

Social and cognitive factors in semantic change:
Case studies in the development of the Spanish lexicon

By

David Korfhagen

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
(Spanish)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2017

Date of final oral examination: 6/5/2017

The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:

Fernando Tejedo-Herrero, Associate Professor, Spanish and Portuguese

Thomas Cravens, Emeritus Professor, French and Italian

Rajiv Rao, Associate Professor, Spanish and Portuguese

Catherine Stafford, Associate Professor, Spanish and Portuguese

Grant Armstrong, Assistant Professor, Spanish and Portuguese

For Matt

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Acknowledgments

To the members of my dissertation committee: Fernando Tejedo-Herrero, Thomas Cravens, Rajiv Rao, Catherine Stafford, and Grant Armstrong; thank you for your close reading of the manuscript and invaluable guidance throughout the process—I am indebted to all of you.

To Ray Harris-Northall, David Mackenzie, Jason Doroga, Marisa Carpenter, Nate Maddux, Ryan Grosvald, Jared Hendrickson, Sandro Sessarego, Pablo Ancos, Mercedes Alcalá-Galán, Steven Hutchinson, Joe Salmons, Venkat Mani, Todd Michelson-Ambelang, Paloma Celis, John Burns, Luís Madureira, Tammi Simpson, Gail Tanner, and Kate Fanis—thank you all for your guidance and support, which took many different forms.

Special thanks to Joel Rini and Donald Tuten, for organizing the sessions on Romance Linguistics at the annual Kentucky Foreign Language Conference, and to Fernando Tejedo-Herrero and Gabriel Rei-Doval for organizing the annual Lusophone and Hispanic Linguistics Symposium. These events allowed me to present and receive helpful feedback on earlier versions of Chapters 2-4. Thanks to Natalya Stolova, Ken Wireback, Steven Dworkin, David Pharies, Patricia Giménez, and José Ignacio Hualde for their helpful comments.

Thanks to the Mellon Foundation and to the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at UW-Madison for their financial support.

To my family: Laura, Rob, Matt, Joe, Emily, John, Terry, Ale, Iván, Dasha, Natasha, Karlos, Patricia, Carlos, and Eva; I cannot thank you enough for your constant support during this lengthy process. And to Edith, Gollum and Simón—thank you for your endless patience, emotional and intellectual support, and for always reminding me to take a breath.

Abstract

This dissertation contributes to diachronic semantics, in both its theoretical and methodological approaches. A series of case studies show how a socio-cognitive approach to semantic change leads to a deeper understanding of semasiological restructuring than offered by other approaches. Most importantly, the studies exemplify the interaction of social and cognitive factors in semasiological change.

Chapter 1 details the key aspects of the socio-cognitive approach (encyclopedic meaning, conceptualization, salience, entrenchment, conventionalization, prototypes, and social/cultural cognition), as well as the methodology employed in the case studies.

Chapter 2 traces the semantic development of the Spanish verb *afeitar* ('adorn > apply cosmetics > shave'). Historical evidence from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries suggests that the act of applying cosmetics was increasingly viewed in a negative light. I argue that positive connotations were a requisite component to the meaning of *afeitar*, and that the verb was therefore increasingly viewed as inappropriate for reference to the act of applying cosmetics, while it remained suitable for reference to the act of shaving.

Chapter 3 traces the development of the verb *ahorrar* ('free a slave/prisoner > avoid a difficulty > save money/resources'). Historical evidence suggests that a series of economic crises, originating in the sixteenth century, followed by the development of a middle class, influenced the cognitive experience of individuals by increasing the salience of a perceived need—and ability—to save money and resources. The underlying meaning 'remove from action/set aside' made *ahorrar* a good candidate for reference to the action of saving money and other resources.

Chapter 4 traces the development of the adjective/noun *siniestro* ('left > sinister/evil'). Historical evidence suggests that the relative rarity of left-handedness, combined with the social practice of viewing abnormality with fear or disdain—itsself reinforced by religious beliefs and practices—modified the (embodied) cognitive experience of individuals by establishing a conceptual link between the left-hand side of the body and (moral) incorrectness. Over time, the negative connotations became more cognitively salient than the spatial sense of *siniestro* in certain contexts, allowing for expressions involving the non-spatial sense, and even nominal uses.

0 Introduction

The semantic developments of Spanish *afeitar* ('adorn' > 'apply cosmetics' > 'shave'), *ahorrar* ('free a slave/prisoner' > 'avoid a difficulty' > 'save money/resources'), and *siniestro* ('left' > 'sinister/evil') challenge the interpretive scope of most approaches to semantic change. Analysis of these three lexical items shows that each of them involves the intervention of both social and cognitive factors, which most traditional approaches have considered to be "extra-linguistic", and therefore outside the primary scope of linguistic study. Through a series of case studies, I will show that a socio-cognitive approach provides a means for arriving at a deeper level of understanding of these and similar semantic developments.

What is most notable about these words (*afeitar*, *ahorrar*, and *siniestro*) is the fact that the changes in their meanings cannot be understood in strictly semantic terms (in the more traditional, structuralist sense of semantics, which excludes pragmatic and other social factors). For example, there is no clear "language-internal", "structural" motivation for *afeitar* to lose the meaning 'apply cosmetics', while continuing to mean 'shave'. I use the term structuralist here in a broad sense, to refer to a number of different approaches that generally share a view of language that seeks to limit or even eliminate social factors from consideration: these include Structuralist Semantics proper (exemplified by Coseriu 1964, Lehrer 1974, etc.), Generativist Semantics (most notably Katz & Fodor 1963), and Neostucturalist Semantics (e.g. Wierzbicka 1972).¹ The main problem that these approaches face in consideration of the words that I have chosen to study (and of language change in general) is that they view meaning in a decontextualized, clearly delineated way. This reduces semantic change to a shift from one

¹ Traugott & Dasher (2002) and Geeraerts (2010) provide excellent overviews of the principal differences between these approaches, along with their similarities.

structure to another, with little to say about the “external” motivating factors behind the shifts. More recently, cognitive approaches address this issue by adopting a maximalist perspective, which blurs the distinction between semantics and pragmatics (that is, meaning is viewed in a contextualized, “encyclopedic” way), and which views language structure as an integral part of general cognitive abilities (allowing for conceptualization, which constantly modifies meaning structure). This is a step in the right direction toward addressing the changes found in *afeitar*, *ahorrar*, and *siniestro*, but the focus of these approaches tends to remain on the individual speaker’s mental activity, leaving social factors as an implied component of meaning, but one that is generally excluded from the analysis. Thus, to continue with the example of *afeitar*, we can analyze the development of the meanings ‘apply cosmetics’ and ‘shave’ as conceptual (in this case, metonymic) extensions from the earlier meaning ‘adorn’—a process facilitated by the encyclopedic nature of meaning—but we are still left without an understanding of the specific motivations behind the loss of ‘apply cosmetics’. Therefore, I have adopted a more explicit approach to analyzing social factors within this framework, which I refer to as a socio-cognitive approach.²

There are two types of social factors that I have considered for this study. The first type involves social activities that influence individual speakers’ understanding of what a word means. In the case of *afeitar*, this activity most crucially involves the writings of the *moralista* tradition, which denigrated the (excessive) use of cosmetics, especially by women. With regard to *ahorrar*, economic activities came into play, particularly a series of financial crises followed

² Note that there is a growing field known as Cognitive Sociolinguistics (see Pütz et al. 2012, 2014 and Pizarro Pedraza 2016 for overviews). While this study shares a common theoretical foundation with that field, this is, to my knowledge, the first diachronic, semasiological application, at least for Spanish. Díaz-Vera (2014) applies a similar approach to mine using English-language data, but with an onomasiological focus.

by the development of a viable middle class capable of saving money. For *siniestro*, a social tendency toward fear or disdain of abnormality—specifically left-handedness—contributed to the attribution of negative connotations to the word itself. These factors influenced the internal structure of the words’ ranges of meaning, which I will refer to as their semasiological profiles (see Chapter 1 for a detailed explanation).

The second type of social factor involves the spread of the innovative meanings from one individual to another. The cognitive approach, generally speaking, only indirectly addresses the first part of this process, which is known as actuation.³ The “actuation problem” (Weinreich et al. 1968) is described in Milroy & Milroy (1985), Milroy (1992, 2003, etc.), as a process involving both innovation (a modification in the system made by an individual) and change (the spread, or diffusion, of the modification throughout a community).⁴ Indeed, the assumption within the cognitive perspective is that innovation is a result of the (encyclopedic) indeterminacy of lexical meaning. This indeterminacy may arise from various sources, including *negotiability* (which can lead to extension, through the use of linguistic elements in non-conventional ways), *polysemy* (which results from extension), the *graded nature of entrenchment and conventionality* (that is, the degree of entrenchment and conventionality of a given lexical unit varies among individuals and communities), and the *limitless conceptual scope* of even single, well-established senses

³ As Dworkin (2011: 590) points out: cognitive semantics “may throw light on the processes of semantic innovation, but it does not explain how the innovation is accepted by and spreads through the speech community.”

⁴ Some confusion occasionally arises with regard to the terminology involved, as evidenced in Milroy (2006: 148): ...we can say that the primary *actuation* of a change is speaker-based, but the *diffusion* of the change to a whole community and its acceptance into the language of that community, are also essential parts of what has to be explained in accounting for language change. The conventional discourse, which assumes an axiomatic distinction between sound change and borrowing, has not generally incorporated this prior separation of *innovation* from *change*.

Note that ‘actuation’ is typically understood to involve both the innovation and the change. Dworkin (2005: 651) presents another example of the potential for confusion, albeit in Spanish: “varios sociolingüistas [...] han distinguido entre la *implantación* o *introducción* y la *actuación* o *difusión* del cambio en la comunidad” (emphasis added).

(Langacker 2010: 96). A speaker might at any time be influenced by any of these sources; indeed, this is probably impossible to avoid, since one's background knowledge about the world is constantly changing and no two usage events are ever identical. The cognitive approach assumes that further usage events that employ the innovative use of the lexical item lead to its entrenchment in the minds of interlocutors, who go on to re-use it in other usage events with other interlocutors, and so on.⁵ The tendency, however, is to leave analysis of the second part of actuation (i.e. diffusion) to the side, without delving further into the matter. As I will show further along, however, the words I have chosen to study present cases in which the matter is far from trivial. In the case of *afeitar*, for example, a purely cognitive approach might address, in part,⁶ the innovatory senses of the word (from 'adorn' to 'apply cosmetics' to 'shave', etc.), but it has little to say about the diffusion of the innovation throughout the community. To address this issue, I have included the social/cultural cognition model (Sharifian 2009, Sinha 1999, *inter alia*), which provides a plausible account of how language structure—from the maximalist, contextualized perspective, as a collective cognitive structure with gestalt properties—changes through interactions between speakers.

The primary objective of this project, then, is to show how a socio-cognitive approach to semantic change leads to a deeper understanding of changes to a given word's range of meanings (in other words, to a deeper understanding of semasiological restructuring). In order to achieve this objective, I will first provide a descriptive account of the developments of each word in

⁵ The employment of the innovative use of the conceptual structure need not be conscious, although it can be. This might be the case, for example, in contexts involving the reinforcement of social identity (e.g. word-final bilabial realizations of nasals in the Yucatan Peninsula; see, for example, Michnowicz 2007, 2008), or in the processes of language planning and standardization.

⁶ It does not, for example, fully account for the social factors involved in the (social) gender distinction between the two activities (i.e. women are the prototypical 'appliers of cosmetics' while men are the prototypical 'shavers').

question. This involves determining, through a corpus-based analysis, what the prototypical meaning of each word was at a given time, starting as early as possible, and finding when the shifts from one meaning to the next occurred. Once this description has been established, the task will be to account for the shifts in terms of social and cognitive factors. In some cases, the shift appears to be understandable in terms of cognitive factors alone (for example, ‘apply cosmetics’ can be viewed as a result of metonymic extension from ‘adorn’). Other cases are less obvious, and require consideration of social factors (as in the shift from ‘apply cosmetics’ to ‘shave’, which requires an understanding of the social evaluation of applying cosmetics and shaving at the time of the change). In each case study, I will offer examples of words that appear to have undergone similar developments to the ones that I focus on here. While the specifics of each case will vary from one word to the next—in terms of the degree of involvement of each cognitive factor, and the nature of the intervening social factors—the goal will be to provide a basis for generalization across a number of cases, each of which will be the topic of future research.

The remaining chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides further detail and justification regarding the key aspects of the socio-cognitive approach that I have adopted (encyclopedic meaning, conceptualization, salience, entrenchment, conventionalization, prototypes, and social/cultural cognition), as well as the methodology employed in the case studies.

Chapter 2 traces the semantic development of the verb *afeitar*, analyzing it in terms of its referential (or denotational) and nonreferential (or connotational) meaning. Data collected from electronic corpora suggest the existence of three phases in the semantic development of the verb. The three phases were associated with the semantic domains ADORN, APPLY COSMETICS, and SHAVE, which corresponded to the prototypical meanings of the verb during each phase,

respectively. Literary evidence from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries suggests that the social élite increasingly viewed the act of applying cosmetics in a negative light. I argue that positive connotations were a requisite component to the meaning suggested by the verb, and that the verb was therefore increasingly viewed as inappropriate for reference to the act of applying cosmetics, while it remained perfectly suitable for reference to the act of shaving.

Chapter 3 traces the development of *ahorrar*, analyzing it in terms of entrenchment and conventionalization. As with *afeitar*, data collected from the corpora suggest three phases, in this case associated with the domains FREE A SLAVE, AVOID A DIFFICULTY, and SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES. Historical evidence suggests that a particular series of economic crises, originating in the sixteenth century, followed by the development of a viable middle class, influenced the cognitive experience of individuals by increasing the salience of a perceived need—and ability—to save money and resources (entrenchment). This increased salience contributed to increased frequency of discussion of the topic during social interaction. The underlying domain REMOVE FROM ACTION/SET ASIDE made *ahorrar* a good candidate for reference to the actions of saving money and other resources, and consequently the use of the lexical item increased in frequency (conventionalization).

Chapter 4 traces the development of *sinistro*, analyzing it in terms of embodied cognition and metaphorical extension. In this case, historical evidence suggests that the distribution of left-handed people (i.e. approximately 10% of the population), combined with the social practice of viewing abnormality with fear or disdain—itsself reinforced by religious beliefs and practices—modified the (embodied) cognitive experience of individuals by establishing a conceptual link between the left-hand side of the body and (moral) incorrectness. This process involved a series of metaphorical associations (ABNORMAL IS BAD > LEFT-HANDEDNESS IS

ABNORMAL > THE LEFT HAND IS BAD > THE LEFT IS BAD), and continued to the extent that the negative connotations became more cognitively salient than the spatial component of *sinistro* in certain contexts, allowing for expressions involving the non-spatial sense (e.g. *la siniestra muerte* ‘horrible death’), and even nominal uses (e.g. *un siniestro en la carretera* ‘a traffic accident’).

In Chapter 5, I summarize the results of the case studies, drawing general conclusions about the efficacy of the socio-cognitive approach for the study of semantic change, and discussing possibilities for future research. I show that this project offers useful contributions to diachronic semantics, in both its methodological and theoretical approaches.

1 Theoretical framework and methodology

1.1 Overview

This study employs a socio-cognitive approach which is heavily influenced by the work of Langacker (especially 1987, 1990, 2000, 2008, 2010) and others.⁷ It should be noted that while these authors all describe themselves as cognitive linguists, their particular takes on the workings of language do not always completely overlap with each other. Given this fact, it will be necessary to bear in mind that when I use the term ‘cognitive’, I typically refer to points which cognitive linguists in general tend to agree upon, with the knowledge that there may occasionally be discrepancies.⁸ It should also be noted that, while the theoretical notions employed in this study are generally shared by many sub-fields of cognitive linguistics, the principal source of the terminology used here—for its general clarity—is the sub-field known as Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1990, 2000, 2008, 2010).

The adoption of this approach for this study was motivated by three primary observations. First of all, my early analysis of the data suggested that, among the previously used approaches to semantics (structuralist semantics, e.g. Coseriu 1964, Lehrer 1974; generativist semantics, e.g. Katz & Fodor 1963; neostructuralist semantics, e.g. Wierzbicka 1972; etc.), it was the best-suited for examination of the evidently social nature of the semantic changes observed. In the case of *afeitar* ‘shave’ (<CL *affectare*⁹ ‘do something to someone/something’),

⁷ Primarily Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987), Geeraerts (1992, 1997, 1999, 2006, 2010), Geeraerts et al. (1994), Blank (1999), Croft (2000), Talmy (2000), Taylor (2003, 2006 [2009]), Evans & Green (2006), Grondelaers et al. (2007), and Sharifian (2009, 2011).

⁸ In fact, I use terms like ‘cognitive’ and ‘cognitive linguists’ as terms of convenience, principally because the cited authors use those terms. In reality, there are many disparate research trends that in one way or another lay legitimate claim to the term, including the formalist (e.g. ‘Chomskyan’) approaches that authors such as Langacker wish to distance themselves from. Taylor (2006 [2009]) provides a good analysis of the different ways in which the term has been used, and Taylor (2010) discusses the ‘polemical streak’ in much of the literature.

⁹ I have chosen here to acknowledge Classical Latin’s status as a part of the diachronic Latin-Romance-Spanish continuum—and not as something anomalous or ‘special’—by representing Classical items in lower-case form.

the development from the rather vague Classical sense to the much more specific modern sense might, at first, appear to be a relatively straightforward case of semantic restriction, driven by cognitive mechanisms (e.g. the sequence ‘do something to someone’ > ‘adorn/beautify’ > ‘shave’ shows metonymic specification). But a look at other attested senses of the verb, most interestingly ‘apply cosmetics’, leads one to wonder what factors contributed to the loss of some of the more specific ones, and not others. Analysis of the data, combined with socio-historical background information, shows that the time-period in which the sense ‘apply cosmetics’ fell into disuse was essentially the same time-period in which a public sentiment against the use of cosmetics came to the fore in the Iberian Peninsula, and consequently rendered meaningless the use of a word with positive connotations, such as *afeitar*, to refer to the act of applying cosmetics. As we will see further along, the words *ahorrar* and *siniestro* present similar problems, where other approaches cannot suffice to account for the observed changes in their semasiological profile.¹⁰

Secondly, while researchers in cognitive semantics acknowledge the importance of social factors in lexical/semantic change, their focus has generally, and understandably, remained on cognitive factors. Efforts are under way to develop a new field that combines sociolinguistics and cognitive linguistics (e.g. Pütz et al. 2012, 2014; Díaz-Vera 2014; Pizarro Pedraza 2016; etc.) but, at least so far, the general focus has been on synchronic data, and the thrust has been toward incorporating sociolinguistic methodologies into cognitive semantics (e.g. using corpus-

¹⁰ A semasiological profile is understood to mean the set of meanings associated with a given word, in contrast to an onomasiological profile, which is the set of words associated with a given meaning. This point will be developed further along.

based data) and toward incorporating the study of semantics into sociolinguistics (see Pizarro Pedraza 2016 for a detailed discussion).

Thirdly, there have as of yet been few studies undertaken within the cognitive framework (socio- or otherwise) in general that focus on Spanish. Santos Domínguez & Espinosa Elorza (1996) appears to be the only book-length study undertaken to date that follows closely along the theoretical lines discussed here and that deals with Spanish.¹¹ The primary thrust of the study is to apply the theoretical work on changes resulting from metaphorical and metonymic extensions outlined in Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), and Johnson (1987). The study involves exposition of the relationship between six different image schemas (namely, CONTAINER, CENTER/PERIPHERY, PART/WHOLE, FORCE DYNAMICS, LINK, and PATH). Image schemas will be further discussed in section 1.3 and their metaphorical or metonymic extensions into specific conceptual domains (e.g. the image schema CONTAINER is projected via metaphor onto the concept WORD, such that words are conceptualized as ‘containers’ that hold semantic content (p. 171)). The conceptual domains covered are SPATIAL ORIENTATION AND MOVEMENT, SPACE > TIME, CAUSATION, PHYSICAL PERCEPTION > INTELLECTUAL PERCEPTION, VERBAL COMMUNICATION, and FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS. The present study expands on this earlier work by going beyond the level of image schemas into more complex domains. For example, Chapter 2 examines the complex domain BEAUTIFY as it relates to multiple domains associated with the lexical item *afeitar*. Other relevant studies will be reviewed in this chapter within the context of the theoretical notions that they address.

What is particularly attractive about the application of a socio-cognitive approach in the context of historical linguistics is that it addresses some of the concerns raised by sociolinguists

¹¹ Additional studies exist, mainly with reference to other languages, and some of which are reviewed in Dworkin (2011), but they are only peripherally related to the present purposes.

(e.g. Milroy 2003), who criticize the ‘standard’ perspective for being excessively (or, at times, exclusively) focused on endogenous change, and it likewise addresses some of the concerns raised by those who prefer to seek language-internal factors, reserving sociolinguistic arguments exclusively for cases in which internal factors fail to provide satisfactory analyses (e.g. Rini 2004). The socio-cognitive view sees language structure as something that must be studied with both perspectives in mind.

One of the possible difficulties involved in applying the cognitive approach (as with all ‘functional’ approaches¹²) to historical data is that it depends crucially on the notion that language is created ‘interactionally,’ that is, usage events (involving multiple interlocutors) lead to the creation of conventional units, which are repeatedly employed in other usage events, allowing for their entrenchment in speakers’ minds.¹³ Since all available historical data (at least those that were created prior to the twentieth century) are not only limited to the involvement of only one interlocutor (with the exception of cases in which sequential letters between correspondents survive¹⁴), but also to the written medium, and since many of the surviving written texts are composed in rather contrived and non-spontaneous styles (e.g. legal documents, poetry, etc.), it is not only impossible to observe usage events in this context, but also extremely difficult to find evidence of the results of real-time usage events.¹⁵ Consequently, the best we can

¹² Tuten & Tejedo-Herrero (2011) provide a helpful overview of the problems and advantages of applying sociolinguistic approaches to historical data.

¹³ This also relates to the ‘actuation problem’, which will be briefly discussed below, in section 1.7.

¹⁴ Although, even then, the respective turns taken in the ‘usage event’ are considerably separated both chronologically and topically.

¹⁵ However, in some respects the data provided by certain types of historical documents (especially legal documents), might prove to be useful as evidence of the process of conventionalization (i.e. entrenchment on the societal level, rather than in the individual mind), since they often involve the repeated employment of particular conventional units (although the very fact that the lexical items in question are employed in writing might in itself suggest that they are already entrenched, except in the case of neologisms that are only recorded in one instance).

do is to apply the uniformitarian principle, which states that the mechanisms and processes involved in language variation and change in the present must have been involved in variation and change in the past (see Labov 1994 for discussion). This might be rephrased within the cognitive framework as ‘what is true of general cognitive abilities and functions in humans in the present was also true in the past’. Therefore, albeit with great care, we can apply many of the insights gleaned from recent synchronic research to the available historical data.

The goals of this chapter, then, are to present a detailed outline of the theoretical component of my analysis—drawing from various sub-fields within cognitive linguistics—and to describe the methodology that I have used to carry out the three case studies presented in chapters 2-4. The ordering of the sections is generally meant to flow from the most basic notions to the most complex, and from the workings of individual minds to the workings of the ‘collective mind’ but, as the discussion will make clear, these are gradient notions that cannot be completely separated from each other. Section 1.2 lays the foundation for what follows by discussing the nature of meaning as it is conceptualized within the cognitive framework (as usage-based and encyclopedic). Section 1.3 addresses the relevant aspects of conceptualization: basic and non-basic domains, categorization, and metaphor; section 1.4 discusses salience, entrenchment, conventionalization, and conventional linguistic units; section 1.5 deals with the establishment of prototypes; section 1.6 incorporates the social/cultural cognition model into the theory; section 1.7 outlines the methodology for the case studies; and section 1.8 concludes the chapter.

1.2 The nature of linguistic meaning

According to the cognitive view, linguistic meaning is usage-based and encyclopedic in nature. That is, all of the pieces of knowledge that speakers have regarding a particular entity (object, process, etc.) can potentially come into play when considering the meaning of a word that refers to that entity, depending on the context of the usage event.¹⁶ The ‘pieces of knowledge’ are often called *attributes*, *concepts*, *conceptions*, *conceptualizations*, *categories*, etc. but, as we will see later on, they are essentially the same thing as *conceptual domains* (at least for the type of analysis that I will be doing here); thus, I will simplify the discussion by referring to them as *domains*.¹⁷ I will refer to the (potentially infinite) set of all domains that comprise the encyclopedic meaning of a word as that word’s *semasiological profile*.¹⁸ The notion that meaning is encyclopedic follows from the view that natural language is usage-based and ‘non-autonomous,’ in the sense that it is integrated with other cognitive capacities. As Langacker (2010: 96) puts it:

Consider the lexical unit *cat*, in its ordinary sense of referring to a typical domestic feline. Speakers know a great deal about such creatures: their size and shape; the range of their colors and markings; the sounds they make; how they move; what they eat; that they are kept as pets; their penchant for sleeping; that they like to scratch on furniture; their playfulness as kittens; their occasional utility in catching rodents; their stereotype as being self-centered and aloof; their cultural role in being emblematic of the mysterious; and so on. In contrast to standard doctrine, there is no good reason to believe that any particular portion of this knowledge functions exclusively as the linguistic meaning of

¹⁶ I use the expression ‘usage event’ to encompass both speech and writing/reading. In a similar fashion, I tend to use ‘interlocutor’ to refer both to speakers and to writers/readers.

¹⁷ I actually prefer the de-verbal term *conceptualization* for its emphasis on their dynamic, flexible nature, but it can be problematic in that it also refers to cognitive processing and meaning construction. *Domain* also has the advantage of working well with certain highly conventionalized terminology (e.g., as we will see later, *basic* vs. *non-basic domains*, terms which many authors use regardless of their choice among *attributes*, *concepts*, etc.). The term *attributes* is meant to contrast with *features*, a popular term in generativist and other structuralist approaches to semantics. Those approaches depend on a so-called ‘necessary-and-sufficient-conditions’ or ‘dictionary’ view of meaning, which assumes an autonomous mental lexicon, separate from cultural, social, and physical knowledge. Evans & Green (2006: especially 206-222) provide a particularly helpful discussion of the differences between the different approaches.

¹⁸ *Conceptual substrate* or *domain matrix* are other common terms for this.

cat, nor that it assumes any special, specifically linguistic format. From the C[ognitive] G[rammar] standpoint, the lexeme is seen instead as flexibly invoking this largely independent knowledge in context-dependent fashion.

This, of course, is not meant to imply that all of the many possible domains associated with a given word's semasiological profile bear equal semantic importance at any given time, but rather that context influences the focus of the participating interlocutors, such that different domains become more 'central' to the meaning of the word than others in a given usage event. The contextual influence can work in two directions—sometimes the context guides the interlocutors (e.g. observing a cat in a room), other times the interlocutors create the context (e.g. talking about their cats back home); in both cases the context influences, or even dictates, which aspects of the meaning of *cat* that they focus on. In the case of many lexical items, certain domains are centralized—or 'activated' in Langacker's terminology—with such frequency that they give the impression that they represent the 'true' meaning of the word, as opposed to sporadic meanings arising from ignorance, misunderstanding, mis-use, etc. For example, SLOWLY is conventionally activated by use of the verb *plod*, such that sentences like those presented in (1) might appear "contradictory or redundant" (Montrul & Salaberry 2003: 62-3; examples taken from p. 62):

- (1) a. Mary plodded along, #but not slowly.
- b. Mary plodded along, #slowly.

The implication, according to the 'dictionary' view of meaning, is that SLOWLY is a fixed, central domain within the semasiological profile of *plod*. According to the encyclopedic view, however, sporadic (or 'novel') meanings are possible precisely because of the flexibility of semasiological profiles. During a usage event that could potentially produce (1a), the phrase *but not slowly* temporarily de-emphasizes the domain SLOWLY within the semasiological profile of *plod*, leaving WALK HEAVILY alone as the central meaning. In (1b), at least two differing interpretations are possible: on the one hand, the speaker/writer might have wished to add extra emphasis to

SLOWLY within the semasiological profile or, on the other hand, SLOWLY might have been absent from their understanding of the word's meaning, such that they felt the need to add it. At any rate, the main point is that pragmatic factors are viewed here as something beyond simple performative anomalies: they reflect substantive changes to (or individual differences in) the very structure of semasiological profiles, to varying degrees of permanence. I will presently return to the distinction between semantics and pragmatics.

The extreme consequence of the points made in the preceding paragraph would be that all words could potentially mean anything at any given time. In principle, this is actually true, but social constraints generally prevent extremely novel usages from extending beyond a single usage event. For example, I could refer to the color of these printed words with the lexical item *rhinoceros*. In this isolated usage event (my writing of these words and your reading them), I have used the lexical item *color* to elicit the mental construction of a semasiological profile consisting of the domain COLOR, which itself entails a series of domains (including ORANGE, YELLOW, BLACK, CRIMSON, etc.). The visual context invoked by the expression *these printed words* has then encouraged the momentary activation—or centralization—of the domain BLACK, and I have then associated that domain with the word *rhinoceros*. Thus, I have (at least temporarily) added the domain BLACK to the semasiological profile of *rhinoceros*. If I then—having contextually influenced this very usage event (i.e. ‘primed’ my reader’s mind)—write something like *these words are rhinceros*, then the word *rhinoceros* does, in a cognitively real way, activate the domain BLACK, in the same way that the word *black* conventionally does across many usage events. If contextual factors were such that that domain were activated within the semasiological profile of *rhinoceros* with sufficient frequency, it would eventually begin to rival *black* as an acceptable choice for reference to that color. As we will see in greater detail in

section 1.4, this is related to entrenchment and salience—the more frequently a domain is activated, the more entrenched and salient it becomes as a cognitive processing routine. In this way, peripheral meanings at one point in time can become central meanings at a later time. All three case studies will exemplify this point.

Another important notion to which I have already alluded is that words (and expressions in general) are not ‘containers’ that carry meaning, but rather that they are ‘prompts’ for meaning construction. As Evans & Green (2006: 214) put it, “according to this view, language actually represents highly underspecified and impoverished prompts relative to the richness of conceptual structure that is encoded in semantic structure: these prompts serve as ‘instructions’ for conceptual processes that result in meaning construction.” But this type of construction is highly conventionalized, such that most lexical items, by virtue of their conventionality, tend to activate a relatively consistent set of domains across a number of usage events.¹⁹ Another way to put this is that expressions both impose and reflect particular construals of an idea or situation (Langacker 2008: 4). As the following discussion will make clear, this flexibility can have far-reaching consequences across a large number of usage events. For example, as we will see in Chapter 4, *NEGATIVE*—a context-dependent domain within the semasiological profile of the Classical Latin word *sinister*—eventually ‘overtook’ the more central domain *LEFT*, to the extent that the modern form *siniestro* is now rarely used to mean ‘left’.

Another consequence of the usage-based, encyclopedic view of linguistic meaning is that the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is blurred, and the two become part of a continuum. This follows from the idea that context always influences meaning construction. A simple demonstration of this point can be found in the case of homophones, such as the English

¹⁹ Exceptions would include lexical items like *thing*, *stuff*, etc., which are conventionally schematic.

words *reed* and *read*, which, in speech, cannot be distinguished without context, at least in varieties in which they are indeed pronounced the same. A more poignant example would be *Buckner*, which in some contexts is the surname of a famous professional baseball player from the 1980s, but in other contexts is a verb that means ‘commit an error in a key situation’, as in *he really bucknered the ball*. In this case, the ‘pragmatic’ knowledge that Bill Buckner made an error in 1986 that led to his team’s loss in an important game has become indistinguishable from the ‘semantic’ content of a new verb. The notion that semantics and pragmatics form a continuum stems from the fact that the meaning of some words, such as deictics like *here*, *now*, etc., are generally more context-dependent than others, such as *Wisconsin*. Technically speaking, it follows from this viewpoint that “pragmatic meaning, rather than coded [i.e. semantic] meaning, is ‘real’ meaning” (Evans & Green 2006: 216). Nevertheless, as a matter of convenience and of convention, the term ‘semantics’ is used within the socio-cognitive framework to refer to the study of meaning in general.

In spite of the blurring of semantics and pragmatics, many authors have found it useful to maintain a theoretical distinction between the two types of meaning, but with different terminology: referential (or denotational in the ‘traditional’ view) meaning vs. non-referential (or connotational) meaning. As the name suggests, referential meaning deals with the *referent* of an utterance, that is, the *mentally-represented* entity indicated by the utterance. Non-referential meaning, on the other hand, deals with the *emotive*, *stylistic*, or *discursive* aspects of an utterance, as well as its social distribution.²⁰ Two important points follow from these distinctions.

²⁰ Note that an ‘utterance’ is generally understood as anything from an interjection to a full sentence or, arguably, an entire extended discourse, and that ‘utterance meaning’ (i.e. contextualized, pragmatic meaning) is often distinguished from ‘sentence meaning’ (i.e. decontextualized, semantic meaning) (see, for example, Cruse 2004: 19-22). In the present study I focus, of course, on the contextualized use of individual lexical items, and I use the term utterance here to simply mean “the use of a word.”

First of all, as Taylor (2002) and Jackendoff (1983) point out, for the purposes of linguistic meaning, there is no useful distinction between ‘mentally-conceived’ entities and ‘real-world’ entities, given that linguistic meaning is essentially a mental phenomenon. That is not to say that real-world entities in some way ‘do not exist’, but rather that our awareness of them takes place completely in the mind. This forms part of a movement in cognitive linguistics to recuperate certain elements of Saussurean doctrine which have, according to Taylor, been misunderstood and therefore rejected without proper consideration. As Taylor points out, the famous ‘tree diagram’, linking the ‘signifier’ [tʁi:] to the ‘signified’ [a visual image of a tree],

[...] can be deceptive, in a number of ways. To begin with, the diagram might suggest that the linguistic sign associates a ‘thing’ (i.e. an actual tree growing in the yard) with a ‘sound’ (i.e. an actual pronunciation of the word *tree*). Saussure emphatically states that this is *not* how the linguistic sign is to be understood [...] Both the concept and the acoustic image are mental entities which reside in the mind of a language user. (2002: 41-2)²¹

This will be a recurring theme throughout the discussion that follows, but especially in section 1.3 with regard to basic vs. non-basic domains, and section 1.4 regarding the distinction between cognitive (i.e. ‘mental’) and ontological (i.e. ‘real-world’) salience.

The second point is that whether or not we choose to call them different things, both types of meaning—referential and non-referential—are afforded equal analytic status within the semasiological profile of a word. That is, referential domains, such as FURRY ANIMAL, and non-referential domains, such as MYSTERIOUS, are analyzed ‘on the same level’ when determining the semasiological profile of *cat*, and not as separate ‘language-internal’ and ‘language-external’ factors. We will see this, for example, in Chapter 2 with regard to *afeitar*: referential domains

²¹ Cf. Saussure (1964: 32): “[...] les deux partis du signe sont également psychiques” (the two parts of the sign are equally psychological).

will include SHAVE and APPLY COSMETICS, while NEGATIVE and POSITIVE will be regarded as non-referential domains.

In the following sections, I will move on to the way in which meaning is structured within the semasiological profile of a word, beginning with the relevant aspects of conceptualization (basic and non-basic domains, categorization, and metaphor) and then continuing with salience, entrenchment, and conventionalization in the following section.

1.3 Conceptualization: basic domains, non-basic domains, categorization, and metaphor

Semasiological profiles comprise sets of conceptual domains and, while the number of domains associated with a given lexical item is—at any point in time—potentially infinite, the actual number and type of associated domains is severely limited by contextual factors. In this section and those that follow, we will delve into the creation and workings of the domains themselves, with respect to their internal structure and their interaction with each other.

In the first place, it is important to bear in mind that the practice of representing domains with lexical items (in this case, I have been using English lexical items, such as the word *color* to represent the domain COLOR, *tree* for TREE, *black* for BLACK, etc.) is inherently problematic, given the nature of semasiological profiles as outlined up to this point. One reason is that domains themselves are ‘pre-linguistic’—in the sense that they provide the conceptual content for lexical items, but are not words in their own right (in part because they lack a ‘real-world’ acoustic component). Rather, they are schematic mental representations, which can themselves be broken down into more basic schematic representations, and so on, in the flexible, encyclopedic fashion outlined above. As we saw earlier, lexical items are ‘prompts’ for the construction of meaning. Domains, however, are not themselves prompts, but rather pieces of meaning that can be combined in various ways during the construction process. This is one of the

reasons why a visual image of a tree is normally used to represent the ‘signified’ (i.e. domain) portion of the Saussurean sign—to avoid using the lexical item *tree* when a domain, not a word, is meant. But, as we have seen, this can lead to further misconceptions, including the idea that the image represents a ‘real-world’ tree, or that it represents a specific type of tree, and so on (cf. Taylor 2002: 41-2; quoted in the preceding section).²² Consequently, upper-case lexical items are used to represent domains as a matter of methodological convenience, but with the disclaimer that they are inherently inaccurate.

The next point relates back to the distinction between ‘mentally-conceived’ and ‘real-world’ entities (cf. Jackendoff 1983, Taylor 2002). There is, of course, some type of objective reality—a realm in which human beings have ‘embodied’ experiences, such as the rising and falling of temperature, physical/spatial movement (with associated physical forces, such as gravity, etc.), tastes, smells, and so on. But experiencing this reality and conceptualizing it (even in a non-linguistic way) are two distinguishable phenomena. The difference between the two is such that even with the use of gestures and deictics—of the type *this bucket that I have here in my hand* (said by someone while pointing at the bucket)—the linguistic expression still refers to a *mental* representation (i.e. conceptualization) of both the bucket and the hand, etc., and only indirectly to the bucket and the hand in the objective world. It is beyond the scope of this study to undergo a complete philosophical discussion of this point (see, for example, Wittgenstein 1978 for such discussion), but it is necessary to bring it up here in order to properly introduce the notions of categorization, basic domains, and non-basic domains.

²² Likewise, a more accurate representation than BLACK might be something like this: ████. But methodological difficulties can still arise, for example, when trying to represent other colors on a black-and-white page (not to mention the multitude of gradations involved in trying to represent COLOR, or more abstract notions such as LOVE).

Categorization is a specific type of process included in the larger set of engaged, embodied, and interactive mental processes known as conceptualization. As Langacker puts it, “in addition to purely mental ruminations, [conceptualization] is taken as including sensory, motor, and emotive experience. Rather than being insular, therefore, conceptualization encompasses these basic modes of engaging the world” (Langacker 2010: 95). Categorization, especially as expounded in Lakoff (1987), is fundamental to cognitive semantics in general. According to this view, the mind creates categories in order to make sense of the vast array of perceived objects, actions, and notions. ‘Basic level’ categories are those which typically relate directly to our embodied experience in the world (keeping in mind that ‘perception’ and ‘experience’, here, refer to a mental construal of ‘real-world’ objects, etc.). For example, CAT represents something that we can easily see and touch and recognize the shape of, and it constitutes what is essentially the ‘prototypical’ level within the larger set of more abstract categories directly related to it. These more abstract (or ‘superordinate’, ‘higher’, ‘more general’, ‘more schematic’) categories consist of entities or concepts that cannot be imagined in terms that do not relate back to the basic level, but which are not directly part of our embodied experience. That is, a superordinate category, such as ANIMAL, must, by its nature, be imagined in terms of cats, dogs, etc. (it is impossible to imagine a featureless animal)—yet ANIMAL is clearly not on the same level of categorization as CAT—and more specific (or ‘subordinate’, ‘lower’) categories consist of particular examples of the basic level (e.g. CALICO CAT).

Within the process of categorization are what Langacker calls basic domains (not to be confused with basic-level categories), which are closely related to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) image schemas.²³ To paraphrase Langacker (2010), cognitive domains in general are understood

²³ Evans & Green (2006: 233-5) outline some technical differences between image schemas and basic domains (e.g. the image schema CONTAINER is based on a combination of the basic domain SPACE and the image schema

as the content of an expression (provided by its ‘conceptual substrate’²⁴) and are considered to be basic when they are associated with fundamental facets of experience such as time, space, and sensory perception (hence the inclusion of the notion of embodiment—our bodies take up space, pass through time, and perceive the world through the senses), and can therefore no longer be broken down into less-complex domains. Non-basic domains include simple categories, such as YELLOW, or elaborate systems, such as THE RULES AND STRATEGIES OF CHESS. Conceptualization, then, is the cognitive process by which the conceptual substrate provides the content of conceptions, by means of construal, which is done via conceptual abilities/mechanisms (Langacker 2010: 98).²⁵

Returning to the notion of metaphor—recall the brief overview of Santos Domínguez & Espinosa Elorza (1996) in section 1.1—from the Cognitive Linguistics perspective, it is typically viewed as a process of ‘mapping’ from a source (usually basic) domain to a target (usually non-basic) domain (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, etc.). In the case of a metaphor such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, JOURNEY is the source domain and LIFE is the target domain. Basic domains, then, act as links between the ‘real world’ and the mentally construed world. But this is not to say that

MATERIAL OBJECT, and thus is more complex than a basic domain [cf. Clausner and Croft 1999]). Langacker (2010: 98) states that basic domains “are not themselves concepts but irreducible realms of experience within which conception can emerge”. Image schemas, on the other hand, are generally considered to be entirely conceptual. Since this study focuses on more complex domains, the technical difference will be unimportant, and I will simplify the discussion by referring to ‘basic’ and ‘non-basic’ domains, leaving the term ‘image schema’ to the side.

²⁴ Note that my term ‘semasiological profile’ only applies when talking about a single lexical item, while ‘conceptual substrate’ can apply to sentences as well.

²⁵ Evans & Green (2006: 190) offer the following “far from exhaustive” list of image schemas, organized according to the nature of their experiential grounding (note the bolded categories, which are themselves image schemas), most of which also qualify as basic domains: **SPACE**: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, LEFT-RIGHT, NEAR-FAR, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, CONTACT, STRAIGHT, VERTICALITY; **CONTAINMENT**: CONTAINER, IN-OUT, SURFACE, FULL-EMPTY, CONTENT; **LOCOMOTION**: MOMENTUM, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL; **BALANCE**: AXIS BALANCE, TWIN-PAN BALANCE, POINT BALANCE, EQUILIBRIUM; **FORCE**: COMPULSION, BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, DIVERSION, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT, ENABLEMENT, ATTRACTION, RESISTANCE; **UNITY/MULTIPLICITY**: MERGING, COLLECTION, SPLITTING, ITERATION, PART-WHOLE, COUNT-MASS, LINK(AGE); **IDENTITY**: MATCHING, SUPERIMPOSITION; **EXISTENCE**: REMOVAL, BOUNDED SPACE, CYCLE, OBJECT, PROCESS (Evans & Green culled the list from Cienki 1998, Gibbs & Colston 1995, Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1987, and Lakoff & Turner 1989).

metaphor and metonymy only operate between basic domains/image schemas and non-basic domains; they often involve two or more non-basic domains, as in cases like ‘I like to read Cervantes’, where CERVANTES is metonymically mapped onto THE WORK OF CERVANTES. Metaphor will be especially important in Chapter 4, where I will discuss its involvement in the development of *sinistro* (wherein NEGATIVE was mapped onto LEFT).

Important for fully understanding the theoretical notions outlined up to this point are salience, entrenchment, conventionalization, and conventional linguistic units, which we will turn to in the next section.

1.4 Salience, entrenchment and conventionalization, conventional linguistic units

The term ‘salience’ has two different senses. *Cognitive* salience refers to the active, present-moment workings of the brain. A domain is cognitively salient if it is the focus of active mental processing in a given moment. *Ontological* salience, on the other hand, is a conceptualization of the ‘real world’ that tends to stand out in the general experience of an individual or a community. Schmid (2007: 120) gives the example of a dog running through a field: generally speaking, for most people—and in most situations—the running dog is more ontologically salient than the field.

Salience is an important component of entrenchment, which is the process through which cognitive processing routines are embedded in an individual’s memory (while conventionalization involves the spread of entrenched forms throughout a community—we will return to this point in a moment). Langacker states that

linguistic structures are more realistically conceived as falling along a continuous scale of **entrenchment** in cognitive organization. Every use of a structure has a positive impact on its degree of entrenchment, whereas extended periods of disuse have a negative impact. With repeated use, a novel structure becomes progressively entrenched, to the

point of becoming a unit; moreover, units are variably entrenched depending on the frequency of their occurrence [...] (1987:59; emphasis in original).

The ‘use’ mentioned in this passage refers to a ‘usage event’, which he defines as “a symbolic expression assembled by a speaker in a particular set of circumstances for a particular purpose: this symbolic relationship holds between a detailed, context-dependent conceptualization and some type of phonological structure” (1987:66). Linguistic units (i.e. established linguistic forms—see below for more detail) are abstracted from repeated usage events, such that they become entrenched in the mind of the speaker.

Schmid (2007: 120) notes that “...ontologically salient entities attract our attention more frequently than nonsalient ones. As a result, cognitive events related to the processing of ontologically salient entities will occur more frequently and lead to an earlier entrenchment of corresponding cognitive units, or concepts.” Of course, ontological salience is relative to the experience of the individual or the community. For example, details of a building’s appearance will be more ontologically salient to an architect or a carpenter than to a person without training or interest in those fields. Likewise, a backpack sitting unattended in an airport is probably much more salient to the general population (at least in the United States) since the events of September 11th, 2001 than it was before that point. I will argue in Chapter 3, for example, that the notion that money and resources are things that could be feasibly saved became more salient to the general population of the Spanish Empire as a middle class gradually developed from the sixteenth century on, thereby leading to the entrenchment and conventionalization of the domain *SAVE MONEY* within the semasiological profile of *ahorrar*.

The theoretical notions discussed up to this point apply both at the level of the individual member of a speech community (the ‘micro’ or ‘local’ level) and at the level of the speech community itself (the ‘macro’ or ‘global’ level). Two relevant notions that address this point are

conventional linguistic units and social/cultural cognition. Conventional linguistic units (henceforth referred to simply as units) are usually discussed in terms of their presence in the minds of individuals—in spite of their communal nature—at the micro level. Section 1.6 will show how the same can be applied to the macro level.

The ‘structure’ of a language (sometimes referred to as ‘the target’²⁶), according to the cognitive view, is understood to be intrinsically dynamic, but given to stability through patterns that arise by means of repeated cognitive processing and interaction between speakers (Langacker 2010: 88). These (relatively) stable patterns are referred to as ‘conventional linguistic units’, which comprise such elements as phonological segments, syllables, words, or meanings of linguistic elements (‘semantic units’). In Langacker’s view, units emerge from more general physical and cognitive phenomena, such as hearing and vocalizing, or conceptualization and encyclopedic knowledge:

A **unit** is a structure that a speaker has mastered quite thoroughly, to the extent that he can employ it in a largely automatic fashion, without having to focus his attention specifically on its individual parts or their arrangement” (1987: 57; emphasis in original).²⁷

Linguistic structures can gain ‘unit status’ as a result of entrenchment, and, once their use spreads throughout a speech community, they become ‘conventional(ized) linguistic units’. According to Schmid, “[...] although the size of linguistic units can vary from single morphemes to quite elaborate syntactic constructions, it is the hallmark of fully entrenched [or

²⁶ That is, “[...] an entity, reasonably called ‘the structure of a language’, that is sufficiently coherent and well delimited to be viable as an object of description’ (Langacker 2010: 87)

²⁷ Elsewhere (2010: 88) he states that “...units are best regarded as sociocultural skills: well-rehearsed patterns of processing activity called upon as needed as part of the more elaborate activity comprising linguistic interactions.”

conventionalized²⁸] units that they are conceived of as single gestalts” (2007: 121; parenthetical insertion mine).

It is worth repeating that different units can be viewed in terms of the differing factors associated with the traditional ‘language internal vs. language external’ dichotomy, with the caveat that they are all viewed, within the cognitive framework, as integrated parts of the structure of the language, and that they are all afforded equal analytical importance, in the sense that some are not invoked as a ‘last resort’ when others are not sufficient for the analysis. That is, traditional, ‘language internal,’ units (phonemes, morphemes, etc.) are analyzed alongside ‘language external’ factors, such as pragmatics, cultural values, identity, etc. Both types of units function in tandem, as interrelated phenomena which impose constraints on and influence each other. In an extreme case, even the *social evaluation* of established lexical usages is understood to impart its own semantic value (as a semantic unit or, in my terminology, as a domain) to the communicative event and, in so doing, to the lexical items involved, at least within that particular context. This is most clearly seen with standardization, in which a preferred variant is ‘marked’ as superior to the suppressed variant. According to the theoretical perspective adopted here, the *very notion that the selected variant is preferred* is seen as an integral part of the word’s semasiological profile, at least in the usage event in which the selection of the variant is made. For example, in cases like the one presented in Harris-Northall (1996, 1999), where *ponzoña* ‘poison’ was replaced by *veneno* ‘poison’ in a printed version of the *Gran Conquista de Ultramar*, a domain that could be expressed as something akin to SOUNDS MORE LIKE LATIN AND IS THEREFORE BETTER would be a salient component of the semasiological profile of *veneno*, at

²⁸ Schmid does not seem to distinguish between ‘entrenchment’ and ‘conventionalization’, at least terminologically. He uses the former in cases where Langacker uses the latter.

least in the mind of the person who made the replacement.²⁹ The cases presented in Chapters 2-4 will be less subtle than this; for example, I will present evidence which suggests that positive (or, at least, neutral) connotations are a heavily entrenched domain within the semasiological profile of *afeitar*, and that negative ones are heavily entrenched within the profile of *sinistro*.

The groundwork has now been laid for proper discussion of the notion of prototypes, which the next section addresses.

1.5 Prototypes

For the purposes of this study, the terms prototype and prototypical refer to the entrenched, central, non-peripheral meaning of a word (Rosch 1978; Rosch & Mervis 1975), determined by the frequency of a given meaning at a given time.³⁰ There is compelling evidence to suggest that frequency is a reliable indicator of prototypicality in corpus-based studies like those presented in Chapters 2-4.³¹ Schmid (2000: 39) proposed the ‘From-Corpus-to-Cognition

²⁹ Related to this issue is Milroy’s (2003:150) statement that “one characteristic of a discourse is that certain underlying assumptions are shared by the participants and not questioned: they are not immediately available for scrutiny and may not always make sense to outsiders.” The context of linguistic standardization seems to be one of the more promising contexts for historical linguists seeking to determine such underlying assumptions, given that it seems reasonable to assume that the standardizers tacitly assume the superiority of their own selections over the (semantically equivalent or near-equivalent) variants that they have eliminated. Of course, in some cases the assumption of superiority is made quite explicit (as shown, for example, in the Real Academia’s famous proposal to *fixar las voces y vocablos de la lengua castellana en su mayor propiedad, elegancia y pureza* [roughly ‘fix the words of the Castilian language such that they show their greatest correctness, elegance, and purity’]), but more often the assumption is only implied.

³⁰ There is by no means a consensus in the literature as to what constitutes prototypicality. Gilquin (2008), for example, points out several different, albeit not necessarily mutually exclusive, uses of the word ‘prototype’ in the literature, including ‘cognitively salient’ (Williams 1992; Radden 1992), ‘central’ (with respect to metaphorically- or metonymically-derived meanings in a radial network: Viberg 2002), ‘first’ (in a diachronic or acquisitional sense: Sassoon 2005), ‘frequent’ (Stubbs 2004), and so on. Geeraerts (2006: 9-10) notes that “*prototype* is itself a prototypically structured concept, i.e. that there is no single definition that captures all and only the diverse forms of ‘prototypicality’ that linguists have been talking about.”

³¹ Note that I ignore here the terminological difference between ‘corpus-based’ and ‘corpus-driven’ as presented, for example, in Biber (2010: 162): “Corpus-based research assumes the validity of linguistic forms and structures derived from linguistic theory; the primary goal of research is to analyze the systematic patterns of variation and use for those pre-defined linguistic features. [...] In contrast, ‘corpus-driven’ research is more inductive, so that the linguistic constructs themselves emerge from analysis of the corpus.” It could be argued that the present study incorporates both approaches at once.

Principle', which states that "frequency in text instantiates entrenchment in the cognitive system." This means that by analyzing the frequency of a given meaning of a word within the corpus we can determine—within a reasonable margin of doubt—the degree to which that meaning is entrenched (and/or conventionalized) in the collective mind of the speech community, and therefore in the semasiological profile of the word. A greater degree of entrenchment/conventionalization implies greater cognitive salience (section 1.4), which in turn tends to imply greater prototypicality. In Schmid's words, "the basic idea is that observed frequencies in the actual use of a language correlate with degrees of preferences in the linguistic system. The importance of a phenomenon in a given language can be extrapolated from an analysis of its frequency in a large corpus" (2000: 39). The author exemplifies this point with an example from Halliday (1993: 14-16), in which corpus frequency suggests a preference in the English language for positive clauses over negative ones. Schmid goes on to say that

taking Halliday's example one step beyond his systemic view to a cognitive view of language, it can be argued that there is also a tendency in our cognitive system to think in positive rather than negative terms. This methodological transfer from frequency in actual use, first to preference in the linguistic system, and then to entrenchment in the cognitive system, is not very daring here, given that a negative statement (e.g. *Mother isn't at home*) leaves open an infinity of other options and is therefore logically speaking not as informative as a positive statement. (2000: 39)

It should be pointed out, however, that at least two potential problems arise from these statements. In the first place, it is, in fact, not always clear that frequency correlates to prototypicality. Gilquin (2008) attempts to exemplify this by comparing the apparent cognitive salience of multiple senses of the English verbs *give* and *take* to their frequencies in two corpora of American English from the 1990s (identified only as Frown [for written data] and Switchboard [for spoken data]). To determine salience, she asked 40 native speakers of American English to write the first sentence that occurred to them using the target words, in

addition to several other ‘distractor’ words, yielding a total of 80 tokens. For frequency, she extracted 500 tokens of each of the target words from each of the corpora, yielding a total of 2000 tokens. She then compared the tokens to a number of senses found in ‘learner’s dictionaries’ (15 senses for *give* and 18 senses for *take*). The result was that the frequencies of the senses elicited from the native speakers did not correspond to those drawn from the corpora (for example, the sense ‘to use one’s hand to pass something over to another person who receives it with his/her hands’ for *give* appeared in 42.5% of the elicited responses but only in 7.7% of the corpus data). The author concludes that corpus data and elicitation experiments seem to “tap into essentially different things” (p. 250), and that it is not clear whether salience or frequency (or something else) indicates prototypicality. It should be pointed out, however, that Schmid emphasizes that a large corpus is necessary for making such inferences; the corpus that he referred to had 18 million words, and the conclusions were drawn from a comparison of 961,646 tokens vs. 64,391 tokens—a far cry from the 2080 tokens used by Gilquin which, furthermore, do not represent all of the tokens available in the corpora that she used (she does not indicate how many total words were available). Jansegers *et al.* (2015) also address this issue: they find that the apparent prototypical meaning of the verb *sentir* differs when comparing a frequency analysis to an analysis of the variety of ‘formal’ contexts in which each meaning occurs.³² When they looked at frequency in the corpora (in this case they used the *CREA* [Real Academia Española 2017b] and two additional oral corpora, for a total of 1,810 tokens), they found that the

³² “[...] another way of handling prototypicality is by taking into account the multiplicity of [syntactic] contexts in which an element can occur: more prototypical elements are taken to be less formally constrained and thus to appear in a wider variety of contexts” (2015: 400; parenthetical insertion mine).

prototypical meaning was ‘regret’, while a look at formal (i.e. syntactic) constraints yielded ‘general physical perception’ as the prototypical meaning.³³

In spite of the methodological concerns regarding these two studies, the point is well-taken that one must be careful when making assumptions about prototypicality based on corpus frequency, especially when using a small number of tokens. Indeed, as we will see in the case studies that follow, while the *Corpus del español* (Davies 2002-) includes approximately 100 million words, the number of relevant tokens will actually be relatively small as well: 630 for *afeitar* (Chapter 2), 1206 for *ahorrar* (Chapter 3), and 2910 for *sinistro* (Chapter 4), but with the caveat that I consider all of the available tokens.³⁴ We could simply state that this is an unavoidable limitation of historical research, given the limited nature of the available written data and the impossibility of conducting elicitation experiments with native speakers, and press on undeterred. It will become clear as the case studies unfold, however, that the nature of the attested senses—in terms of their number, their frequencies, and their representation in dictionaries—will be such that frequency actually does seem to be a reliable indicator of prototypicality. In the case of *afeitar*, for example, the 630 tokens can be split into 10 semantic categories, yet analysis of each century still yields a clear ‘winner’ in terms of frequency, and the winner generally correlates with the impression given by contemporary dictionaries.

The second potential problem that arises from Schmid’s statements is that we must be careful to distinguish between prototypes and actual cognitive representations. Rosch (1978: 40) notes that “the pervasiveness of prototypes in real-world categories and of prototypicality as a

³³ Note that *CREA* actually produced 6,742 tokens, but “in order to obtain a more practical and workable corpus, a representative random sample was selected corresponding to 25% of this total, yielding 1,686 occurrences” (2015: 392).

³⁴ In fact, the percentage comparisons will involve even smaller numbers, since the numbers cited here include totals across eight centuries, while the comparisons will be made within each century.

variable indicates that prototypes must have some place in psychological theories of representation, processing, and learning. However, prototypes themselves do not constitute any particular model of processes, representations, or learning.” Lakoff (1987: 45) builds on this point by saying that “it is important to bear in mind that prototype effects are superficial. They may result from many factors. [...] Our basic claim will be that prototype effects result from the nature of cognitive models, which can be viewed as ‘theories’ of some subject matter.”³⁵ The main point is that when we consider Schmid’s principle that “frequency in text instantiates entrenchment in the cognitive system,” and relate this to prototypicality, we need to keep in mind that we are talking about the ‘superficial’ effects of ‘deeper’ cognitive processes. In other words, we are not talking about how the brain works in any direct sense, but rather how the evidence indirectly suggests what might be going on in the brain.³⁶ Schematic models involving prototypical and peripheral meanings will be presented in the case studies in Chapters 2-4 with this in mind. To summarize what I have discussed so far, I will offer an example.

Figure 1.1³⁷ shows a highly schematic representation of the lexical item *cat*, based on the encyclopedic model of meaning (recall Langacker’s description quoted above). Due to the

³⁵ The ‘prototype effects’ mentioned by Lakoff are asymmetries among members of a particular category. As Lakoff (1987: 41) puts it, “for example, robins are judged to be more representative of the category BIRD than are chickens, penguins, and ostriches, and desk chairs are judged to be more representative of the category CHAIR than are rocking chairs, barber chairs, beanbag chairs, or electric chairs. The most representative members of a category are called ‘prototypical’ members.” These asymmetries contrast directly with the classical notion that all members have equal status within a category.

³⁶ This, of course, is likely true of all of the theoretical notions employed here.

³⁷ I have been following the convention of representing mental conceptualizations/categories in upper-case letters, and lexical items in lower case and italics. In a more fine-grained analysis, I would follow Langacker’s practice of representing (conventionalized) units in brackets, and non-units (i.e. ‘novel’ structures) in parentheses—e.g. [A] vs. (A)—and, within symbolic units, the “semantic pole” in upper case and the “phonological pole” in lower case—e.g. [[CAT]/[kat]] (2008: 93-4). In figures, the boxes generally correspond to brackets, and the circles correspond to parentheses. Due to the more speculative nature of the type of analysis that I am doing here (i.e. with historical data), and for ease of presentation, I have generally chosen to dispense with the brackets/parentheses distinction, and collapsed the two components of symbolic units into a simpler form (e.g. *cat*), but I have tentatively maintained the box/circle distinction in my figures. In all cases, it should be kept in mind that my own practice represents a purely aesthetic—and not a theoretical—departure from Langacker’s approach.

difficulties inherent in two-dimensional representation, the figure does not reflect that each individual category (e.g. PREDATORY and WHISKER-BEARING) actually overlaps as well (Figure 1.2 gives a somewhat more accurate representation of this idea), nor does it come close to including all of the domains potentially involved. The main point here is that the conceptualization CAT arises from the blending of numerous domains (which themselves arise from the blending of other domains). The two-directional arrow reflects the two-way relationship between the lexical item *cat* and the conceptualization CAT: on the one hand, utterance of the lexical item prompts the interlocutor to mentally construct the meaning encompassed by the conceptualization (i.e. in a semasiological fashion); on the other hand, the conceptualization prompts the speaker to select the lexical item (in an onomasiological manner).³⁸ Figure 1.1 also fails to represent the fact that some of the domains are more salient/prototypical—that is, ‘central’—than others, depending not only on the usage event in question, but also on the degree to which the salience/prototypicality has been entrenched in the interlocutors’ minds or conventionalized in the speech community. For example, one particular usage event might involve a speaker’s listing of furry, playful animals, in which case the domains FURRY and PLAYFUL would be profiled (and thereby more salient in the moment), while in another usage event the speaker might be thinking of mysterious, aloof animals. Multiple usage events of the same type would lead to entrenchment of the domains in the speaker’s mind, leading to easier

³⁸ Another point of clarification bears mentioning here: I have generally been using the terms ‘words’ and ‘lexical items’ interchangeably, primarily for the purpose of avoiding repetitiveness. This seems to be common practice in the literature—in fact, when discussing his *cat* example, Langacker (2010: 96) uses ‘lexical item’, ‘lexical unit’, and ‘lexeme’ in a single paragraph. Elsewhere, he defines the lexicon as “the set of **fixed expressions** in a language” (2008: 16-17; emphasis original) which can include both ‘isolated’ words, such as *moon*, and combinations of words, such as *moonless night*. Hence, both *moon* and *moonless night* technically count as lexical items/units, since they have been conventionalized. But ‘novel’ words, such as *dollarless*, by virtue of the fact that they are not ‘fixed’ or conventionalized, do not count as lexical items/units. Since I am only dealing with conventionalized, single-word examples like *moon* here, I will continue to use the terms interchangeably.

mental access to the domains due to the decreased need for ‘real-time’ processing power. Further usage events of the same type among multiple speakers would then lead to conventionalization of the domains within the speech community. As Figure 1.3 suggests, WHISKER-BEARING seems to be a highly salient domain for the conceptualization CAT within the American Sign Language community (or at least in the mind of the person or people who first established the sign).

Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of the semasiological profile of the lexical item *cat*.




Figure 1.2 Schematic representation of overlapping domains with varying degrees of centrality in the semasiological profile of the lexical item *cat*.




Figure 1.3 The American-Sign-Language sign for the lexical item *cat* (from Riekehof 1987: 291).



Up to this point, we have seen that—according to the cognitive perspective—polysemy and semantic change arise from the non-determinate nature of the process of conceptualization, since the (encyclopedic) content of a conception can be construed in multiple ways (Langacker 2010: 98). What remains to be discussed, however, is the way in which social factors guide or ‘constrain’ the process of construal, leading to patterns of conventionalization, in which some senses of a word become more salient and prototypical, while others become more peripheral—sometimes to the extent of falling into disuse. For example, it will be argued in Chapter 2 that the social phenomenon of viewing the practice of applying cosmetics in a negative way led to the construal of the conceptual substrate of the verb *afeitar* in a different way, rendering APPLY COSMETICS inappropriate as a central part of the semasiological profile of the verb. Chapter 3 will do the same with *ahorrar* and FREE A PRISONER/SLAVE, and Chapter 4 with *siniestro* and LEFT. The next section addresses these matters through the lens of the ‘social’, or ‘cultural’, cognition model.

1.6 From a Cognitive approach to a ‘Socio-’ Cognitive approach: Social/cultural cognition

Langacker implicitly posits a methodological problem with a historical application of the cognitive approach when he states that:

We can validly distinguish [...] between what a single speaker knows and the collective knowledge of a whole society. The former is arguably more basic, since collective knowledge consists in (or at least derives from) the knowledge of individuals. For the purposes of studying language as part of cognition, an expression's meaning is first and foremost its meaning **for** a single (representative) speaker. This is not to deny or diminish the social aspect of linguistic meaning. An individual's notion of what an expression means develops through communicative interaction and includes an assessment of its degree of conventionality in the speech community. By their nature, moreover, certain questions have to be studied at the population level (e.g. how norms are established and maintained, the extent to which consensus is achieved, and the range of variation actually encountered). Still, these questions cannot be fully answered unless the knowledge of individual speakers is taken into account. (2008: 30; emphasis in the original)

In a footnote on the same page, he adds that “societal knowledge is also stored in books, databases, the design of artifacts, and so on, but ultimately these reduce to the activity of individual minds in creating or using them.” From this perspective, then, the methodological problem for historical linguistics is clear: since we do not have access to individuals from the past, we cannot attempt to determine experimentally what their knowledge is. Two important points can be made to address this problem. On the one hand, if we assume it is true that societal knowledge does indeed reduce to the activity of individual minds, we can apply the uniformitarian principle and take what we know of how human minds work in the present and assume that the same was true of human minds in the past. On the other hand, it is not clear that the reduction of societal knowledge to the activity of individual minds is necessarily a valid assumption to make in the first place. To address this point, we will look at the notion of social/cultural cognition.

Social cognition and cultural cognition appear to be two different names for essentially the same thing.³⁹ As Sharifian (2009: 165) puts it, “cultural cognition [...] is an emergent system

³⁹ Sharifian (2009: 163) uses the terms *group-level cognition*, *cultural cognition*, *collective cognition*, and *social cognition*, without any clear distinction between them (although he does specify that *cultural cognition* is a particular form of *collective cognition*).


in that it results from the interactions between the members of a cultural group across time and space.” He elaborates on this point in a later publication, saying that “the emergent properties of cultural cognition as a system at the global level are not mirror images of those that characterise the cognition of each individual or the sum of the individuals within the group” (Sharifian 2011: 23). Moreover:

In relation to cultural cognition, as is the case with other types of complex systems, the role of an individual agent can be viewed as two-fold. On the one hand, **the individual is the locus of cultural cognition** and can have an initial causal role in its development, dissemination and reinforcement. On the other hand, an individual’s performance can be influenced or determined to a varying degree by the cultural cognition that characterises the cultural group. Thus, the role of individuals in a cultural group may be described in terms of a circular pattern of cause and effect. (Sharifian 2011: 24; emphasis added)

In other words, from this perspective, in spite of the fact that cognition takes place in the minds of individuals, societal knowledge does not reduce to the activities of individual minds, as Langacker put it in the quotation above. To illustrate this point, Sharifian (2011: 4) draws on connectionist models of cognition, wherein schemas and categories are viewed as patterns that emerge from knowledge which is distributed across a network.⁴⁰ While connectionist models are focused on networks within a single brain, Sharifian applies them to cultural networks made up of groups of individuals. Figure 1.4, slightly modified from Sharifian (2011: 6), represents the distribution of 5 hypothetical elements of a cultural schema (labeled A, B, C, D, and E) across a network of individual minds. It is immediately noticeable that each individual mind has knowledge of at least one element of the shared schema, but no individual is familiar with them all. This could be compared, for example, to the lexicon of a given language, which comprises far more words than any individual speaker could possibly know, or to the conventionalized

⁴⁰ Cf. Rumelharret, McClelland & the PDP Research Group (1986); McClelland, Rumelhart & the PDP Research Group (1986); Churchland & Sejnowski (1992); Thorpe (1995).

Figure 1.4 Sharifian's "distributed model of a cultural schema."



semasiological profile of a given word, where no two individuals imagine the exact same configuration of domains.⁴¹ Crucially—and at least partially contrary to what Langacker seems to suggest—study of individual minds does not give us the full picture of the emergent shared schema, or what I prefer to call collective cognitive structure (that is, a set of notions shared by the members of a group, registered in cultural documents, such as dictionaries, literature, etc.).

One of the consequences of this is that what can be said about the cognitive workings of the individual (at the micro level) can generally be said about the workings of the group (at the macro level)—keeping in mind that the properties of the macro system are distributed unevenly across the local level (that is, the systems are essentially the same, but the properties that emerge from the workings of the systems are different). In other words, both levels are governed by encyclopedic meaning, fuzzy boundaries between domains, salience, construal, and so on, but no individual has access to all of the knowledge created at the macro level. This helps to account for individual discrepancies both at the lexical level (e.g. disagreements about what a word means)

⁴¹ Note the assumption here that semasiological profiles themselves—not just the domains within them—undergo entrenchment in individual minds and conventionalization across a group of speakers.

and at the conceptual level (e.g. disagreements about whether the act of applying cosmetics should be viewed negatively). In spite of the uneven distribution, macro-level prototypes tend to emerge, reflecting the conceptual preferences of a majority of the members of the speech community.⁴² I will argue that this is the case with *afeitar*, for example; while the act of applying cosmetics was certainly not construed negatively by 100% of the speech community, the macro-level prototype appears to have been that it was not a favorable act (at least among the members of the speech community who provided us with textual evidence), and, conversely, the macro-level prototype might have been that the lexical item could only refer to favorable or neutral acts.⁴³

Going beyond the nature of collective cognitive structures, it is necessary to have a look at how they emerge. Returning for a moment to the notion of embodiment, Sinha (1999: 235; emphasis original) states that:

I will certainly grant that there needs to be a perceptible world (or surround) for reference to make any sense at all, and that our subjectivity is fundamentally *grounded* in this perceptible world—grounded in our direct perceptions and in our non-discursive organization of embodied experience. It is a basic tenet of cognitive linguistics that linguistic meaning is made possible by its *embodied grounding*. The principal, and best-known, part of the research program of cognitive semantics has been the investigation of the grounding of linguistic meaning in image schemas. More liberally, but perhaps even more in keeping with the “embodied cognition” thesis of cognitive semantics, we could speak of functional, action-based, force-dynamic image schematization; a formulation which emphasizes both the reliance of linguistic-communicative action upon the perceptuo-motor organization of physical action, and the active, online nature of the psycholinguistic processes permitting communication in speech and gesture [...]

He adds, crucially, that:

[...] we need to bear in mind that linguistic reference involves more than schematization-for-self. To *refer* implies the *picking out* or *figuration* of some aspect(s) of the

⁴² What constitutes a ‘sufficient’ majority to effect noticeable change, however, is by no means certain (more than 50% of the speakers? More than 75%?), and might vary from case-to-case, depending, for example, on the salience of the feature in question.

⁴³ Of course, from a methodological standpoint, this would be much easier to confirm with living informants.

schematized world, in such a way that the figured aspect is a *topic of joint and shared attention*. (Sinha 1999: 236; emphasis original)

This perspective is key for the present study because it addresses how embodiment can be manifest beyond the level of the individual. While the role of the physical body is certainly fundamental to understanding how individual minds construe (i.e. ‘pick out’ or ‘figure’) reality, understanding of collective cognitive structure necessitates positing a metaphorical ‘collective body’, which is grounded in social interaction.⁴⁴ It is not much of a stretch to assume that such a metaphorical body exists, given that culture itself is a social construct, and that the mechanisms that govern the workings of the brain (e.g. entrenchment, creation of semasiological profiles in general) do seem to mirror those that govern the workings of society (e.g. conventionalization, establishment of norms)—again, in spite of the fact that the specific social and linguistic features that result from the workings of the mechanisms are heterogeneously deployed across individuals and groups.

Figure 1.5 represents a simplified model for the development of collective cognitive structures.⁴⁵ As we have seen, according to this model, meaning is negotiated through social interaction, which involves a vast array of assumptions made by the members of the social group, aggregated in the collective structure. The result of these interactions is that individual members of the group mentally internalize the negotiated meaning, and then transmit the restructured semantic configurations in subsequent interactions. Usually, the changes are subtle, if perceptible at all, but, over time, social circumstances become so salient that a significant shift

⁴⁴ Yu (2008: 247) puts it nicely: “While the body is a potentially universal source for emerging metaphors, culture functions as a filter that selects aspects of sensori-motor experience and connects them with subjective experiences and judgments for metaphorical mappings. That is, metaphors are grounded in bodily experience but shaped by cultural understanding. Put differently, metaphors are embodied in their cultural environment.”

⁴⁵ This model is my own, but it is influenced by many authors, especially Sharifian (2009, 2011, etc.).

occurs in the collective structure, as we will see, for example, in the transition from APPLY COSMETICS to SHAVE in Chapter 2.


The process begins with each individual speaker's interactions—represented by dotted lines—with other speakers (which are, of course, not limited to the ones shown in the figure). It is during these interactions that speakers learn novel meanings or reinforce already established ones—in both cases, this leads to individual cognitive restructuring.⁴⁶ In the first case, this restructuring would involve a reconfiguration of domains within the semasiological profile of a given word, such that a peripheral domain (or domains) becomes further entrenched and centralized, while a central domain becomes less entrenched.⁴⁷ In the second case, the restructuring would involve further entrenchment of the central domain, with no superficially obvious change taking place in the word's semasiological profile. The effects of the restructuring can be short-lived, as in cases where an utterance is dismissed as erroneous or odd (e.g. using the word *rhinoceros* to refer to BLACK), or they can be extended across multiple usage events, as indicated in the figure by “More social interaction”. A feedback loop is then created in which novel meanings occasionally arise or established meanings continue to be reinforced. Finally, each individual's cognitive structure contributes to the collective cognitive structure, but in a heterogenous fashion (indicated by the differently-patterned arrows pointing toward the center of the figure). Due to word-processing constraints, the patterns of the arrows might give the impression that they are more different than they are meant to be, at least when we are speaking

⁴⁶ It should also be noted that this model is not limited to lexical/semantic structure—the same process applies to morphosyntactic and phonetic/phonological structures as well.

⁴⁷ A question for further study would be whether or not entrenchment is truly a reversible process: can entrenched domains become less entrenched (i.e. in isolation), or does their level of entrenchment remain stagnant while other domains ‘overtake’ them? I have not found any discussion of this question in the existing literature beyond Langacker's (1987: 59) statement, quoted above in section 1.4: “Every use of a structure has a positive impact on its degree of entrenchment, whereas extended periods of disuse have a negative impact.” But it is still not clear whether degree of entrenchment is a relative or an absolute concept.

of the semasiological profile of a single lexical item. Under normal circumstances, the differences between each individual's contribution to the collective cognitive structure are (nearly) imperceptible, but an important point of the figure is to point out that they do exist, since no two minds are identical. Moreover, the two-way directionality of the arrows reflects the idea that individuals are influenced by their perception of the collective cognitive structure, as much as they contribute to it.⁴⁸

Figure 1.5 Development of collective cognitive structures.



What remains, then—beyond application of the theoretical models outlined thus far—is to fill in the socio-historical details for each specific word, as we will see in the case studies that

⁴⁸ Figures 1.4 and 1.5 also harken to the gradient nature of entrenchment and conventionalization, which is part-and-parcel of the heterogeneous nature of individual minds' relationships with collective structure.

follow. In what is left of the present chapter, I will give a brief outline of the methodology employed in the case studies, and then offer some general conclusions regarding what has been said up to this point.

1.7 A brief outline of the methodology for the case studies

As Sharifian (2011: 12) notes, “cultural conceptualisations may be instantiated and reflected in cultural artefacts such as painting, rituals, language, and even silence.” A clear example of this type of instantiation in language is found in lexicography. Thus, my first step for each of the three studies was to analyze the word in question with respect to its etymology and appearance in synchronic and historical dictionaries.⁴⁹ This provided a useful starting point for establishing the development of each word’s semasiological profile.

Secondly, I searched for all inflected forms of the word in the *Corpus del español* (Davies 2002-), an online corpus which includes Spanish-language texts spanning from the thirteenth to the twentieth century.⁵⁰ I then analyzed the context of all available tokens and categorized them in terms of their meaning, counting the total number of tokens with a given

⁴⁹ The following dictionaries were consulted: Alemany y Bolufer (1957); Aragó (2008), Arellano & Zafra (2006); Corominas (1959, 1973 [*BDEL*], 1976 [1955-57] [*DCEL*]); Corominas & Pascual (1980-1991); Cuervo (1953); García de Diego (1985); Gili y Gaya (1947); Herrera (1996); Kasten & Cody (2001); López García-Molins (1985); Mac Donald (2007); Moliner (2007); Meyer-Lübke (1935); Monlau (1881); Müller (1995); Nieto Jiménez & Alvar Ezquerro (2007); Real Academia Española (1972 [1933] [*DHLE*]), 2005 [*DPD*], 2016a [*DRAE*], 2016b [*NDHE*]); Suances-Torres (2000); *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (1900- [*TLL*]); Van Scoy (1986); and Zerolo (1905).

⁵⁰ It should be pointed out that *CORDE* purportedly includes more tokens than Davies (2002-), although this number is actually uncertain. As Davies (2009: 140 [footnote]) points out, figures have ranged from 125 million at the *CORDE* website itself to “more than 300 million” by other researchers. As of 10 May 2017 the *CORDE* website says 250 million words in one place (<http://www.rae.es/recursos/banco-de-datos/corde>) and in another place the 125 million reported by Davies (under the heading “A1.2 DISEÑO DEL CORPUS DIACRÓNICO DEL ESPAÑOL. CORDE” at http://corpus.rae.es/ayuda_c.htm). In any case, since the main purpose was to gain a broad view of the most common meanings associated with the verb, it seemed sufficient to rely primarily on Davies (2002-), which contains more than 100 million tokens, clearly grouped by century and easily searchable (e.g. putting an infinitive between brackets usually yields all of the conjugated forms of a verb in one search). It also clearly indicates the frequency of a word within each given century. See Davies (2009) for additional commentary on the advantages of using the *Corpus del español* over *CORDE*.

meaning. Next, I used these numbers to establish percentages and frequencies of each meaning; the meaning with the highest percentage/frequency within a given century was assumed to be the prototypical meaning for that time period, following Schmid's 'From-Corpus-to-Cognition-Principle' (discussed above, in section 1.5). In all cases, I cross-checked the meanings with the dictionary entries mentioned above. I also used this information to hypothesize about the cognitive processes involved in the changes, and searched for an underlying domain that links all of the attested meanings.

Third, having established the chronological development of the prototypical meanings of the word, I focused on the time periods in which prototype shifts took place. Looking at the examples gleaned from the corpus, I was able to determine what socio-historical evidence might be useful for an understanding of the shifts, and I thereby developed hypotheses to account for the observed changes.

1.8 Conclusions

This chapter has outlined the theoretical prerequisites for the data analysis presented in the following case studies. We have seen that, according to the cognitive perspective, meaning is encyclopedic in nature, and that this encyclopedic information can be represented as a series of domains which make up the semasiological profile of a given word. Some domains are more salient than others within semasiological profiles, depending on the context in which a word is used. Repeated usage events lead to entrenchment on the individual, or micro, level, and to conventionalization on the group, or macro, level. Basic domains link physical experience with the cognitive realm, and provide a basis for the development of non-basic domains, on both the micro and macro levels. Social factors guide/influence entrenchment and conventionalization of specific domains within semasiological profiles, and either lead to novel usages or reinforce

established ones. All of these points will be essential for analysis of the words under consideration in the case studies that follow in chapters 2-4. This will become clear as those chapters unfold, but before moving on, I would like to point out that it is, perhaps, misleading to speak of ‘lexical change’ or ‘semantic change’ at all. What appear to be changes in the lexicon are really changes in the choices that speakers make upon expressing their conceptualizations. Any appearance that words “mean” (i.e. “have meaning”) is the result of the conventionalizing practice of repeatedly linking up particular conceptualizations with particular lexical items. As Geeraerts puts it:

The mental act of categorization is an onomasiological one, not a semasiological one. Speakers choose a category, and onomasiological change in the language at large cannot be understood unless we take into account pragmatic onomasiology: changes are always mediated through the onomasiological choices made on the level of *parole*. Words die out because speakers refuse to choose them, and words are added to the lexical inventory of a language because some speakers introduce them and others imitate these speakers; similarly, words change their value within the language because people start using them in different circumstances. **Structural change, in other words, is the output of processes that are properly studied in the context of pragmatic onomasiology.** Also, this pragmatic, *parole*-based perspective automatically takes the form of a sociovariational investigation: in choosing among existing alternatives, the individual language user takes into account their sociolinguistic, non-referential value, and conversely, the expansion of a change over a language community is the cumulative effect of individual choices. In this sense, it is only through an investigation into factors determining these individual choices that we can get a grasp on the mechanisms behind the invisible hand of lexical change. (2010: 265; emphasis added)

Indeed, while the approach that I am taking here is fundamentally focused on semasiology, what I am in fact arguing is that knowledge of social factors—or, to use Geeraerts’ terminology, pragmatic onomasiology—is essential for understanding changes in the semasiological profile (i.e. the ‘structure’) of a word. But I would add that, in reality, semasiology and onomasiology are nothing more than perspectives—two sides of the same coin—both of which are necessary for a full view of lexical change. Nevertheless, as the case studies will show, starting with a semasiological perspective can still bring about interesting insights into the mechanisms of

change. First of all, tracking the changes in a word's semasiological profile gives us an index of the *results* of speakers' onomasiological choices. While a speaker's choice of a word starts with conceptualization (i.e. categorization), and is therefore onomasiological, the *listener's* interpretation of the utterance is semasiological. That is, the listener (or reader) is confronted with a word and must determine what the speaker/writer meant by it—or what conceptualization(s) the speaker/writer had in mind. Secondly, when we approach a text from a research (or any other) perspective, we necessarily adopt the role of listener/reader. Since we cannot ask Cervantes, for example, to clarify what he had in mind when he wrote a particular word, adopting a semasiological perspective as a starting point is not just the best way to ascertain what he meant, but the *only* way to do so. When we observe that he seems to use particular words in different ways in different contexts, or in different ways than his predecessors, contemporaries, or successors, at that point it makes sense to begin looking at social/onomasiological factors.

2 Case study #1: The interplay of referential and non-referential meaning in prototype shifts; *afeitar* ‘adorn, apply cosmetics, shave’⁵¹

2.1 Overview

The principal goal of the present chapter is to identify the role of non-referential domains in the semantic development of the verb *afeitar*.⁵² As we saw in the previous chapter, referential meaning deals with the *referent* of a word (or utterance), that is, the mentally-represented entity or action indicated by a given use of the word.⁵³ Non-referential meaning, on the other hand, deals with the *emotive*, *stylistic*, or *discursive* aspects of an utterance, as well as its social distribution. The more-traditional view that non-referential meaning is somehow ‘extra-linguistic’ has, in my view, contributed to an underestimation of their importance in semantic change. In the case of *afeitar*, what looks like a simple case of semantic restriction (from the general sense of ‘adorn’ as the prototypical meaning to the more specific sense of ‘shave’), seen from a more nuanced perspective, is more complicated. Why did speakers stop using the verb to mean ‘apply cosmetics’ during the intervening period?

In this chapter I will show that changes in non-referential meaning, driven by social trends, can influence the range of referential meanings of a given lexical item. In the case of *afeitar*, the aforementioned ‘social distribution’ of the verb has to do with societal opinion toward the verb’s available referents. More specifically, changes in the social perception of the verb’s prototypical referent during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, namely the action

⁵¹ This chapter is an expanded version based on Korfhagen (2016).

⁵² Unless otherwise mentioned, the use of the form *afeitar* in this chapter is meant to assume all orthographical variants (e.g. *af(f)eytar(se)*, *af(f)eytar(se)*, etc.) as well as all of their inflected forms.

⁵³ It is worth repeating (see Section 1.2) that I follow Taylor (2002) and Jackendoff (1983) in assuming that, at least for the purposes of linguistic semantics, there is no useful distinction between ‘mentally conceived’ entities (or actions) and ‘real world’ entities (or actions), given that linguistic meaning is essentially a mental phenomenon. Accordingly, the term ‘referent’ will be used here with both senses in mind.

APPLY COSMETICS, contributed to a shift toward a new prototypical referent, SHAVE. As the evidence will suggest, it appears that, leading up to the shift in the prototype, there was a tendency to heavily stigmatize the act of applying cosmetics, at least within certain social groups, which could be generally characterized as *moralistas* ‘moralists’.⁵⁴ Key to the argument will be the suggestion that an underlying, highly schematic domain—BEAUTIFY—was likely present in the conventionalized semasiological profile of *afeitar*, linking the two common referents APPLY COSMETICS and SHAVE. Once the stigmatization of the act of applying cosmetics was sufficiently entrenched in speakers’ minds, it was no longer viewed with sufficient frequency as an act of beautification, and the conceptual link between APPLY COSMETICS and BEAUTIFY was (at least temporarily) weakened, to the extent that the verb *afeitar*, which still summoned BEAUTIFY, was no longer perceived to be an appropriate choice for reference to that action.⁵⁵ This last part was reinforced by the availability of SHAVE as an additional referent.

The following sections present the relevant evidence. Section 2.2 discusses the etymology of *afeitar*, along with its attested senses. Section 2.3 outlines the proposed social and cognitive factors, respectively, that intervened in the process of semantic change, and section 2.4 provides my conclusions.

⁵⁴ There is an extensive literature about the *moralistas* of the Renaissance (roughly from the late fifteenth to the early seventeenth century) and the (Early) Modern Age in Spain (from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, which includes the *Siglo(s) de Oro* or *Edad de Oro* ‘Golden Age’, roughly from 1550 to 1680, and *El Barroco* ‘The Baroque Period’, roughly from 1600-1750). See, for example, Ruiz Ortiz (2014), Candau Chacón (2013), Torremocha Hernández (2008), Colón Calderón (1995), Terrón González (1990) for further discussion.

⁵⁵ It should be kept in mind that this argument does not intend to imply that BEAUTIFY is a ‘necessary and sufficient attribute’ of *afeitar*, but rather a statistically prominent domain harkened to by use of the word (see section 1.2 for discussion of this point).

2.2 Etymology and attested senses

Before delving into a theoretical approach to the semantic development of *afeitar*, it will be useful to take stock of the etymological source of the verb and its attested senses throughout its recorded history. Doing this will provide the clearest possible picture of the verb's semasiological development and allow for proper analysis.

2.2.1 'Etymological controversy' and the first documentation in Castilian Ibero-Romance

As a first step for this part of the study, a thorough investigation of the etymology was done using a number of dictionaries and other academic resources.⁵⁶ Dworkin (2012: 183-4) includes *afeitar* in a subsection of his chapter on Portuguese and Catalan loans in Spanish titled "etymological controversies." While there is clearly not a consensus regarding the word's transmission from the Classical period to medieval Ibero-Romance/Spanish (i.e. whether it ought to be considered a Lusism, a Gallicism, or a 'semi-learnèd' form; see the discussion below), the word is generally recognized as a reflex of Classical Latin *affectare* or **affactare*, most likely < *ad* + *facere*.⁵⁷ Corominas & Pascual (1980-1991; henceforth *DCECH*) suggests that the sequence of derivation was: *facere* 'make' (*hacer*) > *afficere* 'affect, put in order (*afectar*, *disponer*)' > *affectare* 'dedicate oneself to something' (*dedicarse* [*a algo*]), this last form being a frequentative form of the preceding form.

⁵⁶ See footnote 49 (p. 42) for a full list of the dictionaries consulted. Additional sources are cited where appropriate.

⁵⁷ The change from (or variation between) *-a-* > *-e-* (*-fac-* > *-fec-*) is typical even within the highly normative system known as Classical Latin and may be observed, among other places, within the paradigm of the verb *facere* (e.g. perfect *feci*, etc.). **Affactare*, while unattested, was likely a common variant within the more dynamic system of spoken and written Latin in the Classical period, and is therefore likely viewed as anomalous only through the prescriptive lense worn by current scholars who measure all written Latin against the static Classical Latin system. The *-t-* in the stem is frequentative (also called intensive or iterative [Mahoney 2001: 152-3]), analogous to that found in *cano* ~ *canto* (< *cantare* 'sing'), *iacio* ~ *iacto* (< *iacere* 'throw'), etc.

The *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (henceforth *TLL*) derives *affectare* from *afficere*, *affectum* and lists the following senses:

- I) *aggredi[or]* ‘approach, attack,’ *adoriri* ‘assault, attack,’ *temptare* ‘attack’
- II) *fere i.q. niti ad* ‘strive toward,’ *cum studio expetere* ‘desire earnestly’
- III) *fere i.q. appetere* ‘strive, grasp for, try to get, attack, seize, approach, be at hand, desire, long for, have an appetite for,’ *attingere* ‘come in contact with, touch, assault, taste, approach, undertake, etc.’
- IV) *i.q. afficere* ‘affect’

As we can see from the wide variety of possible attestations in the list provided in the *TLL*, the semantic value of *affectare* in the Classical period was rather non-specific in nature.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it can be observed that all of the meanings cited involve some type of movement (which is not a surprise, given the meaning of the prefix *ad-* ‘toward, to, up to’), whether it be the physical movement toward another entity implied in an attack (sense I), the metaphorical movement toward a goal or a possession implied in desire (senses II & III), or the metaphorical movement (i.e. influence) of one’s will toward another being or entity (sense IV). This informs the later development of the meaning ‘adorn,’ discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter, which involves the movement of one entity toward another for the purpose of beautification.

As mentioned above, it has so far proven impossible to pin down with complete certainty the point at which the form *afeitar* was first used by Castilian Ibero-Romance writers, much less speakers, and from what variety of Romance. Phonological evidence suggests that it was

⁵⁸ The *TLL* entry also includes numerous proposed synonyms: *petere*, *appetere*, *contendere ad*, *cupere*, *sperare*, *curam habere*, *desiderare*, *colere*, *quaerere*, *amare*, *concupiscere*, *ambire*, *imitari*, *emendicare*, *affectatus*, *elaboratus*.

probably a borrowing from a non-Castilian variety, given that the change *-ct-* > *-it-* was already in effect in the ‘Late Latin’ period (Penny 2005: 607), and the subsequent change *-it-* > *-ch-* was well on its way to completion by the first quarter of the second millennium A.D.⁵⁹ Hanssen (1900: 10), Sá Nogueira (1947: 187-8) and Salvador (1967: 243) interpret the *-it-* sequence as suggestive that the word was borrowed from Galician-Portuguese, while *REW* (s.v. 253) and Malkiel (1957: 56-61) argue in favor of transmission from French, the *DRAE* claims Aragonese or Leonese provenience, and *DCECH* (s.v. AFEITAR) calls it a semi-learned form. A similar argument might be made using the notion of lexical diffusion: *-it-* > *-ch-* might simply not have reached *afeitar* before the change stopped being productive.

Dworkin (2012: 183-4) argues convincingly in favor of the Gallicism hypothesis, noting the presence of *afeitar* in early works from the *mester de clerecía* tradition, including the *Libro de Alexandre*, *Libro de Apolonio*, and *Milagros de Nuestra Señora*.⁶⁰ Assuming that Meyer-Lübke, Malkiel, and Dworkin are correct in their claim that *afeitar* is a Gallicism (< *afaitier*), it follows that the phonetic/phonological development took something resembling the following path: **affactare* > *afaitier* ~ *afaitar* > *afeitar*, stopping short of the full development seen in cases such as *lactem* > *laite* > *leite* > *leche*.

⁵⁹ To give an example, a *CORDE* search for *lecho*, between the years 1000-1300, yields 465 cases in 92 documents, while a search for *leito* during the same period only yields 9 cases in 4 documents (Davies 2002- finds 318 cases of *lecho* in the thirteenth century and zero of *leito*).

Note also the existence of such patrimonial forms as the following, from García de Diego (1985: s.v. *affectāre*): *ahechar*, *ajechar*, *jechar*, *echar*, *feitar*, *afaitar*, *afitar*, *afechar*, *aflechar*, *aechaduras*, *echaduras*, *echador*, *achador*, *aechos*, *aechuras*.

⁶⁰ Additional semantic evidence for the Gallicism hypothesis is found in von Wartburg’s *Französisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (*FEW*: s.v. **affactare*), Tobler & Lommatzsch (1925-: s.v. *afaitier*), and Hindley et al. (2000: s.v. *afaitier*), all of which report a similar range of meanings to that found in the early Spanish data, as we will see further along. From Hindley et al.: ‘fashion, arrange’, ‘mould, shape’, ‘sort out, put to rights’, ‘prepare, train [a hound]’, ‘affete [train, gentle a hawk]’, ‘educate’, ‘dress, bind [wounds]’, ‘season [food]’.

Whatever the case may be, the starting point of the present study is the point at which the word is clearly attestable as a Castilian Ibero-Romance form. As will become evident in the sections that follow, the answer to the question of whether the word is a Lusism, a Gallicism, a Leonesism, an Aragoneseism, a semi-learnèd form, or a form that simply was not affected by lexical diffusion will be largely irrelevant to the cognitive analysis, but it will have some minor import on the social analysis.

Regarding the first documentation of *afeitar* in Castilian Ibero-Romance, *DCECH* cites the first documentation as stanza 515 of Berceo's *Milagros de Nuestra Señora* (ostensibly from between the years 1246 and 1252):

- (1) Y tenié la imagen de la sancta Reíгна,
la que fue pora'l mundo salut e medicina;
teniéla **afeitada** de codrada cortina,
ca por todos en cabo Essa fue su madrina. (Taken from *CORDE*: García Turza 1992.)

(There she had the image of the Holy Queen,
who was health and medicine for all.
She had Her image **adorned** with a red curtain,
for, in the end, She was Godmother to all) (Translation from Mount and Cash 1997: 100.)

Another early attestation comes from the *Libro de Alexandre* (likely from between 1240 and 1250, making it a possible predecessor to the citation mentioned in *DCECH*):

- (2) Tant' avié la nariz a razón **afeitada**
que non podría Apelles reprenderla en nada;
los labros abenidos, la boca mesurada,
los dientes bien iguales, blancos como cuajada. (From *CORDE*: Cañas 1988.)

(Her nose was so beautifully **painted**
that Apelles could not reprimand her in any way;
perfect lips, a modest mouth,
well-proportioned teeth, white like milk.)

Note the variation found in the same passage across the two versions studied by Casas Rigall (2017), where *afeitar* has been replaced by *levantar* (or, perhaps, the other way around):

- (3) Ms. P (BNP Esp. 488; copied 1450-1475 [*BETA*])

Tanto auje la naris a raçon **afeytada**
 que non ha Apelles de rreprenderla en nada
 los labros abenjdos la boca mesurada
 los dientes bien yguales blancos commo cuajada

- (4) Ms. O (BNM Vitrina 5-10; copied 1300-1400 [*BETA*])

Era tan a rrazon: la nariz **leuantada**
 que non podria Apelles: deprender la posada
 los beços auenidos: la boca mesurada
 los dientes por iguales: brancos cuemo quaiada

Incidentally, this could potentially be additional evidence in favor of the Gallicism hypothesis; given that Ms. O generally shows western (Leonese) characteristics and Ms. P generally shows eastern (Aragonese) characteristics (Uría Maqua 2000: 179), it is possible that the copyist of Ms. P was familiar with Gallo-Romance and therefore chose to use a form related to *afaitier*, while the copyist of Ms. O chose a different word.⁶¹

CORDE finds several additional thirteenth-century examples (of the infinitive form):

- (5) E dixieron-le: ¿Qué es en poder del ome de **afeitar** e **desafeitar**? E dixo Socrates: El **afeitar** es enderesçar el seso con sapiencia, e esclarecer -le con buen enseñamiento, e matar la ira con sufrença, e vencer la cobdicia, e quebrantar la enbidia, e domar el alma desde aquí fasta que sea obediente al bien. E el **desafeitar** es encobrir el seso de sapiencia, e ensuziar-le con mal enseñamiento, e acender la ira, e crescer en la codicia bestial.

(*Bocados de oro*, anonymous, c. 1250)

(And they told him: What is within man's power to **afeitar** and **desafeitar**? And Socrates said: **afeitar** is to guide the mind with wisdom, and to enlighten it with good teachings, and to kill anger with suffering, and to defeat greed, and to destroy envy, and to tame the soul from now until it is obedient to goodness. And **desafeitar** is to remove wisdom from the mind, and to dirty it with bad teachings, and to ignite anger, and to grow in bestial greed.)

⁶¹ It is probably more likely, however, that the copyist made an error here, given the other changes to the first two lines of the quartet, as well as the fact that Ms. O does contain two instances of *afeitar* (*afeytados* at 59r10 and *afeytando* at 146r18).

- (6) Pon a tus desengañadores e a tus amigos por espejo a las tus obras, como pones el fierro acecalado por espejo a tu rostro. E a ti es más menester enderesçar la tu natura e las tus obras, que **afeitar** la tu forma.

(*Bocados de oro*, anonymous, c. 1250)

(Hold your detractors and friends as a mirror to your deeds, as you hold polished iron as a mirror to your own face. And it is more necessary for you to correct your nature and your works, than to **adorn** your appearance.)

- (7) E quando el Rey oyó esto, enbió a su marido a una hueste. E la muger era muy casta e muy buena e muy entendida e dixo: - Señor, tú eres mi señor e yo só tu sierva e lo que tú quesieres, quiérollo yo, mas irme he a los vaños **afeitar**. E quando tornó, diol' un libro de su marido en que avía leyes e juizios de los reyes, de cómmo escarmentavan a las mugeres que fazían adulterio. E (e) dixo: - Señor, ley por ese libro fasta que me **afeinte**.⁶²

(*Sendebat*, anonymous, c. 1253)

(And when the King heard this, he sent her husband to a [hueste]. And the woman was very chaste and very good and intelligent and said: - Sir, you are my lord and I am your servant and what you want, I want, but I will go to the bath house **to prepare [myself]**. And when she returned, she gave him a book of her husband's in which there were laws and judgments of the kings, and how they punished women who committed adultery. And she said: - Sir, read through this book until I **am prepared**.)

- (8) e aquellos a qui lo él rey mandara que fueron e fiziéronle **afeitar** e vestir bien primero, ca assí gelo castigara el rey

(*General Estoria, Primera parte*, attributed to Alfonso X, c. 1275)

(and those whom the king had commanded left and made [him] **prepare** and dress well first, because then the king could punish him)

- (9) Onde decálogo, como avemos dicho, tanto es segund esto como X razones o razones de X, e esto es d'estos X mandados. E sobr'esto dize Huguiucio, e Papía, e maestre Ebrardo en el Grecismo que en esta palabra colere á estos cuatro sesos: morar, labrar, **afeitar**, onrar e aun amar. Mas dexados los otros sesos dizremos dell onrar e dell aorar. D'esto departe Orígenes en la glosa sobr'este capítulo de los X mandados, e maestre Pedro otrossí en su Estoria, e dizen que ell aorar dell omne que pertenece al verdadero Dios solo e non a otra cosa ninguna.

(*General Estoria, Primera parte*, attributed to Alfonso X, c. 1275)

(Where [according to] the decalogue, as we have said, it is so as much according to this as ten reasons or reasons of ten, and this is from these ten commandments. And regarding this Huguiucio, and Papía, and master Ebrardo in the Grecismo say that this word affects [colere] these four terms [sesos]: live, work, **do unto others**, honor and even love. But leaving aside the other terms we will speak about honoring and adoration. Orígenes

⁶² The -n- in this last example appears to be a copyist's error: *CORDE* only records the one example.

departs from this in the text of this chapter on the ten commandments, and also from master Peter in his Story, and they say that man's adoration only pertains to the true God and not to anything else.)

Additionally, Davies (2002-) finds 58 attestations across 17 texts and with at least 5 distinct meanings (represented in Table 2.1, section 2.2.4). Again, the variety of meanings is not surprising, if we assume that *afeitar* is indeed a Gallicism, given the range of meanings reported for Old French (see footnote 60 above).

2.2.2 Lexicographical attestations

This section outlines the senses found in various lexicographical sources, including historical corpus-based dictionaries compiled in recent times with descriptive intentions (such as Kasten & Cody 2001), as well as more prescriptively-bent dictionaries and thesauruses compiled at various times which will be used here as primary sources (such as Covarrubias' *Tesoro*, cited as Arellano & Zafra 2006). The outline is intended to give an overall impression of the breadth of the semantic scope of *afeitar*, but it is by no means comprehensive. As will become clearer in subsequent sections, the senses most pertinent to the analysis (due to their prototypicality) are few. Presentation of the senses includes brief comparisons with the data taken from Davies (2002-), which is described more extensively in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 and which forms the basis for the subsequent analysis.

Subsection 2.2.2.1 focuses on *afeitar*, while subsection 2.2.2.2 provides a brief outline of (near-) synonyms and related terms.

2.2.2.1 *Afeitar*

Beginning with a current dictionary, *afeitar* is registered in the *DRAE* with seven senses, two of which bear the notation '*desus.*' (*desusado* 'no longer used'):

afeitar.

(Del arag. o leon. *afeitar*, y este del lat. *affectāre* ‘arreglar’).

1. tr. Raer con navaja, cuchilla o máquina la barba o el bigote, y, por ext., el pelo de cualquier parte del cuerpo. U. t. c. prnl.

(Cut a beard or mustache with a razor, blade or machine and, by extension, the hair of any part of the body.)

2. tr. Esquilar a una caballería las crines y las puntas de la cola.

(Shear a horse’s mane and the tip of its tail.)

3. tr. Recortar e igualar las ramas y hojas de una planta de jardín.

(Cut and even out the branches and leaves of a garden plant.)

4. tr. Adornar, componer, hermosear. U. t. c. prnl.

(Adorn, decorate, beautify.)

5. tr. *Taurom.* Cortar o limar la punta de los cuernos al toro para que su lidia resulte menos peligrosa.

(*In bullfighting* Cut or file the tip of the horns of a bull so that its fighting is less dangerous.)

6. tr. desus. Componer o hermosear con afeites el rostro u otra parte del cuerpo. Era u. t. c. prnl.

(Decorate or beautify the face or another part of the body with cosmetics.)

7. tr. desus. Guiar, instruir, enseñar.

(Guide, instruct, teach.)

The current prototypical meaning (implied by its place as the first sense on the list) is ‘shave,’ which will be confirmed by the data from Davies (2002-) presented later on. Sense (2) shows up only four times in the data, and (3) does not show up at all. Interestingly, (4) is not marked as ‘*desus.*,’ yet, as the data suggest, it seems to have barely been used at all—at least in writing—since the seventeenth century (only two tokens were found after that point, one in the eighteenth and one in the twentieth). Sense (5) was also not present in the data, and (6) and (7) disappear in the data set in the twentieth and fourteenth centuries, respectively.

The information presented in the *DRAE* is quite different from that presented in Kasten & Cody (2001), which compiles data from the medieval period:

afeytar (afeitar, affectar, affeytar, afitar) [lat. affectare]

1. v.t. adornar

(adorn)

2. v.t. persuadir, convencer, aconsejar

(persuade, convince, advise)

3. v.t. afeitar, embellecer con engaño, disimular

- (shave, embellish with trickery, feign)
- 4. v.t. (*fig.*) marcar
(*(figuratively)* mark)
- 5. v.t. amaestrar
(train an animal)
- 6. v.t. obrar sobre alguna cosa causando en ella una modificación, poner en cierto estado, acabar
(work on something causing a modification to it, put in a certain state, finish)
- 7. v.i. adornarse, hermosearse
(adorn oneself, beautify oneself)
- 8. v.r. rasurar o raer la barba, cabellos, etc.
(shave or trim a beard, hair, etc.)
- 9. v.r. adornarse, ponerse afeites, hermosearse
(adorn oneself, apply cosmetics to oneself, beautify oneself)
- 10. v.r. (*fig.*) cubrirse con algo, y por extensión, someterse, guiarse
(*(figuratively)* cover oneself with something, and by extension, submit, allow oneself to be guided)

Here, we see that ‘adorn’ was likely the prototypical meaning (which concurs with the data from Davies 2002-), while ‘shave’ was relegated to position (8). Senses (5), (7), (8), and (9) are also found in significant numbers in the data, while the others were not.

Filling in the chronological space between the medieval period (covered by Kasten & Cody 2001, from the year 1140 to 1489) and the present, moving toward the present, we find the following entries from Nebrija’s *Dictionarium hispano-latinum* (published in 1495; examples taken from Davies 2002-):

- [1] Afeite de muger. {LAT. fucus .i.}
(Women’s cosmetic.)
- [2] Afeitar la muger con afeites. {LAT. fuco .as.}
(Beautify a woman with cosmetics.)
- [3] Afeitada cosa assi. {LAT. fucatus. fucusus .a .um.}
(A beautified thing.)
- [4] Afeitar la barva o cabello. {LAT. to<n>deo .es. coma .is.}
(Cut a beard or hair.)
- [5] Afeitador enesta manera. {LAT. tonsor .oris.}
(Barber.)
- [6] Afeitadera enesta manera. {LAT. tonstrix .icis.}
(Female barber.)
- [7] Afeitaderuela assi. {LAT. tonstricula .<a>e.}
(Female barber.)

- [8] Afeitadera de muger. {LAT. cosmata .<a>e.}
(Female cosmetics specialist.)
[9] Afeitar como quiera. {LAT. orno. exorno. adorno}
(Adorn.)

Here we see that the first sense that came to the lexicographer's mind was apparently 'apply cosmetics' (sense [2]), and then 'shave' (sense [4]). Of note here is also the explicit mention of women along with the act of applying cosmetics. Furthermore, this correlates with the data from Davies (2002-), in which 'apply cosmetics' dominates in the period immediately following the publication of Nebrija's *Dictionarium*, while 'shave' is on the rise as well.

Also notable is the entry in the Spanish-Latin dictionary from the fifteenth century (Mac Donald 2007), which is supposed to have pre-dated Nebrija,⁶³ and which invokes the acts of coloring, painting, and dyeing, all of which are involved in applying cosmetics:

afeytar *Fuco .as. auj . atum.*
(Color, paint, dye)
afeyte *Hic fucus .ci do vjene Fucatus .a .um* por cosa afeytada
(Rouge, red dye, disguise, from which comes *Color, paint, dye* for something *afeytada*)

As far as I am able to tell, the next lexicographical mention of *afeitar* is found in the seventeenth century, where we see that Covarrubias (Arellano & Zafra 2006) included *afeitar* as a sub-heading under the noun *afeite*:

afeite. El aderezo que se pone a alguna cosa para que parezca bien y particularmente el que las mujeres se ponen en la cara, manos y pechos para parecer blancas y rojas [...]

(The adornment that one adds to something so that it looks good and particularly that which women apply to their faces, hands and chests so that they appear white and red [...])

Afeitar, se toma muchas veces por quitarse los hombres el cabello, y propiamente se afeitan aquellos que con gran curiosidad e importunidad van señalando al barbero este y el otro pelo que a su parecer no está igual con los demás [...]

⁶³ And is arguably not directly related to it, according to the editor.

(it is often taken to mean removal of hair for men, and properly speaking those men who with great curiosity and impertinence point out to the barber this and that hair which seems to him to not match with the other hairs are said to *afeitarse* [*se afeitan*] [...])

Notable again is that this correlates quite well with the data from Davies (2002-), wherein the period in question shows prototypicality of APPLY COSMETICS, but the beginnings of encroachment from SHAVE, albeit, in the opinion of Covarrubias, primarily when the man being shaved makes annoying and meticulous demands of the barber.

Moving to the eighteenth century, the following entries from the 1726 edition of *Autoridades* show a return to the sense of ‘adorn’ (senses [1] - [3]; although [3] is noted as ‘antiquated.’), followed by ‘shave’ (sense [4]), and continued mention of women, but further down the list (senses [7] and [8]). Again, this correlates with the data to be presented further on.

- [1] **afeitar.** v.a. Aderezar, adobar, componer con afeites alguna cosa, para que parezca bien: lo que particular y frequentemente se dice del rostro, y hacen cada día las mugéres para su adorno y hermosúra en cara, manos y pechos, para parecer blancas [...]

(Adorn, prepare, decorate something with cosmetics, so that it looks good: which particularly and frequently is said of the face, and what women do every day to adorn and beauty their faces, hands and chests, so that they look white [...])

- [2] **afeitar.** Vale algunas veces tanto como Aderezar, ó componer con artificio lo que se ha de vender para encubrir el defecto que tiene: como afeitar una carroza, un furlón, un biombo, y assi otras cosas que ya han servido, para que parezcan como nuevas. Lat. *Ornáre.Fucáre*. Marian. Hist.Esp.lib.7.cap.19. Para disimular su cobardía y flaqueza se arman, y *afeitan* con apellidos magnificos.

(Sometimes used in the same way as Correct [*Aderezar*], or decorate with trickery that which must be sold in order to cover a defect that it has: as in adorn a carriage, a coach, a folding screen, and likewise other things that have already been used, so that they appear new. Lat. *Ornáre.Fucáre*. Marian. Hist.Esp.lib.7.cap.19. In order to disguise their cowardice and weakness they take up arms, and *afeitan* with magnificent surnames.)

- [3] **afeitar.** Se toma tambien por Adornar, pulir y componer alguna cosa. Es voz antiquada. Lat. *Paráre.Excólere*. Part.2.tit.7.ley 4. Les dén a los que los guarden, e los *afeiten* en su comer e en su beber. Chron.Gen.fol.240. E honraba, e *afeitaba* los Altares de las Iglesias con ricos paños.

(It is also taken to mean Adorn, polish and decorate a thing. It is an antiquated sense. Lat. *Paráre.Excólere*. Part.2.tit.7.ley 4. [That] they give to those who save, and [that] they *afeiten* them in their eating and drinking. Chron.Gen.fol.240. And [he] honored, and *afeitaba* the Altars of the Churches with extravagant cloths.)

- [4] **afeitar**. Vale tambien por analogía hacer la barba, componer y cortar el pelo, segun lo que se estila y usa. Lat. *Tondére*. Partid.7.tit.15.ley 17. Raer e *afeitar* deben los Alfajémes los omes en los lugares apartados. Covarr. en su Thes. en la voz Afeite. Propriamente se *afeitan* aquellos, que con gran curiosidad e importunidad van señalando al Barbero este y otro pelo, que a su parecer no está igual con los demas.

(It also means, by analogy, shave the beard, improve and cut hair, according to style and use. Lat. *Tondére*. Partid.7.tit.15.ley 17. Barbers must shave and *afeitar* the men in separated areas. Covarrubias in his Thesaurus under *Afeite*. Properly speaking those men who with great curiosity and impertinence point out to the barber this and that hair which seems to him to not match with the other hairs are said to *afeitarse* [se *afeitan*].)

- [5] **afeitar los caballos y mulas, y otras caballerias**. Es trasquilarlas, y hacerlas las clines. Lat. *Tondére*.

(It means to shear them [horses, mules, and other mountable animals], and tend to their manes. Lat. *Tondére*.)

- [6] **afeitar los jardines**. Es componer las guarniciones hechas de box, u de otras matas al rededór de los quadros, igualándolas, y cortando las espalderas que las guarnecen y adornan. Trahe esta voz Covarr. en la palábra Afeite. Lat. *Excólere. Expolire*.

(It means to improve the decorations made of *box*, or of other shrubs around the quarters, making them similar to each other, and cutting the trellises that decorate and adorn them. Covarrubias covers this sense in the word *Afeite*. Lat. *Excólere. Expolire*.)

- [7] **afeita un cepo, parecera mancebo**. Refr. que explica que el adorno y la gala conducen mucho para el bien parecer. Lat. *Formosus aderit truncus ornatu nitens*.

(A saying that explains that adornment and elegance go far to create good appearances. Lat. *Formosus aderit truncus ornatu nitens*.)

La mugér del ciego para quien *se afeita*. Refr. que da a entender que la compostúra en las mugéres que tiene contentos a sus maridos denota querer agradar a otros. Lat. *Caeci uxor beus Lycisca, cui vultum oblinis?*

Lop.Dorot.fol.171. Yo no me hallé en las mocedádes de mi Madre, viuda es, y no le pesa de parecer bien, la mugér del ciego para quien *se afeita*?

(For whom does the wife of the blind man *se afeita*[?]. A saying that suggests that the use of cosmetics by women that makes their husbands happy means that they want to please others. Lat. *Caeci uxor beus Lycisca, cui vultum oblinis?*)

Lop.Dorot.fol.171. I did not find myself in the dishonesty [*mocedádes*] of my Mother, who is a widow, and it does not trouble her to look well, for whom *se afeita* the wife of the blind man?)

La muger y la camuésa por su mal *se afeitan*. Refr. que parece se dixo, porque la camuésa quando se pone coloráda está regularmente podrida por adentro, y la mugér se suele poner afeites para disimular los achaques que tiene. Lat. *Malum, atque femina proprio rubent malo*.

Lop.Dorot.fol.218. Pues no se dirá por ti; que la mugér y la camuésa por su mal *se afeitan*.

(Women and apples *se afeitan* to cover their defects. A saying that [parece se dixo], because when an apple turns red it is usually rotten on the inside, and women tend to put on cosmetics [*afeites*] in order to disguise the defects that they have. Lat. *Malum, atque femina proprio rubent malo*.)

Lop.Dorot.fol.218. It will not be said because of you; that women and apples *se afeitan* to cover their evilness.)

- [8] **afeitado, da.** part. pas. del verbo Afeitar en todas sus acepciones. Lat. *Comptus. Fucátus. Tonsus*. Acost. hist.Ind.lib.4.cap.39. Que si veía mugéres *afeitádas* iba y las tiraba del tocado, y las descomponia y tratába mal. Cerv. Nov.3.fol.112. Entraron con él dos mozas, *afeitádos* los rostros, llenos de color los lábios. Lop.Philom.fol.13. *En afeitádos Céspedes del prado / Conservába las perlas del rocío*.

(Past participle of the verb Afeitar in all of its senses. Lat. *Comptus. Fucátus. Tonsus*. Acost. hist.Ind.lib.4.cap.39. If [he] saw women *afeitádas* [he] went and touched them, and messed up their makeup and treated them poorly. Cerv. Nov.3.fol.112. Two young women entered with him, their faces *afeitádos*, their lips full of color. Lop.Philom.fol.13. *In afeitádos Grasses of the field / [It] conserved the pearls of the dew*.)

This brief series of ‘snapshots’ gives us a good idea of the semantic scope of *afeitar*, according to lexicographers over the last several centuries, and allows us to begin to see the shifts in the verb’s semasiological profile, from the prototypical sense ‘adorn’ in the medieval period, to ‘apply cosmetics’ in the early modern period, to the current sense ‘shave’. Section 2.2.3 verifies this tendency with examples taken from the electronic corpora, but first it is worth taking an overview of the onomasiological perspective, in order to contextualize the lexical item *afeitar*.

2.2.2.2 Synonyms and related terms

This subsection highlights some of the synonyms and other terms that are related to the domains ADORN, APPLY COSMETICS, and SHAVE, which, according to the data found in Davies (2002-) have been meanings associated with *afeitar*, and which will be the focus of the analysis further on.

A complete onomasiological study of the semantic domains ADORN/APPLY COSMETICS would include a wide array of lexical items, including, among others, the following verbs, all of which are taken from Terrón González (1990), except those in brackets (which were common enough to be thought of while perusing the volume in question):⁶⁴ *aderezar* ‘decorate, make up,’

⁶⁴ Other examples from Terrón González (1990) include: *acicalar* ‘clean up,’ *aconchar* ‘decorate,’ *adamar* ‘to make feminine,’ *adelgazar* ‘make or become softer or thinner,’ *afilar* ‘sharpen,’ *aforrar* ‘line [clothing], adorn, apply cosmetics, shave,’ *alcorzar* ‘polish, clean, adorn,’ *almagrar* ‘dye or smear with red ochre,’ *almidonar* ‘starch [clothing],’ *amapolar* ‘apply rouge, blush, dress up,’ *amoldar* ‘fit, adjust, shape,’ *ampollar* ‘soften the hairs of the neck,’ *arrear* ‘adorn,’ *arrebolar* ‘apply rouge, blush, dress up,’ *arrollar* ‘curl [hair],’ *atezar* ‘dye black, straighten, smooth,’ *atildar* ‘decorate, clean, adorn,’ *atusar* ‘cut hair,’ *azogar* ‘add mercury or silver,’ *barnizar* ‘varnish,’ *bruñir* ‘burnish, polish, clean,’ *cabellar* ‘add a hairpiece or extension,’ *cinchar* ‘adjust, secure, cover,’ *colorar* / *colorear* ‘color, dye [especially with red],’ *contrahacer* ‘imitate,’ *crespar* ‘curl,’ *cubrir* ‘cover,’ *dar (cejas)* ‘paint,’ *demudar* ‘alter, disguise,’ *desafeitar* ‘unadorn, make ugly,’ *desgerumar* ‘remove earwax, empty a cosmetic flask,’ *deslustrar* ‘tarnish,’ *desnaturalizar* ‘disfigure,’ *echar (en adobo / en tinta los cabellos)* ‘dye hair,’ *embarnizar* ‘varnish,’ *emplastar* ‘apply cosmetics [excessively],’ *enalmagrar* ‘dye or smear with red ochre,’ *encalar* ‘whiten,’ *encerar* ‘apply wax,’ *encrespar* ‘curl,’ *encubrir* ‘cover, hide,’ *enflorececer* ‘adorn, beautify [especially with flowers],’ *engomar* ‘gloss,’ *engrifar* ‘curl,’ *enguedejar* ‘be or become handsome, add locks of hair,’ *enharinar* ‘dye,’ *enjalbogar* ‘apply cosmetics,’ *ennegrecer* ‘dye black,’ *enrizar* ‘curl,’ *enrubiar* ‘dye blond,’ *ensortijar* ‘curl,’ *entablar* ‘cover, apply cosmetics,’ *entintar* ‘dye,’ *entiznar* ‘dye black,’ *entresacar* ‘extract [especially white hairs],’ *entretener* ‘cover, disguise,’ *envestir* ‘cover, disguise,’ *erizar* ‘lift, straighten,’ *escabechar* ‘dye [especially white hairs],’ *escarolar* ‘frill,’ *estirar* ‘stretch,’ *estrecharse* ‘narrow, squeeze,’ *guedejar* ‘add locks of hair,’ *hacer (el cabello / el caballo / cejas / guedeja / la barba / los bigotes / pelo / sortija)* ‘decorate, adorn, beautify (hair / eyebrows / bangs / beard / mustache / curls),’ *hilar (los bigotes)* ‘braid hairs,’ *lavar* ‘clean, dye, renew,’ *pelar* ‘pull, cut, shave hair,’ *quitar (cejas)* ‘remove (eyebrows),’ *rebujar* ‘cover a bald spot with existing hair,’ *renovar* ‘renew, replace, dye,’ *repintar* ‘apply cosmetics [excessively],’ *restaurar* ‘repair, renew,’ *resuscitar* ‘renew, dye,’ *rizar* ‘curl,’ *rociar* ‘spray,’ *sahumar* ‘perfume,’ *tapar* ‘cover,’ *teñir* ‘dye,’ *tirar* ‘stretch,’ *tiznar* ‘stain, dye,’ *tocar* ‘brush, adorn hair,’ *torcer* ‘twist,’ *tornar* ‘change,’ *trampear* ‘disguise, dye,’ *trastejar* ‘fix, change, decorate,’ *trenzar* ‘braid,’ *vestir* ‘dress, disguise.’

Incidentally, it is worth mentioning Arellano’s claim (1990: 181-2) that “...abundan en esta lista unas supuestas acepciones lexicalizadas que no son en realidad sino metáforas ocasionales que guardan toda la plenitud de su nivel connotativo” (“...supposed lexicalized acceptations abound in this list which in reality are nothing other than occasional metaphors which preserve the totality of their connotative level [value]”). Nevertheless, from a cognitive perspective, it is fortunate that these items were included, since it is precisely their metaphorical use that provides the most revealing information about semantic change. Terrón González (1990) also includes a long list of nouns related to cosmetics; see also Romero del Castillo (2014) for a study of the nouns found in *El Corbacho* and *La*

adobar ‘adapt, repair,’ *afeitar* ‘adorn, apply cosmetics, shave,’ *agraciar* ‘beautify, perfect,’
alcoholar ‘paint or dye with an alcohol-based unguent,’ *aliñar* ‘decorate, adorn, dress up,’
almizclar ‘perfume with musk,’ *ataviar* ‘decorate, clean, adorn,’ *blanquear* ‘whiten,’
componer(se) ‘decorate, adorn, fix,’ *disfrazar* ‘disguise,’ *dorar* ‘gild, disguise,’ *engalanar*
‘adorn, decorate,’ *enrojar* / *[enrojecer]* ‘dye red,’ *guisar* ‘dye, adorn,’ *hermosear* ‘beautify,’
hojaldrar ‘apply cosmetics,’ *jalbegar* ‘apply cosmetics,’ *[maquillar(se)]* ‘apply cosmetics,’
mudar ‘change, dye, falsify,’ *peinar* ‘brush,’ *pellejar* ‘shave, remove hair,’ *perfilar* ‘beautify,
decorate, dye,’ *pintar* ‘dye, apply cosmetics,’ *poblar* ‘add a hairpiece or extension,’ *polvorear*
‘powder,’ *pulir* ‘polish, adorn, beautify,’ *rapar* ‘remove, shave hair,’ *[rasurar(se)]* ‘shave,’
refinar ‘refine, polish,’ *remediar* ‘correct,’ *ungir* ‘apply oil, lotion,’ *untar* ‘apply oil, lotion,’
zahumar ‘perfume.’

The majority of these lexical items pertain more closely to the domain APPLY COSMETICS than to ADORN, except in the extension PERSONAL ADORNMENT. If we were to include terms that referred to NON-PERSONAL ADORNMENT, the list would be far longer—not to mention the fact that the list almost exclusively contains items from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With respect to SHAVE, fewer, but still quite a few, absolute and partial synonyms and related terms were found during the study: *apurar*, *cercenar*, *cortar*, *depilar*, *desbarbar*, *raer*, *rapar*, *rasurar*, *recortar*, *tonsurar*.

As mentioned above, the present study takes a semasiological focus, but, as it will become clearer in the discussion that follows, it is necessary to maintain an awareness of the onomasiological situation. For now, suffice it to say that *afeitar* is a member of a lexically very productive set of semantic domains.

Celestina, as well as several verbs, all of which are found in the list presented here, except for *afinar* ‘polish, sharpen’, *destilar* ‘distill, filter, reveal’, *falsear* ‘falsify, sag’, and *martillar* ‘pound’.

2.2.3 Attestations from searchable databases

This part of the study relies on data culled from Mark Davies' *Corpus del español* (Davies 2002-), with occasional supporting evidence from the Real Academia Española's *Corpus diacrónico del español* (Real Academia Española 2017a; henceforth *CORDE*). Ten principal semantic domains were found in the broad analysis of the data, which were then found to be divisible into more specific sub-sets (giving a total of 42 identifiable domains), based on a more fine-grained analysis with respect to verbal transitivity, the type of semantic agents and patients involved, and the non-referential (connotational) implications of each token (these will be presented further along—see table 2.4 in section 2.3). The ten broad categories were ADORN, TRAIN (AN ANIMAL), APPLY COSMETICS, SHAVE, CUT (HAIR), CUT (PLANTS), CLEAN, WEAR (OSTENTATIONOUSLY), GUIDE, and HIDE. Based on the frequency criterion presented in Chapter 1 (section 1.5), ADORN, APPLY COSMETICS, and SHAVE were found to be semasiological prototypes of the lexical item *afeitar* at different times throughout the eight centuries covered by the corpus, which, as I have mentioned, corresponds to the evidence found in the lexicographical sources presented in section 2.2.2. The analysis presented here focuses on these three categories, but all ten of the broad categories are presented in table form in the next section. First, however, I will give examples of each of the three principal domains in question.

2.2.3.1 ADORN

From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, the largest grouping of the tokens referring to ADORN (55 out of 112) involved adorning an object, with a positive connotation. The object could be physical, such as a church (*eglesia*):

- (10) Otrossi fazen sobeiania metiendo toda su femencia en allegar grandes riquezas. & faziendo grandes misiones en labrar sus eglesias & en afeytar las. E trabaian se de fazer las paredes dellas pintadas & fermosas.

(*Siete partidas I*, thirteenth century)

([The clerics] reign by putting all of their efforts into obtaining great riches and making great expenditures to build their churches and adorn them. And they work to make their walls decorated and beautiful.)

Or the object could be something abstract, such as the mind (*el seso*):

- (11) E dixo Socrates el afeytar es endereçar el seso con sapiencia & enlarcerlo con buen enseñamiento.

(*Bocados de oro*, Bonium, thirteenth century)

(And Socrates said that afeytar is to guide the mind with wisdom and enlighten it with good teachings.)

The next largest number of tokens referring to ADORN from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century

(49 out of 112) involved personal adornment of some type (either literal [e.g. with jewelry or

fancy clothing] or figurative [e.g. with ‘holiness’], generally with a positive connotation:

- (12) Uenus es fortuna. fria & vmida. nocturna. alegre. gozosa. risuenna. de buen parecer. afeytada. linpia hermosa. ama ioglerias & alegrias.

(*Judizios de las estrellas*, thirteenth century.)

(Venus is luck; cold and wet, nocturnal, happy, cheerful, good-looking, adorned, clean, and beautiful; she loves games and pleasures.)

- (13) Escorpion. es hermoso & apuesto. & de buen parecer. temudo. & de hermosos uestidos. & de buenas caualgaduras. & afeytado & limpio.

(*Judizios de las estrellas*, thirteenth century.)

(Scorpio is beautiful and handsome, and good-looking, feared, well-dressed, he has good horses and he is adorned and clean.)

- (14) toma tu por ende esta uestidura que te yo do del thesoro de mio fijo. por que seas afeytado en esta uida de uestidura de gloria & de santidad.

(*Estoria de España I*, thirteenth century)

(therefore take these clothes that I give you from the treasury of my son, so that you might be adorned in this life and have glorious and saintly clothes.)

2.2.3.2 APPLY COSMETICS

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we see a shift toward a more specific type of personal adornment: APPLY COSMETICS. The vast majority of the agents and patients are women (78/82 tokens), with the largest number of them (36/78) clearly expressed with a negative connotation:

- (15) BRÍGIDA: Señor don Solórzano [...] que en verdad no soy para desechar, y que tengo yo tan buenas entradas y salidas en mi casa como la señora doña Cristina; que, a no temer que nos oyera alguna, le dijera yo al señor Solórzano más de cuatro tachas suyas: que sepa que tiene las tetas como dos alforjas vacías, y que no le huele muy bien el aliento, porque se **afeita** mucho; y, con todo eso, la buscan, solicitan y quieren [...]
(*Entremeses*, Cervantes, sixteenth century)

(BRÍGIDA: Sir Solórzano [...] in truth, I should not be overlooked, I have as many visitors as the lady Miss Cristina; if I were not afraid that somebody would overhear us, I would tell you of more than four defects of hers: you should be aware that her breasts are like two empty saddlebags and her breath does not smell good, because she **uses** a lot of **cosmetics**; and, in spite of all of that, they seek her out and love her [...].)

- (16) PETRONA: Por eso es mayor mi queja; cóqueme por perezosa, por floja, por descuidada, por fea, por **afeitada**, por liviana, por golosa.
(*Santa Teresa de Jesús*, Lope de Vega, seventeenth century)

(PETRONA: For that reason my complaint is greater; consider me lazy, weak, unkempt, ugly, **coquettish**, frivolous, greedy.)

2.2.3.3 SHAVE

In the eighteenth century, the prototype shifts again, this time from a type of personal adornment done typically by women to one done typically by men. From the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the corpus records 276 tokens meaning SHAVE, eight of which explicitly involve women (and only five more of which could potentially involve women, were the agents and patients explicit). The connotation is overwhelmingly neutral (i.e. non-explicit in the context). In earlier texts it was more common to express what was being shaven (either the hair

being removed or the location of the removal, such as the face), while more recent texts dispense with those details more readily:

- (17) Su talla es idéntica a la mbayá, como también el vestido y el no sufrir cejas, etc., pero son amiguísimos de pintarse y ponen en ello más estudio que los demás bárbaros. Cortan el pelo horizontalmente a media frente, se **afeitan** una grande media luna o semicírculo sobre cada oreja y el pelo de atrás cae flotante. Algunos se rapan toda la cabeza menos un mechón a la mahometana, y otros **afeitan** todo lo que está delante de la sutura coronal o la mitad anterior de la cabeza.

(*Descripción general del Paraguay*, Félix de Azara, 1782)

(Their size is equal to that of the *Mbayá*, as is their way of dressing and their lack of eyebrow, etc., but they love to paint themselves and they put more effort into that than the other barbarians. They cut their hair horizontally, halfway down their foreheads, **they shave** a large half-moon or semicircle over each ear and the hair in the back falls loosely. Some shave their entire heads except for a Muslim-style lock, and others **shave** everything in front of the coronal suture or the middle-front of the head.)

- (18) Era de mediana estatura, tenía la frente angosta, bastante pelo, ojos pequeñitos, boca grande, labios apretados, pómulos salientes, largas orejas, color pálido, rugoso el cutis y muy **afeitada** la barba.

(*Esbozos y rasguños*, José María de Pereda, 1870)

(He was of medium stature, with a narrow forehead, a lot of hair, small eyes, a large mouth, pursed lips, protruding cheekbones, long ears, a pallid color, wrinkled skin and a well-**shaven** beard.)

- (19) Mientras me **afeito** en el espejo del baño dispuesto a ir al sanatorio, llaman a la puerta.

(*Los pies de barro*, Salvador Garmendia, twentieth century)

(While I **shave** in the bathroom mirror, ready to go to the hospital, someone knocks on the door.)

2.2.4 Summary of the sequence of semantic changes

This section summarizes the evidence presented in the previous section. Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 present the information, and further explanation follows.

Table 2.1 Tokens of *afeitar(se)* by century (from Davies 2002-).

Century Meaning	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th	Totals
ADORN	41	5	66	16	20	1	0	1	150
TRAIN (AN ANIMAL)	3	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	30
APPLY COSMETICS	0	1	3	45	37	3	7	0	96
SHAVE	8	2	8	13	14	26	136	114	321
CUT (HAIR)	4	0	3	12	1	0	1	0	21
CUT (PLANTS)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	4
CLEAN	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	4
WEAR (OSTENTATIOUSLY)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
GUIDE	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HIDE	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
Totals	58	36	82	88	74	30	144	118	630

Table 2.2 Frequency of *afeitar(se)* (words per million) by century (from Davies 2002-).

Century Meaning	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
ADORN	6.1	1.87	8.09	0.94	1.62	0.1	0	0.04
TRAIN (AN ANIMAL)	0.45	10.11	0	0	0	0	0	0
APPLY COSMETICS	0	0.37	0.37	2.64	3	0.3	0.36	0
SHAVE	1.19	0.75	0.98	0.76	1.13	2.65	7.05	5
CUT (HAIR)	0.6	0	0.37	0.7	0.08	0	0.05	0
CUT (PLANTS)	0	0	0	0	0.08	0	0	0.13
CLEAN	0.3	0	0.25	0	0	0	0	0
WEAR (OSTENTATIOUSLY)	0	0	0	0.06	0	0	0	0
GUIDE	0	0.37	0	0	0	0	0	0
HIDE	0	0	0	0.06	0.08	0	0	0

Table 2.3 Percentage of tokens of *afeitar(se)* by century (from Davies 2002-).

Century Meaning	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
ADORN	71	14	80	18	27	3	0	1
TRAIN (AN ANIMAL)	5	75	0	0	0	0	0	0
APPLY COSMETICS	0	3	4	51	50	10	5	0
SHAVE	14	6	10	15	19	87	94	97
CUT (HAIR)	7	0	4	14	1	0	1	0
CUT (PLANTS)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
CLEAN	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
WEAR (OSTENTATIOUSLY)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
GUIDE	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
HIDE	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

As Table 2.1 indicates, (and as mentioned in section 2.2.3) the data were divisible into ten broad semantic categories. Each of these categories was later subdivided (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Division into the broad categories was based on what was perceived to be relatively clear-cut referential distinction, thus, for example, CUT HAIR and CUT PLANTS were given separate categories, given that the entity being cut is different in each case (not to mention that the tools used to do the cutting are presumably different as well), while SHAVE was considered to be a relatively homogeneous category—at least in terms of its referential content—given that, for example, ‘shaving a beard’ and ‘shaving one’s head’ both involve the act of removing hair by means of a blade or other sharp implement. Furthermore, it should be noted that the (presumably de-verbal) noun *afeite(s)* ‘cosmetics’⁶⁵ was excluded from this analysis, along with, of course, verb phrases such as *poner(se) afeite(s)* ‘lit. put (oneself) cosmetics’, since it constitutes a distinct lexical item.

⁶⁵ As well as the orthographic variants *afeyte(s)* and the occasional *afeito(s)*. Care was taken to distinguish these forms from the verbal forms belonging to the present subjunctive and indicative paradigms.

Additionally, meanings for which only a few tokens were found are still included in the chart in order to demonstrate the breadth of the range of meanings found in the corpus (in addition to those attested in lexicographical sources, many of which were not attested in the corpus). Nevertheless, these meanings were marginalized in the analysis, as will become evident.

Finally, it should be noted that—in a few cases—the assignment of the tokens into the domain categories was more or less arbitrary, given the contexts in which the tokens were found as well as the overlapping nature of all of the meanings involved.⁶⁶ This will be discussed more in-depth further along (especially in section 2.3, where I will return to the underlying schematic domain BEAUTIFY, which links all of the domains in question). But it bears mentioning that cases in which PERSONAL ADORNMENT did not explicitly collocate with a cosmetic of some type, the default category was ADORN (see example 20 below), while explicit mention of some type of cosmetic justified classification as APPLY COSMETICS (example 21). Therefore, it is possible that, for example, some of the 20 tokens noted for the seventeenth century in the row marked ADORN (in Table 2.1) ought to actually be included in the APPLY COSMETICS row (examples 22-23), but not vice-versa. The consequence of this would only be a strengthening of my proposal that the prototypical meaning shifted from a general notion of ADORN to a more specific notion of ADORN THE FACE, that is, APPLY COSMETICS (again, this will be discussed in detail below).

- (20) Andas de gentes en gente, Como pública mujer, Para venderte [...] mas no te veen Ni
conocen a la clara, Porque te afeitas la cara Para que más te deseen [...]
(*Obras morales*, Cristóbal de Castillejo, 1500)

(You go around from person to person, like a public woman, to sell yourself [...] but they do not know your true identity, because you adorn your face so that they desire you more [...])

⁶⁶ As we saw in Chapter 1, the encyclopedic nature of meaning implies an inevitable vagueness within a given semantic domain and fuzziness of boundaries between different domains.

- (21) [Neptuno], dios dado a los diablos, con una cara **afeitada** con hollín y pez, bien zahumado con alcrebite y pólvora [...]
(*La Hora de todos y la Fortuna con seso*, Francisco de Quevedo, 1612)

([Neptune], a god associated with demons, with a face **adorned** with soot and tar, well-perfumed with sulfur and gunpowder [...])

- (22) De mil modos las damas allá deleitan, porque se lavan y **afeitan** y se visten para todos.
(*La discordia en los casados*, Lope de Vega, 1611)

(Women have a thousand ways to entrance you, because they wash and **adorn** themselves and dress for everyone.)

- (23) [...] te despreciarás tú misma en tu misma vanagloria: que la mujer a quien quieren por el dote que la adorna, es como la que se **afeita** y de querida blasona, sin mirar que es de otra dama tercera contra sí propia; porque si puede cualquiera tener celos, envidiosa de que otra quiera a su amante, ella, **afeitada**, es tan otra, que de sí misma olvidada pudiera quedar celosa.

(*Los trabajos de Job*, Felipe Godínez, 1622)

([...] you will despise yourself by your own vanity: the woman who is loved for the qualities that adorn her is like she who **adorns** herself and boasts about being desired, without seeing that she is a third woman against herself; because if anyone can be jealous, envious of the fact that another woman loves her lover, she, **adorned**, is such a different person, that she could be jealous of her own forgotten self.)

Continuing with an overview of Table 2.1, it will also be noted that the division of the columns by century should also be viewed as somewhat arbitrary. The convention follows what was available in the corpus, and functions as a convenient way to handle the broad scope of the data set, which spans eight centuries. It was also assumed that any chronological details lost in the process of dividing the data in this manner would be irrelevant to the analysis, given the general continuity of the perceived patterns. For example, it is possible that all or most of the tokens in a given century come from texts published in a single decade, leaving large chronological gaps. However, even if every other column were eliminated, the same patterns would be obtained.⁶⁷ Moreover, the corpus deals entirely with tokens gleaned from written

⁶⁷ Assuming that the fourteenth-century data represent an anomaly, as will be discussed below.

sources.⁶⁸ Given the well-known relationship between speech and writing, wherein it has been observed that changes in speech tend to manifest themselves in writing well after-the-fact, if at all, it is safe to assume that the data represent at best an approximation of exactly when the changes took place.

Along a similar vein, it should be noted that in general no clear correlation was found between text type (genre) and meaning. For this reason, it was deemed unnecessary to include such information in the table.

As shown in Table 2.1, a total of 630 tokens of *afeitar(se)*, including all inflected forms and orthographic variants, were found in Davies (2002-). Of these, more than half (321) were determined to mean, in their given context, SHAVE, while just under one fourth (150) meant ADORN and just under one sixth (96) meant APPLY COSMETICS. The cells with the black shading represent the largest aggregations of a particular meaning within a given century, and are hypothesized to represent the prototypical meaning within that time period. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 repeat this information in terms of frequency (words per million, henceforth WPM) and percentages. Once again, it should be noted that the data for the fourteenth century are potentially anomalous, given that 25 of the 27 tokens were found in a single text (Juan Manuel's *Libro de la caza*) and, while the raw number of five tokens for ADORN may appear small, it should be noted that the corpus size for that century is itself relatively small⁶⁹ and that the frequency (cf. Table 2.2: 1.87 WPM) and percentage (cf. Table 2.3: 14%) figures for the five tokens are not insignificant.

⁶⁸ Several of the twentieth-century tokens in the corpus are taken from speech samples; for the sake of consistency, these were eliminated from consideration and are not included in Table 2.1.

⁶⁹ 2.6+ million words, compared to 6.7+ million for the thirteenth century and 8.1+ million for the fifteenth.

In sum, observation of the data provided in the tables suggests that the prototypical meaning expressed by the lexical item *afeitar* was ADORN during the first five available centuries (shifting slightly from a general sense from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century to the more specific sense of PERSONAL ADORNMENT, i.e. APPLY COSMETICS, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), and then it shifted again to SHAVE during the eighteenth century, where it remains in the present day. It should be emphasized that the sequence ADORN > APPLY COSMETICS > SHAVE here refers to prototypical meanings. Thus, while tokens meaning ‘shave’ appear in the corpus before tokens meaning ‘apply cosmetics’ do, the latter took on prototypical status before the former did. The primary question to be asked, then, is what were the contributing factors to the disassociation of the lexical item with the domains adorn/apply cosmetics? As the following sections of this chapter will show, the evidence suggests that a combination of social and cognitive factors intervened during the period in question.

Section 2.3 outlines the social context (primarily) in the Iberian Peninsula in which the disassociation occurred, and offers a proposal for the underlying cognitive factors involved in the process of semantic change.

2.3 Intervening social and cognitive factors

Returning to the point made in Chapter 1, treating social factors as extra-linguistic leads to an underestimation of their importance in semantic change. In the case of *afeitar*, they seem to be particularly important for understanding why speakers stopped using the verb to refer to the act of applying cosmetics, but still found it useful for reference to the act of shaving. Based on the available evidence, it appears that the key shift in non-referential meaning of the verb (from a practice done primarily by women, APPLY COSMETICS, to a practice done primarily by men, SHAVE) coincided historically with the social focus on the supposed impropriety of cosmetic use

by women. The principal period in this regard is the so-called Golden Age, or *Siglo(s) de Oro*, which comprise the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the Iberian Peninsula (e.g. Ruíz Ortiz 2014, Candau Chacón 2013, Torremocha Hernández 2008, Colón Calderón 1995, Terrón González 1990), although there is ample evidence that the increasing social focus on (and critique of) cosmetic use by women began at least as early as the fifteenth century (Martínez Crespo 1993). Given that clear evidence of the shift in non-referential meaning does not occur until the seventeenth/eighteenth centuries, we can see the expected ‘lag’ between cultural developments and their linguistic consequences.

At a first glance, it might appear that the social ideals prevalent in this period actually favored the advancement of women, along with their use of cosmetics. Terrón González paints such a picture:

Si consideramos las corrientes ideológicas del momento, que conforman el modo de pensar los hombres en este período, observamos que, aunque para muchos la palabra Renacimiento significa la vuelta a la Antigüedad grecolatina, a sus letras, a su humanismo... [sic] también podríamos añadir que Renacimiento significa: la alegría de vivir sobre la tierra, que ya no es considerada como un valle de lágrimas; nueva apreciación del cuerpo humano, cuya desnudez manifiesta en la pintura los recursos más sutiles de expresión sensual; nuevas directrices poéticas, cuyas formas más revolucionarias son constantes en la obra de Marie Louise Lablé, y libertad de expresión y de acción, como lo muestra la vida galante, en nada disimulada, de Lucrecia Borgia. Por otra parte, es un hecho evidente el prestigio de la promoción social de la mujer: Margarita de Navarra, Diana de Poitiers, Catalina de Médicis o Isabel de Inglaterra, por sólo citar ejemplos sobresalientes, desempeñan papeles importantes bajo distintos aspectos. (1990: 22)

(If we consider the ideological currents of the time, which conform to the way people thought in this period, we observe that, although for many the word Renaissance signifies a return to Greco-Latin Antiquity, to its literature, to its humanism... we could also add that Renaissance signifies: the happiness involved with living on the earth, which is no longer considered to be a valley of tears; a new appreciation of the human body, whose nudity manifests in paintings the most subtle resources of sensual expression; new poetic directives, whose most revolutionary forms are found in the work of Marie Louise Lablé, and freedom of expression and of action, as the gallant, and in no way concealed, life of Lucretzia Borgia shows. On the other hand, the prestige of the social promotion of women is an evident fact: Marguerite of Navarre, Diane of Poitiers, Catherine de Medici

or Elizabeth of England, to mention only a few outstanding examples, play important roles in different ways.)

The author adds that the colonization of the Americas allowed for the importation of goods that were previously unknown in Europe, which contributed to the development of a new merchant class (*burguesía*), “cuyos lemas de vida son: transformar en arte su propia existencia, embellecer su cuerpo y luchar por todos los medios contra el envejecimiento” (whose mottos in life are: transform their own existence into art, beautify their body, and fight in any way possible against aging) (Terrón González 1990: 22). This represents a traditional view of the Renaissance/Early Modern period as one of an almost ecstatic celebration of the human body and of physical beauty in general. Indeed, such a liberal social environment would be the perfect breeding ground for a strong, conservative, reactionary current to take hold, as we will see in the writings of the *moralistas*. Colón Calderón (1995) and Torremocha Hernández (2008) do find a number of quotations in the writings of contemporary authors that seem to praise the act of applying cosmetics, albeit indirectly or with some reservations or qualifications. To cite a couple of them:

- (24) De todo lo cual se echa de ver que no es malo, ni desusado el afeitarse una mujer para dar gusto a su marido. Y particularmente ser bonísimo cuando con esto al marido, aunque lo manda le quita su afición a otras mujeres, para que se contente con lo que tiene en casa, sin ir a mendigar a puertas ajenas lo que no es lícito a nadie codiciar
(*Afeite y mundo mujeril*, Antonio Marqués, 1617)

(Of all of these things it should be pointed out that a woman's applying cosmetics to please her husband is not a bad thing. And it is particularly good when it distracts the husband from his affections for other women, so that he is happy with what he has at home, and he does not go around begging at other doors for that which nobody should covet)

- (25) no del uso nos privó / de aquel aplicado aliño / con que la Naturaleza / se vale del artificio.
/ Pues ¿cómo, siendo heredados, / contra el natural estilo / canceláis de las mujeres / los
privilegios antiguos?

(*Las armas de la hermosura*, Pedro Calderón de la Barca, c.1623)

([it] did not deprive us of use / of that applied adornment / with which Nature / exploits
its trickery. / But how, being inheritors, / against natural style / do you deprive women /
of the ancient privileges?)

In spite of the fact that such apparently positive assessments of the act of applying cosmetics can
be found in texts of the period, they are the exception rather than the rule. As Torremocha

Hernández points out:

Efectivamente, de forma general, se puede admitir que la mayor parte de estos escritores
apostaban por condenar los afeites de las mujeres. Antonio Marqués, autor de la obra
Afeite y mundo mujeril, en 1617, obra de referencia clave en este trabajo, y en su época, a
priori no se muestra totalmente opuesto, *porque el traer uno galas y afeites, de suyo no es
malo ni bueno, sino muy indiferente, y la bondad o la malicia que en ello pudiere haber
pende [sic] de la intención y ánimo del que los usa, por lo cual, si el fin es bueno y
honesto, tan lejos está de que dé en cara de Dios, que antes, para mostrar que no le
desagrada, echa sobre ello su bendición*. Sin embargo, pese a esta aparente permisividad
en el desarrollo de su obra hace ver lo contrario. (Torremocha Hernández 2008: 1-2)

(Indeed, in general, it can be admitted that the majority of these writers tended to
condemn the use of cosmetics by women. Antonio Marqués, author of the work *Afeite y
mundo mujeril* [*Cosmetics and women's affairs*], in 1617, a key work of reference in this
study, and in its time, does not seem *a priori* completely opposed, *because wearing
jewelry and cosmetics is neither bad nor good, but rather very innocuous, and the
goodness or malice that could be found therein depends on the intention and spirit of the
person who uses them, such that, if the purpose is good and honest, that person is so far
from offending God, that first, in order to show that it does not displease Him, He grants
His blessing upon the act*. Nevertheless, in spite of this apparent permissivity, in the
development of his work he makes himself clear to the contrary.)

The author does go on to add that young, unmarried women (*doncellas*), married women,
widows, and nuns were treated differently by Marqués and other *moralistas*, pointing out that
doncellas were sometimes considered to be justified in using cosmetics, but only as long as they
were not about to be married, and that married women were likewise justified as long as their
intentions were limited to pleasing their husbands, but widows and nuns were strictly forbidden

to do so. In general, however, there were few clear-cut cases in which an author praised the use of cosmetics by women (Torremocha Hernández 2008: 2-3). Cabré i Pairet (2002: 775) adds that, in spite of the fact that the use of cosmetics was clearly not limited to just women, there is no room for doubt regarding the close relationship between women and cosmetics:

Por una parte, teólogos y confesores les atribuyen, a veces con gran profusión de detalle, la realización de prácticas cosméticas; por otra, en la Castilla medieval y renacentista se desarrolló un género de literatura cosmética—el *recetario*—destinado explícitamente a las mujeres, un género que, al igual que los *De ornatu mulierum* y los *De decoratione mulierum* latinos, no tiene un paralelo masculino en los textos cosméticos.

(On the one hand, theologians and confessors attributed, at times with great detail, the use of cosmetics to women; on the other hand, in Medieval and Renaissance Castile a genre of cosmetic literature was developed—the recipe book [*recetario*]—explicitly directed toward women, a genre that, like the Latin *De ornatu mulierum* [On the adornment of women] and *De decoratione mulierum* [On the decoration of women], it has no masculine parallel in texts on cosmetics.)

The so-called *recetarios* were manuals that included ‘recipes’ for resolving a number of domestic matters, including cosmetics, medicines, food, and even strategies for dealing with problems. They were generally written for women of the upper class, who were literate and required them for their proper education. Nevertheless, many of the remedies found in these compilations came from the oral tradition transmitted by women of the illiterate ‘popular’ class (Martínez Crespo 1993: 211). Indeed, as Ruíz Ortiz (2014: 70-1) points out, everybody—women and men, rich and poor—participated in the use of cosmetics of one type or another in order to create new, more attractive, identities. But, for the *moralistas*, it was not a simple question of imitating luxury with ostentatious displays, but rather it was a matter of virtue, as we can see in this passage:

- (26) No basta que una mujer sea doncella y honesta, sino que es necesario, que se entienda, y se crea que lo es, de manera que ninguno que la viere, lo dude. La honestidad y la entereza así en la exterior apariencia, como en la verdad interior se ha de mostrar igual de tal fuerte, que en el excesivo adorno no desacredite la bondad e integridad del cuerpo.
(*Consejos Políticos y Morales*, Juan Enríquez de Zúñiga, 1634)

(It is not enough that a woman be proper and honest, but rather it is necessary, that it be understood, and that it be believed that she is so, such that nobody who sees her, doubts it. Honesty and integrity should be found in the outer appearance, as one's inner truth should be found to be equally as strong, and the goodness and integrity of the body should not be discredited by excessive adornment.)

In other words, women who wore cosmetics in excess (in the opinion of the *moralistas*) ran the risk of being perceived as immoral. In addition to the association of the *recetarios* with women, the focus on women's use of cosmetics (and not men's) is, no doubt, directly related to the misogynistic, patriarchal attitudes prevalent at the time (indeed, arguably, even to this day). Ruíz Ortiz has this to say about the matter:

Los eclesiásticos deseaban librar a las mujeres de sí mismas, aunque lo realmente importante era controlar la manifestación pública de esos rasgos peligrosos, por los posibles desórdenes sociales que podían generar. Su devenir cotidiano se encontraba restringido al ámbito privado, convirtiéndose en poco más que un objeto de opresión, primero bajo el yugo paterno y después marital. Según el pensamiento agustiniano, la subordinación de la mujer era vista como una condición intrínseca a la creación original de Dios. Su código de conducta estaba marcado por el silencio y el enclaustramiento: “Como los hombres para lo público, así las mujeres para el encerramiento; y como es de los hombres el hablar y el salir a la luz así de ellas encerrarse y encubrirse. Nada de teñirse el pelo, llevar aros...” (Ruíz Ortiz 2014: 63; Quotation from *La perfecta casada*, Fray Luis de León, 1583)⁷⁰

(The clergymen desired to free women from themselves, although what was truly important was to control the public manifestation of those dangerous traits, given the possible social problems that they could generate. Their daily lives were restricted to the private sphere, wherein they became little more than an object of oppression, first under the paternal yoke and then under the marital one. According to Augustinian thought, the subordination of the woman was seen as a condition intrinsic to God's original creation. Their code of conduct was marked by silence and reclusion: “As men are bound to public life, women are bound to enclosure; and as it is for men to speak and go out into the open, it is for women to isolate and cover themselves. No dyeing their hair, wearing rings...”)

The Catholic church's control over most aspects of public and private life during the Early Modern Period in the Iberian Peninsula was, without a doubt, extremely profound. Going against

⁷⁰ See Candau Chacón (2013), Torremocha Hernández (2008), and Colón Calderón (1995), among many others, for further discussion.

the church's will was not only a matter of risking one's spiritual salvation, but also of exclusion from society, and potentially of persecution through the Inquisition (which lasted from 1478 to 1834). However, in spite of the efforts of the clergy to stamp out the practice of using cosmetics—including denial of the sacraments to women who dressed too lasciviously—the practice persisted. This led to an ever-increasing level of criticism toward the use of cosmetics, especially by women (Ruíz Ortiz 2014: 74-6). The following quotations provide further illustration of the elevated level of criticism. From the fifteenth century:

- (27) grand peligro es enmendar ni annadir ninguna cosa a la ymagen de Dios, ca desaféanla ofende a su hazedor, ca bien commo un maestro o pintor tomaría grant pesar quando viese la su obra borrada y desfecha, quanto más quien desaze la ymagen de Dios, ca dize que estas que así se componen y afeytan, no son sino armas del diablo [...]
(*Castigos e doctrinas que un sabio daba a sus hijas*, Anonymous)

(it is very dangerous to amend or add anything to the image of God, because those things disfigure the image and offend their maker, because just like a master or painter would be very sad to see his work erased and undone, much more so he who undoes the image of God, though they say that this makes them better and prettier, but they are nothing but weapons of the devil [...])

- (28) [los afeites] hazen que las negras representan falsas blancuras; las amarillas falso color; las lagañosas encubren su mal con el alcohol; las arrugadas se mienten ser lisas.
(*Jardín de nobles doncellas*, Fr. M. de Córdoba)

([cosmetics] make blacks seem like false whites; yellows false reds; bleary women cover their ugliness with alcohol; wrinkled women pretend to be smooth.)

From the sixteenth century:

- (29) en cobrando vn poco de color el cuerpo se trasluze: y descubrese por entre bla[n]co vn escuro, y verdinegro, y vn entre azul, y morado: y matizase el rostro todo, y señaladamente las cuencas de los bellisimos ojos, co[n] una variedad de colores feyssimos: y aun corre[n] a las vezes derretidas las gotas, y aran con sus arroyos la cara [...]
(*La perfecta casada*, Fray Luis de León)

(upon obtaining a little color the body becomes evident: and within white a darkness is revealed, and dark green, and within blue, purple: and the whole face becomes tinged, as, notably, do the sockets of the most beautiful eyes, with a variety of the ugliest colors: and sometimes some drops of the makeup melt and plow the face with their streams [...])

- (30) enmascararla [la verdad] y afeitarla, que se desconoce, como el rostro de la fea
(*Guzmán de Alfarache*, Mateo Alemán)

([when asked to tell the truth, men...] mask it and put cosmetics on it, which makes it unknown, like the face of an ugly woman)

Returning to the data from Davies (2002-), we see a similar trend, in which 36 out of the 82 tokens meaning APPLY COSMETICS in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries refer explicitly to women with a negative connotation (see table 2.4 below, meanings DD and KK), with an additional 23 of the 82 tokens referring explicitly to women with a neutral (i.e. non-explicit) connotation (meanings EE and II). In each of the two centuries, around 50% of the tokens referring explicitly to women were determined to have an explicitly negative connotation: 22/40 for the sixteenth century, and 14/29 for the seventeenth.⁷¹ Indeed, many of the ‘neutral’ tokens do in fact seem to reflect non-explicit criticisms within the larger context of the work in which they are found, whether or not the author or narrator involved is clearly attempting to make such a criticism. An example of this point is found in Chapter 19 of *Viaje de Turquía*, a work of anonymous authorship published in 1557.⁷² The text takes the form of a dialog between Juan de Voto a Dios (JUAN), Mátalascallando (MATA), and Pedro de Urdemalas (PEDRO):

- (31) MATA: Las bodas turquescas hizimos sin acordárenos del nobio y toda la plática de ayer y hoy hemos hecho sin acordárenos dellas. ¿Hay mugeres en Turquía?

PEDRO: No, que los hombres se nasçen en el campo como hongos.

MATA: Dígolo porque no hemos sabido la vida que tienen ni la manera del vestir y afeitarse.

⁷¹ With regard to text type/genre, as mentioned earlier, there does not seem to be any clear correlation with attitude toward women. That is, both positive and negative attitudes were found across all text types, with the exception of the *recetarios*, in which explicit attitudes toward female adornment tend to be either neutral or positive.

⁷² Available online at: <http://biblioteca.org.ar/libros/89768.pdf> (examples 31-2 are taken from that source).

(MATA: We did the Turkish weddings without remembering the groom and all of our conversations yesterday and today have gone without remembering them [the weddings]. Are there any women in Turkey?

PEDRO: No, the men are born in the fields like mushrooms.

MATA: I ask because we have not yet found out about their lives nor their way of dressing and using cosmetics.)

Up to this point, the nonreferential meaning of *afeitarse* seems neutral, MATA appears to simply be curious about the common practices of Turkish women. But the conversation quickly becomes misogynistic:

(32) JUAN: Media hora ha que vi a Mátalas Callando que estaba rebentando por esta pregunta.

MATA: ¿Son las mugeres turcas muy negras?

PEDRO: Ni aun las griegas ni judías, sino todas muy blancas y muy hermosas.

JUAN: ¿Cayendo tan allá el Oriente son blancas? Yo pensaba que fuesen como indias.

PEDRO: ¿Qué haze al caso caer al Oriente la tierra para ser caliente, si partiçipa del Setemptrión? Constantinopla tiene 55 grados de longitud y 43 de latitud, y no menos frío hay en ella que en Burgos y Valladolid.

MATA: ¿Aféitanse como acá?

PEDRO: Eso, por la graçia de Dios, de Oriente a Poniente y de Mediodía a Setemptrión se usa tanto, que no creo haber ninguna que no lo haga. ¿Quién de vosotros vio jamás vieja de ochenta años que no diga que entra en cuarenta y ocho y no le pese si le dezís que no es hermosa? En sola una cosa biben los turcos en razón y es ésta: que no estiman las mugeres ni hazen más caso dellas que de los asadores, cucharas y cazos que tienen colgados de la espetera; en ninguna cosa tienen voto, ni admiten consejo suyo [...]"

(JUAN: A half-hour ago I saw Mátalas Callando bursting with eagerness to ask that question.

MATA: Are Turkish women very dark-skinned?

PEDRO: Not even the Greeks or the Jewish women—all of them are light-skinned and very beautiful.

JUAN: They are light-skinned so far east? I thought they were like Indians.

PEDRO: What does it matter how far east they are, if latitude is also involved? Constantinople is located at 55 degrees longitude and 43 latitude, and it is no less cold there than in Burgos and Madrid.

MATA: Do they use cosmetics like they do here?

PEDRO: Those [cosmetics], by the grace of God, from the east to the west and from the south to the north are used so commonly that I do not believe that there are any women who do not use them. Who among you has ever seen a woman of 80 years that does not say that she is close to turning 48 and that it does not hurt her if you tell her that she is not beautiful? The Turks have gotten one thing right: they do not respect women, nor do they pay them any more attention than they do to kitchen supplies; they [women] have no say in any matter, nor are they allowed to give advice [...])

From that point on the conversation turns to other matters, but the misogynistic tone continues throughout the dialog. Notable here is that MATA's use of *afeitar* seems to carry neutral connotations, but PEDRO clearly interprets the referent of the verb with negative connotations (these are the only two cases in the work, except for one token that means SHAVE). What never becomes clear is whether MATA thinks that the use of cosmetics is a positive or a negative thing.

Nevertheless, in light of the evidence presented up to this point, it seems clear that in spite of the occasional argument in favor of female personal adornment, there was a general tendency to disapprove of the practice. While women obviously did not stop using cosmetics altogether, many of them almost certainly would have felt the effects of the negative attitudes—driven, at least in part, by the fear of isolation from the religious community, on top of the relative isolation that they already experienced within their patriarchal society. Through repeated interactions with other speakers, the negative attitudes would have become entrenched in their individual minds as a non-referential domain that formed a significant part of the semasiological profile of the verb *afeitar*, and eventually conventionalized across the speech community.

From a cognitive perspective, it is clear that the data represented in Table 2.1 demonstrate that *afeitar* has undergone the process of semantic restriction. During the thirteenth century, we see that the prototypical meaning associated with the term involved a (relatively general) notion of ADORN. Alongside this prototype are several peripheral meanings, the most salient of which is SHAVE. Assuming the fourteenth-century data to be anomalous (see the discussion in section 2.2.4), we see that ADORN remains the clear prototype through the fifteenth century, all the while SHAVE continues to be used. Some tokens of the generalized meaning persist throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but we can also see a slight metonymic shift in the prototype, from a generalized notion of ADORN to the more specific practice of personal adornment, or APPLY COSMETICS. The sixteenth century sees an increase in the number of tokens meaning CUT HAIR, along with SHAVE. These last two meanings are closely related, and suggest an increased salience of the notion of cutting. The eighteenth century then witnesses another shift in the prototypical meaning, from APPLY COSMETICS to SHAVE. This might be viewed as increased semantic restriction, simply due to the reduction in the number of distinguishable meanings, even if SHAVE is not considered to be a specific type of adornment (at least not in the sense that it involves the addition of one entity to another to increase its attractiveness). During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we see that the APPLY COSMETICS meaning persists as a peripheral meaning, albeit in a severely reduced number of tokens, and by the twentieth century it appears to have disappeared, at least from the written record presented in Davies (2002-).

If we take the observations outlined in the previous paragraph, along with a more global view of the additional, peripheral meanings present in Table 2.1, as well as the additional lexicographical attestations mentioned in section 2.2.2, we can see that the common semantic domain underlying all of the meanings seems to be something along the lines of BEAUTIFY. It

should be noted from the outset that the English lexical item *beautify* is used here as a term of convenience; its selection is nothing other than an attempt to avoid excessive abstraction in the analysis (i.e. to ease readability). As I discussed in Chapter 1, semantic domains are conceived here to be analogous to phonemes in phonological analysis: speakers may have an idea of what sound they represent, but they are inherently unpronounceable. In the same way, speakers may have an idea of what meaning the domain represents, but it is inherently non-specific and not necessarily associated with a specific lexical item. It is meant to represent a notion or conceptualization underlying and uniting multiple meanings, which in turn are associated in varying ways with lexical items.

It appears, then, that the conceptual links between the various domains found in the data are facilitated by the underlying presence of the domain BEAUTIFY, and this encourages a semantic restriction of the associated lexical item that arises through speaker interactions and negotiations of meaning. Through these interactions, the prototypical sense of ADORN—already associated with the general notion of beautification—began to give way to the related, more specific, senses of APPLY COSMETICS and SHAVE. Eventually, other lexical items began to be used with greater frequency to convey the ‘peripheralized’ meanings, each one becoming the prototypical term for its respective meaning (e.g. *adornar* ‘adorn’, *maquillar* ‘apply cosmetics’).⁷³ These processes were implemented, of course, by speakers involved in the negotiation of meaning through interaction, employing the cognitive mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy to establish mental connections between the related semantic domains.

⁷³ Davies (2002-) shows a dramatic increase in the frequency of *adornar* beginning in the fifteenth century (with very few prior attestations)—precisely when APPLY COSMETICS began to take over as the prototypical domain associated with *afeitar*.

As the evidence presented up to this point suggests, when writers during the period in question referred to the practice of applying cosmetics, their comments tended to carry a non-referential assumption that the practice was typically done to and by women. Likewise, it seems safe to assume that reference to the practice of shaving, especially when the face was mentioned or implied, carried a non-referential assumption that the practice was typically done to and by men. Indeed, while many of the tokens in the data set do not collocate with explicit reference to women or men, many in fact do (as shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5).

If we combine these assumptions with the social tendencies outlined above, we can see that the centuries leading up to the shift in prototypical meaning from APPLY COSMETICS to SHAVE involved heavy negative criticism of the feminine practice, with little or no criticism (positive or negative) of the masculine practice. Given this lack of criticism toward the masculine practice, we might assume that it was still perceived to involve beautification of some sort. Therefore, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the lexical item *afeitar*, which presumably retained its underlying schematic conceptualization of BEAUTIFY, was deemed inappropriate by writers for reference to the feminine practice (given that it was increasingly viewed not as one of beautification, but rather as one of moral depravity), but still appropriate for reference to the masculine practice (since, even if writers did not consciously perceive that practice as one of beautification *per se*, they at least did not seem to perceive it in a negative light).⁷⁴ This can be represented schematically as shown in Figure 2.1.

⁷⁴ It bears reiterating that the selection of the English lexical item ‘beautify,’ while convenient, is essentially misleading, since it inevitably carries with it a series of non-referential meanings which are not intended to apply in this analysis.


Table 2.4 Guide to the meanings attested in Davies (2002-), in terms of non-referential factors.

	Action	Transitivity	Patient	Agent	Connotation
A	SHAVE	(transitive)	(men)		[neutral]
B	SHAVE	(transitive)	(men)		[positive]
C	SHAVE	(transitive)	(women)		[neutral]
D	SHAVE	(transitive)	(person)		[neutral]
E	SHAVE	(reflexive)		(men)	[neutral]
F	SHAVE	(reflexive)		(men)	[negative]
G	SHAVE	(reflexive)		(women)	[neutral]
H	SHAVE	(reflexive)		(person)	[neutral]
I	SHAVE	(transitive)	(animal)		[neutral]
J	CUT (HAIR)	(reflexive)		(men)	[neutral]
K	CUT (HAIR)	(transitive)	(men)		[neutral]
L	CUT (HAIR)	(transitive)	(person)		[neutral]
M	CUT (PLANTS)	(transitive)	(object)		[neutral]
N	CLEAN	(transitive)	(object)		[neutral]
O	ADORN	(transitive)	(object)		[pos./neut.]
P	ADORN	(transitive)	(object)		[negative]
Q	ADORN	(transitive)	(men)		[positive]
R	ADORN	(transitive)	(women)		[positive]
S	ADORN	(transitive)	(women)		[negative]
T	ADORN	(transitive)	(women)		[neutral]
U	ADORN	(transitive)	(person)	(person)	[negative]
V	ADORN	(reflexive)		(women)	[neutral]
W	ADORN	(reflexive)		(women)	[positive]
X	ADORN	(reflexive)		(women)	[negative]
Y	ADORN	(reflexive)		(men)	[neutral]
Z	ADORN	(reflexive)		(person)	[neutral]
AA	ADORN	(reflexive)		(person)	[positive]
BB	WEAR (OSTENTATIOUSLY)	(reflexive)		(women)	[negative]
CC	APPLY COSMETICS	(reflexive)		(women)	[positive]
DD	APPLY COSMETICS	(reflexive)		(women)	[negative]
EE	APPLY COSMETICS	(reflexive)		(women)	[neutral]
FF	APPLY COSMETICS	(reflexive)		(men)	[neutral]
GG	APPLY COSMETICS	(reflexive)		(men)	[positive]
HH	APPLY COSMETICS	(reflexive)		(person)	[positive]
II	APPLY COSMETICS	(transitive)	(women)		[neutral]
JJ	APPLY COSMETICS	(transitive)	(women)		[positive]
KK	APPLY COSMETICS	(transitive)	(women)		[negative]
LL	APPLY COSMETICS	(transitive)	(men)		[positive]
MM	APPLY COSMETICS	(transitive)	(men)		[negative]
NN	TRAIN	(transitive)	(animal)		[neutral]
OO	GUIDE	(transitive)	(person)		[neutral]
PP	HIDE	(transitive)	(object)		[negative]

Table 2.5 Numerical guide to the attested meanings, in terms of non-referential factors.

Century Meaning	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
A	7	1	4	6	9	4	66	27
B					2	6	1	
C							1	
D				2	1	3	13	32
E	1	1	4	4	2	11	47	43
F				1		2		
G							1	6
H							2	3
I							5	3
J				6	1			
K	3		2	5			1	
L	1		1	1				
M					1			3
N	2		2					
O	22		33	2	5	1		1
P	5	1	4	4	11			
Q	1		1					
R	1		8					
S			2	2	1			
T			3		1			
U			2	4				
V		1			1			
W		1	2					
X	1		4	1				
Y	1	1	3	2				
Z	2		3	1	1			
AA	8	1	1					
BB				1				
CC					6		1	
DD				21	12	1	4	
EE			2	8	7			
FF		1		3	2			
GG				1				
HH					3		1	
II			1	8				
JJ				2	2			
KK				1	2	1	1	
LL				1	2			
MM					1	1		
NN	3	27						
OO		1						
PP				1	1			
Totals	58	36	82	88	74	30	144	118


Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of the conventionalized disassociation of *afeitar* from the semantic domain APPLY COSMETICS.



Both parts of this figure show an advanced state of conventionalization of the configuration of domains associated with the lexical item *afeitar*, at the level of collective cognitive structure (as discussed in section 1.6). The dotted lines are meant to suggest that some residual association of the domain remains in the minds of some individual members of the speech community (indeed, in order to understand many of the examples presented earlier in this chapter, one must, at least temporarily, make the association). The transition from the left side of the figure to the right side was gradual—over centuries of interactions between individuals—and the disassociation only became perceptible once (an indeterminate) critical mass of individual speakers no longer held the clear association between *afeitar* and APPLY COSMETICS in their minds. It should also be clarified that the configuration of domains shown in the figure is meant to represent the (temporary) results of the particular social situation outlined earlier, with respect to the semasiological profile of *afeitar*—that is, it is not meant to imply, for example, that APPLY COSMETICS and BEAUTIFY have become mutually exclusive semantic domains for Spanish speakers; the general tendency was to separate the two, but there were still cases in which applying cosmetics was praised. At some point during the transition shown in Figure 2.1, another

word (or words) would have taken over as the preferred choice for reference to the act of applying cosmetics with positive connotations, as shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Encroachment by alternate lexical items to refer to APPLY COSMETICS with positive connotations.



Figures 2.1 and 2.2 also help to account for cases like the one expressed in example 33, where *afeitar* is used to refer to applying cosmetics in a deceitful way. In this case, negative associations are clearly still involved.

- (33) ¿Qué parece una cara cuando se afeita? Hermosura que en verso miente y deleita.
(*Poesía*, Tirso de Molina, 1616)

(What does a face look like when it is made up [with cosmetics]? Beauty that lies and entrances in verse.)

A similar use is that of sense 2 of the 1726 edition of *Autoridades*, repeated here as example 34, in which an object for sale is disguised to appear more attractive, or in which cowards use alternate names to give the appearance that they are brave:

- (34) **afeitar**. Vale algunas veces tanto como Aderezar, ó componer con artificio lo que se ha de vender para encubrir el defecto que tiene: como afeitar una carroza, un furlón, un biombo, y assi otras cosas que ya han servido, para que parezcan como nuevas. Lat. *Ornáre.Fucáre*. Marian. Hist.Esp.lib.7.cap.19. Para disimular su cobardía y flaqueza se arman, y afeitan con apellidos magnificos.

(Sometimes used in the same way as Correct [*Aderezar*], or decorate with trickery that which must be sold in order to cover a defect that it has: as in afeitar a carriage, a coach, a folding screen, and likewise other things that have already been used, so that they appear new. Lat. *Ornáre.Fucáre*. Marian. Hist.Esp.lib.7.cap.19. In order to disguise their cowardice and weakness they take up arms, and afeitan with magnificent surnames.)

At any rate, the following facts combine to suggest that in the current state of the collective cognitive structure of Spanish the disassociation of *afeitar* from APPLY COSMETICS is (near) total: (1) the use of *afeitar* with the meaning APPLY COSMETICS has zero attestations in the twentieth century, at least in the data from the corpus; (2) recent dictionaries either do not list the meaning or they mark it or relegate it to a position that implies infrequent use; and (3) intuitive and anecdotal evidence suggests that native speakers (from all Spanish-speaking regions) do not associate the term with that meaning.⁷⁵

One might ask, then, why negative connotations would doom a particular sense of a word. Indeed, plenty of words exist whose (only) referent(s) evoke negative connotations (e.g. *siniestro* ‘sinister’, *imbécil* ‘idiot’, etc.). The answer, suggested by the evidence presented in this chapter, is that the negative connotations in and of themselves do not doom the use of the word to convey a particular meaning, but rather the way that the connotations combine with other factors—such as the availability of alternative lexical items—might do so. In the case of the referent APPLY COSMETICS a plethora of other lexical items were available to writers (as suggested by the list provided in section 2.2.2.2). Determining which of those items immediately became the onomasiological prototype is outside the scope of this study, but *hermosear(se)*, *componer(se)*, and *pintar(se)* would be good candidates; all three increase in frequency at the same time that APPLY COSMETICS loses ground to SHAVE within the semasiological profile of *afeitar*. In fact, they could have even shared an equal status as onomasiological prototypes for APPLY COSMETICS. In any event, it is evident that the eventual winner was *maquillarse*, after it

⁷⁵ Of course, a synchronic, interview-based study would have to be carried out in order to strengthen the third statement (also note that the *DRAE* still lists it as an apparently active meaning, albeit *poco usado* ‘infrequently used’), but the strength of the first two statements seems sufficient for the present purpose.

was borrowed from French toward the end of the nineteenth century.⁷⁶ Moreover, SHAVE remained as a perfectly viable, positively connoted referent of the verb, leaving more than enough semantic ‘material’ within its semasiological profile to keep it alive as a useful word.

2.4 Conclusions

The goal of this chapter was to examine the influence of social and cognitive factors on the restructuring of the semasiological profile of the verb *afeitar*. Section 2.2 established the etymology of the verb (< CL *affectare*) and its transmission into Ibero-Romance (based on its phonetic/phonological development, as well as its range of meanings in early texts, it seems most likely that it is a Gallicism). Data from the corpus (Davies 2002-) confirmed the presence of a number of salient domains within the verb’s semasiological profile (ADORN, TRAIN (AN ANIMAL), APPLY COSMETICS, SHAVE, CUT (HAIR), CUT (PLANTS), CLEAN, WEAR (OSTENTATIONOUSLY), GUIDE, and HIDE). A frequency analysis suggested two major shifts in the verb’s prototypical meaning: from ADORN to APPLY COSMETICS during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and from APPLY COSMETICS to SHAVE during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The involvement of social factors in the first major shift in prototypical meaning is unclear, so the change is best described as a metonymic shift (i.e. applying cosmetics is a specific type of adornment). But the second major shift—which was followed by the (nearly) complete loss of APPLY COSMETICS from the verb’s semasiological profile—most likely involved the influence of increasingly negative attitudes toward the use of cosmetics. As suggested by numerous textual examples from the *moralista* tradition—which was characterized by patriarchal and misogynistic tendencies—these negative attitudes were particularly strong when the use of

⁷⁶ The *DRAE* lists it as a borrowing of French *maquiller*, of nineteenth-century theatrical jargon. Penny (2002: 275) agrees, and Davies (2002-) finds only one nineteenth-century token, and 70+ from the twentieth.

cosmetics was considered to be excessive, and when it was done by women. Shaving, on the other hand, while certainly done by women, was more frequently associated with men, and therefore less susceptible to outward criticism.

With respect to cognitive factors, in the first place, the encyclopedic nature of meaning is evident in the multiplicity of meanings found in the corpus, and where the boundaries between one semantic domain and the next are not always clear. For example, ADORN and APPLY COSMETICS sometimes show an overlap in meaning, since the latter is a specific type of the former. Moreover, the flexible configuration of the different domains within the semasiological profile of the word is obviously subject to change over time, as we saw in the diachronic shifts from one prototype to another. These shifts were facilitated and guided by the presence of the underlying domain BEAUTIFY, which was particularly important for establishing a cognitive association between ADORN/APPLY COSMETICS on the one hand, and SHAVE on the other.

Secondly, the negative attitudes toward the act of applying cosmetics—part of the non-referential encyclopedic meaning associated with *afeitar*—were likely first entrenched in the minds of the more conservative members of the speech community, most notably the *moralistas*. As more speakers were influenced by the negative attitudes, through the continuous feedback loop described by the social/cultural cognition model, the negative connotations became entrenched in more individual minds, eventually conventionalizing the associations at the level of collective cognitive structure. At the same time, neutral or positive attitudes were commonly held toward the act of shaving, which was consistent with its association with the underlying domain BEAUTIFY. The increasing frequency with which the domain NEGATIVE CONNOTATIONS was associated with APPLY COSMETICS (cf. Figures 2.1 and 2.2) clashed with the inherent positive connotations of BEAUTIFY, leading to a decreased salience of APPLY COSMETICS and an increased

salience of SHAVE within the semasiological profile of *afeitar*, first at the micro level and later at the macro, collective level.

Regarding the question of whether other words have undergone similar changes, a good candidate for comparison to *afeitar* might be the English word *gay*, whose prototypical meaning was once HAPPY, but has more recently shifted to HOMOSEXUAL.⁷⁷ According to the *OED* (s.v. *gay*, *adj.*, *adv.*, and *n.*), an intermediate sense developed at the end of the sixteenth century: “Originally of persons and later also more widely: dedicated to social pleasures; dissolute, promiscuous; frivolous, hedonistic. Also (esp. in *to go gay*): uninhibited; wild, crazy; flamboyant,” as shown in example 35:

- (35) Sum gay professors (kepinge secret minions) do love there wyues..to avoyde shame.
(*Royall exchange*, John Payne, 1597)

Social stigmas and stereotypes linked promiscuity and hedonism with homosexuality, leading to the more recent sense. Like that of *afeitar*, the semasiological profile of *gay* still retains vestiges of its original sense (albeit to a greater extent in the latter case), but in both cases that sense was reinterpreted and associated with excess (excessive use of cosmetics in the first case, excessive happiness/dedication to pleasure in the second case).

⁷⁷ See Kulkarni et al. (2015) for a statistical analysis of the word’s frequency in the twentieth century, using data from Google Book-ngrams, Twitter, and movie reviews from Amazon.com. Chauncey (1994) provides useful background information regarding the semantic development of *gay* and related terms in the early twentieth century, and Brontsema (2004) discusses the term in the context of linguistic reclamation.

3 Case study #2: Entrenchment and conventionalization; *ahorrar* ‘free a slave/prisoner > avoid a difficulty > save money/resources’

3.1 Overview

This chapter examines the role of entrenchment and conventionalization in the semasiological development of the verb *ahorrar* (< Arabic *hurr* ‘free [adj.]’). As we saw in Chapter 1, linguistic units are “structure[s] that a speaker has mastered quite thoroughly, to the extent that he can employ [them] in a largely automatic fashion, without having to focus his attention specifically on its individual parts or their arrangement” (Langacker 1987:57). Linguistic structures can gain unit status as a result of entrenchment, and, once their use spreads throughout a speech community, they become ‘conventional(ized) linguistic units’. Saliency is an important component of the process of entrenchment. As Schmid (2007: 120) put it: “...ontologically salient entities attract our attention more frequently than nonsalient ones. As a result, cognitive events related to the processing of ontologically salient entities will occur more frequently and lead to an earlier entrenchment of corresponding cognitive units, or concepts.” I will argue below that the gradual development of an economically viable middle class throughout the Spanish empire (beginning in the sixteenth century), combined with a series of economic crises, contributed to the increased saliency of money and resources as things that could feasibly be saved up for the future, and thereby led to the entrenchment and conventionalization of SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES as the prototypical meaning of *ahorrar*. As additional supporting evidence for the degree to which MONEY has become centralized within the semasiological profile, I will do a brief analysis of the frequency of intransitive uses of the verb (e.g. *necesitamos ahorrar* ‘we need to save’ [with an implied direct object, usually money or

resources]). I will focus on the Iberian Peninsula, but parallel developments occurred in the former colonies, before and after their independence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The notion that changes in economic structure can have an influence on the way in which lexical items are used by speakers and writers may seem rather intuitive (new lexical items are often borrowed or coined to meet the needs of changing currencies and the like). The task here, however, is to examine *how* the economic influence took hold in the cognitive experience of individuals and subsequently, through social interaction, fomented linguistic change within the speech community in question.

Of parallel interest is the fact that the sense ‘free a slave/prisoner’ began its fall into obsolescence well before the decline and abolition of slavery in the Spanish empire.⁷⁸ Thus, the influence of social factors in the (near) disappearance of that sense are less clear. On the one hand, the decline and abolition of slavery probably did contribute—to some extent—to the decline in frequency of the sense ‘free a slave’, given that the real-world referent was lost (i.e. there were no longer slaves to be freed), but, of course, speakers still talk about freeing slaves. On the other hand, even if we could establish that the sense ‘free a slave’ *did* drastically decline in frequency due to the abolition of slavery, there is no socially-based reason why ‘free a prisoner’ would decline as well.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way. Section 3.2 discusses the etymology and attested senses of *ahorrar*, section 3.3 discusses the social and cognitive factors involved in the semantic change, in light of the theoretical approach outlined in Chapter 1, and section 3.4 offers some general conclusions.

⁷⁸ Slavery was legally abolished in Spain in 1811, and at various other times in the current and former colonies during the nineteenth century.

3.2 Etymology and attested senses

As we did in Chapter 2, before delving into the analysis and discussion, we will have a look at the background of the lexical item in question. Subsection 3.2.1 considers the etymology and first (known) documentation in Castilian Ibero-Romance, subsection 3.2.2 presents the lexicographical attestations found in the dictionaries consulted, 3.2.3 presents the attestations found in Davies (2002-), and 3.2.4 summarizes the information presented in 3.2.1-3.2.3.

3.2.1 Etymology and the first documentation in Castilian Ibero-Romance

The etymological history of *ahorrar* is much simpler than that of *afeitar*. While the source language of the latter remains uncertain (it could be French, Portuguese, or a ‘popular’ transmission), it seems clear that that of the former is Arabic (i.e. *hurr* ‘free’).

Following the same initial process as in Chapter 2 with *afeitar*, the first step for this part of the study involved a thorough investigation of the etymology of *ahorrar* using a number of dictionaries and other academic resources. According to the available evidence, the verb derives from an adjective that was borrowed from Arabic at some point in the medieval period: Ar. *hurr* ‘free’ > Sp. *forro/horro* ‘freed person’. Note the orthographic variation *f*- ~ *h*-, both of which probably represented a glottal pronunciation [h], borrowed from Arabic along with the word itself. This is an example of the well-documented (morpheme-initial) /f-/ > /h-/ > Ø process in Castilian Romance/Spanish (e.g. Penny 2002: 90-4).

The ‘first documentation’ of the adjective, according to the *DCECH*, is from the eleventh century (1074) in the *doc. de San Salvador del Moral*;⁷⁹ this is how it appears in *CORDE*:

⁷⁹ The document does not appear in PhiloBiblon (*BETA*), such that the dating of the manuscript cannot be confirmed by that means.

- (1) Mançebo **forro** qui homicidium fecerit et casam non habuerit pectet ad palacium medietatem de suo peguiar et non hereditatem
(*Fueros de la villa de Palenzuela*, anonymous, eleventh century)

(A **freed** man who commits homicide and does not have a house will pay as a fine to the palace one half of his cultivated land and he will not receive an inheritance)

This example shows an early definition of the term:

- (2) Todos aquellos que son librados de servidumbre de sus señores [...] llaman en esta tierra **forros**.
(*Siete Partidas*, thirteenth century)

(All who are freed from servitude [...] are called **forros** in this land.)

The first documentation of the verb form appears to be from the thirteenth century (c.1219; cf. *DCECH*):⁸⁰

- (3) [§108] Qui so moro tornare cristiano e non oviere fijos, heredelo⁸¹ su senno[r], sy por Dios **se**⁸² **aforrare** [...] (Fuero de Guadalajara, thirteenth century)

([The debt of a] moor who converts to christianity and does not have children is inherited by his master, if by God's grace [the moor] **is freed** [...])⁸³

Already within several years of the first extant documentation, the verb shows some minor polysemy. The *NDHE* includes example 3 under the entry “tr. Dar libertad a un esclavo o

⁸⁰ *NDHE* dates the passage to 1219, while Müller gives a noncommittal “[s XIII]”. The three extant manuscripts appear to have been copied in the fifteenth or sixteenth century (*BETA*, Martín Prieto 2008-9: 157-8).

⁸¹ The pronoun *lo* apparently refers to the *debdo* ‘debt’ mentioned two sections earlier (§106): “Tod ome que heredare de omne muerto poco o mucho, [que el heredador] pague el debdo, e sy no lo quisiere pagar, no herede” (Any man who inherits little or much from a deceased man, [the heir must] pay the [deceased man’s] debt, and if he does not wish to pay, he may not inherit). Text from Keniston (1924: 17). See also Martín Prieto (2008-9: 212).

⁸² Müller (1995) notes a variant form in Ms. E: “**lo aforrare**”.

⁸³ My interpretation of the passage coincides with that of Martín Prieto (2008-9: 176): “Aun abolida, desde el fuero anterior, la *mañería*, subsiste una forma residual de la misma, relacionada con la herencia de los bienes del converso manumitido, a la que tiene derecho su antiguo dueño, en ausencia de herederos cristianos (§108)” (Although *mañería* [i.e. the right of a king or lord to inherit the goods of a deceased person, in spite of the existence of living heirs] had been abolished in the preceding *fuero*, a residual form lingers, related to the inheritance of the goods of manumitted converts, to which that person’s former owner had a right, in the absence of christian heirs (§108)).

a un prisionero” (Give freedom to a slave or prisoner), and example 4, ostensibly from six years later, under the entry “tr. Eximir de un impuesto o tributo. El compl. dir. es el impuesto.”

(Exempt from a tax or tribute. The direct object is the tax). Of course, the semantic leap from FREE to EXEMPT is not a great one; the latter could easily be paraphrased as FREE FROM.

- (4) Jo, don Gonzaluo Pérez, señor de Molyna, atrego & prendo en comenda & en my enpara todas las cosas que son & que pertecen en la casa de la mercet de Uclés de Conca & de Uélamo; et **afórroles** todo el portadgo de toda cosa [...] ⁸⁴

(I, Don Gonzalvo Pérez, lord of Molyna, grant and entrust to my protection all of the things that are and that pertain to the house of the will of Ucles de Conca and of Uélamo; and I **exempt** them from all of the costs of all things [...])

A noteworthy early example is found in *Bocados de oro* (written in 1250), an anonymous translation of the Arabic text entitled *Mukhtar al-hikam*, itself an eleventh-century work by Abu al-Wafa al-Mubashshir ibn Fatik, also known as Bonium of Persia (*BETA*):

- (5) E estudo en cativerio grant tienpo; e después **aforraron-lo** ⁸⁵

(He was in captivity for a long time; then they **freed him**)

It is also noteworthy that the first extant documentation of the verb comes from a city which was founded by Arabic speakers (Guadalajara), although the first example of the adjective from which the verb derives (example 1) comes from Palenzuela, on the other side of Castile, in

⁸⁴NDHE gives the source information as: c1225 Molina, Guadalajara (*Doc. ling.* 251⁰ 1919) 338,11. Compare to the following from *CORDE* (note also the difference in the identification of the sources [but with the same year identified]; neither source appears in *BETA*):

Notum sit hominibus hominibus tam presentibus quam futuris, quomo jo don Gonzaluo Perez, señor de Molyna, atrego & prendo encomenda & en my enpara todas las cosas que son & que pertecen en la casa dela mercet de Ucles de Conca & de Uelamo; et **aforroles** todo el portadgo de toda cosa quela casa dela merced cononbrada, que dizen de Conca, que heredan lo que quisieren & que conpren lo que quisieren & que por ello non den portadgo en Molyna, por Djos & por remysion de myos pecados.

Exención de portazgos [Documentos del Reino de Castilla]; anonymous, identified as a “documento notarial”, published by Ramón Menéndez Pidal, Centro de Estudios Históricos (Madrid), 1919.

⁸⁵ As quoted in Müller (1995).

present-day Palencia. This suggests that the word(s) most likely entered Ibero-Romance well before the date of first documentation.

Other early examples, from the thirteenth century, include the following:

- (6) [...] entendiendo por esta rrazon que grant merçed era de **afforrar** los ssieruos. & tornar los en aquella ffranqueza que deuen sseer por derecho natural **afforo** a ffulan mjo ssieruo que ssea **quito** & **fforro** de aqui adelante

(*Espéculo de Alfonso X*, anonymous, c.1260)

([...] understanding for this reason what a great mercy it was to **free** the slaves, and give them the freedom that they should have by natural rights; I **free** Fulan my servant, that he be **free** and **freed** [sic] from now on)

- (7) Mando ell essora que troxiessen quantos sieruos auien. e quando fueron aduchos escoio el todos aquellos que eran pora armas e **fizolos afforrar**. E dixoles que los **afforraua** sennalada mientras por uengar a Roma. o morir por ella. Y esso mismo a todos los que eran echados de Roma. e aun a los ladrones que tienen los caminos perdono e acoiolos a todos. E desta guisa ayunto quanta yent ouo mester.

(*Estoria de Espanna*, Alfonso X, 1270)

(He [Cipion] ordered them to bring all of the slaves to him, and when they were brought he picked out all of the ones who were capable of bearing arms and **he freed them**. And he told them that he **was freeing** them with a distinct purpose: to avenge Rome or die for her. And he did the same for all of those who had been sent away from Rome; he even pardoned the thieves and welcomed them to the group. In that way he gathered as many people as were necessary.)

- (8) E puede dar esta libertad el señor a su sieruo en eglesia o fuera della: o delante del iuez: o en otra parte: o en testamento: o sin testamento o por carta. [...] Mas ha menester que quando lo **aforrare** por carta: o delante sus amigos que lo faga ante çinco testigos & si lo quesiere **aforrar** en testamento no lo puede hazer amenos de auer catorze años el señor quel **aforra** & si lo quesiere **aforrar** de otra manera por carta o delante testigos o amigos no lo puede hazer amenos de auer el señor veynte años

(*Siete Partidas*, thirteenth century)

(A master can give this freedom to his slave in the church or outside of it, or in front of a judge, or in another place, or in his will, or without a will, or by letter. [...] But when he **frees** the slave by letter, or in front of his friends, it is required that he do so before five witnesses and if he wants to **free** [a slave] in his will he cannot do so unless the person who **frees** [the slave] is at least fourteen years old, and if he wants to **free** the slave in another way, he [the one doing the freeing] must be at least twenty years old)

An interesting example comes from the *General Estoria* (c. 1275), attributed to Alfonso X:

- (9) [...] e contól en su poridad cómo Futifar non era pora mugier, ca era castrado, e castraral el rey, e rogól e dixol que si él quisiesse fazer lo que ella querié quel darié grand aver, e fazer le ie muy ric omne, e fazer le ie **aforrar** e ponerle en grand estado.

([...] and [Zulaime] told [Josep] in secret about how [her husband] Futifar was not disposed to be with a woman, because he was castrated, and he had been castrated by the king, and she pleaded with him and told him that if he wanted to do what she wished that he would do [Futifar] a great favor, and make him very rich, and **free** him and put him in a lofty position.)

In this example, it is actually not clear whether *aforrar* truly means ‘free’ (in this case, from his current position); it is likely a form of the verb *forrar* ‘make/become rich’. We will return to this point in section 3.2.2.2, where I will discuss synonyms and related terms.

The earliest attestation of the *-h-* spelling that I can find is from the fourteenth century, in the anonymous work *Libro del cavallero Çifar* (ostensibly from between the years 1300 and 1305):

- (10) Verné -dixo el Cavallero Amigo-, si me dieren vagar. Pero dígovos que si no lo oviesse prometido a la Infanta, que yo no fuese allá, que paréceme que vos tenéis por embargado conmigo y queréis **ahorrar** de mí [...]

(I will come—said the friendly *cavallero*—if you give me time. But I will tell you that if I had not promised the *Infanta* that I would do so, I would not go there, because it seems to me that you have a problem with me and you want to **escape** from me [...])

In sum, it bears mentioning that, of the 157 tokens found in Davies (2002-) that refer to FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER, 144 of them come from the *Siete Partidas* (and comprise all of the tokens from the thirteenth century), and very few examples are to be found (in Davies 2002- or elsewhere) in texts published before the sixteenth century. As we will see further on, that is the point where the verb’s frequency increases rather significantly, and the meaning AVOID A DIFFICULTY takes over as its semasiological prototype.

3.2.2 Lexicographical attestations

Having dealt with the question of diachronic transmission in the previous section, this section briefly outlines the senses found in the *DRAE* and other lexicographical sources. Included are brief comparisons with the data taken from Davies (2002-), which are described more extensively in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 and which form the basis for the subsequent analysis.

3.2.2.1 *Ahorrar*

Ahorrar is registered in the *DRAE* with the following eight senses, two of which bear the notation ‘p. us.’ (*poco usado* ‘infrequently used’ [senses 5 and 6]), and another two of which bear the notation ‘ant.’ (*antiguo*; *anticuado*; *antiguamente* ‘antiquated’ [senses 7 and 8]):

ahorrar.

(De *horro*).

1. tr. Reservar alguna parte del gasto ordinario. U. t. c. prnl.
(Set aside a part of one’s ordinary expenses)
2. tr. Guardar dinero como previsión para necesidades futuras.
(Save money for future necessities)
3. tr. Evitar un gasto o consumo mayor.
(Avoid an excessive expense)
4. tr. Evitar o excusar algún trabajo, riesgo, dificultad u otra cosa. U. t. c. prnl.
(Avoid or excuse a job, risk, difficulty or other thing)
5. tr. p. us. Entre ganaderos, conceder a los mayores y pastores cierto número de cabezas de ganado horras o libres de todo pago y gasto, y con todo el aprovechamiento para ellos.
(Among ranchers, give a certain number of animals to shepherds free of charge, and with all rights to make use of them)
6. tr. p. us. Dar libertad al esclavo o prisionero.
(Give freedom to a slave or prisoner)
7. tr. ant. Quitarse del cuerpo una prenda de vestir.
(Remove a piece of clothing from one’s body)
8. prnl. ant. Aligerarse de ropa. U. en Aragón y Salamanca.
(Wear lighter clothing)

Also included in the entry is an idiomatic expression:

no ~se, o no ahorrárselas, alguien con nadie.

1. locs. verbs. coloqs. Hablar u obrar sin temor ni miramiento.
(Speak or work without fear or tact)

Of passing interest are senses 7 and 8, which may come from a different etymon but, due to a type of lexical ‘contamination’ (Hock 1991: 256; Lehmann 1992: 223-4), or *cruce léxico* (Campos Souto 2008), have been interpreted by lexicographers as being referents for *ahorrar* at least since Covarrubias—we will return to this point in the next section.⁸⁶ Sense 6 (‘give freedom to a slave or prisoner’), as we saw above (Section 3.2.1), is the one that appeared in the earliest extant texts, and, as we will see further on (in Section 3.2.3), was likely the prototypical sense for at least the thirteenth century, and probably the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as well.⁸⁷ The notation ‘*p. us.*’ (infrequently used) is interesting in this case, since the corpus shows no tokens that employ that sense after the seventeenth century, and the last century with a significant number of tokens is the fifteenth. Sense 5 seems to be quite rare (it was copied with minor changes from *Autoridades*), and therefore will not figure in the present analysis, and senses 1-4 represent the other two prototypical senses that will be examined in this chapter (simplified as AVOID A DIFFICULTY and SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES). With the exception of sense 5, as well as the idiomatic expression, all of the senses presented in the *DRAE* are represented in Davies (2002-), and no additional senses were found therein.

⁸⁶ The other potential etymon is the verb (*a*)*forrar*, which *DCECH* traces from either Gothic *FÔDR* ‘vaina’ (sheath), or “su hermano el fránico *FÔDAR [...] ‘funda, revestimiento, forro’. (its Frankish brother *FÔDAR [...] ‘cover, lining, upholstery’).” The *DRAE* adds a third possibility: French *fourrer* ‘line, upholster’, which itself likely comes from one of the other two. Covarrubias (Arellano & Zafra 2006), under the heading *horro*, lists “**5. Ahorrado**, el que lleva poca ropa, porque va más suelto y libre [...]” (one who wears little clothing, because in that way he moves more freely [...]). The adjective *forrado* can also mean “[una persona] bien dotada para urdir intrigas de las que saca provecho” (a person who is well endowed with the ability to plot schemes from which he gains an advantage) (*DRAE*) or ‘one who has obtained riches’ (*DRAE*, s.v. *forrar*, sense 2: *enriquecerse* ‘to become rich’). On the one hand, it could be that the similarity between the early spelling of *ahorrar*, namely *aforrar*, contributed to the word being confused with *forrar* (that is, the initial *a-* could have been interpreted as a negation—hence *forrar* ‘to put clothing on’ ~ *aforrar* ‘to remove clothing’ [note, however, that the *DRAE* defines *aforrar* as ‘forrar’, meaning ‘to get dressed’]). On the other hand, it is probably just a coincidence that the two words share both formal and semantic similarity, in spite of their etymological unrelatedness.

⁸⁷ The data are inconclusive for the latter two centuries, but it was apparently the only noteworthy sense for inclusion in Nebrija’s and Fernández de Santaella’s fifteenth-century works (examples are given below in Section 3.2.3.1).

All of the additional lexicographical sources that I consulted (Kasten & Cody 2001, Nebrija's *Dictionarium hispano-latinum*, *Autoridades*, etc.) reported the same senses, with insignificant variation. The only other noteworthy lexicographical note that I found comes from Covarrubias' *Tesoro* (Arellano & Zafra 2006), under the entry for *horro*:

[...] Algunos quieren que horro sea forro, y se haya dicho *a foro*, por la libertad que adquiere de poder parecer en juicio. [...]

([...] Some people want *horro* to be *forro*, and *a foro* will have been said, because of the freedom that one acquires from being able to appear in court [...])

The *Tesoro* does not include an entry for *forro*, but *foro* appears under the headings *emplazar* and *aforrar*:

- (11) **EMPLAZAR.** Citar a uno para que parezca delante del juez: díjose así porque antiguamente los tribunales de los jueces estaban en las plazas que se hacen delante de las puertas de la ciudad. El tal juzgado se llamaba *forum*; en Valencia le dicen corte [...]

(Call upon someone to appear before a judge: because in the past the tribunals of the judges were in the plazas that are set up in front of the city gates. This tribunal was called a *forum*; in Valencia it is called a *corte* [...])

AFORRAR. Doblar la vestidura o la tela por de dentro con otra, para más abrigo, o dura, o para que haga más bulto y cuerpo. 2. **Aforro**, la tal dobladura de tela. Y díjose de A, que aquí vale contra, y FORO, fuera; contra lo de fuera, que es contra la haz que anda fuera, y el aforro por dentro. Andar **aforrado**, andar con ropa y bien abrigado [...] Dicen ser nombre godo, *fodra*; puede ser italiano de *fodero*, que vale la vaina de la espada, y la cubierta y defensa de otra cosa, porque el aforro defiende la ropa para que no se rompa.

(Fold the interior cloth to thicken clothing. 2. *Aforro*, the said fold of the cloth. The A means against, and FORO means outside; thus, against what is outside, against the exterior face and the interior fold. To go *aforrado* means to go with clothing and bundled up [...] They say that is a Gothic noun, *fodra*; it could be from the Italian *fodero*, which means the sheath of a sword, and the covering and defense of another thing, because the *aforro* defends the clothing so that it does not break.)

These examples show a clear confusion among the words *(a)horro*, *(a)forro*, *(a)foro*, *fuero*, *fuera* and their associated verb forms, not only on the part of Covarrubias, but also on the part of his seventeenth-century contemporaries. The next section will describe this possible lexical 'contamination' in further detail.

3.2.2.2 Synonyms and related terms

While the focus of this study is semasiological, it is worth taking a brief look at some of the synonyms of *ahorrar* at different points in time, as well as some of the formally and semantically related words mentioned above, which seem to have led to some confusion about the word's semasiological profile.

First of all, with respect to the domain FREE (A SLAVE/PRISONER), I encountered the lexical items *dar(le) libertad*, *desembarazar*, *franquear*, *franco*, *liberar*, *liberado*, *manumitir*, *libertar*, *liberto*, and *manumitido*, as well as the less-common *quitar* and *quito* (recall example 5: ***afforo*** *a ffulan mjo ssieruo que ssea quito & fforro*, where *quito* means 'free'. For the domain AVOID (A DIFFICULTY), I found *eludir*, *escaquear*, *esquivar*, *excusar*, *evitar*, *obviar*, *rehuir*, *rehusar*, *sortear*, and *soslayar*. For SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES I found *atesorar*, *conservar*, *economizar*, *guardar*, *no gastar*, *reservar*, and *reunir (dinero)*. A full onomasiological study would have to account for at least those words, if not many others.

With regard to the aforementioned confusion, or lexical 'contamination', Campos Souto shows, for example, how *perculdir* 'infect' and *cundir* 'infect' blended to form *percundir* 'infect', clearly as a result of their formal and semantic similarities (Campos Souto 2008: 48; the article offers examples of several additional types of 'contamination'). I suspect that something similar occurred with the lexical items *aforar*, *aforrar* ~ *ahorrar*, and *aforrar* ~ *forrar*, which also share formal and semantic similarities (Figure 3.1 below is an attempt to provide a schematic representation of this). While the formal similarity between these words might be coincidental, given their different etymologies (*aforar* 'grant a privilege' < Cl. Lat. *ad forum*, lit. 'to the forum'; *aforrar* ~ *ahorrar* 'free a slave or prisoner' < *horro* 'free' < Ar. *hurr* 'free'; *aforrar* ~ *forrar* 'cover, become rich' < Gothic *fodr* 'sheath' or Frankish **fodar* 'cover, lining, upholstery')

or French *fourrer* ‘line, upholster’), their semantic similarities are more than trivial. In addition to the glosses I have just provided, other meanings are associated with these words. The *DRAE* lists seven senses for *aforar*, the most pertinent of which are:

1. tr. Dar o tomar a foro alguna heredad.
(Legally give or take an inheritance)
2. tr. Determinar la cantidad y valor de los géneros o mercancías que haya en algún lugar, generalmente a fin de establecer el pago de derechos.
(Appraise)
6. tr. *Teatro*. Dicho de una decoración: Ocultar los lados o partes del escenario que no deben quedar a la vista del público. U. t. c. intr.
(In the theater, conceal the parts of the stage that should not be seen by the public)

Senses 1 and 2 evoke the semantic domain *LEGAL ACTION*, which is also closely related to the domain *FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER*, associated with *aforrar* ~ *ahorrar*, given that manumission was a legal process. Sense 6, *COVER/CONCEAL*, is seemingly unrelated (although it could arguably mean something like *FREE FROM VIEW*), but it certainly coincides with senses 2 and 3 of *aforrar*, as well as sense 1 of *forrar*:

aforrar.

1. tr. forrar.
(see *forrar*)
2. tr. *Mar*. Cubrir a vueltas con un cabo delgado parte de otro más grueso.
(Maritime usage: Wrap a thin rope around a thicker rope)
3. prnl. Vestirse, abrigarse.
(Get dressed, bundle up)

forrar.


(Del fr. *fourrer*).

1. tr. Poner forro a algo.
(Add a lining or covering to something; upholster)
2. prnl. coloq. enriquecerse.
(Colloquial: get/become rich)

Notably, *COVER/CONCEAL* also has an antonymic relationship with senses 7 and 8 in the *DRAE*’s entry for *ahorrar* (‘remove clothing’, ‘wear lighter clothing’), which leads to my suspicion that the initial *a-* was interpreted as a negation, thus *forrar* ~ *horrar* would mean ‘put on clothing’,

while *aforrar* ~ *ahorrar* ‘remove clothing’. This is similar to the claim made by Covarrubias in his entry for *aforrar*, but he derived the second morpheme from *fuera* ‘outside’, rather than *forrar* (see example 11 above).⁸⁸ Sense 2 of *forrar*, BECOME RICH, brings us back to the idea of SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES, the prototypical sense of *ahorrar* since the sixteenth century at the latest. Figure 3.1 gives a visual representation of the information that I have just outlined. As I will argue later on in this chapter, REMOVE FROM ACTION/SET ASIDE seems to be the underlying domain that links all of the various domains, in addition to the links that they already form among themselves.

Figure 3.1 The relationship between the lexical items *aforrar*, *aforrar*, *ahorrar*, and *forrar*, with respect to the most salient semantic domains associated with their respective semasiological profiles.



The point here is that there were many opportunities for reinterpretation on the part of Ibero-Romance/Spanish speakers in the late medieval/early modern period, if not beyond. The potential for confusion almost certainly influenced the semasiological profile of *ahorrar* as it was entrenched in the minds of speakers and conventionalized throughout the speech

⁸⁸ To make matters even worse, sometimes *aforrar* ~ *ahorrar* was also spelled *aforrar* (e.g. example 14 below).

community, contributing to the shifts in the verb's prototypical meaning. We will now turn to an examination of the tokens found in the corpora.

3.2.3 Attestations from searchable databases

As in the previous chapter, this part of the study relies on data culled from Davies (2002-) and *CORDE*. The three principal semantic categories were found in the analysis of the data, coinciding with what we have already seen, and which are considered here to be semasiological prototypes of *ahorrar* at different times throughout the eight centuries covered by the corpus: FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER, AVOID A DIFFICULTY, and SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES. The review here (subsections 3.2.3.1-3.2.3.3) focuses on examples of these three categories, which are presented in table form in the summary found in the next subsection (3.2.4). Discussion of the factors involved in the transitions between the prototypes will follow (Section 3.3).

3.2.3.1 FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER

The first prototypical meaning of *ahorrar*, as found in Davies (2002-), was FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER. In fact, all of the 144 tokens found in the corpus for the thirteenth century pointed to this meaning, and came from a single text (the *Siete Partidas*).⁸⁹ Representative examples are 12-14, reproduced below. These are followed, in diachronic order, by additional examples.

In the *Siete Partidas*, we see many examples in which the verb is used transitively, with explicit direct object/patients that refer to slaves or servants (typically *sieruos*):

- (12) Patronus llaman en latin al señor que **ahorra** su sieruo por quel torna como de nuevo en estado de onbre

⁸⁹ Müller (1995) cites several additional texts (e.g. *Foro Real*, *Espéculo*, *Crónica General*, *General Estoria*, and the above-mentioned *Bocados de oro* and *Fuero de Guadalajara* [section 3.2.1]).

(*Patronus* is used in Latin/Romance to refer to a man who **frees** his servant, so that he returns to a state of manhood)⁹⁰

- (13) Ley nouena porque razones puede el señor tornar a seruidunbre aquel que ouiese **aforrado**. Señores y ha algunos que **aforran** sus sieruos tan sola mente por su buena voluntad queriendo les hazer bien & merçed no tomando preçio ninguno dellos. E otros y ha quelos **aforran** por preçio que reçiben: o por quelos mando **aforrar** su señor en su testamento al heredero que estableçio enel. E porende dezimos que si el señor **aforra** su sieruo por su buena voluntad no tomando preçio: o si reçibiese preçio del sieruo mismo que lo da por si [...]

(Law nine: reasons for which a man can return to servitude a person whom he had **freed**. Some masters **free** their slaves simply because of their good will, wanting to do them a favor and show them mercy, without taking any payment in exchange. And others **free** them for a payment that they receive: because the master ordered his heir to **free** them in his will. For that reason we say that if the master frees his slave on good will, without taking a payment: or if he received a payment from the servant himself by his own free will [...])

Example 12 shows that the term *sieruo* most likely referred to a slave, given that the *sieruo* “returns to a state of manhood.” Example 13 indicates that the agent, that is, the person doing the freeing, could receive a *preçio* for his action. While it may not be clear whether the *preçio* received for the *aforramiento* is necessarily money (it could be livestock or other resources), this example shows a clear case in which the agent receives money in exchange for the action:

- (14) Ley terçera por quales razones pueden las mugeres ser fiadores por otri. Muger diximos enla ley ante desta que no puede entrar la muger fiador por otri. Por razones ya por quello podrian fazer. La primera es quando fiase alguno por razon de libertad. E esto seria como si alguno quisiese **aforar** su sieruo por dineros & le entrase alguna muger fiador por los dineros del aforamiento. La segunda es si fiase aotri por razon de dote.⁹¹

(Law three: reasons for which women can be money lenders. In the preceding law we said that women cannot be money lenders, but here we will give exceptions to this law. The first is when she lends money in order to grant freedom. This would be if a master wanted to **free** his slave for money and a woman intervened to provide the money for the manumission. The second is if she lends money as a dowry.)

⁹⁰ See Tejedo-Herrero (2008) and Cano Aguilar (2016) for discussion regarding the translation of the word *latín*.

⁹¹ The spelling *-r-* instead of *-rr-* is a common variant found throughout the corpus (see section 3.2.2.2 for further discussion).

This point will be relevant to the discussion below regarding the subsequent shifts in prototypical meaning. I will argue that even though both the thirteenth-century prototypical meaning and the current, twenty-first century prototype involve the domain MONEY/RESOURCES, the true underlying domain that links the two is actually REMOVE FROM ACTION/SET ASIDE. I base this argument, in part, on the presence of the intervening prototype AVOID A DIFFICULTY, which has no consistent relationship with the domain MONEY/RESOURCES (see section 3.4 for details).

In the fourteenth century, we see an example in which the direct object/patients seem to be prisoners of war, rather than slaves or servants:

- (15) Otro dia sallio el çid de castejon & fuesse henares arriba. ca non qujso fincar alli. por non fazer pesar al Rey don alfonso Su sseñor / Pero non quiso dexas el castillo assi desenparado mas **ahorro** çientos moros con sus mugeres & dexolos de Su mano enel castillo
(*Crónica de veinte reyes*, anonymous, fourteenth century)

(The Cid left Castellón and went up toward [the river] Henares, because he did not want to stay there, in order to not disappoint his master, King Alfonso. But he did not want to leave the castle unprotected, so he **freed** hundreds of moors with their women and he left them in the castle)

In late fifteenth-century works by Fernández de Santaella (examples 16 and 17) and Nebrija (example 18) we see lexicographical entries which continue the transmission of FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER, but which appear to already be somewhat antiquated, at least if we trust the data from Davies (2002-), and which would not be surprising given the typical tendency of lexicographers to be rather conservative.⁹²

- (16) Manumissus. sa. sum. de manumitto. tis. libertado o **ahorrado** dela seruidumbre
(*Vocabulario eclesiástico*, Rodrigo Fernández de Santaella, 1499)

(Manumitted: freed or **ahorrado** from servitude)

- (17) Manumitto. tis. si. ssum. iij. conjuga. **ahorrar** o libertar. S. Augustinus
(*Vocabulario eclesiástico*, Rodrigo Fernández de Santaella, 1499)

⁹² Only 7 tokens are found with that meaning in the fifteenth century, all from lexicographical sources.

(Manumitted: **ahorrar** or free [as used by] Saint Augustine)

- (18) Mnumitto. is. si. por **ahorrar** al siervo.a.i. Manumissio. onis. por aquel **ahorramiento**
(*Dictionarium latino-hispanicum*, Antonio de Nebrija, 1492)

(Manumitted: **free** a slave; Manumission: the act of **freeing** [a slave])

Also notable here is the use of the preposition *de* in example 16, which is the earliest such example found in the available corpora related to the semantic domain FREE A SLAVE.⁹³ As we will see further on, this represents the early stages of a long process of intransitivization of the verb, which remains incomplete.

3.2.3.2 AVOID A DIFFICULTY

The second prototypical meaning of *ahorrar*, as found in Davies (2002-), was AVOID A DIFFICULTY. The first tokens appear in the sixteenth century:

- (19) Mayormente que antes el cambio se inventó y se ejercita para **ahorrar de peligros**, y es contra su naturaleza correr riesgo el que los da aquí para que se los den en otra parte
(*Summa de tratos y contratos*, Tomás de Mercado, 1545)

(Principally that beforehand the change was invented and is applied in order to **avoid dangers**, and taking risks is against the nature of he who gives them here so that they are given elsewhere)

- (20) [...] me detuve allí algunos días esperando el sacerdote señalado, que si viniera me fuera con él por **ahorrar de tanto despoblado y riesgo** de algunos indios de guerra [...]
(*La descripción de las Indias*, Reginaldo de Lizárraga, 1569)

([...] I stopped there for a few days, waiting for the appointed priest, with whom I was supposed to leave—if he arrived—in order to **avoid open areas and risks** from some war-faring Indians [...])

- (21) Esta calzada han tenido y tienen hoy en gran veneración los indios de aquella comarca, así porque el mismo Inca trabajó en la obra como por el provecho que sienten de pasar por ella, porque **ahorran mucho camino y trabajo** que antes tenían para descabezar la ciénaga por la una parte o por la otra.

(*Comentarios reales*, Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, 1578)

⁹³ Bearing in mind that in example 10 (*queréis **ahorrar de mí***)—from the fourteenth century—the sense of the verb is ‘escape’. While this is obviously semantically related to the domain FREE, it is only sporadically present in the corpora, and will have no meaningful bearing on the analysis.

(The Indians of this region have held—and still hold—this road in great veneration, because the same Incas built it and because of the benefit that they gain by using it, because they **avoid** a great amount of travelling and work that they used to deal with in order to clear the swamp.)

Again, we see the appearance of the preposition *de*, but in a different sense than in example 16.

In example 16, the prepositional phrase indicates what the slave or servant was freed from (*seruidumbre*), while in examples 19 and 20 it indicates what is being avoided (*peligros*, *despoblado*, *riesgo*). Clearly, there is a semantic kinship between these prepositional complements—in the sense that they are undesirable, even though the general meanings are different (in that being freed from servitude involves having been in a state of servitude, while avoiding dangers does not necessarily involve having been in danger).

In the seventeenth (examples 22 and 23), eighteenth (example 24), nineteenth (example 25) and twentieth (example 26) centuries, there are more examples that lack the preposition, and the direct object/patients are viewed as problematic and to be avoided:⁹⁴

- (22) [...] y si vuesa merced quiere **ahorrar** camino y ponerse con facilidad en el de su salvación, véngase conmigo

(*Don Quijote*, Miguel de Cervantes, 1605)

([...] and if you want to **save** on your trip and make your salvation easier, come with me)

- (23) La tierra es de temple caliente, de mucha montaña, y arboleda, y los que van a la provincia de Nicaragua suelen atravesar esta bahía en canoas de los indios de la isla; con que **ahorran** muchas leguas y cansancio [...]
(*Compendio y descripción de las Indias Occidentales*, Antonio Vázquez de Espinosa, 1600)

(The land is of a warm nature, very mountainous, and with many trees, and those who go to the province of Nicaragua tend to cross this bay in the canoes of the Indians of the island; in that way they **save** many leagues and weariness [...])

- (24) Menos sensible me hubiera sido la muerte, si hubiese podido con ella **ahorrar** a mi Gabriela esa cruel herida

(*Eusebio*, Pedro Montengón, 1784)

⁹⁴ Note that in my English-language glosses I chose the lexical item *save*, rather than *avoid*. Nevertheless, in these cases, *save* corresponds to the domain *avoid*.

(The death would have hurt me less if I had been able to use it to save my Gabriella [from] that cruel injury)

- (25) Y se habría ahorrado el señor de la Revilla mucho mal camino y muchos tropiezos si hubiese comenzado por aquí [...]

(*La ciencia española: polémicas, indicaciones y proyectos*, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, 1884)

(And the man from Revilla would have saved himself a difficult journey and many hardships if he had begun from here [...])

- (26) Antes que nada, me disculpo por no escribirte inmediatamente, con lo cual te hubiera ahorrado la angustia con la que me acabas de hablar hace unas horas

(*El oficio del abuelo*, Erika Mergruen, 1999)

(First of all, I apologize for not immediately writing you, which would have saved you the anguish with which you just called me a few hours ago)

Additional examples of the expanded variety of objects/patients found in the corpus for this period, from the sixteenth century to the present, include *cuernos* ‘lit. horns [refers to spousal infidelity]’, *disgustos* ‘displeasures’, *dolor de cabeza* ‘headache’, *enfado* ‘anger’, *enojo* ‘anger’, *guerras* ‘wars’, *pecado* ‘sin’, *peligro* ‘danger’, *pesadumbre* ‘grief’, *quebranto* ‘sadness’, *quejas* ‘complaints’, *riesgo* ‘risk’, *sangre* ‘blood [bleeding]’, and *tormento* ‘torment’. Notably, all of these objects/patients represent things that people tend to avoid, in contrast to what we will see in the next subsection.

3.2.3.3 SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES

The third prototypical meaning of *ahorrar*, as found in Davies (2002-), was (and still is) SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES. As with the meaning AVOID A DIFFICULTY, the first century with a significant number of tokens with this meaning (57) was the sixteenth century, but I did find one token from the *Textos y documentos completos de Cristóbal Colón*, which Davies puts in the fifteenth:

- (27) [...] allende de las otras cosas que son para los mantenimientos comunes e de la botica, çapatos e cueros para los mandar fazer, camisas comunes e de otras, jubones, lienços, sayos, calças, paños para vestir en razonables precios e otras cosas, como son conservas, que son fuera de ración e para conservación de la salud; las cuales cosas toda la gente de acá recibiría de grado en descuento de su sueldo, e si allí esto se mercase por ministros leales e que mirasen al servicio de Sus Altesas, **se ahorraría algo** [...]

([...] in addition to the other things that are used for common maintenance and for the commissary, shoes and leather to make them, common shirts, doublets, linens, tunics, breeches, cloth for dressing at reasonable prices and other things, as they are preserved, that are outside of the ration and used for health maintenance; everyone would receive such things voluntarily as a discount from their salary, and if this were overseen by loyal ministers who faithfully served their superiors, **some [amount of money/resources] would be saved** [...])

From the sixteenth century:

- (28) ...porque si no tuviesen criados, de la despesa **ahorrarían muchos dineros**, y del corazón quitarían muchos cuidados
(*Libro primero de las epístolas familiares*, Antonio de Guevara, 1513)

(...because if they did not have children, they would **save a lot of money** from their expenses, and they would remove many worries from their hearts)

Here we see that the direct object/patient is not something to be avoided. Additional examples of this come from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries (examples 29-32, respectively).

- (29) Yo te juro que hubieras **ahorrado muchos ducados** si te hubieras encomendado a mí porque no soy nada amiga de dineros.
(*Historia de la vida del Buscón*, Francisco de Quevedo, 1612)

(I assure you that you would have **saved a lot of money** if you had entrusted yourself to me because I am by no means a friend of money.)

- (30) [...] las innumerables máquinas, que han inventado, e inventan, con que **ahorran mucho tiempo, trabajo, y dinero** en la ejecución de varias operaciones necesarias [...]
(*Cartas eruditas y curiosas*, Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, 1742)

([...] the innumerable machines that they have invented, and keep inventing, with which they **save a lot of time, work, and money** in the execution of various necessary operations [...])

- (31) ¿Qué trabajador no se halla en estado de **ahorrar cinco céntimos** diarios? ¡Cinco céntimos diarios! Son seis reales al mes; es la comida de un día, de día y medio [...]
(*El pauperismo*, Concepción Arenal, 1856)

(What worker does not find himself in a state of saving five cents per day? Five cents per day! That is six *reales* per month; it is enough food for a day, for a day and a half [...])

- (32) [...] una caja de lata con un poco de café y un poco de azúcar, todo revuelto: ahorra tiempo; echas el café junto con el azúcar [...]
(*Hijo de ladrón*, Manuel Rojas, 1951)

([...] a tin can with a little coffee and a little sugar, all mixed together: it saves time; you throw the coffee in along with the sugar [...])

It is, of course possible to interpret *trabajo* in the eighteenth-century example (30) as something to be avoided, but its juxtaposition with *dinero* certainly seems to change the meaning. It appears, rather, that the example reflects the beginnings of the period of transition between the two prototypical meanings (which was not complete until the twentieth century). That is, the example could show a blend of the two meanings—AVOID A DIFFICULTY and SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES—or, alternatively, ‘work’ could also be seen as a resource of sorts, in that it is useful for procuring other resources (principally, money).

Also noteworthy is this early seventeenth-century example, which shows the use of other verbs (*rescatarse* and *libertarse*) to mean FREE A SLAVE (in this case reflexively), alongside an intransitive use of *ahorrar* to mean SAVE MONEY:

- (33) [...] todas las costas de la isla son puertos, mas no en todas hay poblaciones; las que tienen los ingleses en aquellas mas capaces esclavos que tienen porque, no faltandoles en que trabajar, se aumenta el precio de estos; y corriendo la plata con abundancia entre todos, tienen no solo para vestirse, quedar proveidos de ropa y lo necesario hasta otra armada, pero aun con dinero de sobre; y, assi, en estas ocasiones, se rescatan y libertan muchos esclavos con lo que ahorran despues de haver pagado sus jornales y haverse mantenido.
(*Viaje a la América meridional*, Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxóchitl, 1608)

([...] all of the coasts of the island are ports, but not all of them are settlements; the English ones have the most capable slaves because, not lacking work to do, their price increases; and given the abundance of silver among them, they have enough not only to dress, be well-provided with clothing, and to even have enough to form another navy, but even with money left over; and, in that way, on these occasions, many slaves free themselves with what they save after having paid their daily wages and maintained themselves.)

As I will discuss further along, examples like this reflect the fact that the abolition of slavery does not seem to have had a great impact on the loss of the meaning FREE A SLAVE; this one comes from a text published two centuries before slavery was abolished in the Spanish empire.

3.2.4 Summary of the sequence of semantic changes

This section gives a brief but broader view of the evidence presented in the preceding subsections. Table 3.1 presents the number of tokens and frequency (in words per million [wpm]) of *ahorrrar*, organized vertically by the meaning of the tokens and horizontally by the century in which they were found. The bolded, underlined numbers represent the raw number of tokens, and the numbers in parentheses represent the frequencies. The darkened boxes represent the meanings with the largest number of tokens (and, consequently, the highest frequency) within a given century, and therefore likely the prototypical meaning of the lexical item during that period.⁹⁵

Table 3.1 Number of tokens and frequency (in words per million) of *ahorrrar* by century (from Davies 2002-).

Century Meaning	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th	Totals
FREE A SLAVE/ PRISONER	<u>144</u> (21.44)	<u>4</u> (1.50)	<u>7</u> (0.86)	<u>1</u> (0.01)	<u>1</u> (0.08)	0	0	0	<u>157</u>
AVOID A DIFFICULTY	0	0	0	<u>86</u> (5.05)	<u>113</u> (9.15)	<u>82</u> (8.35)	<u>179</u> (9.28)	<u>57</u> (2.50)	<u>517</u>
SAVE MONEY/ RESOURCES	0	0	<u>1</u> (0.12)	<u>57</u> (3.35)	<u>69</u> (5.59)	<u>45</u> (4.58)	<u>125</u> (6.48)	<u>193</u> (8.46)	<u>490</u>
Other/Unclear	0	<u>2</u> (0.7)	<u>7</u> (0.86)	<u>6</u> (0.35)	<u>6</u> (0.49)	<u>7</u> (0.71)	<u>11</u> (0.57)	<u>3</u> (0.13)	<u>42</u>
Totals	<u>144</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>189</u>	<u>134</u>	<u>315</u>	<u>253</u>	<u>1206</u>

⁹⁵ The same caveats apply, of course, as those in Chapter 2: misinterpretations could potentially arise due to the arbitrary cutoff points between centuries, as well as possible misinterpretations of the meanings due to ambiguities, but efforts were made to reduce the latter by eliminating unclear tokens from the analysis, and the differences between the sums within each given vertical column seem to be sufficient to reduce any problems related to the former.

As the table shows, FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER was likely the prototypical meaning during the thirteenth century, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are inconclusive due to lack of data (although the lexicographical evidence presented in the preceding section suggests that it remained as FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER), AVOID A DIFFICULTY was the prototypical meaning from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES is the current prototypical meaning. It is also clear from the table that the lexical item is, and has been, somewhat polysemous at least since the sixteenth century.⁹⁶ This fact will moderate some of the conclusions to follow, since it is not a clear-cut case of the full loss of polysemy, but rather a tendency in that direction.

3.3 Intervening social and cognitive factors

It is clear that the domain MONEY was integrated into the semasiological profile of *ahorrar* from the beginning of its use, in the context of freeing slaves and prisoners.⁹⁷ Obviously, the sale of slaves (and the ransoming of prisoners) involved an exchange of money (or goods). But it is worth pointing out that, prior to the word's entry into the Ibero-Romance lexicon, the Roman legal code—the *Corpus Juris Civilis*—included provisions for slaves to earn a modest stipend, called a *peculium*, which “formed the slave's working capital, derived from gifts, a portion of the wages a slave might earn from working outside the home, tips from guests, or savings from the slave's allowance” (Phillips 2014: 127). In principle, slaves could use this money to purchase their own or another person's freedom. Similar allowances were made during the Visigothic period and under Muslim law in the early medieval period (Phillips 2014: 128-9).

⁹⁶ Keeping in mind that other attestations not found in Davies (2002-) suggest some degree of polysemy from the first documentation in the eleventh century (see section 3.2.1 for examples).

⁹⁷ Of course, there were other ways of obtaining one's freedom: slaves and prisoners could escape, their masters or captors could voluntarily let them go, etc.

The evidence suggests that it was in this context that *ahorrar* was first used by Romance speakers. The practice of allowing the slaves to earn a stipend continued to be codified in the thirteenth-century *Siete Partidas*, and later in the sixteenth-century *Leyes de Indias*. In the late-medieval period, the *talla* system was developed in Aragon wherein a slave owner and slave could sign a contract which allowed the slave to make monthly payments over a period of several years in order to purchase his or her freedom (Phillips 2014: 135). The same practice was fairly common in the Americas, albeit with less regulation. In principle, once the agreed-upon amount was paid, the slave obtained his or her freedom and received a *carta de (a)horro/ahorría* as proof of the transaction (Lucena Salmoral 1999: 359).

The fact that slaves were able to purchase their own freedom not only reinforced the salience of MONEY, but it also added an extra dimension to the semasiological profile of *ahorrar*: not only could it be used to refer to a transitive action involving two participants (master frees slave), but also to a reflexive action (slave frees himself/herself). As I will argue further along, this is an important step in the verb's transition toward the meaning AVOID A DIFFICULTY.

A key point to bear in mind, however, is that—in spite of the occasional comments made by historians to the contrary (e.g. Phillips' definition of the *peculium* above)—the money used by slaves to buy their freedom was generally not saved up, but rather paid directly once it was given. In fact, there is little evidence that saving money—by slaves and free people alike—was common at all until much later. Rodriguez (2007:153) points out that, at least in the fourteenth century, “ransoms were costly and beyond the means of most people who needed them.” He goes on to compare average ransom prices with average disposable incomes and concludes that:

an unskilled laborer would have needed about twenty-five years to ransom a loved one or to pay off the debt of his own ransom [...] a master craftsman had to save from two to five years to reach the necessary amount. A well-paid oarsman had almost no chance to raise the money in his working lifetime [...] A ship's captain, on the other hand, could

raise the necessary money in less than a year and a half. Individuals engaged in the least paying professions would have found it next to impossible to acquire the necessary sum for a ransom from their own wages. (p. 157)

In the sixteenth century; “only a minority of Spaniards took part in industry and commerce; most of them lived on and from the land” (Lynch 1994: 142). Lynch goes on to give the following description of the situation, which is worth quoting in full (1994:149-150; emphasis mine):

In a society where standards were set by the landed aristocracy there were few prospects for labourers and artisans. The Spanish working class of the sixteenth century, confronted by a prosperous nobility whose estate was a magnet for manufacturers and merchants, had visible evidence for the view that work was degrading. In the absence of an identifiable middle class, possible entry to which might have acted as a stimulus, the tenant and the craftsman lost confidence in work as a means of progress. They worked because there was no alternative, or because the alternative was hunger. The notion that the typical Castilian was the idle *hidalgo*, too proud to work, is a myth that would hardly need contradicting were it not repeated so often. Except in the extreme north, in Asturias, *hidalgos* formed a minority of the population; the Basques believed they were all nobles, but that did not prevent them cultivating the land and building ships. The further inference—that in Spain only the moriscos worked—is equally false, for there were hundreds of thousands of hard-working peasants and the extensive public and private building that was done in the sixteenth century could only have been performed by an army of artisans. **Indeed for a miserable subsistence, which barely covered vital provisions, they had to work hard indeed. A contemporary report of the tavern-keepers of Barcelona recorded that the workers of the city ate a midday meal consisting of a piece of bread and garlic. If by any chance the worker had a surplus from his wages, heavier and heavier taxation took it from him. But usually he had little to start with.**

This grim situation was the norm, not only throughout the Spanish empire, but throughout Europe, and not only in the sixteenth century, but throughout the preceding centuries as well (López Alonso, 1986). Nevertheless, it was in the sixteenth century, the point at which the first tokens of *ahorrar* with the sense of SAVE MONEY appear in the database, that a true merchant class began to exist. But, almost immediately, trade between the Peninsula and America picked up speed and led to increased prices in Peninsular markets, primarily due to an increase in demand and an expansion of credit (Grice-Hutchinson 1978: 124). As Tomás de Mercado put it in his 1569 publication *Tratos y contratos de mercaderes* (p. 54, verso):

I saw velvets in Granada that were priced at 28 and 29 *reales*. A fool arrived from the steps, and began to treat and bargain so indiscreetly for the lading of a caravel that within a fortnight he had put up prices to 35 and 36. And the velvet-merchants and weavers went on in this way, and afterwards charged the same prices to their fellow-countrymen [...] So, in Seville, is the daily trend of prices, as much in the mercery that comes from Flanders as in the cloths from Segovia and Toledo, and the wine and oil produced in the Axarafe.⁹⁸

A perusal of the relevant body of literature shows a clear consensus among scholars that Peninsular, Spanish-speaking society has seen almost constant economic difficulties since the end of the sixteenth century. There is no need to belabor the point here; suffice it to note that the chapter headings of Comín et al. (2010) from the sixteenth century to the present reflect the image of general adversity found throughout the literature:⁹⁹

Las raíces del atraso económico español: Crisis y decadencia (1590-1714)
(The roots of the Spanish economic delay: Crisis and decadence [1590-1714])

Expansión, reformismo y obstáculos al crecimiento (1715-1789)
(Expansion, reform and obstacles to development [1715-1789])

La crisis de Antiguo Régimen y la revolución liberal (1790-1840)
(The crisis of the Old Regime and the liberal revolution [1790-1840])

El difícil arranque de la industrialización (1840-1880)
(The difficult beginnings of industrialization [1840-1880])

Crisis y recuperación económica en la restauración (1882-1913)
(Crisis and economic recovery during the restoration [1882-1913])

While the majority of these studies adopt a macro-perspective, analyzing the policies of the State and outlining broad trends, there are occasional mentions of the situation of ‘common’

⁹⁸ Translation from Grice-Hutchinson (1978:124; brackets added to indicate the location of a sentence omitted in the translation). Facsimile available online at <http://bibliotecadigital.jcyl.es/i18n/consulta/registro.cmd?id=13016>

⁹⁹ For a general overview of the economic situation in the Peninsula from the tenth to the twentieth century, see Comín et al. (2010). For a focus on the twelfth to the eighteenth century, see Grice-Hutchinson (1978); for the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, see Marcos Martín (2000); for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Plaza Prieto (1975), Martí (2001), Morales Moya (2003) Rueda Hernanz (2006); and for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Harrison (1978, 1984), Sánchez-Albornoz (1987), Shubert (1990), Echeverría Zabalza (1999), Germán, Llopis, Maluquer de Motes & Zapata (2001), Sánchez Marroyo (2003), Carreras & Tafunell (2004) Barciela et al. (2006), among many others.

people (who are, in the end, the ones who tend to drive linguistic change). To exemplify: In addition to quoting the passage by Tomás de Mercado reproduced above, Grice-Hutchinson adds that “consumers were unhappy. Their anxiety was voiced by the Cortes on several occasions. Excessive exports were seen as the main cause of the alarming increase in the cost of living” (1978:124). She goes on to say that

by the middle of the [sixteenth] century the Spanish price-level had drawn away from that of the rest of Europe. At about this time, protests began to be made against the import of foreign manufactures, which, attracted by the high level of Spanish prices, were competing successfully with home products. The balance of trade was turning against Castile, and the hard-won American treasure beginning to melt away. People complained that Spain was ‘the Indies of the foreigner’. And it was true enough. The colonies had paid high prices for Spanish goods, and sent large quantities of the precious metals in return for them. Now, in response to the rise in Spanish prices, foreigners were flooding the Spanish market with relatively cheap merchandise, and draining gold and silver from Spain. They were also capturing an increasingly important share of the Indian trade. (p. 125)

Note that the context is the sixteenth century, before the supposed beginning of the economic decline around the year 1590. But even if the economic situation of ‘common’ people was difficult well before that century, the particular problems caused by new trading patterns made possible after 1492 seem to have been especially difficult. In that context, it would not be surprising to find that Spanish speakers were increasingly concerned about saving money (and resources), and that around the time of the initial crisis of the sixteenth century they began to speak about it with greater frequency, and continued to do so throughout the following centuries. Here are some examples from the corpus that reflect these economic concerns:

- (34) [...] que se obligaba a sustentar nuestra casa, y que lo que pudiésemos ganar sería para vestimos y **ahorrar**.
(*Segunda parte de la vida de Lazarillo de Tormes*, Juan de Luna, 1605)

([...] that [he] was obligated to support our household, and that what we could earn would be for clothing and **saving**.)

- (35) ¿Estoy loco? Si soy pobre **ahorrando** y adquiriendo, ¿cómo seré rico dando? ¿Este dinero no es el sustento de mi mujer y familia? Pues si doy lo que tengo en mi poder, ¿cómo aguardo a sustentarlos con lo que está en el ajeno? ¿Con qué conciencia puedo soltar el dinero para darlo a los extraños y dejar pereciendo a los propios?

(*Epístolas y tratados*, Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, 1630)

(Am I crazy? If I am poor [in spite of] **saving** and acquiring, how will I be rich giving? Isn't this money what supports my wife and my family? If I give what I have under my control, how can I expect to support them, with what is going on out there? How can I in good conscience let go of my money to give it to strangers and allow my loved ones to perish?)

- (36) [...] el hecho es que muchos pudiendo **ahorrar** no **ahorran** (en todas las clases), que el motivo es la gran dificultad que para economizar encuentran, y debe reconocerse y combatirse en vez de tratar de resolver el problema como si no existiese. 4. Los que no pueden querer **ahorrar**. Esta clase, suprimida (en los libros), es muy numerosa, y se compone de los que tienen posibilidad económica, pero no psicológica de **ahorrar**. El caso, muy frecuente, se da cuando el pobre necesita una tensión fuerte y constante de su voluntad para resistir, no ya a las tentaciones del vicio, sino a la de algunos goces honestos, que serían razonables si sus recursos no fueran tan exigüos.

(*El pauperismo*, Concepción Arenal, 1856)

([...] the fact is that many who are able to **save** do not **save** (in all social classes), the reason is the great difficulty that they experience with economizing, and it should be recognized and dealt with instead of trying to resolve the problem as if it did not exist. 4. Those who cannot hope to **save**. This class, ignored (in books), is very large in number, and is composed of those who have the economic, but not psychological, possibility to **save**. The situation frequently arises when the poor person needs strong and constant willpower to resist, not the temptations of vice, but rather those of some innocent pleasures, which would be reasonable if their resources were not so meager.)

It is likely that this trend was the impetus for the sudden appearance of tokens in the database referring to contexts involving money (and concurrently to contexts involving avoiding difficulties). This sudden, drastic cultural change would have had lasting effects, such that, regardless of the actual economic situation in subsequent time periods (that is, in spite of the occasional 'modest recovery'), the discourse remained essentially the same. This is not to imply, of course, that saving money was not a topic of conversation before the sixteenth century, nor


that there were not economic difficulties prior to that time.¹⁰⁰ The point is that the perceived need to save money likely increased in salience as the economic crises unfolded, and that the increased salience correlated with increased frequency, and thus the link between the concepts SAVE and MONEY was entrenched and conventionalized in the semasiological profile of *ahorrar*. It was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that a true middle class began to form (Harrison 1978, Sánchez-Albornoz 1987, Shubert 1990, Tortella 2000, Germán et al. 2001), and we see a concurrent increase in frequency of the use of the verb to mean SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES—most likely because a large number of Spanish speakers had, for the first time, the ability to do so.

I will now turn to the cognitive factors that likely intervened in the semantic transitions outlined above. Here I will focus on two major points of interest. The first one harkens back to Chapter 2, in which I suggested that the underlying semantic domain BEAUTIFY served as a basis for connecting the various prototypical meanings of *afeitar*. Here I will argue that the underlying domain for *ahorrar* is REMOVE FROM ACTION/SET ASIDE. The second, more important, point of interest returns to the theoretical notions of linguistic units, (ontological) salience, entrenchment, and conventionalization. A key factor involved in the case of *ahorrar* is the verb's argument structure, which appears to have undergone a gradual process of (still incomplete) intransitivization.

Figure 3.2 shows diachronic relationship between the three prototypical meanings of *ahorrar* and the underlying domain that links them.

¹⁰⁰ Nor yet that there were not other words being used to refer to the act of saving money and resources. Since the present study is semasiological in nature, the focus here is limited to the use of this particular verb.

Figure 3.2 The diachronic relationship between the prototypical meanings of the lexical item *ahorrar*.



The presence of this underlying domain would explain why examples like (37) are possible, in which there seems to be a blend of two types of patients: resources (*tiempo* and *dinero*) and difficulty (*trabajo*).¹⁰¹

- (37) [...] las innumerables máquinas, que han inventado, e inventan, con que **ahorran** mucho tiempo, trabajo, y dinero en la ejecución de varias operaciones necesarias [...]
(*Cartas eruditas y curiosas*, Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, 1742)

([...] the innumerable machines that they have invented, and keep inventing, with which they **save** a lot of time, work, and money in the execution of various necessary operations [...])

Obviously, work cannot be saved up in the way that money (or time, if it is interpreted as a resource) can, and time and money are not things one typically wants to avoid (if time can be avoided at all). The only obvious thing that ties them together is the notion of ‘removing from action’ or ‘setting aside’.

The presence of the underlying domain REMOVE FROM ACTION/SET ASIDE would also motivate the appearance of the meaning AVOID A DIFFICULTY in examples like (38) and (39):

¹⁰¹ Of course, ‘work’ could also, perhaps, be seen as a resource of sorts, in that it is useful for procuring other resources (principally, money).

- (38) Manumissus. sa. sum. de manumitto. tis. libertado o **ahorrado** dela seruidumbre.
(*Vocabulario eclesiástico*, Rodrigo Fernández de Santaella, 1499)

(Manumitted: freed or **ahorrado** from servitude)

- (39) Mayormente que antes el cambio se inventó y se ejercita para **ahorrar de peligros**, y es contra su naturaleza correr riesgo el que los da aquí para que se los den en otra parte
(*Summa de tratos y contratos*, Tomás de Mercado, 1545)

(Principally that beforehand the change was invented and is applied in order to **avoid dangers**, and taking risks is against the nature of he who gives them here so that they are given elsewhere)

In example 38, the function of the prepositional phrase is to indicate what the slave or servant was freed from (*seruidumbre*), while in example 39, it indicates what is being avoided.

Nonetheless, both the servitude and the dangers are things being ‘set aside’, or taken out of the picture for the slave or whomever Tomás de Mercado was referring to in example 39. The same, of course, is true for other examples in which no preposition is present:

- (40) Esta calzada han tenido y tienen hoy en gran veneración los indios de aquella comarca, así porque el mismo Inca trabajó en la obra como por el provecho que sienten de pasar por ella, porque **ahorran mucho camino y trabajo** que antes tenían para descabezar la ciénaga por la una parte o por la otra.
(*Comentarios reales*, Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, 1578)

(The Indians of this region have held—and still hold—this road in great veneration, because the same Incas built it and because of the benefit that they gain by using it, because they **avoid a great amount of travelling and work** that they used to deal with in order to clear the swamp.)

In the case of a patron freeing a slave, the slave is ‘removed from action’, or taken from service, or the like. And in examples like (41), anguish is being taken away from the referent of the second-person pronoun:

- (41) Antes que nada, me disculpo por no escribirte inmediatamente, con lo cual te hubiera **ahorrado** la angustia con la que me acabas de hablar hace unas horas
(*El oficio del abuelo*, Erika Mergruen, 1999)

(First of all, I apologize for not immediately writing you, which would have **saved you the anguish** with which you just called me a few hours ago)

The same applies to examples in which the verb means SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES. The money or resource is set aside for later use. This also potentially explains the difference between the presence of money in the contexts of the thirteenth-century examples (i.e. the *preçio* received upon the *aforramiento*) and the later examples (i.e. *dineros* as something being saved).

The presence of the underlying domain REMOVE FROM ACTION/SET ASIDE within the semasiological profile of *ahorrar* allowed the metaphoric extensions necessary for the changes to take place. A series of mental associations would have allowed speakers to use the same word for various purposes:

FREEING A SLAVE/PRISONER IS REMOVING THE SLAVE/PRISONER FROM ACTION (SETTING IT ASIDE)

AVOIDING A DIFFICULTY IS REMOVING THE DIFFICULTY FROM ACTION (SETTING IT ASIDE)

SAVING MONEY/RESOURCES IS REMOVING THE MONEY/RESOURCES FROM ACTION (SETTING IT ASIDE)

Of course, this list is highly simplified, and does not capture the entire picture. A large number of additional domains are intertwined with the elements of these metaphors (LEGAL TRANSACTION, ECONOMICS, FREEDOM, CONVENIENCE, PRIVATE SPHERE, PUBLIC SPHERE, etc.), and the associations were not necessarily made in a linear fashion. Rather, the domains interacted with each other in the dynamic, encyclopedic fashion outlined in Chapter 1. The interactions were not arbitrary, but they were guided by social factors. Ultimately, the verb became a viable choice for reference to the actions of saving money and resources, in a social context which increased the salience of a perceived need to perform those actions.

We will now turn toward the current situation and the outlook for the future of *ahorrar*'s semasiological profile. The most striking examples from the last few centuries involve the meaning SAVE MONEY, but without an explicit direct object:

- (42) [...] dio comienzo a la consulta. Al terminarla (¡cuatro duros encima de la mesa!) persistíale la pena de que la oferta no se le hubiese hecho cinco o seis años después, cuando ya él hubiera **ahorrado** lo bastante.

(*El médico rural*, Felipe Trigo, 1890)

([...] he began the consultation. When it was over (four *duros* [coins worth 5 pesetas each] on the table!), the regret persisted in his mind that the offer had not been given to him five or six years later, by which time he would have **saved** enough.)

- (43) Enderezó el cuerpo y alzó la cabeza: - Lo gasté todo; tendré que **ahorrar** de nuevo, se dijo, el rostro ahora tranquilo [...]

(*Memoria sin tiempo*, Maybell Lebron, 1992)

(She straightened her body and lifted her head: I spent everything; I'll have to **save** again, she told herself, her face now relaxed [...])

It is, of course, not particularly difficult to interpret the meaning of the verb in these examples, given their close collocation with other words that invoke the domain MONEY (*cuatro duros* in example 42, and *gasté* in 43). But examples 44-46 require a bit more encyclopedic knowledge:

- (44) Y yo me voy contigo - dijo Silda su andar lento y oscilante, parecía un oso polar, suponiendo que en el Polo hubiera osos verdes de medio arriba, y pardos de medio abajo. No había cosa más decente a que compararle. Sotileza le había predicado mucho que **ahorrara** para echarse un vestido bueno de día de fiesta [...]

(*Sotileza*, José María de Pereda, 1870)

(I'm going with you, said Silda, her gait slow and wavering, she looked like a polar bear, supposing that in the Arctic there were bears that were green from the waist up, and brown from the waist down. There was nothing more decent to compare her to. Sotileza advised her to **save** in order to get herself a good party dress [...])

- (45) Hacía cinco o seis años que habían suprimido el chófer, para **ahorrar** un poco y para adaptarse a los tiempos modernos, que en el momento de tomar esa decisión, en la mitad del período de Salvador Allende, se anunciaban tormentosos, difíciles.

(*La mujer imaginaria*, Jorge Edwards, 1985)

(It had been five or six years since they had gotten rid of the chauffer, in order to save a little and to adapt to modern times, which looked especially difficult at the time that they made the decision, halfway through the Salvador Allende period.)

- (46) Tampoco yo era un potentado, pero prefería ahorrar todo un mes para ir a una discoteca de moda como el “Pachá” y reventar hasta el amanecer, antes que salir todos los fines de semana a cualquier antro.

(¿Mientes?, Ivan Thays, 1997)

(I was hardly a tycoon, but I preferred to save for a whole month to go to a fashionable discotheque like the “Pachá” and stay out all night, rather than going out every weekend to any regular club.)

In example 44, the reader must interpret the highly polysemous verb *echarse* as ‘purchase’, along with the fact that ‘decency’ and ‘good party dresses’ are associated with having a certain amount of money, (45) requires an understanding of the economic difficulties associated with ‘modern times’ during the presidency of Salvador Allende, as well as the fact that money had to be spent to pay a chauffer, and (46) requires knowledge of the fact that ‘tycoons’ are rich and that admission to fashionable discotheques requires a lot of money. Example 47 is even more obscure; one must know that saving money is sometimes associated with negative connotations: a person who focuses on saving (i.e. not spending) can be considered boring or isolated (hence, given to anger when confronted with new experiences).

- (47) La gente en seguida arremete contra los niños, aunque muchas veces el enojo de los hombres proviene de su natural irritable y suspicaz y no de las travesuras de aquéllos. Ahí estaba Paco, el herrero. Él les comprendía porque tenía salud y buen estómago, y si el Peón no hacía lo mismo era por sus ácidos y por su rostro y su hígado retorcidos. Y su mismo padre, el quesero, porque el afán ávido de ahorrar le impedía ver las cosas en el aspecto optimista y risueño que generalmente ofrecen.

(*El camino*, Miguel Delibes, 1950)

(People immediately go after the children, although men’s anger often comes from their irritable and suspicious nature and not from the children’s mischief. So it was with Paco, the blacksmith. He understood them because he had good health and a good stomach, and if Peón didn’t do the same it was because of his ulcers and his warped face and liver. And his own father, the cheesemaker, because his avid desire to save kept him from seeing things in the positive and cheerful light that they normally offer.)

Examples like (42-47) reflect the final step in what I have referred to above as a process of intransitivization. As Figure 3.3 and Table 3.2 show, in the data for the twentieth century, 61% of the tokens (154/253) involve the domain SAVE MONEY. This is a notable increase in frequency from the previous several centuries: the sixteenth shows 25/150 tokens involving money (17%); the seventeenth shows 39/189 (21%); the eighteenth shows 29/134 (22%); and the nineteenth shows 102/315 (32%).¹⁰² Moreover, explicit mention of the direct object/patient (some form of money) has decreased in frequency (dropping from a peak of 52% [15/29] in the eighteenth century to 34% [52/154] by the twentieth).

Figure 3.3 Percentages of tokens of *ahorrar* involving the domain SAVE MONEY and of tokens with an explicit mention of money as the direct object/patient.




Table 3.2 Numerical summary of Figure 3.3.

	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
Tokens involving SAVE MONEY	0	0	0	25	39	29	102	154
Tokens involving explicit mention of money (as direct object/patient)	0	0	0	12	20	15	37	52
Total number of tokens	144	6	15	150	189	134	315	253

¹⁰² If we include the generalized notion of resources (e.g. time, water, air, gasoline, energy, etc.), the percentages jump to 76% (193/253 tokens) in the twentieth century, 38% (57/150) in the sixteenth century; 37% (69/189) in the seventeenth; 34% (45/134) in the eighteenth; and 40% (125/315) in the nineteenth.

These data suggest that, in this case, entrenchment (and, ultimately, conventionalization) involves the incorporation of a specific type of direct object/patient (money) into the semasiological profile of the transitive verb *ahorrar*, resulting in a higher frequency of intransitive uses (in the sense that the direct object/patient is not mentioned explicitly). That is, the collocational relationship between the two domains SAVE and MONEY seems to have become increasingly ontologically salient (through the development of a middle class, the possibility of saving money became more commonplace, and the need to do so became more salient as economic crises unfolded), and its corresponding linguistic unit (the lexical item *ahorrar*) seems to be in the process of conventionalizing as a (partially) intransitive verb—partially in that the process only applies to the particular context of talking about money. To put it another way, recall Schmid’s (2007) statement that fully entrenched [or conventionalized] units are conceived of as single gestalts. In the case of intransitive *ahorrar*, the components of the gestalt would be the ‘transitive action’ of SAVE and the direct object/patient MONEY which, together, comprise a single domain within the verb’s semasiological profile.¹⁰³

As Figure 3.3 also shows, the process of full intransitivization is far from complete. The data from the twentieth century show that money was still explicitly mentioned 34% of the time as a direct object/patient in the context of saving money (and other miscellaneous resources were also present in their respective context). Not to mention the 57 tokens referring to avoiding difficulties (23% of the total tokens for the twentieth century), and the 3 ‘other’ tokens, as seen earlier in Table 3.1. The point, nonetheless, is that the trend favors the possibility that the verb

¹⁰³ This is essentially the same point as the one made in Armstrong (2016)—albeit from a different theoretical perspective—with respect to similar verbs (*leer* ‘read’, *comer* ‘eat’, *tomar* ‘drink’, *beber* ‘drink’, etc.). In the absence of contextual factors that would elicit atypical readings, “there is a general prototypicality constraint on the interpretation of unspecified objects” (p. 172). It seems that *ahorrar* would represent a special case, where MONEY has reached a level of prototypicality such that it is the only interpretation in utterances like *tengo que ahorrar* ‘I have to save [money]’, akin to cases like *Juan tomó/bebió toda la noche* ‘Juan drank [alcohol] all night’, where ALCOHOL is (almost) always the implied object (ibid.).

could eventually end up being fully intransitive (i.e. with the idea of MONEY fully integrated into the semantic profile of the verb, such that mentioning it would always seem redundant). Even if this does not become the case, the influence of the conventionalization process as discussed above does seem clear, not only in the innovatory use of the verb sometime around the sixteenth century, but also in its development in the subsequent centuries, as the perceived need to save money (and other resources) became increasingly salient within the speech community.

3.4 Conclusions

The principal task of this chapter was to examine the semasiological restructuring of *ahorrar* in terms of social and cognitive factors. Section 3.2 established the etymology of the verb (< Arabic *hurr*) and speculated on its transmission into Ibero-Romance, through contact with Arabic speakers. Analysis of the data from Davies (2002-) revealed two major shifts in the verb's prototypical meaning: from FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER to AVOID A DIFFICULTY during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and from AVOID A DIFFICULTY to SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

With regard to social factors, I have suggested that a particular series of economic crises, originating in the sixteenth century, influenced the cognitive experience of individuals by increasing the ontological salience of a perceived need to save money and resources. This increased salience contributed to increased frequency of discussion of the topic during social interaction. The underlying conceptualization of REMOVE FROM ACTION/SET ASIDE made the lexical item *ahorrar* a good candidate for reference to the actions of saving money and other resources, and consequently the use of the lexical item increased in frequency. This increased frequency resulted in entrenchment of the gestalt whose component parts were 'transitive action' of SAVE and the direct object/patient MONEY, at which point the 'intransitive' use of the verb

gained unit status in the minds of individual speakers. With the passing of time and continued economic problems, the unit has become increasingly conventionalized, such that when speakers use the verb without mentioning an object/patient, the default assumption is most likely that the thing being saved is money.

In terms of ontological salience, the practice of freeing slaves gradually decreased over time, while the perceived need to save money and resources increased. This correlated with a decrease in cognitive salience of the domain FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER, and an increase in the cognitive salience of the domains AVOID A DIFFICULTY and SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES within the semasiological profile of *ahorrar*. The underlying domain SET ASIDE/REMOVE FROM ACTION aided in the metaphorical transition from the first domain to the third as semasiological prototypes of the verb. We have seen a progression from SETTING ASIDE/REMOVING A SLAVE FROM THE ACTION/STATE OF BEING A SLAVE, to SETTING ASIDE/REMOVING A DIFFICULTY/INCONVENIENCE/DANGER FROM ONE'S PATH (i.e. AVOIDING IT), to SETTING ASIDE/REMOVING MONEY/RESOURCES FROM ONE'S BUDGET (i.e. FREEING ONESELF FROM DEBT/CUTTING DOWN ON EXPENSES). Each innovative step along the way involved entrenchment of the salient domains in the minds of individual speakers—that is, in the semasiological profile that each speaker constructed with regard to the verb *ahorrar*—and, through interaction between speakers, the newly-configured profiles were conventionalized over time.

The peripheralization of FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER within the semasiological profile of *ahorrar* was likely due to a combination of factors. The decline and abolition of slavery did remove the verb's referent from the real-life experience of most Spanish speakers and relegated

it—for the most part—to discussion of the past.¹⁰⁴ But FREE A SLAVE was already a peripheral domain well before the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century, and there is no reason why FREE A PRISONER would peripheralize along with it. The notion that a slave could purchase his or her own freedom, provided by the legal tradition established in the Roman *Corpus Juris Civilis* and maintained in the *Siete Partidas* and the *Leyes de Indias*, certainly gave rise to the reflexive form *ahorrarse*. This form appears relatively early in the documentation. *DEM* cites several such examples, one of which is:¹⁰⁵

- (48) Et sy se desposare un siervo con otra sierva, et antes que casen **se aforrare** ella, et pagase de quitarse dél [...]

(*Leyes Moros*, fourteenth century)

(If a slave marries another slave, and before they marry she **frees herself**, and pays to free herself from him [...])

Once the domain FREE ONESELF became sufficiently salient, the action of doing so could be more readily interpreted as AVOID A DIFFICULTY, since the erstwhile patient (i.e. the slave or prisoner) was now conceptualized as an agent. Meanwhile, other verbs meaning ‘avoid’ were readily available as alternatives—most notably *evitar*, which rapidly increased in frequency starting in the sixteenth century (Table 3.3) at the same time that AVOID A DIFFICULTY became the semasiological prototype of *ahorrar*.

¹⁰⁴ Of course, the legal abolition of slavery did not end the practice of enslaving people altogether (on the contrary, by some estimates there are more slaves now than there ever were). It did, however, severely reduce the average person’s exposure to the practice.

¹⁰⁵ Interestingly, the verb *franquear*—one of the principal onomasiological ‘competitors’ for reference to FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER in the medieval period—appears 121 times with that meaning in Davies’ (2002-) thirteenth-, fourteenth-, and fifteenth-century data, without a single reflexive example. Further study of *franquear* would be required to come to any conclusions, but it could be that there was a non-referential differentiation between *franquear* and *ahorrar*, in that *ahorrar*, borrowed from Arabic (whose speakers also allowed manumission), carried with it the domain CAN BE DONE TO ONESELF, while *franquear*, borrowed from a Germanic source, did not.

Table 3.3 Number of tokens and frequency (in words per million) of *evitar* by century (from Davies 2002-)

	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII	XIX	XX
tokens	2	9	78	644	370	1323	2800	3017
wpm	0.3	3.37	9.56	37.81	29.96	134.77	145.1	132.2

Whether or not the process of intransitivization will eventually become complete depends on numerous factors, perhaps most importantly (and most obviously) whether or not speakers continue to use the lexical item to refer to direct object/patients other than money (i.e. resources, etc.). Similar processes may have occurred with many intransitive verbs (at least ones that were once transitive, or still are and can be used intransitively). In the case of *afeitar*, it is often unnecessary to indicate what is the thing being shaven (*la barba*, *la cara*, etc.). As we saw in Chapter 2, this was not always the case. It could be a matter of the increased salience of male agents/patients/beneficiaries in the context of shaving. Something similar could apply to verbs like *conducir* (or *manejar*), in which the thing being driven usually does not need to be mentioned. It could even apply to certain nouns whose increased salience within specific contexts correlates with decreased need for adjectival modification (e.g. *Te mando un correo [electrónico]*). All three of these examples appear to have undergone semasiological shifts due to changes in society (as do most, if not all, of the verbs mentioned in Armstrong 2016).

4 Case study #3: Social influence in metaphorical extension; *siniestro* ‘left > sinister/evil’

4.1 Overview

This chapter analyzes the influence of embodied meaning, metaphor, and social/cultural cognition in the semasiological development of the lexical item *siniestro*. The most notable characteristic of this development, as we will see, is the fact that both the spatial (LEFT) and non-spatial (SINISTER/EVIL) senses are attested in Classical texts, but by the time we get to the ‘earliest’ (twelfth-century) Castilian Ibero-Romance texts, it appears to have all but lost association to negative connotations, only to regain the association in the subsequent centuries, with full force. Indeed, if we did not have the Classical data available, it would appear that the transition from the neutral sense to the negative sense(s) began during the Medieval period. Some scholars (e.g. Uría Varela 1997; Penny 2002, del Río Entonado 2010, 2012a, 2012b) have suggested that *sinister* was a euphemistic replacement of *laeuus* and *scaeuus*, and that *izquierdo*, in turn, was a euphemistic replacement of *siniestro*, in both cases due to the taboo (also called “interdicción”) associated with the conceptualization LEFT. I will argue here that this hypothesis is not supported by the textual evidence, nor by the fact that LEFT is such a fundamental aspect of embodied experience that reference to it could not be entirely avoided, unlike other tabooed conceptualizations, such as bodily excretions, sexual activity, and death—which are fundamental indeed, but not to the same degree as LEFT.¹⁰⁶ Accordingly, I will present a different hypothesis, supported by the socio-cognitive approach.

As we saw in Chapter 1, one of the fundamental assumptions of cognitive linguistics is the idea that meaning is ‘embodied’. That is, “our conceptual systems draw largely upon the

¹⁰⁶ For example, one might avoid speaking directly about DEATH by using expressions such as ‘pass away’ or ‘kick the bucket’, but there is no evidence that people avoid LEFT in such a way (e.g. ‘it’s on your non-right side’).

peculiarities of our bodies and the specifics of our physical and cultural environments” (Yu 2008: 247). As Langacker (1987, 1990, 2000, 2008, 2010) has suggested, cognitive domains are ‘basic’ when they are associated with fundamental facets of experience such as time, space, and sensory perception, and can therefore no longer be broken down into less-complex domains. LEFT is a profoundly fundamental conceptualization that has obvious ties to the symmetry of the human body and its relationship with our physical environment, and thus it qualifies as a basic domain. Basic domains are key to forming metaphorical links between the physical world and the mentally construed world. Metaphor is typically viewed as a process of ‘mapping’ from a source domain to a target domain (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Chilton 2009, etc.). In the case of a metaphor such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, JOURNEY is the source domain and LIFE is the target domain. As Chilton (2009: 459) notes, “there is a general claim that source domains are more basic and intuitively understood by the human mind, target domains are more schematic, less well understood and more abstract.” What is interesting about the metaphor involved in the development of *siniestro*, namely LEFT IS NEGATIVE, is that the source domain, NEGATIVE, is more abstract than the target domain upon which it maps. There are, of course, many cases in which an abstract domain maps onto another abstract domain—LIFE IS A JOURNEY is one, as well as TIME IS MONEY, etc.—but it seems unusual that an abstract domain would map onto a target as fundamental and obviously embodied as LEFT, and thus it constitutes an exception to the general claim.

It will be important here to give special attention to the cultural component of the analysis, which has been crucial in the association of LEFT with negative connotations, as reflected in the semasiological development of *siniestro*. Returning for a moment to the

statement made by Sinha about the way that embodied experience can be linked to social interaction:

[...] we need to bear in mind that linguistic reference involves more than schematization-for-self. To *refer* implies the *picking out* or *figuration* of some aspect(s) of the schematized world, in such a way that the figured aspect is a *topic of joint and shared attention*. (1999: 236; emphasis original)

In what follows, we will see how this formulation links up with the notion of social cognition.

The main point will be that while LEFT is a universally-shared conceptualization (or schematization, to use Sinha's terminology), its association with negative connotations is arrived at through social interaction, within the context of particular cultural norms and practices, leading to the development 'left > sinister/evil' for *siniestro*.¹⁰⁷

Semin et al. (2013: 643-5), under the rubric of 'social cognition' (discussed in Chapter 1), outline a number of studies related to Lakoff & Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory. In particular, they cite several studies on what they refer to as the abstract domain *affect*, and its relationship with verticality (Crawford 2009; Landau et al. 2010; Meier & Robinson 2004; Crawford et al. 2006; Casasanto & Dijkstra 2010; Palma et al. 2011). The authors note that "Meier and Robinson (2004) were able to show that positive words (e.g., ethical, friendly) were classified more rapidly as positive when presented at the top rather than at the bottom of a monitor, whereas the opposite was true for negative words," and that other studies have shown an "upward position bias for positive images and a downward bias for negative ones," and that others yet have suggested that "people were faster in retrieving positive auto-biographical memories when performing upward movements and negative memories when performing

¹⁰⁷ It should be borne in mind that by "universally-shared conceptualization" I am referring to embodied experience in the physical world, regardless of whether or not a given language has commonly-used words for LEFT, RIGHT, FRONT, BACK, etc. Presumably, in the absence of rare neurological disorders, every human being can perceive his or her physical presence in the world.

downward movements” (Semin et al. 2013: 643). After reviewing a series of studies about the links between affect and size, the grounding of divine figures (such as God and the Devil), power and verticality, and time and space, they conclude that:

these diverse studies reveal that abstract concepts are understood through different metaphors about space, size, or brightness, and that these affect the classification of stimuli and have effects on memory and evaluative processes as a function of the congruence or incongruence between the source and the target. (p. 645)

While there do not appear to be any similar studies related specifically to the dimensions LEFT and RIGHT, it is clear that an analogous relationship exists (i.e. UP/RIGHT IS POSITIVE, DOWN/LEFT IS NEGATIVE). What remains is to determine how these embodied, metaphorical relationships link up with social tendencies.

Del Río Entonado (2010, 2012a,b) has already studied this word extensively and quite admirably, although his approach and analysis do not address cognitive factors. There are three major points of contention that will be addressed throughout this chapter. In the first place, del Río Entonado’s studies rely on a structuralist approach to understanding semantics, based on notions such as ‘acepción’ and ‘subacepción’, etc. (ultimately stemming from Coseriu’s work, which was critiqued through the cognitive lense in Chapter 0). This might work well for lexicography but it does not allow for satisfactory hypotheses regarding the inter-relatedness of social and cognitive factors in the way that the socio-cognitive approach does, vis-à-vis the encyclopedic nature of meaning.

Secondly, the data set is limited to that provided by *CORDE*, which is beneficial in that it is larger than Davies (2002-), but it does not allow for calculation of frequencies in terms of words per million, etc. As the author states in the dissertation (2010: 376), comparing the raw numbers of tokens of *siniestro* and *izquierdo*:

El problema que plantean estos datos es que el número tan variable de ejemplos que encontramos de un siglo a otro provoca que no podamos analizar objetivamente la evolución de cada término. De hecho, si nos fijamos en los números de *siniestro*, no apreciamos de forma clara, ni mucho menos, el descenso de su empleo con el significado ‘izquierda’. Por su parte, aunque los datos de *izquierdo* sí demuestran un aumento considerable de su empleo, vemos que en el siglo XVIII, por ejemplo, se produce un descenso importante, descenso que no es real, sino que se debe al escaso número de fragmentos que ofrece el CORDE en este período.

(The problem that arises with these data is that the varying number of examples that we find from one century to the next makes it impossible to objectively analyze the evolution of each term. In fact, if we focus on the numbers of *siniestro*, we cannot clearly appreciate the decline in its use with the meaning ‘left’. Although the data for *izquierdo* do in fact show a considerable increase in its use, we see that in the eighteenth century, for example, an important decline becomes apparent, a decline that is not real, but rather one that is due to the scarce number of fragments that the *CORDE* offers in this period.)

The author addresses the problem by comparing the two words in terms of the percentage of tokens each of them represents with respect to each of the meanings he encounters (e.g. for the fourteenth century he finds 434 combined tokens of *siniestro* and *izquierdo* with the meaning ‘left’, 73.9% of which are *siniestro* and 26% of which are *izquierdo*). This is useful information—indeed, the same type of information will be gleaned from Davies (2002-)—but, nonetheless, the frequency information provided by Davies’ corpus will help give a more robust analysis, beyond token counts and percentages.

Third, as already mentioned above, the author’s use of the notions of “interdicción” and “eufemismo” (following other scholars, e.g. Uría Varela 1997; Penny 2002) does not seem to really contribute much to our understanding of the (cognitive) mechanisms behind the specialization of *siniestro* as a term that invokes negative connotations and the appearance of *izquierdo* as a more neutral term. As del Río Entonado puts it:

Así, utilizaremos *interdicción* como ‘presión externa o psicológica que desaconseja el empleo de ciertas formas lingüísticas, dando origen al juego eufemístico’ [...] *Eufemismo* se utilizará para el ‘fenómeno lingüístico por el que algunas palabras son evitadas y reemplazadas por otras’; el término utilizado para denominar en concreto a la palabra que

reemplaza al término interdicto será el de *sustituto eufemístico*. (2010: 19; emphasis original)

(Thus, we will use *interdiction* to mean ‘external or psychological pressure that discourages the use of certain linguistic forms, giving origin to euphemistic play’ [...] *Euphemism* will be used for the ‘linguistic phenomenon by means of which some words are avoided and replaced by others’; the term used to refer specifically to the word that replaces the banned word will be *euphemistic substitute*.)

Nevertheless, there seems to be little evidence that the word *siniestro* has “been avoided”, and it is clear that *izquierdo* has not replaced it (although it has displaced it as the onomasiological prototype of the semantic domain LEFT).

This chapter, then, is to some extent a reaction to del Río Entonado’s approach, while at the same time it constitutes a replication of his experiment, using a different corpus. Much of the ground work has been done by del Río Entonado, at least with respect to the exposition of the word’s semasiological range, as well as the social context involved in the word’s development, but this study takes on a different theoretical approach (involving a deeper analysis of the involvement of metaphor as a cognitive process in the word’s development), and it addresses somewhat different questions (especially with regard to the nature of the cognitive mechanisms at play in the diachronic process). The chapter also includes some additional reflections on the social context/mechanisms involved (e.g. the possibility that LEFT might have been associated with ABNORMAL *vis à vis* left-handedness being characteristic of only 10% of the population).

Following the pattern set out in the preceding chapters, section 4.2 discusses the etymology and attested senses of *siniestro*, including the first documentation in Castilian Ibero-Romance, the word’s treatment in lexicographical sources, synonyms and related terms, and attestations from the corpora (Davies 2002- and *CORDE*), along with a comparison of the results of the present study with those of del Río Entonado (2010). Section 4.3 discusses the intervening

cognitive and social factors—employing the theoretical perspectives just outlined above—and section 4.4 presents the conclusions.

4.2 Etymology and attested senses

This section outlines the background of the lexical item in question. Subsection 4.2.1 considers the etymology and first (known) documentation in Castilian Ibero-Romance, subsection 4.2.2 presents the lexicographical attestations found in the dictionaries consulted, as well as synonyms and related terms, 4.2.3 presents the attestations found in Davies (2002-), and 4.2.4 summarizes the information presented in 4.2.1-4.2.3.

4.2.1 Etymology and the first documentation in Castilian Ibero-Romance

Siniestro derives from the masculine accusative form of the Classical Latin adjective *sinister*, -a, -um (i.e. *sinistrum*). *DCECH* posits an intermediate ‘Vulgar Latin’ form *SĪNĒXTER—presumably to account for the diphthong—which would have arisen from the influence of DĒXTER. The authors cite as supporting evidence the following passage from St. Isidore’s *Etymologies*: *sinixtra autem vocata quasi sine dextra, sive quod rem fieri sinat. A sinendo enim sinixtra est nuncupata.*¹⁰⁸ Whether or not this is an isolated case, it seems quite plausible that the analogous diphthong arose from the frequent contraposition of the two words, in expressions like *a diestro y siniestro* ‘to the right and left, all around’, *a la mano diestra* [...] y *a la mano izquierda* ‘at the right hand [side] [...] and at the left hand [side]’, etc.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ “The ‘left hand’ (*sinixtra*, i.e. *sinistra*) is so called as if the word were derived from ‘without the right hand’ (*sine dextra*), or as if it ‘permitted’ something to happen, because *sinixtra* is derived from ‘permitting’ (*sinere*)” (Barney et al. 2006: 235).

¹⁰⁹ Lloyd (1987: 63-4) attributes it to Malkiel’s (1951) notion of ‘lexical polarization’, whereby “a word having the opposite meaning to another word can also adopt some phonetic feature of the other word, especially if both already have some partial likeness of form,” and he adds the example of SŪRSUM ‘upward’ and DEORSUM ‘downward’, where the influence of the former resulted in the adoption of the /u:/ into the latter, yielding Old Spanish *suso-yuso* (and Italian *su-giù*).

The polysemy ‘left, perverse, inauspicious, etc.’ is already evident in Classical texts (cf.

Lewis & Short 1907):

- (1) optime autem manus a **sinistra** parte incipit, in dextra deponitur, sed ut ponere non ut ferire videatur; quanquam et in fine interim cadit, ut cito tamen redeat, et nonnunquam resilit vel negantibus nobis vel admirantibus
(*Institutio oratoria*, Quintilian, first century AD)

(The best effect is produced by letting the motion of the hand start from the **left** and end on the right, but this must be done gently, the hand sinking to rest and avoiding all appearance of giving a blow, although at the end of a sentence it may sometimes be allowed to drop, but must be quickly raised again: or it may occasionally, when we desire to express wonder or dissent, spring back with a rapid motion.)¹¹⁰

- (2) Det libertatem fandi flatusque remittat cuius ob auspiciū infaustum moresque **sinistros** (dicam equidem, licet arma mihi mortemque minetur) [...]
(*Aeneid*, Vergil, first century BC)

(Let that man, through whose inauspicious leadership and **perverse** ways (speak I will though he threaten me with violence or death) [...])¹¹¹

- (3) Ille ubi nascentem maculis variaverit ortum conditus in nubem medioque refugerit orbe, suspecti tibi sint imbres; namque urget ab alto arboribusque satisque Notus pecorique sinister.
(*Georgicon*, Vergil, first century BC)
(When, hidden in cloud, he's discoloured the early morning with blotches, and is veiled at the centre of his disc, expect the showers: since the south wind, **inauspicious** for trees, crops and herds, is sweeping up from the deep.)¹¹²

Of particular interest is example 4, which shows the spatial sense of the word associated with positive connotations:

- (4) Ita nobis **sinistra** videntur, Graiis et barbaris dextra meliora. Quamquam haud ignoro, quae bona sint, **sinistra** nos dicere, etiamsi dextra sint; sed certe nostri **sinistrum** nominaverunt externique dextrum, quia plerumque id melius videbatur.
(*De divinatione*, Cicero, first century BC)

¹¹⁰ Translation from: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Quintilian/Institutio_Oratoria/11C*.html

¹¹¹ Translation from: http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Latin/VirgilAeneidXI.htm#anchor_Toc6053012

¹¹² Translation from: http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Latin/VirgilGeorgicsI.htm#anchor_Toc533589854

(So we regard signs on the **left** as best—Greeks and barbarians, those on the right. And yet I am aware that we call favourable signs *sinistra*, or ‘**left-hand**’ signs, even though they may be on the right. Undoubtedly our ancestors in choosing the **left** side and foreign nations the right were both influenced by what experience had shown them was the more favourable quarter in most cases.)¹¹³

As Barcía (1950, s.v. SINIESTRO, Adverso) explains it:

La palabra *siniestro*, *sinister* en latín, significó primitivamente el lado izquierdo, la mano zurda. Pero la idea de lo izquierdo o de lo zurdo entró después en la designación del espacio para los augurios, y la voz *siniestro* adquirió una significación religiosa que conserva aún en los idiomas neolatinos. Mas debe notarse una curiosidad, y es la siguiente: los augures romanos, para las ceremonias del rito, dividían el cielo de modo que lo que era mano izquierda para ellos era mano derecha para los dioses. Suponían que los dioses estaban delante del mundo, al frente de los hombres, y la situación que ocupaban era diametralmente contraria a la nuestra. Tal es la razón por que lo *siniestro* se consideraba como favorable entre los latinos. Lo *siniestro* estaba a la diestra del *numen*, y significaba para ellos lo contrario de lo que significa entre nosotros. Por esto dice Cicerón que las cosas *siniestras* parecían mejores a los romanos [...].

Pero los griegos, al designar el espacio celeste para la observación de los presagios, obraron al revés que los latinos. Los dioses griegos debían estar detrás del mundo, guardando la espalda de los hombres, y lo que era *siniestro* para Roma fue *diestro* para Atenas [...]

(The word *siniestro*, *sinister* in Latin, originally referred to the left side, the left hand. But the idea of the left or of left-handedness arose afterward in the in the designation of space for auguries, and the word *siniestro* acquired a religious meaning that still remains in the Romance languages [*idiomas neolatinos*]. But the following curiosity should be noted: the Roman augurs, in their ritual ceremonies, divided the heavens in such a way that their left-hand side was the right-hand side for the gods. They saw the gods as being located in front of the world, in front of humans, and their situation was diametrically opposed to ours. That is why the left [*lo siniestro*] was considered to be favorable by the Romans. The left [*lo siniestro*] was to the right of *divine power* [*numen*], and signified for them the opposite of what it signifies for us. That is why Cicero says that *sinister* things were considered better by the Romans [...].

But the Greeks, designating celestial space for the observation of omens, worked in the opposite way. The Greek gods were located behind the world, protecting humans from behind, and what was *siniestro* for Rome was *diestro* for Athens [...])

Regardless of this explanation (found in many other sources; additional examples and arguments are presented in del Río Entonado 2010: 44-59), the evidence seems to show that this was the exception to the rule that the left was associated with negative connotations (we will return to

¹¹³ Translation from: <http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:latinLit:phi0474.phi053.perseus-eng1:2.82>

this point in detail in section 4.3). Indeed, even Cicero himself uses *sinister* with negative connotations elsewhere:

- (5) de quo ferre, cum de reliquis, noluisti: quem etiam ad censuram petendam, eamque petitionem comparasti quae etrisus hominum et querelas moveret. cur autem ea comitia non habuisti? an quia tribunus plebis **sinistrum** fulmen nuntiabat? cum tua quid interest, nulla auspicia sunt; cum tuorum, tum fis religiosus. quid?
(*Phillipics*, Cicero, first century BC)

(about whom you refused to pass a law when you were passing one about all the rest; and whom at the same time you encouraged to stand for the censorship, and instigated him to a canvass, which excited the ridicule and the complaint of every one. But why did you not hold that comitia? Was it because a tribune of the people announced that there had been an **ill-omened** flash of lightning seen? When you have any interest of your own to serve, then auspices are all nothing; but when it is only your friends who are concerned, then you become scrupulous. What more?)¹¹⁴

The earliest known attestation of *siniestro* in Castilian Ibero-Romance is found in the *Cid* (*DCECH* s.v. SINIESTRO). The example ostensibly dates from the year 1140 (Menéndez Pidal 1971), although the only extant manuscript is from the middle of the fourteenth century, probably a copy of a copy made by Per Abbat in 1207 (Smith 2003: 114).¹¹⁵

- (6) Alli pienssan de aguijar, allí sueltan las riendas.
A la exida de Bivar ovieron la corneja diestra
y entrando a Burgos ovieron la **siniestra**.
Meçio mio Çid los ombros y engrameo la tiesta:
- ¡Albrĩa, Albar Ffañez, ca echados somos de tierra!¹¹⁶

(They resolve to make haste, they loosen the reins
Upon leaving Bivar they had the crow on their right
and upon entering Burgos they had it on their **left**.
My Cid shrugged his shoulders and raised his head:
Good news, Albar Fañez, we are cast from the land!)

¹¹⁴ Translation from: <http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:latinLit:phi0474.phi035.perseus-eng1:2.98>

¹¹⁵ But the author adds that “aceptar la fecha de 1207 (o algunos años antes) como fecha de la composición del poema puede parecer demasiado sencillo y hasta ingenuo, pero (hoy de acuerdo con muchos) lo creo perfectamente correcto” (accepting the date of 1207 (or a few years earlier) as the date of composition of the poem might seem too simple or even naive, but (in agreement with many more recent authors) I think it is perfectly correct) (p. 43).

¹¹⁶ Text from Smith (2003: 145).

The passage is often cited as an example of the negative connotations of LEFT, given that the apparent movement of the bird (*corneja* ‘crow’) from the right to the left was perceived as a negative omen (DCECH s.v. *SINIESTRO*; Salinas 1958: 31; Conde 1999: 98; Michael 1984: 76-7; Menéndez Pidal 1971: 105; etc.). Marcos Marín (1997: 171), however, does not agree: “el Cid interpreta el agüero como favorable, de acuerdo con el sistema árabe, como un movimiento de derecha a izquierda [...] El presagio es negativo para quienes se quedan, no para quienes se van, por lo cual puede pedir albricias” (the Cid interprets the omen as favorable, in accordance with the Arabic system, as a movement from the right to the left [...] The portent is negative for those who stay, not for those who leave; therefore he can say “good news”). The lack of agreement among scholars led del Río Entonado (2010: 127) to list it among ‘normal cases’ of LEFT—that is, without any clear positive or negative connotations—a policy which I have followed for this study.

An early case in which negative connotations are clearly associated with LEFT is found in the *Fazienda de Ultramar*, a translation by Almerich of an earlier missing text (or texts), from the beginning of the thirteenth century (*CORDE* lists the date as ‘c. 1200’; *BETA* says ‘1205 ad quem’):

- (7) Vio Israel los fijos de Josep e dixo: “Quien son estos?” Dixo Josep a so padre: “Mios fijos son, quem dio Dios aquí”. Dixo Jacob: “Aplegalos a mi e bendezirlos hé”. Ojos de Israel se agravacionaron de vegedat e non podia veer. Aplegolos a el e dixo Jacob a Josep: “Tus fazes no [quedé] veer e aun me amostro Dios tos fijos”. Tyrolos Josep contra sos ynoios e adoro con sus fazes a tierra. Priso Josep estos amos, Effraym de so dyestro a **synvestro** de Israel e aplegolos a él. Tendio Israel su diestra e pusola sobre la cabeça de Effraym, y es era el menor. [...] Vio Josep que puso so padre la mano sobre la cabeça de Effraym. Priso la mano de su padre por redrarla de la cabeça de Effraym a la cabeça de Manassen. Dixo [a] so padre: “Non assi, ca este es el mayor. Pon tu diestra sobre su cabeça”.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Text from Lazar (1965), via *CORDE*.

(Israel saw the sons of Joseph and said: “Who are these people?” Joseph said to his father: “They are my God-given sons.” Jacob said: “Bring them close to me and I will bless them.” Israel’s eyes became aggrieved from his old age and he could not see. He brought them near to him and Jacob said to Joseph: “I could not see your face, yet God has shown me your sons.” Joseph pushed them toward his knees, their faces pointed toward the ground. Joseph put Ephraim to his right and Israel to his **left** and brought them closer. Israel extended his right hand and put it over the head of Ephraim, the younger of the two. [...] Joseph saw that his father had put his hand over the head of Ephraim. He grabbed his father’s hand to move it from Ephraim’s head to Manasse’s head. He said to his father: “Not that way, this one is the older son. Put your right hand over his head.”)

In this case, it seems clear that Joseph places greater importance on his older son, Manasse, than on his younger son, Ephraim, by placing the latter to the left before Israel’s blessing (del Río Entonado 2010: 128).

What is particularly interesting about the data is that, in spite of the evident polysemy in the Classical period, it is not until the fourteenth century that the non-spatial sense unambiguously appears in the textual record.¹¹⁸ As we will see further on in greater detail, of the 557 tokens found in Davies (2002-) for the thirteenth century, only two are potentially interpretable as non-spatial, but even those are questionable, and probably cases of negative connotations associated with the spatial domain LEFT. Both are found in Berceo’s *Del Sacrificio de la Misa* (the second and third tokens in example 8).¹¹⁹

- (8) Por la **sinistra** mano que es mal embargada La gent de paganismo nos es significada: Ca andaba errada essa loca mesnada Adorando los ydolos, e la cosa labrada. Quando don Ihesuchristo el pastor natural Vino quitar el mundo de la premia mortal, Non quiso la su grey comer de la su sal; Mas quanto mas podio buscoli todo mal. De gent de paganismo fuele obedient, Acogiose a Él mucho de buena ment: Si ante fue **sinistra** por su grant falliment, En cabo tornó diestra del Rey omnipotent. Los iudios que eran diestra del Criador, Ca tenien la su ley, iazien en su amor, Creer non lo quisieron, fizieron lo peor, Cayeron a **sinistro** por el su grant error. Los que eran por fiios de la diestra contados, Trastornosse la rueda, tornaron en annados: Los que annados eran que andaban errados, Passaron a la diestra, e foron porfijados.

¹¹⁸ CORDE gives the same result as Davies (2002-); see de Río Entonado (2010).

¹¹⁹ According to BETA, the text was written between 1236 and 1246, and of the two extant manuscripts, one is from between 1301 and 1310, while the other is from between 1774 and 1778. It is not clear which manuscript is the source of the version presented here, via Davies (2002-): <http://www.geocities.com/urunuela1/berceo/misa.htm>

(On the **left** hand that is impaired the Pagans are explained: because that wild group of followers erred by worshipping idols, and carved things. When the natural shepherd Jesus Christ came to save the world from original sin, his followers did not want to eat his salt; but the more he tried he found that everything was evil. The pagans were obedient and they joined him with good intentions: if before they were on the **left** because of their great failure, they ended up to the right of the omnipotent King. The Jews were to the right of the creator, because they had His law, they basked in His love, [but] they did not want to believe, they made the worst [decision], they fell to the **left** because of their great mistake. Those who were counted as the sons of the right, the wheel turned, they became stepsons: Those who were stepsons, who were mistaken, ended up on the right, and they were persistent.)

Del Río Entonado (2010: 129-33) classifies these tokens in his category “la izquierda es mala para el cristianismo” (the left is bad for Christianity), which seems reasonable, but the second token could also be read with a meaning such as BAD, in contraposition to the GOOD of *buena ment* ‘with good intentions’ (i.e. something like WITH BAD OR MALICIOUS INTENTIONS), and the third could be read as a noun meaning something like EVIL WAYS.

In any case, what is clear is that the polysemy of *siniestro* found in texts from the Classical period seems to have essentially disappeared from Iberian texts by the twelfth century—at least in the texts presented in Davies (2002-) and *CORDE*—only to reappear in the fourteenth century. Before continuing with discussion of the subsequent development of the word (section 4.2.4), we will first have a brief look at its treatment in dictionaries (section 4.2.2), as well as some synonyms and related terms (section 4.2.3).

4.2.2 Lexicographical attestations

Given the more straight-forward semasiological development of this particular lexical item, a detailed analysis of the lexicographical history is less important for this chapter than it was in chapters 2 and 3.¹²⁰ Indeed, nearly all of the current senses of the term were present in the

¹²⁰ Furthermore, since this word begins with the letter *s*, fewer resources are available than were for the previous words studied (*afeitar* and *ahorrar*), since the *TLL*, *Diccionario histórico* (Real Academia 1972 [1933]) and *DEM*

Classical period (in spite of the apparent loss of the abstract senses in the early Medieval Period), and those that were not are unsurprising innovations (e.g. automobile accidents, insurance terminology, etc.). Nonetheless, there are a few noteworthy points to be made in this section.

4.2.2.1 *Siniestro*

Siniestro is registered in the most recent (online) version of the *DRAE* with the following six senses, plus a reference to the expression *mano siniestra*:

siniestro, tra.

(Del lat. *sinister*, *-tri*).

1. adj. Dicho de una parte o de un sitio: Que está a la mano izquierda.
(Said of a part or location: That it is to the left)
2. adj. Avieso y malintencionado.
(Malicious and ill-intentioned)
3. adj. Infeliz, funesto o aciago.
(Unhappy, terrible, or tragic)
4. m. Suceso que produce un daño o pérdida material considerable.
(An event that produces considerable damage or material loss)
5. m. *Der.* En el contrato de seguro, concreción del riesgo cubierto en dicho contrato y que determina el nacimiento de la prestación del asegurador.
(In an insurance contract, a stipulation regarding the risk covered in the contract that determines the source of the benefits provided by the insurer.)
6. m. desus. Propensión o inclinación a lo malo; resabio, vicio o dañada costumbre que tiene el hombre o la bestia. U. m. en pl.
(Propensity or inclination toward evil; a bad habit, vice, or harmful habit held by a human or an animal. Usually plural.)

mano siniestra

(left hand)

~ **siniestra**, ~ **zoca**, o ~ **zurda**.

1. f. **mano izquierda** (|| la opuesta a la derecha).
(left hand, the one opposed to the right)

The most important point here is that the ordering of the entry seems to reflect the usual conservatism of the Real Academia: the spatial sense is certainly not the most frequently used in

have not yet reached that point in the alphabet. Nevertheless, the available resources do seem to provide more than sufficient evidence for the present purpose.

present-day Spanish, yet it is the first entry in the *DRAE*.¹²¹ Of course, this could also reflect pragmatic concerns, since the average user might find that to be the most pertinent sense for the purposes of his or her inquiry. In any case, it is also notable that the abstract sense SINISTER/NEGATIVE is divided into five sub-categories, two of which are adjectives and three of which are nouns, and that none of the nouns refer to the spatial sense. This is different from what we see in Kasten & Cody (2001), which covers texts from the twelfth to the fifteenth century. The entry includes three senses that refer to LEFT (senses 1, 3, and 4), and does include the abstract sense (sense 2), but cites the passage from the *Cid* in which the crow is seen at first to the right and later to the left (example 6 above) as the only example of that usage in the 86 texts used for the dictionary.¹²²

siniestro (seniestro, sinistro) [*lat.* *sinestru<sinistru]

1. *adj.* izquierdo

(left)

2. *adj.* adverso, funesto

(adverse, terrible)

3. *adj.* que tira a la izquierda (un caballo)

(turning toward the left [a horse])

4. *m.* parte o lado izquierdo

(left-hand part or side)

In the absence of a scholarly consensus regarding the passage from the *Cid*, it is probably safe to assume that this aligns with the data from the corpus (section 4.2.3), in which the abstract sense seems to have all but disappeared from the textual record during the Medieval period.

¹²¹ Del Río Entonado (2010: 239-55) reports that of the 1071 tokens of *siniestro* that he found in *CREA* (which covers ‘current’ texts from the year 1975 to 2004), only 18 (1.7%) that referred to the spatial sense, and often with the implied sense of *zurdo* ‘left-handed’.

¹²² But twenty-four different texts are cited for the spatial senses, including additional passages from the *Cid*.

4.2.2.2 Synonyms and related terms

While the goal here is to do a semasiological study of *sinistro*, it is worth taking a brief look at its Classical Latin synonyms, *laeuus* and *scaeuus*, along with the more recent *izquierdo*.¹²³

4.2.2.2.1 *Laeuus* and *scaeuus*

The Classical terms *laeuus* and *scaeuus* both referred to the spatial sense ‘left’, as well as abstract senses such as ‘stupid’, ‘silly’, and ‘foolish’ (Segura Munguía 2006: s. v. *laevus*, *scaevus*). Their apparent disappearance in the Romance languages is usually attributed to the aforementioned phenomenon known as *interdicción lingüística* (‘linguistic prohibition’), which prompts a euphemism, in this case *sinister*, to replace a socially disfavored word, usually for its association with negative connotations.¹²⁴ Uría Varela (1997: 164-9) seems convinced of this theory, although he admits that the unclear etymology of *sinister* makes it difficult to be certain—competing theories suggest that it could come from sources associated with either negative connotations (from the same source as *sine* ‘different’ or related to *senior* ‘old’ [cf. Provençal *ma sanega* ‘left hand’, lit. ‘old hand’]) or positive connotations (related to Sanskrit *sānīyān* ‘more advantageous’). But it is worth having a look at his following assertions (pp. 167-8; emphasis mine):

Si se admite, pues, que en la base de lat. *sinister* está una significación positiva, frente a la negativa de *laeuus*, no cabe duda de que se trata de una designación eufemística. Aun

¹²³ Also cited as synonyms of *sinistro* are the adjectives *aciago*, *adverso*, *aterrado*, *avieso*, *desgraciado*, *espantable*, *espantoso*, *espeluznante*, *funesto*, *infausto*, *infeliz*, *lúgubre*, *(de) mala sangre*, *malintencionado*, *perverso*, *trágico*, *zurdo*, and the nouns *avería*, *azote*, *catástrofe*, *daño*, *desastre*, *desgracia*, *fuego*, *hecatombe*, *incendio*, *perjuicio*, *plaga*, *resabios*, *ruina*, and *vicios* (Barcía 1950; López García-Molins 1985; Sainz de Robles 1985). A complete onomasiological study of the semantic domain LEFT would have to include all of these words, in addition to the many synonyms of *derecho* and *diestro* associated with the abstract senses of the words. Del Río Entonado (2010) covers *sinistro* and *izquierdo*, as well as *derecho* and *diestro*, but does not thoroughly analyze the synonyms mentioned here.

¹²⁴ Note that the disappearance is not complete: Italian retains the form *levogiro* ‘movement from left to right’.

no admitiéndose la etimología propuesta, es asimismo muy probable que *sinister* haya sido originariamente un sustituto eufemístico de **otro adjetivo** para «izquierda», casi con toda seguridad ***laeuus***.¹²⁵

(If we assume that there is a positive meaning in the base of the Latin word *sinister*, in contrast to the negative meaning associated with ***laeuus***, there is no doubt that we are dealing with a euphemistic designation. Even if the proposed etymology is not correct, it is still very likely that *sinister* was originally a euphemistic substitute of **another adjective** for ‘left’, almost certainly ***laeuus***.)

Acknowledging the potential tenuousness of these statements, the author adds (p. 168) that:

Hay que advertir, sin embargo, que la sustitución no es total en el latín antiguo, pues *laeuus* —y también, en menor medida, *scaeuus*— coexisten con *sinister*; en la desaparición de los dos primeros en las lenguas románicas, creo que no se puede exagerar la acción de la interdicción lingüística, pues más bien hay que pensar en que *laeuus* y *scaeuus* eran términos técnicos del lenguaje de la adivinación y que, aunque usados en obras literarias, especialmente, según parece, en las poéticas o en la prosa más retórica [...], probablemente fueron desplazados poco a poco en el uso corriente, mientras que *sinister* se habría impuesto como designación popular, favorecido por la semejanza morfológica con *dexter*.

(It should be pointed out, however, that the substitution is not complete in Old Latin, since *laeuus*—and also, to a lesser degree, *scaeuus*—coexist with *sinister*; in the disappearance of the first two in the Romance languages, I think that one cannot exaggerate the involvement of linguistic prohibition, but rather one must consider that *laeuus* and *scaeuus* were technical terms used in the language of divination and that, although they were used in literary works, especially, it seems, in poetry and rhetorical prose [...], they were probably displaced little-by-little in everyday usage, while *sinister* would have been imposed as a popular designation, favored by its morphological similarity with *dexter*.)

Finally, he concludes (p. 169) that:

[...] por lo que concierne a la interdicción lingüística que existía sobre la noción de izquierda, parece evidente que provocó la introducción de *sinister* como sustituto de *laeuus* en la lengua corriente, aunque no puede decirse lo mismo de la lengua literaria; en la progresiva imposición de *sinister* como vocablo básico para la noción no parece que la interdicción lingüística haya sido el único factor influyente, pues también lo fue el hecho de que *laeuus* se hubiera consagrado como término técnico y literario y de que, habiéndose mantenido *dexter* como designación básica de la «derecha», *sinister* ofreciera una simetría morfológica mucho más “cómoda” para el hablante.

([...] with regard to the linguistic prohibition that existed with regard to the notion of the left, it seems clear that it caused the introduction of *sinister* as a substitute of *laeuus* in

¹²⁵ It is possible that the author meant to say *scaeuus* instead of *laeuus* in one of the two cases.

everyday usage, although the same cannot be said of literary usage; in the progressive imposition of *sinister* as a basic word for the notion it does not seem that linguistic prohibition has been the only influencing factor, also involved was the fact that *laeuus* had been consecrated as a technical and literary term and that, *dexter* having been maintained as the basic designation for “right”, *sinister* offered a morphological symmetry much more “comfortable” for the speaker.)

As we will see in more detail further along with respect to the loss of *siniestro*’s spatial reference to *izquierdo* (section 4.3), attributing the loss of these terms to ‘linguistic prohibition’ and ‘euphemism’ is problematic. In the passages just quoted, it almost seems that Uría Varela feels an obligation to make the attribution, in spite of the difficulties that he himself points out—most importantly the fact that *laeuus* and *scaeuus* apparently had specialized meanings.

4.2.2.2.2 *Izquierdo*

Izquierdo is a borrowing from the Basque word *ezker*,¹²⁶ first documented in Castilian Ibero-Romance in the twelfth century as the name *Exquerdo* (DCECH s.v. *izquierdo*), and found in various other Romance varieties (e.g. Galician and Portuguese *esquerdo*, Catalan *esquerre*, etc.). Del Río Entonado (2010: 108-14) provides a detailed account of the theories regarding the etymology of *ezker* and the dating of its transmission into Castilian Ibero-Romance. For the purposes of the present study, which focuses on the semasiology of *sinister*, it is sufficient to point out that it is documented as early as the year 1117 (although Davies 2002- does not record a significant number of tokens until the fifteenth century).

In many early cases, *izquierdo* was used alongside, and apparently synonymously with, *siniestro*. Example (9) shows a case from the fourteenth century:

- (9) E porende deue el rey, tener en la mano diestra el libro de la ley por que se deuen judgar los omes, e en la mano **siniestra** vna espada, que sinifica el su poder para fazer conplir

¹²⁶ José Ignacio Hualde (personal communication) has indicated that the actual etymon is *ezkerdo*, wherein the suffix *-do* has negative connotations. Unfortunately, I have—as of yet—found no further evidence of this (cf. Trask 1997: 418, “Widely attested throughout the Peninsula and in the south of France, the Romance word is indisputably of the same origin as Basque *ezker*”).

sus mandamientos del derecho de la ley; ca bien asy commo la man derecha es mas usada e mas meneada que la **esquierda** [...].

(*Libro del Caballero Zifar*, Anonymous)

(For that reason, the king should have the book of laws by which men should be judged in his right hand, and in his **left** hand a sword, which signifies his power to make sure that his just orders be followed; because the right hand is used and moved more often than the **left** [...])

To get an idea of the distribution of *izquierdo* and *sinistro* across different types of texts, I have combined the data from del Río Entonado's (2010) tables, organized according to the text-type classifications given in *CORDE* (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Black shading indicates the highest percentage within a given century, and gray shading indicates other percentages above twenty percent.

Table 4.1 Percentage of tokens of *izquierdo* by text type (adapted from del Río Entonado 2010)

Text type \ Century	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
Literary texts	10	4	15	16	22	16	29	53
Didactic prose	14	5	7	7	2	6	6	4
Scientific prose	28	26	23	25	7	37	32	23
Social prose ¹²⁷	0	0	11	21	28	18	21	10
Religious prose	0	23	4	7	7	0	0	2
Press and advertising	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	3
Historical prose	0	14	26	18	29	20	10	5
Legal prose	48	28	13	6	1	2	1	1

¹²⁷ This is my translation of “prosa de sociedad”.

Table 4.2 Percentage of tokens of *siniestro* by text type (adapted from del Río Entonado 2010)

Century Text type	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
Literary texts	12	7	25	49	43	20	63	67
Didactic prose	6	3	7	2	5	30	3	4
Scientific prose	46	2	33	12	8	10	5	6
Social prose	1	13	11	8	5	9	5	4
Religious prose	4	25	6	14	4	2	1	6
Press and advertising	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Historical prose	18	40	15	14	33	23	19	9
Legal prose	12	10	3	1	2	6	4	2

While these data should be taken with caution, given the fact that the distribution of text types within the corpus is unclear (that is, the number of texts belonging to each type within a given century is not available), it does seem noteworthy that, in earlier (thirteenth- and fourteenth-century) texts, *izquierdo* is used primarily in text types that lend themselves to technical or professional precision (scientific, historical, and legal prose), and it is not until the twentieth century that it is used primarily in literary texts. *Siniestro* is used in earlier texts with a similar distribution (mainly in scientific and historical prose), but by the sixteenth century its primary use is in literary texts. This could indicate that *izquierdo* was indeed viewed as a more precise term than *siniestro* for references with neutral connotations.

Del Río Entonado's (2010: 346) study of the word using *CORDE* identifies the following senses:

- Como adjetivo:
 (As an adjective)
 1. 'Izquierda'.
 (Left)
 2. 'Zurdo'.
 (Left-handed)

3. Aplicado a las caballerías.
(Used with regard to horses)
Como sustantivo:
(As a noun)
4. Aplicado a la ideología política.
(Used with regard to the political ideology)

Otros casos:
(Other cases)

5. Empleos poco frecuentes o dudosos.
(Infrequent or unclear uses)
6. Expresiones: a izquierdas, de la mano izquierda, (tener) mano izquierda.
(Expressions: to the left, on the left-hand side, (have) a left hand)

Focusing on the first four senses, the author refers to the notion of ‘linguistic prohibition’ (i.e. taboo; here *interdicción*—cf. section 4.1) stating that:

[...] frente a lo que ocurría con *siniestro*, destaca la ausencia de significados con una carga claramente negativa. Es cierto que se han hallado numerosos casos en los que eran evidentes las connotaciones negativas, pero en ninguna de las cuatro acepciones señaladas aparece el efecto de la interdicción sobre la izquierda con tanta nitidez como en las ya comentadas del término *siniestro* (sí aparece esta carga negativa, en cambio, en la expresión *de la mano izquierda*). (p. 373)

([...] in the context of what occurred with *siniestro*, the absence of meanings with a clearly negative meaning stands out. It is true that numerous cases were found in which the negative connotations were evident, but the effect of the prohibition regarding the left did not appear in any of the four aforementioned senses with as much clarity as in those of the term *siniestro* (although the negative connotation does appear in the expression *de la mano izquierda* [‘on the left-hand side’]).)

As with the case of Uría Varela’s assessment of *sinister* as a euphemistic replacement of *laevis* and *scaevus*, we see del Río Entonado attempting to defend the notion that *izquierdo* is a euphemistic replacement of *siniestro*.¹²⁸ Again, as will be discussed more thoroughly in section 4.3.2, this line of argumentation (in both cases) relies on the assumption that there is an implicit social prohibition of reference to the notion LEFT, and seems to overlook the fact that LEFT is such a basic notion, linked to bodily experience, that it would probably be impossible to avoid

¹²⁸ He goes on to suggest (pp. 431-6) that *izquierdo* could be replaced by another word in the future, presenting evidence that it is already occurring in political discourse.

reference to it in the first place. It is more likely that *izquierdo* was simply viewed as a convenient alternative for neutral reference. Before engaging further in that discussion, we will first have a look at the results of the corpus study with Davies (2002-).

4.2.3 Attestations from searchable databases

As in chapters 2 and 3, this part of the study relies on data taken from Davies (2002-). In this case, I will draw comparisons to del Río Entonado's (2010) findings with respect to *CORDE*. In essence, this is a replication of that study, with a different source of data. In line with the information presented above regarding lexicographical attestations, two principal semantic categories were found in the analysis of the data found in the corpus, which are considered here to be semasiological prototypes of *sinistro* at different times throughout the eight centuries covered by the corpus: LEFT and SINISTER/NEGATIVE. The first, spatial, sense can be divided into three subcategories: 1) associated with positive connotations; 2) associated with neutral connotations, and 3) associated with negative connotations.¹²⁹ The review here focuses on

¹²⁹ Note that del Río Entonado (2010: 261) identifies the following nine sub-categories. For the purposes of the present study, it will suffice to simplify the analysis, although examples of each of these were found in the data from Davies (2002-):

Como adjetivo:

(As an adjective)

1. 'Izquierda', con muchos casos en los que encontramos connotaciones negativas.
(‘Left’, in many cases with negative connotations)
2. 'Infeliz, funesto, aciago'.
(Unhappy, terrible, tragic)
3. 'Avieso, malintencionado'.
(Malicious, ill-intentioned)
4. 'Falso, engañoso'.
(False, deceptive)
5. 'Que provoca repulsión o temor por su aspecto'.
(Provoking revulsion or fear due to its appearance)

Como sustantivo:

(As a noun)

6. 'Accidente, desgracia', teniendo en cuenta el empleo específico relacionado con el campo de las compañías aseguradoras.
(‘Accident, tragedy’, taking into account the specific use related to the field of insurance companies)

examples of these categories, which are presented in table form in the summary found in the next subsection (4.2.4). Discussion of the factors involved in the transitions between the prototypes will follow (section 4.3).

4.2.3.1 Spatial sense LEFT associated with positive connotations

In line with the comments made above with respect to example (4) in section 4.2.1, in which Cicero attributes positive connotations to LEFT, such examples were extremely rare in the data taken from Davies (2002-). Two clear examples were found in Moamyn's thirteenth-century text *Libro de las animalias que cazan*, in which the presence of an eagle to the left, or the movement of the eagle or a dog from the left, indicates that the hunt will be successful:

- (10) e quando llegaren a la caça si ouieren aguila siniestra. o que este posada de siniestro; o que passe de siniestro a diestro; demuestra que fallaran caça. & que se apoderaran della.

(when they get to the hunt if they have an eagle to the left or perched to the left; or that moves from the left to the right; it is a sign that they will have a good hunt and they will benefit from it)

- (11) E el aguero delos canes quando llegaren a la caça si uieren can que pase de parte siniestra. demuestra que se apoderaran de la caça. e que auran alegria con ella. E mayor mient si fuere el can uermeio.

(the omen of the dogs when they get to the hunt if they see a dog that approaches from the left it is a sign that they will benefit from the hunt and that they will enjoy it, especially if it is a red dog)

But if a crow is located to the left, it is a negative sign:

7. 'Vicio, mala costumbre', que aparece muchas veces con la expresión tomar siniestro.
(‘Vice, bad habit’, often appearing with the expression *tomar siniestro* [lit. ‘take a vice’])

Otros casos:

(Other cases)

8. Empleos poco frecuentes.

(Infrequent uses)

9. A diestro y siniestro.

(Everywhere [lit. ‘to the right and left’])

- (12) si ouieren cueruo que pose siniestro. demuestra que auran caça mas que sera poca.

(if there is a crow perched to the left it is a sign that they will have a hunt but they will catch little)

Here is an example from the sixteenth century:

- (13) Con estas quatro piedras preciosas quisiste adornar los quatro brazos de la cruz. La caridad está en lo alto, la humildad - fundamento de todas las virtudes - en lo bajo, la obediencia a la mano diestra y la paciencia a la siniestra. Con esas quatro esmeraldas enriqueciste esa gloriosa bandera, mostrándote en ella tan paciente en las heridas, tan humilde en las injurias, tan amoroso para con los hombres y tan obediente para con Dios.
(*Libro llamado guía de pecadores*, Luis de Granada, 1546).

(With these four precious stones you wanted to adorn the four arms of the cross. Charity is found up high, humility—the foundation of all virtue—down low, obedience on the right-hand side and patience on the left. With these four emeralds you enriched this glorious flag, showing yourself through it to be so patient when wounded, so humble when insulted, so loving toward men and so obedient to God.)

Further along, we will see a few additional examples of the positive sense, but, again, these are clearly isolated cases, and their presence in the data will have a negligible effect over the results.

4.2.3.2 Spatial sense LEFT associated with neutral connotations

Examples of this sense are found across all eight centuries covered by the corpus, diminishing in frequency as we approach the twentieth century (475/557 tokens in the thirteenth century, or 85%; but only 3/260 in the twentieth, or 1%). The following are examples from each century.

Many examples from the thirteenth century collocate with body parts:

- (14) Toda bustaliza deue ser alo menos quoanto.j quoanto.j. ombre pueda echar. xij. ueguadas a.iiijo a.iiijo. partes la segur. E est ombre que a a echar la segur deue se assentar arecho en meyo dela bustaliza. E esta segur que es a echar deue auer en el mango.i mango.i. cobdo raso. E deue auer en el fierro dela una part agudo & dela otra part esmochado. E teniendo la oreia di estra enla mano siniestra. deue passar el braço diestro por entre el pescueço & el braço siniestro. & eche quoanto podiere mas echar esta segur como dicho es de suso.

(*Fuero General de Navarra; Versión B*)

(All pastures should be sufficiently large that a man can make 12 fields with a sickle. This man, upon using the sickle, should sit straight in the middle of the pasture. And the sickle that is used should have a sharp bend on the handle. And the iron should have a sharp side and a blunt side. And holding the right ear in the **left hand** the right arm should pass between the neck and the **left arm** and with as much force as possible the sickle should be swung from above.)

Many other examples collocate with directional terms, such as *parte*:

- (15) yendo alexandre en derredor con su hueste a la **siniestra** parte de India entro en un tremedal que tremie la tierra mas era seco.

(*General Estoria IV*, Alfonso X)

(Alexander, following behind with his army toward the **left** side [i.e. west] of India, entered a peat bog that moved underfoot but was dry.)

There are also many cases in which the word is used in the expression *a diestro y a siniestro*, with a clear spatial sense (most often something like EVERYWHERE):

- (16) Tenie en la cabeza corona muy onrrada, De suso una impla blanca e muy delgada, A diestro e a siniestro la tenie bien colgada [...]

(*Milagros de Nuestra Sennora*, Gonzalo de Berceo)

(She had an impressive crown on her head, above a white and very thin veil, she had it well-placed all around [...])

The fourteenth century yields relatively few examples, due to the smaller size of the corpus for that period.¹³⁰ Of the 18 tokens referring to LEFT, nearly all are neutral (16/18; 27 total), as in this example:

- (17) E despues de chipre sa va hombre de Jherusalem a mano **siniestra** por mar fasta egipto.

(*Libro de las maravillas del mundo*, Juan de Mandevilla)

(After Cyprus, one goes from Jerusalem to the **left/west** toward Egypt)

The fifteenth through the twentieth centuries show more of the same. From the fifteenth (166/235 total):

¹³⁰ This is a case where using *CORDE* can provide an advantage; del Río Entonado (2010) finds 593 tokens of *siniestro* for the fourteenth century, while Davies (2002-) only yields 27 (and, furthermore, only finds examples spelled with *i*, whereas *CORDE* picks up many different spellings, e.g. *sinjestro*, *synyestro*, etc.).

- (18) Sepas que los pulsos no es otra cosa sino mouimiento de coraçon & de las venas que son llamadas arterias segun alçamiento & abaxamiento Sepas que el coraçon es erenido a la siniestra parte & a la diestra parte & ha lugar por do sale mucha sangre e por la siniestra parte sale mucho espiritu. E por esso es mas conoçido el pulso a la siniestra parte que a la diestra.

(*Recetas*, Anonymous)

(The pulse is nothing other than upward and downward movement of the heart and of the veins that are called arteries. The heart is lifted to the left side and to the right there is a place from which a lot of blood leaves and on the left side a lot of spirit [breath/respiration] leaves. For that reason the pulse is more easily identified on the left side than on the right.)

From the sixteenth century (273/545 total):

- (19) [...] dos ríos caudalosos, el uno llamado Paraguay, que viene de la siniestra, el otro Paraná, que sale de la derecha [...]

(*La Argentina*, Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, 1594)

([...] two mighty rivers, one of them called the Paraguay, which comes from the left, the other the Paraná, which comes from the right [...])

- (20) Proseguimos la vía, hallando en ella a breve trecho una isla entre el brazo de nuestra navegación y la de San Francisco; pareció prolongada y ancha, y la llamé de Santa Elena: dejándola por popa y orilleando por la siniestra mano la isla grande de San Francisco, y navegadas dos leguas nos ministró agrados otra isla, a quien llamé de Santa Catalina.

(*Relación del descubrimiento del río Apure hasta su ingreso*, Jacinto de Carvajal, 1597)

(We continued on the route, finding at a short distance an island between the arm of our waterway and the island of San Francisco; it looked long and wide, and I named it Santa Elena: leaving it behind and skirting on the left hand side the big island of San Francisco, and, after sailing for two more leagues we happily found another island, which I named Santa Catalina.)

From the seventeenth century (91/212 total):

- (21) Era mozo de lindo garbo, llevaba al brazo terciado el ferreruelo y, en la misma mano siniestra, el sombrero y las riendas de los caballos, con que, desocupada la diestra, vibraba el gobierno y repetía los estallidos del azote.

(*Cómo ha de ser el Privado*, Francisco de Quevedo, 1612)

(He was a young man with elegant poise, he wore a short cape and, in his left hand, his hat and the reins for the horses, so that, his right hand unoccupied, he shook the brakes and repeated the cracking of the whip.)

- (22) Acompañábanle todos los nobles, ministros y sacerdotes hasta el templo del dios de la guerra, donde se apeaba de sus andas, y hechos los sacrificios de aquella función, le ponían los príncipes electores la vestidura y manto real, le armaban la mano diestra con un estoque de oro y pedernal, insignia de la justicia; la siniestra con el arco y flechas, que significaban la potestad o el arbitrio de la guerra, y el rey de Tezcucó le ponía la corona, prerrogativa de primer elector.

(Historia de la conquista...de Nueva España, Antonio de Solís, 1648)

(All of the nobles, ministers, and priests accompanied him to the temple of the god of war, where they dismounted their horses, and, having made the appropriate sacrifices, the elector princes put the royal vestment and cape on him, arming his right hand with a rapier made of gold and flint, an emblem of justice; his left hand with the bow and arrows, which signified the legal authority or discretion of war, and the king of Tezcucó place the crown on his head, which was his prerogative as the first elector.)

By the eighteenth century (59/237 total), the majority of the tokens meaning LEFT with neutral connotations were found in the context of military activities (in many cases alongside *izquierda*), indicating a possible specialization of the sense:

- (23) A cada paso ocurren operaciones manuales, que por razón de la respectiva positura de la materia, en que se ha de obrar, no se pueden ejecutar, o se ejecutarían mal con la diestra, y muy cómodamente con la siniestra. Así, en muchos oficios mecánicos los Artífices habitúan una, y otra mano, sin lo cual serían casi enteramente inútiles para su ministerio. El Martillo, la Hacha, el Cíncel, la Sierra, el Escoplo, &c. en muchas circunstancias no tienen uso, sino dándoles impulso con la mano izquierda.

(Cartas eruditas y curiosas, vol. 1, Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, 1742)

(Manual operations occur at each step, which because of the **respective** positioning of the material that needs to be worked on, cannot be executed, or would be poorly executed with the right [hand], and very comfortably with the left. In that way, in many mechanical trades the Artisans get accustomed to using both hands, without which they would be almost entirely useless for their employment. The Hammer, the Hatchet, the Chisel, the Saw, etc. in many cases do not have a use, without giving them a push with the left hand.)

- (24) Los franceses separaron mucho las dos alas: la derecha la mandaba el mariscal de Boufflers, en la selva que llaman de Sansart, y la siniestra, Villars de Biaugies; pero acudía también al centro. Puso en la izquierda la mayor fuerza, porque vio que con Malburgh estaban los ingleses, prusianos y irlandeses, con la infantería más escogida.

(Comentarios de la guerra de España e historia de su rey Felipe V, El animoso, Vicente Bacallar y Sanna)

(The French greatly separated the two flanks: the right one was commanded by the marshal of Boufflers, in the jungle that they call Sansart, and the left, Villars de Biaugies;

but he also went toward the center. He put the greatest force on the **left**, because he saw that the English, Prussians, and Irish were with Malburgh, with the most elite infantry.)

In some cases we find it used in the same text with a non-spatial sense, as in this example, which is the same text as example 24:

- (25) Querían éstos una paz particular, ventajosa a sus intereses y hecha traidoramente; y no atreviéndose a explicar, por miedo de los ingleses, dieron unas proposiciones que ya sabían no había de admitirlas la Francia. El Rey, con la **siniestra** intención que hemos dicho, dio libertad a sus ministros de firmar los preliminares, reservándose a ratificarlos en término de un mes.

(They wanted a particular peace, aligned with their interests and achieved through treason; and not daring to explain, for fear of the English, they made some propositions that they knew wouldn't be accepted in France. The King, with the **sinister** intention that we have already mentioned, gave his ministers permission to sign the preliminaries, planning to approve them after a month.)

Notable in example 26 is the translation of *laeva* as *siniestra*, alongside *izquierda*, and in (27)—from the same text—in which the author seems to criticize the prevailing negative view of LEFT:

- (26) [...] una preocupación mal fundada el estudio que se pone en habitar a los Niños al uso privativo de la mano derecha, en todas aquellas cosas que se ejecutan con una mano sola. Piérdense en ello utilidades muy considerables, como ya he probado, y sobre esto se procede contra el destino de la naturaleza; la cual, formando la mano **izquierda** con perfecta semejanza a la derecha, nos manifiesta bastantemente, que con igualdad la ordena al mismo uso. No ignoro, que Aristóteles dejó escrito, que la diestra naturalmente es más fuerte, que la **siniestra**: *Dextra namque manus validior est laeva*, natura. Pero Aristóteles sin duda se engañó, juzgando natural el exceso de fuerza, que la diestra adquiere con el ejercicio. Es cierto, que los hombres comunísimamente experimentan en la diestra más actividad por el impulso, y más resistencia para el trabajo; pero uno, y otro pende de que la ejercitan mucho más. El uso continuado hace ensanchar más los vasos pertenecientes al brazo derecho, por lo que fluyen a él en mayor copia la sangre [...]
(*Cartas eruditas y curiosas*, vol. 1, Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, 1742)

([...]) an ill-founded worry is the idea that one must train Children in the exclusive use of the right hand, in all things that are done with one hand. It causes very considerable skills to be lost, as I have already shown, and accordingly one behaves against nature; which, making the **left** hand with perfect similarity to the right, it gives us sufficient evidence that with equality it orders [the left hand] to the same use. I am not ignoring that Aristotle wrote that the right is naturally stronger than the **left**: For indeed the right hand is naturally stronger than the **left**. But Aristotle undoubtedly fooled himself, judging an excess of strength to be natural, although the right hand acquires strength through exercise. It is true that men very commonly experience more activity in the right hand

due to exertion and greater resistance during manual labor; but it still depends on the fact that they use the right hand much more. Continuous use makes the arteries of the right arm become wider, such that more blood flows through it [...])

- (27) En los demás miembros hermanos, o homogéneos no privilegió más la naturaleza los del lado derecho, que los correspondientes del izquierdo. Tan firme pisa el pie izquierdo, como el derecho. Tanto resisten la fatiga del movimiento el muslo, y rodilla de aquel lado, como los de éste. También ve el ojo sinistro, como el diestro. ¿Porqué se ha de pensar, que en orden a manos, y brazos tomó otro método? Pero aun en caso que el brazo izquierdo fuese naturalmente menos fuerte que el diestro; ¿por qué se ha de dejar ociosa esa fuerza, aunque menor en muchos casos, en que puede servir, supliendo la de su compañero, impedido por algún accidente?

(Regarding the other fraternal, or homogeneous, members, he did not give more privilege to those on the right side than to those on the left. The left foot steps as firmly as the right. The thigh and knee of the one side resist the fatigue of movement as much as those of the other. The left eye also sees as well as the right. Why must one think that hands and arms work differently? Even in the case that the left arm were naturally weaker than the right; why must one leave that strength—albeit less in many cases—unused, when it can be used, standing in for that of its companion, when the latter is hindered by an accident?)

But even this author still uses *sinistro* in other writings with the non-spatial sense:

- (28) La cuarta causa es la diminuta, o falsa noción, que tienen acá muchos de la Filosofía Moderna, junta con la bien, o mal fundada preocupación contra Descartes. Ignoran casi enteramente lo que es la nueva Filosofía; y cuanto se comprehende debajo de este nombre, juzgan que es parto de Descartes. Como tengan, pues, formada una sinistra idea de este Filósofo, derraman este mal concepto sobre toda la Física Moderna.
(*Cartas eruditas y curiosas*, vol. 2, Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, 1745)

(The fourth cause is the miniscule, or false notion, that many modern philosophers have, along with the well, or poorly, founded preoccupation against Descartes. They almost completely ignore the new philosophy, and they judge everything that is understood to fall under that name [new philosophy] to be the work of Descartes. Since they have a sinister idea of this philosopher, they spill this bad idea over all of modern physics.)

Continuing on to the nineteenth century (52/837 total):

- (29) Absortas las naciones Obedecen y admiran. ¡Escucha, escucha!... a su derecha mano reina sublime, con semblante ufano otra matrona está fulgente y bella, de grandeza y valor alto conjunto. A la sinistra tú, dulce trasunto de cuanto brilla y resplandece en ella, de cuanto en ella reverencia el hombre; ella tu nombre tiene; tú su nombre.
(*Poesía*, Rafael María Baralt, 1845)

(Fascinated, the nations obey and admire. Listen, listen!... at their right hand another matron sublimely governs, with a smug facial expression, she is dazzling and beautiful, both in her greatness and in her high value. At their **left**, you, a sweet copy of all that shines and gleams on her, of what in her men revere; she has your name; you her name.)

- (30) En blanco seguía el papel, puesto delante sus ojos; seca la pluma, que su diestra oprimía; la **siniestra** se crispaba sobre la frente.

(*Página rota*, Joaquín Dicenta, 1890)

(The paper remained blank, placed before his eyes; the pen, which his right [hand] squeezed, was dry; the **left** was clenched over his forehead.)

Finally, the twentieth century, which only yields the following three examples (3/260):

- (31) Paradas frente al altar donde el santo crucifijo tallado en palo santo se agigantaba con la llama de cebo de la vela, las ancianas eran bultos ululantes custodiadas a la diestra por la imagen del Ángel de la Guarda, a la **siniestra** por el San Miguel Arcángel.

(*Debajo de la cama*, Mabel Pedrozo Cibilis, 2000)

(Standing in front of the altar where the blessed crucifix, carved from sacred wood, loomed with the light of the candle, the old women were howling shapes, watched over from the right by the image of the Guardian Angel, on the **left** by the Archangel Michael.)

- (32) No obstante, en el momento en que la mano diestra - - que empuñara un mundo - - quiere abrir la puerta de su alcoba ascética de sabio; es la mano **siniestra** la que con fruición acariciadora, entreabre el cáliz deseado.

(*Tiempo de silencio*, Martín Santos, 1962)

(Nevertheless, in the moment that the right hand—which would grasp a world—wants to open the door of the plain room of the wise man; it is the **left** hand which with caressing delight, opens the desired chalice.)

- (33) El godfather del grupo se deja ver entre todos los mafiosos, sus súbditos, y abre los brazos para recibir al recién llegado, quien acepta el contacto y luego le besa el anillo del dedo anular, regordete, de la mano **siniestra**.

(*Lugar donde las arañas hacen su nido*, Marcial Fernández, 1999)

(The godfather of the group allows himself to be seen by all of the mafiosos, his underlings, and he opens his arms to receive the recent arrival, who accepts the contact and then kisses the ring on his thick ring finger, on his **left** hand.)

4.2.3.3 Spatial sense LEFT associated with negative connotations

Examples of this sense are also found across all eight centuries covered by the corpus, but generally in very small numbers (only 95 of the 2910 total tokens refer to this sense, and they never exceed 7% of the tokens within a given century). The following are examples from each century.

Only 8/557 tokens were found to refer to LEFT with negative connotations for the thirteenth century. Examples (34) and (35) are from the *Judizios de las estrellas*, a text attributed to Ali aben Ragel and Alfonso X:

- (34) Mas si fuere Saturno alçado sobre Jupiter. & Jupiter enla quadradura **siniestra**; es peor. E si fuere Jupiter alçado sobre Saturno en la quadradura diestra; es menos mal & menos danno. & non llega el danno a sos padres.

(But if Saturn is raised over Jupiter and Jupiter is in the **left** quadrant; it is worse. And if Jupiter is raised over Saturn in the right quadrant; it is not as bad and less harmful, and the harm will not affect your parents.)

- (35) E quando Mars fuere en quadradura // Mars del Sol; & en su **siniestro**; aquel nacido sera engannador. & engannara a su padre & assi mismo. & aura mucho mal. & gastara & dannara todo quanto a. & sera mal andante en quanto fiziere. & escurecera su uiso. & quiça cegara. & sila naciencia fuere en esto diurna; es peor.

(And when Mars is in the quadrant // Mars of the Sun; and on his **left**; that newborn will be deceptive and he will deceive his father and he will also have bad luck and he will spend and harm everything that he has, and he will fail in whatever he does, and his vision will dim, possibly leaving him blind, and if said birth occurs during the day, it is worse.)

But note that even within the same text, the associations could be positive:

- (36) E quando Jupiter fuere en quadradura dela luna. seyendo Jupiter alçado sobrella. & ella en su **siniestro**. & la naciencia nocturna. significa quelos padres daquel nacido uiuiran bien & ondrada miente. & faran bien a sos propincos. & el nacido sera de alta nombradia & ondrado & connoscido delos nobles omnes. & asmara buenos asmamientos. & diran los omnes del bien.

(And when Jupiter is in the Moon's quadrant, and raised above it, and the Moon to the **left** of Jupiter and rising, it means that the parents of the newborn will live well and with honor and they will do well by their relatives and the newborn will be respected and

honored and known by noble men and he will think good thoughts and others will speak well of him.)

From the fourteenth century (2/27 total):

- (37) Otrosi porque son mas cercanas del coraçon y del figado y delos miembros callentes. E porende la parte derecha es mejor que la **siniestra**: por la vezindad del figado: do esta la calentura natural: y porende las agujas dela parte derecha son mejores que todos los otros miembros [...]
(*Sevillana medicina*, Moisés ben Samuel de Roquemaure and Juan de Aviñón)

(Furthermore because the heart and the liver are closer to the warm organs. And therefore the right side is better than the **left**: because of its proximity to the liver: where natural warmth is found: and therefore needles on the right side are better than all of the other organs [...])

From the fifteenth century (13/235 total):

- (38) E aquestos fizieron templo en que pusieron diuersidad de cantares & multitud de sacrificios & oblaçiones E pintauanle dos arcas grandes. La vna llena de bienes ala mas derecha E la otra llena de males ala mano **siniestra** E pensauan que quando el ombre nasçia. Que luego la fortuna le daua el bien o el mal que auia de auer en su vida.
(*Visión delectable*, Alfonso de la Torre)

(And those people made a temple in which they put a diversity of songs and a multitude of sacrifices and offerings and they painted two large arcs on it; one full of good things to the right and the other full of bad things on the **left**-hand side. And they thought that when Man was born, fortune gave him the good or bad things that were meant to occur in his life.)

From the sixteenth century (29/545 total):

- (39) Dios, el cual crió cielo y tierra y todo lo visible y invisible; el cual, luego que me hubo acabado de hacer, me dio en los coraçones de los hombres, como juro sobre ciudad, una pura libertad, un entero y libre albedrío. Poniéndome a la derecha mano las virtudes y el camino estrecho de la vida, a la **siniestra** los vicios y el camino de la perdición para que, siguiendo mi voluntad, siguiese la bandera de lo que más me aplaciese y tomase la vía que mejor me pareciese. Yo, usando de la libertad y arbitrio que Dios me hubo dado, tomé y escogí la compañía de los vicios y abracéme con los deleites y escogílos para me acompañar de ellos.
(*Peregrinación de la vida del hombre*, Pedro Hernández de Villaumbrales)

(God, who raised the sky and the earth and everything visible and invisible; who, after having made me, put me in the hearts of men, as I swear over the city, a true freedom, an entire and free will. Putting virtues and the narrow road of life on the right hand, vices and the road to perdition to the **left**, so that, following my will, I would follow the flag of

that which most pleased me and take the path that seemed best to me. I, using the freedom and discretion that God had given me, took and chose the company of vices and embraced pleasures and chose them to accompany me.)

From the seventeenth century (12/212 total):

- (40) [...] «El Señor Dios tuyo es fuego que consume», Deut. cap. 4, vers. 24, y en otras muchas partes. Razón que motivó el epígrafe *Ducente Deo*. Y aun en lo profano y gentilico era el fuego de los rayos siniestros (digo de los que caían por este lado) prenuncio seguro de dichas grandes. Ennio citado de Cicerón, lib. 2 de *Divinatione*: «Cuando hacia la izquierda tronó con tempestad serena». Y Virgilio fue de este mismo sentir, 2 *Aeneid*.: «... y con repentino fragor tronó por el lado izquierdo... ».
(*Teatro de virtudes políticas que constituyen a un príncipe*, Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, 1672)

([...] “Your God is fire that consumes,” Deuteronomy, chapter 4, verse 24, and in many other places. This statement inspired the epigraph *Ducente Deo*. And even in profanity and gentile things was the fire of the siniestros lightning bolts (by that I mean the ones that struck from that direction), a sure sign of said great things. Ennio cited Cicero, book 2 of *de Divinatione*: “When toward the left it thundered with a calm storm.” And Virgil had the same sentiment, in 2 *Aeneid*: “...and with a sudden clamor it thundered from the left...”)

From the eighteenth century (9/237 total):

- (41) Cuando das limosna, dice, no sepa tu mano siniestra lo que la derecha: *Te autem faciente eleemosynam nesciat siniestra tua qui faciat dextera tua*. Esto supone, que solo la mano derecha ha de distribuir la limosna. No me digan, que me detengo en lo material de la letra, que antes bien descubro debajo de lo material de la letra un profundísimo sentido. Es estilo constante de la Sagrada Escritura simbolizar en la mano derecha las obras buenas, como en la siniestra las malas: de aquí es, que hablando en muchas partes de la mano de Dios, nunca nombra con expresión sino la derecha, porque todas las operaciones de Dios son santas.

(*Teatro crítico universal*, vol.5, Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, 1733)

(When you give alms, he says, do not allow your left hand know what your left hand is doing: *Te autem faciente eleemosynam nesciat siniestra tua qui faciat dextera tua*. This assumed that only the right hand should give out alms. Do not tell me that I am getting lost in the details, because I might find a deep meaning below the surface of the details. It is a constant feature of Sacred Writings to associate good works with the right hand and bad works with the left: that is why, speaking on many occasions about the hand of God, it never names with an expression anything other than the right, because all of God's works are holy.)

In this example the word actually reflects a non-spatial meaning, but still with reference to a hand:

- (42) En esto hacia los ángulos internos del templo corren las malignas sagas, y del sombrío suelo mil dañosas plantas recogen, con siniestra mano y misteriosos ritos arrancadas.
(*Poesía*, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, 1778)

(Malignant family lines run toward the internal angles of the temple, and they collect a thousand harmful plants from the dark floor, uprooted with the left hand and mysterious rituals.)

From the nineteenth century (21/837 total):

- (43) A su siniestra un demonio tiene, y a su diestra un ángel que él no ve, pero que escucha aunque le hablan sin hablarle.
(*Romances históricos*, Ángel de Saavedra, 1828)

(He has a demon on his left, and an angel that he does not see on his right, who listens even though they speak to him without speaking to him.)

Just one token was found in the data for the the twentieth century (1/260 total), and the negative connotations are only interpretable in an indirect manner:¹³¹

- (44) Más tarde, mientras la policía y el juez reconstruían la carnicería, todos se habían asombrado de que no hubiera podido desarmar al criminal, siendo él un robusto y Ezequiel un enclenque. No podían saber que, en las tinieblas ensangrentadas, el propagandista médico parecía poseído de una fuerza sobrenatural: don Sebastián sólo atinaba a dar gritos imaginarios y a tratar de adivinar la travesía de la siguiente cuchillada para atajarla con las manos. Recibió entre catorce o quince (los médicos pensaban que la boca abierta en la nalga siniestra podían ser, coincidencias portentosas que encanecen a un hombre en una noche y hacen creer en Dios, dos cuchilladas en el mismo sitio), equitativamente distribuidas a lo largo y ancho de su cuerpo, con excepción de su cara, la que—¿milagro del Señor de Limpías como pensaba doña Margarita o de Santa Rosa como decía su tocaya?—no recibió ni un rasguño.
(*La tía Julia y el escribidor*, Mario Vargas Llosa, 1977)

(Later, while the police and the judge reconstructed the butcher shop, everyone had been surprised that he had not been able to disarm the criminal, since he was strong and

¹³¹ It could be that the author simply chose the word *siniestra* in the context of using florid language in general (e.g. *robusto*, *enclenque*, *atajar*, *portentosas*, etc.—all relatively uncommon words which bear poetic overtones that help to convey the supernatural mood of the narrative). However, it does not seem to be a coincidence that LEFT is symbolically correlated here with stab wounds and ‘portentious coincidences that make a man’s hair go white’, which leaves open the possibility that it does indeed have negative connotations.

Ezequiel was a weakling. They could not know that, in the bloody darkness, the medical spokesperson seemed possessed by a supernatural force: don Sebastián only managed to give imaginary screams and to try to guess the path of the next stab to try to stop it with his hands. He received between fourteen and fifteen (the doctors thought that the open mouth on his **left** buttock could be portentous coincidences that make a man's hair go white in one night, and make one believe in God, two stabbings in the same spot), equally distributed throughout his body, with the exception of his face, which—a miracle of the Señor de Limpias [shaman] like doña Margarita thought or of Saint Rosa as her friend with the same name said?—did not receive a single scratch.)

4.2.3.4 SINISTER/NEGATIVE

The non-spatial, abstract, sense does not clearly appear in the data from Davies (2002-) until the fourteenth century, with the exception of the questionable thirteenth-century tokens found in Berceo's *Del Sacrificio de la Missa*—example 8, partially repeated here—which could be interpreted non-spatially:

- (45) [...] De gent de paganismo fuele obedient, Acogiose a Él mucho de buena ment: Si ante fue **siniestra** por su grant falliment, En cabo tornó diestra del Rey omnipotent. Los iudios que eran diestra del Criador, Ca tenien la su ley, iazien en su amor, Creer non lo quisieron, fizieron lo peor, Cayeron a **siniestro** por el su grant error. Los que eran por fiios de la diestra contados, Trastornosse la rueda, tornaron en annados: Los que annados eran que andaban errados, Passaron a la diestra, e foron porfijados.

([...] The pagans were obedient and they joined him with good intentions: if before they were on the **left** because of their great failure, they ended up to the right of the omnipotent King. The Jews were to the right of the creator, because they had His law, they basked in His love, [but] they did not want to believe, they made the worst [decision], they fell to the **left** because of their great mistake. Those who where counted as the sons of the right, the wheel turned, they became stepsons: Those who where stepsons, who were mistaken, ended up on the right, and they were persistent.)

The fourteenth century data only yield 9 examples (but represent 33% of the 27 total), all of them from Guido de Columna's *Historia Troyana* (which is, admittedly, a fifteenth-century copy).

Here, we see the word as an adjective that modifies *casos* & *auenimientos*:

- (46) muchos se creen alcançar victoria de sus injurias & desonores & se meten a graues peligros & finalmente acrescientan en su deshonor: quesiste te someter alos casos ocurros & malos de conoser por que tu mal afortunado caso & dela final destruycion tuya & delos tuyos & del cruel estrago & cayda dela tu noble cibdad de troya otra vez refrescases

& renouases alas gentes por venir materia de delitosas fablas & ystorias de destruycion. Ca muchas vezes el oyr delas gentes se suele alegrar & recrescer oyendo los siniestros casos & auenimientos de otros & lo que te despues avino & se te seguio a ti & alos tuyos [...]

(many believe that they can achieve victory over their injuries and dishonors and they get themselves into grave dangers and they end up increasing their dishonor: you wanted to give in to the dark cases and evil things not yet known, because of your unfortunate case and of your final destruction and that of your people and of the cruel consequences and the fall of your noble city of Troy, yet again you remind people by talking about tales of crime and stories of destruction. Because many times people tend to become happy and cheer up when they hear about the sinister cases and happenings of others and what later happened to you and your loved ones [...])

And here, *fortuna*:

- (47) ANSI que enneas llamo a consejo a todos los troyanos que avian quedado enla cibdad & fablo les enesta manera. Amigos & hermanos pues que siniestra fortuna a causado vos ser venidos al estado en que estays claramente & de manifiesto vedes que sin amparo [...]

(Therefore Eneas called all of the Trojans who had remained in the city to council and he spoke to them in this way. Friends and brother, because sinister fortune has caused you to be in the state that you are in, you are clearly and manifestly left without protection [...])

From the fifteenth-century data (52/235 total), we begin to see cases in which *siniestro* functions as a noun:¹³²

- (48) Gozoso el rey y todos sus caualleros de hauer botado de la ciudad todos los enemigos [...] mas sale al traues vn siniestro muy grande que el alcayde de auersa / de quien el rey se pensaua seguro estar: como aleuoso traydor [...]
(*Crónica de Aragon*, Gauberto Fabricio de Vagad, 1499)

(The king and all of his soldiers were proud of having thrown all of their enemies from the city [...] but a very serious unfortunate event soon occurred, that the governor—whom the king thought to be faithful—turned out to be a traitor [...])

¹³² For the purposes of this study, the transition from adjective to noun is of secondary interest, since the focus is on the connotations associated with the word. Note that example (48) is actually from a fifteenth-century copy, but, in any case, the nominal form is already found in Classical texts, with implied *latus* ‘side’ or *manus* ‘hand’, or even by itself (Lewis & Short 1907: s.v. *sinister*, senses 1 and 2).

Other examples from the fifteenth century show the adjectival use modifying such nouns as *aduersidades*, *inclinaciones*, *informaciones*, *intinciones* (*intenciones*), *muerte*, *temor*, etc.

Nebrija includes two definitions of *sinister* in his *Dictionarium latino-hispanicum*, the first of which is ambiguous in meaning, but the second of which clearly focuses on the negative connotations of the Classical term, which could clarify what he means by the first:

(49) Sinister. a. um. por cosa **sinieſtra**. Sinister. a. um. por cosa de mal aguero

(*Sinister. a. um.* for something that is **sinieſtra**. *Sinister. a. um.* for an ill-omened thing)

Moving on to the sixteenth century (189/545 total), we see an even greater diversity of nouns modified by the adjectival form, including *aprehensión*, *casos*, *condiciones*, *demanda*, *fin*, *hado*, *información*, *informes*, *opinión*, *relaciones*, *señales*, *sucesos*, *suerte*, *trabajos*, etc. The diversity of the nouns modified by the adjectival form continues to increase from the seventeenth century to the present. At this point, nearly half of the tokens (92/212 total, or 43%) clearly employ the non-spatial sense of the word, and this percentage increases significantly in the following centuries (67% for the eighteenth, 87% for the nineteenth, and 90% for the twentieth). Here is an example from the seventeenth:

(50) [...] y buscando el que más apasionado les parecía que podría ser, eligieron al Lic. Cristóbal Gutiérrez de Medina, capellán del marqués de Villena, expulso de la Compañía, cura de la catedral de Méjico, el cual había predicado cuatro días antes en aquella ciudad muy libremente contra mí sobre estas materias con general escándalo del pueblo y había afirmado en una consulta que algunas proposiciones en el libro de las alegaciones de los diezmos por mi iglesia con los religiosos de la Compañía eran sospechosas o contrarias a la fe, dándoles **sinieſtra** y caviſosa interpretación; y a éste tal nombraron y dieron esta comisión muy amplia para que viniese a estas averiguaciones.

(*Carta al inquisidor general don Diego de Arce y Reinoso*, Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, 1630)

([...] and searching for the most passionate person that they could find, they chose Lic. Cristóbal Gutiérrez de Medina, the chaplain of the marquis of Villena, expelled from the Company [of Jesus], priest of the cathedral of Mexico, who had preached very freely against me four days prior in that city, about these topics, with the general disapproval of the people, and he had confirmed in a consultation that some propositions in the book of

allegations of the tithe [collectors] at my church along with the members of the Company were suspicious or contrary to the faith, giving them a **sinister** and quarrelsome interpretation; and they named this man and gave him this very ample commission so that he would come to [participate in] these inquiries.)

From the eighteenth century (159/237 total):

- (51) De aquí viene que no sólo no se da el verdadero sentido que tiene en una, si le traduce exactamente, sino que el mismo traductor no la entiende, y, por consiguiente, da a su nación una **siniestra** idea del autor extranjero, siguiendo Desde que Miguel de Cervantes compuso la inmortal novela en que criticó con tanto acierto algunas viciosas costumbres de nuestros abuelos [...]

(*Cartas marruecas*, José Cadalso, 1762)

(From this we can conclude that not only does the true meaning of the text not appear, if one translates it exactly, but rather the very translator does not understand it, and, consequently, he gives his nation a **sinister** idea of the foreign author, continuing since Miguel de Cervantes wrote the immortal novel in which he criticized with so much skill some immoral customs of our grandparents [...])

From the nineteenth century (728/837 total):

- (52) ESCENA X Beatriz, Roger y Juana. BEATRIZ, separada de los otros, que forman un grupo. Roger. (A Juana.) **Siniestro** el bastardo va y ella espantada se queda. Algo dijo él por lo bajo que en voz alta no dijera. Juana. ¿«**Siniestro**» dices? Quizá como todo hombre de guerra que acorralado se ve y apareja la defensa [...]

(*En el seno de la muerte*, José Echegaray, 1874)

(SCENE 10 Beatriz, Roger and Juana. BEATRIZ, separated from the others, who form a group. Roger (to Juana): The bastard is acting in a **sinister** way and she remains scared. He said something without saying it. Juana: “**sinister**,” you say? Maybe like all soldiers who get defensive when they are cornered [...])

And finally, from the twentieth century (234/260 total):

- (53) Lo abrumba la desconfianza que sembraron en su corazón, como un virus **siniestro**.

(*Angola y otros cuentos*, Helio Vera, 1984)

(The suspicion that they planted in his heart burdens him, like a **sinister** virus.)

4.2.4 Summary of the sequence of semantic changes

This section summarizes the information presented in section 4.2.3, and compares it with the findings of del Río Entonado (2010). As will become evident, the two corpora (Davies 2002-


and *CORDE*) give similar results, but with some key differences, namely, in their identification of the point at which the non-spatial sense of *siniestro* overtakes the spatial sense in terms of frequency, and of the point at which *izquierdo* overtakes *siniestro* as the more common lexical item in the data set used to refer to the spatial sense.

Looking first at the results of the present study, Figure 4.1 shows that the seventeenth century is the point at which the non-spatial sense begins to represent the largest percentage of tokens of *siniestro*, but only by a small margin (43.4% vs. 42.92%). Interestingly, but perhaps coincidentally, this is nearly the same time that the key changes occurred with *afeitar* and *ahorrar*, albeit a century later.¹³³ Figure 4.2 shows the pattern established by the data from *CORDE*, as presented in del Río Entonado (2010). The two patterns are very similar, except that according to the data from *CORDE*, the point at which the non-spatial sense begins to represent the largest percentage of tokens of *siniestro* does not occur until the eighteenth century.¹³⁴ In any case, in large diachronic studies such as these, what is more important than precision is the overall trend, given that meaning change is a gradual process. Most important for the arguments to be made in the next section of this study, on the other hand, is the fact that both figures show an overwhelming majority of tokens meaning LEFT with neutral connotations in the earliest documented centuries, and both show that the non-spatial EVIL/BAD sense does not appear in a significant way until the fourteenth or fifteenth century.

¹³³ In this case, it would be more difficult to identify a clear social trend that coincided with and likely intervened in the change, although it could be possible that it was related to an increased focus on morality, *vis-à-vis* the *moralista* tradition discussed in chapter 2, with respect to *afeitar*.


¹³⁴ This difference is likely related to the fact that *CORDE* contains a larger amount of data, although there is the possibility that the author's assignment of meanings to individual tokens differed from mine. This latter possibility seems unlikely, however, given the overall similarities in the general patterns.

Figure 4.1 Percentage of tokens of *siniestro* with each meaning by century (from Davies 2002-)



	Left (negative)	Left (neutral)	Evil/Bad	Other
12th	-	-	-	-
13th	1.26	85.28	0.54	12.93
14th	7.41	59.26	33.33	0.00
15th	5.53	70.64	22.13	1.70
16th	5.32	50.09	34.68	9.91
17th	5.66	42.92	43.40	8.02
18th	3.80	24.89	67.09	4.22
19th	2.51	6.21	86.98	4.30
20th	0.77	1.15	90.00	8.08

Figure 4.2 Percentage of tokens of *siniestro* with each meaning by century (from *CORDE*, data taken from del Río Entonado 2010: 128-238)



	Left (negative)	Left (neutral)	Evil/Bad	Other
12th	0.00	94.12	0.00	5.88
13th	7.93	88.70	0.00	3.37
14th	5.36	90.18	2.38	2.08
15th	4.51	72.49	20.29	2.71
16th	3.50	62.71	25.76	8.04
17th	2.27	62.27	30.00	5.47
18th	10.23	31.06	54.55	4.17
19th	0.23	15.21	79.23	5.33
20th	0.85	11.51	77.92	9.72

Turning to the overall frequency of *siniestro* and *izquierdo* (without distinguishing their senses) in terms of words per million, which is not possible with *CORDE*, we see the following trend (Figure 4.3) from Davies (2002-), in which the frequencies of the two words are roughly similar throughout most of the time-period in question. This reinforces the (rather intuitive) point that *izquierdo* did not simply replace *siniestro* (in spite of the sudden drop in frequency of the latter from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries). This will be important for the discussion

that follows regarding the notion that *izquierdo* is a ‘euphemistic replacement’ of *siniestro*, wherein it will be argued that there is little evidence that such a replacement was made.

Figure 4.3 Frequency (in words per million) of *siniestro* and *izquierdo* by century (from Davies 2002-)




	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
<i>izquierdo</i>	0.15	0	2.94	22.48	23.81	15.99	34.41	34.88
<i>siniestro</i>	83.39	10.11	28.92	32.05	17.17	24.55	43.37	11.48

Focusing on the meaning *LEFT*, we can make a comparison between the two studies in terms of the percentage of tokens of *izquierdo* and *siniestro* that refer to that meaning in a given century. Figure 4.4 shows the results from Davies (2002-), and Figure 4.5 shows those from *CORDE*.¹³⁵ Again, we see striking similarities, and the same offset of a century with regard to

¹³⁵ Since the focus of this study is on *siniestro*, the results of an analysis of *izquierdo* are limited to those shown in figure 4.4. In any case, there were few tokens in Davies (2002-) that showed meanings other than *LEFT* for *izquierdo* (del Río Entonado 2010: 297-374 presents a detailed analysis from *CORDE*).


the point at which *izquierdo* overtakes *siniestro* as the more common lexical item used to refer to the spatial sense—in this case, Davies (2002-) shows the change later than *CORDE* does.

Fig. 4.4 Percentage of tokens meaning LEFT of *izquierdo* and *siniestro* by century (from Davies 2002-)



	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
<i>izquierdo</i>	-	0.2	0	11.6	51.8	71	66.8	85.9	96.8
<i>siniestro</i>	-	99.8	100	88.4	48.2	29	33.2	14.1	3.2

Fig. 4.5 Percentage of tokens meaning LEFT of *izquierdo* and *siniestro* by century (from CORDE, data taken from del Río Entonado 2010: 376, 378)



	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th
<i>izquierdo</i>	0	2.7	26	41	72.2	77.4	87.8	96.6	98
<i>siniestro</i>	100	97.3	74	59	27.8	22.6	12.2	3.4	2

As before, the importance of this information for the present study is that the replacement of *siniestro* by *izquierdo* was gradual, and that *siniestro* was clearly the predominant word for reference to LEFT at the beginning of the time-period in question. It will also be noted that the point at which *izquierdo* overtakes *siniestro* appears to have taken place in the fifteenth or sixteenth century, while the point at which the abstract, clearly negative sense of *siniestro* becomes the prototypical sense of the word does not take place until the seventeenth or eighteenth century. In other words, for at least a century after *izquierdo* was the primary word for LEFT, *siniestro* still prototypically meant LEFT. Again, this does not seem to suggest the existence of a prohibition of reference to LEFT, but rather a gradual specialization of *siniestro* to imply

negative connotations, and a concurrent increase in frequency of *izquierdo* for reference to the neutral sense.

We will now move on to discussion of the cognitive and social factors involved in these changes, according to the theoretical notions outlined above.

4.3 Intervening social and cognitive factors

Metaphor is typically viewed as a process of mapping from a source domain to a target domain, and the former are generally more basic than the latter (e.g. LIFE IS A JOURNEY, where JOURNEY is the source domain and LIFE is the target domain). The proposed metaphor involved in the development of *sinistro* (i.e. the phenomenon that allows the association of negative connotations with the original neutral sense)—LEFT IS NEGATIVE—however, seems to be structured in the opposite way. That is, the source domain, NEGATIVE, is more abstract than the target domain, LEFT. It would, perhaps, be possible to formulate the metaphor as LEFT IS NEGATIVE, along the lines of Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) formulation MORE IS UP, wherein UP is the source domain that is mapped onto MORE, making LEFT the source domain and NEGATIVE the target. This would fit better with the general assumption that source domains are more basic—more closely related to embodied experience—than target domains. It seems more likely, at least in this case, that POSITIVE and NEGATIVE were mapped onto RIGHT and LEFT, rather than the other way around. Here, it is worth having a look at some passages from Hertz (1973 [1909]). The author notes that

according to some authors the differentiation of right and left is completely explained by the rules of religious orientation and sun-worship. The position of man in space is neither indifferent nor arbitrary. In his prayers and ceremonies the worshipper looks naturally to the region where the sun rises, the source of all life. Most sacred buildings, in different religions, are turned towards the east. Given this direction, the parts of the body are assigned accordingly to the cardinal points: west is behind, south to the right, and north to the left. Consequently the characteristics of the heavenly regions are reflected in the

human body. The full sunlight of the south shines on our right side, while the sinister shade of the north is projected on to our left. The spectacle of nature, the contrast of daylight and darkness, of heat and cold, are held to have taught man to distinguish and to oppose his right hand and his left. (p. 20)

Hertz immediately rejects this idea, saying that the external world “enriches and gives precision to religious notions which issue from the depths of the collective consciousness; but it does not create them” (p. 20). He goes on to suggest that the answer might be found in the relationship between the anatomy of the human body and “social constraint”:

The slight physiological advantages possessed by the right hand are merely the occasion of a qualitative differentiation the cause of which lies beyond the individual, in the constitution of the collective consciousness. An almost insignificant bodily asymmetry is enough to turn in one direction and the other contrary representations which are already completely formed. Thereafter, thanks to the plasticity of the organism, social constraint adds to the opposed members, and incorporates in them, those qualities of strength and weakness, dexterity and clumsiness [*gaucherie*], which in the adult appear to spring spontaneously from nature. (p. 21)

It is difficult to see a meaningful difference between these two approaches to the question; it seems that, in both cases, the “external world” intervenes and assigns positive and negative connotations to RIGHT and LEFT, respectively: in the first passage, the external world is the orientation and movement of the sun, in the second passage it is social constraint. In any case, Hertz’s point that social constraint takes primacy makes sense, but the quantitative fact that only around 10% of the population is left-handed (and probably always has been, as we will see shortly) does actually make the bodily asymmetry that he mentions significant. Indeed, if the great majority of people preferred to use their left hand, and used it with more ‘dexterity’, it seems likely that the assignment of positive and negative connotations would have been reversed. This is not just a minor correction, however. It shows how embodied experience and social experience influence each other in the construction of meaning—here, the social experience involves the shared knowledge of the bodily experience of the individuals that

constitute the community (those who are right-handed are part of the norm, those who are left-handed are abnormal). It also shows, however, how social factors can act as a ‘filter’ in the development of metaphorical mappings (Yu 2008: 247). LEFT is a basic, universal conceptualization, but its association with negative connotations is both dependent on cultural input and culture-specific, even if it happens to be shared by many cultures (see the discussion below). This suggests that LEFT is the target domain onto which NEGATIVE is mapped, in spite of its more basic status.

Returning to the point about the percentage of people who are left-handed versus right-handed, it seems that del Río Entonado (along with other scholars) underestimates the potential influence of overwhelming proportions:

Obviamente, para justificar el uso de la diestra en muchos actos de nuestra vida puede aducirse una razón lógica: la mayoría de la población es diestra y por tanto emplea la mano derecha en la mayoría de sus actos cotidianos. Pero este sería un argumento lógico y válido solamente para ciertas costumbres sociales, como por ejemplo la de dar la mano en un saludo. Una vez vistos todos los datos expuestos hasta ahora, vemos que la preferencia por la derecha va más allá de la mayor capacidad que muestran la mayoría de las personas para el uso de este lado del cuerpo. (2010: 77-8)¹³⁶

(Obviously, in order to justify the use of the right [hand] in many daily activities a logical argument can be adduced: the majority of the population is right-handed and therefore employs the right hand in the majority of its daily activities. But this would only be a logical and valid argument for certain social customs, such as hand-shaking. Having seen all of the data presented to this point, we see that the preference for the right goes beyond the greater ability that the majority of the population shows for the use of this side of the body.)

The author goes on to outline various arguments with respect to the “cause(s)” of the cross-cultural preference towards the RIGHT over the LEFT, including those related to the fact that “la mayor parte de los humanos domina mejor la parte derecha de su cuerpo que la izquierda” (p.

¹³⁶ The “datos expuestos hasta ahora” are examples of ways in which many (cross-cultural) customs reflect negative connotations associated with LEFT. This point will be discussed further along.

78), as well as some theories about the position and motion of the sun (pp. 81-4). Nevertheless, he rejects these theories and presents his own (tentative) hypothesis:

También puede verse de otro modo. Hemos comentado casos en los que la relación entre la oposición espacial y la sexual es demasiado fuerte, lo que nos lleva a pensar que puede existir entre ellas una vinculación más importante. Podríamos formular –eso sí, con muchas reservas– una hipótesis: la impuesta superioridad del sexo masculino en la mayor parte de los pueblos del mundo podría ser la causante de que el lado derecho sea el privilegiado. Es decir: parece que el lado preferente es el que aparece asociado al sexo más fuerte. En la mayoría de las culturas el sexo más fuerte es el masculino y el lado que se le asocia es el derecho.

(It can also be seen in another way. We have discussed cases in which the relationship between the spatial opposition and the sexual one is too strong, which leads us to think that there could be a more important link between the two. We could formulate—albeit with many reservations—a hypothesis: the imposed superiority of the masculine sex in the majority of the world’s societies could be the causing factor for the privilege of the right side. That is: it seems that the preferred side is the one that appears associated with the stronger sex. In most cultures the masculine sex is stronger and the side associated with it is the right.)

In the first place, the problem with this analysis is that correlation does not necessarily imply causation. A strong, well-established correlation can, however, lead to more interesting hypotheses. In this case, the author mentions on two occasions the fact that a ‘majority’ of human beings prefers the use of the right hand, but appears to overlook the fact that this majority is quite overwhelming, likely forming 90% of the population.¹³⁷ Secondly, the author mentions

¹³⁷ For example, Hardyck & Petrinovich (1977: 385) find that “handedness is most appropriately regarded as a continuum ranging from strong right-handedness across mixed-handedness to strong left-handedness. Left-handedness, ranging from moderate through strongly left-handed, is found in approximately 10% of the population.” Note that the article reviews a number of studies whose findings related to the incidence of left-handedness range from 1% of the population to 30% (depending on the methodology for obtaining the data). The authors state that:

In Table 1, a classification of incidence figures is given, categorized by the methods used to determine them. Examination of this table indicates that estimates that are either extremely high or extremely low tend to be those based either on opinion unsupported by data or on indirect determinations of handedness, such as eyedness or strength of grip—measures that have a positive but far from perfect correlation with preferred handedness.

When performance measures have been taken, results have been much more stable, with the incidence of left-handedness centering around 9%-10%. (p. 392)


the fact that the apparent preference toward the RIGHT—as shown in evidence from cross-cultural customs—“goes beyond the greater capacity that most people show with respect to the use of that side of the body”. This might be true from a synchronic perspective, but it does not negate the possibility that, diachronically, the preferences find their source in the physiological tendency. As we saw before with regard to metaphor, it is precisely in the physiological realm (embodied experience) that construction of meaning normally begins to take place. Again, it seems more likely that the shared knowledge—that right-handedness was the norm and left-handedness was abnormal—was later applied to other contexts, extending the preference into realms beyond those directly related to the physiological. This shared knowledge that right-handedness was more common came to be conventionalized as a cultural schema; the embodied experience of individual members of the group was shared through interaction between those members, and left-handedness came to be viewed first as abnormal, later as deficient, and then as evil.¹³⁸ The series of metaphorical associations was relatively straightforward (following a sequence such as ABNORMAL IS BAD > LEFT-HANDEDNESS IS ABNORMAL > THE LEFT HAND IS BAD > THE LEFT IS BAD), and continued to the extent that the negative connotations became more salient than the spatial component in certain contexts, allowing for expressions involving the non-spatial sense of *sinistro* (e.g. *la siniestra muerte*). This can be schematically represented as in Figure 4.6. Time 1 shows the status of the conceptual fields prior to their association with

Furthermore, del Río Entonado (2010: 78-9) and Hardyck & Petrinovich (1977: 390-1) cite a number of anthropological studies whose cumulative conclusions suggest that the predominance of right-handedness is not a recent phenomenon.

¹³⁸ The association with deficiency, in particular, has continued to persist, even among professional researchers, to the extent that Hardyck and Petrinovich, in their article from near the end of the twentieth century (1977), comment that “there is remarkably little evidence for any association of left-handedness with deficit, as has often been suggested” (p. 385), adding that “the search for deficit associated with left-handedness has been both extensive and unceasing. Attempts have been made to link left-handedness with mental deficiency, dyslexia, speech disturbances, birth defects, emotional instability, motor awkwardness, and alcoholism, to provide only a partial list.

each other. Time 2 shows the initial overlapping of the two conceptual fields, and their association with the three aforementioned Classical lexical items. The solid line indicates a strong association (corresponding to a high degree of salience of the conceptual field), while the dotted line indicates a weak one. Time 3 shows the introduction of *izquierdo*, and an increase in the salience of LEFT with negative connotations, as well as slightly stronger association between *siniestro* and NEGATIVE. Time 4 shows a weakening of the association between *siniestro* and LEFT, and a strengthening of that with NEGATIVE. Finally, Time 5 shows a weakening of the association between *siniestro* and LEFT with negative connotations.

Figure 4.6 The diachronic relationship between LEFT and NEGATIVE, as well as the primary lexical items associated with them.



The associations shown in Figure 4.6 are grounded in bodily experience but shaped by cultural understanding. We will now have a look at the social/cultural knowledge involved in this particular development.

For the purposes of the present study, there is no need to undertake a thorough analysis of the many different cultures and religious traditions that have apparently been influenced by association of negative and positive connotations to the LEFT/RIGHT opposition. Del Río Entonado (2010: 27-86) does an extensive survey of several cultures and religions, noting that Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism all show clear evidence of a preference for the RIGHT. The ancient Hittites, Greeks, and Romans, as well as the current Maori, all do the same, with the exception, of course, of the occasional attribution of positive connotations to the left by Romans. Of the cultures and religions surveyed, the Chinese and Japanese are the only ones that appear to show a consistent preference for the LEFT.¹³⁹ Many further examples, in addition to those presented in del Río Entonado (2010), are found in Needham (1973). Hardyck and Petrinovich (1977) comment, albeit in a tongue-in-cheek manner, that preferences for the RIGHT—more specifically RIGHT-HANDEDNESS—were still alive even among twentieth-century scientists:

Among the contemporary ideological descendants of the Biblical scribe who, along with their ancestor, would be eager to consign the left-handed to burn in hell forever, would be found a good many neurologists, neurosurgeons, and neuropsychologists, sharing among themselves the frustrations of seeing their theories of cerebral function unable to account for the bilateral cerebral organization found in many of the left-handed. (p. 386-7)

In any case, the evidence appears quite overwhelming in favor of the notion that a large number of cultural and religious traditions associate positive connotations with the RIGHT and

¹³⁹ Although Granet (1973 [1933]: 57) comments that, with respect to the Chinese, “there is thus a certain preeminence of the left, [...] but this pre-eminence is only occasional [...] There is a cycling and alternation, or an alternating pre-eminence. There is no fixed predominance, no absolute opposition.”

negative connotations with the LEFT, to the extent that the trend appears to be near-universal (with the caveat that a comprehensive analysis of all cultures and religions is probably far from complete, and that there are well-known cases in which the reverse seems to be true, as we saw with China and Japan).

Lexically speaking, it is notable that “los nombres del lado derecho en general y de la mano derecha en particular son, en la lengua reconstruida y en cada una de las lenguas históricas indoeuropeas, mucho más estables que los correspondientes a ‘lo izquierdo’” (the words for the right side in general and for the right hand in particular are, in reconstructed languages and in each of the historical Indoeuropean languages, much more stable than those corresponding to ‘the left’) (Uría Varela 1997: 164). For example, Classical Latin had *dexter* ‘right’, but *laeuus*, *scaeuus*, and *sinister* ‘left’, and Ancient Greek had *δεξιός*, *δεξιτερός* ‘right’, but *λαιοός*, *σκαίοός*, *εὐώνυμος*, and *ἀριστερός* ‘left’. Moreover, terms that refer to LEFT tend to become associated with negative connotations, and those that refer to RIGHT tend to become associated with positive connotations. Focusing on *sinister*~*siniestro*, as we have seen, this has indeed occurred. Multiple scholars have attributed these tendencies to linguistic taboo (also ‘prohibition’ and ‘interdicción’) and euphemism (Uría Varela 1997; Penny 2002; del Río Entonado 2010, 2012a,b). Returning to del Río Entonado’s definitions, which match those of Uría Varela and others):

Así, utilizaremos *interdicción* como ‘presión externa o psicológica que desaconseja el empleo de ciertas formas lingüísticas, dando origen al juego eufemístico’ [...] *Eufemismo* se utilizará para el ‘fenómeno lingüístico por el que algunas palabras son evitadas y reemplazadas por otras’; el término utilizado para denominar en concreto a la palabra que reemplaza al término interdicto será el de *sustituto eufemístico*.” (2010: 19; emphasis original)

(Thus, we will use *interdiction* to mean ‘external or psychological pressure that discourages the use of certain linguistic forms, giving origin to euphemistic play’ [...] *Euphemism* will be used for the ‘linguistic phenomenon by means of which some words

are avoided and replaced by others'; the term used to refer specifically to the word that replaces the banned word will be *euphemistic substitute*.)

Penny describes several examples of linguistic taboo, focusing on those related to fear. With regard to the word under consideration here, he comments that:

Other fear taboos include avoidance of the words meaning 'left', owing to the popular association between this concept and evil or the Devil. Of the Latin terms for 'left', LAEVUS, SCAEVUS, SINISTER, only the latter survives, partially, in Romance; in Old Spanish it appears as *siniestro* (with /ie/ under the influence of its antonym *diestro*). Thereafter, it is retained only in the sense 'sinister', reflecting the association just mentioned, and in the sense 'left' is replaced by another borrowing from Basque, namely *izquierdo*. It will be noted that foreign borrowings may serve the same purpose as euphemisms in providing replacements for tabooed words. (2002: 306-7)

Del Río Entonado makes an *a priori* assumption about the influence of taboo and euphemism in the disappearance of *laeuus* and *scaeuus*:

Centrándonos en el español y remontándonos en sus orígenes hasta el ámbito indoeuropeo, se puede comprobar que la evolución de los significantes asociados a la 'derecha' no tiene nada que ver con la de los términos asociados a la 'izquierda'. La interdicción ha quedado patente en el hecho de la cantidad de significantes que siempre ha necesitado relacionado con la izquierda. Esto sucedía, sin ir más lejos, en latín, donde la aparición de un sustituto eufemístico unida a otros factores tuvo como consecuencia que no haya huellas en romance ni de *laeuus* ni de *scaeuus*. Pero los derivados de *sinister* pronto sucumbieron a sus empleos despectivos, y tanto el español como otras lenguas emparentadas tomaron un préstamo del vasco para intentar ocultar las malas connotaciones del significado interdicto. (2010: 439)

(Focusing on Spanish and going back to its origins in the Indoeuropean context, it can be shown that the evolution of the words associated with the 'right' have nothing to do with the terms associated with the 'left'. The prohibition has remained patent in the fact that the amount of words that it has needed related to the left. This occurred, without a need to go further, in Latin, where the appearance of a euphemistic substitute linked to other factors had as a consequence that there are no traces in Romance of *laeuus* or of *scaeuus*. But the reflexes of *sinister* quickly succumbed to pejorative uses, and Spanish as well as other related languages took a borrowing from Basque in an attempt to hide the negative connotations of the prohibited meaning.)

Regarding the respective developments of *siniestro* and *izquierdo* as evidenced in the data from *CORDE*, he notes that:

El análisis diacrónico de *sinistro* e *izquierdo* ha dejado en evidencia que la evolución de uno y otro vocablo durante la historia de nuestra lengua presenta unas tendencias totalmente opuestas. Los resultados obtenidos señalan el siglo XVI como el primero en el que los empleos de *izquierdo* para referirse al significado espacial superan a los de *sinistro*. Precisamente en este último término hemos visto reflejados durante toda la Edad Media diferentes ejemplos en los que aparecen las connotaciones negativas que demuestran la interdicción y que, a su vez, han provocado el nacimiento de diversos significados peyorativos. Entre este grupo de ejemplos que presentan estas connotaciones destacan, indudablemente, los relacionados con el cristianismo, cuya relevancia en la interdicción al menos durante esta época está, como hemos dicho, fuera de toda duda. (2010: 439)

(Diachronic analysis of *sinistro* and *izquierdo* has made it clear that the evolution of each word during the history of our language shows completely opposing tendencies. The results point to the sixteenth century as the first in which the uses of *izquierdo* to refer to the spatial meaning are greater than those of *sinistro*. Precisely in the latter word we have seen different examples reflected during the Middle Ages in which the negative connotations show the prohibition and that, at the same time, have given birth to different pejorative meanings. Within this group of examples that show these connotations, those related to Christianity undoubtedly stand out, and their relevance to the prohibition, at least during this period, is, as we have said, doubtless.)

These arguments, however, are unconvincing. In the first place, the notion of LEFT is so fundamental to bodily experience that reference to it simply cannot be avoided, whether or not it is associated with negative connotations. Topics such as bodily excretions, sexual activity, and even death can be avoided in general conversation, but discussion of spatial orientation is a necessary part of the human experience. In other cases of linguistic taboo, one can modify a word, or use an intentionally vague, highly schematic expression, to avoid its explicit use—such as *heck* instead of *hell*, or *collateral damage* instead of *dead civilians*, and so on. There are also cases where a sound change was apparently avoided, as in the famous example of the toponym *Mérida*, which otherwise would supposedly have become *Mierda*, had it followed the usual pattern of development. Dworkin (1990, 1993, 1994, 1995, etc.) has published several studies on lexical loss due to probable taboo influences.

Secondly, there does not appear to be any clear evidence suggesting that speakers were attempting to avoid the use of *sinistro* due to a social prohibition. Indeed, as we saw earlier, a full 99.6% (555/557) of the tokens from the thirteenth century (100% if we classify the tokens from Berceo as spatial, as del Río Entonado did) refer to the spatial sense, and it is not until the fifteenth century that we find significant numbers of tokens that refer to the non-spatial sense.¹⁴⁰ Given that the association of negative connotations with LEFT was already well-established in the Classical period, it seems odd that the preferred word to refer to LEFT would still be the same one centuries later, if the use of that word was being avoided. Moreover, one would expect to see a high percentage of tokens associated with negative connotations from the earliest medieval documentation, which we clearly do not see.

It appears, rather, that the increased frequency of *izquierdo* arises from a simple need or desire to clarify that the speaker/writer is referring to the spatial notion, with no intention of implying negative connotations. A similar phenomenon occurs in English, where the word *right* has both a spatial sense and an affirmative sense. If speakers want to clarify their intention to refer to the affirmative sense, they can use the word *correct* instead of *right*. In both cases, there is no need to posit euphemism as an explanation.

Montero Cartelle (1981) seems to, at least implicitly, agree with this assessment:

Existe, pues, una interdicción, pero, curiosamente, sólo se manifiesta de manera negativa. *Scaeuus* y *laeuus*, formas que expresaban ese concepto en latín, no dejaron continuadores en las lenguas romances. *Sinister*, presumiblemente un eufemismo reciente como apuntan Ernout y Meillet (*DELL*, s.v. *sinister*), sí que los dejó (fr. *sinistre*, it. *sinistra*, gall. *sinistra*, *sinistro*, port. *sestro*, cast. *sinistra* y *sinistro*), aunque, sintomáticamente, hayan adquirido con la acepción ‘mano izquierda’, ‘parte o sitio que está a la mano izquierda’, la de ‘infeliz, funesto o aciago’ y la de ‘avería grave, destrucción fortuita o

¹⁴⁰ Note that 72 of the 555 tokens were involved in variants of the expression *a diestro y siniestro*, but in the thirteenth-century texts analyzed all of them clearly referred to the spatial sense TO THE RIGHT AND TO THE LEFT/EVERYWHERE. Therefore, in spite of their separate treatment in section 4.2, they can be considered along with LEFT for this purpose.

pérdida importante que sufren las personas o la propiedad, especialmente por muerte, incendio o naufragio' (*DRAE*, s.v. *sinistra* y *sinistro*, aceps. 3ª y 6ª).

Otra prueba negativa de su interdicción es la ya aducida por A. Meillet: que el gall.-port. *esquerda*, el cast. *izquierda* y cat. y prov. *esquer* remitan al vasco *ezker(r)* (Corominas, *DCELC*, s.v. *izquierdo*); mientras que el fr. *gauche* es de origen germánico [...] (p. 139)

(There is a prohibition, but, curiously, it only appears in a negative way. *Scaeuus* and *laeuus*, forms that expressed that concept in Latin, did not leave traces in the Romance languages. *Sinister*, presumably a recent euphemism as pointed out by Ernout & Meillet (*DELL*, s.v. *sinister*), did indeed leave them (Fr. *sinistre*, It. *sinistra*, Gal. *sinistra*, *sinistro*, Port. *sestro*, Cast. *sinistra* and *sinistro*), although, symptomatically, they have acquired, along with the sense 'left hand', 'part or place that is situated on the left-hand side', that of 'unhappy, terrible or tragic' and that of 'a serious failure, fortuitous destruction or important loss that people or property suffer, especially through death, fire, or shipwreck' (*DRAE*, s.v. *sinistra* and *sinistro*, 3rd and 6th senses).

Another piece of evidence against the influence of prohibition is that which has already been pointed out by A. Meillet: that Galician-Portuguese *esquerda*, Castilian *izquierda* and Cat. and Prov. *esquer* come from Basque *ezker(r)* (Corominas, *DCELC*, s.v. *izquierdo*); while French *gauche* is of Germanic origin [...])

Again, it appears that, rather than attempting to avoid mention of the negative conceptualization, speakers were using *sinistro* in a specialized sense—precisely to be able to mention it—and employed borrowings from other languages in order to clarify that they were referring to the spatial sense. Notably, the author goes on to say, with respect to Galician in particular, that:

Las designaciones que, en gallego, expresan ese concepto (*esquerda*, *zurda*, *cochena*, *maneta*, *manicha*, *resga*, etc.), **en ningún momento pueden aducirse como eufemísticas**. Si se quisieran exhibir como indicios de una posible interdicción, entonces habría que forzar los argumentos, incidiendo sobre el origen no latino de *esquerda* o de *zurda* o sobre el carácter despectivo de *manecha*, *manicha* o *maneta*. En este último caso, podría recurrirse a la literatura clásica para corroborar que, desde siempre, el pueblo vió a los zurdos “como gente inútil y, aún peor, gente mala y de mal agüero” (Corominas, *DCELC*, s.v. *zurdo*), pero incluso esto sería un nuevo argumento indirecto, sin correspondencia alguna en la parte léxica (la atenuante) que aquí interesa. (1981: 139-40; emphasis added)

(The designations that, in Galician, express this concept (*esquerda*, *zurda*, *cochena*, *maneta*, *manicha*, *resga*, etc.), **can at no point in time be considered euphemistic**. If one wanted to show them as indicators of a possible prohibition, they would have to force the arguments, imposing on the non-Latin origin of *esquerda* or of *zurda* or on the pejorative nature of *manecha*, *manicha* or *maneta*. In the latter case, one could go back to

classical literature to corroborate that, since the beginning, the people saw left-handed people as “worthless people and, even worse, bad and unfavorable people” (Corominas, *DCELC*, s.v. *zurdo*), but even this would be a new indirect argument, without any correspondence in the lexical part (the attenuating one) that is of interest here.)

The argument here is not that taboo was never associated with LEFT, nor that it did not have some indirect influence on the loss of *laeuus* and *scaeuus*.¹⁴¹ Rather, it seems more likely that *siniestro* simply began to take on the same negative connotations associated with its primary referent (through the development of shared cultural knowledge), and *izquierdo* assumed the role of the neutrally-connoted term. Socially-determined taboo most likely did have an influence, however, on the association of negative connotations with the domain LEFT. The prohibition, however, would not likely have been on verbal reference to the LEFT, rather, it would have been on gestures and movements (i.e. using the left hand to write/shake hands with, etc.). Indeed, LEFT is such a fundamentally embodied notion that the direct effect of the taboo could not have been linguistic.¹⁴²

4.4 Conclusions

The goal of this chapter was to analyze the influence of embodied meaning, metaphor, and social/cultural cognition in the semasiological restructuring of the lexical item *siniestro* (< CL *sinister*). In this case—unlike those of *afeitar* and *ahorrar*—a previous corpus-based study was available for comparison with regard to the sequence of prototypical meanings (del Río

¹⁴¹ Although Uría Varela’s aforementioned suggestion (section 4.2.3.1) seems more likely: “[...] más bien hay que pensar en que *laeuus* y *scaeuus* eran términos técnicos del lenguaje de la adivinación y que [...] probablemente fueron desplazados poco a poco en el uso corriente, mientras que *sinister* se habría impuesto como designación popular, favorecido por la semejanza morfológica con *dexter*” ([...] but rather one must consider that *laeuus* and *scaeuus* were technical terms used in the language of divination and that [...] they were probably displaced little-by-little in everyday usage, while *sinister* would have been imposed as a popular designation, favored by its morphological similarity with *dexter*.) (1997: 168).

¹⁴² In fact, Davies (2002-) shows a higher frequency for *siniestro* in the thirteenth century (83.39 words per million), than even *diestro* (55.39 words per million).

Entonado 2010). There was only a minor difference in the data: my analysis of the data found in Davies (2002-) showed a shift from LEFT to SINISTER/EVIL during the seventeenth century, while del Río Entonado's analysis of the data from *CORDE* showed the same shift slightly later, between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In both studies, the most notable characteristic of this development is the fact that both the spatial (LEFT) and non-spatial (SINISTER/EVIL) senses are attested in Classical texts, but by the time we get to the 'earliest' (twelfth-century) Castilian Ibero-Romance texts, it appears to have all but lost association to negative connotations, only to regain the association in the subsequent centuries, with full force.

With regard to the intervening social factors, I have proposed an alternate hypothesis to the one already put forward by other scholars (Uría Varela 1997; Penny 2002; del Río Entonado 2010, 2012a,b; etc.), namely that the semasiological development of *siniestro* was primarily influenced by a linguistic prohibition related to taboo associations with LEFT, which led to its replacement by *izquierdo* for reference to that semantic domain. I have shown that a socio-cognitive approach provides a more nuanced account of the development. The social factors involved in the semasiological development of *siniestro* had more to do with the metaphorical extension that led to association with negative connotations (ABNORMAL IS BAD > LEFT-HANDEDNESS IS ABNORMAL > THE LEFT HAND IS BAD > THE LEFT IS BAD) than with a prohibition on mention of its referent. Far from having been replaced or avoided—unlike, perhaps, *laeuus* and *scaeuus* in the Classical period—*siniestro* is still a perfectly viable word that continues to be used for reference to occurrences or objects that the speaker evaluates as negative.

The apparent near-universality of the social preference for the RIGHT correlates with the near-universality of right-handedness. It does seem most likely that—in apparent agreement with the taboo hypothesis—an embodied understanding of LEFT was associated by metaphor to

negative connotations, and spread through the processes involved in the development of a collective cognitive structure. Nevertheless, the status of LEFT as a fundamental, basic, domain within embodied experience prevents it from being avoided as a point of reference. This would not preclude maintenance of polysemy—that is, there would be nothing preventing the use of *sinistro* for both the spatial and the non-spatial meanings (as is done, for example, in Italian with *sinistro*)—but the availability of *izquierdo* as a more neutral term allowed *sinistro*'s semasiological profile to specialize to the point of losing the spatial domain.

An obvious example of a word that has undergone a similar development to that of *sinistro* is *diestro*. The two cases are similar in that they have both shifted from a spatial sense to a non-spatial one (in the case of *diestro*, multiple senses with positive connotations have arisen, including 'dexterous', 'wise', and 'favorable'). The main difference, however, is that *diestro* has maintained the spatial sense to a much greater degree (it still means 'right-handed' and 'toward the right'). Nevertheless, the same social and cognitive factors come into play, but in a converse fashion: for *diestro*, the metaphorical associations would have taken the form

NORMAL IS GOOD > RIGHT-HANDEDNESS IS NORMAL > THE RIGHT HAND IS GOOD > THE RIGHT IS GOOD.

5 General conclusions

The principal objective of this project has been to show how a socio-cognitive approach leads to a deeper understanding of semasiological restructuring, in light of the developments observed in the Spanish lexical items *afeitar*, *ahorrar*, and *sinistro*. The case studies have exemplified how both social and cognitive factors likely intervened in the development of each lexical item's semasiological profile. In this final chapter, I will revisit the most important aspects of the socio-cognitive approach, summarize the findings from each case study, and draw some general conclusions.

There are three important points to be made about the cognitive component of the approach. In the first place, the assumption that linguistic meaning is encyclopedic (section 1.2) has established a plausible basis for integrating social and cognitive factors into a theory about the nature of semasiological profiles. The evidence presented in Chapters 2-4 suggests that both types of factors are equally important for understanding a word's overall meaning—in the sense that social factors are not “extra-linguistic”, rather they are fundamental to the structure of the semasiological profiles in question. In the case of *afeitar*, for example, the social reality that applying cosmetics was negatively evaluated likely played a role in speakers' choice not to use that word to refer to the semantic domain APPLY COSMETICS, and consequently that meaning was cognitively “pushed” from the center to the periphery of the word's profile. Notably, a non-encyclopedic approach to meaning would not be able to account for that process.

The second point regards the elements of a semasiological profile (i.e. domains) and their organization. Here I have employed the cognitive notion of conceptualization (sections 1.3 and 1.4). The idea that different types of domains (i.e. basic and non-basic) can be linked through the cognitive mechanism of metaphor to form new categories is fundamental to understanding how

meanings change. This was most prominent in the case of *sinistro*, where the basic domain LEFT was linked through metaphor with the non-basic domain BAD/NEGATIVE. The resulting conceptualization, LEFT IS BAD, became increasingly salient, leading to its entrenchment in the minds of speakers and its eventual conventionalization across the speech community. With the aid of a more neutral lexical alternative for reference to LEFT (namely, *izquierdo*), LEFT was eventually marginalized within the semasiological profile of *sinistro*, and BAD/NEGATIVE became the central, prototypical domain. A theoretical approach that does not allow for the cognitive reorganization of semantic domains through metaphor could not account for this process.

Another consequence of employing the notions of encyclopedic meaning and conceptualization is that they allowed me to posit what I have referred to as underlying domains, which diachronically connect one prototypical domain with another. For the verb *afeitar*, I have proposed that the underlying domain would be BEAUTIFY, which links the meanings ADORN, APPLY COSMETICS, and SHAVE. In the case of *ahorrar*, SET ASIDE links FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER, AVOID A DIFFICULTY, and SAVE MONEY/RESOURCES. All of the domains mentioned (the underlying ones and the prototypical ones) are assumed to have been present—alongside many others—within the semasiological profiles of each respective lexical item across time, but with different degrees of salience/prototypicality at different times. Assuming the presence of the underlying domains provided a basis for metaphorical relations (e.g. ADORNING IS BEAUTIFICATION, APPLYING COSMETICS IS BEAUTIFICATION, and so on).¹⁴³ Of course, this is not meant to imply that there were not conceptual links between the prototypical domains themselves. For example, APPLY COSMETICS can be interpreted as a metonymic extension of

¹⁴³ Note that there is no need to posit an underlying domain for *sinistro*, since there are only two relevant domains (LEFT and SINISTER/EVIL).

ADORN (that is, the former is a specific type of the latter), but the links are less clear in cases like FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER and SAVE MONEY. It is not clear whether an underlying domain could be posited for any given lexical item whose semasiological profile has undergone a high degree of restructuring, but it seems likely, given the apparent rarity of changes as drastic as FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER > SAVE MONEY. Confirmation of this would be a topic for future research.

The third point is that the cognitive notion of semantic prototypes, based here on frequency of use, is an indispensable tool for determining how semasiological profiles change. The notion that within the realm of related semantic domains some are more cognitively salient (i.e. prototypical) than others—yet they do not entirely exclude the less-salient ones—helps to explain how words apparently add and subtract meanings in the first place. That is, a word's primary meaning at one point in time does not completely disappear from its semasiological profile once another meaning takes its place and, conversely, a peripheral meaning has the potential to become a prototypical meaning, given the proper circumstances. This is most notable in the case of *ahorrar*, where the semantic domain MONEY was marginally involved in the activity of freeing slaves and prisoners, but eventually overtook FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER as an integral part of the verb's prototypical meaning. Likewise, LEFT is still vaguely present in the semasiological profile of *sinistro* (e.g. in the expression *a diestra y siniestra* 'everywhere'), but it is certainly no longer the word's prototypical domain.


One of the most important contributions of this project has been its focus on the 'socio' part of the socio-cognitive approach. Consideration of social factors has provided an invaluable complement to cognitive factors when establishing how a particular change came about within a lexical item's semasiological profile. In the case of *afeitar*, the development from ADORN to APPLY COSMETICS/SHAVE is fairly straightforward in cognitive terms: the latter meanings derive

from the former through a metonymic shift (i.e. applying cosmetics and shaving are types of personal adornment or, more generally, beautification). The loss of *APPLY COSMETICS*, however, can only be fully understood by analyzing the social context in which speakers stopped using the word to convey that meaning, one which involved an increasing amount of criticism toward the act of applying cosmetics. In the case of *ahorrar*, the shift from *FREE A SLAVE/PRISONER* to *AVOID A DIFFICULTY* makes sense in purely cognitive terms, given that the state of being a slave or prisoner is a difficulty that can be avoided by obtaining freedom, but the choice on the part of speakers to use the verb to mean *SAVE MONEY* is most easily understood in the context of a series of economic crises, wherein money could scarcely be saved by the majority of speakers, followed by economic recovery, wherein a middle class began to form and, for the first time, the majority of speakers had the means to save money for future use. Of course, from a cognitive perspective, saving money can be viewed as a means to avoid economic difficulties, but the specific inclusion of *MONEY* in the verb's semasiological profile requires an analysis of social factors. Finally, the development of *sinistro*, perhaps the most obvious case presented here, cannot be understood in purely cognitive terms: there is no clear, purely cognitive association between *LEFT* and *SINISTER/EVIL*, but analysis of the distribution of left-handed people (i.e. approximately 10% of the population), combined with the social practice of viewing abnormality with fear or disdain—itsself reinforced by religious beliefs and practices—makes the basis for metaphorical association between the two cognitive domains more obvious. Of course, I would not claim that it is necessary to invoke social factors to account for the semasiological development of every single lexical item, but they are clearly useful when cognitive factors alone lead to a dead-end. I will return to this point below.

In addition to including the abovementioned social factors, I have employed the social/cultural cognition model (section 1.6). My principal motivation was to provide an account of the nature of language “structure” in general, and in particular of semasiological profiles. From a structuralist perspective, languages change independently of speakers (Lass 1980, 1997, among many others). Indeed, most, if not all, changes to the structure of a language occur without the conscious effort of the language’s users—certainly at the macro/collective level, but also at the micro/individual level. The evidence presented in this study, however, has demonstrated that speakers are integrally involved in structural change. The crux of the issue is whether the structure of a given language, at a given time, should be perceived as essentially the same across a group of individual (presumably native) speakers, or whether it should be seen as a more heterogeneous entity, distributed in an unequal way across a group of speakers, itself existing in a constant state of change.¹⁴⁴ The social/cultural cognition model offers a clear illustration of the latter perspective. Language structure emerges from interactions between speakers, and it also guides those interactions. In other words, language change crucially depends on the involvement of speakers. With regard to the semasiological profiles that I have proposed in the case studies, my assumption is that the evidence—which I derived from a usage/corpus-based analysis—represents an advanced stage in the process shown in Figure 1.5 (reproduced below). That is, each of the semasiological profiles that I have proposed within the studies is assumed, by virtue of the fact that it appears in written texts, to exist at the center of the figure, as a part of the collective cognitive structure (i.e. macro-level language structure), after social interaction and individual cognitive restructuring took place.

¹⁴⁴ While it is only tangentially related to the present study, it is worth mentioning that this also has implications for the study of first- and second-language acquisition: if the target is a heterogeneous structure, then notions such as incomplete or imperfect acquisition become problematic, if not meaningless, because *all* speakers would lack full knowledge of the target structure.

Figure 1.5 Development of collective cognitive structures.



The social factors that I have included in my analysis (moral objections to applying cosmetics, economic issues, fear of/disdain for abnormality, etc.) played a guiding role at the social interaction/individual cognitive restructuring level, resulting in gradual changes at the collective level.

Finally, it should be noted that the semasiological focus that I have adopted here is not independent of an onomasiological one. Indeed, at various points I have mentioned the potential influence of related lexical items, most importantly the availability of *izquierdo* as an alternative to *sinistro* for reference to LEFT. In fact, the case studies could be viewed as starting points for larger studies on the meanings involved, although the questions would be different. One that comes immediately to mind is how to establish an onomasiological profile in the way that I have done semasiological profiles here; given the schematic and fluid nature of semantic domains, it

would generally be difficult to verify that multiple words truly refer to the same domain, especially if it is non-basic (note that the semantic content of basic domains, such as LEFT, is more clearly delineated than that of non-basic domains, such as THE RULES AND STRATEGIES OF CHESS). In any case, the starting point for said studies would be to find words that refer to the underlying domains for each respective word (e.g. BEAUTIFY and SET ASIDE), since those are key to understanding the cognitive component of the semasiological changes.

Returning to the point about semasiological restructuring in general, the three case studies presented here suggest that each word develops according to cognitive principles that are applied to varying degrees. All of the principles described in Chapter 1 (metaphor, non-referential meaning, entrenchment, etc.) are present in the development of all three of the studied words, but their relative importance is different in each case. For example, the development of *afeitar* involves a greater degree of influence of non-referential meaning within its semasiological profile than does *ahorrar*, while *siniestro*'s development relies more heavily on metaphorical extension than the other two. Moreover, different facets of the social context in which the words were used are implicated in each case; while all three words were obviously used by the same speakers and in the same society at any given time, their development was influenced by differing contexts—*afeitar* and *siniestro* were influenced by moral/religious practices and discussions, while *ahorrar* had more to do with economic issues. Nevertheless, the parallel examples that I identified in the conclusions of each case study (*gay* and *afeitar*, *afeitar/manejar/conducir* and *ahorrar*, and *diestro* and *siniestro*) suggest that the approach itself is useful for understanding a number of different cases.

In sum, the case studies presented in Chapters 2-4 have shown that a socio-cognitive approach can provide meaningful insights with respect to semasiological change in ways that

other approaches cannot. While the focus here lay on three lexical items, in principle the same methodology could be applied to any word that has undergone a high degree of semasiological restructuring.

Abbreviations used in the text and in the references section

BDELC	Corominas 1973
BETA	Faulhaber 1997-
BNM	Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid
BNP	Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris
CL	Classical Latin
CORDE	Real Academia Española 2017a
CREA	Real Academia Española 2017b
DCECH	Corominas & Pascual 1980-1991
DCELC	Corominas 1976 [1955-1957]
DELL	Ernout & Meillet 1985 [1932]
DEM	Müller 1995
DHLE	Real Academia Española 1972 [1933]
DPD	Real Academia 2017d
DRAE	Real Academia Española 2017c
FEW	von Wartburg 1969-1983
HSMS	Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ms.	Manuscript
NDHE	Real Academia Española 2017e
OED	Oxford English Dictionary
REW	Meyer-Lübke 1935
TLL	Thesaurus Linguae Latinae 1900-

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