inadmissible and to exclude the possibility of a correct fulfillment of the decision of the Moscow conference of the three ministers on Korea, if such persecution of the democratic organizations and leaders of South Korea should not be immediately and fully discontinued. The Soviet government deems necessary that the delegation of the U.S.A. in the Joint Commission should receive appropriate instructions for the fulfillment of the agreement reached by the governments of the US and USSR during April of the present year and it does not object to your proposal that the Joint Commission should report regarding the status of its work in order that each government could immediately consider what steps it would be expedient to take in order to fulfill the aims of the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Delegation had been given instructions in accordance with the aforementioned.

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Copies of this letter are being simultaneously forwarded by me to the governments of Great Britain and China.

I beg, Mr. Secretary of State to receive assurance of my very high respect,

Signed: V. Molotov

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION
MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

23 August 1947

In view of the fact that three weeks have passed since the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation issued a report on the progress of the Joint Commission, it is deemed advisable to inform representatives of the Korean and American press, so they can inform the people, what efforts have been and are now being made to resolve the Commission's present impasse.

Little progress has been made, despite continued meetings and discussions, on the compilation of a list of parties and social organizations to be admitted for oral consultation.

The Soviet Delegation continues to uphold its right to exercise a veto power over certain parties of which it is suspicious. The American Delegation, on the other hand, remains firm in its stand for full and free consultation, based on the contention that all parties and organizations in Korea must receive equitable and fair treatment in accordance with the principle of fair play.

Repeated proposals have been made by the American Delegation to review systematically the list of applicants for consultation to determine if any should be excluded for cause. Each time such proposals have been rejected by the Soviet Delegation.

Within the past three weeks the American Delegation has made three specific proposals as part of a concentrated effort to resolve the present disagreement over consultation and thus to expedite other phases of the Joint Commission's work. Two of these proposals have been rejected by the Soviet Delegation and there has been no answer, up to the present time, to the third proposal.

At the 48th meeting, on 29 July 1947, it was proposed:

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION
MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

23 August 1947

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At the 48th meeting, on 29 July 1947, it was proposed:

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"That the Soviet Delegation conduct consultation with those political parties and social organizations of North Korea and the American Delegation consult with those political parties and social organizations of South Korea."

At the 50th meeting, on 1 August 1947, the American Delegation made the following proposal:

"That consultation be conducted jointly north and south of the 38th Parallel with those parties which the Soviet Delegation is willing to hear, and that the American Delegation conduct unilateral consultation south of the 38th with those parties they (the Soviet Delegation) claim are suspicious to them. Such consultation by the American Delegation will be considered consultation with the Joint Commission."

Both of these proposals were rejected by the Soviet Delegation.

The third proposal, made at the 53rd meeting, on 12 August 1947, and to which no reply has been received, reads as follows:

"1. Oral consultation shall be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement.

"2. Directive to be issued to Subcommission No. 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission a provisional charter and political platform for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective.

"3. The Joint Commission shall in the charter proposed to the Four Powers include a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national legislature and such other individuals of the government as the charter may specify, which election shall be held with free electioneering, secret and multi-party ballots, under international supervision. That Sub-

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commission No. 2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election in North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with the proposed charter.

"4. That Subcommission No. 3 be directed to prepare a plan for the selection of appointive personnel for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government together with a plan for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea."

Through a general free election as outlined in this proposal, the American Delegation feels the Korean people could express opinions which because of the position taken by the Soviet Delegation cannot be obtained through oral consultation on a broad basis. It is the belief of the American Delegation that a general election, where a clear and free election under international supervision is guaranteed, would permit even wider expression of opinion than would consultation.

The third proposal made at the 53rd meeting on 12 August 1947 visualized that the only change which would be made in Joint Commission Decision No. 12 would be that initial oral consultation as specified in paragraph 7 of that Decision would be cancelled and the written answers to questionnaires substituted therefor. The proposal did not abandon the creation of the consultative body as required by paragraph 9, Joint Commission Decision No. 12. With the consultative body, representing all shades of Korean opinion to advise it, the Joint Commission should be able to organize a general election which would lead to free expression of the desires of the Korean people as to their government.

On several occasions since the receipt of Secretary Marshall's letter to Foreign Minister Molotov requesting both delegations to submit a report to their respective governments

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by August 21, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation made overtures looking toward the preparation of a joint report. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation said he would be unable to collaborate on a joint report pending instructions from his government, which had not been received.

The American Delegation compiled its own confidential report on progress of the Joint Commission and the document has been forwarded to Secretary Marshall.

At the Commission's 54th meeting, on 20 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation registered a vehement protest over what he called "repression" of Leftist leaders and organizations in South Korea. Many of them, he said, support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission and have applied for consultation. He cited numerous instances of arrests, declaring these arrests created conditions which "impede" fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and the Marshall-Molotov Agreement and charging that the situation has been created to undermine the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Commissioner insisted that the American Delegation take immediate measures "for restoration of the normal conditions for existence and activities of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea."

The American Delegation replied it would need time to have this document translated and prepare a reply, and stated:

"In listening to the document, it is the opinion of the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation that the Soviet Delegation is attempting to interfere in the conduct of the government of South Korea. It is not the function of the Joint Commission to govern Korea, but to prepare plans which will establish a government which in the future will govern Korea. There are others who have present responsibilities for governing Korea. The American Delegation will reply to this statement at a later date."

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STATEMENT OF THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE PRESS ON
22 AUGUST 1947

In Joint Commission's Session on the 20th of August the Soviet Delegation made a statement pertaining to the mass arrests which take place in South Korea.

Following is the text of this statement:

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THE SOVIET DELEGATION

US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

20 August 1947

As it is known, the US-USSR Joint Commission was created in accordance with the Moscow Agreement"in order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures." According to paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision, "in preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations."

During the course of its work this year, the Joint Commission adopted the coordinated Decision #12 on the order of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, worked out and approved questionnaires on governmental structure of Korea and on a political platform of a future Provisional Korean Democratic Government, sent out these questionnaires to all the Korean democratic parties and organizations, which expressed their desire to participate in consultation with the Joint Commission.

Democratic parties and social organizations of North as well as South Korea signed the declaration, set forth in Joint Communique #5, submitted declarations to the Joint Commission for participation in consultation, designated their representatives for oral consultation with the Joint Commission, and also submitted their considerations on the structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter), and on a political platform for a Provisional Government.

During the study of a list of democratic parties and social organizations by the Joint Commission, essential differences of opinions arose and the work of the Joint Commission is being delayed because of this.

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The Korean people follow the work of the Joint Commission with anxiety and with understandable and legitimate impatience await the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

And now, in this responsible and tense moment in the work of the Joint Commission, mass arrests of leaders and actual closing down of democratic parties and social organizations of the Leftist trend, pograms of Leftist Democratic newspapers, arrests of workers of the Leftist Democratic press, began in South Korea. Arrests are being carried out in Seoul, as well as in the provinces.

It should be noted that the repression is carried out only against those democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea, which actually support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission.

Among those arrested, some are representatives of democratic parties and social organizations, designated for participation in oral consultation with the Joint Commission.

I shall cite several instances which, nevertheless, vividly show the amplitude of repressions in South Korea, directed against the above mentioned democratic parties and social organizations.

These instances became known to the Soviet Delegation from conversations with numerous Korean delegations, as well as from the news releases of the South Korean press.

During the People's meeting of 27 July 1947 in Seoul, organized by the Democratic People's Front of South Korea for the support of the work of the Joint Commission, where, as it is known, the Chief Commissioners of both delegations were present, the Korean police, in the presence of the members of the Joint Commission, arrested the representative of the Trade Union and the representative of the Women's Union immediately following their appearance at this meeting with the appeal to support the work of the Joint Commission. A few days later one of the organizers of this meeting, KIM KWAN SU, was arrested.

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The Deputy Leader of the Labor Party of South Korea, LEE GEE SOK, was arrested as well as other members of the Central Committee of the Labor Party.

On 12 August in the office of the Central Committee of the Democratic People's Front and on the premises of the "Moon Hack" Publishing Company, a large number of leading workers and working personnel of the Central Committee of the DPF and of the Publishing Company were arrested. During 11 and 12 August leading workers of the city and region committees of the Democratic People's Front of Seoul were arrested on working premises and in their quarters.

At the beginning of August, PAIK, YONG HI, chairman of All Korea Farmer's Alliance, was arrested; on 12 August, LEE, KOO HOON, deputy chairman of the All Korea Farmer's Alliance, KIM, KI YOUNG, chief of the General Affairs Department, HYUNG SONG OOK (?), chief of Propaganda Department, CHOI, HAN CHOL (?), member of the Presidiam and many other members of the All Korea Farmer's Alliance were arrested.

MOON, EUN CHONG and PAK BONG OO (?), members of the Central Committee of the Confederation of Trade Unions, were arrested as well as many other leading workers.

The leading workers of the Democratic Women's Union, among them, YOO, YAWNG CHOON, chairman of the Women's Union, and CHAN, CHIL SON (?), deputy chairman, were arrested.

Also the leading staff of the Cooperative Union (PAK, KYON SOO (?), the chairman, and AN, KI SUNG (?), a member of the Central Committee) the leading staff of the Union of Literary Men (PAK, CHAN MO (?), chief of the Propaganda Department), YOON, HAK KI (?), a member of the Central Committee of the Lawyers Union, workers of the newspapers "Taklin Sinbo" and "Noryok Inmin," CHAN, SUN HAK (?), LEE, SIN SIK (?), KIM, HO DGIN (?), and others were arrested.

In addition the leading staff of the Laboring People's Party (PAIK, NAM UN, LEE, YAH SUNG, HAN IL TE (?), SIN, DON IL (?), PAK,

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TAN CHAL (?), and many others), as well as the leading staff of the Young Friends' Party (PAK, OO CHEN (?), KIM, BEN DE (?), and others) were arrested.

Upon orders of authorities, the premises of the Central Committee of the Democratic People's Front, of the Central Committee of the Labor Party, of the Central Committee of the Republican People's Party, of the Central Committee of All Korea Confederation of Trade Unions and other democratic organizations were closed down.

Many of those arrested are members of the delegations which visited the Joint Commission with the purpose of conveying to it the demands and good wishes of the people.

A group of correspondents of democratic newspapers, which attended a press conference held by the Soviet Delegation for the purpose of informing the press and the public opinion of the course of work of the Joint Commission, was arrested upon leaving the Duk Soo Palace on 14 August.

The numerous arrests of the leaders of the democratic parties and organizations, many of whom are designated representatives of these parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission, created in South Korea conditions which impede the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, and the agreement reached between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall.

Such a situation is being created, it seems, with the aim of undermining the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation draws the attention of the American delegation in the Joint Commission toward serious consideration of these circumstances and insists on taking of immediate measures for restoration of the normal conditions for existence and activities of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea, and for appropriate conditions for work of the Joint Commission.

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STATEMENT OF ALBERT E. BROWN, CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
AMERICAN DELEGATION, US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

25 August 1947.

At the 54th meeting of the Joint Commission, 20 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation read a statement concerning the arrest of certain leftist leaders of South Korea. In this statement he requested the American Delegation to join with the Soviet Delegation in initiating certain action. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation informed the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation that before the American Delegation could comment on his statement it would be necessary to have it translated, that comment would be made at a later meeting. He also informed the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation that in listening to the Soviet statement it appeared to the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation as though the Soviet Delegation was attempting to interfere with the Government of South Korea, that the Joint Commission had no responsibility at this time for governing Korea, but did have responsibility for preparing plans for the formation of a government which would later govern Korea.

On August 22nd the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation released to the American and Korean press the above mentioned statement. By informing the people of the world of a complaint against an outside third party - the South Korean Government - prior to agreement by the American Delegation, which was not even given a chance to reply, the Soviet Delegation is in fact attempting to usurp the functions of the Joint Commission and to take upon itself action which the Joint Commission could only take by mutual agreement of both delegations. The Soviet Delegation overlooks the fact that while in South Korea it is actually a guest of the South Korea Government and of the United States which this government represents, and that it should follow the normal dictates of

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common courtesy in conducting its business.

The statement that fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is being impeded by the arrest of the few individuals reported in the Soviet statement is absurd. There remain tens of thousands of individuals left in the political parties and organizations represented by those arrested who can substitute for them if necessary as representatives of their parties and organizations. Moreover, for reasons totally unrelated to the arrests, the Joint Commission has had no prospect of holding oral consultation since the meeting of 2nd July. The arrests, therefore, have no bearing whatsoever on the conduct of oral consultation. Furthermore, the Soviet Delegation does not know whether, if oral consultation should commence tomorrow, the individuals of whose arrests it complains would or would not be made available for consultation. I can assure the Soviet Delegation that the American Delegation will join with it in requesting that any individual with whom the Joint Commission desires to consult be made available to the Joint Commission for that purpose. The American Delegation also expects that the Soviet Delegation will join with it in producing certain individuals now held under arrest in North Korea with whom the American Delegation is most anxious to consult.

The statement of the Soviet Delegation that these arrests seem to have been made for the purpose of creating conditions which would undermine the work of the Joint Commission is pure fantasy. The Soviet Delegation is bringing these charges for purposes of pure propaganda and of creating a smoke-screen to obscure certain strategic blunders of the Soviet Delegation. These blunders have placed the Soviet Delegation, through its inexcusable refusal to consult broadly with Korean parties and social organizations, in the position of repudiating the Marshall-Molotov Agreement and holding up the work of the Joint Commission, the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea and the final establishment of Korean

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independence.

While the American Delegation did not and would not have raised the issue, since the Soviet Delegation itself raised it, the American Delegation desires to make the following comments on the activities of the parties and organizations in South Korea which the Soviet Delegation is attempting to defend.

The South Korea Labor Party and other parties and organizations, members of the Democratic People's Front of South Korea, have since their inception been disloyal to the government of South Korea and hostile to the United States. They have used illegal means, including subversive action, to embarrass and undermine the governmental functions in the United States zone.

They have been aided and abetted in such actions by the Democratic People's Front of North Korea.

Agents from without South Korea have been sent into South Korea to organize disorders against the government and to lead parties and organizations, members of the Democratic People's Front, in such disorders.

Unless and until the parties and organizations holding membership in the Democratic People's Front cease their present policy of intrigue and disloyalty to the existing government, their leaders must accept the responsibility for the illegal acts of the parties which they lead and which they presumably plan and direct. Such responsibility includes the ever present possibility of arrest, fine and/or imprisonment.

The government of South Korea has authority to take such action as is necessary to protect itself.

The American Delegation once again advises the Soviet Delegation to avoid entanglement in Korean politics, particularly in support of parties and organizations hostile to the United States.

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Following is text of letter sent by Acting Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, to Mr. Molotov on 26 August 1947.

Dear Mr. Molotov:

In your letter of August 23, 1947, to Secretary Marshall, the position of the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission has been set forth in terms which corroborate a recent report received by this Government from the US Delegation to the Joint Commission. The report of the United States Delegation was in compliance with the desire of Secretary Marshall as set forth in his letter to you of August 12 that a report from the Joint Commission should be submitted by August 21 in order that our governments might immediately consider what further steps may be useful to achieve the long delayed unification and independence of Korea.

The report of the United States Delegation makes it clear that the Joint Commission has been unable to reach agreement regarding the basis on which representatives of democratic Korean parties and social organizations shall be consulted by the Joint Commission. The U. S. Delegation also reports that it has been unable to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Delegation to any alternative method of completing the task of the Joint Commission.

As pointed out in your letter it was agreed in the interchange of correspondence inMay of this year that the "Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea." You will, however, recall that in your letter of May 7 you expressly agreed to the interpretation of the above phrase as proposed by the US Commander in Korea that "signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation." The parties and organizations mentioned by you as belonging to the Anti-Trusteeship committee did sign Communique No. 5 and are, in the opinion of the US Government, eligible for initial consultations.

Your letters of May 7 also provided that any decision excluding individuals, parties and social organizations for active opposition to the

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work of the Joint Commission "shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

Accordingly, the US Delegation has repeatedly, but without success, attempted to obtain from the Soviet Delegation agreement to criteria for consultation with Korean parties and social organizations applying for such consultation in accordance with the terms embodied in your letter. The Soviet Delegation has insisted on the unilateral right to exclude parties which have expressed distaste for "Trusteeship," even though such parties have declared and reiterated their intention fully to support the Joint Commission andhave in fact, since signing the declaration not instigated active opposition to the work of the Commission.

The Soviet position is not only contrary to the specific terms of the agreement between you and Secretary Marshall, it is also contrary to the democratic principle of freedom of opinion. In Secretary Marshall's letter to you of August 11, 1947, reference was made to the fact that the United States Delegation has several times offered to limit oral consultations to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000 or any other reasonable figure proposed by theSoviet Delegation. The U.S. Delegation reports, however, that when the Soviet Delegation proposed limiting consultation to parties of 10,000 or more, the Soviet Delegation submitted a list which omitted 24 such parties which claimed total membership of 15,200,000 and refused to consider any other list or alternative proposal.

The U. S. Government denies categorically that there has been oppression or persecution of Korean parties or individuals in the US zone as charged in your letter. The arrests which you mention have been necessary to control subversive activities aimed at the destruction of constituted government and law and order in the American zone. United States forces are charged with the responsibility for maintaining law and order in South Korea without interference with democratic rights. That they have done so successfully is amply proven by the freedom with which all shades of political opinion are expressed and respected in the United States zone.

It is noted that you have no objection to the proposal that the Joint Commission furnish an agreed report to our two governments. The United States

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Delegation has accordingly been instructed to take immediate steps to reach agreement on a joint report of the status of the deliberations of the Joint Commission. In view of the position set forth in your letter and the report already rendered by the United States Delegation, however, it is apparent that a joint report can accomplish little other than a formal delineation of the issues which have prevented the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement. For almost two years the Government of the UnitedStates has devoted its utmost efforts to carrying out the terms of the Moscow Agreement on Korea.

The present stalemate in the Joint Commission negotiations and the failure of thatcommission to accomplish even the first task of its mission have made it abundantly clear to all that bilateral negotiations on the subject of consultation with Korean political parties and organizations will only serve to delay the implementation of this agreement and defeat its announced purposes of bringing about early independence for Korea. The United States Government cannot in good conscience be a party to any such delay in the fulfillment of its commitment to the Korean independence and proposed that the Four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out. The United States Government therefore submits for the consideration of your government the enclosed outline of proposals designed to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The United States government proposes thatthese suggestions be considered at an early date by the powers adhering to that agreement.

It is therefore hoped that the Soviet Charge D'Affaires at Washington or an authorized deputy may be designated to participate in Four Power conversations on this problem at Washington beginning on September 8, 1947. It is believed that the Joint Commission's report on the status of its deliberations might be helpful in consideration of the United States proposals during these Four Power conversations. The U.S. Delegation has accordingly been instructed to endeavor to reach agreement with the Soviet Delegation on a joint report to be submitted not later than September 5, 1947.

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Copies of this letter are being transmitted to the Foreign Ministers of the UK and China together with invitations to participate in the Four Power conversations referred to above.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed) ROBERT A. LOVETT

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Enclosure to Mr. Lovett's letter to Molotov, 26 August 1947

UNITED STATES PROPOSALS REGARDING KOREA

1. In both the USSR and US zones of Korea, there shall be held early elections to chose wholly representative provisional legislature for each zone. Voting shall be by secret, multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage and elections shall be held in accordance in each zone.

2. These provisional local legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. This legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional government for a United Korea.

3. The resulting provisional government of a United Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the Four Powers adhering to the Agreement on Korea to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken.

5. The Korean provisional government and the powers concerned shall agree upon a date which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.

6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea.

7. Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate cases.

Sent Moscow, London, Nanking and Seoul.

(signed) LOVETT

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STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

3 September 1947

The American Delegation has carefully studied the counter-proposals submitted by the Soviet Delegation on 26 August 1947 in reply to the American Delegation proposals of 12 August 1947.

The Soviet counter-proposals contain the same objectionable features which have characterized almost every proposal which the Soviet Delegation has made since the Joint Commission first met on 20 March 1946 and reconvened on 21 May 1947.

The Soviet counter-proposals maintain the position of "exclusion" and the right to the veto power as insisted upon by them throughout the recent discussion of consultation. More specifically, they exclude from membership in the consultative body representatives of parties stated by them to be non-democratic, representatives of all parties and organizations with membership less than 10,000, those who do not fully support the Moscow Decision, and those who struggle against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers.

Paragraph 2 of the Soviet counter-proposals visualizes the creation of a "Provisional All Korean People's Assembly", which resembles a consultative body. The creation of a consultative group on a fair and liberal basis and the methods by which it is to be established were already agreed to by the American and Soviet Delegations and included in Joint Commission Decision No. 12. The counter-proposal presently submitted by the Soviet Delegation would, therefore, in fact create a consultative body of a type and in a manner different from that agreed upon by the Soviet and American Delegations, as promulgated in Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

Acceptance of the Soviet counter-proposals would create a consultative body from which would be excluded representatives of 24 major rightist groups of South Korea, with a claimed membership in excess of 15½ million. Should the American Delegation be foolish enough to accept these counter-proposals, it would change

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the normally substantial rightist-moderate majority throughout North and South Korea to an overwhelming and unrealistic leftist majority. It thus reverses the actual political situation.

The Soviet Delegation offers what is ostensibly a fair proposal - "the creation of a legislative body, elections for which should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general, direct, equal suffrage, by secret ballot." However, closer study indicates that the "election" would without doubt only be conducted after the leftist dominated consultative body and the government created by it had organized and prepared Korea for the type of election recently conducted in North Korea under which 99 percent of the people, as the Soviets said, "willingly and voluntarily dropped their ballots into the white box" - an election typical of those being held in other Soviet satellite countries.

What have the Soviets to be afraid of in forming a government by free participation of all political groups? They have a deep and serious fear, otherwise they would be content to proceed to form a government which would assure to all of the political groups in Korea an equal opportunity for consultation and at the polls.

The position of the Soviet Delegation has been made crystal clear, more so than ever before, by the statement in the latest Soviet proposals that "The number of representatives in a Provisional All Korean People's Assembly for North and South Korea must be equal", when as a matter of fact everyone will admit that the population of South Korea is more than double that of North Korea.

There is nothing in the Moscow Agreement with respect to Korea which justifies or supports the Soviet position as indicated above. That Agreement is a brief, simple document, the clear

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purpose of which was the setting up of an independent government for all Korea of a democratic nature through consultations with Korean democratic parties and organizations and by the rendering of such aid and assistance as might later be determined, with the participation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government, to develop and maintain democratic self-government in Korea.

The American Delegation cannot, therefore, agree to these counter-proposals as presented by the Soviet Delegation.

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PRESS RELEASE OF MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

8 September 1947

In compliance with the letter of August 26, 1947, of the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, Robert A. Lovett, to the Foreign Minister of USSR, V. M. Molotov, the American Delegation has been attempting for the past ten days to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Delegation to a joint report. The purpose of this report was to inform the two governments as to the reason why the Joint Commission had been unable to agree on the principles involved in the first task facing the Commission at its present session - the establishment of a provisional government over a united Korea. This report was to have been presented to the Powers not later than September 5th.

Initial responsibility for the preparation of this report was placed upon Subcommission No. 1, which after several meetings found it impossible to reconcile the divergent points of view presented in the two draft reports which had been prepared by each Delegation. The problem was then discussed at one full meeting of the Joint Commission which referred it back to Subcommission No. 1 for further consideration. After several meetings, Subcommission No. 1 again failed to agree and the matter was referred back to the Joint Commission. On the initiative of the American Delegation, the Joint Commission then took each report and discussed them paragraph by paragraph. After completion of this discussion, it was found that each side had made so many objections and reservations with regard to the report of the other that no joint report was possible.

Thereupon the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation proposed that the full report of each Delegation be transmitted to the two governments concerned with a covering letter signed by the two Chief Commissioners stating that neither side agreed fully

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with the contents of the other's report. The Soviet Delegation declined this proposal. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation then proposed that the sections of the two reports dealing with the positions of the two Delegations be extracted from the full reports and transmitted to the governments concerned with a covering letter of the nature indicated above. This proposal the Soviet Delegation also declined, and gave no reason for refusing to forward both statements except that this would not constitute a "joint" report. When the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation then inquired of the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation what suggestions he had for resolving the difficulties, he replied that he had no proposals to make. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation proposed, as the only other alternative, that each Delegation report to its government that no agreement could be reached on a joint report. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation accepted this proposal.

In the discussions it became quite clear that the Soviet Delegation wished to prepare a joint report which would obscure the basic disagreements regarding consultation which have been stated in previous releases. The Soviet Delegation attempted to remove from the U. S. statement of its position all factual statements which accurately portrayed the U. S. position and explained essential points of difference between the American and the Soviet positions.

For example, the Soviet Delegation wished to remove from the U. S. statement of its position all references to the published letter, written by the nine members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee excluded from the Soviet list and other members of the United Council, in which full cooperation was promised the Joint Commission. It also wished to delete all references to the 24 parties excluded from the proposed Soviet list of democratic parties and social organizations with a membership of 10,000 or

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above, together with the statistical analysis that showed that acceptance of the Soviet proposal would have given the Democratic People's Front an overwhelming majority. To have acceded to these proposals would have meant that the report would not contain a true statement of the U. S. position.

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THE STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, COLONEL-GENERAL T. F. SHTIKOV, AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE

9 September 1947

On 4 September 1947, the U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. M. Molotov, sent through the Soviet Ambassador to the United States to the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. G. C. Marshall, the following reply to the letter of the U. S. Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Lovett, of 26 August 1947, on the question of Korea:

"Dear Mr. Marshall,

"I acknowledge the receipt of the letter from Mr. Lovett of 26 August 1947.

"I deem it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that the preliminary elaboration of measures to assist in the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, according to the Decision of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, is being carried out by the Joint Commission, which had been formed of the representatives of the Soviet Command in North Korea and the representatives of the American Command in South Korea.

"The recommendations elaborated by the Joint Commission prior to their final acceptance, according to the Moscow Decision, should be presented for the consideration of the four powers, which include the governments of Great Britain and China.

"Furthermore, the governments of Great Britain and China, together with the governments of the U. S. S. R. and the U. S., will participate in the consideration of the proposals elaborated by the Joint Soviet-American Commission on the measures of helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, in order to work out an agreement on a four-power trusteeship representing Korea.

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"The task of the Soviet American Joint Commission, as it is known, consists in assisting the formation of one Provisional Democratic Government for all Korea. It is true that the Joint Commission has as yet done little in this direction, but such a circumstance resulted mainly from the position taken by the American Delegation regarding the question of consultation of the Commission with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, which had been noted in my last letter addressed to you.

"Had the American Delegation displayed a proper inclination to the rendering of aid in the formation of a truly democratic government in Korea, then the work of the Joint Commission would have been more successful; the task, imposed on it, may have been fulfilled and there would not have been such a stagnant condition in the work of the Joint Commission, which in the letter of Mr. Lovett was called a stalemate.

"As you know, the Soviet Delegation, desiring to resolve the situation existing in the Joint Commission, and striving to expedite the work on the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, agreed with the proposal of the American Delegation to dispense with oral consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and on 26 August 1947 submitted a new proposal on the formation of a consultative body -- a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly -- of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of all Korea. This proposal should not, in our opinion, meet with any objection on the part of the American Delegation, because it could eliminate the difficulties which confront the Joint Commission.

"We deem it necessary to add to the above statement that the successful realization of the measures indicated in the proposal of the Soviet Delegation is only possible on the basis of free and unhindered activity of democratic parties and organizations, representatives of which are currently subjected in South Korea to

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arrests and other repressions, which fact is incompatible with the principles of democracy and justice, as well as with those commitments which the governments of the USA and the USSR assumed towards Korea.

"Regarding the assertions stated in the letter of Mr. Lovett, pertaining to the position of the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission, the sense of which is that the Soviet Delegation, allegedly, does not evince any understanding of the proposals of the American Delegation, I do not see any necessity of dwelling upon these assertions in view of their obvious unfounded nature.

"At the same time, I cannot refrain from expressing regret in regard to actions undertaken by you unilaterally, such as your extension of invitations to the governments of Great Britain and China to participate in the discussions of this question, in which were set the place and date for the conference. Your proposal of transferring the question concerning the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government for consideration by the governments of t he four countries the Soviet Government considers inexpedient, because the Joint Commission is far from having exhausted all its possibilities for the working out of coordinated recommendations, which is entirely feasible.

" 'The U. S. proposals on Korea', as indicated in Mr. Lovett's letter, are also unacceptable. These proposals cannot help but result in further disunity of Korea, since they stipulate formation of separate legislative assemblies in South and North Korea (in the Soviet and American zones), whereas the urgent problem consists in securing as soon as possible a joint, even though provisional, but unified organ of power, i.e. of an All-Korea Provisional Democratic Government.

"The American proposal does not remove the now existing situation in Korea, which is the division of the country into two zones, for the liquidation of which all the efforts should be directed, but on the contrary the American proposal perpetuates this abnormal situation.

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"Bearing in mind that the proposal to review the question on Korea in a joint conference of the four-power representatives does not derive from the Moscow Decision of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Korea, and taking into consideration the above-mentioned reasons, the Soviet Government does not see the possibility of accepting Mr. Lovett's proposals advanced in his letter.

"Copies of this letter are being forwarded to the governments of Great Britain and China.

"I beg Mr. Secretary of State to accept the assurances of my very high respect.

V. M. Molotov"

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

17 September 1947

The work of the Joint Commission already has been at a standstill over a prolonged period of time. The Soviet Delegation regrets to recognize the unwillingness of the American Delegation to work in the Joint Commission on the solution of the questions connected with the formation of a unified Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which became so evident lately. Instead of striving for the overcoming of the difficulties arisen in the Joint Commission and for the acceptance of coordinated decisions, the American Delegation resorted to an artificial complication and prolonging of the Joint Commission work, emphasizing and sharpening of dissensions between the delegations with the purpose of proving the impossibility of resolving the questions confronting the Joint Commission.

It became especially apparent during the working out of the joint report by the Commission. Prior to the discussion of the presented joint draft reports by both delegations, the American Delegation proposed to dispense with the compilation of a joint report, and to forward the draft reports presented by the Soviet and American Delegations to the Governments along with an accompanying letter pointing out, that both Delegations could not reach an agreement regarding the joint report. Instead of a business-like discussion of the presented drafts, which should have as its aim the compilation of an acceptable joint report, the American Delegation resorted to trifling fault-findings, emphasizing the differences in the drafts, attempting to exclude any possibility of the compilation of a joint report, and thus, attempting also in this instance to show the impossibility of reaching an agreement in the Joint Commission.

The events which took place lately in the Joint Commission itself and outside of it, fully confirmed the apprehensions in connection with the true attitude of the American Delegation toward the

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work of the Joint Commission, which involuntarily arose even before in connection with the position of the American Delegation in regard to the proposals, submitted by the Soviet Delegation with the object of speeding up the work of the Joint Commission.

As it is known, the work of the Joint Commission was being delayed because of differences of opinion between the delegations on the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation.

The Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the solution of the question on the compilation of the list for consultation, repeatedly proposed to instruct Subcommission No. 1 to begin reviewing the applications for participation in consultation received from parties and organizations, to include in the list and immediately begin consultation with those parties and organizations whose admission to consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision, the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall as well as Joint Commission Decision No. 12, did not arouse suspicion, and then to continue consideration and verification of the remaining statements as to parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the Soviet Delegation made several proposals, whose object is the resolution of this question in compliance with the Molotov-Marshall agreement. If the American Delegation would have shown sufficient willingness to expedite the resolution of the disputed questions, the work of the Joint Commission would have considerably advanced as early as July. However, the aforementioned proposals of the Soviet Delegation were rejected by the American Delegation, which preferred to carry on discussions on general issues, avoiding the concrete individual considerations of applications for participation in consultation, submitted by parties and organizations, and by this prolonging the work of the Joint Commission.

Considering that as a result of the position taken by the

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American Delegation on the question of compilation of the list, the entire work of the Joint Commission was held up, the Soviet Delegation as early as 5 August 1947 suggested the commencement of the elaboration of proposals on the Provisional Charter, political platform, as well as on the questions of personnel of the Provisional Government the order of assumption of power by the Provisional Government and the selection of personnel.

The Soviet Delegation proceeded from the consideration that the Joint Commission has to perform a great amount of work on the elaboration of aforementioned proposals and that it is necessary to begin this work as soon as possible. However, even this proposal of the Soviet Delegation was rejected by the American Delegation, which refused to consider other questions listed on the program of work of the Joint Commission until the question of the list of parties and organizations would be solved.

26 August 1947, the Soviet Delegation introduced new proposals in reply to the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August 1947. The Soviet Delegation accepted point 1 of the proposals of the American Delegation - to dispense with oral consultation and to substitute it with the written proposals of Korean parties and organizations which were submitted to the Joint Commission as returns to the questionnaires. Therefore, the Delegations have reached an agreement on this question.

The Soviet Delegation proposed - to direct Subcommission #2 and 3 to commence the study of written proposals of democratic parties and social organizations on the questionnaires which were submitted to the Joint Commission and to present the drafts of proposals on corresponding questions to the Joint Commission. These proposals ensue from the plan of work which was accepted in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 22 May 1947, according to which the first stage of work of the Joint Commission includes the following questions:

1. Conditions and order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations.

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2. Elaboration of recommendations on the structure and principles of the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter).
3. Preliminary elaboration of the political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.
4. Elaboration of recommendations on the personnel of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.
5. Order of assumption of power by a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the order of selection of personnel for a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

The proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August concerning the work of Subcommissions #2 and #3 correspond in many ways with the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August.

The proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August also provided for the creation of a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations. This consultative body should be created in order to draw Koreans now towards a direct participation in the working out of all questions connected with the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government.

The American Delegation in the meeting on 3 September, stated that on the whole it was against the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August, but actually presented objections only against the proposals concerning the creation of a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly.

The American Delegation, in substance, did not object to other points of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned, the Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the creation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, insists upon the realization of those items

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from the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August and the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August regarding which the points of view of the two delegations are closer together and which correspond to the above cited decision of the Joint Commission of 22 May 1947, and it proposes to entrust:

(1) Subcommission No. 2 immediately to initiate the study of the written answers to the questionnaires distributed by the Joint Commission which had been submitted to the Joint Commission in written form by the democratic parties and social organizations, and to submit to the Joint Commission projects for the structure of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the local bodies of authority (Provisional Charter) and the political platform.

(2) Subcommission No. 3 to submit to the Joint Commission proposals regarding the personnel composition of the Provisional Government and regarding the order of assumption of authority by that government.

As regards the problem of the formation of the Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly, the Soviet Delegation considers that the objections regarding that question advanced by the American Delegation in its statement of 3 September to be not well founded and supposes that it is necessary to continue the discussion of this problem for the purpose of reaching agreement.

If this proposal will be accepted by the American Delegation, the Joint Commission directly will be able to begin elaboration on the proposals regarding the questions connected with the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which, in accordance with the Moscow Decision, the Joint Commission must present to the respective governments.

The Soviet Delegation deems it necessary to add that the successful work of the Joint Commission on the formation of a

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Provisional Korean Democratic Government is possible only on the condition of complete abolishment of the repressions regarding the democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea, the release of arrested leaders and members of these organizations, and the assurance of free and unimpeded activities of the said parties and organizations.

The Soviet Delegation proceeds from the fact that all efforts should be directed toward the formation of a unified All-Korean organ of power, that is of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and considers that the plans recently introduced which are actually leading to the re-enforcement of the already existent division of the country into two zones, conceal an even greater peril for the Korean people.

The Soviet Delegation still holds to the point of view that if both delegations desire to fulfill exactly and completely the Moscow Decision on Korea, and the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, the Joint Commission can successfully solve the problem, put before it, on the formation of a unified Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which is so impatiently awaited by the Korean people.

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Press Release 26 September 1947

STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

At the 60th meeting of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation presented a formal statement, which was given to the press on the 18th of September.

The Soviet statement is illustrative of what the American Delegation has with regret come to accept as typical Soviet propaganda. It is replete with misstatements. It manipulates facts in such a way as to distort them to bolster the Soviet Delegation's weak position. It deliberately omits reference to facts which support the American position and highlights those which support the Soviet position.

It would be both useless and pointless for the American Delegation to attempt to make specific replies to the false allegations or to correct the misstatements contained in the Soviet paper. The Soviet Delegation well knows the real point of disagreement between the two delegations. Briefly stated, it is the refusal of the Soviet Delegation to permit all segments of the Korean people to participate in the formation of their government and by the exclusion of certain groups which it does not like to insure the setting up of a Communist-dominated leftist government over a United Korea.

The methods used by the Soviet Delegation to sell a false concept to the peoples of the world are interesting. They undoubtedly will fool some people, particularly those who are blanded by propaganda. Fortunately the devious methods followed by the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission in 1946 and 1947 to attain its ends have been written into the record of the Joint Commission. There is no statement which it can now prepare which can change the written record. Any accusation which it may make can be answered by pages of quotations from the written record.

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The Soviet Delegation refuses to admit that any political party or social organization can be defined as "democratic" unless it follows the Moscow line. In doing this it has adopted the word "democratic" for its own purposes, using a definition without historical precedent and in violation of over two centuries of usage and development. Its refusal to consult with or to permit any political party or social organization other than one which is "democratic" by Soviet definition to participate in the formation of the provisional government naturally follows as a means of implementation.

The Soviet Delegation attempts to assure successful attainment of its objective by refusing to deal with any political party or social organization which "struggled against" the Moscow Decision. This was a particularly valuable fiction, which it invented to inflame an already volatile opposition.

The U. S. Delegation attempted to find a solution and has proposed many alternatives, one of which was a general supervised election which is recognized throughout the world as a democratic method of expression by a people. These were all refused by the Soviet Delegation, which instead proposed an unrepresentative consultative assembly. Not only did it exclude from this suggested consultative assembly all parties and organizations which opposed certain phrases in the Moscow Decision but it also claimed that representation from North Korea (where only Democratic People's Front parties and organizations were permitted to apply for consultation) should have equality of representation with South Korea, in spite of the fact that the population statistics show there are twice as many people in South Korea as in North Korea. The only possible result from accepting such a proposal

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would be the establishment of a Communist-controlled provisional government, with the majority of patriotic Koreans being excluded from participation.

The recent effort to reach agreement on a joint report to be subritted to the two governments also fully reflects the Soviet attitude. The Soviet Delegation openly and determinedly attempted to write a joint report which concealed the Soviet attempt to deny consultation with and participation by a large segment of Korean opinion in the formation of a provisional government for the specific purpose of arbitrarily setting up a Communist-dominated government.

The Soviet Delegation has the effrontery to demand the release of certain leftist leaders who have been arrested by the South Korean authorities for plotting subversive activities. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation again suggests that the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation confine his activities to matters which are of proper concern to him--the establishment of a provisional government and an independent Korea free from foreign domination. The arrest and punishment of subversive elements are the concern of the proper authorities, namely those who are responsible for the government of South Korea.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that unless and until the Soviet Delegation is willing to accept the principle of equality of consideration for participation in the formation of the provisional government of all political parties and social organizations which are not barred for specific cause by mutual agreement of both delegations, the American Delegation perceives no object in assigning tasks to Subcommissions 2 and 3 or in the further discussion of the formation of the Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly under the conditions proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

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The position of the American Delegation as expressed in the preceding paragraph is in exact accord with the agreements reached in the Marshall-Molotov exchange of letters on the basis of which the Joint Commission resumed its discussion.

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION, 26 September 1947

The Soviet Delegation in the Joint-Soviet American Commission has repeatedly made declarations regarding the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Korea and has insisted on them.

The Korean people with the assistance of the great allies must obtain its democratic government and independence. The basic document which expresses the aims of the allied governments to assist the Korean people in the rebirth of its statehood is the Moscow Decision on Korea of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This decision expounds the program of the allies on the restoration of Korea as a free and independent state.

As it is known, the majority of the Korean people and of the democratic parties and social organizations regarded with approval this decision. It is also known that certain political parties and their reactionary leaders have opposed and are still opposing the Moscow Decision. Up to date it is the fault of these reactionary leaders and their patrons that the Provisional Democratic Government of Korea has not yet been formed.

The Soviet Delegation, which represents the Soviet Command in Korea and which, in the course of a year and a half, has observed events, moods and aspirations of the Korean people, can note that the Korean people from the very first days of its liberation from the yoke of Japanese imperialism, began to evince a tremendous interest in political life, and is striving to acquire the experience in independent governing of its state.

At the moment of the arrival of the Soviet Army in Korea in August 1945 the Korean people have created throughout Korea organs of people's authority - local People's Committees as well as the Central People's Committee, the People's Republic. Representatives of all strata of the Korean people took part in these organs of authority.

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The Soviet Delegation can also note that in the course of two years of work the People's Committees, as organs of people's authority in North Korea, have performed a tremendous task and have realized a series of democratic reforms, supported and approved by the people. However, it should be noted that there were great difficulties in the progress of this work. These difficulties consisted in the guiding cadres having no necessary experience in solving the questions of state. It is true, as we know, that peoples are not born with experience, the experience is acquired through practical work. Therefore, the five-year term of trusteeship, anticipated in the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers, is fully sufficient for the growth of the national governmental cadres.

A different situation arose in South Korea. The People's Committees were not recognized by the American Military Command as organs of people's authority. The People's Committees of South Korea have not been admitted to govern the political and economic life, and, consequently, the growth of the guiding governmental personnel in the ranks of the Korean people was hindered. No democratic reforms have been introduced. Democratic parties and social organizations, upholding the Moscow Decision on Korea, their leaders, members and even sympathizers of these organizations, are subjected to cruel persecution.

Reactionary leaders of certain political parties of South Korea, being disposed against democratic reforms and against developing Korea along the democratic lines, opposed and are opposing the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They explain their opposition by the fact that the Moscow Decision stipulates trusteeship, which is allegedly not acceptable to Korean people. The Korean reactionary press, as well as some American newspapers, attempted to prompt the Korean people that the trusteeship was adopted because of the demand of the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union alledgedly strives to seize Korea and to establish there the Soviet ways.

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The Soviet Delegation deems it necessary to refute the rumors originating from the reactionary circles that the Soviet Union intends to seize Korea and to establish there Soviet ways as fictitious and inimical towards the Soviet Union. As it is known, the question of Korea was discussed at the Conference of Three Foreign Ministers in Moscow at the initiative of the American Delegation. The American draft proposed to establish a unified administration headed by the two commanders, who would have to govern Korea until the establishment of the trusteeship. The American draft anticipated the creation of an administrative organ composed of the representatives of the Four States (USA, China, United Kingdom and USSR), which would have to act in the name of the United Nations and in the name of the people of Korea. This administrative organ would have to be vested with such executive, legislative and judiciary authority which might be necessary for effective governing of Korea until the establishment of a Korean Government. At the same time, this administrative organ would have to realize its powers and functions through a high commissioner. It was proposed to carry out such governing of Korea in the course of five years. This term could have been extended by a further five years which would constitute in fact a ten year mandate type of government over Korea. The American draft did not anticipate the creation of a Korean Government.

The Soviet Union could not, of course, agree with such proposals of the American Delegation, in the first place because Korea had not been a belligerent against the Allies and in the second place because a five year term could be fully sufficient for restoration of statehood of Korea, for creating state institutions and for training the cadres for independent governing of the state.

The Soviet Delegation submitted its draft proposals for the consideration of the Ministers. The Soviet proposal took into account the interests and aspirations of the Korean people and provided for the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Govern-

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ment with the participation of which there would have to be worked out measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposal of the Soviet Delegation, with slight amendments, was adopted in the Conference of the Ministers. If the American proposal on Korea, submitted for consideration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, should be compared with the decision adopted by the Three Ministers, it will become clear to every Korean that the Moscow Decision is the more progressive decision respecting Korea and that it takes into account the interests of the Korean people. The Korean reactionaries are opposing this decision because they do not desire a democratic development for Korea. Nor do they desire democratic reforms demanded by the Korean people.

We are convinced that it is impossible to deceive or to intimidate the Korean people with clamor and slander. There are parties and leaders in Korea who are closely bound to the people, know their aspirations and expectations and who are able to discern what is more to their advantage: lawlessness, tyranny, want of rights, poverty, and colonial dependence or liberty, democratic rights and a free democratic independent Korean state. The Korean people cannot be bought with riches from beyond the seas; it has enough riches in its own country, with the mastery of which it could in a short time enter the ranks of most advanced countries of Asia.

The Soviet Delegation cannot understand the behavior of the American Delegation, which considers that whereas there are some Koreans who do not desire trusteeship, therefore, it is possible to get along without trusteeship. The Soviet Delegation is for trusteeship only because this trusteeship is stipulated by the Moscow Decision, which had been signed by our Ministers and must be exactly fulfilled. The Soviet Delegation cannot understand why the American

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Delegation, which regards with favor the activities of a small coterie of Korean reactionaries who appear under the motto of struggling against trusteeship, does not wish for the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, which had been adopted by the American Delegation itself. For its part, the Soviet Delegation has applied all its efforts in order to expedite the establishment of one democratic government for all Korea on the basis of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. However, the position taken by the American Delegation has up to now impeded the formation of this government.

The Soviet Delegation considers that it would be a deception to the Korean people to state that they could get along without trusteeship while American and Soviet troops remained upon the territory of Korea. Korea can become a free and independent state only then, when it will obtain its own democratic government supported by the people, and when the American and the Soviet troops will be withdrawn from its territory.

The Soviet Delegation has always regarded small peoples with respect and still so regards them. It has struggled and it shall continue to struggle for their independence and sovereignty. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea. The Soviet Delegation declares that if the American Delegation would agree with a proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops during the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops will be ready to evacuate Korea simultaneously with the American troops.

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The Soviet Delegation has no other proposals. In the course of the work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation with sufficient completeness has expounded its point of view concerning the ways of re-establishing Korea as an independent democratic state.

The Soviet Delegation awaits the answer and the proposals of the American Delegation.

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STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

18 October 1947

In accordance with instructions of my government, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation presents to you the following proposal on Korea submitted to the United Nations by the Government of the United States.

Following is the text of a letter which was addressed on October 17th, 1947, to his Excellency, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, New York:

"Excellency:

"I have the honor to refer to the facts that on September 17, 1947, the United States Secretary of State announced that the United States was placing the problem of Korean independence before the General Assembly and on September 23, 1947, the General Assembly voted to place that problem upon its agenda. On September 26 the Chief Soviet Delegate on the Joint United States - USSR Commission meeting in Seoul, Korea, made the following statement, in translation:

'Therefore, the Soviet Delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea.'

"The United States Government desires to take any practicable step which will further the speedy establishment of a truly independent Korea. The only concern of this government is to make certain that its responsibilities to the Korean people and to the United Nations are properly carried out. It will be recalled that, after negotiations in the Joint Commission had reached a stalemate, the United States Government proposed that the question of forming a

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government for Korea be discussed in Washington by representatives of all powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement with respect to Korea: China, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. China and the United Kingdom accepted this suggestion but the USSR did not. It was only after this that the matter was presented to the United Nations. It is believed that inasmuch as the General Assembly has already voted to consider the problem of Korean independence, its attention should be called to the most recent Soviet proposal, referred to above, as well as the suggestions for a solution of the problem which the Secretary of State said the United States Government would be prepared to advance. With these proposals before it, the General Assembly will, it is hoped, be able to recommend measures for orderly transition from the present systems of government in North and South Korea to an independent, united Korean Government and the consequent speedy withdrawal of all occupying forces.

"There is therefore transmitted herewith a Resolution which contains the suggestions the United States Delegation will submit for the consideration of Committee members of the General Assembly when the problem of Korean independence comes before that Board. It is considered that an arrangement of the nature indicated in this Resolution should make possible the early establishment by the Korean people themselves of their own government and the withdrawal of all Soviet and United States armed forces from Korea. It is requested that copies of this letter together with its enclosure be circulated to the various delegations to the General Assembly for their information.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

"Warren Roger Austin,
"United States Representative."

RESOLUTION

"The General Assembly, recognizing the urgent and rightful

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claims to independence of the people of Korea:

"Having in mind that it is one of the purposes of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

"Having noted the international obligations undertaken with respect to Korea, including the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, in which China, the United Kingdom and the United States stated their determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, in which China, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration and to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered upon entering the war in the Pacific, and the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, in which the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, with the adherence of China, provided that there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government with a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state;

"Believing that the national independence of Korea should be reestablished and all occupying forces should be withdrawn from Korea at the earliest practicable date;

"To this end, recommends that the occupying powers hold elections in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, under the observation of the United Nations, as the initial step leading to the creation of a National Assembly and the establishment of a national government of Korea in conformity with the procedure set out in the annex to this Resolution;

"Further recommends that immediately upon the establishment of the national government of Korea referred to above, that government will constitute its own national security forces and will arrange with the occupying powers for the early and complete withdrawal from Korea of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the United States;

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"Resolves that the responsibilities assumed by the United Nations under this Resolution should be discharged by a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, consisting of the representatives of (names of states).

"This United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall:

"(1) Be present in Korea during the elections in each zone with the right of freedom of travel and observation throughout all of Korea,

"(2) Be available for such consultation as may be appropriate in connection with the elections, the organization of the National Assembly, the formation of the national government and the conclusion of agreements for the withdrawal of the occupying forces,

"(3) Report to the General Assembly or, if in its judgment developments so require, to any competent agency of the Assembly, with respect to its activities under the terms of this Resolution, and make any recommendations that it may wish concerning further United Nations action in maintaining the independence of Korea;

"Calls upon the member states concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the United Nations Temporary Commission On Korea in the fulfillment of these responsibilities."

Annex and Recommended Procedure for the Holding of Flection for the Establishment of a National Government OF Korea.

"(1) The elections to be held by the occupying powers in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, shall be for the purpose of choosing representatives to a National Assembly. The number of representatives elected to the National Assembly from each zone shall bear the same proportion to the total membership of the National Assembly as the population of that zone bears to the total population of Korea. Subject to this principle, the number of representatives to be elected from each zone shall be determined by the United Nations Commission on Korea in consultation with the occupying powers.

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"(2) As soon as possible after the elections the National Assembly of Korea shall meet and form a government and shall notify the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of the formation of this government.

"(3) Upon notification to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of the formation of a national government of Korea, that government shall take over the functions of North and South Korea, respectively, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed upon under the auspices of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea between the Government of Korea and the respective occupying authorities.

"(4) The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall be available for such consultation and assistance as may be requested and appropriate in connection with the decisions and actions contemplated in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) above."

Proposal of American Delegation:

In view of the action taken by its government, as stated above, and with the approval of its government, the U. S. Delegation proposes that, pending consideration of the Korean question by the United Nations, the Joint Commission recess and the two delegations hold themselves in readiness at the headquarters of the respective occupation forces for such assistance as may be requested by the United Nations.

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE PRESS
October 20, 1947

In view of the fact that the American Delegation in Joint Commission session on October 18, 1947 made the proposal to recess the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation, Colonel General Shitkov met the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, Major General Brown on October 20, 1947 and handed him the following reply of the Soviet Delegation to the proposal of the American Delegation:

"Dear General Brown:

In answer to your proposal at the meeting of the Joint Commission of 18 October 1947 I have the honor to communicate to you the following:

'During the period of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Soviet Delegation has exerted all its efforts toward the speediest fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement on Korea and, on the basis of that decision, toward the creation of a united independent Korea under the guidance of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

In view of the position of the American Delegation, which made impossible the realization of the Moscow Decision, the Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the creation of a united independent Korea, on 26 September 1947 introduced, at the direction of its government, a proposal to withdraw simultaneously the American and Soviet troops from Korea during the beginning of 1948 and to afford Koreans themselves the opportunity of forming the government of Korea.

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The American Delegation refused to discuss this proposal and at the Joint Commission meeting of 18 October 1947, referring to the direction of its government, proposed to interrupt the work of the Joint Commission.'

In connection with the above stated, the Soviet Delegation has received from its government, a direction to depart for Pyongyang."

Chief of the Soviet Delegation
in the Joint Soviet-American
Commission
Colonel General Shitkov

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THE JOINT COMMISSION ON KOREA

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KOREA

JOINT COMMISSION

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ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN DELEGATION OF JOINT COMMISSION



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JOINT DECISION 12
(Communique 11)

THE ORDER OF CONSULTATION WITH KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS.

1. Marshall-Molotov Agreement.
2. Declaration (of Communique 5).
3. Instructions to organizations regarding applications.
4. Instructions to organizations regarding questionnaires.
5. Compilation of list of applicants by Subcommission No. 1.
6. Mass meetings in Seoul and P'yongyang with representatives.
7. Individual oral consultation by Subcommittees.
8. Analysis of results of written and oral consultation.
9. Formation of Korean consultative body from representatives of organizations in accordance with membership and influence.
10. Equal rights and opportunities North and South Korea.

11&12. Drafting of Charter and Platform.

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APPLICATIONS FOR CONSULTATION WITH JOINT COMMISSION



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POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF 460 GROUPS

APPLYING FOR CONSULTATION

IN ALL KOREA

TOTAL CLAIMED MEMBERSHIP ALL GROUPS – 65,520,000

141 GROUPS PEOPLES FRONT 27,060,000 MEMBERS 42%	68 GROUPS MODERATES 13,500,000 MEMBERS 20%	251 GROUPS RIGHT 24,960,000 MEMBERS 38%

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SOVIET LIST
FOR CONSULTATION-SOUTH KOREA
(Parties and Organizations with membership in excess of 10,000)



RATIO

19 : 19

R = Rightist Groups	Approx.	11.3 Millions
MR = Moderate Right Groups	"	4.4 "
M = Moderate Groups	"	2.9 "
ML = Moderate Left Groups	"	5.3 "
PF = Peoples Front Groups	"	13.8 "

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SOVIET LIST

FOR CONSULTATION - NORTH & SOUTH KOREA
(Parties and Organizations with membership in excess of 10,000)



24 Groups
Combined claimed membership 15,286,000
(EXCLUDED BY SOVIETS)

71 Groups
Combined claimed membership 18,587,000

75 Groups
Combined claimed membership 32,417,000

RATIO

18 : 32

R = Rightist Groups	Approx.	11.3	Millions
MR = Moderate Right	"	4.4	"
M = Moderate Groups	"	2.9	"
ML = Moderate Left Groups	"	5.3	"
PF = Peoples Front Groups	"	27.1	"

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STEPS AND PROBLEMS IN JOINT COMMISSION'S TASK

STEPS:

1. Consultation
2. Analysis of consultation result
3. Drafting charter and platform
4. Method of obtaining personnel
5. Report to powers

PROBLEMS:

1. Reconciliation of divergent Korean viewpoints
2. Formation of a representative consultative body
3. Agreement on charter and platform
4. Integration of governments of North and South Korea
5. Integration of economies of North and South Korea

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GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE NORTH KOREA



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GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE SOUTH KOREA



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THE LIST OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

Col. General T. F. Shtikov	- Chief Commissioner
Counselor ~~1st Class~~ G. I. Tounkin	- Subcommission No. 1
Major General N. G. Lebedeff	- Subcommission No. 2
Counselor 2nd Class G. M. Balasanov	- Subcommission No. 3
Col. T. I. Korkulenko	- Commissioner
Col. I. T. Avramenko	- Secretary

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SUBJECT: Moscow Conference (Korea Section)

"Section III - Korea Section

"1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations. The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks."

Reproduced 22 April 1946
by U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION.

RBH

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

0829

I N D E X

TAB A

		PAGE NO.
9 May 46	Hodge to Chistiakov	1
15 Jun 46	Hodge to Chistiakov	2
12 Jul 46	Hodge to Chistiakov	3
6 Aug 46	Chistiakov to Hodge reply to 15 June 46 letter	4
12 Aug 46	Hodge to Chistiakov reply to 6 Aug 46 letter	5
26 Oct 46	Chistiakov to Hodge reply to 12 Aug 46 letter	7
1 Nov 46	Hodge to Chistiakov reply to 26 Oct 46 letter	10
26 Nov 46	Chistiakov to Hodge reply to 1 Nov 46 letter	12
24 Dec 46	Hodge to Chistiakov reply to 26 Nov 46 letter	14
28 Feb 47	Chistiakov to Hodge reply to 24 Dec 46 letter	16

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

9 May 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I assume you are fully aware of the differences of opinion that have arisen within the Joint U. S. - Soviet Commission. I regret very much that any block to fast progress has arisen, but the American delegation cannot agree to exclusion of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and their leaders from consultation concerning the future of their nation because of expression of their political views on the Moscow Decision.

For your information as to my attitude on the subject, I am enclosing a transcript of the conference between General Shtikov and myself on 8 May 1946.

The Americans stand ready and willing to continue the work of the Commission in carrying out fully the Moscow Decision upon one day notice. All accommodations used by the Soviet Delegation remain open for their use.

If there remain other issues to be cleared up before the Commission reconvenes, I suggest that we meet for a personal conference at such place and time as you suggest. I will gladly come to Pyongyang for such a meeting, or I will be delighted if you would accept my long standing invitation to visit me in the Korean metropolis of Seoul.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

15 June 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

Although it has been more than one month since I wrote you suggesting that we meet to discuss and clear-up between us any misunderstood points of difference between our two delegations on the U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission, I have not had the honor of a reply.

As indicated in my letter, the American Command stands ready to resume negotiations in the Joint Commission at any time you suggest, in order fully to carry out the Moscow Decision in accordance with the principles of freedom of expression as enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. Therefore, I reiterate the invitation indicated in my letter of May 9, that you return your delegation to Seoul at an early date to resume negotiations for the complete fulfillment of the terms of the Moscow Decision in the cooperative spirit in which that Decision was made.

Should you decide to accept this invitation, I request advance notice of arrival of the Soviet delegation in order to rearrange for their housing and messing.

I will appreciate an early reply.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

12 July 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

Over two months have now elapsed since the discontinuance of the work of the Joint United States - Soviet Commission. Since I have received no reply from you to my letters of 9 May and 14 June, I must now amend the conditions for future meetings.

In my letter of 9 May I stated that the American delegation is now ready and willing to reconvene upon one day's notice. I must amend that stipulation and increase the period to ten day's notice. I am sure you will realize that the reason for this is the necessity for utilizing on other tasks temporarily the services of the personnel previously allocated to the Commission, and the necessity for using certain housing facilities which have remained vacant during the absence of the Soviet delegation.

The above condition of reopening the Joint Commission does not in any way change my views toward the desirability of reconvening as outlined to you in the above quoted letters.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
XXV SOVIET AREY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

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6 August 1946

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

I have received your letter of 15 June 1946 pertaining to reconvening the Soviet-American Joint Commission in Seoul.

Having studied the material of the work of the Soviet - American Joint Commission, I have come to the conclusion that the stand taken by the Soviet Delegation in its negotiations, which took place in Seoul, was correct.

The Soviet Delegation was motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision of 3 Foreign Ministers on Korea, the only document in which is laid out the program of the Allies, foreseeing the creation of a democratic government in Korea and also the measures of assistance for developing Korea on democratic principles and the establishment of an independent Korean state.

As you know, the break in the work of the Joint Commission, fulfilling this decision, came about on the initiative and suggestion of the American Delegation.

Regretfully, your letter did not state whether the American Delegation in the Joint Commission will uphold the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and consult only with those parties and organizations and their representatives, which fully, without any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision.

Upon receiving your consent to resume negotiations on the basis of the above mentioned, I am ready at any time to send a representative of the Soviet Command to the city of Seoul for conducting negotiations in the Soviet-American Joint Commission for the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Respectfully yours

I.M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
The Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in North Korea

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

12 August 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, XXV Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

This is in answer to your letter of 6 August 1946 in regard to resumption of negotiations by the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission in Korea.

I note with interest your statement th t the Soviet delegation is motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. I take this opportunity to state that the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is and always has been the mission of the American Delegation, and is exactly what it will try to accomplish when the Commission reconvenes.

However, there are certain factors in this connection that I am impelled to point out. These are:

a. There is nothing the U.S. Delegation can read into the Moscow Decision that requres or implies that only those parties and organizations are to be consulted by the Joint Commission which fully, without any reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision. Reading this interpretation into the Moscow Decision is purely unilateral.

b. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision or in the general usage of the word "democratic" throughout the world that restricts its application only to organizations or parties belonging to schools of social thought favoring certain classes in the community over others, which seemed to be the interpretation given in practice to the word by the Soviet delegation. The American delegation can apply the word "democratic" only as it is applied in common usage throughout the world, which normally would exclude only parties or organizations opposed to popular rule by elected representatives and to equal rights for all classes of the people.

c. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that prohibits Koreans in conferences with the Commission or elsewhere from expressing freely their wishes and desires in formation of their own government.

d. There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that makes any predetermination of the terms of nature of the Four Power Trusteeship beyond the one provision imposing a limit of five years duration. On the contrary, the Moscow Decision states positively that "The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted Following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the ***(Four Powers)****for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years". I see no reason for the Joint Commission or the Korean people to enter into commitments concerning a Four Power Trusteeship before the Korean Provisional Government is formed.

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In view of the Soviet Delegation's interpretation of the Moscow Decision during the sessions last spring, that delegation might wish to restudy the Decision in the light of the views expressed above.

Since the Moscow Decision was made by our foreign Ministér in good faith and is the only legal vehicle for setting up the independence of Korea, the U.S. Delegation has no alternative but to carry it out exactly and in full, and has no intention of making changes in the Decision or of asking for any repudiation. However, I can assure you that the U.S. Delegation cannot be a party to any arbitrary exclusive or punitive tactics in dealing with the accredited representatives of the Korean people on grounds not specifically stated in the Moscow Decision itself, and inconsistent with the world-accepted definition of the word "Democratic".

On the basis given above, I not only welcome but invite the Soviet Delegation to return to negotiations of the Joint Commission and suggest that you send your representative to Seoul at an early date to make preliminary arrangements.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
65TH SOVIET ARMY IN NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

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26 October 1946

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General
Army Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

In your letter of 12 August 1946 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, you, speaking of the intentions of the American delegation to resume the discussions of the Joint Commission, at the same time have advised the Soviet delegation to restudy its position.

In answer to this, I must declare that the Soviet delegation is guided in its work by the terms of the Moscow Decision of the Three Foreign Ministers on Korea and intends to steadfastly adhere to this decision.

I again assure you that the Soviet Delegation is always ready to resume the work of the Joint Commission on the basis of strict fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

As far as the question of the discontinuing of the work of the Joint Commission is concerned, as you well know it was the American Delegation itself which time after time in the course of the discussions suggested that the work of the Joint Commission be suspended, and finally at its suggestion the work of the Commission was suspended 5 May 1946.

In your letter you state that "the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is and always has been the mission of the American Delegation".

I must however note that during the work of the Joint Commission the American Delegation did not, in fact, evince such a readiness and many times even declared that it did not quite understand the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Your assertion that the Soviet Delegation allegedly interprets unilaterally the Moscow Decision concerning the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the consultation on the subject with Korean political parties and social organizations is unfounded.

In the decision on Korea reached by the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, a series of measures were laid out which aim at the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for the development of the country on democratic principles and the speedy liquidation of the ruinous after-effects of long Japanese domination in Korea. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation, being guided by the aims and spirit of the Moscow Decision, deems that it would not be right to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling the Moscow Decision with those parties and organizations which are voicing opposition to this decision, or those, who for tactical considerations, although declaring their support of the decision, at the same time make such stipulations which convert their statement of support of the Moscow Decision into an empty declaration.

In regard to that part of your letter concerning the definition of the word "democratic", the Soviet Delegation would like to point out that in this question it is necessary to consider not the declarative announcements of the party, and not the names of separate parties and organizations, but the actual policies pursued by a given party.

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Inasmuch as the Moscow Decision has outlined the necessary measures for the democratic reconstruction of Korea, it is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the attitude of different parties and groups towards the Moscow Decision is the most important criterion of their true democratic nature and of their striving to see Korea a democratic state.

Thus, the position of the Soviet Delegation on the question of consultation of the Joint Commission with the Korean democratic parties and organizations fully corresponds to the Moscow Decision.

At the same time it is impossible not to note that there is an obvious contradiction between the interpretation in your letter of the word "democracy" and the actual position which the American Delegation assumed during the period of the work of the Joint Commission.

It is well known that the American Delegation has included in the list of political parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission on the question of the creation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, all political parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition against the Moscow Decision and only three democratic parties which upheld the Moscow Decision. It is completely obvious that the American Delegation, when it excluded from participation in consultation with the Joint Commission such democratic parties and organizations of mass character as the Korean National Revolutionary Party, the All-Korean Confederation of Labor, the All Korean Women's Union, the All-Korean Youth Union, the All-Korean Farmer's Union and a number of other organizations, was guided by other than their democratic principles.

As regards the freedom for the Koreans to express their position toward formation of the Korean Government or the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, the Soviet delegation has never anywhere made proposals directed against the freedom of expression by the representatives of Korean parties and organizations, wherever they may be, and it is accordingly understood that any party or group as well as any individual Korean citizen, can express similar ideas or present them to the Joint Commission.

I cannot agree with the interpretation set forth in your letter on the question of trusteeship because such an interpretation actually places in doubt the decision of the Moscow Conference on this question. As it is known the Moscow Decision states: "It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to also work out measures for helping and assisting (on trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea."

Thus, among the tasks of the Joint Commission is included the preparation of proposals dealing with the establishment of a trusteeship in regard to Korea with the stipulation that these proposals relating to Korea for a period up to 5 years will after consultation with the Provisional Korean Government, be submitted for joint consideration to the governments of the Four Powers.

From the above it is clear that the question of the establishment of the trusteeship as a measure which must aid in the democratic transformation of Korea has been definitely decided by the Moscow Conference and on this basis there must be prepared concrete proposals for the eventual working out of the agreement on trusteeship.

During the interruption in the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission many events have occurred in South as well as in North Korea.

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All these events testify that the Korean people are striving to unite their country, to have a democratic government, and to carry out their democratic transformation.

It is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the delay in the formation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government impedes the so necessary unification of Korea into a single state; it is having a negative effect on the economic and political situation of the Korean people and is holding back the realization of democratic transformation in all Korea.

The Soviet Delegation is greatly concerned that the negotiations of the Joint Commission, interrupted on the initiative of the American Delegation in May, 1946, have not yet been resumed and wishes to resume those negotiations as soon as possible on the basis of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

If after taking this into account, along with the foregoing statement, you will express your consent to resume the work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation will always be ready to resume that work.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in North Korea

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

1 November 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov
Commanding General, 25th Army
Soviet Forces in Korea
Pyongyang, Korea

Dear General Chistiakov:

I thank you for your letter of October 26th, 1946, and agree with you that the continuation of the division of Korea into two parts works a great hardship on the Korean people. It also weakens the prestige of two great Allies who cooperated so fully to bring a victorious end to the bitterest war in history. Each added month of this division tends to make more difficult the implementation of the Moscow Decision on Korea made by the Foreign Ministers of the Allies last December.

For the purposes of reconciling the differences between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. delegations, which are not fully resolved in your letter, I propose that the following basis of agreement for reconvening the Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commission be accepted by both the Soviet and American delegations with a view to the early resumption of the sessions of the Joint Commission:

> It is agreed to interpret paragraphs 2 and 3 of the declaration in Communique #5 of the US-USSR Joint Commission, dated April 17th, 1946, to mean that such individuals, parties and social organizations shall not foment or instigate mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties, and social organizations which do foment or instigate such opposition shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties, and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.
>
> In consideration of this interpretation of the declaration published in Communique #5 of the Joint Commission, dated April 17, 1946, both Delegations agree that they will not oppose consultation with any individual, political party, or social organization which subscribes to and abides by the declaration published in Joint Communique #5.

In order to eliminate any possible future misunderstanding I believe it is advisable briefly to restate the position of the United States at this time.

(a) The United States has always favored the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision by the Joint Commission. This decision obviously includes the preparation of proposals "for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years" which "shall be submitted for the joint consideration" of the Four Powers "<u>following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government</u>." However, there is nothing in the Moscow Decision which predetermines the terms or nature of a Four Power trusteeship except that it shall be a method "for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress

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of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea" to be worked out "with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government," and a limitation placed upon its duration.

(b) The United States has always favored the exercise of freedom of speech in Korea. The United States believes that all Korean democratic parties and social organizations should be permitted to make known their desires in the formation of their own government. The representatives of the United States see a great difference between (1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision; and (2) the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government.

On the basis of the United States position herein stated and the suggested interpretation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the declaration in Communique No. 5 of the Joint Commission which I approved for the United States Delegation, the American Command proposes that the Joint Commission resume its work without delay and I again cordially invite the Soviet Delegation to return to Seoul at an early date for the purpose of resuming negotiations.

I shall be pleased to hear from you as early as possible in order that the necessary preliminary arrangements can be effected.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
25TH SOVIET ARMY IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

26 November 1946

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General
Army Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated November 1st, 1946.

It is with regret that I have to conclude that the conditions upon which you propose to renew the negotiations of the Joint Soviet-American Commission in substance do not differ from the position laid down in your previous letters, which, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Actually, you propose that the Joint Commission should consult with any person, political party or social organization which adheres to and abides by the declaration published in Communique #5, moreover, such persons, parties or social organizations must not and will not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

Thus, according to this formula, the Joint Commission must consult not only with democratic parties and social organizations which uphold the Moscow Decision, but also with those parties and organizations which are hostile to this decision. Furthermore, these latter parties and organizations are even given an opportunity to continue their activities directed against the Moscow Decision with the exception that they should not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

The acceptance of such a proposal would appear, rather as a call to reactionary parties and groups not to retreat from their hostile position towards the Moscow Decision, but merely to curtail temporarily their activities directed against this decision so that they may have an opportunity to take part in the consultations with the Joint Commission. I must remind you that it was precisely in such manner that these parties accepted your public announcement of April 27, 1946 which contained an analogous interpretation of the agreement embodied in Communique #5.

The result was that the parties and organizations which had voiced their opposition to the Moscow Decision agreed to sign the declaration, but on the very second day after the termination of the work of the Joint Commission, prominent leaders of these parties and organizations again returned to an active fight against the Moscow Decision and its supporters.

There is no doubt that participation by those elements in the consultations would be utilized by them with the aim of sabotaging the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and would only facilitate their activities in that direction.

I must again declare that if we are aiming at actual and complete realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea, then in the

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opinion of the Soviet Delegation, it is impossible to consult on the question of methods of fulfilling this decision with those persons, parties and organizations who voice opposition to the above mentioned decision and who are aiming at sabotaging its fulfillment, but whom, for tactical considerations, may for the period of consultation with the Joint Commission temporarily and in part limit their activities directed against the Moscow Decision in order that they may renew these activities in full force as soon as consultation with the Joint Commission is terminated.

The foregoing in no way limits the freedom of Korean democratic parties, social organizations or individuals to express their position regarding the formation of the Korean government or other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

In my previous letter I have already directed your attention to the fact that the Soviet Delegation has never made proposals directed against the freedom of individuals, parties or organizations to express anywhere their views on these questions and it is accordingly understood that any party or social organization as well as an individual Korean citizen can express similar views or present them to the Joint Commission.

Desiring to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea as speedily and as definitely as possible, the Soviet side advances the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

1. The Joint Commission must consult with those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and social organizations, by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultations with the Joint Commission.

In the event you should agree to the foregoing proposals the Soviet Delegation is prepared, without delay, to arrive in Seoul for the resumption of the negotiations of the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Seoul, Korea

24 December 1946

Guard Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov,
Commanding General of the Soviet
Forces in Northern Korea,
Headquarters, 25th Soviet Army,
Pyongyang, Korea.

Dear General Chistiakov:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 26 November 1946.

I have had attached to this letter a copy of your letter of 26 November 1946 with paragraphs numbered to facilitate reference.

From a careful reading of paragraphs II to VIII, both inclusive, the impression I receive is that the Soviet Delegation believes that proposals previously submitted by the United States Delegation appear to encourage "reactionary parties and groups" to continue hostile opposition to the Moscow Decision. I assure you that the United States Delegation has no such intention and desires to cooperate with you in preventing such hostile opposition. Paragraphs IX and X of your letter guarantee on the part of the Soviet Delegation complete freedom of expression to Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals "regarding the formation of the Korean government and other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea." The views expressed in these paragraphs are identical with the position assumed by the United States Delegation.

The last three paragraphs of your letter number 1 to 3, although apparently in conflict with paragraphs IX and X nevertheless provide a basis for further discussion.

In view of the closeness of our positions, I suggest that your proposals with the following modifications be made the basis for reconvening the Joint Commission.

Proposal No. 1 to be interpreted as follows:
Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

Proposal No. 2, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission, may after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

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Proposal No. 3, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows: "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

I trust that the basis proposed above will be acceptable to you and that you will notify me so that I may make the necessary preliminary arrangements for reconvening the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S.Army
Commanding, United States
Army in Korea

1 Incl.
Copy ltr of
Gen. Chistiakov
dtd 26 Nov 46

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HEADQUARTERS
SOVIET ARMY FORCES IN NORTHERN KOREA
Pyongyang, Korea

28 February 1947

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
The Commanding General
American Forces in South Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Hodge:

Confirming the receipt of your letter of December 24, 1946, it is with satisfaction I note that as a result of our correspondence the positions of both sides have actually drawn closer together.

1. I take note of your declaration that you are ready to accept as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission, the proposals set forth in my letter dated November 26, 1946. I agree with your interpretation of proposal #1, bearing in mind that the matter may not and must not be confined merely to expressions of good intentions to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on the part of those parties and organizations which will sign the declaration contained in Communique #5. Subsequent actions of these parties and organizations who have signed the above mentioned declaration, and consequently have accepted the obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, likewise must be consonant with that obligation.

2. In reference to paragraph #2 of my proposals, I should like to explain that the Soviet Delegation considers it expedient that parties and organizations which will take part in consultation with the Joint Commission be informed beforehand that they must not designate for consultation such representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

Bearing this in mind, and taking into consideration your observations, I propose the following wording for paragraph #2:

"A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION SIGNATORY TO THE DECLARATION CONTAINED IN COMMUNIQUE #5 HAS THE RIGHT TO APPOINT SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE WHO IN ITS OPINION CAN BEST PRESENT TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ITS VIEWS REGARDING THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION, AND WHO HAS NOT COMPROMISED HIMSELF BY ACTIVELY VOICING OPPOSITION TO THAT DECISION. HOWEVER, IF THE APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVE, FOR COMPLETELY VALID REASONS, BE CONSIDERED ANTAGONISTIC TOWARD THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW DECISION OR TOWARD EITHER OF THE ALLIED POWERS, THEN THE JOINT COMMISSION, FOLLOWING MUTUAL AGREEMENT, MAY DEMAND THAT THE PARTY HAVING MADE SUCH A STATEMENT (DECLARATION) SHOULD DESIGNATE ANOTHER REPRESENTATIVE IN HIS PLACE."

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3. I agree with your wording of proposal #3. I assume, however, that by the concept "individuals" shall be understood representatives of parties and social organizations invited to participate in consultations in accordance with the provisions set forth in paragraph #2 above.

I would deem it more expedient to substitute for the word "individuals" the words "and their representatives" with the result that the first sentence of your third proposal would be worded as follows:

"Parties and social organizations and their representatives invited for consultations," etc. according to the text.

The remainder of the wording of this proposal is accepted by me without change.

4. Concerning your observations regarding the alleged existence of conflict between paragraphs 9 and 10 of my letter, and the proposals set forth in that letter, I must say that I do not discern any such conflict.

I hope that agreement by us on the conditions of consultation will assure a speedy and successful resumption of the work of the Joint Commission.

Respectfully yours,

I. M. CHISTIAKOV
Guard Colonel General
Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in N. Korea.

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I N D E X

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TEXT OF MARSHALL'S LETTER TO MOLOTOV 8 APRIL 1947

I wish to call your attention to the situation in Korea. The representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States on the Joint (U.S. - U.S.S.R.) Commission in Korea have been unable to make progress towards the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government. It has been 19 months since the Japanese surrender, yet Korea has profited little. The country is divided into two zones. The Soviet Commander in Northern Korea has refused to permit freedom of movement and free economic exchange between these zones. This has precluded freely Chosen political amalgamation of the Korean people and had resulted in grave economic distress. The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following basic objectives:

1. To assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations.

2. To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

3. To aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state.

The United States, in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, declared its determination that in due course, Korea should become free and independent. The United Kingdom and the Republic of China were parties to the same declaration. The Cairo Declaration was specifically reaffirmed by the three powers in the Potsdam Declaration which defined terms for the Japanese surrender. The U.S.S.R. in its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, declared its adherence to these declarations. Upon the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea the areas respectively South and North of a line arbitrarily assigned for this purpose, the 38th degree parallel. This line of demarcation became in effect a boundary between zones of occupation. At the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. in Moscow in December 1945, the serious consequences of the bi-zonal division of Korea were discussed and an agreement regarding Korea was reached and published in Part 3 of the Communique of the Conference. The Republic of China subsequently subscribed to this agreement. March 20, 1946, the Joint (U.S. - U.S.S.R.) Commission appointed under the terms of the Moscow Agreement met and began its task, as outlined in the agreement, of assisting in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government as a 1st step in assuring the establishment of an independent and sovereign Korean nation. It was the hope of the Government of the United States that speedy action would be taken by the Joint Commission, a Provisional Korean Government would rapidly be established, the unfortunate results of the line of demarcation between the United States and the Soviet Forces would be overcome and Korea could be started on the way to attaining an independent and democratic government. Unfortunately the work of the Joint Commission became stalemated after a short time through failure to agree on the definition of the word "democratic" as it pertained to the representatives of the parties and social organizations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement to be consulted by the Joint Commission in its task of assisting in the formation of a provincial government. As it became evident that no agreement could be reached at the time, the Joint Commission adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946. The United States Commander in Korea has several times suggested to the Soviet Commander that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work. However, the Soviet Commander has insisted on a formula which would result in eliminating

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the majority of representative Korean leaders from consultation as representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and has reiterated this position in a letter to the American Commander as recently as February 28, 1947. It has therefore been impossible to agree upon a basis for reconvening the Commission. Now in April 1947, almost 16 months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real progress made toward the implementation of that agreement. In fulfillment of the intent of the agreement and declaration made at Moscow in December 1945, the Government of the United States desires to finish the work of establishing a free and independent Korea without additional delay. To this end I ask that our Governments agree to instruct our respective Commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. I further suggest that a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 be fixed for a review by the two Governments of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the United States, mindful of its obligations under the Moscow Agreement, has no alternative to taking without further delay such steps in its zone as will advance the purposes of that Agreement. I am furnishing copies of this letter to the British and Chinese Governments.

(Signed). Acheson

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TEXT OF MOLOTOV'S LETTER TO MARSHALL, 19 APRIL 1947

Dear Mr. Marshall:

In reply to your letter of April 8 on the question of Korea, I am communicating the following: At the Moscow Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in December 1945, an agreement was reached which determined the policy of the 3 powers with respect to Korea. A basis for this agreement were the proposals of the Soviet Government, to which the Government of the U.S.A. also agreed, having consequently abandoned its first intention not to establish a National Korean Government in Korea. The Moscow Agreement held the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government which could take all the necessary measures for the development of Korean industry, transport, agriculture and the national culture of the Korean people, to be a problem of primary importance. Having made these proposals the Soviet Government deemed that the unification of Korea under the leadership for the Korean National Government was the most important prerequisite for the restoration of Korea as an independent state and the establishment of basis for the development of the country on democratic principles. The Soviet Government continues to adhere to this point of view and insists on a steadfast implementation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, being certain that, on the basis of the execution of this agreement Korea could be successfully developed along democratic principles and would become an independent and prosperous state and an equal member of the United Nations. However, the legislative program provided for Korea by the Moscow Agreement has not yet been carried out. A Provisional Democratic Government has not been established. The work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, established for the purpose of collaborating in the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government was suspended as a result of the fact that the American Delegation on this Commission took a stand contrary to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Furthermore, the American Command in Southern Korea did not agree to a serious consideration of the proposals by the Soviet Command in Northern Korea on the question of an economic exchange between the two zones, which made it impossible to reach an agreement on this question.

In the course of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission during the period from March to May, 1946 the Soviet Delegation made every effort to effect the execution of the aforementioned agreement on Korea and first of all, provide for a prompt establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government and for the unification of Korea under its leadership. However, the Soviet Delegation met with not only difficulties in this connection, but also with direct counter-action on the part of the American Delegation, basing itself on the agreement of Korea, which provides that the Joint Commission, in formulating its proposals, should consult Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The Soviet Delegation insisted on a wide-scale attraction of such parties and organizations to consultation with the Commission. The American Delegation excluded participation by a whole series of large democratic organizations in Southern Korea and insisted on consultation with groups which had taken a stand in opposition to the Moscow Agreement, consultation with which, naturally could not facilitate the execution of this Agreement. The American Delegation included in the list of parties and organizations submitted by it for the consultation with the Joint Commission, 17 political parties and social groups of Southern Korea which took a stand against the Moscow Agreement, and only 3 democratic parties which supported the agreement. The American Delegation excluded sueh large democratic

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parties and social organizations as the All-Korean Labor Confederation, the All-Korean Peasant Union, the Korea National Revolutionary Party, The All-Korean Youth Union, etc., from participation in consultations. Deeming it impossible to agree to this position of the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation nevertheless did its utmost to find a way to reach an agreed decision. This, however, appeared impossible and the work of the Commission, on the suggestion of the American Delegation was curtailed.

The intolerance of the resulting situation is evident. As a result of this, as you know, it was necessary to take new measures in endeavoring to find a way out of such a situation. The Soviet Commander in his relations with the American Commander endeavored to find a basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. As a result of an exchange of letters, there has been a considerable reapproachment of the points of view of both sides, which fact was noted by both Commanders. It was expected that an agreement would soon be reached and the Joint Commission would begin its work very shortly. However, no reply has been received to date from the American Commander to the last letter of February 28, from the Soviet Commander and the proposed agreement was not reached. Disagreement of action was a serious obstacle for the opportune fulfillment of the program of measures proposed in the Moscow Agreement of Korea as a whole.

In connection with Northern Korea, during the period beginning with the capitulation of Japan, considerable progress was made in the field of democratic action, and also with respect to the restoration of national economy and culture. Wide democratic reforms have been made which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population. I have in mind, first of all, the introduction of an over-all electoral right; a law on equal rights for women; the establishment of local authority agencies and the peoples committee of Northern Korea on the basis of free democratic elections; land reform, as a result of which 725,000 landless peasant farmers and those having little land received more than 1,000,000 hectares of free land, which formerly belonged to Japanese colonists and their accomplices in Korea; the nationalization of former Japanese industries, the 8-hour work day, safeguarding of labor and social insurance; CIC educational reform, as a result of which the Korean language has been reestablished, the network of schools was increased and the number of students was increased, etc. However, such wide democratic reforms have been carried out only in Northern Korea, where there is only two-fifths of the population of Korea.

The Soviet Government, closely adhering their policy toward Korea to the program planned in the Moscow Agreement, believed the following to be points of primary importance:

Part 1. The establishment of Provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of a wide-scale of participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, in order to expedite the political and economic unification of Korea as a self-supporting state independent of foreign interference, which would do away with the division of the country into two zones.

Part 2. The establishment of democratic authority agencies throughout Korea by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right.

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Part 3. The aiding of Korean people in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture.

In connection with the steadfast aspiration on the part of the Soviet Government for the prompt restoration of Korea as a united sovereign state and elimination of difficulties arising from the fact that Korea to date had not been unified and does not have a national government. I propose that the Joint Soviet-American Commission resume its work on May 20 of the current year in the City of Seoul on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, and that the Commission present the result of its work on the elaboration of recommendations with respect to the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government for consideration by the two governments in July and August 1947.

I am sending copies of the present letter to Mr. Bevin and to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow.

I beg you, Mr. Secretary of State, to accept the assurance of my very highest consideration.

V. MOLOTOV

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TEXT OF MARSHALL'S LETTER TO MOLOTOV, 2 MAY 1947

Dear Mr. Molotov:

I have considered your letter of April 19, 1947, in which you accept our proposal to reconvene the US-USSR Joint Commission and suggest that the commission resume its work on May 20 of this year. I have also noted your statement that resumption of the commissions work shall be on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea.

In order to avoid any future misunderstanding with respect to the phrase "exact execution" I wish to make clear my interpretation of the phrase. In my letter to you of April 8, I stated that the Joint Commission should be charged with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. In making this statement I had and have in mind the well known position of the government of the United States and Korean representatives of Democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the commission.

You mention three points which the Soviet Government believes to be of primary importance in its policy towards Korea. Your statement concerning the importance of establishing a provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of wide scale participation of Korean Democratic parties and social organizations has from the beginning been accepted by the United States government as a basis to its policy of assisting in the establishment of a self governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations.

I interpret your second point with respect to the establishment of "Democratic Authority Agencies" throughout Korea as referring to local, provinicial and national government agencies chosen, as you state, by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electorial right.

I welcome the assurance contained in your third point with regard to the importance you attach to aiding in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture. The United States government has under consideration a constructive program for the rehabilitation of the economy of Korea and for its educational and political development.

In order that I may direct the United States Commander in Korea to make preparations for opening the sessions of the Joint Commission in Seoul on May 20, 1947, may I receive an early confirmation that we are mutually agreed as to the basis on which the commission shall resume its important work? I am furnishing copies of this letter to the governments of China and the United Kingdom.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, assurnace of my highest esteem.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

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TEXT OF MOLOTOV'S LETTER TO MARSHALL, 10 MAY 1947

Dear Mr. Marshall:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 2 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea. Your proposal, as I understand it, is to the effect that before the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission an agreement should be reached concerning the conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. This question was the subject of my exchange of correspondence between the Soviet and American Commanders in Korea as a result of which, as I already answered in my previous letter, the points of view of the two sides were brought considerably closer. The Soviet Commander in his letter of Nov 26, 1946, advanced the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow Decision.

3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case, such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.

The American Commander in his letter of Dec. 24, 46, agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following changes as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

"Proposal Number 1 to be interpreted as follows:

"Signing the declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for signing consultation.

Proposal Number 2 - I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

"Proposal Number 3 - It is suggested that it be reworded as follows: Individuals, parties and social organizations invited

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for the consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

With a view to expediting the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and the creation of a temporary Korean democratic government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander. I hope that there will thus exist no further reasons for postponing the convocation of the Joint Commission. In your letter you stated that the Government of the United States is at the present time considering a constructive program for the reconstruction of Korean economy and its cultural and political development. I presume that the Joint Commission, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement on Korea, after the completion of the work connected with the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government should consider with the participation of this government proposals from the American and Soviet sides concerning measures of aid and assistance for the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of the democratic autonomy, and the establishment of the state independence of Korea and present agreed recommendations on these questions. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China. Please accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurance of my highest consideration.

V. Molotov

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TEXT OF MARSHALL'S LETTER TO MOLOTOV 13 MAY 1947

My dear Mr. Molotov:

I have received your letter of May 10 1947 and am pleased to note the agreement of your government to the reconvening of a Joint Commission on the basis of the proposals made in the American's Commander's letter of 24 Dec 46 to the Soviet Commander in Korea. Those proposals were authorized by this government and are identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of 2 May 1947.

I am instructing the Commander in Korea to make immediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul. A copy of this letter has been sent to the governments of the United Kingdom and China.

I convey renewed assurances of my highest consideration. State Department advises that exchange of correspondence referred to in your cable is unclassified.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

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TFXT OF MOLOTOV'S LETTER TO MARSHALL, 16 MAY 1947

Dear Mr. Marshall:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of reply dated May 13, 1947. Your statement that you are instructing the American Commander in Korea to make immediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul, I regard as your agreement to my proposal to resume the work of the Commission on May 20, 1947.

For my part, I inform you that the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission is prepared to arrive in Seoul by that date.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Govts of UK and the Chinese Republic.

Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my highest consideration.

V. M. MOLOTOV

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US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

12 June 1947

JOINT COMMUNIQUE #11

During the week ending 7 June 1947 the Joint Commission devoted its attention to the question of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations in northern and southern Korea. The decision reached by the Joint Commission regarding the method of consultation and those with whom consultation will be held is contained in a document entitled "The Method of Consultation with Korean Democratic Parties and Social Organizations in Northern and Southern Korea." There is also an agreed questionnaire on the "structure and principles of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government"; and a questionnaire on the "political platform of the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government".

The document on consultation sets forth in detail the conditions for consultation, method of conducting consultation and the procedure and schedule to be followed by the parties and organizations in submitting applications and answers to the questionnaires.

The questionnaires are for the purpose of determining the views of the Korean people on the Charter and on the Political Platform of the Provisional Government.

The decisions provide that all parties and organizations should submit their views regarding the provisional government and its platform through their central organs only, so that one single set of answers is filed for each party and organization.

The results of fifteen days work by the Joint Commission form a milestone on the road towards the inauguration of a Korean Provisional Government. The decisions reached will assure consultati

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with all Korean parties and social organizations who comply with the conditions for consultation.

The objective of the consultation is to determine the views and desires of the Korean people on the charter and platform of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The action is as required by the Moscow Decision.

There is attached the document on method of consultation and the two questionnaires as agreed upon by the Joint Commission.

Representatives of the democratic political parties and social organizations can obtain copies of the questionnaires and of the instructions for consultation at the Duk Soo Palace in Seoul and at Do San-Ri 18 in Pyongyang. Application for consultation must be submitted in duplicate by 23 June and answers to the questionnaires will be submitted in duplicate by July 1. Both will be submitted to the Joint Commission at Seoul or Pyongyang.

General Brown of the American Delegation and General Shtikov of the Soviet Delegation have expressed their appreciation for the hard work of the Subcommissions thus far.

Chairman of the Joint Commission for the next week will be Colonel General Shtikov.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of U.S. Delegation

T. F. SHTIKOV
Colonel General
Chief of Soviet Delegation

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US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

JOINT COMMISSION DECISION NO. 12*
(Revision of Joint Commission Decision No. 4)

THE ORDER OF CONSULTATION WITH KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN KOREA

1. In consulting with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Joint Commission shall be guided by the conditions stated in the letter of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. V. M. Molotov, of 7 May 1947, and accepted by the Secretary of State of the U.S.A. George Marshall in his letter of 13 May 1947. The appropriate quotation from the letter of Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov is given below:

"The Soviet Commander in his letter of Nov. 26, 1946, advanced the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

'1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea.

'2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by active opposition to the Moscow Decision.

'3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not actively oppose nor will they incite others to actively oppose the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case, such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.'

"The American Commander in his letter of Dec. 24, 1946, agreed

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to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following changes as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission:

'Proposal Number 1 to be interpreted as follows:

'Signing the declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

'Proposal Number 2. I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow Decision.

'However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

'Proposal Number 3. It is suggested that it be reworded as follows: Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

'Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.

'The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.'

"With a view to expediting the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and the creation of a provisional Korean

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democratic government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander."

2. The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declaration:

"We _____ declare that we will uphold the aims of the Moscow Decision on Korea as stated in paragraph 1 of this decision, namely:

'The reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.'

Further, we will abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government;

Further, we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in working out by it with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, of proposals concerning the measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision.

Signed _____

Representing the _____ Party or Organization."

3. Democratic parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea are hereby invited to submit their applications for participation in consultation with the Joint Commission. Every party and organization must submit only one application through its central zonal organ.

The application should be accompanied by a text of the declaration given in paragraph 2 above, duly signed and sealed with the seal of its central organ and also signed by the designated representative. The application shall contain the following information:

a. The full name of the party or organization, the address of its central office, the date of establishment, the number, membership, and location of branches, and total membership.

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b. The full name of a designated representative given in Chinese characters and, where possible, in English and Russian transliteration, the place and date of birth, position held in the party or organization and home address.

Applications for participation in consultation shall be submitted to the Joint Commission at Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, or Dos Sanri 18, Pyongyang, Korea, by 23 June, 1947.

4. Democratic parties and social organizations of Northern and Southern Korea which have signed the declaration contained in paragraph 2 may submit to the Joint Commission in written form their considerations regarding the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) and also the political platform for this Government, in accordance with a questionnaire approved by the Commission. This questionnaire shall be published in the press and printed copies will be available at the Joint Commission headquarters, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, and Dos Sanri 18, Pyongyang.

The aforementioned considerations shall be submitted to the Joint Commission at the above addresses by 1 July 1947.

5. Subcommission No. 1, upon receiving the applications for consultation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration in paragraph 2.

6. Following the approval by the Joint Commission of the list of democratic parties and social organizations and their representatives ~~mentioned~~ in paragraph 5, the Joint Commission shall convene in Seoul on 25 June 1947 a joint meeting to which it shall invite the above mentioned representatives of parties and social organizations in South Korea. A similar meeting of representatives of

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parties and social organizations in North Korea shall take place in Pyongyang on 30 June 1947. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation shall preside over the meeting in Seoul, and the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation shall preside at the meeting in Pyongyang. At such meetings the Chief of the Delegation in whose zone the assembly is being held will present a statement elaborated by the Joint Commission.

7. Representatives of parties and social organizations of both Northern and Southern Korea which are included in the list referred to in paragraph 5 above will be invited to individual oral consultation regarding the structure and principles of organization of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) and also regarding the political platform for this Government. For this purpose the Joint Commission will appoint the necessary number of subcommittees and shall notify each representative of the time and place he is to appear for consultation.

Oral consultation shall commence on 5 July 1947 and take place in Seoul and Pyongyang.

8. The Joint Commission will present the considerations and proposals received from the Korean democratic parties and social organizations of North as well as South Korea for study and elaboration of coordinated proposals to the corresponding subcommissions which will create, for this purpose, the necessary number of subcommittees. Advisors, experts and technical personnel for the work in the Joint subcommissions and subcommittees will be appointed by the heads of the corresponding delegations.

9. For the purpose of consultation and aiding the Joint Commission in elaboration of recommendations regarding the structure and principles of organization of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government and of the local organs of authority (Provisional Charter), and also the political platform for this government, representatives of

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U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

JOINT COMMISSION DECISION NO. 5.

The Joint Commission established 20 March 1946 at Seoul, Korea, in accordance with Section III (Korea) of the Decision of the Communique of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, agreed upon the following points:

Questionnaire to be submitted to democratic parties and social organizations of North and South Korea regarding the Provisional Charter for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

Request your point of view concerning the structure and principles of the organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) to be given to the Joint Commission (...date...). It is desired that your reply state your views on the following subjects in sufficient detail that these replies can be used in compiling the Provisional Charter:

1. Rights of the people. (Bill of Rights. For example, freedom of speech, press, universal suffrage, religion, assembly; inviolability of personal freedom; equality of sexes, and others)

2. The general type or character of provisional government to be established.

3. The organ or organs of authority of the central government to perform the executive and legislative functions.

   (a) Is it necessary to give the Provisional Korean Government the right to make laws before the creation of a legislative organ founded upon general elections?

   (b) Composition and structure of the organ or organs to perform these functions (For example: Organization, designation and function of the ministries; designation of the chief executive or body to perform the chief executive functions; organization, designation and functions of any organ to perform the legislative functions).

   (c) Powers and duties of the various ministers and officials.

   (d) Election or appointment and replacement of ministers and other principal members of the organ or organs to perform the legislative and executive functions (For example: Terms of office, succession to office; removal from office).

   (e) Method of discharging executive and legislative functions.

4. Local organs of authority, their formation, structure, powers and duties.

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(a) Method of selection of local authorities. (Should the local authorities of provinces, counties, cities, townships, towns and villages be elected? If elected, then on what principles should the elections be conducted? If appointed, then by whom?)

(b) Composition and structure of the local organs of authority of provinces, counties, cities, townships, towns and villages, to include the designation, duties, and rights of local authorities.

(c) Jurisdiction, powers and duties of the local organs of authority (provinces, counties, cities, townships, towns and villages.)

5. Judicial Organs.

(a) Composition (For example: Type, size, and number of courts, establishment of any other judicial organizations.)

(b) Powers and duties of courts and other judicial bodies.

(c) Selection and replacement of judicial personnel.

(For example: Election or appointment of members, term of office, removal from office.)

6. Method of changing and amending Provisional Charter.

Subjects not listed above which appear appropriate for inclusion in the Provisional Charter may be included in your reply.

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US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
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JOINT COMMISSION DECISION No. 13*
(Revision of Joint Commission Decision No. 6)

LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR THE
KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES
AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
REGARDING THE
POLITICAL PLATFORM OF THE
PROVISIONAL KOREAN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

A. Political Policies of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

1. Rights of citizens - What rights and duties of Korean citizens, male and female, must be proclaimed in the political platform of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government?

2. Elimination of Japanese influence.

   a. What measures should be undertaken for the elimination of the evil consequences of the prolonged Japanese domination in Korea.

   b. What measures should be taken by the Korean Provisional Democratic Government to classify and punish those Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese to the detriment of Korea and Koreans?

3. How should excessive private concentration of economic or political power, and the activity of reactionary, anti-democratic elements and elements attempting to undermine the Provisional Korean Government, be prevented?

4. Law and Justice.

   a. What policy should be followed in establishing a Korean code of law?

   b. How shall the courts judiciary and legal procedures in the Korean language be established?

   c. How is the democraticization of the judiciary to be exercised?

5. What should be the policy relative to minorities and non-citizens?

B. Economic Policies of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

1. What measures should be taken with respect to the development of agriculture, industry and transportation, in order to increase production and to raise the living standards of the Korean people?

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*Approved 7 June 1947
(J.C. 32nd Mtg, Item 2)
Supersedes Joint Commission
Decision No. 6.

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2. Agricultural Land Tenure.

a. What should be the policy with respect to the system of landlordism and tenancy prevailing under the Japanese?

b. What policies should be followed with respect to land tenure?

(1) Private ownership of land with the farmer having a completely free title.

(2) Private ownership of land but, in the case of land obtained from the government, the right to sell or mortgage would be restricted by the State.

(3) Nationalization of land belonging to landlords and its transference to farmers for permanent and free use.

(4) Any other methods of solution of the question of land tenure you may suggest.

c. What special policies should be followed with respect to land formerly owned by the Japanese?

d. If land owned by Korean landlords is to be distributed to tenants, should these landlords be compensated for their land?

e. Should land distributed to tenant farmers be sold or distributed free?

f. What should be the policies with respect to irrigation facilities and their use?

3. Organization of Industry.

a. What should be the policy with respect to industrial production and distribution?

b. What kind of ownership (public, private or cooperative) should be adopted for each of the following:

Large industries (for example, steel and chemicals)
Medium industries (for example, textiles and shoes)
Small industries (for example, furniture and farm tools)
Banks
Wholesalers
Retailers
Mineral resources
Forests
Railroads
Shipping companies
Insurance
Fishing industries
Public utilities (for example, electric power, water, communications)
Household industries.

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4. Labor, Wages and Social Security.

   a. What should be the policy with respect to minimum wages, maximum hours, and working conditions?

   b. What should be the policy with respect to labor of children and women?

   c. What should be the policy with respect to labor organizations?

   d. What should be the policy with respect to social insurance?

   e. What should be the policy with respect to increasing the efficiency of labor?

5. Trade and Prices.

   a. Should a program of rationing the necessities of life be continued while commodities are scarce? If so, how should this program be administered.

   b. What should be the policy with respect to the collection of essential foodstuffs.

   c. What type of program of price stabilization and control, if any, should be undertaken.

   d. What measures should be taken to cope with speculation and hoarding.

   e. What should the policy be with respect to the foreign trade of Korea.

6. Finance.

   a. What should be the policy with respect to:

      (1) Income taxes
      (2) Taxes on real property
      (3) Sales taxes
      (4) Taxes on imports and exports
      (5) Receipts from government monopolies
      (6) Inheritance taxes
      (7) Any other taxes

   b. What measures should be undertaken to establish a uniform and sound system of currency throughout Korea.

   c. What should the policy be in respect to balancing the budget.

   d. What measures should be taken to cope with excessively high interest charges (usury).

C. Educational and Cultural Policies of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

   1. Education - What educational program should be adopted and developed in Korea in the following fields?

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(a) Elimination of illiteracy among adults.
(b) Compulsory lower school attendance.
(c) Middle school.
(d) Higher levels of education.

2. Training - What program should be established to train Korean specialists and technicians to fill all necessary positions in economic and governmental activities.

3. National Culture - What measures should be undertaken to promote the development of national culture, art, and also of science.

4. Public Health - How should health protection be organized.

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TENTATIVE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF REPLIES OF MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPS TO JOINT COMMISSION QUESTIONNAIRES 5 and 6 REGARDING CHARTER AND PLATFORM FOR KOREAN PROVISIONAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

(Based upon as yet incomplete translations of replies of Political Parties and Social Organizations.)

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People's Front	Moderate Groups	Right
(replies of North and South Korea Labor Parties, both essentially the same)	(as represented by coalition of moderate groups, under leadership of KIMM Kiu Sic)	(from replies of Hankook Democratic Party and 133 other righist groups)

ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

People's Front	Moderate Groups	Right
1. Centralized "Democratic People's Republic".	1. Centralized "Republic of Korea".	1. Centralized "Republic of Korea".
2. All-powerful Cabinet of 15 selected by Joint Commission on advice of Democratic Political Parties and Social Organizations.	2. Legislative Organ, selected by Korean Committee of Democratic Political Parties and Social Organizations with approval of Joint Commission. Representation 25% left, 50% neutral, 25% right.	2. President elected by universal secret ballot.
3. Present People's Committees retained in North Korea, and system extended to South Korea.	3. Legislature appoints Board of Presidents, Chief Executives.	3. President appoints Provisional Parliament and directly or indirectly all other officials of government.

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

People's Front	Moderate Groups	Right
1. Cabinet of 15 has full executive and legislative power.	1. Legislature appoints President, two vice presidents, Prime Minister, and State Affairs Committee.	1. President appoints State Affairs Commission, headed by Secretary of State and including 16 ministers, each a director of department.
2. Eventually Cabinet will draft constitution and select People's Congress which, in turn, selects President.	2. 15 ministers nominated by Legislature, appointed by Prime Minister.	2. Theoretical separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches. However, presidential appointive power and his power to implement laws by ordinances makes him supreme.
3. Cabinet appoints supreme court.	3. President appoints Chief Justice and Chief Prosecutor and other judicial officers upon nomination by Legislature.	3. President appoints judiciary.
		4. Provisional Parliament adopts election law, and thereupon Legislature is elected by universal secret ballot.

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People's Front	Moderate Groups	Right
	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	
1. At present, Cabinet appoints Provincial Committees; Provincial Committees in turn appoint local committees.	1. State Affairs Committee nominates chief provincial officials who are appointed by the President.	1. Provincial Governors appointed by Secretary of State on recommendation of Minister of Home Affairs. County officials are appointed by Minister of Home Affairs. Township officials appointed by Provincial Governor.
2. Ultimately all People's Committees to be chosen by people through usual communist "election" procedures.	2. Provincial Affairs Committee composed of officials and local residents nominate most local leaders, whose appointments are confirmed by appropriate National Minister. Provides for general election of Provincial Congress at a later time.	2. Provincial and local consultative councils elected by popular vote, have power to ratify appointment of bureau chiefs on provincial, county & township levels.
	PLATFORM	
1. Nationalization of industry, including mines, railroads, banks, utilities & major industries.	1. Major industries nationalized; medium industries partly nationalized; small industries privately owned.	1. Nationalization of mines, railroads, utilities & certain unspecified industries; semi-government operation of other major industries; remainder private.
2. Tenancy abolished; all land over 12.5 acres confiscated and distributed "free of charge" with State controlling land.	2. Tenancy abolished. Rights of private ownership recognized. Former Japanese land, plus land of Korean landlords, distributed "free," with compensation to ex-landlords. 20% of total land involved in transfers to be nationalized & utilized on collective basis by villages.	2. Private ownership of land upheld. Distribution to tenant farmers of all ex-Japanese farm land, plus all land over 12.5 acres of Korean landlords. Payment to landlords on graduated basis; farmers purchase land on installments, 25% of crop for period 10 to 15 years.

3. All three groups have outlined essentially similar progressive labor legislation, guaranteeing rights of workers and including social security legislation.

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American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
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PRESS RELEASE BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN: 12 July 1947

In a hearty response to the Joint Commission's invitation to Koreans for consultation regarding formation of a Korean Provisional Government, 463 political parties and social organizations submitted applications. Of these applicants for consultation, 425 were from the American zone of occupation in southern Korea and 38 from Korea north of the 38th parallel.

Although Koreans both north and south of the 38th parallel were asked to submit applications under identical conditions, there is a sharp contrast between the lists of applicants from North and South Korea. All organizations in the North Korea list are members of the People's Front, and are affiliated with the North Korea People's Committee. The groups applying from southern Korea are almost entirely non-official and represent all shades of political opinion. More than two-thirds of the South Korean applicants are of right, middle-of-the-road, or moderate left political complexion. Less than twenty-five percent of the applicants are in the People's Front, both with regard to numbers of organizations and total membership.

Applicants from South Korea represent a broad cross-section of Korean society, including 39 political parties, 101 civil organizations, 54 cooperative, economic and business associations, 43 professional, scientific, and technical societies, 40 cultural groups, 35 labor unions, 34 young men's organizations, 31 religious groups, 19 relief and welfare agencies, 15 farmers' unions and agricultural organizations, and 14 women's organizations.

The North Korea list includes three political parties, 18 labor unions, five cultural groups, three religious organizations, two welfare groups, two civic organizations, and one each of

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the following organizations: farmers' union, consumers cooperative, women's, youth, and technical.

The single organization with the highest claimed membership applying was the Democratic People's Front of South Korea, with 6,217,819 members. The second highest was the Federation of Women's Associations in South Korea with 4,525,150 member. The group with the lowest membership was the Korean Patriots' Relief Association, with 22 members. The largest single political party registered in all Korea was the Hankook Democratic Party in South Korea, with a claimed membership of 865,706.

The largest religious groups to apply for consultation include the Central Headquarters of the Korea Buddhists, with 4,250,120 members and the Headquarters of the Chun Do Kyo, native religion, with 4,064,000 members. The largest individual women's organization to apply for consultation is the Women's Association of the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, with a claimed membership of 3,281,724. The largest farmers organization applying is the North Korea Peasants Alliance, with a claimed membership of 2,572,714. The largest economic group is the North Korea Consumers Cooperative Alliance with claimed membership of 2,751,798. The largest youth group to apply is the Young Korea Party of South Korea, with 1,889,000 claimed membership.

Eighteen of the organizations applying for consultation have claimed memberships of more than one million. However, the bulk of those applying are relatively small, 291 having less than 10,000 members. There is considerable duplication of membership on the list; for example, membership is given for both individual political parties and coalitions of parties. There is additional duplication of membership because many

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individual Koreans are members of several of the various organizations applying for consultation. Claimed membership of all 463 organizations applying for consultation totals about 70,000,000, of whom about eighty per cent are from south of the 38th parallel, and twenty per cent from North Korea. Several fraudulent applications have been discovered; for example, one large youth organization registered under three different names.

The large number of applications stemmed in part from Soviet refusal to agree to any definition in Joint Decision No. 12 regarding political parties and social organizations, or to any limitation on applications with respect to membership or types of organizations. Social organizations applying include a wide variety of organizations, such as the North Korea Society of the People's Air Fleet, the Merchants Association for Dong Dae Moon Market, the Kyonggi Province Mid-Wives Association, and the Korean Young Men's Esperanto League.

Of the 463 organizations applying for consultation, 435 handed in answers to the Joint Commission questionnaires concerning the Provisional Charter and Political Platform of the Korean Provisional Government by the deadline of 5 July 1947. The Joint Commission is engaged in translation, tabulation and analysis of these answers.

This list of democratic parties and social organizations to be consulted by the Joint Commission will be published as soon as it has been agreed upon by the Joint Commission.

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July 15, 1947

PRESS RELEASE OF CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

The US - Soviet Joint Commission held its 42nd meeting, 1330, 14 July 1947, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea. General Brown was Chairman.

The Joint Commission has continued the discussion of a disagreement which arose in the 37th meeting and extended through to the 42nd meeting, on the list of parties and organizations to be invited for initial consultation. The basic issues involved in this disagreement are as follows :

I. Soviet Delegation's General Position:

1. That parties and organizations falling within the following categories should not be included in the list for initial consultation, specifically:

a. Those not classified by them as social organizations,

b. District and other purely local organizations, and

c. Those which it contends do not intend to support fully the Moscow Decision, especially members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations.

I. American Delegation's General Position:

1. That Soviet Delegation's proposals are contrary to:

a. Paragraph 1 of the three principles of the Foreign Ministers upon which agreement for reconvention of the Joint Commission was reached: "Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

b. Paragraph 5, Joint Commission Decision published in Communique No. 11, mutually

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agreed to and signed by the Chief Commissioner of each Delegation:

"Subcommission No. 1, upon receiving the applications for consulation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration. . . ."

II. The Soviet Delegation's Specific Contentions are:

1. That industrial, mercantile and producers' organizations, such as Chambers of Commerce, Industrial Medical Institute, Buddhist Research Institute, Accountants' Society and societies organized for the study of politics and economics, are not in fact social organizations as the word "social" is used in the Moscow Decision.

II. The American Delegation's Specific Contentions are:

1. a. The Moscow Decision does not define the term "social organization."

b. The Soviet Delegation refused requests of the American Delegation to define the terms in the Joint Commission Decision.

c. The American Delegation served notice on the Soviet Delegation prior to final decision that after joint approval of the Joint Commission Decision No. 12, the American Delegation would not agree to amendment or change in the decision as finally agreed upon. Therefore, the term "social organization" must be interpreted as defined in the dictionaries of the world.

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2. A party or organization local in character which has no central zonal office is not eligible for consultation.

2. District and other purely local organizations are not barred by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall - Molotov agreement, or Joint Commission Decision. In order to eliminate small organizations, the American Delegation several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000 or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet Delegation.

3. The good faith of a party or organization which signs the declaration and applies for consultation, and thus agrees to uphold the Moscow Decision, is challenged by the Soviet Delegation if such party or organization continues membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or a similar organization. Such party or organization is acceptable for consultation only if it publicly withdraws from membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization.

3. a. Parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations are clearly eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall - Molotov agreement if they have applied for consultation and signed the required declaration.

b. They remain eligible unless and until they are by mutual agreement excluded after indictment as provided by paragraph 3 of the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers - namely "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission

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4. The fact that a party is eligible for consultation under the agreement of the Ministers, as published in Joint Commission Decision, does not mean that it must be admitted for consultation by the Joint Commission.

5. In order for a party to be placed on the list for consultation, it must be acceptable to both Delegations.

should not, after signing the declaration contained in communique No. 5, foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations, which, after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

4. The arbitrary line of distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation", nullifies the agreements reached by the two Ministers (quoted in 1. a. above) and by the Joint Commission.

5. The first paragraph of the agreement accepted by Mr. Molotov and rewritten into Joint Commission Decisions specifically states that all parties and social organizations which sign the application

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for consultation are eligible and must be accepted for consultation. The contention by the Soviet Delegation is an attempt to establish ar arbitrary veto power over consultation, which is implicit in the method of compiling the list proposed by the Soviet Delegation. There is no provision in any of the agreements reached which provides such veto power.

There are two basic issues involved in the differences outlined above:

The first issue is whether one delegation may unilaterally exercise veto power and exclude from consultation any party or social organization that it does not approve. The Soviet Delegation wishes to exercise such veto power. The American Delegation maintains that this is an arbitrary position and is contrary to the agreement of the Foreign Ministers. Furthermore, it is impractical in application because it could be used to exclude parties and social organizations to such a degree that consultation would not represent a fair sample of Korean opinion. The U.S. position is that exclusion from consultation can only be by mutual agreement of both delegations as specifically stated in the Marshall - Molotov letters. The U.S. Delegation has many times offered to review systematically the whole list of applicants and consider any and all objections by either delegation to various parties and organizations in order to make a decision as to which should be excluded through mutual agreement. The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly refused such proposals.

The second issue is in regard to membership of a party or organization in the so-called Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization. The Soviet Delegation has not brought specific charges

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against any one party that it has actually fomented or instigated active opposition to the Joint Commission or the Moscow Decision after signing the declaration, but has arbitrarily accused all the member parties of bad faith and imply that they are guilty even before they have been indicted. The U.S. position is that no party or social organization can be assumed guilty of acting in bad faith until it has been indicted and proven guilty of actions which do in fact incite and foment active opposition to the Joint Commission, the Moscow Decision, or either of the Allies.

The American Delegation has consistently upheld and will continue to insist on complete implementation of the Marshall - Molotov agreements which guarantee wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in consultation and freedom of expression of opinion by all Koreans.

The Joint Commission is continuing its meetings in an attempt to resolve these basic differences.

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31 July 1947

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION, MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

On July 15 the Chief Commissioner the American Delegation issued a statement to the Press. Since that time the issues presented in that release have continued to be the subject of Joint Commission meeting through July 29.

In the meeting of July 29 the Soviet Delegation rejected a proposal made by the American Delegation.

This American proposal, made on July 25, would give the Joint Commission an accurate listing of all applicant parties and the position of each delegation with respect to each of the parties. The American Delegation proposed specifically that Subcommission Number 1 be directed to reconvene and to consider the application of all parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission and to prepare:

(1) A list of all of those parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation;

(2) A list of those parties and social organizations appearing on the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) which <u>both</u> the Soviet and American Delegations are willing to exclude from oral consultation, with the reasons for exclusion;

(3) An additional list of those parties and social organizations appearing on the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) with which <u>either</u> delegation does not wish to consult, orally, together with a statement of specific objections in each case;

(4) To prepare a complete list of all representatives of parties and social organizations appearing in the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) and a list of those with which either delegation does not wish to consult, together with a statement

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of the specific objections in each case.

This American proposal would not prejudice the Soviet position in the Joint Commission nor would it assist the American position. It would, however, result in a clear factual picture of both positions.

This proposal was made after the Soviet Delegation had reintroduced without substantial modification a proposal which had been presented by them on 12 July and reiterated on many previous occasions. The Soviet Delegation has not since then manifested any willingness to alter this proposal in any way to effect a compromise with the many proposals which had been made by the American Delegation. In this Soviet proposal was contained a list of parties and organizations, each with a claimed membership of over 10,000, for consideration by Subcommission No. 1. However, the Soviet list did not include certain important parties and organizations, each with a claimed membership of over 10,000, which have qualified for consultation with the Joint Commission. It has been the Soviet contention that these parties and organizations being members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee could not be placed on the list for initial consultation.

The American Delegation has always been ready to exclude from oral consultation parties and social organizations that are fraudulent or duplicative, or which for just cause are indicted before the Commission and adequate and proper evidence is presented to prove the guilt of the accused parties.

The eligible parties and organizations can be removed from the list only by mutual agreement after indictment as provided by paragraph 3 of the agreement of the Foreign Ministers: "Those individuals, parties and social organizations, which after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Com-

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mission."

The American Delegation has always insisted on full and free consultation. It will not agree to the unilateral exclusion by the Soviet Delegation of parties and social organizations which are entitled to consultation. The American Delegation has agreed to review systematically the list of applicant parties and organizations with a view to excluding for cause those that may not be eligible for consultation. The Soviet Delegation has refused to review the list in this manner.

If we examine in detail the 12 July Soviet proposal, we find that the Soviet list eliminated 27 parties, 3 for fraud and 24 others which represent large and important groups of the rightists and moderates. The 24 parties eliminated have a claimed membership of over 15 million. The Soviet list includes for South Korea 118 parties and organizations which, from records available to the American Delegation, should be classified as follows:

A - SOUTH KOREA:

	Political Orientation				
	Right	Moderate Right	Moderate	Left Moderate	People's Front
Number of parties	44	18	9	6	41
Total Membership (in thousands)	12,483	4,029	2,882	4,609	14,450

If to the above tabulation are added the 28 People's Front groups with membership in excess of 10,000, included in the list from North Korea, the classification of Parties and Social organizations of all Korea would be as follows:

B - ALL KOREA:

Number of parties	44	18	9	6	69
Total membership (in thousands)	12,483	4,029	2,882	4,609	27,707

Examination of the tables above show that if the Soviet proposal is followed, and if the moderate are considered as right, there are 71 rightist parties in South Korea as against 47 leftist. Claimed

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membership of the 71 rightist parties is 19.3 million, and claimed membership of the 47 leftist parties slightly over 19 million. By adding the 28 parties and organizations of North Korea, each of over 10,000 membership, all members of the People's Front, we get actually 71 parties of the right, with a total claimed membership of 19.3 million, but an increase of leftist representation to 75 parties with a claimed membership of 32.3 million.

Furthermore, there is no assurance that further elimination of rightist parties and organizations would not be attempted by the Soviet Delegation.

Although the Soviets deny that it is their intention to eliminate the rightist from proper participation in the government, and also deny that they intend by such elimination to bring about a future government of Korea predominantly People's Front, acceptance of their proposal by the American Delegation would nevertheless inevitably lead to this result, because the People's Front groups would be given an overwhelming majority.

The only objective of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission is to establish a Korean Provisional Democratic Government that fully reflects the wishes of the Korean people. The position taken by the American Delegation is that no one faction shall dominate the creation of this government because no one group enjoys a majority support of the masses of the Korean people. It is highly undesirable, therefore, that either the extreme right or the extreme left have a dominating position in consultation with the Joint Commission.

At the meeting of July 29 the Soviet Delegation summarily rejected the proposal of the American Delegation without discussion and without stating proper cause. The balance of the meeting was taken up with general discussion.

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STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

7 August 1947

A Soviet proposal that representatives of 15 South Korean parties under Soviet suspicion be called before the Joint Commission for questioning marked the 51st Meeting of the Commission, August 5th.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov gave as his reason for the questioning of the representatives, a desire to have them clarify points in a letter which the representatives of the 15 organizations sent to the Commission when they learned that the Soviet Delegation desired to exclude certain organizations from oral consultation with the Joint Commission on the grounds that the parties opposed the Moscow Decision.

Major General Albert E. Brown, in an attempt to understand the Soviet view, inquired of General Shtikov what questions were to be asked. The Chief Soviet Commissioner replied only that he would ask questions designed to clarify the letter. General Shtikov stated he also desired to verify the signature in the letter.

The U.S. Delegation pointed out that the letter was a voluntary effort of these parties and social organizations to assist the Joint Commission to overcome the deadlock announced in the press over the Soviet refusal to consult with parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The U.S. Delegation has upheld the right of all parties and social organizations to be consulted which have signed the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, and no evidence against any of these parties has been produced. The American Delegation maintained that any questions which either Delegation desired to ask any representatives could and should be asked when the representatives appeared for oral consultation and not in special examination proceedings. The American Delegation, therefore, rejected the Soviet proposal.

The letter, which had been introduced during the 49th Meeting of the Joint Commission, on July 31st, is as follows:

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LETTER SUBMITTED BY THE MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE UNITED COUNCIL

28 July 1947

TO: Chief Commissioners
Soviet and American Delegations
US-USSR Joint Commission

Gentlemen:

This is on behalf of the member organizations of the United Council, to express our sincere appreciation of the hard and fine work that you and your colleagues have been rendering in the US-Soviet Joint Commission for the cause of Korean independence, and, at the same time, to offer to you our loyal cooperation in every possible way to a successful conclusion of the great and difficult task that is, we feel, both yours and ours also.

We are informed that one of the issues upon which the U.S. and the Soviet delegations have not been able to come to an agreement is the membership in the so called anti-trusteeship committee of some of our member organizations. The position of the Soviet delegation as reported in the press is that certain parties who were formerly active in the anti-trusteeship committee should be excluded from consultation with the Joint Commission.

It is true that the anti-trusteeship committee had been formed with a view to oppose in the future the trusteeship that is foreshadowed but not explained in the Moscow Decision. However the basic right of free expression of opinion has been guaranteed to the Koreans, as you will readily agree, in the official letters exchanged between General Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State and Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, prior to the reconvention of the Joint Commission at Seoul on May 21. Furthermore, we can assure you that the anti-trusteeship committee has never actively opposed or instigated active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission. This is well proved by its action that, in the early part of June, the committee called its member organizations together in a great conference for discussion on the matter

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of the participation in the Joint Commission and upon the finding that the organizations could not come to an agreement it was decided that the matter of participation in the Joint Commission should be left to the free choice of each individual organization affiliated with the anti-trusteeship committee and that there should be no active opposition between those organizations which will consult with the Joint Commission and those which will not.

Furthermore none of the organizations which applied for consultation participated in any way in the so-called June 23 demonstration.

Those organizations which are members of the anti-trusteeship committee and have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission are definitely of the opinion that they should fully cooperate with the Joint Commission in the formation of a provisional government which is its task in the first stage, and, after the formation of the provisional government, in the discussion of the measures of aid and assistance that is its task in the second stage by expressing their honest opinions, and by expressing even an honest expression of difference to any measure should it infringe upon Korean national sovereignty or interfere with Korean internal politics. Apart from these reservations of right the organizations have never instigated, nor will instigate, any active opposition to the work of the Joint Committee. An active opposition to it is indeed contrary to their own policy of consultation with the Joint Commission.

(Signed with Seal By)

Yi, Yun Yung - Vice Chairman of the United Council for the Establishment of Provisional Government.

Yi Yun Yung, Vice Chairman of the Chosun Democratic Party.

Duk, Soo Chong, The Democratic Party of Korea.

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Sim, Yi Sung, The Popular Party,

Son, Ta Ri, - The Tehundo Kyo Bokik Party.

You, Hong, - The 1919 Independence Declaration Memorial Association.

Ryu, Chin San, The General League of Youngmen's Korea.

Sun, Chung Hi, The Korean Military Affairs Association.

Esther Whong, Union of All Womens' Associations in Korea.

Pahk, Sang Ho, Women's Patriotic Association.

Choi, Yun Dong - The Kwang Bok Hoi.

Chun, Chin Han, - General Labor League for the Korean Independence.

Chal, Tak Ryong, The Korean Independent Young Men's Association.

Choi, Hueng Cho, - Korean Youngmen's Association.

Lee, Sun Keun, Young Korean Party.

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN
DELEGATION, US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

9 August 1947

The present failure of agreement in the Joint Commission and the letter recently written the Commission by certain members of the United Council has again raised the question of "Freedom of Expression." The opinions of the American Delegation on this question were presented to the Joint Commission and read into the records at its 52nd meeting. These views have been previously released to the Korean press by the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation. It appears advisable at this time that they be restated.

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

In the meetings of the Joint Commission in 1946 the Soviet Delegation took the position that those Koreans who did not fully support the Moscow Decision would not be accepted for consultation by the Joint Commission. They even insisted that objection to one word of the Moscow Decision was failure to fully support the Moscow Decision. The Commanding General, Soviet Forces in North Korea, followed this contention up to his letter of February 28, 1947, in reply to the letter of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, of December 24, 1946. During the exchange of letters between the Commanders, attempt was made to reach a formula which would define the limit of objection to the Moscow Decision beyond which a Korean could not go without being barred from consultation with the Joint Commission. The Soviet Commander of North Korea in his letter of 26 November 1946 recommended a formula to cover this matter. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, in his letter of December 24, 1946, recommended certain modifications to the formula proposed. The matter was taken up by the two Ministers, and they agreed to accept the formula proposed by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, in his letter of December 24, 1946. Under this formula a Korean representative of a political party or social organization, which party or organization signs the application for consultation, may freely express his opinion publicly or privately concerning the Moscow Decision, the future formation of his government or any words, phrases or thoughts involved in either, provided he does not instigate or foment active opposition against the Moscow Decision or either of the Allies.

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation has throughout the past several weeks attempted to return to his position of a year

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ago. He apparently has not understood the efforts of the two Commanders in Korea to resolve this difficulty and the decision reached by the two Ministers, which has in fact resolved the difficulty if it is faithfully followed. As a matter of fact, in the Subcommission No. 1 meeting of May 28, 1947, the Soviet representative, Mr. Tounkin, made the statement that the Soviet Delegation would not agree to consultation with any Korean who did not fully support the Moscow Decision and every paragraph of that decision. While this statement does not go as far as the intent of the Soviet Delegation to oppose those who object to a word contained in the Moscow Decision, it still goes a long distance back from the agreement by the two Ministers and in fact destroys the value of that agreement, returning the Soviets as it does to their original position of May 1946.

Furthermore, in the 43rd meeting on July 16, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation made the following statement: "The Soviet Delegation does not wish to speak with and consult those which carry on a fight against the Moscow Decision even if it is one word or one period in the Moscow Decision."

The Moscow Decision is so written that practically each provision contained in it is subject to wide interpretion. There is one word in this decision, however, to which a partial interpretion is given--that is the word "trusteeship." The Moscow Decision interprets trusteeship as "aid and assistance." It further guarantees to the Korean people independence. The Korean people are a proud race. They were subject to Japanese domination for 40 years. It is perfectly natural that they should crave full and complete independence. The Korean people naturally fear that in offering them aid and assistance as provided by the Moscow Decision, attempts will be made to control the government of the nation and to delay or destroy their independence. It is possible that control will be necessary. However, the Moscow Decision clearly envisages the extent of that

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control as that required to make effective the aid and assistance rendered. The aid and assistance rendered likewise being limited to that essential to assure that Korea is properly evolved during the period of aid and assistance into a full, free and independent nation. It is perfectly natural, the exact extent of the aid and assistance to be rendered not being defined, that Koreans should have different ideas as to the interpretion of the Moscow Decision on this point. Having these ideas, it is natural that they should express them. It is also natural that they should state their objection to any interference with the sovereignty of their nation. It is this right of any free man to express his thoughts in private or in public without being excluded from consultation that the United States Government has consistently insisted upon in its dealings with the Soviet Government concerning the establishment of a Provisional Government for Korea. It is this principle to which the Soviet authorities agreed after almost one year of exchange of views. It is this principle which the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation and the Soviet Delegation is now trying to destroy, thus repudiating the agreement signed by their Minister and their own signed agreement on Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

The American Delegation does not regard expression of opposition to "trusteeship" as fomenting and instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision. The Moscow Decision is a broad document which by direct statement or by implication covers all requirements included in the creation and evolution of a government over a reunited Korea. As previously stated, every loyal Korean craves independence for his country. All Koreans welcome the opportunity to secure that independence under the Moscow Decision. They fear and distrust but one concept of that decision--the unknown implication of the word "trusteeship." The Moscow Decision states in paragraph 1 the intent of the document--that is, "to reestablish Korea as an in-

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dependent state; to create conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea." Unquestionably those who wrote it had no intention by inserting in paragraph 3 the word "trusteeship", to vitiate the provision of the entire document. How then can discussion of and statement of opinions against fancied or exaggerated meanings of this word be considered as opposition to the document? Such a contention is untenable.

The American Delegation does not regard membership by a political party or social organization in an anti-trusteeship committee or any similar organization as a bar to its admission for consultation by the Joint Commission. It is perfectly natural that political parties and social organizations should join together in committees for the discussion and consideration of the aid and assistance to be rendered to their country and should call themselves anti-trusteeship or similar named committees. As long as these committees confine their activities to free expression of opinion and stop short of fomenting and instigating active opposition, they are permitted under the agreement of our Ministers to express their opposition.

As a matter of fact, paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision assigns to the Joint Commission the task, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations, to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. How can the Joint Commission expect any Korean who remains silent on this important matter to be of any assistance to the Joint Commission at the time when it must determine and resolve its responsibility under this requirement of paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision. The Joint

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Commission has recently broadcast throughout Korea an invitiation to all Koreans to freely express themselves as to the formation of their government, its charter and platform. This is an invitation to Koreans to think, discuss and present views on the future of Korea. After the Provisional Government is formed, one of the most vital and important topics involved in any such discussion, from the Korean point of view, is trusteeship. What are the Soviets trying to do? Goad patriotic Koreans to the point of actually fomenting and instigating active opposition so that they can discredit them from consultation with this Commission, or are they actually proceeding in good faith to attempt to evolve a Provisional Government and Korean independence under the provision of the Moscow Decision? Do they intend to follow the signed agreement reached by their Ministers?

There are different kinds of trusteeship. That exercised by the United Nations is one form known throughout the world. Before Japan annexed Korea it pretended to exercise another form, now hated and feared by all loyal Koreans. Trusteeship as prescribed in the Moscow Decision is not known nor can it be known until its definition is worked out as provided under the Moscow Decision. When Koreans say that they object to trusteeship, they are objecting to an imaginary concept or to the hated Japanese concept, not an actuality. It should be the effort of the Joint Commission to quiet the fears of the Koreans, to educate and guide them in a proper understanding of this term, and methods which will be employed in applying it, not to condemn them, to convict them without a hearing and to bar them from proper participation in what to them is the most vital interest of their life - the formation of a free and independent government for their country.

The American Delegation requests the Soviet Delegation to join with it in a sincere and honest effort to create a provisional government over a united Korea as provided for by the Moscow Decision and thus to demonstrate to the world that two great powers can unselfishly work together in the interest of a small, weak and dependent nation.

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN DELEGATION,
MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

14 August 1947

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has received many questions concerning the work of the Joint Commission by members of the Press, the Korean public, and by parties and social organizations who have applied for consultation. The American Delegation would like to answer the more frequently asked questions in the following statement.

The position of the Soviet Delegation as the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation sees it is:

1. That political parties or organizations can only be placed on the list for consultation by mutual agreement of Subcommission No. 1, which means that the Soviets could by withholding approval to the inclusion on the list of any party dictate the makeup of the list. This is in fact a contention that the Soviets must hold the veto power.

2. That certain parties (almost all are rightist) must be denied consultation through the device of excluding:

(a) Parties alleged to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organizations,

(b) Those without zonal headquarters,

(c) Those not social.

The list of parties and organizations with membership in excess of 10,000 submitted by the Soviets as the parties and organizations which are not suspicious to them and with which they are apparently willing to consult omits 24 important parties each of which has a membership in excess of 10,000, all but one of these 24 are apparently rightist, and contain the most important rightist parties requesting consultation. The Soviet Delegation states that these 24 parties are omitted because they are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. In the first place, the American Delegation is unwilling to concede that mere membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee a basis for denying the right of consultation to any group. In the second place, as far as the American Delegation can determine, only 9 of these 24 parties were at one time members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The others are apparently eliminated arbitrarily; at least, the Soviets refused to state their reasons for their elimination. The Soviets have apparently also included on the list presented by them certain parties and organizations which were reported at one time to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. They do not explain why they are willing to consult with certain parties which were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee while they refused to consult with certain other parties which were also reported to be members of this committee. It is a reasonable conclusion that they were reserving the right to question these parties at a later date and deny them consultation in the improbable event that the American Delegation should accept the Soviet view. It is likely that there were other parties and organizations on the list submitted by the Soviet Delegation with which at a later date they would refuse to consult because of their "non-social" or "local" character.

The Soviet proposal to deny consultation to the 24 parties omitted from their list is apparently in furtherance of the plan to eliminate from consultation an important segment of Korean public opinion which holds different political views. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has many times asked the Soviet Delegation to produce adequate and satisfactory evidence upon which the American Delegation could determine the validity of the Soviet contentions. None has been produced.

The Soviet contentions are:

1. <u>That these 24 parties are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.</u> They have produced no evidence to substantiate this contention. They simply make the statement. They vaguely mention certain newspaper articles. The reliability of newspaper articles is doubtful. However, they have not even produced those newspaper articles nor read them into the record as evidence. When the Chief

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Commissioner of the American Delegation attempted to get the Soviet Delegation to discuss their reasons for excluding these 24 parties by discussing each party as a separate entity, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation not only refused to discuss the issue but even refused to answer the questions of the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation.

2. That the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is engaged in fomenting and instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation has produced no evidence to prove this contention. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has many times asked them for evidence.

3. That the 24 parties bear responsibility for an Anti-Trusteeship Committee demonstration on 23 June. They contend that this Anti-Trusteeship Committee demonstration was instigated and participated in by the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. They have offered no proof of this fact other than a statement that they have a letter signed by KIM, Koo. They have made no attempt to link any one of these 24 parties specifically with that demonstration.

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has written in to the record the results which approval of the Soviet proposal would produce. In effect it would change the three to two rightist majority of applicant parties in all Korea to an overwhelming leftist majority. It would actually at this early stage of the meeting of the Joint Commission assure an entirely unwarranted, definite leftist control over a united Korea, which in fact would mean domination by groups imbued with Communist Party principles. It is highly naive of the Soviet Delegation to expect that this could be accepted by the American Delegation. Should the American Delegation agree to any such political maneuver, it would be contrary to the role of the Joint Commission and such action would be condemned by the honest people throughout the world.

The right is not a unified group and some of the more extreme elements have revealed their political immaturity and instability by eliminating themselves from consultation through refusing to apply. These extremists continue their clamoring against an as yet undefined arrangement - trusteeship; the maneuvers of this group are not the business of the Joint Commission, but of the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea. General Brown assures you that any attempt to disturb public order by the group will be promptly dealt with.

The American Delegation believes that all shades of public opinion among the Korean population which have applied for consultation should be given a hearing. However, if any parties and organizations are uncooperative with the Joint Commission or inimical to the best interests of Korea, then the American Delegation is willing to push aside these obstacles to the accomplishment of its most pressing task - the establishment of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. However, if the right is arbitrarily eliminated, a proper balance is restored only by arbitrary elimination of the extreme left also. Should both of these groups be eliminated, two of the largest segments of the people would have no voice in consultation.

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PRESS RELEASE OF MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN, CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

14 August 1947

On 12 August 1947 the United States Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, wrote to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. V. M. Molotov, calling his attention to the deadlock that has existed in the proceedings of the US-USSR Joint Commission which has been meeting in Seoul to recommend to the Four Powers the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

General Marshall suggested in his letter to Mr. Molotov that the respective delegations of the Joint Commission be called upon to submit a report of their work to their governments by 21 August 1947 in order "that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations."

Verbatim copies of this letter, copies attached, were sent to the governments of the United Kingdom and China.

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LETTER MARSHALL TO MOLOTOV

12 August 1947

Dear Mr. Molotov:

In your letter of April 19, 1947, you suggested that the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea resume its work on May 20 in Seoul "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea" and that the Commission should present the result of its work for the consideration of the Soviet and United States Governments in July and August, 1947. According to all reports received from the American delegation to the Joint Commission, it has been impossible for the two delegations to agree on the issue of broad consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations. This situtation has continued without material change for more than one month and is a matter of great concern to the government of the United States.

You will recall that in my letter to you of May 2, I referred to your statement that the work of the Commission should be "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement" and that in order to avoid future misunderstanding I made clear my interpretation of that phrase. I pointed out that it had been the consistent and well-known position of the United States Government that "Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." In your reply of May 7 you did not take exception to this position. You accepted as a basis for reconvening the Commission the suggestion outlined by General Hodge in his letter to General Chistiakov of December 24, 1946, which was in accordance with the United States position described above. In further-

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ance of this policy the American delegation to the Joint Commission has maintained that there should be the widest possible participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and that in such participation there shall be no restriction on freedom of expression and opinion of all Koreans. In an effort to expedite matters the U.S. Delegation has several times offerred to limit oral consultations to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet Delegation.

The United States Government believes that, in justice to the Korean people whose hopes of independence have been so long postponed, there cannot be further delay. It is the desire therefore of this government that by August 21, 1947, the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations so that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations.

I am providing copies of this message to the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.

I have the honor to be, etc. . . .

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Soviet-American Joint Commission
Soviet Delegation
Seoul, Korea

TO: Chief Commissioner of U. S. Delegation,
Major General Albert E. Brown

25 August 1947

Dear General Brown:

I am forwarding to you a copy of the answer by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, dated 22 August 1947, to the letter of the Secretary of State of the United States, George C. Marshall, of 12 August 1947, regarding Korea.

ANNEX: Copy of letter on two sheets.

Respectfully yours,

Chief Commissioner of Soviet
Delegation of the Joint
Soviet-American Commission
Colonel General T. F. Shtikov

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Soviet-American Joint Commission
Soviet Delegation
Seoul, Korea

TO: Chief Commissioner of U. S. Delegation,
Major General Albert E. Brown

25 August 1947

Dear General Brown:

I am forwarding to you a copy of the answer by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, dated 22 August 1947, to the letter of the Secretary of State of the United States, George C. Marshall, of 12 August 1947, regarding Korea.

ANNEX: Copy of letter on two sheets.

Respectfully yours,

Chief Commissioner of Soviet
Delegation of the Joint
Soviet-American Commission
Colonel General T. F. Shtikov

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Dear Mr. Marshall:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter 12-8-47 regarding the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

As it is known the work of the Joint Commission was renewed on the basis of the three conditions of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations cited in full in my letter of 7 May 1947 and accepted by you in your letter of 13 May. The Soviet Delegation had been instructed to be guided by these very conditions in the questions relating to consultation.

According to these conditions the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Nevertheless, in order to participate in consultation parties and organizations affiliated with the Committee for Struggle against the Moscow Decision Regarding Trusteeship had also filed applications.

The Soviet government considers that such parties and organizations could be admitted to consultation only provided that such parties and organizations would officially sever their relations with the aforementioned Committee, and would declare that they would withdraw from that committee, without which no consultation should effected with them.

The Soviet government, which upholds the position of broad consultation with Korean democratic parties and organizations, does not feel that the Joint Commission should consult with such organizations which have in their ranks merely tens or hundreds of individuals. A great number of such organizations is present and the consultation with them could not be effective because of their non-authoritative character; furthermore, the consultation with such small groups would have delayed the work of the Joint Commission by many months and would lead to the deferment, by a long period of time, of the creation of the government of Korea.

The Soviet government considers that consultation may take place with such parties and organizations whose membership exceeds

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10,000 members.

As regards your reminder stating that no limitation of any kind of the freedom of word and opinion should obtain in the course of consultation, this must extend in the first place to the parties and organizations which cooperate with the realization of the Moscow Decision.

In the meantime currently the parties and organizations of South Korea which maintain the position of upholding the Moscow Decision are subjected on the part of American authorities in Korea to most severe limitations and harsh persecutions, which contradicts democratic principles and completely does not correspond to the decisions of the Moscow conference. The premises of such parties and organizations are seized by the police authorities, their leaders and members are being arrested and their printed organs are being suppressed.

The Soviet government feels such a state of affairs to be abnormal and inadmissible and to exclude the possibility of a correct fulfillment of the decision of the Moscow conference of the three ministers on Korea, if such persecution of the democratic organizations and leaders of South Korea should not be immediately and fully discontinued. The Soviet government deems necessary that the delegation of the U.S.A. in the Joint Commission should receive appropriate instructions for the fulfillment of the agreement reached by the governments of the US and USSR during April of the present year and it does not object to your proposal that the Joint Commission should report regarding the status of its work in order that each government could immediately consider what steps it would be expedient to take in order to fulfill the aims of the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Delegation had been given instructions in accordance with the aforementioned.

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Copies of this letter are being simultaneously forwarded by me to the governments of Great Britain and China.

I beg, Mr. Secretary of State to receive assurance of my very high respect,

Signed: V. Molotov

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION
MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

23 August 1947

In view of the fact that three weeks have passed since the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation issued a report on the progress of the Joint Commission, it is deemed advisable to inform representatives of the Korean and American press, so they can inform the people, what efforts have been and are now being made to resolve the Commission's present impasse.

Little progress has been made, despite continued meetings and discussions, on the compilation of a list of parties and social organizations to be admitted for oral consultation.

The Soviet Delegation continues to uphold its right to exercise a veto power over certain parties of which it is suspicious. The American Delegation, on the other hand, remains firm in its stand for full and free consultation, based on the contention that all parties and organizations in Korea must receive equitable and fair treatment in accordance with the principle of fair play.

Repeated proposals have been made by the American Delegation to review systematically the list of applicants for consultation to determine if any should be excluded for cause. Each time such proposals have been rejected by the Soviet Delegation.

Within the past three weeks the American Delegation has made three specific proposals as part of a concentrated effort to resolve the present disagreement over consultation and thus to expedite other phases of the Joint Commission's work. Two of these proposals have been rejected by the Soviet Delegation and there has been no answer, up to the present time, to the third proposal.

At the 48th meeting, on 29 July 1947, it was proposed:

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At the 48th meeting, on 29 July 1947, it was proposed:

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"That the Soviet Delegation conduct consultation with those political parties and social organizations of North Korea and the American Delegation consult with those political parties and social organizations of South Korea."

At the 50th meeting, on 1 August 1947, the American Delegation made the following proposal:

"That consultation be conducted jointly north and south of the 38th Parallel with those parties which the Soviet Delegation is willing to hear, and that the American Delegation conduct unilateral consultation south of the 38th with those parties they (the Soviet Delegation) claim are suspicious to them. Such consultation by the American Delegation will be considered consultation with the Joint Commission."

Both of these proposals were rejected by the Soviet Delegation.

The third proposal, made at the 53rd meeting, on 12 August 1947, and to which no reply has been received, reads as follows:

"1. Oral consultation shall be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement.

"2. Directive to be issued to Subcommission No. 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission a provisional charter and political platform for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective.

"3. The Joint Commission shall in the charter proposed to the Four Powers include a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national legislature and such other individuals of the government as the charter may specify, which election shall be held with free electioneering, secret and multi-party ballots, under international supervision. That Sub-

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commission No. 2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election in North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with the proposed charter.

"4. That Subcommission No. 3 be directed to prepare a plan for the selection of appointive personnel for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government together with a plan for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea."

Through a general free election as outlined in this proposal, the American Delegation feels the Korean people could express opinions which because of the position taken by the Soviet Delegation cannot be obtained through oral consultation on a broad basis. It is the belief of the American Delegation that a general election, where a clear and free election under international supervision is guaranteed, would permit even wider expression of opinion than would consultation.

The third proposal made at the 53rd meeting on 12 August 1947 visualized that the only change which would be made in Joint Commission Decision No. 12 would be that initial oral consultation as specified in paragraph 7 of that Decision would be cancelled and the written answers to questionnaires substituted therefor. The proposal did not abandon the creation of the consultative body as required by paragraph 9, Joint Commission Decision No. 12. With the consultative body, representing all shades of Korean opinion to advise it, the Joint Commission should be able to organize a general election which would lead to free expression of the desires of the Korean people as to their government.

On several occasions since the receipt of Secretary Marshall's letter to Foreign Minister Molotov requesting both delegations to submit a report to their respective governments

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by August 21, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation made overtures looking toward the preparation of a joint report. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation said he would be unable to collaborate on a joint report pending instructions from his government, which had not been received.

The American Delegation compiled its own confidential report on progress of the Joint Commission and the document has been forwarded to Secretary Marshall.

At the Commission's 54th meeting, on 20 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation registered a vehement protest over what he called "repression" of Leftist leaders and organizations in South Korea. Many of them, he said, support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission and have applied for consultation. He cited numerous instances of arrests, declaring these arrests created conditions which "impede" fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and the Marshall-Molotov Agreement and charging that the situation has been created to undermine the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Commissioner insisted that the American Delegation take immediate measures "for restoration of the normal conditions for existence and activities of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea."

The American Delegation replied it would need time to have this document translated and prepare a reply, and stated:

"In listening to the document, it is the opinion of the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation that the Soviet Delegation is attempting to interfere in the conduct of the government of South Korea. It is not the function of the Joint Commission to govern Korea, but to prepare plans which will establish a government which in the future will govern Korea. There are others who have present responsibilities for governing Korea. The American Delegation will reply to this statement at a later date."

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STATEMENT OF THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE PRESS ON
22 AUGUST 1947

In Joint Commission's Session on the 20th of August the Soviet Delegation made a statement pertaining to the mass arrests which take place in South Korea.

Following is the text of this statement:

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Following is the text of this statement:

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THE SOVIET DELEGATION

US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

THE STATEMENT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

20 August 1947

As it is known, the US-USSR Joint Commission was created in accordance with the Moscow Agreement"in order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures." According to paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision, "in preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations."

During the course of its work this year, the Joint Commission adopted the coordinated Decision #12 on the order of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, worked out and approved questionnaires on governmental structure of Korea and on a political platform of a future Provisional Korean Democratic Government, sent out these questionnaires to all the Korean democratic parties and organizations, which expressed their desire to participate in consultation with the Joint Commission.

Democratic parties and social organizations of North as well as South Korea signed the declaration, set forth in Joint Communique #5, submitted declarations to the Joint Commission for participation in consultation, designated their representatives for oral consultation with the Joint Commission, and also submitted their considerations on the structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter), and on a political platform for a Provisional Government.

During the study of a list of democratic parties and social organizations by the Joint Commission, essential differences of opinions arose and the work of the Joint Commission is being delayod because of this.

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The Korean people follow the work of the Joint Commission with anxiety and with understandable and legitimate impatience await the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

And now, in this responsible and tense moment in the work of the Joint Commission, mass arrests of leaders and actual closing down of democratic parties and social organizations of the Leftist trend, pograms of Leftist Democratic newspapers, arrests of workers of the Leftist Democratic press, began in South Korea. Arrests are being carried out in Seoul, as well as in the provinces.

It should be noted that the repression is carried out only against those democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea, which actually support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission.

Among those arrested, some are representatives of democratic parties and social organizations, designated for participation in oral consultation with the Joint Commission.

I shall cite several instances which, nevertheless, vividly show the amplitude of repressions in South Korea, directed against the above mentioned democratic parties and social organizations.

These instances became known to the Soviet Delegation from conversations with numerous Korean delegations, as well as from the news releases of the South Korean press.

During the People's meeting of 27 July 1947 in Seoul, organized by the Democratic People's Front of South Korea for the support of the work of the Joint Commission, where, as it is known, the Chief Commissioners of both delegations were present, the Korean police, in the presence of the members of the Joint Commission, arrested the representative of the Trade Union and the representative of the Women's Union immediately following their appearance at this meeting with the appeal to support the work of the Joint Commission. A few days later one of the organizers of this meeting, KIM KWAN SU, was arrested.

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The Deputy Leader of the Labor Party of South Korea, LEE GEE SOK, was arrested as well as other members of the Central Committee of the Labor Party.

On 12 August in the office of the Central Committee of the Democratic People's Front and on the premises of the "Moon Hack" Publishing Company, a large number of leading workers and working personnel of the Central Committee of the DPF and of the Publishing Company were arrested. During 11 and 12 August leading workers of the city and region committees of the Democratic People's Front of Seoul were arrested on working premises and in their quarters.

At the beginning of August, PAIK, YONG HI, chairman of All Korea Farmer's Alliance, was arrested; on 12 August, LEE, KOO HOON, deputy chairman of the All Korea Farmer's Alliance, KIM, KI YOUNG, chief of the General Affairs Department, HYUNG SONG OOK (?), chief of Propaganda Department, CHOI, HAN CHOL (?), member of the Presidiam and many other members of the All Korea Farmer's Alliance were arrested.

MOON, EUN CHONG and PAK BONG OO (?), members of the Central Committee of the Confederation of Trade Unions, were arrested as well as many other leading workers.

The leading workers of the Democratic Women's Union, among them, YOO, YAWNG CHOON, chairman of the Women's Union, and CHAN, CHIL SON (?), deputy chairman, were arrested.

Also the leading staff of the Cooperative Union (PAK, KYON SOO (?), the chairman, and AN, KI SUNG (?), a member of the Central Committee) the leading staff of the Union of Literary Men (PAK, CHAN MO (?), chief of the Propaganda Department), YOON, HAK KI (?), a member of the Central Committee of the Lawyers Union, workers of the newspapers "Taklin Sinbo" and "Noryok Inmin," CHAN, SUN HAK (?), LEE, SIN SIK (?), KIM, HO DGIN (?), and others were arrested.

In addition the leading staff of the Laboring People's Party (PAIK, NAM UN, LEE, YAH SUNG, HAN IL TE (?), SIN, DON IL (?), PAK,

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TAN CHAL (?), and many others), as well as the leading staff of the Young Friends' Party (PAK, OO CHEN (?), KIM, BEN DE (?), and others) were arrested.

Upon orders of authorities, the premises of the Central Committee of the Democratic People's Front, of the Central Committee of the Labor Party, of the Central Committee of the Republican People's Party, of the Central Committee of All Korea Confederation of Trade Unions and other democratic organizations were closed down.

Many of those arrested are members of the delegations which visited the Joint Commission with the purpose of conveying to it the demands and good wishes of the people.

A group of correspondents of democratic newspapers, which attended a press conference held by the Soviet Delegation for the purpose of informing the press and the public opinion of the course of work of the Joint Commission, was arrested upon leaving the Duk Soo Palace on 14 August.

The numerous arrests of the leaders of the democratic parties and organizations, many of whom are designated representatives of these parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission, created in South Korea conditions which impede the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, and the agreement reached between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall.

Such a situation is being created, it seems, with the aim of undermining the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation draws the attention of the American delegation in the Joint Commission toward serious consideration of these circumstances and insists on taking of immediate measures for restoration of the normal conditions for existence and activities of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea, and for appropriate conditions for work of the Joint Commission.

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STATEMENT OF ALBERT E. BROWN, CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
AMERICAN DELEGATION, US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

25 August 1947.

At the 54th meeting of the Joint Commission, 20 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation read a statement concerning the arrest of certain leftist leaders of South Korea. In this statement he requested the American Delegation to join with the Soviet Delegation in initiating certain action. The Chief Commissoner of the American Delegation informed the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation that before the American Delegation could comment on his statement it would be necessary to have it translated, that comment would be made at a later meeting. He also informed the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation that in listening to the Soviet statement it appeared to the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation as though the Soviet Delegation was attempting to interfere with the Government of South Korea, that the Joint Commission had no responsibility at this time for governing Korea, but did have responsibility for preparing plans for the formation of a government which would later govern Korea.

On August 22nd the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation released to the American and Korean press the above mentioned statement. By informing the people of the world of a complaint against an outside third party - the South Korean Government - prior to agreement by the American Delegation, which was not even given a chance to reply, the Soviet Delegation is in fact attempting to usurp the functions of the Joint Commission and to take upon itself action which the Joint Commission could only take by mutual agreement of both delegations. The Soviet Delegation overlooks the fact that while in South Korea it is actually a guest of the South Korea Government and of the United States which this government represents, and that it should follow the normal dictates of

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common courtesy in conducting its business.

The statement that fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is being impeded by the arrest of the few individuals reported in the Soviet statement is absurd. There remain tens of thousands of individuals left in the political parties and organizations represented by those arrested who can substitute for them if necessary as representatives of their parties and organizations. Moreover, for reasons totally unrelated to the arrests, the Joint Commission has had no prospect of holding oral consultation since the meeting of 2nd July. The arrests, therefore, have no bearing whatsoever on the conduct of oral consultation. Furthermore, the Soviet Delegation does not know whether, if oral consultation should commence tomorrow, the individuals of whose arrests it complains would or would not be made available for consultation. I can assure the Soviet Delegation that the American Delegation will join with it in requesting that any individual with whom the Joint Commission desires to consult be made available to the Joint Commission for that purpose. The American Delegation also expects that the Soviet Delegation will join with it in producing certain individuals now held under arrest in North Korea with whom the American Delegation is most anxious to consult.

The statement of the Soviet Delegation that these arrests seem to have been made for the purpose of creating conditions which would undermine the work of the Joint Commission is pure fantasy. The Soviet Delegation is bringing these charges for purposes of pure propaganda and of creating a smoke-screen to obscure certain strategic blunders of the Soviet Delegation. These blunders have placed the Soviet Delegation, through its inexcusable refusal to consult broadly with Korean parties and social organizations, in the position of repudiating the Marshall-Molotov Agreement and holding up the work of the Joint Commission, the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea and the final establishment of Korean

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independence.

While the American Delegation did not and would not have raised the issue, since the Soviet Delegation itself raised it, the American Delegation desires to make the following comments on the activities of the parties and organizations in South Korea which the Soviet Delegation is attempting to defend.

The South Korea Labor Party and other parties and organizations, members of the Democratic People's Front of South Korea, have since their inception been disloyal to the government of South Korea and hostile to the United States. They have used illegal means, including subversive action, to embarrass and undermine the governmental functions in the United States zone.

They have been aided and abetted in such actions by the Democratic People's Front of North Korea.

Agents from without South Korea have been sent into South Korea to organize disorders against the government and to lead parties and organizations, members of the Democratic People's Front, in such disorders.

Unless and until the parties and organizations holding membership in the Democratic People's Front cease their present policy of intrigue and disloyalty to the existing government, their leaders must accept the responsibility for the illegal acts of the parties which they lead and which they presumably plan and direct. Such responsibility includes the ever present possibility of arrest, fine and/or imprisonment..

The government of South Korea has authority to take such action as is necessary to protect itself.

The American Delegation once again advises the Soviet Delegation to avoid entanglement in Korean politics, particularly in support of parties and organizations hostile to the United States.

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Following is text of letter sent by Acting Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, to Mr. Molotov on 26 August 1947.

Dear Mr. Molotov:

In your letter of August 23, 1947, to Secretary Marshall, the position of the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission has been set forth in terms which corroborate a recent report received by this Government from the US Delegation to the Joint Commission. The report of the United States Delegation was in compliance with the desire of Secretary Marshall as set forth in his letter to you of August 12 that a report from the Joint Commission should be submitted by August 21 in order that our governments might immediately consider what further steps may be useful to achieve the long delayed unification and independence of Korea.

The report of the United States Delegation makes it clear that the Joint Commission has been unable to reach agreement regarding the basis on which representatives of democratic Korean parties and social organizations shall be consulted by the Joint Commission. The U. S. Delegation also reports that it has been unable to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Delegation to any alternative method of completing the task of the Joint Commission.

As pointed out in your letter it was agreed in the interchange of correspondence inMay of this year that the "Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea." You will, however, recall that in your letter of May 7 you expressly agreed to the interpretation of the above phrase as proposed by the US Commander in Korea that "signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation." The parties and organizations mentioned by you as belonging to the Anti-Trusteeship committee did sign Communique No. 5 and are, in the opinion of the US Government, eligible for initial cnnsultations.

Your letters of May 7 also provided that any decision excluding individuals, parties and social organizations for active opposition to the

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work of the Joint Commission "shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission." Accordingly, the US Delegation has repeatedly, but without success, attempted to obtain from the Soviet Delegation agreement to criteria for consultation with Korean parties and social organizations applying for such consultation in accordance with the terms embodied in your letter. The Soviet Delegation has insisted on the unilateral right to exclude parties which have expressed distaste for "Trusteeship," even though such parties have declared and reiterated their intention fully to support the Joint Commission andhave in fact, since signing the declaration not instigated active opposition to the work of the Commission.

The Soviet position is not only contrary to the specific terms of the agreement between you and Secretary Marshall, it is also contrary to the democratic principle of freedom of opinion. In Secretary Marshall's letter to you of August 11, 1947, reference was made to the fact that the United States Delegation has several times offered to limit oral consultations to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000 or any other reasonable figure proposed by theSoviet Delegation. The U.S. Delegation reports, however, that when the Soviet Delegation proposed limiting consultation to parties of 10,000 or more, the Soviet Delegation submitted a list which omitted 24 such parties which claimed total membership of 1[illegible],200,000 and refused to consider any other list or alternative proposal.

The U. S. Government denies categorically that there has been oppression or persecution of Korean parties or individuals in the US zone as charged in your letter. The arrests which you mention have been necessary to control subversive activities aimed at the destruction of constituted government and law and order in the American zone. United States forces are charged with the responsibility for maintaining law and order in South Korea without interference with democratic rights. That they have done so successfully is amply proven by the freedom with which all shades of political opinion are expressed and respected in the United States zone.

It is noted that you have no objection to the proposal that the Joint Commission furnish an agreed report to our two governments. The United States

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Delegation has accordingly been instructed to take immediate steps to reach agreement on a joint report of the status of the deliberations of the Joint Commission. In view of the position set forth in your letter and the report already rendered by the United States Delegation, however, it is apparent that a joint report can accomplish little other than a formal delineation of the issues which have prevented the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement. For almost two years the Government of the UnitedStates has devoted its utmost efforts to carrying out the terms of the Moscow Agreement on Korea.

The present stalemate in the Joint Commission negotiations and the failure of thatcommission to accomplish even the first task of its mission have made it abundantly clear to all that bilateral negotiations on the subject of consultation with Korean political parties and organizations will only serve to delay the implementation of this agreement and defeat its announced purposes of bringing about early independence for Korea. The United States Government cannot in good conscience be a party to any such delay in the fulfillment of its commitment to the Korean independence and proposed that the Four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out. The United States Government therefore submits for the consideration of your government the enclosed outline of proposals designed to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The United States government proposes thatthese suggestions be considered at an early date by the powers adhering to that agreement.

It is therefore hoped that the Soviet Charge D'Affaires at Washington or an authorized deputy may be designated to participate in Four Power conversations on this problem at Washington beginning on September 8, 1947. It is believed that the Joint Commission's report on the status of its deliberations might be helpful in consideration of the United States proposals during these Four Power conversations. The U.S. Delegation has accordingly been instructed to endeavor to reach agreement with the Soviet Delegation on a joint report to be submitted not later than September 5, 1947.

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Copies of this letter are being transmitted to the Foreign Ministers of the UK and China together with invitations to participate in the Four Power conversations referred to above.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed) ROBERT A. LOVETT

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Enclosure to Mr. Lovett's letter to Molotov, 26 August 1947

UNITED STATES PROPOSALS REGARDING KOREA

1. In both the USSR and US zones of Korea there shall be held early elections to chose wholly representative provisional legislature for each zone. Voting shall be by secret, multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage and elections shall be held in accordance in each zone.

2. These provisional local legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. This legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional government for a United Korea.

3. The resulting provisional government of a United Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the Four Powers adhering to the Agreement on Korea to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken.

5. The Korean provisional government and the powers concerned shall agree upon a date which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.

6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea.

7. Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate cases.

Sent Moscow, London, Nanking and Seoul.

(signed) LOVETT

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STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

3 September 1947

The American Delegation has carefully studied the counter-proposals submitted by the Soviet Delegation on 26 August 1947 in reply to the American Delegation proposals of 12 August 1947.

The Soviet counter-proposals contain the same objectionable features which have characterized almost every proposal which the Soviet Delegation has made since the Joint Commission first met on 20 March 1946 and reconvened on 21 May 1947.

The Soviet counter-proposals maintain the position of "exclusion" and the right to the veto power as insisted upon by them throughout the recent discussion of consultation. More specifically, they exclude from membership in the consultative body representatives of parties stated by them to be non-democratic, representatives of all parties and organizations with membership less than 10,000, those who do not fully support the Moscow Decision, and those who struggle against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers.

Paragraph 2 of the Soviet counter-proposals visualizes the creation of a "Provisional All Korean People's Assembly", which resembles a consultative body. The creation of a consultative group on a fair and liberal basis and the methods by which it is to be established were already agreed to by the American and Soviet Delegations and included in Joint Commission Decision No. 12. The counter-proposal presently submitted by the Soviet Delegation would, therefore, in fact create a consultative body of a type and in a manner different from that agreed upon by the Soviet and American Delegations, as promulgated in Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

Acceptance of the Soviet counter-proposals would create a consultative body from which would be excluded representatives of 24 major rightist groups of South Korea, with a claimed membership in excess of 15½ million. Should the American Delegation be foolish enough to accept these counter-proposals, it would change

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the normally substantial rightist-moderate majority throughout North and South Korea to an overwhelming and unrealistic leftist majority. It thus reverses the actual political situation.

The Soviet Delegation offers what is ostensibly a fair proposal - "the creation of a legislative body, elections for which should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general, direct, equal suffrage, by secret ballot." However, closer study indicates that the "election" would without doubt only be conducted after the leftist dominated consultative body and the government created by it had organized and prepared Korea for the type of election recently conducted in North Korea under which 99 percent of the people, as the Soviets said, "willingly and voluntarily dropped their ballots into the white box" - an election typical of those being held in other Soviet satellite countries.

What have the Soviets to be afraid of in forming a govemment by free participation of all political groups? They have a deep and serious fear, otherwise they would be content to proceed to form a government which would assure to all of the political groups in Korea an equal opportunity for consultation and at the polls.

The position of the Soviet Delegation has been made crystal clear, more so than ever before, by the statement in the latest Soviet proposals that "The number of representatives in a Provisional All Korean People's Assembly for North and South Korea must be equal", when as a matter of fact everyone will admit that the population of South Korea is more than double that of North Korea.

There is nothing in the Moscow Agreement with respect to Korea which justifies or supports the Soviet position as indicated above. That Agreement is a brief, simple document, the clear

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purpose of which was the setting up of an independent government for all Korea of a democratic nature through consultations with Korean democratic parties and organizations and by the rendering of such aid and assistance as might later be determined, with the participation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government, to develop and maintain democratic self-government in Korea.

The American Delegation cannot, therefore, agree to these counter-proposals as presented by the Soviet Delegation.

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PRESS RELEASE OF MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

8 September 1947

In compliance with the letter of August 26, 1947, of the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, Robert A. Lovett, to the Foreign Minister of USSR, V. M. Molotov, the American Delegation has been attempting for the past ten days to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Delegation to a joint report. The purpose of this report was to inform the two governments as to the reason why the Joint Commission had been unable to agree on the principles involved in the first task facing the Commission at its present session - the establishment of a provisional government over a united Korea. This report was to have been presented to the Powers not later than September 5th.

Initial responsibility for the preparation of this report was placed upon Subcommission No. 1, which after several meetings found it impossible to reconcile the divergent points of view presented in the two draft reports which had been prepared by each Delegation. The problem was then discussed at one full meeting of the Joint Commission which referred it back to Subcommission No. 1 for further consideration. After several meetings, Subcommission No. 1 again failed to agree and the matter was referred back to the Joint Commission. On the initiative of the American Delegation, the Joint Commission then took each report and discussed them paragraph by paragraph. After completion of this discussion, it was found that each side had made so many objections and reservations with regard to the report of the other that no joint report was possible.

Thereupon the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation proposed that the full report of each Delegation be transmitted to the two governments concerned with a covering letter signed by the two Chief Commissioners stating that neither side agreed fully

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with the contents of the other's report. The Soviet Delegation declined this proposal. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation then proposed that the sections of the two reports dealing with the positions of the two Delegations be extracted from the full reports and transmitted to the governments concerned with a covering letter of the nature indicated above. This proposal the Soviet Delegation also declined, and gave no reason for refusing to forward both statements except that this would not constitute a "joint" report. When the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation then inquired of the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation what suggestions he had for resolving the difficulties, he replied that he had no proposals to make. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation proposed, as the only other alternative, that each Delegation report to its government that no agreement could be reached on a joint report. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation accepted this proposal.

In the discussions it became quite clear that the Soviet Delegation wished to prepare a joint report which would obscure the basic disagreements regarding consultation which have been stated in previous releases. The Soviet Delegation attempted to remove from the U. S. statement of its position all factual statements which accurately portrayed the U. S. position and explained essential points of difference between the American and the Soviet positions.

For example, the Soviet Delegation wished to remove from the U. S. statement of its position all references to the published letter, written by the nine members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee excluded from the Soviet list and other members of the United Council, in which full cooperation was promised the Joint Commission. It also wished to delete all references to the 24 parties excluded from the proposed Soviet list of democratic parties and social organizations with a membership of 10,000 or

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above, together with the statistical analysis that showed that acceptance of the Soviet proposal would have given the Democratic People's Front an overwhelming majority. To have acceded to these proposals would have meant that the report would not contain a true statement of the U. S. position.

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THE STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, COLONEL-GENERAL T. F. SHTIKOV, AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE

9 September 1947

On 4 September 1947, the U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. M. Molotov, sent through the Soviet Ambassador to the United States to the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. G. C. Marshall, the following reply to the letter of the U. S. Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Lovett, of 26 August 1947, on the question of Korea:

"Dear Mr. Marshall,

"I acknowledge the receipt of the letter from Mr. Lovett of 26 August 1947.

"I deem it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that the preliminary elaboration of measures to assist in the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, according to the Decision of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, is being carried out by the Joint Commission, which had been formed of the representatives of the Soviet Command in North Korea and the representatives of the American Command in South Korea.

"The recommendations elaborated by the Joint Commission prior to their final acceptance, according to the Moscow Decision, should be presented for the consideration of the four powers, which include the governments of Great Britain and China.

"Furthermore, the governments of Great Britain and China, together with the governments of the U. S. S. R. and the U. S., will participate in the consideration of the proposals elaborated by the Joint Soviet-American Commission on the measures of helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, in order to work out an agreement on a four-power trusteeship representing Korea.

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"The task of the Soviet American Joint Commission, as it is known, consists in assisting the formation of one Provisional Democratic Government for all Korea. It is true that the Joint Commission has as yet done little in this direction, but such a circumstance resulted mainly from the position taken by the American Delegation regarding the question of consultation of the Commission with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, which had been noted in my last letter addressed to you.

"Had the American Delegation displayed a proper inclination to the rendering of aid in the formation of a truly democratic government in Korea, then the work of the Joint Commission would have been more successful; the task, imposed on it, may have been fulfilled and there would not have been such a stagnant condition in the work of the Joint Commission, which in the letter of Mr. Lovett was called a stalemate.

"As you know, the Soviet Delegation, desiring to resolve the situation existing in the Joint Commission, and striving to expedite the work on the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, agreed with the proposal of the American Delegation to dispense with oral consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and on 26 August 1947 submitted a new proposal on the formation of a consultative body -- a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly -- of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of all Korea. This proposal should not, in our opinion, meet with any objection on the part of the American Delegation, because it could eliminate the difficulties which confront the Joint Commission.

"We deem it necessary to add to the above statement that the successful realization of the measures indicated in the proposal of the Soviet Delegation is only possible on the basis of free and unhindered activity of democratic parties and organizations, representatives of which are currently subjected in South Korea to

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arrests and other repressions, which fact is incompatible with the principles of democracy and justice, as well as with those commitments which the governments of the USA and the USSR assumed towards Korea.

"Regarding the assertions stated in the letter of Mr. Lovett, pertaining to the position of the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission, the sense of which is that the Soviet Delegation, allegedly, does not evince any understanding of the proposals of the American Delegation, I do not see any necessity of dwelling upon these assertions in view of their obvious unfounded nature.

"At the same time, I cannot refrain from expressing regret in regard to actions undertaken by you unilaterally, such as your extension of invitations to the governments of Great Britain and China to participate in the discussions of this question, in which were set the place and date for the conference. Your proposal of transferring the question concerning the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government for consideration by the governments of t he four countries the Soviet Government considers inexpedient, because the Joint Commission is far from having exhausted all its possibilities for the working out of coordinated recommendations, which is entirely feasible.

" 'The U. S. proposals on Korea', as indicated in Mr. Lovett's letter, are also unacceptable. These proposals cannot help but result in further disunity of Korea, since they stipulate formation of separate legislative assemblies in South and North Korea (in the Soviet and American zones), whereas the urgent problem consists in securing as soon as possible a joint, even though provisional, but unified organ of power, i.e. of an All-Korea Provisional Democratic Government.

"The American proposal does not remove the now existing situation in Korea, which is the division of the country into two zones, for the liquidation of which all the efforts should be directed, but on the contrary the American proposal perpetuates this abnormal situation.

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"Bearing in mind that the proposal to review the question on Korea in a joint conference of the four-power representatives does not derive from the Moscow Decision of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Korea, and taking into consideration the above-mentioned reasons, the Soviet Government does not see the possibility of accepting Mr. Lovett's proposals advanced in his letter.

"Copies of this letter are being forwarded to the governments of Great Britain and China.

"I beg Mr. Secretary of State to accept the assurances of my very high respect.

V. M. Molotov"

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

17 September 1947

The work of the Joint Commission already has been at a standstill over a prolonged period of time. The Soviet Delegation regrets to recognize the unwillingness of the American Delegation to work in the Joint Commission on the solution of the questions connected with the formation of a unified Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which became so evident lately. Instead of striving for the overcoming of the difficulties arisen in the Joint Commission and for the acceptance of coordinated decisions, the American Delegation resorted to an artificial complication and prolonging of the Joint Commission work, emphasizing and sharpening of dissensions between the delegations with the purpose of proving the impossibility of resolving the questions confronting the Joint Commission.

It became especially apparent during the working out of the joint report by the Commission. Prior to the discussion of the presented joint draft reports by both delegations, the American Delegation proposed to dispense with the compilation of a joint report, and to forward the draft reports presented by the Soviet and American Delegations to the Governments along with an accompanying letter pointing out, that both Delegations could not reach an agreement regarding the joint report. Instead of a business-like discussion of the presented drafts, which should have as its aim the compilation of an acceptable joint report, the American Delegation resorted to trifling fault-findings, emphasizing the differences in the drafts, attempting to exclude any possibility of the compilation of a joint report, and thus, attempting also in this instance to show the impossibility of reaching an agreement in the Joint Commission.

The events which took place lately in the Joint Commission itself and outside of it, fully confirmed the apprehensions in connection with the true attitude of the American Delegation toward the

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work of the Joint Commission, which involuntarily arose even before in connection with the position of the American Delegation in regard to the proposals, submitted by the Soviet Delegation with the object of speeding up the work of the Joint Commission.

As it is known, the work of the Joint Commission was being delayed because of differences of opinion between the delegations on the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation.

The Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the solution of the question on the compilation of the list for consultation, repeatedly proposed to instruct Subcommission No. 1 to begin reviewing the applications for participation in consultation received from parties and organizations, to include in the list and immediately begin consultation with those parties and organizations whose admission to consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision, the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall as well as Joint Commission Decision No. 12, did not arouse suspicion, and then to continue consideration and verification of the remaining statements as to parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the Soviet Delegation made several proposals, whose object is the resolution of this question in compliance with the Molotov-Marshall agreement. If the American Delegation would have shown sufficient willingness to expedite the resolution of the disputed questions, the work of the Joint Commission would have considerably advanced as early as July. However, the aforementioned proposals of the Soviet Delegation were rejected by the American Delegation, which preferred to carry on discussions on general issues, avoiding the concrete individual considerations of applications for participation in consultation, submitted by parties and organizations, and by this prolonging the work of the Joint Commission.

Considering that as a result of the position taken by the

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American Delegation on the question of compilation of the list, the entire work of the Joint Commission was held up, the Soviet Delegation as early as 5 August 1947 suggested the commencement of the elaboration of proposals on the Provisional Charter, political platform, as well as on the questions of personnel of the Provisional Government the order of assumption of power by the Provisional Government and the selection of personnel.

The Soviet Delegation proceeded from the consideration that the Joint Commission has to perform a great amount of work on the elaboration of aforementioned proposals and that it is necessary to begin this work as soon as possible. However, even this proposal of the Soviet Delegation was rejected by the American Delegation, which refused to consider other questions listed on the program of work of the Joint Commission until the question of the list of parties and organizations would be solved.

26 August 1947, the Soviet Delegation introduced new proposals in reply to the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August 1947. The Soviet Delegation accepted point 1 of the proposals of the American Delegation - to dispense with oral consultation and to substitute it with the written proposals of Korean parties and organizations which were submitted to the Joint Commission as returns to the questionnaires. Therefore, the Delegations have reached an agreement on this question.

The Soviet Delegation proposed - to direct Subcommission #2 and 3 to commence the study of written proposals of democratic parties and social organizations on the questionnaires which were submitted to the Joint Commission and to present the drafts of proposals on corresponding questions to the Joint Commission. These proposals ensue from the plan of work which was accepted in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 22 May 1947, according to which the first stage of work of the Joint Commission includes the following questions:

1. Conditions and order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations.

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2. Elaboration of recommendations on the structure and principles of the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter).
3. Preliminary elaboration of the political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.
4. Elaboration of recommendations on the personnel of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.
5. Order of assumption of power by a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the order of selection of personnel for a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

The proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August concerning the work of Subcommissions #2 and #3 correspond in many ways with the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August.

The proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August also provided for the creation of a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations. This consultative body should be created in order to draw Koreans now towards a direct participation in the working out of all questions connected with the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government.

The American Delegation in the meeting on 3 September, stated that on the whole it was against the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August, but actually presented objections only against the proposals concerning the creation of a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly.

The American Delegation, in substance, did not object to other points of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned, the Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the creation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, insists upon the realization of those items

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from the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August and the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August regarding which the points of view of the two delegations are closer together and which correspond to the above cited decision of the Joint Commission of 22 May 1947, and it proposes to entrust:

(1) Subcommission No. 2 immediately to initiate the study of the written answers to the questionnaires distributed by the Joint Commission which had been submitted to the Joint Commission in written form by the democratic parties and social organizations, and to submit to the Joint Commission projects for the structure of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the local bodies of authority (Provisional Charter) and the political platform.

(2) Subcommission No. 3 to submit to the Joint Commission proposals regarding the personnel composition of the Provisional Government and regarding the order of assumption of authority by that government.

As regards the problem of the formation of the Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly, the Soviet Delegation considers that the objections regarding that question advanced by the American Delegation in its statement of 3 September to be not well founded and supposes that it is necessary to continue the discussion of this problem for the purpose of reaching agreement.

If this proposal will be accepted by the American Delegation, the Joint Commission directly will be able to begin elaboration on the proposals regarding the questions connected with the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which, in accordance with the Moscow Decision, the Joint Commission must present to the respective governments.

The Soviet Delegation deems it necessary to add that the successful work of the Joint Commission on the formation of a

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Provisional Korean Democratic Government is possible only on the condition of complete abolishment of the repressions regarding the democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea, the release of arrested leaders and members of these organizations, and the assurance of free and unimpeded activities of the said parties and organizations.

The Soviet Delegation proceeds from the fact that all efforts should be directed toward the formation of a unified All-Korean organ of power, that is of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and considers that the plans recently introduced which are actually leading to the re-enforcement of the already existent division of the country into two zones, conceal an even greater peril for the Korean people.

The Soviet Delegation still holds to the point of view that if both delegations desire to fulfill exactly and completely the Moscow Decision on Korea, and the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, the Joint Commission can successfully solve the problem, put before it, on the formation of a unified Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which is so impatiently awaited by the Korean people.

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Press Release 26 September 1947

STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

At the 60th meeting of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation presented a formal statement, which was given to the press on the 18th of September.

The Soviet statement is illustrative of what the American Delegation has with regret come to accept as typical Soviet propaganda. It is replete with misstatements. It manipulates facts in such a way as to distort them to bolster the Soviet Delegation's weak position. It deliberately omits reference to facts which support the American position and highlights those which support the Soviet position.

It would be both useless and pointless for the American Delegation to attempt to make specific replies to the false allegations or to correct the misstatements contained in the Soviet paper. The Soviet Delegation well knows the real point of disagreement between the two delegations. Briefly stated, it is the refusal of the Soviet Delegation to permit all segments of the Korean people to participate in the formation of their government and by the exclusion of certain groups which it does not like to insure the setting up of a Communist-dominated leftist government over a United Korea.

The methods used by the Soviet Delegation to sell a false concept to the peoples of the world are interesting. They undoubtedly will fool some people, particularly those who are blinded by propaganda. Fortunately the devious methods followed by the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission in 1946 and 1947 to attain its ends have been written into the record of the Joint Commission. There is no statement which it can now prepare which can change the written record. Any accusation which it may make can be answered by pages of quotations from the written record.

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The Soviet Delegation refuses to admit that any political party or social organization can be defined as "democratic" unless it follows the Moscow line. In doing this it has adopted the word "democratic" for its own purposes, using a definition without historical precedent and in violation of over two centuries of usage and development. Its refusal to consult with or to permit any political party or social organization other than one which is "democratic" by Soviet definition to participate in the formation of the provisional government naturally follows as a means of implementation.

The Soviet Delegation attempts to assure successful attainment of its objective by refusing to deal with any political party or social organization which "struggled against" the Moscow Decision. This was a particularly valuable fiction, which it invented to inflame an already volatile opposition.

The U. S. Delegation attempted to find a solution and has proposed many alternatives, one of which was a general supervised election which is recognized throughout the world as a democratic method of expression by a people. These were all refused by the Soviet Delegation, which instead proposed an unrepresentative consultative assembly. Not only did it exclude from this suggested consultative assembly all parties and organizations which opposed certain phrases in the Moscow Decision but it also claimed that representation from North Korea (where only Democratic People's Front parties and organizations were permitted to apply for consultation) should have equality of representation with South Korea, in spite of the fact that the population statistics show there are twice as many people in South Korea as in North Korea. The only possible result from accepting such a proposal

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would be the establishment of a Communist-controlled provisional governmant, with the majority of patriotic Koreans being excluded from participation.

The recent effort to reach agreement on a joint report to be subritted to the two governments also fully reflects the Soviet attitude. The Soviet Delegation openly and determinedly attempted to write a joint report which concealed the ~~Soviet attempt to~~ deny consultation with and participation by a large segment of Korean opinion in the formation of a provisional government for the specific purpose of arbitrarily setting up a Communist-dominated government.

The Soviet Delegation has the effrontery to demand the release of certain leftist leaders who have been arrested by the South Korean authorities for plotting subversive activities. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation again suggests that the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation confine his activities to matters which are of proper concern to him - the establishment of a provisional government and an independent Korea free from foreign domination. The arrest and punishment of subversive elements are the concern of the proper authorities, namely those who are responsible for the government of South Korea.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that unless and until the Soviet Delegation is willing to accept the principle of equality of consideration for participation in the formation of the provisional government of all political parties and social organizations which are not barred for specific cause by mutual agreement of both delegations, the American Delegation perceives no object in assigning tasks to Subcommissions 2 and 3 or in the further discussion of the formation of the Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly under the conditions proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

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The position of the American Delegation as expressed in the preceding paragraph is in exact accord with the agreements reached in the Marshall-Molotov exchange of letters on the basis of which the Joint Commission resumed its discussion.

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION, 26 September 1947

The Soviet Delegation in the Joint-Soviet American Commission has repeatedly made declarations regarding the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Korea and has insisted on them.

The Korean people with the assistance of the great allies must obtain its democratic government and independence. The basic document which expresses the aims of the allied governments to assist the Korean people in the rebirth of its statehood is the Moscow Decision on Korea of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This decision expounds the program of the allies on the restoration of Korea as a free and independent state.

As it is known, the majority of the Korean people and of the democratic parties and social organizations regarded with approval this decision. It is also known that certain political parties and their reactionary leaders have opposed and are still opposing the Moscow Decision. Up to date it is the fault of these reactionary leaders and their patrons that the Provisional Democratic Government of Korea has not yet been formed.

The Soviet Delegation, which represents the Soviet Command in Korea and which, in the course of a year and a half, has observed events, moods and aspirations of the Korean people, can note that the Korean people from the very first days of its liberation from the yoke of Japanese imperialism, began to evince a tremendous interest in political life, and is striving to acquire the experience in independent governing of its state.

At the moment of the arrival of the Soviet Army in Korea in August 1945 the Korean people have created throughout Korea organs of people's authority - local People's Committees as well as the Central People's Committee, the People's Republic. Representatives of all strata of the Korean people took part in these organs of authority.

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The Soviet Delegation can also note that in the course of two years of work the People's Committees, as organs of people's authority in North Korea, have performed a tremendous task and have realized a series of democratic reforms, supported and approved by the people. However, it should be noted that there were great difficulties in the progress of this work. These difficulties consisted in the guiding cadres having no necessary experience in solving the questions of state. It is true, as we know, that peoples are not born with experience, the experience is acquired through practical work. Therefore, the five-year term of trusteeship, anticipated in the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers, is fully sufficient for the growth of the national governmental cadres.

A different situation arose in South Korea. The People's Committees were not recognized by the American Military Command as organs of people's authority. The People's Committees of South Korea have not been admitted to govern the political and economic life, and, consequently, the growth of the guiding governmental personnel in the ranks of the Korean people was hindered. No democratic reforms have been introduced. Democratic parties and social organizations, upholding the Moscow Decision on Korea, their leaders, members and even sympathizers of these organizations, are subjected to cruel persecution.

Reactionary leaders of certain political parties of South Korea, being disposed against democratic reforms and against developing Korea along the democratic lines, opposed and are opposing the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They explain their opposition by the fact that the Moscow Decision stipulates trusteeship, which is allegedly not acceptable to Korean people. The Korean reactionary press, as well as some American newspapers, attempted to prompt the Korean people that the trusteeship was adopted because of the demand of the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union alledgedly strives to seize Korea and to establish there the Soviet ways.

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The Soviet Delegation deems it necessary to refute the rumors originating from the reactionary circles that the Soviet Union intends to seize Korea and to establish there Soviet ways as fictitious and inimical towards the Soviet Union. As it is known, the question of Korea was discussed at the Conference of Three Foreign Ministers in Moscow at the initiative of the American Delegation. The American draft proposed to establish a unified administration headed by the two commanders, who would have to govern Korea until the establishment of the trusteeship. The American draft anticipated the creation of an administrative organ composed of the representatives of the Four States (USA, China, United Kingdom and USSR), which would have to act in the name of the United Nations and in the name of the people of Korea. This administrative organ would have to be vested with such executive, legislative and judiciary authority which might be necessary for effective governing of Korea until the establishment of a Korean Government. At the same time, this administrative organ would have to realize its powers and functions through a high commissioner. It was proposed to carry out such governing of Korea in the course of five years. This term could have been extended by a further five years which would constitute in fact a ten year mandate type of government over Korea. The American draft did not anticipate the creation of a Korean Government.

The Soviet Union could not, of course, agree with such proposals of the American Delegation, in the first place because Korea had not been a belligerent against the Allies and in the second place because a five year term could be fully sufficient for restoration of statehood of Korea, for creating state institutions and for training the cadres for independent governing of the state.

The Soviet Delegation submitted its draft proposals for the consideration of the Ministers. The Soviet proposal took into account the interests and aspirations of the Korean people and provided for the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Govern-

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ment with the participation of which there would have to be worked out measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposal of the Soviet Delegation, with slight amendments, was adopted in the Conference of the Ministers. If the American proposal on Korea, submitted for consideration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, should be compared with the decision adopted by the Three Ministers, it will become clear to every Korean that the Moscow Decision is the more progressive decision respecting Korea and that it takes into account the interests of the Korean people. The Korean reactionaries are opposing this decision because they do not desire a democratic development for Korea. Nor do they desire democratic reforms demanded by the Korean people.

We are convinced that it is impossible to deceive or to intimidate the Korean people with clamor and slander. There are parties and leaders in Korea who are closely bound to the people, know their aspirations and expectations and who are able to discern what is more to their advantage: lawlessness, tyranny, want of rights, poverty, and colonial dependence or liberty, democratic rights and a free democratic independent Korean state. The Korean people cannot be bought with riches from beyond the seas; it has enough riches in its own country, with the mastery of which it could in a short time enter the ranks of most advanced countries of Asia.

The Soviet Delegation cannot understand the behavior of the American Delegation, which considers that whereas there are some Koreans who do not desire trusteeship, therefore, it is possible to get along without trusteeship. The Soviet Delegation is for trusteeship only because this trusteeship is stipulated by the Moscow Decision, which had been signed by our Ministers and must be exactly fulfilled. The Soviet Delegation cannot understand why the American

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Delegation, which regards with favor the activities of a small coterie of Korean reactionaries who appear under the motto of struggling against trusteeship, does not wish for the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, which had been adopted by the American Delegation itself. For its part, the Soviet Delegation has applied all its efforts in order to expedite the establishment of one democratic government for all Korea on the basis of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. However, the position taken by the American Delegation has up to now impeded the formation of this government.

The Soviet Delegation considers that it would be a deception to the Korean people to state that they could get along without trusteeship while American and Soviet troops remained upon the territory of Korea. Korea can become a free and independent state only then, when it will obtain its own democratic government supported by the people, and when the American and the Soviet troops will be withdrawn from its territory.

The Soviet Delegation has always regarded small peoples with respect and still so regards them. It has struggled and it shall continue to struggle for their independence and sovereignty. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea. The Soviet Delegation declares that if the American Delegation would agree with a proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops during the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops will be ready to evacuate Korea simultaneously with the American troops.

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The Soviet Delegation has no other proposals. In the course of the work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation with sufficient completeness has expounded its point of view concerning the ways of re-establishing Korea as an independent democratic state.

The Soviet Delegation awaits the answer and the proposals of the American Delegation.

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STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

18 October 1947

In accordance with instructions of my government, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation presents to you the following proposal on Korea submitted to the United Nations by the Government of the United States.

Following is the text of a letter which was addressed on October 17th, 1947, to his Excellency, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, New York:

"Excellency:

"I have the honor to refer to the facts that on September 17, 1947, the United States Secretary of State announced that the United States was placing the problem of Korean independence before the General Assembly and on September 23, 1947, the General Assembly voted to place that problem upon its agenda. On September 26 the Chief Soviet Delegate on the Joint United States - USSR Commission meeting in Seoul, Korea, made the following statement, in translation:

> 'Therefore, the Soviet Delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea.'

"The United States Government desires to take any practicable step which will further the speedy establishment of a truly independent Korea. The only concern of this government is to make certain that its responsibilities to the Korean people and to the United Nations are properly carried out. It will be recalled that, after negotiations in the Joint Commission had reached a stalemate, the United States Government proposed that the question of forming a

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government for Korea be discussed in Washington by representatives of all powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement with respect to Korea: China, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. China and the United Kingdom accepted this suggestion but the USSR did not. It was only after this that the matter was presented to the United Nations. It is believed that inasmuch as the General Assembly has already voted to consider the problem of Korean independence, its attention should be called to the most recent Soviet proposal, referred to above, as well as the suggestions for a solution of the problem which the Secretary of State said the United States Government would be prepared to advance. With these proposals before it, the General Assembly will, it is hoped, be able to recommend measures for orderly transition from the present systems of government in North and South Korea to an independent, united Korean Government and the consequent speedy withdrawal of all occupying forces.

"There is therefore transmitted herewith a Resolution which contains the suggestions the United States Delegation will submit for the consideration of Committee members of the General Assembly when the problem of Korean independence comes before that Board. It is considered that an arrangement of the nature indicated in this Resolution should make possible the early establishment by the Korean people themselves of their own government and the withdrawal of all Soviet and United States armed forces from Korea. It is requested that copies of this letter together with its enclosure be circulated to the various delegations to the General Assembly for their information.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

"Warren Roger Austin,
"United States Representative."

RESOLUTION

"The General Assembly, recognizing the urgent and rightful

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claims to independence of the people of Korea:

"Having in mind that it is one of the purposes of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

"Having noted the international obligations undertaken with respect to Korea, including the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, in which China, the United Kingdom and the United States stated their determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, in which China, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration and to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered upon entering the war in the Pacific, and the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, in which the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, with the adherence of China, provided that there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government with a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state;

"Believing that the national independence of Korea should be reestablished and all occupying forces should be withdrawn from Korea at the earliest practicable date;

"To this end, recommends that the occupying powers hold elections in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, under the observation of the United Nations, as the initial step leading to the creation of a National Assembly and the establishment of a national government of Korea in conformity with the procedure set out in the annex to this Resolution;

"Further recommends that immediately upon the establishment of the national government of Korea referred to above, that government will constitute its own national security forces and will arrange with the occupying powers for the early and complete withdrawal from Korea of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the United States;

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"Resolves that the responsibilities assumed by the United Nations under this Resolution should be discharged by a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, consisting of the representatives of (names of states).

"This United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall:

"(1) Be present in Korea during the elections in each zone with the right of freedom of travel and observation throughout all of Korea,

"(2) Be available for such consultation as may be appropriate in connection with the elections, the organization of the National Assembly, the formation of the national government and the conclusion of agreements for the withdrawal of the occupying forces,

"(3) Report to the General Assembly or, if in its judgment developments so require, to any competent agency of the Assembly, with respect to its activities under the terms of this Resolution, and make any recommendations that it may wish concerning further United Nations action in maintaining the independence of Korea;

"Calls upon the member states concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the United Nations Temporary Commission On Korea in the fulfillment of these responsibilities."

Annex and Recommended Procedure for the Holding of Flection for the Establishment of a National Government OF Korea.

"(1) The elections to be held by the occupying powers in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, shall be for the purpose of choosing representatives to a National Assembly. The number of representatives elected to the National Assembly from each zone shall bear the same proportion to the total membership of the National Assembly as the population of that zone bears to the total population of Korea. Subject to this principle, the number of representatives to be elected from each zone shall be determined by the United Nations Commission on Korea in consultation with the occupying powers.

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"(2) As soon as possible after the elections the National Assembly of Korea shall meet and form a government and shall notify the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of the formation of this government.

"(3) Upon notification to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of the formation of a national government of Korea, that government shall take over the functions of North and South Korea, respectively, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed upon under the auspices of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea between the Government of Korea and the respective occupying authorities.

"(4) The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall be available for such consultation and assistance as may be requested and appropriate in connection with the decisions and actions contemplated in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) above."

Proposal of American Delegation:

In view of the action taken by its government, as stated above, and with the approval of its government, the U. S. Delegation proposes that, pending consideration of the Korean question by the United Nations, the Joint Commission recess and the two delegations hold themselves in readiness at the headquarters of the respective occupation forces for such assistance as may be requested by the United Nations.

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE PRESS
October 20, 1947

In view of the fact that the American Delegation in Joint Commission session on October 18, 1947 made the proposal to recess the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation, Colonel General Shitkov met the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, Major General Brown on October 20, 1947 and handed him the following reply of the Soviet Delegation to the proposal of the American Delegation:

"Dear General Brown:

In answer to your proposal at the meeting of the Joint Commission of 18 October 1947 I have the honor to communicate to you the following:

'During the period of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Soviet Delegation has exerted all its efforts toward the speediest fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement on Korea and, on the basis of that decision, toward the creation of a united independent Korea under the guidance of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

In view of the position of the American Delegation, which made impossible the realization of the Moscow Decision, the Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the creation of a united independent Korea, on 26 September 1947 introduced, at the direction of its government, a proposal to withdraw simultaneously the American and Soviet troops from Korea during the beginning of 1948 and to afford Koreans themselves the opportunity of forming the government of Korea.

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The American Delegation refused to discuss this proposal and at the Joint Commission meeting of 18 October 1947, referring to the direction of its government, proposed to interrupt the work of the Joint Commission.'

In connection with the above stated, the Soviet Delegation has received from its government, a direction to depart for Pyongyang."

Chief of the Soviet Delegation
in the Joint Soviet-American
Commission
Colonel General Shitkov

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