

Demanding Development:
Democracy, Community Governance, and Public Goods Provision in India's Urban Slums

By

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Political Science)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2013

Date of final oral examination: 07/29/13

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For my Parents, Marcia and Robert Auerbach

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank the members of my dissertation committee—Rikhil Bhavnani, Ivan Ermakoff, Yoshiko Herrera, Melanie Manion, Nadav Shelef, and Aseema Sinha—for their guidance, patience, and support at every stage of this project. Since my first day of graduate school, Aseema Sinha has provided wise advice on my research and development as a scholar. Rikhil Bhavnani offered excellent guidance on my dissertation and insights into many facets of the profession. I have been lucky to work with these two outstanding scholars of Indian politics. Nadav Shelef was the first professor I had in graduate school and has been an excellent mentor ever since. My discussions with him over the years about scholarship and teaching have been invaluable. I have been extremely fortunate to have Melanie Manion on my dissertation committee. My dissertation, and research design in particular, have benefited tremendously from her advice and suggestions. It has been an honor to work with Ivan Ermakoff, who has offered thoughtful and sharp feedback on all stages of the dissertation. This research would not have been possible without years of support, mentorship, and encouragement from the chair of my dissertation committee, Yoshiko Herrera. If I have the opportunity to advise students in the future, I have an example of outstanding academic mentorship to follow. It has been an honor and privilege to work with these six scholars at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

I would also like to thank Leonardo Arriola, Mary Breeding, Scott Gehlbach, Anirudh Krishna, Victor Menaldo, Vijayendra Rao, Michael Schatzberg, Laura Schechter, Erica Simmons, Scott Straus, Alex Tahk, Ajay Verghese, Sanjeev Vidyarthi, and David Weimer for insightful comments and feedback on various parts of my dissertation and econometric work.

Friends and colleagues in Madison made my time in graduate school a pleasure. I thank Nick Barnes, Leticia Bode, Ryan Biava, Barry Driscoll, Kyle Hanniman, Nick Judge, Yujin Kim,

Brett Kyle, Aliza Luft, Peter Nasuti, Kyle Marquardt, Jake Neiheisel, David Ohls, Jennifer Petersen, Kerry Ratigan, Emily Sellars, Charlie Taylor, and Kristin Vekasi for their support and friendship. Dave Ohls, in many ways, was an informal member of my dissertation committee. His dedication to teaching, collegiality, and integrity are inspiring. I am lucky to have him as a friend. Since my first day of the program, Kyle Hanniman has been the best friend I could have hoped to have in graduate school. His friendship and humor did much to make my time in Madison both productive and enjoyable.

During my time in the departments of Political Science and Agricultural and Applied Economics, I received a great deal of support from administrative staff—Debbie Bakke, Mary Hurley, Barbara Forrest, Lance Potter, and Beth Shipman. Deb McFarlane was more than a graduate student advisor. I will always be grateful for her professional and personal guidance.

In Jaipur, Varsha Joshi, Surjit Singh, and Rima Hooja provided invaluable mentorship during each stage of my fieldwork. In New Delhi, I had the honor of being advised by Niraja Gopal Jayal and Arup Mitra. Jawaharlal Nehru University provided a rich intellectual home during my time in India. I also thank the faculty and graduate students who participated in my presentations at the *Centre de Sciences Humaines*, the Delhi School of Planning and Architecture, and the Centre for the Study of Law and Governance.

I will forever be grateful for the warmth and support I received from the Das, Kothari, Khawad, Lal, and Pathak families in Jaipur, Bhopal, and New Delhi. The late Dr. Das—Indian Administrative Service officer and accomplished scholar—will forever remind me that scholarship and public service work best when they are engaged together. The Sharmas have been like family to me since I first studied abroad in Jaipur as an undergraduate student almost a decade ago. Their support and kindness have extended far beyond my research.

I thank staff and officers at the Jaipur and Bhopal Municipal Corporations for providing me with a wide range of information—often times requiring many hours of searching in old, dusty boxes in the basements of government buildings. District officers in Jaipur and Bhopal were extremely welcoming and helpful during my research. I am also grateful to officers in both the Congress Party and *Bharatiya Janata* Party in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and New Delhi for sharing and helping me understand the complex world of urban politics in India.

The survey teams in Jaipur and Bhopal provided excellent research assistance in very difficult conditions. Their dedication to the project and suggestions on the survey directly contributed to its success. Hitesh Pathak deserves special acknowledgement. Hitesh provided nearly two years of outstanding research assistance—translating documents and interviews in several languages, assisting with the survey teams, and helping with a range of other research activities. This project would not have been possible without his support and friendship.

I very humbly thank the many residents, leaders, politicians, and officials that generously gave me their time and thoughts over the course of my fieldwork. If I can single out one person, I would like to thank one community leader, “Mr. B”, for spending countless hours of his time explaining to a curious American student how life and politics work in India’s informal urban settlements. Our early conversations largely inspired this dissertation.

Dissertations mean little without loved ones and family. Prita—you remind me everyday what the most important things in life are. I am so excited about all of our future adventures together. There are no adequate words to fully express my gratitude to my parents, Marcia and Robert Auerbach. They have given me a lifetime of unconditional support. Thank you for always encouraging Sarah, Daniel, and me to explore the world and our own potentials. I am so incredibly lucky to have you both as parents and friends.

This dissertation was generously funded by fellowships from the Social Science Research Council, Fulbright-Hays, and the National Science Foundation. Pre-dissertation research in India was supported by grants from the University of Wisconsin's International Institute, Department of Political Science, and Center for South Asia. A Scott Kloeck-Jenson fellowship funded a summer research internship at the National Institute of Urban Affairs in New Delhi. I also acknowledge the Foreign Language and Areas Studies (FLAS) Program for providing nearly three years of financial support for the intensive study of Hindi, Urdu, and Marathi.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the origins of political order and development in India's urban slums. It accounts for the conditions under which poor urban communities in India are able to demand and secure development from the state. Two related questions motivate the study. First, the level of basic public goods and services—access to drinking water, sanitation and waste removal, paved roads, public safety, and schools—vary widely across slums in India. *What causes these developmental disparities?* Second, urban slums are among the most densely populated and ethnically diverse areas in India. Residents exist at the margins of the state, in an environment defined by informality and clientelistic politics. Despite these shared conditions, slums exhibit incredible variation in the extent to which they are organized to mitigate pervasive risks, reduce social conflict, and demand development from the state. *In the face of common challenges, why do some vulnerable communities develop institutions that advance the collective interests and security of residents while others fail?*

The answers to these questions lie in the internal organization of slums, and degree to which they are integrated into larger party networks. Party structures in urban India extend deep into the neighborhoods and markets of cities. Workers embedded in these networks are arranged in a hierarchy that links them to the highest strata of party leadership. Slums that are integrated into dense party networks are well positioned to claim and secure development from the state. Party networks afford settlements with political connectivity and an organizational capacity for protest. Further, competition among party workers to expand their following—their source of rents and social prestige—generates an informal accountability in patron client hierarchies that encourages development. Settlements that fail to develop party networks are marginalized in the distributive politics of the city. I demonstrate qualitatively and quantitatively that the density of

party networks in slums outperforms alternative explanations of local development—levels of social capital, ethnic diversity, the income and education levels of residents, the strength of property rights, and the intensity of electoral competition at the municipal and state levels.

An examination of the origins and formation of slums reveals two factors that generate spatial unevenness in party networks—the population of settlements and their internal degree of social heterogeneity. Ethnic diversity fragments community leadership. Over time, parties extend organizational positions to these leaders to capture votes, increasing party network density in the process. Diversity, then, is *positively* related to organizational capacity and development through its effects on party network formation and competition. Second, the population of a slum, or size of its ‘vote bank’, determines electoral incentives for political parties to extend limited patronage and party organizational networks. The resulting spatial variation in the density of party networks across slums has serious implications for the nature of informal community governance, and, in turn, the ability of residents to organize to demand development. Central to my causal argument is an understanding of how migratory preferences, geographic constraints to settlement growth, and labor markets generate exogenous variation in both the population and social diversity of slums.

Even in the face of political marginalization, settlements that are cooperative and produce responsive leadership can internally secure a set of more quotidian public goods. These goods include dispute resolution, the maintenance of infrastructure, resistance to crime and gangs, and mediated access to government documents for the urban poor. I find that slum leaders who come to power democratically are more likely to work to improve the conditions of their settlements. Remarkably, more than half of the survey respondents in this study who first acknowledged informal leadership in their settlement went on to state that their leaders came to power through

deliberative community meetings or informal elections—organized by residents outside the purview of the state. Social capital compliments active leadership by facilitating everyday forms of collective action. Moreover, a cooperative settlement can more easily sanction leaders if the latter become inactive or transgressive.

This dissertation combines 20 months of intensive ethnographic fieldwork and archival research with an econometric analysis of original household survey data. In eight slum settlements in the north Indian cities of Jaipur and Bhopal, I traced the historical development of order and public goods provision from the founding of the settlements to the present. A unique source of qualitative data is the approximately 3,000 documents I collected from leaders, including correspondence with politicians, election materials, and community meeting notes that span a fifty-year period. These documents provide a deep look into processes of leadership formation and patron-client bargaining during elections. To construct community development scores, maps were created with satellite images that accurately depict the quality and location of development assets. In the spring of 2012, I led research teams to complete an original survey involving 1,925 households across 80 settlements in Jaipur and Bhopal. The resulting dataset allows me to quantitatively assess the impact of community institutions on the provision of public goods. The study contributes to scholarship on political clientelism, informal institutions, and the political economy of development. This dissertation research has been supported by fellowships from the Social Science Research Council, Fulbright-Hays, and the National Science Foundation, and received the 2013 Best Fieldwork Award from the American Political Science Association's Section on Comparative Democratization.

Chapter One: Introduction

The summer of 2009 was a busy time for urban development efforts in India. Several national schemes were either underway or under preparation, each unprecedented in their geographic reach and financial backing.¹ As a graduate research intern at the National Institute of Urban Affairs in New Delhi, I had the fortuitous opportunity to examine recently collected survey data on slum settlements throughout the country. The Indian state had decided to “see” its slum population—an effort that included large-scale surveys, GIS mapping, and focus groups. What I found in the data was startling. Despite a shared context of material poverty and informality, India’s urban slums exhibit dramatic variation in their levels of infrastructural development and access to public services. Settlements in the same areas of cities—exposed to the same politicians, electoral campaigns, and public officials—have diverged in the trajectory of their development. This variation held even after taking into account the age of settlements, proximity to labor markets, environmental factors, and the education levels and occupations of residents. I was confronted with a question that would motivate two years of intensive ethnography, archival research, and an original household survey in the slums of north India: Why are some vulnerable communities able to demand and secure development from the state while others fail?

The government data provided a global sense of the puzzle, though was too blunt to afford much explanatory traction. Understanding the causes of variation in development across India’s slums would require closer, sustained investigation. On a subsequent trip to the city of Jaipur, Rajasthan, I began to examine slum organization and development up close. Selecting my first site was not difficult. Behind my apartment building stood *Saraswati*, a settlement of 2,600 squatters from Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar. With some trepidation, I approached *Saraswati* and asked a group of residents if I could speak to someone about the history of their

¹ These schemes include the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission and *Rajiv Awas Yojana*.

settlement. They insisted that I meet with their leader, Jagdish.²

Jagdish does not fit the popular image of a slumlord. Just 30 years old, he boasts a high school education and runs a private elementary school. He also leads a savings group in the slum, organizes trash collections and health camps, and helps residents to secure ration cards, voter ID cards, and other essential government documents for the urban poor. The most striking feature of Jagdish's leadership, however, is the way he came to power. Under threat of eviction, and facing almost two decades of severe underdevelopment, the people of *Saraswati* organized an informal election in 2008, with candidates, campaign speeches, and handmade ballots. It was decided that residents needed to unify behind an *adyaksh*, or president, to advance their collective interests. With a margin of 141 votes, Jagdish defeated Prem, another resident, propelling him to local authority. As my ethnography and survey research would later reveal, democratic norms have traveled with many of India's poor migrants to the sprawling slums of cities, where it provides a ready template for organization and leadership selection.

Jagdish has worked hard since his victory to demand development from the state. His claims, however, have been dismissed. The provision of public infrastructure and services require more than strong community leadership—they demand a responsive state. Most of *Saraswati* is without paved roads. Water is scarce, electricity provision is unreliable, and in absence of sewers and public bathrooms, most residents resort to open defecation. *Saraswati* has streetlights, yet many are unmaintained, leaving sections of the slum in complete darkness at night. Without strong ties to politicians and political parties, the developmental claims of *Saraswati* have been swept aside in the distributive politics of the city.

A few kilometers north of *Saraswati* is *Ram Nagar*. Like *Saraswati*, squatters established

² The names of all individuals and slum settlements in this dissertation have been changed to ensure the privacy and protection of research participants. See *Appendix A* for further information.

Ram Nagar around 1980. Two leaders have emerged in *Ram Nagar* in the last several decades, not through elections, but by virtue of their charisma, literacy, and confidence in dealing with politicians. Both have worked to improve the settlement. *Ram Nagar*, however, is even more underdeveloped than *Saraswati*. Not a single road is paved in *Ram Nagar*. Without drainage, rain and wastewater make the serpentine alleyways of the slum almost impassable. The municipality does not collect trash and the slum is without sewers. As a consequence, the western area of the slum has become both a trash dump and open bathroom. Residents have tapped into the electricity grid, forming a canopy of exposed wires that precariously hang over the settlement. Only a handful of streetlights work in the slum and a few rusty spouts provide drinking water.

Ganpati Nagar eclipses both *Saraswati* and *Ram Nagar* in development. Squatters established *Ganpati Nagar* at the same time as *Ram Nagar* and *Saraswati*. Since their founding, all three slums have shared the same state constituency, a common labor market, and are settled on public land. *Ganpati Nagar*, however, differs from the other two slums in its integration into political party networks. Party networks percolate every corner of the settlement. Local workers embedded in these networks are situated in a well-defined hierarchy that connects them to the larger party organizations of the city. The history of *Ganpati Nagar* is punctuated with protests to demand development. Parties and their local workers rush to take up the problems of the slum, all in the effort to build electoral support. The effects of these networks are easily observable. All roads in *Ganpati Nagar* are paved, drainage pipes line the front of the slum, and drinking water is provided through community taps and a system of PVC tanks. A constellation of streetlights keeps *Ganpati Nagar* illuminated at night, and municipal workers remove solid waste.

Differences among *Saraswati*, *Ram Nagar*, and *Ganpati Nagar* are not isolated. Instead, they represent a larger pattern of divergences in organization and development across India's

urban slums. Slums are not uniformly marginalized and underdeveloped. Nor are they equally positioned to make demands on the state through political society—a space in which the poor engage the state through political parties, brokers, and mass politics (Chatterjee 2004).

This dissertation examines the origins of political order and development in India's urban slums. It accounts for the conditions under which poor urban communities in India are able to demand and secure development from the state. Two related questions motivate the study. First, the level of basic public goods and services—access to drinking water, sanitation and waste removal, paved roads, public safety, and schools—vary widely across slums in India. *What causes these developmental disparities?* Second, urban slums are among the most densely populated and ethnically diverse areas in India. Residents exist at the margins of the state, in an environment defined by informality and clientelistic politics. Despite these shared conditions, slums exhibit incredible variation in the extent to which they are organized to mitigate pervasive risks, reduce social conflict, and demand development from the state. *In the face of common challenges, why do some vulnerable communities develop institutions that advance the collective interests and security of residents while others fail?*

I argue that the answers to these questions lie within the internal political organization of slums, and the degree to which settlements are connected to larger party organizations in the city. Party structures in urban India, unlike in the countryside, are well organized and extend deep into the neighborhoods and markets of cities. Workers embedded in these networks are arranged in a hierarchy that links them to the highest strata of party leadership. In the effort to secure public services, settlements that have developed party networks are better positioned to make demands on the state than those with sparse or absent networks. This relationship works through three mechanisms: *competition*, *monitoring*, and *connectivity*. Party workers compete with one another

in slums to maintain and expand their following—and, in turn, their access to rents, promotion, and social prestige. Competition among workers produces an informal accountability in patron-client networks that strengthens the organizational capacity of settlements and encourages development. From above, parties contribute to accountability by monitoring their workers and sanctioning those who tarnish the party brand. Party networks, moreover, afford settlements with a critical degree of political connectivity while engaging with the state. I demonstrate both qualitatively and quantitatively that the density of party networks in slums outperforms alternative explanations of local development—levels of social capital, the extent of ethnic diversity, the material resources of residents, levels of education, the strength of property rights, and the intensity of electoral competition at the municipal and state levels.

Even in the face of political marginalization, settlements that are cooperative and produce responsive leadership can internally secure a set of more quotidian public goods. These goods include dispute resolution, the maintenance of infrastructure, resistance to crime and gangs, and mediated access to government documents for the urban poor. I find that slum leaders who come to power democratically are more likely to work to improve the conditions of their settlements. Remarkably, more than half of the survey respondents in this study acknowledged that their leaders came to power through deliberative community meetings or informal elections—organized by residents outside the purview of the state. Social capital compliments active leadership by facilitating everyday forms of collective action. Moreover, a cooperative settlement can more easily sanction leaders if the latter become inactive or transgressive. While these sanctions are most often expressed as acts of public shaming, they can also be violent.

India, the world's largest democracy and arguably most ethnically and linguistically diverse society, provides an ideal setting in which to examine political organization and

development in urban slums. Almost a billion people now reside in slums worldwide. Ninety million of them live in India's slums.³ Within three decades, half of the population in India will live in cities—a demographic trend that now defines much of the developing world. Concurrently, economic inequality is rising in cities, leaving the poor behind in India's vast and unregulated informal economy (Breman 2013; Kohli 2012: 127-130). As urban India climbs past rural India in population, the manner in which the urban poor organize themselves and interact with the state will increasingly shape the nature of democracy and development in India.

Beyond India, the scope conditions of the theory outlined in this dissertation are few and have broad geographic reach—poor urban communities in contexts defined by weak formal institutions, multiparty competition, and clientelistic politics. These conditions describe slum communities in developing democracies as diverse as Brazil, Ghana, Bangladesh, and Thailand.

This dissertation combines 20 months of intensive ethnographic fieldwork and archival research with an econometric analysis of original household survey data. In eight slum settlements in the north Indian cities of Jaipur and Bhopal, I traced the historical development of order and public goods provision from the founding of the settlements to the present. A unique source of qualitative data is the approximately 3,000 documents I collected from leaders, including correspondence with politicians, election materials, and community meeting notes that span a fifty-year period. Coupled with ethnography, these documents provide a deep look into processes of leadership formation and patron-client bargaining during elections. To construct community development scores, maps were created with satellite images that accurately depict the quality and location of development assets. In the spring of 2012, I led research teams to complete an original survey involving 1,925 households across 80 settlements in Jaipur and

³ Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India, 2011 Report.

Bhopal. The resulting dataset allows me to statistically assess the impact of community institutions on development and public order.

This introductory chapter is divided into eight sections. Section 1.1 establishes the puzzles of variation in development and organization across slums. Section 1.2 then advances the theoretical framework of the dissertation and Section 1.3 foreshadows its scholarly contributions. Section 1.4 places the dissertation within the context of urban India and defines the particular subset of slums that are of primary interest in this dissertation—urban squatter settlements. Section 1.5 introduces the two research sites under examination—Jaipur, Rajasthan and Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Section 1.6 turns to the multi-method research design of the dissertation and Section 1.7 concludes with an outline of the remaining chapters.

1.1: The Puzzles: Divergent Developments in Urban India

Slums face a range of conditions that make them susceptible to clientelism and marginalization in the distributive politics of the city. Less than 12 percent of the survey respondents in this study had permanent land titles, leaving a majority of households in a suspended state of vulnerability over land tenure and eviction. Most residents work in India's informal, unregulated economy. The average, per capita household income of survey respondents was just a dollar a day. Most respondents have only achieved a few years of primary school, and forty percent of respondents were illiterate. From above, formal state institutions are notoriously weak in urban slums. Police are often predatory. Faced with resource constraints, officials are loath to extend services to areas that rarely pay taxes or user charges. These conditions, though, are accompanied by high rates of political participation. Eighty-seven percent of survey respondents confirmed voting in elections. The urban poor provide swelling crowds for rallies and are brought to the polls, *en masse*, during elections. Political engagement is a critical means of securing individual and collective goods for

the poor. The urban poor, as Harriss writes, are “left with politics” to improve their material wellbeing and security in India’s democracy (Harriss 2010: 6).

The characterization of slums as impoverished, marginalized spaces relegated to party politics and clientelism, however, overlooks the diversity of ways that the urban poor organize and engage the state. It fails to account for the conditions that produce variation in public services across settlements—why some groups succeed in commanding state responsiveness while others fail.

The Uneven Provision of Public Goods Across Slums

The most recent national surveys on slums reveal uneven access to a range of basic public goods and services (NSS 2010; Census of India 2011). *Table 1.1* presents descriptive statistics. Approximately 65 percent of slums in India have both streetlights and household electricity connections. Eighty-seven percent have a primary school within one kilometer of the settlement and 48 percent are within a similar distance to a government hospital. Municipalities collect and dispose of garbage in 65.3 percent of slums. At the other extreme, 16 percent of slums have no means of garbage disposal, either public or private. Concerning access to water, 78 percent of slums obtain their water from taps, 16-17 percent from tube-wells, and another 5-7 percent from wells and “other sources.”⁴ 2011 census data finds that 56.7 percent of water sources are located within households.⁵ The remainder use shared community sources.

The provision of public infrastructure shows similar unevenness. 67.6 percent of sampled slums have paved roads within the settlement and a similar percent (65.4 percent) have a paved approach road. The remaining slums are either fully or partially left with dirt roads. A plurality

⁴ Preliminary data from the 2011 Census mirrors the NSS findings: 74 percent of slum households have access to water taps (65.3 percent from “treated sources”), 12.7 percent from hand pumps, 3 percent from wells, 7.6 percent from tube-wells/ bore-wells, and 2.8 from “other sources” (Chandramouli 2011).

⁵ This data is summarized in Chandramouli 2011.

of slums uses community bathrooms (42.4 percent), though only 26 percent of slums have underground sewer systems. Roughly 15 percent of slums have no latrines at all. Census 2011 data reveal that 18.9 percent of slum households go to the bathroom in the open—in fields, clearings, and sidewalks near their settlement. Relatedly, only 17 percent of slums have underground drainage to remove rain and wastewater.⁶ Almost half of slums, consequently, suffer from severe waterlogging during the monsoon season.

While the census data is useful in rendering an aggregate picture of slum development in India, it is insufficiently detailed to capture disparities between and within cities, as well as intra-slum variation in access to public goods and services. This dissertation draws on satellite images and a large household survey to provide more fine-grained measures of development across a sample of slums in two north Indian cities. *Table 1.2* presents descriptive statistics of these indicators. Mirroring the national situation, some slums in Jaipur and Bhopal have been provided paved roads, underground sewers, streetlights, and piped water. Municipalities collect solid waste, and government medical camps are held for residents. Other settlements have none of these goods and services, and remain in the same state of squalor as the time of their establishment. A majority of the sampled slums are somewhere in between these two extremes, with some public goods and services but lacking others.

My ethnographic fieldwork and survey data also reveal variability in public order. In some settlements, residents are cooperative and conflict is rare. When fights do erupt, neighbors quickly intervene and leaders resolve disputes. In other settlements, bloody fights, public arguments, and gang activity are part of daily life. Theft is a rampant concern, forcing people—mostly women—to stay home and guard possessions. In the average slum, nine percent of respondents were the victims of theft within the previous two years. In the worst settlement, 42

⁶ Census 2011 data reveals that 18.8 percent of households do not have drainage (Census 2011).

percent of respondents suffered from theft, while in other slums there was not a single report of theft. In the average slum, about 20 percent of respondents noted gangs were present, with a large standard deviation of 16 percent. In the most gang-active settlement, two thirds of respondents noted the presence of gangs. The average slum had 1.41 fights per month, with a one standard deviation of 1.76. In ten of the sampled slums, though, there were no reported fights. What causes divergences in development and public order across communities?

Organizational Divergences Across Slums

Variation in public goods is accompanied by equally puzzling divergences in the political organization of slums. Slums are not anarchic spaces. Instead, they reveal significant variation in the nature of their internal leadership, styles of informal community governance, and degrees of connectivity to larger party structures in the city. These organizational differences explain why some slums are able to secure development from the state, maintain public order, and advance the everyday welfare and security of residents while others languish in underdevelopment and social discord. In explaining variation in public goods, four key differences in slum organization and leadership come into focus.

First, this dissertation uncovers a puzzling feature of clientelistic organization in urban India—the extension of political party networks is highly uneven across slums. Scholarship on clientelism typically assumes that patron-client networks are uniform across the space under study, and that when elections approach, workers are in place to monitor voters, distribute patronage, and bring the poor to the polls. Clientelism is treated as a context, not as a network of actors that vary across neighborhoods and villages. I find that the presence, strength, and multi-party balance of party networks are highly uneven across slums. 513 party workers operate across the 80 sampled slums. Their distribution, though, is highly uneven. While the average

slum has roughly two party workers per 1,000 residents, almost a quarter have no party workers at all, while several settlements exhibit densities of over six party workers per 1,000 residents. Further, slums vary in the extent to which they exhibit multi-party networks. Twenty-seven of the 80 sampled slums experience one-party dominance. Others reveal a variable degree of multi-party representation and competition. Party networks have powerful effects on the ability of settlements to organize and secure development. What, then, explains spatial variation in the presence and density of party networks across slums?

Second, I find that slum leaders vary greatly in the scope and intensity of their leadership activities. Informal community leadership is a defining element of political life in slums. The survey identified 837 distinct leaders across the 80 slums under examination, many of which overlap with the 513 party members stated above. Only 3 settlements were without identifiable leadership. Despite the pervasiveness of slum leaders, and their common positions of authority, these individuals vary in their levels of responsiveness and activities performed for residents. Some leaders resolve disputes, organize collections for community projects and neighbors in need, spread information about government programs, repel gangs, and demand development from the state. Others leaders are inactive, performing few or none of these activities, while another set of leaders are predatory and violent. The quality of community leadership varies from settlement to settlement, with powerful consequences for development and public order. Why?

Third, leaders vary both in the ways they come to power and how—and if—they are sanctioned by residents for failing to perform. Over half of the survey respondents in this dissertation acknowledged that their leaders came to power through informal democratic selection—deliberative community meetings or informal elections. Other leaders rise to power through brute cohesion and violence, while others are political entrepreneurs, and build a

following by demonstrating their ability to ‘get things done’. A smaller percentage of leaders come to power through traditional means, drawing on notions of caste or religious authority. Relatedly, slums differ in the extent to which residents can sanction their leaders when the latter are inactive or transgressive. What are the deep determinants of these institutional differences?

Fourth, slums vary in their levels of social capital—the stock of trust and cooperation among individuals in a proximate social space. Social capital is a latent variable, reflecting the underlying capacity for residents to come together in collective efforts to improve their shared conditions. Drawing on qualitative case studies and a battery of survey questions, I find that some communities have constructed enduring forms of trust, cohesiveness, and cooperation while others are divided and hostile. Why are some settlements able to develop inter-household trust and cooperation while others remained fragmented?

1.2: Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation

This dissertation advances a novel theoretical framework to jointly identify the vertical and horizontal sources of public goods in informal urban settlements. Development in India’s slums rests on the internal organization of settlements, and the extent to which settlements are integrated into larger party organizations in the city. Forces originating both within and outside slums jointly structure community organization. From above, the most significant influence on slum organization is political parties. Parties in India target slums as ‘vote banks’ and seek to establish interdependent, though asymmetrical relationships with slum dwellers in which their patronage is exchanged for votes. To extract votes, parties attempt to cultivate partisan leadership in slums and absorb existing slum leaders into their organization. The extension of party organizational networks, however, is highly uneven. Some settlements are flush with party workers. Organizational hierarchy is externally imposed and invigorated by larger party

organizations in the city. Other slums are home to only a few party workers, while others exhibit a complete absence of party networks altogether. Scholarship on political clientelism has overlooked variation in the presence and strength of patron-client networks across communities, and the resulting divergences in development and democratic responsiveness that face people residing in those communities.

In slums with dense party networks, competition among party workers generates a degree of accountability in patron-client hierarchies that strengthens the organizational capacity of settlements and encourages development. Party workers compete with each other in slums to maintain and increase their following—and, in the process, their access to rents, promotion, and social prestige. To parties, the size of a worker's following is the currency of exchange during elections for both patronage and promotion. Workers who secure development, resolve disputes, and mediate access to state services can build a loyal following. Those who are inactive or predatory risk losing their base of support to more responsive workers. Parties also contribute to the production of accountability through monitoring. Workers are the grassroots representatives of parties. Those who fail to perform or transgress on residents can damage the party brand. Parties therefore monitor their workers and sanction those who undermine their electoral interests. Competition among party workers and monitoring by parties converge to establish accountability in spaces that are typically defined by their absence of it.

Dense party networks, moreover, afford settlements with a critical degree of political connectivity and organizational capacity. Party organizational networks are hierarchical, pyramid-shaped structures in which workers are given defined positions and responsibilities. These networks stretch down to the smallest alleyways of the city and up to the highest ranks of party leadership at the district, state, and national levels. Workers embedded in these networks

can more easily approach officers at higher levels to seek assistance with individual and collective problems. Through repeated interactions, politicians and workers build face-to-face relations that the latter can exploit during their engagements with the state. Party workers are also provided letterhead stationary and cards bearing the party symbol and names of their patrons. These are powerful signals to state officials that their claims should be taken seriously. Political connectivity is invaluable to settlements. When problems arise, party networks are activated to rally residents and engage in contentious protest. Settlements that lack these networks face greater obstacles in organizing and demanding state responsiveness.

I find that the benefits of dense party networks, however, partially depend on the degree to which those networks represent multiple parties. Party organizations can internalize the externalities of competition among their workers through hierarchical discipline, promotion, and shared electoral interests. Rival party networks lack such mechanisms. Competition across party lines can be fierce, as losing an election means a loss of political connectivity and access to rents. Rival party networks therefore attempt to undermine each other's mobilization and development efforts, even to the detriment of their own communities. Politicians also hesitate to extend infrastructure to slums with multi-party networks. This is because opposing networks can enjoy these goods and even take credit for their provision. As a consequence, multi-party network representation in slums can be harmful for development, particularly in the extension of capital-intensive, non-reversible infrastructure such as roads, underground sewers, and piped water.

Even in the absence of party network organization, there are smaller-scale public goods that slum dwellers can provide for themselves.⁷ I find that the internal provision of public goods rests on levels of community social capital and the presence of accountable and responsive

⁷ These goods include mechanisms of dispute resolution, the maintenance of infrastructure, access to government documents, organizing community programs and collections to help neighbors in crisis, repelling gang aggression, and the dissemination of information regarding programs for the urban poor.

leadership. In addition to the mechanism of competition, two conditions encourage the formation of responsive leadership in slums. First, leaders are more responsive when they have come to power through informal democratic selection—and face sanctions if they fail to perform. 54 percent of survey respondents in this study report that their leaders have come to power through democratic selection. Some communities select their leaders in public meeting in which residents vote with their hands. In others, residents extensively deliberate until a consensus is reached or organize informal elections with ballots. Settlements that are able to endogenously construct mechanisms of democratic selection are better positioned to secure a range of everyday public goods that improve the welfare and security of residents.

Social capital also contributes to the production of responsive and accountable slum leadership. Leaders embedded in communities with high levels of social capital face a more communicative, cohesive, and cooperative public—and therefore can be sanctioned if they fail to perform. Rumors and gossip often serve as effective sanctioning mechanisms, though violence is employed as well. Social capital independently contributes to the production of public goods through its facilitation of collective action. More cooperative settlements are able to organize to solve internal problems. Settlements that fail to develop responsive leadership and high levels of social capital are prone to underdevelopment and conflict.

The determinants of public goods in slums, then, are diverse and depend on the good or service in question. In the provision of heavy public infrastructure and municipal services, integration into *vertical* party organizational networks is essential. Party networks provide both the connectivity and conditions for accountability and organizational capacity that encourage development. Slum settlements that fail to command a degree of democratic responsiveness through vertical networks are marginalized in the distributive politics of the city. The state,

however, does not hold a monopoly on the provision of all public goods. The production of everyday public goods—conflict resolution, the maintenance of infrastructure, collections for residents in need—occurs through the *horizontal* mechanisms of social capital and responsive, intra-community leadership. This dissertation, then, advances a framework for understanding the vertical and horizontal determinants of development in poor urban communities.

India's urban slums offer a critical area in which to examine the formation of informal institutions. After the dust of migration settles, squatters face an unsettled social environment that lacks a defined set of rules, behavioral expectations, and inter-group forms of social hierarchy and authority. Most slums in India have emerged within the last several decades, affording a chance to trace community organization and public goods provision through ethnography, interviews, and focus groups. I find evidence that two demographic features of India's slums—internal levels of ethnic diversity and settlement size—powerfully influence the historical expansion of party networks and patronage across settlements.

The sequencing of events in India's slums offers important analytic leverage. All but one of the settlements under examination in this dissertation emerged before India's decentralization reforms and the start of discretionary development funds in the early 1990s. Further, all of the sampled settlements were uniformly underdeveloped at the period of their initial settlement. Settlement demographics were largely established before infrastructure and public services were extended to slums starting in the mid 1990s. The formation of leadership and party networks also preceded this period, providing an understanding of the causal sequencing of events.

A large body of research on local public goods provision offers several alternative explanations. In the following chapters of this dissertation, I present and assess these alternative explanations alongside the theoretical framework outlined above. The alternative explanations

include the cognitive and material resources of residents, the size and ethnic diversity of slums, the strength of property rights, land ownership categories, levels of community social capital, and the intensity of electoral competition at the municipal and state levels. While some of these factors do explain some variation in development, subsequent chapters empirically demonstrate that the theoretical framework of this dissertation outperforms alternative explanations of local public goods provision in India's slums.

1.3: Contributions of Dissertation

This dissertation contributes to several bodies of literature in comparative politics, political economy, and South Asian studies. First, it advances the study of clientelism in emerging democracies. Across the globe, scholars have found the urban poor embedded in clientelistic relations with politicians in which patronage and protection are exchanged for political support.⁸ Shadowy networks of intermediaries are in place to facilitate these *quid pro quo* exchanges between patrons and clients. This dissertation, however, reveals a remarkable and unexamined feature of clientelistic organization: party networks are dramatically uneven in their presence, density, and partisan balance across communities. Research on clientelism implicitly assumes that party networks are uniform across the political space under study, and can be drawn upon during elections to drum-up turnout and monitor voters.⁹ This study is the first to comprehensively enumerate party networks across a large sample of communities, and examine the influence of these networks on local democracy and development.

This dissertation also moves beyond approaches that cast political intermediaries as a

⁸ For examples, see Ayero 2001; Burgwald 1996; Gay 1994; and Jha et al. 2007.

⁹ See, for instance, Brusco et al. 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Cox 2009; Dunning and Stokes 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; 2009; and Nickerson et al. 2011.

homogenous, interchangeable set of actors.¹⁰ While community leaders and party workers occupy similar typological positions in India's slums, they widely differ in the extent to which they are active and responsive toward the claims of residents. Some leaders engage in a wide variety of activities that advance the conditions of their settlements. Other leaders are inactive or predatory. This dissertation examines the social institutions in which informal actors are embedded—in particular, those local norms, rules, and beliefs that generate informal accountability—to understand the deep determinants of responsive leadership.

Studies of clientelism often focus on episodic moments of vote-buying—the distribution of money, liquor, and food for votes during elections. I instead place the analytical focus on more protracted and significant forms of clientelistic bargaining that unfold among residents, community leaders, and politicians for infrastructural development and public services. I find that the sources of responsiveness and accountability in slums do not exclusively flow from elections, but rather everyday forms of political engagement and protest. To understand responsiveness, the focus must be on those local institutions that structure and facilitate engagements with the state. This dissertation also departs from conventional analyses of clientelism in its level of analysis. Studies of clientelism typically cast voters as a mass of atomistic individuals that are targeted by politicians. In the distribution of infrastructure and public services, though, politicians approach slums as spatially defined *communities* that have distinct names, histories, social networks, and developmental deficiencies that can be taken advantage of for electoral gain. The primary dyadic relationship in the distributive politics of slum development is between politicians and settlements, not politicians and individuals.

Research on local public goods tends to focus on highly decentralized forms of

¹⁰For examples, see Oldenberg 1976; 1987, Haragopal and Reddy 1985; Mitra 1992; Manor 2000; Auyero 2001; Krishna 2002; 2007; 2011; Stokes et al. *forthcoming*.

cooperation and collective action.¹¹ This dissertation *does* find evidence that intra-community factors—particularly social capital—matter for a number of important outcomes in development. Social capital, however, is not a silver bullet. Many of the most important forms of development cannot be secured without strong ties to political parties. In the study of politics and public goods provision in the urban areas of the developing world, scholars must examine both the horizontal and vertical factors that shape community development. Relatedly, this study advances our understanding of ethnic diversity and public goods provision. Given the larger thrust of the literature on ethnic politics, we would expect ethnic heterogeneity to have an especially detrimental effect on development in slums. This dissertation, however, finds strong evidence that diversity is *beneficial*, through its effects on the formation of party networks and competition. Scholars of ethnic politics and collective action must investigate the ways in which social cleavages interact with extra local forces to structure informal hierarchy and authority.

A research agenda has emerged in comparative politics to uncover the conditions in which accountability can be produced in non-democratic contexts (Tsai 2007). Even within India's resilient electoral democracy, slums exist in a space characterized by weak formal institutions. Existing studies of informal accountability emphasize the role of rumors, moral claims, and embeddedness in social institutions.¹² These mechanisms do play a role in the production of accountability in slums. This dissertation, however, examines a largely unexamined mechanism of accountability—decentralized competition among informal actors in patron-client hierarchies. Clientelistic networks, under certain conditions, can produce robust and enduring forms of accountability that improve the wellbeing of their host communities.

Finally, this dissertation makes a contribution to study of democracy and development in

¹¹ See Knack and Keefer 1997; Bowles and Gintis 2002; Krishna 2002; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Putnam 1993; Khwaja 2007; Ostrom 1990, 2000; Habyarimana et al. 2009.

¹² See Scott 1977; 1987; Booth 1993; Arnold 2001; Schatzberg 2001; and Tsai 2007.

India's cities. Urban India is set to exceed rural India in population by 2040. Roughly 90 million people live in India's slums—a quarter of India's urban population and one-tenth of the world's total slum population. With important exceptions,¹³ scholars have insufficiently examined how local-level democracy and development works in India's sprawling urban slums. This dissertation makes a contribution to the study of India's political economy by tracing the ways that India's urban poor organize and engage and the state.

1.4: The Context: Urban India

Scholarship on contemporary development and politics in India exhibits a strong rural bias (Jha et al. 2007). Urban India, however, is quickly expanding, and is poised to overtake rural India in population in the next few decades.¹⁴ *Table 1.3* shows growth in the share of India's urban population since 1900. At the start of the 20th century, urban India made up just 10 percent of the total population. By 2001, over a quarter of the population, or 285 million people, lived in India's towns and cities—10 percent of the world's total urban population (Sivaramakrishnan 2006: 7). The number of towns and urban agglomerations also doubled in this period, from 1,827 to 4,368. Provisional population totals for 2011 put India's urban population at 377,105,760, or 31.16 percent of the total population (Census of India, 2011). Approximately 25 percent of India's urban population lives below the poverty line (GoI 2009), having consumption expenditures of less than US 50 cents per person per day.

Estimates of India's slum population are varied and contested. The 2001 census puts India's slum population at approximately 40 million people, or 14.12 percent of the total urban population (Sivaramakrishnan et. al. 2006). A 2010 report by the Ministry of Housing and Urban

¹³ See, for important examples, Benjamin 2000; Appadurai 2001; Mitra 2003; Jha et al. 2007; Roy 2007; Gill 2009; Banerjee et al. 2011; Krishna 2012.

¹⁴ A statistical model developed by the McKinsey Global Institute projects that urban India will represent approximately 40 percent of the total national population by 2030 (McKinsey Report, 2010).

Poverty Alleviation, however, points to several reasons why the figure of 40 million is an underestimate.¹⁵ The report places the number closer to 60 million (GoI 2010). A 2001 estimate by the United Nations puts India's slum population at a much higher number: almost 170 million (UN-HABITAT, Global Urban Observatory, 2005). A recent government projection put the population of India's slum dwellers in 2011 at approximately 90 million (GoI 2010). Even with these discrepancies, India's slum population is alarmingly massive, exceeding the entire population of countries such as France, Canada, and Argentina.

The percentage of the urban population living in slums varies across India's states. *Table 1.2* presents descriptive statistics on urban and slum populations, by state. At the top of the list, Maharashtra has more than one quarter of its urban population residing in slums. On the lower side, Kerala has less than one percent of its urban population in slums. In reference to the listed states in *Table 1.4*, the average percentage of residents living in slums across states is 11.69. Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh lie close to the average, with the former having 9 percent of its urban population in slums, and the latter 15 percent.

The prevalence and spread of slums can be further disaggregated to the city level. Many of India's slum dwellers reside in the megacities of Mumbai, New Delhi, Chennai, and Kolkata. A majority of scholarly and journalistic efforts to examine slum settlements have focused on these cities,¹⁶ and a handful of notable slum settlements within those cities.¹⁷ Less examined are the 56 'mid-sized' cities that are more representative of urban India,¹⁸ as well as the constellation of smaller towns that are quickly expanding throughout the country. A recent report found that

¹⁵ These reasons include variation in the definition of slums across states and underreporting in states.

¹⁶ See, for a representative example of studies, Boo 2013; Harriss 2005; Jha et al. 2007; Roy 2002.

¹⁷ *Dharavi*, or "Asia's largest slum", a geographically contiguous slum settlement of almost one million people in Mumbai, is perhaps the most studied and discussed of these mega slums (see Sharma 2000).

¹⁸ See the *Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) Overview*, Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India.

out of the 4,041 Statutory Towns in the Census of 2011, 2,543 (63 percent) reported the presence of slums. Remarkably, only 38 percent of India's slum households are in "million plus" cities. This mirrors a larger trend with urban poverty—the urban poor compose a larger percentage of the population of smaller cities and towns than in major metropolitan areas of cities like Delhi and Mumbai.¹⁹ A vast majority of slum households have emerged in the many smaller towns and cities that dot India's landscape (Census of India Report 2013).

Table 1.5 lists the slum populations of the 35 million-plus cities in India, as of 2001. Jaipur and Bhopal, the two cities under examination in this dissertation, are ranked, respectively, 11 and 14 for the size of their slum populations. The 2001 Census reports that approximately 9 percent of Bhopal's residents, or 126,346 people, reside in slums. This is a significant underestimate. A survey conducted in 2000 estimated the total slum population in Bhopal to be 468,606, or just under one third of the total population of the city (Bhopal JNNURM: 76)

Defining the Population of Inference: Squatter Settlements

The urban poor reside in a diversity of informal housing situations. The term 'slum' is used to describe many of these situations, from public housing projects in Chicago to the sprawling favelas of Rio de Janeiro and pavement dwellers in Dhaka. UN-HABITAT defines a slum household as "a group of individuals living under the same roof in an urban area who lack one or more of the following: Durable housing of a permanent nature that protects against extreme climate conditions; sufficient living space, which means not more than three people sharing the same room; easy access to safe water in sufficient amounts at an affordable price; access to

¹⁹ Kundu writes, "It would be wrong and dangerous to let the process of urbanization and migration be centered on a few megacities ignoring the smaller towns in the country. The latest data from the National Sample Survey suggest that poverty in large cities, particularly in metro cities, is rather low—at or below ten percent. Towns with less than 50,000 people, on the other hand, report much higher levels of poverty and greater deprivation and the quality of life is almost similar to that in rural areas" (GoI 2009: xxix).

adequate sanitation in the form of a private or public toilet shared by a reasonable number of people; security of tenure that prevents forced evictions” (UN-HABITAT 2006). In India, the National Sample Survey defines slum settlements as “A slum is a compact settlement with a collection of poorly built tenements, mostly of temporary nature, crowded together usually with inadequate sanitary and drinking water facilities in unhygienic conditions in that compact area” (NSS Report 534 2010: 7). Similarly, the Census of India defines slums as “Residential areas where dwellings are unfit for human habitation by reasons of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements, and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of street, lack of ventilation, light, or sanitation facilities or any combination of these factors which are detrimental to safety and health” (Census of India, 2011).

This dissertation is specifically interested in a pervasive type of slum in India: the *squatter settlement*.²⁰ Squatter settlements can be described as “mainly uncontrolled low-income residential areas with an ambiguous legal status regarding land occupation; they are to a large extent built by the inhabitants themselves using their own means and are usually poorly equipped with public utilities and community services...They proliferated with the rapid growth of cities in the less developed countries after the Second World War” (UN-HABITAT 1982). What differentiates these settlements is the manner in which they are settled. Squatter settlements organically expand in vacant areas of cities, as squatters set up shanties and call relatives and friends to join them. Satellite images show squatters settlements as amorphous, unplanned colonies, fractured by labyrinthine alleyways, drainage streams, and spontaneous clearings set

²⁰ In my estimation, about sixty percent of slum settlements in Jaipur and sixty-five percent of slum settlements in Bhopal are squatter settlements. Lists of urban slum settlements are from the following datasets gathered in Jaipur and Bhopal: NIUA (Jaipur), PDCOR (Jaipur), UNDP (Bhopal), and RAY (Bhopal) 2012.

aside for trash. These types of slums are the product of decentralized, unplanned construction by squatters. Most often, squatter settlements emerge on hazardous or undesirable lands.²¹

Excluded from the sample frame are urban poverty pockets such as post-eviction resettlement colonies, agricultural villages located within municipal boundaries, factory housing, and a transient population of pavement dwellers. Moreover, Bhopal and Jaipur also have small and historic “old cities” at their center. These dilapidated areas were once home to the artisans, masons, and laborers of the princely states. Because these areas emerged in a historically distinct manner from their more contemporary squatter settlement counterparts, they too were omitted from the sample frame. They do not exhibit the characteristics of unplanned, organic growth and initial possession through the illegal capturing of land. Further, because of their older existence, they are less marked by the informality and illegality that face squatter settlements. Pathways of development are unique for squatter settlements, which started to emerge in the 1960s and 70s throughout India, as poor rural migrants traveled to the cities in search of work and captured land without approval. The inclusionary consideration for the sample is whether or not the settlement *initially* arose in the post-Independence period through squatting. Levels of development do not factor into the identification, as they do with most definitions of slums. This is because subsequent success or failure in securing development serves as the primary outcome of interest in this dissertation, and therefore was not a consideration in sampling.

Master lists of slums provided by municipal and state governments do not differentiate among different types of slums. I therefore isolated the population of squatter settlements in the two cities by drawing on a range of sources. First, villages and settlements within the boundaries of the old cities were not included. Next, I gathered maps that mark the location of slums. With

²¹ “Slums are generally located on marginal lands, along the riverbanks, drains, low-lying areas, hill slopes, and railway tracks, and have a high risk of accidents” (GOI 2009).

the help of urban planners in Jaipur and Bhopal, it became quite simple to identify squatter settlements from above. If there were any ambiguities over the status or location of a settlement, I would further examine the case through field visits or discussions with officials. At the conclusion of this exercise, I came up with a list of 162 squatter settlements in Jaipur and 240 in Bhopal. These lists were subsequently used as sample frames.

For ease of exposition, and conformity with the colloquial use of the term on the ground,²² I continue to use the terms “slum”, “settlement”, or “slum settlement” to refer to the communities under study. Squatter settlements, however, define the population of cases under examination in this dissertation.

1.5: A Comparative, Multi-Method Research Design

This dissertation rests on a multi-method research design that combines ethnography, interviews with residents and political elites, focus groups, archival research, and an original household survey that was administered to 1,925 households across 80 slum settlements. In total, the fieldwork and survey research were conducted over a period of 20 months between September 2010 and July 2012. Two pre-dissertation research trips to India preceded this longer period of fieldwork. This section describes the research design of the dissertation and the qualitative and quantitative data gathered in the field.

Qualitative Research Design

I conducted 15 months of ethnographic research in eight case study slum settlements—four settlements in Jaipur and four in Bhopal. The case study slums were carefully chosen to hold

²² Slums in India go by several names depending on the region of the country. In much of north and northeast India, the term *juggie jhopprie* is used for urban slums. In northwest India, and the state of Rajasthan in particular, an individual slum is referred to as a *katchi basti*. In southern India, urban slums go by the term *jhopadpatti*. In addition to these regional names in the vernacular, slum residents, city officials, politicians, and the media use the English term “slum” as well.

constant a range of variables so as to isolate the explanatory variables of theoretical interest. Case study settlements in each city share the same land ownership status, lack formal property rights, and were established within a few years of one another. Residents exhibit approximately the same economic and educational statuses, and proximity to local labor markets. The case study slums were also historically clustered in the same state legislative assemblies, and have therefore been exposed to the same politicians, elections, and political campaigns since their establishment. Analytically, then, the case study slums “started” at the same time and under the same local conditions. This allowed me to isolate the influence of slum settlement size, ethnic heterogeneity, and party organization in the qualitative research.

My case study fieldwork involved interviews with slum leaders, focus groups and interviews with residents, and sustained ethnographic observation. The qualitative segment of the research focused on process and mechanism, and sought to uncover the factors that cause divergences in organizational capacity and development across slums. Ethnography is particularly well suited to capture such processes. The anthropology of routine politics and state-society relations allows the researcher to uncover the “hidden transcripts” that unfold in marginalized communities (Scott 1990; Bowie 1997; Corbridge et al. 2005; Schatz 2003). I was able to observe how residents make individual and collective demands on politicians and the state, the strategies that residents use to hold slum leaders and politicians accountable, and ways that residents mitigate threats to their security and economic wellbeing. In addition to observations of the routine, my ethnographic fieldwork was punctuated with intense moments—government evictions, mounting gang activity, electricity blackouts, inter-household conflict, and failing infrastructure—in which I observed the strategies that residents and leaders employ to

solve such problems. Cumulatively, the ethnographic segment of the fieldwork afforded rich, comparative insights into the processes of organization and development.

A unique and unanticipated source of qualitative data is the approximately 3,000 documents I collected from leaders, including public correspondence with politicians, newspaper clippings, election materials, and community meeting notes that span a fifty-year period. Coupled with ethnography, these documents provide a deep look into processes of leadership formation, party network expansion, and patron-client bargaining among residents, slum leaders, and politicians.

Outside of the case study slums, I conducted elite interviews with municipal and state politicians, political party officers, and government bureaucrats. The interviews covered a wide range of subjects, including the distributive politics of slum development, practices of vote-buying, collective action and protest by slum residents, order and security in slums, and mechanisms of leadership selection, accountability, and legitimacy. I also gathered extensive archival documents, newspaper articles, slum development council documents, and historical maps of urban expansion and slum growth.

Quantitative Research Design

Based on the ethnographic fieldwork, I designed and administered an original survey to 1,925 households across 80 slums. Household rosters for slum settlements do not exist, and because migrants often lack proper documentation, voter lists were inappropriate sampling frames. I therefore employed a spatial sampling technique that used satellite images. Slum settlements in Jaipur and Bhopal were first stratified into population quintiles. Cities were divided into three larger zones to ensure a geographically diverse sample. Eighty settlements were then chosen through a stratified random sampling procedure. Next, satellite maps were created for sampled

slums and settlements were divided into clusters of roughly 20 contiguous households. Ensuring a spatially representative sample of households was important, as migrants sometimes form ethnic enclaves and development is often internally uneven within settlements. Approximately one out of every 20 households in each cluster was sampled and marked on the maps. I went with the survey teams on a daily basis to ensure the integrity of the sampling procedure.²³

The survey instrument measured a range of household demographic indicators, cognitive and behavioral social capital, strategies of collective action and protest, settlement access to goods and services, inter-household conflict, practices of clientelism and vote-buying, electoral behavior, the strength of property rights, the scope and nature of leadership activities, and perceptions of legitimacy and accountability toward informal slum leaders.

Building accurate party membership lists for all of the 80 sampled slums were necessary to measure the density and inter-party balance of party networks. Therefore, I constructed a database of party workers by triangulating official party membership rosters that I gathered from party organizations, survey responses, and interviews with local party officers. I uncovered a total of 513 party workers across the 80 slums. To my knowledge, this is the first study to comprehensively enumerate patron-client networks across a large sample of communities.

To build precise measures of infrastructural development for each of the sampled slums, maps were created with satellite images that depict the quality and location of community development assets—water tanks and wells, paved roads, sewer lines, schools and childcare centers, temples and mosques, drainage, and streetlights. Research assistants and I traversed every street and walkway in the 80 sampled slums to note the exact location of these goods on the satellite images. Along with the household survey responses, the community asset maps provide accurate measures of a range of public goods and services.

²³ See *Appendix B* for further details on the survey design and implementation.

I gathered a wide variety of other types of quantitative data during my fieldwork from municipal and state archives, city-planning commissions, and political party offices. This includes 15 years of municipal and state-level development expenditures toward slums, 30 years of electoral data at the municipal and state levels, eviction histories, city master plans, and existing survey data on slums. The resulting dataset allows me to test a range of competing hypotheses on the determinants of political order and development in urban slum settlements.

1.6: Fieldwork Sites

Fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted in the north Indian cities of Jaipur, Rajasthan and Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Jaipur and Bhopal share many similarities that make them attractive comparisons at the city level of analysis. Both cities are classified as tier “two cities”—2.8 million and 2 million people, respectively²⁴—and are the administrative capitals of their respective state. NGO activity in the slums of both cities is marginal.²⁵ Both cities were princely states before independence in 1947—Jaipur a Hindu princely state and Bhopal a Muslim princely state—with historic, increasingly dilapidated, and densely populated “old cities” at their core and more recent urban sprawl in the peripheries. In both Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, the two major parties are the BJP and INC. Jaipur and Bhopal have been selected as JNNURM cities by the Government of India,²⁶ a major urban development initiative, and are therefore undergoing considerable change in terms of infrastructural development and poverty alleviation programs.

A majority of slum dwellers in India do not live in the mega-cities of Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata, but rather across “medium-sized” cities with populations under four million that are

²⁴ To put the two cities in comparative perspective: if Jaipur and Bhopal were in the US, they would be the third and fourth largest cities in the country, behind only New York City and Los Angeles.

²⁵ Survey respondents were asked: “Are there any NGOs or social organizations that are working in your slum?” Only 12.5 percent confirmed the presence of NGOs or social organizations.

²⁶ For a list of all selected cities under this scheme, as well as an overview of the stated mission and policies, see Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission Overview, Ministry of Urban Development.

spread throughout the country. As Davis notes, “If megacities are the bright stars in the urban firmament, three quarters of the burden of future world population growth will be born by faintly visible second-tier cities and smaller urban areas: places where, as UN researchers emphasize, ‘there is little or no planning to accommodate these people or provide them with services’” (Davis 2007: p. 7). Jaipur and Bhopal, as regional cities with high population growth rates, represent these “faintly visible second-tier cities” that are coming to characterize urbanization patterns in India and the developing world more broadly.

Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh were also appropriate field sites for reasons of feasibility. Ethnography demands a strong command of language and understanding of context and culture. I have extensively studied Hindi and Urdu, and had spent approximately a year in Jaipur prior to the dissertation fieldwork for language training, study abroad, and preliminary research. These previous experiences provided an essential network of academic and official contacts that helped introduce me to research assistants, obtain government permission, and facilitate access to politicians and government officials.

1.7: Outline of Dissertation

The central question of this dissertation can be disaggregated into four component parts. Each component reflects a distinct outcome in political organization, development, or public order that requires independent explanation. I therefore compose each chapter in this dissertation as a self-contained piece, with its own outcome to explain, substantive motivation, theoretical framework, data, and contributions to scholarship. All of the following chapters, however, are intimately related to one another. The arguments in each chapter sequentially build off the findings of those that precede them. The remainder of this dissertation is organized into five chapters, with the final concluding chapter devoted to a discussion of the larger contributions of the dissertation.

Chapter Two presents a theory of party organization and development. The chapter seeks to explain variation in levels of infrastructural development and access to public services across slums. *Why are some vulnerable communities able to demand and secure development from the state while others fail?* I find that party networks powerfully influence the ability of poor urban communities to organize and demand development. In slums that develop dense party networks, local accountability is produced through competition among workers to maintain and expand their following. Parties add to this by monitoring the behavior of workers from above. Dense party networks also provide settlements with a degree of political connectivity and organizational capacity for protest. The presence of multi-party networks, however, has heterogeneous effects on development. Politicians are less likely to provide capital-intensive goods to settlements with multi-party networks. Partisan competition also creates perverse incentives for rival party networks to undermine each other's mobilization efforts. The chapter contributes to research on clientelism, distributive politics, and the political economy of development.

Chapter Three takes a step back in the sequencing of events and investigates the origins of party networks and the reasons why they vary so remarkably across slums. *What explains variation in the presence and density of patron-client networks across communities?* Tracing the origins of patron-client networks is essential to explaining subsequent divergences in the organization and development of slums—why some settlements are able to secure development while others fail. Two explanatory variables form the core of the argument. First, levels of social diversity are positively associated with party network organization in slums. Higher levels of social diversity increase the fractionalization of leadership within a settlement. Over time, parties attempt to bring leaders into the party fold, increasing party network density and party representational balance in the process. Second, the population of the slum, or size of the 'vote

bank’, determines electoral incentives for parties to extend their organizational networks to maximize votes. This is because slums present increasing returns to scale in the exchange of resources for votes. Both ethnographic case studies and an econometric analysis of survey and party network data provide the empirical foundation of the chapter. By measuring and explaining spatial variation in party networks—and how these networks shape informal governance in slums—this chapter contributes to scholarship on clientelism, informal institutions, and representation.

Chapter Four examines the internal dynamics of informal governance, leadership, and accountability in slums. Informal leadership is pervasive across India’s urban slums. The scope and intensity of developmental activities performed by slum leaders, however, are highly uneven across settlements. *Why do some communities develop responsive leadership that advances the interests of residents while others fail?* I find that leaders are more active and responsive to the needs of residents when they have endogenously come to power through informal democratic selection—and face sanctions if they fail to perform. These selection mechanisms are informal because they are the social construction of slum dwellers themselves, organized outside the purview of the state. Further, a second mechanism—and substitute for democratic selection—is the accountability that is produced from competition among slum leaders. I present ethnographic case studies that provide rich insights into the historical processes of leadership formation and the construction of legitimacy in slum settlements. I then draw on the household survey data to construct an index of leadership activity and responsiveness, and test the theory of the chapter econometrically. The chapter contributes to theories of political selection, accountability, and democratic responsiveness.

Chapter Five examines the sources of public order and safety in India’s slums. Urban

slums are commonly portrayed as anarchic, lawless spaces. The characterization of urban slums as uniformly ungoverned areas, however, misses the sustained efforts of many slum settlements to internally produce public order. My ethnographic fieldwork and survey research reveal wide variation in the extent to which settlements are able to maintain peace and security. *Why are some communities able to produce order and security while others languish in conflict?* This chapter argues that order is jointly produced through social capital and vigilant leadership. The key to peace are those decentralized mechanisms of conflict mitigation that can be spontaneously deployed by residents to stop conflicts before they become serious enough to require outside authority and police intervention. Vigilant leaders can provide important means of social sanctioning and dispute resolution, and be particularly effective in repelling gang activity. The chapter advances a large and interdisciplinary literature on order, conflict, and violence.

Chapter Six concludes. I first review the major findings of the dissertation. I then relate these findings to several distinct bodies of research in comparative politics and comparative political economy. I additionally discuss the contributions of the dissertation to our understanding of local-level democratization, poverty, and development in urban India.

Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Public Goods and Services in India's Urban Slums

| Public Good/ Service | Percentage of Sampled Slums |
|--|-----------------------------|
| % Slums with Street-Lights and Household Electricity Connections | 64.6 |
| % Slums with Internal Paved Roads | 67.6 |
| % Slums with Motorable, Paved Approach Road | 65.4 |
| % Primary Source of Water through Water Taps | 78.00 |
| % Slums with Underground Sewer Systems | 26.00 |
| % Slums without Latrines | 14.7 |
| % Slums with Municipal Trash Disposal | 65.3 |
| % Slums with Primary School within One Kilometer | 87.00 |
| % Slums with Government Hospital within One Kilometer | 48 |

Source: NSS 2010 (*Report 534*)

Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics of Development and Services Across Slum Settlements (N = 80)

| | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
|---|---------|-----------|--------|--------|
| % Paved Road Coverage | 0% (18) | 100% (28) | 65.07% | 40.75% |
| % Sewer Line Coverage | 0% (53) | 100% (15) | 23.97% | 32.08% |
| No. Streetlights Per 1000 People | 0 (24) | 24.43 | 5.09 | 5.39 |
| % Household Access to Municipal Trash Collection | 0% (8) | 100% (1) | 39.20% | 26.89% |
| % Household Access to Government Medical Camps | 0% (8) | 95% (1) | 27.71% | 17.92% |
| % Households with Piped Water | 0% (27) | 100% (2) | 33.23% | 35.58% |

Note: Number of Slum Settlements in Parentheses

Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of India's Urban and Slum Populations

| Census Year | Number of Towns/ Urban Agglomerations | % Urban Population to Total Population |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1901 | 1,827 | 10.84 |
| 1911 | 1,815 | 10.29 |
| 1921 | 1,949 | 11.18 |
| 1931 | 2,072 | 11.99 |
| 1941 | 2,250 | 13.86 |
| 1951 | 2,843 | 17.29 |
| 1961 | 2,365 | 17.97 |
| 1971 | 2,590 | 19.91 |
| 1981 | 3,378 | 23.34 |
| 1991 | 3,768 | 25.72 |
| 2001 | 4,368 | 27.78 |
| 2011 | 7,935* | 31.16 |

Source: Sivaramakrishnan et al. 2006 (p. 27) and Census of India Provisional Population Totals, 2011

Note: *Number of "Towns" (2011 Provisional Population Totals, Rural-Urban Distribution)

Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics of India's Urban and Slum Populations

| State | Urban Population | % Urban Population to Total State Population | Slum Population | % Slum Population to Total Urban Population |
|-----------------|------------------|--|-----------------|---|
| Andhra Pradesh | 20,503,597 | 27.08 | 5,149,272 | 14.12 |
| Assam | 3,389,413 | 12.72 | 84,644 | 2.50 |
| Bihar | 8,679,200 | 10.47 | 507,383 | 5.85 |
| Chhattisgarh | 4,175,329 | 20.08 | 788,127 | 18.88 |
| Delhi | 12,819,761 | 93.01 | 2,025,890 | 15.80 |
| Gujarat | 18,899,377 | 37.35 | 1,346,709 | 7.13 |
| Haryana | 6,114,139 | 29.00 | 1,421,839 | 23.25 |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 2,505,309 | 24.88 | 270,084 | 10.78 |
| Jharkhand | 5,986,697 | 22.25 | 309,557 | 5.17 |
| Karnataka | 17,919,858 | 33.98 | 1,267,759 | 7.07 |
| Kerala | 8,267,135 | 25.97 | 45,337 | 0.55 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 16,102,590 | 26.67 | 2,388,517 | 14.83 |
| Maharashtra | 41,019,734 | 42.40 | 10,644,605 | 25.95 |
| Orissa | 5,496,318 | 14.97 | 635,150 | 11.56 |
| Punjab | 8,245,566 | 33.95 | 1,151,864 | 13.97 |
| Rajasthan | 13,205,444 | 23.38 | 1,206,123 | 9.13 |
| Tamil Nadu | 27,241,553 | 43.86 | 2,530,289 | 9.29 |
| Uttar Pradesh | 34,512,629 | 20.78 | 4,156,020 | 12.04 |
| Uttaranchal | 2,170,245 | 25.59 | 195,604 | 9.01 |
| West Bengal | 22,486,481 | 28.03 | 3,822,309 | 17.00 |

Source: 2001 Census Data, Table Reproduced from Sivaramakrishnan 2006 (pages 5-6; 108)

Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics of Slum Populations in India's Million-Plus Cities

| City | 2001 Population | % City Population Residing in Slums |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Greater Mumbai | 11,914,398 | 48.88 |
| Delhi | 9,817,439 | 18.89 |
| Kolkata | 4,580,544 | 32.55 |
| Bangalore | 4,292,223 | 8.04 |
| Chennai | 4,216,268 | 25.60 |
| Ahmedabad | 3,515,361 | 12.15 |
| Hyderabad | 3,449,878 | 17.43 |
| Pune | 2,540,069 | 20.92 |
| Kanpur | 2,532,138 | 14.57 |
| Surat | 2,433,787 | 16.68 |
| Jaipur | 2,324,319 | 15.07 |
| Nagpur | 2,051,320 | 35.42 |
| Indore | 1,597,441 | 16.25 |
| Bhopal | 1,433,875 | 8.81 |
| Ludhiana | 1,395,053 | 22.56 |
| Patna | 1,376,950 | 0.25 |
| Vadodara | 1,306,035 | 8.21 |
| Lucknow | 2,207,340 | N/A |
| Agra | 1,259,979 | 9.67 |
| Kochi | 596,473 | 1.32 |
| Varanasi | 1,100,748 | 12.55 |
| Nashik | 1,076,967 | 13.21 |
| Meerut | 1,074,229 | 43.87 |
| Faridabad | 1,054,981 | 46.55 |
| Coimbatore | 923,085 | 6.49 |
| Madurai | 922,913 | 19.06 |
| Vishakhapatnam | 969,608 | 17.65 |
| Jabalpur | 951,469 | 28.95 |
| Jamshedpur | 570,349 | N/A |
| Asansol | 486,304 | N/A |
| Dhanbad | 198,963 | N/A |
| Allahabad | 990,298 | N/A |
| Amritsar | 975,695 | N/A |
| Vijaywada | 825,436 | 31.97 |
| Rajkot | 966,642 | 15.57 |

Source: 2001 Census Data, Table Reproduced from Sivaramakrishnan 2006 (page 210)

Notes: N/A = data not available

Chapter Two: Clients and Communities: The Political Economy of Party Network Organization and Development in India's Urban Slums

2.1: Introduction

The slums of *Gandhi Nagar* and *Gautam* are situated just east of Bhopal's central market. Both slums were settled in the late 1970s by poor rural migrants eager to find work in the growing capital city of Madhya Pradesh, India. Despite their proximity and shared origins, the two slums have diverged remarkably in their development. Residents of *Gandhi Nagar* have experienced three decades of severe underdevelopment. Roads are unpaved and almost impassable during the monsoon season. Without municipal waste removal, the settlement is strewn with trash. Water is scarce and electricity provision is erratic. Naveen, the informal leader of *Gandhi Nagar*, has fought with the municipality for years to improve the condition of the settlement. However, without strong ties to politicians and political parties, his claims have been dismissed. *Gautam* differs strikingly from *Gandhi Nagar* in its active political environment and history of political party support. Party workers pervade all corners of the slum. Developmental deficiencies are quickly taken up by parties and their local leaders, all eager to capture the votes of the settlement. The developmental consequences of these political networks are easily observable. Roads in *Gautam* are paved and lit, drainage pipes line the slum, a children's health center has been constructed, and the municipality provides adequate water.

Gandhi Nagar and *Gautam* illuminate a larger puzzle in urban India. Despite a shared context of informality and clientelistic politics, slums are not uniformly underdeveloped and marginalized. Instead, the level of basic public goods and services—drinking water, paved roads, proper sanitation and waste removal, streetlights, and schools—varies widely across slums in India. Uneven development across India's slums provokes a fundamental question in

comparative political economy: *Why are some vulnerable communities able to demand and secure development from the state while others fail?*

I find that party networks powerfully influence the ability of poor urban communities to secure development from the state. In slums with dense party networks, competition among party workers generates a degree of accountability in local patron-client hierarchies that encourages development. Dense party networks further afford slums with political connectivity. I demonstrate econometrically that slums with more dense party networks have higher quality roads, more street lighting, greater access to municipal trash collection, and a higher frequency of government medical camps. The presence of multi-party networks, however, has heterogeneous effects on development. Politicians are less likely to extend non-reversible infrastructure to settlements with multi-party networks, as opposing networks can enjoy the good and even take credit for its provision. Partisan competition can also create perverse incentives for rival networks to undermine each other's development efforts. The density and balance of party networks eclipse alternative explanations of local development—human and social capital, ethnic fractionalization, resources for collective action, and the intensity of electoral competition.

This chapter contributes to research on clientelism, distributive politics, and the political economy of development. Studies of clientelism often assume that patron-client networks are uniform across the political space under study, and that when elections come, networks are in place to distribute patronage and monitor voters. In contrast, this study empirically demonstrates that clientelistic networks vary widely in their density and partisan balance across communities, with serious consequences for the provision of local public goods and services. This chapter also moves beyond the predominant focus in studies of clientelism on episodic practices of vote-

buying during elections.²⁷ Instead, I investigate the more protracted and quotidian forms of engagement that unfold among politicians, community leaders, and residents for infrastructural development and public services.

Clientelism has been found to be negatively associated with a range of outcomes in development and the quality of governance.²⁸ In turn, research has focused on why clientelism persists in different contexts, as well as the conditions under which it gives way to programmatic distribution. Within larger “patronage democracies” (Chandra 2004; 2007), however, there is considerable variation in clientelistic practices and development that have gone unexamined. This chapter brings down the level of analysis to the community, and systematically investigates variation in clientelistic linkages and development across a population often portrayed as inescapably locked in dependent, clientelistic relations with politicians—urban slums.

This chapter uses original survey data and qualitative fieldwork to examine the influence of party networks on local development. I administered a survey to 1,925 households across 80 slums in the north Indian cities of Jaipur and Bhopal. The survey instrument was designed after 15 months of ethnographic research in the same two cities. To measure the density and balance of party networks, I constructed party membership lists with official rosters and interviews with local party elites. I uncovered a total of 513 party workers across the 80 sampled slums. This project is the first among studies of clientelism to comprehensively enumerate patron-client networks across a large and representative number of communities. Finally, maps were created with satellite images that depict the quality and location of community development assets.

²⁷ Much of the current literature on clientelism focuses on the exchange of mundane and particularistic goods—cash, liquor, food, and clothing—for votes during elections. For examples, see, Calvo and Murillo 2004; Dunning and Stokes 2007; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Nichter 2008; and Stokes 2005.

²⁸ Clientelism has been found to be harmful to growth (Keefer 2007), democratization (Fox 1994), collective action and social capital (Putnam 1993), the emergence of programmatic policymaking (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), and democratic accountability (Stokes 2005).

Along with the survey, these maps provide accurate measures of a range of public goods and services. The resulting dataset allows me to statistically examine the influence of party networks on development while assessing the relative impact of alternative explanations.

The chapter is organized as follows. I first motivate the puzzle of uneven development across India's slums. Subsequently, I draw on my qualitative fieldwork and survey data to examine the various strategies that slum residents use to secure development. I then present a theory of party organizational networks, local competition, and community development. I proceed to the econometric analysis, demonstrate the robustness of the findings across several model specifications, and conclude with a discussion of the larger empirical and theoretical contributions of the chapter.

2.2: The Puzzle of Uneven Development Across Urban Slums

Approximately 90 million people are spread across 50,000 slums in India.²⁹ These individuals reside in a context defined by weak formal institutions, pervasive material poverty, ambiguous land ownership rights, informal and unregulated economic activity, and, for many, constant uncertainty over the risk of forced eviction. Despite these shared conditions, slum settlements in India reveal substantial divergences in their levels of infrastructural development and access to public services. *Table 2.1* presents descriptive statistics from a random sample of 80 slums in the state capitals of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh and Jaipur, Rajasthan. The sampled slums demonstrate remarkable variation in a range of goods and services. While some slums have paved roads, sewer line connections, municipal trash collection, and access to piped water, other slums have none of these goods and services and persist in the same level of underdevelopment as the time of their initial settlement. Most of the settlements exist somewhere in between these extremes,

²⁹ Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India, 2011 Report; NSSO 2010.

remaining only partially developed.

Scholars have examined how the urban poor and slum dwellers gain access to public services (Edelman and Mitra 2007; Harriss 2005; Jha et al. 2007), draw on social networks to obtain employment (Mitra 2003; 2010), develop inter-household trust and cooperation (Carpenter et al. 2004), and experience upward mobility (Krishna *forthcoming*). Related studies have examined vote buying and the distribution of patronage to individuals (Breeding 2007), as well as the effects of land titling on household investments, access to credit, and occupational choices (Field 2005; 2007). These studies have made important contributions to our understanding of political life and development in slums. An exclusive focus on individual behavior and social networks, however, cannot capture the protracted, clientelistic bargaining among residents, community leaders, and politicians that drive variation in development.

Other studies examine slum dwellers, and the urban poor more generally, as a larger economic class struggling to improve their material conditions and tenure security (Amis and Kumar 2000; Benjamin 2000, 2008; Gandy 2008). Partha Chatterjee (2004) refers to this area of struggle as political society—a space in which the poor engage the state through mass politics and political parties, as opposed to organized civil society and formal legal procedures. While concepts such as “subaltern” and “political society” do shed some light on the position of the urban poor, these categories prevent a nuanced understanding of the variety of organizational responses that different slums have to the politics and social life of the city. They also obscure variation in the success of some settlements to attract development while others are neglected.

Slums are not an undifferentiated mass of voters that exist independently from space and social networks. Politicians and political parties think of slums as spatially defined and named communities with distinct social groups, histories, and developmental deficiencies that can be

taken advantage of for electoral gain. The iterative, dyadic relationship is between politician and settlement. The exchange is not contingent on an individual's vote, but rather a politician's best sense of the aggregate voting behavior of the settlement. Infrastructural development and public services are extended to the whole or part of slum settlements, not to particular individuals or households. Individuals can enjoy the delivered club good irrespective of their personal vote. The unit of analysis in this chapter, therefore, is the slum settlement.

A geographically diverse body of ethnographic research places the analytical focus on the slum settlement, and examines processes of organization, patron-client bargaining, and community development.³⁰ However, without comparative research across a larger number of slums, these studies have limited leverage over why some communities are more successful than others in securing development. I combine qualitative research with a large household survey to gain leverage over processes of clientelistic bargaining and development.

2.3: Slum Development in India

The extension of development to slums in India is highly politicized and discretionary. Elected representatives at the municipal, state, and national levels receive discretionary budgets ("area development funds") that can be drawn on to finance slum development in their constituency. There are also funds for various poverty initiatives at the municipal and state level, in addition to central schemes and grants for slum development.³¹ Funding for slum development is limited, and elected representatives and officials must prioritize some slums over others. Patterns of development, consequently, reflect the political interests of politicians and officials.

Solutions to everyday problems—a broken water tap, weathered roads, electricity

³⁰ See Ayero 2001; Burgwald 1996; Gay 1994; and Jha et al. 2007

³¹ The most prominent schemes in India for slum development in the last decade have been the Basic Services for the Urban Poor, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, and *Rajiv Awas Yojana*.

blackouts, mounting gang violence, and clogged drains—are also highly politicized. Local bureaucrats, police, and engineers face a dizzying amount of citizen claims. Intervention by politicians is necessary to ‘get things done’ in a timely manner, especially by residents of informal settlements that often do not pay user charges or taxes. In an interview with the head engineer of a water works department in Jaipur, I asked if and how political intervention is important to the responsiveness of local government agencies toward citizen claims. He responded that, without political involvement, paperwork and applications usually “wander” in the office for a long time and are then sent back to lower levels for reassessment. He said a phone call or letter from a politician is necessary to move the work along and have money sanctioned for the project. Bureaucrats have incentives to entertain these requests for their own professional advancement. Rigid or defiant bureaucrats face political transfer to undesirable locations and departments (Author Interview, Jaipur, June 14, 2011).

2.4: Securing Development in India’s Slums

How do slum dwellers in India secure development?³² This section examines the demand side of development, and presents three strategies that slum residents use to secure development. These strategies were observed during the ethnography and then incorporated into the survey.

The first strategy is the internal self-provision of development by residents themselves, without the assistance of the state. I encountered such efforts during my ethnographic fieldwork. Residents collected money for light bulbs to hang outside their homes at night, replaced community water taps, and paved over potholes after the monsoon rains. Residents collectively

³² A rich body of literature examines citizen engagements with the state in India and other developing democracies—how claims and demands on the state are made, the actors and institutions that facilitate those engagements, and the pathways of access and means of organization that people use to secure public goods and services. For prominent examples, see Corbridge et al. 2005; Harriss 2005, 2010; Houtzager et al. 2002; Houtzager and Acharya 2010; Krishna 2002, 2007, 2011; Manor 2000; Mitra 1992; Wade 2007; and research by Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner on claim-making practices in rural Rajasthan.

dug channels to remove wastewater in those areas without proper drainage. Due to infrequent or absent municipal trash collection, groups would sometimes gather and sweep waste into areas designated for trash. Thirty-one percent of respondents (587 of 1,925) stated that people in their community engaged in such activities.³³ Of these 587 individuals, 385 claimed that community leaders were at least sometimes involved. The collective self-provision of development is quite common, and when communities do engage in these activities, leaders are often involved.

A second strategy of community development is group claim-making. This strategy focuses on getting the attention of politicians and state officials to improve the community. It differs from the former in its positioning toward the state, and the underlying assertion that the state should provide such goods. Such efforts are contentious, but fall short of the intensity and scale of collective protest, which is the subject of the following strategy. Group claim-making was the most common strategy of community development I observed during my fieldwork. An acute developmental or social problem would arise. In response, a group of concerned residents would go to the offices of their municipal councilor, state representative, or a local bureaucrat. Usually, after several hours of waiting, the group would be given the audience of the politician or official to voice their grievances. A significant 80 percent of respondents (1,542 of 1,925) noted that residents of their slum would gather in groups to go and meet politicians and officials.³⁴ As with self-provision, group claim-making is most often conducted under the presence of leadership. Approximately 65 percent of those respondents who acknowledged group claim-making also stated that a leader was either “sometimes” (210 respondents) or “almost always”

³³ Survey respondents were asked: “Sometimes people in slums are able to get together and improve their community without the help of the government. In this slum, have people ever collected money or organized to fix something, build something new, or generally improve the community?” See Houtzager and Acharya (2010) for a discussion of self-provision and other strategies of securing public goods.

³⁴ Survey respondents were asked, “Do people in this slum ever gather together in groups to meet political leaders (ward councilor, MLA, or MP) or government officials to ask for development or solve a problem in the slum?”

(786 respondents) involved.

The struggle for water in *Singh Basti* effectively illustrates the use of group claim-making. Piped water has not yet been extended to *Singh Basti* in eastern Jaipur. To provide the 500 residents with water, a public tanker comes five or six times a week to fill a single 5,000-liter PVC tank. In the height of the summer in 2012, the number of water deliveries to *Singh Basti* was reduced. Further, when the truck did come, the time was highly variable—anytime between 10am and 3pm. This would force residents to sit idly by the tank, preventing them from engaging in more productive activities. Desperate for more water, Rima, a particularly vocal woman and leader in *Singh Basti*, organized a group of 25-30 women to visit the ward councilor to demand daily and more predictable water supply. The women asserted that they have a right to water, and that failure to deliver an adequate supply is a violation of that right. Water delivery became more frequent and predictable for the duration of my time in *Singh Basti*.

A third strategy is collective protest. These events are contentious and initiated to cause public disruption. Collective protest is most often planned and involves a larger segment of the settlement than group claim-making. Residents will block roads and trains, march on government buildings, and go on hunger strikes. In some protests, effigies of politicians are burned and property destroyed. Collective protest is more common than efforts of self-provision, though less common than group claim-making. Thirty-eight percent of respondents acknowledged that their settlement had engaged in collective protest to improve community development. 583 of those 731 respondents stated that leaders were involved in “most” (477 respondents) or “some” (105) of the protest events.³⁵ Also noteworthy is the involvement of parties. Sixty-two percent of respondents claimed that parties were involved “most of the time” (245 respondents) or “some of

³⁵ Survey respondents were asked: “Have people here ever participated in a public protest to get development for the slum, like roadblocks, picket lines, or a demonstration?”

the time” (204 respondents). The following newspaper article illustrates an act of protest:

Around 1,500 [slum people] came to the state assembly building this afternoon to protest for their demands. Many women and children were also in the protest. First, the protestors reached the circle and had a meeting under the guidance of [the ward councilor and slum leaders]. They were planning to meet the Chief Minister to inform him about their problems. As the chief minister was busy, he instructed [another minister] to have a conversation with the Board of Ministers of Slums. The protestors did not want to meet the minister, but after, when they agreed to meet, the minister became busy in the proceedings of the state assembly and gave time to the protestors to meet him at his house on Wednesday morning...the protestors became angry. The slum leaders gathered at the main door of the assembly building and declared they would block the road (newspaper clipping gathered from a Jaipur slum leader, *undated*).

People in India’s slums tend to seek community development in groups, and position their collective action and demands toward the state. The internal self-provision of development is not entirely absent, though it relatively uncommon. This is not necessarily due to a deficiency of cooperation. Rather, many of the most important forms of development require professional expertise and significant finances. The state is the chief provider of these goods and services. Efforts to secure development are therefore oriented toward elected representatives and officials. A party worker explained to me the importance of demanding development from the state using a simple analogy: “When a baby cries he gets milk from his mother. When he doesn’t cry, he doesn’t get milk” (Author Interview, Jaipur, 12/2/2010). As I develop in the remainder of this chapter, the presence, density, and partisan balance of local party networks powerfully determine the level of success that residents have in demanding development from the state.

2.5: Party Networks and Political Clientelism at the Margins of the State

Political clientelism—the contingent, iterative relationship between politicians and voters in which goods, services, and protection are exchanged for political support—is striking in its persistence across a diverse range of developing democracies. Perhaps the most common faces of clients are those of the urban poor. Scholars have uncovered numerous instances of the urban

poor embedded in face-to-face exchange networks with politicians and political brokers.³⁶ In such contexts, access to basic goods and services is mediated, conditional on political support, and brokered through complex, vertical networks of intermediaries and community leaders.

In India's slums, political party workers represent the most grassroots manifestation of these patron-client networks. Based on party membership rosters and extensive interviews with local party officers, I enumerated a total of 513 party workers across the 80 sampled slums. Residents look to these party workers to mediate their claims, as they possess a degree of connectivity to politicians and officials. The pervasiveness of clientelism, party representation, and informal leadership makes variation in development across slums all the more puzzling.

I argue that divergences in community development emerge because not all slums are equally positioned to make demands through clientelistic channels. This study reveals startling unevenness in the presence, density, and partisan balance of party organizational networks across slums. Some settlements are flush with party workers of varying ranks and positions. These slums are connected to politicians through defined organizational hierarchies. Other settlements have only a few party workers, while others exhibit a complete lack of party networks altogether.

In slum S_i there are a certain number of party workers p living within the settlement. To be counted as a party worker in this study, an individual had to be an official member of the party and possess a distinct rank within the larger party organizational hierarchy. Residents who were only party supporters, but without organizational positions, were not counted. A measure of party network density, per 1,000 residents, is measured in the following manner:

$$\text{Party Network Density} = \left(\frac{p}{S_i(\text{population})} \right) \times 1000$$

³⁶ See Auyero 2000; Burgwald 1996; Gay 1994; Harriss 2005; and Jha et al. 2007.

The per-capita distribution of party workers is highly unequal across settlements. *Table 2.2* provides descriptive statistics from the sampled slums. The average slum has approximately two party workers per 1,000 people, with a one standard deviation of 1.56. Seventeen of the 80 sampled slums are absent of party workers, while the most politically saturated slums have roughly six party workers per 1,000 people.

A related concept is the balance of party representation in slums. Party workers may all belong to the same party, creating a situation of one-party dominance. Or, several parties may be represented, giving the nature of local partisan leadership a degree of multi-party balance. I measure the balance of party representation within settlements as:

$$\text{Party Representational Balance} = \left(\frac{1}{\sum p_j^2} \right) - 1$$

where p is the proportion of workers in the slum from party j . Because Jaipur and Bhopal exhibit two party competition, scores are bound between 0 and 1, with a score of 0 representing one-party dominance and a score of 1 representing a 50-50 split. Considering only those slums with party workers ($n = 63$), the average party representational balance score is 0.43, with a one standard deviation of 0.42. Twenty-seven of the sampled slums have party workers from just one party. At the other extreme, 5 of the sampled slums have a perfect 50-50 representational split.

Slum settlements in India exhibit a remarkable degree of variability in their degree of party network density and inter-party representational balance. This unevenness in patron-client networks has gone largely unnoticed—and unexamined—in studies of clientelism. I leverage this unevenness to examine the impact of patron-client networks on community development.

2.6: A Theory of Political Party Networks, Competition, and Community Development

This chapter argues that slums with dense party networks are better positioned to demand and secure development from the state than those settlements in which party networks are sparse or absent. The mechanisms operating between party networks and development are competition, accountability, and political connectivity. This section presents the theoretical framework of the chapter, and discusses each of the three mechanisms.

Aspiring slum leaders are aware of the material benefits associated with party leadership. To reap these rewards, individuals must build a large and loyal following in the slum.³⁷ Similarly, to join a party organization and move up the ranks, leaders need to demonstrate to politicians a strong hold on voting behavior in the settlement. A slum leader's following, or 'vote-bank', is the currency of exchange during elections to obtain material benefits and protection from politicians. To attract residents, slum leaders engage in activities they often refer to as *samajik seva*, or 'social work'. 'Social work' might involve assisting residents secure ration cards and electricity connections, dealing with police cases, resolving disputes, and presenting the needs of the slum before politicians. These everyday acts of problem solving and brokerage provide a stream of rents for leaders who manage to attract and keep a large following.

Informal accountability is generated from below, where the threat of exit among residents is a silent sanctioning mechanism that keeps leaders in check. Residents of urban slums are not isolated like their rural counterparts, limited to one or a few local patrons in the village for connectively to the outside world. Particularly in slums with dense party networks, residents have options in deciding which leaders to seek help from and follow. Leaders that secure development, resolve fights among neighbors, and organize against government eviction can

³⁷ Colloquially, party workers and political parties sometimes refer to a leader's following as his or her *dukhan*, or "store" of supporters whose votes can be sold during elections.

build a loyal following. Those who can more expeditiously and cheaply help residents secure ration cards, water taps, and electricity connections will surpass other leaders who drag their feet or charge exorbitant amounts for their services. Leaders in slums with dense party networks must watch their behavior, lest they lose their following to another leader.

From above, politicians and higher party officers have electoral incentives to carefully monitor the behavior of party workers in slums—and they do. Workers are the face of the party in communities. The front doors of leaders are emblazoned with party symbols. Flags fly above their homes, and everyday conversations are littered with partisan promotions. Residents associate leaders with the party to which they belong. Egregious acts of extortion, corruption, and violence, therefore, reflect poorly on the party brand. Residents might punish that party at the ballot box because of the behavior of local workers. As one senior politician in Jaipur put it, “Sometimes [we] talk to the common people of the slum and [ask] if this man doing a good job. If they tell us that, no, he always takes money from us whenever we ask him for any help, then [we] kick him out” (Translated Interview, February 11, 2012). During my fieldwork, several workers had been removed from their party organizations because of transgressions on residents.

Dense party networks also positively impact slum development through vertical party linkages. As *Section 2.4* illustrated, slum dwellers in India engage the state in groups, and look toward slum leaders and parties to mediate their claims. In such efforts, settlements with high levels of party network density possess the organizational capacity and connectivity to demand development from the state. Vertical party integration connects networks to the highest levels of party leadership at the city and state level. Party workers in slums meet with politicians, often on a daily basis, to seek guidance with individual and slum-wide problems. Slums with sparse or absent party networks are isolated in their developmental efforts. As one party worker in Bhopal

put it, “Politicians are the ones running the government. So when you become a part of a party, then you can meet the government officers easily, because they know [you are] from the party. So it will help me to get things for my community” (Translated Interview, Bhopal, July 2012).

Khan *Bhai*, a Congress Party worker in a slum in eastern Jaipur, exemplifies the importance of party connectivity. Whenever a problem arises, he is able to directly call the ward councilor or state assembly member. Khan *Bhai* possesses letterhead stationary bearing his party symbol and the name of the area’s state representative—a powerful signal of party connectivity to government officials. Below Khan *Bhai* are 11 Congress workers of varying rank. With this internal network, he can quickly organize a meeting in the slum to spread awareness about upcoming protests. Politicians in the area are aware of his standing in the party and electoral sway over the slum. Accordingly, he is given attention and priority over the hundreds of other constituents vying for time with politicians.

Underdevelopment and threats of eviction provide rich opportunities for slum leaders and politicians to harness a slum’s *lokshakti*, or people power, to expand and invigorate their following. Party networks will organize residents to demonstrate in front of government offices, go on hunger strikes, and block major transport roads. Politicians and slum leaders often refer to the strength of these actions as “agitation power.” Political parties are centrally involved in the organization of collective protest. The following excerpt from a newspaper illustrates the involvement of political parties in slum protests:

Under the leadership of [a] former minister and BJP leader...slum dwellers organized a traffic jam at [the slum’s] bypass to protest about various issues...The gathering was addressed by BJP workers and from [local municipal councilors]. They demanded repairing the damaged roads, immediate discontinuation of heavy vehicle movement on the road, removing biases in development work, and resettling [the slum] in an organized way at the same spot. The gridlock continued from 10 am until 2 pm in the afternoon [while the public meeting continued]...Police officers tried to appease the BJP leaders who were organizing the traffic jam. But the hundreds of people who were jamming the traffic opened the roads only after the meeting was over (*Dainik Navjyoti*, January 12, 2002).

In slums with dense party networks, then, the electoral compulsions of political parties, material self-interest of party workers, and daily needs of residents converge to generate an incentive structure that encourages development. Workers have strong incentives to broker and secure development for their settlements in the effort to maintain and expand their following—and access to rents.³⁸ Dense party networks also afford a degree of political connectivity that can be leveraged in dealings with politicians and officials.

Partisan Competition Among Party Workers

The presence of multi-party networks adds a unique dynamic to local competition. Over half (36) of the 63 slums with party networks in this study have some degree of multi-party representation. Partisan competition among these workers is intense. The ability to engage in political brokerage is largely conditional on having one's party in power, particularly at the municipal and state levels. Losing a constituency election is a devastating blow to political connectivity. Without direct access to politicians, leadership and everyday problem solving becomes difficult, threatening to erode a leader's base of support. The cumulative effects of losing elections, therefore, can mean a significant reduction in access to patronage and rents.

Multi-party representation intensifies competition in a settlement, and may increase accountability and responsiveness among workers through the mechanisms outlined above. The prospect of political isolation might compel workers to fight even harder to win over residents. My qualitative fieldwork, however, presented several reasons to be less optimistic about partisan

³⁸ Other scholars have identified competition and exit as factors that can encourage collective action in clientelistic environments. Ermakoff (2011) argues that patrimonial relations can produce collective capacity when the incentive structures of patrons and clients congeal in such a manner that promotes self-regulation and accountability. Two factors that promote self-regulation are competition for nodes in the hierarchy and the threat of exit (Ermakoff 2011: 198-199). Shami (2012) finds in rural Pakistan that patrons can encourage collective action among peasants when the latter have access to cities by roads. Connectivity introduces competition, compelling patrons to provide public goods or lose their clients.

competition. Party organizations can internalize the externalities of intra-party competition among workers through shared electoral interests, promotion, and hierarchical discipline. Multi-party networks competing within a slum, however, have no such mechanisms. Competing networks have incentives to undermine each other's efforts, even at the expense of development. In response to the protest described above, Congress workers in the slum distributed a pamphlet to weaken the mobilization efforts of BJP workers:

A few BJP leaders, with personal selfish motto, are misleading the people with deceptive statements, whereas in their eight years of rule, they neither got the [road] repaired even once, nor did they work toward the planned settlement of slum dwellers. So much so, they collected money from you for this purpose but did nothing concerning this issue, which is not fair. Even now, these same people [are] distracting the development work...Congress has always adopted the process of development. Block Congress Committee...requests you not to be enticed by these people. Please do not let their dubious intentions succeed and remove all hindrances being put up in the works being done in their favor.

Party networks seek to demobilize and capture the following of the competing network. While rumors and gossip are the everyday artillery in these confrontations, violence and intimidation are also employed. In several case study settlements, rival networks stoned each other's marches, burned cars, and engaged in inter-party brawls. In these ways, the presence of multi-party networks can serve to politically fragment slums, thereby undermining the scale and intensity of collective action and protest, and, in turn, long-term development.

Interviews with politicians illuminated a second reason that multi-party networks can undermine the development of a settlement. I asked a current MLA in Bhopal why some settlements are prioritized for development over others. He replied, "Where did you get good votes? The other factor is your workers, if they are strong, if they are able to convince you, you give work priority of that place." I asked him to clarify what he meant by "good votes". He responded, "Where you get majority votes, those areas automatically come under priority" (Author Interview, Bhopal, 7/7/2012). Another sitting MLA in Jaipur echoed this sentiment:

“Wherever [the politician] gets more votes, more supporters, that will be his priority area. So, say slums X and Y are giving me more support, I will go for more development there. This is in any democracy” (Author Interview, 7/26/2012).

The composition of party workers in a settlement is a signal for politicians to understand the partisan leanings of that settlement. The presence of opposition workers means that the settlement is not fully committed. It means that rival networks are working to undermine the reputation of the politician, steal away votes, and take credit for development projects.³⁹ If politicians observe opposition party workers in a settlement, they might allocate major projects to more loyal slums. This is consistent with the logic of “turnout buying”—that politicians predominantly target loyalists for patronage to ensure electoral stability and increase voter turnout (Nichter 2008; Stokes et al *forthcoming*).

Partisan competition, therefore, may temper or reverse the positive effects of party network density. In the econometric analysis below, I interact party network density with party representational balance to examine the effects of multi-party networks on local development.

2.7: Empirical Strategy

The average slum in the sample is 33 years old, with a standard deviation of 9.53 years. All slum settlements were completely absent of infrastructural development and services at the time of their founding. Settlements grew in a largely unplanned and organic manner, and were extended development after their establishment. In the sequencing of events, therefore, all sampled slums uniformly “started” under the same developmental conditions.

³⁹ Politicians in urban India are obsessed with “stamping” development projects with their name. When construction projects are going on in slums—installing water pipes, paving roads, building schools and clinics, or clearing trash—the representative or representatives that are responsible for the project will visit the slum and call local party workers to gather a crowd for the event. Speeches will be given, flowers will be draped around the neck of the politician, and sweets will be distributed. Politicians want credit for their work, and fear rival party networks will take credit for it.

All but one of the 80 sampled slums in this study was established before the start of India's decentralization reforms in the early 1990s. Moreover, the sampled slums pre-date the provision of discretionary development funds for elected representatives (started in 1993), as well as the start of major urban development schemes in the 2000s. Development has been almost exclusively extended within the last 18 years, in the post-decentralization period⁴⁰. This is an analytically salient point. By the time infrastructural development was used as a clientelistic tool, most slums had already reached their maximum population capacity and demographic character, and had begun processes of leadership formation and the development of clientelistic linkages. Community-level variables and party networks were established prior to development, providing leverage over questions of organization and public goods provision.

The data used in this dissertation are cross-sectional, preventing an econometric analysis that explicitly examines changes over time. My qualitative fieldwork, however, revealed several facts about party leadership, development, and other community characteristics that further increase our analytic leverage. Party workers live within slums and exclusively engage in leadership activities for local residents. Not once during 15 months of fieldwork did I find party workers moving among slums to sell their services. Leaders are embedded in the social networks of their settlement; to leave the slum is to leave behind the social ties from which they derive authority. The density of party networks in a slum today, then, is roughly proportional to the levels of party network density ten or twenty years ago.

Similarly, other key explanatory variables, such as land ownership categories and the nature and extent of social diversity, are either temporally constant or relatively stable once the

⁴⁰ Most development work prior to this period was limited to the provision of community water taps and electricity connections. Controlling for settlement age and land ownership categories will likely explain most variation due to any pre-decentralization development. See Mitra 1988 and Bhatnagar 2010 for historical discussions of slum development in Bhopal and Jaipur, respectively.

settlement reached maximum population capacity. The analyses below, then, represent the cumulative impact of these variables—from the period of initial squatting to the present—on levels of development.

2.8: Variables and Their Measurement

This section describes the variables used in the econometric analyses below. Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in *Table 2.2*, and discussion of data collection and the survey can be found in *Appendix B*.

Six development indicators serve as the dependent variables. Three of the development indicators—percentage of paved roads, number of streetlights per 1,000 people, and percentage underground sewer line coverage—were measured using satellite imagery and traverse walks. A small team and I surveyed every area of the 80 sampled slums with detailed maps and noted the location and quality of various infrastructural development goods. The three public services under consideration—the provision of government medical camps, municipal trash collection, and piped water—were measured with the survey instrument. Respondents were asked to state the availability and frequency of their access to these services.

The two explanatory variables of primary interest are party network density (*PN Density*) and party representational balance (*PR Balance*). *Section 2.3* described the measurement of these two variables and their descriptive statistics. Party network density and party representational balance are interacted in the following regressions to examine the marginal effects of network density on development, conditional on levels of representational balance.

A voluminous literature on local development provides a number of alternative explanations that I incorporate into the econometric analyses below. Scholars have found

evidence that social heterogeneity can undermine cooperation and development.⁴¹ Social diversity may introduce conflicting social norms and behavioral expectations, as well as incentives for politicians to encourage ethnic violence as a vote-seeking strategy. In a context of weak formal institutions, we would expect social diversity to have a negative relationship with development. Respondents were asked to state a number of social identity categories, including caste, religion, and region of origin. Social fragmentation scores ($1 - \sum e_i^2$) were calculated along these different social cleavages for each sampled slum.

A second alternative explanation of slum development is social capital. Social capital has been found to be important for governance and development.⁴² To measure social capital, survey respondents were asked eight questions that probed their perceptions of inter-household cooperation and trust in the settlement. With the method principal component analysis, I derived an underlying factor among responses to the eight questions (see *Appendix C*).

A third alternative explanation points to the importance of group resources, both material and cognitive. Material resources—the income and assets of residents—may influence collective action, the size of rents that leaders can demand for their brokerage, and the ability of residents to privately secure development. I measure the available material resources of a settlement as the average per-capita household income of settlements. Stated household monthly incomes were placed in larger bins for every Rs. 1,000 (1 = Rs. 0 – 1,000; 2 = Rs. 1,001 – 2,000; 3 = Rs. 2,001 – 3,000; etc.). The average household monthly income across the settlements is approximately Rs. 7,000 (\$140), with a standard deviation of Rs. 1,500 (\$30). Average per-capita monthly household income is Rs. 1,400, or about a dollar per person per day.

⁴¹ See, for examples, Alesina et al. 1999; Banerjee et al. 2005; Easterly and Levine 1997; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Krishna 2002; Posner 2004; and Putnam 2007.

⁴² See Knack and Keefer 1997; Krishna 2002; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Putnam 1993.

Education levels might also be critical to slum development. Higher educated and literate residents may be more likely to engage in horizontal collective action, more aware of their beneficiary status under government schemes, and better able to use alternative pressures to secure development—the media, civil society groups, and legal measures. Further, education is key to the consumption of information, which has been found to be central to political accountability (Pande 2011). Responses to highest level of education achieved were placed in the following bins: 0 = no formal education; 1 = 1- 4 years of education; 2 = 5-7 years; 3 = 8-10 years; 4 = higher secondary; 5 = college degree; 6 = graduate or professional degree. The average education score across slums is 1.61, or just a few years of primary school.

Group size is a potentially important factor. Increasing size might undermine collective action due to its influence on free riding and monitoring (Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Olson 1965). Oppositely, increasing size might encourage development through increasing the scale of protest and the size of the slum's 'vote bank'. Slum size was calculated using both existing survey data and spatial area calculations using satellite imagery and close approximations of population density based on housing structures. The latter was essential to insure uniformity, and to construct population figures for sampled slums that the government has not yet surveyed.

Party systems and the degree of electoral competition have been found to influence public expenditures at the regional level in India.⁴³ The intensity of electoral competition at the municipal and state levels might directly affect the development of slums as well. Since 1994, the average margin of victory in Jaipur and Bhopal's municipal elections, for instance, is just 13.1 percent, with a standard deviation of 6.6 percent. This is an average margin of victory of 1,275 votes. A slum in a competitive constituency, therefore, can determine an election.

⁴³ See Khemani 2004; Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Saez and Sinha 2009.

Incumbents in these competitive constituencies face higher levels of uncertainty over future elections, and therefore may “overbid” in public expenditures (Saez and Sinha 2009).

Using electoral data from municipal elections (since 1994) and state legislative assembly elections (since 1980) in Jaipur and Bhopal, I calculated the vote margin between the winning candidate and the candidate with the second highest amount of votes. Since the larger dataset is cross-sectional, I averaged the scores across elections. Sampled slums were then matched to the averaged competition scores for the constituencies in which they have been located.

Three additional controls are used in the econometric analyses. First, the land ownership category on which a slum is located may have important effects on development. I aggregate land categories into three groups—central government land, private land, and state/ municipal land. State and municipal representatives enjoy great discretion over developmental activities on state and municipal land. National ministries administer central land, however, and so politicians face more legal and regulatory obstacles in delivering development to slums on central land. Second, I control for the age of the sampled slums—the duration of time between the initial settling of the slum and the present. Third, I calculate the ratio of a slum’s population to the total slum population in its municipal ward. In wards with many slums, competition across slums for scarce resources may reduce the level of development for some of those settlements.

2.9: Econometric Results

I now estimate the effects of party network density and party representational balance on the provision of infrastructural development and services. The regressions take the following form:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 PN_Density_i + \beta_2 PR_Balance_i + \beta_3 PND_i * PRB_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where y is the good or service under examination. The explanatory variables of interest are party network density, party representational balance, and their interaction. X_i is a vector of control

variables. The regression output is displayed in *Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5*. In the *Chapter Appendix*, I present two alternative model specifications.⁴⁴ The first alternative specification uses the logged values of party network density. The second uses seemingly unrelated regression.⁴⁵

I first examine the influence of party network density on development, with reference to those models that exclude representational balance. Party network density is both statistically and substantively significant in explaining variation in four of the six development indicators. Concerning streetlight coverage, an additional party worker per 1,000 people is associated with one additional streetlight per 1,000 residents. Given a densely populated cluster of 1,000 residents, or approximately 200 houses, an additional streetlight is significant. An increase of one party worker per 1,000 residents is associated with a 6.55 increase in the percentage of roads that are paved. A one standard deviation change in party network density, then, is associated with a 10.09 percent increase in paved roads. Party network density also has a statistically significant association with municipal trash collection and the provision of government medical camps. An additional party worker per 1,000 residents is associated with an increase in the percentage of households with access to municipal trash collection by 2.92 percent, and an increase of 2.68 in the percentage of those reporting access to government medical camps.

I now turn to the interactive effect of party network density and representational balance on development. I focus on the marginal effects of party network density *conditional* on the range of values for party representational balance. The coefficient on party representational balance cannot be substantively interpreted by itself, since representational balance cannot exist, by definition, without party networks. Marginal effects plots of these interactions are presented

⁴⁴ There is some clustering of observations at 0 and 100 for several of the development indicators. This is not due to censoring, and so Tobit is not an appropriate model specification (Sigelman and Zeng 1999)

⁴⁵ The six outcomes examined may not be independent of one another, presenting the possibility that the error terms in the regressions are correlated with one another. I present estimates from a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model that explicitly takes inter-equation correlations into account.

in *Figures 2.1.1* through *2.1.6*. The figures demonstrate that party representational balance has heterogeneous conditional effects on development that depend on the good in question.

All else constant, the marginal effect of party network density on paved road coverage, conditional on party representational balance, decreases as the value of representational balance rises. A similar relationship holds with respect to the provision of government medical camps. These associations are statistically significant up to representational balance scores of 0.5 and 0.3, at which point the associations lose statistical significance. Party representational balance also has a negative conditional influence on underground sewer connections and piped water, though the associations are statistically insignificant. Notice that the marginal effects of party network density are still positive throughout the full range of representational balance scores, with the exception of sewer connections. Party representational balance, therefore, does not negate or reverse the effect of network density, but instead diminishes its positive magnitude.

The marginal effect of party network density on streetlight coverage, conditional on party representational balance, *increases* as levels of party representational balance rise. This association is statistically significant throughout the range of values for party representational balance, and is robust across all model specifications. In the regressions with logged values of party network density, party representational balance also exhibits a positive conditional influence on municipal trash collection (see *Figure 2.1.7*).⁴⁶ This positive and significant association holds across a band of party representational balance scores between 0.05 and 0.5.

The coefficient on party network density represents the marginal effect of the variable when representational balance is zero. Party network density—absent of any representational balance—has a positive and statistically significant effect on the provision of paved roads,

⁴⁶ The remainder of the marginal effects plots for logged party network density are consistent with *Figures 2.1.1* through *2.1.6*. I present these alternative marginal effects plots in the *Chapter Appendix*.

streetlights, and doctor camps. With the provision of roads, the size of the coefficient on party network density almost doubles in comparison to those models without the interaction term.

In sum, the results point toward a robust and positive influence of party network density on development, regardless of representational balance. All else constant, settlements with more dense party networks tend to have higher levels of infrastructural development and access to public services. Party representational balance has a mixed influence on development, both in direction and significance. As a conditioning variable, representational balance exhibits a positive and significant association with the provision of streetlights and, to a lesser extent, municipal trash collection. However, in relation to capital-intensive infrastructure—paved roads, piped water, and underground sewers—representational balance has a negative conditional influence. Heterogeneity in the impact of party representational balance is a provocative finding. Partisan competition may have the most perverse effects on the distribution of high-cost infrastructure. Politicians might extend these scarce projects to loyal settlements that have few or no rival party networks. Everyday services like trash collection and street lighting, however, can be more easily extended to—and retracted from—communities. Politicians might therefore be more inclined to extend basic services and goods to settlements with a strong party network presence, regardless of whether or not that settlement also has rival party workers.

I now discuss the other explanatory variables. The variable for central land ownership exhibits a significant and negative relationship with sewer line coverage and household access to piped water. Given the capital-intensive nature of providing sewers and water lines, this relationship may reflect the difficulty of politicians in circumventing central government laws. The variable of settlement age was also found to be statistically significant for two goods and

services—sewer line coverage and municipal trash collection. Older slum settlements are more likely to have sewer lines and municipal trash removal than their newer counterparts.

Unexpectedly, education levels among residents and household income per capita lack robust explanatory power across the models. There is no evidence to suggest that group resources—either material or cognitive—have a direct impact on development.

Equally surprising was the positive and statistically significant association between vote-margins (municipal level) and the provision of streetlights, trash collection, and sewers. In other words, *more* intense electoral competition at the municipal level is associated with *lower* development for slums in those constituencies. A one standard deviation (6.55 percent) increase in average vote margins in municipal elections is associated with one less street-light per 1,000 residents, a 4.78 decrease in the percentage of households with access to trash collection, and roughly a 6.50 percent decrease in sewer line connections. Electoral competition at the state legislative assembly level lacks explanatory power in all models except for the provision of government medical camps. A one standard deviation *decrease* (4.21) in average vote margins in state elections is associated with a 3.79 increase in the percentage of respondents reporting access to government medical camps in the previous year. These findings complicate a literature in political economy that posit a positive effect of competition on development.⁴⁷

The explanatory power of social capital was limited to the provision of streetlights and municipal trash collection. This is a provocative finding in light of a large literature on the importance of social capital for development.⁴⁸ Studies of social capital primarily focus on interactions among actors of equal political prominence to explain levels of development. In the context of slums, residents can collectively act toward some developmental ends. However,

⁴⁷ See Khemani 2004; Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; and Saez and Sinha 2009.

⁴⁸ See, for example, Knack and Keefer 1997; Krishna 2002; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Putnam 1993.

residents alone cannot provide many of the most significant forms of development. Studies of public goods provision that limit the analytical focus to decentralized forms of collective action among residents, consequently, may overlook the convergence of local and extra-local variables that drive variation in slum development.

A final result that demands acknowledgement is the lack of a strong, consistent, and negative influence of social diversity on development. While caste diversity is negatively associated with the provision of sewer lines, social fragmentation categories are otherwise lacking in explanatory power. Given the larger context of weak formal institutions in slums, we would expect informal institutions—particularly ethnic boundaries—to be central to outcomes in collective action and development. And given the general findings of the literature on diversity and development, we would expect the impact of diversity to be negative. Considering the bundle of indicators examined in this study, the direction and explanatory strength of social heterogeneity on development is undetermined.

2.10: Conclusion

Drawing on qualitative fieldwork and original survey data, this chapter demonstrates that the density and inter-party balance of local party networks have a critical influence on the ability of slum residents to demand and secure development. In slums with dense party networks, competition among leaders generates a degree of accountability and organizational capacity that encourage development. Connectivity to higher nodes in party hierarchy facilitates the claim-making efforts of residents. The presence of multi-party networks, however, can tamper the positive impact of density. Politicians are less likely to extend infrastructure to slums with multi-party networks because residents can enjoy these goods regardless of their vote. Moreover, politicians are wary of rival party workers potentially taking local credit for development

projects. Inter-party competition also generates perverse incentives for rival networks to undermine each other's development efforts. The negative conditional effect of multi-party networks holds with capital-intensive and non-retractable projects like roads, piped water, and underground sewers. The econometric results provide strong evidence that party network density and balance outperform alternative theories of local development—human and social capital, social heterogeneity, group size and resources, and the intensity of electoral competition.

Scholarship on clientelism has overlooked unevenness in the presence, strength, and partisan balance of patron-client networks across spatially distinct communities. This study makes an original contribution to studies of clientelism by measuring the density and partisan balance of patron-client networks across a large number of communities, and investigating the conditions under which these networks encourage development. To my knowledge, this is the first study of political clientelism to systematically do so. It also moves beyond characterizations of “clientelistic networks” as uniformly detrimental, and demonstrates that under certain conditions, clientelistic networks are critical to the development of vulnerable communities. The next chapter endogenizes party networks, and explains both the deeper historical origins of these networks and why they vary so dramatically across communities.

Research on local development often places the analytical focus on highly decentralized forms of cooperation, trust, and collective action. The findings from this study demonstrate that the explanatory power of social capital is limited. For many of the most important infrastructural goods, vertical party linkages are of primary importance for development. Similarly, we would expect high levels of ethnic diversity to be particularly caustic on collective action and development in urban slums. The relationship between ethnic diversity and development in this study, however, is unclear. Together, these findings suggest that decentralized theories of

collective action and development must incorporate informal hierarchy to understand the provision of infrastructure and public services in contexts like urban slums.

This chapter also contributes to a growing body of scholarship on informal mechanisms of accountability (Tsai 2007). Research on political accountability predominantly focuses on elections and other formal democratic institutions. Less understood are those informal mechanisms that can produce accountability in undemocratic spaces. Despite operating in a larger democratic context, party workers in India's slums are informal actors, and are not held accountable by elections. Still, competition among workers can produce accountability and encourage development, even in the absence of elections. In contexts with dense party networks, competition leads party workers to regulate their own behavior and fight for development to increase the size of their following, thereby advancing their own access to rents and promotion in the party hierarchy. Accountability also comes from above, where parties have electoral incentives to keep their workers—the local face of the party—in check. This chapter advances our understanding of how political accountability can be produced in informal, clientelistic, and locally non-democratic spaces.

The scope conditions of the theory outlined in this article are few: poor urban settlements in contexts defined by clientelism, multi-party competition, and informality. This describes developing democracies with expanding urban slum populations as diverse as Argentina, Kenya, and Thailand. Spatial variation in slum development marks many developing cities. In the UN-HABITAT's State of the World's Cities Report, variation in development across slums is highlighted.⁴⁹ Scholars have additionally pointed to variation in development across slums⁵⁰, though without a sufficiently large number of observations at the settlement level, have been

⁴⁹ UN-HABITAT State of the World's Cities, 2006/2007.

⁵⁰ See, for example, Gay 1994.

unable to statistically examine the reasons for that variation. With a global population of one billion and growing, a critical research agenda for social scientists is to understand how slum dwellers organize to demand and secure development from the state.

International institutions and governments are working across the developing world to improve the conditions and livelihoods of slum dwellers. A central component of contemporary development policy is the sustained participation of communities. The findings from this study suggest that intra-community organization alone may be insufficient in helping residents secure many of the most basic public goods and services. As long as the provision of development is politicized and discretionary, integration into dense, clientelistic networks will continue to be a critical factor in determining the developmental trajectory of poor urban communities.

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Development and Services Across Slum Settlements (N = 80)

| | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
|---|---------|-----------|--------|--------|
| % Paved Road Coverage | 0% (18) | 100% (28) | 65.07% | 40.75% |
| % Sewer Line Coverage | 0% (53) | 100% (15) | 23.97% | 32.08% |
| No. Streetlights Per 1000 People | 0 (24) | 24.43 | 5.09 | 5.39 |
| % Household Access to Municipal Trash Collection | 0% (8) | 100% (1) | 39.20% | 26.89% |
| % Household Access to Government Medical Camps | 0% (8) | 95% (1) | 27.71% | 17.92% |
| % Households with Piped Water | 0% (27) | 100% (2) | 33.23% | 35.58% |

Note: Number of Slum Settlements in Parentheses

Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N = 80)

| Variables | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
|---|-------|-------|----------|-------|
| Party Network Density | 0 | 6.37 | 1.84 | 1.56 |
| Party Representation Balance | 0 | 1 | 0.34 | 0.41 |
| Population | 349 | 23811 | 2469 | 3222 |
| Slum Age | 9 | 62 | 32.75 | 9.5 |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | 0 | 1 | 0.5625 | 0.50 |
| Average Education | 0 | 3.25 | 1.61 | 0.65 |
| Average HH Monthly Income Per Capita | 0.67 | 1.86 | 1.31 | 0.29 |
| Caste Diversity | 0 | 0.99 | 0.79 | 0.17 |
| Religious Diversity | 0 | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.17 |
| State of Origin | 0 | 0.74 | 0.29 | 0.22 |
| Community Social Capital Index | -4.61 | 4.02 | 1.89e-07 | 1.75 |
| Municipal Elect. Competition | 3.28 | 37.91 | 13.14 | 6.55 |
| State Elect. Competition | 9.80 | 25.16 | 15.23 | 4.21 |
| Ratio of Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | 0.87 | 100 | 27.57 | 28.29 |
| Central Land Ownership | 0 | 1 | 0.275 | 0.45 |
| Private Land Ownership | 0 | 1 | 0.075 | 0.27 |

Note: Number of Slum Settlements in Parentheses

Table 2.3: OLS Models for Streetlights and Piped Drinking Water

| Models | Street Lights Per 1,000 Residents | | | Percentage Household Access to Piped Water | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
| Intercept | 3.57 (4.64) | -2.22 (4.97) | -3.66 (5.60) | 9.20 (37.95) | 10.45 (46.87) | -16.34 (48.73) |
| PN Density | 1.12 *** (0.34) | 1.01 *** (0.32) | 1.01 ** (0.40) | 1.95 (3.03) | 2.14 (2.89) | 4.03 (3.90) |
| PR Balance | | | -1.08 (2.11) | | | -8.68 (18.94) |
| PND*PRB | | | 0.10 (0.72) | | | -3.69 (6.61) |
| Log Population | 0.15 (0.70) | 0.94 (0.71) | 1.20 (0.86) | 2.63 (4.93) | 4.05 (4.83) | 8.36 (5.96) |
| Social Capital | | 0.68 ** (0.33) | 0.73 ** (0.33) | | 1.30 (2.22) | 2.21 (2.27) |
| Age of Slum | -0.03 (0.04) | 0.008 (0.04) | 0.007 (0.04) | -0.19 (0.45) | 0.27 (0.42) | 0.29 (0.40) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -6.78 *** (1.28) | -5.07 *** (1.33) | -5.04 *** (1.33) | -35.47 *** (8.43) | -33.96 *** (9.79) | -33.65 *** (9.30) |
| Central Land | | 0.60 (1.28) | 0.51 (1.27) | | -23.58 *** (8.21) | -24.92 *** (8.59) |
| Private Land | | -1.26 (1.39) | -1.30 (1.45) | | -16.85 (12.96) | -18.61 (13.31) |
| Caste Diversity | -1.35 (3.31) | -1.86 (3.57) | -2.15 (3.59) | 4.45 (24.87) | -10.24 (25.15) | -17.43 (25.68) |
| Religious Diversity | 4.56 (3.13) | 4.79 (3.33) | 5.33 (3.47) | -8.44 (21.55) | -11.40 (21.57) | -0.21 (22.16) |
| State Diversity | -0.57 (2.29) | -1.12 (2.47) | -1.02 (2.52) | -28.12 (19.78) | -20.11 (20.73) | -16.20 (20.79) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 1.29 (1.53) | 0.86 (1.67) | 0.79 (1.71) | 12.58 (11.18) | 9.47 (12.74) | 9.69 (12.56) |
| Education | 1.12 (0.74) | 0.31 (0.83) | 0.28 (0.83) | 8.96 (5.90) | 6.78 (5.46) | 6.22 (5.57) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | | 0.15 * (0.09) | 0.16 * (0.09) | | 0.07 (0.55) | 0.21 (0.56) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | | -0.08 (0.10) | -0.07 (0.11) | | -0.09 (0.89) | -0.05 (0.91) |
| Ratio of Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | | -0.005 (0.12) | -0.05 (0.12) |
| R ² | 0.58 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.40 | 0.48 | 0.50 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 2.4: OLS Models for Municipal Trash Removal and Doctor Camps

| Models | Percentage Household Access to Trash Collection | | | Percentage Household Access to Doctor Camps | | |
|---|---|-----------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 |
| Intercept | -32.75 (20.90) | -64.81 *** (24.40) | -64.10 ** (26.84) | 6.47 (18.41) | 9.39 (23.66) | -6.48 (24.18) |
| PN Density | 3.31 ** (1.63) | 2.92 * (1.62) | 3.37 (2.20) | 1.98 * (1.16) | 2.68 * (1.41) | 4.23 ** (1.74) |
| PR Balance | | | 3.02 (10.68) | | | -2.69 (9.14) |
| PND*PRB | | | -1.27 (4.07) | | | -3.38 (3.21) |
| Log Population | 3.77 (2.97) | 7.49 ** (2.92) | 7.23 * (3.80) | 3.97 * (2.28) | 3.79 * (2.27) | 6.22 * (3.16) |
| Social Capital | | 5.60 *** (2.01) | 5.60 *** (2.08) | | 0.85 (1.34) | 1.41 (1.35) |
| Age of Slum | 0.46 * (0.25) | 0.63 ** (0.24) | 0.64 ** (0.25) | -0.15 (0.18) | 0.01 (0.20) | 0.03 (0.21) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | 36.88 *** (5.52) | 50.30 *** (7.23) | 50.23 *** (7.26) | -11.65 *** (4.27) | -4.32 (5.23) | -4.18 (5.12) |
| Central Land | | 2.89 (5.34) | 3.00 (5.30) | | -1.26 (4.47) | -1.98 (4.23) |
| Private Land | | 0.39 (7.45) | 0.19 (7.68) | | -0.26 (5.30) | -1.51 (5.70) |
| Caste Diversity | -20.13 (16.50) | -26.91 (21.24) | -27.14 (22.49) | -5.51 (22.53) | -20.29 (22.97) | -24.91 (22.84) |
| Religious Diversity | 14.00 (13.56) | 16.70 (12.85) | 16.67 (15.01) | 11.19 (12.11) | 17.61 (12.52) | 24.48 * (14.28) |
| State Diversity | 7.85 (12.23) | 0.19 (11.83) | 0.60 (12.97) | 6.31 (8.83) | 7.08 (9.14) | 9.85 (9.03) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 12.80 (9.11) | 9.86 (8.90) | 10.23 (9.16) | -3.73 (6.23) | -2.96 (6.23) | -2.50 (6.26) |
| Education | -1.75 (4.71) | -7.23 (6.34) | -7.23 (6.40) | 3.56 (3.60) | 4.02 (3.62) | 3.69 (3.54) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | | 0.73 * (0.40) | 0.74 * (0.41) | | 0.39 (0.32) | 0.47 (0.32) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | | -0.04 (0.59) | -0.07 (0.61) | | -0.90 ** (0.42) | -0.90 ** (0.43) |
| Ratio of Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | | 0.08 (0.10) | 0.08 (0.10) | | 0.19 *** (0.06) | 0.16 * (0.06) |
| R ² | 0.50 | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.26 | 0.39 | 0.43 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 2.5: OLS Models for Paved Road Coverage and Sewer Line Connections

| Models | Percentage Paved Roads | | | Percentage Households Attached to Sewer Line | | |
|---|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|-----------------------|------------------------|
| | Model 13 | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 | Model 17 | Model 18 |
| Intercept | -92.42 ** (40.77) | -78.57 (48.32) | -77.22 (55.51) | -50.08 (37.04) | -90.36 *** (33.12) | -118.99 *** (36.57) |
| PN Density | 7.34 *** (2.48) | 6.55 ** (2.68) | 10.75 *** (3.77) | -0.29 (2.35) | -0.46 (1.92) | 2.58 (2.72) |
| PR Balance | | | 24.73 (17.94) | | | -3.52 (15.56) |
| PND*PRB | | | -11.68 ** (5.53) | | | -6.75 (5.32) |
| Log Population | 21.86 *** (4.79) | 23.85 *** (5.34) | 22.41 *** (7.16) | 9.54 ** (4.56) | 15.60 *** (3.99) | 19.91 *** (5.08) |
| Social Capital | | 4.16 * (2.49) | 4.30 (2.75) | | 1.79 (1.91) | 2.81 (1.98) |
| Age of Slum | -0.02 (0.47) | 0.11 (0.47) | 0.20 (0.46) | 0.43 (0.44) | 0.87 ** (0.43) | 0.91 ** (0.41) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | 18.66 * (10.12) | 25.74 ** (12.22) | 25.22 ** (12.05) | -16.14 ** (7.05) | -16.10 * (8.44) | -15.89 * (8.08) |
| Central Land | | 9.43 (8.41) | 10.19 (7.91) | | -31.85 *** (5.74) | -33.11 *** (5.59) |
| Private Land | | -9.82 (19.78) | -11.85 (19.55) | | -12.29 (16.07) | -14.67 (15.38) |
| Caste Diversity | -36.11 (24.22) | -12.94 (25.85) | -16.16 (26.17) | -50.88 * (29.92) | -70.37 ** (28.26) | -78.91 *** (26.89) |
| Religious Diversity | 21.31 (23.81) | 5.43 (23.94) | 7.19 (25.34) | 21.29 (18.23) | 15.20 (18.33) | 27.71 (18.85) |
| State Diversity | -10.39 (19.80) | -18.55 (20.14) | -14.22 (20.54) | -8.35 (14.57) | 4.82 (14.51) | 10.07 (13.55) |
| HH Income Per Capita | -8.08 (15.86) | -7.01 (14.19) | -3.77 (14.56) | 24.01 ** (11.77) | 18.85 (11.41) | 19.86 (10.29) |
| Education | 7.67 (7.59) | -3.16 (8.24) | -3.22 (8.00) | 4.48 (4.77) | 1.96 (4.20) | 1.34 * (4.16) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | | -0.60 (0.46) | -0.54 (0.48) | | 0.91 ** (0.40) | 1.07 *** (0.39) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | | -1.04 (0.98) | -1.25 (0.98) | | 0.50 (0.74) | 0.50 (0.77) |
| Ratio of Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | | -0.39 *** (0.13) | -0.39 *** (0.14) | | -0.17 (0.11) | -0.23 ** (0.11) |
| R ² | 0.42 | 0.53 | 0.55 | 0.34 | 0.54 | 0.58 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Figure 2.1.1




Figure 2.1.2




Figure 2.1.3




Figure 2.1.4




Figure 2.1.5




Figure 2.1.6





Figure 2.1.7



Chapter Appendix: Alternative Models

I present two alternative model specifications. I first use logged values of party network density. Population enters into the right-hand side of the equation twice, once in log population and once as the denominator in the measure of party network density. To account for this, I take logged values of party network density.⁵¹ Since some observations have values of 0 for party network density, I add one to every value before making the log transformation. Results are presented in *Tables 2.6* and *2.7*, and the corresponding marginal effects plots are displayed in *Figures 2.2.1* through *2.2.6*. The second alternative model specification uses seemingly unrelated regression. The six development outcomes examined might not be independent of one another, presenting the possibility that the error terms in the regressions are correlated with one another. I present estimates from a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model that explicitly takes inter-equation correlations into account. Results of the SUR model are presented in *Table 2.8*.

⁵¹ See, for a similar estimation approach: Brown, J. David, James Earle, and Scott Gehlbach. "Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? *State Bureaucracy and Privatization Effectiveness*." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 103, No. 2 (May 2009): 264-283.

Table 2.6: OLS Models for Streetlights, Piped Water, and Trash Collection (Logged PND)

| Models | Street Lights/1000 Residents | | % Access to Piped Water | | % Access to Trash Collection | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| | Model 19 | Model 20 | Model 21 | Model 22 | Model 23 | Model 24 |
| Intercept | -2.30 (5.12) | -3.84 (5.72) | 13.04 (47.45) | -14.77 (49.96) | -60.34 ** (24.85) | -61.25 ** (26.85) |
| Log PN Density | 2.48 ** (0.97) | 2.05 * (1.07) | 6.60 (8.85) | 8.94 (10.32) | 9.46 ** (4.61) | 8.96 (5.76) |
| PR Balance | | -3.73 (2.78) | | -14.61 (25.78) | | -3.53 (14.21) |
| Log PND*PRB | | 2.57 (2.21) | | -2.47 (20.06) | | 2.75 (12.48) |
| Log Population | 0.89 (0.75) | 1.24 (0.89) | 3.52 (5.14) | 8.28 (6.25) | 6.62 ** (2.88) | 6.87 * (3.73) |
| Social Capital | 0.66 * (0.33) | 0.68 ** (0.33) | 1.20 (2.25) | 2.10 (2.31) | 5.44 *** (1.99) | 5.45 ** (2.09) |
| Age of Slum | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.004 (0.042) | 0.28 (0.41) | 0.27 (0.40) | 0.64 ** (0.24) | 0.63 ** (0.26) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -5.16 *** (1.34) | -5.09 *** (1.34) | -34.16 *** (9.78) | -33.76 *** (9.35) | 50.02 *** (7.08) | 50.08 *** (7.15) |
| Central Land | 0.69 (1.35) | 0.54 (1.30) | -23.42 *** (8.11) | -24.96 *** (8.54) | 3.10 (5.21) | 2.98 (5.24) |
| Private Land | -1.43 (1.40) | -1.28 (1.46) | -16.88 (12.77) | -18.27 (13.40) | 0.46 (7.61) | 0.65 (7.89) |
| Caste Diversity | -1.53 (3.58) | -1.70 (3.61) | -9.84 (24.83) | -16.38 (25.40) | -26.47 (20.69) | -26.50 (21.87) |
| Religious Diversity | 4.80 (3.35) | 5.28 (3.52) | -12.24 (21.25) | -1.21 (22.26) | 15.25 (12.55) | 15.48 (14.66) |
| State Diversity | -1.32 (2.56) | -1.52 (2.58) | -21.19 (21.59) | -18.51 (21.52) | -1.50 (11.35) | -1.77 (12.43) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 0.81 (1.73) | 0.58 (1.73) | 9.80 (13.14) | 9.24 (12.93) | 10.45 (8.86) | 10.22 (9.07) |
| Education | 0.32 (0.84) | 0.31 (0.84) | 6.70 (5.50) | 6.11 (5.64) | -7.37 (6.15) | -7.37 (6.27) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | 0.16 * (0.09) | 0.16 * (0.09) | 0.07 (0.55) | 0.19 (0.56) | 0.72 * (0.40) | 0.71 * (0.42) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | -0.09 (0.11) | -0.07 (0.11) | -0.14 (0.89) | -0.05 (0.92) | -0.13 (0.59) | -0.11 (0.61) |
| Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.007 (0.12) | -0.06 (0.12) | 0.08 (0.10) | 0.08 (0.10) |
| R ² | 0.61 | 0.62 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.60 | 0.60 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 2.7: OLS Models for Doctor Camps, Paved Streets, and Sewers (Logged PND)

| Models | Access to Gov. Doc. Camps | | % Paved Street Coverage | | % Access to Underground Sewers | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Model 25 | Model 26 | Model 27 | Model 28 | Model 29 | Model 30 |
| Intercept | 10.18 (24.05) | -6.20 (24.37) | -65.20 (47.66) | -68.61 (55.23) | -80.33 ** (33.58) | -111.26*** (36.79) |
| Log PN Density | 7.06 * (4.13) | 9.10 * (4.65) | 22.86 *** (7.92) | 28.26 *** (9.54) | 3.79 (5.58) | 10.21 (6.86) |
| PR Balance | | -5.13 (12.93) | | 25.05 (21.89) | | 3.76 (21.66) |
| Log PND*PRB | | -4.68 (10.35) | | -25.14 (16.16) | | -21.27 (17.06) |
| Log Population | 3.50 (2.39) | 6.19 * (3.19) | 21.40 *** (5.40) | 21.14 *** (7.19) | 14.10 *** (4.20) | 18.77 *** (5.17) |
| Social Capital | 0.77 (1.39) | 1.33 (1.38) | 3.75 (2.49) | 4.10 (2.78) | 1.62 (1.88) | 2.79 (2.00) |
| Age of Slum | 0.02 (0.20) | 0.03 (0.21) | 0.13 (0.46) | 0.20 (0.46) | 0.86 ** (0.43) | 0.91 ** (0.40) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -4.56 (5.31) | -4.38 (5.20) | 25.11 ** (12.34) | 24.74 ** (12.23) | -16.10 * (8.34) | -15.96 ** (7.94) |
| Central Land | -1.02 (4.49) | -1.85 (4.35) | 9.86 (8.04) | 10.31 (7.75) | -32.02 *** (5.78) | -33.27 *** (5.54) |
| Private Land | -0.59 (5.40) | -1.67 (5.93) | -9.27 (20.07) | -11.51 (20.09) | -11.02 (15.64) | -14.11 (14.97) |
| Caste Diversity | -19.52 (22.76) | -23.59 (22.88) | -12.31 (24.59) | -14.78 (25.62) | -71.60 ** (27.48) | -80.11 *** (25.89) |
| Religious Diversity | 17.31 (12.41) | 23.96 * (14.28) | 1.14 (22.59) | 3.66 (24.95) | 12.09 (17.87) | 25.22 (18.49) |
| State Diversity | 6.30 (9.05) | 8.29 (8.88) | -23.10 (19.51) | -19.62 (20.33) | 2.60 (14.14) | 7.93 (12.97) |
| HH Income Per Capita | -2.93 (6.40) | -3.03 (6.26) | -5.15 (14.65) | -3.38 (15.22) | 20.42 * (11.39) | 21.17 ** (9.99) |
| Education | 4.03 (3.67) | 3.66 (3.60) | -3.58 (7.87) | -3.79 (7.81) | 1.58 (4.06) | 0.82 (4.04) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | 0.39 (0.33) | 0.47 (0.32) | -0.65 (0.45) | -0.57 (0.49) | 0.86 ** (0.39) | 1.06 *** (0.39) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | -0.94 ** (0.43) | -0.90 ** (0.44) | -1.27 (0.96) | -1.39 (0.99) | 0.36 (0.75) | 0.36 (0.77) |
| Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | 0.19 *** (0.06) | 0.16 ** (0.07) | -0.39 *** (0.13) | -0.40 *** (0.13) | -0.17 (0.11) | -0.23 ** (0.11) |
| R ² | 0.39 | 0.42 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.54 | 0.58 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Figure 2.2.1




Figure 2.2.2




Figure 2.2.3




Figure 2.2.4




Figure 2.2.5




Figure 2.2.6




Table 2.8: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Estimates for Six Development Indicators

| | Streetlights | Piped Water | Trash Collection | Doctor Camps | Paved Roads | Sewers |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Models | Model 31 | Model 32 | Model 33 | Model 34 | Model 35 | Model 36 |
| Intercept | -2.22 (4.94) | 10.45 (38.27) | -64.81 ** (25.74) | 9.39 (20.88) | -78.57 * (41.87) | -90.36 *** (32.66) |
| PN Density | 1.01 *** (0.29) | 2.14 (2.24) | 2.92 * (1.50) | 2.68 ** (1.22) | 6.55 *** (2.45) | -0.46 (1.91) |
| Log Population | 0.94 (0.62) | 4.05 (4.84) | 7.49 ** (3.26) | 3.79 (2.64) | 23.85 *** (5.30) | 15.60 *** (4.13) |
| Social Capital | 0.68 ** (0.28) | 1.30 (2.15) | 5.60 *** (1.45) | 0.85 (1.18) | 4.16 * (2.36) | 1.79 (1.84) |
| Age of Slum | 0.008 (0.04) | 0.27 (0.34) | 0.63 *** (0.23) | 0.01 (0.19) | 0.11 (0.37) | 0.87 *** (0.29) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -5.07 *** (1.19) | -33.96 *** (9.21) | 50.30 *** (6.19) | -4.32 (5.03) | 25.74 ** (10.08) | -16.10 ** (7.86) |
| Central Land | 0.60 (0.95) | -23.58 *** (7.36) | 2.89 (4.95) | -1.26 (4.02) | 9.43 (8.05) | -31.85 *** (6.28) |
| Private Land | -1.26 (1.50) | -16.85 (11.63) | 0.39 (7.82) | -0.26 (6.35) | -9.82 (12.72) | -12.29 (9.93) |
| Caste Diversity | -1.86 (2.86) | -10.24 (22.13) | -26.91 * (14.88) | -20.29 * (12.08) | -12.94 (24.21) | -70.37 *** (18.89) |
| Religious Diversity | 4.79 * (2.51) | -11.40 (19.45) | 16.70 (13.08) | 17.61 * (10.61) | 5.43 (21.28) | 15.20 (16.60) |
| State Diversity | -1.12 (1.99) | -20.11 (15.39) | 0.19 (10.35) | 7.08 (8.40) | -18.55 (16.84) | 4.82 (13.14) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 0.86 (1.50) | 9.47 (11.65) | 9.86 (7.84) | -2.96 (6.36) | -7.01 (12.75) | 18.85 * (9.95) |
| Education | 0.31 (0.78) | 6.78 (6.02) | -7.23 * (4.05) | 4.02 (3.29) | -3.16 (6.59) | 1.96 (5.14) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | 0.15 ** (0.07) | 0.07 (0.52) | 0.73 ** (0.35) | 0.39 (0.28) | -0.60 (0.57) | 0.91 ** (0.44) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | -0.08 (0.11) | -0.09 (0.83) | -0.04 (0.56) | -0.90 ** (0.45) | -1.04 (0.91) | 0.50 (0.71) |
| Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.005 (0.12) | 0.08 (0.08) | 0.19 *** (0.06) | -0.39 *** (0.13) | -0.17 * (0.11) |
| R ² | 0.63 | 0.48 | 0.59 | 0.39 | 0.53 | 0.54 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Chapter Three: 'Vote Bank' Politics: Community Demographics and Party Network Expansion in the City

3.1: Introduction

In developing democracies across the globe, scholars have demonstrated that political parties seek to establish clientelistic relationships with the urban poor in which their patronage and protection are exchanged for political support. To extract votes, political parties attempt to cultivate partisan leadership in slums and bring existing leaders into the party fold. These networks are drawn upon to increase voter turnout, distribute patronage, and monitor the electoral behavior of residents. Urban India, however, presents an important puzzle for theories of political clientelism: the extension of party organizational networks is highly uneven across slum settlements. Some slums are flush with party workers. Organizational hierarchy is externally imposed and invigorated by larger party organizations in the city. Other slums are home to only a few party workers, while others exhibit a complete absence of party networks altogether. Scholarship on clientelism has overlooked the systematic unevenness in the presence, strength, and multi-party balance of patron-client ties across spatially distinct communities, and the resulting divergences in democratic responsiveness and development that face residents residing in those communities. *What explains variation in the presence, density, and partisan balance of patron-client networks across communities?*

This chapter advances a theory of party network expansion and community organization in urban slums. Two explanatory variables form the core of the argument. First, levels of social diversity are positively associated with party network organization in slums. Higher levels of social diversity increase the fractionalization of leadership within a settlement. Over time, parties attempt to bring these leaders into the party fold, increasing party network density and party

representational balance in the process. Second, the population of the slum, or size of the ‘vote bank’, determines electoral incentives for parties to extend their organizational networks to maximize votes. This is because slums present increasing returns to scale in the exchange of resources for votes—limited party positions or a unit of patronage invested in a large slum has higher electoral returns than in smaller slums. Larger settlements, consequently, are more likely to have dense, multi-party networks than their smaller counterparts.

The previous chapter demonstrated that the density and balance of party networks powerfully influence the ability of slum residents to demand and secure development from the state. In settlements with dense party networks, competition among slum leaders creates (1) a degree of informal accountability that encourages pro-social behavior and (2) an incentive structure that rewards developmental activity. Multi-party representation has heterogeneous effects on development, depending on the extent to which the good is capital-intensive and retractable. This chapter takes an important step back in the causal chain, and examines where party networks come from. Tracing the origins of patron-client networks and vertical party integration is essential to explaining subsequent divergences in the organization and development of slums—why some settlements are able to secure development while others fail.

I first situate the chapter in the larger literature on political clientelism. Next, I provide a description of party organization and hierarchy in India’s cities. I then present a theory of party network expansion and community organization. To ground the theory, I draw on two case study narratives to illustrate the emergence of party networks, community organization, and development. Subsequently, I discuss the data, variables, and model specifications. I then present the results and conclude with the contributions of the chapter.

3.2: Political Clientelism and Brokerage Networks

Comparative politics has seen a resurgent interest in explaining the emergence and persistence of political clientelism—the reciprocal, though asymmetric, relationship between politicians and citizens in which votes are exchanged for goods, jobs, and protection. Clientelism is defined by its contingent, particularistic, and iterative nature, and given form by hierarchical networks that connect politicians to voters (Hicken 2011). These networks materialize to facilitate clientelistic exchange, monitor voters, and drum-up voter turnout. In slums, patronage goods may take the form of private goods distributed to individuals—money, liquor, jobs, pensions, or government ration cards—or more broad-based club goods⁵² specific to the settlement, such as roads, streetlights, sewer lines, piped water, and storm drains.

An implicit assumption in much of the literature on political clientelism is that the presence of patron-client networks is constant across the political space under study.⁵³ Local clientelistic networks are assumed to be uniform in their density and degree of integration with higher nodes in the patron-client hierarchy. Scholars take as a given that during elections, party networks are in place and patronage goods mechanically flow through these brokerage networks to targeted voters. Unevenness in the presence and density of patron-client networks across India's slums presents an important puzzle for the literature on clientelism. This chapter seeks to explain this variation and its consequences for local development.

A related literature concerns the intermediaries, or “brokers” who populate various levels in patron-client hierarchies (Oldenberg 1976, 1987; Haragopal and Reddy 1985; Mitra 1992;

⁵² The provision of club goods can be clientelistic if it is contingent on political support, and that the exchange is characterized by predictability, elasticity, and competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, p. 14-15; Hicken 2011).

⁵³ For examples, see Brusco et al. 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Cox 2009; Dunning and Stokes 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; 2009; and Nickerson et al. 2011.

Manor 2000; Krishna 2002; 2007; 2011). Intermediaries stand at an important nexus among everyday citizens, politicians and parties, and government institutions. For citizens, they can help secure public services, employment, and various documents of citizenship. For politicians, these intermediaries are highly sought after, as they are embedded in communities and can deliver votes. What scholars have overlooked is the uneven distribution and partisan balance of political brokers across distinct communities.

Explaining outcomes in clientelistic organization and development across slums requires a departure from the predominant unit of analysis employed in studies of clientelism—the individual. Scholarship on clientelism and vote-buying typically approach voters as a mass of atomistic individuals who are individually targeted by politicians or brokers and offered mundane patronage goods in exchange for their votes. Other studies consider the role of ascriptive identity categories such as caste, religion, or tribe as the fault lines along which patronage is promised and delivered (Chandra 2004; 2009; Fearon 1999; Wantchekon 2003). These studies have made important contributions to our understanding of how politician-voter linkages have developed. Politicians in urban India, however, court slums as *spatially* defined settlements with distinct histories, diverse social networks, and developmental needs. Politicians extend or withhold development based on community characteristics. Further, high levels of social diversity and mobility largely inhibit the provision of development along ethnic lines in slums. This chapter, therefore, places the level of analysis at the slum settlement.

3.3: Political Party Organizations and Slum Settlements in Urban India

Political scientists describe India's party system as organizationally weak and undisciplined at the grassroots level (Kohli 1990; Krishna 2007). This is far from the case in urban India. The description of weak party organizations arises from a rural bias in studies of Indian politics and

development. Cities, unlike villages, are densely populated and well integrated. Cities are administrative and political centers that allow for easy outreach to voters. Migration and internal movement prevent parties from relying on stable social structures during elections, as they do in rural areas. These conditions have both allowed and compelled parties to extend their reach deep into the neighborhoods, markets, and slums of the city.

Political parties are hierarchically organized in cities in a pyramidal fashion.⁵⁴ At the most grassroots level is the booth organization, where each party has in place a president and a small team of workers that can be drawn on to promote the party and build voter turnout. One level higher than the booth is the ward. In each ward a president and a committee of approximately 10 other members are appointed and given the responsibility to oversee electoral activities for the ward. Above the ward is the block. Like the other organizational levels, each block has a president and a committee of 10-15 members. A block roughly corresponds to a state legislative assembly constituency. Above the block is the district. The district committee is composed of regionally known party officers that have considerable political sway in local politics. Above that are the state committees, which represent the regional apex of the party organizations.

Despite claims of democratic selection, higher party officers and politicians, in practice, appoint organizational positions at each level of the party hierarchy. The allocation of party is a top-down affair. As one prominent politician in Bhopal described, “When you see the parties, the committee is made from top to bottom...It’s very hard for a person from a slum to rise up in the party...Parties approach people in the slums” (Translated Interview, Bhopal, 9/30/2011). Selections are based on a range of criteria—seniority in the party, loyalty and previous work for

⁵⁴ The following descriptions of these hierarchies are based on the Indian National Congress Party (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the major parties in competition in the states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.

the party, connections to prominent politicians, and “money power”. In slum settlements, personal wealth is less of a concern for selection. Instead, politicians and party officers at higher levels are interested in the size of a leader’s following, and his or her ability to mobilize residents during elections and political rallies. The function of these workers is to get votes for their parties. They do this, as one worker in Jaipur put it, by helping people and keeping a good reputation. If a party discovers a leader is not helping people, they are removed or not promoted. Parties keep an eye on workers (Author Interview, Jaipur, 2/4/2011).

Slum residents are a key demographic focus of parties. Politicians know that effort in building a following in a slum has far higher returns than in a secure, wealthier neighborhood. These latter areas already have been provided basic infrastructure and services, and residents are less likely to be cajoled by petty patronage. A state-level party worker in Madhya Pradesh illustrated this reality in his own local terms. He pointed to a wealthy colony in Bhopal, and said that only 25 or 30 percent of people in that area will vote. They will not decide the representative. Instead, he stated that 80 to 90 percent of people vote in the slums of the area, and so they will be the kingmakers (Author Interview, Bhopal, 10/3/2011). Slums are central to electoral politics, and, consequently, parties have extended their networks into slums to extract votes. The district president of the BJP slum cell in Bhopal clearly expressed this electoral importance. He stated that there are over 300 slums in Bhopal, and in each community there might be between 2,000 and 3,000 *juggies* (shanties) to capture. To get these votes, the BJP needs local workers operating in the slums (Author Interview, Bhopal, 10/8/2011).

A common and substantively important base of comparison across slums in India is the presence and strength of political party networks within each settlement. To briefly reintroduce

the concept of *party network density*: in slum settlement S_i there are a certain number of party workers p . A measure of party network density, per 1,000 residents, is formally expressed as:

$$\text{Party Network Density} = \left(\frac{p}{S_i(\text{population})} \right) \times 1000$$

A total of 513 ranked party workers live across the 80 sampled slums in Jaipur and Bhopal. As described in the previous chapter, the distribution of these party workers is highly unequal across settlements.⁵⁵ *Table 3.1* provides descriptive statistics from the sampled slums.

A related, though separate concept is the relative balance of party representation in slums. Party workers may all belong to the same party, creating a situation of one-party dominance in the settlement. Or, workers may represent several parties, giving the nature of local partisan leadership a degree of multi-party balance. The balance of party representation within settlements is measured as:

$$\text{Party Representational Balance} = \left(\frac{1}{\sum p_j^2} \right) - 1$$

where p is the proportion of workers in the slum from party j . Descriptive statistics of party representational balance for the 80 sampled slums can be found in *Table 3.1*. Slum settlements exhibit a variable degree of multi-party representation in the form of local party workers. What generates spatial unevenness in the density and representational balance of party networks?

3.4: Explaining Variation in Party Network Density and Balance

The density and inter-party balance of political party networks are highly uneven across settlements. This section outlines a theory of party network expansion. Two variables form the

⁵⁵ In a survey of Jaipur slums in the early 1990s, Mathur (1996: 116) similarly uncovered variation in political party membership across a smaller sample of slums.

framework of the theory: (1) population, or the size of the slum's 'vote-bank' and (2) the degree of internal social heterogeneity. I discuss each variable in turn.

Slum Size

Politicians and parties are faced with time and resource constraints in fighting elections and building organizational networks. Not every vote can be fought for with the same amount of vigor, attention, and money. A finite number of positions in the party organizational hierarchy can be allocated among the thousands of party workers in the city. There can be only one president of the ward, block, or district, and a limited number of workers can fill the ranks of the committee under the president in each tier. The allocation of scarce positions reflects the electoral interests of higher party officers.

A major consideration in the allocation of time and resources is the population of a slum—the size of the potential “vote bank.” This is because a unit of expended time and resources in a larger slum has higher electoral returns than that same unit spent in a smaller slum. To understand why, it is necessary to think about slums as Indian politicians do—as geographically bounded social entities with particular demographic characteristics. Slums are not an undifferentiated mass of voters that exist independently from space and social networks. Politicians and political parties think of slums as spatially defined and administratively named clusters with distinct social groups, leaders, histories, and developmental deficiencies that can be taken advantage of for electoral gain. I employ the terms large and small for ease of exposition. Slum size is a continuous variable. *Table 3.3* presents descriptive statistics of slum populations in Jaipur and Bhopal.

In the allocation of scarce and highly sought-after party organizational positions, it is more advantageous to give ranking positions to active party workers in larger slums. The demand for these positions among party workers is high, as they provide political access and protection, sources of illicit money, and local prestige in the community. To be a settlement-wide leader in a large slum means that some degree of legitimacy and prominence has been earned from residents. This prestige is secured before a party appointment is made; it is a condition of that appointment. As an elected representative from Bhopal noted, “I will appoint one man either on the cost basis or on the strength of the following of that leader. If he has got a good following, if he has fought for their causes for electricity, sewerage, water supply. If they fought against the municipality or government they get popular” (Author Interview, Bhopal, 11/21/2011). Similarly, a high-ranking party officer asserted: “In politics there are only voters. Where to get these votes, then? Wherever I find many voters, the party will send people there to take people into the party” (Author Interview, Bhopal, 10/14/2011). A popular party leader in a large slum is able to deliver a bigger vote bank, and is therefore able to command greater consideration in the allocation of important party positions.

Consider the INC Slum Cell in Jaipur. The state president took it upon himself to designate *basti pramukhs*, or slum chiefs, of the INC slum cell in some slums but not others. Not coincidentally, the 29 slums the president chose are among the largest slums in Jaipur. In an interview with a state member, I inquired why those particular 29 slums were chosen out of the larger population of slums in Jaipur. At first, he said to provide development. I then rhetorically asked why not all of the slums require development. He went on to say these slums are their priority slums. I asked for further elaboration. With a grin, he stated that they are large and important slums (Interview, November 3, 2011). It is the convergence of constraints and

electoral incentives that generates supply side discrimination for larger slums in the allocation of party resources and organizational positions.

Top-down efforts by parties to spread their organizational networks deep into slum settlements must be met by an eager group of slum leaders, ready to join and devote time to the party cause. How do individual residents within slums join political party organizations and advance up the party hierarchy? What incentives do these individuals have to engage in leadership activities? A common narrative of leadership formation and party entry emerged during the ethnographic period of research. The accumulation of developmental problems or a specific traumatic event such as the threat of eviction overwhelms residents. One or a few individuals come to the fore in taking the problems of the settlement to the concerned government offices and politicians. A confluence of personal attributes made these individuals focal points of problem solving in the settlement. Initially, leaders may have been one of the few, if only literate people in the settlement, allowing them to engage the state with more confidence and information than their peers. Many had publically demonstrated acts of courage and charisma, and were able to confidently articulate the needs of the settlement before politicians. Even after the immediate problems have subsided, these leaders become important problem-solving focal points in their community.

Parties observe these activities and seek to absorb leaders with large followings. Little effort is required in this endeavor—slum leaders will directly visit politicians and local party offices to seek help with various problems. Over time, these iterative exchanges become highly personalized relationships. With greater name recognition and political connectivity, slum leaders are better able to secure development. If leaders demonstrate a sizable ‘vote bank’ and loyalty to the party, they may also be extended an official position within the party hierarchy. In

turn, politicians draw upon local leaders during elections to promote the party, distribute patronage, and deliver their “vote banks” during elections. While the relationship between politician and slum leader is asymmetric, it is of mutual benefit.

A current MLA in Bhopal described the process: “If someone has guts to lead certain people, if he has guts to come to the MLA and the concerned officers for work, and raise a voice for the problems, then he automatically becomes leader of the slum...It lies in him only, in the person. What we do if we see that this man is good, and he is interested in development and is a reasonable person, and doesn’t put unreasonable demands in front of you, we try to push him, to help him, to make him come up, if he is of our thinking, our principals, so we promote him.” (Author Interview, Bhopal, 7/6/ 2012).

There are several motivations for engaging in party work. The first is the material rewards associated with leadership activities. Delivering one’s vote bank during an election can be lucrative. One prominent party worker in Jaipur admitted that during one election, he was able to make Rs. 30,000 for election activities—an amount equal to almost 6 months of income for most residents in the slum. Mundane patronage goods such as liquor, money, and clothes also pass through the hands of party workers, allowing further access to the spoils of electoral competition. A more regular source of money is serving as an intermediary in the slum and facilitating access to goods and services, for a price.

A second incentive to engage in party work is gaining the protection and support of elected representatives and higher party leaders. The police have a predatory and ever-looming presence in slums. Well-positioned party workers can directly appeal to politicians to reduce a fine or avert jail time. Illegal activities in slums—the spread of illegal electricity and water lines,

gang activities and extortion, liquor sales, and prostitution—can more safely unfold under the aegis of politicians and parties.

Improved social standing in the slum is a third motivation for leaders. Slum leaders decorate the walls of their shanties with pictures showing them standing next to famous political figures. Scooters, motorcycles, and doors are emblazoned with the name, rank, and party symbol of leaders. These activities improve the *namcheen* of slum leaders, or their name and degree of social prominence, in the settlement. Fourth, slum leaders live within the settlements and seek a higher quality of life for themselves and their families. In addition to being political leaders, they are neighbors, parents, and friends. They too want paved roads, public schools to send their children to, and clean drinking water.

In sum, parties extend their network deep into large slums. The general electoral logic is simple: “Our main strategy is that those people who are more, who are more voters, we have to capture them.” (Author Interview, Bhopal 11/21/2011). These networks serve a range of functions for the party, all of which have the least common denominator of extracting votes during elections. Politicians and candidates typically marginalize small slums. These communities have fewer voters, and hence less attention is given to their demands. A slum leader in Bhopal, commenting on the importance of slum size, gave a pertinent analogy. He said that, to an MLA, a small slum is like a basic scooter. You wouldn’t really want to go far on it, and it only requires a little gas. A big slum is like a large four-wheeler. It is something you want to take far and requires a lot of gas, tune-ups, and attention (Author Interview, Bhopal, 9/23/2011).

Social Diversity, Leadership Fragmentation, and Party Network Formation

In contrast to popular assumptions that slum settlements are homogenous transplants of clustered villages, slums exhibit rich and variable levels of social diversity across a range of identity

categories.⁵⁶ Only one of the eighty sampled slums in this study can be considered socially homogenous. The average slum is highly diverse in terms of caste, language, and region of origin, and exhibits considerable religious diversity. *Table 3.4* presents descriptive statistics of social fractionalization across the lines of caste and tribe, religion, and state of origin.

A large and interdisciplinary literature demonstrates that ethnic diversity can powerfully undermine the ability of communities to engage in collective action and provide public goods.⁵⁷ Instead, I find that levels of social diversity in slum settlements are *positively* related to organizational capacity and development—through the influence of diversity on party network formation. To understand this counter-intuitive finding, we must consider the emergence of informal hierarchy in slums, and the role of social heterogeneity in that formation.

The early stage of a slum settlement, after the initial influx of squatters, is a novel social environment marked by behavioral uncertainty among diverse migrant groups. Migrants are unfamiliar with the preferences, norms, relative social status, and behavioral expectations among individuals or groups in the settlement. Consider the following: a Bengali migrant and her close kin are called to Bhopal to join a relative and work in a new textile factory. A flood-prone riverbed close to the factory becomes an area to squat for poor migrants working in that section of the city. Unanticipated prior to migration, the Bengali migrants find themselves in a densely

⁵⁶ Mathur (1996), describing slums in Jaipur, similarly found a high degree of diversity in ethnicity and occupation: “One could recount dwellers belonging to several caste and sub-caste groups living together in several slums, following vocations of their choice...an overview gives out that *brahmin, balai, khatik, harijan, koli, meena, banjara, nayak, regar, dhanka, gujar, mehra*, muslim, *vaish*, and *kumhar* were among the different categories...the slum dweller is not identifiable so much owing to the caste, community or religious factor as owing to the situation of economic deprivation” (Mathur 1996: 50).

⁵⁷ From rural Tanzania to inner-city America, scholars have found evidence of a negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and several developmental outcomes, including economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997; Posner 2004), good governance and social capital (Ostrom 2000; Putnam 2007), community peace (Krishna 2002), and collective action and the provision of public goods and services at the local level (Alesina et al. 1999; Banerjee et al. 2005; Bardhan 2000; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Miguel 2007; Habyarimana et al. 2007).

populated settlement with neighbors from Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh—all seeking to live in close proximity to the market and its surrounding housing colonies—who speak different languages and belong to different castes and religions. The interactions among these diverse groups in the early years of the settlement will involve trepidation over inter-group sanctioning, leadership selection, and norms of legitimacy. The extent of uncertainty is largely function of the level of social heterogeneity.

Migrants often organize and develop leadership within groups of a common ethnic⁵⁸ identity. Before repeated interaction among diverse social groups allows individuals to update beliefs and construct novel behavioral expectations, the transaction costs of coordination among migrants of a common social identity—village or region or origin, religion, caste, or tribe—are lower than the transaction costs associated with inter-group coordination. Ethnicity is a powerful cognitive heuristic for individuals (Brubaker et al. 2004; Hale 2004; Hale 2008; Abdelal et al 2009). As Hale describes, ethnicity provides “a set of points of personal reference on which people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit, to make sense of the myriad constellations of social relationships that they encounter, to discern their place in these constellations, and to understand the opportunities for action in this context” (Hale, 2004: 463). In providing a template for group behavior, sanctioning, and communication, ethnicity can reduce the transaction costs of collective action (Greif et al. 1994).

In the early period of a settlement, nascent leadership often forms within ethnic enclaves. A politician in Bhopal, for example, described early leadership fragmentation in a diverse

⁵⁸ Weber defined ethnicity as “groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration” (Weber, 1996: 56). Chandra similarly understands ethnicity as “a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent” (Chandra, 2006: 398). The membership requirement of *descent*, then, provides a minimal definition of ethnicity that distinguishes it from other social identities.

settlement: “In *Nadi*...someone is Buddhist, someone is Muslim, someone is Rajput, and someone is Brahmin. All castes are there. So everyone is a leader of their own, so there are many leaders” (Author Interview, Bhopal, 11/21/2011). The oldest leader of *Nadi* described leadership in the early 1980s in a similar way. He recalled that the settlement was highly diverse, and leadership was specific to small *mohallah* (neighborhoods). This pre-dated the formation of party networks, and there was no overarching organizational structure to unite the smaller leaders (Author Interview, 8/28/2011; 10/20/2011). Ethnic diversity, in this way, is positively correlated with leadership fragmentation in the early stages of a settlement.

Time and repeated social interactions among groups, however, relax the rigidities of ethnicity. Interactions across ethnic lines are unavoidable in the dense living conditions of urban slums. After the dust of migration settles, residents start to take on the shared identity of their settlement. Despite their differences, they now exist in a defined community with a common fate and shared developmental problems. The importance of ethnicity in determining leadership wanes. Residents can increasingly “shop around” in choosing their preferred leader. This is because, first and foremost, residents are interested in improving their welfare and security. Material needs trump in-group biases. As one senior politician put it, “In slums, the system of caste and creed is not there. It is needs based” (Author Interview, Jaipur, 7/26/2012).

During elections candidates and local political parties identify slum leaders and attempt to bring them into the party fold. Slum leaders become absorbed into party organizations and are given distinct ranks in the hierarchy. In this environment, more socially heterogeneous settlements tend to produce a greater fragmentation of political leadership, which in turn produces higher levels of party network density. More diverse settlements also tend to produce multi-party network representation. I statistically demonstrate these claims below.

3.5: Causality

Understanding the origins of uneven party network expansion is critical for the theory outlined in Chapter Two. Causality and the sequencing of events must be established. Specifically, causality must be discussed at two points: (1) between slum demographics and party network organization and (2) between party network organization and development. I argue in this section that slum size and ethnic diversity are exogenous determinants of party network density, which is in turn plausibly exogenous to development.

The sampled slums under examination are uniformly undeveloped at the period of establishment. This, as discussed in the previous chapter, is a defining element of squatter settlements. Squatters *do* create their settlements in places where they can access labor markets, water sources, and roads. But *within* the borders of the settlement, infrastructure of any kind does not exist at the period of establishment. Development became a tool of clientelism mostly after decentralization reforms in the early 1990s. For most settlements in the sample, a decade or more had elapsed before major infrastructure—roads, electricity poles, water lines, drainage, or sewers—were extended by the state. Many had to wait even longer, and some are still waiting. Slum size and diversity were determined *before* these goods and services were extended.

The creation of squatter settlements in South Asia occurs through processes of gradual accretion, wherein migrants iteratively capture empty land in an unplanned manner (UNHABITAT 1982: 15). Unused government land, hazardous sites unfit for sanctioned urban development, or private lands under ambiguous ownership are attractive sites for squatting, as eviction efforts are unlikely.⁵⁹ Whole communities of squatters do not pre-plan a land invasion,

⁵⁹ Scholars have long noted the draw of squatters to hazardous areas. Singh and de Souza write, “Favored locations of squatters seem to be abandoned graveyards, embankments of drains, pits filled with refuse, dumping grounds, railway lands, and open undeveloped plots reserved for public buildings. These sites are favored for the very pragmatic reason that they offer the most secure tenure. There are usually no

and seek prior political protection, as they sometimes do in Latin America. Neither do early squatters themselves forecast future demand for space beyond immediate kin.

Elected representatives and parties can lend their support in thwarting eviction after the initial settlement. Such efforts, however, would be uniform across constituencies—politicians would eagerly take an opportunity to be seen as the savior of a settlement and enjoy the subsequent electoral returns for that effort. Politicians and parties welcome the growth of a potential vote bank, but they are not in the business of altering the physical boundaries to which slums can grow. Further, almost all of the sampled slums were established in the late 1970s and 1980s, before major eviction efforts began in Jaipur and Bhopal. Major evictions and slum development did not emerge until the late 1990s, allowing two decades for settlement expansion.

Supply-side forces in the local labor market and idiosyncratic geographical factors determine the size of a slum—the available government land between the factory and drainage basin, the vacant space between the market and railroad tracks, and the flood prone riverbed. When considering a location to set up a shanty, poor migrants exhibit strong preferences for proximity to work and social network support. Given similar levels of government vigilance toward slum expansion in areas of a city, slums tend to expand to the limits of the vacant area on which they emerged. The population of slums is therefore plausibly exogenous to outcomes in party organization and development. The size of slums is an accident of geographic constraints and labor market conditions that are unrelated to organization and development.

To illustrate: Migrants first started to settle *Ganeshpuri* slum in Jaipur in 2003. To the north and east of the settlement are the imposing *Aravali* Hills that flank the eastern part of

immediate alternative development plans for such land, and political pressure may be more easily exerted to prevent or delay eviction” (Singh and de Souza 1980: 42; Chandramouli 1975). The period described in this passage is important, as most of the sampled slums in this dissertation emerged during this time. A 2009 NSS Report estimated that 24 percent of slums in India are settled along drainage basins, 8 percent along rivers and riverbanks, and another 12% run parallel to railway lines (NSS Report No. 534: 14).

Jaipur. The slope of the mountains is far too steep and unstable for human settlement, forming a natural limit to the potential growth of *Ganeshpuri*. Perhaps even more restricting are the sand dunes beneath the mountains. It is difficult to get a stick to stand upright in the sand, let alone a house. To south is a middle class colony that pre-dated the slum. To the west is a drainage basin and protected temple grounds. In a decade, *Ganeshpuri* expanded to the maximum possible limit, and now stands at just over 1,500 residents. The settlement will *never* be a large vote bank slum.

Concerning social heterogeneity, kinship and village networks facilitate the migration process *for individuals and small groups* (Mitra 2003). However, a scarcity of land and spatial clustering of work opportunities prevent migrants from sorting themselves into exclusively homogenous enclaves. This is why settlements are overwhelmingly diverse along a range of identity categories. *Figure 3.1* presents descriptive statistics for the stated preferences over settlement location (n = 1,925).⁶⁰ Respondents demonstrate preferences for proximity to work, available land or housing, and living with immediate kin. The data does not show that migrants self-select into communities based on anticipated levels of shared social ties or existing levels of development. Instead, migrants are forced to coexist with social groups that are unknown and unanticipated prior to migration. At the *community level*, slums develop varying levels of social diversity that are plausibly exogenous to outcomes in organization and development.

3.6: Uneven Party Network Expansion and Development: Vignettes from Two Case Studies

The following two vignettes of *Ram Nagar* and *Ganpati* slums in Jaipur provide a more grounded picture of the emergence of party networks, community organization, and development. The slums were chosen to hold constant a range of variables. Both settlements

⁶⁰ 1925 respondents were asked in the household survey, “Jaipur/ Bhopal is a big city with many slum settlements. Why did you move to this *particular* settlement?”

were settled in eastern Jaipur between 1978 and 1980. They have shared the same state legislative assembly constituency since their founding, the same local labor markets, and are settled on land administered by the Indian Forest Department. Moreover, the two slums have faced and thwarted several government eviction attempts. The most prominent difference between the two slums is the initial, idiosyncratic boundaries to which the slums could ultimately expand, which subsequently determined the population of the two settlements.

Ram Nagar

The 900 residents of *Ram Nagar* live in a field between a government building and an upper-middle class neighborhood. Socially, the community is divided between a caste group from southern Rajasthan and a tribal group from the adjacent state of Madhya Pradesh. Residents are well integrated into the local informal economy. The men of the settlement sell medicine and food, drive auto-rickshaws, engage in daily construction work, and hold music performances in the housing colonies of Jaipur. After preparing food for the day, many of the women weave bamboo threshers and baskets. Children scour local neighborhoods for recyclable waste that can be broken-down and resold.

Two individuals have emerged as leaders in the slum: Varun and Rajesh. Rajesh's 7th grade education separated him from his less educated neighbors. His status as leader was cemented in 1985 when he was invited on the stage with the winning candidate for the state legislative assembly and introduced by the politician as the leader of *Ram Nagar*. Varun, like Rajesh, became a focal point for help among his tribe because of his relatively higher education and confidence in dealing with officials. Further, Babulal, his predecessor, suggested Varun as his successor before his death in the mid-1990s. Though Varun is acknowledged as a leader across *Ram Nagar*, his influence and development efforts are mostly confined to his tribe.

Both leaders perform a range of problem-solving activities. Rajesh carefully stores the ration cards of residents within his house and helps to keep them up to date. He also brought an employment program to the slum that involves building and using rickshaws with pedal-generated electricity. Rajesh put an end to several illegal activities in the slum and demanded a replacement for a negligent public school teacher. Varun fought for a primary school in the slum in the early 2000s. After much effort, a one-room schoolhouse was constructed. He additionally demanded that his tribe be included in Rajasthan's official list of tribes—an important condition to be eligible for inclusion in state government programs tribal castes. Both Varun and Rajesh demonstrate great awareness of current government schemes and provide a modicum of information for residents. Neither leader, however, has attempted to organize a protest to advance the causes of the group. When I asked Varun to explain why, he responded: “Our understanding level is low, our population strength is low, and we are afraid.”

Rajesh and Varun—together and individually—have spent countless hours in government offices and have sent a number of letters to various departments demanding formal land titles, infrastructural development, and inclusion in various government schemes for the poor. Rajesh even traveled to New Delhi in 1991 to seek the audience of the Prime Minister of India. Both leaders have carefully stored all letters and correspondence since 1982. Together, the documents tell a story of systematic dismissal and marginalization. Two letters from 2006, composed by Varun and Rajesh, encapsulate the sense of futility that accompanies years of fruitless effort:

We poor [tribals] and many other poor people...have to tolerate heat, cold, rain, and many other problems. We sell herbs, drive rickshaws, make swings, play drums, and [make] wooden trays. We have been staying here for the last 30 to 35 years. We...here for so many years, request the government for help. We do not get any attention and have been to offices many times and as a result, it has all become a headache. Therefore, we request that *Ram Nagar* should be rehabilitated, and wherever that is, we should get land titles. We poor people shall be obliged.

We...tribal peoples and other backward class people live below the poverty line and face many problems in winters, summers and during the monsoon. We have been living here for 30-35 years by doing our day-to-day work like selling traditional medicine, driving rickshaws, making thatch, and playing instruments. We tribal people have been requesting the government [for help] but they don't think about it. Now, after going to these offices so many times, we have lost hope. Therefore, we request you sir to give orders to resettle *Ram Nagar* and give land titles to people on the same land. We poor tribal people will always be thankful to you.

Rajesh, for his two decades of leadership and support for the BJP, has been made a “propaganda officer” in one of the BJP’s organizational wings—a minor position. He promotes the BJP during elections, and admittedly distributes patronage to residents. He denies taking money himself for this work. Despite his 25 years of support for the BJP and clear electoral influence over his tribe, Varun does not have a party position. At 1.07, the level of party network density in *Ram Nagar* is low.

In its thirty years of existence, the infrastructural development extended to *Ram Nagar* is negligible. Residents have dug makeshift channels into the dirt paths in front of their houses to establish some semblance of drainage. Wastewater quickly erodes the sides of the channels, requiring constant maintenance. Solid waste is not gathered and collected by the municipality. Instead, residents throw garbage in what has now become a trash dump that flanks the western side of the slum. Without any bathroom complexes, residents resort to open defecation. In the mid-1980s, and again in 2008, Rajesh was able secure a handful of water taps in exchange for the slum’s votes. Streetlights have been placed in the slum, though only three of them work, leaving most of the slum in darkness at night. Just after the 2008 state elections, Rajesh wrote to the winning candidate: “Sir, we request you...to kindly provide roads, drainage pipes, land titles, bathrooms, and settle the slum in a organized way...you said earlier that roads and drainage in *Ram Nagar* would be given through your development fund.” Nothing has been done. Residents still confront most of the same development challenges that faced their parents.

Ganpati

With over 20,000 residents, *Ganpati* is one of the larger slums in Jaipur. Migrants hail from states throughout north and northeast India. Caste and religious diversity is high. One can even find a few Bangladeshi and Nepali enclaves deep in the slum. Residents engage in work commonly associated with the urban poor—rickshaw pullers, construction workers, butchers, rag pickers, small shop-owners, painters, and government clerks. Cottage industries can be found throughout the slum, producing everything from furniture to cigarettes and wedding cards.

In the mid 1980s, *Ganpati* faced many of the same problems as *Ram Nagar*: massive flooding, fire, eviction attempts, police transgressions, and a total absence of infrastructural development. Older women in the slum recount having to roam around middle class neighborhoods in search of water and reusable waste. During this early period in *Ganpati's* history, political parties began to take interest in the slum's sizable 'vote-bank' and began to cultivate partisan leadership in the settlement. Unlike *Ram Nagar*, *Ganpati* was not confined to a small abandoned plot of land. Instead, the settlement had considerable room to expand along a road in the periphery of the city. As poor migrants continued to pour into the settlement, *Ganpati* became increasingly essential to winning elections. Competition over the votes of the slum grew intense, and party workers in the settlement began to struggle to build a following for themselves and their party.

Today, the organizational networks of the INC and BJP percolate into all corners of *Ganpati*. Workers from the party in power at the state and municipal level are eager to exploit political connections to advance the interests of the slum—and in the process, their own political status and material wellbeing. Oppositional party networks are ready to point to inadequacies in the current government and protest for better conditions. The municipal councilor lives within

the slum itself. Although he lacks the money many of his counterparts have in the municipal corporation, a 20-year history of sustained “social work” in *Ganpati* propelled him to local fame and ultimately a party ticket. Sunil, the BJP president of the area, sits at the apex of the BJP network. Beneath him, dozens of BJP workers with assorted positions extend the reach of the party to each small alleyway. In all, I enumerated 147 party workers in *Ganpati*, giving the slum a density score of 6.17.

Whenever a threat confronts the slum, or a developmental deficiency emerges, political parties call general meetings in which workers are given instructions on how to gather crowds and promote the party. Election time brings party networks into full fervor. Posters are to be hung, pamphlets and party manifestos distributed, liquor and cash allocated to key supporters, and voters to be brought to the polls. Newspaper archives, documents and election materials collected from leaders, and the stories of everyday residents tell of a number of protest movements in the history of the slum. Residents have been organized to fight for water, electricity, compensation after massive flooding, land titles, roads and drainage, and even for speed breakers after several children died playing in the chaotic traffic in front of the slum.

In a conversation explicitly comparing *Ram Nagar* and *Ganpati*, I asked a political leader in Jaipur to describe what makes a strong slum. He said that very thickly populated areas that are unified get development. For example, he said if there are no water connections, people gather and go to the water department. If 2,000 people come on the road the government will give it to them. In *Ram Nagar*, only 100 people will come on the road and the police will easily chase them away. Explaining the developmental success of *Ganpati*, he went on to note that in democracy, where people are more and are powerful, their work gets done faster (Translated

Interview, February 12, 2011). While numbers define the scale of protest, movements in slums are not spontaneous. Party networks are positioned to harness collective grievances and agitate.

Ganpati's uneven topography and vulnerability to flood makes it a difficult settlement to develop. Nevertheless, given its massive vote bank, *Ganpati* has attracted a high level of development. All roads in *Ganpati* are well paved. Streetlights keep a majority of the serpentine alleyways in the slum well-lit. Primary and secondary schools can be found throughout the slum. Every morning, water is provided through taps spread throughout the lowest parts the slum. Not less than 36, 4000-liter water tanks supplement the piped water. A two kilometer-long drainage channel has been constructed in front of the slum to remove wastewater. Responding to why *Ganpati* has been able to secure development, a politician stated, “In a democracy, votes are important...*Ganpati* is very thickly populated. There are more than 15,000 voters there. To attract those 15,000 voters we will do all things” (Translated Interview, February 11, 2011).

3.7: Variables, Measurement, and Data

The two explanatory variables of theoretical interest are slum size and social heterogeneity. Slum size was calculated using both existing Government of India survey data and spatial area calculations using satellite imagery and close approximations of population density based on housing structures. The latter was essential to insure uniformity across slum settlements, and construct population figures for slums that have not yet been surveyed. To measure social heterogeneity, respondents in the survey were asked a battery of questions regarding various social identity characteristics—state and district of origin, caste, *zat*, or tribe, and religion. Diversity is measured by calculating the fractionalization score for each settlement, $1 - \sum e_i^2$. The measure reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a settlement are from a different social group.

Ethnic identities are politically constructed and situational (Kondo 1990; Laitin 1998, Chandra 2004, Posner 2005, Abdelal et al. 2009). A resident of a slum might describe herself primarily as a Hindu, of the Rajput caste, a Rajasthani, or Hindi speaker. These choices define the social cleavages of a settlement. The identities that are politically salient are often endogenous to the social and economic conditions of the slum. Consequently, I examine social “structures”—the full and overlapping set of social identities that characterize a slum population—and not social “practices”—the social identities that are *politically salient* in a slum population (Posner 2004; Posner 2005; Chandra 2009: 250). The former are more exogenous to outcomes in organization and are therefore more appropriate for the econometric models.

Control Variables

Social capital may influence the formation of clientelistic networks. First, social capital may be a substitute for vertical networks—horizontal trust and cooperation might increase the ability of residents to collectively act to demand and secure development, thereby decreasing the demand for leadership and political brokers. Second, high levels of social capital may blunt the importance of social cleavages, leading to lower levels of leadership fragmentation and thus party network density. To test this relationship, a section of the survey included 8 questions that measured inter-household trust and cognitive social capital. Using principal component analysis, I calculated weights for responses to each of these questions, and combined the average scores across the 80 slums to generate a community-level variable of social capital.

Party systems and the degree of electoral competition have been found to influence public expenditures in India (Khemani 2004; Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Rodden and Wilkinson 2004; Sinha and Saez 2009). Electoral competition may also influence organization and development in slum settlements through a second channel—the spread of political party

networks. Candidates and party organizations in areas that are historically competitive might have stronger incentives to spread their party networks deep into settlements. Parties require workers to promote the party, bring residents to the polls, and distribute small patronage goods. On the demand side, high levels of electoral competition might compel candidates and parties to expend more resources on campaigns and patronage. In such an environment, slum leaders have the opportunity to enjoy a windfall of material benefits for delivering votes. Intense electoral competition, therefore, may increase the demand for party work among slum leaders.

An average slum in Jaipur has approximately 3,000 residents. The average population of an urban ward in Jaipur is 33,180 (Census of India 2001), and the average population of a state assembly constituency is roughly 300,000. An individual slum, then, does not dictate the larger political currents of wards and state assembly constituencies. Instead, a larger population of various classes and social groups—with heterogeneous interests and preferences—determines the overarching degree of electoral competition at different constituency levels. Consequently, the influence of electoral competition and the number of effective parties are exogenous to any individual slum settlement.

Increasing levels of electoral competition might not just increase the density of party workers in slum settlements, but also additionally increase the representational balance of party networks. In constituencies that are historically uncompetitive, non-incumbent parties face significant difficulty in attracting party workers. Slum leaders would hesitate to join a party that has little prospect of winning, as doing so would drastically reduce post-election spoils, undermine their political access, and weaken their ability to make developmental claims. Parties may decide to allocate limited resources elsewhere, in constituencies with better prospects of victory. In competitive areas, where multiple parties have a chance to win, parties extend their

networks into slum settlements to extract votes and boost voter turnout. The result is a more balanced representation of workers from multiple parties.

Using electoral data for every municipal election (since 1994) and state legislative assembly election (since 1980) in Jaipur and Bhopal, I calculated the vote margin between the winning candidate and the runner-up. Since the larger dataset is cross-sectional, I averaged the scores across elections. Sampled slums were then matched to the averaged competition scores for the constituencies in which they have been located since their establishment.

I also include a control variable for land ownership. State and municipal representatives have a greater scope of discretion in developmental activities on state and municipal land. Central government land, however, lies under the jurisdiction over central ministries. Politicians encounter more legal and administrative obstacles in delivering development to slums on central land. Political parties may hesitate to allocate scarce party positions to settlements on private or central government land. These areas are more difficult to develop and more vulnerable to eviction, thereby reducing incentives to build long-term clientelistic relations. Twenty-two of the sampled slums are located on central land, six on private, and 54 on municipal and state land.

Another control variable is the ratio of a slum's population to the total population of all slum settlements in the ward. This variable was constructed using data from India's census and more recent survey data on slum populations across wards (Census of India 2012; RAY City Data 2012). Party network positions are limited and distributed at the ward level. Even a smaller slum settlement, if spatially isolated from other settlements, may have a disproportionately large share of party workers due to its seclusion from larger clusters.

Other control variables used below are settlement age, the average income and education level of residents, and a city dummy variable (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1).

3.8: Empirical Analysis and Discussion

I now test the theoretical framework stated above. The first set of regressions examines variation in party network density, while the second focus on party representational balance. Tobit is an appropriate model specification when party network density is a left-hand-side variable. There are residents in a slum that engage in party work and aspire to join a party organization. These residents did not possess a party organizational position at the time of the survey and so they were not enumerated. In its measurement, then, party network density can be understood as bottom-censored. A latent and unobserved party network density exists that has yet to fully manifest as actual workers that can be enumerated. The Tobit model takes the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_i^* &= \alpha + \beta X_i + \delta Z_i + \varepsilon_i \\
 y_i &= y_i^* \text{ if } y_i^* > 0 \\
 y_i &= 0 \text{ if } y_i^* \leq 0
 \end{aligned}$$

where y_i is the measure of party network density in slum settlement i , and X_i is a vector of the explanatory variables of theoretical interest: slum size and social diversity measures for religion, state of origin, and caste. Z_i is a vector of control variables. Regression results are presented in *Table 3.4*. In addition to the Tobit model, I present results from a simple OLS model to examine the robustness of the findings.

Population is positive, statistically and substantively significant, and robust across all model specifications in its association with party network density. In *Model 1*, an increase slum population by 5,000 residents is associated with an additional party worker per 1,000 residents. In *Model 2*, a one-percentage increase in log population is associated with a 0.007 increase in party network density. In the preferred Tobit model (*Model 3*), a one percent increase in population is associated with a 0.009 increase in the latent dependent variable, y^* . Larger slums

have more political party workers per capita than their less-populated counterparts. The findings present evidence that population drives the uneven spread of party networks across slums.

In the preferred Tobit model, diversity in religion and region of origin are statistically significant and positively related to party network density. In relation to the latent dependent variable, a one standard deviation increase in religious diversity (0.17) is associated with an increase of 0.36 party workers per 1,000 residents—equivalent in effect to an increase in population by 2,000 residents. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in state diversity (0.22) is associated with a 0.36 increase in the number of party workers per 1,000 residents. The sign on caste diversity is positive, though statistically insignificant. More diverse slums, particularly along the lines of religion and region of origin, are more likely to exhibit higher levels of party network density than their less diverse counterparts.

Political competition at the state constituency level is statistically significant. The direction of that effect, however, is counter-intuitive. A positive coefficient on state electoral competition suggests that *larger* vote margins are associated with higher levels of party network density. The less competitive the state legislative assembly, then, the more likely slums in that area will exhibit lower levels of party network density. Party competition at the municipal level does not demonstrate any statistical significance in explaining the density of party networks. This unanticipated finding deserves deeper investigation in future research.

The second set of regressions examines the determinants of party representational balance. *Model 4* employs a fractional logit, as scores of party representational balance are bound and continuous between 0 and 1. For an alternative model specification, I transform party network balance in *Model 5* into a dichotomous variable, with 0 representing those settlements without multi-party representation and 1 representing those that do. I then use a logit model

specification. In *Models 6* and *7* I truncate the sample to only those settlements that exhibit party networks. This is an important consideration, as otherwise slums without any party networks and those with party networks that lack multi-party representation are grouped together with scores of 0. Regression results are presented in *Table 5* and marginal effects in *Table 6*.

I first discuss the results using the non-truncated sample. In *Models 4* and *5*, population is positively associated with representative balance in slums and is also statistically significant. In the logit model, a one-percent increase in log population is associated with a 0.01 increase in representational balance. As large vote banks, large slums attract the attention of multiple parties.

The coefficient on religious diversity is statistically significant and positive. State diversity is just shy of conventional levels of statistical significance, with a p-value of 0.108. All else constant, one standard deviation change in religious diversity is associated with a 0.28 increase in party representational balance, and a one standard deviation change in state of origin is associated with a 0.21 increase in party representational balance. As with network density, the more socially diverse settlements are, the more likely the party networks in those communities will represent multiple parties. I do not find evidence that the intensity of electoral competition and the municipal and state levels influence the balance of party representation in slums.

The results from the truncated sample almost exactly mirror those of the full sample, with the exception that state diversity is statistically insignificant in the logit model. The findings across all models, therefore, demonstrate that large, socially diverse settlements are more likely to have multi-party network representation than their smaller, less diverse counterparts.

3.9: Conclusion

This chapter presents a theory of party network expansion. I find qualitative and quantitative evidence that party network expansion is largely driven by the size and degree of social

heterogeneity in slum settlements. Larger slum settlements tend to be disproportionately targeted by political parties in the extension of patronage and party network positions. This is because slums present increasing returns to scale—a unit of resources or a limited party position invested in a large slum has higher electoral returns than those same resources or positions invested in a smaller slum. Furthermore, more diverse slums, especially along the lines of religion and region of origin, tend to produce a higher degree of leadership fragmentation. Slum leaders become important focal points for political parties during elections, and, over time, become absorbed into party networks with distinct organizational ranks. Through such processes, more diverse settlements tend to produce higher levels of party network density and multi-party balance—conditions that encourage informal accountability and development.

The chapter contributes to the study of political clientelism by advancing our understanding of the origins of patron-client networks in and across spatially distinct communities. The literature on political clientelism has insufficiently examined variation in the presence and strength of patron-client ties across localities, and the resulting developmental divergences that face citizens residing in those communities. This study reorients the analytical focus to the political foundations of informal hierarchy and vertical party integration—informal institutions that powerfully determine organizational capacity and public goods provision.

The chapter also contributes to the study of ethnic diversity, collective action, and public goods provision. A large and interdisciplinary literature in the social sciences demonstrates that ethnic diversity can undermine collective action and development. Several of the most notable works on the subject have India as an empirical focus. The emergence of inter-ethnic organization in India's slums presents a puzzle for this larger literature. The findings presented in this chapter suggest that ethnic heterogeneity can be advantageous for development through its

effects on leadership fragmentation and local political competition. Scholars of ethnic politics must look beyond horizontal interactions among social groups to the manner in which extra-local forces—in this study party organizational networks—interact with diverse communities to structure order and hierarchy among social groups.

Finally, this chapter endogenizes the formation of party networks within the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Two. It takes an important step back in the causal chain linking party network organization and development. I find that population and social diversity are determined by plausibly exogenous factors—in particular, idiosyncratic geographic constraints to settlement growth and migratory preferences to live in close proximity to labor markets. The former factor determines the size to which settlements can ultimately grow, while both factors jointly determine why ethnically diverse migrant groups are forced to co-exist with one another in dense-populated slums, all seeking some degree of tenure security and employment in the city. By tracing the sequencing of events from the initial period of squatting to the present, this chapter provides evidence that party networks precede and are determined by factors unrelated to the provision of infrastructural development and public services. These findings provide analytic leverage over questions of community organization and development, and increase confidence in the causality of the theory outlined in the previous chapter.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Community Political Saturation Across Sampled Slums

| | Party Network Density | | | |
|--------------------------|---|-----------|------|------|
| | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
| Jaipur (N = 35) | 0 (n = 7) | 6.37 | 1.83 | 1.65 |
| Bhopal (N = 45) | 0 (n = 10) | 5.47 | 1.85 | 1.51 |
| Combined (N = 80) | 0 (n = 17) | 6.37 | 1.84 | 1.56 |
| | Party Representational Balance (<i>for full sample</i>) | | | |
| | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
| Jaipur (N = 35) | 0 (n = 14) | 1 (n = 1) | 0.42 | 0.40 |
| Bhopal (N = 45) | 0 (n = 30) | 1 (n = 3) | 0.28 | 0.41 |
| Combined (N = 80) | 0 (n = 44) | 1 (n = 4) | 0.34 | 0.41 |

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Slum Populations in Jaipur and Bhopal

| | Total Sample Frame | | | | | Sample | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|-----|-------|------|------|--------|-----|-------|------|------|
| | N | Min | Max | Mean | SD | N | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
| Jaipur | 162 | 353 | 23811 | 3303 | 3415 | 35 | 467 | 23811 | 3525 | 4331 |
| Bhopal | 240 | 302 | 15604 | 1608 | 1740 | 45 | 349 | 7083 | 1648 | 1604 |
| Combined | 402 | 302 | 23811 | 2291 | 2680 | 80 | 349 | 23811 | 2469 | 3222 |

Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Social Diversity Across Sampled Slums (N = 80)

| | Social Diversity Across Four Categories ($1 - \Sigma e_i^2$) | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|-----|------|-----|-----------------------------|
| | Min | Max | Mean | SD | Correlation With Population |
| Caste Diversity | 0 (N = 1) | .99 | .79 | .17 | .28 |
| Religious Diversity | 0 (N = 32) | .5 | .15 | .17 | .14 |
| State of Origin | 0 (N = 15) | .74 | .29 | .22 | -0.06 |

Figure 3.1: Migratory Preferences Over Settlement (N = 1,925)




Table 3.4: Explaining Variation in Party Network Density

| Dependent Variable | Party Network Density | | |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Model 1 (OLS) | Model 2 (OLS) | Model 3 (Tobit) |
| Intercept | -0.87 (1.39) | -5.06 ** (2.09) | -7.99 *** (2.34) |
| Population/ 1000 | 0.19 *** (0.05) | | |
| Log Population | | 0.70 *** (0.24) | 0.98 *** (0.28) |
| Social Capital | 0.04 (0.10) | 0.07 (0.10) | 0.09 (0.14) |
| Age of Slum | 0.003 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.02) | 0.002 (0.02) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -0.36 (0.44) | -0.07 (0.45) | -0.26 (0.58) |
| Central Land | 0.027 (0.44) | 0.16 (0.47) | 0.23 (0.44) |
| Private Land | -0.70 (0.46) | -0.76 (0.47) | -0.85 (0.72) |
| Caste Diversity | 1.24 (1.37) | 0.87 (1.32) | 1.41 (1.40) |
| Religious Diversity | 1.95 * (1.10) | 1.56 (1.07) | 2.14 * (1.16) |
| State Diversity | 1.00 (0.86) | 0.95 (0.85) | 1.64 * (0.95) |
| HH Income Per Capita | -0.88 (0.57) | -0.82 (0.58) | -1.20 (0.72) |
| Education | 0.31 (0.29) | 0.20 (0.28) | 0.34 (0.40) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | 0.09 ** (0.04) | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.09 * (0.05) |
| Ratio of Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | -0.005 (0.006) | -0.005 (0.006) | -0.006 (0.007) |
| R ² / Pseudo R ² | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.14 |
| No. Left Censored Obs. | | | 17 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 3.5: Explaining Variation in Party Representational Balance

| Dependent Variable | Party Representational Balance | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---|----------------------|
| | All Observations (N = 80) | | Only Those With Party Networks (N = 63) | |
| | Model 4 (Frac. Logit) | Model 5 (Logit) | Model 6 (Frac. Logit) | Model 7 (Logit) |
| Intercept | -23.53 *** (4.09) | -37.45 ** (17.22) | -20.55 *** (4.15) | -35.63 ** (15.70) |
| Log Population | 3.15 *** (0.46) | 5.64 ** (2.23) | 2.87 *** (0.47) | 5.32 *** (2.05) |
| Social Capital | 0.68 *** (0.18) | 0.75 (0.54) | 0.63 *** (0.17) | 0.72 (0.50) |
| Age of Slum | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.08) | 0.006 (0.04) | 0.02 (0.10) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -0.54 (0.90) | -1.51 (1.33) | -0.56 (0.82) | -2.57 ** (1.29) |
| Central Land | -0.96 (0.60) | -1.32 (1.18) | -0.69 (0.57) | -1.41 (1.34) |
| Private Land | 0.37 (0.97) | 0.27 (1.26) | 0.38 (1.06) | 0.80 (1.10) |
| Caste Diversity | -0.82 (1.43) | -3.42 (3.44) | -1.14 (1.71) | -2.54 (2.46) |
| Religious Diversity | 5.83 *** (1.39) | 8.29 *** (2.30) | 4.98 *** (1.40) | 8.18 *** (2.53) |
| State Diversity | 2.90 ** (1.46) | 4.75 [.108] (2.95) | 2.40 * (1.30) | 3.07 (2.46) |
| HH Income Per Capita | -1.66 (1.02) | -2.19 (2.22) | -1.55 * (0.93) | -2.26 (1.53) |
| Education | -0.41 (0.57) | -0.47 (0.93) | -0.41 (0.58) | -0.59 (1.03) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | 0.05 (0.05) | 0.08 (0.09) | 0.09 * (0.05) | 0.12 (0.10) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | 0.15 ** (0.07) | 0.10 (0.12) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.08 (0.05) |
| Ratio of Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | -0.04 *** (0.01) | -0.06 ** (0.02) | -0.04 (0.01) | -0.07 *** (0.02) |
| Pseudo R ² | | 0.62 | | 0.57 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 63 | 63 |

Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 3.6: Explaining Variation in Party Network Balance (marginal effects)

| Dependent Variable | Party Representational Balance | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|----------------------|---|-----------------------|
| | All Observations (N = 80) | | Only Those With Party Networks (N = 63) | |
| | Models | M.E. for Model 4 | M.E. for Model 5 | M.E. for Model 6 |
| Log Population | 0.43 *** (0.07) | 1.23 *** (0.36) | 0.67 *** (0.11) | 1.21 *** (0.34) |
| Social Capital | 0.09 *** (0.03) | 0.15 (0.09) | 0.15 *** (0.04) | 0.16 * (0.10) |
| Age of Slum | -0.004 (0.004) | -0.007 (0.016) | 0.001 (0.009) | 0.004 (0.02) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -0.08 (0.13) | -0.31 (0.25) | -0.13 (0.19) | -0.51 *** (0.19) |
| Central Land | -0.11 * (0.06) | -0.23 (0.15) | -0.16 (0.12) | -0.33 (0.29) |
| Private Land | 0.06 (0.16) | 0.06 (0.28) | 0.09 (0.26) | 0.16 (0.18) |
| Caste Diversity | -0.11 (0.19) | -0.68 (0.76) | -0.27 (0.40) | -0.58 (0.58) |
| Religious Diversity | 0.80 *** (0.18) | 1.66 *** (0.43) | 1.16 *** (0.32) | 1.86 *** (0.56) |
| State Diversity | 0.40 ** (0.18) | 0.95 * (0.53) | 0.56 * (0.31) | 0.70 (0.54) |
| HH Income Per Capita | -0.23 (0.14) | -0.44 (0.39) | -0.36 * (0.22) | -0.51 * (0.31) |
| Education | -0.06 (0.08) | -0.09 (0.18) | -0.10 (0.14) | -0.13 (0.22) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | 0.007 (0.007) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 * (0.01) | 0.026 (0.02) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | 0.02 * (0.01) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.008 (0.006) | 0.018 (0.012) |
| Ratio of Slum Pop. to Ward Slum Pop. | -0.005 *** (0.001) | -0.01 *** (0.004) | -0.009 *** (0.002) | -0.015 *** (0.004) |

Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Chapter Four: *Netagiri*: Democracy, Accountability, and Leadership Responsiveness at the Margins of the State

4.1. Introduction

If you visit *Kali Basti* in southwest Bhopal, and ask to be taken to the leader of the settlement, residents will escort you to the modest home of Shashank. Unless Shashank is visiting his village of origin in Chhattisgarh, you will probably join a small group of residents waiting outside his home, each eager to get Shashank's assistance with their problems. Similarly, if you travel just two kilometers north to the slum of *Varuna* and inquire about leadership, you will be taken to the makeshift office of Kunal, where he will likely be sipping *chai* and talking politics with local party workers. Both men are acknowledged as slum leader in their respective settlement. These men engage in *netagiri*, or leadership activities. Outside of the slum, politicians and officials are well aware of the local authority held by Shashank and Kunal. Police know to first approach the men for information and assistance when a crime occurs in *Kali Basti* or *Varuna*.

Despite their shared title, however, Shashank and Kunal differ in the quality of their leadership. Shashank voices the concerns of his settlement to local politicians and officials. He regularly helps residents secure government ration cards and voter IDs. Shashank has collected money to build a temple, organized the installation of drainage pipes, and oversaw the construction of a community center. Shashank also organizes religious programs, resolves disputes, and collects money for residents and families in crisis. Leadership looks much different in *Varuna*. Kunal has organized a number of protests to improve the conditions of the settlement. These efforts have yielded improved roads and water delivery. However, Kunal does little to help residents with their everyday problems and shows little concern for the fights that erupt in the settlement. The differences in leadership between Shashank and Kunal are not isolated.

Instead, these differences are representative of a larger unevenness in the scope and intensity of activities performed by India's slum leaders.

Informal leadership is pervasive across India's urban slums. Situated in a hierarchical space between residents of the slum and the larger political and administrative currents of the city, slum leaders are central actors in the drama of local distributive politics. The scope and intensity of developmental activities performed by slum leaders, however, are highly uneven across settlements. Some leaders resolve disputes among residents, enforce social order, facilitate access to public services for individuals and households, and organize the settlement to demand development from the state. Others engage in a limited subset of these activities, while others act as bandits, transgressing against residents for their own material gain. As this chapter demonstrates, active leaders can make significant improvements in the conditions and security of their communities, even in the face of marginalization by political parties and government officials. Variation in the scope and intensity of leadership activities across slums motivates the central question of this chapter—*why do some communities develop active and responsive leadership that advances the interests of residents while others fail?*

I find that leaders are more active and responsive to the needs of residents when they have come to power through informal democratic selection—and face sanctions if they fail to perform. These selection mechanisms are informal because they are the social construction of slum dwellers themselves, organized outside the purview of the state. In many settlements, residents collectively choose their leaders. This might be in a large community gathering where people raise their hands in support of a candidate. In some settlements, residents even organize elections. All of these procedures share a common democratic element. Norms of democracy have traveled with poor migrants to India's sprawling cities, where squatters fall back upon

democratic forms of organization in the socially novel context of the slum. Residents in many settlements additionally develop means of sanctioning leaders when they fail to perform. This chapter demonstrates that democratic selection and the capacity to sanction are critical determinants of informal accountability in slums, and, in turn, responsive leadership.

Other factors encourage active and responsive leadership. Levels of community social capital are positively associated with leadership responsiveness. Communities with high levels of social capital are better able to monitor the behavior of leaders and collectively sanction them in cases of inactivity or transgressions. Further, and consistent with findings from Chapter Two, the density of political party networks is positively associated with leadership responsiveness. Leaders in competitive environments are compelled to provide services for residents, or else lose their following and access to rents. Finally, slums that organize development councils tend to have more active leadership than those without development councils. Development councils are community associations that are voluntarily created by residents and registered with local governments. The presence of a development council adds another layer of monitoring, organization, and accountability to a settlement that encourages leadership responsiveness.

Under the banner of “community-driven development”, development projects are increasingly calling for local participation and leadership. Policymakers and scholars argue that local participation improves the efficiency of service delivery, increases the accountability of elected representatives, and makes the process of development more sensitive to local preferences. The World Bank has spent more than 85 billion dollars on community participation initiatives in the last 10 years (Mansuri and Rao 2013: ix). In India, several major slum development schemes have been implemented in the last decade.⁶¹ These schemes include

⁶¹ Two such initiatives, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and *Rajiv Awas Yojna* (Rajiv Housing Scheme), are unprecedented in their financial and geographic scope.

extensive guidelines to involve slum residents and leaders in the development process.⁶² This chapter, then, has direct policy relevance for development projects that seek to engage community members and leaders.

I first situate the chapter among the literatures on political selection, accountability, and public goods provision. I then describe leadership in India's slums, as observed in the field, and present statistics from the survey that describe the various activities and services that slum leaders perform for residents. The household survey data show wide variation in the scope and intensity of leadership activities. Subsequently, I present descriptive statistics of leadership selection and accountability in India's slums and draw on two ethnographic case studies to illustrate these processes. I then discuss the model specifications, data and variables, and regression results. I conclude by discussing the contributions of the chapter to research on political selection, informal institutions, and community development.

4.2. The Informal Institutional Sources of Leadership Responsiveness and Accountability

Politicians and officials would often tell me that the key to development in slums is having honest and hardworking slum leaders. I would then ask why some settlements produce “good” leaders while others do not. Responses would always be vague, and often tautological—slums with “good leaders” are those slums in which leaders are honest and hardworking. Asking slum leaders directly further muddled the issue. Slum leaders passionately describe their motivations for engaging in leadership activities, often evoking altruism, a sense of responsibility for their neighbors, and even patriotism. However so true these claims might be, such traits are highly particularistic. Personal characteristics *do* influence the quality of leadership, however these characteristics are idiosyncratic and mostly unobservable, and therefore evade generalizability.

⁶² See, for example, the Rajiv Awas Yojna's “Guidelines on Community Participation” (Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, GOI, 2011).

Even in the shadowy informality of India's slums, leaders do not operate independently of the social environment in which they are embedded. The agency of leaders is circumscribed by local rules, norms, and behavioral expectations. These informal institutions⁶³ dictate the "rules of the game" in a slum, both among residents and between residents and leaders. To understand variation in the responsiveness of leaders, then, we must investigate the institutions that emerge in slums to constrain the behavior of leaders. In particular, the analytical focus must be placed on those institutions that produce *informal accountability*—a situation in which community members are able to reward or punish a leader based on assessments of performance.⁶⁴ This accountability is *informal* because it is not codified in or enforced by the state.

This section outlines three determinants of informal accountability. The first determinant of informal accountability is how leaders are *selected* from the pool of community members. Do community members select their leaders? If so, how is this selection conducted? The second determinant of informal accountability is how community members *sanction* their leaders when the latter fail to perform. The third determinant of informal accountability is *monitoring*. To what extent are community members able to observe and assess the actions of leaders? I discuss leadership selection, sanctioning, and monitoring in turn.

Leadership Selection

I encountered an incredible diversity of ways that leaders come to power in India's slums. One analytical division that cuts through this organizational diversity, however, is between those

⁶³ Informal institutions are "socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727).

⁶⁴ Fearon (1999) provides a more general definition of accountability: "We say that one person, A, is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are met. First, there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B. Second, B is empowered by some formal institution or perhaps informal rules to sanction or reward A for her activities or performance in this capacity" (Fearon 1999: 55).

settlements that collectively choose their leaders and those that do not. Some communities select their leaders in public meeting in which residents vote with their hands or voices. The candidate with the plurality of support wins. In other instances, residents extensively deliberate until a consensus is reached. Remarkably, some settlements even organize informal elections with campaigns, speeches, and secret ballots. Of the 1,475 survey respondents who acknowledged leadership in their settlement, over half (54 percent) went on to report that their leaders were selected in one of these ways. Ethnographic accounts of political life in India's slums have similarly uncovered instances of informal democratic activity (Jha et al. 2007; Mathur 1996). This dissertation, to my knowledge, is the first to systematically capture democratic activity across a large and representative sample of slum settlements.

These forms of leadership selection just described shared many democratic elements: direct, popular participation over choices in representation, deliberation, and the expression of preferences in a public forum. They approximate a form of deliberative democracy. Some even involve elections. Of course, leadership selection in India's urban slums should not be romanticized. Not every resident has an equal voice in these meetings, and differences of caste, religion, and sex can be deeply exclusionary. Still, even in formal elections, elite capture, coercion, and social discrimination do much to push democracy away from its ideal form.

The selection of leaders in India's slums are reminiscent of a rural *gram sabha*—forums in rural India in which villagers gather to discuss development and community problems before their local representatives. Informal governance institutions organized around caste and tribe are also prevalent in rural India, and can serve to compliment formal village governance in the areas of representation, service delivery, and resource mobilization (Pur 2007; Pur and Moore 2010). India's rural institutions of grassroots democracy, both informal and formal, have provided a

ready organizational template for migrants in urban slums.⁶⁵

Democratic selection allows residents to deliberate over which candidate is best suited to represent the group. Potential leaders come under direct public scrutiny. Experimental research has shown that deliberation of this kind can help align the preferences of group members (List et al. 2006), helping to facilitate decisions in heterogeneous populations. Democratic selection, moreover, bestows an important legitimacy on leaders. These individuals have a democratic mandate to rule in the settlement and can employ that legitimacy in mobilizing residents, bargaining on behalf of residents with politicians and officials, and sanctioning residents that engage in anti-social behavior. As I establish in the remainder of this chapter, leaders that come to power through informal democratic selection tend to be more responsive to the needs of residents, more trusted, and better able to organize their settlements to improve development.

A growing body of research provides evidence that democratic selection is beneficial for local governance and public goods provision. Grossman (2013) demonstrates that leaders in rural Uganda are more likely to be responsive when group members choose them. Similarly, Grossman and Baldassarri (2012) find that group members are more likely to cooperate toward the provision of public goods when their leaders are chosen through elections. The introduction of village elections in China has been found to improve trust in leaders (Manion 2006), compel leaders to be more responsive to local preferences (Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011), and lead to increased levels of public spending (Luo et al. 2007). Elections can even improve governance in politically turbulent spaces. In post-conflict Liberia, Fearon et al. (2012) find that individuals are more trusting of leaders, cooperative, and politically active in those villages that have chosen

⁶⁵ “The *gram sabha* has arguably [become] the largest deliberative institution in human history, at the heart of two million little village democracies that affect the lives of several hundred million rural Indians. Thus, the practice of democratic politics, with its attendant deliberative rituals, election cycles, and political machinations and negotiations, has now become part of the quotidian landscape of India’s rural life” (Rao and Sanyal 2010: 147).

their leaders through elections. Indeed, decentralization reforms across the globe are predicated on the belief that local elections will improve accountability and responsiveness.⁶⁶

In all of these studies just cited, democratic selection is either a formal state institution or something imposed on communities by an external agency. Authority and leadership selection in slums, however, are entirely informal. Migrant squatters internally construct, or fail to construct the rules and norms that determine how slum leaders are chosen. As the remainder of this chapter demonstrates, endogenous leadership selection is highly diverse across India's slums, with consequences for leadership accountability and the everyday welfare of residents. I leverage these differences to examine the influence of informal institutions of community governance on the scope and intensity of leadership activities.

Sanctioning Leaders without Elections

Without formal elections, how can community members sanction leaders for failing to perform? Tsai (2007; 2007a) argues that informal accountability can be produced when officials are embedded in solidarity groups—"groups based on shared moral obligations as well as shared interests" (Tsai 2007: 365). Members of these solidarity groups can leverage social norms to encourage officials to provide public goods, and shame them when they fail to do so. In a similar vein, a generation of research on moral economies provides rich ethnographic evidence that individuals can make claims on those in authority through discourses of fairness, justice, and reciprocity (Arnold 2001; Booth 1993; Schatzberg 2001; Scott 1977; Thompson 1966). In many of these same ways, slum dwellers can punish and reward leaders for their behavior.

Slum leaders live within settlements, pray in local temples, mosques, and *gurdwaras*, and attend community social functions. They face the same threats and vulnerabilities as their

⁶⁶ See Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Bardhan 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Bergh 2004; Crook and Manor 1998; Govinda and Singh 2005; Manor 1999; Oxford et al. 2004.

neighbors. To many residents, slum leaders are also friends, family, and fellow members of the *basti samaj*, or slum community group. Slum leaders are deeply embedded in the social networks that compose slum settlements. Much like Tsai's solidarity groups, slum dwellers can appeal to shared histories, social obligations, and the idea of a common fate to push leaders into providing services and fighting for the improvement of the settlement.

Breaking social norms and obligations can invite a storm of public shaming on leaders. Urban slums are information rich environments, perennially abuzz with rumors and gossip. If word spreads that a leader is underperforming or transgressing on residents, that leader will likely face reputational effects that diminish the base of support from which their authority is derived. Since leaders do not serve fixed terms, they only remain in authority if they are able to maintain a following. Negative rumors can cripple a leader, and thus serve as an effective sanctioning mechanism. These assessments can be far more effective than formal elections. The rumor mill of a slum makes any moment a potential referendum on a leader's performance.

Take Saini, a former leader in one of Bhopal's many lakeside slums. Saini rose to power within in the early 1980s because of his assertiveness and prominence within his section of the slum. The Congress Party was eager to capture Saini and the votes of his followers, and extended him a position. Soon after, however, Saini began to abuse his power. He would intimidate and beat residents and did nothing to improve their material wellbeing. Word quickly spread of his behavior in the settlement. Not only was Saini removed as leader, but he was also banished from his caste organization and thrown out of the Congress party. Younger residents credit their current distaste for the Congress party to memories of Saini's rule.

Social capital⁶⁷ is an important component of sanctioning in slums. Encompassing social norms, inter-personal trust, and shared behavioral expectations must be actively constructed in urban slums; they are not traditional, multi-generational social structures like Tsai's rural solidarity groups. Slum settlements are only a few decades old and populated by diverse migrants groups that had no prior interaction. We therefore need to examine and measure the extent to which squatters have developed inter-personal trust and cooperative ties—social capital. A large literature on social capital has demonstrated that trust, participation, and cooperative social norms improve democratic governance (Putnam 1993; Woolcock 2010). Social capital helps groups overcome collection action problems and produce public goods (Ostrom 1991; Putnam 1993; Bowles and Gintis 2002). Furthermore, a community with high levels of social capital can better stand up to inactive or transgressive leaders (Weingast 1997).

In many circumstances, the sanctioning of leaders can turn violent. In the 1980s, for instance, a powerful local leader in one of my case study slums was accused of embezzlement and engaging in gang activities. There were also rumors that this leader was running illegal activities in the settlement. Residents united and confronted the leader about the accusations, and proceeded to beat the leader (Author Interview, Jaipur, 4/25/2011).

A final mechanism of accountability is competition among existing slum leaders, as well as those that aspire to authority. In settlements with multiple nodes of authority, leaders compete with each other to maintain and expand their following. Regardless of their motivation—access to rents, social prominence, or altruism—expanding one's base of support is a guiding objective of slum leaders. To accomplish this goal, leaders need to provide services for residents. This is not unique to India. Koster and Vries (2012) describe their observations from the field in Brazil:

⁶⁷ Excellent reviews of this literature can be found in Woolcock and Narayan (2000) and Woolcock (2010). In the former article, social capital is defined as “norms and networks that enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 226).

“[Leader] is a severely fought for position, one for which a reputation has to be cultivated. Community leaders are known to make efforts for the community, do personal favors for people, and thoroughly know the community’s history and current problems” (Koster and Vries 2012: 88). The relationship between informal competition and accountability is discussed at length in Chapter Two. This chapter provides a direct test of the competition mechanism on the activity levels of leaders. The econometric results show that competition is an important determinant of leadership activity levels, and that it is even a substitute for democratic leadership selection.

Monitoring

If the actions of leaders cannot be monitored, group members cannot accurately assess the performance of leaders and sanction them. Central to monitoring is access to information (see Pande 2011). Greater information improves accountability and reduces opportunism on the part of leaders (Lipset 1959; Besley et al. 2005). In an experimental study, Banerjee et al. (2011) find that more informed slum residents in New Delhi are more likely to vote, as well as choose higher quality politicians. Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) demonstrate that community monitoring in Uganda is associated with improved accountability of local healthcare providers. Given the close proximity of leadership in India’s slums, monitoring is a relatively simple task if residents are connected and cooperative. Social capital facilitates monitoring through its effect on communicative channels, participation, and daily social engagements. Social capital therefore improves the responsiveness of leaders through several pathways, including the spread of information, the creation of shared social norms and obligations, and facilitating a cohesive front among residents when sanctioning leaders. I use a multi-dimensional index of community social capital to examine the influence of horizontal trust and cooperation on leadership responsiveness.

4.3. Leadership in India's Urban Slums

With the larger theoretical framework of the chapter established, I now proceed to a deeper empirical description of the components of that theory. I first describe the prevalence of leadership in India's slums. I then elaborate on the various services and activities that leaders perform for residents using the household survey data. Subsequently, I describe the primary explanatory variables of interest and their measurement—democratic selection and sanctioning. I also discuss a particular form of organization in India's slums—community development councils—that influence accountability. The following section draws on my ethnographic fieldwork, and presents two case study narratives to further ground the variables in the lived experience of slum leaders and residents.

It is difficult to find a slum settlement in India without identifiable leadership. Only three of the 80 sampled slums in this study exhibited a complete absence of leadership, as reported by respondents. 1,475 respondents—or 76.6 percent of the total sample—acknowledged the presence of one or more leaders residing in their settlement. Most of the settlements under study had multiple leaders. Survey respondents across the 80 slums identified 837 distinct community leaders. Moreover, based on political party rosters and extensive interviews with local party officers, I compiled an exhaustive list of 513 political party workers living across the 80 sampled slums. Sociological and anthropological studies of urban slums in India similarly document the prevalence of informal community leadership.⁶⁸

Why is leadership so common in India's slums? The prevalence of informal community leaders is the result of factors both internal and external to settlements. Inside slums, material poverty and illiteracy make it difficult for residents to directly approach state officials and

⁶⁸ For examples, see Bijlani and Roy 1991; Dhadave 1989; Jha et al. 2007; Rao and Rao 1984; Rao 1990; Roy 2007; and Srivastava 2013.

politicians for assistance. Forty percent of survey respondents were illiterate, and the average education achieved was only a few years of primary school. Further, the average monthly household income of respondents is Rs. 7,600, or about \$169. Per-capita monthly household income is Rs. 1,400, or about a dollar per person per day. The interaction of material poverty and low educational attainment makes navigating India's bureaucracy difficult. The poor are made to wait for hours outside government offices, often to be turned away for the day without first being given the audience of the concerned official or politician. To gauge the degree to which residents feel a lack of agency in their dealings with the state, survey respondents were asked: "If you went to a politician or government official by yourself, would you receive attention or be ignored?" Only 12 percent of respondents felt that they would be given attention. This environment creates a strong demand for political brokerage.

The Scope and Intensity of Leadership Activities in India's Urban Slums

What activities and services do slum leaders provide for residents? The ethnographic segment of the fieldwork uncovered a wide range of activities, as well as significant unevenness in the scope and intensity of those activities across slums. Leadership activities can be grouped into two larger categories: (1) services for individuals or households and (2) activities to improve the settlement as a whole. Concerning the former, slum leaders facilitate access to a number of goods and services that are consumed at the household level. Most prevalent among these activities is helping residents obtain government-issued documents. These documents include voter-ID cards, ration cards, and below-the-poverty line (BPL) cards. Ration and BPL cards are essential for residents to access food and energy at subsidized prices, as well as government services for the poor. Other household-level services are widow and handicapped pensions, postal savings accounts, and bank accounts.

Slum leaders often charge residents for their assistance, and the going rate of services is public information. A typical price for assistance in obtaining ration cards or BPL card in Jaipur, for instance, is between Rs. 300 and Rs. 500 (\$6-\$10). In Madhya Pradesh, there are several types of BPL cards that depend on the specific level of poverty facing the household, measured by household assets and income. Each BPL type determines a specific level of subsidies that beneficiary households can receive. Slum residents, therefore, have incentives to be categorized in the lowest socio-economic group possible. Bribes to local leaders and local government workers can ensure that the TV set or scooter in one's household is ignored during enumeration, or the monthly income of the household is underestimated to make sure the household can be placed in the lowest BLP category possible. Voter-ID cards in both Jaipur and Bhopal are most often given to slum residents without a bribe. This is because parties have strong incentives to ensure all residents are registered and ready to vote. For party workers, registering new migrants to vote is among the most routine and common activities.

Leaders perform other activities for individuals and households. When residents become involved in police cases, slum leaders can leverage their political connections in reducing or eliminating fines or jail time. For instance, a resident in one of my case studies hit a pedestrian driving his motorcycle while intoxicated. While in jail, the resident contacted a leader in his settlement, who requested that a more prominent party officer contact the station chief to have the resident released. Bribes were exchanged and the resident averted jail time. Slum leaders additionally help residents find employment, obtain electricity and water connections, assist parents getting their children admission into local schools, and gain access to a wide range of other state and private services.

Colloquially, these activities cast slum leaders in the role of *dalaal* or *prayveekar*, or intermediary and “fixer”. However, in contrast to images of shadowy backroom brokerage and deal making, most acts of mediation unfold in public spaces. A common sight during my fieldwork would be a slum leader casually sitting at the local *chai* shop, in front of his or her house, or outside a temple, surrounded by a handful of residents seeking assistance with their problems. Many leaders even had their own makeshift offices to house such exchanges. Slum settlements are lucrative places for brokerage activities. Beyond material considerations, slum leaders derive local fame and legitimacy by facilitating access to state services.

The household survey probed the frequency with which respondents visited slum leaders for assistance and development. Of the 1,475 respondents that identified community leadership, 668 (47 percent) said that they or a family member had visited a leader in their community to seek help. 519 of these respondents noted that they had visited a leader for help within the previous 12 months. The most common reason to seek the help of slum leaders was to secure voter ID cards, ration cards, and BPL cards (54.3 percent of the stated reasons). The second most common reason was to ask slum leaders to solve development problems for the community (33.23 percent of the stated reasons). Other less common reasons to seek help were for employment, starting a bank account, assistance with police cases, solving disputes among neighbors, and getting electricity connections.

Slum leaders perform a number of activities that aim to improve the settlement, in whole or part. Efforts to secure community development—clientelistic bargaining with politicians, organizing demonstrations and protests, and organizing the collective self-provision of development—have been discussed in Chapters Two and Three. A sample from the letters that I

collected from leaders in Jaipur and Bhopal give a sense of the various developmental goods and services that leaders fight for on behalf of their settlements:

We request you that we have a huge problem of water and electricity [and] it is very dark at night. People are scared of going out from their houses at nighttime because they are scared of thieves. So therefore, we request you to resolve our problems as soon as possible and allot (regularize) our slum here. We slum people hope something will happen soon on our request (translated letter from a leader of *Pahari* slum to Rajasthan state minister, *undated*).

Sir, it is a humble request that in our slum very dirty roads are damaged and are always full of muddy water. It is so much so that a disease called cholera is spreading and the whole slum is paralyzed because of this dirt...the mentioned road is 700 feet long and 30 feet wide. Please kindly make this road so that we can get rid of all these life-taking diseases (translated letter from a leader of *Naga* slum to Jaipur Development Authority, *undated*).

The citizens of the slum want to thank you for repairing the hand-pump. There is an additional request now. We have a water tank with a capacity of 3,000 liters...but it does not have a lid and sometimes lizards and dust get into the tank. We have lots of problems because of this. We request that you kindly arrange a lid soon (translated letter from a leader of *Saraswati* slum to authorities, *undated*).

The cleaning of the roads has not been done and there are a lot of mosquitos. In some of the lanes the water is overflowing due to improper drainage...the gutters are blocked here due to garbage on the roads and residents find it hard to walk (letter to ward councilor, *Ganpati*, 2005)

Slum leaders also engage in activities to improve order and security in their settlements.

Residents turn to leaders to resolve inter-household disputes and fights. Verbal arguments and fighting are a common sight in India's urban slums. Some leaders will rush to the scene of the mounting altercation to control the disputing parties. Residents will also directly approach leaders to resolve ongoing disputes and disagreements among individuals in the settlement. In two of my case study slums, leaders had engaged in sustained efforts to repel local gang activities. Another leader in Jaipur put an end to a growing prostitution ring. Other activities contribute more generally to peace and feelings of solidarity. These activities include organizing community programs during religious and national holidays, organizing efforts to build various places of worship, and collecting funds for funerals, pregnant women, and sick residents. Chapter Five examines of the sources of public order, peace, and security in slums.

In sum, slum leaders provide a range of services for both individuals and communities, though the scope and intensity of those activities vary across slums. To gain a more systematic understanding of the scope of leadership activities, I asked survey respondents whether or not leaders in their settlement engage in 12 distinct activities. Each of these activities was observed during the ethnographic segment of research. *Table 4.1* lists these activities while *Table 4.2* presents descriptive statistics of each leadership activity. For the descriptive statistics, responses were first averaged for each sampled slum and then averaged across the 80 sampled slums.

The most common activities performed by slum leaders are bargaining with politicians for development during elections and helping residents secure voter IDs, ration cards, and BPL cards. On average, over half of respondents in the sampled slums noted that their leaders engage in these two activities. At the other extreme, respondents infrequently reported that their leaders would bring the problems of the slum to media outlets in order to raise awareness. Respondents also infrequently stated that their leaders spread information about government schemes and services for the poor. The remaining activities are somewhere in between these two extremes. All activities exhibit a high variability across sampled slums.

I calculate the following leadership activity score:

$$w(S_i) = \frac{\sum a_{is}}{\text{respondents}(S_i)}$$

where ω is the measure of leadership activity levels in slum S_i , α is the number of confirmed activities stated by respondent j in slum i , and the denominator, *respondents*, is the number of respondents surveyed in slum i . A respondent stating there is no leadership in the slum is equivalent to a respondent acknowledging leadership but then stating leaders perform none of the activities. *Table 4.3* presents descriptive statistics. In the average slum, respondents stated that leaders perform roughly 5 of the 12 activities, with a one standard deviation of 2.13 activities.

Four of the sampled slums have a score of 0, while at the other extreme, one of the sampled slums has a score of 9. In some slums, leaders are highly active and engage in a number of activities that improve the settlement. In other slums, leaders are inactive.

What causes this variation? The following sub-section presents descriptive statistics concerning leadership selection, informal accountability, and sanctioning in India's slums.

Democratic Selection and Informal Accountability

Among the most striking findings from the survey was the prevalence of democratic mechanisms of leadership selection and sanctioning. Over half of the survey respondents (798 out of 1,475) who first acknowledged leadership went on to state that leaders in their community were chosen either through informal elections or a large community meeting in which residents selected leaders through collective discussion. My qualitative and archival research substantiate these findings. In seven of the eight case study communities in Jaipur and Bhopal, the settlements had, at some point in their history, chosen leaders either through a community meeting or an actual informal election, with makeshift ballots and candidates. Slum leaders can also be held accountable for their behavior, and be removed from their position if found to be inactive or transgressive. 578 of the 1,475 respondents who acknowledged community leadership stated that residents have the power to remove leaders.

The household survey also included questions that examine the nature of trust toward slum leaders. Survey respondents were asked: "If leaders in your slum were collecting a small amount of money from residents to develop the slum, say Rs. 200 (roughly two days of income), would you contribute?" Residents would be unlikely to contribute to a community fund unless they believed that leaders would make use of the money in the publically stated way. A large majority of respondents (1,029) stated that they would contribute Rs. 200, while another 163

respondents said they would “maybe” contribute money. Respondents were also asked, “If leaders in the slum tried to organize everyone to improve the community, do you think most people would join and participate?” Residents are unlikely to follow a leader that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the community. 1,248 respondents said the community would follow the leader, while only 160 said they would not follow the leader.

Development Councils

Thirty-two of the 80 sampled slums in this study have community-wide development councils. These councils go by several names in north and central India, including *vikas samiti* and *mohalla sudaran samiti*, or development council and community improvement council. Community development councils are often registered with urban local bodies as legally recognized social organizations.⁶⁹ At the apex of development councils is the president, who is either elected by residents of the settlement or appointed by prominent members of the community. Below the president are the vice-president, secretary, treasurer, ministers, and general members. Typically, the councils will have between 11 and 20 members and represent a diverse cross-section of the settlement. Development councils coexist with party organizations, and members of the council are often members of political parties. Councils provide an extra layer of accountability and organizational structure to the settlement.

The following question was asked to respondents: “In some slums, leaders work alone. In other slums, leaders work within a community organization or council. Usually, there are

⁶⁹ Social organizations can be registered with state governments, in the process obtaining a degree of formality and legal recognition. The organizations must, on paper, abide by the rules set forth by the state registrar office: payment of registration fees and regular dues, creation of group objectives, and selection of members. The history of these civil society associations dates back to the colonial period, when the British established the Societies Registration Act of 1860. See the *Societies Registration Act of 1860* and the corresponding state laws in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh for the specific legal text governing the creation and maintenance of development councils.

about 11 or 12 other people on these councils, and they are called community development councils or community improvement associations. Is there a development council or association here in the slum?” 291 of the 1,475 respondents (20 percent) confirmed that their leaders work within a development council. Respondents were subsequently asked how many times in the last 12 months the council held a meeting. The average response was 5.4 times, or roughly once every two months.

What explains the mismatch between the formal existence of development councils and the acknowledgement of those councils by residents? Most likely, development councils are an organizational means of demand-making for leaders, not a meaningful and transparent representative body. Residents might acknowledge leadership in settlements with councils, but not recognize that their leadership is organized into a larger association. Further, I observed during my fieldwork that the use of council letterhead stationary is for correspondence between slum leaders and politicians or officials. Everyday residents may not be exposed enough to the councils to identify the organizations separately from the leaders that populate them.

4.4. The Formation of Leadership and Informal Governance: Two Narratives

India’s urban slums offer a critical area in which to comparatively examine the formation of leadership and informal governance. In the early stages of a slum—after the initial influx of migration into the settlement—migrants face an unsettled social environment that lacks a defined set of rules, concordant behavioral expectations, and inter-group forms of organization and leadership. Most slums in India are only several decades old. The decisions, processes, and events that determine the nature of authority and accountability in a slum unfold in a short period of time. Slums, therefore, provide an important opportunity to understand the endogenous rise of leadership and informal institutional change through a comparison of community histories.

In this section, I present narratives of leadership formation, community organization, and leadership activity in two case study settlements. *Saraswati* and *Pahari* are located along the *Aravali* mountain range in Jaipur. Both slums are settled on Forest Department land and have faced several government evictions since their establishment in the late 1970s. In many ways, these two settlements “started” at the same time and under the same general conditions, allowing for a provocative comparison of their histories.⁷⁰

Saraswati

Migrant laborers first settled *Saraswati* in the late 1970s to work as rock cutters and porters in local stone quarries. Older residents still reminisce of good and stable wages from work in the mountains. As the settlement became more established, families began to join the laborers and work in the expanding residential neighborhoods of the area. *Saraswati*’s population now stands at just over 2,600 people. Residents mostly hail from eastern Rajasthan, though pockets of the slum are home to migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal. The slum is remarkably diverse in terms of caste, with a fractionalization score of 0.90. All residents are Hindu.

Leadership has come in many forms in the history of *Saraswati*. For the first 15 years of the slum’s existence, Bilu, a labor contractor with ties to the Congress party and the local land mafia, engaged in leadership activities. As the “don” of the area, Bilu informally represented the settlement before local police and bureaucrats. Older residents say that Bilu’s contributions to the development of *Saraswati* were minimal. In a decade and a half, he was only able to secure a hand-pump and drinking well for residents. In the same conversations, residents would describe Bilu’s illicit activities and acts of coercion within the settlement. According to current residents,

⁷⁰ The two slums also shared the same state legislative assembly between 1980 and 2008, at which time they split into two constituencies. Political organization and development diverged before this change in assembly boundaries, removing the possibility that differences occurred because of the split.

Bilu used the slum for the production and distribution of liquor. Further, as the *de facto* landlord, Bilu collected rents from workers to squat on the land. Given his undisputed authority over employment and land, Bilu's authority could not easily be challenged.

Bilu's rein came to an end in 1996, when mining activity was ordered to close by the high court of Rajasthan. Bilu left the area, leaving a void in leadership in *Saraswati*. Between 1996 and 2006, leadership was nascent, fluid, and isolated to distinct pockets of the settlement. In the north part of the slum, Prem engaged in leadership activities. Prem, at that time, was a driver for an official in the area. Through this connection, he managed to secure a paved approach road and a water tank for his area of the settlement. In the center of the slum, Jagdish, a young private school teacher, was growing in popularity. In the east, Mr. Sharma, a high caste Brahmin, served as a leader. Other residents engaged in fleeting acts of leadership during this period, though only enough to be mentioned in passing during interviews about past leadership.

Ambiguity over leadership quickly changed in face of eviction. In 2006, the Forest Department began an effort to clear encroachments in the area. The community was thrown into panic. Without strong political connections, residents first reached out to a local shopkeeper just outside the slum who has built relations with residents as their grocer and creditor. Most important to residents was that the shopkeeper was a party member of the BJP. The shopkeeper was briefly made "president" (*adyaksh*) of *Saraswati*, and began to approach the state-level representative, a BJP politician, for help. Letters were written to local newspapers to spread awareness of the Forest Department's aggression toward *Saraswati*. With the help of the MLA, a series of meetings with the forest department stalled the eviction.

Uncertainty over the possibility of eviction persisted. In December 2007, concerned residents decided that someone from the slum itself must be president; someone that can be more

easily accessed and personally faces the problems of the settlement. Residents created a series of criteria for leadership. Candidates needed to be at least 21 years old, be “mentally balanced,” seek to improve the welfare of the community, not have a criminal background, and have at least a primary education. Further, candidates needed to promise to take action against anti-social residents in the slum, be cooperative and maintain public spaces, improve the “cultural progress” of the settlement, prevent further encroachments into the forest area, and not use abusive language. Leaders would be “suspended or punished” if found to break these conditions (*Saraswati* leader selection documents, Winter 2007).

Three candidates came forward: Jagdish, Prem, and Prabhu. A community meeting was held with the three candidates to discuss the needs of the settlement and the conditions of granting authority. One hundred and fifty people were in attendance. It was decided that the leader should be well educated, knowledgeable about the government, and confident when dealing with politicians. Prabhu was forced to abandon the race because of his illiteracy and public intentions of seeking benefits from the position (Author Interview, Jaipur, 1/9/2011). The choice then would come down to Jagdish or Prem.

The residents and candidates decided that an informal election with secret ballots should be held. All residents over the age of 18 were invited to participate. Police officers were invited to oversee the election and ballot counting. Both the municipal and state assembly representatives were invited to observe the election:

On January 8th, 2008, an election is going to be held for the post of president of *Saraswati* with the consent of the residents for the purpose of progress, development, and stopping anti-social activities. Therefore, we request you sir to accept our proposal of being the chief guest and give us your valuable time. We expect that you will accept our proposal and help us. We shall wait for your reply. All the people of the slum hope you will give your valuable time and oblige (translated letter from *Saraswati* residents to ward councilor, *undated*).

Almost 800 residents voted in the informal election on January 8th, 2008—a majority of the adult population of the slum. With 458 votes, Jagdish defeated Prem, who received 317 votes. Several points explain Jagdish's victory. Prem had developed a reputation for engaging in *dadagiri*, or forceful behavior to advance one's private aims, through land grabbing and informally selling plots in the slum. Jagdish had opened a tutoring center in his house to teach local children, led two separate savings groups for women in the slum, and started a youth group to clean public areas. Jagdish's "social work" and reputation of honesty were well known. He also had the support of Mr. Sharma, thereby holding two of the three smaller clusters of the slum. Residents democratically chose the individual who they deemed of higher quality.

Jagdish's leadership and the development council started with great zeal. A slum-wide ceremony was held in which Jagdish and his council promised before residents to work hard and honestly for the development of the slum. The council drafted 19 rules regarding social conduct and related punishments in the slum. Separate rules for committee members, such as minimum age and education requirements, were passed. Stated aims of the council were defined and ambitious: the advancement of education, peace, cleanliness, social awareness, cooperation among residents, and infrastructural development.

Over time, however, enthusiasm among members waned. Household and work priorities took precedence. Perhaps more important, an agreement was reached between residents and the forest department in which the people of the slum agreed not to encroach further into the forest. Journal entries in the committee register become infrequent and ended altogether after just 6 months. Discussions quickly turned away from problems of the slum to issues of absence among members. Without the external invigoration of party organizations, material incentives for leadership, and the threat of eviction, council members lost interest.

Jagdish now serves as a singular leader. Nevertheless, he has had some success in pushing various government departments to deliver development. The slum has been given water tanks, streetlights, and bore-wells. On several occasions, Jagdish has collected money to fix broken tanks and build speed breakers. As a smaller ‘vote-bank’, and with little network connectivity, local politicians have mostly neglected *Saraswati* in the allocation of major infrastructure projects. Indeed, one resident provided a metaphor to describe the unmet developmental requirements of *Saraswati*. Development given to the slum is “*jaisae ek bukha unt kae muh mae jira hain*” (like a small seed in a hungry camel’s mouth).

Still, with limited political assistance, Jagdish has managed to improve life for residents of the settlement. He was entrusted with authority after the election, and does much to serve his neighbors. Jagdish helps residents secure ration cards, voter ID cards, and various pensions for widows and people with disabilities. He continues his work with women’s savings groups and youth groups in the slum. These are an impressive range of services, given that he must balance leadership activities with teaching and caring for his children.

Residents are ready to hold Jagdish accountable for his behavior. Several times during my fieldwork, residents approached Jagdish’s house to confront him about delays and inactivity. In one instance, a large and angry group of residents gathered outside Jagdish’s home with rocks. Rumors had spread that he was “eating” money from a recent sanitation project in the settlement. Jagdish was able to convince the group that the accusations were false. Expectations for Jagdish are just as high as with formally elected representatives. Jagdish is aware that the community will hold him accountable, and so he tries to maintain some satisfaction among residents.

Toward the end of my fieldwork in *Saraswati*, three residents began to show an interest in *netagiri*. Mukesh, a resident in his early 20s, had recently opened a small private school.

Mukesh explained to me that he was inspired by Jagdish's social work and rise to power in the settlement, and sought to emulate Jagdish in his own profession and activities in the settlement. Mukesh clearly admired Jagdish, but also freely stated that he sought to someday compete with Jagdish for the position of slum president. Not far from Mukesh's school, a new Hindu temple for the god *Shiva* was being constructed under the leadership of a nearby shop owner. The temple was quickly becoming a source of pride for the people in the northwest section of *Saraswati*, and the shopkeeper's *namcheen*, or fame, was expanding in the settlement. Though he denies aspirations of political leadership, the shopkeeper had begun to help residents obtain ration and pension cards, thereby increasing his prominence in a way that could be translated into overt leadership. Anoop, another shopkeeper and resident of *Saraswati*, also exhibited an interest in leadership within the Congress party booth organization. Residents do not yet widely refer to any of these three men as leader. However, they could very well become nodes of authority in *Saraswati*, and challenge Jagdish's monopoly on authority.

Pahari

Pahari is north of *Saraswati*, between a transport depot and the imposing, crimson-colored cliffs of the *Aravali* Mountains. The slum is almost entirely populated by north Indian Muslims. *Pahari*, however, should not be considered homogeneous. A range of *zat*⁷¹—a hybrid caste system that developed in India among Muslims—populate the community. *Zat* continues to determine occupation, marriage, and to some extent, everyday social interaction. The largest social chasm in *Pahari*, though, is a regional one. The northeast corner of the slum is home to migrants hailing from a cluster of villages in Uttar Pradesh. Migrants from Uttar Pradesh make up more than 30 percent of the community. Residents from Uttar Pradesh are mechanics and

⁷¹ Major *zats* in *Pahari* include *sayyed*, *sheikh*, *pathan*, *mirja*, *telli*, *lohar*, *masuri*, *kureshi*, *merchawalla*, and *fakeer*. See Alam (2003) for a discussion of Muslim identity and *zat* in India.

butchers, while residents from Rajasthan are mostly artisans in the precious and semi-precious gemstone cutting industry.

Pahari has historically exhibited strong forms of leadership. When squatters first settled the land in the late 1970s, a range of threats faced the settlement. A battalion of police stationed in the area would frequently harass residents. Fires twice destroyed most of the wood and thatch shanties, and, on several occasions, the city development trust sent police to evict residents. In an environment of persistent threats, a group of men under the leadership of two residents, one Muslim and one Hindu, decided to organize the slum. Funds were collected from residents to pay for the activities of the two leaders—in particular, transportation costs to government offices and fees associated with legal paperwork. These early leaders also engaged in dispute resolution and attempted to curb illegal activities such as gang activity and prostitution. Older residents and current leaders note, however, that great suspicion grew within the community over how these funds were spent. Rumors of embezzlement spread. Consequently, the legitimacy of the council eroded over the few years it was active.

In the early 1980s, an ambitious Congress party leader started to regularly travel to *Pahari* to problem-solve and organize residents. *Pahari* presented a quickly growing and vulnerable community to defend, lead, and extract votes from. Older residents remember that Uttam, the Congress leader, would visit the slum almost on a weekly basis. Under his guidance, a new development council was created in 1980, the *Pahari Kachi Basti Vikas Samiti* (“*Pahari* Slum Development Council”). The stationary of the council was adorned with the spinning wheel, a symbol of Gandhi and the Congress Party. Residents were invited to a clearing behind the slum to elect a president. In lieu of ballots, residents raised their hands as votes, and Khan was elected president.

Through the medium of the council, leaders in *Pahari* were able to improve the conditions of their community. Several hand-pumps were installed, eviction efforts stopped, and electricity was extended to the slum. Uttam involved both Hindus and Muslims, and began collections to build a small Hindu temple and mosque. From 1980 until the late 1990s, the council continued uninterrupted, as evidenced by the journal entries and letters I collected from leaders spanning this period. The president changed at least 4 times during this period because of leadership fatigue, a leader shifting out of the slum, and, in one case, accusations of corruption. Demand letters and council journal entries throughout this time period provide strong evidence that the council was active and engaged in various problem-solving activities for the slum. An early letter, dated 8/17/1980, demonstrates the extent of Uttam's involvement, and the important connections he provided in the Congress:

In *Pahari* slum a common meeting was held in which an idea of getting water taps and electricity was proposed. The meeting was held under the guidance of Uttam and the President. The discussion of the problems of the basti occurred...For the facilities of water and electricity we have been given a time when the Chief Minister will visit the slum and see our situation. This will happen Sunday at 7.

The influence of Uttam continued until his death in 1998. Internal leadership, though, became increasingly confident and independently tied to the Congress party starting in the early 1990s. Unelected leaders emerged outside the committee and joined political parties. Over time, a majority of leaders in *Pahari* have been absorbed by the Congress party and now enjoy prominent positions at the ward and block level. The BJP has also made considerable inroads into the community through sustained organizational efforts and delivered development. Two prominent Muslim leaders in *Pahari* have changed their allegiance from the Congress to the BJP. The greatest gains in development occurred from the mid-1990s onward. Streetlights and piped water connections were extended to the slum and now serve most of the households. Most of the roads have been paved. Drainage channels have been constructed to remove wastewater and the

municipality cleans the streets. Several leaders spearheaded a collection effort among residents to build a community mosque that now towers above houses in the western area of the slum. Despite the illegal origins of their own land-grabbing efforts, leaders defend informal property rights, ensure adequate space for roads, and monitor who comes to the slum.

While several of the older leaders can point to democratic selection, the community did not select the majority of party workers now operating in *Pahari*. Instead, these workers were able to organically build a following based on their effort and ability to ‘get things done’. As one leader put it, “if someone knows how to lead and work in politics, to the public, he will be king” (Author Interview, Jaipur, 6/26/2011). Each of these party workers aspires for party promotion, increased influence in the settlement, and higher access to rents. Accountability and leadership activity levels in *Pahari* are a function of competition among party workers. Leaders know they are in a large and important ‘vote-bank’ slum, and so to continue their access to rents, they need to perform.

Most interviews I conducted with leaders in *Pahari* would include scathing remarks and rumors about other leaders in the settlement—their acts of corruption, greed, and lack of concern for the settlement. These rumors are very much a part of daily gossip among common residents in the settlement. When they reach a boiling point, rumors can mean the end for a leader. For example, one prominent leader in the early 2000s was removed from leadership because rumors spread that he was charging exorbitant rates for ration cards and BPL cards, and becoming wealthy off of his leadership position. While he continues to call himself leader, his base of support atrophied after word of his corruption spread.

Discussion

Leadership in *Saraswati* and *Pahari* has been the contingent product of severe underdevelopment and threats of eviction. Extra-community leadership was active in the early stages of both settlements. In *Pahari*, this leadership was explicitly political under Uttam, while in *Saraswati* it was associated with labor and employment under Bilu. Over time, nascent, internal leadership came to the fore in both settlements to respond to risks and replaced external leadership. These nascent leaders, over time, became focal points of problem solving for residents. Now, when you enter *Saraswati* or *Pahari*, there is a defined set of residents that hold positions of authority.

Accountability is produced through different mechanisms in each settlement. Leadership was democratically chosen in the early stages of *Pahari's* history, but it can no longer be described as such. With almost 5,000 residents, *Pahari* is one of the larger slum settlements in Jaipur. Politicians know that *Pahari* is electorally critical, and so party networks have been cultivated in the settlement to extract votes. In *Pahari*, intense competition among party workers generates a degree of accountability and encourages leadership responsiveness. Leaders are only as strong as their base of support, and that support is maintained and enlarged through pro-social behavior. *Saraswati* is a smaller settlement. Jagdish has only been offered a minor position by the BJP. In *Saraswati*, accountability has been produced through democratic selection and an informal social contract between residents and Jagdish. A plurality of residents has thrown their support behind Jagdish, and demand that he work toward the improvement of the community. In *Saraswati*, leadership is, at the moment, very much singular. However, the three residents aspiring for positions of leadership may come to challenge Jagdish, and perhaps generate a degree of accountability through that competition.

Leaders were sanctioned for inactivity or transgressions in both settlements. Rumors spread word of inactivity, corruption, and embezzlement. Individuals lost their authority as residents defected to other leaders that were deemed to be more honest and diligent. Residents also directly confronted leaders in *Saraswati* and *Pahari* over corruption or inactivity. As the two case studies illustrate, the sources of accountability in India's urban slums are multiple and diverse. The econometric analyses below demonstrate that these different sources of accountability do much to encourage leaders to provide public goods and services for residents.

4.5. Variables, Econometric Analysis, and Results

Five explanatory variables have been identified in the discussion above. The first explanatory variable is democratic leader selection. I measure this variable as the percentage of respondents in each settlement that stated their leaders were democratically selected. It is not possible to definitively know the nature of leadership selection across all 80 sampled slums without ethnographic research. Further, as the ethnography demonstrated, there is ambiguity about leadership selection. In *Saraswati*, for instance, Jagdish's rise to power through informal elections in 2008 is indisputable. Still, some respondents are unaware, do not acknowledge Jagdish's authority, or moved to the settlement after the election. There are often multiple leaders in settlements, some of which may have been elected while others were not. The percentage of respondents that confirmed democratic leadership selection is therefore an appropriate measure. This provides a global measure of democratic leadership selection for each settlement.

The ability to sanction and remove leaders is a second explanatory variable. As with democratic selection, opinions on the ability to sanction and remove leaders vary within settlements. I measure the ability to sanction, then, as the percentage of respondents in each settlement that believe their leaders can be removed from power if they are found to be inactive

or transgressive. This is a very overt form of sanctioning. It does not capture sanctioning mechanisms like rumors and defections to other leaders. Those more subtle mechanisms are better left to ethnographic observation.

Social capital works through several mechanisms to improve accountability and leadership responsiveness—shared norms, communicative channels, and social cohesion. It is the third explanatory variable of interest. Eight separate questions form the social capital index. Using factor analysis, I calculated a single underlying component, and the weights corresponding with that component were then used to form the index. Party network density is the fourth variable. The measure of party network density is consistent with that presented in Chapter Two.

Those communities that endogenously form development councils have another potential layer of organization that contributes to accountability and leadership responsiveness. I collected development council letterhead stationary from those settlements in which leaders claimed the existence of a council. Letterhead stationary is unambiguous evidence of a council. The pages typically provide information on members and party affiliations. Settlements that have a development council are given a score of one, and those without councils a zero.

The primary dependent variable in this chapter is the activity levels of leaders across slums. The activities under examination, and measurement of this variable, are described in *Section 4.3*. With the major variables described, I now turn to the econometric analysis, and estimate the following equation:

$$\omega(S_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 DEM_SELECT_i + \beta_2 REMOVE_i + \beta_3 SOC_CAPITAL_i + \beta_4 PN_DENSITY_i + \beta_5 DEV_COUNCIL_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where the ω is the leadership activity level in slum S_i , DEM_SELECT is the percentage of respondents in slum S_i that reported their leaders were democratically selected, $REMOVE$ is the

percentage of respondents in slum S_i that stated residents can remove poor-performing leaders, $SOC_CAPITAL$ is the level of social capital in slum S_i , $PN_DENSITY$ is the party network density in slum S_i , and $DEV_COUNCIL$ is a dummy variable for whether or not a slum has a development council. X_i is a vector of control variables, including the age and population of the settlement, the average income and education level of residents, the land ownership category, social fragmentation scores (caste, religion, and state), electoral competition at the ward and state level, and a dummy variable for Jaipur or Bhopal (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1). Bivariate correlations among the major explanatory variables are presented in *Table 4.4*. Democratic selection, removal, and social capital are all positively correlated with each other, though the correlations are weak. This reduces concerns of multicollinearity and, more critically, the possibility that these variables reflect a single underlying attitudinal component.

Regression results are presented in *Table 4.5*. The coefficients on both democratic selection and leader removal are positive and statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of survey respondents reporting informal democratic selection is associated with a 0.76 increase in the leadership activity score—almost an additional performed activity, and explaining more than a third of one standard deviation in the dependent variable. This finding is robust to the inclusion of a range of control variables. With regard leadership removal, a one standard deviation in the percentage of respondents stating that residents can remove their leaders is associated with a 0.48 increase in the leadership activity score. As with democratic selection, the significance and magnitude of the coefficient is robust to the three model specifications. These findings provide evidence of a positive and substantively significant association between democratic leadership selection and the responsiveness of leaders.

Levels of community social capital are positive and statistically significant in relation to the activity levels of slum leaders. A one standard deviation increase in the level of community social capital is associated with an increase of 0.28 in the leadership activity score. The relationship loses some significance as more control variables are included in the model, though the p-values remain below 0.10 in all of the specifications.

Consistent with the argument outlined in Chapter Two, levels of party network density are statistically significant and positively associated with leadership activity levels. An additional party worker per 1,000 residents is associated with 0.18 increase in the leadership activity score. Moving from the minimum observed value of party network density (zero) to the maximum observed value (approximately six party workers per 1,000 residents) is associated with almost a 1.20 increase in leadership activity levels. These are substantively important findings that support the argument that leadership fragmentation in India's slums encourages pro-social behavior through the mechanisms of competition and informal accountability.

The dichotomous variable for development councils in each of the three models is just shy of conventional significance levels. However, given the relatively small number of observations, the association should not be dismissed. The presence of a development council is associated with a 0.41 increase in the leadership activity score, explaining almost a quarter of one standard deviation in the dependent variable.

As the coefficient and significance level on the city dummy variable suggests, leaders are less active in Bhopal than Jaipur. The degree of social heterogeneity along the lines of caste, religion, and region of origin are uniformly insignificant. The influences of electoral competition at the ward and state levels, as well as the land categories, are also statistically insignificant. The

findings from the econometric analysis demonstrate that the factors associated with high leadership activity levels are located within settlements.

I now examine two alternative measures of leadership quality—the ability to lead and mobilize residents (*FOLLOW_LEADER*) and the ability to raise funds from group members (*CONTRIBUTE*)—as dependent variables. Again, a simple OLS model is employed, taking the same form as above:

$$\lambda(S_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 DEM_SELECT_i + \beta_2 REMOVE_i + \beta_3 SOC_CAPITAL_i + \beta_4 PN_DENSITY_i + \beta_5 DEV_COUNCIL_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where the λ is the measure for either *FOLLOW_LEADER* or *CONTRIBUTE*, in slum S_i , and all other right-hand-side variables are consistent with the previous regressions. Results are presented in *Table 4.6*.

I first consider the determinants of mobilization. The coefficients on democratic selection are positive and statistically significant across the three specifications. A one standard deviation increase in democratic leadership selection is associated with a ten-point increase in the percentage of residents who stated they would follow if their leader tried to organize the settlement for development. Party network density, moreover, is positively associated with those confirming they would follow leaders in an effort to improve the settlement. An additional party worker per 1,000 residents is associated with a 2.62 increase in the percentage of residents willing to follow leaders. The variable for leadership removal is positively associated with the willingness to follow leaders, though it fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Leaders in Bhopal, again, seem to underperform their counterparts in Jaipur.

I now turn to the determinants of monetary contributions. While democratic leadership selection is positive in sign, it does not exhibit statistical significance. Leadership removal,

however, is both substantively and statistically significant. A one standard deviation in the percentage of respondents reporting the ability to remove leaders is associated with a 13 percent increase in the percentage of respondents confirming they would contribute to a development fund organized by a leader. This supports the claim that when leaders can be sanctioned and removed from power, they are more likely to be trusted by group members in matters of money.

Social capital is positively associated with contributions. A one standard deviation increase in levels of community social capital is associated with a 7 percent increase in the willingness to contribute. Again, party network density is positively associated with contributions. An additional party worker per 1,000 residents is associated with an almost 5% increase in respondents stating that they would contribute.

The econometric results provide evidence that leaders are more active, trusted, and able to mobilize residents in those settlements in which leaders are democratically chosen and face sanctions if they underperform. High levels of social capital and party network density compliment democratic selection in encouraging active and responsive leadership. The survey data are observational in nature, and so endogeneity concerns cannot be dismissed. Leadership and organization in India's slums, however, is informal and endogenous by definition. Poor squatters construct norms and authority after the dust of migration has settled. If experimental data were to be gathered through manipulation of leadership selection rules, they would most likely lack the necessary duration of treatment, intra-community legitimacy, and external validity to be inferentially useful.

4.6. Conclusion

Chapter Two demonstrated that slums with weak or absent party networks are marginalized in the distribution of infrastructural development and public services—paved roads, underground

sewers, piped water, government doctor camps, streetlights, and municipal trash collection. These goods and services are provided by the state, and their distribution is guided by an electoral logic that prioritizes the development of some slums over others. Still, there are public goods and services that can be internally provided by residents and their leaders. The purpose of this chapter was to peer deeper into the internal dynamics of slum settlements, and examine the informal institutional conditions under which responsive community leadership emerges.

Leaders that rise through democratic selection are more active than their counterparts in slums without these forms of leadership selection. Further, when residents can sanction leaders in the event of inactivity or transgressions, those leaders are more likely to be responsive to the needs of their settlements. Political accountability in India's urban slums is informal, in that it does not arise through periodic, codified elections. Instead, residents can keep their leaders in check through rumors, defection to other leaders, and forming a cohesive front to punish or remove them. Active leaders provide a range of services and public goods: helping residents secure government documents and services, organizing community meetings to discuss common problems, resolving disputes and sanctioning anti-social residents, spreading information about programs for the urban poor, bargaining with politicians for development, and organizing community social events.

This chapter provides a test of the competition mechanism first discussed in Chapter Two. It was argued that slums with more dense party networks produce an environment of informal accountability through competition among party workers. In settlements with density party networks, workers compete with each other for a larger following, promotions, and access to rents. Pro-social behavior and responsiveness are rewarded with these desired ends. Conversely, those leaders that are inactive or transgressive face an erosion of support, the loss of

followers to other leaders, and possibly removal from the party. I empirically find that the density of party networks is positively associated with leadership activity levels, the ability of leader's to mobilize residents, and collect fund from residents. The econometric analysis, then, presents strong evidence that leaders are indeed more responsive in settlements with dense, competitive party networks. This finding contributes to a budding research agenda on the sources of informal accountability in non-democratic spaces (Tsai 2007).

I find that other factors can compliment democratic selection in bringing about accountability and responsiveness. First, high levels of social capital among residents are positively associated with active leadership. Inter-household trust and cooperation improve the capacity of residents to monitor leaders and come together as a credible sanctioning force. Moreover, those settlements that voluntarily create development councils have an additional layer of organization and monitoring that encourages a higher intensity of leadership activities.

Studies of local governance and accountability overwhelmingly focus on formal elections. Less studied, however, are those groups in which authority is informal and rules of selection and sanctioning are the creation of group members themselves. This chapter contributes to the literatures on political selection and community governance by systematically examining endogenous leadership selection and responsiveness in a novel social context. Further, the chapter contributes to studies of local democratization—and Indian democracy in particular—by uncovering the prevalence of democratic activity in informal urban communities. Contrary to common notions that slums are uniformly anarchic spaces ruled by strongmen and gangs, I find that many settlements have internally produced democratic mechanisms of selecting and sanctioning leaders. Norms of democracy travel with poor migrants into the slums of cities, offering a legitimate template for informal governance among residents in many settlements. An

important path for future research is to understand why some slum settlements endogenously develop democratic means of leadership selection and sanctioning while others do not.

This chapter also contributes to scholarship on local intermediaries, middlemen, and political brokers in developing countries.⁷² Scholars have noted the importance of face-to-face transactions between intermediaries and citizens, the embeddedness of intermediaries in communities, and the multi-faceted nature of relations between brokers and their clients—based on friendship, kinship, co-ethnicity, or entrepreneurial ties—that determine the ways that clients are able to make claims on both intermediaries and the state. Whether through ethnography or survey research, however, scholars tend to homogenize intermediaries, and cast them as interchangeable actors that exist independently from the social environment in which they are embedded. It is implicitly assumed that these actors offer the same set of services for their clients, with a uniform degree of responsiveness and efficacy. I move beyond homogenizing characterizations of India's slum leaders as political intermediaries and instead highlight both variation in the responsiveness of these actors and the extent to which clients can hold leaders accountable for their performance. This chapter contributes to our understanding of political intermediaries by examining the conditions under which group members are able to compel their intermediaries to advance the individual and collective interests of the group.

⁷² For examples, see Oldenberg 1976; 1987, Haragopal and Reddy 1985; Mitra 1992; Manor 2000; Auyero 2001; Krishna 2002; 2007; 2011; Stokes et al. *forthcoming*.

Table 4.1: The Twelve Leadership Activities Examined in the Household Survey

| Activity | Which of the following activities do your slum leaders engage in... |
|-----------------|--|
| Activity One | Help people in the slum get voter ID cards, ration cards, and BPL (Below Poverty Line) cards |
| Activity Two | Collect money from residents to fix something or make something new in the settlement |
| Activity Three | Organize meetings to discuss development and other community problems |
| Activity Four | Stop people in the slum from engaging in anti-social behavior (fighting, drinking, stealing) |
| Activity Five | Help resolve fights among people in the slum |
| Activity Six | Help people deal with police and legal cases |
| Activity Seven | Meet with political leaders and officers for the development of the slum |
| Activity Eight | Organize religious programs |
| Activity Nine | Help individual people in the slum meet politicians and officers to get help with their problems |
| Activity Ten | Spread information about government schemes and services for the urban poor |
| Activity Eleven | Tell newspaper or TV people about the problems of the slum |
| Activity Twelve | During elections and ask candidates to develop and improve the slum |

Table 4.2: Performed Leadership Activities in India's Slums (Slum-Level Averages, in Percentage)

| Activity | Average (%) | SD (%) | Min (%) | Max (%) |
|------------------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| Activity One | 50.36 | 24.47 | 0 (4) | 100 (3) |
| Activity Two | 29.70 | 19.33 | 0 (8) | 80 (2) |
| Activity Three | 35.33 | 21.49 | 0 (9) | 90 (1) |
| Activity Four | 43.67 | 24.38 | 0 (6) | 96.43 (1) |
| Activity Five | 47.70 | 25.69 | 0 (7) | 100 (1) |
| Activity Six | 46.64 | 26.17 | 0 (6) | 100 (2) |
| Activity Seven | 48.85 | 20.35 | 0 (4) | 100 (1) |
| Activity Eight | 46.04 | 22.62 | 0 (4) | 100 (1) |
| Activity Nine | 42.74 | 18.83 | 0 (5) | 80 (1) |
| Activity Ten | 23.89 | 15.23 | 0 (10) | 68.75 (1) |
| Activity Eleven | 14.81 | 13.27 | 0 (17) | 50 (3) |
| Activity Twelve | 58.96 | 22.79 | 0 (4) | 1 (2) |

Table 4.3: The Average Scope of Leadership Activities

| Statistic | Average | SD | Min | Max |
|------------------|----------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Score | 4.89 | 2.13 | 0 (n = 4) | 9 |

Table 4.4: Bivariate Correlations

| Variable/ Variable | Democratic Selection | Leader Removal | Social Capital |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Democratic Selection | 1.00 | | |
| Leader Removal | 0.63 | 1.00 | |
| Social Capital | 0.25 | 0.28 | 1.00 |

Table 4.5: Explaining Variation in Leadership Activity Levels

| Dependent Variable | Leadership Activity Score | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Model 1 (OLS) | Model 2 (OLS) | Model 3 (OLS) |
| Intercept | 3.31 * (1.74) | 4.11 ** (1.66) | 3.78 * (1.97) |
| Democratic Selection | 0.04 *** (0.01) | 0.036 *** (0.01) | 0.04 *** (0.01) |
| Leader Removal | 0.03 *** (0.01) | 0.033 *** (0.009) | 0.03 *** (0.01) |
| Development Council | 0.41 (0.27) | 0.42 (0.28) | 0.44 (0.30) |
| Social Capital | 0.16 ** (0.08) | 0.14 * (0.08) | 0.15 * (0.09) |
| PN Density | | 0.18 * (0.09) | 0.18 * (0.096) |
| Log population | 0.19 (0.17) | 0.05 (0.17) | -0.008 (0.21) |
| Age of Slum | 0.009 (0.01) | 0.006 (0.01) | 0.002 (0.016) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -1.68 *** (0.39) | -1.79 *** (0.40) | -1.62 *** (0.52) |
| Central Land | | | 0.27 (0.32) |
| Private Land | | | 0.57 (0.56) |
| Caste Diversity | | | -0.008 (1.14) |
| Religious Diversity | | | 1.28 (0.93) |
| State Diversity | | | -0.24 (0.89) |
| HH Income Per Capita | -0.71 (0.59) | -0.61 (0.57) | -0.37 (0.66) |
| Education | -0.49 (0.29) | -0.51 * (0.29) | -0.48 (0.66) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | | | 0.01 (0.02) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | | | -0.01 (0.01) |
| R ² | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.77 |

Notes: Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 4.6: Explaining Mobilization Capacity and Trust in Leaders

| Dependent Variable: | % Follow Leaders | % Contribute to Leader Collections |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Models | Model 4 (OLS) | Model 5 (OLS) |
| Intercept | 57.49 ** (25.57) | 195.97 *** (35.33) |
| Democratic Selection | 0.52 *** (0.13) | 0.14 (0.20) |
| Leader Removal | 0.24 (0.15) | 0.84 *** (0.29) |
| Development Council | 1.45 (4.13) | 2.25 (6.49) |
| Social Capital | 0.21 (1.21) | 3.93 * (2.34) |
| PN Density | 2.62 ** (1.26) | 4.87 ** (2.19) |
| Log population | -0.76 (2.66) | -4.97 (4.59) |
| Age of Slum | -0.10 (0.21) | -0.34 (0.32) |
| City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1) | -23.26 *** (6.99) | -66.64 *** (8.80) |
| Central Land | 0.98 (4.54) | -4.53 (8.35) |
| Private Land | 1.45 (5.20) | -14.87 (9.54) |
| Caste Diversity | 2.24 (16.17) | 2.74 (27.09) |
| Religious Diversity | 12.93 (10.87) | 0.89 (18.70) |
| State Diversity | 5.63 (11.70) | 7.77 (20.75) |
| HH Income Per Capita | -10.55 (7.48) | -28.20 ** (11.80) |
| Education | 0.85 (4.16) | -1.39 (6.62) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | 0.07 (0.32) | -0.49 (0.58) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | -0.18 (0.18) | -0.11 (0.30) |
| R ² | 0.69 | 0.76 |

Notes: Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Chapter Five: Security in Insecure Places: The Sources of Public Order in India's Urban Slums

5.1: Introduction

It was the third full night of fighting that finally drove residents in *Ram Nagar* to intervene in the domestic dispute. The conflict between the husband and wife was quickly involving adjacent households, threatening to envelop the larger community in the fight and force police action. Varun, a leader in *Ram Nagar*, called residents and the feuding couple to a makeshift temple in the back of the slum. Both sides aired their grievances with heightened emotion. The woman charged her husband with abuse and excessive alcoholism. The husband accused his wife of neglecting her household duties. Varun and a council of residents heard both sides, deliberated, and decided the punishment. The husband was forced to immediately end his abuse or be banished from the *samaj*, or social group. He also had to pay Varun and each of the council members a fine for a day of lost wages. The abuse thereafter stopped. Twenty months of fieldwork revealed a diversity of ways that slum dwellers deal with internal conflicts and crime. Most fights and disputes never make it to leaders like Varun. Instead, neighbors manage conflicts among themselves. In the dense and vulnerable living conditions of urban slums, everyone has a personal stake in the maintenance of public order.

Urban slums are commonly portrayed as anarchic spaces, rife with violence, roving gangs, and slumlords that rely on brute coercion and intimidation to stay in power. Criminality is often assumed, even in academic research (Schenk 2001: 20). Indeed, the very definition of slums used by the Government of India suggests a lack of “morality”.⁷³ Weak formal institutions,

⁷³ The *Slum Area Improvement and Clearance Act* (1956) defines slums as “those residential areas where dwellings are in any respect unfit for human habitation by reasons of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and designs of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangements of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities or any combination of these factors which are detrimental to safety, health and *morals*” (GOI 2011, *emphasis added*).

poverty, and illiteracy certainty leave urban slums vulnerable to conflict and crime. However, the characterization of urban slums as uniformly ungoverned spaces misses the sustained, informal efforts of many slum dwellers to provide themselves a degree of public order and security.

My fieldwork and survey research revealed significant variation in levels of public order and security. Some settlements are peaceful and safe places for residents. Neighbors resolve disputes, shame those who instigate fights and steal, and resist gang activities. Leaders compliment these efforts by using their authority to keep the peace and sanction those that disturb it. In other slums, conflict is a part of daily life. Leaders take little interest in keeping the peace. Some even contribute to its demise. A small argument between two neighbors can spiral into a confrontation between larger groups that end only with police intervention. *Why, then, are some communities able to produce order and security while others languish in conflict?*

With a billion people now living in informal urban settlements worldwide, understanding how the urban poor provide themselves security is an important research agenda. These are spaces that often lie outside the reach of the state. To many residents, calling on the police is a desperate final resort that brings with it disproportionate force and unwanted attention. Public order in slums mostly falls on the shoulders of residents and their leaders. Beyond urban slums, a study of localized order and conflict extends to contexts as diverse as Afghanistan, Colombia, and Sudan, where the reach of the state is weak, absent, or even predatory, and security is left to the organizational capacity and vigilance of the local population. This chapter contributes to a large and interdisciplinary literature on order, conflict, and violence.⁷⁴

Vertical party organization has been a central explanatory variable in much of this dissertation. This chapter instead argues that order is produced and maintained through social capital and vigilant leadership. The keys to peace are those decentralized mechanisms of conflict

⁷⁴ See Kalyvas et al. (2008).

mitigation that can be spontaneously deployed by residents to stop conflicts *before* they become serious enough to require outside authority. Vigilant community leaders can provide important means of dispute resolution, and be particularly effective in resisting gang activity and punishing anti-social residents. I also find evidence that the possession of land titles is critical for the prevention of theft. As the econometric analyses demonstrate, social capital and vigilant leadership outperform alternative explanations of public order—poverty, the intensity of electoral competition, ethnic diversity, and the percentage of residents from outside the home region, which can fuel nativist violence in urban India.

Section 5.2 provides a brief review of competing theories of decentralized order, conflict, and violence. *Section 5.3* then describes the sources of everyday conflict, crime, and violence in India's slums by drawing on my ethnographic fieldwork and survey data. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggest that levels of peace and order are highly uneven across settlements. I then present the central argument of the chapter in *Section 5.4*. Subsequently, I discuss the variables and econometric models in *Section 5.6*, discuss the results in *Section 5.7*, and conclude with the contributions of the chapter.

5.2: Theories of Decentralized Order and Conflict

Most conflict in India's slums is not the intense, deadly, and episodic kind that typically comes under examination in comparative research—riots, pogroms, insurgencies, civil wars, and electoral violence. Instead, most conflict is inter-personal and particularistic to the settlement. These events rarely make their way into the media unless they become sufficiently large and violent. They can only be observed from the inside, and therefore demand sustained observation. I encountered a range of conflicts and disputes during my ethnographic fieldwork. Sporadic fistfights erupted between residents. Neighbors argued over the borders of their land, which

family took more than their allotted share of water, and who was responsible for the mounting trash. Unpaid debts among residents became prolonged disputes. Domestic violence and alcoholism were pervasive in many settlements. Scholarship on conflict and violence highlights several variables that might explain levels of public order across slums. This section outlines those variables. I test each of these explanations in the econometric analyses below.

The first variable concerns the nature and intensity of electoral competition. In electorally competitive places, politicians may seek to foment ethnic tensions and violence as a vote-seeking strategy. Heightened communal rhetoric can deepen ethnic cleavages and place voters in a vulnerable position in which their co-ethnic candidates promise to protect them. Both Jaipur and Bhopal have experienced bloody riots between Hindus and Muslims as a result of such electoral politics.⁷⁵ In *Votes and Violence*, Wilkinson (2004) argues that cities in India are particularly vulnerable to Hindu-Muslim violence when elections are tight and candidates do not require the support of the minority group. Riots and communal tensions can deepen ethnic divisions and thus consolidate groups that might otherwise be internally divided along other social identity cleavages. Elected representatives in India have a great deal of influence over policing in their constituencies. In such a capacity, they can choose to control, allow for, or even encourage ethnic violence based on electoral calculations. Under the same logic, slums in constituencies that are highly competitive may be at risk of party-generated ethnic conflict.

A second variable is the level of ethnicity heterogeneity in a community. Ethnic diversity has been shown to undermine collective action and cooperation,⁷⁶ and differences in traditions, beliefs, and social norms might make diverse groups prone to conflict (Suttles 1968; Tajfel 1982; Horowitz 1985; Huntington 2002). India possesses a range of social identity cleavages along

⁷⁵ For a thorough discussion of the Hindu-Muslim riots in Jaipur and Bhopal during the early 1990s, see, respectively, Basu (1994) and Mayaram (1993).

⁷⁶ See Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Easterly and Levine 1997; and Krishna 2002.

which conflict has unfolded in the post-Independence period.⁷⁷

Urban slums are a microcosm of India's social diversity. A scarcity of urban land and clustering of employment opportunities prevent migrants from sorting themselves into homogenous settlements. Instead, poor migrants are often forced to share limited spaces with other ethnic, religious, and regional groups—groups they may have never interacted with in their village or city of origin. The social cleavages that emerge through the migration process—tribal, caste, linguistic, regional, or religious—might impact public order in a way that is independent of outside political influence. Diversity itself may cause conflict.

A third variable is the relationship between residents from the home region and migrants from other regions. A sizable 18.8 percent of survey respondents in this study were from outside the host state. Migrants from outside the host state are sometimes cast as a threat to employment and the integrity of culture and language. In an exhaustive study of civil wars across the globe, Fearon and Laitin estimate that roughly one-third of ethnic civil wars have a nativist, “sons of the soil” dynamic (Fearon and Laitin 2010). While violent “nativism” can be seen as a subset of the ethnic fractionalization hypothesis, it has a distinct line of research in India and demands independent elaboration (Katzenstein 1973; Weiner 1978). In the post-Independence period, several regions of India have experienced violent “sons of the soil” movements to marginalize and intimidate migrants from outside the region. In Maharashtra, Assam, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu, nativist parties have emerged. Urban slums, where poor migrants settle to make a better life in the city, may become flashpoints in these conflicts.

Neither Rajasthan nor Madhya Pradesh has nativist parties. However my fieldwork

⁷⁷ This includes religion (Basu 1997; Brass 1993; Jaffrelot 2003; Pandey 2006; Varshney 2004; Wilkinson 2004), caste (Brass 1983; Bayly 1999; Chandra 2004; Heller 1999; Kothari 1970; Mendelsohn and Viczainy 1998; Rudolph 1965), and language and region (Barnett 1976; Katzenstein 1973; Katzenstein et al. 1997; Weiner 1978; Ziegfeld 2012).

brought to the fore several forms of discrimination toward migrants. A large and impoverished population of Bengali migrants in Jaipur is commonly described as thieves, rapists, and Bangladeshi migrants in disguise. Similarly, poor migrants from Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar are seen as inherently untrustworthy and criminal-minded. For those migrants that hail from Nepal and Bangladesh, life is particularly insecure. During several interviews, prominent politicians would make wild assertions that Bangladeshi migrants are overrunning the city, and call for door-to-door investigations and expulsions. In Bhopal, a sizable contingent of slum dwellers is from the southern states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. Many Bhopali natives view these “*Madrasi*” people as a threat to their jobs. Tensions may rise between migrants from the home state and those from outside. This can happen within a slum, or be encouraged by nativist politicians seeking to consolidate their base of support.

A fourth variable is the material resources of a community—the income and assets of the population. In addition to the social makeup of a neighborhood, poverty itself can be a powerful ecological predictor of violence and crime (Shaw and McKay 1942; Duncan et al. 2003; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). India’s slums exhibit considerable variability in the income and assets of residents, as well as the quality of housing. Economically vulnerable communities may experience more conflict and crime than their economically secure counterparts.

A fifth variable is the strength of property rights. Without secure land tenure, the threat of eviction is an ever-present concern for residents. Weak or undefined property rights leave the boundaries between plots ambiguous, creating the potential for land disputes. Further, residents may feel less ownership over the community and its problems when they lack formal property rights, and have fewer incentives to develop enduring mechanisms of dispute resolution (Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson 1988; Taylor 1997). Olson (1993) asserts that leaders are more

likely to provide security, order, and public goods when leaders and populations are more “stationary”, as doing so facilitates economic activity and therefore increases the pool of resources that can be taxed. There is a parallel in slums. Settlements that face eviction and heightened uncertainty over their tenure might be less likely to produce leaders that see it in their interest to provide public order and security for their own long-term rent extraction.

A sixth variable is the level of social capital in a community. Varshney (2001; 2003) argues that social capital—the stock of trust, cooperative behavior, reciprocity, and associational ties in a defined social space—is a powerful determinant of local conflict or peace. He finds that dense, cooperative networks between Hindus and Muslims can serve to ameliorate potential conflict by playing down rumors and dissuading those who might instigate problems. Levels of trust and associational ties, moreover, are not the product of short-term, ephemeral engagement. Instead, these ties were historically constructed in the pre-Independence period, and forged among groups that shared a common adversary. Similarly, Krishna (2002) finds that social capital is an important determinant of peace in north India’s villages. In each of these studies, decentralized social norms, trust, and shared behavioral expectations do much of the work in upholding peace and security.⁷⁸

Social capital exists *laterally* among individuals. Hierarchy, then, is a distinct factor and seventh variable involved in the production of order. In highly decentralized and informal environments like urban slums, hierarchy can emerge to provide public order and security. Murtazashvili (2009) finds that informal hierarchy among squatter communities (“claim clubs”) during America’s westward expansion was central to dispute resolution and the local

⁷⁸ A body of scholarship in institutional economics that argues that shared norms and inter-personal trust can reduce transaction costs and conflict, as well as generate trust and facilitate exchange (Leeson 2006; Grief 1989; 1994; 2006; Milgrom et al. 1990). Ellickson (1994), drawing on fieldwork from farms and ranches in the southern US, finds that informal norms among farmers do much to maintain public order.

enforcement of property norms. Laitin and Fearon (1996) highlight the role of leaders in policing their own ethnic groups and communicating with other groups to maintain order. Athey and Jha (2006) demonstrate the positive influence of hierarchy in communities as a way to encourage trust. Krishna (2002) finds that hierarchy and authority play important roles in upholding communal harmony in rural India. As discussed in the previous chapter, informal community leaders in many of India's slums provide a range of services for residents. Strong, active leadership might play a critical role in enforcing public order, arbitrating disputes, and punishing those that deviate from behavioral expectations.

5.3: Living in Disorder: A Descriptive Account

Disorder can manifest itself in many ways. The current section outlines those forms of disorder that are prevalent in India's urban slums by drawing on ethnographic observations and household survey data. The section also demonstrates that order and safety vary widely across slums.

In many settlements, insecurity and conflict flow from a lack of formal property rights. Most survey respondents (1,782 of 1,925) claim ownership over their housing structure and personal possessions within the household. Only 224 of those respondents, however, have a permanent land title issued by the government. The majority of respondents are either illegally squatting on the land (63.3 percent) or have temporary land titles (25.1 percent), which only afford some legal protection for a fixed-number of years. Renters, who make up 7.3 percent of the total sample, are a particularly vulnerable population. Landlords and land mafias can evict renters without warning or legal recourse.

Eviction is an ever-looming possibility for slum dwellers. Of the 1,560 respondents that claim ownership over their household but do not possess a permanent, government-issued land title, 668 respondents believe they "will" be evicted in the future, while another 487 respondents

believe they “might” be evicted in the future. Considering past attempts at eviction, 435 respondents (22.6 percent of the total sample) claim that the government has damaged or demolished structures in their settlement at some point in the past.

To illustrate: In the winter of 2011, a group of Forest Department officials ventured into the northeast corner of *Saraswati* slum to inspect rumors of encroachment. In the darkness of night, a group of squatters had erected several shanties with bricks, cement, and tin roofs. Shanties are often built in a single night to prevent authorities from observing construction. The Forest Department officials had been monitoring the area, though, and knew the structures were recent. Warnings were first issued to the squatters to clear the area. Discovered, the squatters confidently expressed to me that bribes and pleading would save their shanties. When I entered the settlement the following week, however, the houses had been completely destroyed. The Forest Department officials demolished the structures and took away the bricks to prevent the squatters from rebuilding. Defeated, shocked, and desperate, the group of squatters sat where their shanties had stood and discussed their next steps to find shelter in the city.

A lack of formal property rights leave residents vulnerable to conflicts over plot boundaries and the buying and selling of land. Moreover, without land titles and clear transfer rules, the unregulated market for the buying and selling of property in slums is riddled with disputes. Slum leaders are often central players in these markets, and collect rents from facilitating transactions between residents hoping to sell their shanty and new migrant hoping to buy a plot in the settlement. Without clear property rights, such transactions are vulnerable to predation and conflict.

Aggressive forms of land grabbing by local strongmen also confront many slum dwellers. Take Sen, a land grabber and resident of *Saraswati* slum. During my fieldwork, Sen and his

family were busy claiming land on a hillside in the settlement. Demand for space in the area was growing, making even a rocky hillside sought-after property. Their method of claiming land was simple. Sen simply placed rocks over the desired plots of land and constructed a makeshift temple. Building a place of worship is a common tactic for securing land, as it deters others from demolishing the structure. Intimidation, however, was Sen's preferred weapon. Anyone challenging him faced threats and verbal abuse.

Population density is extremely high in slums, and the quality of housing is often poor. A vast majority of survey respondents (69 percent) live in houses that do not have permanent roofs and durable siding. Even for those residents that do have permanent roofs, construction is often shoddy and dangerous. Coupled with illegal tenure, the dilapidated quality of housing makes theft a concern for residents. Even in the most impoverished settlements, it is common to find assets that are vulnerable to theft. For instance, 85 percent of survey respondents have TVs, 88 percent have cell phones, 70 percent have gas stoves, 64 percent have electric coolers, and 33 percent have scooters or motorcycles. Ten percent of respondents claimed that something from their household was stolen within the last two years. Members of a family—often, adult women—are forced to stay home at all times to guard possessions. This dramatically undermines the economic productivity of the household.

Local *gundagiri*, or gang activities, is an everyday threat for many residents. Four hundred and eighty one respondents (25 percent) stated that gangs are active in their settlement. Most gangs in Jaipur and Bhopal are fragmented and rarely extend their influence beyond one or a few adjacent slums. Larger and more organized *bhoom mafias* (land mafias) do operate throughout the city, though I would rarely hear of their day-to-day influence during my fieldwork. The efforts of land mafias are concentrated on capturing and selling property in the

peripheral areas of the city. The more common stories of *gundagiri*, or thug activities, would concern gangs that operate in smaller sections of the city. The following letter to the Jaipur police exemplifies localized gang activity:

A group of 8-10 street boys from outside our slum come here and drink alcohol near the water tank where women fetch water. They drink there and speak very abusive language to the women. Our slum boys tried to control them but the [street boys] started beating them...Consequently, we are facing a lot of problems. We request you to investigate the matter and catch those boys as soon as possible. (translated letter from *Saraswati* residents to police, *undated*).

Gang violence in *Lal Nagar* in Bhopal is further illustrative. As I approached *Lal* one afternoon, a funeral procession was slowly forming outside the settlement. From afar, it appeared like any other Hindu funeral procession in India, in which the deceased is cloaked in a white cloth and carried to the funeral pyre for cremation. At closer inspection, however, the crowd was demanding justice. The night before, a major gang leader in the area had mysteriously been stabbed to death. As it happened, this was the same gang leader that had made his way into several of my interviews. The gang had been roaming in *Lal Nagar* at night to steal and threaten residents. Arjun, the oldest and most respected leader in *Lal*, told me that the gang leader had once approached him with a knife. Extending his chest, Arjun proudly told me that the gang leader's cavalier demeanor immediately broke after Arjun stood up to him.

Small arguments can erupt into physical violence between individuals and groups. A common scene during the morning hours in *Krusher* slum, for instance, were women pushing and shoving each other to make sure they received adequate water for the day. Often, this jostling would turn even more hostile and erupt into a larger argument and physical confrontation. This threatens to involve families, and then larger groups in the settlement that come to the defense of their kin or co-ethnics. In several of my case study settlements, physical aggression among residents was a weekly occurrence. In others, I never once saw a fight among residents. To obtain a more systematic understanding of the frequency of fights, survey

respondents were asked how many fights they had seen among residents within the last month. The average number of reported fights across the entire sample of survey respondents is about two fights per month. Well over half of the respondents (66 percent), however, claimed that they had *not* witnessed any fights at all during the previous month.

The police are prominent actors in the drama of conflict and crime in India's slums. In cases where residents cannot stop violence or disputes themselves, the police are called upon to control the situation. The police, however, are often directly involved in the production of disorder in slums, and materially benefit from crime and illicit activities. During my fieldwork, I was told stories of extortion, bribery, and the shielding of illegal activities on the part of the police.

Spatial Variation in Order and Security across Communities

Given the pervasive threats and insecurities surrounding slums, to what extent are residents able to experience some degree of order and peace? Survey respondents were asked the following question: "In some slums, residents live together in peace. In other slums, neighbors fight and argue with each other. Is this slum generally very peaceful, a little peaceful (sometimes there are fights and arguments), or not peaceful at all (there are often fights and arguments)?" Forty-six percent of respondents (888 respondents) claimed that their settlement is "very peaceful". Another 44 percent (842 respondents) stated that their settlement was a "little peaceful", while the remaining ten percent (191 respondents) said that their settlement was "not peaceful at all." Respondents were additionally asked to assess how levels of peace have changed over time. They were asked, "In the last five years, has the slum become more peaceful, less peaceful, or stayed the same?" 39 percent, or 754 respondents stated that their community has become *less* peaceful over the last five years. 26 percent (510 respondents) noted that the level of peace has

remained the same, and the remaining 34 percent said that community peace has increased.

Respondents were additionally asked how safe they feel living in the slum. A majority of respondents (60 percent) stated that they feel “very safe” in their settlement. Only 4.4 percent of respondents (85 respondents) said that they “do not feel safe at all” in the settlement. 677 respondents (35 percent) were in between, stating that they only feel a “little safe.”

India’s urban slums are not uniformly absent of peace and security. To display inter-slum variation in order, I aggregate responses to the slum level and present descriptive statistics in *Table 5.1*. In the average slum, nine percent of respondents reported that something from their house had been stolen in the last two years. In the worst settlement, 41.6 percent of respondents claimed that something had been stolen in the past two years. In the average slum, about 20 percent of respondents noted gangs were present in their settlement, with a large standard deviation of 16 percent. In the most gang-active settlement, two thirds of respondents noted the presence of local gangs. The average slum exhibits 1.41 fights per month, with a one standard deviation of 1.76. In ten of the sampled slums, not a single respondent noted seeing a fight in their settlement within the previous month.

To aggregate the attitudinal questions to the slum level, responses of “very peaceful” were coded as 2, a “little peaceful” as 1, and “not peaceful” as 0. The average score across the slums is 1.39, with a one standard deviation of 0.26. The maximum score is 1.89 while the minimum score is 0.66. Regarding changes in perceived community peace over the last five years, responses were coded in a similar manner: “more peaceful” is coded as a 2, “the same” is coded as a 1, and “less peaceful” is coded as a 0. The average score across the 80 sampled slums is 0.95, with a one standard deviation of 0.28. General feelings of safety were coded as “very safe” = 2, “a little safe” = 1, and “not safe at all” as 0. The average slum exhibits a score

of 1.59, with a one standard deviation of 0.21. Three of the sampled slums had 100 percent of respondents stating that they felt “very safe” in the settlement. Some settlements, then, are more secure and peaceful than others.

5.4: The Horizontal and Hierarchical Sources of Order in Slums

How is public order and security established in India’s urban slums? This section advances the central argument of the chapter: Public order can be secured in those settlements that have high levels of social capital and vigilant community leadership.

Social Capital, Collective Efficacy, and Public Order

The first line of defense against conflict and crime is spontaneous, decentralized intervention by residents themselves; the extent to which residents intervene in each other’s behavior to insure the integrity of public order in their settlement. Decentralized intervention by residents is employed in a range of situations. Bystanders break up fights. Protracted disputes over land, marriage, or unpaid debts are addressed by a group of neighbors until a settlement is reached. Alcoholism and abuse invite strong public shame. Gang members are punished, and neighbors take steps to watch each other’s property. Collectively, these are acts of *social control*⁷⁹ that impose collective preferences for order on individuals through behavioral regulation.

Decentralized efforts to maintain public order are facilitated by a community’s stock of social capital. Social capital is a latent variable that reflects the level of trust, cooperation, and social engagement in a community and exists within shared norms and beliefs about appropriate behavior. Social capital can be activated when conflict and discord face a community. When neighbors are socially engaged and exhibit a high degree of inter-personal trust, they are more

⁷⁹ Social control can be defined as the “capacity of a social unit to regulate itself according to desired principles to realize collective goals” (Sampson and Wikstrom 2008: 99).

likely to intervene in fights and help each other work through ongoing disputes. Acts of social control are often preemptive, addressing mounting problems before they become public conflicts. Social capital also suggests a degree of cohesion among individuals that can be drawn upon to jointly resist gangs and crime. Social capital, then, helps residents to collectively act to maintain public order.

Intervention is not always peaceful. Nor is sanctioning always performed by residents themselves. Residents often use coercion and violence to punish those who threaten order. Residents also turn to the police to apply sanctions. The key point, however, is that residents actively observe and take steps to regulate the behavior of others.

A rich literature in urban sociology examines inter-personal violence and crime in American cities. A concept has emerged from this literature that directly connects social capital to social control: *collective efficacy*. Collective efficacy is “the link between mutual trust and a shared willingness to intervene for the common good of the neighborhood...[it] reflects shared beliefs in a neighborhood’s capability to achieve the intended effect and assumes active engagement among neighbors” (Duncan et al. 2003: 245).⁸⁰ Social cohesion, as an element of social capital, is a critical component of collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997; Duncan et al. 2003 citing Sampson 1998). Residents must be cohesive in the sense that they feel a shared sense of community and are willing to cooperate with one another to ensure the safety of others. It reflects a feeling that a transgression on one resident is also a threat to the larger community. Altruism is not the motivation, but rather self-interest of having a secure and peaceful neighborhood that is free from crime. The collective efficacy of a community can do much to mitigate conflict and resist crime and violence.

⁸⁰ Sampson et al. (1997) define collective efficacy as “social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good.” (918). See also Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) and Browning et al. (2004) for a study of social efficacy and public order in urban neighborhoods.

I employ a multi-faceted index of community social capital in the econometric analysis below. The eight survey questions that compose the index measure reciprocity and trust in other residents of the settlement, social cohesion, willingness to contribute time and resources for the improvement of the settlement, and inter-ethnic social engagement. Taken together, these questions measure the underlying social conditions that facilitate or inhibit residents from regulating themselves to uphold public order.

Hierarchy, Authority, and Public Order

When the decentralized efforts of residents fail to maintain public order, community leaders can step in to provide alternative mechanisms to mitigate conflict and crime. Community leaders, in particular, can provide two important functions: dispute resolution and social sanctioning. Forty-four percent of survey respondents noted that their leaders try to stop anti-social behavior within their settlement, including fighting, alcoholism, and theft. Forty-eight percent of respondents stated that leaders in their community resolve fights and disputes among residents, and a similar number (47 percent) noted that leaders help residents deal with the police and legal cases. In many slums, then, community leaders are actively involved with issues of peace and security. The presence of vigilant leadership is an important determinant of public order.

Vigilant leadership flows from the institutions discussed in the previous chapter. Those settlements that are able to produce active and responsive leadership have in place a structure of authority that can impose sanctions and assist residents in settling disputes. Community leaders often persist as such because they possess some degree of legitimacy in the eyes of residents. They get things done. Whether through legitimacy or brute coercion, though, active leaders can do much to ensure public order.

The opening anecdote of this chapter illustrates the role of a vigilant leader in dispute resolution and punishment. Leaders in *Ram Nagar* have devised a number of ways to keep the peace and punish those that break it. During a focus group with a small group of leaders in *Ram Nagar*, I asked about the various punishments that leaders impose on residents when they break the *khanoon*, or laws, of the settlement. One is to shave the head of the person at fault. Another punishment is to cut their moustache, beard, and hair and then make them sit and ride around the settlement on an animal. There are also monetary fines that can “go up to a *lakh*” (US \$2000). One of the worst punishments, according to the leaders, is that the guilty are required to buy cigarettes for the leaders and sit among them as they smoke. This suggests that what they did was so bad that no monetary fine can adequately fit the crime. It brings great social shame (Author Interview, Jaipur, 5/8/2011). To further illustrate the role of leadership:

[Two people in the slum] have given a petition against you. Your housewife had a fight with [another woman]. We request you that you come before a group of five leaders today, in the temple...This is because your family has tried to break the peace of the slum (translated letter from leader of *Parvat* slum to a fellow resident, September 1995).

Today a meeting was held...because today [two residents] had a fight over water. So, in front of five leaders, [the two residents] were forced to sit-down with each other. Both parties had to embrace each other and apologize. Now they are not fighting with each other... (document from *Parvat*, September 1995).

The survey data descriptively supports the importance of decentralized intervention and leadership in public order. 772 respondents reported that fights in their settlement are typically resolved with the help of neighbors, and another 432 respondents stated that the disputing parties handle fights among themselves.⁸¹ These numbers suggest that many conflicts are resolved spontaneously by residents and do not require hierarchy or external intervention by the state. Another 337 respondents noted that slum leaders usually resolve fights. This differs from the average percentage of respondents that stated leaders engage in dispute resolution (47.70) and

⁸¹ Survey respondents were asked: “Who *usually* resolves fights in this slum?” Respondents were allowed to give multiple answers.

social sanctioning (43.67). Intervention by leaders might therefore be available to residents in many settlements, but residents are more inclined to first try to solve their own problems before turning to leaders for help. Interestingly, the most common answer was the police. 827 respondents stated that the police usually become involved in the resolution of fights. Slum dwellers often do everything in their power to prevent the involvement of the police, as doing so invites disproportionate force and inspections of other illicit activities in the settlement. The high number of responses regarding police intervention is reflective of those fights that are too serious and protracted to be internally handled by residents.

Two variables, then, are hypothesized to influence the extent of public order across settlements. The first is the level of social capital among residents. Social capital, as a concept that encompasses the state of inter-personal trust, reciprocity, and cohesion in a community, helps to facilitate decentralized interventions among residents to uphold public order. The higher the level of social capital, the more likely slum settlements are to regulate and police themselves. The second variable is the presence of vigilant leadership. Vigilant community leaders that help resolve disputes among residents, sanction anti-social residents, and organize the settlement to repel crime can do much to uphold public order. The following section outlines the variables, data, and models used to statistically examine the determinants of public order. *Section 5.7* presents the results of the econometric analyses.

5.5: Variables, Measurement, and Econometric Models

I consider six separate dependent variables in the econometric analysis below. The first three are public acts of conflict and crime—theft, gang activity, and incidences of physical fighting among residents. The variable *THEFT* is measured as the percentage of respondents in each settlement that reported having something stolen from their home in the previous two years. The variable

GANGS is measured as the percentage of respondents in each settlement that acknowledged the presence of local gangs. The variable *FIGHTS* is measured as the average number of reported public fights within the previous month in each settlement. These three variables are objective in nature, and their aggregation to the community-level represents how vulnerable settlements are with respect to each variable. The second three dependent variables are attitudinal—general assessments of community peace (*PEACE*), perceptions of changing levels of peace over time (*CHANGE PEACE*), and assessments of personal safety (*SAFETY*). Measurement of these three variables is described in *Section 5.3* and descriptive statistics are provided in *Table 5.1*.

I also examine a single index of community order, *COMMUNITY ORDER INDEX*. Using principal component analysis, I derived a single component among the six factors and use the weights associated with that component to construct the index. With an eigenvalue of three, the six factors load heavily onto the first component. This component reflects the underlying degree of order and security in a settlement.

Section 5.2 illuminated seven distinct explanatory variables. Social capital and the vigilance of leadership are the primary explanatory variables of interest. Social capital is measured as a community level index that draws on eight survey questions.⁸² The survey questions probed levels of trust, reciprocity, social engagement, inter-ethnic social ties, and willingness to invest in the improvement of the community.⁸³

Two questions in the survey probed the vigilance of leadership in maintaining peace and order. The first question asks respondents if their leaders engage in dispute resolution and arbitration for residents. The second question asks respondents if their leaders stop anti-social

⁸² To ensure comparability with other surveys and research on social capital, these eight questions mirror those used in the World Bank's Capital Assessment Tool and Krishna (2002). The questions were fit to make sense in the context of urban slums in India.

⁸³ For a list of the survey questions, see *Appendix C*.

people in the community.⁸⁴ The responses to both questions are highly correlated (0.81) and exhibit the same degree of statistical significance and sign in each of the models below. I therefore use the variable *LEADER ENFORCE*, which is the percentage of respondents in each settlement that acknowledged their leaders try to stop anti-social elements in the community.⁸⁵

The intensity of electoral competition—at both the municipal (*ELECTORAL COMP (WARD)*) and state legislative assembly (*ELECTORAL COMP (STATE)*) levels—is measured as the average vote difference between the winning candidate and the runner-up. For state assemblies, I draw on every election since 1980, and for municipal elections, since 1994. Sampled slums were then matched with each constituency and competition score, the latter being averaged across each election period.

I measure the strength of property rights (*LAND TITLE*) as whether or not respondents had *any* government documents proving land ownership. This includes permanent land titles, but also extends to households that have fixed-year titles (1, 10, and 30 year titles) in Madhya Pradesh. Arjun Singh, the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh in the mid 1980s, extended fixed-year land titles to settlements under the *Patta Act*. The distribution of these fixed-year titles have continued, *ad hoc*, up to the present time, as each new state assembly has electoral incentives to extend the cut-off date to attract supporters. Despite a clear rubric that defines beneficiaries, the distribution of these fixed-year titles were and continue to be discretionary and political. Land titles are plausibly exogenous to levels of conflict, as internal levels of social discord or crime were unlikely to factor into whether or not land titles were extended to residents.

⁸⁴ These measures are preferable to those that probe the number of arbitrations or interventions performed by leaders. Such questions would be highly endogenous to the left-hand side indicators of order. I am more interested in the *presence* of vigilant leadership, as it can be employed when problems arise.

⁸⁵ Residents that do not acknowledge leadership and those that do acknowledge leadership but go on to state these leaders do not stop anti-social elements in the settlement get the same score. In either case, it is an observation where that respondent does not believe that internal authority is present to intervene to stop residents from disrupting the peace.

I calculate social diversity scores for each settlement along three axes, without *a priori* assumptions of one's salience over another—religion, region of origin, and caste. Using the Herfindahl Index, each score represents the probability that two randomly selected residents are from a *different* social group.

To test for nativist cleavages (*NATIVIST*), I measured the percentage of respondents in each sampled slum that originate from a village or city outside the host state. For respondents who were born in the slum, this would be the state from which their parents migrated. In the average slum, 20.66 percent of residents are from either outside Rajasthan (for Jaipur slums) and Madhya Pradesh (for Bhopal slums), with a one standard deviation of 19.33 percent.

The material resources of residents are measured in two ways. The first draws on the monthly per-capita incomes of each surveyed household. I average these scores to the slum level to obtain a community-level measure of economic wellbeing. I also construct an asset index. Respondents were asked if their household owned each of 11 different assets.⁸⁶ The scores for each household were then averaged at the slum level.

Other control variables are used in the econometric analysis: settlement population, age of settlement, a dummy variable for the city, and average education of respondents in each settlement. Descriptive statistics of these variables can be found in *Table 5.2*.

The unit of analysis examined in the econometric models could be the individual survey respondent. Results would reflect statistical associations between individual perceptions of order and safety and the right-hand side variables. I instead approach inter-personal violence and crime as a “quintessentially social act” (Sampson and Wikstrom 2008: 99) best examined at the community level of analysis. This level of analysis is common in sociological studies that

⁸⁶ These 11 assets are televisions, motorcycles/ scooters, mobile phones, coolers (electric, water-cooled fans), fans, refrigerators, beds, gas stoves, radios, cars, and metal dressers.

analyze the ecological determinants of public order and crime. It is within community structures and social networks that order breaks down and conflict is produced. This is why slums, as spatial units, vary so remarkably in their levels of order and peace.

The first set of models takes on the simple OLS form:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta X_i + \delta Z_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where y is the conflict variable under consideration in slum i , X is a vector of the explanatory variables of theoretical interest, and Z is a vector of control variables. I also examine a seemingly unrelated regression that jointly estimates all six models to take into account possible correlations among the error terms when the models are estimated individually.

5.6: Results

Community social capital is statistically significant in its association with four of the six community order variables. A one standard deviation increase in community social capital (1.76) is associated with 0.51 fewer reported fights per month. This explains almost one third of a standard deviation in the number of reported fights. In relation to assessments of community peace, a one standard deviation increase in community social capital is associated with a 0.07 increase in community peace—over half of a standard deviation in peace assessment scores. The influence of social capital on perceptions of personal safety and changes in community peace is almost identical to its influence on assessments of community peace, suggesting that these three attitudinal measures are correlated with one another.⁸⁷ A one standard deviation is associated with a 0.11 increase in perceptions of safety and a .09 increase in changes in community peace.

⁸⁷ The correlations are positive, though they are not particularly strong. The correlations between measures of community peace and changes in community peace, community peace and personal safety, and changes in community peace and personal safety are, respectively 0.36, 0.60, and 0.43.

Social capital is significant at the 0.05 level in each of these models. Social capital is statistically insignificant in relation to the presence of gangs and incidences of theft.

The variable for leadership enforcement is statistically significant in three of the six models. A one standard deviation increase in leadership enforcement (26.31 percent) is associated with a 4.47 decrease in the percentage of respondents acknowledging a gang presence in their settlement. A one standard deviation increase in leadership enforcement is also associated with a 0.11 increase in peace assessment scores and a .08 increase in changes in peace scores. Leadership enforcement explains about a third of a standard deviation in these variables.

The strength of property rights, as measured by the percentage of respondents in each slum with some legal document of land ownership, is statistically significant in its association with the variable for theft. A one standard deviation in the percentage of respondents with land titles (37.07) is associated with 2.22 percent decrease in the percentage of respondents that claimed something was stolen from their house within the previous two years. This explains almost 25% of a standard deviation in the theft variable. Surprisingly, the strength of property rights in settlements does not explain other indicators of disorder. Defined, formal property rights in a community would seem to be a critical factor in the maintenance of public order. The econometric results, however, do not provide robust support for this contention.

The influence of social diversity is heterogeneous and limited in explanatory power. Caste diversity is positively related to incidences of theft. A one standard deviation increase in caste diversity (0.17) is associated with a 2.42 rise in the percentage of respondents claiming something from their house was stolen in the previous two years. And a one standard deviation increase in religious diversity is associated with a 0.08 decrease in assessments of changes in peace. In the opposite direction, caste diversity is positively associated with changes in peace.

Interestingly, the percentage of respondents from out of state is significant and positively associated with perceptions of personal safety, with a one standard deviation increase associated with a 0.11 increase in the scores for personal safety. A lack of uniform direction and significance prevents a clear determination of the relationship between ethnic diversity and order. This is puzzling. We would expect ethnic diversity to have a particularly toxic effect in informal urban settlements. Understanding why the relationship between diversity and order is mixed is an important path for future research.

A peculiar finding is the negative association between education and general assessments of peace and security. This might be explained by the attitudinal nature of these two dependent variables. More educated residents may expect more from the state or their community in terms of law and order, leading them to be more vocal about these preferences.

The main findings from *Models 5.1* through *5.6* are reproduced with the community order index on the left-hand side.⁸⁸ Social capital and leadership enforcement continue to demonstrate a positively and statistically significant association with community order. A one standard deviation increase in community social capital is associated with a 0.69 increase in the community order index, thus explaining almost half a standard deviation in the latter variable. A one standard deviation increase in the variable *LEADER ENFORCE* is associated with a 0.53 increase in the community order index. These two variables outperform the others in explaining the range of indicators of community order and security. The finds present strong evidence that

⁸⁸ Education, counter-intuitively, has a negative association with the community order index. It is possible that social capital breaks atrophies when residents are better educated and independent, as they are less reliant on social networks to smooth consumption during periods of crisis. As Wade (2007) argues, institutions are often a product of collective needs. As education levels rise, then, social capital may be less necessary to maintain order. Under a similar logic, Villarreal and Silva (2006) find that higher levels of poverty in Brazilian favelas are associated with higher levels of social cohesion.

public order in India's slums is largely the product of decentralized efforts among residents and the level of vigilance of community leaders.

The first six models are likely to exhibit cross-model correlations in the error terms. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) explicitly takes those cross-model correlations into account and tests each model simultaneously in a larger nested regression. The results of the SUR model are presented in *Table 5.6 and Table 5.6.1*. With respect to the two variables of principal interest, social capital and vigilant leadership, the findings from the SUR model are consistent with those from the individual regressions and the community order index. Social capital continues to be statistically significant and positively related to reduced fighting, assessments of community peace and temporal changes in peace, and increased feelings of personal safety. Vigilant leadership is statistically significant and positively related to reduced gang activity and assessments of community peace and temporal changes in peace.

5.7: Conclusion

This chapter argues that the determinants of public order in slums originate within the social structures of communities. While hierarchical party organization is the principal driving force behind infrastructural development and public service provision, public order and security is contingent on the extent to which residents can police and sanction themselves. Social capital—the stock of trust, reciprocity, and community engagement that exists among individuals in a social space—bears much on the ability of residents to engage in these acts. Social capital is a latent variable that is spontaneously activated when fights and disputes erupt. In settlements with high levels of social capital, bystanders in public spaces break-up fights, neighbors watch each other's houses and children, and anti-social residents are shamed and punished. Community leaders can contribute to these efforts by using their informal authority to sanction residents and

arbitrate disputes. Social capital and vigilant community leadership together explain much of the variation in order and security across slums.

Alternative explanations of public order are measured and tested in this chapter. These alternative explanations include social heterogeneity, the strength of property rights and density of clientelistic networks, electoral competition, nativist social cleavages, and the material resources of settlements. Consistent with Chapters Two and Four, neither social diversity nor the material resources of residents play an explanatory role. Public order seems to emerge and collapse independently of community demographic characteristics. Party networks and electoral competition also show a uniform lack of explanatory power. The production of everyday public order in slums is very much an internal affair that is maintained outside the influence of these extra-local forces. The explanatory strength of formal property rights is limited to reducing instances of theft. Finally, I do not find evidence that the social cleavage between natives and migrants from outside the region is a source of conflict.

This chapter contributes to research on order and conflict by examining inter-personal conflict and crime in a novel empirical context. Scholarship on conflict and violence in political science has overwhelmingly focused on episodic and deadly forms of conflict—riots, pogroms, insurgencies, and civil wars—to the neglect of everyday fighting, crime, and social discord within distinct communities. Quotidian forms of inter-personal conflict, crime, and violence are far more pervasive than the types of conflict that typically come under study. These events are highly decentralized and isolated to distinct communities, and therefore require sustained fieldwork and survey research. The findings from this chapter support a line of research that looks to informal community institutions—both horizontal social capital and informal hierarchy—as the primary source of local peace and security.

Scholars of urban crime and violence have almost exclusively studied neighborhoods and housing projects in American cities. These studies, mostly in urban sociology, predominantly focus on the demographic determinants of crime and violence. This chapter contributes to this body of research in two distinct ways. First, it joins a relatively small group of studies (Villarreal and Silva 2006; Sampson and Wikstrom 2008) that examine order and conflict in urban contexts outside the United States. Second, I explicitly incorporate authority into the theoretical framework. Quantitative studies in urban sociology often ignore community leadership. Hierarchy and authority, however, are defining elements of urban communities. Ethnographic research in poor urban spaces in the United States has revealed the existence of informal leaders (Venkatesh 2008; Whyte 1937). This chapter empirically demonstrates that responsive and vigilant community leadership can add to social capital and collective efficacy to further insure the integrity of public order in poor urban communities.

Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Order Variables (N = 80)

| Variables (Slum Level Averages) | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
|--|---------|--------|----------|--------|
| % Reporting Theft in Household in Last Month | 0% (27) | 41.67% | 8.82% | 9.25% |
| % Reporting Presence of Gangs | 0% (16) | 66.67% | 19.80% | 16.20% |
| Average Number of Fights Observed in Last Month | 0 (10) | 9.45 | 1.41 | 1.76 |
| Average Assessments of General Peace in Community | 0.67 | 1.89 | 1.39 | 0.26 |
| Average Assessments of Change in Levels of Community Peace | 0.19 | 1.75 | 0.95 | 0.28 |
| Average Assessments of Personal Safety in Community | 1.15 | 2 | 1.59 | 0.21 |
| Community Order Index | -4.79 | 3.45 | 1.15e-07 | 1.59 |

Number of Slum Settlements in Parentheses

Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables (N = 80)

| Variables (Slum Level Averages) | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
|---|---------|------|-----------|-------|
| Community Social Capital Index | -4.59 | 4.02 | -6.43e-13 | 1.76 |
| % Respondents with Land Title Documents | 0% (32) | 100% | 33.44 | 37.07 |
| Party Network Density | 0 (17) | 6.37 | 1.84 | 1.56 |
| Multi-Party Competition (Dummy) | 0 (44) | 1 | 0.45 | 0.50 |
| Caste Diversity | 0 (1) | 0.99 | 0.79 | 0.17 |
| Religious Diversity | 0 (32) | 0.5 | 0.15 | 0.17 |
| State Diversity | 0 (15) | 0.74 | 0.29 | 0.22 |
| % Respondents from Outside Home State | 0% | 75% | 20.66 | 19.34 |
| Average, Per-Capita Household Income | 0.67 | 1.86 | 1.31 | 0.29 |

Number of Slum Settlements in Parentheses

Table 5.3: Explaining Variation in Community Order

| Dependent Variable | THEFT | GANGS | FIGHTS |
|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Model 1 (OLS) | Model 2 (OLS) | Model 3 (OLS) |
| Intercept | 15.23 (12.51) | -40.23 * (22.77) | 5.90 ** (2.56) |
| Social Capital | -0.02 (0.75) | -1.24 (1.27) | -0.29 ** (0.12) |
| Leader Enforce | 0.01 (0.05) | -0.17 * (0.10) | 0.003 (0.006) |
| Percent Land Titles | -0.06 ** (0.03) | 0.03 (0.06) | -0.001 (0.005) |
| Party Network Density | -0.22 (0.52) | -1.46 (1.09) | 0.12 (0.12) |
| Multi-Party Networks | -2.19 (2.77) | 0.57 (4.53) | 0.43 (0.47) |
| Caste Diversity | 14.21 *** (5.25) | 5.58 (11.26) | -1.74 (2.31) |
| Religious Diversity | 8.58 (7.63) | 4.24 (10.88) | -0.14 (1.37) |
| State Diversity | -14.99 (16.41) | 2.65 (25.19) | 3.25 (2.37) |
| Percent out of State | 0.006 (0.18) | -0.07 (0.26) | -0.03 (0.02) |
| Age of Slum | -0.14 (0.11) | -0.02 (0.20) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| City (Bhopal = 1) | 3.15 (3.12) | -1.89 (6.09) | -2.41 *** (0.61) |
| Education | -0.39 (2.28) | 3.62 (3.50) | 0.27 (0.35) |
| Log Population | -0.79 (1.63) | 8.86 *** (2.55) | -0.19 (0.74) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 2.59 (4.19) | -8.49 (7.02) | -0.19 (0.74) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | -0.33 (0.26) | 0.40 (0.41) | -0.04 [p = 0.115] (0.02) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | -0.12 (0.29) | 0.20 (0.47) | -0.04 (0.05) |
| R ² | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.48 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 5.4: Explaining Variation in Community Order

| Dependent Variable | PEACE | CHANGE PEACE | SAFETY |
|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Models | Model 4 (OLS) | Model 5 (OLS) | Model 6 (OLS) |
| Intercept | 1.06 *** (0.36) | 0.75 ** (0.32) | 1.46 *** (0.35) |
| Social Capital | 0.04 ** (0.02) | 0.05 ** (0.03) | 0.06 *** (0.02) |
| Leader Enforce | 0.004 *** (0.002) | 0.003 ** (0.001) | 0.0005 (0.001) |
| Percent Land Titles | 0.0004 (0.0008) | 0.001 (0.0009) | 0.0005 (0.0006) |
| Party Network Density | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.003 (0.02) | -0.003 (0.02) |
| Multi-Party Networks | -0.0008 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.08) | -0.04 (0.05) |
| Caste Diversity | -0.09 (0.21) | 0.49 ** (0.22) | 0.02 (0.23) |
| Religious Diversity | -0.17 (0.14) | -0.47 *** (0.16) | 0.07 (0.13) |
| State Diversity | 0.04 (0.36) | -0.04 (0.40) | -0.51 (0.34) |
| Percent out of State | -0.001 (0.004) | -0.001 (0.005) | 0.006 * (0.004) |
| Age of Slum | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.0001 (0.002) |
| City (Bhopal = 1) | 0.28 *** (0.08) | -0.04 (0.09) | 0.11 (0.07) |
| Education | -0.11 * (0.06) | 0.004 (0.07) | -0.11 ** (0.05) |
| Log Population | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.05) | 0.0007 (0.04) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 0.21 * (0.11) | -0.18 (0.11) | 0.10 (0.10) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | -0.006 (0.006) | 0.003 (0.005) | -0.0002 (0.005) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | 0.002 (0.007) | -0.001 (0.008) | 0.005 (0.007) |
| R ² | 0.36 | 0.33 | 0.29 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 5.5: Explaining Variation in Community Order

| Dependent Variable | Community Order Index | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| | Model 7 (OLS) | Model 8 (OLS) |
| Intercept | -0.18 (1.77) | -0.48 (1.98) |
| Social Capital | 0.40 *** (0.13) | 0.39 *** (0.13) |
| Leader Enforce | 0.02 * (0.009) | 0.02 * (0.01) |
| Percent Land Titles | | 0.005 (0.005) |
| Party Network Density | | 0.04 (0.11) |
| Multi-Party Networks | | -0.09 (0.40) |
| Caste Diversity | | 0.39 (1.36) |
| Religious Diversity | | -1.10 (0.86) |
| State Diversity | | -1.52 (2.41) |
| Percent out of State | | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Age of Slum | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) |
| City (Bhopal = 1) | 1.30 *** (0.41) | 1.11 ** (0.49) |
| Education | -0.51 (0.32) | -0.63 * (0.35) |
| Log Population | -0.27 (0.22) | -0.25 (0.24) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 0.59 (0.62) | 0.60 (0.70) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | | -0.007 (0.04) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | | 0.02 (0.05) |
| R ² | 0.30 | 0.33 |
| N | 80 | 80 |

Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 5.6: Explaining Variation in Community Order (Seemingly Unrelated Regression)

| Dependent Variable | THEFT | GANGS | FIGHTS |
|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Models | Model 9 (OLS) | Model 10 (OLS) | Model 11 (OLS) |
| Intercept | 15.23 (12.37) | -40.23 * (20.94) | 5.90 *** (2.02) |
| Social Capital | -0.023 (0.69) | -1.24 (1.16) | -0.29 ** (0.11) |
| Leader Enforce | 0.014 (0.042) | -0.17 ** (0.07) | 0.003 (0.007) |
| Percent Land Titles | -0.06 ** (0.03) | 0.03 (0.05) | -0.001 (0.005) |
| Party Network Density | -0.22 (0.72) | -1.46 (1.22) | 0.12 (0.12) |
| Multi-Party Networks | -2.19 (2.74) | 0.57 (4.63) | 0.43 (0.45) |
| Caste Diversity | 14.21 ** (6.91) | 5.58 (11.71) | -1.74 (1.13) |
| Religious Diversity | 8.58 (6.52) | 4.24 (11.05) | -0.14 (1.07) |
| State Diversity | -14.99 (13.27) | 2.65 (22.48) | 3.25 (2.17) |
| Percent out of State | 0.006 (0.15) | -0.07 (0.26) | -0.025 (0.025) |
| Age of Slum | -0.14 (0.10) | -0.016 (0.173) | -0.012 (0.017) |
| City (Bhopal = 1) | 3.15 (3.14) | -1.89 (5.32) | -2.41 *** (0.51) |
| Education | -0.39 (1.88) | 3.62 (3.18) | 0.27 (0.31) |
| Log Population | -0.79 (1.67) | 8.86 *** (2.83) | -0.19 (0.27) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 2.59 (3.62) | -8.49 (6.14) | -0.19 (0.59) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | -0.33 ** (0.16) | 0.40 (0.26) | -0.04 (0.03) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | -0.17 (0.25) | 0.20 (0.43) | -0.04 (0.04) |
| R ² | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.48 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 5.6.1: Explaining Variation in Community Order (Seemingly Unrelated Regression, Cont.)

| Dependent Variable | PEACE | CHANGE PEACE | SAFETY |
|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Models | Model 12 (OLS) | Model 13 (OLS) | Model 14 (OLS) |
| Intercept | 1.06 *** (0.33) | 0.75 ** (0.36) | 1.46 *** (0.28) |
| Social Capital | 0.04 ** (0.02) | 0.05 *** (0.02) | 0.06 *** (0.02) |
| Leader Enforce | 0.004 *** (0.001) | 0.003 ** (0.001) | 0.0005 (0.001) |
| Percent Land Titles | 0.0004 (0.0008) | 0.001 (0.0008) | 0.0005 (0.0007) |
| Party Network Density | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.003 (0.021) | -0.003 (0.016) |
| Multi-Party Networks | -0.0008 (0.0737) | 0.03 (0.08) | -0.04 (0.06) |
| Caste Diversity | -0.09 (0.19) | 0.49 ** (0.20) | 0.02 (0.16) |
| Religious Diversity | -0.17 (0.18) | -0.47 ** (0.19) | 0.07 (0.15) |
| State Diversity | 0.04 (0.36) | -0.04 (0.39) | -0.51 * (0.30) |
| Percent out of State | -0.0009 (0.004) | -0.001 (0.004) | 0.006 * (0.003) |
| Age of Slum | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.0001 (0.0023) |
| City (Bhopal = 1) | 0.28 *** (0.08) | -0.04 (0.09) | 0.11 (0.07) |
| Education | -0.11 ** (0.05) | 0.004 (0.055) | -0.11 *** (0.04) |
| Log Population | -0.016 (0.045) | -0.02 (0.05) | 0.0007 (0.0381) |
| HH Income Per Capita | 0.21 ** (0.10) | -0.18 * (0.11) | 0.10 (0.08) |
| Electoral Comp. (Ward) | -0.006 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.005) | -0.001 (0.004) |
| Electoral Comp. (State) | 0.002 (0.007) | -0.001 (0.007) | 0.005 (0.006) |
| R ² | 0.36 | 0.33 | 0.29 |
| N | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Chapter Six: Conclusion

Within the first week of my fieldwork, a slum resident told me that, to politicians, “slums are only vote banks in India. They [politicians] make promises that are not fulfilled” (Author Interview, Jaipur, 9/24/2010). This sentiment is widely shared by slum dwellers in India, and politicians do not hesitate to similarly describe the relationship. A prominent politician in Bhopal explained to me that, “these political parties, after they win an election, they are afraid if we give them [slum dwellers] all the facilities right now, like education, health, roads, and other things, someday they will become independent and not go around seeking help. That is a loss for the parties, as they [slum dwellers] become very smart [in how they decide to vote]” (Translated Interview, Bhopal, 9/12/11). The urban poor in India and developing democracies across the globe are embedded in clientelistic relations with politicians in which their electoral support is exchanged for patronage and protection. Political engagement is a way for the poor to secure the most basic public goods and services, as well as protection from eviction and state predation.

Yet, despite the shared conditions of material poverty, informality, and clientelistic politics, this dissertation demonstrates that slums are not uniformly marginalized. Nor are they equally positioned to engage the state through political society. India’s urban slums exhibit wide variation in their levels of infrastructural development and access to public services. Many settlements hardly resemble popular images of slums. Streets are paved, water is provided through underground pipes, sewers have been installed and properly function, and municipalities remove solid waste. These settlements have enjoyed some degree of responsiveness from the state. The claims of other settlements, however, are dismissed. Roads are unpaved and prone to flooding. An absence of toilets and sewers force residents to go to the bathroom in the open, and trash is left to fester without municipal waste removal. Schools have not been constructed and a

lack of street lighting makes nighttime movement difficult and dangerous. Most settlements lie somewhere in between these extremes, having access to only some public goods and services.

Uneven development across India's slums provokes a fundamental question in comparative political economy, and the central motivation of this dissertation: In the face of common challenges, why do some vulnerable communities develop institutions that advance the collective interests and security of residents while others fail? I have argued that the answer to this question lies within the internal political organization of slums, and the extent to which settlements are connected to larger political party structures in the city. This concluding chapter reviews the major findings of the dissertation, and ends with a discussion of how these findings contribute to scholarship in comparative politics, political economy, and South Asian studies.

6.1: Summary of Arguments and Findings

How do slum dwellers in India organize and engage the state? Chapter Two examined three strategies that slum dwellers use to secure development. Each of these strategies were observed in the field and then incorporated into the survey. The first strategy is the internal self-provision of development, without the assistance of the state. This includes, as the survey question states, giving time and money to fix something, building something new, or generally improve the community without the help of the *sarkar* (government). I found this strategy to be fairly common, with 31 percent of respondents acknowledging such efforts in their settlement. More common than acts of internal self-provision, though, are efforts of group claim-making (80 percent): residents collectively voicing their demands to politicians and state officials. Groups present a degree of *lokshakti*, or collective "people power" that can push politicians to extend goods and services. Collective protest, the third strategy, is a larger and more contentious form of group claim-making. Settlements engage in mass protests, destroy public property, stop trains,

burn effigies of politicians, and picket in front of government offices. This strategy is more common than collective self-provision, though less common than group claim making. The pattern that emerges from the ethnographic fieldwork and survey data, therefore, is that efforts to secure development in India's slums are oriented toward the state. This does not reflect an absence of cooperation, but rather the understanding that the state is the principal source of infrastructural goods and public services. As a result, the most important factors in determining the development of slums are those that facilitate vertical engagements with the state.

I argue in this dissertation that settlements with dense party networks are better positioned to demand and secure development from the state than those settlements with sparse or absent party networks. The mechanisms linking party network density and development are competition, accountability, and political connectivity. Access to rents is a function of the size of a leader's following and his or her party position. In the presence of other party workers seeking to maintain and expand their base of support, party workers must perform or else lose their following. Competition among workers generates a degree of accountability in patron-client networks that strengthens organizational capacity and encourages development. Parties also carefully monitor their workers. Transgressions on residents or general inactivity reflect poorly on the party brand. Political parties, therefore, will sanction or remove workers that threaten to diminish support for the party. In settlements with dense party networks, the developmental needs of residents, material interests of workers, and electoral compulsions of parties converge to produce accountability and development. Leaders in settlements with thin or absent party networks face fewer incentives to work hard for the development of the community. They simply do not face any competition over authority.

Dense party networks also give settlements a degree of political connectivity. When slum

leaders are members of party organizations, they have a defined, hierarchical channel through which to directly communicate with politicians and high-ranking party officers. Party workers are given letterhead stationary bearing the party symbol and name of their political patron—powerful symbols when corresponding with state officials and the police. Connectivity to political parties additionally provides a structure that can organize residents when settlements are faced with underdevelopment or eviction. The local party organization can gather residents, rapidly spread information, and transport whole settlements to government offices where their voices can be heard. As this dissertation demonstrates, spatial variation in the density of party networks across slums has serious implications for the nature of internal community governance, and, in turn, the ability of residents to organize—across ethnic lines—to demand development.

This dissertation also finds that multi-party network representation in settlements has a unique influence on local development. Political parties can internalize many of the negative externalities of intra-party competition. Hierarchical discipline can be employed, and workers share the same interests in advancing the party for their own individual access to rents and social prominence. Rival party networks within settlements, however, do not possess these mechanisms. Partisan competition is intense, as losing an election is crippling for the network out of power. This dissertation finds strong evidence that multi-party competition has heterogeneous effects on development. Elected representatives are less likely to extend capital-intensive infrastructure—roads, sewers, and water lines—to settlements with rival networks. The presence of multi-party networks signals to politicians that a settlement is not a fully committed vote bank, and that rival party workers endeavor to undermine the reputation of the politician. Moreover, politicians fear that rival party networks will take credit for their development work. Party networks seek to undermine each other's mobilization efforts, in the

process damaging the development of their shared communities.

The explanatory importance of party network organization in slum development raises a second, ancillary question: what explains spatial variation in the extension of party networks across slums? Party organizational positions are scarce. Only a limited number of positions can be allocated across the thousands of party supporters in the city, each vying for membership, promotion, and political access. In the allocation of scarce party positions and patronage, large slums take priority over their smaller counterparts. This is due to a simple economic logic: a party position or unit of resources invested in larger slums has higher returns than in smaller slums. Slums present increasing returns to scale as their population increases. Leaders in large slums can ultimately deliver a larger bloc of votes during elections. Further, the reputational reverberations of development activities are greater in a larger slum. As a consequence, larger slums exhibit higher levels of party network density than their smaller counterparts.

Ethnicity heterogeneity is also positively associated with party network density due to its effects on leadership fragmentation. In the early stages of a settlement—before diverse migrant groups have had an opportunity to engage in repeated interaction—ethnic groups tend to produce nascent, parochial forms of authority. Over time, parties attempt to bring these nascent leaders into the party fold. Time, however, relaxes the rigidities of ethnicity in the dense conditions of urban slums, and residents become more able to decide among leaders in the settlement who to follow and seek help from. Party workers from different ethnic backgrounds will then compete with each other over followers in the settlement. Through this process, more diverse settlements tend to have higher levels of party network density. Provocatively, ethnicity heterogeneity is *positively* associated with collective capacity and development in India's urban slums, through the mechanisms of leadership fragmentation, competition, and accountability.

Slum size and ethnic heterogeneity are plausibly exogenous determinants of party network density. Idiosyncratic geographical features determine the ultimate area to which a settlement can expand—the space between the riverbed and factory, the area beside the train tracks or trash dump, the graveyard, or available plot between the bazaar and apartment high-rise. Residents are not aware of the land ownership category on which they initially squat, nor do they plan to accommodate the future expansion of the settlement. As the survey revealed, migrant squatters are almost exclusively interested in settling with a known person and near a place of work. Further, while politicians can lend assistance in keeping government eviction attempts at bay, they do so in a uniform manner across constituencies. Any politician would take a chance to be seen as the protector of a settlement and reap the subsequent electoral rewards. Slum size, therefore, is plausibly exogenous to party network density.

As a large literature on rural-urban migration suggests (Rao 1986; Mitra 2003), migrant squatters *do* self-select into slum settlements where they know a family member, caste fellow, or someone from their *janam bhoomi*, or village of origin. Migrants, however, do not anticipate, prior to the time of arrival, the nature and extent of diversity in the host settlement. Poor migrants simply do not have the luxury of “shopping around” for a desirable settlement in the city. A scarcity of urban land and the need to be close to work compel migrants to cluster in settlements with a diversity of other ethnic and religious groups. This is what explains the high and variable levels of social diversity across India’s slums. At the community level, then, slums are treated with varying levels of ethnic diversity that are exogenous to subsequent outcomes in political organization. These two features—slum size and diversity—offer important leverage in understanding variation in party organization and development.

The sequencing of events in India’s slums lends further analytic leverage. All but one of

the sample settlements under examination in this dissertation emerged before India's decentralization reforms and the start of discretionary development funds in the early 1990s. Further, because of the nature of squatting, all of the sampled slums were uniformly underdeveloped at the period of their initial settlement. Settlement demographics, therefore, were largely established before infrastructure and public services were extended to slums starting in the mid 1990s. The formation of leadership and clientelistic ties also preceded this period. Even with cross-sectional data, this sequencing of events does much to alleviate concerns of reverse causality—that levels of development attract certain demographics or levels of party network density. These latter two variables preceded the former.

Even in the face of political marginalization, active slum leadership can do much to improve the security and wellbeing of residents. Chapter Four investigated the internal dynamics of authority, accountability, and leadership responsiveness in slums, looking beyond infrastructure and public services to a broader range of activities that can be performed by leaders. Informal community leadership in India's slums is pervasive. Only three of the eighty slum settlements under examination were without identifiable leadership. These actors occupy a space between residents and the larger political and administrative currents of the city. Across settlements, however, there is significant variability in the scope and intensity of activities that slum leaders perform for residents. I find that leaders are more active and responsive when they have come to power through informal democratic selection—and face sanctions when they fail to perform. Selection and sanctioning mechanisms are informal because they are the internal social construction of residents, upheld and enforced outside state-sanctioned channels. Democratic selection might take place in a large community meeting in which residents deliberate over who is best fit to lead and represent the group. In other settings, residents raise their hands in lieu of

ballots, or sit behind their preferred candidate as a demonstration of support. Some settlements even hold informal elections with secret ballots, campaigns, and elaborate selection criteria.

Democratic selection in India's slums should not be over romanticized. Just as in formal elections, gender, caste, and religion can be exclusionary criteria in participation. Acts of leadership selection and deliberation in India's slums mirror a rural *gram sabha*, in which villagers meet with their leaders to discuss community-wide problems and how to allocate development funds. The collective selection of a leader bestows legitimacy on those in authority. Those selected are expected to perform. Decentralized, deliberative democracy helps to align the preferences of group members and can lead to the selection of a leader—and, in many cases, a committee—that is broadly acceptable to and representative of diverse groups in settlements.

Other conditions facilitate the emergence of accountability and leadership responsiveness in slums. The mechanism of competition, first outlined in Chapter Two, is explicitly tested in Chapter Four. Surrounded by others seeking to attract a larger following, party workers engage in *samajik seva*, or social work—helping residents get ration cards, voter ID cards, electricity connections, and water. They fight for development and resolve disputes. In slums with dense party networks, slum leaders are more active and responsive to the needs of residents. Moreover, in settlements with high levels of social capital, residents can jointly hold their leaders accountable for their behavior. Social capital also facilitates the spread of information about leaders—rumors and gossip that can undermine the reputation of poor-performing leaders, damaging their legitimacy and strength of their following. The rumor mill can do much to hold leaders accountable. Ultimately, India's slum leaders are neighbors, parents, friends, and community members. They too want development, and fellow residents draw upon norms of moral obligation to spur leaders into action.

Public order and security are often assumed to evade the shadowy informality of India's slums. Scholars and media often cast slums as inherently criminal and lawless—a “den of vices” (Rao 1986: 24). Poverty, illegality, and weak formal institutions are certainly conditions that invite disorder. Twenty months of fieldwork and survey research, though, revealed that many slum settlements have developed a range of decentralized mechanisms to deal with and resolve conflicts. Why are some communities able to maintain public order while others languish in conflict? Chapter Five outlined a range of existing hypotheses that might explain levels of public order across slums. I find that public order is a function of vigilant community leadership and social capital. In slums with high levels of social capital, residents can intervene in each other's actions to uphold order in the community and sanction those who break it. Active leadership can further these efforts by punishing anti-social residents, standing up to gang activities, and arbitrating disputes. Hierarchy and horizontal cooperation, therefore, play complimentary roles in the production of public order in India's urban slums.

6.2: Contributions to Scholarship

This dissertation contributes to several strands of literature in comparative politics, political economy, and South Asian studies. In this concluding section, I discuss how the findings of this dissertation address and advance these different bodies of scholarship.

Political Clientelism, Party Networks, and Representation

This dissertation makes original contributions to a large and interdisciplinary literature on political clientelism. Scholars, working across the developing world, have found the urban poor embedded in clientelistic relations with politicians in which patronage and protection are

exchanged for political support.⁸⁹ An army of intermediaries and brokers exist between citizens and politicians, facilitating access to state services, for a price. For politicians, these brokers are critical, as they are entrenched in communities and can advance the party cause, drum-up turnout during elections, and monitor voting behavior. This dissertation, however, uncovered a remarkable fact of clientelistic organization in India's slums: party networks are uneven in their density and partisan balance across communities. Scholars of clientelism implicitly assume that networks are uniform across space, and can be drawn upon during elections to promote the party and bring voters to the polls.⁹⁰ This the first study of political clientelism to systematically enumerate party workers across distinct communities, and examine the influence of party network density and balance on local democracy, representation, and development.

Studies of political clientelism often focus on episodic practices of vote-buying—conditional exchanges during elections in which candidates and political parties distribute mundane patronage goods in exchange for votes. These goods include money, clothes, liquor, food, and medicine. Thirty-seven percent of survey respondents acknowledged that liquor, money, and food are distributed in their settlement—a number that is likely to be underestimated due to social desirability bias. My qualitative work suggests that vote-buying is pervasive and expected among voters during elections; almost ceremonial in its application. When I would ask about the importance of vote-buying, though, residents would often laugh in response, and say they simple take whatever parties have to offer and vote for their preferred party the next day. A state representative in Jaipur frankly noted that vote-buying might only sway five percent of voters. This dissertation strays from studies of vote-buying and instead places the analytical focus on more robust and substantively important forms of clientelistic bargaining that unfold

⁸⁹ For examples, see Ayero 2001; Burgwald 1996; Gay 1994; and Jha et al. 2007.

⁹⁰ See, for instance, Brusco et al. 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Cox 2009; Dunning and Stokes 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; 2009; and Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2011.

among residents, party workers, and elected representatives for infrastructural development and public services. Outcomes in development unfold to a similar *quid-pro-quo* logic, though they are far more protracted and meaningful than fleeting acts of vote-buying.

This dissertation also departs from most studies of clientelism in placing the level of analysis at the community. Politicians approach slum settlements as spatially defined communities that have distinct names, histories, social groups, and developmental deficiencies that can be drawn upon to garner votes. The forms of patronage most sought by slum dwellers—roads, sewers, drainage, schools, piped water, and protection from eviction—are not particularistic to individuals. Instead, they are club goods that are non-excludable to the group of residents in that space. Residents can enjoy these goods and services whether or not they support the incumbent. In the political economy of slum development, the primary dyadic relationship is between politicians and settlements, not politicians and individuals. The demographics and organization of settlements determine the strength and success of demand making. Moreover, ethnic targeting in the provision of public goods and services is difficult in slum settlements, as high levels of diversity and turnover due to migration prevent politicians from relying on stable social structures, as they do in rural areas. This dissertation consequently argues that the appropriate level of analysis is the slum settlement.

The findings from this dissertation caution against approaching political intermediaries—in this study party workers and informal leaders that live and operate in slums—as a homogenous, interchangeable set of actors that exist in that shadowy space between citizens and the state.⁹¹ While slum leaders and party workers occupy a similar typological position in India's slums, they dramatically vary in the extent to which they are active and responsive toward the

⁹¹For examples, see Oldenberg 1976; 1987, Haragopal and Reddy 1985; Mitra 1992; Manor 2000; Auyero 2001; Krishna 2002; 2007; 2011; Stokes et al. *forthcoming*.

claims of residents. Some leaders engage in a wide variety of activities that advance the interests of people in their settlements. Other leaders are inactive or perform only a select number of services for residents, while another group of leaders are transgressive and predatory. The scope and intensity of *netagiri*, or leadership activities, are highly variable from community context to community context. Scholars must therefore look closely at the local informal institutions in which intermediaries are embedded—in particular, those norms, rules, and beliefs that generate informal accountability.

The Horizontal and Vertical Sources of Local Public Goods Provision

Research on the provision of local public goods tends to focus on highly decentralized forms of cooperation and collective action.⁹² This dissertation *does* find evidence that intra-community features—particularly social capital—matter for a number of important outcomes in local development. Regarding outcomes in development, social capital is positive and robustly associated with streetlights and trash collection. Social capital—and the related concepts of social cohesion and social control—also facilitates the maintenance of public order and safety by allowing residents to better monitor, communicate with, and sanction one another. Social capital is a critical component of informal accountability in slums; a united, cooperative, and communicative public can keep their leaders in check through the threat of collective sanctions and defections to other leaders. Fragmented, distrusting, and uncooperative settlements are worse off than their more unified, trusting, and cooperative counterparts.

Social capital, however, is not a panacea in slums. Many of the most important forms of development and public services cannot be secured without strong ties to politicians and officials. These goods and services—paved roads, underground sewer lines, drainage, and piped

⁹² See Knack and Keefer 1997; Bowles and Gintis 2002; Krishna 2002; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Putnam 1993; Khwaja 2007; Ostrom 1990, 2000; Habyarimana et al. 2009.

drinking water—are provided by the state. They are prohibitively costly for slum dwellers to privately secure. Vertical linkages to the larger political currents of the city trump social capital in explaining most of the development indicators under consideration in this dissertation. The internal organization of communities and vertical party networks interact to produce outcomes in local governance and development in India's slums. In the study of local politics and public goods provision in the urban areas of the developing world, scholars must examine both the horizontal and vertical factors that determine community development, and the ways these factors converge and shape one another over time.

Ethnicity, Collective Action, and Public Goods Provision

Comparative politics has devoted a great deal of energy in the last two decades to the study of ethnic politics—in particular, how ethnic diversity impacts public order, development, and democratization. Much of this literature posits and finds a negative relationship between ethnicity and development.⁹³ Diversity can introduce divergent norms, modes of authority, and behavior expectations to a social space, thereby potentially undermining collective efforts to provide public goods. From above, politicians can attempt to consolidate their base of support by deepening ethnic cleavages through provocative rhetoric and violence. Given the larger thrust of the literature on ethnic politics, we would expect ethnic heterogeneity to have an especially caustic effect on cooperation and development in urban slums.

India's urban slums present rich and variable levels of ethnic diversity. These settlements are not homogenous transplants of a cluster of villages. Only one of the eighty settlements under examination can be considered homogenous in terms of caste, religion, and region of origin. Contrary to findings in much of the ethnic politics literature, I find that ethnicity does not

⁹³ For prominent examples, see, Alesina et al. 1999; Banerjee et al. 2005; Easterly and Levine 1997; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Krishna 2002; Posner 2004; and Putnam 2007.

directly influence outcomes in development. In a direct, proximate sense, the relationship between ethnic diversity and development is underdetermined. I do find strong evidence in this dissertation that ethnic heterogeneity is indirectly and *positively* associated with development, through its effects on leadership fragmentation. In the early stages of a settlement, before squatters have engaged in repeated, iterative transactions, leadership often forms within homogenous enclaves. The degree of leadership fragmentation is therefore positively correlated with levels of ethnic diversity, as migrants first form nascent, parochial leadership within their own group. Over time, though, the importance of ethnicity in social interactions subsides in slums, leaving residents open to follow their desired community leader. Through this process, more diverse settlements have higher levels of party network density and, as a consequence, development. Scholars of social diversity and collective action must investigate the manner in which social cleavages interact with extra local forces to structure informal hierarchy in a social space. The relationship may be indirect and work through institutions and institutional change.

Competition and Informal Accountability

Competition—among party workers, community leaders, and political parties—has been a central analytical focus in much of this dissertation. I have argued that competition is a primary mechanism linking party network density and development, as well as a source of leadership accountability and responsiveness. Existing studies of informal accountability examine rumors, moral claims, foot-dragging, and embeddedness in local institutions.⁹⁴ This dissertation highlights an additional and under-examined mechanism that can produce accountability and public goods in non-democratic spaces—decentralized competition among informal actors in

⁹⁴ See Scott 1977; 1987; Booth 1993; Arnold 2001; Schatzberg 2001; and Tsai 2007.

patron-client hierarchies.⁹⁵ Informal leadership is a defining element of urban informality across the developing world. Beyond slums, scholars have found informal leadership and political intermediaries in a diversity of places. The mechanism of competition in the production of informal accountability, therefore, has broad scope conditions and should apply to clientelistic environments in a wide set of contexts.

A darker side of competition also revealed itself in this dissertation: when competition is across political party lines. Rival party networks seek to undermine and de-mobilize each other's efforts—even to the detriment of their own, shared communities. In this way, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of competition in democratic contexts. Inter-party competition is often assumed to be an important element of responsive governance and accountability. Findings from this dissertation give pause to universal assumptions of the benefits of party politics at the local level. Moreover, a fascinating, though unexplored finding in this dissertation is that the intensity of electoral competition at the constituency level is negatively related to several development indicators—the *less* competitive the constituency, the *higher* levels of development. This finding contradicts several studies of federalism, elections, and social spending.⁹⁶ Much of the argument for democratic decentralization is to bring representation and elections to a more local level, where competition among parties and candidates will compel incumbents to do more for development. Competition in urban India, though, is associated with lower levels of development in some areas. Understanding the dynamics of this association is an important path of future research.

⁹⁵ Ermakoff 2011 and Shami 2012.

⁹⁶ Khemani 2004; Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; and Saez and Sinha 2009.

Poverty, Democracy, and Development in India's Cities

Studies of development and local politics in contemporary India overwhelmingly focus on the countryside (Jha et al. 2007). India's cities, however, have been quickly expanding since Independence. Currently, a quarter of India lives in urban areas, and urban India is set to exceed rural India in the mid twenty-first century. Roughly 90 million people live in India's slums, representing a quarter of India's urban population and one-tenth of the total slum population of the world. How do individuals in India's slums engage the state? Under what conditions is the state responsive to the demands of the urban poor? This dissertation makes a contribution to the study of India's political economy by addressing these two questions. As urban India continues to expand, the future of the country's democracy will be largely shaped by how the urban poor organize and engage the state.

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Appendix A: A Note on the Use of Individual and Community Names

I have met all of the requirements for the protection and privacy of human subjects as defined and monitored by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I have been trained and certified through the CITI Human Subjects Protection Training Program, and I personally trained all research assistants and enumerators involved in the survey research to uphold the standards set forth by the IRB. Copies of the IRB consent form, survey instrument, CITI Human Subjects Protection certificate, or any other information concerning the protection of human subjects are available on request.

I have either not identified or have changed the names of research participants—residents of slum settlements, slum leaders, politicians and party officers, and government officials—in this dissertation. I have also changed the names of slum settlements to further ensure the privacy and protection of research subjects.

Appendix B: Survey Data Collection

To construct the sampling frames for the household survey, lists of slum settlements were first gathered from the municipal governments in Bhopal and Jaipur. As discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, the category of “slum” includes a wide diversity of housing conditions for the urban poor. This dissertation, however, focuses on a specific and pervasive type of slum in India—squatter settlements. The larger list of slums, therefore, required further truncation. Excluded from the sample frame were urban poverty pockets such as post-eviction resettlement colonies, rural villages located within municipal boundaries, factory housing, middle-class colonies not yet formally recognized by development authorities, dilapidated colonies in the historic “old cities” of Jaipur and Bhopal, and a transient population of pavement dwellers. Further, and consistent with the Census of India, only slums with a population of over 300 people (roughly 60-70 households) were included. The resulting sample frames were 162 slums in Jaipur and 240 slums in Bhopal. Slums in Jaipur and Bhopal were then stratified into population quintiles. Cities were also divided into three larger zones to ensure a geographically diverse sample. 80 settlements were selected through a stratified random sampling procedure. In Jaipur, seven slums were randomly sampled from each population quintile (for a total of 35) and nine slums were randomly sampled from each population quintile in Bhopal (for a total of 45).

Due to the informal nature of slums, it was important to allow for some flexibility in the sampling process. For instance, some initially selected slums had been evicted since their enumeration in the government list, while other selected slums were found to be non-squatter settlements upon field inspection. For these reasons, slums were first visited before sending in the survey teams to ensure that the slums still existed and fit the category of squatter settlements.

The next stage of the survey sampling involved the selection of households within selected settlements. Slums are poorly documented spaces in India, and accurate household rosters do not exist. Poor migrants often lack formal documentation and there can be high rates of population turnover, and therefore voter lists are an inappropriate sampling frame. Sampling every n^{th} household by linearly walking down a street is not feasible in squatter settlements either, as these areas do not have a coherent system of roads but rather a labyrinthine series of alleyways and streets. Enumerators would be faced with countless decisions on which alleyway to turn down, undermining an attempt to acquire a spatially distributed sample. I therefore employed a spatial sampling technique with satellite images that ensured even geographic coverage and minimized discretion on the part of survey interviewers while in the field.

Satellite images were created for all sampled slums, and each slum was divided into clusters of roughly 20 households. Ensuring a spatially representative sample of households was critical, as migrants form ethnic enclaves and development can be internally uneven. In each slum, a household was first selected in an arbitrarily chosen starting cluster, and subsequent households in that settlement were then sampled across the remaining clusters to deliberately maintain approximate distances to ensure a spatially representative sample. This is similar to a design in which every n^{th} household is sampled along a street, except the repeated sampling is across geographic clusters, not linearly along a series of streets. Each sampled household was marked on the satellite image and assigned to a survey enumerator (all satellite images were from Google Earth). The resulting maps exhibit a spatial grid-system. This was all done prior to the survey work, affording a sample that approximates a random sample. Approximately one out of every 20 households in each slum was sampled, with some variation due to the number of survey interviewers who could be deployed to a particular slum in a given day.

This sampling procedure yielded a total sample size of 1,925 households across the 80 slums. Survey teams in Jaipur and Bhopal conducted the household survey between March and July 2012. Interviewers were recruited from a local development institute in Jaipur and a NGO that works on urban development in Bhopal. I accompanied the survey teams for the entire survey period to ensure the integrity of the sampling procedure.

The survey teams were able to successfully interview 80.5 percent of the households initially selected through the sampling procedure. For those remaining households that were locked, vacant, or unwilling to participate in the survey, survey enumerators were instructed to interview an adjacent household, alternating sides (to the left or right) of the original selected household each time a re-sample was necessary. Enumerators were further instructed, whenever possible, to alternate the sex of the respondent from interview to interview. Just over half (52.9 percent) of the survey respondents were male. To ensure an occupationally diverse set of respondents, the survey teams conducted interviews between 3pm and 8pm. This period straddles two important blocks of time. Between 3 and 5, slums are mostly populated by unemployed residents, stay-at-home adults and residents working in household cottage industries. After 5pm, laborers and those working outside the settlement begin to return home. Conducting the survey across these two periods of time allowed for an economically and occupationally diverse sample that would not have been possible if the interviews had been conducted during earlier hours.

Appendix C: Measuring Social Capital

The table below lists the eight questions that were used to construct measures of community social capital. Responses for each question were first averaged at the slum level. The averaged scores for each slum were then rescaled by subtracting the mean value and then dividing by the standard deviation. Weights were then calculated with principal component analysis, using the component with the highest eigenvalue. A social capital score was then constructed for each sampled slum by summing the rescaled indicators times their weights.

Measuring Social Capital

| Survey Question | Coding |
|--|---|
| If a family here is short of money, or has a member that is sick or dies, will people here in the slum help that family in need? | No = 0; Yes = 1 |
| If you were short of money and needed Rs. 1,000, would your neighbors in the slum lend you the money? | No = 1; Maybe = .5; Yes = 1 |
| In your opinion, would your neighbors in the slum give time or money to improve the development of the slum? | No = 1; Maybe = .5; Yes = 1 |
| If there was a big problem in the slum, like no water or electricity for several days, would people in this slum unite to solve the problem? | No = 0; Yes = 1 |
| When people here are free, do they mostly socialize and spend time with their own social group or do they mix with other social groups? | Mostly with own group = 0 Mix with other groups = 1 |
| During your free time in the slum, how often do you meet with your neighbors to socialize? | Rarely = 0; Every few months = .25 About once a month = .5; About once a week = .75; Daily = 1 |
| Is the following true or false: People in this slum only really care about their own household and don't care about the welfare of the community as a whole. | True = 0; False = 1 |
| Generally speaking, how much do you trust people in this slum? | Don't Trust at all = 0; Trust a little = .5 Trust a lot = 1 |

Appendix D: Slum Populations and Community Asset Maps

I was able to gather accurate government population data on Bhopal's slums. This data was gathered using GIS mapping and exhaustive slum surveys, all in preparation for the central development plan, *Rajiv Awas Yojana*. In Jaipur, available population data on slums were rough, rounded estimates. Some were even derived from residents' guesses of settlement populations. I was able to gather several sources of population data on slums in Jaipur, and the estimates were highly variable across sources and excluded many slums. I therefore calculated more accurate population estimates for all slums in Jaipur using satellite imagery and estimates of population densities. A smaller slum was first selected that had a verifiably accurate population estimate (*Katarpur* slum in central Jaipur). An area and population density was calculated for that slum. I then calculated the area of all slums using Google Earth Pro, and was able to calculate approximate populations of all slums in relation to *Katarpur's* population density. While the resulting calculations face some error due to variability in population densities across slums, the population estimates represent the most accurate data available on the city's slum population.

In each of the 80 sampled slums, community asset maps were created with satellite images and traverse walks. The infrastructure noted on the maps included streetlights, water tanks and community taps, paved roads, schools, places of worship, drainage, and underground sewers. These indicators were then supplemented by the household survey data. A small team of researchers and myself visited all of the 80 sampled slums with satellite maps and marked the exact location of these goods ("traverse walks"). The maps, therefore, provide a highly accurate measure of the quality and placement of various infrastructural goods.

Appendix E: Measuring Party Networks

I enumerated 513 party workers across the 80 sampled slums. This section first describes the structures of parties in Jaipur and Bhopal and then outlines the process used to enumerate political party workers.

The Congress party and BJP are hierarchically organized in the cities in the same pyramidal fashion. At the most grassroots level is the booth, where each party has in place a booth president or representative and a small team of workers that can be drawn on to promote the party and build voter turnout during elections. In Jaipur, for instance, there are approximately 1,500 booths. One level higher than the booth is the ward. There are 77 wards in Jaipur and 70 wards in Bhopal. In each ward a president and a committee of at least 10 other members are appointed and given the responsibility to oversee promotional and electoral activities for the entire ward. Above the ward, then, the two parties slightly diverge. The INC divides cities in blocks—two blocks for each state assembly constituency. Jaipur has 12 and Bhopal has 10 blocks. Each block has a president and a committee of about 10-15 members. Instead of blocks, the BJP has *mandals*, which correspond to the same boundaries as state assembly constituencies. Above the INC block and BJP *mandal* are the district and state. These committees are composed of regionally known party officers that have considerable political sway in local politics.

Both parties have also created specific *prakoshts* and *morchas*, or cells and wings, to organize various interest groups. This includes cells for slum dwellers, women, students, “lower” castes, Muslims, and even occupational wings for engineers, doctors, and lawyers. For both parties, the hierarchical structure of the cells follow that of the rest of the organizational structure of the party, with the exception that positions do not exist at the booth level.

There were two inclusion criteria in enumerating party workers. First, the individual

needed to be a party member with an organizational position in either a main body or an organizational wing. Any level from the booth to the national level was acceptable. Slum leaders that were party supporters but not actual organizational members were not included. Second, the individual needed to live within the sampled slum. Party workers that lived in nearby housing colonies but outside the slum under study were not included.

I then identified party workers by drawing on three sources of information. First, I collected available party membership rosters from city party organizations. These lists were often aggregations of information provided by lower level committees (block and ward levels), and were uneven in their quality and comprehensiveness. When possible, I gathered rosters from lower levels and even slum leaders themselves. These lower-level lists often came in the form of posters or listed entries on party stationary. Second, I asked survey respondents to identify leaders. This allowed me to better match names from rosters to specific slums. Most important, though, were the short interviews I conducted in all of the 80 slums with local party workers to fill-out the lists and ensure their completeness. If slums had party workers from both the INC and BJP, I interviewed party workers from both parties, as party workers have incentives to play down the members of rival networks. Together, the party rosters, survey responses, and interviews with local party workers allowed me to create a comprehensive list of party workers across the 80 sampled slums.