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United States Department of State

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
**Foreign
Relations
of the
United
States**



**The Lansing Papers
1914-1920
Volume II**

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**Department of State
Washington**



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THE LANSING PAPERS
1914-1920

(In Two Volumes)

Volume II



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REPORT OF GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS, MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL		
1920 Feb. 19	<p><i>From the Military Representative on the Supreme War Council</i> Encloses report on the work of the Supreme War Council (text printed).</p>	199

RUSSIA

1915 Undated	<p><i>Memorandum by the Counselor for the Department of State of Interviews With the Russian Ambassador, April 2 and April 6, 1915</i> Discussion of certain comments upon Russia and the Czar appearing in President Wilson's book <i>When a Man Comes to Himself</i>.</p>	307
Apr. 3	<p><i>To President Wilson</i> Reports interview with the Russian Ambassador concerning comments upon Russia and the Czar in the reprint of President Wilson's book.</p>	307
Apr. 5	<p><i>From President Wilson</i> Requests that the Russian Ambassador be told that the passages referred to did not express the President's present opinion.</p>	308
1916 Undated [Rec.'d May 2] (526)	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)</i> Reports arrival in Russia. Comments on conditions there.</p>	309
May 2	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Russia</i> Comments on conditions in Russia.</p>	310
May 7	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Russia</i> Comments on conditions in Russia.</p>	313
July 25	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Russia</i> Comments on conditions in Russia.</p>	315
Aug. 14	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Russia</i> Comments on conditions in Russia.</p>	318
1917 Feb. 11	<p><i>From the Ambassador in Russia</i> Comments on conditions in Russia.</p>	320

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Date and number	Subject	Page
1917 Apr. 5	<i>To President Wilson</i> Suggests a communication to the Russian Government congratulating the Russian people upon the establishment of democratic institutions in that country.	324
Apr. 11	<i>To President Wilson</i> Suggests the sending of a commission to Russia. Encloses telegram of April 10 (text printed) from the Ambassador in Russia regarding the unsatisfactory military and naval situation there.	325
Apr. 12	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves of the suggestion of a commission to Russia. Discussion of possible personnel of such a commission.	326
Apr. 12	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the personnel of the proposed commission to Russia.	326
Apr. 19	<i>From President Wilson</i> Forwards a tentative list of the personnel of the proposed commission to Russia.	327
Apr. 20	<i>To President Wilson</i> Suggests the sending of a message intended for the Russian people expressing the confidence of the American people in the success of democratic government there and the American desire to aid Russia in the struggle against Germany.	328
Apr. 30	<i>To President Wilson</i> Suggests sending a message to the Ambassador in Russia intended to remove any erroneous impression that joint conferences were being held between the American Government and the Allies without Russia being a party thereto.	328
May 6	<i>From the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia</i> Suggests that the Railroad Commission to Russia be attached to the Root Mission.	329
May 7	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards Mr. Root's letter regarding the Railroad Commission. Encloses two drafts (texts printed) of a proposed letter to Mr. Stevens of the Railroad Commission outlining the relation intended to exist between the Root Mission and the Railroad Commission.	329
May 7	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that it would be undesirable to make the Railroad Commission subsidiary to the Root Mission.	331
May 8	<i>From the Ambassador in Russia</i> Comments on conditions in Russia. Encloses editorial from the Petrograd <i>Rjetch</i> (text printed).	331
May 9	<i>To the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia</i> Conveys the President's views with regard to the relationship between the Root Mission and the Railroad Commission.	336
May 10	<i>From President Wilson</i> Forwards a further tentative list of the personnel of the Root Mission.	337

RUSSIA—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1917 May 17	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports that certain passages from the President's addresses are being used by the radical socialists to promote a policy which would remove the incentive to Russian offensive military operations. Suggests the issuance of an interpretation of these passages to prevent such an effect.	338
June 1	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses hope that the new forces in Russia may be guided by the democratic principles set forth in the recent statement by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.	338
July 5	<i>To President Wilson</i> Expresses the opinion that it would be unwise for Mr. Root or any members of the Root Mission to stop in Japan on their return to the United States.	339
Aug. 13	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses a message (text printed) to the people of Russia from the United States Railway Advisory Commission issued by the Stevens Commission on July 4, 1917. Expresses belief that Mr. Stevens may be assuming unwarranted authority. Recommends that Stevens be told that the Commission is not a diplomatic one.	339
Aug. 14	<i>From President Wilson</i> Encloses the text of a message to be sent to Mr. Stevens reminding him that the impression should not be created that he or his associates speak for the Government of the United States.	342
Sept. 10	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses a message (text printed) from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador in which gratification is expressed that the principles upon which the President's answer to the Pope's peace note was based fully agreed with Russian policy.	342
Dec. 10	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of whether support ought to be given to certain Russian elements opposed to the Bolsheviki.	343
Dec. 12	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses the draft of a message (text printed) for the American representative on the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance outlining the considerations governing possible assistance to the Kaledine group in Russia.	345
1918 Jan. 2	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the Bolshevik communication of December 29, 1917, addressed to the peoples and governments of the Allied countries. Expresses opinion that no reply should be made.	346
Jan. 10	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses draft statement (text printed) to be issued by the Secretary of State outlining the attitude of the United States Government toward the Russian situation.	349
Jan. 20	<i>From President Wilson</i> Discussion of Japanese naval activity at Vladivostok.	351

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Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Jan. 24	<i>To President Wilson</i> Inquires whether the telegram sent to the Ambassador in Japan on January 20 regarding proposals for Japanese action in Vladivostok and in Siberia would be sufficient for the time.	351
Jan. 28	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that the action referred to in the preceding document would be sufficient for the present.	352
Feb. 15	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of policy to be adopted toward revolutionary forces in Europe and toward the proposed Socialist meeting at Stockholm.	352
Feb. 27	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports interviews with the British and French Ambassadors regarding Japanese desire to occupy Siberia with a military force.	353
Undated	<i>Draft Telegram to the Ambassador in Japan</i> Intended to indicate the unwillingness of the United States to join the Allied Governments in asking the Japanese Government to act in Siberia. (Footnote: This draft was handed to Secretary Lansing on March 1. It was shown to the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors but was not sent.)	355
Mar. 5	<i>From the Counselor for the Department of State</i> Reports interviews with the British, French, Italian, and Japanese Ambassadors regarding the Siberian situation.	356
Mar. 21	<i>To President Wilson</i> Transmits telegrams received by the British Ambassador from the Foreign Office dealing with the Siberian situation.	357
Mar. 22	<i>From President Wilson</i> Does not regard the papers received from the British Ambassador as sufficient cause for altering the American position on Siberia.	357
Mar. 24	<i>To President Wilson</i> Considerations regarding possible occupation of important points in Siberia by a German military force.	357
Undated [Rec'd May 18]	<i>From the Japanese Ambassador</i> Conveys the substance of a note exchanged between the Japanese and Chinese Governments on March 25, 1918, regarding consultation on the subject of the penetration of German influence into Russian territories in the Far East.	359
Apr. 8	<i>From the British Embassy</i> Informs of the receipt of a telegram from the Foreign Office regarding employment of American railway experts in Russia.	359
Apr. 18	<i>From President Wilson</i> Requests a memorandum containing information about nuclei of self-government in Siberia.	360
May 16	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports interviews with the British Ambassador, who presented two memoranda regarding intervention in Russia and Siberia.	360

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Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 May 20	<i>From President Wilson</i> Comments on the papers presented by the British Ambassador regarding intervention in Russia and Siberia.	361
June 13	<i>To President Wilson</i> Suggests the creation of a "Commission for the Relief of Russia" to be headed by Mr. Hoover, and to be guided in all questions of foreign policy by the Department of State.	362
June 17	<i>From President Wilson</i> Comments on the suggestion of the Minister in China that Czecho-Slovak troops might be organized to resist the Germans in Siberia.	363
June 19	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a report from the Consul at Moscow regarding the sentiments of the Russian Cooperative Societies.	363
June 19	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that the Russian Cooperative Societies may be useful forces in Siberia.	364
June 23	<i>To President Wilson</i> Expresses belief that the Czecho-Slovak forces in Siberia might form a nucleus for military occupation of the Siberian railway.	364
June 26	<i>From the Japanese Ambassador</i> Transmits paraphrased copy (text printed) of a telegram received from the Japanese Government regarding the Japanese reply to the proposal of the Allied Governments to undertake common action in Siberia.	365
July 1	<i>From Lt. Col. Raymond Robins</i> Forwards a statement of recommendations concerning the Russian situation (text printed) containing suggestions for American economic cooperation with Russia.	365
July 8	<i>To President Wilson</i> Inquires whether Chinese troops holding the Manchurian railway ought to be considered in connection with the guarding of the Siberian railway in aid of the Czecho-Slovaks and whether the Allied Governments, including the Chinese, ought to be advised of the proposed American policy with regard to Siberia.	372
July 10	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on the subject of the command of the combined forces in Siberia.	373
Aug. 16	<i>From the British Chargé</i> Informs that the British Government have accepted the view of the Japanese Government that the supreme command of the Allied forces in Siberia should be Japanese.	373
Aug. 18	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discusses the extension of Japanese military activities in Siberia. Encloses a communication (text printed) from Japanese Foreign Office to Japanese Ambassador concerning the situation at Manchuli. Encloses a communication from the French Ambassador (text printed) conveying information received about the military situation in Siberia. Encloses a telegram (text printed) from Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the extension of American assistance to the Czecho-Slovaks.	374

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1918 Aug. 22	<i>To President Wilson</i> Transmits a communication from the French Embassy proposing the sending of a High Commissioner to Siberia. Recommends that reply be made that the American Government does not intend to appoint a High Commissioner.	378
Aug. 23	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves Secretary Lansing's proposed reply to the French Embassy indicating that the American Government does not intend to appoint a High Commissioner in Siberia.	378
Aug. 29	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the question of supplies for the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia.	379
Sept. 2	<i>From President Wilson</i> Suggests a conference with Mr. Baruch on the question of supplies for the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia. Comments on the relationship between the Japanese and Czecho-Slovak military forces.	380
Sept. 4	<i>To President Wilson</i> Suggests the possibility of a loan to the Czecho-Slovak National Council for the purchase in this country of supplies for Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia.	380
Sept. 5	<i>From President Wilson</i> Disapproves Secretary Lansing's suggestion of a loan for the purchase of supplies for the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia.	381
Sept. 5	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports a conversation with Mr. Baruch regarding Czecho-Slovak relief.	381
Sept. 9	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the question of supplies for the Czecho-Slovak military forces in Siberia and Russia, relief of the civilian population in Siberia, and assistance to the civilian population on the Murman Coast and in the Archangel District.	381
Sept. 14	<i>To the General Director of the Foreign Section of the Committee on Public Information</i> Requests the postponement of publication of documents attacking Lenin and Trotsky in order to insure the safety of Americans in Russia.	384
Sept. 14	<i>From the General Director of the Foreign Section of the Committee on Public Information</i> Expresses belief that publication of the documents would not add to the peril of Americans in Russia.	385
Sept. 17	<i>From President Wilson</i> Instructs that inquiry should be made of the British, French, and Italian Governments as to the nature and authority of the so-called Allied Military Council at Vladivostok and that intimation be given that the American Government does not recognize the authority of such a body.	385
Sept. 20	<i>From President Wilson</i> Comments on a telegram from the Secretary of War regarding M. Clemenceau's request that additional American troops be sent to Murmansk.	386

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Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Sept. 24	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the position of the Czecho-Slovak force west of the Urals.	386
Sept. 27	<i>To President Wilson</i> Informs that Secretary Lansing had been told by the Italian Ambassador that Italy would send no High Commissioner to Siberia and that the Italian Government desired to conform to the American policy in such matters.	388
Sept. 30	<i>From the President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council</i> Encloses notes (text printed) on the American memorandum of September 27 on the subject of the military policy of the United States in Russia and Siberia. Comments on the military situation in Russia and Siberia.	388
1919 Dec. 4	<i>To President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that the question of American policy with regard to the Russian situation should be laid before Congress.	392
Dec. 23	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses a memorandum to be read to the Japanese Ambassador discussing the withdrawal of American forces from Siberia.	392
1921 Oct. 3	<i>Notes Prepared by Mr. Robert Lansing Concerning Certain Phases of the Negotiations and Conversations Relating to Military Intervention in Siberia in 1918</i>	393

THE FAR EAST

JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES

1915 Jan. 23	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports conversations with the Japanese Ambassador regarding the conclusion of a treaty which would guarantee to Japanese in the United States equal treatment with other aliens.	399
Jan. 27	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses the opinion that such an agreement should be concluded at an opportune time, but that there should first be considered Japanese intentions in China and the Japanese attitude toward the open door in the Far East.	400
Mar. 8	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discusses possible relief of the Japanese situation on the Pacific Coast by dispersion of the Japanese throughout the country.	400
Mar. 8	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that Secretary Bryan's proposed solution might aggravate the situation.	402
1917 May 16	<i>From Colonel E. M. House</i> Encloses correspondence (texts printed) with the Japanese Ambassador concerning plans for improving Japanese-American relations by adjustments in the treatment of Japanese resident in the United States.	402

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ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD FOREIGN
INFLUENCE IN CHINA

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1915		
Feb. 22	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the 21 demands of Japan on China.	405
Feb. 25	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves of presenting very frankly to Japan the American views on the 21 demands.	407
Mar. 1	<i>From the Counselor for the Department of State</i> Comments on the position to be taken by the United States with regard to the 21 demands.	407
Mar. 10	<i>From President Wilson</i> Inquires whether the note to Japan on the 21 demands has been sent.	409
Mar. 12	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves the note to Japan on the 21 demands.	409
Mar. 22	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of a telegram of March 21, 1915, received from the Ambassador in Japan describing an interview with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in which various aspects of Japanese policy in China were discussed.	409
Mar. 24	<i>From President Wilson</i> Comments on the telegram received from the Ambassador in Japan referred to in the preceding document.	411
Mar. 25	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a proposed telegram to the Ambassador in Japan in which he is instructed to inform the Japanese Government that the United States has no objection to an arrangement between Japan and China looking toward the withholding by China of any concession to any foreign power which might involve harbor improvement on the coast of Fukien or the establishment of a coaling station or naval base on that coast by any foreign power.	412
Mar. 25	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards an additional proposed telegram in regard to the Japanese demands on the subject of advisers, arms, and police supervision in China.	413
Mar. 26	<i>To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)</i> Outlines position to be taken with regard to the Japanese demands on the subject of advisers, arms, and police supervision in China.	414
Apr. 6	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a telegram (text printed) from the Ambassador in Japan conveying information which he had received from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding Japanese demands on the subject of the Han-yeh-p'ing works.	415
Apr. 14	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves the despatch of a telegram to the Minister in China indicating continued friendly interest on the part of the United States in the industrial and political welfare of China.	416
Apr. 15	<i>To the Minister in China (tel.)</i> Conveys the text of a statement to be given out to the effect that the American Government has not surrendered any of its treaty rights in China and continues its friendly interest in everything concerning the industrial and political welfare of China.	417

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ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD FOREIGN
INFLUENCE IN CHINA—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 Apr. 27	<i>From President Wilson</i> Discussion of the desirability of making public the Government's position with regard to the Chinese situation.	417
May 3	<i>To President Wilson</i> Comments on a memorandum left by the Japanese Ambassador on April 30, 1915, regarding the progress of negotiations between Japan and China.	418
May 6	<i>To the Minister in China (tel.)</i> Instructions to call upon the Foreign Office and urge that negotiations between China and Japan be conducted amicably.	422
May 6	<i>To the Chargé in Japan (tel.)</i> Instructions to deliver to Count Okuma a personal and unofficial communication from Secretary Bryan containing an appeal for the use of his influence for the maintenance of peace between Japan and China.	422
May 6 (1519)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Instructions to inquire of the Foreign Office whether the British Government would join in an appeal to Japan and China to continue their negotiations in a spirit of friendship. (Sent, <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , to the Ambassadors in France and Russia.)	423
May 6	<i>To the Chargé in Japan (tel.)</i> Forwards text of personal telegram to be delivered to Count Okuma and text of telegram to the Ambassadors in Great Britain, France, and Russia. Declares it to be of highest importance that friendly relations between Japan and China should not be interrupted.	423
May 7	<i>From the Counselor for the Department of State</i> Forwards a note to be sent to Japan and China indicating that the United States Government cannot recognize any agreements between Japan and China which would impair the treaty rights of the United States in China, the political or territorial integrity of China, or the open-door policy.	424
May 8	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain (text printed) giving the text of a memorandum from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in Great Britain, and a telegram (text printed) from the Chargé in Japan in which he reported the delivery of Secretary Bryan's personal telegram to Count Okuma.	424
May 10	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that Sir Edward Grey's action was wise and that Secretary Bryan's personal message to Count Okuma would have more than a temporary effect.	426
May 10	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves Mr. Lansing's suggestion contained in his letter of May 7.	426
Oct. 27	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the possible restoration of a monarchy in China.	426

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ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD FOREIGN
INFLUENCE IN CHINA—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 Oct. 28	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> Reports concern of Chinese Ministers over Japanese attitude toward possible restoration of monarchy in China.	427
Oct. 29	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses a memorandum from the Chinese Minister regarding the establishment of a monarchical form of government in China.	428
Oct. 31	<i>From President Wilson</i> Suggests that intimation be given to the Japanese and other Governments that it is the American point of view that a change in the form of government of China would be wholly a domestic question.	428
Dec. 4	<i>From the Minister in China (tel.)</i> Comments on the attitude of Great Britain, Russia, and Japan toward the situation in China.	429
Dec. 5	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that a conversation should be had with the Japanese Ambassador about the Chinese situation and that Japan should be informed how the United States would look upon Japanese efforts to gain further control of China.	430
1917 June 22	<i>From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)</i> Reports that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had handed him on June 18 a copy of a memorandum of the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State of June 15, 1917. Reports that this copy contained the declaration, "Japan possesses paramount interests both political and economic in China".	430
June 30	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses copy of memorandum read to Secretary Lansing by the Japanese Ambassador on June 15, 1917, containing the request that the statement made by Secretary Bryan in his note of March 13, 1915, to the Japanese Ambassador, regarding American interest in China, should be confirmed. Suggests a form of reply.	430
July 3	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves Secretary Lansing's proposed reply with certain alterations.	431

THE LANSING-ISHII NEGOTIATIONS

1917 Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, September 6, 1917</i> Discussion of cooperation between Japan and the Allies and the United States in the war. Reference to the disposition of the former German islands in the South Pacific. Secretary Lansing's proposal that the co-belligerents against Germany should redeclare the open-door policy.	432
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THE LANSING-ISHII NEGOTIATIONS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1917 Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, September 22, 1917</i> Further discussion of the open door and the proposed redeclaration on that subject. Discussion of the nature of Japanese interest in China.	435
Sept. 25	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses memoranda of two interviews with Viscount Ishii. Requests the President's views.	437
Undated	<i>From President Wilson</i> Acknowledges the receipt of the memoranda referred to in the preceding document. Mentions a conversation between himself and Viscount Ishii.	438
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference with the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, September 26, 1917</i> Account of discussion with Viscount Ishii. Preparation of a draft (text printed) of a note setting forth the policies of the two Governments with regard to China.	438
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, October 8, 1917</i> Submission by Viscount Ishii of a counterdraft of the proposed note relative to a redeclaration of the open-door policy.	441
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, October 10, 1917</i> Account of a discussion with Viscount Ishii concerning textual changes in the proposed note relative to the open-door policy.	441
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, October 20, 1917</i> Further discussion of textual changes in the proposed note.	443
Oct. 20	<i>To President Wilson</i> Informs of intention to request Viscount Ishii to add to the notes exchanged a confidential memorandum. Encloses draft (text printed) of confidential memorandum intended to accompany the reply of the Japanese Government in the proposed exchange of notes.	444
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, October 22, 1917</i> Submission to Viscount Ishii of Secretary Lansing's proposed confidential memorandum to accompany the reply of the Japanese Government, and Secretary Lansing's redraft (text printed) of the proposed notes.	445
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, October 27, 1917</i> Information received from Viscount Ishii to the effect that the Japanese Government did not favor the confidential memorandum proposed by Secretary Lansing, but that instead he was instructed to propose a protocol in the nature of a joint memorandum.	447

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THE LANSING-ISHII NEGOTIATIONS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1917 Oct. 27	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports the interview of October 27 with Viscount Ishii and refers to the Japanese proposal for a protocol to be retained confidentially.	448
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, October 29, 1917</i> Discussion of textual changes in the proposed protocol.	448
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, October 31, 1917</i> Information received from Viscount Ishii that the suggested amendments in the proposed protocol were acceptable to his Government. Discussion of arrangements for publication of the notes to be exchanged.	449
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission, November 2, 1917</i> Account of the exchange of notes and the signature of the protocol.	449
Nov. 2	<i>Protocol to Accompany Exchange of Notes Between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission</i>	450
Nov. 5	<i>Memorandum by Mr. Hugh S. Gibson, Division of Foreign Intelligence, Department of State</i> Copies of the notes exchanged between Secretary Lansing and the Japanese Special Ambassador handed to the Chinese Minister.	451
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of an Interview With the Chinese Minister, November 12, 1917</i> Discussion of Chinese attitude toward the exchange of notes between Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii.	451

SHANTUNG

1919 Aug. 4	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses public statement of the Japanese Government in regard to Shantung. Suggests that the President prepare a statement of his understanding of the agreement reached at Paris with regard to Shantung. Encloses copy of a draft (text printed) of a proposed declaration to be made by Japan regarding the Shantung question which had been submitted to Baron Makino, Mr. Balfour, and M. Clemenceau at Paris.	454
Aug. 6	<i>From President Wilson</i> Forwards statement to be given to the press with regard to Shantung.	455

LATIN AMERICA

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Date and number	Subject	Page
1914 June 16	<i>From the Counselor for the Department of State</i> Encloses a memorandum (text printed) entitled "Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine, and Its Need of Restatement."	459
1915 Feb. 25	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a communication received from the French Ambassador regarding French interests in Haiti in which the proposal was made that France should be taken into partnership in measures proposed for the financial reorganization of Haiti. Suggests that answer should be made that partnership with any country in any political influence exerted in Haiti would be inconsistent with the Monroe Doctrine and that any American influence there would be exerted impartially for the protection of the interests of the nationals of all countries.	465
Feb. 26	<i>From President Wilson</i> Indicates agreement with Secretary Bryan's suggested answer to the French proposal with regard to Haiti.	466
Nov. 24	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a further memorandum on the "Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine" (extract printed).	466
Nov. 29	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that Secretary Lansing's argument in his memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine would appear to be unanswerable.	470

THE PROPOSED PAN-AMERICAN TREATY

1915 Jan. 28	<i>From President Wilson</i> Encloses draft article (text printed) for a proposed Pan-American Treaty.	471
Jan. 29	<i>From President Wilson</i> Encloses four draft articles of agreement (text printed) for proposed Pan-American Treaty.	472
Feb. 1	<i>To the Chilean Ambassador</i> Encloses draft of Pan-American Treaty. Suggests that the Ambassador call to discuss the language of the proposed convention. (Sent, <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , to the Argentine and Brazilian Ambassadors.)	473
Mar. 8	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports progress of negotiations with Brazil, Argentina, and Chile on the subject of the proposed Pan-American Treaty.	473
Mar. 8	<i>From President Wilson</i> Directs that the treaty be drawn in such a way that those nations not accepting it at once would have an opportunity to ratify it at a future time.	475

LATIN AMERICA

THE PROPOSED PAN-AMERICAN TREATY—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 Apr. 3	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports that the Chilean Ambassador had understood from Colonel House that the proposed treaty would not be presented to other countries unless it had the approval of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.	475
Apr. 5	<i>From President Wilson</i> Suggests a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador to ascertain whether he received the same understanding from Colonel House as the Chilean Ambassador.	476
Apr. 21	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a communication from the Chilean Ambassador in which it was stated that he had understood that the matter was not to be proposed to other governments unless it was approved by Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, and also containing objections to the guarantee of a republican form of government and to the guarantee of territorial integrity.	476
Apr. 22	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that it would be best to draft an agreement to which Argentina and Brazil would subscribe, leaving Chile free to decide whether to adhere or not.	479
Apr. 23	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Reports inquiry from the Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the attitude of the United States toward Uruguay's associating herself with the proposed agreement between the A. B. C. countries.	479
Apr. 24	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards the foregoing communication from the Chargé in Uruguay. Expresses opinion that the United States cannot undertake to decide who are to be included in the proposed agreement between the A. B. C. countries.	480
Apr. 26	<i>From President Wilson</i> Recommends a talk with the Argentine Ambassador on the matter discussed in the preceding letter.	481
Apr. 27	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves of draft of letter to the Chilean Ambassador regarding the proposed Pan-American Treaty.	481
Apr. 29	<i>To the Chilean Ambassador</i> Reply to the communication from the Chilean Ambassador discussed in Secretary Bryan's letter of April 21. Discussion of the Ambassador's impression that the treaty would not be presented to other governments unless it were first approved by Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Discussion of the objections raised to the guarantee of a republican form of government and to the guarantee of territorial integrity.	482
May 19	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a memorandum received from the Brazilian Ambassador regarding the proposed treaty. Suggests that the plan be communicated confidentially to the representatives of other Latin American countries.	484

LATIN AMERICA

THE PROPOSED PAN-AMERICAN TREATY—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 Sept. 10	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a telegram (text printed) from the Ambassador in Chile, who was of the opinion that the Chilean Government could be brought to accept substantially the President's plan for the proposed treaty and suggested that negotiations be opened on the subject at Santiago.	485
Sept. 11	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that the Ambassador in Chile should be authorized to proceed with negotiations at Santiago.	486
Oct. 12	<i>From Colonel E. M. House</i> Reviews his part in the negotiations for the proposed Pan-American Treaty.	486
Oct. 26	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports negotiations with the Argentine Ambassador, who suggested certain changes in the proposed treaty, including the removal of a time limit for the settlement of disputed territorial claims.	488
Oct. 27	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that, while alteration involving the removal of the time limit would be admissible, such concession should be the only one made.	489
Oct. 28	<i>To Colonel E. M. House</i> Informs of Secretary Lansing's conversations with the Argentine and Chilean Ambassadors. Expresses belief that the objection of the Chilean Ambassador to the guarantee of political independence had been overcome.	489
Oct. 30	<i>From Colonel E. M. House</i> Expresses gratification at the rapid progress of negotiations on the subject of the Pan-American Treaty. Expresses opinion that the time limit for the settlement of boundary disputes could be safely omitted.	490
Nov. 3	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the attitude of the Chilean Ambassador toward the proposed treaty.	490
Nov. 11	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a revised draft of the four propositions to be contained in the proposed Pan-American Treaty.	491
Dec. 30	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports that Secretary Lansing has seen the Ambassadors and nine of the Ministers of Latin American countries and has given them copies of the proposed treaty.	492
1916 Jan. 6	<i>To President Wilson</i> Suggests that it be made clear that the proposed treaty does not contemplate a specific guarantee of republican forms of government.	493
Jan. 24	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of influences at work to defeat the proposed treaty.	493

LATIN AMERICA

THE PROPOSED PAN-AMERICAN TREATY—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1916 Mar. 9	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a memorandum from the Chilean Ambassador regarding the omission from the treaty of the article concerning the settlement of boundary disputes by arbitration or agreement.	494
Mar. 17	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador, who suggested a compromise arrangement regarding the provisions of the treaty on the subject of the guarantee of territorial integrity.	494
Apr. 3	<i>From President Wilson</i> Suggests that Colonel House be requested to inform Mr. Fletcher regarding the negotiations which he had conducted on the subject of the proposed treaty.	495
Apr. 13	<i>To the Argentine Ambassador</i> Forwards draft articles (text printed) for the proposed Pan-American Treaty.	495
Aug. 9	<i>From the Ambassador to Mexico</i> Reports that no progress has been made in the negotiation of the Pan-American Treaty during the absence of Secretary Lansing.	496
1917 Apr. 8	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports a conversation between the Brazilian Ambassador and the Counselor for the Department of State in which it was intimated that Brazil desired to proceed with the negotiation of the treaty.	498
Apr. 17	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of difficulties which might arise through signatories of the proposed treaty becoming involved on either side in the European war.	498
Apr. 19	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that the questions raised by Secretary Lansing do not constitute difficulties of practical importance.	499
May 24	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Instructs that the Department does not desire that the proposed Pan-American Treaty be taken up with the Government of Brazil at the moment.	500

PURCHASE OF THE DANISH WEST INDIES

1915 June 16	<i>From President Wilson</i> Acknowledges receipt of papers dealing with previous negotiations with Denmark on the subject of the purchase of the Danish West Indies. Expresses hope that the matter may be taken up so that a treaty on the subject may be laid before the Senate at the next session.	501
Sept. 30	<i>From President Wilson</i> Indicates deep interest in proposed purchase of the Danish West Indies.	501

LATIN AMERICA

PURCHASE OF THE DANISH WEST INDIES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 Nov. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Danish Minister</i> Discussion of possible occupation of the islands by the United States in case a sale was not agreed upon.	501
Undated (Rec'd Dec. 1]	<i>From the Danish Minister</i> Forwards a communication received from the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs indicating that under the circumstances Denmark would not be able to refuse a proposition from the United States.	502
Dec. 4	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports progress during October and November of negotiations with the Danish Minister on the subject of the purchase of the Danish West Indies.	503
Dec. 5	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses gratification that the subject had been discussed with the Danish Minister in a frank and friendly manner.	504
Dec. 28	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses a memorandum (text printed) of an interview with the Danish Minister on December 27, 1915, regarding the monetary consideration involved in the purchase of the islands, in which the Danish Minister had made an offer to negotiate for their sale on the basis of a purchase price of 27 million dollars.	505
Dec. 29	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves Secretary Lansing's negotiations with the Danish Minister on the subject of the purchase.	506
1916 Jan. 5	<i>To President Wilson</i> Indicates belief that the amount requested by Denmark is high, but that the negotiations should not be allowed to fail on account of disagreement over the price.	506
Jan. 7	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses belief that the acquisition of the Danish West Indies is so important that the negotiations should not be broken off because of the question of price.	507
Jan. 22	<i>From the Danish Minister</i> Reports that his Government has agreed to the sale for the sum of 25 million dollars.	507
Mar. 11	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses draft of treaty providing for the cession of the Danish West Indies in consideration of 25 million dollars. Advises prompt action.	507
Aug. 28	<i>To the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations</i> Expresses opinion that the Senate should act on the Danish treaty at the earliest possible moment.	508
1917 Feb. 14	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discusses plans of naval representatives in the West Indies for the formal transfer of the islands.	509

LATIN AMERICA

PURCHASE OF THE DANISH WEST INDIES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1917 Feb. 15	<i>From President Wilson</i> Suggests a talk with the Secretary of the Navy with regard to the plans of naval representatives for the transfer of the islands.	510
Mar. 19	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of arrangements for the formal delivery of the islands and the question of a provisional government.	510
Mar. 26	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of formalities of the transfer of the islands.	511
Mar. 27	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves Secretary Lansing's plans regarding the transfer of the islands.	511

COLOMBIA

1915 July 31	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of situation with regard to the Treaty of April 6, 1914, between the United States and Colombia and the objections which had been raised thereto.	512
Aug. 2	<i>From President Wilson</i> Suggests an interview with Senator Stone regarding the obstacles in the Senate to the ratification of the treaty with Colombia.	513
Dec. 21	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses a memorandum from the Colombian Minister emphasizing the importance attached by Colombia to prompt ratification of the treaty.	514
Dec. 27	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses hope that early ratification of the treaty with Colombia may be brought about.	514
1916 Feb. 2	<i>From the Minister in Colombia to President Wilson</i> Comments on German activities in Colombia.	514
Mar. 1	<i>From President Wilson</i> Regards the adoption of the treaty with Colombia as of capital importance in view of German activities there.	516
1917 Mar. 23	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports belief that the treaty with Colombia could obtain the consent of the Senate only by the acceptance of several amendments.	516

COSTA RICA

1917 Feb. 7	<i>From President Wilson</i> Directs that a telegram be sent to the Minister in Costa Rica instructing him to inform Tinoco that no government set up by him would be recognized.	518
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LATIN AMERICA

COSTA RICA—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1917 Feb. 19	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports a conversation with the deposed President of Costa Rica, who was informed by Secretary Lansing that the United States would not recognize the Tinoco government.	518
Feb. 20	<i>From President Wilson</i> Comments on Secretary Lansing's conversation with the ex-President of Costa Rica.	519
May 23	<i>To President Wilson</i> Regards the situation in Costa Rica as an increasing cause of concern. Points out that Tinoco is favorable to the Allies in the European war.	519
Dec. 29	<i>From President Wilson</i> Admits difficulty of Costa Rican situation and comments on the projected revolution of Alfredo Volio.	521
Dec. 31	<i>To President Wilson</i> Indicates difficulty of Costa Rican situation, as American policy of nonrecognition of Tinoco runs contrary to American interests in the prosecution of the war.	521
1918 Jan. 1	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves Secretary Lansing's course with regard to projected revolution against the Tinoco government.	522

HAITI

1915 Aug. 7	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards draft instructions (text printed) from the Acting Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Caperton. Reports an interview with the Haitian Minister, who stated that the Haitian people were doubtful of American motives.	523
Aug. 9	<i>To President Wilson (tel.)</i> Proposes sending instructions to Admiral Caperton to allow the election of the President to take place whenever Haitians wish and containing, with specific mention of Mole St. Nicholas, an assurance that the United States desires no Haitian territory.	524
Aug. 9	<i>From President Wilson (tel.)</i> Approves message to Admiral Caperton, but instructs that with regard to Mole St. Nicholas it be stated that the Government of the United States would take up the question of the cession of the Mole along with other questions to be submitted to the reorganized Haitian Government.	525
Aug. 10	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses copy of instruction (text printed) sent by the Acting Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Caperton.	525
Aug. 13	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses copy of telegram to the Legation in Haiti directing the Chargé to negotiate and sign a treaty with the Haitian Government. Considers that speedy action should be taken in regard to the negotiations for such a treaty.	526

LATIN AMERICA

MEXICO

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 Mar. 5	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the Mexican situation and of language used by General Obregon which might arouse opposition to foreigners.	528
Mar. 6	<i>From President Wilson</i> Indicates that recent despatches from Mexico have caused him anxiety. Directs that General Carranza be informed that the course of General Obregon has renewed talk of joint action in Mexico by other governments.	529
Mar. 8	<i>From the Counselor for the Department of State</i> Discussion of results which would follow the employment of force in Mexico. Suggests that such consequences might be avoided by joint action by the United States and the A. B. C. powers. Discusses advantages and objections to such joint action.	529
Mar. 12	<i>From President Wilson</i> Discussion of General Carranza's action in closing the port of Progreso. Considers that General Carranza should be told that the United States cannot recognize his right to blockade the port to the exclusion of American commerce.	531
Mar. 13	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards a copy of the message to be presented to General Carranza in regard to Progreso.	531
Mar. 18	<i>From President Wilson</i> Comments on Mr. Lansing's letter of March 8, 1915, regarding the employment of force and the suggestion of joint action by the United States and the A. B. C. powers in Mexico. Indicates his approval of Mr. Lansing's suggestion.	532
June 2	<i>From President Wilson</i> Forwards draft of a proposed statement by the President on the Mexican situation.	532
June 2	<i>To President Wilson</i> Comments on President Wilson's proposed statement on the Mexican situation. Suggests certain textual changes.	533
June 2	<i>From President Wilson</i> Indicates his willingness to consider the recognition of Carranza should the latter develop the necessary influence.	534
June 2	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports conversation with the Argentine Ambassador on the Mexican situation. Further discussion of the textual changes suggested in the President's proposed statement on the Mexican situation.	534
June 2	<i>From President Wilson</i> Acknowledges Secretary Bryan's suggestions with regard to the proposed statement.	535
June 17	<i>From President Wilson</i> Suggests that General Carranza might be informed that American recognition would be possible should he make every effort at conciliation and conference with the other factions.	535

LATIN AMERICA

MEXICO—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 June 18	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves of telegram to Special Agent Silliman instructing him to convey to General Carranza the information referred to in the preceding document.	535
June 22	<i>From President Wilson</i> Directs that preliminary steps be taken with regard to the proposed conference of Latin American diplomatic representatives on the Mexican situation.	536
June 25	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion concerning the Latin American diplomatic representatives who would take part in the conference on the Mexican situation.	537
July 2	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that the importance of attempting a settlement in Mexico was becoming more pressing and that the Latin American diplomatic representatives with whom it was intended to confer on the Mexican situation should be requested to come to Washington.	537
July 5	<i>To President Wilson</i> Forwards an outline embodying the attitude of the Government on the Mexican situation. Expresses belief that the principal problem was the harmonizing of the factions representing the revolution.	538
July 7	<i>From President Wilson</i> Suggests the designation of a person to keep in touch with the representatives in the United States of the several Mexican factions.	539
July 8	<i>To President Wilson (tel.)</i> Reports that the six Latin American diplomats with whom it is proposed to confer regarding the Mexican situation are pleased at the plan for identical action.	540
July 8	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves of the suggestions contained in Secretary Lansing's letter of July 5, 1915, as a foundation for the formulation of policy in regard to the Mexican situation.	540
July 29	<i>From President Wilson</i> Indicates perplexity as to the immediate duty of the United States with regard to Mexico.	541
July 31	<i>To President Wilson (tel.)</i> Reports that the six Latin American diplomats with whom it is proposed to confer regarding the Mexican situation have agreed to a meeting at Washington on August 5.	541
Aug. 1	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that the approach of the conference and its objects, in general terms, should be announced.	542
Aug. 2	<i>To President Wilson</i> Agrees that announcement of the conference should be made as soon as possible.	542

LATIN AMERICA

MEXICO—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 Aug. 5	<i>To President Wilson (tel.)</i> Reports meeting with the six Latin American diplomats for conference on the Mexican situation. Expresses belief that the President's immediate return to Washington is not necessary.	542
Aug. 6	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports progress of conference with Latin American diplomats on August 5 and 6. Encloses extract from proceedings of the conference (text printed).	543
Aug. 6	<i>From President Wilson (tel.)</i> Expresses belief that actions of Villa need not interfere with the success of the conference.	545
Aug. 6	<i>To President Wilson (tel.)</i> Encloses text of message to the Secretary of Agriculture recommending the admission of meat from the State of Chihuahua, Mexico, after an approved form of inspection.	545
Aug. 7	<i>From President Wilson</i> Questions whether the proposed admission of Mexican meat might not assist Villa.	546
Aug. 7	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports that the establishment under military decree of cattle inspection upon the border would probably relieve Villa's financial situation, which is believed to be responsible for his arbitrary conduct.	546
Aug. 8	<i>From President Wilson (tel.)</i> Approves the proposed communication to Mexican factions drawn up by the conference of Latin American diplomats. Believes that the most essential step in Mexico is the establishment of a provisional government of revolutionary character, which should precede resumption of full constitutional forms.	547
Aug. 9	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of support to Villa as a possible offset to Carranza.	547
Aug. 10	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses stenographic report of the two conferences with six Latin American diplomats in Washington.	548
Aug. 11	<i>From President Wilson (tel.)</i> Expresses belief that the conference should not insist upon the elimination of Carranza and that the object of the revolution would in any event have to be conserved.	549
Aug. 14	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses report dealing with shipment of arms and ammunition to Mexico. Considers the advisability of placing a general embargo on the export of arms and ammunition to Mexico.	549
Aug. 16	<i>From President Wilson</i> Comments on the report of the proceedings of the conference with the six Latin American diplomats. Regards the legalistic attitude and <i>cientifico</i> leaning as unfortunate.	550

LATIN AMERICA

MEXICO—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1915 Aug. 16	<i>From President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that the renewal of the arms embargo might be a very important weapon.	550
Sept. 12	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses the reply of Carranza to the communication of the conference of Latin American diplomats. Reports the position of the Carranza faction as stronger than previously.	550
Sept. 13	<i>From President Wilson</i> Outlines course of action to be taken, which is to consist of suggesting conference between the Latin American diplomats and representatives of Carranza at Washington and the calling of a conference of representatives of other factions to be held in Mexico.	552
Sept. 18	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports the conclusion of the conference of Latin American representatives. Encloses agreement reached at conference (text printed).	552
1916 Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With Mr. Arredondo, March 9, 1916, 4 p. m.</i> Discussion of the situation caused by the attack on Columbus, New Mexico.	554
Mar. 20	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports a conversation between the Acting Secretary of State and Mr. Arredondo regarding the proposed agreement between the United States and Mexico concerning the crossing of troops over the boundary line in pursuit of bandits.	555
May 8	<i>From General Carranza to Mr. Arredondo (tel.)</i> Telegram received from General Carranza handed to the Secretary of State by Mr. Arredondo, concerning an agreement for reciprocal crossing of the boundary by forces in pursuit of organized bands endeavoring to provoke an international conflict.	556
June 15	<i>To President Wilson</i> Encloses draft of a reply to the Mexican note of May 22, 1916, containing the Mexican demand for the withdrawal of American troops.	557
June 18	<i>From President Wilson</i> Approves Secretary Lansing's draft note to Mexico enclosed with the preceding letter. Encloses letter (text printed) from the Secretary of War to President Wilson discussing embargo upon shipments of arms and ammunition to Mexico.	557
June 21	<i>To President Wilson</i> Expresses opinion that in dealing with the Mexican situation the use of the word "intervention" should be avoided and that it should be denied that any invasion of Mexico is for the sake of intervention. Suggests further that a communication be sent to the Latin American diplomatic representatives in Washington stating the attitude of the United States and denying any intention to intervene in Mexico.	558
June 21	<i>From President Wilson</i> Agrees with Secretary Lansing's suggestions in the preceding letter.	559

LATIN AMERICA

MEXICO—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1916 Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> A statement prepared for use in discussion with President Wilson regarding the American policy of nonintervention in Mexico.	560
July 3	<i>To President Wilson</i> Suggests the naming of a joint American-Mexican commission to study questions relating to boundary troubles and the means to prevent them in the future.	560
July 5	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador to discuss the Ambassador's plan to visit Mexico and explain the attitude of the United States Government to General Carranza.	562
Sept. 5	<i>To Colonel E. M. House</i> Discusses progress made by the American-Mexican Joint Commission.	563
Oct. 26	<i>From President Wilson</i> Encloses copy of a letter (text printed) from the President to the Secretary of War in which the President informed the Secretary that rumors had reached him of the possibility of another raid by irregular Mexican forces into the territory of the United States. The President directed that General Funston should be instructed to take every precaution in the circumstances.	564
Oct. 27	<i>To President Wilson</i> Reports that Secretary Lansing had conferred with the Secretary of War and that they were in agreement that publicity would have the effect of deterring those planning such raids and also of preventing the rise of sentiment hostile to the President politically in case such raids occurred.	564
1917 Apr. 25	<i>To President Wilson</i> Discussion of the attitude to be taken by Ambassador Fletcher at the inauguration of General Carranza as President of Mexico. Discussion of the question of whether Fletcher's presence would be formal recognition of the <i>de jure</i> character of the government. Encloses form of reservation (text printed).	565
Apr. 28 (145)	<i>To the Ambassador in Mexico (tel.)</i> Instructions to attend the festivities in connection with the inauguration of President Carranza but to do nothing which would indicate recognition of his government as <i>de jure</i> in character.	567
1919 Dec. 5	<i>To President Wilson</i> Informs the President that Secretary Lansing regards the issue between the United States and Mexico to be not the Jenkins case alone but to include the entire series of wrongs suffered by Americans in Mexico during the Carranza administration.	567

**THE WORLD WAR:
PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES**

THE COURSE OF THE WAR—COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIES—WAR AIMS—PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

862.85/61a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to the disposition to be made of the German refugee ships in American ports, about which we conversed yesterday, I wish to set forth my further views on the subject. They have the character of enemy private property within the jurisdiction of a belligerent. It might be argued that inasmuch as they are subsidized by the German Government and are more or less under its control, they partake of the nature of enemy public property, which is confiscable by the belligerent in whose possession it is found; but I think this would be regarded as a strained interpretation of their character, and I would, therefore, rather regard them as privately owned enemy property. As to the disposition of enemy private property thus situated, there are two views among authorities. According to the one view, there is an obligation that they should be exempt from confiscation except in the exigency of military necessity, public safety, or reprisal. This is the European Continental view. According to the Anglo-American view, the sovereign possesses the right to require confiscation if this should be found necessary, but [it] leans toward a general policy of exemption. The difference in effect between these two views is not very great. In practice, however, nations as a rule seem to recognize the exemption of private property as a policy which ought to be followed save in exceptional cases.

In view of the foregoing, it has, I believe, become the modern custom to requisition enemy private property when necessary upon the payment of compensation. This is the rule agreed to by the nations at The Hague in Convention Six, 1907,¹ relating to the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities. The United States, however, did not sign this Convention on the ground, among others, that it did not give complete freedom for vessels of the enemy in port at the outbreak of hostilities to depart. As these vessels are generally so disabled as to be unable to depart, and as they would be immediately seized on the ocean by Allied cruisers if they did depart,

¹ For text, see *The Second International Peace Conference*, Senate Document No. 444, 60th Cong., 1st sess., p. 156.

it seems this policy of the United States need not interfere with any policy of requisition which may be adopted.

It may be argued that the Treaties of 1828,² 1799,³ and 1785⁴ would be violated by requisitioning the German refugee vessels. The only stipulation of these treaties bearing on this point is Article 23 of the Treaty of 1799 providing that in case of war "The merchants of either country then residing in the other shall be allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and settle their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects without molestation or hindrance." As most of the German vessels are owned by non-resident German corporations, with only operating agents here, only two or three vessels lying in our insular ports being possibly owned by Germans residing there, it would seem that this stipulation of the treaty would, as a practical matter, have little application to vessels in United States ports. I have not exact data, however, as to the resident ownership of these vessels.

As to the authority of the President to requisition the German ships without an act of Congress, I have considerable doubt, except possibly in the event that they are to be used directly in warlike operations, in which case the President might be regarded as exercising his powers as commander-in-chief. I have not had opportunity to examine this point thoroughly.

I think that, outside of the purely legal questions involved, there is strong moral right on our side in taking possession of these German vessels and using them in our merchant marine. The German submarine warfare has very materially decreased the shipping of the world and has caused very serious embarrassment to this country in the matter of transportation. I do not feel that we are bound to let these ships lie idle in our ports while the tonnage of the world is being from day to day reduced by the German Government. If you hold the same view as to the matter, I have no doubt that the legal difficulties can all be removed and the vessels can be repaired and sent forth with cargoes.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

862.85/61½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 8 April, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I must say that this matter gives me grave concern. Undoubtedly we need the ships, and some of them

² Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, vol. 3, p. 427.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 433.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

could be got in shape for use, no doubt, within a month or two, when, perhaps, they would be even more needed than they are now; and yet I despise the spirit of seizure.

Inasmuch as, so far as I know, they are not, at any rate immediately, needed for military purposes, I take it from your memorandum that the only course open to us is requisition for other transportation uses or seizure by way of reprisal. I suppose either of these courses would require authorization by the Congress (may I not have your advice on that point?)

I believe that seizure (ship for ship, for the American ships sunk) by way of reprisal would, in the extraordinary circumstances of this submarine warfare, be morally justifiable. This would be confiscation and would hardly fall under my general war powers.

I shall await your further advice on the points of law, domestic as well as international, with the greatest interest.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

862.85/613

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In your note of April 8th you asked me whether the requisition of German ships for transportation uses or the seizure of such ships by way of reprisal requires authorization by Congress. In reply, I should say that both requisition and reprisal, in the circumstances, require action by Congress.

Reprisal is a well-established method in international practice by which one nation obtains redress for injuries inflicted by another nation when other means of satisfaction have failed. A reprisal in the nature of seizure of property may amount to, and in this case I assume that it is desired that it should amount to, confiscation of the property in question. The confiscation of enemy private property within the jurisdiction of the United States at or after the outbreak of war has been in several cases held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be contrary to "the modern usage of nations which has become law." As this usage of nations has thus been declared to be the law in the United States, it is necessary to have Congress authorize the confiscation. That such confiscatory acts by Congress are necessary is shown by the history of the United States in the War of Independence and the Civil War, when special acts of confiscation were passed—the Acts of August 6, 1861,⁵ July 17, 1862,⁶ the Joint

⁵ 12 Stat. 319.

⁶ 12 Stat. 589.

Resolution of same date,⁷ and the Act of March 3, 1863.⁸ Moreover, the Constitution delegates to the Congress the power to make rules concerning "captures on land and water", and power to grant letters of marque and reprisal. It was the opinion of Jefferson, Clay, and Gallatin that an act of Congress was necessary to vest in the President authority for making reprisals.

As to requisitions of private property, I find no case in which, as commander-in-chief, the President has requisitioned property of the enemy within United States territory. Many cases of requisitions of goods for the use of American forces have occurred, of course, but these have been within territory occupied by the army in the Mexican and Civil Wars. The right of requisition under military occupation is, I take it, different from the right of requisition of goods in the United States for commercial purposes in time of war. In the Mexican and Civil Wars, goods were requisitioned without an Act of Congress by order of the President as commander-in-chief, but receipts for the goods taken or money payments were generally made, though the right was asserted that requisition might be made without compensation. The Supreme Court of the United States has held in cases coming before it that compensation must be made for taking private property by the armed forces during military occupation. There appear to be on the books no statutes giving the President direct authority to requisition enemy property, and I am of the opinion that such authority by Congress in the circumstances is necessary.

I have turned over to the War Trade Committee the task of drafting an appropriate act to cover the seizure of German and Austrian ships, by way of reprisal, ship for ship for the American ships sunk, and for purposes of requisitioning the remaining ships.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

841d.00/103½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 10 April, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The recent debates on the war resolution in Congress lead me to suggest that you send the following confidential message to Ambassador Page in London:

Take an early opportunity in conversation with the Prime Minister to convey to him in the most confidential manner the information that the only circumstance which seems now to stand in the way of an absolutely cordial cooperation with Great Britain by practically all Americans who are not influenced by ties of blood directly asso-

⁷ 12 Stat. 627.

⁸ 12 Stat. 758, 759, 762.

ciating them with Germany is the failure so far to find a satisfactory method of self-government for Ireland. This appeared very strikingly in the recent debates in Congress upon the war resolution and appeared in the speeches of opponents of that resolution who were not themselves Irishmen or representatives of constituencies in which Irish voters were influential, notably several members from the South. If the people of the United States could feel that there was an early prospect of the establishment for Ireland of substantial self-government a very great element of satisfaction and enthusiasm would be added to the cooperation now about to be organized between this country and Great Britain. Convey this information unofficially of course but as having no little significance. Successful action now would absolutely divorce our citizens of Irish birth and sympathy from the German sympathizers here with whom many of them have been inclined to make common cause.^{8a}

Page now knows the Prime Minister well enough to know how to say these things to him frankly, and if a way could be found now to grant Ireland what she has so often been promised, it would be felt that the real programme of government by the consent of the governed had been adopted everywhere in the anti-Prussian world.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72/3773

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Although you have received a copy of this message⁹ I desire to call your attention particularly to it and to receive from you directions as to what reply we should make.

I believe that it would be for our interest to have Guatemala in the war, and very possibly Honduras, as it would offer a constant check upon Mexico in case its Government should adopt any measures in the interest of Germany.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/3801½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 13 April, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think that we should meet Guatemala half-way in this matter. I am ready to enter into the understanding she suggests.

^{8a} This telegram was sent Apr. 11, 1917, 2 p.m.

⁹ Memorandum from the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister in Guatemala, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 258.

And the more I think the matter over the more I am convinced that this is a good time to go forward with our Pan-American treaty with such countries as are able to come in.¹⁰ There would be a rather substantial advantage in having Brazil come in first, for the German influence has been supposed to be stronger there, and the German plans for immigration and control, more definite, than anywhere else in Latin America.

I would be very much obliged to you if you would take both these matters up with the purpose of putting them through as promptly as possible. The initial impressions being made now seem to me more influential than any can be that will come later.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

811.911/26a

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War (Baker), and the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1917.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Even though the co-operation of the press has been generous and patriotic, there is a steadily developing need for some authoritative agency to assure the publication of all the vital facts of national defense. Premature or ill-advised announcements of policies, plans and specific activities, whether innocent or otherwise, would constitute a source of danger.

While there is much that is properly secret in connection with the departments of the Government, the total is small compared to the vast amount of information that it is right and proper for the people to have.

America's great present needs are confidence, enthusiasm and service, and these needs will not be met completely unless every citizen is given the feeling of partnership that comes with full, frank statements concerning the conduct of the public business.

It is our opinion that the two functions—censorship and publicity—can be joined in honesty and with profit, and we recommend the creation of a Committee on Public Information. The Chairman should be a civilian, preferably some writer of proved courage, ability and vision, able to gain the understanding co-operation of the press and at the same time rally the authors of the country to a work of service. Other members should be the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, or an officer or officers detailed to the work by them.

¹⁰ See pp. 471 ff.

We believe you have the undoubted authority to create this Committee on Public Information without waiting for further legislation, and because of the importance of the task, and its pressing necessity, we trust that you will see fit to do so.

The Committee, upon appointment, can proceed to the framing of regulations and the creation of machinery that will safeguard all information of value to an enemy, and at the same time open every department of government to the inspection of the people as far as possible. Such regulations and such machinery will, of course, be submitted for your approval before becoming effective.

Respectfully,

ROBERT LANSING
NEWTON D. BAKER
JOSEPHUS DANIELS

033.4111/17a

*The Secretary of State to the Chief of the British Special Mission
(Balfour)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. BALFOUR: Permit me to extend to you on the occasion of your arrival in America my very warm greetings and express to you the satisfaction which it gives me to welcome you to the United States.

Your visit to Washington will accomplish much good not only because of the benefit to be derived from personal conferences but because it will be interpreted by the American people as an evidence of the cordial good will of the people of Great Britain.

The chief desire of this nation is to cooperate in the most efficient way with the nations which are engaged in the struggle against autocracy. The Government and people of [the United States?] are ready to exert their full power and only seek to know in what way it can contribute to the accomplishment of the supreme purpose of the war.

I have instructed Ambassador Page to express to your Government the earnest hope that you and your private secretary, General Bridges and Admiral de Chair, each accompanied by a staff officer, and the Governor of the Bank of England, will consent to be the guests of the nation for a few days after your arrival in the United States. I now repeat this earnest hope to you.

Anticipating meeting you here in Washington within a few days I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/4029½

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, April 18, 1917.

[Received May 14.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Most of the things to which this letter relates will have come to a head before it reaches you, and you will probably know even without my telling you that a number of those measures which appeared to have their origin in this part of the world do not reach the proportions which are brought to your attention without being directed and impelled. The whole question of supply whether of money or of material, such as food, coal, steel, etc. comes within the above list. The situation has become so imperative here of late that a Commission of some kind is going over to America immediately and I have just given the Minister of Transportation, Sr. Enrico Arlotta, a letter of introduction to you, as he is going immediately. I hope also that Marconi may go with him, or follow him very closely as he stands for something international and is one of those who has the broad view and understands profoundly how the relations between the two countries should be strengthened in every way possible.

You will have seen from my telegram ¹¹ that I have felt the great importance of some aid being extended to Italy directly instead of through the medium of the other Allies. There is no question that Italy feels most sensibly her subjection in the present situation to both England and France, especially the former, and that this is the moment in which she would do much to be emancipated from this subjection, however measurably and therefore will deal with America in a more liberal spirit than has hitherto been found in our relations with her.

I do not wish to suggest the Naturalization Treaty in any way as a condition precedent to the aid which we may be able to extend her, but I feel that it is not inappropriate to urge Italy to enter on negotiations for this Treaty, and I have suggested it to Baron Sonnino and also to several other Ministers with whom I have been brought in touch of late. Baron Sonnino said that since we had entered the conflict on the side of the Allies it would certainly seem easier to accomplish than before; for this reason I am urging with as much earnestness as possible that this Naturalization Treaty be put through and I have some hope of succeeding in getting it done.

Quite irrespective of this however I trust very much that a Loan may be made to Italy of as large an amount as may seem feasible along the lines suggested by the Minister of the Treasury Sig. Carcano

¹¹ Not printed.

and also that, if possible, ships may be furnished for the transport of American coal, grain and other products, of which Italy stands at present in real need. I feel sure that if this be done we shall be able hereafter to obtain our fair share of the commerce of Italy instead of, as hitherto, being almost excluded therefrom. I cannot emphasize too strongly the need which Italy has at present of coal, grain, steel, corn, hay, sugar, etc.

I am sending a memorandum¹² handed me yesterday or the day before by Sig. Arlotta, the Minister of Transportation, showing that Italy absolutely needs 650,000 tons of coal per month and that at present she is getting only about 400,000 tons. Her normal consumption is about 800,000 tons per month. What she needs also quite as much as coal is the ships to bring it here, and I understand that this is one of the prime motives of Mr. Arlotta's visit to America.

When I get time I am going to send copies of a speech or two which I have had an opportunity to deliver here in Rome and which I hope may have some effect in opening the eyes of the Italian people to what America stands for. They constitute a part of my general plan to try and interpret America to the Italians as something of much more value to them than they have hitherto been led to imagine. As a part of the same programme I am organizing a sort of Intelligence Department for the purpose of obtaining and collating all the information obtainable here in every field which I think may be of value to us at home in our endeavour to strengthen and make closer our relations. I have a good man to place at the head of it, Mr. G. Speranza, who is an American of culture and ability and whose articles may have attracted your attention as they have appeared in the *Outlook*, the *New York Evening Post* and perhaps other magazines. He is an American of Italian parentage, his father having been a professor at Columbia College. He has offered his services and I feel sure that we can justify the outlay to which I referred in my telegram of yesterday to you on this subject.¹² The expense will be that of having a stenographer and typewriter and getting material. I thought that it might be tried for at least a few months in order to see how the plan works out.

I have been sending you in sections a report on the Mobilization of Economic Resources of Italy and the Administration thereof under the Extraordinary powers given the Government during the War.¹² I have already sent one Section on Coal (Fuel); one on Foodstuffs; one on Munition Factories and the Industrial Mobilization connected therewith, and I am sending along with this part V Sections 1 & 2, the former being Legislation concerning the Vigilance and Economic Treatment of Aliens in Italy, and Section 2, being a report on the

¹² Not printed.

Censorship. I wish that the latter were in your hands now as I see that the question of the Censorship of the Press is being much discussed at home.

Personally I am a great believer in a free press; I feel that it is the true Palladium of Liberty. The Censorship which I believe in is that which relates to military secrets; the censorship of the mails is also of great importance; I refer to the mails for regions outside of the country, censorship of which have [*has*] proved of great value.

I hope very much that these reports which I have taken much trouble with are not filed for the benefit of future investigators into the archives of our Government, but will reach duly the proper authorities for consideration, especially as Italy's handling of the question of spying and of secret information seemed very complete.

Believe me [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

763.72112/3527a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We ought to issue a list of contraband. We are receiving inquiries in regard to the matter and are unable to answer.

The Allied Governments have issued lists detailing numerous articles, the lists being very long, increasingly long because of the constant additions made from time to time.

After consideration of the subject it seemed to me that a general rather than a detailed list of contraband could be issued which would not require frequent change and consequent confusion.

If this method meets with your approval I would suggest the issuance of a contraband list like the one enclosed. It covers I believe all the articles included in the lists issued by the Allies, and at the same time it will not require constant amendments as their lists have.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Draft List of Contraband of War

(1) All kinds of arms, guns, ammunition, explosives, and machines for their manufacture; component parts thereof; materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for their use.

(2) All contrivances for or means of transportation on land, in the water or air, and machines used in their manufacture; component parts thereof; materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles or animals necessary or convenient for their use.

(3) All kinds of food and clothing destined to come into possession or control of the enemy government or its officers or agents; articles and materials for the manufacture thereof.

(4) Tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, correspondence, papers and other articles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile operations.

(5) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt, metals, materials, dies, plates, machinery or other articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture.

763.72112/3527½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 20 April, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I agree with you that this form is the best in which to announce our list of contraband and that we should make an immediate announcement; but I am not clear as to the meaning of all of the enclosed statement.¹⁴

No. 1 is clear. Under No. 2, is it your idea that all vehicles, of whatever kind, should be considered contraband no matter whither bound? Under 3 I assume that the words "destined to come into the possession or control of the enemy government or its officers or agents" is meant to apply to "articles and materials for the manufacture thereof" as well as to "all kinds of food and clothing", but the language does not make that clear. No. 4 is clear. Under 5 I assume that it is meant only to include materials and metals useful in the manufacture of coin, currency, etc., but the section might be read to include all metals of all kinds and uses. Of course these points can all be made clear. They do not go to the merits.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

S11.711/33a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As the existence of a state of war makes it essential for the public safety that no communication of a character

¹⁴ *Supra.*

which would aid the enemy or its allies should be permitted I wish to lay before you the great necessity of preparing some plan for the censorship of postal correspondence.¹⁵ I understand that at the present time there is no bar to sending by mail from the United States communications, plain or in cipher, from Germans or German agents here, to Germans in Mexico or other neutral countries for their information and transmission by various means to Germany and her allies. The dangers to the country inherent in this form of communication are obvious—the present channel is open to the transmittal of military information, transference of money and credit, and manipulation of intrigues, etc. I enclose a copy of a memorandum of the British Embassy dated April 12th¹⁶ pointing out the transference of German securities to the nominal value of \$1,250,000, by a letter of Kuhn-Loeb and Company.

In these circumstances I have to suggest that a plan of censorship of postal correspondence should be formulated at the earliest moment—in the first instance by the Post Office Department which is familiar with our postal laws and regulations, and later in cooperation with the State Department and possibly the Department of Justice.

On April 20th I laid the urgency of this matter before the Postmaster General but as I have not as yet received any indication as to the attitude of his Department in the matter and as I regard the matter as of the utmost importance I take the liberty of calling it to your particular attention.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/588a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think that we should anticipate two moves on the part of Germany and be prepared to deal with them promptly and decisively.

From our various sources of information, which are of course more or less uncertain, it appears that Germany may in the near future directly or indirectly through Austria outline terms of peace, which the German Government practically declined to do. I do not believe that the terms will be such that they can be considered nor do I think that they will be bona fide. They will be made to influence public opinion in this country and Russia.

¹⁵ For correspondence previously printed concerning postal censorship, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. II, pp. 1230 ff.

¹⁶ Not printed.

The other move on the part of the German Government will be to indicate the success of democracy in Germany either by concessions by the Government or by an apparent revolution carefully staged. This step will also be taken to influence public opinion here and in Russia. It will of course be artificial and manufactured for the occasion. I am convinced that the sentiment for democracy in Germany is entirely under the control of the Government, which will take every means to give it the appearance of genuineness and the movement an appearance of irresistible popular pressure.

I am writing of these possible, and I believe probable, steps by Germany because it seems to be advisable to consider in advance the policy to be adopted in meeting them. Would it be well to let the impression get abroad through the press that Germany may possibly make such moves, but that the American people ought not to be deceived as to their purpose, which is of course to cause reaction against a vigorous war policy and arouse false hopes of an early peace?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/4528½

The Chief of the British Special Mission (Balfour) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 4 May, 1917.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just received a telegram from the Foreign Office asking me to express the warm appreciation of His Majesty's Government for the important force of Destroyers already sent by the United States Government to assist in our Naval operations and for their generous intention to largely augment this force. This very timely and prompt assistance will be invaluable.

May I add a personal expression of my own thanks?

Yours very sincerely,

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

811.711/31a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In reply to your note of May 3d,¹⁷ allow me to bring to your attention some further facts for your considera-

¹⁷ Not found in Department files. Printed in part in R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters* (New York, 1939), vol. VII, p. 47.

tion in connection with the censorship of mails brought to your attention in my note of April 30th. I am not doing this in a controversial spirit or for any other purpose than to have the whole situation laid before you, as I consider it to be of supreme importance. Whatever may be the British facilities for censorship of mails and telegraphs, and whatever may be the stringency of the American censorship of telegraphs, it remains that there is by mail or courier to Mexico and to South American countries an open channel for communication of military information, of credit, and of intrigue, to the countries to the south of us. This, in itself, is important, because we are aware of German intrigue in Mexico, the flocking of thousands of Germans to that country, probable German intrigues in Central America, and also in certain countries of South America. There is, moreover, in these countries, an effort on the part of Germans to build up German trade after the war, which scheme is played up by German newspapers in order to hearten the German spirit at the present time. Again, German raiders have been operating off the South American coasts, and probably obtaining some supplies from German firms in South America. It is very probable that in the near future German submarines may endeavor to undertake similar operations. The censorship of the mails to Latin-American countries at least would assist very materially in preventing or hindering the carrying out of any of the projects mentioned. The matter came up for discussion yesterday at the conference with Mr. Balfour, and he said that the importance of the information obtained from censorship could not be overestimated and could not be fully appreciated in advance.

In the second place, via South America there is direct means of communication with Germany, which seems to me should be cut off. Mail may be sent to South American countries from the United States and transmitted from there by the diplomatic and consular officers of Germany through devious channels of communication; or, I am told by Mr. Balfour, direct to Spain by mail and possibly by cable (he was not sure as to the cable), and thence by wireless from Spain to Germany. Mr. Balfour said that this was a clear channel of communication still open.

I trust you will understand that I am only desiring to inform you fully on what to my mind is a very important matter. If it should turn out that any censorship of mails is imposed by the United States, there would, of course, be no duplication of the censorship by the Entente Powers, as it would be arranged for them to pass mails censored by the United States.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/45241a

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *May 5, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In our conference yesterday with Mr. Balfour and members of his Commission on the subject of export restrictions, he and Lord Percy called attention to the large amount of commercial information which the British Government had collected in regard to firms doing business in the neutral countries of Europe—information which the British Government was using in discriminating between persons in those countries to whom goods might safely be allowed to be shipped, and another class of persons who were merely channels of trade with Germany. Mr. Balfour thought that, in the enforcement of the pending legislation for the control of exports, it would be a great convenience, if not a necessity, to have the information in London available to the United States, and he suggested, as a means of keeping in touch with the British information, that a person be designated by the United States to represent it in the War Trade Intelligence Department in London.

I think that it is very important to follow out Mr. Balfour's suggestion in this respect, and I am calling the matter to your particular attention for consideration. I think the representative should be somebody from the United States who is familiar with general trade conditions and with the policies of our Government. If you approve Mr. Balfour's suggestion, I will present some names for your consideration, unless you already have some persons in mind.

I should add that, until the Exports Control Bill pending in Congress has been passed, we will have no machinery for using the information from London, in controlling exports from the United States.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/45251

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*WASHINGTON, *7 May, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The practicability and wisdom of carrying out this very useful suggestion depends, as in so many other cases, upon finding the right man,—a really capable man who will be equally able and well poised and sensible, not likely to swell with importance and instruct us every day by cable. Have you such a man in mind, or do you think you could find one?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72/4669½

The Chief of the British Special Mission (Balfour) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 9 May, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think it may interest you personally to know that I received yesterday a telegram from home saying that the recent submarine returns were rather less heavy and that the reports of destruction of submarines were rather more numerous. Of course these reports of destruction are highly problematical. The telegram emphasizes that there is nothing to justify the belief that the situation is less serious.

German resistance and counter-attacks are fiercely proceeding on the Western front, but nevertheless the British offensive is being carried on satisfactorily and methodically.

A conference held at Paris on May 4 and 5 showed that there was complete agreement between the military experts of the two countries. I understand that General Petain has practically taken the place of General Nivelle. The Conference resulted in a definite understanding that the war should be prosecuted with full strength along the whole line. From the other theatres of war there were practically no reports.

The attitude of Spain is still unsatisfactory, and Señor Maura's speech, which we mentioned in our conversation on Sunday, has given the Germans a strong weapon which they are using to the utmost of their power.

Miliukoff¹⁸ professes that he has prevailed against the Workmen and Soldiers' Committee, but the situation is still critical.

The Foreign Office report that the new Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs will only accept office on the condition that Brazil should associate herself with the United States against Germany.

The position of the Ministry in France is said to be weaker. The French Socialist minority have decided to send a representative to the Socialist Conference in Stockholm. If the French Government agree to allow this we shall probably have great pressure exercised on us from our Socialist group to allow them also to send delegates. As I understand there is also a question as regards delegates from the United States I have telegraphed to the Foreign Office proposing that the question should be discussed with Mr. Page and the French Ambassador in London.

Believe me [etc.]

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

¹⁸ Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

763.72119/632½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 11 May, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you very much for the copy of Mr. Balfour's letter to you of the ninth.

I do not like the movement among the Socialists to confer about international affairs. They are likely to make a deal of mischief, especially in connection with affairs in Russia. I think our own people would warmly resent any encouragement by our government of the American Socialists who may seek to take part, especially after their recent almost treasonable utterances in their convention (at St. Louis, was it not?). It is their own lookout what they do. We should neither give them leave nor seek to restrain them. My own view is, that they will make themselves either hated or ridiculous.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

867.00/804½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I had yesterday two conversations in relation to Turkey which are worthy of consideration because any possibility of alienating an ally of Germany ought not to be ignored even if accomplishment is doubtful.

In the morning Mr. Elkus'¹⁹ private secretary (Mr. Alsberg, I believe) called to see me and I spent some time questioning him as to conditions in Turkey. He left Constantinople on April 6th and, therefore, brought the latest information.

He said that the food situation was as bad as it could possibly be, that he thought 200,000 people were starving in the city, and that in the interior the condition was even worse; that the people were most anxious for peace but without leadership could do nothing; and that all classes were bitter against the Germans who were being gradually removed as officers in the army.

He said that even the Government was becoming irritated at the arrogance of the Germans and feared German control after the war; that they did not want to become a vassal of Germany; that they saw in American capital the only hope of rebuilding their ruined fortunes and desired to remain on friendly terms but were compelled by the Germans to break off relations, which increased Turkish ill-

¹⁹ Abram I. Elkus, Ambassador to Turkey.

feeling toward the German Government. Alsberg said that he believed the Turks would listen to terms of a separate peace if they dared.

I asked him what prevented them, and he replied the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, which were anchored before Constantinople with their guns trained on the city, and that to the Turks the preservation of Constantinople was the all-important thing, that he believed that they would give up Palestine, Syria and Armenia in order to hold Constantinople, even though it were under a practical protectorate like Egypt.

He believed that it was possible, on account of the attitude of Turkey toward the United States, for us to approach the Turkish Government with suggestions for a separate peace, and that it might be brought about if the German cruisers could in some way be destroyed by bombs or other means.

When he spoke of the Turkish Government he referred of course to the Triumvirs, Enver, Talaat and Djemel, who possess practically absolute power. He felt that these three were beginning to chafe under German control and to resent the insolent manner in which they were being treated, while the possibility of rebellion among the Turks was increasing as a result of the famine and suffering of the people.

I had been impressed with these statements, when Mr. Morgenthau²⁰ came to see me in the afternoon and said that he had been thinking over the situation and believed that the time was ripe to make secret overtures to Turkey for he was sure that by this time the Turkish leaders were heartily sick of their German masters.

I asked him why they submitted and he said that the cruisers and some of the forts were in the hands of the Germans, which prevented the people from acting against the Government, and the Government from acting against the Germans. He said that he believed if the three Turkish leaders were properly approached (meaning undoubtedly by bribery or promises) he thought that they would allow some submarines to enter the Dardanelles and destroy the German vessels, and that if that was done and the Turks relieved of their fear of the Germans, they would be willing to make peace on very favorable terms for the Allies.

I asked him how he would get in touch with Enver, Talaat and Djemel. He replied that he believed that he could do it by going himself to Switzerland where two members of the former Turkish Cabinet were at the present time, men, whom he knew intimately, to whom he could talk freely, and who would act as intermediaries. He said that he did not court this service but was willing to under-

²⁰ Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador to Turkey, 1913-16.

take it if it seemed desirable. He suggested that we (he and I) confer with Mr. Balfour on the subject. I told him that I would think it over and if it seemed feasible would communicate with him later.

Of course it would be a tremendous blow to the Central Powers to have Turkey withdraw as no doubt Bulgaria would be forced to follow the same course. But has this plan the slightest prospect of success? It seems very doubtful, and yet, if the chance was one in fifty, I think it should be taken, but has it that chance? Of course we could well afford to spend a large sum to accomplish such a result. To make the attempt would cost very little. Is it worth trying? That is, is it worth while to send Morgenthau to Switzerland and let him make the attempt?

The other day I asked Mr. Balfour what chance he thought there was of making a separate peace with Turkey. He replied that he had nothing very definite on the subject, but that he had been advised that they were "nibbling" and that Bulgaria was also.

This may be the opportune time, but I am not at all sure that it is. The only thing is that I do not like to leave any stone unturned which will lessen the power of Germany, and I have therefore felt that I should submit the matter to you in detail for your consideration.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/5163½

The Chief of the British Special Mission (Balfour) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 18 May, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On that delightful Sunday which we spent in the country I promised to send you the main points of a statement which I made on foreign policy to the Imperial War Council. The proceedings of the Imperial War Council are of course absolutely secret. I feel that many of the problems dealt with are inadequately treated, but I trust that you may find it of some value.

Believe me [etc.]

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

[Enclosure]

Mr. Balfour's Statement on Foreign Policy to the Imperial War Council

THE PRIME MINISTER: I will now ask Mr. Balfour to give his statement on Foreign Policy.

MR. BALFOUR: I do not think it is necessary really for me to say much about either of the two important foreign countries, America

and Russia, at this moment, because about America some of the gentlemen here have more direct knowledge than is possessed by the Foreign Office. The Canadian representatives have a knowledge of America which we hardly possess, while as regards Russia we have already discussed the situation, and I think the Cabinet understands it as well as anybody can understand this rapidly moving cinematograph of Russian politics. The real thing that is important to us I think is to know whether, if, as we hope, the reasonable and moderate reformers win, they will be able successfully to administer the country. If you look back upon Russian history you will see that every great movement of reform has come when the administrative inefficiency of the autocracy has been followed by some great calamity. The Crimean War, which broke the heart of Nicholas I. was immediately followed by the greatest of all revolutions, the freeing of the serfs, and other great legal reforms of the early reign of Alexander II. The calamity of the Japanese War was followed by the establishment of the Duma, and the administrative disgraces of the present war are followed by the revolution which is now going on before our eyes. But we have to notice that while the general feeling of disgust and discontent with the inefficiency of the autocracy has always been able to produce these reforms, we have never had the opportunity of seeing whether the democracy will be able to do what the autocracy utterly failed to do, which is to administer this enormous country and to organize it for purposes either of war or peace. The total failure of the autocracy is amazing if you look back, and my fear is whether these new people will do so much better than the old. In Russia there is no middle class. Corruption has eaten deeply into their vitals and we must not hope for too much. It seems certain, however, that they cannot do worse than their predecessors. I think that is quite clear.

The Central Powers, as we all know, have an enormous military advantage over us in their central position. They have a corresponding advantage from the point of view of their aims. Germany dominates the aims of the whole of the coalition against us, but none of the other Powers have aims which are inconsistent or even divergent from those of Germany. Austria, for example, has, or had, in the earlier days of the War, nothing except to gain by German successes. Germany's desire to press on in the East was not only good for Germany but for Austria. Turkey, of course, was promised hegemony in the farther East, which certainly, when it came to the point, Germany would never have allowed her to exercise. But Turkey felt that her objects were identical with Germany, so there has been not only a central direction but a central motive. Now we and our Allies, on the other hand, are not only not contiguous with each other, but

we are as widely separated as we well can be. Our most important Ally, next to France, is Russia, and we cannot get at Russia. Even to take away a single individual or a single mission from Russia is a matter which the Admiralty has seriously to consider, and steps for which they have to work out with the utmost caution. Japan is at the extreme end of the world, we are separated geographically; but there is a much more important separation, and that is the separation of temperament, and the separation of history and tradition. It is really an extraordinary thing on which to reflect that of the five Great Powers now fighting on the Entente side, Japan and Russia were in death grips about ten or eleven years ago. France and England were on the edge of war more than once, and on more than one subject, until the Entente arrangement was finally made in the year 1904. Italy was actually joined by treaty with the Central Powers as a counterpoise to France and Russia, whilst we and Russia were regarded as almost traditional enemies. I remember quite well in the first days of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which started in the year I think 1902 or 1903, we worked out the many problems with which the Empire was then faced. What were they? How to prevent Russia getting to India and how to deal with a war with France. That was twelve or more years ago. Now the change which has been brought about largely by German ambition backed by German diplomacy, which is the worst diplomacy in the world, has welded all those nations into one coalition determined to put down this world tyranny. We have to accept the fact that residues of the old condition of things must to a certain extent remain, and one of the diplomatic troubles which we have to deal with for example, is the eternal jealousy between Italy and France. It is curious that these two Latin nations, one of which owes so much to the other because, without France, Italy would hardly have gained her unity, in spite of that they cannot get on with each other. We are the link between the two. I think if you were to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, he would tell you that one of our difficulties in the Adriatic is that the French will not work under the Italians. We ourselves are quite ready to do so. We have sent ships to help them and our ships work under an Italian Admiral; but the French will not do this. In the Eastern Mediterranean there is jealousy at this moment which is hampering our diplomacy, I do not say in a serious way, but it is vexatious and irritating. Greece, which is the scandal of contemporary diplomacy, is a scandal because three nations—the French, the English and the Italians—are trying to manage her, all of whom have divergent views. The Italians detest M. Venizelos—I do not know why—but they appear to think that under M. Venizelos Greece might attain to a position of influence in the Aegean Sea, which is inimical

to the ambitions of Italy. Merely as a characteristic mark of what is going on, the Italians have been sending troops to Corfu, but nobody knows why. We cannot get any explanation. The French say, "Cannot you send even a corporal's guard so that the British flag may be hoisted there as well as the French, the Greek and the Italian." Broadly speaking, however, everything is working well with the exception of these little elements of discord, which are very vexatious to the Foreign Office but which I hope will not profoundly modify the general course of the war.

I do not want to go at length into the question of Japan because that is too large, but perhaps I ought to say a little about it. The great Dominions and the United States of America are naturally, and I think rightly, jealous of Japan's obtaining any footing within their territories. Japan on the other hand, at present quite genuinely believes that what has been the sheet anchor of her policy for the last twelve years, namely, the British alliance, is still the sheet anchor of her present policy and they still cling to that. Of course, we are talking quite privately and I do not think we can conceal from ourselves that there is in every quarter of the Eastern world a certain uneasiness as to whether Japan is in the future going to try and play the part in those regions which Prussia has played in Europe,—whether she is not going to aim at some kind of domination. That fear hangs over the world. I do not venture to give any opinion on that at all. Lord Grey held the view that if you are going to keep Japan out of North America, out of Canada, out of the United States, out of Australia, out of New Zealand, out of the islands South of the Equator in the Pacific, you could not forbid her to expand in China. A nation of that sort must have a safety valve somewhere, and although I think Lord Grey carried his doctrine to excess, I think there is something in it. I do not, however, propose to touch further on this question.

As regards the War in the immediate future, I have myself no doubt that Japan, with an eye to her own interests, is quite genuinely helping the Allies, and helping the Allies to the best of her ability. She is making money, unlike the rest of us, she is doing well: but I do not think we ought to underrate the services she has given or the services she is giving, and the present administration so far as I can judge is incomparably more reasonable in its Chinese policy than the ministry which immediately preceded it. They are making great professions of leaving China to work out her own salvation. Whether these professions will be carried out to the full remains to be seen, but certainly I have not observed anything at present which ought to inspire us with suspicion. I do not believe suspicion is well placed. The only reason for which I mention that

is I am told that at this moment the Germans still have hopes of detaching Japan. That telegram which was sent to Mexico²¹ and which produced all that excitement, you remember, suggested that Mexico should act as an intermediary between Japan and Germany. I do not know whether you have that in your minds. The plan was to bring in Japan on the German side. I believe that was one of Germany's extraordinary blunders which she is always making, and I do not myself look forward with the least apprehension to anything that Japan is likely to do during the course of the War.

If I turn from these considerations, which affect the Allies, to the diplomatic relations between the Allies and the Central Powers other than the immediate military relations between the Allies and the Central Powers, the most important question is,—are the Terms of Peace to which we are committed of a kind which are unnecessarily going to prolong the War? There is no doubt that Germany, as we have heard today, is in very great peril. How are they keeping up the spirits of their people? They are keeping them up in two ways. They are saying in the first place that England will succumb under the submarine warfare. They are saying in the second place, "You must go on fighting at whatever sacrifice, because, if you do not win, our enemies are determined not merely to beat us but to destroy us"; and every nation worth anything, of course, will fight to the last crust of bread and to the last cartridge, if its actual destruction is going to be the result of an unsuccessful war.

The practical destruction of the Turkish Empire is undoubtedly one of the objects which we desire to attain. The Turks may well be left—I hope they will be left—in a more or less independent position in Asia Minor. If we are successful unquestionably Turkey will be deprived of all that in the larger sense may be called Arabia; she will be deprived of the most important portions of the Valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris; she will lose Constantinople; and Syria, Armenia and the southern parts of Asia Minor will, if not annexed by the Entente Powers, probably fall more or less under their domination.

If we turn from Turkey, however, to Austria, the position is somewhat different. According to rumours, which you must all have heard, Austria is so exhausted that she would desire to have a separate peace; but, again, one of the difficulties about a separate peace is what, by the terms as interpreted in our Note to President Wilson,²² will be left of Austria if we do make a separate peace? We have entered into treaties with Italy, Roumania and Serbia, all of which affect Austrian territory. Italy, who came into the war in

²¹ *Foreign Relations, 1917*, supp. 1, p. 158.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

April, I think it was, of 1915, opened her mouth rather widely: that is Italy's way; and she not only got the Allies to promise her *Italia Irredenta*, the populations bordering upon her frontier, who are of Italian origin, speak Italian and possess Italian culture, but she asked also for parts of Dalmatia which neither ethnologically nor for any other valid reason can be regarded as a natural part of Italy. Her justification, however, was not ethnological, it was purely military, or rather, naval. Italy is very unfortunately situated in the Adriatic; she possesses the whole of the western seaboard of that sea, but along her coasts from Venice to Brindisi there really is nothing which deserves to be called a harbour at all. But opposite, threatening her, within easy striking distance and within a few hours' steam, there is the coast of Dalmatia with its islands and its harbours contrived by nature to suit modern submarine warfare, and it is most natural that Italy should say: We should like, in our own interests and for our own protection to possess this coast. Except from that military point of view I am not aware that it is easy to justify handing over the Dalmatian coast, which is not Italian, to Italy. But there it is, it is in the Treaty to which we are bound. We, the French, the Russians and the Italians, are bound to each other never to make peace without the other, and among the conditions which we have mutually promised are these cessions of territory which so far as Italy is concerned I have just described.

If you turn to Serbia, we promised Serbia Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I think that it is a most legitimate promise. They are of the same race, of the same language, and of the same religion. They are not old provinces of Austria; they were Turkish provinces up to the Treaty of 1878 in the full sense of the word, and after 1878 until 1908 when Austria broke through the Treaty of Berlin they were still Turkish provinces in name, though not in administration or in any other substantial sense. Still, they are not old provinces of Austria and if Austria lost them nobody could say that Austria was destroyed. If you go a little further north and ask how you are going to treat the Slav population which also speaks the same form of Slav language, the Croat and other Slav communities to the south of the Danube you undoubtedly are going to make a great breach in the traditional Austrian Empire. But I am not aware that we are by treaty bound in any sense to do that.

THE PRIME MINISTER: The promise to Serbia was conditional.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN: Did we promise anything more than Bosnia and Herzegovina?

MR. BALFOUR: We promised an outlet to the Adriatic.

THE PRIME MINISTER: We wanted Serbia to give up a certain portion of Macedonia to Bulgaria, and then we said, if you do this when

the settlement comes we will give you these provinces the populations of which are more or less akin to your own. If the war is won by the Allies then we will give you access to the Adriatic.

MR. BALFOUR: I do not see that so far as Italy and Serbia are concerned it can be said that even if we had the sort of peace we liked it could be said that we had destroyed Austria, certainly not the historic Austria, the Austria of the 18th century, in any sense of the word at all.

When you come to our promises to Roumania and our promises in connection with Poland, in connection with which I shall speak presently, the case is different. We promised Roumania, if she came in, that that part of Hungary which is predominantly Roumanian in race and in language should be handed over to Roumania. There are people who say that there are Roumanians in Hungary who do not wish to be handed over to Roumania. I do not know whether that is true or not; I should doubt it. But at all events it is undeniable that to take away the Roumanian part of Hungary, namely Transylvania, and hand that to Roumania is to break up historic Hungary. That does touch the historic kingdom of Hungary.

As regards another historic Kingdom with an important past, Bohemia. Bohemia is predominantly Slav in language and in civilization. It differs of course from the Southern Slavs, from the Serbs, for instance, in being Roman Catholic in religion and in speaking a language of a variety of Slav which is very different from that spoken by their brothers further South. It has a history and a tradition of its own. It has been quite abominably used by Austria in this war. If all accounts are true Bohemia has a hatred of German civilization and German propaganda which is intense and I think inextinguishable. Whether, however, all those feelings could not be adequately satisfied by giving Bohemia some form of autonomy in the Austrian Empire I am not so clear. I happened to meet a few months before his assassination with the poor man who was the beginning of all our troubles. He was then heir to the Austrian Throne, and he had a view that the only way to keep Austria together was to make it a triple State instead of a dual State.

At present it is a dual State which is the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He wanted to make a third element in the Empire, namely a Southern Slav. It seems to me that if you made it a quadruple Empire and gave Bohemia autonomy, it would be a very curious construction, but not more curious than Austria has been through all these centuries and it might really meet the views of the populations without absolutely destroying Austria as history knows it. But I am afraid that does not touch the Roumanian difficulty. I do not see any way out of that at present.

With regard to Poland, I do not think you can call the Polish part of Austria—in fact, it would be absurd to call it a part of historic Austria; it became Austrian because Frederick the Great, Catherine II, and Maria Theresia chose to cut up Poland and divide it among themselves. Galicia is not part of historic Austria, and might and ought to go to the Poland of the future. But what is the Poland of the future? That, I think is now, as it has been ever since the great crime of partition was accomplished, the greatest crux of European diplomacy. A very distinguished Pole came to see me yesterday, whose name I will not even venture to pronounce, (Lord R. Cecil: Mr. Dmowski²⁸) but he is a man of very high character and great position. He is an ardent advocate for a completely independent Poland which should include all the Poles. But, I asked him: "What relations does the Poland that you desire, the Polish Poland that you desire created, bear to the Poland of 1772, the year of the first partition?" "Well", he said, "I quite agree you cannot precisely follow those old frontiers". Part of what was then Poland is more Russian than Polish—the Eastern part of it—and we could not ask that it should be taken from Russia and handed over to Poland. On the other hand, there is a part of Upper Silesia which had been taken from ancient Poland before the partition; Frederick the Great, in fact, took it from Austria. "That", he said, "is quite genuinely Polish". I think, he said, 80% of the inhabitants of the Polish area of Silesia were Poles by birth and Poles by language; and in his view that ought to be added to Poland. Then I said to him, "Well, what about Dantzic?" Dantzic, as you will remember, is one of the old Hanseatic towns, and undoubtedly, subject to its municipal independence, it was part of the Polish kingdom. But I suspect, myself, it has been practically German for many centuries; it is certainly predominantly German at this moment. The country immediately around it, or a great deal of the country in its immediate neighbourhood, is just as Polish as other parts of Poland; at any rate, more than 50% are Poles. But here comes the difficulty. He said, without Dantzic, Poland is impossible. Dantzic is the one outlet, the one adequate outlet to the sea, which the restored Poland would have, and unless you are prepared to give back Dantzic to Poland it is useless to try and create a really flourishing modern State. Of course, you will remember Dantzic belonged to Poland at the time of the Partition. In fact, it belonged to Poland after the first Partition. Frederick the Great was content not to take it at that time because he said, with great truth, that "Anybody who has the Vistula, or the upper waters of the Vistula, will become in time the owner of Dantzic";

²⁸ Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee.

as indeed he did become; but still, I think everybody must admit that to take away Dantzic from Germany would be to deprive Germany of a town which is predominantly German; but if you have the map in your mind, it cuts off Königsberg, and all East Prussia from the rest of the Prussian State, and therefore undoubtedly that is a thing which would touch German emotions and German interests very quickly. Königsberg and East Prussia would become a kind of enclave, separate from Germany, but remaining German, embedded in a Polish and Russian framework. The difficulties of that are very great, but you see you are in a dilemma, according to my friend, whether Poland is absolutely independent, as he desires, or whether it becomes an autonomous State, bound more or less closely to Russia. However that may be, whether you include Dantzic or not, any idea to make a Poland which does not include Posen is, in his view, destroying Poland. On the other hand, Posen is, at present, a very integral part of Germany, and Germany, no doubt, would feel that if Posen were taken by a Power which was potentially a great power it would bring it very close up to the gates of Berlin. And yet, supposing we are successful, can we allow this war to come to an end without doing something substantially to get rid of the Polish scandal? It is true that Poland brought it upon herself. If Poland had understood the elements of reasonably good government, the idea that she could be partitioned like an inert mass, as she was, is out of the question. But that is in the past, and it is quite possible that the Poland of the future will be a useful member of the European community; but until she is satisfied you will have this nucleus of bitter discontent, and a nation going back to great and glorious memories, when it was the most powerful State in Eastern Europe. I frankly admit that when the Germans say that we are fighting for a cause which means their destruction, it is not true in one sense; we are not destroying a German Germany, but we are trying to destroy the rather artificial creation of the modern Prussia, which includes many Slav elements which never belonged to Germany until about 140 years ago, and ought, really, not to belong to Germany at this moment.

I am afraid I am merely stating difficulties; I am sorry to say I am not solving them. If we are not successful in the war, there is no hope of solving them. If the war is a drawn battle, these great causes, I am afraid, will never be satisfactorily dealt with by us. If we win triumphantly, then we shall be able to deal with them. Let me return for a moment to my Polish friend. He urged me very strongly to make a public appeal now on behalf of Poland. "Now", said he, "that the Tsar has gone, the Entente Nations ought to announce publicly that they are going to establish an independent Poland; and if you

do not do that", he said, "there is great danger that the Germans may succeed in the future in doing what they have failed to do in the past, which is to raise a Polish army".

His view was, that the recruiting of this Polish army had largely failed because the magnates whether ecclesiastical or lay in Poland had taken the oath of allegiance to the Tsar and were not prepared to break it. The Tsar has gone, the oath has gone, and he declared that his view was that the constant pressure of Germany, after this particular doubt had been removed, might succeed in producing this great addition to her man-power. If it did, the effect upon the Allied cause would undoubtedly be most serious. He put the numbers down at between 700,000 and 1,000,000. Supposing Poland came in, in that way, on the side of the Central Powers, and supposing Russia fell into disorganization and military chaos, the whole of the position in the East would be changed disastrously for the worse. Whether we are in a position to proclaim our intentions with regard to Poland and whether, if we did, it would have the effect which he says, I do not know; I think, very likely, it would. I put this question to him: "The Tsar has gone, and with the Tsar one obstacle may have gone, but can you ask this new Russian Government to begin its career by handing over what the Russians regard as an indisputable part of their territory?" He seemed to think it would be possible. I confess I have my doubts. I am sending an account of this conversation to Sir George Buchanan²⁴ and I shall be interested to hear what he says about it.

Personally, from a selfish Western point of view, I would rather that Poland was autonomous under the Russians, because if you make an absolutely independent Poland, lying between Russia and the Central States, you cut off Russia altogether from the West. Russia ceases to be a factor in Western politics, or almost ceases. She will be largely divided from Austria by Roumania. She will be divided from Germany by the new Polish State; and she will not be coterminous with any of the belligerents. And if Germany has designs in the future upon France or the West, I think she will be protected by this new State from any action on the part of Russia, and I am not at all sure that that is to the interests of Western civilization. It is a problem which has greatly exercised my mind, and for which I do not see a clear solution. These are disjointed observations in regard to Poland; they lead to no clear-cut recommendation on my part. I am not pleading for a cause; I am trying to lay before the Cabinet the various elements in the problem as they strike me.

The next branch of the subject on which I have anything to say is the smaller neutrals.

²⁴ British Ambassador to Russia.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN: "Is there any point about Belgium?[""]

MR. BALFOUR: With regard to Belgium, I think I can very shortly describe the position to the Cabinet. It is more an economic than a diplomatic problem. I take it, that whatever we fight for, we fight for the restoration of Belgium to her old limits and her old condition of independence and prosperity. The Belgian Minister has more than once been to see me and has put to me this problem. He says: "All of us, every nation, will, after the War, have to face a whole series of new and difficult questions, social, economic, military; the upsetting of everything is so complete, that there is not a nation in the world that will not have to face a new set of things, and do their very best to solve the problem raised." All that is true of Belgium. But what is true of Belgium is true to some extent of no other country. Unless the Allies will, while the war is going on, make preparation to help Belgium, when peace comes, even though its independence be restored and its old frontiers established, she will be left derelict; it is an industrial community, thickly populated, depending for its very livelihood and bread for its people upon mining and upon manufactures. The Germans have not only over-run the country, but they have taken away all the machinery, all the raw material, they have practically taken away everything for the carrying on of the elementary economic effort of the country, and it is impossible for Belgium to make itself again a going concern unless the Allies are prepared at the moment of peace, at the first moment possible, to pour in the raw material, to supply the machinery to make Belgium, in other words, something like what it was before the Germans overwhelmed it. I have no answer to that; I believe what he said is perfectly true, and I believe the appeal which the Belgian Minister makes to the Allies is one which ought to be considered. We are overwhelmed with work; my office can do nothing; I am not sure what office ought to do it. So great is the pressure that I have not had time to put this case before the Prime Minister and our smaller Cabinet. I only circulated an account of my conversation with the Belgian Minister, but the question must be raised and it must be faced. I think it is one of the most important things, outside the war itself, but how it is to be done, other Ministers and other Departments must say.

SIR JOSEPH WARD: In regard to that restoration of machinery, do you mean prior to the re-building of the devastated Belgium?

MR. BALFOUR: I think we ought to be ready to pour it into the country if we can.

THE PRIME MINISTER: It is impossible for the simple reason that all our available manufacturing capacity is put to urgent war work. If we have anything to spare, we put it into agricultural work.

MR. BALFOUR: Perhaps I should add that in my view, the notion which is going through the German mind that they can restore Belgian independence enough to satisfy the world, and yet keep a grip upon Belgian economic life and Belgian ports, I regard as absolutely inadmissible. I think that is almost as bad as annexing Belgium, and I would fight against it to the last drop of my blood. I do not think that is arguable.

As regards the Neutrals—the small Neutrals I mean—Sweden and Royalist Greece, which must be regarded as more or less hostile, Spain and Holland, which I think are friendly, but more doubtful, Norway and Denmark, which are certainly very weak, especially Denmark—there is a great deal of important diplomatic work and Foreign Office work done with these countries; but most of that work really belongs to my colleague, the Minister of Blockade, and measured by telegrams it is far greater, I believe, than that of all the other Offices of State put together; but he will make a statement upon the subject. I do not believe I have anything more to say except this one observation.

MR. AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN: Are you going to say anything more about German aims in the Middle East and their consequence to us?

MR. BALFOUR: I feel intensely upon that question. It was referred to, I think, by the Prime Minister in his statement the day before yesterday, but I am quite ready to say something about it if you think it desirable. This War has been described, and quite accurately I think, as a war against the world domination of Germany, but I think that Germany after all was not equally anxious to have world domination in every direction at one and the same time. What Germany wanted to do was not to make every country equally subservient to her economic designs; I think her economic ambitions in these later years were largely directed, not, of course, wholly, but largely directed to developing the communications between Germany, through Austria, through subordinate States like Bulgaria and Turkey to the Persian Gulf and ultimately to India and the Far East. All the German literature of the last ten years is full of these dreams. Germany has borrowed a great deal from Napoleon, almost always the worst things of Napoleon's. These are the dreams and they have eaten very deeply into the social imagination of the whole community. They picture to themselves Asia Minor, the Valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris and beyond, India and the East; they picture that as a happy field where German enterprise can reign undisturbed. They found Great Britain and the United States had got before them in entirely new countries. South America they were nibbling at, but they had never made up their minds to deal with it. But they thought they had a really fair field in these Oriental regions, and I believe that it was within their power to do it. I believe that if they were successful in this war, they would do it

and that their success would undoubtedly adversely affect the British Empire. I will not say the British Empire would fall, I do not think it would, but it would have a very severe struggle for existence and the whole balance of the world's trade and the world's power would be altered. The Dominions like Australia and New Zealand would be in an entirely different position from what they are now. India would be in an entirely different position from what it is now, and I am not at all sure that among the dangers of German domination, which every country has to fear, the particular dangers that arise through their being able to establish an unbroken avenue of influence from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf is not the greatest of all. I think whatever else happens in the war, that recent events have upset that dream, and I do not think that things could possibly go so badly that Germany could piece together the scattered fragments of this structure which they are striving to complete. In that particular I think we have been successful. I wish I could feel that our success was as complete in other fields of operations and that we could look forward with equal confidence to breaking the designs of Germany in Europe as I hope we have been now in breaking her designs in Turkey and the Middle East generally.

MR. MASSEY: Can you tell us anything with regard to the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine?

MR. BALFOUR: The importance of Alsace and Lorraine is two-fold. In the first place, if we could transfer them back to France we should, I think, do something to improve the equilibrium of Europe. You would remove a population which does not wish to be under Germany to France which it does wish to be under. You would further increase the population of France relative to the population of Germany, which undoubtedly must make for the equilibrium of Europe, and because it makes for the equilibrium of Europe, makes also for the peace of the world. Then there is another point. Since Alsace and Lorraine were taken by Germany, means have been found to utilise the great iron deposits of Lorraine to an extent which makes them a very formidable adjunct to Germany's industrial power. I frankly admit that I should very much like to see these great fields of industrial enterprise restored to their original owners. Germany's strength in coal and steel is an absolutely new phenomenon, you must remember, since the war of 1870, and it is one of the most formidable factors in her success in this War.

THE PRIME MINISTER: And it is one you cannot touch by the Blockade.

MR. BALFOUR: I was told that when the war broke out, Germany had a greater power of producing munitions at the moment than the whole of the rest of the world put together. She owed that, of

course, partly to her desire to be prepared in a military sense, but partly to these enormous resources which she has developed since 1870, of which the iron and coal fields west of the Rhine are an important part and, therefore, from that point of view as well as from the more strictly political and diplomatic point of view, I should be most desirous to see Alsace and Lorraine restored to France. I am told that the French are not so eager about them as they were. Or let me put it rather differently; I am told that the war-weariness in certain sections of French society in consequence of their terrific losses and the general burdens which the war has thrown upon them are so great that if they could get an honourable peace, even without Alsace and Lorraine, or even a small fragment of Alsace and Lorraine, they might be content to take it. I should be very disappointed if this War ends without the complete restoration of the ancient frontiers of France.

The only other thing I have to say is that German atrocities have really had an important diplomatic effect. I think that when Lord Robert Cecil comes to speak, he will tell you how great an effect upon allied diplomacy has been the terrorism which Germany has inspired and produced in Holland, Denmark and Norway. These countries are trembling at the German terrorism. They hate Germany, they hate the domination of Germany, but they feel that if they quarrel with Germany, they will be as Belgium is, and that is undoubtedly a very great diplomatic weapon in the hands of Germany. It is painful to have to admit it, but I think it is true.

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am sure we are very much obliged to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his most illuminating exposition. I do not know whether any members of the Cabinet would like to ask any further questions.

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The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have just had a talk with Morris Hillquit, the socialist, who is seeking a passport to go abroad and attend the Stockholm conference.²⁵ . . .

. . . I do not see how it can result in good and it may do much harm. I understand that the British are greatly disturbed over it and are disposed not to issue passports to their socialists who wish

²⁵ For correspondence previously printed on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, pp. 738 ff.

to attend and that the French have the same view. They feel if we issue passports to our socialists that they will be forced to do the same.

The question is shall we issue passports to men who are avowedly going to the Conference. If we refuse, it may make them martyrs. If we do issue them, we may encourage a dangerous pro-German movement and permit agitators near Russia who are frankly hostile to the Commission to Russia and will seek every means to discredit it and weaken their influence with the socialistic and labor element.

Will you be good enough to give me your opinion as to the action which we should take?

I enclose a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Russell and which bears on this subject.²⁸

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.751/a

The Secretary of State to the Governor of New York (Whitman)

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1917.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: I understand that there is before you at the present time a certain bill, or bills making it a criminal offense for anyone to use without authorization a telephone wire in the State to obtain information.

While I would not presume to advise you in this matter I hope that you will give very careful consideration to the effect which such legislation would have on the investigations and collection of information by federal agents at the present time when national safety requires extraordinary measures, which would not be justified or tolerated under normal conditions. Of course the supreme purpose of all federal and state authority at this critical period should be to increase, rather than to obstruct the exercise of governmental powers.

I realize that it is superfluous to write you thus, as I know the bills before you will be given careful consideration by you before they are approved, but I thought in view of the mass of measures which you are required to pass upon at this time I would direct your attention to proposed laws which materially affect the activities of our federal agents.

With very warm regards [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

²⁸ Not printed.

811.751/1

The Governor of New York (Whitman) to the Secretary of State

ALBANY, N. Y., May 24, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Answering yours of May 19th, the measure with regard to which you write, was vetoed yesterday, in conformity with what seems to me your very wise attitude in the matter.

With kindest personal regards [etc.] CHARLES S. WHITMAN

811.751/1

The Secretary of State to the Governor of New York (Whitman)

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1917.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 24th in which you advise me that the measure concerning which I wrote you on the 19th was vetoed by you. I believe your action will save the Federal Government very serious embarrassment and I heartily thank you for the prompt and wise course which you have taken in regard to the proposed legislation.

With warm regards [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/627a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Senator Owen called to see me yesterday and left with me a copy of a resolution which he had drafted and which is embodied in a speech which he proposes to deliver in support of the resolution.²⁷

While he did not say so I assume that he wished me to submit it to you for comment as to the desirability of introduction at the present and as to the terms of the resolution.

I did not have time to read the Senator's speech until today. I think that it is based on the essential principles which will be the foundation of a permanent peace, but I am not at all sure that this is the time to invite controversy over the terms of peace in Congress and, as a consequence, throughout the world. I am not sure how the various Allied Governments would view this formal declaration on our part of arrangements, in which they are so vitally interested, without

²⁷ No enclosures with file copy of this letter. For text of Senate Joint Resolution 94, introduced by Senator Owen, and his remarks on the subject, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 55, pt. 6, pp. 6164, 6288-6298.

our consulting them or giving them an opportunity to object to one or more of the provisions.

In fact I believe that any resolution at the present time would precipitate a debate in Congress which might give opportunity to those hostile to you to criticize your declarations as to the purposes which we seek to accomplish in the war. That would be very undesirable and might cause serious differences with our co-belligerents.

I do not know quite how to explain this to Senator Owen who has evidently given much thought to the subject and is strong in the belief that Congress should declare our purposes. I am afraid that my objection alone would not restrain him from acting.

It seems to me that the best way is for you to ask Senator Owen to come and see you, and then give him orally your views rather than write them to me for transmission to him.

I will tell the Senator that I have sent you his resolution and speech for your consideration.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/6733a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been turning over in my mind in what way we can best utilize the intense longing of the Poles for the restoration of Poland as an independent nation.²⁸

It seems to be recognized by all the Allies that Polish independence should be one of the results of the war and that the Poles should as far as possible be segregated into military units so that they would feel their nationality and be inspired to fight for the freedom of their country.

It is my understanding that France has already taken steps to form a skeleton on which to build up a Polish army to fight on the Western front; and that something of a like nature could be organized on the eastern front. This latter plan will require discreet handling because the Russians may be at first loath to release troops already incorporated in the Russian armies, but I think that it can be done by starting with a movement to call Poles not already in military service to join a Polish army for independence. When this step is taken I believe the separation of the Poles in the Russian armies will follow as a matter of course.

²⁸ For correspondence previously printed concerning this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, pp. 759 ff., and *ibid.*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, pp. 871 ff.

To gain the full benefit of the loyalty of the Poles to their country it seems to me that, in the first place, this government and those of the Allies should announce in separate but identic declarations that they recognize the legitimate nature of Polish desire for self-government and that they purpose to devote their energies to free Poland and restore the nation to full sovereignty, in contradistinction to a nation under the protection or control of any neighboring power.

In the second place, the matter of financing the Polish military establishment is most important. Of course it will have to be done by this country. My suggestion is that a Polish Provisional Government [be] set up in this country, that it be recognized by this Government and the Allied Governments, and that it send diplomatic representatives to all the powers with which it is associated in the war. After formal recognition of this Government of an independent Poland we could legally loan the Government for military purposes the necessary funds secured by Polish bonds underwritten by this country and the Allies.

I have carefully considered the place where the Provisional Government should be located and have come to the conclusion that to avoid all suspicion as to the genuine purpose of this step looking to the rebirth of Poland this country is the only place. Furthermore, in view of the fact that this country will have to supply the money for this enterprise, I believe that the new Government should be where we can keep a watchful eye on the expenditures.

If this plan or one along the same lines meets with your approval, shall I sound the diplomatic representatives of the Allies on the subject?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/6238½

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 31, 1917.

[Received August 13.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think it may interest you to have some of my impressions after a week in England. I am much struck but not in any way surprised to find that, so far as a casual observer can see, whatever stirring there may be on the part of a small if noisy element, the people at large are overwhelmingly firm in their determination to stand by the Government and to see it through to the end. I feel sure, however, that my friend and colleague here, who knows England thoroughly, keeps you informed as to everything that is important.

Baron Sonnino's visit to London, accompanied by the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, de Martino, has attracted some attention here, and I have wondered if it has not something more behind it than that which the press accords to it in its very brief explanation to the effect that he had not been here for ten years and that he came to return the visit of Lloyd George to Rome last winter. I saw those gentlemen yesterday afternoon, but only for five minutes, as when I called Sonnino was on the point of going to keep an engagement with Lloyd George, after which Lloyd George had a War Committee meeting. I did not get a great deal of information in reply to my inquiry as to what they had accomplished or discussed at the Paris Conference, but I drew from de Martino an expression of great interest in what was meant by the President's statement that he was studying the different plans for re-organization, et cetera. He asked me what the President meant by this and what the plans were. It was easy for me to say that I did not know enough to enlighten him on this point, but that I did know enough to feel that the President had already laid down the principles on which he felt the re-organization should be made, and that it seemed to me that if Italy desired to obtain the benefit of the help of the United States, it would be well for her to endeavor to align herself with the United States so that her aims might be in accord with those which the President had already enunciated. He said he was going to say that to Sonnino, who had already left.

I see from the extracts in the morning press from the Italian papers that the Nationalist press in Italy is attacking Sonnino for what it terms his surrender of Italian claims at the Paris Conference. The Moderate press is excusing what he did there as a necessary concession to England, but it is apparent that the newspapers in Italy as elsewhere know very little of what was really done at the Paris Conference beyond what was made public in Paris.

Your speech to the Press Association representatives in New York is the subject of much comment and praise in the press here this morning; that part of it in which you speak of the necessity of overcoming German might by armed force and rescuing the world from the perils of German military subjugation is especially commented on in warm terms of approval. For myself I want to say that I agree with you absolutely, remembering as I do how little effect starvation had on the South, which subsequently collapsed from want of material of war—not from want of food, which it had long undergone. I feel sure that your proposition is absolutely sound—that Germany can only be beaten on the field of battle. I think that it is universally recognized here that it was the coming in of America that saved the situation. From policy or from pride

they may refuse to admit it publicly, but I do not believe that any well-informed man denies the fact.

The foregoing are merely my impressions but I think that in the main they give a reflection of the situation as it exists here to-day. Lloyd George said in a talk last night to press representatives that he could assure them that he had never known the spirit in France more resolute and determined than it is at present. Based on the assumption of the correctness of this statement, I would say that our entry into the war is the thing which has brought about this change.

Believe me [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

851.00/26½a

*Professor Felix Frankfurter to the Secretary of State*²⁹

ON BOARD S. S. "ESPAGNE," August 7, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This report is made in response to the telegraphic instructions of Acting Secretary Polk under date of July 19³⁰ to "study and make a report for the information of the Department of the present situation in France".

A preliminary word as to the extent and manner of the study is pertinent. From the first day of our arrival in Paris—throughout my stay I was, fortunately, accompanied by Mr. Max Lowenthal, whose critical faculties and imaginative industry were a most important help—I followed events and pursued inquiry with the present study in view, so that the whole of my stay in Paris, including the ten days preceding the receipt of the Department's wire, was in fact devoted to the study requested. This anticipation enabled me to leave Paris in less than a week's time after the receipt of the Department's instructions. Altogether we were in France from July 12 to July 29. This entire period was passed in Paris, except one day at the cantonments of the United States troops at Gondrecourt and Demange-aux-Eaux, and the nearby hospital base at Bazailles, and one day at Bordeaux, whence we sailed on July 30.

Throughout I kept in mind the dangers against generalizing about any people, particularly in war time, and particularly the French. I was also mindful that Paris, however controlling in French life, is not wholly France; that the feelings of those at the front and those at home are not wholly the same; that the people may think differently from the politicians.

Therefore, as to all phases I sought a quantitative judgment, and sought to test individual feelings, doubts and opinions by evidence

²⁹ President Wilson wrote to the Secretary of State on August 14: "Thank you very much for this report of Frankfurter's. I had already had a copy of it and had read it with a great deal of interest." (File No. 851.00/27½.)

³⁰ Not printed.

weighty both in extent and authoritativeness, and by rigorous questioning, to shake down opinions to their residual foundation of facts. In this attitude we touched a wide variety of French life through typical representatives. We talked with French army officers of long service at the front as well as on the staff, army surgeons, French officials, English and American diplomatic officials resident in France during different periods of the war, English and American army officers, French and American journalists of different shades of opinion, members of the Chamber of Deputies, bankers, lawyers, business men, and "just people". I purposely abstained, because the circumstances made it wise, from interviews with cabinet members.

1. SOURCES OF UNREST IN FRENCH MORALE

That France is tired is surely by this time a platitude. One hears it everywhere, from everybody. In addition to this pervasive feeling of general tiredness there are a few basic facts which have profoundly affected French morale, and are still potent. The outstanding single fact is the enormous loss of lives. Whatever may be the authoritative figures (probably known in the War Department at Washington), the conservative estimates generally accepted in France place the loss in dead and permanently disabled at over 2,000,000. Much more important than the gross total is the widespread conviction among the French that France cannot afford to lose many more. This feeling has been much reinforced since the spring offensive. It is the universal testimony that a veritably tragic shudder went through France when the whole nation came to believe, largely as a result of the letters written home from the front, that 100,000 men were sacrificed through an offensive futile in result and generally regarded as unwise in conception. This heavy blow came on top of an abnormally severe winter, bringing widely felt hardships, especially through want of coal. Other economic conditions, the rising high cost of living, and a growing popular belief that wealth is largely immune from the costs of the war, also fed the flame of unrest.

These are the main factors. There are minor elements which serve as items of aggravation, such as the infrequency of furloughs for the men at the front (recently corrected by General Pétain), and the resentment aroused in soldiers on leave by the sufferings of their families. All these enervating factors gained collective strength from the disheartening losses of the spring offensive, and together they undoubtedly intensified the French feeling of unrest into a state of deep depression.

This widespread feeling of war weariness and of decreasing hope has become manifest in several noticeable directions. In a subtle yet persistent way it has been availed of by peace propagandists to such

a degree that the growing number of pacifist publications became the subject of interpellations in a secret session of the Senate. The most sinister effect, and the one most uncertain as to its future importance, has been the recrudescence of Caillaux. For some time he had been working under cover. Latterly he has come into the open, the financial policies of the government having given Caillaux's conceded financial ability the opportunity for an effective reappearance. Making the most conservative discounts, allowing for all the personal and political feeling against him, it cannot be gainsaid that Caillaux is attaining a growing power in French political life. His interests are associated with the presence of M. Malvy in the Ribot cabinet. His importance is attested by the fact that in secret session the government recently confessed itself dependent upon the Caillaux group as represented by M. Malvy, for its supporting bloc. It does not seem at all likely that Caillaux will himself come into power for the present, or that, in office, he would open peace negotiations immediately. But he is distinctly associated with early peace aims. In private conversation he asserts that reasonable terms of peace could now be made. More than that, Caillaux is playing on a vague, though probably growing, suspicion, of England's advantage as against France, from continuance of the war. Caillaux frankly avows hostility to England.

2. EFFECT ON FRENCH MORALE OF AMERICA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR

The arrival of American troops and the belief that the United States will largely take over France's burden have oxygenized France and greatly checked the peace tendencies of the spring. America's participation is the note of hope in the press, men at the front speak about it with eager persistence, it served as the most effective answer by Ribot to the attack, in secret session, against the government's conduct of the war. For the present the expectation that America will soon be at the front is the fact that envelops one in France. Their hopes in us are surely touching; their hopes have no less the seeds of danger. For the expectations aroused are too exuberant and dangerously vague. If American troops in great numbers will not be in France by the end of the year, if the winter should again be a hard one, if the Russian situation should become worse instead of better, the diverse elements of impatience may well give Caillaux and his friends their opportunity.

3. FRANCE'S WAR AIMS IN THEIR BEARING UPON FRANCE'S STABILITY

There is then at present, thanks supremely to the American intervention, a decided strengthening of spirit. But what is the native

foundation of the endurance of the French fighting spirit? Apart from disciplined obedience, what inner cause holds them in the fight? The presence of Germans on French soil is surely the controlling answer. That is enough to assure France's persistence under normal conditions. But there is a growing feeling, which unusual hardship, as time passes, may raise to a dangerous degree, that in any event French soil will be restored to France. German occupation, then, furnishes no unequivocal affirmative aim of the war. There is Alsace-Lorraine; but one is astounded to find among responsible French opinion the feeling that Alsace-Lorraine may not be worth fighting for much longer. Particularly to southern and western Frenchmen do Alsace and Lorraine seem rather remote. These are feelings not now in the ascendant, but they are feelings entertained with sufficient depth and to a sufficient extent to be kept in mind as important in any evaluation of the present and future forces of war-time France.

There is hardly a trace in France of the larger aim which brought the United States into the war, or at least animates our prosecution of it, namely, to have issue from the war not only the failure of German aggression, but the frustration, through an international partnership, a league of nations, of any future aggression. The program is not discussed in the Chamber of Deputies, it is not made the subject of speeches by the government, the press is silent about it. The important exception is M. Leon Bourgeois. Otherwise the scheme of a league to enforce peace is regarded as too "utopian"—the impatient adjective one hears from practically all to whom the subject is mentioned. They are, they say, too busy with the war to indulge in "philosophizing". It is too vague, they contend; they do not understand it. M. Bourgeois is trying to direct attention to it; he is urging upon his colleagues the appointment of a committee for its study. However, the strong impression left on one's mind is that Bourgeois is, as yet, a voice crying in the wilderness.

4. SCOPE OF AMERICA'S ACTIVITY IN FRANCE

The evident danger to the realization of America's war aims, because of an inadequate comprehension of these aims in France, makes indispensable a consideration no less of the larger aspects of the French state of mind than of the people's fighting morale. The diagnosis of existing French opinion which discloses a grave impediment to the accomplishment of that which is behind our material contributions also discloses that this source of danger can be counteracted, and some of the means by which this can be done. The basic necessity for such action, and the directions it can effec-

tively take, are among the most impelling aspects of the French situation.

Very little impetus can be expected to come out of France itself for a sympathetic and cooperating understanding by the French of the war purposes of the United States. They have hardly, if at all, broken through the surface crust of the popular mind. They have not been accorded more than the beginning of a serious discussion, even in that narrowly limited section which has given them any thought at all. The portions of the President's speeches dealing with a sound future world organization, which in the United States is deemed the very condition of our war participation, are either unknown in France, or deemed aspiring rhetoric.

The need of community of purposes between the two republics is obvious. The conclusion is no less inevitable that, in the present state of the French mind, we must take thought how we can be best assured of French understanding and belief in such purposes. We ourselves must build towards an opinion in France for a league of nations, or we may later be without supporting knowledge in our French allies for such a claim by us. Fortunately the means seem ready to hand for making the purposes of the United States, which are conceived to be the world's purposes, a reality in France. French conditions make clear that some such course can be safely undertaken by the United States, with every solicitude for French susceptibilities. For the outstanding facts in France to-day, so far as the United States is concerned, are the great leverage this country now has in France, and the commanding authority enjoyed by President Wilson. The problem is how this leverage and this authority may be exercised.

Respectfully submitted,

FELIX FRANKFURTER

763.72119/7914

*Memorandum by the British Ambassador (Spring Rice)*³¹

Very Urgent.

His Majesty's Government intends to make announcement on the 13th instant that the attendance of British subjects at the Stockholm conference will not be permitted. They are informing the French and Italian Governments that their hands would be considerably strengthened if they were able to announce simultaneously with their own

³¹ This paper bears the notation: "Handed me by British Amb. I told him we had again refused passports and should continue same policy Aug. 11/17. RL."

decision the fact that the governments of the United States, France and Italy had taken a similar line in regard to attendance at the Stockholm conference.

The British Government would be very grateful for an intimation of the views of the government of the United States.

WASHINGTON, 11 August, 1917.

763.72119/717a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Sir Cecil ³² came to see me Saturday evening and handed me the enclosed appeal by the Pope to the belligerents which he said would soon be issued.³³

My own impression is that this statement of peace terms emanates from Austria-Hungary and is probably sanctioned by the German Government. It is undoubtedly preliminary to the Stockholm Conference.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

600.119/399

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose to you a letter from Sir Cecil Spring Rice to Mr. Polk, dated August 11th,³⁴ and also a formal communication from Sir Cecil to me, which was received yesterday.³⁵

These communications mean that the British Government is willing to go as far as we desire in the matter of restricting exports to neutrals, and are giving it, as I understand, for the purpose of preventing this Government from bearing all the blame for any drastic action which may be determined upon.

As it all enters into the general policy concerning which I have not yet had an opportunity to talk with you I express no opinion in regard to it at the present time.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

³² Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the British Ambassador.

³³ For text of the Pope's appeal, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 161.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 920.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 921.

763.72119/7921a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: After a careful analysis of the Pope's appeal to the belligerents³⁶ I am of the opinion that it practically goes no further than the German peace proposal of last December,³⁷ that is, it amounts merely to an invitation to negotiate. The chief difference lies in a preliminary agreement to restore Belgian independence in exchange for the restoration of Germany's colonies, to erect an independent state out of "part of the old Kingdom of Poland" (meaning, probably, Russian Poland), and a general condoning of the wrongs committed, though in particular cases a modification according to "justice and equity". Everything else, even the sovereignty of the Balkan States, is left to negotiation.

Belgian independence and the recreation of Poland were at the time of the German proposal in December considered to be essential to any restoration of peace, so that the only new basis suggested is the waiving by all parties of the losses sustained by them respectively. Except in East Prussia, Galicia and Bukowina (territories which have been reconquered) the Central Powers have not suffered from invasion and hostile occupation. They have little to forgive.

On the other hand neutral Belgium has been grievously outraged and her people impoverished, brutally treated, even enslaved. Would it be just to deny the Belgians the right to claim full reparation for all they have lost through three years of German occupation? Serbia and Montenegro have, from all we can learn, been treated with equal, if not with greater harshness. Are they not entitled to be indemnified for all that they have endured? Roumania also has suffered though in a less degree.

Is the enormous damage done by the German invaders in northern France not even to be paid in part, though much of the damage was the result of wantonness? Is the lawless destruction of hundreds of merchant vessels by German submarines to be condoned?

If I read the Pope's appeal aright, all these questions are to be answered in the affirmative. It is carrying the Christian doctrine of forgiveness a long way, since the burden falls very heavily on one side and very lightly on the other. The suggestion is lacking in justice and reciprocity.

The effort of the German Government through its December note was to induce the Allied Powers to meet the Central Alliance in

³⁶ For correspondence previously printed on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, pp. 161-226.

³⁷ See *ibid.*, 1916, supp., pp. 85 ff.

conference to negotiate on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*. And that is all that the Pope's appeal does, except that Russian Poland is to be given independence. With slight changes of territory here and there amounting to a rectification of boundaries, I do not see that there is to be any material change from the political conditions which existed prior to the war and which resulted in the war.

As to the methods of insuring a continuance of peace, which are suggested for negotiation, their adoption depends largely upon the trustworthiness of the signatories to the peace treaty. In view of the violation of Belgian neutrality, the disregard of human rights, the promises broken by the German Government, I do not see how it is possible to rely upon the good faith of that Government as it is now constituted. It would be folly to expect it to change its character or to abandon its cherished ambitions. To make peace by accepting guarantees from the military rulers of Germany would only be to postpone the struggle not to end it.

I think it necessary to consider the motives which inspired the Pope's appeal or the influences which induced him to make it at this particular time, when the military tide of the Central Powers is at the flood, when the submarine warfare appears to be most menacing, when the power of the United States is just beginning to be exerted, when Russia has not yet gained her equilibrium, when a vigorous peace propaganda in this country and other countries is being pressed and when the socialistic bodies are being employed, as at Stockholm, to demand an end of the war. I would only say that the Pope, probably unwittingly or out of compassion for Austria-Hungary, has become in this matter the agent of Germany.

In a word then the Pope's appeal appears to me to be but a renewal of the German proposal to negotiate and a suggestion of a peace based on the *status quo ante*. The proposal to negotiate has already been declined by the Allies. The suggested basis must of course be rejected by all.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

841.51/80a

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury (McAdoo)

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1917.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In view of your letter of the 14th³⁸ sending me the correspondence in relation to a proposed letter to be sent by

³⁸ For text of this letter and of the preceding correspondence, see Hearings Before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, United States Senate, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 8999-9001.

you to the representatives of the powers to whom money is being loaned and your opinion that a notice should be given them such as the one you propose, I have gone over the matter very carefully again and I am more firmly convinced than ever that such a communication would be a grave mistake.

The same argument which is urged in regard to loans might be advanced in regard to the employment of the embargo, the co-operation of our naval vessels about the British Islands, the presence of our military forces in France, and similar active aid by this Government. It seems to me that it is much wiser to avoid statements of this sort, which might be misconstrued. On the other hand, I am not at all afraid that any of the powers will attempt to construe our silence into acquiescence in the national objectives of the various countries. But, even if it should be considered out of abundant caution to make our position plain, I think that it would be unwise to do so until there is some evidence that such a claim may be made. There is no evidence of the sort now.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.911/26b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have had several intimations that the men at the head of the great news-gathering associations and also some of the leading editors of the country feel that, while every other branch of enterprise has been called in in an advisory capacity to aid the Government, their knowledge has not been utilized and their advice has not been asked in regard to systematizing and making more efficient the various channels of publicity.

It is the wish of many, I understand, to help in an advisory capacity and to cooperate more fully with the Government. I think that they have a sincere desire to aid in any way they can, and have an impression that the failure to use them is because they are not fully trusted.

I feel that it might accomplish a very real good to select a few leading and trustworthy newspapermen, who would be fairly representative of the press and organize them into an Advisory Council on Publicity. This council could consult and advise with Mr. Creel and through their influence control and direct press comment and news.

If this seems to you a suggestion worthy of consideration, perhaps you might submit it to Mr. Creel for his views.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.911/261

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 4 September, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have myself received intimations of the feeling on the part of the men at the head of the news-gathering associations and of some of the leading editors of the country, to which you refer in your letter of September first. It is based upon a complex of misunderstandings (many of which are now being removed) and of jealousies which I can expound to you some time, but the net result of my impressions is that it would be safest not to call them into systematic conference. They are a difficult lot to live with. They do not agree among themselves.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

763.72/71701

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 1, 1917.

[Received October 15.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS I'm sure you've heard, your speech,³⁹ which the *Spectator* publish^d here in full, has been the subject of much complimentary comment, all which, I hope, has reach^d you in clippings sent through the pouch. We aim to send all newspaper comment on American subjects. Your speech pleased the English greatly and gave us all the keenest pleasure.

The newspaper notice of House's quest of peace data—it caused a little shudder here in spite of your explanation and his that it had no reference to making peace now but only to collecting information for the peace conference. Peace isn't a popular word here especially since London is now in the firing line. A two-hour-&-20-minute battle has just ended here—ended, at least, for the moment. All the batteries in London kept up a continuous fire and we heard the low thud of bombs as the bombardment went on, and several of them jarred my house. We've had 6 raids in 8 nights now, & I imagine we shall have one every night so long as the moonlight lasts—a week more. With the dead to bury in London every day, "peace" in any newspaper doesn't please Londoners. All this work can, I hope, be done without publicity. A boy has just brought in a

³⁹ For text, see *Address by Robert Lansing, Secretary of State . . . at Madison Barracks, New York, July 29, 1917* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1917).

4½ lb. piece of shell that fell on the sidewalk in front of my house and having broken the pavement stone rolled into the area. Our houses, you see, have become our trenches.

I've written to House, of course, putting myself at his service in his task. I can without publicity get any information in this Kingdom, and I hold myself at your service in this as in all other matters.

This Government freely gives us all information that we seek. This is my own experience; and I ask every man who comes here properly authenticated, if he is getting what he comes for. They all say "Yes." The appreciation and applause of our vast preparation and of the enormous service that we have already rendered are spoken on all sides and in every quarter.

Yours sincerely,

WALTER H. PAGE

841.857 L 97/137½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] *October 3, 1917.*

Senator Kellogg (Minn.) called at the Department on yesterday and left a memorandum which is attached herewith.⁴⁰ Today I spoke with the senator over the telephone and said the following:

"A careful search of the records has been made and we find that we had no information such as is stated by Senator La Follette in his speech.⁴¹ I then tried to get in touch with former Secretary Bryan. I did not know where he was but by good fortune he was in Washington and I got him on the telephone. He said he knew nothing about any ammunition on board the vessel until three or four days after the *Lusitania* had been sunk. There is absolutely nothing to it. He got hold of La Follette (this is confidential you understand) and told him he ought to deny the statement at once. La Follette said he had been told by a man who claimed that Bryan had told him this story and that he ought to get in touch with this man before he did it. Of course that is an insult to Bryan. I told Mr. Bryan I was going to inform the persons who had been making the inquiry in regard to it and he said 'All right'. That is the whole story. You can deny it flat-footedly."

R. L.

763.72/7096a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *October 3, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and said that his Government were greatly disturbed

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ See letter from the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, *infra*.

over the situation in Russia and that it was proposed to hold an Inter-Allied Conference in Paris as soon as possible to consider what means might be adopted to aid Russia and prevent further disintegration. He said that the date tentatively fixed for the meeting was October 16th and that his Government were most anxious that the United States should be represented at the Conference.

He said further that while he hesitated to speak there was a feeling in Paris that Colonel House would be most acceptable as our representative in order that all the phases of the situation could be fully discussed. I asked him if I should present this suggestion to you and he was doubtful about it as he feared you might not like such a suggestion. I replied to him that I was sure you would understand the hesitation which he felt in presenting it and would myself take the responsibility of submitting it to you.

I further told him that personally I did not think it was possible for Colonel House to go at this time but could not speak with any authority on the subject until I had communicated with you. I also said that I did not wish to commit myself in any way as to the United States being represented at the Conference, as it would be very difficult to find a man properly equipped for such a conference and that all I could do was to lay the matter before you. He said that he hoped, in any event, we could have someone present at the Conference even if that person did not take part as a member.

Personally I think something may be gained by a Conference of this sort as Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia will be represented in any event. We might have an "observer" present but where to find one in Europe at this time I am rather at a loss to say. The only man of real acuteness who understands the Russian situation among our diplomatic representatives seems to me to be Ira Nelson Morris, our Minister to Sweden.

I think this matter should be immediately decided as the situation in Russia is certainly critical and everything should be done that can be done to give stability to the Government there and possibly such a Conference as is suggested would be of material aid.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

841.857 L 97/138½

*The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections
(Pomerene) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] *October 9, 1917.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On the 20th of September, 1917, Honorable Robert M. La Follette made an address before the Non-Partisan

League Convention at Saint Paul, Minnesota. This address is the subject matter of investigation by the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections. I enclose herewith a copy of the address. Page 6 of this address ⁴² contains the following:

"Now, fellow citizens, we are in the midst of a war. For my own part I was not in favor of beginning the war. (Continued applause) I didn't mean to say we had not suffered grievances. We had, at the hands of Germany, serious grievances; we had cause for complaining; they had interfered with the right of American citizens to travel upon the high seas on ships loaded with munitions for Great Britain. (Applause and yells.) And, gentlemen, I would not be understood as saying we didn't have grievances; we did, and upon those grievances, which I have regarded as insufficient, considering the amount involved and the rights involved, which was the right to ship munitions to Great Britain with American passengers on board to secure a safe transit. (Laughter and applause) We had a right, a technical right, to ship munitions, and the American citizens had a technical right to ride on those vessels. I was not in favor of riding on them (laughter) because it seemed to me when the consequences resulting from any destruction of life that might occur would be so awful, I say (a voice: 'Yellow')—any man who says that in an audience where he can conceal himself is yellow himself. (Cries: 'Put him out'.) I say this, that the comparatively small privilege of the right of an American citizen to ride on a munition-loaded ship flying a foreign flag is too small to involve this country in a loss of millions and hundreds of millions of lives. (Applause.)

"Now, fellow citizens, I didn't believe we should have gone into this war for that poor privilege, the right of an American citizen to travel upon a foreign vessel loaded with munitions of war, because a foreign vessel loaded with munitions of war is technically foreign territory (applause), and an American citizen takes his own life in his own hands, just as much as he would if he were on the territory of France and camped in the neighborhood of an arsenal. Mr. President, it has sometimes occurred to me that the shippers of munitions of war, who are making enormous profits out of the business, should not have encouraged American citizens to ride on those ships in order to give a sort of semblance of safety to the passage of their profiteering cargo abroad. (Applause) But, Mr. President, we went into the war by the adoption by Congress of a declaration of war in constitutional form; therefore, we are in the war legally. I was not in favor of going into the war illegally; I resisted the right to arm merchantmen when I knew that that would result in producing a condition that would bring about war without a declaration by Congress, and the Constitution says that Congress, and not the acts of the President, shall bring on a war with a foreign Government. (Applause) But war is declared and lawfully declared; it was not brought about by unlawfully and tyrannically arming of merchant ships. I had a little bit to do with stopping that on the 4th of March, and I put it to my everlasting credit that I was able to do it. (Applause)"

⁴² The reference is to the committee print of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections (65th Cong., 1st sess.).

And on page 7 occurs the following language :

“Ah! But somebody will tell you American rights are involved. What American rights? The right of some venturesome person to ride upon a munition-laden vessel in violation of an American statute that no vessel which carries explosives shall carry passengers. Four days before the *Lusitania* sailed President Wilson was warned in person by Secretary of State Bryan that the *Lusitania* had 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition on board, besides explosives, and that the passengers who proposed to sail on that vessel were sailing in violation of a statute of this country, that no passengers shall travel upon a railroad train or sail upon a vessel which carries dangerous explosives. (Applause) And Mr. Bryan appealed to President Wilson to stop passengers from sailing upon the *Lusitania*. I am giving you some history that maybe has not come to you heretofore—the grievances that carried this country into the war, into a war the results of which, as to the loss of life and burdens, financial burdens, that shall be laid upon us cannot be calculated by any mind. I say that the conditions that carried us into that war needed to be weighed carefully, for I announce no new doctrine, but the doctrine of Daniel Webster, who said when the Mexican War was on that it was the right of the people of this country to determine for themselves whether there has been a sufficient grievance of the people to incur all of the burdens and risks that go with a war of this kind.”

The Committee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate will be greatly obliged to you if you will furnish it at your earliest convenience with a complete statement of the facts concerning the *Lusitania* incident and of the law relating thereto, both so far as it affects our International relations and the rights of American citizens to travel upon the high seas on vessels of the character of the *Lusitania*.

The Committee desires especially to be advised :

First—Did the *Lusitania* have on board ammunition or explosives?

Second—Did the passengers aboard this vessel sail in violation of a statute of this country?

Third—Did Mr. Bryan or the Department of State appeal to President Wilson to stop passengers from sailing upon the *Lusitania*?

Fourth—To what extent did the grievances connected with the sinking of the *Lusitania* carry this country into the war?

Fifth—Kindly also give us the diplomatic correspondence relating to the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

Sincerely,

ATLEE POMERENE

841.857 L 97/138½

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections (Pomerene)

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1917.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 9, 1917, transmitting a copy of the address by the Hon-

orable Robert M. La Follette before the Non-Partisan League Convention at Saint Paul, Minnesota, on September 20th last, which you inform me is now the subject matter of an investigation by the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections. In your letter you quote certain extracts from this address and request, on behalf of the Committee mentioned, to be furnished with:

“a complete statement of the facts concerning the *Lusitania* incident and of the law relating thereto, both so far as it affects our international relations and the right of American citizens to travel upon the high seas on vessels of the character of the *Lusitania*,”

and especially to be advised as to:

“First—Did the *Lusitania* have on board ammunition or explosives?

“Second—Did the passengers aboard this vessel sail in violation of a statute of this country?

“Third—Did Mr. Bryan or the Department of State appeal to President Wilson to stop passengers from sailing upon the *Lusitania*?

“Fourth—To what extent did the grievances connected with the sinking of the *Lusitania* carry this country into the war?

“Fifth—Kindly also give us the diplomatic correspondence relating to the sinking of the *Lusitania*.”

In reply to your request, and particularly in answer to the first inquiry: “Did the *Lusitania* have on board ammunition or explosives?” I beg to enclose a copy of a letter dated June 2, 1915, from the Treasury Department and photographic copies of the original and supplemental manifests of the S. S. *Lusitania* transmitted therewith.⁴³

As regards the second inquiry, viz.: “Did the passengers aboard this vessel sail in violation of a statute of this country?”, I would suggest that you request the Attorney-General to furnish you with the desired information, as it pertains to the interpretation of a federal statute.

In answer to the third inquiry, viz.: “Did Mr. Bryan or the Department of State appeal to President Wilson to stop passengers from sailing upon the *Lusitania*?”, I am advised the [*that*] neither Mr. Bryan nor any other officer of the Department of State appealed to the President to prevent passengers from sailing on the *Lusitania*.

As regards the fourth inquiry, viz.: “To what extent did the grievances connected with the sinking of the *Lusitania* carry this country into the war?”, I beg to say that the sinking of the *Lusitania* was only one—though in some respects the most monstrous—of several cases in which merchant ships with American citizens on board were sunk by German submarines without warning and without any re-

⁴³ Enclosure not printed; for Summary of the Manifest, see vol. I, p. 435.

gard for the safety of the persons on board, in violation of international law and the dictates of humanity. This case was immediately taken up with the German Government and formed the subject of considerable diplomatic correspondence in which the position of this Government was fully set forth and maintained. Copies of this correspondence have already been delivered to you. It will be observed from the paper of most recent date, namely, the note of the German Ambassador of September 1, 1915,⁴⁴ that the German Government admitted the contentions of this Government that ships like the *Lusitania* should be warned, and that the safety of non-combatants should be assured, which procedure was understood to require visit and search. The German Government, in spite of its solemn promises, repeatedly attacked passenger vessels until finally it abandoned all pretense of fulfilling its engagements, and by its declaration of January 31, 1917 (see the note from the German Ambassador of that date),⁴⁵ repudiated its promises and began a campaign of indiscriminate submarine warfare.

The destruction of the *Lusitania* was but one of the incidents in the lawless and inhuman policy of the German Government, which emphasized the evil character of that Government and made impossible any honorable adjustment of the controversy over its illegal and unprecedented use of submarines, or any dependence upon the undertaking of a Government which wilfully violated its word because it interfered with its ruthless policy.

In reply to the fifth inquiry, viz.: "Kindly also give us the diplomatic correspondence relating to the sinking of the *Lusitania*," I take pleasure to enclose copies of the diplomatic correspondence requested.

A complete statement of the facts concerning the *Lusitania* incident and of the law relating thereto will be found in the instructions to the American Ambassador at Berlin particularly those of May 13, June 9, and July 21, 1915, respectively.⁴⁶

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

841.857 L 97/139½

*The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections
(Pomerene) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] *October 16, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On the 29th of September, 1917, certain resolutions adopted by the Minnesota Commission of Public Safety,

⁴⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, supp., p. 530.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 97.

⁴⁶ For these instructions, see *ibid.*, 1915, supp., pp. 393, 436, and 480, respectively.

asking that proceedings be instituted looking to the expulsion of Honorable Robert M. La Follette, a Senator from the State of Wisconsin, were laid before the Senate, together with a copy of a speech delivered by him in St. Paul, Minn., on the 20th day of September, 1917, in which sentiments were expressed recited in the resolutions to be "disloyal and seditious."

These resolutions with the accompanying report of the speech were referred by the Senate to the Committee on Privileges and Elections, which Committee appointed a Sub-Committee charged with the duty of investigating the accuracy of statements made by Senator La Follette in the speech referred to.

In the speech referred to, copy of which is herewith transmitted to you, among other things, Senator La Follette said:

[Here follow extracts from the speech similar to those quoted in Senator Pomerene's letter of October 9, 1917, page 49.]

These and similar assertions in the speech appear to the Committee to amount to a statement to the effect that this country went to war, and is engaged in the present war, to vindicate the right and because of the violation by Germany of the right of American citizens to travel on foreign vessels carrying munitions of war.

The Committee would like to have you attend before it at some date in the near future to submit to it such diplomatic correspondence and other public documents available to you, and to make such statement of facts, as may serve to demonstrate the accuracy or inaccuracy of the assertion thus made, and clearly to point out the real cause of our engaging in the present war.

Likewise, at the same time, the Committee will be glad to hear from you touching the following statement made in the speech referred to, namely:

"Four days before the *Lusitania* sailed President Wilson was warned in person by Secretary of State Bryan that the *Lusitania* had 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition on board, besides explosives, and that the passengers who proposed to sail on that vessel were sailing in violation of a statute of this country, that no passengers shall travel upon a railroad train or sail upon a vessel which carries dangerous explosives. (Applause) And Mr. Bryan appealed to President Wilson to stop passengers from sailing upon the *Lusitania*."

The Committee would like to be advised:

- (1) Whether the *Lusitania* did carry 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition at the time she was sunk; or any ammunition?
- (2) Whether she carried explosives in addition to such, or any, ammunition, and what explosives, if any?
- (3) Whether President Wilson was warned by Secretary of State Bryan that the *Lusitania* had such ammunition and explosives on board, or any munitions or explosives of war?

(4) Whether Mr. Bryan appealed to President Wilson to stop passengers from sailing upon the *Lusitania*, and,

(5) Whether any representative of the State Department gave such information or made such appeal to President Wilson.

Will you kindly advise us whether you can serve the Committee in this way.

Very sincerely,

ATLEE POMERENE

763.72/7608

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 24 October, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for sending me Mr. Phillips' memorandum about the question put by Mr. de Laboulaye.⁴⁷

I think that it would be a mistake for the British and French Governments to address the Japanese Government with the request that Japan should send troops to the West Front next spring and summer, but, of course, I do not wish to press the objection and think it would be unwise to raise one.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

763.72Su/103

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 24 October, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am glad to instruct you to indicate to the French Government and to the other governments associated with us in the war that the Government of the United States accepts the invitation conveyed by the French Ambassador to be represented in the Allied Conference to be held early in November,⁴⁸ and that I have designated Mr. Edward M. House to act in that Conference as the representative of the Government of the United States.

Faithfully Yours,

WOODROW WILSON

763.72Su/104

The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1917

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am sending you today the formal acceptance of the President to be represented in the approaching

⁴⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 696.

⁴⁸ See the letter of Oct. 3, 1917, from the Secretary of State to President Wilson, p. 48.

Allied Conference and designating Colonel House as his representative. I know you will appreciate the wisdom of advising your Government that until the safe arrival of the Colonel and his party in Europe this Government considers it unwise to make any announcement on the subject, as it would be a strong incentive to submarine attack. Indeed out of abundance of caution it would be well I think not to discuss the subject with the representatives of the Allies in Washington.

I wish to express to you my personal appreciation of the honor done me by your Government in suggesting me as the representative of this Government, and I hope that you will express the regret which I feel in not being able to leave my Department at this time to participate in so important a conference as this one will be.

May I ask whether the Japanese Government is to be represented? My own view is that it should be.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72Su/10½

The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)

WASHINGTON, *October 24, 1917.*

EXCELLENCY: In reply to the invitation of your Government, communicated orally by you through this Department, to the President that the Government of the United States be represented in the Allied Conference to be held early in November, I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by the President to indicate to the French Government and to the other Governments associated with us in the war that the Government of the United States accepts the invitation conveyed by you to be represented in the Allied Conference to be held early in November and has designated Mr. Edward M. House to act in that Conference as the representative of the Government of the United States.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72Su/10¾a,b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *October 25, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been thinking over further the matter of credentials for Colonel House and I have come to the conclusion that a simpler way than giving him a certified copy of the letter addressed to the French Ambassador here would be for you to give him a formal designation. I therefore enclose a letter which I would suggest be given him. In view of the regard for formality which prevails among European governments it might be well

for me to countersign your letter and place upon it the seal of the Department.

If this course meets with your approval will you please sign the letter and return it to me for transmission to Colonel House—indicating whether or not you approve of the countersigning.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Letter of Designation for Mr. Edward M. House

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1917.

SIR: You are hereby designated to represent the Government of the United States at the Conference to be held by representatives of the Allied Governments in the early part of the month of November, 1917.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

WOODROW WILSON

By the President:

ROBERT LANSING, [SEAL]
Secretary of State.

763.72Su/11½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 25 October, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am very glad to comply with your suggestion about this letter to House and I would be obliged if you would be kind enough to countersign it and see that it is promptly forwarded to him. I believe he leaves New York on Sunday.

Faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

841.51/89

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Crosby) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I believe it is already quite familiar to you that a considerable portion of the loans made by this Government to the British Government and also to the French Government, acting more or less indirectly through the British Government, have been used for the purpose of buying all French and English exchange offered on the New York market. In so far as the amount thus pur-

chased represents final balances of trade between France and England on the one hand and neutral countries on the other, the purchase of these bills is in fact a payment of the debts of English and French nationals or their Governments for the balances thus incurred. Until a recent date, it was possible for the sellers of these goods throughout the world to receive ultimate payment, if they so desired, by the shipment of gold from the United States. This movement, as has been indicated to you in the past, had attained very considerable proportions when the tentative embargo upon gold shipments was established by our Government. Since that date, the sales of these bills have resulted rather in the establishing of credits in New York banks in favor of the selling countries or the banks in various neutral countries representing these original sellers, these credits remaining as a part of the deposits of our great banks.

From this point of view perhaps there should be no complaint on our part, save that two questions of great import are presented in connection with the matter, namely, first, that the establishment of these credits through the means above indicated means at all times a heavy and almost unbearable pressure upon the Treasury of the United States to furnish to the French and British Governments the moneys to make the purchases of bills of exchange in New York; and, second, that after a certain period it may appear that the sellers of the goods, say from the Argentine Republic, or from Brazil, or Spain, will be unwilling or unable to receive their payment solely in New York bank credits. In this latter case, it is apparent that our associates in the war would be deprived, unless other means are taken, of obtaining goods which in the main we know are considered by them as essential for the prosecution of the war. It is true that some further economies in respect to their purchases in neutral markets may be established; but, without going too narrowly into the question, we are assuming now that they have already exercised an extreme prudence in limiting their importations to articles considered necessary.

In order to alleviate the situation without continuing the supply of funds for the purchase of bills of exchange in New York, with the attendant danger indicated above, the following means of relieving the situation have been discussed, namely:

1. That there should be an absolute forbidding of the dealing in bills traceable to neutral countries for British and French commerce in our market, thus at once diminishing the demand for moneys by those Governments intended for the purchase of these bills. This, of course, is an extreme and from many points of view an undesirable remedy, and is mentioned merely as one of the possible remedies. It would be attended with such great hardships upon our associates in the war that we scarcely like to contemplate it.

2. That there should be a renewed study by our associates in the war of the possibility of purchasing in this country the goods which they are now obtaining in neutral countries, which commerce creates the situation here described. It may be assumed that this particular remedy is now being more or less applied by the British and French Governments, but it seems difficult if not impossible that the whole situation should be thus met, since in the case of certain minerals from Spain, coffee from Brazil, and needed grain supplies from the Argentine, our markets cannot offer substitutes.

3. It has been considered that possibly the neutrals selling the goods in question might be content with increasing their London bank credits. This process, however, has been going on for so long a time in London and Paris, since the beginning of the war, that it is believed by the English and French advisers that it can scarcely be carried further.

4. Finally, it has seemed possible that by arrangement with these neutral countries their whole fiscal systems may be modified to meet the world-wide emergency in this way, namely, that as against securities or other satisfactory guarantees owned by the English or French Governments or their nationals, the neutral countries in question should issue currency in their own countries permitting payment to their producers for the articles in question. This is by far the most obvious and sensible arrangement which could be made. Obviously, it is not easy to accomplish at once. Doubtless in some cases legislation of special character would be required in order that paper money should be issued against securities in ways not now familiar in the countries in question. It does not follow that an actual legislative change of monetary systems will be required in every country in question, but it is contemplated that in some countries such changes may be required, and hence, since we cannot assume that these changes could be immediately brought about, it is desirable that the question should receive large and general consideration at as early a date as possible.

The importance of the matter is such that I venture to suggest that you should communicate to the neutral governments which I shall name below a statement that it is believed to be of common interest to them and to this Government that their present representatives in Washington should be fully empowered to negotiate such financial arrangements as have been above indicated, or that other representatives thus empowered should immediately be sent to Washington.

For your information, I beg to state that I have talked this matter over with the representatives of Great Britain and France, who approve of the proposed procedure. They realize that what we are attempting to accomplish is specially for their benefit.

The countries in question are, notably, Brazil, the Argentine Republic, Chile, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland. You will of course determine whether in this list any countries appear with whose governments you would not now desire

to enter into negotiations looking to the amelioration of and continuance of our commercial relations.

It seems difficult to arrange with any prudence and wisdom the vexatious questions connected with gold exports, dealings in bills of exchange, and even the general determination of exports and imports between our own country and the countries named, unless we have in view some general solution throughout the world of the extraordinarily difficult financial problems now being presented.

In the meantime, I am [etc.]

OSCAR T. CROSBY

865.6131/8 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, November 12, 1917—6 p. m.

[Received November 13—3:15 a. m.]

1214. Premier told me Saturday that greatest need now is grain and I was informed today by man who knows, that 3 million quintals, about 11 million bushels, grain were lost or destroyed by army in evacuated territory, that Italy now has food only to last through January. Guns and aeroplanes also greatly needed.

NELSON PAGE

841.857 L 97/139½

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections (Pomerene)

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SENATOR: After considering the matter, and after consultation with the President, it seems incompatible with the public interest that I should appear before your Committee in connection with the investigation which is being made as to Senator La Follette. I trust you will explain to your colleagues on the Committee my unwillingness to appear before them in this matter.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/7796a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Before I left the city on Friday last I told you that I was having prepared a memorandum in regard to our grounds of complaint against Austria. Mr. Woolsey, the Solicitor for the Department has prepared such a memorandum and I

enclose it herewith.⁵¹ We have not a very strong case against Austria so far as hostile acts are concerned. It seems to me that it comes down very largely to a matter of national safety in having at large and free to act a very considerable body of Austrian subjects in this country.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

841.857 L 97/139½

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections (Pomerene)

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1917.

MY DEAR SENATOR POMERENE: Referring to your letter of October 16th last and to our conversations regarding certain data which the subcommittee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections desires from the Department in relation to the address made by Senator La Follette before the Non-partisan League Convention at St. Paul, Minnesota, on September 20th last, I desire to call your attention to my letter of October 15th last, which, I believe, covers all of the inquiries made in your letter under acknowledgment.

In our interview, you requested to be supplied with: (1) A list of vessels of American registry or of foreign registry having Americans on board attacked or sunk by submarines, together with a statement of facts in regard thereto; (2) A statement and discussion of the law upon which the American protests to Germany regarding submarine warfare were based; and (3) A review of the violated pledges of Germany in regard to her conduct of submarine warfare.

In respect to the attacked or sunken vessels, I enclose three lists—one of American vessels (marked A),⁵² another of foreign vessels having Americans reported on board, on which correspondence has been published (marked B),⁵³ and a third of foreign vessels having Americans reported on board, on which no correspondence has been printed (marked C).⁵⁴ These lists also indicate briefly, in a tabulated form, certain facts regarding each vessel. The references in the last column at the right⁵⁵ are to the published diplomatic correspondence, a set of which I enclose, entitled, "European War Nos. 1, 2, and 3," respectively, and the galley proof of Part XVII (entitled "Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Regarding Submarine

⁵¹ No copy of this enclosure found in Department files.

⁵² Enclosure 1.

⁵³ Enclosure 2.

⁵⁴ For text of List C, see European War No. 4: *Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Duties* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 300.

⁵⁵ Last column not printed.

Interferences with Commercial Vessels") of a proposed fourth volume of diplomatic correspondence in the course of being printed.⁵⁶ In the documents referred to in these references further details regarding the attacks and sinkings will be found.

As to the statements and discussions of the law upon which the American protests to Germany were based, I would refer you to the following pages of the enclosed correspondence and of certain addresses of the President, which are also enclosed.⁵⁷ On these pages the particular passages stating and discussing the law are marked on the margin:

European War No. 1, Pages 54, 74, 75, and 76.

European War No. 2, Pages 171, 172, and 178.

European War No. 3, Pages 243 and 244.

Addresses of the President: February 26, 1917, Pages 5 and 6;
April 2, 1917, Pages 3, 4, and 5.

In regard to the violated pledges of the German Government, I enclose an informal memorandum entitled: "Violations of German Pledges Regarding Conduct of Submarine Warfare,"⁵⁸ which reviews roughly, in chronological order, the German declarations of submarine warfare, the attack upon or sinking of certain vessels thereunder, and the various pledges given by the German Government from time to time up to April 6, 1917.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

⁵⁶The reference is to the publication *Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce [or Duties]* (4 vols., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1915-1918).

⁵⁷Copies of the addresses are not enclosed with file copy of this letter. For the address of Feb. 26, 1917, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 54, pt. 5, p. 4272; for that of Apr. 2, 1917, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 195.

⁵⁸Not printed; consists chiefly of extracts from correspondence previously printed.

[Enclosure 1]

AMERICAN VESSELS ATTACKED OR SUNK BY SUBMARINES, MINES, ET CETERA, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT WAR, AND LIVES LOST UP TO APRIL 6, 1917

Name of Vessel	Sunk or Attacked	Lives Lost	Date
1. William P. Frye (ship) ¹	Sunk	None	January 28, 1915
2. Evelyn ¹	Sunk	1	February 19, 1915
3. Carib ¹	Sunk	3	February 23, 1915
4. Greenbrier ¹	Sunk	None	April 2, 1915
5. Cushing ¹	Attacked	None	April 28, 1915
6. Gulfight.....	Attacked	3	May 1, 1915
7. Nebraskan.....	Attacked	None	May 25, 1915
8. Seaconnet ¹	Sunk	None	June 18, 1915
9. Leelanaw.....	Sunk	None	July 25, 1915
10. Vincent (ship) ²	Sunk	None	September 27, 1915
11. Helen W. Martin.....	Attacked	None	November 18, 1915
12. Owego ¹	Attacked	None	August 3, 1916
13. Lanao (Philippine).....	Sunk	None	October 28, 1916
14. Columbian.....	Sunk	None	November 8, 1916
15. Chemung.....	Sunk	None	November 26, 1916
16. Rebecca Palmer.....	Attacked	None	December 14, 1916
17. Sacramento.....	Attacked	None	January 6, 1917
18. Westwego.....	Attacked	None	January 21, 1917
19. Housatonic.....	Sunk	None	February 3, 1917
20. Lyman M. Law (schooner).....	Sunk	None	February 12, 1917
21. Algonquin.....	Sunk	None	March 12, 1917
22. Vigilancia.....	Sunk	15	March 16, 1917
23. City of Memphis.....	Sunk	None	March 17, 1917
24. Illinois (tank).....	Sunk	None	March 18, 1917
25. Haldton (tank).....	Sunk	20	March 21, 1917
26. Aztec.....	Sunk	28	April 1, 1917
27. Marguerite (schooner).....	Sunk	None	April 4, 1917
28. Missourian.....	Sunk	None	April 4, 1917

¹ Sunk by German cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. [Footnote in the original.]

² Sunk by mine. [Footnote in the original.]

³ Attacked by airplane. [Footnote in the original. The *Owego* was actually attacked by a submarine. See *Foreign Relations*, 1916, supp., pp. 283, 285-287.]

[Enclosure 2]

VESSELS OF FOREIGN REGISTRY DESTROYED OR ATTACKED BY SUBMARINES, WITH AMERICANS ON BOARD, ON WHICH CORRESPONDENCE IS PUBLISHED BY THE UNITED STATES

Name of Vessel	Registry	Date of Attack	Torpedoed	Mine	Gun Fire	Warned	Americans on Board	Americans Killed	Sunk
Agder.....	Norwegian	Dec. 10, 1916	-----	-----	Yes	Not stated	1	None	Yes
Arabia.....	British	Nov. 6, 1916	Yes	-----	-----	No	Yes; no. not stated	None	Yes
Ancona ^f	Italian	Nov. 7, 1915	Yes	-----	Yes	Yes	do	7	Yes
Arabic.....	British	Aug. 19, 1915	Yes	-----	-----	No	do	3	Yes
Barbara.....	British	Oct. 20, 1916	-----	-----	Yes	Yes	3	None	Yes
Delto.....	Norwegian	Oct. 31, 1916	-----	-----	Yes	Yes	1	None	Yes
Berwindvale.....	British	Mar. 16, 1916	Yes	-----	-----	No	4	None	Yes
Falaba.....	British	Mar. 28, 1915	Yes	-----	-----	Yes	Yes; no. not stated	1	Yes
Laconia.....	British	Feb. 25, 1917	Yes	-----	-----	No	20	8	Yes
Lokken.....	Norwegian	Nov. 12, 1916	-----	-----	Yes	Yes	Yes; no. not stated	None	Yes
Lusitania.....	British	May 7, 1915	Yes	-----	-----	No	do	114	Yes
Imperator ^f	Russian	Apr. 11, 1916	-----	-----	Yes	-----	2	None	Yes
Marina.....	British	Oct. 28, 1916	Yes	-----	-----	No	51	6	Yes
Orduna.....	British	July 9, 1915	Yes ^b	-----	-----	No	Yes; no. not stated	None	No
Persia.....	British	Dec. 30, 1915	Yes ^c	-----	-----	No	do	2	Yes
Rowanmore.....	British	Oct. 26, 1916	Yes	-----	Yes	No	7	None	Yes
Russian.....	British	Dec. 14, 1916	Yes	-----	-----	No	90	17	Yes
Sebec.....	British	Oct. 12, 1916	Yes	-----	-----	No	1	None	Yes
Sussex.....	French	Mar. 24, 1916	Yes	-----	-----	No	25	None	No ^d
Trebaarraca.....	British	Nov. 16, 1916	Yes	-----	-----	Yes	2	None	Yes
Trippel.....	Norwegian	Nov. 11, 1916	-----	-----	Yes	Yes	1	None	Yes

^a One wounded. [Footnotes a, b, c, d, and f in the original.]

^b Torpedo missed.

^c Believed to have been torpedoed.

^d Badly damaged by Torpedo.

^f Sunk by Austrian Submarine.

811.032/14

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 28 November, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would be very much obliged to you if I might have a memorandum from you as to any legislation which you think it imperative should be considered at this session of Congress.

I assume that the Congress will prefer to confine itself entirely to matters directly connected with the prosecution of the war, and in my judgment that is the policy which it should pursue. My request, therefore, concerns only such matters as you think should be provided for at once and cannot be postponed.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

811.032/14

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Replying to your request of November 28, for a statement as to any legislation which should be considered by Congress at this session, I enclose memoranda on this subject which are self-explanatory.

In addition to these memoranda I might suggest that, in my opinion, it would be wise if Congress would pass a resolution suspending during the term of the war the so-called Seaman's Act.^{58a} I understand that Secretary Redfield is strongly in favor of this. Many protests from foreign countries, particularly the Allied countries, have come to my knowledge complaining that as a result of this Act it is impossible to hold seamen on merchant vessels as they are free to desert whenever they please, following their own inclinations whether voluntarily or induced by German intrigue.

In this connection may I also suggest that it would be of great value to this Department if a law could be passed making it perjury for false affidavits to be presented to this Department or any Department of the Government by persons seeking action in support of their interests abroad. I understand that there is a provision in the Civil Service law which protects the Commission from misstatements. Such a law for the Department of State would go far in preventing it from being imposed upon by unscrupulous persons. Now, as heretofore, the Department has to rely upon statements in affidavits pre-

^{58a} 38 Stat. 1164.

sented to it as the basis for communications with foreign governments. It is very important, particularly at the present time, that there should be some law requiring persons to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in the sworn statements which they present to the Department in support of their claims.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

P. S. If you approve the termination of the treaties with Norway and Sweden, I think it would be well to notify their governments in advance of any action on our part. R. L.

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum Suggesting an Amendment to the Draft Act of
May 18, 1917*

NOVEMBER 30, 1917.

The Draft Act of May 18, 1917,^{58b} provides for the conscription of aliens (except enemy aliens) who have taken out their first papers. Neutral countries have protested against such conscription of their subjects, those having treaties of exemption basing their protests on treaty provisions, and those having no treaties basing their protests on international law and custom. As you know, the War Department, with your approval, has acceded to their views, and accordingly this Department has advised the neutral countries that while there is no way under the Draft Act to exempt their subjects, the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-chief, would discharge them immediately after they had been incorporated in the army, upon satisfactory proof of their nationality. To the Spanish Ambassador, who has been particularly insistent upon the exemption of his fellow-countrymen, and also of the subjects of Turkey, whose interests are in his charge, the Department has said that it would suggest the amendment of the present Draft Act so as to avoid the present circuitous procedure.

In view of the fact that the action of the Government in discharging neutral declarants from the army is virtually a refusal to execute the act of Congress in this respect, it would seem to me that the situation should be cleared up by an amendment to the Draft Act excluding from its operation declarants of neutral nationality.

The Governments who are co-operating with us in the war have not (except Cuba) protested against the incorporation of their declarants in the American Army.

^{58b} 40 Stat. 76.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum Suggesting the Abrogation of the Treaty of 1827 With Norway and Sweden by Resolution of the Senate

NOVEMBER 30, 1917.

Article XVII of the treaty with Sweden and Norway of 1827^{53c} revives Article XVII of the treaty of 1783^{53d} (both treaty of 1827 and revived articles of treaty of 1783 are regarded as in force between the United States and Sweden and Norway separately) which reads as follows:

“One of the contracting parties being at war and the other remaining neuter, if it should happen that a merchant-ship of the neutral power be taken by the enemy of the other party, and be afterwards retaken by a ship of war or privateer of the Power at war, also ships and merchandizes of what nature soever they may be, when recovered from a pirate or sea rover, shall be brought into a port of one of the two Powers, and shall be committed to the custody of the officers of the said port, that they may be restored entire to the true proprietor as soon as he shall have produced full proof of the property. Merchants, masters, and owners of ships, seamen, people of all sorts, ships and vessels, and in general all merchandizes and effects of one of the allies or their subjects, shall not be subject to any embargo, nor detained in any of the countries, territories, islands, cities, towns, ports, rivers, or domains whatever, of the other ally, on account of any military expedition, or any public or private purpose whatever, by seizure, by force, or by any such manner; much less shall it be lawful for the subjects of one of the parties to seize or take anything by force from the subjects of the other party, without the consent of the owner. This, however, is not to be understood to comprehend seizures, detentions, and arrests, made by order and by the authority of justice, and according to the ordinary course for debts or faults of the subject, for which process shall be had in the way of right according to the forms of justice.”

The last two sentences of this article (that is, the portions between “merchants, masters, and owners . . . forms of justice”) are causing the difficulties in the operation of the plans of the Shipping Board and the War Trade Board.

A large number of Norwegian ships are being built in American shipyards, and the Shipping Board is desirous of taking over these ships for the purpose of speeding up their construction and for the purpose of requisitioning them when completed for the use of the United States; but the Board hesitates to do so in the face of the

^{53c} Miller, *Treaties*, vol. 3, p. 283.

^{53d} *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 123.

treaty provision quoted and of the protest of the Norwegian Government thereunder. A plan of having the title to these ships vested in an American corporation and having them chartered to the Shipping Board during the war is being worked out so as to avoid a possible violation of the treaty.

The War Trade Board is desirous of controlling the movements of Swedish and Norwegian ships coming to American ports by the refusal of licenses until the owners or masters sign the "bunker agreement" by which in general they undertake not to assist the enemy, but to transport cargoes for the Allies. In some cases the ships come here with full bunkers for the purpose of unloading part of their cargoes, without taking on any supplies or bunkers. To refuse a license to at least this class of ships, and so to detain them until they sign the bunker agreement, would seem to be a violation of the treaty, and would leave a large number of ships free from the control desired by the War Trade Board. Relying on this treaty, the Swedish Government has protested against such action on the part of the War Trade Board.

The Food Administration has seized certain supplies held in this country by Swedish and Norwegian owners, and such seizures might be regarded by Sweden and Norway as violating this treaty, although they have not yet, so far as I am advised, raised the treaty article in this connection.

The so-called Seamen's Act has abrogated articles in these treaties relating to the apprehension of deserting seamen, and has modified other articles relating to the right of consular officers to decide differences between the captains and crews of merchant vessels. Under this Act notice was served on Norway that this Government desired to suspend the articles affected but retain the remaining articles of the treaty.^{58e} Norway has refused to accede to this request, and there is nothing left to do but to terminate the treaty.

In view of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that it might be well to terminate these treaties by one year's notice, in accordance with their terms, or preferably, to abrogate the treaties by a resolution of the Senate. I enclose the subjects of the articles of these two treaties, which show the scope of the matters covered by them.^{58f} While it is convenient to have agreements with these countries on these subjects, yet the objects and terminology of these articles drafted 90 to 135 years ago are largely unsuited to present conditions.

^{58e} See *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 6.

^{58f} Not printed.

763.72 Su/1: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 1, 1917—noon.

[Received December 3—6:35 a. m.]

901. The Supreme War Council sat at Versailles this morning at 10:30. General Bliss and I represented the United States. Clemenceau and Foch, France, Milner and Lloyd George, Robertson and Wilson, Great Britain, Orlando and Cadorna, Italy, were present. The French Prime Minister presided. The following questions submitted for examination: One, Italy, two, Saloniki, three, Roumania.

One, Italy. The French Prime Minister said it was necessary to know whether offensive or defensive measures were to be considered and that choice of operation should not be left to enemy. Orlando thought that aid should be sent to Italy immediately without waiting for a report, alleging that if divisions sent were in excess of requirements they could always be sent back. Lloyd George said that railway facilities to Italy were so limited that with six French divisions using the Mont Cenis and six British divisions using the Ventimiglia route no transportation facilities would be left for supplying Saloniki. He suggested that a railway expert be appointed to report on the transportation situation as a whole including not only Italian transportation question, but also transportation across the Atlantic and railway transportation on the various theatres of the war. He said that Geddes would be a good man to draw up this report if he could be spared and report could be made in about 2 months. Orlando said that in addition to the railways between France and Italy it was possible always to send men by [ship?] from Marseilles to Genoa, a trip which would involve only one night. At Genoa he said that the Italians had six large steamers which could be utilized for this work.

Two. The French Prime Minister proposed that the disposition of the Belgian [*Greek?*] army consisting of six divisions which had done nothing up to the present time but issue communiqués be considered. It was agreed that a dossier on this subject be distributed.

Three. The question Saloniki was taken up and the chairman said that unfortunately very little was known about the situation and what was known was unfavorable. He stated that the British had 170,000 troops at Saloniki and only 40,000 bayonets. Wilson objected to this latter figure but could not give reliable estimate thereof. The French Prime Minister said he could give absolutely no details as to French army. Sarraill had been directed to report but the report was not satisfactory. He stated that the French Government intended to reorganize the French army at Saloniki and that, in view of the fact

that in addition to the French and British troops there were also Italian, Greek and Russian forces there, he did not think that the expedition should be abandoned. The French [*Greek?*] Prime Minister in the meantime having [assured?] the conference there were three Greek divisions actually on the front at Saloniki and that Greece was prepared to put nine divisions more into the field if the munitions promised by the Allies at the conference in Paris of the present year as well as the provisions were forthcoming. He said that the essential thing was that Greece should receive provisions as his country was on starvation rations. Foch objected that the Greeks had not lived up to their agreement to disband their old army and to send the men back to the Peloponnesus. Venezelos admitted that this had not been done because all of the rolling stock of the Greek railways had been taken by the Allies for work at Saloniki and that the Greeks had had most of their merchant marine taken by the Allies and if these ships were restored to them they would transport their own provisions.

Lloyd George said he thought it vital to the Allies that authority of Venezelos be supported and that provisions be sent to Greece. He said that he had not realized how badly and how unintelligently the Allies had treated Greece. Klotz, the French Minister of Finance, appeared before council and stated that after conferring with Venezelos [?] and Crosby he had ascertained that sum of 50 million francs was immediately necessary for the expenses of November and December of the Greek army. This sum has been placed at the disposal of the Greek Government yesterday although Crosby had made certain reservations as far as the United States was concerned. The French Prime Minister asked House whether the United States were prepared to participate with France and England in lending money to Greece. House replied that he thought they would be. Klotz said that Greek army budget for the year 1918 amounted to 900 million francs divided as follows: 350 million francs pay for 1918. Venezelos stated that Greece herself could provide internally 150 million francs of the amount, leaving balance of 750 million francs to be provided by the Allies. Bliss and House approving. Crosby states that he will recommend to McAdoo that the United States provide one-third of this amount, England and France making up balance provided tentative estimate of 600 million francs additional for the Greek army munition program for 1918 is taken care of in similar or other manner. Crosby will explain in a separate cable to the Treasury details of proposed arrangement.

Four. Details of the Roumanian situation left to military authorities which have already discussed situation. Thereupon conference adjourned at 1:30 p. m.

EDWARD HOUSE

841.857 L 97/139½

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections (Pomerene)

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1917.

MY DEAR SENATOR: While I have not changed my personal opinion as to the expediency of my appearing before the La Follette Investigation Committee, I desire of course to conform to the wishes of yourself and your associates. I hope you will understand, therefore, that, in the event you think my presence will prevent any embarrassment to your Committee or any criticism which might be raised, I will, if your views are unchanged, be ready to appear before you whenever you desire me to do so.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/7997 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, December 6, 1917—2 p. m.

[Received December 7—2:25 a. m.]

1272. Baron Sonnino, who returned yesterday seems to be pleased with results of Paris Conference but everything depends now putting decisions of Conference into practical operations.

He was impressed by House, says latter appeared understand his Government's practical suggestions. He is disappointed House could not come to Italy, as I am. He says that Italy's present needs of grain and coal so serious that question of supplying sufficient tonnage immediately to furnish her these is most urgent.

He expressed his pleasure at the President's recommending declaration of state of war with Austria-Hungary. Believes that it will have important effect. Text of message appeared in press few hours later. Comments so far very favorable.

I hear from reliable source that feeling in some quarters is that England has not yet pooled all interests in common cause, and will not do so, fearing that it may lead to appointment of generalissimo who would be French General and also will not consider greater urgency of needs in Italy as demanding more than prorata relief. These two ideas may have to be reckoned with for a strong propaganda has gone on telling people that England alone is keeping Italy and France at war.

NELSON PAGE

867n.01/13½a

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*⁵⁹

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is being brought considerable pressure for the issuance of a declaration in regard to this Government's attitude as to the disposition to be made of Palestine. This emanates naturally from the Zionist element of the Jews.

My judgment is that we should go very slowly in announcing a policy for three reasons. First, we are not at war with Turkey and therefore should avoid any appearance of favoring taking territory from that Empire by force. Second, the Jews are by no means a unit in the desire to reestablish their race as an independent people; to favor one or the other faction would seem to be unwise. Third, many Christian sects and individuals would undoubtedly resent turning the Holy Land over to the absolute control of the race credited with the death of Christ.

For practical purposes I do not think that we need go further than the first reason given since that is ample ground for declining to announce a policy in regard to the final disposition of Palestine.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

860C.01/84½

The Representative of the Polish National Committee (Paderewski) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1918.

SIR: For a long time before the official recognition of the Polish National Committee at Paris, the members of that organization have been carrying out the work of propaganda among the masses of Polish population for the resistance to Germany's political plans. Their endeavors, involving considerable expenditure of energy and money, have been successful. Outside of two members, who cheerfully offered for that purpose all they had possessed, the expenses of the propaganda were covered partly by contributions from the Polish organizations in the United States, partly by private donations from

⁵⁹ This paper bears the notation: "The President returned me this letter at Cabinet Meeting December 14, 1917, saying that very unwillingly he was forced to agree with me, but said that he had an impression that we had assented to the British declaration regarding returning Palestine to the Jews R.L." For text of the declaration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, p. 317, footnote 1.

that part of Russian Poland which has not been invaded by the enemy.

The present position of the Polish National Committee at Paris, while greatly enhanced, both politically and morally, through its recognition as an official organization by the Entente Powers and the United States Government, is nevertheless very precarious by reason of the existing financial conditions. Though not adopting, for obvious political reasons, temporarily at least, the name of a provisional government, the Polish National Committee has assumed all the burden of responsibility of such an institution and accepted many of its charges imposed upon it by the very fact of its recognition as an official organization. The already established agencies and offices in Paris, London, Rome, Lausanne and Petrograd with their numerous staffs require the more funds as the members and agents of the Polish National Committee at Paris, handicapped by comprehensible difficulties of correspondence, by letters and wires, are obliged to travel constantly in order to communicate personally. The resources of individuals are now totally exhausted. The contributions from the Polish organizations are being absorbed by charities, especially by the needs of Polish volunteers going to fight in France. The recent social and political disturbances in Russia have completely wiped out all that remained of Polish fortunes there. The Polish National Committee at Paris has practically no financial means whatever.

In view of this distressing situation, the Polish National Committee at Paris, much to its regret, finds itself compelled to appeal to the United States for aid, and most respectfully begs your Excellency to decide whether the President or the Government of the United States would be inclined to grant, in the form of a loan, to the future State of Poland, the financial help as follows:

1. Sixty thousand dollars as a monthly subvention for the maintenance of agencies and offices already existing in Paris, London, Rome, Lausanne, and Petrograd as well as of those which are to be established in neutral countries, for the duration of the war.
2. One million dollars for the immediate relief of Polish refugees in Russia whose situation, under the present regime, is most critical and the number exceeds sixteen hundred thousand.
3. A subsidy of five hundred thousand dollars for the purpose of bringing over from Russia, five hundred experienced Polish officers of all ranks, already promised by the Russian General Staff, and whose presence among the Polish soldiers would greatly increase the value of that fighting material.

The members of the Polish National Committee at Paris, enjoying confidence and respect of an immense majority of our people, there is no doubt that the future State of Poland would gladly redeem this loan which, however important, is only a trifling matter as compared

to the unbounded indebtedness of Poland towards the President, the Government, and the people of the United States.

With profound respect [etc.]

I. J. PADEREWSKI

763.72119/1271½

Mr. Frank E. Anderson to the Secretary of State

REPORT OF A VISIT TO AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY IN DECEMBER, 1917⁶⁰

The items of information gained from the interviews and observations being the most important part of the report, they will be stated under various heads at the beginning instead of summarized at the end and are as follows:

1st: The feeling of war-weariness is plainly evident and the desire for peace is universal throughout Austria and Hungary, both on the part of the Government, including the Emperor (whom Count Apponyi described as "the greatest pacifist" he knows), and on the part of the people; and the necessity for an early peace on account of present conditions is most pressing.

2nd: Notwithstanding the pressure of necessity and the sacrifices endured by the people, no separate peace with the Entente is considered possible. Suggestions for a separate peace have been made by unreliable demagogues, but the people, though blaming Germany for desiring conquest, annexations, and other obstacles to peace, repudiate the suggestions. Count Apponyi said it would be "infamy more than could be described" for them to make a separate peace, that any amount of suffering will be endured before that could happen. This was confirmed after his conference with the Emperor Carl and Count Czernin. This was supported by Mr. Drucker of the Vienna Bank Verein, speaking for financial and industrial circles, and by the leading social democrat of the Austrian Parliament, Dr. Julius Offner, speaking for the common people.

3rd: That Austria and Hungary will yield to their necessities and consent to any terms, outside of disgrace, to obtain peace. In a conference to which Germany shall be a party, they will oppose the demands of the Pan-Germanists and support the aims of the Entente if in accordance with the "Wilson policy". (I left Austria before the speech of Lloyd George of January 5th, which moderated his aims in regard to Germany as previously understood; and before that date Count Apponyi said Lloyd George's policy to continue fighting

⁶⁰ For correspondence previously printed concerning Mr. Anderson's mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, pp. 209, 249-250, 277, 454, 458, 461, 466-467, 478-482, 492.

would mean "only butchery of the fighting forces without victory for either side".

4th: That 95 per cent. of the people of Austria-Hungary and a very large majority of the German people are antagonistic to the German Junker Party or Pan-Germanists. It was affirmed by several of those I interviewed that out of a total population of 125,000,000 in the Central Powers, more than 100,000,000 are opposed to the military party.

5th: That in Austria a far more correct understanding of the will of the German people exists than that known to the outside world. That the German press is largely owned by the militarists, many papers having been recently purchased by the Krupp funds. What papers are not owned by them are for the most part censored in their interest. The will of the German people is known to Count Czernin, who is in constant communication with Count von Hertling and von Kuehlmann.

6th: It is known in Austria that the majority of the German people favor peace on the basis of no annexations, reduction of armaments, arbitration of disputes, and an established international organization to prevent future wars. The Chancellor, who is now speaking for the people of Germany, has declared himself in perfect sympathy with the announcement of the above aims stated by Count Czernin in Budapest and sanctioned by the Hungarian Parliament. No such definite declaration of German aims has been made public to the world at large before. Von Kuehlmann, now acting in accordance with the will of the German majority in the Reichstag, has recently consistently held to the "no annexations policy" and has stated, according to Count Apponyi, that "There is nothing now in the way of peace except on the part of the Entente nations," and that "Alsace-Lorraine is the only question that remains to be settled to obtain peace." As to the authority of the Chancellor to speak for the people of Germany, Count Apponyi says, "No Chancellor can now exist who has not the good will of the Reichstag." He says this has been proved by the removal of Michaelis and the appointment of von Hertling and is confirmed by information from German sources which I obtained and cabled to you from Holland at the time von Hertling was proposed.

7th: What seems the most important result of all the information is the invitation sent through me to the Entente for a "conversation", as it was called, in the interests of democratization. Not a peace conference, but a meeting between a few representatives (not more than three or four for the entire Entente and three or four for the Central Powers and their allies). The kind of democratization that will be required and the kind that could be conceded would be discussed and

probably an agreement on that important condition to a settlement would be reached. The will of the majority of the people of Germany would become known and the full support of Austria and Hungary would be for fair enfranchisements. Many misunderstandings that exist today, according to Count Apponyi, would be removed. The "conversation" so held would be of an unbinding nature and could do no harm. Democratization could be brought about in friendly conference but not enforced on the point of an enemy's sword. While all of the belligerents might be entitled to a knowledge of the meeting, it should be kept from the press until actually an accomplished fact. On the first interview, Count Apponyi said that the Central Powers could not again call a conference as they were so repulsed in regard to the call of December 1916, but at the second interview, after his conference with Emperor Carl and Count Czernin and just after Czernin's conference at the Court of Berlin, the above proposal was made and I agreed to carry it to the President of the United States for him to decide whether it should be submitted to the Governments of the Entente or not. Count Apponyi believes that a greater burden of responsibility rests upon President Wilson than on any one man since the days of Moses and that a greater aggregate of confidence is placed in his wisdom than was ever bestowed on any one man since the beginning of the world. If it should be decided to take any further steps in regard to this meeting, the proposal as far as Austria is concerned is only known to Czernin, Apponyi and the Emperor Carl, and I have means of communicating with them on the subject through their Legations either in Holland or Switzerland.

8th: From observations as to conditions:—The first impression of abnormal conditions is received in traveling after crossing the frontier. In Austria and in Hungary the accommodations are far from adequate for the number of people traveling; fares have been doubled and in some instances trebled, but it does not seem to restrict sufficiently the number of passengers. Every train is crowded and many were compelled to stand in the corridors, beside over-crowding the seats in all the trains that I used. Sleeping cars and dining cars are withdrawn even from long distance trains and for lack of food many station restaurants have been discontinued and others in Austria only serve tea or coffee without a particle of sugar or milk, with not even bread or a biscuit to eat. Passengers on the trains carried a dark-colored bread, from which they cut a chunk with a pocket knife and ate it with apparent satisfaction. Probably the number of travelers seems larger than normal on account of fewer trains, but it is enough to indicate that people have money to spend, which fact is confirmed by the crowded hotels that are charging high prices but are constantly full. At Vienna, I was refused at five hotels that

showed me waiting lists and finally got a room reserved for a party that did not arrive at a cost of 34 Kronen per day. At Budapest, after being refused at four hotels, I was taken in by a New Yorker who keeps the Astoria Hotel, after he had refused fifty people that night. It was two hours before he had a closet fixed up where I could spend the night. In Budapest the hotels were very gay; music and dancing go on in most of them during the evening. As in other countries, labor is well employed and well paid in Austria and Hungary. Food seemed scarcer in Austria than in Hungary. I did not see any butter, milk or sugar in Vienna, but had a limited supply in Budapest. One does not see poverty, if any exists. Throngs of people are on the streets and in the shops. The street cars running trailers of three and four are packed so that I did not get further than the platforms on any occasion when I used them. It was the time for Christmas shopping and Christmas trees in abundance were offered on the streets and the usual advertising of gifts displayed. There were lines of people at different places where food is dispensed, but the lines were no longer than I had seen in London. Walking close to these lines, I saw no distress and though it was a very cold day with snow on the ground, the people seemed good-natured and patient. The bread allowance while I was there was 219 grammes per day per person, equal to about six average sized rolls.

9th: Regarding Count Karolyi:—Without disclosing any information as to what I had learned in regard to Count Karolyi having made suggestions to this Government, I tried to learn what I could about him. Count Apponyi volunteered information at the first part of our interview, apparently supposing I had talked with Karolyi, but I had not. He spoke of not agreeing with him, that he had ideas he could not carry out and was chimerical. Apponyi said at times he (Karolyi) had quarrelled with the Ministers of his Government, but thought he would prove himself a patriot in an emergency. . . .

10th: Regarding possibilities of revolution in Austria-Hungary:—It was said in Germany before the late declaration of war by the United States against Austria-Hungary, that people in Germany thought such a declaration might precipitate a revolution in Austria. I talked with the proprietor of the hotel where I was staying at considerable length on this subject. His occupation brought him into contact with men of many different points of view. He said that personally he would be glad to see a revolution, as he thought it would force the issue and he wanted peace at any cost. His profitable business he would willingly see ruined if that would bring peace, but the people of Austria and Hungary he said might strike for wages, or even fight against the profiteers and capitalists, but they would never take arms against their King (Carl is the King of Hungary and

Emperor of Austria). The barber who shaved me, an elderly man, has a son who went to Texas and is now in the United States army, and another son fighting in the Austrian army. As one of the people he has the inherited sentiment for his King, something akin to that felt by Americans for their flag. He said there would be no resistance to the Government, but the people would go as far as they could to have peace. He, himself, hated the Germans, who he thought were responsible for this war. This expression of hatred of the German war party seems general. Dr. Julius Offner, whose philanthropy has gained for him the devotion of the common people, does not believe revolution could ever proceed beyond its incipiency in either Austria or Hungary. There is much discontent and a sensational orator might secure a temporary following.

Having stated some of the results of my interviews in Vienna and Budapest, I give below the reasons for going to those places.

In 1915, I was in Berlin for several weeks in connection with obtaining dye stuffs from Germany for interests in the United States and for the Bradford Dyers Association of England. The latter company had been probably the largest purchasers of German dyes in the world and at that time held a Royal License from the Crown in England to trade with the enemy on this particular commodity. In this way I became intimately acquainted with German officials and some of the industrial barons there, so far that I was entertained in their homes; also with connections of theirs in Holland, some of whom were parties to the *pro-forma* contracts made on the dye stuff business. These channels and the acquaintance I had with Count Apponyi when he was in this country, gave me opportunities for obtaining information of value and I offered my services to the Government. I foretold of the proposal of the Pope before it was made public and knew the source of its inspiration, which has since been confirmed. In Holland, from residence there and from some of my German acquaintances who came there, I learned of, and cabled to this Government advance information regarding plans for constitutional changes in Germany, the proposed appointment of a non-militarist Chancellor, and other matters, some of which have already been accomplished. Through one of my German acquaintances, I was presented to a member of the Austrian Legation at The Hague, who told me of the Emperor Carl's support of the new Peoples' Party in Germany and the Emperor's regret that diplomatic relations had been severed with the United States because misunderstandings had arisen between the two countries. These items I cabled to the Department at the time. At a second meeting with the member of the Austrian Legation, I told him of my desire to meet Count Apponyi unofficially and that I had telegraphed Count Apponyi from

The Hague asking if a meeting could be arranged at some neutral point but had received no answer. I told him of my acquaintance with Count Apponyi in America and that I would like to consult with him as to the possibility of establishing his idea of an international parliament subsequent to the war. I had discussed this subject with him when he was in the United States in 1910. I felt sufficiently acquainted with Count Apponyi to send him such a telegram and thought I could not serve my Government better than to obtain an interview with him. This was in October last before any declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. The member of the Legation said he would talk with his chief and consult the Foreign Office and Count Apponyi. I went to London and back before seeing him again, but on my return he told me that Count Apponyi would be glad to meet me if I could go to Switzerland, as it would take more time for him to go to Holland and he could not be absent from his duties for so long. They wanted my reply if I would go to Switzerland and for me to name the day I would meet him there, so that he could arrange in advance for his absence. Berne was the place appointed and Saturday, November 24th, the day. I did not arrive until Sunday, November 25th. On Saturday the 24th, Karolyi arrived at Berne. On the 25th, he asked to have an interview with Mr. Wilson, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of our Legation at Berne. I thought at that time that Apponyi and Karolyi were co-workers, as they had been before. (I found out my mistake afterward.) But due to the coincidence of Karolyi arriving on the day set for meeting Apponyi, I supposed he had come in his stead. I went to the Austrian Legation from my train that Sunday evening to announce my arrival and learned that Karolyi was in town. They had been advised from the Legation at The Hague and by the Foreign Office at Vienna of my coming and the object of my visit. The secretary took me in his own car to the house of the Minister, Baron Mousselin, who thought he should not interfere in any way with Count Karolyi's intentions, but advised my going to Karolyi's hotel and advising him of my arrival. I did so, but only saw his secretary, who was very anxious I should see his chief. I waited some time but did not see him at all. He saw Wilson that same Sunday evening and you have the substance of his statements.

Apponyi was repeatedly prevented from coming to Berne. Cabinet matters were at a crisis then. On Tuesday, December 4th, a telegram came stating that Count Apponyi could not come to Berne, that he would send a Mr. De Pukovics to represent him, or, if I could come to Austria to see him, I would receive a safe conduct from the Foreign Office within 48 hours and I could come to Vienna. Knowing that my real object to get information for my Government would be defeated

if I did not meet Apponyi himself, I cabled to Washington that I was offered a safe-conduct and would proceed to Vienna unless advised of the Government's disapproval before leaving. This cable I handed in at the Legation on Tuesday, but learned afterwards it was not sent out until Wednesday morning. My safe-conduct papers were issued on Thursday but I did not start until Friday p. m. Mr. Wilson advised me not to go. The banker who furnished me with Austrian money told me the last Englishman who had gone in had not been heard from since and the least that would happen to me would be to be interned until the end of the war, if not ordered "to be shot before sunrise." I could not see why my Government could object if I was willing to take the risk and do not yet understand why cables were sent later expressing disapproval. The Austrian Legations and the Vienna Foreign Office knew that I was acting unofficially and the safe conduct was granted to me personally as a friend of Count Apponyi's desiring to visit him. I arranged on leaving Berne on Friday afternoon that Mr. Wilson could reach me at Zurich if any later message came, and to make sure, I telephoned him to Berne from Zurich late Friday night, but nothing had been received. Saturday I went on and was then beyond recall and proceeded to do what I considered my duty. I was treated with marked courtesy everywhere, but traveling such long distances under present conditions was a severe trial of endurance. I will not fill space with a description of the discomforts.

The balance of this report embodies partly cables sent through the Legation to the Department and particulars of interviews with Count Apponyi from notes made after the interviews and approved when submitted to him. At Budapest and Vienna most important interviews were held. The description of Count Apponyi given me at the Vienna Foreign Office is that he is the wise man of the age, one whose opinions are the outcome of study and sifted evidence, which have for their bases confirmed facts and that he is the broadest visioned aristocrat in the dual empire.

The remarkable accuracy of Count Apponyi's predictions were commented on by Count Coloredo-Mansfeld, Chief of the Foreign Office, who married Miss Iselin of New York, and by Count Ambrozy, who was for nine years in the Austrian Embassy at Washington.

In 1910, when Count Apponyi was in the United States, he said: "The next outbreak would set the world on fire and even the United States might be drawn into the vortex by the complications which would arise." This appears in Apponyi's pamphlet published in 1911, in our Congressional Library as pamphlet "JX 1963 A7 Apponyi", which contains other counsel of value and interest today. Apponyi is constantly consulted by Count Czernin, who is his inti-

mate friend, as well as by the leaders of the new party in Germany, whose strength and intentions are known to him. His universal knowledge and experience exceptionally qualify him for his position in the Cabinet as Minister of Education. My former reports to you from German sources of the change in constitution and the plans for reforms are stated by him to be in existence but these reforms he says must be established by voluntary action on the part of the people. At Budapest our first interview extended over two hours, after which Count Apponyi concluded that we two should go to Vienna the next day and there he would consult with Count Czernin, who had just returned from a trip to Berlin and I would be presented by him to Count Czernin. This I felt constrained to decline with regret, stating to Count Apponyi that my Government had given consent to my meeting him unofficially but that until I had the further approval of my Government, I should do nothing further than what it already had knowledge of. Apponyi then stated that he would have something further to say to me after seeing Count Czernin. The notes made on our first interview and confirmed by Count Apponyi, follow: Without any allusion to this subject by me, Count Apponyi was most emphatic in stating that Austria-Hungary would never make any separate peace that did not include Germany. "It was not to be thought of." He mentioned Galicia, Transylvania and Italy and that the Germans had saved them at those three points. It would be "infamy worse than could be described" for them to separate from Germany. He believes a peace that would be acceptable to the Entente can be had now. Victory for the Entente is possible on the terms of the "Wilson policy". He referred to recent speeches by Count Czernin and by von Kuehlmann, which he considers of great importance and significance. He said Kuehlmann's speech implied concessions in regard to Belgium and other items of disagreement between the belligerents. He said guarantees would be given and required by both sides. The people of the Central Powers desire peace and have declared that they are in favor of a reduction of armament and arbitration of disputes.

He thinks it a great mistake that the proposal for a conference made in December 1916 was not acted upon then. No one was committed or bound to any conditions but much would have been gained. If the contending parties could meet together, there might be obstacles to agreement at first, but in one or two days or in one or two weeks they might one by one disappear.

He says there is much misunderstanding in regard to existing conditions in Germany in respect to democratization. The election to the Reichstag "rests upon the broadest franchise that exists through-

out the world and is absolutely without corruption." Election expenses as understood in England and America are scarcely known in Germany. Every male of the population has his vote for his representative in the Reichstag. Reforms are proposed and being considered in regard to the Prussian body, but the Reichstag is the voice of the people. "No Chancellor can now exist who has not the good will of the Reichstag." He said the Reichstag is for peace and not for war. Whether the reforms proposed for enfranchisements in the Landtag are accomplished or not (and they will be), that body can not affect the vote of the Reichstag any more than a vote of the New York Legislature can affect the vote of the National Congress.

He was greatly disappointed when the United States went into the war with Germany and many of his countrymen do not feel convinced that the real aim of the United States is to change the constitutional government of Germany. One reason why they do not believe that to be the aim is because the leading statesmen of the United States must know that change of government can only be brought about from the inside and not from without. "Democracy must come as a friend." The hostile action at this time is disturbing and not helping Democracy. He also regrets that the United States went into the war, because he hoped that they would have remained impartial and in a position to act as a fair judge in the final settlement. He says the war party in Germany is in the minority and the peace party has a very large majority. The quotations from extremists that have been circulated so widely in England and the United States (from writings by Nietzsche, Treitschke, Bernhardt and others), purporting to represent the views of the German people and their worship of the war god are what might be collected from the extreme eccentric writers of any country and be equally misleading.

He thinks militarism is not now confined to any country and the adjective should be changed from German militarism to international militarism. It is prevailing in all countries now. France has had for many years the burden of a military establishment too great for her population. With a smaller population than Germany, she has tried to maintain as large an army. He said France's army has done well and German experts commend several of their achievements, but Germany had undoubtedly made the best use of her military organization.

In Vienna the morning after returning from Budapest, I received a telephone call from Count Apponyi to the effect that he would see me at 4 p. m., as he had been commanded to be in attendance at the Royal Closet that day. It was reported in the papers by the Havas

Agency that Emperor Charles received on Friday Count Czernin and that Count Apponyi was present.

The second interview with Apponyi took place after he had been in consultation with Emperor Charles and Count Czernin and was much longer than the first. Beside the statements made by Count Apponyi at this time, he gave me a written statement over his own autograph, which will be appended later. He said the declaration of war by the United States has had a depressing effect upon the people. Apponyi himself can not understand the action of the United States in declaring war on Austria-Hungary, as nothing has occurred to warrant it since the time of our declaration of war against Germany. He said the unfounded optimism of Lloyd George (which has been somewhat curbed since then) is due either to a desire to mislead his own people or to blind ignorance of existing conditions. Victory for the Allies can now be secured on what might be termed the "Wilson policy". Only butchery of the fighting forces can be the result of Lloyd George's present policy. This referred to his policy as declared before January 5th. Apponyi says that if peace is made with Russia it will result in the release to Germany of 2,000,000 fighting men who are trained to their duties. He took his pencil and figured that before America could put that number in the field, at least 1½ years would expire. If such a number were now ready, it would mean the transportation each month of 110,000 men and supplies for them. He thinks it is the belief of Lloyd George that the war will be won by excess in numbers, but if so, the Central Powers will have the advantage. He does not think that this war will be ended by battles but by agreement and any advantage in fighting lies in superior efficiency. A victory for the Allies according to the Wilson policy can now be secured and the war stopped if the following can be arranged :

A conference, consisting of one representative each of France, England, United States, Austria-Hungary and Germany (and Italy if insisted upon) should be held either openly or secretly. No change is to occur pending the deliberations of this conference. No cessation of hostilities. No one is to be committed beforehand to acceptance of any terms. It would be what might be termed a meeting of the respective counsel of litigants without prejudice. The conference may disband and no harm is done, if it is their conviction that no agreement can be reached. He says the Kaiser will not resist the Reichstag, which is the voice of the people, and the Reichstag is for peace.

Concerning the supply of food, he said I could see that there was not plenty but that a supply sufficient to last will be conserved by limitation of consumption. He says the largest winter seed sowing

that has ever been known has been made and is now being protected and fertilized by the early and very deep snows that now cover Austria-Hungary.

He said that obedience to any ruling international organization could be made compulsory. If the present world-wide economic distress could be concentrated against one offending power by international cooperation, it would compel obedience. Apponyi has long advocated international concerted action, but says that is a subject to be considered in the future. The autographed statement he gave me is as follows:

“I insist on the two facts below:

First: As stated by the Foreign Secretary Czernin in his speech lately delivered at Budapest, international arbitration, reduction of armaments and, in a general way, the setting up of an international machinery to prevent war is the official program of Austria-Hungary: it has been sanctioned by the Hungarian Parliament and accepted by Germany when the Chancellor (or the Foreign Secretary) declared himself in perfect sympathy with Czernin's statement.

Second: Simply to try how difficulties could be set aside in a spirit of mutual good will, without any previous acceptance of certain conditions of peace, the Central Powers are always ready to accept a peace conference of representatives of the belligerents. It is France and England that decline even conversation of this unbinding nature. Pacifists are denounced as enemies of their country and even prosecuted legally in England and in France.

Democratic reforms, or reforms of any kind, if they are brought to us on the point of an enemy's sword will always be rejected with scorn, even by the most advanced parties in our countries. The natural evolution towards democracy in these countries is greatly discouraged by their being made part of the war program of our enemies.

Signed: Albert Apponyi”

While I was at the Vienna Bank Verein, Count Anton Apponyi, nephew of Albert, entered as a customer of the bank and Mr. Drucker of the bank, who is a friend and great admirer of Mr. Penfield, introduced me to him. My interviews with Albert Apponyi were known to Anton, who spoke of them before Mr. Drucker and the latter became very much interested. He said that through Austro-Hungarian connections he was in touch with a number of important interests and while Count Apponyi's statements were to be relied upon as exactly true, he thought I ought to get the views of men of other parties. I told him that I was not there as a representative of my Government or in any official capacity. He said, notwithstanding, he wished to talk with me unofficially and expressed a desire that some of the misunderstandings which he was of the opinion had been wilfully spread abroad should be cleared up.

According to him, 99 per cent. of the people of Austria-Hungary are antagonistic to the Junker Party of Germany and their only adherents in the dual empire are men who because of their capital have been allowed to come in on financial deals and make profits possible on account of the war.

It was Mr. Drucker's desire that I should meet one man, Dr. Julius Offner, one of the leading lawyers in Vienna, an authority on political economy and he said he was world-renowned as a publicist and a great philanthropist, beloved by the poor. I thought that his information pertaining to the position of the masses would be valuable in view of his being in touch with the common people. I met him with Mr. Drucker. He said 95 per cent. of the Austro-Hungarian people were opposed to the Junker or Pan-German Party of Germany. He was as emphatic as all others that there was no possibility of permanent revolution, disintegration or separation from Germany. He stated that the Junker Party, long in the minority, were dwindling and losing the influence of those in authority in Germany. What Count Apponyi had stated about election to the Reichstag was confirmed by him and he said the power of the Bundesrat to dissolve the Reichstag had never been exercised, that without the cooperation of two other Kingdoms, members of the German Empire, the Kaiser did not control the Bundesrat. He said that the Landtag at present was unfairly enfranchised but would be reformed by the Bill which has already been drawn. According to him, the Kaiser is a changed man. He said a tendency to make a powerful commercial man the Prime Minister is in evidence. He has a thorough knowledge of the German Government and German politics and said if I would submit a list of questions pertaining to the German political bodies through any of the Austro-Hungarian Legations, they would be answered by him through the same medium.

Upon my return from Vienna to Bern I learned of the Government's cables of disapproval, of the instructions for me to inform the Austrian Legation that I went to Austria without the consent and against the wishes of the American authorities, and for me to proceed to London and await further instructions. Later in London I received instructions to return to America and report to the State Department, in accordance with which I am here at the present time.

I regret exceedingly having acted contrary to the wishes of my Government and certainly would have obeyed instructions if they had been received before I left. The Austrian authorities distinctly understood that I acted on my own initiative. On my final statement to

them in accordance with your instructions as above, the secretary of their Legation at Berne told me that if desired they would give me in writing the statement: that from the first I had told them I was acting unofficially and not as a representative of the United States Government.

However, I cannot but feel that it is fortunate I did not receive the instructions as my information is quite positive that no separate peace will be made with the Entente, but that the German Peace Party is in a strong majority and have agreed with Count Czernin as to terms they will consent to, which terms are not now vague as claimed by Lloyd George in his speech of January 5th. Further than this, if the Entente will consent to the unbinding conference suggested, encouragement will be given to the democratic movement in Germany and Austria and Hungary will become the Allies of President Wilson in support of his policy as now declared.

Count Czernin has been consistent from the start and today confirms what he stated March 30th 1917, (a few days before we declared war against Germany) in the following words:

“As soon as our enemies abandon their unreasonable ideas of smashing us up; as soon as they are ready to negotiate for a peace honorable to them and to us, nothing stands in the way of negotiation.”

In regard to my sources of information in Holland, I would say that two of my German acquaintances are in the Kriegsministerium and naturally belong to the military party. The senior of the two has a son-in-law in Holland who has talked with me rather freely, but firmly believes that though battles may be lost and won Germany will never suffer military defeat. Two others are commercial men with large connections who look on conditions from the economic standpoint. They feel that the commercial defeat is of greater consequence to the Nation and are strong advocates for peace with no annexations and have fullest communication with the Peace Party in Germany. The Hollanders I know are some of them pro-German but for peace. Since Lloyd George's withdrawal from his knock-out “blow” attitude and the assurance now given that it is proposed that Germany shall have equal economic advantages with other nations, it would be valuable to obtain the present views through these sources, and I would like to return soon to Holland for that purpose.

The above report made at your request is respectfully submitted.

Yours faithfully,

FRANK E. ANDERSON

WASHINGTON, *January 24, 1918.*

763.72119/1265½

*The Representative of the Polish National Committee (Paderewski)
to the Assistant to the Counselor for the Department of State
(Auchincloss)*

NEW YORK, January 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AUCHINCLOSS: I beg to apologize for the delay in preparing the enclosed memorandum.

The problem of our army is a vital one and its speedy and favorable solution is the more urgently needed, as the French officers, interested in the affair, are getting rather impatient. I sincerely hope that after having so kindly taken charge of the Polish question, you will make of it a brilliant personal success.

Thanking you most warmly for the generous interest in the cause of our national revival, I beg to remain

Very sincerely yours,

I. J. PADEREWSKI

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Representative of the Polish National Committee
(Paderewski)*

Recognizing the political and strategic necessity of a Polish national fighting force on the side of the Allies, on the Western front, the French Government issued a decree, dated June 5, 1917, signed by President Poincaré, calling to life an Autonomous Polish National Army in France. In August last, a special Franco-Polish Military Mission arrived in this country for the purpose of recruiting volunteers from among the Polish residents of the United States, and started at once an active propaganda. The Polish residents, however, though desirous of fighting for the independence of their State, as proclaimed by the President, the Polish residents, led by absolute loyalty to this Government, wanted to know, before enlisting, what would be the attitude of the Administration towards this scheme. A Polish Military Commission was appointed by the National Department in Chicago, the leading political Polish organization in America, and steps were taken in order to obtain official information about, and approval of the plan.

On October 6, 1917, the War Department authorized the following:

"It has been brought to the attention of the War Department that the Military Commission of the National Department of the Polish Central Relief Committee, located in Chicago, Illinois, intends to start, on October 7, 1917, an active campaign for recruiting for the Polish Army now engaged in fighting on the Western front in France.

The War Department has been advised that no individual of Polish nationality resident in the United States, who is in any way subject to the draft, will be accepted as a recruit by this Military Commission,

and that special care will be taken not to recruit any man whose family would be left without means of support.

Having in mind the attitude of this Government toward a United and independent Poland the War Department is glad to announce that it is entirely in accord with the proposed plans of this Military Commission and that the Department trusts that this recruiting campaign, looking to the strengthening of the Polish army already fighting in association with the armies now in France, will be a success."

On October 7, 1917, recruiting offices in various centers were opened—their number being now forty-one—and the enlistment had begun. Up to this moment 10,200 volunteers have joined the Polish army.

Considering the tenor of the statement of the War Department, which positively excludes from recruiting all the non-naturalized Poles subject to the draft, and recommends not to accept any man supporting his family, the results, so far obtained are truly remarkable. The French authorities, however, who have spent large sums of money for recruiting purposes, do not consider the number of enlisted men as satisfactory. If the restrictions mentioned in the statement of the War Department are not removed or modified, the recruiting will be undoubtedly discontinued. From the military point of view this would be regrettable, as the Poles are generally regarded as the best fighting material in the world. Indeed, the volunteers already enlisted, after only a fortnight of training, in their camp at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Canada, have been declared by the examining Canadian and French officers as "*troupes d'élite*", comparable solely to the best French soldiers from the Department du Nord.

Furthermore the abandonment of the idea of a Polish National Army fighting for the Allies' cause, which has already attracted so much attention and excited so much interest, would be exploited by the enemy as another failure of the Entente powers, and its effect upon the morale of the Polish people and soldiers still willing to fight on the Russian front would be most depressing.

According to recent reports there are at Bobruysk, Province of Minsk, over 80,000 Polish soldiers, perfectly disciplined, under the command of General Dowbor-Musnicki, thus forming the nucleus of a large Polish army whose possibilities should not be underestimated. General Rampon is supposed to be at Bobruysk as the representative of France at General Dowbor-Musnicki's head-quarters.

Certain attention should be given to these important facts.

II

The idea of a Polish army in the United States as submitted to the Administration at the very beginning of America's entrance into the war, was not due to the desire of creating a nationalistic movement

in this country, but, to the firm belief that a large homogeneous and consequently efficient military force, could effectively assist the United States in winning her noble cause and, eventually, contribute to the re-establishment of an independent Polish State.

To win a war means efficiency. There cannot be absolute efficiency in an army where there is a lack of comprehension between soldiers and officers, or among the soldiers themselves.

Ever since the entrance of the United States into the war, volunteers have been flocking to the recruiting offices. The Polish boys who were so eager to show their loyalty to this noble country, as well as those, who, desirous of an immediate success, were equally eager to enlist them, did not realize that they were adding to the perplexity of the commanders and instructing officers.

The number of Polish boys who had arrived in this country shortly before the war, and who do not understand or know English well, is extremely large. Some cantonments contain from thirty to forty per cent of them. In a militaristic empire possessing numerous cadres, this would not much matter. Divided into small detachments, spread over some 400 or 500 regiments, these foreign-born soldiers would be quickly and automatically assimilated. But in this pacific Republic, whose regular army has so far consisted of about one twentieth of the number of Polish soldiers already wounded or killed on European battlefields, the presence of such a numerous linguistically foreign element in the training camps is certainly a drawback, retarding the speedy formation of a fighting force so urgently needed. It increases considerably the labor of the instructing officers; it makes them impatient and nervous, causing in some cases, inevitable severity, resulting always in humiliation. Besides, it creates something incompatible with lofty principles of this country, something utterly undemocratic, for it establishes two different classes of soldiers; a privileged one, made up of those who understand, and one, made up of those who do not understand. This is manifestly to the detriment of the spirit of unity among the fighters, especially as the Polish volunteers, assigned in many cases, to kitchen police and other menial duties are too frequently ridiculed by their fellow-soldiers.

Evidences of the facts above mentioned have been gathered not only from private informations and numerous complaints, but also frankly acknowledged by distinguished American officers and even confirmed by a high authority.

Considering:

A—That a separate Polish National Army is a recognized political and strategic necessity;

B—That the superior value of Polish fighting material is generally admitted;

C—That the Polish soldiers are imbued with a distinct ideal, as they know that the existence of their ancestral country is at stake, while it is still extremely difficult to explain to an average American, why he has to risk his life for the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine or for the independence of Montenegro;

D—That at this grave moment everything causing embarrassment, obstructing speedy progress of preparedness, impeding efficiency of the army, should be removed without delay;

It seems indispensable that all the Poles not speaking English should be united into one body, protected by the United States Government. As to the definite solution of this problem it is respectfully suggested that:

(1) Either the Polish soldiers not knowing enough English, already in the American army, as well as those subject to the forthcoming draft, should be incorporated in the Polish army in France, provided that the French Government would establish a statute for that "Autonomous Army" and not apply to it the regulations of the foreign legion.

(2) Or all the Polish soldiers, non-speaking English should be put together as a separate unit and submitted to the exclusive control of the United States Government.

In both instances the bringing over here from Russia of 400 to 500 experienced Polish officers, as promised already by the Russian General Staff, would be imperatively needed.

The Poles fighting for the independence of their State will also fight for the American ideals and they believe to be entitled to ask this generous country for aid and protection.

763.72119/1265¹a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *January 25, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I presume you have read the telegrams from Rome indicating a measure of dissatisfaction or at least of disappointment on the part of the Italian Government and people with the statement in your address of January 8th⁶¹ relative to Italy and presumably the statement in regard to Austria-Hungary. The point which the Italians seem to make is that if their frontiers are to be rectified only on the basis of nationality, they will be as vulnerable to attack from Austria-Hungary as they have been in the past. That is, the Adriatic Question will remain unsettled and will compel the nation to continue its present policy of defense.

⁶¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

There is no doubt but that Italy's position in the Adriatic is more or less precarious and that it is one which the Italian Government seeks to make more stable in the final peace. The Italian coast is low-lying and without harbors. It offers no opportunities for naval bases from which to operate. On the other hand, the opposite coast is indented with numerous inlets and ports. As a consequence the Italian shores are difficult of defense and control of the Adriatic lies to a very considerable degree with the power possessing the eastern shores of the sea.

Manifestly an adjustment of the Italian frontiers along lines of nationality will in no way cure this situation or make Italy's position more secure than it is at present. I think that this is the ground for Italian dissatisfaction, and it is not entirely without justification.

While, as you know, I am strongly inclined to nationality as the basis for territorial limits I believe that it cannot be invariably adopted, but that in certain cases physical boundaries and strategic boundaries must be considered and modify boundaries based on nationality. These will constitute exceptions to the general rule but will be very few in number.

I mention this at the present time because I fear that if Italy gains the impression that she is not to strengthen her position in the Adriatic, the Italian people will become discouraged and feel that the war has no actual interest for them, that they will be disposed to make peace provided the Germans and Austrians retire from Italian territory, and that they will consider themselves to have been abandoned by this country and the Allies. With the present political situation in Italy and the depression following their military reverses such an impression would be most unfortunate and might be disastrous.

Do you not think that something could be done to restore Italian confidence that a satisfactory settlement of the Adriatic Question will be made at the peace conference? If anything can be done it seems to me it ought to be done without delay.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/1270¹a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *January 27, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The clear and explicit declaration of war aims contained in your address of January 8th has brought forth no corresponding declaration from the German Government. They have never made a definite statement of terms which would satisfy them, but have preferred to criticize the declarations of their enemies leaving

their own aims uncertain. Even in the discussion of the addresses of yourself and of Lloyd George the Imperial Chancellor is, I believe intentionally, ambiguous, vague and careful to avoid making reply to certain propositions which might embarrass Germany with her allies.

It seems to me that we are not getting the full benefit of your candid declaration of aims unless we point out that the German Government has never frankly stated their aims and are apparently unwilling to do so. I think that in some way, by an address, a letter or other means, you should challenge them to do this, possibly going so far as to challenge them to answer specific questions such as—What is the German purpose as to Belgium? What reparation will Germany make as to the occupied regions of Belgium and France? What is Germany's aim as to Alsace-Lorraine? What is Germany's attitude as to the independence of Poland, and what territories is it proposed to include in the new nation? What is Germany's aim as to the Baltic provinces of Russia? Does Germany insist that Armenia shall remain under Turkish rule and that Palestine shall be restored to the Turks? Questions such as these if unanswered will place Germany in an unenviable light before the world, and I am convinced that they will be unanswered.

It seems to me that there is an opportunity to weaken very materially the German peace propaganda by showing that, while they seek our war aims, they are unwilling to disclose their own.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

860C.01/84½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1918.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On November 10, 1917, this Government recognized the Polish National Committee with headquarters in Paris and with representatives in France, Italy, Switzerland, Great Britain and the United States. Mr. Paderewski is the representative of the Committee in this country. Previous to recognition by this Government, the Polish National Committee had been recognized by Great Britain, France and Italy. The avowed purpose of the Committee is to further the cause of a united and independent Poland in allied countries and in the United States. The Committee's status cannot be considered that of a Provisional Government. Whatever formal character it may have is the result of recognition by the above mentioned countries.

Up to the present time our recognition of this Committee has been, without doubt, justified at least by the efforts of Mr. Paderewski and his associates in this country.

I attach herewith a letter and a memorandum⁶² sent me by Mr. Paderewski concerning, among other things, the recruiting of Poles not subject to the draft in this country.

I have been reliably informed that the efforts of the Polish National Committee in the allied countries have been equally successful along somewhat different lines. Moral support has been secured in England and in Italy for the cause of an independent Poland and in addition to this in France the Committee working in conjunction with the French Government has constituted a small but determined force of men who are willing to fight for the cause represented by the Committee.

The work of this Committee will be seriously crippled unless funds now are provided by the Allies and the United States. Up to the present time the Committee has been financed by private subscriptions.

Within the last few weeks I have received several memoranda from the British Embassy requesting to be advised of this Government's attitude towards furnishing financial aid in conjunction with Great Britain to the Polish National Committee for the relief of Polish refugees in Russia, the necessities of the Polish Army and the continuation of the organizations of the Polish National Committee in the allied countries and in the United States. I hesitated to submit the matter to you until I heard direct from Mr. Paderewski.

I attach herewith a letter I received from him a few days ago.^{62a}

Mr. Paderewski asks for financial assistance for three distinct purposes:

- 1—Polish National Committee expenses.
- 2—Relief of Polish refugees in Russia.
- 3—Five hundred thousand dollars for the purpose of bringing certain Polish officers from Russia to assist in the Polish Army.

If you approve I shall take up (2) with the Red Cross and (3) with the War Department with the recommendation that these matters be promptly investigated and that assistance be extended if it is at all practicable.

I have been informally advised that with respect to (1) the British Government will be glad to share these expenses with this Government. The view of the British Government is that it is highly desirable to keep in close touch with the activities of the Polish National Committee, not only for present purposes, but on account of

⁶² *Ante*, p. 86.

^{62a} *Ante*, p. 71.

obvious advantages to be gained ultimately when peace negotiations are being carried on. I entirely agree with this view. At the present time I believe that considerable assistance can be obtained through this organization in securing political and military information concerning the Central Powers for the use of this Government. The agents of the Polish National Committee have peculiar advantages in securing such information on account of their activities in Sweden and Switzerland and at the Vatican.

My thought is that if you are willing to advance from your war fund, say, a maximum of thirty thousand dollars a month to be placed under the control of an agent of this Department who would be attached to the American Embassy at Paris and to be used by him to assist the organizations of the Polish National Committee (a like sum to be provided by the British Government under the supervision of one of its agents), the understanding being that the Polish National Committee in return therefor will secure and place at the disposal of the British Government and this Government all information of a political and military character secured by its agents, great benefit would accrue therefrom both to the Polish National Committee and to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States.

I know of no other way by which the assistance requested by Mr. Paderewski can be furnished by this Government, inasmuch as the Treasury Department is not authorized to lend money except to established governments at war with the Central Powers.

I shall be grateful to you if you can furnish me with your directions with respect to the foregoing.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

860C.01/85½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 29 January, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think I see this situation as a whole, and of course I am disposed to help in every way possible, but I do not feel at liberty to pledge thirty thousand dollars a month indefinitely. Would the Committee think it fair if I were to limit the pledge to (say) six months, pending developments?

And,—another question,—is it not likely that the portion to [*the*] British Government is to pay would in fact be drawn from our Treasury, by loan? I feel obliged to think of the financial burdens piling up on us.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72119/1266½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 29 January, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is a very delicate matter;⁶³ but while you were away from your office I took occasion to say to the Italian Ambassador (who, oddly enough, had called to thank me in the name of his Government for what I had said) that I had limited my statement about Italian rights as I did because I was taking my programme as a whole, including the league of nations through which mutually defensive pledges were to be given and taken which would render strategic considerations such as those affecting the Adriatic much less important. I told him that, failing a league of nations, my mind would be open upon all such matters to new judgments.

I am clear that I could not pledge our people to fight for the eastern shore of the Adriatic; but there is nothing in what I have omitted to say to alarm the Italian people, and it ought to be possible for Orlando to make that plain to his own followers.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

861.51/272

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: A copy of this message has been sent to you and I am sure that it causes you the same concern that it does me.⁶⁴

I think that resolutions of this sort are valueless and tend to give an impression that we recognize a certain measure of force in acts of the Bolshevik Government. This seems to me unfortunate. In any event I think it unwise for Mr. Crosby to act in a matter which is chiefly political rather than financial. Do you not think it would be well to speak to Secretary McAdoo about this and see if something cannot be done to offset this unauthorized action on the part of Mr. Crosby?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

⁶³ See Secretary Lansing's letter of Jan. 25, 1918, p. 89.

⁶⁴ Telegram No. 8656, Feb. 14, 1918, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, p. 34.

763.72 Su/32½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 16 February, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I was indeed very much disturbed by this message. I will speak to McAdoo about the impropriety of Crosby's taking part in any such action in the future. The Inter-Allied Board was certainly not constituted to give political advice.

And this leads me to beg that you will communicate with the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy to the following effect,—referring to the recent action of the Supreme War Council with regard to conditions of peace and to this action of the Inter-Allied Board with regard to the recognition of the Bolshevik authorities:

That the President wishes very respectfully but very earnestly to urge that when he suggested the creation of the Inter-Allied Board and gave his active support to the creation of the Supreme War Council it was not at all in his mind that either of these bodies should take any action or express any opinion on political subjects. He would have doubted the wisdom of appointing representatives of this Government on either body had he thought that they would undertake the decision of any questions but the very practical questions of supply and of the concerted conduct of the war which it was understood they should handle. He would appreciate it very much if this matter were very thoroughly reconsidered by the political leaders of the Governments addressed and if he might be given an opportunity, should their view in this matter differ from his, to consider once more the conditions and instructions under which representatives of the United States should henceforth act.⁶⁶

This is, it may be, a bit blunt, but I think it imperative that we should safeguard ourselves in this all-important matter. Perhaps you will think it best to communicate these views through the diplomatic representatives here, so that they may put it in their own language after being given to understand how grave our objection is.

Faithfully yours,

W. W.

763.72/8706½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I send you a letter which I have just received from Ambassador Page at Rome which voices a fear which

⁶⁶ This was communicated to the Ambassadors in France, Great Britain, and Italy and to the French, British, and Italian Ambassadors in Washington on February 18. See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 125.

I have had in regard to Italy. I wonder how soon Secretary Baker intends to have the Military Commission in Italy? It seems to me that that is the next best move we can make.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, January 29, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have sent by this pouch a long letter to the President, but there were a number of matters which I did not discuss with him, or discuss at least as fully as they require.

The expressions in the President's message⁶⁶ and Lloyd George's speeches relating to Italian war-aims fell so far short of what Italy desires and what her Government and Press have led her people to expect that there has been a tremendous stir here about Italy's aims and claims, at least on the part of the people who write and talk about such things. This has resulted in strong currents of critical feeling about America and England, and the propaganda which has been going on for months against England is, I learn, now sufficiently broadened to include America also. I believe that this is a part of the almost universal German propaganda which covers the world, but undoubtedly a good many Italians are being drawn in to take part in it. Happily for us, a great many Italians have been equally aroused to resist this propaganda. These last, however, are continually bringing to our attention the importance of our taking some steps ourselves to countervail this anti-American, anti-Democratic propaganda. And I agree with them fully in thinking that it is a matter of great importance that we should set ourselves seriously to this work. I have on a number of occasions sent telegrams about this matter, more or less urgent, but so far I have apparently had little success in impressing my views on whoever the matter has been referred to at home. I suggested making an appropriation of funds, reasonable enough one would think; for in the beginning I suggested something like \$2,500. Later I suggested the great effect that it would have to send a Military Mission, or a Mission of Military Observers to the Italian Front. The response was a suggestion of sending a distinguished newspaper or war correspondent just made into a Reserve Captain to represent America where all the other Allies were represented by trained military men in Commissions of

⁶⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

from six to a dozen members each with Generals, or at least Colonels at their head. This was far worse than nothing, and would undoubtedly have been considered by the people here as a slight and possibly an intentional slight. The absence of a Mission of Military Observers here is often commented on, though naturally not to me, by Italians who say they have enrolled a greater number of men to their population than France has done; that they have lost over a million men; that they have until just recently borne a greater weight thrown against them per kilometer of front without any assistance whatever than any other of the Allies; that they have suffered more than any of the Western Allies in privation, and as much in battle losses.

A great part of this is true. The Italian people have suffered and are suffering tremendously. Moreover, another claim which they put forward insistently is well-founded: that Italy's front is as important to the Allied cause as the French front; that if Italy's front should be broken and Italy forced to make peace France would be lost as definitely as if the French front were forced. Now the security of Italy's front rests upon first her troops at the front, and secondly the endurance of her people, and it is this endurance which the propaganda to which I have alluded above is addressed on the part of the Germans and of those Italians who allow themselves to be used in this German propaganda. The military situation appears for the present to be very good, although I understand the propaganda is again working to some extent even in the trenches. The dangerous point is the failure to meet the economic situation in Italy with sufficient food supplies, coal supplies and other supplies of the necessities of life.

I have sent you by this mail a letter written by David Lubin,⁶⁷ the American Representative at the International Institute of Agriculture, giving the views of a number of important Italian public men on this point, and I commend those views to serious consideration. The number of men at present under arms in Italy, is I believe somewhat exaggerated, though I learn that Italy has enrolled about 4,300,000 men of which she has lost about a million, one half of them, about, being prisoners in Austria. But the main facts stated by these men is the importance of saving Italy to the Allied cause. And whatever may be said of certain elements who are against Democracy and who are at heart more friendly to Germany, if reports are to be believed, than they are to America, the Italians at large beginning with the King and concluding with the great body of the plain

⁶⁷ Not found in Department files.

people are believers in Liberty. And it is to stand by them and to overthrow those who are carrying on the German propaganda that we should take effective steps, the most effective in our power.

The declaration of war against Austria was a tremendous stimulus here. There was an element undoubtedly which was far from wishing us to take this step and which has resented our doing so, but the Italian people and many of their best leaders know what it has done for Italy, however the press may be engaged at present in fomenting criticism of us because the President did not go further in his message, and announced that Italy ought to have all her Government has claimed. The sending of troops here would be the greatest propaganda that could be started. Even a small number of troops with the flag would count for much. But undoubtedly there would be expectations that that small number would ultimately be increased. I could not tell you how many men have said to me personally what I have heard several say in public speeches: If America would only send her flag—her starry flag it would be a symbol not only to Italy but to the world that America recognizes that Italy is fighting for freedom, for Liberty and has the same ideals that America has.

Believe me, Mr. Secretary, it would have an immense moral effect. It would have an immense effect not only for the present and while the war lasts,—but for years to come.

I know the difficulties that stand in the way of sending troops here, but it is well worth all the trouble. It will bind Italy to America in a way that nothing else on earth will.

Meantime, I ought to have the means placed in my hands to carry on a reasonable propaganda here in Italy to show the Italians what America and Americans are doing for Italy. We are doing it and it is now [*not*] known as it should be known. The other Allies are engaged in pressing upon the attention of the Italians what they are doing for them. We have no means here of showing what we are doing, and about all they know is that we are lending them money, selling them supplies by no means as much as they need, or think their due proportion, and helping the other Allies with everything including armies.

I urge you to have this matter given the most serious consideration. No money could be spent which would bring so rich a return. There are many more things which I would like to write you about, but for the present I forbear.

Believe me [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

763.72/90091

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, February 18, 1918.

[Received March 6.]

MY DEAR MR. LANSING: Since receiving the Department's telegram of January 12th.⁶⁸ calling for weekly reports upon general conditions existing in France, I have been impressed with the thought that I ought to write you setting forth some fundamental facts underlying those conditions, that a more intelligent understanding of those reports may be had. I have preferred to put this communication in the form of a personal letter to you rather than that of an official despatch, even though I realize from my own experience during these busy days that sometimes such letters—especially long ones—look very formidable and uninviting.

Naturally, the weekly reports will only come to have any significance as events over here vary from time to time.

Incidentally, let me take this occasion to explain, referring to your telegram N° 3171 of the 12th. instant,⁶⁸ that in making my report in my N° 3136⁶⁸ concerning the aeroplane raid, and the rather full comment thereon, I, of course, had not in mind to point out its military importance which, as you say, would not have justified the space given it, but the marked influence which it had upon the public mind in giving it new resolve to prosecute the war with greater vigor.

As a matter of fact there are certain outstanding conditions which, in so far as they affect France herself or her attitude toward America, will not change with the week. If I write with considerable conviction in setting forth some of my observations, it is because, with no affectation of conceit, I trust, my position here has been of such a nature that few if any men have had the opportunity to meet and talk with more people from all over Europe prominent in public and private life than myself. The geographical as well as political position of Paris has made it a Mecca for nearly everybody having a mission.

Whatever particular phase passing events may give to political conditions in France, thus far, one must above all recognize that her determination to resist the enemy—indeed, to win the war if possible—has never been questioned. The courage and sacrifice with which she has prosecuted that determination are also conceded.

While it is undeniably true that occasionally, after some check in her military operations resulting in a heavy loss of men, or the discouraging fact of enemy victories on other fronts, there has come

⁶⁸ Not printed.

a feeling of discouragement, yet the rebound has always been strong and splendid. Perhaps owing to a combination of the causes just mentioned, with unfavorable domestic conditions like labor troubles, the morale of France was the most shaken just preceding the arrival of the American troops in June of last year, but like some magic tonic, with their arrival came a revival in confidence and in the fighting spirit of France which from that moment right up to the present has not diminished.

I am sure that you have from time to time read, particularly in the American press, exaggerated stories of the weakening of the morale of France. Rumors without much foundation have been crystallized by such writers into facts portentous of very great consequences to the country. One on our shores must have gotten the impression growing out of disclosures in the Bolo and Caillaux affairs that the upper crust of French politics is wholly corrupt; and that former Ministers must have deliberately shielded powerful wrong doers. Yet it is my opinion that, as a matter of fact, no one of the belligerent Powers has been more conservative, more united, or more efficient than France, considering all the difficulties to be encountered. And yet none of the larger countries has suffered as much as she.

The devotion to country seems to be an attribute as innate to every Frenchman, whether of high or low degree, as is his temperament. All have suffered terribly in the loss of their sons. But a hundred of such bereaved fathers have told me that they gloried in the sacrifice. This feeling, if it were not so ideal and exalted in character, might be called almost fanatical.

Mr. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs in my early days in Paris, once told me that upon the walls of his schoolroom when a boy was placed the motto adjuring the reverence for family ties, but above family and everything else devotion to country. That motto is as a flaming sign in the clouds for every Frenchman. It has brought to his children a training and sense of duty ideal, and has made his patriotism superb. Imbued with such feelings and in the recognition of such obligations to their country, the people of France may be depended upon to carry out their part, regardless of sacrifice, to advance the common cause of their Allies. At the present moment, even in the face of the long threatened attack of the German forces, the morale of this country is perhaps better than it has been at any time since the beginning of the war.

Such, I believe, is the situation to-day as regards her dependability, which is so important to the Allied Armies because it is upon her soil alone that they can and must fight. All reports from time to time, therefore, will recognize this situation.

In view of Department's instructions to which reference has been made, one other factor may be considered which I am certain is as unvarying in its nature as the loyalty of France to herself—I refer to her relations to America. It may be affirmed without any qualification that, since the day of our entrance into the war, France has not only looked upon America as her special friend but she has recognized in her help the one aid without which the cause of the Allies must have failed. With an affection and confidence unlimited, the French people as well as the Government have manifested the greatest concern to please us, and have shown the greatest deference to the views of President Wilson. Although political factions wage bitter controversies between themselves, yet, singularly enough, they unite in pronouncing President Wilson as the particular champion of their Articles of Faith and the exponent of their views. Such a situation is highly important at the present time because of the renewed efforts which the Socialist Groups are making to discredit the present Ministry and which, if successful, might have an important bearing upon the conduct of the war itself.

Naturally, it also gives to the President a very great power and influence in moulding the views of the Allies, particularly as they affect the position of France.

The many anxious enquiries which I have received from members of the Ministry, as well as those of the Parliament, as to what more France can do to show her welcome to our American soldiers, are pathetic in their solicitude. Their gratitude, amounting to almost reverence, which they show to our people testifies to the absolute confidence which they repose in our promises and aims.

In making these general observations, bearing, as it will be noted, upon the two fundamentally important facts—the solidarity of France and her attitude toward America—I have ignored making reference to various rumors which, though seemingly qualifying my statements, nevertheless, in my opinion, merit but little weight. The temptation to generalize from single instances often leads to conclusions which are at entire variance with the real situation. That, here and there, there have been instances of some friction between the French people and some of our workers, either civil or military, of overcharging on the part of French storekeepers, or of complaints of dilatoriness on the part of French officials, is doubtless true, but France is at war and was sorely tried for nearly three years before we entered into it. Indeed, the marvel to me is that she has through it all been able to play so well such an important part.

If I ventured upon the rôle of a prophet—and in these days of rapid change one man's prophecy is as good as another's—I would say

that in the telegraphic weekly reports which are to follow, the political conditions of France would be affected almost solely by the conduct of the Socialists. Unfortunately, the prosecution of Caillaux and Malvy, with their past powerful political connections, must be taken into account in adding new elements of a very probable disquieting nature, however meritorious may be those prosecutions or however great the guilt of the accused.

In considering the economic features to be embraced in such a report, undoubtedly labor conditions and food supplies—the latter depending upon the ever pressing tonnage question—will have to be most frequently considered.

Commercial questions, both by the policy of our country in limiting exports and the same policy practised by the French Government—again so greatly dependent upon the tonnage question—must be of minor importance in such reports.

In concluding, let me say that I hope, in my observations of such a very general nature, that I may have acquainted you in such a manner with the situation existing here that my letter will serve in some measure as an elucidation of what my telegraphic reports, necessarily and desirably brief, may set forth.

With my kindest regards [etc.]

WM. G. SHARP

763.72116/532

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In connection with the appeal of the International Committee of the Red Cross,⁷¹ concerning which I spoke to you yesterday, together with Secretary Baker—whose Department is opposed to any such arrangement—I send you herewith a draft of a communication which I had then prepared for transmission to our Embassies at London, Paris and Rome.⁷²

Upon returning to the Department I found that Mr. Barclay of the British Embassy had seen Mr. Phillips and under instructions from his Government orally asked whether the appeal of the International Committee should not be answered in identic terms and also whether we would not agree that the reply be framed in Paris.

Pursuant to Mr. Barclay's communication I propose sending the enclosed telegram to Paris, before sending out the one which is directed to London.

⁷¹ See telegram of Feb. 11, 1918, from the Chargé in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 2, p. 779.

⁷² Not printed; for the telegram as sent, see *ibid.*, p. 781.

Will you kindly indicate your wishes in the matter?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72116/532

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 21 February, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I must say I am afraid of any expression of policy framed jointly at Paris. There has been none yet that seemed to me even touched with wisdom. I see that you have sought to suggest and safeguard, but I am afraid that statesmen like our friend L-G. will not care to be guided and will rather rejoice in a somewhat crude and cynical rejoinder to the Red Cross.

I approve the despatch to Sharp, however, and am quite willing to subscribe to a proper reply if they will let us see it beforehand. Sharp can cable it, and the delay will not be serious.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72 Su/32½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I told you after cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 19th, of my interview that morning with Lord Reading and his perturbation over your attitude as to the Versailles declaration^{72a} and the resolutions of the Inter-Allied Council of which Mr. Crosby is president.^{72b} I think his chief fear was that the matter would become public and be used by the political enemies of Lloyd George for I understand that since the parliamentary crisis has passed he is less disturbed.

Day before yesterday, the 20th, Jusserand came to see me. He was far more excited than Lord Reading and showed considerable irritation that he had not been warned beforehand. He said that you had received him recently and had never mentioned the matter to him nor had you done so to Reading, a fact which he considered most unfortunate. He said that he was sure that "your rebuke" would be very badly received.

I told him that the Prime Minister must have known that this Government did not consider that the Supreme War Council had to

^{72a} See *ibid.*, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 70.

^{72b} See *ibid.*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, p. 34.

do with political subjects, that we had no political representative on the Council and had no intention of having one, and that it seemed an extraordinary proceeding to issue a statement at Versailles which would give the impression that the War Council had approved. I told him that in the event that the three Allied Governments considered your assertion as to the scope of the two Councils to be a rebuke, they had no one to blame but themselves and that you had no other course but state plainly your views.

This did not seem to satisfy Jusserand at all, though his chief ground of complaint seemed to be that you had not consulted him about the matter.

Yesterday (Thursday) I had an interview with the Italian Ambassador. I found him in a very different temper from the other Ambassadors. He agreed that your attitude was quite correct, that Baron Sonnino fully understood it, and that the latter had resisted so far as he was able any joint action without first consulting this Government.

This is a brief résumé of my interviews.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/1374a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *February 23, 1918.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I thought over last night what course we should take in dealing with the communication which we have been warned will arrive via Spain. It seems to me we might do this: Give the text to our principal cobelligerents and say to them that through the same channel as we received the communication we intend to reply by asking whether the document has been submitted to the German Government and, if so, whether it meets with its approval as no answer could be made until we are advised of German knowledge or ignorance of Austria's action.

This would furnish an acknowledgment to Austria without saying we have the communication under consideration, and I cannot see how it would arouse any suspicion or cause any offense among the Allies. Then whichever way Austria replies we will be in a position to do as we please for either reply offers possibilities since we can avoid giving any indication which one we desire.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/90103

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, February 23, 1918.

[Received March 15.]

MY DEAR MR. LANSING: In my letter of last week, in which I considered, first, the morale of the French Government and people as it affects their courage and determination to vigorously prosecute the war, and, second, their attitude toward the United States and its participation in the war, I took occasion to refer to these two factors as in their nature fundamental and little likely to become less favorable.

After writing you this, it occurred to me that I might very properly supplement that letter by the treating of a situation which has to do with the standing of the present Ministry, and certain conditions that have seemed of late to threaten its stability. Let me say, at the outset, however, that even the fall of the Clemenceau Ministry would by no means necessarily or with any degree of probability bring about a change which would seriously affect either the morale of France or her attitude toward us—most assuredly not the latter. Nevertheless, such a change just at this time might be unfortunate in giving encouragement to the enemy.

Since I took charge of this mission, late in the Fall of 1914, there have been five radical changes in French Ministries. Each new one succeeded the old one without any particular jar or weakening effect. However, it is undeniable that both in the Ribot and Painlevé Ministries, the seeds of their final overthrow—the last one remained in power but twenty days—were sown at the very inception of their institution when no member of any of the Socialist Groups, as had been the custom in the past, became a part thereof. This precedent was followed in the constitution of the present Ministry which has had to face, in addition, the bitter hostility of the Socialists on account of their long-time animosity toward Mr. Clemenceau himself. Only his strength with the army, and the confidence which the mass of the French people seem to place in his courage and integrity of purpose, have, thus far, been proof against both the secret and open opposition of those forces.

As stated in my last weekly telegraphic report N^o 3210 of the 18th instant,⁷³ certain complications other than what may be termed strictly political have come to exert no little influence upon public opinion. Their effect strengthen and at the same time weaken the present Gov-

⁷³ Not printed.

ernment. I refer to the revelations growing out of the exposure of Bolo Pasha and Caillaux.

Undoubtedly the prosecution and conviction of Bolo Pasha, whose name for the past six months has stood as a synonym for corrupt intrigues and treason, has greatly popularized Clemenceau, and, for a time, the arrest of Caillaux, involving somewhat the same charges,—possibly devoid of financial corruption—added to his strength. But, apparently, reconstructing their lines of offensive, the friends of the latter, comprising substantially the whole of the Socialist Party, as well as certain other strong influences whose identity seems to remain in the background, are said to be at the present moment very active in their efforts to overthrow the Clemenceau Ministry.

Concerning the carrying out of such plans, as I intimated in my abovementioned telegram, one hears now very frequently of threatened labor troubles involving strikes in munition plants, predicted to begin in the near future. A very prominent member of the Chamber of Deputies, at the head of a great Paris newspaper, told me yesterday that such strikes were scheduled to take place on next Wednesday, the 27th. instant. You have doubtless been an interested reader of the proceedings of the Inter-Allied Labor Conferences now being held in London.

My informant told me also that a demand would be made upon the French and English Governments for passports for an International Socialist Conference—somewhat along the lines of that proposed last summer for Stockholm—; in the event of a refusal to issue passports to delegates of such a convention, the order for the strike would go forth at once. Facts are gradually coming to light of how within the past few weeks Clemenceau took most drastic steps in throttling a formidable strike in a munition factory at its very beginning. It is said that he issued an ultimatum that if the men quit work they would at once be marched to the front. Evidently they preferred the rear, for they did not strike.

The same Deputy above-quoted informed me that everybody was afraid of Clemenceau, and that his opponents in the Chamber, figuratively speaking, mentioned his name only in whispers. It would seem that the soubriquet given to him of "The Tiger" is not so inappropriate.

A humorous story was told by the same gentleman that even the President waved aside two envoys—Frenchmen—who came recently up from the Queen Mother of Spain—herself Austrian by descent but bitterly anti-German—to talk of a peace proposition. The President, with no little haste and embarrassment, referred these messengers to the Government. Later Clemenceau, hearing of the incident, had the men arrested and put under a watch near the Front.

As my informant is not a partisan of Clemenceau, it may be well appreciated that his comments were not intended to be those of praise.

However, the very courage and boldness of Clemenceau have attracted to him the support of the Army, and that fact alone will, in my opinion, operate as a very strong deterrent upon those who, if conditions were different, might seek to overthrow him. I have even heard it stated that the most prominent members of preceding Ministries are desirous of, if not active in bringing about the fall of his Ministry. Some of these are charged with no more serious offence than being altogether too lax in dealing with offenders like Bolo and Caillaux, after having knowledge of their intrigues. Undoubtedly, however, the resentment which they feel toward a Ministry that has brought their names into prominence in connection with such charges is very bitter.

My own observation has been that underlying the causes announced for the overthrow of all the past Ministries during my stay here may be found personal jealousies and animosities rather than differences in the governmental policies. It is indeed fortunate that the patriotism and good sense, so inherent in the mass of the French people,—as I pointed out in my previous letter—have been as a sheet anchor of strength against any harmful effects from such personal resentments of those in the various Ministries that have come and gone. Momentous consequences, even affecting the outcome of the war, might have otherwise followed.

In a later letter, pursuing the purpose to acquaint you with certain situations not liable to materially change from week to week, I shall take occasion to inform you as to some of the economic conditions existing in France—particularly in Paris—as they have to do with not only the everyday life but their effect on the prosecution of the war.

I am [etc.]

WM. G. SHARP

867n.01/14½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *February 28, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Zionist Committee, through its secretary, has sent me the letter which I attach hereto. This Committee makes two requests:

1—That passports be issued to representatives of the Committee to proceed to Palestine via London or Paris as a part of a Commission composed of representatives of the Zionist organization of England which is acting with the sanction of the British Government.

2—That this Department recognize a Zionist Medical Unit composed of from thirty-five to forty-five persons. This Unit is to proceed to Palestine to render service to the civilian population there.

I hesitate to accede to these requests in view of the following considerations:

1—This Government has never accepted Mr. Balfour's pronouncement with reference to the future of Palestine⁷⁴ and has expressly refrained from accrediting consular agents to that territory, in which action the British Government has entirely acquiesced.

2—This Government is not at war with Turkey.

3—A possible embarrassment may arise on account of the presence in Palestine of individuals, even though their errand is one of mercy, sponsored by an organization having distinctly political aims.

I should be grateful to you if you would advise me of your views with reference to this communication from the Zionist Committee.⁷⁵

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs (De Haas) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1918.

SIR: On behalf of the Zionist organization, I earnestly request you to authorize the issuance of passports to E. W. Lewin-Epstein, Mary Fels, and such others as may be named by my Committee, all being loyal American citizens of creditable reputation, said passports to be issued to them personally on their appearing before the designated official, so as to enable them to proceed to Palestine, via London or Paris. Together, the persons named and to be named will go as part of a Commission representing our Zionist organization, joining a Mission composed of representatives of the Zionist organizations of England and other countries, which together will form a Mission proceeding with the sanction of the British Government under the direction of Dr. Weitzmann to Palestine. The objects of the Mission are outlined in a cable, signed Weitzman Frankfurter, copy of which I attach.^{75a}

MEDICAL UNIT

Further in connection with the proposed sending of a Zionist medical unit to Palestine, which matter has been before the Department in various forms, I now beg, in the first place, to call your at-

⁷⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, p. 317, footnote 1.

⁷⁵ This paper bears the notation: "March 3—18 Pres. authorized the Unit. F L P[olk]."

^{75a} Not printed.

attention to the following message from the British Embassy, and earnestly request the State Department to recognize our unit, which will comprise from thirty-five to forty-five persons, in the form requested by the British authorities, which I understand from representatives of the British Embassy, is in accord with the precedent established by the British Government in the recognition of various units that have rendered service during the war for special purposes. Under the convention proclaimed February 28, 1910,⁷⁶ between the United States and other powers for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention, it is necessary that the unit receive an official commission from the United States, and that the Government notify the names of the personnel to the Central Powers.

I may add that the British authorities clearly understand that our unit is to render much needed service to the civilian population in Palestine, which is at present practically denuded of doctors and nurses required for the normal purposes of any country. May I ask, upon such recognition being accorded to us, the Department authorize the issuance of the passports in the usual way and enable us to purchase medical supplies, etc. The message from the British Government reads:

“Mr. Jacob de Haas, Secretary of Zionist Committee, 44 East 23rd Street, New York.

We are informed that there will be no objection to despatch of Zionist Medical Unit to Palestine as one of the American Medical Units provided American Government will recognize it and will in accordance with Geneva convention notify enemy of their recognition.

Reading.”

Very truly yours,

JACOB DE HAAS

763.72119/1410a

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador on Special Mission
(Reading)

WASHINGTON, *March 1, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: The President has received from the Emperor of Austria a message in which the Emperor expresses agreement with the four principles of peace which were formulated by the President in his address to the Congress on the eleventh of February last⁷⁷ and in effect invites a further comparison of views through personal representatives. In reply the President has asked the Emperor

⁷⁶ William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. II, p. 2269.

⁷⁷ *Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 108.*

for as definite a programme for the application of the four principles as the President himself made public in his address to the Congress on the eighth of January last.⁷⁸ The President hopes in this way that he may possibly obtain what has so long been desired—a definite programme of the war aims of the Central Powers. He feels at liberty while making this effort to accede to the wish of the Emperor of Austria that this interchange of messages be personal and private.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/9320½

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, March 12, 1918.

[Received April 1.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am sending by this pouch the translation of the last communication received by me from Baron Sonnino, under date of March 9th, relating to the Convention or stipulation touching the conscription for military service of the citizens of the one country by the Government of the other.⁷⁹ The substance of this communication has already been telegraphed you on March 10th, being my 1464 [1462],⁸⁰ and I hope that the agreement arrived at will appear as satisfactory to you as it has done to me.

Baron Sonnino has been laid up for over two weeks suffering I learn from boils or carbuncles; he has, however, continued his work, which, indeed, seems to have been the cause of his illness, and though no one has been able to see him personally, he himself signed the Note referred to above. Just what the effect of his illness would be on the Government it is hard to tell. It is said in some circles that Orlando and Nitti are drawing closer together; while in other circles it is said that Orlando considers Nitti as a serious rival for the Premiership and knows that Sonnino does not want this post, but prefers the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—also that Sonnino has the confidence of the country and likewise of the Allies. Furthermore, a statement which Nitti made the other day in which he claims to have unearthed what is now called here the "Silk Waste Scandal", was taken by Orlando as claiming credit which the latter thought belonged to him as the Minister of the Interior, under whom comes all the Secret Service work relating to internal affairs. This, according to the rumor, has caused some coolness on Orlando's part towards Nitti. Italian politics and political combinations, however,

⁷⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

⁷⁹ Communication of March 9 not printed; for correspondence previously printed on this subject, see *ibid.*, supp. 2, pp. 648 ff.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 695.

change so rapidly that I would not like to prophesy what the future combinations may be. It can only be said with certainty that Sonnino has hitherto been the chief force for carrying on the war to the bitter end that his influence has impressed itself on both of the younger men—that is, Orlando and Nitti, who, I believe recognize—both of them, the necessity of following this policy through to the end.

Orlando is now in London having gone there from the front, where he and Nitti and the Minister of War and one or two other Ministers went last week to see the King, and—it is said, to learn on the ground the feeling of the Army. Several reasons are assigned for Orlando's visit to Paris and London, one of which is that he has gone to make it plain to France and England that Italy must be furnished more coal and more grain, and that British and French troops must be left here to help withstand the expected attack of Austria and her allies against this weakest link in the Allied chain,—if they expect Italy to be able to hold out on the Piave Line, or, indeed, at all.

There is another rumor to the effect that this visit has a further object and relates Orlando's visit to the story hinted at in the press some time back about a meeting of a British high official and an Austrian high official in Switzerland for purposes of discussing Austria's making a separate peace. You will know much better than I what foundation there was for this rumor, and I give you the one relating to Orlando's visit simply for your information.

I have been informed by Signor Nitti that the Italian Loan subscriptions have reached about six milliards of Lire. I do not know, however, what form all of these subscriptions have taken. He is looking forward with great interest to the expected visit of Mr. Crosby; and I myself am doing the same, for I feel that anything which can be done to show the Italian people that we are drawing closer to them will have a great effect in strengthening their morale. The morale of the Army is, I am assured, exceedingly good, but unquestionably the morale of the people needs bolstering up in view of all the writing that goes on in the press and all the talk that goes on outside about approaching peace negotiations, as the result of the Notes and speeches which have been made on this subject by leading public men on one side or the other.

If the stories about Austria's wishing to make peace are true, she appears to be going about it, so far as Italy is concerned, in a somewhat curious way, unless indeed she feels she has some good reason to believe that her attempt to destroy Italian cities and kill numbers of the civil population will terrorize Italians into insisting on stopping the war. She not only has increased immensely her attempts at destruction of cities in the war zone, such as Venice, Treviso and

Padua, but has just sent a dirigible or dirigibles to drop bombs on Naples, where the night before last some fifteen people were killed and some forty were wounded in a dirigible raid. Apparently the raid on Naples has not affected the spirit of the people in the least, though in Venice, where so many of the men have left and the remaining population are mainly old men, women and children, the continued air raids have got on the nerves of the people and arrangements have had to be made to remove them to a certain extent. We had quite an alarm here just after day-break which proved to be the result of the return of the dirigible from its innocent diversion of killing civilians in Naples, it having taken a course which indicated that it was returning by way of Rome. All the lights were extinguished and street cars and other traffic were stopped, but the dirigible did not come this way. The story got out that the Vatican which has its own electric plant, kept its lights burning, and some color is given to the report by the fact that the press this morning contains a statement that the Vatican will extinguish its lights along with the rest of the city should any future alarm be given.

As I forward regularly weekly reports containing a resumé of the political news given in the press from day to day, I do not feel it necessary to do more than send you in these letters what may be termed "inside information", or information which will throw a light on what is sent in those reports.

I will say in closing, however, that I consider the situation here, especially among the civil population is sufficiently serious for us to avail ourselves of every occasion and means to show the people that we are doing more and more all the time to aid and sustain them. They certainly rely more and more on America for this, and I feel it important for us to do as much as lies in our power to justify their expectation.

I am [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

711.00/183

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 12 March, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish you would be kind enough to formulate a careful and conclusive memorandum for the use of the committee of the Senate with regard to the enclosed resolution.⁸¹ I take it for granted that you feel as I do that this is no time to act as the resolution prescribes, and certainly when I pronounced for open diplomacy, I meant not that there should be no private discus-

⁸¹ For text of resolution, see enclosure to the following document.

sions of delicate matters, but that no secret agreements of any sort should be entered into and that all international relations, when fixed, should be open, above-board, and explicit.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

711.00/19½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *March 23, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In response to your letter of March 12th I herewith enclose a memorandum of objections to the public discussion of treaties in the Senate.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure]

Memorandum on Senate Resolution 178

Senate Resolution 178 was introduced in the Senate by Senator Borah on January 9, 1918, and reads as follows:

“Resolved, That the Committee on Rules be, and the same is hereby, directed to consider the advisability of preparing a revision of the rules of the Senate relating to the consideration of treaties, with a view to providing that all treaties hereafter shall be considered in the open executive sessions of the Senate, report to be made to the Senate at an early day.”

This resolution provides in substance for the consideration of treaties by the Senate in open session. The inadvisability of passing a resolution of this sort is shown by the following considerations:

1. The public discussion of treaties might and in certain cases certainly would wound the sensibilities of foreign governments, resulting in estrangement rather than friendship which it is presumed is always one of the purposes of international agreements. The feelings of foreign governments must be considered because subjects of discussion in international affairs do not, as a rule, concern ourselves alone, but concern other countries also. Confidential matters which are entrusted to us cannot properly be divulged to other countries without discourtesy and offence; for we have no right to insist that the secrets of one power be shared by all other powers. If foreign countries knew it was the fixed practice of this Government to discuss publicly all treaties before senatorial consent was given they would hesitate to enter into many agreements which they now negotiate with the United States in the confidence that the information disclosed in the course of the negotiation will not be published but will be held in confidence, a condition which they have a right to impose. There is no more reason why treaties should be discussed in open session than appointments made by the President by and with the

advice and consent of the Senate should be debated there publicly. The reason such appointments are approved or disapproved by the Senate in secret sessions is chiefly because of the sensibilities of the nominee and of the restraint publicity imposes upon debate.

2. If the feelings of foreign governments were to be regarded in the public discussion of treaties in the Senate, the views of individual senators would not be freely exchanged. This would [in]evitably lead to a curtailment of the frank discussion which now takes place in secret executive session. Treaties would, therefore, be given less consideration, resulting in an imperfect understanding of their provisions, and possibly in more frequent rejection than would be the case if the discussion was confidential.

3. The discussion of a Treaty should be distinguished from the discussion of a Bill. The one relates to intercourse with foreign nations, the other almost exclusively to relations between citizens of the United States; or of citizens and the Government of the United States. Citizens do not stand in the same relation to each other as do nations. Laws are imposed by the Legislature while treaties are compacts between equal parties. There is no breach of confidence in the discussion of a Bill. Moreover citizens may protect their interests through their representatives in the Senate, whereas a foreign nation has no such means of influencing that body, except by insidious propaganda—a practice to be discouraged.

4. The public discussion of treaties by the Senate would lead to the injection of local politics into international affairs with unfortunate results. An example of the effect of debating a treaty in open session is the result of the public discussion of the Bayard-Chamberlain Fisheries Treaty of 1888. That treaty, if it had been ratified, would have practically ended the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries controversy between the United States and Great Britain. As a result of open discussion in the Senate, the treaty became something of an issue in the Presidential campaign of that year and failed of ratification. That the treaty did not deserve to be killed by publicity is evidenced by the fact that the substance of some of its most important provisions were embodied twenty-two years later in the award by the permanent court at the Hague in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration. There may, of course, be exceptional cases in which it may be desirable to have public debate in the Senate upon treaties, but this should be left to the discretion of the Senate, and should not be made the rule. In 1912 the Taft arbitration treaties were debated in open session.

5. The introduction of politics into the approval of a treaty might, for obvious reasons, lead to the publication of all or some of the correspondence leading up to the treaty. The possible results of this method would be to destroy the usefulness of the American representative abroad, and confidence in him among the people at home. If an American diplomat reports to the Secretary of State that the foreign minister with whom he deals is attempting to barter and therefore the initial demands should be exaggerated, publication of this despatch would destroy the success of the negotiation and the usefulness of the diplomat in the country to which he is accredited. If, on the other hand, the diplomat reported that the foreign minister was fair and reasonable, and that it would be better to draft the

demands as nearly as possible to meet his wishes, publication of such a despatch might destroy confidence in the United States as to the diplomat's ability to represent his country. Publication of the one despatch would tend to create antagonism in a foreign country, and publication of the other, suspicion of disloyalty of the diplomat to the best interests of his country.

The practice of publishing despatches exchanged during negotiations would have an inevitable effect upon the negotiators of a treaty. Their discussion would be less frank; sources of information would be more guarded; the possibility of agreement less likely. There would also be the tendency to encourage the writing of despatches not for the person to whom they were addressed, but for the public by whom they will be read. It would close the door for confidential or even friendly exchange of views or ideas during the progress of the negotiations. In short the end most to be desired, namely, to reach an agreement, would be endangered.

6. Consideration of treaties by the Senate is really a part of the negotiations; for that body then functions as an adviser of the Executive. He may reject its advice or he may adopt it, continue negotiations accordingly, and resubmit the result to the Senate. In the latter case the whole negotiation might be nullified by public discussion in Executive session for the reasons already mentioned. There would, moreover, appear to be no sound reason why the Senate's part in the negotiations should be public and the rest of the negotiation kept secret. For the grounds stated it seems clear that the entire course of negotiations should be confidential, including discussion in the Senate, until possibly after the treaty has been completed.

7. There is in fact no necessity for public discussion of treaties in the United States, for the reason that it is not and never has been the policy in this country to make secret treaties with foreign countries. This perhaps has been in a measure due to the fact that the United States has been moved by the general conception that the policy of fairness toward other states in the long run inures to the benefit of this country in its international relations. The finished treaty is always made public while the confidences exchanged in negotiation are protected. But in any event there could be no secret treaties in the United States since the treaty-making power does not rest wholly in the President, but is shared by the Senate. The history of the constitution shows that when the states gave up their right to enter into treaties they insisted that through the Senate they should have a voice in, and advise and consent as to any convention. If the Senate should approve of any treaty inimical to the interests of the United States or any State, the Senators who approved such a treaty can in due course be removed by the people. It is not possible, therefore, for the United States, even if it were not contrary to its principles, to bind itself for any length of time to a treaty which is secret, and hostile to the best interests of the country. Thus the secret article annexed to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 failed of approval by the United States.^{31a} In certain other countries, particularly in European countries the practice of entering

^{31a} For text of this treaty, see Miller, *Treaties*, vol. 5, p. 207.

into secret treaties is fostered by the constitutional system giving the Executive or the Crown exclusive power to make and ratify treaties or at least certain classes of treaties without reference to the people. For this reason Bismarck stipulated in the preliminary articles of peace at the close of the Franco-Prussian war that the treaty of peace should have the sanction of a National Assembly of France.

Owing to the sensitiveness of foreign countries in respect to the divulgence of confidential information imparted to the United States during negotiations; in view of the curtailment of frank discussion if the sensibilities of foreign countries are not to be wounded; considering that the public discussion of a treaty is not on the same plane as the debate on an Act of Congress; considering also that the public debate of treaties in the Senate would lead to the injection of local politics into international affairs with the possible publication of the negotiations leading up to the treaties to the detriment of the diplomatic service abroad and at home; considering further that the "advice and consent" of the Senate to treaties is really a step in the confidential negotiations preceding the treaty; and finally in view of the fact that owing to the system of government of the United States whereby the President and Senate are responsible to the people no secret treaties are or can be entered into by the United States, it would seem clearly unwise for the Senate to consider in public executive session treaties submitted from time to time to that body by the President so long as the final result of the negotiations is not concealed from the people.

763.72/9321½

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, March 26, 1918.

[Received April 18.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On the receipt of your reply ⁸² to my telegram of March 20th (No. 1479)⁸² referring to the rumor being circulated in Italy that the President had made some statement adverse to Italy's hopes, I published through the Stefani Agency a brief denial of the rumor. This denial has been commented on very favorably in the Italian press, the *Messaggero* having an editorial.

The *Tribuna* points out that besides the specific report denied by me there have been other false statements circulated in Italy, such as that Italy's internal conditions had been reported in the United States by American commissioners in Italy as being very disheartening. All of this is to a certain extent a part of the defeatist propa-

⁸² Not printed.

ganda and for the rest is due to a certain nervousness on the part of the public which latter is caused, I think, in part by our concentrating in France all of our troops who are sent over to this side. It has interested me very much to see a certain growth here in the feeling against France, a feeling which is apparently much stronger among the people than in the Government. It seems to be felt that France avails herself of her position and her relation to America to take for herself an unconscionable part of what America as well as England and South American countries can furnish to the common cause.

A memorandum recently furnished me by Signor Nitti, who is one of the coolest and most level headed men in the Government here, which I sent to you in my despatch No. 857 of March 19th,⁸³ reflects this feeling and states that Italy would be content with one sixth of the coal that France gets if it were sufficient to enable her to carry on the war; but at present she only gets about one ninth.

To some extent she has the same feeling towards England and she looks to America to more nearly equalize in her case the assistance extended to the Allies. This is indicated by the reference to her feeling that England and France could readily furnish her more than they do but will not do so unless America takes steps to insist upon a juster apportionment. The fact is that Italy, . . . conscious of having faced extraordinary difficulties internal as well as external in this war, feels herself tremendously isolated and cut off from the other Allies. Her whole foreign policy for thirty years has been addressed towards the Central Empires which she feels was necessary for her at the time but has left her in a false position, at least according to the views of the Allies, and whatever failure there may be to come to her aid is regarded with a certain bitterness as being caused by this view. Nitti's memorandum alludes to the fact that Italy was left to defend alone, except for recent loans of British and French troops, her Austrian frontier which was nearly as long as the French frontier, defended by France, England, and Portugal, and now by us. They are looking to the United States as giving the most immediate promise of additional aid and if it does not come I would not like to guarantee how long her present enthusiasm about the United States will continue.

Her Government people have heard only this morning that Baker does not think he can come to Italy and their disappointment and their feeling that a great mistake has been made was so plain that, sharing fully in this view as I do from my knowledge of the situation, I telegraphed Baker urging him to come here without fail and have telegraphed you asking you to support me in this request.

⁸³ Not printed.

It is believed here that an attack is most imminent. Austria has massed against Italy not only her armies formerly aligned against her but those which have come from her eastern frontier and there is a feeling of subdued but serious anxiety here as to what the effect of this attack will be. The crumbling at Caporetto in the autumn gave Italy a shock from which she is still suffering and I feel that it is necessary to do everything possible to sustain her and keep established her resistive power.

At this moment all Italy is awaiting with bated breath the result of the tremendous German offensive on the British front in France, the anxiety being increased by the fact that little or no news is allowed to come through beyond the official communiqués which are too sybilline to give much assurance. Ere this reaches you, however, the issue will have been decided and so it is useless for me to take up your time in discussing the situation. To me it appears that the whole matter now rests on which side has the best generals. If England and France have generals who know how to handle the situation and utilize the great resources at their command they ought to win the war there and now.

Believe me [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

763.72119/1562a

The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL: Mr. Auchincloss gave me your invitation for luncheon on Friday next and I am sorry I cannot accept it. I concluded from what he said that the purpose was to discuss the American and British differences as to the League of Nations, and particularly the attitude of Lloyd-George as expressed in his public address about a month ago.

As you probably know Mr. Page wrote a long letter to the President on the subject. He sent a similar one to me,⁸⁴ which I found very interesting in its dissection of British opinion.

To be entirely frank I am not disposed to quarrel too severely with the Prime Minister's opinion in regard to the League to Enforce Peace, because I am not at all sure he is not in a measure justified. The movement has been for several years very industriously and, I may say, very ably advocated in this country; but, doubting its efficiency as a means to insure international peace, I have, as you know, never affirmatively given it my personal support.

⁸⁴ Not found in Department files.

The practical element, in my opinion, in any league of nations is the good faith of the members. If they are untrustworthy, an agreement to unite in the forcible maintenance of peace would be worthless. If this is the true view, the character of the membership of the league should be of first consideration, and I do not understand this to be in the scheme of Mr. Taft and others advocating a League to Enforce Peace.

Briefly let me recall to you my line of thought, which I discussed with you a year and a quarter ago: No people on earth desire war, particularly an aggressive war. If the people can exercise their will, they will remain at peace. If a nation possesses democratic institutions, the popular will will be exercised. Consequently, if the principle of democracy prevails in a nation, it can be counted upon to preserve peace and oppose war.

Applying these truths (if they are truths and I think they are), I have reached the conclusion that the only certain guarantor of international peace is a League of Democracies since they alone possess the trustworthy character which makes their word inviolate. A League, on the other hand which numbers among its members autocratic governments, possesses the elements of personal ambition, of intrigue and discord, which are the seeds of future wars.

A League, composed of both democratic and autocratic governments and pledged to maintain peace by force, would be unreliable; but a League, composed solely of democracies, would by reason of the character of its membership be an efficient surety of peace.

To my mind it comes down to this, that the acceptance of the principle of democracy by all the chief powers of the world and the maintenance of genuine democratic governments would result in permanent peace. If this view is correct, then the effort should be to make democracy universal. With that accomplished I do not care a rap whether there is a treaty to preserve peace or not. I am willing to rely on the pacific spirit of democracies to accomplish the desirable relation between nations, and I do not believe that any League relying upon force or the menace of force can accomplish that purpose, at least for any length of time.

Until Autocracy is entirely discredited and Democracy becomes not only the dominant but the practically universal principle in the political systems of the world, I fear a League of Nations, particularly one purposing to employ force, would not function.

It seems to me that the proper course, the one which will really count in the end, is to exert all our efforts toward the establishment of the democratic principle in every country of sufficient power to be a menace to world peace in the event it should be in the hands of

ambitious rulers instead of the people. Unless we can accomplish this this war will, in my opinion, have been fought in vain.

We must crush Prussianism so completely that it can never rise again, and we must end Autocracy in every other nation as well. A compromise with this principle of government, and an attempt to form a League of Nations with autocratic governments as members will lack permanency. Let us uproot the whole miserable system and have done with it.

In reading over this letter it impresses me as a little too oratorical, but I am sure you will pardon that in view of the strong convictions which I have on the subject. I simply cannot think with complacency of temporizing or compromising with the ruffians who brought on this horror, because to do so will get us nowhere, and some future generation will have to complete the work which we left unfinished.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.751/2

The Governor of New York (Whitman) to the Secretary of State

ALBANY, N. Y., April 8, 1918.

SIR: A year ago at your request, through Mr. Polk, I vetoed two so-called wire tapping bills, amending the Penal Law in relation to the overhearing of telephone conversations.

There is now before me awaiting my approval a bill to amend the Penal Law in relation to overhearing telephone conversations; copy of which I enclose.⁸⁵

Will you please advise me if the approval of the bill in its present form would in any way embarrass the Federal government?

I am sending a similar letter to the Attorney General.

Very truly yours,

CHARLES S. WHITMAN

811.751/2

The Secretary of State to the Governor of New York (Whitman)

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1918.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: Replying to your letter of April 8, enclosing a copy of a Bill to amend the Penal law of New York in relation to the overhearing of telephone conversations, and asking me to advise you if the Bill in its present form would embarrass the Federal Government, stating that you have sent a similar inquiry to the Attorney General, I beg to say that it would seem to me that the situation at the present time is exactly the same as that outlined in my letter of

⁸⁵ Not printed.

May 19 last, in respect to a similar measure then before you for approval. It would seem to me highly important that nothing should be done to obstruct the exercise of governmental powers in obtaining information in the interest of national safety and defense.

As, however, the matter of investigation and collection of such information is largely under the immediate direction of the Attorney General I shall, of course, defer to his judgment in this matter.

With very warm regards [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/10115b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 2, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I spent nearly two hours this afternoon with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in regard to the King resolution for a declaration of a state of war with Turkey and Bulgaria. From what Senator Hitchcock had told me and from the impression I gained in the first few minutes of the conference today I found that all of the Republicans and many of the Democrats on the Committee were predisposed to reporting favorably the King resolution.

In view of the situation I thought it best to state that the question was one of expediency, that I was not present to advise but to consult with the Committee as to the wisdom of a declaration such as the one proposed. I made it clear that neither you nor I sought to influence improperly Congressional action, that the responsibility for the declaration of a state of war lay with Congress and they could not avoid the responsibility, and that the Executive branch of the Government could go no further than lay the facts before them and give opinions when asked. This attitude seemed to make the supporters of the resolution very cautious.

The Committee asked me whether it was considered expedient by the British, French and Italian Governments for us to declare a state of war with these two allies of Germany. I told them that I did not know but that I was willing to inquire if they wished me to do so.

I emphasized the fact that the whole problem was one of policy based upon the proposition of winning the war, that I was not there to advocate a particular course of action but to elucidate to the Committee the situation as far as I was able, and that it was only a question of whether a declaration of war would be more helpful or more injurious to our cause.

As a result of this conference with the Committee it was arranged that I should obtain the views of the Allied Governments as to the advisability of a declaration by us of a state of war with Turkey

and Bulgaria together, or with Bulgaria alone. Until this information is obtained there will be no action.

In view of the very evident majority in the Committee favoring a declaration against both Turkey and Bulgaria I suggest the sending of the enclosed telegrams to London, Paris, and Rome, and to the War Council at Versailles.⁸⁶

Will you be good enough to consider these telegrams and to indicate your wishes in the matter?

I have agreed to confer again with the Committee when I know more definitely the views of our cobelligerents, expressing the opinion that it would take at least ten days to obtain these views.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/10293½

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to President Wilson

ROME, May 7, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have written a letter to Mr. Lansing by the pouch which leaves this evening,⁸⁷ enclosing two interesting papers; one a secret report by an English authority on the German propaganda and influence in Italy,—the other a Memorandum of a Secret or quasi-Secret Convention signed on the 21st of April, "Rome's Natal Day", between the Italian Government and a certain Colonel Stefanik, representing the Czech-Slav Council, as it is called.

This paper will, I think, interest you as may the observations which I have made on it to the Secretary.

I am also sending with a covering despatch, a document typewritten in French⁸⁸ containing what I suppose may be termed the aspirations of Montenegro, which I am really sending for you, as I think it will also interest you. It was handed me yesterday by the King of Montenegro himself as I was leaving him after a call on him in return for a call which he had made on me the afternoon before. He arrived here two or three days since on a visit to his daughter the Queen, which is the first visit which he has made to Italy, as when he passed through here on his way to France on the collapse of Montenegro he did not leave the special train on which he travelled from Brindisi through Italy, although the train remained in Rome over night. He was visited at the station both in the evening and early morning by the Queen, and, as I recall it, by the King also—I think the King was in Rome at that time—but the King of Montenegro did not leave the

⁸⁶ For the telegrams as sent, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 222.

⁸⁷ Not printed.

⁸⁸ Neither printed.

Station. It was said at the time that this was to prevent political complications of one kind or another, but gossip also had it that the numerous guards which guarded the train that night served another purpose also.

On the present occasion, however, the King is paying a visit to the Queen of Italy at the Villa Savoia, and he left his cards on both the British Ambassador and myself. I suppose also on some of the other Ambassadors. On my return visit to him I found him to be a strong, vigorous, clear-headed, and, I think, shrewd old gentleman, with his mind very definitely set on aiding Montenegro. He brought up the subject of the charge laid against him of a deal with Austria, and denied it with great earnestness, crossing himself by way of an oath to affirm his innocence of any such idea. He declared that his hope and the hope of his people is in America, the champion of Liberty and of Democracy. He asked me to do all in my power to commend his country and people to this great American champion of free peoples, and he used the phrase that his country threw itself into the arms of America. I said in reply that our people and you who represent them have great sympathy and appreciation with and of all free peoples, and that it would give me pleasure to repeat his conversation to you, but that, of course, all such matters as those to which he adverted rest with our Government at home and its chosen representative, and it would be manifestly out of my province to make any declaration touching matters which rested with you. It was just as I was leaving, that he picked up the paper which related to Montenegro's aspirations which I am sending and asked me to send it to you. This I am doing for your information, as I feel sure you will find it interesting. I asked him about his stay in France, saying that I supposed he had found it very pleasant and he replied: "Oh, yes, it is very pleasant there and the French have been very kind to me."—I think he rather indicated that he was referring to the past rather than to the present, for, he added "There are too many Servians about me, and the Servians do not like me. They hate my country and want to absorb it."

I give you the foregoing items because I think they throw a certain light on his present situation. It is said here that his arrangements made in secret with Austria have placed him under suspicion of nearly all the Allied Powers and I have heard the criticism made that he got a great deal of money from the British and French, who have rather resented this. Perhaps he remembers that wise saying of Solomon that the rich have many friends.

My own idea is that he is, as I have said, a vigorous and shrewd old Statesman who knows the full value of the cards in his hand

and intends to use them to win his game, if it be possible, and I believe that what he has in mind is to save his people and his House, and, if possible, to better their condition.

By-the-by he informed me that he is sending a Minister to Washington whom he spoke of as one of the first men in Montenegro and he mentioned with satisfaction that he had been a General. He evidently desired to impress me with the fact that this Minister is a man on whom he greatly relies.

Having said so much, I can only repeat in closing that Balkan Politics are too muddy for me to know what lies underneath.

My telegrams have given as full information as to the situation here at present as I possess, so I will not go into this at present, except to say that the gossip about the rivalries of Nitti and other Members of the Cabinet who are in control continues. Orlando has just returned from the meeting of the Premiers in France. He and Sonnino appear to have drawn somewhat closer together of late, possibly in view of what is said to be Nitti's ambition, to become the ruling Member of the Cabinet. Orlando knows that Sonnino has no ambition to take his place and Sonnino knows that Orlando does not want his, but both are said to feel that Nitti is their rival and would take either place. This Nitti denies. He said to me—evidently referring to this report—that he could not and would not under present conditions leave the Treasury Ministry. It is even said by Nitti's enemies that he is trying to make terms with both the Clericals and the Socialists. This seems to have some foundation, and I should not be surprised to see him making all the friends he can, but I feel very sure that his idea is rather to lead them in the defense of Italy through the prosecution of the war to a just peace than to yield to any views which they might have contrary to this end.

Believe me [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

763.72/9893

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 8, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You have undoubtedly read the enclosed message from General Bliss⁸⁹ giving the opinion of the Supreme War Council that we should declare war against Turkey but not at present against Bulgaria. From the fact that it is signed by Sackville-West I assume that it represents in substance the views of the British Government. As you have also seen the Italian Gov-

⁸⁹ See telegram No. 3825, May 7, 1918, from the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 227.

ernment favors a declaration against both, and I have been unofficially advised that the French Government holds the same view. I think that we may assume, therefore, that all the Entente Powers favor a declaration against Turkey, but that Great Britain thinks that it would be wise to delay action against Bulgaria and that is also Bliss' opinion.

In considering these replies I think that we should observe the failure to recognize the humanitarian side of the question. Thousands of Armenians and Syrians are being kept alive today by the distribution of supplies purchased through funds sent to our missionaries in Turkey, which amount to one or two millions of dollars a month. If a state of war is declared that relief will come to an end, our missionaries will be expelled or interned and the great missionary properties will be confiscated. I am not arguing the undesirability of a declaration but only pointing out the consequences which appear to have been ignored, possibly through ignorance, by the Supreme War Council and the Governments which have given their opinion. Their point of view seems to have been entirely military and their opinion based practically on the encouragement of resistance by the Georgians, Caucasians and others to the Turkish advance in the Caucasus and upper Euphrates. Whether that is sufficient aid in winning the war must be decided.

In any event the time has arrived when a definite policy for or against a declaration against the Turks must be formulated as the Senate Committee will expect guidance in regard to the resolution before them. Furthermore I think nothing can be gained now by delay in reaching a decision.

In regard to our attitude toward Bulgaria Great Britain seems disposed to have us postpone action until we have seen the effect upon that country of a declaration against Turkey. I see the possible strategic advantage to be gained by such a course, but I am not at all sure that the Committee will, and I am not at all sure that British diplomacy is now more adroit than it has been previously in dealing with the Balkan situation.

It has been my impression that the chief advantage to be gained by declaring war against the two Governments which we are considering was the effect that a declaration against Bulgaria would have upon the Greeks and Serbs; and that the peculiar reason for a declaration against Turkey was that war against a Christian nation without war against a Moslem nation would cause general criticism in this country and possibly could not be prevented in view of the temper of the Senate. Undoubtedly the presence of the Bulgarian Minister in this capital has been one of the principal reasons for the present agitation, and I do not think that we can ignore it.

I think that I should add that an argument against any declaration has undoubtedly weighed with some of the Committee in that neither Turkey nor Bulgaria have committed acts of war against this country since the declaration against Austria-Hungary. In view of this fact, what plausible reasons could be urged for a change of policy at the present time? In this connection would not it be said with reason by Germany that we had not declared war against Turkey or Bulgaria because we hoped to separate them from the Central Powers and that having failed in our diplomacy we had abandoned the effort and purposed to coerce them? This might possibly encourage the Germans and subject us to their ridicule.

As I expect any day to be asked to appear again before the Senate Committee and tell them of the views of the other Governments and of the War Council, I would like to be advised what I shall say to them.

The following courses seem open:

1. No declaration against either country on the ground that we could not declare war against Bulgaria without declaring against Turkey, and that to declare against Turkey would be to remove the protection and relief which we have furnished to thousands of refugees in Turkey.

2. A declaration against Turkey alone, on the ground that it would encourage the resistance in the regions of the Caucasus, and would constitute a threat to Bulgaria which would bring her to terms.

3. A declaration against Turkey and a severance of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria which would emphasize the threat as to the future.

4. A declaration against both Turkey and Bulgaria on the ground that every nation which is an ally of Germany should be classed as a foe.

I do not include as an alternative a declaration against Bulgaria alone because I think that the Committee would be radically opposed to that action.

If you would be good enough to indicate the attitude which you think that I should take with the Committee I would be greatly obliged.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

763.72119/1657a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 10, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I feel that the time has arrived when it is wise to assume a definite policy in relation to the various nations which make up the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The ill-considered disclosure of the "Sixtus letter"⁹⁰ by M. Clemenceau has compelled the Emperor and Government of Austria-Hungary to take a position in regard to Germany which makes further peace approaches to them well-nigh impossible, while their attitude toward Italy will be, as a result, generous in order to influence the latter country to withdraw from the war, and so release Austrian troops for the front in Flanders.

Like all these questions arising at the present time I think that they should be considered always from the standpoint of winning the war. I do not believe that we should hesitate in changing a policy in the event that a change will contribute to our success provided it is not dishonorable or immoral.

In the present case it seems to me that the pertinent questions are the following:

1. Is there anything to be gained by giving support to the conception of an Austria-Hungary with substantially the same boundaries as those now existing?

2. Is there any peculiar advantage in encouraging the independence of the several nationalities such as the Czech, the Jugo-Slav, the Roumanian, &c, and if so, ought we not to sanction the national movements of these various elements?

3. Should we or should we not openly proclaim that the various nationalities subject to the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary ought to have the privilege of self-determination as to their political affiliations?

4. In brief, should we or should we not favor the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into its component parts and a union of these parts, or certain of them, based upon self-determination?

It seems to me that the time has come when these questions should be answered.

If we are to check the effect of the possible bribe of territory which will doubtless be offered to Italy, is not the most efficacious way to offset this inducement to declare that the aspirations of the subject nations of Austria-Hungary should be determined by the people of those nations and not by the power which has compelled their submission? Italy in such circumstances will undoubtedly consider the possibility of obtaining far greater concessions than Austria-Hungary can offer. She will therefore remain true to the common cause. Furthermore the revolutionary spirit of the nationalities concerned would be given a new hope. Unquestionably a revolution or its possibility in the Empire would be advantageous. Ought we or ought we not to encourage the movement by giving recognition to the nationalities which seek independence?

⁹⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, pp. 213, 215.

I have no doubt that you have been, as I have, importuned by representatives of these nationalities to give support to their efforts to arouse their fellow-countrymen to opposition to the present Austrian Government. This importunity is increasing. What should be said to these people? Some answer must be made. Should we aid or discourage them?

I do not think in considering this subject we should ignore the fact that the German Government has been eminently successful in the disorganization of Russia by appealing to the national jealousies and aspirations of the several peoples under the Czar's sovereignty. Whether we like the method or not, the resulting impotency of Russia presents a strong argument in favor of employing as far as possible the same methods in relation to Austria's alien provinces. I do not think that it would be wise to ignore the lesson to be learned from Germany's policy toward the Russian people.

I would be gratified, Mr. President, to have your judgment as to whether we should continue to favor the integrity of Austria or should declare that we will give support to the self-determination of the nationalities concerned. I think that the time has come to decide definitely what policy we should pursue.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/9817

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 13, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with our conversation of the 10th in relation to the oppressed races of Austria-Hungary I sent a telegram to Ambassador Page at Rome—a copy of which is enclosed.⁹¹

I am also enclosing a statement which might be given out here in this country in relation to this matter, which, I think, would have a very great influence upon a large body of our population.⁹² If you approve the statement will you please indicate it?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/10049

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 20, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Enclosed is the reply of the British Foreign Office⁹³ to our inquiry as to the advisability of declaring war on Turkey and Bulgaria.

⁹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 803.

⁹² For text of this statement as issued, see *ibid.*, p. 808.

⁹³ See *ibid.*, p. 232.

This makes the situation as follows: The British, French and Italian Governments agree in advocating a state of war with both countries, while the Supreme War Council favors war against Turkey at once and probably war against Bulgaria later in the event of the latter not being affected by a declaration against Turkey.

From the political point of view the Council's advice seems to me unwise. As to the united opinion of the Allied Governments I think careful consideration should be given. I feel, however, that a decision cannot be much longer delayed.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/10103

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I presume that you read the meaning of this telegram from Page at Rome (No. 1635, May 18) as I do.⁹⁴ To me it indicates that Italy is very willing to weaken Austria by exciting the Czecho-Slovaks with the hope of independence or at least of self-determination, but is unwilling to encourage the Jugo-Slavs because of their relations with the Serbs whose ambitions and claims over-lap those of Italy along the Adriatic.

The claim that the Serbs and Jugo-Slavs will fall under Austrian influence seems to me a very flimsy argument put forward to disguise the real motive of the Italian objection to giving encouragement to the political aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs. It is all after a piece with the selfish policy which wrecked the Balkan situation early in the war.

Should we, or should we not, listen to Italy, knowing her motive, and give no encouragement to the Slavs of the south? Will the possible dissensions aroused in the Austrian Empire by awaking in those peoples the hope of an autonomous nationality be worth while even though it may not be in accord with the ambitious expectations of Italy as to the eastern shores of the Adriatic?

It seems to me that the Jugo-Slavs are a sufficiently defined nationality to be entitled to self-determination and to have their desire recognized, unless policy prevents.

It all comes down to the expediency of listening to Italy or of recognizing the justness of the Jugo-Slav desire for nationality disregarding the extreme claims of Italy to territory now occupied by Jugo-Slavs.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 805.

From the standpoint of principle I think that the Jugo-Slavs and Serbs are entitled to support, but from the standpoint of winning the war a decision is more difficult. Nevertheless I feel that a decision should be speedily reached, because, if the suppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary are to be aroused, now seems to be the time.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/1803a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Representative Gallagher⁹⁵ called on me this morning and submitted the draft of a proposed resolution relative to Poland, which is practically an adoption of the declaration of the Premiers attending the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

He asked me for my views as to the propriety of introducing such a resolution and I told him that I would take it under consideration.

Would you be good enough to give me your judgment in the matter, and any suggestions as to change in phraseology which would meet your wishes?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Draft Resolution

Whereas, the President of the United States in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918 said: "An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by the indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea;"

And, Whereas, on the fifth day of June, 1918, at the session of the supreme war council at Versailles the British, French, and Italian representatives agreed that: "The creation of an independent Polish state, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe."

Be it therefore Resolved by the House of Representatives, that the House of Representatives consider the creation of a free and independent Polish state, with access to the sea, to be one of the objects for which the United States is fighting in the present war, and as one of the necessary provisions in any treaty of peace which may be concluded.

⁹⁵ Thomas Gallagher, of Illinois.

763.72/10596½

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 27, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: At a time when a stage has been reached in the progress of this great war which marks it as probably the most critical since the early September days of 1914, when Paris all but fell into the grasp of the German armies, I have thought that a survey of the situation as it exists at this moment might be appreciated by you. Reports which deal exclusively and in detail with the military situation must be so readily available to your Department that I shall confine myself almost entirely to the political aspects of conditions to be found here.

Like former ones to you, I have chosen to have this letter partake of a personal nature rather than that of a more official despatch because of its confidential character on account of the use of certain names, as well as quotations from those prominent in public affairs. Such a letter also gives me more freedom than I would feel permitted to employ in telegrams to the Department, regardless of the kind of cipher used.

We are now passing through the third stage of the war, well-defined and quite distinctive from the preceding ones.

The first stage, in its shortness of duration as well as in the pyrotechnic display of its force, was as some brilliant meteor flashing across the skies from the borderlands of the Belgian frontier and dying out almost in the very environs of Paris. Like a flash, the flower of Germany's troops swept over what should have been the inviolate territory of Belgium, meeting its first check by the heroic defenders of Liège.

I shall always believe that the forced delay of but a few days, before the forts of that doomed city were crumbled by the shells of the great German guns, was, nevertheless, sufficient to enable the Allied forces to oppose the oncoming horde of invaders with the matchless defenders of the Marne.

This first stage of the war, so spectacular in its course, was ended within six weeks after the declaration of hostilities. Both contending forces, given a momentary respite, then burrowed themselves underground along a line extending from the English Channel to the Swiss frontier, and a unique warfare began such as has never in its fullest sense characterized any other war of history. This was the trench system of warfare.

The strongest of man-made forts could be crumbled like powder by the giant shells of modern artillery, but they made little depressions like so many dents on the surface of Mother Earth which, in

some places,—particularly in the territory of the famous campaign of Arras—were so numerous as to resemble, when I first saw them, a myriad of miniature valleys among the choppy billows of an ocean. Amidst such scenes one wondered how even a mole could escape alive. But the trenches were deep and whole armies lived within their cavernous protection.

For nearly four years this second stage—pre-eminently the trench stage—of the war ran its course, as we know, until late in the month of last March, with only here and there any material advance, the exception being the marked retreat of Von Hindenburg's army just a year before in the section extending from Noyon in the south to Arras in the north. This very method of warfare, characterized by the impregnability of the trenches, and the constant watchfulness of the "man up in the air" to prevent any surprise massing of troops on either side, made such conditions fixed and unchanging.

These two stages, however,—the first of but a few weeks' duration, the second of nearly as many years—have become a matter of history.

The third stage—more important than the preceding ones, because I believe it to be destined to be the final stage of actual warfare—was ushered in by the German attack late in March as above-mentioned. It is this stage and the aspects surrounding its advent, in so far as the Paris view is concerned, that just now naturally most seriously engaged the attention of the Allied Powers.

All recognize that the attacks now being made constitute Germany's supreme effort to win the war;—the "hurry-up" program of her military chieftains, to strike a mortal blow at the French and English armies before those from America can intervene to save the situation. The universal question as to whether they will be able to carry out such purpose, and, if so, of course to end the war, was asked with the greatest concern at the end of the first ten days of the marked gains made by the enemy along the British front.

The final checking of that advance was reassuring only in a limited measure. Everybody naturally expected the second attack, but, unfortunately, not in the place where it was finally launched. Again confidence was shaken in the ability of the Allied forces to withstand these onslaughts for again, as in the preceding attack, a considerable slice of territory including what must be conceded as an enormous booty in supplies, munitions, guns and prisoners of war, fell into the hands of the enemy.

But as the wearing away of the surface of a body that has been constantly more and more compressed becomes more difficult and more retarded in its process, so the mass of the defenders of the important passes leading toward Paris, becoming more compact,

was finally able to resist any further advances—nay, more than this, to recover in some places the ground already lost and to inflict upon the enemy what is now quite fully admitted by him to have been an enormous punishment in loss of men.

Having “gotten their hand in”, so to speak, the troops under General Foch have been able, only recently, to hold the enemy in his third successive attack, even though in superior numbers, at a standstill. It is in the last two attacks—particularly in the second one on the sector between Rheims and Soissons—that the American troops first signalled the mighty power upon which, almost in the twinkling of an eye, the weary and discouraged soldiers of the English and French divisions, fighting so desperately all these trying years, have come now to rely so implicitly for deliverance.

The effect upon the people has been magical. To-day America's stock is quoted in the streets of every hamlet, village and town of France at a highwater mark. Everywhere the American soldier is looked upon somewhat as the big policeman who interposes to protect the passerby against the sudden attack of the murderous thug. Perhaps, excepting that of courage, if I were to signalize the one predominating characteristic—which, after all, is rather generic in its scope—of our American boys in action, it would be that of resourcefulness. It is indeed that one quality which, in my opinion, has been more disconcerting to the enemy than any other one thing, and if I may be pardoned for my conceit—I would rather call it pride—in their achievements, I would say that the German troops are hereafter going to give these boys as wide a berth as possible.

I am only confirmed in the opinion which I expressed in one of my weekly telegraphic reports, that somewhere down the line, before these series of German attacks have ended, the American troops will play a most important rôle in saving a situation which, without them, would surely mean a hopeless defeat. Ere this letter reaches you such an opportunity may present itself, though I would rather believe that the next attack will be directed against the English forces at a point where not many of our American boys are stationed, and probably with such suddenness as to preclude their effective participation for some days.

But, interesting as are these speculations, I set out to write more of political than military matters.

While the above résumé has dealt quite entirely with an account of the military operations, yet, out of certain conditions imposed by them, the status of political affairs now existing in France may be said in a measure to have had their origin.

Anything like an account, however cursory, of the doings of preceding Ministries would be out of place in these busy times when

we all have enough to do in dealing only with the problems of the moment—or even in reading of them. As I think I told you in a former letter, since my stay here of a little less than four years, I have seen five ministerial changes, all of them, with the possible exception of the present one, dictated in a large degree by personal considerations—for jealousy, I am persuaded, can be found more fully developed in the public life of France than anywhere else in the world, notwithstanding her thousand and one most admirable qualities.

While having a personal regard for every member of those Ministries, particularly the Premiers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs,—for they have all been and are to-day my good friends—yet I believe that Clemenceau, despite some of his alleged shortcomings—for if must be remembered that he is a man approaching seventy-seven years of age and has received as many blows as he has ever given—is the one man in the public life of France best qualified to meet the present critical situation where the issue, many believe, must be decided on the battlefield. Personally, I do not share that belief. Courage in dealing with one's friends as well as in facing the enemy is demanded; in addition to this, great energy, determination and singleness of purpose must be qualities possessed by the man who would dominate the situation presented in France to-day. If I know the man—and I have had occasion to talk with him rather frequently and study his temperamental “make-up”—I believe Clemenceau possesses all these qualities.

However, while they give him strength with the people, the usual concomitants of resentment and bitter feeling have not failed to manifest themselves toward him from former powerful leaders in the French Government. Our own well-known saying at home, that “politics makes strange bed-fellows” is well exemplified in French politics, for conservative men who have no socialistic tendencies find a common cause of grievance against the Premier with out-and-out Radical Socialists. He is a veritable “*bête-noire*” in everything political, to this latter class.

Concerning the influence, quite occult in its bearing, of Mr. Cail-
laux, and the circumstances growing out of his long incarceration, I make no comment. That it seems to have a mysterious power and reaches out in the most unexpected ramifications is a fact with which the future may have to seriously concern itself.

It is not strange that under such circumstances the Socialists who have had no representatives in the present, nor in the preceding Ministry have at different times sought by their interpellations as to the conduct of the war to weaken Clemenceau's Ministry; nor that whis-

pered rumors have gained currency from time to time of some unexpected coalition of forces that would restore Mr. Briand to power.

I know that I may repeat to you in confidence what came to me recently from a very distinguished Frenchman of high military rank and very popular here. He said that President Poincaré had recently deplored the fact that they no longer had a Government in France. The Premier's enemies quite unite in the charge that he is arbitrary, dictatorial and at times whimsical. Undoubtedly he has strong likes and dislikes, and such a man almost always incurs bitter enmities as well as draws to him the loyal affection of others. The picture of Clemenceau is to-day a composite picture of the French Government. His chief element of strength lies in the confidence and trust which the army places in him, and it is upon the army that France looks for her protection.

In this connection, interesting stories have been in circulation of late growing out of the possible consequences of a necessary evacuation of Paris. The fear has been expressed that should the Government again leave the city, as it did in September of 1914, there would be a crystallization of the Socialists' element, the backbone of whose strength consists in the adherence to its principles of the working classes, and which might undertake to make overtures of peace with the enemy—even a revolution might be inaugurated, if necessary, to carry out such purpose.

But it is my opinion that only some dire calamity—some disheartening defeat at the front resulting in the loss of Paris—would make the position of Mr. Clemenceau insecure. With the enemy in tremendous force but forty miles away, the masses of the people will not look with favor upon the weakening or discrediting of a leader who, by his conduct, has symbolized the national resistance to such an invader. And the politicians dare not do so.

Paradoxical and strange as it may seem, the counsel of President Wilson, and his constructive measures, exert a vastly greater influence upon shaping the thought of the socialistic mind in France—sometimes of an iconoclastic tendency—than do any other leaders of the Allied Powers. The reason, perhaps, is not far to seek; it has confidence in his motives. In my judgment, that influence has been a valuable asset, and far more powerful in restraining the radical actions of this particular group, than is generally understood. They have time and again reiterated their own principles as being in full accord with those enunciated by President Wilson, and I would not be at all surprised that coming events would so shape themselves as to give such an unusual situation great weight in harmonizing the discordant elements which will have to be dealt with in making the terms of peace.

While in its broadest application of party names, there is an actual majority in the present Parliament of France—elected before the war—of Socialists, yet probably out of the total number, approximating six hundred, there are not more than 110 or 120 that belong to the out-and-out radical variety. The moderate Socialists include men of marked ability and high standing.

In my opinion, the only danger—and I have never believed it to be great—to wise and safe action, even under adverse conditions, will come from the small group of Radical Socialists. I do not here use the word "Radical" as a party designation but more in its descriptive sense as applied to their views.

While I have expressed the opinion that only under certain conditions which I have named could the Clemenceau Ministry fall, yet I must make the statement with the reservation that as in the instances of one or two Ministries in the past, plans apparently deeply laid have very quickly brought about their fall. Some men in high places have expressed the belief that this was due to happen again. Some unexpected incident may cause such a result.

If I have allowed my observations to center around Mr. Clemenceau, it is not alone because of his official position,—for he is both Premier and Minister of War—but because he typifies the martial spirit of the French people.

I would say something, in my concluding sentences, of the attitude exhibited in this crucial moment by the great mass of the people themselves. If anything like fear or panic finds place in their minds, it would be very difficult to discover it. I sometimes find myself wondering what new phase of danger or deprecation could seriously disturb the outward calmness of these people. I must chiefly attribute it to the fact that they have had nearly four years of war and have come to accept as a matter of course any kind of conditions that might be imposed by it. And yet, naturally enough, everybody is intensely concerned over the events now taking place; very few fail to recognize their gravity. Many have indeed quietly left the city as a precaution against any dangers that may come from the expected bombardment.

Last evening I was returning at an early hour from a dinner at the Hotel de Crillon, and, strolling along with some friends by the Place de la Madeleine and the Boulevard Haussmann, it was remarked amongst the members of the party how almost completely deserted were the streets. Not for a distance of eight or ten blocks could be seen a half dozen vehicles or that many people walking along. The crowds that promenaded the Champs Elysées at the most frequented hours have also been greatly thinned out, and I should say

that in all probability one-half of the people of Paris has left the city during the past month.

I dislike to express my views as to what would happen in the possible contingency of Paris being eventually taken by the Germans. I have two good reasons for not doing so; first, because I have never believed that they could take the city, and, second, because if they did it would be a matter for the commanding officers of the Allied Armies to consider. If Paris in the gay times of peace was the center jewel in the crown of France, it is certainly, in times of war, her heart. For that and all other reasons which such a loss would involve, I hope that it may be the decree of Providence that no such question will have to be considered.

Stranger things have happened than that to the American boys from across the seas may yet come the lasting glory of saving not only Paris but, with it, the Allied cause, for if the enemy cannot take Paris he cannot win the war.

I am [etc.]

WM. G. SHARP

763.72119/1775a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Day before yesterday I telegraphed to all our embassies and legations an extract from our note to the Serbian Minister in regard to the Slav peoples,⁹⁶ and yesterday, before I received your letter telling me of the French Ambassador's statement as to some proposal for a joint declaration,⁹⁷ I had already issued to the press a statement embodying our declaration to the Serbs.

I am not at all sure but that this has been fortunate though inadvertent because by acting independently we avoid the declaration being subjected to objection and suggested amendment induced by the jealousies and differences of European politics which would result in prolonged discussions. The Allies are constantly seeking to have us act jointly with them in political matters, and this is another effort in that direction. I believe that to keep our hands free and to act independently is our best policy, since we can in that way avoid taking sides in the conflict of interests.

Will you be good enough to tell me if I have rightly interpreted your wishes in this regard?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

⁹⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, pp. 815-816.

⁹⁷ For the note from the French Ambassador, see *ibid.*, p. 816.

763.72119/1770½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 1 July, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you not be kind enough to have the enclosed message coded as soon as possible and sent to our Minister at Berne?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

[Enclosure]

*Draft Telegram to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*⁹⁸

The President requests that you immediately convey the following message to Professor George D. Herron at Geneva.⁹⁹

"I have just received your letter of the thirty-first of May and am deeply moved by it. Please let the Minister transmit to me by cable your answer to this question: Do you think that the immediate formation of a Society of Nations would have the effects you predict if its only members at the outset were the nations now associated in war against Germany? The neutral nations of Europe would in all likelihood not dare to enter such a Society now in such company for fear of becoming involved in the present conflict since some of them lie almost at the mercy of Germany.[""]

763.72119/1804½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 8 July, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My clear judgment about this¹ is, that it is not wise to take such action piecemeal about the items of a final settlement. Our attitude is clearly spoken by our actions. The world has no doubt where we stand, and we have already recognized the representatives of a Polish State. If we are to be definite in the case of this particular national aspiration, why not in the case of others, and where shall we stop, definition being at each step increasingly difficult.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

⁹⁸ Telegram sent July 1, 1918, 5 p. m. (file No. 763.72119/1770a).

⁹⁹ For correspondence previously printed concerning the activities of Professor Herron, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, pp. 21-297, *passim*.

¹ See Secretary Lansing's letter of June 14, 1918, p. 130.

763.72119/1804½a

The Secretary of State to Representative Thomas Gallagher

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. GALLAGHER: I have given most careful consideration to the draft of the proposed resolution relative to Poland which you submitted to me on June 14 and to your request for an expression of my views as to the propriety of introducing such a resolution in the House of Representatives.

It is my opinion, and I know I share the views of the President in this respect, that it is not wise to take action piecemeal with regard to a final settlement. Our attitude is clearly spoken by our actions which can leave the world in no doubt as to where we stand. We have already recognized the representatives of a Polish State. If we are to be definite in the case of this particular national aspiration, it might well be said that we should be equally definite in the case of the others, and we should hardly know where to stop, definition being at each step increasingly difficult. I think it would be wiser then to defer the introduction of this resolution.

Thanking you for having consulted me in this matter, I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

763.72/11132a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Governments of France, Italy and Great Britain, as you have seen by the reports, have given recognition to the Czechs as a sovereign nation or at least to the Czech National Council, in terms which are assumed to be a full recognition. Doubtless this was induced by our public expression of sympathy with the national aspirations of the oppressed races.

In view of this action by the Allied Governments I think that we ought to consider whether it is expedient to make a further declaration giving more complete definition to our attitude in order to encourage the Czecho-Slovaks in their struggle against the Central Powers.

Although I feel strongly that Austria-Hungary as an Empire should disappear since it is the keystone of Mittel-Europa, I do not think that it would be wise to give full recognition to the Czecho-Slovaks as a sovereign nation. Without discussing the legal objections a serious embarrassment would be the effect on the Jugo-Slavs, who would undoubtedly clamor for similar recognition and feel offended

if it was not granted. In any event I think the declaration would have to contain a reservation as to territorial limits, which would materially weaken it.

Two other courses seem open in case it is deemed to be advisable to make any declaration at this time:

First. We might recognize the belligerency of the Czecho-Slovak revolutionists in view of their military organization operating in Siberia and Eastern Russia against Austrian loyalists and their German allies. I think that it would be proper in such case to recognize the Czecho-Slovak Council with Masaryk at its head as a *de facto* Revolutionary Government and give to it such aid as seems expedient. Basing this action on the state of belligerency the Jugo-Slavs would have no similar ground to claim recognition. As you know the jealousy of Italy and the desire of Serbia to absorb the Jugo-Slavs rather than to become federated with them makes it necessary to be cautious in deciding on a policy.

Second. It may be wise, in order to avoid any future charge of deception or secretiveness, to adopt a more general policy by issuing a frank declaration that the utter subservience of Austria-Hungary to Germany, whether the result of coercion, fear or inclination, forfeits whatever right the Dual Monarchy had to be treated as an independent state; that the nationalities aspiring to be free from Austro-Hungarian rule are still more entitled to be saved from German domination; that such nationalities should receive not only the sympathy but the material aid of all nations who realize the evil ambitions of Germany's rulers; and that this Government is prepared to advance the cause of national freedom by assuming relations with any council or body of men truly representative of revolutionists against the Austro-Hungarian Government, who seek national independence by force of arms.

Such a declaration would avoid the question of defined territory and of naming any particular nationality, though the latter would later have to be done when a military organization was in actual operation.

If this course should be adopted, it would give Austria-Hungary notice that at the peace table we would oppose the continuance of the Empire in its present form and within its present boundaries. To that extent it would limit our freedom of action; but, if you have definitely decided that that should be the policy, its declaration can do little harm since Austria-Hungary is and will continue to be a tool of Germany.

It would cause a profound impression and would deeply affect the nationalities involved; it would put heart into the patriots now attempting to organize revolutions in the Empire; and it would be a

notification to the world that this Government intends to support and give substantial aid to all little nations which have been held in subjection against their will by the exercise of superior force.

I submit the foregoing as a proper subject for discussion at this time.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/11132½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 22 August, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I agree with you that it is time that we took definitive action in this important matter, and my inclination would be to take the second course you outline; but I am restrained by considerations which I shall take pleasure in explaining to you orally at our next interview. They are rather too complex for a brief memorandum like this.

The first alternative you suggest is, it seems to me, the one we should now accept. It to a certain extent carries with it by implication the principle of the second, but is as far as we need go at this time.

I would be very much obliged if you would prepare and let me see the public announcement you would think it best to issue.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

811.24/251½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 29 August, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You know how much pains we have taken to make arrangements for the purchase of supplies in this country by the Allies on the same terms with our own government and with our civil population. I am sorry to say that the English government has not been equally generous, or perhaps I should say equally successful, in arranging that supplies that this government purchases in England should be purchased upon the same terms upon which sales are made to the British government and to the civilian population of Great Britain. I would be very much obliged to you if you would convey a very earnest intimation to the British government of our hope and expectation that this reciprocal arrangement should be made as promptly and completely as possible. The discriminations I have heard of have disturbed me a good deal, and while I am sure that the men at the top of the government over there would

be willing to make a cordial response to such representations, I am equally sure that the traders with whom they are consulting are not equally willing. You will know how to give emphasis with courtesy.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

841.61311/-

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Lord Reading has cabled the British Embassy that there is a strong movement to bring about the increase of the price paid by the British Government to the British farmer for wheat, and that he had pointed out, at a meeting of the War Cabinet, that the British Government should not take any action in this matter until the views of the United States Government had been obtained. His reason for giving this advice was that he had written you a letter, at the time the bill fixing the price of wheat in this country at \$2.50 a bushel was pending in Congress, pointing out that such an increase in the price of wheat in the United States would bear very heavily on the Allies and that you had expressed yourself very strongly to Congress in the matter, stating that this country should not profit in the emergency by the Allies' need.

Lord Reading stated at the War Cabinet that, in view of your generous action at that time, he did not wish the British Government to increase the price paid the British farmer for wheat without asking this Government for its views.

The British Embassy consulted Mr. Hoover and he, informally, stated that he felt that as wheat is costing Great Britain \$2.39 per bushel, delivered at New York, plus ocean transportation, that a rise of twenty or thirty cents a bushel on the price now current in Great Britain would not cause us embarrassment.

Mr. Hoover's views were cabled to Lord Reading who answered that he desired the views of the United States Government as expressed through the State Department.

My first answer to the British Embassy was that I regarded this matter as purely an internal question and one concerning which this Government would not express any opinion. I have further considered the matter with particular reference to the fact that Lord Reading feels that having urged upon you the desirability from the Allies' standpoint of not advancing the price of wheat in this country, action by the British Government advancing the price of wheat to its farmers to cover the increased cost of production, would be most ungracious, unless an intimation was received from the United States Government that such action would not embarrass it.

I should appreciate authority from you to advise the British Embassy, informally, that I had submitted the matter to you and that, while you did not wish in any way to be quoted, you did not feel that the proposed action of the British Government would embarrass this Government.

I am told by the British Embassy that this matter is rather urgent.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/11135½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: After our conversation yesterday I prepared for your consideration the enclosed draft of a public declaration in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks.²

I find there is a disposition among the newspapermen to discuss—possibly to criticize—our silence in regard to this matter. I have been fortunate enough to be able to stop it thus far but to tell the truth it is getting out of hand. I hope therefore that we can do something very shortly.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/13369

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received the enclosed telegram³ which appears to me to be extremely important on account of the necessity of action here in case the policy is adopted. I would be glad if you would tell me your views Tuesday after Cabinet meeting.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/13378½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 2 September, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Such a message as this from General Pershing surprises me very much. It is the first time he has undertaken to give advice, political as well as military, in this way.

² Not printed.

³ Telegram No. 129, Aug. 30, 1918, from the Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 301.

I am clear that it would be out of the question for me to urge, without the (at least intimated) concurrence of the Supreme Military Council, such action in all the military theatres of the war; and it is equally clear to me that events, not any suggestions from us, will determine the action of Bulgaria and Turkey. You know the advances that have been made to us from Bulgaria and Turkey and how imprudent and unwise it would be for us to use the only channels that are open!

Baker, as you know, is now on the water, on his way to the other side, and Pershing will have an opportunity to confer with him about the whole matter. Baker special commission is to have every question about the actual conduct of the war and its effective pressure to an early conclusion that can be answered now, and with the utmost possible definiteness.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

841.61311/-

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 2 September, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This action on the part of Lord Reading is certainly very courteous and very right and I appreciate it.⁴

I am, however, of the same judgment as Mr. Hoover. There can be no just objection on our part to any such action as the British Government has in mind with regard to the price of their own domestic wheat.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72/11136½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 2 September, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I respectfully suggest the following as a partial modification of your wording of the declaration which we must make with regard to belligerency of the Czecho-Slovaks:

The Czecho-Slovak peoples having taken up arms against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and having placed organized armies in the field which are waging war against those Empires under officers of their own nationality and in accordance with the rules and practices of civilized nations; and

The Czecho-Slovaks having, in prosecution of their independent purposes in the present war, confided supreme political authority to the Czecho-Slovak National Council,

⁴ See p. 142.

The Government of the United States recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks thus organized and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

It also recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a *de facto* belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks.

The Government of the United States further declares that it is prepared to enter formally into relations with the *de facto* government thus recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemy, the Empires of Germany and Austro-Hungary.

It seems to me that you have successfully stated both the actual facts and the new legal relationship which we assume.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

811.24/2521

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *September 4, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In reference to your letter of August 29th, which I enclose as a reminder of its contents,⁵ I have inquired as to the situation relative to British Government prices being denied our Government in England.

I am informed by representatives of the War Trade Board that Mr. Baruch says that the matter has been satisfactorily adjusted as a result of conferences which representatives of the War Industries Board, now in London, have had with British officials; and he also suggests that the matter be allowed to rest for the present.

In going over the matter I find the problem is much more complicated than appears on the face, and that the attitude which we should definitely take has not been determined. The British colonies, for example, are desirous of making large purchases in this country and it is a question to what extent we should give them the benefit of our governmental prices since, in many cases, it is almost impossible to determine whether their purchases are for military purposes or for civilian purposes. I believe it is generally agreed that the Associated Governments should give one another the benefit of governmental prices where the goods purchased are required for the conduct of military operations. This seems to be the theory, but in practice the line of demarcation between purchases for military purposes and purchases for commercial purposes is difficult to draw. This is particularly true in cases where the governments themselves are so largely purchasing for their domestic requirements and subsequently allocating their purchases among their nationals.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 141.

In view of the situation I believe it would be advisable not to rest [*raise?*] the question at the present time.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.24/253‡

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 5 September, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am content, in the circumstances you set forth, that this matter should rest for the present; but I hope that we shall make sure that promises are fulfilled. Many other promises have been made which minor persons of various indirect influence have seen to it should not be redeemed.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72 Su/138‡

The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

VERSAILLES, September 14, 1918.

1. I have the honor to forward, herewith, copy of Joint Note No. 37 adopted by the Military Representatives at their meetings held at Versailles the 5th, 7th and 10th of September.

TASKER H. BLISS

[Enclosure]

Joint Note No. 37 on General Military Policy of the Allies for the Autumn of 1918 and for the Year 1919

(Study submitted by the Permanent Military Representatives to the Supreme War Council, in accordance with a Resolution of the Supreme War Council, dated 4th July, 1918)

PART I.—WESTERN FRONT

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

France and Italy remain, as always, the main theatres of the war. A decisive victory can only be gained by the Allies by the decisive defeat of the German Army, and its defeat would necessarily entail the total collapse of enemy resistance on the remainder of the Western front and in all other theatres of war.

The Allies must, therefore, concentrate their resources both in man power and in material on the Western front for the decisive struggle.

The decisive defeat of the enemy coalition can only be achieved on the portion of the Western front between the North Sea and Switzerland. And, even though it might appear possible to crush the Austrian Army on the Italian front, and a portion of the German Army with it, the final defeat of Germany, the real foundation of the hostile coalition, can only be brought about in the theatre of operations where the main German Armies are to be found, that is to say, between the North Sea and Switzerland.

Operations in the other theatres of war must be made to play their part in the decision sought for on the Western front by contributing to the moral and material exhaustion of the enemy. But such operations must not be allowed to absorb resources which are required by the Armies of the Entente on the decisive front. The defeat of the Central Powers in any of the subsidiary theatres of war could only be a step on the road to the defeat of Germany: it could not bring about the final decision.

A. The front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

By the continued arrival of American troops in increasing numbers the Allies will have from the Autumn of 1918 onwards a numerical superiority which will be appreciable. But if, in spite of the reverses he has met with during the Summer and Autumn of 1918, the enemy's fighting power still remains unbroken, it will only be in the Spring of 1919 that the Allied superiority in men, in tanks, in aeroplanes and in other material of war will justify the expectation of a great success, which would be capable of being exploited to the extent necessary to bring about a final decision.

Moreover, this superiority can only be obtained and developed:—

(a) If France, Great Britain and Italy maintain their present effort, and

(b) If American troops continue to arrive in such numbers as have been demanded by the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France.

If, however, it is evident that the fighting power of the enemy has diminished, it will be the duty of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France to consider if active operations can be successfully carried out before the Spring of next year.

B. Italian Front.

It is clear from the present situation of the opposing forces:—

(a) that, for the present, the Allies could contemplate no considerable withdrawal of troops from their Armies in Italy,

(b) that so long as the Austrians are not largely reinforced by German troops, the Allied forces in Italy appear to be able not only to hold their own but, if an opportunity should occur, to hasten the exhaustion and disorganization of the enemy by offensive action.

II. GENERAL PLAN

*A. Autumn and Winter, 1918, and the year 1919.**(a) Front from the North Sea to Switzerland.*

From what has already been stated it follows that the Allies must, during the Autumn and Winter 1918-1919, first of all render their front secure against any hostile attack and, secondly, must make preparations, which are complete in all respects, for those offensive operations by which it is hoped to reach a final decision as soon as a sufficient superiority has been realised, and climatic conditions permit.

The Allied Front can only be made secure by a solid, vigorous and active attitude of defence, which must include such local offensives and counter-offensive actions, as may be required, to disturb the enemy's preparations.

For the preparation of offensive operations it is necessary:—

(i) to ensure, to adjust, or to develop more fully, the programmes for munitions, for tanks, for aviation and other material so as to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France:

(ii) to put the troops through a systematic course of training for offensive operations:

(iii) to push forward the preparation of the theatre of operations as rapidly as possible, in accordance with the plans of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France:

(iv) to spare no effort to accumulate in the shortest possible time the greatest possible numerical superiority. For this purpose it is very important that American troops should continue to be sent to France, to the exclusion of other theatres of operations, and to be placed at the disposal of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France, until such time as the Supreme War Council may decide otherwise and with this object in view the necessary tonnage should be made available.

Finally, it is necessary to think out beforehand all such operations as are calculated to improve our chances, from a military and an economic point of view, for the final decisive operations; and as are calculated to keep the initiative in the hands of the Allies; or to prevent the enemy from reorganizing his forces; or to take full advantage of any mistakes he may make or any weakness he may show. It will be the duty of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France to determine the scope of such preparatory operations, having regard to the relative conditions of the Allied forces and those of the enemy, while remembering that the final decisive operations must be executed with the greatest possible force.

(b) Italian Front.

Similar preparations should be made for the Italian front. If the conditions in Austria render it advantageous to support an active diplomacy by military action, offensive operations in Italy might be

advisable. Such operations should be executed with a concentration of resources as great as the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France considers that the situation on the front between Switzerland and the North Sea will permit.

In order to facilitate a concentration of troops in Italy not only for offensive operations, as indicated above; but also in order to deal effectively with a possible attack by the Austro-Hungarian Army, reinforced for that purpose by a number of German Divisions, it is essential for the Allies to push forward as rapidly as possible such improvements to communications as will enable a sufficient force to be transferred from France to Italy before a hostile attack can achieve success.

B. Year 1919.

Although the Allied Forces will not be fully developed before the Summer of 1919, the offensive operations by which it is hoped to gain a final decision should be begun as soon as the weather permits. If this is not done the enemy might forestall the Allies and seize the initiative, thus compelling the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France to employ his troops in a manner other than that intended.

These operations will be carried out on the front between the North Sea and Switzerland with the maximum available resources.

As soon as offensive operations are begun in France the utmost vigour must characterize our operations on the front in Italy, and in every other theatre of war, so as to take advantage of any favourable developments and prevent the Germans from obtaining help from their Allies.

It must not be forgotten:

(i) that a considerable offensive operation by the Italian Armies, if carried out in conjunction with the general offensive in France, might contribute largely to the final decision by the defeat of the Austrian Army, which could not at such a time count on any help from Germany;

(ii) that the opportunity may arise for the Allied Armies to undertake in Italy in the Autumn and Winter of 1919 the offensive intended for the Autumn and Winter of 1918.

PART II.—REMAINING THEATRES OF WAR

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The following are the broad principles which should guide the Entente in carrying out any operations in the subsidiary theatres of war:

(1) To retain at a distance from the Western front, those forces, which the Central Powers now maintain in the subsidiary theatres of war and, if possible, to attract additional forces:

(2) To attempt to break up the alliance of the Central Powers both by military and by diplomatic action:

(3) To prevent the Central Powers from exploiting the countries of which they are now in military occupation.

These objects demand a vigorous attitude by the Allied Armies in all the exterior theatres.

II. MACEDONIA

The operations on this front have formed the subject of a special study which was submitted to the Governments by the Military Representatives. The following conclusions were reached:

(a) that it is desirable to make energetic preparations to enable the Allies to begin an offensive operation in the Balkans not later than 1st October, 1918, provided that these preparations do not entail the transfer of any men or material from the Western front, or the diversion of any tonnage, which would otherwise be available for the continuous transport of men and material at the maximum rate, indispensable for the realisation of the Plan of Operations on the Western front, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France:

(b) that it is necessary, in principle, to give the General Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies of the East a free hand to carry this offensive into execution at the moment which he may consider most favourable, provided new and unforeseen circumstances do not compel the Supreme War Council itself to fix the date, or to abandon the operation altogether.

Should this offensive be carried out in 1918, the operations to be undertaken in the Balkans in 1919 will depend on the results obtained in 1918 and on the general situation. It is not possible to foresee what these operations should be, on account of the uncertain political conditions in which some of our enemies are now involved.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Macedonia should not in preparing his offensive operations, lose sight of the necessity, which still exists, of improving his lines of communication and of establishing new bases in Old Greece, in accordance with the directions laid down by the Supreme War Council, (See Joint Note No. 4 of the Military Representatives).

III. TURKEY IN ASIA

A. Palestine.

The Turkish Armies in Palestine are relatively weak, they are of moderate value and are badly supplied, whilst the British Armies, in spite of reduction in number and the partial substitution of native for white troops, still possess a high military value.

If the relative position of the forces opposing one another be considered alone, the British Armies in this theatre would appear to be in a position to carry out offensive operations of considerable extent. But:

(1) as the armies progress the restricted means of communication would necessarily limit their advance:

(2) the eventual objectives, which might be assigned to these Armies, have lost much of their importance in consequence of the new lines of communication available for the Turkish Army to the Caucasus and Mesopotamia by the Black Sea, thus avoiding the Baghdad railway line.

Under these conditions it is neither possible nor opportune to fix distant objectives. But, operations of limited scope should be carried out in order to hold and attract enemy forces.

Operations of this nature would not justify a large numerical superiority of the British over the Turkish Armies. The possibility, therefore, of withdrawing troops during the winter should be considered in order to reinforce the Armies on other fronts.

B. Mesopotamia & Persia.

The British Army in Mesopotamia is very greatly superior in numbers to the Turkish troops actually opposed to it, or which are likely to be opposed to it. It might appear possible, therefore, to operate both in Mesopotamia and in Persia; but lack of communications and means of transport would probably prevent this. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia with the troops now at his disposal should spare no effort which would enable his forces to establish themselves firmly on the shores of the Caspian Sea and to render secure the Baghdad-Hamadan-Enzeli road.

A secure front, which included Baghdad and the Caspian Sea, would limit German activities in the East and would enable the Allies to stretch out a hand to such forces as could eventually penetrate into Russia from Vladivostock and the Arctic Ports. With the Allies established firmly on such a front, not only will the Germans be unable to supply themselves from the rich resources of Turkestan, on which they could otherwise draw by means of the Caspian Sea and the railways leading East and West from it; but all the healthy elements which still exist in Russia, as well as the anti-turc and Armenian elements in the Caucasus, would be encouraged to crystallise into effective fighting bodies, which would absorb considerable enemy forces and so relieve pressure on the Western front.

The Commander-in-Chief should be free to advance to Mosul if it should appear to be advantageous to do so, provided that the necessary operations did not entail any diminution of the effort towards the Caspian Sea.

IV. RUSSIA

Outside the Caucasus, which is directly connected with Mesopotamia and Persia, Russia contains two theatres of operations which are important to the Allies: Northern Russia and Eastern Siberia.

In both these theatres the Allies must aim at attaining the following objects:

(1) To prevent the Central Powers from exploiting such resources as may be available in Russia.

(2) To collect round nuclei of Allied forces all anti-German elements of resistance; to train these elements; to organize them, and so to make them into a force fit to fight against Germany.

(3) To bring assistance as soon as possible to the Czecho-Slovaks, who are in a critical position owing to Bolshevik propaganda; also owing to the military support given to the Bolshevik forces by the Germans and by enemy prisoners of war in increasing numbers, and whose organisation continues to expand.

(4) Finally, should circumstances permit, to build up again an Eastern front by continuing the various operations undertaken in the different regions of Russia, (Northern Russia, Siberia and the Caucasus.)

These objects having been defined, it is necessary to point out:—

(a) As regards Northern Russia:—

that the man-power situation of the Western Powers of the Entente precludes the transfer of any appreciable forces from the Western front in addition to those being sent in accordance with the decision taken by the Supreme War Council on the 3rd July, 1918:

that local resources being practically negligible in this region, the maintenance of the Allied contingents depends altogether on the despatch of supplies from Overseas. Communications between Western Europe and Northern Russia are, however, very precarious:

that, under these conditions, the scope of any operations in Northern Russia must be somewhat restricted until a junction with the Czecho-Slovak contingents of Western Siberia can be assured.

(b) As regards Siberia:—

that it is in this region that the effort of the Allies can give the greatest results on account of the presence of the Czechs; on account of the support to be obtained from Russian troops, favourable to the Allies; and also on account of the considerable resources in food and supplies of all sorts which the country affords:

that, consequently, it is expedient to increase the efforts of the Allies in this theatre; but resources necessary for the Western front, which is the decisive front, must not be absorbed elsewhere.

V. EASTERN AFRICA

The operations in East Africa should be prosecuted with the utmost vigour with a view to their being brought to a conclusion at a very early date.

PART III.—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING WAR MATERIAL

Having weighed the considerations which should govern the conduct of the operations in the various theatres of war, the Military Representatives are of opinion that the investigations into the various Allied manufacturing programmes should be followed up by determining without delay the relative proportion of raw materials, of labour and tonnage which should be allotted to each kind of manufacture according to its importance for the prosecution of the war.

The manufacturing resources of the Allies appear already to be extended to their utmost capacity. It is, therefore, essential in order to obtain the best returns that the available resources be distributed strictly in accordance with the military requirements of the operations to be undertaken. And this distribution must be made in accordance with the views expressed by the Commanders-in-Chief in the various theatres of operations as to the relative amount of manufactured products they would like to receive in the form of guns, aeroplanes, heavy tanks, light tanks, gas, railway material, etc.

The Military Representatives wish in conclusion to draw the attention of the Supreme War Council to the very great importance of ensuring that as early as possible the Allied Armies shall be made to reach their maximum strength, not only in man-power, but also in material. The Military Representatives consider that the culminating points in the development of mechanical contrivances of all kinds should coincide with the culminating point in the development of man-power.

If this coincidence of culminating points is attained, the Allies may look forward with all confidence to the operations of the year 1919, which will bring the fulfilment of their hopes, that is to say, peace through victory.

Genl. BELIN, *Military Representative*

French Section, Supreme War Council

C. SACKVILLE WEST, *Maj. Gen., Military Representative*

British Section, Supreme War Council

14.9.18

ROBILANT, *Military Representative*

Italian Section, Supreme War Council

TASKER H. BLISS, *Military Representative*

American Section, Supreme War Council

Given at Versailles on the 10th September 1918.

783.72/116791

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*ROME, *September 24, 1918.*

[Received October 14.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just returned from an interesting, and from the point of reinvigoration, very successful visit to France and England. On other accounts also I esteem my visit to have been profitable, if not successful, for I was able to see both Mr. Baker and General Pershing and impress on them the absolute need of not disappointing Italy in her expectation of having American troops sent here. Indeed, to see General Pershing and get this necessity lodged in his mind was the main object of my visit to France.

I can not say that I consider my mission there to have attained complete success or, for the present, any success at all. In fact I made it clear to General Pershing that I was not asking that he should send any troops whatsoever from France at this time who would by possibility be available in the present offensive, but I addressed my efforts to securing his assent to sending them later on when the offensive, and any immediate consequences it may have, shall be finished.

I was appalled to find not only the ignorance of matters Italian, but the indifference to all such matters as I found among those with whom I came in contact in France. I do not say this of General Pershing or of his Chief of Staff, for they struck me as being open minded, but the majority of those to whom I mentioned the importance of supporting Italy in what is really a very serious moment not only for her, but for the Allies, "pooh-poohed" Italy as wholly negligible, and more than one met my assertion of Italy's need with the argument that it was held by some well informed military personages that the Allied cause would be stronger without Italy than with her. In other words, that Italy's balance with the Allies was one of burden and not one of assistance. They appeared to stand blindly on the military aphorism that a general should not divide his forces, which I take to apply to tactics rather than to strategy. I cited to them, in response to this, the signal example of Napoleon's having divided his forces and conquered Europe through Austria; and the further examples of Lee having divided his forces again and again and won substantial victories over his adversaries; and of Grant having divided his forces and sent Sherman across the south while he held Lee in his trenches from Cold Harbor to Petersburg.

Irrespective of the foregoing, however, I must say that at this moment Italy is holding her own defensively with firmness, and the

spirit of her people up to the present is as high as it ever was. But this I attribute, to an important extent, to her confidence in the United States. The San Mihiel victory has given her new spirit but if, during the late autumn and early winter, the United States does not send troops to Italy, this feeling is liable to evaporate and she will feel that she has been abandoned by the great power to which she has trusted.

Her efficient forces are far less numerous than they are generally supposed to be. Colonel Buckley has made a careful study of this matter and has sent me a statement of her resources in man power based on official figures and verified by him to the best of his ability. From this it appears that Italy has only 1,589,000 combatants actually serviceable at this moment. I enclose a copy of Buckley's statement on this subject which is complete.⁶

Add to such inferiority in numbers her want of articles of absolute necessity such as coal, steel, gasoline, and other crude materials, and the condition of poverty in which her people find themselves, as compared with the condition of the people of France and England, and you can see what a field exists here for pacifist propaganda, socialistic or other.

The peril of this situation is recognized not only by the Italians themselves from the very highest down, but by every American who comes here with an open mind and sees the situation for himself. I can not tell you how many men of the most serious character have told me what their apprehensions are should America leave Italy unassisted with soldiers this autumn. But they range from the chief of state down, however veiled their method may be of giving this information.

The need, indeed, of supporting Italy with American troops is much greater from other standpoints than from the military. The feeling between the people of Italy and the people of France is one of at least acute rivalry, and Italy, that is the Italian people, feel profoundly that France is now growing fat on America while Italy grows poorer and poorer.

The sudden lowering and control of Italian exchange will, I trust, in time have a good effect, but the immediate consequence is that the Italian currency buys less than it did before the exchange fell because the prices are maintained at the old figures.

The foregoing, my dear Mr. Secretary, is but a small part of what I could say on this most important question. I will add only another hint on the political situation.

⁶ Not printed.

Our people have saved France and England. They can, I believe, save Italy and then they may rest contented with having saved the world.

Always [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

763.72/11679 $\frac{1}{2}$ a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *September 27, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I cannot help but feel that we stand in a peculiar relation to the civilian population in the regions of France and Belgium occupied by the Germans. As we are fighting on their soil and as our own people and territory are, in a measure by that fact, spared the horrors of a German invasion, it seems to me that we should view the situation very much as if our own land had been occupied and our own people subjected to the privations and brutal treatment which for four years have been the portion of the Belgians and French.

We are receiving constant reports, the truth of which seems beyond question, that the retiring armies of Germany are destroying property and committing outrages in the territory which they are forced to evacuate, that the destruction is without any military benefit whatsoever, and that this deliberate lawlessness is inspired by malice and spite.

If these criminal acts were perpetrated against American citizens on American soil, I believe that we would be warranted in attempting to prevent it by threatening reprisals upon the territory and property of the Germans and by declaring that full reparation would be required for all property destroyed or carried away, which in no way contributed to the military advantage of the retreating armies.

If this view is correct and I think that it is, our peculiar relationship to the French and Belgians, arising from the fact that our battlefields are on their territory and their non-combatants are suffering from German vindictiveness caused by the successes of our arms, raises the question whether it is not our right, if not our duty, to threaten reprisals unless this wanton destruction and ill-treatment by the retreating Germans cease.

We have been for some time, as you know, pressed to do this by the French and Belgian Governments, but up to now I have not had time to consider the subject except from their standpoint. I do it now from our standpoint, and would appreciate your determination as to our course of action.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

763.72119/2024a

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *September 30, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It has occurred to me that the entire collapse of Bulgaria and the complete submission to the terms demanded for an armistice may create a situation which will require action.

It is possible that the Allied Governments may consider the time is opportune to negotiate with Bulgaria a definitive treaty of peace in order to forestall a possibly too generous treatment when the final peace is made. I believe that Serbia and Greece would favor a settlement of the Balkan Question now while Bulgaria is helpless, and that Roumania would not be loath to such an arrangement.

As we are not at war with Bulgaria, the Allies may take the position that a separate peace treaty with her is not our affair and that they can conclude it independently going as far as they please in drawing the boundaries of the Balkan States. If they do this there will be the future embarrassment of revising such a conqueror's peace. It will be hard to do it. And if it is harsh and unjust (as is very possible), it will not make for permanent peace.

In the circumstances ought we not to consider the advisability of intervening with the Powers and of insisting that as the Balkan Question must be included in the final settlement, all questions relating to territory in those regions should be, by agreement in the separate peace treaty, postponed for consideration to the general peace conference?

I am very fearful that now that Bulgaria is powerless the old political game in the Balkans will be renewed, and that the same pernicious jealousies, which prevented the kingdom from remaining neutral, if not friendly, will start the victors to quarreling again. If this can be prevented it ought to be because the consequences might be very serious.

We could act on the Bulgarian appeal to you for mediation, or we could act on the principle that no treaty relating to territory should be recognized if negotiated during the war but should be treated as the Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest Treaties will be treated.

If anything is to be done to anticipate an undesirable treaty with Bulgaria by the Allies, it will have to be done quickly, I think, if it is to be effective. It would be difficult to face a *fait accompli*.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/2024b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Bulgarian Minister, this morning, went through the rather farcical business of presenting the communication which we had read and handed to him last night.⁷ Before seeing him the announcement was made that the armistice had been signed at Salonika, so he said that he could see no object in making reply to the note.

The Minister seemed to be actually rejoiced at the surrender of his country. He said that when the change of ministry took place some weeks ago he was convinced Bulgaria would withdraw from the war because the new cabinet was anti-German. I told him in response to his inquiry, that I did not know the terms of the armistice but assumed that they would be demobilization of the Bulgarian armies, control of the railroads, and surrender of all occupied territory.

He further said that he was convinced that the capitulation was forced by the people and very likely by the army.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/2025a

*Memorandum by President Wilson*⁸

Gov't of U. S. cannot be [*but*] regard every question that concerns any one of the Balkan States as an essential part of the general peace settlement, inasmuch as there is no part of Europe that is more likely to be a seed-bed of war than the Balkans. Peace with Bulgaria cannot be treated apart from the general Balkan settlement without embarrassing the consideration of such matters as the reopening of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest and making many matters of final consideration very difficult to handle. It would be very hazardous to treat separately any part of the whole.

763.72119/2024a

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of an Oral Statement by the French Ambassador (Jusserand) Regarding Peace With Bulgaria

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1918—noon.

The Ambassador informed me that he had received a telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs advising him that the French Gov-

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 325.

⁸ This paper bears the notation: "Handed me at Cabinet Oct 1/18 R L."

ernment considered it unwise to discuss terms of peace with Bulgaria, that the difficult settlement of the Balkan Question should be postponed until the general peace conference, and that the present armistice should be continued in force to that time.

He said that the terms of the armistice were evacuation of occupied Serbian and Greek territory by the Bulgarians, disarmament of the Bulgarian army, surrender of important strategic positions in Bulgaria to the Allies, and the use and control of Bulgarian Railways. I have an impression that he said that the Bulgarians were also to deliver over to the Allies all war supplies in their possession.

OCTOBER 1, 1918—4:20 P. M.

I orally informed the President of the foregoing. He had previously handed me the annexed memorandum,⁹ which he had prepared on receipt of my letter of September 30th.

R. L.

763.72/11679½b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *October 4, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In connection with the enclosed memorandum from Mr. Phillips¹⁰ and my recent letter to you on the subject I am now advised that of the 50,000 civilian population of St. Quentin none were found on the entry of the French troops, while the Germans had given the city over to destruction by fire. Of course the removal of the citizens and the setting fire to the city on evacuation were acts without military benefit and appear to have been inspired by malice and vandalism.

Possibly nothing we could say would have any effect in checking this wanton destruction and utterly indefensible removal of civilians who, I think we may presume, are retained for forced labor or to gratify a desire to cause needless suffering. However, it might stay these ruffians if we made a general statement that if those atrocities continued it would be necessary to hold those responsible liable therefor and that it would be impossible to restrain our troops from excesses of a like nature in the event that German cities and villages should fall into the hands of our forces.

I am not sure that this is the best way to deal with this subject, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the troops, who have seen the results of this needless cruelty, will be so enraged and bitter that they will retaliate in kind if the opportunity offers which now seems probable. This would be to my mind deplorable as

⁹ *Supra.*

¹⁰ Not found in Department files.

it would bring them down to the level of German brutality and I feel that, as we may expect such acts of revenge if the Germans do not cease their present methods, we should warn them of the consequences by some general statement which will present the possibilities to them.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

763.72119/2536

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Enclosed is a translation of the Austro-Hungarian note handed to me this morning by the Minister of Sweden.¹¹

It seems to me that the offer to conclude an armistice and enter upon negotiations can only be considered after the Austro-Hungarian Government has accepted unconditionally the principles which you have laid down and after the sincerity of the offer (which ought to be "request") is shown by withdrawal from all occupied territory, by denouncement of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, and by a declaration that these acts will be performed regardless of the course pursued by Germany—that is on the basis of a separate peace.

The foregoing is a hasty suggestion. I hope we can make speedy answer because of the Loan Campaign.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72 Su/148

*The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss)
to the Secretary of State*

VERSAILLES, October 9, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your very kind personal letter of September 17th,¹² in which you refer to my letters of August 31st and September 3rd¹³ which enclosed for your information certain resolutions and minutes of the Supreme War Council.

I appreciate very deeply your kind words about my work here. They came at the psychological moment, because I was just recovering from an attack of the grippe, in some one of its Protean forms,

¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 341.

¹² No copy of this letter found in Department files.

¹³ Neither printed.

which has literally cursed Europe during this year. I suppose it finds its natural pabulum among these under-nourished and under-warmed populations. It leaves one for a time somewhat depressed and not inclined to take the most cheerful view of things. Naturally, your appreciative words have had a very bracing and tonic effect.

I enclose you herewith some documents that may be of interest to you. You know of the persistent efforts made by our European associates in this war to get the United States to formally approve and commit itself to a policy of action in Russia which is counter to the one which the United States Government has adopted for itself and which was very clearly and solemnly declared to the ambassadors of Great Britain, France and Italy in your Note of (I think) July 22nd [17th] last.¹⁴ Some of them seem to think that there cannot be such a thing as a conscientious policy in such matters; they are inclined to altogether divorce conscience and policy.

That Note plainly declared the policy of the United States, and at the same time, said that the United States Government did not assume to criticise or to interpose objections to such other policy as the European Allies, in their wisdom, might choose to adopt. In accordance with its declared policy, the United States informed the European Allies on September 27th [26th] that it would send no more troops to North Russia.¹⁵ The reason for this I assume, is (among other things) because it was evident that these American troops were intended to be used in a form of military intervention to which the United States Government would not commit itself.

Nevertheless, and only a few days after your declaration of September 27th, Mr. Clemenceau directed the French Military Representative on the Supreme War Council to bring this subject again before the Military Representatives. The French Military Representative did this in the form of the drafts of two proposed Joint Notes, to be passed by the Military Representatives and to be presented by them to the Supreme War Council (which includes, of course, the President of the United States). I enclose herewith, in the original French, a copy of each of these drafts.¹⁶

One of these proposed Joint Notes sets forth a plan of general military intervention in Russia, quite counter to the declared policy of the United States. It also assigns to the United States a specific share in this intervention. If submitted to the President and approved by him, it would require him to reverse the action taken in the declaration of September 27th (about sending additional American troops to Archangel) and also to formally approve a

¹⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 287.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 546.

¹⁶ Not printed.

line of policy counter to that which he had already declared to be the policy of the United States in Russia.

The second of these Joint Notes related specifically to the sending of American reinforcements to Archangel.

Manifestly, as I have understood my instructions on this subject and the general attitude of the United States toward it, I could not sign either of these Notes.

The Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, happened to be here, on the very day of his departure for the United States. I formulated my views in a letter addressed to him, stating the general attitude which I proposed to take provided he believed it correct.

The Military Representatives met to consider these subjects on the morning of October 7th. I was unable to be present in person, on account of my illness, and I therefore submitted my views in the paper, herewith, dated October 6th, and marked "A".¹⁷ I thought that this paper made perfectly clear the fact that I could not sign the Joint Notes because that involved a request for the President of the United States to formally approve a policy counter to his own declared one, and because the sending of further American troops involved their employment in the execution of such a policy.

For some reason, which you may guess (I can only attempt to guess it, myself), the French Military Representative then requested whether I would not sign the note relating to the general policy of intervention in Russia, provided he omitted the clauses in which specific reference was made to participation by the United States. This is in line with the manifest determination to get the President to approve the policy of the European Allies in Russia, even though he should not participate in the execution of such a policy. Of course I could not be a party to putting such a request up to the President of the United States. I therefore submitted to the Military Representatives a second statement dated October 7th (herewith, marked "B").¹⁷

The European Allies know quite well that they have no occasion to ask the President to approve their policy in Mesopotamia, or Palestine, or Macedonia. Why do they insist on his approving it in Russia? I suspect that it is because they feel that effective intervention in Russia, on the scale which they contemplate, can only be carried out by the resources,—men, material and money—of the United States.

With kindest regards [etc.]

TASKER H. BLISS

¹⁷ Not printed.

763.72/12004½

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, October 22, 1918.

[Received November 4.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am sending you a copy of a letter which I have written Colonel House and which I hope will bring him to Italy before he gets his impressions too strongly deepened in an atmosphere which just at present is about as little in sympathy with Italy as can be imagined.

I would be glad to have the President see this letter. I mean to keep Colonel House very fully informed of what goes on here, and there is such seething just now that the sentiment may change almost from day to day. Those with whom I come in contact are beginning to feel very strongly that Italy should make an offensive and I should not be surprised if General Diaz has to do so or give place to some one else,—Should his military judgment, which I incline to think sincere, be as strong as McClellan's was when before Richmond and deter him from taking an offensive himself.

The dash that Italy is making in Albania at present is intended to off-set the inaction of General Diaz on the Piave front, but public opinion here seems to be focusing on an offensive as soon as the Piave, which is now in flood, falls sufficiently to admit of possible success. People say that Diaz has won his laurels in his successful defeat of the enemy on the Piave when he drove him back across the river and is afraid to risk what he honestly believes will be a defeat. It is possible that there is something in this view. There is also another strong influence against an offensive: That of those who say that the Allies are winning already and Italy has lost so much that she should not sacrifice more from any political motive while the Allies are doing so well. I know that some of the ecclesiastics are taking this view, and one can never tell how strong the views of the Church may be with any particular person here in Italy. Diaz is considered to be sustained by Signor Nitti, who is more or less responsible for him.

It may, however, all be over long before this letter reaches you, and we may be on the road to peace. If we are, please say to the President that I know who won this war and made the road to peace. I do not venture to say what I think about it all, but it's enough.

With cordial regards [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

[Enclosure]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to Colonel E. M. House[ROME,] *October 22, 1918.*

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: I am enclosing in a letter to Frazier¹⁹ a personal letter inviting you and Mrs. House on behalf of Mrs. Page and myself to come and be our guests at the Embassy while you are in Rome. We can arrange also for any members of your personal entourage, one or two with us and others at an hotel nearby.

I am sending now, as you know, to Paris copies of all telegrams sent by me relating to the situation here in Italy so that you may have such information before you as I send to America. Information, however, in letters and telegrams falls very far short of that which one gets from being in the atmosphere himself, and no where does that which we attempt to describe by that word indicate so truly the realities of things as here in Italy. There is, in fact, no way in which you could obtain a true comprehension of what Italy is and stands for, and will probably stand for in the future, without coming here where you will be able to meet and talk with and test for yourself the men who not only represent Italy at present but will very likely represent her in the negotiations which may take place before a great while and in the period following the conclusion of peace.

I deem it, therefore, of great importance, on this and on many other accounts besides this, that you should come here and see and feel for yourself the whole complex combination of sentiments, principles and purposes which together make up the Italy which you will have to deal with when the time comes for adjusting matters so as to [*sic*] a just and durable peace. It is not a hard journey from Paris, everything will be made easy for you and I can assure you of a very sincere welcome on the part not only of ourselves at the Embassy but on the part of the Italian Government. I have had two conversations with Baron Sonnino, and he informs me that he has telegraphed Washington and also Paris and intends to telegraph to England—or possibly has already done so—urging you to come to Italy this time. And I will say come before you get your impressions of Italy out of the French atmosphere. I suggest this not only because Italy has felt very neglected in the past, and there is always danger that such a feeling may deepen into an idea that she is intentionally slighted, but because she has been neglected and she does feel isolated and the consequences should she think herself slighted would not cease with the close of this war, but would continue and might have a disastrous effect hereafter on our relations. The other reason why I am particularly urgent in this matter is that there is a strong feeling

¹⁹ A. H. Frazier, counselor of embassy at Paris.

here in Italy that France is cutting her off from America for her own purposes and prevents her getting in touch with those in America who if they came to know Italy really would understand her and have a very different apprehension of what she represents than at present exists among Americans. There is a strong feeling in Italy anyhow against France and this has unquestionably deepened in these last months, and it is no uncommon thing to hear this feeling expressed in terms which represent real antagonism and may, in the future, represent hostility sufficient to injure the smooth working of what the President has in mind. The rivalry between the Italian and the French forces on the other side of the Adriatic, and the race which they are making to get possession each before the other of towns and regions, is only an expression of the feeling I mention, and the failure of Italy to place her army and her fleet under the command of the French Commander in Chief and of the French Admiral, commanding in the Mediterranean, is to some extent also an expression of the same feeling. Nor is this feeling confined to Italy and the Italians. It exists in an equal degree and possibly in an even more exasperating form among the French toward the Italians, and there is danger of the feeling becoming so general that our enemies may be able to take advantage of it, if not at the council table, which is also a possibility,—at least as soon as the war is over.

There is in Italy a certain element composed of very diverse classes which is perhaps more friendly even now to the Central Empires than to France, and they are ready to avail themselves of every opportunity to testify their preference. Italy says—I use this term as representing not only the element above referred to but Italians generally—that France is “squeezing” her and, lying across the highways to England and America, absorbs substantially everything that she can and allows Italy to have only what leaks through. And she says further that not content with this, France is now endeavoring to seize all she can to the east of her and cut her off from any development in that direction.

You see there are many men in public life here in Italy that are familiar with the whole progress of France’s relation to Italy from the demand by her of Nice and Savoy down to the seizure of Tunisia in the early eighties after France had threatened to bombard Genoa should Italy take Tunisia. The Triple Alliance was the direct outcome of this last move on the part of France, and Italy’s whole foreign policy—speaking in general terms—for the last thirty or thirty-five years has been directed with special reference to the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. The questions touching the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean are those which lie at the very foundation of the war. Now, no one can understand the

questions touching the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean without coming to Italy. He may not do so even then, but without coming it is impossible. One might as soon, or sooner, indeed, understand the Negro question in America without going to the South. I cannot emphasize too much the importance of this visit which I am urging on you.

The final success of Mr. Wilson's plan which you have come over about may hinge on your coming here and feeling out the situation for yourself. The future of the Jugo-Slav and the Czech-Slovak States may hang upon your doing so, as may the sound and equitable adjustment of the questions relating to the Adriatic and the regions beyond, on whose equitable and sound adjustment will depend the possibility of a final, durable peace.

I will not add more to this letter at this time, but shall probably send you another letter by the pouch which is due to leave here on Friday. I will only add that the feeling between France and Italy, which you will be able to judge of at least on the French side for yourself before you have been in Paris long, disturbs me very much. I do not undertake to say on which side the chief fault lies. Italy has undoubtedly been "squeezed" as she says, and her people have undergone privations and hardships incomparably greater than anything that has occurred in France. She has lost more than a million and a half men and no one could see the way in which her people have endured what they have had to undergo without feeling immeasurable sympathy with them.

I will not in this letter enter into the political reasons which I think require our taking more account of Italy than we are doing. This I will leave until next time. Some of them I have been setting forth in my letters to the President which I rather suppose you have seen, but those reasons are more cogent now than ever before, and I feel that you will take them into consideration.

There is a rumor that Austria has made just now a separate peace offer to Italy. The last story of this kind was in circulation about ten days ago, or rather the story was that negotiations were going on, and this Sonnino stamped as a "confounded lie." There is a better founded rumor that Italy is going to make an offensive very soon. It was to have been made last week but the torrential rains put the Piave in flood and prevented it. The public sentiment is so much in favor of it that I believe General Diaz will have to start an offensive even against his own judgment or else yield to someone else.

You will hear much of the refusal of Italy to put her armies under the Supreme Command of Marshal Foch. The reason for this lies in the feeling which she has about France, to which I have already alluded, and, I believe, in what also relates to that feeling, that is,

the apprehension that the Italian people who have been coaxed along, or inspired by the idea that their generals are not inferior to those of France, might resent their armies being placed under a French general to the point of refusing to accept it.

Now I will close this letter that you may have an opportunity of "digesting" it.

Always [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

763.72119/2368½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 23 October, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Here is my idea of the form in which we should submit our correspondence with Germany to the governments with which we are associated as belligerents. What do you think of it? I dare say we should send the correspondence to each of them as promptly as possible.²⁰

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72119/2370½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In reference to a reply to the Turkish appeal for our intervention in the matter of an armistice,²¹ the Italian Ambassador states that he has received a reply from his Government in which it is suggested that we answer the Turkish note by proposing to the Turkish Government that it should address itself directly to the Allied Military Authorities.

The French Ambassador has not received anything positive from his Government, but from telegrams which have just arrived he has the impression that it will be acceptable to his Government if the President should suggest to Turkey that she ask for an armistice directly to the Allied Military authorities.

Mr. Barclay²² has received no definite reply as yet but he shares the view of the French Ambassador as to what would probably be his Government's judgment.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

²⁰ For text of these notes as sent, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol 1, p. 383.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

²² Colville Barclay, British Chargé d'Affaires.

763.72119/25541

The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State[WASHINGTON,] *October 30, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. LANSING: Baron Sonnino cabled yesterday to me pointing out that it is vital to Italy that any armistice to be granted to Germany should be coupled with an Austro-Hungarian armistice. I brought this matter late in the afternoon to the attention of Mr. Polk, asking him whether it would be possible for the government of the United States to instruct accordingly their representatives at Versailles. Mr. Polk was good enough to say that he would take up the matter with you this morning. Meanwhile I have received another cable from my Government which gives expression to the thought of the Italian Government in regard to the questions you put to them in your note of the twenty-third to me,²³ and bears largely on the subject of the German and Austrian armistice. I thought it advisable, consequently to let you know confidentially its contents at once, thus conveying also to you in advance the views of the Italian Government on the note in question.

Baron Sonnino, having stated that on the twenty-ninth of October there was called at Paris an interallied meeting to discuss the conditions of an armistice, points out in his cable that it would seem to him premature to give now an official answer to questions which have been addressed also to the other governments and in regard to which there will be a joint discussion in the presence of the American delegate. This the more, inasmuch as Italy, who faces almost alone the whole Austro-Hungarian army, has to safeguard herself against the very serious consequences which might arise from an armistice with Germany alone, which Mr. Wilson has now submitted to the Allies.

Baron Sonnino, however, authorizes me to let the President know at once that in so far as the Italian Government are concerned they are willing to participate in the exchange of views of the allied powers at war against the Central Empires regarding a possible armistice, as suggested in the note of the President of the United States of October 23, 1918.²⁴ The Italian Government fully agree concerning what is said in this note in respect to the manner with which the conditions of such armistice are to be determined. They acknowledge the wise care with which the President of the United States has endeavored in his statements to safeguard the interests of the peoples at war against Germany, and hope that the allied powers proceed at the same time to a determination of the terms

²³ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 383.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

which are to be requested for an armistice of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Because of the very high aims the President put forth in his note of the twenty-third of October, the Italian Government do not deem that an armistice may be in any way taken into consideration and, much less, granted to Germany and to Austria-Hungary separately. An armistice granted only to Germany, even when accompanied by the highest guarantees, would make it possible for the Austro-Hungarian army to reenforce, with the divisions freed from the western front, its forces in Italy, which are already superior in number and position. The Austro-Hungarian army would also thus retain in its rank and file German troops disguised as soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, as they have already done in the past. And the geographical conditions are such that internal communications are made more easy between Germany and Austria than between France and Italy, so that it would be impossible for the allies to parry in time the danger by the transferring of arms and troops from one front to the other.

I thought it was important, on account of the urgency of the matters involved, to bring to your kind attention the aforesaid, and I earnestly hope that you may see the way clear to accede to my Government's point of view, not only in the interests of Italy, but of the allied cause.

Accept [etc.]

MACCHI DI CELLERE

763.72119/8987 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, *October 31, 1918—2 a. m.*

[Received 7:45 a. m.]

14. For the President:

Five minutes before I entered into conference this afternoon of Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries and without previous notification General Pershing handed me a copy of the communication I quote herewith, the original thereof having already been sent to the Supreme War Council at Versailles and when George read this his comment was: "Political not military; some one put him up to it". When Clemenceau read it his comment was: "theatrical and not in accordance with what he has said to Marshal Foch". No Allied general has ever submitted a document of this character to the Supreme War Council without a previous request having been made by the civilian authorities. I have written the following letter to General Pershing: "In regard to the communication which you sent in to the Supreme War Council this afternoon will you not let me know whether your views are shared by any of the other Allied

generals?" He sent me a verbal answer saying he had not gotten the views of the other Allied commanders on this question.

[“]Paris, October 30, 1918.

To the Allied Supreme War Council, Paris.

Gentlemen: In considering the question of whether or not Germany's request for an armistice should be granted, the following expresses my opinion from the military point of view:

1. Judging from their excellent conduct during the three months, the British, French, Belgian and American armies appear capable of continuing the offensive indefinitely. Their morale is high and the prospects of certain victory should keep it so.

2. The American army is constantly increasing in strength and experience, and should be able to take an increasingly important part in the Allied offensive. Its growth, both in personnel and material, with such reserves as the Allies may furnish, not counting the Italian army, should be more than equal to the combined losses of the Allied armies.

3. German man power is constantly diminishing and her armies have lost over 300,000 prisoners and over 1,000 piece[s] of artillery during the last three months in their efforts to extricate themselves from a difficult situation and avoid disaster.

4. The estimated strength of the Allies on the western front, not counting Italy, and of Germany, in rifles is: Allies, 1,564,000; Germany, 1,134,000; an advantage in favor of the Allies of 37 per cent. In guns: Allies, 22,413; Germany, 16,495; advantage of 35 per cent in favor of the Allies. If Italy's forces should be added to the western front we should have a still greater advantage.

5. Germany's morale is undoubtedly low, her allies have deserted her one by one and she can no longer hope to win. Therefore we should take full advantage of the situation and continue the offensive until we compel her unconditional surrender.

6. An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German army and enable it to organize and resist later on and would deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to press their present advantage to its complete military end.

7. As the apparent humility of German leaders in talking of peace may be feigned, the Allies should distrust their sincerity and their motives. The appeal for an armistice is undoubtedly to enable the withdrawal from a critical situation to one more advantageous.

8. On the other hand the internal political conditions of Germany, if correctly reported, are such that she is practically forced to ask for an armistice to save the overthrow of her present Government, a consummation which should be sought by the Allies as precedent to permanent peace.

9. A cessation of hostilities short of capitulation postpones, if it does not render impossible, the imposition of satisfactory peace terms, because it would allow Germany to withdraw her army with its present strength, ready to resume hostilities if terms were not satisfactory to her.

10. An armistice would lead the Allied armies to believe this the end of fighting and it would be difficult if not impossible to resume

hostilities with our present advantage in morale in the event of failure to secure at a peace conference what we have fought for.

11. By agreeing to an armistice under the present favorable military situation of the Allies and accepting the principle of a negotiated peace rather than a dictated peace, the Allies would jeopardize the moral position they now hold and possibly lose the chance actually to secure world peace on terms that would insure its permanence.

12. It is the experience of history that victorious armies are prone to overestimate the enemy's strength and too eagerly seek an opportunity for peace. This mistake is likely to be made now on account of the reputation Germany has gained through her victories of the last four years.

13. Finally, I believe that complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany; but if the Allied Governments decide to grant an armistice the terms should be so rigid that under no circumstances could Germany again take up arms.

Respectfully submitted. John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief American Expeditionary Forces."

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/9048 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 2, 1918—10 p. m.

[Received 6:15 p. m.]

36. For the President :

Please advise the President that the matter mentioned in my telegram number 14 to the President²⁵ has been adjusted in a manner entirely satisfactory and I consider that no further action is advisable.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/2556½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1918.

At 10 o'clock this morning Crane handed me a secret copy of telegram to the War Department received by it at 8:55 which read "Armistice signed" and signed "Warburton", (a military attaché) at Paris. I showed it to Polk and said that there must be some mistake as it was physically impossible for the German parliamentaries to have reached the French lines and much less to have conferred with Marshal Foch. It seemed best, however, to wire Colonel House at once after getting a clear line to Paris.²⁶

A short time later General March came to my office smiling and asked what I thought of the telegram. I told him that I thought it was physically impossible. He said that he was sure that it was a

²⁵ i. e., the telegram addressed to the Secretary of State, *supra*.

²⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, *supp.* 1, vol. 1, p. 480.

false report and he had not sent it to the President. I told him we were telegraphing for confirmation or denial.

Some time after 11:30 Crane said that the United Press had a "flash" from Paris saying that the armistice was signed and also another saying hostilities ceased at 2 p. m. Paris time. I told him to say that we had no official confirmation of the report and that I did not believe it.

The President, whom I had asked to call me up on another matter, telephoned me over our private wire about 11:45. I then told him of the press report and also Warburton's telegram and that I did not believe them. I also said we were wiring Colonel House for information and that the only reason for paying any attention to the extraordinary statement, which seemed to me absurd, was that the French and British censors had permitted the press telegram to come through, which, if without foundation, seemed to me a strange neglect of duty.

When I went to the Club for luncheon at 12:45 the Washington *Times* extras were being called announcing "Germany Surrenders". At the Club I told inquirers that there was no official corroboration of the report and that I considered it most improbable. During luncheon Frank Polk came to the table and gave me a telegram from Warburton denying his previous telegram and saying the German commissioners would not arrive until 5 p. m. of that day.

Meanwhile the public had gone wild over the report. Crowds swarmed through the streets cheering and waving flags. Thousands collected in front of the White House and shouted themselves hoarse. I was informed that the President came out on the White House portico and waved to the multitude of frantic people. A dozen aeroplanes were flying overhead performing feats, whistles and syrens were blowing, horns were sounding, bands playing, while trucks passed along with waving flags and rejoicing people. Reports from New York and Boston were that similar scenes of wild rejoicing were occurring in those cities.

At two o'clock a telegram came from Colonel House²⁷ denying the report and saying that the German representatives could probably not reach Marshal Foch's headquarters until midnight. I at once telephoned the President and then had Patchin²⁸ see the newspapermen and announce the falsity of the story.

The Washington *Evening Star* published the denial at three but the final edition of the *Times* reprinted its fictitious report in glaring headlines and did not refer to the denial.

²⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 480.

²⁸ P. H. Patchin, of the Division of Foreign Intelligence, Department of State.

The popular jollification in spite of the denial, continued all the afternoon and evening. Whether this was because the people did not know the truth or else having started to celebrate enjoyed it so much that the object of the celebration was lost sight of, I do not know. In the evening on the way to the Theater we found about the Treasury Building and on Pennsylvania Avenue an automobile blockade and immense crowds of people, so dense that with difficulty we made our way to our destination.

I wondered whether the rejoicing was over peace or over victory?

763.72119/2557½ : Telegram

The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Solf) to the Secretary of State

NAUEN, November 10, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: Convinced of the common aims and ideals of democracy the German Government has addressed itself to the President of the United States with the request to reestablish peace.

This peace was meant to correspond with the principles which the President has always maintained. Its aim was to be a just solution of all questions in dispute, followed by a permanent reconciliation of all nations.

Furthermore the President has declared that he did not wish to make war on the German people and that he did not wish to impede with its peaceful developments.

The German Government has received the conditions of the armistice.

After a blockade of 50 months these conditions, especially the surrender of the means of transport and the sustenance of the troops of occupation would make it impossible to provide Germany with food and would cause the starvation of millions of men, women and children, all the more as the blockade is to continue.

We had to accept the conditions.

But we feel it our duty to draw President Wilson's attention most solemnly and with all earnestness to the fact that the enforcement of these conditions must produce amongst the German people feelings contrary to those upon which alone the reconstruction of the community of nations can rest, guaranteeing a just and durable peace.

The German people therefore, in this fateful hour, address themselves again to the President with the request to use his influence with the Allied powers in order to mitigate those fearful conditions.

SOLF

CONSCRIPTION OF ALIENS BY THE UNITED STATES

811.2222/3 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Fletcher)

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1917—6 p. m.

186. Department has given following to the press:

“Reports coming from the Mexican border indicate that a general belief exists among Mexican laborers that if they remain in the United States they will be subject to conscription. There is, of course, no intention on the part of the American Government of drafting foreigners into military service, and it is hoped that the press and citizens generally will do all they can to make this clear to Mexicans and other foreigners residing in the United States.”

Bring foregoing to attention Foreign Office, for its information. Suggest advisability sending instructions to Mexican consuls along border, to correct misunderstanding of Mexican citizens.

LANSING

811.2222/14952b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I desire to call to your attention a matter of considerable importance and urgency, arising out of the application of the Draft Act¹ to persons who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States. The situation is briefly set forth in the accompanying memorandum,² which I have had prepared for your information.

The questions are: (1) Whether we should draft declarants whose countries (both Allied and neutral) have treaties exempting their subjects from military service; (2) Whether we should draft declarants whose countries are allies of Germany, many of whose nominal subjects—for example, Poles and other nationalities,—appear to be desirous to join the army; (3) Whether bills pending in Congress regarding drafting of resident aliens who are not declarants should receive the support of the Administration, in view of the fact that some of the Allies and also several neutral countries have treaties

¹ 40 Stat. 76.

² Not printed.

exempting their citizens or subjects from military service. These questions are developed in full in the attached memorandum, which also sets forth the practice of the United States during the Civil War.

The main difficulty to a solution of these questions arises from the fact that, as General Crowder advises the Department, the quota to be drawn from each district under the Draft Act was calculated on the basis of the total population of the district, including citizens and aliens, and not upon the citizen population of the district. As a result, therefore, if the alien population is eliminated from the draft, the number of Americans to be taken from the district to fill the quota would be much greater—in some districts doubled, trebled, or quadrupled—than if the quota had been made up upon the citizen population of the district, or upon the citizen population plus the declarant population less those exempt from military service by treaty.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/414a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to the letter and memorandum³ which I sent to you on Thursday in regard to the drafting of aliens in the United States, allow me to say that the Department is receiving many requests from the Spanish Ambassador in regard to the detention of Spanish subjects of military age desiring to leave the United States notwithstanding the provision exempting them from military service, in the Treaty of 1902.⁴ This Department, and, I understand, the War Department, are waiting upon the word from you as to whether (1) Declarants of military age having treaties of exemption; and (2) Non-declarants of military age having treaties of exemption, are to be accorded the rights granted them by treaty. My suggestions in regard to these classes of persons are contained on Pages 15 and 16 of the memorandum. I now understand from the Spanish Ambassador that his country intends to stand upon its treaty rights; that he had no intention of giving Mr. Polk the impression some days ago that his Government would not object if declarants were drafted. My view, as expressed in this memorandum, is that, inasmuch as there are probably few aliens in the United States of military age coming from neutral countries having treaties

³ Neither found in Department files.

⁴ Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776-1909, vol. II, p. 1701.

of exemption with the United States, we might well stand by the treaties and declare these aliens exempted.

I should be pleased if you could find it possible to notify me of your desires in this matter at the earliest practicable moment.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/493a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The lack of a definite rule as to the drafting of aliens is causing me extreme embarrassment. I am daily besieged with the diplomatic representatives of countries with which we are at peace begging me to define our policy so that they can reply to the large number of letters of appeal which they are receiving. This has been going on for some time but as September 1st approaches the representatives are growing more and more insistent on a statement. In fact they begin to show considerable resentment at not being told what the authorities intend to do.

I have sent you several communications on this subject and hesitate on that account to write again, but as there is a measure of justice in the complaint that we have not stated our policy although aliens are being examined for service by the military authorities, I feel it my duty to call the matter to your attention.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/5241a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to my letters of August 14, and 20, with reference to the treatment to be accorded to declarants having treaties of exemption, and those having no treaties of exemption from military service, I beg to enclose a copy of a letter from the War Department on this subject, holding that the draft Act abrogates conflicting treaties of exemption by reason of its subsequent enactment. This is undoubtedly so and if the question ever came before the courts they would probably so hold, but such an abrogation of a treaty provision agreed to with special reference to an occasion like the present would not relieve us internationally from our obligation thereunder. The War Department's letter contains a plan whereby treaties of exemption may be in effect complied

with, namely, by the discharge by you as Commander-in-Chief of declarants after they have been accepted for military service and so become soldiers in the American Army. The question is whether the same practice should be accorded to declarants not having treaties of exemption. As I read the War Department's letter the plan is to ask you as Commander-in-Chief to discharge all declarants (whether having treaties of exemption or not) whose country protested against their forced enlistment.

As this policy is of far-reaching effect, not only upon declarants in this country, but American citizens who will perceive a discrimination between themselves and declarant aliens, I hesitate to announce this policy to diplomats here without your express approval.

As the matter is of very great urgency, may I ask you to read this letter in connection with my other letters of August 14, and 20, on the same subject, and let me know your views at the earliest moment?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of War (Baker) to the Secretary of State

AUGUST 29, 1917.

The Secretary of War presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State, who has from time to time transmitted requests from Diplomatic Representatives accredited to the United States, of countries with which the United States is at peace, asking that their respective subjects or citizens be exempt from military liability in accordance with the provisions of the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, which excludes from the liability of military service, German subjects whether they have or have not declared their intention to become citizens of the United States and all other aliens with exception, however, of such among the latter class, who may have declared their intention to become citizens.

In reply to these various communications, the Secretary of War has the honor to make the following observations:

The President was authorized by the Selective Service Act to make Rules and Regulations, not inconsistent with the terms of the Act, in order to carry its provisions into effect. Pursuant to this authority, the President on May 18, 1917, prescribed Registration Regulations,⁵ providing that all alien residents should register on a day to be fixed, and June 5th, 1917, was by proclamation of the President fixed for registration.

⁵ 40 Stat. 1664.

The President prescribed on June 30, 1917, Rules and Regulations for Local and District Boards⁶ in order further to carry into effect the provisions of the Act, and to determine in so far as the matter in hand is concerned, the method whereby alien residents other than declarants should be exempt from military service, to which all male persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, were rendered liable, with the express exception of German subjects whether they had or had not declared their intention to become citizens and of all other alien subjects who had not declared their intention to become citizens.

Foreign diplomats and consular officers are exempted from military liability by the law of nations as evidenced by their universal practice.

To determine whether a person registered as required by the Registration Regulations belongs to any one of the exempt classes and is therefore entitled to be withdrawn from the operations of the draft, the Rules and Regulations prescribed by the President, June 30, 1917, in Section 18, sub-section (*e*), provided the method by which German subjects, whether they had or had not declared their intention to become citizens, should be exempted, and Section 18, sub-section (*f*), of the Rules and Regulations prescribed the method by which all other resident aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens should be excluded from the operations of the Selective Service Act.

It was further provided in Sections 16 and 18 that, in order to discommode alien residents as little as possible, the Local Boards might in their cases postpone physical examinations until the question of alienage had been determined, whenever there was reasonable ground for believing that the persons were aliens and as such entitled to exemption. Aliens who have taken out their first papers are not entitled to this privilege.

Leaving out of consideration German subjects, whether or not they had declared their intention to become citizens, and also declarants of other nationalities, all persons claiming exemption on the ground of alienage are required to present to the Local Boards by which they may have been called for physical examination, affidavits verified by oath or affirmation, upon forms prepared by the Provost Marshal General, in order to establish to the satisfaction of the Local Board the right to the exemption in question.

It has come to the attention of the War Department that aliens have had considerable difficulty in preparing the affidavits required

⁶Provost Marshal General's Office: *Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the President for Local and District Boards, etc.* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1917).

of them by the Rules and Regulations, and that the outlay for notarial fees in swearing to the affidavits is regarded by them and by Diplomatic Representatives of their countries as unnecessary and in some cases as a hardship. The Honorable the Secretary of State suggests that blank forms be provided for aliens and that free notarial service be given them. Forms have already been provided by the Provost Marshal General and are in the possession of the Local Boards, and the Secretary of War will take the necessary action to instruct the Local Boards to have the oaths required in the case of aliens other than declarants administered without expense to such alien claimants, if they present themselves in person to the Local Boards.

The Selective Service Act renders aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens liable to its provisions. The Secretary of War is informed that the Department of State has always considered declarants as aliens and has expressly held them to be such during the present war, and if it were not for the Act they would be considered as ordinary aliens and as such exempt from the liability to military service. The Act of Congress, is, however, mandatory, and it is common knowledge, for which no authority need be cited, that from a National point of view an Act of Congress subsequent to a treaty repeals the treaty if they are wholly inconsistent, and, in any event, supersedes the treaty to the extent of the inconsistency. It is incumbent, therefore, upon Local and District Boards to hold declarants liable to military service, and if found physically qualified to accept them into the National Army unless exempted or discharged on other grounds.

Should the Diplomatic Representative of the country whereof the declarant is a subject ask that he be exempted from the operations of the draft and that he be discharged from the National Army after he has been accepted into it, the President of the United States can, as Commander-in-Chief, direct that such a declarant be discharged from the Army. But the President cannot take this action before the declarant has, by being drafted into the Army, become subject to his authority as Commander-in-Chief, and the President cannot instruct Local and District Boards to disregard the terms of the Act, which is law for the President as well as for the Boards.

It is believed, however, that Diplomatic Agents will not take the same interest in their fellow countrymen who have declared their intention to renounce allegiance to the home country as they will in behalf of alien residents who have not declared their intention to renounce their allegiance, and that they will be disinclined to intervene in behalf of declarants if the right to do so be acknowledged.

The Secretary of War, has, therefore, the honor to suggest to the Honorable the Secretary of State that whenever a Diplomatic Agent protests against the acceptance into the National Army of his fellow countryman who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, the Department of State communicate the name of such person, accompanying it with the necessary information in order to enable such declarant to be identified to the end that the Secretary of War may, when the declarant has been accepted into the military service, confer with the President and suggest that in his capacity, as Commander-in-Chief, the President discharge from the Army a declarant in whose behalf the Diplomatic Representative has more than perfunctorily protested and whose discharge seems to be desirable in the interests of friendly diplomatic relations.

811.2222/708a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall our conversation of yesterday in regard to the position of the War Department relative to exemption from the draft of declarants with or without treaty exemption. I understood you to say that you agreed with Secretary Baker's position, but as we discussed many other things and as whatever position is taken on this subject will have to be given to all diplomats taking up the question with this Government, as well as to members of Congress and others who make inquiries, I wish very much you would make your assent of record by sending me a line approving Secretary Baker's letter, and authorizing me to say to inquirers that it represents the position of the Government. My letter of yesterday sets forth the importance and far-reaching effect of this position.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/714

*Memorandum by the Assistant Solicitor for the Department of State
(Hunt)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1917.

The Draft Act of May 18 makes all "declarants" subject to perform military service.

The Spanish Treaty of July 3, 1902, exempts Spanish subjects from military service. The War Department has held that the law modifies the treaty so far as they are inconsistent and that all Spanish subjects are liable to perform military service under law of May 18. The President approves this decision, but has said that he, as

Commander-in-Chief, will consider requests of the Spanish Ambassador for discharge of Spanish subjects who have been drafted and brought into military service. (Same with reference to other treaty countries).

B[ERT] L. H[UNT]

811.2222/2107: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Chile (Shea)

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1917.

Your December 19, 3 p. m.⁷ Under the Draft Act of Congress approved May 18th last, all male persons whether citizens or aliens between the ages of 21 and 30 both inclusive, were required to register in the United States in order to ascertain the facts in regard to persons of military age in the United States. Such registration did not constitute the draft of such persons into the military service of the United States or indicate in any manner the intention of the government as to their ultimate military obligations. This Act further provided that conscription in the United States should be based upon liability to military service of all male citizens or male persons not alien enemies who had declared their intention to abandon their former allegiance and to become citizens of the United States. The liability to military service thus established was passed upon by local exemption boards established throughout the country which heard and judicially determined the cases of those who claimed exemption from military service. Appeals from the decisions of these boards were taken to boards of appeal established in the various states. Of all the persons registered in accordance with the provisions of the Act only a small percentage have been called for examination with a view to their conscription, and ample opportunity has been allowed for the establishment before the exemption boards by those called of their right to exemption from the draft. In the process of deciding claims for exemption presented by the local boards it cannot be expected that no errors or mistakes have occurred resulting in the refusal of claims of exemption and consequent subjection to military service of some aliens in the United States. It appears that numbers of aliens have failed to claim exemption and accepted service in the American Army, thereby becoming practically volunteers. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has stated he will consider the discharge of any aliens who may have been drafted, even though they may have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, if their Governments

⁷ Not printed.

should request such action in their behalf, and provided that evidence of their alien nationality be furnished. Such action was taken by the President, not because he doubted the right of the United States to claim the service of persons within its jurisdiction, who had endeavored to absolve their allegiance to their own country and indicated their intention to assume allegiance to the United States and take up permanent residence therein, but because of his desire to show a friendly regard for the views of the governments of neutral countries in respect to military service of their nationals abroad.

It is therefore clear that if any aliens have been conscripted this is due to their inability or failure to establish their alien nationality and not to any desire on the part of this Government to force them into the military service of the United States.

So far as Department is advised there is no present intention of Congress to conscript aliens generally.

LANSING

811.2222/4195a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson^s

WASHINGTON, *February 7, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I regret to have to call your attention again to certain difficulties arising out of the application of the Selective Service Act to aliens in the United States. As you are aware, all aliens, except enemy aliens, who have declared their intention to become American citizens were, by the Selective Service Act made liable to military service in the same manner as citizens of the United States. The Act contained no provision preserving treaties between the United States and Italy, Japan, Serbia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, Spain, and Switzerland, providing for the exemption of their citizens or subjects from compulsory military service in the United States. It would seem, therefore, that such treaties must be regarded as having been violated by the enactment of this law.

None of the countries who are co-belligerents of the United States has made insistent protests against the compulsory military service of their nationals. Other treaty countries, however, have made numerous and urgent requests for the discharge of their nationals who have been conscripted under the Draft Act; even though they had declared their intention to become citizens of the United States. In addition, non-treaty neutral countries have made similar protests based on the practice of nations in accordance with which they claim, with some force,

^sThis paper bears the notation: "Prest approves Feb'y 8/18 RL."

that resident nationals of foreign countries are generally exempted from compulsory military service in international conflicts.

Certain of the protesting countries have based their representations upon the further consideration that they have naturalization treaties with the United States stipulating that declarants are not citizens. This, in the absence of treaty, is the rule of law in the United States as laid down by the Supreme Court.

Without questioning the right of the United States to claim the services of persons within its jurisdiction who have endeavored to absolve their former allegiance and indicated their intention to take up permanent residence in this country, the Government, out of a desire to show a friendly regard for the views of neutral countries in respect to military service for their nationals here, has worked out a procedure, with your approval, whereby as Commander-in-Chief, you could discharge declarant aliens who had been drafted in accordance with the Selective Service Act, upon the solicitation of the diplomatic representative of the country concerned. But this could be done only after the declarants had been inducted into the military service—really a violation of the treaties and the international practice upon which the protests of foreign diplomats were based.

I regret to report that this procedure has not in practice accomplished the desired results. It has occasioned great embarrassment and annoyance to this Department, and to the War Department. It has given rise to the report abroad that the United States was impressing neutrals into its armed forces, a point advertised by German propagandists with good effect. It has irritated the sensitive feelings of diplomatic representatives and their governments. Moreover, all discharges made prior to December 15, 1917, were revoked by section 4 of the Selective Service Regulations, issued November 8, 1917—⁹ that is, discharges were being made (and diplomats were being informed thereof) which were only good until December 15, 1917. Further there is nothing to prevent the Local Boards from calling on the discharged aliens to report again at any time for military service. Finally, this procedure for the release of persons subject to the draft might be regarded as an avoidance, if not a violation, of a specific Act of Congress.

In view of the foregoing, this Department and the War Department have come to the conclusion that the only effective method of clearing up the situation is to make a slight amendment to the Selective Service Act so as to exclude neutral declarants from its operation. We concur that from the standpoint of international relations it would be highly undesirable that the existing law should stand unmodified as evidence

⁹ Provost Marshal General's Office: *Selective Service Regulations Prescribed by the President*, etc. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1917).

of a disregard of treaty obligations, or of any supposed rule of international conduct heretofore observed by other governments. I enclose, therefore, for your consideration a draft of a proposed Act or Joint Resolution modifying the existing Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917. If this draft meets with your approval I shall be pleased to present it to the appropriate Committee of Congress for their consideration. I presume it would be advantageous to present the Bill to the House Committee on Military Affairs at the same time that it is considering certain other amendments to the Draft Act now being pressed by the War Department.

In case you desire to examine the matter more at length you may wish to examine the enclosed memoranda¹⁰ which I have had prepared containing information on the following points, (a) Historical attitude of the United States towards the drafting of aliens; (b) Practice of drafting aliens during the Civil War; (c) Estimate of the number of persons affected by the proposed amendment. From the data under the last point it will be observed that, counting out citizens or subjects of treaty countries, who it is assumed should be exempted, the proposed amendment would exclude about 29,000 men, of whom not more than 50%, and probably not more than 30%, would be found eligible for military service. Of the 29,000 it is estimated that one half are citizens of our neighboring republic, Mexico, and about 40% are subjects of Scandinavian countries. In essence the amendment gives up a claim to this amount of manpower in order to preserve our treaty obligations and to maintain a sound rule of international practice.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

*Draft of Proposed Amendment to the Selective Service Act of
May 18, 1917*

A BILL

To amend an Act entitled "An Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States."

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the Act entitled "An Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States," approved May 18, 1917 be amended as follows:

¹⁰ Not found in Department files.

In Section two, page three, line twelve after the word "person" strike out the words "not alien enemies," after the word "citizens" add the words "except alien enemies or citizens or subjects of countries not at war with a country or countries with which the United States is at war," so as to make the paragraph read as follows:

Such draft as herein provided shall be based upon liability to military service of all male citizens, or male persons who have declared their intention to become citizens except alien enemies or citizens or subjects of countries not at war with a country or countries with which the United States is at war, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, both inclusive, and shall take place and be maintained under such regulations as the President may prescribe, not inconsistent with the terms of this Act.

NOTE—Amendment is underlined.

811.2222/6510f

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *March 18, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to the matter of the discharge of neutral aliens (declarants and non-declarants) who have been incorporated in the National Army under the Draft Act, and your inquiry to be informed as to the countries with which we have treaty provisions as to military service, I beg to say that we have such treaties with Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, Spain, and Switzerland. The treaty provision generally runs as follows:

"They [citizens of either contracting party]¹¹ shall, however, be exempt in their respective territories from compulsory military service, either on land or sea, in the regular forces, or in the national guard, or in the militia." (Treaty with Italy, 1871.)¹²

Some of the other treaties end with the word "sea."

In this connection, I should call your attention to the fact that there are other neutral countries with which we have naturalization treaties stipulating that declarants are not citizens. These countries are: Costa Rica, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Salvador, Sweden, Norway, Honduras, and Uruguay. The treaty provision generally runs as follows:

"The declaration of an intention to become a citizen of one or the other country has not for either party the effect of citizenship legally acquired." (Treaty with Sweden and Norway, 1869.)¹³

¹¹ Brackets appear in the original letter.

¹² Malloy, *Treaties, 1776-1909*, vol. I, p. 969.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 1758.

Another form is:

"The declaration of intention to become a citizen of one or the other country has not for either party the effect of naturalization." (Treaty with Haiti, 1902.)¹⁴

The Supreme Court of the United States has uniformly held that a declaration of an intention by an alien does not make him a citizen of the United States. Under the law of naturalization an alien is not required to renounce allegiance upon taking out his first papers. He merely declares his intention to do so.

There is still another class of countries with whom we have naturalization treaties stipulating that persons "naturalized" shall be regarded as citizens, from which it is to be inferred that declarants are not to be regarded as citizens. The only neutral country with which we have such a treaty is Denmark.

The argument of countries having these treaties regarding citizenship is that, inasmuch as we recognize by these treaties that declarants are not citizens, but are aliens, we have no legal or moral right to treat them as citizens or quasi-citizens by subjecting them to military service contrary to their wishes.

I have just received a statement from the Spanish Ambassador listing the names of five men who have been discharged from the army under the present procedure, but who have been recalled for classification by the exemption boards.

I trust that whatever action is taken by you will include non-declarants as well as declarants; for notwithstanding what is said in regard to their having a right to claim exemption before the local boards, and if they do not claim exemption they should be regarded as volunteers, the fact is, as is well known to the State Department, to the War Department, and to the diplomats, that, through ignorance or other reasons, claims of exemption are not made, and through prejudice or other reasons claims for exemption in certain cases, when made, are disregarded by local and district boards. When, therefore, a man is drafted in such circumstances, it is practically impossible to explain the matter satisfactorily to the foreign government concerned.

I also hope that it will be possible in some way to provide for the release of subjects or citizens of neutral countries having no treaties of exemption, as well as of those having treaties of exemption, as I regard the impressment of the former under the Draft Act as indefensible as is the case of the latter.

Perhaps I should add a word in regard to declarant and non-declarant aliens of Bulgarian and Turkish nationality. It seems to

¹⁴ Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776-1909, vol. I, p. 939.

me doubtful whether, on any ground of law and policy, these allies of Germany and Austria-Hungary should be in our army, even though they have waived their claims for exemption before the exemption boards, and so are in a sense volunteers.

As to co-belligerent alien declarants and non-declarants, I think that for the present no change of the procedure now followed is necessary, as few, if any, objections are raised by co-belligerents except Russia, and the Russians are, I think, largely instigated by propaganda. It may be possible, however, that the situation may become such that it may be necessary to devise some new method of releasing co-belligerent non-declarants, in order to relieve the opposition of the Russians in the United States from service at the present time, even though they waived their claims for exemption at the time they appeared before the local boards several months ago.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/6817

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I regret exceedingly to have to call your attention again to the question of the discharge of aliens who have been incorporated into the Army under the Draft Act. It is only the urgency of the requests of the diplomatic representatives of neutral countries and their energetic protests which have been received, particularly from the Swedish Minister in the last few days, that compels me to do so. I attach copies of three notes dated March 26, April 2, and 3,¹⁵ from which it will be observed that 74 applications for permits to leave the country and 744 cases of applications for discharge have been presented and very few acted upon, and that three Swedish declarants for failure to obey orders to sign enlist cards and don uniforms, in opposition to their protests that they were aliens and conscientious objectors, were sentenced by court-martial to imprisonment for twenty-five years—the best part of a man's life. They had previously made application to their Minister for discharge from the Army.

I really am at a loss to know what to do in the circumstances. Relying upon correspondence with the War Department we have committed ourselves to the consideration of discharge of neutral aliens upon application, and consequently have received many requests of this sort. Since then the discharges have become less and

¹⁵ Not printed.

less frequent, and recently the War Department has announced a change of policy which affects both discharge of declarants and non-declarants. If we are to refuse hereafter applications for discharge of neutral aliens we must so inform diplomats, but I hesitate to do so, inasmuch as it means a retraction of our promises to the neutral countries, without your specific authorization.

Another course would be to have all neutral aliens subject to military service discharged once and for all from the operation of the Draft Act. As to the legality of this course—a question particularly within the competence of the War Department to decide—I, of course, desire to make no comment.

The third course is to urge the passage of the pending Bill (H. R. 9932) providing for the amendment to the Draft Act so as to exclude neutral aliens from its operation. I have no doubt a letter from you to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees handling the Bill would accomplish this purpose.

I trust that you will understand that in the circumstances I am powerless to do anything but appeal to you again for consideration of the unsatisfactory situation which is resulting from delay in taking a definite, clear position in the matter.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/7226

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 11 April, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have communicated to the Acting Secretary of War to-day my decisions concerning aliens drafted into the military service of the United States as follows:

I. That both declarants and non-declarants of treaty countries shall in all cases be promptly discharged upon the request of the accredited diplomatic representatives of the countries of which they are citizens.

II. That non-declarants of non-treaty countries shall be promptly discharged upon the request of the Secretary of State, and also when the War Department is satisfied that a discharge should be granted in cases where a full and fair hearing has not been given by the local board.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

811.2222/14979b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On April 11th, you decided that (1) Declarants and non-declarants of neutral treaty countries should both

be discharged from the Army; and (2) Non-declarants of non-treaty countries should be also discharged upon certain conditions. The question has arisen as to the meaning of "treaty countries." As I pointed out to you in my former letter,¹⁶ there are three classes of neutral countries with which we have treaties, namely: (1) Countries with which we have treaty provisions explicitly exempting their nationals from military service. We have such treaties with Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, Spain, and Switzerland. The treaty provision generally runs as follows:

"The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall be exempt in the territories of the other from all compulsory military service, by land or sea, and from all pecuniary contributions in lieu of such, as well as from all obligatory official functions whatsoever." (Treaty with Spain, 1902.)¹⁷

Some of the other treaties end with the word "sea."

(2) Countries with which we have naturalization treaties stipulating that declarants are not citizens. These countries are: Costa Rica, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Salvador, Sweden, Norway, Honduras, and Uruguay. The treaty provision generally runs as follows:

"The declaration of an intention to become a citizen of one or the other country has not for either party the effect of citizenship legally acquired." (Treaty with Sweden and Norway, 1869.)¹⁸

The Supreme Court of the United States has uniformly held that a declaration of intention by an alien does not make him a citizen of the United States.

(3) Countries with which we have naturalization treaties stipulating that persons "naturalized" shall be regarded as citizens, from which it may be inferred that declarants are not regarded as citizens. The only neutral country with which we have such a treaty is Denmark.

I would be pleased to be informed as to whether one or all of these classes of countries are included in your order of April 11th.

In this relation, may I venture to point out some advantages accruing to a broad interpretation of your order, so as to include all of these three classes of countries? If all are included, all the neutral countries of Europe except Holland would be treated alike, and the great body of neutral aliens in the United States would be cared for, the greater proportion of which are Scandinavians. So far as I am advised, there are probably more Scandinavians affected by the Draft Act than there are nationals of all the other European neutral countries combined. If the broad interpretation were taken, a large part

¹⁶ Letter of Mar. 18, 1918, p. 185.

¹⁷ Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776-1909, vol. II, p. 1701.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1758.

of the difficulties with neutral countries would be cured, in case the amendment to the Draft Act, which has passed the House and is now pending in the Senate, should for some reason not be passed, or if passed should not be interpreted as being retroactive in effect. The Swedish and Norwegian Ministers are protesting vigorously that Swedish and Norwegian declarants are being sent to France with their units and to the battle front as rapidly as possible. In a personal call on April 27th the Norwegian Minister said that ten declarants had just been sent, and he was very much upset about the matter. . . . No doubt the chance of these neutral aliens being killed or wounded at the front would be minimized if they were detained in the United States or in France until the cases in which diplomats have requested discharge had been investigated. This, however, is not being done, as the War Department has just advised us that its policy hereafter will be to have such soldiers remain with the organizations to which they belong until final action has been taken in their cases. It would seem to me that the applicants should be detained where they are, either in the United States or in France, until their cases have been finally disposed of.

In view of the fact that there are pending several hundred applications for the discharge of declarants of countries in classes two and three, which the War Department refuses to consider, on the ground that these countries are non-treaty countries, and in view of the urgency of making some definite statement to the representatives of these countries here, who are greatly irritated over the situation, I should be pleased if you could indicate to me your decision as to which are "treaty countries" as soon as possible.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/14962

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 21, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to my letters of May 2, and 11,¹⁹ in respect to the discharge of neutral aliens from the Army, I desire to enclose for your information copy of my personal and confidential letter to the Secretary of War dated May 8, copy of his reply of May 9, and of his further reply of May 14, in regard to the detention of neutral aliens in the United States or in France pending the outcome of the investigation preliminary to their discharge from the Army.

¹⁹ Latter not printed.

I want to call your special attention to the fact that the War Department doubts the final action of Congress on the amendment to the Draft Act exempting neutral aliens from conscription, and appears to be inclined to the view, if I read correctly between the lines, that such an amendment is now unnecessary in view of the provisions in the new naturalization Bill which has just become law, enabling declarants to complete their citizenship at once. I am so greatly impressed with the difficulties which will arise if the amendment to the Draft Act does not go through, and if the naturalization of declarants in the Army is pressed, that I cannot refrain from expressing to you my views again on this matter.

By your order of April 11, treaty countries were accorded the right to have their declarant and non-declarant conscripts discharged from the Army, and non-treaty countries the right to have their non-declarant conscripts discharged from the Army. This has afforded some relief. I am, however, convinced that the honor and good name of the United States depend upon the discharge of all declarants and non-declarants of neutral countries from the draft. The United States has never conscripted aliens in its Army, at least without giving them opportunity of returning home, and it has always vigorously insisted that foreign countries should not conscript Americans abroad in an international war. . . . Several senators, with whom I have spoken in respect to the matter, have been astounded to find out that we are drafting aliens into the Army, and have expressed the view that this ought not to be. I am therefore impelled to ask if it is not possible to take up with the members of the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate the amendment to the Draft Act and have it immediately passed. Delay in passing the amendment allows more aliens to be incorporated into our Army and the amendment as drafted may not be construed to be retroactive. In my opinion the amendment should be changed to make it retroactive on account of the late date at which it is likely to pass. The amendment has passed the House, even though the House had shortly before passed the so-called Burnett Alien-Slacker Bill,²⁰ and I believe the amendment will go through the Senate without much objection.

The enclosed letters also indicate another difficulty which I must call to your attention as it is impossible for me to get relief for neutral countries through the War Department. I refer to the practice of sending to France and to the battle front citizens or subjects of neutral countries conscripted in the National Army pending investigations for their discharge under your order of April 11th. The same principle was involved, as I pointed out in my letter to the Secretary of

²⁰ H. R. 5667, 65th Cong., 2d sess.

War, in the case of men being sent abroad pending the outcome of their appeals before the appeal boards, and the matter was rectified by an order addressed to the Adjutant General. If it was necessary to detain men in the United States pending the outcome of their appeals, it seems to me there is stronger reason, in view of our international relations, for detaining neutral aliens in the United States pending the decision as to their discharge under your order of April 11th.

A further point has been called to the Department's attention by foreign diplomats, namely, that naturalization courts are to be set up near the larger camps for the purpose of naturalizing declarants in the Army. They intimate that declarants who do not desire to become naturalized at the present moment may be so ridiculed by their comrades that they are forced to take out naturalization papers. Judging from the War Department's letter, I can foresee serious charges being brought against the United States by foreign countries for the contemplated action, particularly as it is already suggested that this action is being taken in lieu of the discharge of aliens from the Army.

I do not know how to emphasize or express my feeling that something ought to be done to clear up this situation, and that it ought to be done immediately. I should like to confer with you in regard to the matter as soon as possible, as it is imperative that some definite reply be made to the protests and complaints of the neutral countries.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure 1]

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Baker)

MAY 8, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received several letters from your Department stating that persons, whether declarants or non-declarants of treaty countries or non-declarants of non-treaty countries will not be held in the United States pending an investigation with a view to their discharge from the Army under the President's order of April 11th.

Diplomatic representatives of neutral countries have appealed to me against putting into effect an order of this sort so injurious and so important to their fellow country-men. The Department's requests in particular cases for the retention of such men in the United States pending investigation of their cases have been without avail. I am informed that a similar situation arose with respect to persons who had been inducted into the military service but who had appeals pending before District Boards or the President, these persons being sent forward to France notwithstanding that their appeals had

not been decided, and that the Adjutant General was prevailed upon not to transport such men to France pending the outcome of their appeals only by a personal instruction signed by you.

It seems to me manifestly unfair to compel aliens subject to the draft to go to France and perhaps to the battle-front pending an investigation of their right to discharge under the President's order of April 11th,—clearly as unfair as to require conscripted persons to go to France pending the outcome of their appeals.

Is it not possible therefore to make a special order directed to the Adjutant General instructing him to retain in the United States pending investigation persons whose discharges are requested by diplomatic agents.

If there is special objection to this course of action will you not be good enough to let me know, so that we can have a conference in respect to the matter. I venture to enclose a draft of an order which is worded so as to include the classes of persons whom I think should be detained in the United States pending investigation of their cases. Of course this is merely a suggestion for your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Subenclosure]

Draft Order To Be Issued by the War Department

Hereafter, upon receipt through the Department of State of applications for the discharge from the military service of the citizens or subjects of foreign countries, steps will immediately be taken to insure the retention of such persons in the United States, (or if they have already been sent abroad, the withholding of them from the battle-front) pending the necessary investigation preliminary to a final decision upon their applications.

This will apply to all persons from whose application it appears that they are either: (a) declarants or non-declarants of treaty countries, (b) non-declarants of non-treaty countries.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *May* 1918.

[Enclosure 2]

The Secretary of War (Baker) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *May 9, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received your letter of May 8th, with regard to the retention in this country of declarants and non-declarants whose discharge from the military service of the United States has been requested by the diplomatic representatives of neutral countries.

I do not know how practicable the execution of the order will be, but I have directed that all practical steps be taken to retain such persons in this country pending the necessary investigation preliminary to a final decision on the application.

Cordially yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

[Enclosure 3]

The Secretary of War (Baker) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *May 14, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Replying to your letter of April 15th²¹ requesting that neutral alien declarant subjects who are not covered by the President's instructions of April 11th be held in this country until Congress have expressed its wishes regarding them, I consider that the complications which this course would entail make such action impracticable. It would cause a great amount of interference with the organization and training of our forces, would increase very much the correspondence and administrative work throughout the whole military establishment, and take the time of many officers who should be bending every effort towards fitting our troops to take their places among the fighting forces on the other side at the earliest possible date.

While it is realized that Congress may at some future date authorize or direct the discharge of the men in question, there is nevertheless considerable doubt as to what final action Congress will take, or what action the individuals concerned may elect, in view of the provisions in the naturalization bill which has just become law, enabling practically all of these men to complete their citizenship at once. Arrangements are now being made to adjourn courts in the vicinity of the larger camps, to these camps, and hold courts there until all eligible, who desire it, shall have completed their naturalization. Plans are being made at the camps to have the attending ceremonies made as impressive as possible, and it is thought that a very large number of these neutral declarant subjects may avail themselves of the privilege extended to them.

Very sincerely yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

811.2222/14952g

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 22, 1918.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since I wrote you my letter of yesterday in regard to the discharge of neutral aliens from the Army, and their

²¹ Not printed.

detention in the United States pending the investigation of their cases, I have just received from the War Department a copy of an order issued by the Adjutant General of the Army under instructions of Mr. Baker, as follows:

“Hereafter, upon receipt through the Department of State of applications for the discharge from the military service of citizens or subjects of foreign countries, steps will be immediately taken to insure the retention of such persons in the United States pending the necessary investigation preliminary to a final decision upon their applications. This will apply to persons from whose applications it appears that they are either declarants or non-declarants of treaty countries, and non-declarants of non-treaty countries.”

My comments in my letter of yesterday on this subject, therefore, should be disregarded. The other points in the letter, namely, the discharge of declarants of non-treaty countries in the same manner as subjects of treaty countries, and the urgency of the passage of the amendment to the Draft Act I must, though reluctantly, press upon your attention.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/14962

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 24 May, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am concerned, as you are, about so much of the enclosed as has not already been satisfactorily dealt with, and I write very respectfully to suggest that it would be very well if you yourself were to seek an opportunity to present to the military committees of the two Houses the pressing necessity and importance of the amendment to the draft act to which you have referred. I have very little doubt that they would be glad to yield to your representations.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

811.2222/13528m

The Counselor for the Department of State (Polk) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am extremely sorry to have to call your attention again to the question of the discharge of neutral aliens from the Army. An effort was made to clear up the matter by the amendment to the Draft Act, which is now the law and which reads as follows:

“That such draft as herein provided shall be based upon liability to military service of all male citizens or male persons not alien enemies who have declared their intention to become citizens between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, both inclusive, and shall take place and be maintained under such regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the terms of this Act: *Provided*, That a citizen or subject of a country neutral in the present war who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States shall be relieved from liability to military service upon his making a declaration, in accordance with such regulations as the President may prescribe, withdrawing his intention to become a citizen of the United States, which shall operate and be held to cancel his declaration of intention to become an American citizen and he shall forever be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States.”²²

The question has arisen as to whether it should be applied to neutral aliens already drafted into the Army before the passage of the amendment, or merely to those who, since the amendment, have been or are to be drafted.

The Acting Judge Advocate General has rendered an opinion, copy of which I enclose,²³ holding that this amendment “does not except from military service subjects of a neutral country who have been drafted or were in the military service at the time of the approval of the amendment.”

It is clear that the amendment may be open to the interpretation that a neutral declarant, even though inducted before the amendment passed, may claim to be relieved from liability to military service whenever he chooses to withdraw his declaration of intention. Moreover, many of the diplomats of neutral countries have expressed the hope that this amendment will be applied to neutral aliens inducted into the Army before its passage, in order that the present strained situation may be once for all cleared up by the voluntary choice of the declarants in the Army. As you know, some of the neutrals serving under protest have been killed in action.

In view of the possibility of properly applying the amendment to inducted men and thereby ending satisfactorily a disagreeable controversy with the neutrals, would it not be a good plan for you to call upon the Attorney General as the highest law officer of the Government to render a final opinion to you on the question? Such an opinion would bind all the Departments of the Government, and would have a decided effect upon the foreign Governments concerned, as it will be the basis of our correspondence hereafter with them on this subject. Moreover, an opinion by the Attorney General would take the interpretation of the amendment out of the realm of the

²² 40 Stat. 885.

²³ Not found in Department files.

War and State Departments, which have developed strongly opposed views on the general question of liability to military service of neutral declarants in the United States.

I earnestly trust it may be possible to refer this matter to the Attorney General, and if so, to advise me of when such reference is made.

Faithfully yours,

FRANK L. POLK

811.2222/14008

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *October 5, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The question of the release from the army of Turkish declarants who have been inducted into the service has been and is, as you know, a matter which has caused this Government considerable criticism abroad and annoyance at home. The Selective Service Act provides for liability to military service of all "male persons not alien enemies who have declared their intention to become citizens." By an amendment of July 9th, citizens or subjects of countries "neutral in the present war" are allowed to withdraw from the army, upon their cancelling their declaration of intention. The question as to the Turks, therefore, is whether they are enemies or neutrals. Obviously they are not "neutrals in the present war." Neither are they, technically, enemies of the United States, as the United States has not declared war against Turkey. However, according to the Enemy Trading Act²⁴ and the proclamations issued thereunder, the allies of Germany and Austria-Hungary are regarded as enemies for the purpose of the Act. On account of the alliance between Turkey and the Central Empires, and the material assistance rendered by the Turks to Germany and Austria-Hungary in the present war, is it not possible to interpret the Draft Act so as to include the allies of the enemy, in view of their close attachment to, and support of, the enemy cause? It would not be necessary to declare that Turks are enemy aliens, but the Secretary of War could issue a regulation stating that, on account of Turkey's being an ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the subjects of Turkey are to be treated, for the purposes of the administration of the Draft Act, as though they were alien enemies. This would result in no further induction of Turkish declarants into the army, and in the discharge of such Turkish declarants as have already been inducted into the service. I can not too strongly recommend the advisability of taking this action, if you approve, as it will relieve the great embarrassment

²⁴ 40 Stat. 411.

which is now caused by the allies of the enemy being incorporated into the army and from time to time sent to France, and in the eyes of the world forced to fight against their own cause.

I understand that the War Department would not be averse to such a decision on your part.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

811.2222/14008

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 17 October, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I know you will be pleased to read the enclosed. I suggest that you make immediate arrangements with the War Department for the action suggested.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

[Enclosure]

The Acting Secretary of War (Crowell) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In reply to your letter of October 7th²⁵ inclosing a letter from the Secretary of State of October 5th, in which it is proposed that the subjects of Turkey, for the purposes of the administration of the Draft Act, be treated as though they were alien enemies, I have the honor to inform you that I agree fully with the Secretary of State as to the advisability of taking the action he proposes.

Cordially yours,

BENEDICT CROWELL

²⁵ Not printed.

REPORT OF GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS, MILITARY
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

763.72 Su/99

*The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss) to
the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1920.

SIR: I have the honor to submit, herewith, my report on the Supreme War Council.

A duplicate copy has been handed to the Secretary of War.

Very respectfully,

TASKER H. BLISS

[Enclosure]

*The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss) to
the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1920.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the general operations of the Supreme War Council to which I was attached, by direction of the President, as the Permanent American Military Representative.

I.—AMERICAN MISSION OF 1917 TO EUROPE; REPORT OF DECEMBER 18, 1917; FORECAST OF THE MILITARY SITUATION FOR THE SPRING OF 1918; MINIMUM DEMANDS OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES FOR AMERICAN EFFORT IN 1918; RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ABSOLUTE UNITY OF COMMAND, ETC.

In the last days of October, 1917, I went to Europe as a member of the American Mission of which the purpose was to obtain as exact information as possible in regard to the existing conditions in the Allied Nations prosecuting the war against the Central Powers, and the bearing of those conditions on the most effective effort which the United States could make as an Associated Power in that war.

The Mission sailed from Halifax at 10:15 a. m. on October 30th, 1917, on two American warships,—the *Huntington* and the *St. Louis*—escorted by the destroyer *Balch*. On November 4th the American destroyer *Downs* was picked up at the stationary tankship *Arethusa*

and joined the escort. When off the south coast of Ireland, and nearing the British Channel, the destroyers *Cushing*, *Davis*, *Wilkes* and *Sampson* met us on November 6th and escorted the warships to the harbor of Devonport. Before reaching port, at 4 p. m. on November 7th, a British destroyer joined us and escorted our vessels through the minefields protecting the harbor of Devonport. We reached the dock after dark, at 6 p. m. of November 7th, and landed at 7:30 p. m. A special train was awaiting the Mission with high officials representing the British Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the War Office, who accompanied us to London, where we arrived about midnight of the same day.

It will thus be noted that our arrival in England was coincident with the creation, on the same day, of the Supreme War Council at the Conference of Rapallo.

The Government of the United States, on November 17, 1917, gave its adhesion to the Supreme War Council and Mr. House and myself were designated as the civilian and military representatives of the United States on it. In those capacities we attended the first meeting (after the Conference of Rapallo) of the Supreme War Council at Versailles on December 1st, 1917.

On arrival in London and, subsequently, in Paris, I devoted myself to obtaining all possible information in regard to the then military situation and condition of the Allies.

At that time I had formed certain views in regard to the composition and functions, as they were then generally understood to be, of the Supreme War Council, but which, not long afterwards, I found, as the result of experience, to be erroneous. But, guided at the time by these views, I requested Mr. House to obtain permission for us to return to the United States and submit our reports embodying the results of our Mission, before settling down to our work with the Supreme War Council. As a matter of fact, I then hoped (though I am now glad that my hope was not realized) that the President, as the result of our reports, would recommend to his European associates a change in the constitution and functions of the Supreme War Council.

Accordingly, we left Paris with the American Mission at 9:30 p. m., December 6th, 1917, arriving at Brest at 12:55 p. m., December 7th, 1917. On the same day we sailed from that port at 3:45 p. m. on the U. S. S. *Mt. Vernon*, convoyed by the U. S. S. *San Diego* and for two days by the destroyers *Warrington*, *Monahan*, *Smith*, *Preston*, *Roe* and *Reid*. We landed in New York in the afternoon of December 16th, 1917, and arrived in Washington at 12:05 a. m. on December 17th, 1917. On December 18th, 1917, I submitted the following report to The Honorable Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War:

"DECEMBER 18, 1917.

*"Memorandum for the Secretary of War:***"Subject: The Efficient Application of American Military Power in the War.**

"1. When the American Mission headed by Mr. House left the United States it was understood that its object was to ascertain, in conference with representatives of our Allies,* the most efficient way in which all the resources of our country,—military, naval, industrial, commercial, economic,—could and should be brought to bear, in behalf of ourselves and in aid of our Allies, in order to bring the present war to the promptest and most successful conclusion.

"The following statement represents the views of the military member of the Mission, in complete accord with those expressed by his colleagues of the Inter-Allied Conference (of which the American Mission was a component part) and on the Supreme War Council, by the Chiefs of Staff and members of the General Staffs of the Allied armies on the Western Front, and by the Commanders-in-Chief in the field. These views are supported by the independent opinions of the political representatives of the countries which thus far have borne the brunt of the struggle on this front and who must be supposed to know the spirit of morale of their civil populations.

"And it may be said in advance that these views are unanimous in the belief that military efficiency, under existing conditions, means promptness; that much delay, whether avoidable or not, may be disastrous in its consequences. Therefore, from our own point of view, it is the part of wisdom to get in without much delay, or—stay out altogether. The latter is unthinkable; and so, if any one, influenced by consideration of minor difficulties, of minor deficiencies, of the unalterableness of previous programmes of construction and equipment, and provision of transportation, says that to get in without much delay is impossible, the only reply is that we must do the impossible.

"2. By the time the Mission reached Europe a decided change had occurred in the Allied military situation. The collapse in Russia had become so complete that, in the opinion of both political and military men, she must be left out of consideration as even a passive agent working for the Allies. This was plainly stated in the remarks of Mr. Lloyd George at the conference of the American Mission with the British War Cabinet and Heads of Government at 10, Downing Street, November 20; at the conference of Mr. House and General Bliss with M. Clemenceau and General Petain at the French War Ministry, November 25; and at the session of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, December 1. And it was emphasized by all military men without exception.

"Moreover, the full extent of the disaster in Northern Italy was known only after our arrival in England. This, without their ability to put new troops into the field, had obliged the English and French to withdraw, each, six † of their best divisions from Flanders and France for service on the Italian front with the almost certainty that they would not be able to get them back and that they would ultimately have to send more after them.

"These facts made it seem evident that the speedy arrival of American manpower would be the first question that would come up in the solution of the problem of the most efficient utilization of our military resources in the war.

*The word "Allies" was hastily and carelessly used to indicate the powers associated with the United States in the war. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.]

†These were the numbers as given to me in London, in the month of November, 1917. In his final dispatch of April 8, 1919, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig gives the number as five. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.]

"3. On reaching London it was found that General Sir William R. Robertson, Chief of the British General Staff, and other important officers were absent in Italy. But conferences with the Secretary of State for War (Lord Derby), the Deputy Chief of Staff (Major General Sir D. Whigham), the Master-General of the Ordnance (Major General Sir W. T. Furse), the Quartermaster General (Lieutenant General Sir J. S. Cowans), the Adjutant General (Lieutenant General Sir C. F. N. Macready), the Director General of Movements and Railways (Sir W. G. Granet), the Surveyor General of Supply (Andrew Weir, Esquire), the Director of Military Operations (Major General F. B. Maurice), the Director of Military Intelligence (Major General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh) and with other military men and high officials of the civil government, revealed an anxiety due to the backward state of our military equipment in various essentials and our slow rate of movement of troops.

"Before leaving Washington the suggestion had been rather strongly made that the movement of our troops to France be suspended and that the corresponding tonnage be utilized in carrying food and other supplies to nations in need of them. My original opinion as to the effect of this was confirmed by what I heard on all sides from military and civil officers. Of course I did not intimate that such a suggestion had been made. But no conversation on the subject of our participation in the war could go very far without bringing up the burning question of tonnage. Frequently in such conversations emphasis would be laid on the necessity for tonnage to transport food and other supplies. But whenever I asked what would be the effect if this necessity caused a cessation in our troop movements the invariable reply was that the moral effect, especially in France, would be disastrous.

"In view of the various suggestions that had been made to me as to further assistance that might be given by England and France in completing our initial equipment, it seemed clear that the problem would soon resolve itself into one of transportation. Brigadier General Williams, Chief of Ordnance in France, and Brigadier General Rogers, Chief Quartermaster, had been ordered to report to me in London. On their arrival I composed an informal board, consisting of themselves and Brigadier General Lassiter, who was then in London on temporary duty, together with myself, to study the whole question of equipment in the light of the information which I had brought from Washington and the question of tonnage. Assuming that a certain demand would be made for an American force by the end of the next spring the British Department of Movements was requested to make a new study, in the light of their own experience and of our actual operations to date, of the shipping data which had been prepared in the office of the Embarkation Service in Washington. As the assumption made by me in regard to the American force to be there by the month of May next makes demands upon shipping probably beyond the limit of possibility, no further reference is here made to the English study which, however, is attached hereto.¹ It need here be only stated that this English study seemed to conclusively show that certain additional tonnage would be necessary in order to maintain in France the troops estimated in Washington as being brought to that country by the month of May and to accumulate for them the necessary reserve.

"4. Meanwhile, the British Chief of Staff, General Robertson, had returned from Italy. Pending completion of data in respect to equipment and transportation I had had two interviews with him in which he had listened but had said

¹No copy of this document accompanied General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.

very little. On the 14th of November he asked me to confer with him at his office to give him the exact data as to our preparation of equipment, and the transportation of troops.

"I explained to him in detail the military situation in the United States and, so far as we are concerned, in France. I gave him as exactly as possible the state of our equipment for each division as it would arrive in France from now to any time in the month of May next, including the troops now in France. I showed him the data as revised by the English shipping people, from which it appears that by the month of May next, including troops now in France, we could, with the facilities now at our disposal, transport not more than 525,000 men, including non-combatant forces; that without additional tonnage we could not supply even that number of men, much less accumulate the necessary reserve supplies of all kinds for a campaign.

"I showed him that if we could have the shipping for the above purpose we could have in France by the month of May twelve (12) divisions well equipped, with the assistance now being given by the French and English, with divisional, corps, and army artillery and necessary ammunition.*

"He expressed grave apprehension at this statement. He told me that he doubted whether Italy could be held in the war during the coming winter; and that should she remain in, it would require the presence of considerable troops from the English and French forces on the Western front to be maintained in Italy for the remainder of the war.

"He said that the French man-power was going down and their divisions must be consolidated in order to maintain the remaining ones at proper strength because replacement troops cannot be found for this purpose; that for this reason and because of the withdrawal of French divisions to send to Italy their forces would soon be reduced by the number of ten (10) or twelve (12) divisions below the number now holding their line. He said that England likewise must send a certain number of divisions to Italy and she would have great difficulty in maintaining the remaining number on the Western front.

"He added that the Russian situation was such that the probability had to be faced at any moment of the withdrawal of a large part of the 130 divisions of Germany and Austria then on the Russian front and transferring them to the Western front. To offset all this there seemed from my statement nothing in sight except twelve (12) American divisions and that number at a critical time next spring and, even that number, contingent on securing additional shipping.

"He was of the opinion that the state of the French morale, both civil and military, required the prompt presence in France of a large American force, and the general impression left in my mind by his statement of the case was that a military crisis is to be apprehended if we cannot have in that country next year by about the end of the spring a very much larger combatant force than seemed possible to me at the time of our interview.

"General Robertson said that we must not count on a campaign of 1919 and of reserving our efforts for that year; that the surest way to make it impossible was to count on it; that to insure a campaign of 1919 every possible effort must be made early in 1918; that if it were good for America to wait it would be bad for Germany to let her wait; that events on the other fronts were so shaping themselves as to make it quite sure that Germany would con-

*This statement was based on official data prepared in the various bureaus of the War Department for my use on the Mission. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.]

centrate a powerful additional force somewhere on the Western front for a decisive blow; that the man-power of England and France together could probably not be increased and that they must rely on us for additional strength; and that, for this purpose, we must make every effort to get not less than four Army Corps, or twenty-four (24) combatant divisions in France as early in the year as possible.

"I said that I assumed he meant not merely men, but properly equipped soldiers; that even with additional tonnage it would require till the beginning of next summer to bring over twelve such divisions reasonably equipped; that it would be late in the year, even without any fall-down in our scheduled deliveries, before we could equip the remaining divisions.

"He said that England and France could give us and doubtless would give us much greater assistance in the way of artillery equipment than they had promised, providing only that our troops were in Europe and not at home. He said that they could not take the chance of embarrassment resulting from formal agreements to help in the equipment of troops whose arrival was a matter of the indefinite future; but that if our divisions were in France,—if an emergency arose, if they saw our divisions ready to take their place in the line but prevented by lack of this or that, they would surely find means to equip us out of their reserve supply accumulated to meet just such an emergency. He stated further that even if not equipped with their artillery our divisions could be of the greatest service; that the personnel of French divisions was seriously depleted while their artillery remained at normal strength, and that we could fight in front of the French artillery; and, finally, that this depletion in personnel would probably require the consolidation of a number of divisions in the early part of the year, thus rendering a certain amount of artillery surplus which could be turned over to us.

"In short, he urged that our divisions be sent over as rapidly as possible after completion of their infantry equipment, it being assumed that this would still give them time for necessary disciplinary instruction and training.

"5. The British Chief of Staff having spoken thus freely and earnestly, the other principal officers of the War Office spoke with the same freedom and all to the same effect, viz: That America must make the greatest possible effort early in the year 1918.

"The views of the military men outlined above were confirmed and emphasized in the remarks of the Prime Minister at the Conference of the British War Cabinet and the American Mission, held at 10 Downing Street, November 20th. Among other things he said:

“... It is better that I should put the facts very frankly to you, because there is the chance that you might think you can work up your army at leisure, and that it does not matter whether your troops are there in 1918 or 1919. But I want you to understand that it might make the most vital difference.”

"In the above will be seen lurking the startling idea that even with our added man-power Mr. Lloyd George, optimist though he be, feared the possibility of being able only to resist a German attack without inflicting on them a decisive defeat.

"Finally he said:

"To summarize what I have said as to the most important spheres in which the United States can help in the war. The first is that you should help France and her Allies in the battle-line with as many men as you can possibly train and equip, at the earliest possible moment, so as to be able to sustain the brunt of any German attack in the course of next year . . ."

"It will be noted that Mr. Lloyd George referred to the necessity of our sending at the earliest possible date as many men as we could 'train and equip'. He did not know that the various Ministers of Munitions were then considering a plan by which we would be enabled, if we accepted their plan, to complete our equipment in artillery by using material to be furnished by England and France and without waiting for the production of the manufactured articles at home.

"6. So the problem of American military participation in the war began to shape itself as follows:

First: Men, as many as possible and as soon as possible;

Second: Provision of artillery equipment and ammunition for these men as they arrive in France;

Third: Tonnage necessary to transport them.

"It may be assumed that with any possible tonnage that can be made available, the men will be ready to be moved. The problem, therefore, became one of shipping and equipment of artillery and ammunition. If the view of General Robertson, the British Chief of Staff, be accepted, lack of artillery equipment should not delay the movement of troops. Moreover, this question was to be taken up with the Ministers of Munitions and the American Munitions representatives, with good hope of a solution of the difficulty, but not until after arrival of the Mission in Paris.

"As to the subject of tonnage, after numerous conferences with the representatives of the shipping interests, it seemed evident that full consideration would not be given to this subject until there could be submitted to them the unanimous judgment of the responsible military men as to the minimum effort which the United States should make in the provision of man-power and supplies therefor, and the time within which this provision should be made, as a military measure of prime and vital importance.

"The views of English military men (except that of their Commander-in-Chief in the field) as well as of their important civilian officials, were known and were as stated in the foregoing. Unfortunately, representatives of the other Allies were not in London, and their views could not then be obtained.

"7. Prior to leaving England the following matters were considered and as satisfactory arrangements as possible made:

(a) The use was secured of already prepared British camp sites, as near as may be to Southampton, for all the troops that we can send through England, up to the personnel of a division. The use of these facilities to that extent may require us to establish our own ferry service from Southampton to Cherbourg and Havre and to provide convoy. Heavy freight could not be sent by this route, unless we could use Southampton as our port of arrival.

(b) Arrangements were completed for delivery by the British of enough 6'' Newton Stokes Trench Mortars to equip 12 divisions by May 1st, with some but not enough ammunition. Fifty-two 8'' howitzers and twelve 9.2 howitzers were obtained for delivery before May 1st, with ammunition. Two batteries of these howitzers (4 guns each) were ordered to be delivered at once from stock on hand in France, for instruction. The Master General of the Ordnance stated that they would consider (probably favorably), should we so desire, providing all the troops that we may send to France with the 3'' and 6'' trench mortars.

(c) I found that the question of an agreement for replacement by us of English steel used in filling orders for the equipment of our troops in France had become a serious one and there was danger of these orders being held up.

In reply to my cable on this subject the Department advised me that while all possible assistance would be given in this matter, it would not be practicable to transport steel to England in the same manner as to France, that is, as part of cargo going to France.

"This led me to discuss with Admiral Benson the best use to be made of our deep-draft transport fleet now going to Brest. No cargo can be carried to that port. These vessels have had to go to Southampton for coal. Thus they have had to run through the 'danger zone' three times; whereas, if they went direct to Southampton they would pass through the 'danger zone' twice, would have the facilities of a good port for quick discharge and a quick turn-around, and could utilize their cargo space for steel billets to meet our obligations to England. Lord Derby told me that the arrangement would be so advantageous to them that there was no doubt as to our securing the use of Southampton for this fleet. At the time, this suggestion met the approval of Admiral Benson, but later, after an inspection of the port of Brest he concluded that it would be wise to continue the use of that port, believing that arrangements could be made that would obviate the necessity of going to Southampton to coal. This, however, still leaves us with the disadvantage of vessels having cargo carrying capacity going to a port to which they can carry no cargo.

"I think this matter is worthy of further consideration.

"8. The Mission arrived in Paris on the night of Thursday, November 22nd. The one essential thing that remained to be done there was to learn, First, what was the minimum demand that our Allies would unite in making on us for man-power and the approximate date when it must be available? and Second, what would be our state of equipment for this man-power?

"Only with an agreement as to these things could an intelligent demand be made for the necessary tonnage. And among those interested in this latter problem there seemed to be a general agreement that, when it should be known what the military situation demanded, not merely to win success but to avoid disaster, the necessary tonnage would be made available however difficult it might be.

"According to General Pershing's Priority Schedule, the following five transportation phases are suggested, each consisting of one corps, its combatant army troops and service of the rear troops:

1st Phase-----	220.000			
2nd " -----	267.000	or	487.000	total
3rd " -----	246.000	"	733.000	"
4th " -----	232.000	"	965.000	" (24 divisions and service of the rear troops).
5th " -----	226.000	"	1,191.000	"

"According to the estimates made by the experts in the office of the British Director of Movements we should be able with present tonnage to land one Corps in France with Auxiliaries complete, 220,000 men, by January 7 and two Corps complete, 487,000 men, by May 15. But, due to the fact that the animal-carrying capacity of the animal transports is not duly proportioned to the man-carrying capacity of the troop transports, we would not get the animals of the 1st Corps to France until March 15th, nor those of the 2nd Corps until September 11th. Moreover, the cargo ships as listed are not capable of supplying the daily needs and building up a 90 day reserve of supplies for a force arriving as fast as the troop ships can bring them.

"At first, it is true, cargo capacity is large in proportion to troop capacity and, on this account, a small reserve will exist for a time: but by the middle of

March, 1918, the cargo capacity will only be just sufficient to maintain the troops that are then in the country (about 375,000 men) and so could neither supply daily needs of an increasing number of troops nor help build up a reserve.

"Thus, if no additional tonnage whatever can be supplied we must convert some of our troop transports into animal transports, so as to bring animals to France in proportion to men, and when the time comes that our cargo ships can only just maintain the troops in the country (which will then be about April 10th), we will have to stop the flow of troops until a reserve can be built up.

"Assuming, however, that we can get about 150,000 additional tonnage in operation by January 1st, that after April 10th we will add about 11,000 tons capacity per week, and that we make the conversion of troop into animal transports referred to above, then we should be able to get the 1st Corps with Auxiliaries complete to France by about January 10th, and the 2d Corps by June 15th. If then we continue to add cargo transport at the rate of 11,000 tons per week our 3d Corps should be in France by November 10th, and the 4th Corps by April, 1919.

"It was evident that, if the views of the other Allies as to the supreme military necessity of our man-power on an effective scale at an early date should be those held in England, the slight addition of tonnage mentioned above would not approach the actual requirements.

"9. November 23d and 24th brief interviews were had with the French Minister of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff and his immediate subordinates (the Chief of Staff, General Foch, being still absent in Italy), General Petain, who had come from his Great Headquarters at Compiègne to be present at the Inter-Allied Conference, and others.

"On Sunday afternoon, November 25th, a conference was held, at the written request of M. Clemenceau, in his office at the Ministry of War, at which, besides himself, there were present General Petain, Mr. House and myself.

He began by saying that he would get straight to business and discuss the subject of the conference, to wit, the effective strength of the French Army in its relation to the arrival of American troops. He then requested General Petain to make a statement of the case.

General Petain said that the French losses have been approximately 2,600,000 men, killed, died of wounds, permanently incapacitated, and prisoners; and that he now had at his disposition 108 divisions, including all troops both those on the front and in reserve. These are in addition to the men of all classes in the service of the rear. Eight of these divisions, he said, will have been transferred to Italy by the beginning of the year, leaving 100 for service in France.

"He stated that these divisions are not more than 11,000 strong, each, giving him a disposable force of not more than eleven hundred thousand men. The English, according to him, have in France and Flanders sixty divisions which, as their divisions approximate 20,000 men, each, gives them a force of approximately twelve hundred thousand men.

(NOTE: According to . . . information received in London the English have in France sixty-two Infantry Divisions kept hitherto at full strength of 18,825 men, and five Cavalry Divisions at 7,348 each. This makes a force of a trifle over 1,200,000 men.

The normal strength of a French Division is 15,000 men. Their total, therefore is 400,000 men below strength and they have no more that they can or are willing to call out.)

"He further stated that the English with this force are occupying a front of about 150 kilometers, while the French, with a less force were occupying about 500 kilometers.

(NOTE: It is to be noted the English front has been characterized by constant hard fighting while a considerable part of the French front has been quiescent since the early days of the war. Conflicting views come from English and French sources on this subject of the relative extent of fronts. At the War Office in London I was informed that only with the greatest difficulty could they prevail on the French to let them have additional front; at this interview M. Clemenceau said (to use his own words) 'We have a devil of a time to get them to take more front.' While in Paris I was informed that it had been agreed that the English should extend their front by some thirty kilometers further to the south. From information obtained after this interview, I learned that the front occupied by the British was 181 kilometers and that held by the French was 561 kilometers.)

"General Petain estimated that on the German front there was an equal number of troops but that there was no means of determining with accuracy how many disposable men the latter had in the rear.

(NOTE: The English estimate of relative strength on the Western front is more favorable to the Allies, not taking into account disposable forces that may be in the interior of the Central Powers nor reinforcements that may be brought from the Russian front. The 82 German divisions facing the 100 French divisions are equivalent to 1,066,000 Germans against 1,100,000 French or, as General Petain said, about man for man. But the 68 German divisions facing the 62 English Infantry divisions (excluding the 5 Cavalry divisions) are equivalent to 884,000 Germans against 1,167,150 or, a superiority in favor of the British of 283,150.)

"He thought that it was possible that the Germans might be able to transfer from the Russian front as many as 40 divisions if they were not held there by active operations on the part of the Russians and Roumanians, of which there was little hope.

(NOTE: As a matter of fact, the Russian situation will probably permit the transfer of a larger force. About the end of November, 78 German and 25 Austrian divisions were reported on the Eastern front. This amounts to a total of 1,339,000 men. Moreover, there are some 1,500,000 prisoners in Russia who will be released by a treaty of peace. It will take several months to bring them home and many of them will be required to take up work now performed by Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria. But, if the War College estimate in its Strategic Summary of October 17th, 1917, is correct, there were at that time in the interior of Germany and Austria a total of 2,450,000 men under training. Thus, it would appear that if the Central Powers believe that the time is at hand for a supreme effort they can mass a formidable force against the point of attack.)

"In reply to the question as to how many American troops he desired to have available at a fixed date, General Petain replied that as many as possible should be there as early as possible, but that they should be soldiers and not merely men. It being explained to him how desirable it was that we should have an approximate definite number by a fixed date in order to make our negotiations with those who must provide the necessary tonnage, he stated that we must have a million men available for the early campaign of 1919, with another million

ready to replace and reinforce them. Asked, how many we should have in France for a campaign in 1918, he said that this was answered by fixing the number for the campaign of 1919 since, in order to have this number for the latter campaign they would have to arrive at a fixed rate from this moment and extending throughout the year 1918; the number that would thus have arrived at any fixed date in the year 1918 was all that he could ask for that date. He explained that for the campaign of 1918 he would utilize the American troops in holding those parts of the line on which he would not make an offensive, thus relieving the French troops now there and making the latter available for an offensive elsewhere. In order to carry out this plan, he stated that we should move troops to France at the rate of two divisions complete per month with corresponding service of the rear troops, until about the 1st of May, when the rate should be increased to three divisions a month and continued thus through the year.

"During this interview General Petain spoke with an evident lack of readiness and positiveness. Subsequently, when I visited him at his headquarters at Compiègne, he said that he had been summoned to the conference without warning and not knowing what was to be discussed. When I told him of the views that had been expressed to me in England he said very earnestly that the sooner we could get our troops to France properly equipped the better. He confirmed General Robertson's belief as to our getting more assistance in artillery equipment than we had anticipated if our troops were in France instead of at home. For this reason he urged that our artillery regiments precede * the other troops of their respective corps.

"10. At this conference of November 25th there was some discussion of the Supreme War Council as proposed by Mr. Lloyd George, its organization and functions. When asked as to how far they accepted it, both M. Clemenceau and General Petain expressed non-concurrence in it. General Petain held strongly the view that to accomplish real results the Council must have executive power and the right to exercise this power promptly. He said this power did not exist nor could it be exercised in a Council formed as proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. Asked by Mr. House whether a workable Supreme War Council could be formed by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armies on the Western front, together with the Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives) of those armies, the latter constituting a Committee on Strategy, he replied that this could be done were it not for the fact that there would still be no one person to carry into execution the will of this Military Council. Being asked by General Bliss whether this executive official might not be the President of the Council, to be chosen by the members thereof and with the power only to carry into execution the will of the Council, he replied that this could be done and being done such an arrangement would have his approval. He stated, however, that while, in planning an offensive a considerable time beforehand, there would be time for careful consideration and expression of the will of the Council, there might be emergencies requiring such prompt action that this executive officer could not be expected to do more than quickly consult the other members and then give very prompt orders.†

* In order to receive whatever artillery equipment could be made available for them and proceed at once with their field training. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.]

† It will be noted that these views were in line with those then generally held and before the Supreme War Council had demonstrated what its real functions were to be when in actual operation. They were based on the belief that the Council was to decide upon plans instead of as was really the fact, upon policies. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.]

"He gave me the general impression that he could see unity of control only in unity of command.

"Being asked whether M. Clemenceau and General Petain gave their approval of this general plan with the distinct understanding that it eliminated the Prime Ministers and other political representatives of the various Allied countries, they both stated that it was so understood by them.

"11. General Foch, the French Chief of Staff, having returned from Italy, informal conferences continued until November 29th. On this day, during the meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Robertson, General Foch, General Pershing and myself withdrew to an adjacent room. I gave them a summary of the views that had been expressed to me by English and French military and political men with practical unanimity, as to the urgent, even vital, necessity of promptly bringing the military power of the United States into action with the minimum delay. I reminded General Robertson that he had told me in his office in London that I could, if I desired, quote him in a despatch to our Secretary of War as saying that he considered this as a vital necessity. I told them that the time was now come for them to say, having in view the possibilities as they saw them for the year 1918, how many American troops they required by a given date; and in answering this question, to keep in mind the state of our probable equipment. I said that when they answered this, I proposed to present the case, as one of military necessity, to the Inter-Allied Committee on Maritime Transportation.

"After a brief exchange of views, in which there was no difference, they said that the minimum effort to be made by the United States should be to put 24 divisions in France, the last to arrive not later than the month of June, 1918; these to be maintained at full strength and additional troops to be determined by the conditions of the campaign.

"I then asked these gentlemen—Generals Robertson and Foch—to make a full statement for the information of our representatives of the Shipping Board, reviewing the entire military situation, explaining the probable approaching emergency which that situation revealed and making clear the necessity for additional tonnage to move American troops to meet the emergency. I felt this to be most important because the problem had not as yet at any time been placed before the shipping people in definite terms, as one of emergency, and demanding priority in consideration.

"A further conference was accordingly held that same day at my apartments and the case was presented first by General Robertson and then by General Foch.

"Meantime, the Allied Ministers of Munitions, with Mr. Perkins the munitions representative from the United States, had finished an exhaustive study of the situation as to ordnance equipment and ammunition. They recommended the adoption of a program by the respective governments which would completely equip all American divisions as they arrive in France during the year 1918.

"The resolutions of the Ministers of Munitions embodying the foregoing were contained in my despatch No. 10 from Paris to the War Department.

"Finally, a new study had been completed by the board appointed by General Pershing on the subject of the tonnage necessary to move 24 divisions of troops, including all auxiliary services, to France by the month of June, next. I think that the tonnage estimated by this board is insufficient for the purpose, even on the assumption of certain reductions in the numbers of men and animals and supplies to be transported. However, it was the last word which I had received on the subject and I was obliged to use it.

"12. The case was now ready to be submitted to the Committee on Tonnage appointed by the Inter-Allied Conference. Accordingly, on the same day as my

last interview with the British and French Chiefs of Staff, noted above, I addressed a letter to that Committee setting forth the unanimous demands made by the Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied armies on the Western front as to the minimum effort which must be made by the United States early in 1918 to meet an apprehended emergency. I stated the minimum amount of tonnage that ought to be at once provided and requested the Committee to give the matter immediate and favorable consideration. A copy of this letter is attached.²

"This letter was presented to the Inter-Allied Committee by Mr. Colby, representing the United States Shipping Board and who was a member of the Committee.

"I learned that when my letter was read, the Committee was about to adjourn with a *pro forma* report to the Inter-Allied Conference. Realizing the importance of the subject, they took further action and recommended in their report to the Inter-Allied Conference the creation of an Inter-Allied organization for the purpose of coordinating the Allies' action in the matter of tonnage and of 'establishing a common program, constantly kept up to date, enabling them by the maximum utilization of their resources to restrict their importations with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for the transportation of American troops'.

"This, for the first time, proposes the creation of a Commission, the sole purpose of which is to obtain tonnage to meet the military requirements of the United States. The general opinion among shipping men was that such a Commission, having for its object the solution of this one problem alone, would find a solution for it and would provide the tonnage.

"One thing is certain and it must not for a moment be lost from mind. If we are to take any part in the war, now, or at any time within reasonable future limits, the tonnage must be provided and provided now. Even if we are not to fight until 1919, it will require every available ton of shipping in operation from this moment in order to get a reasonable force of our troops, together with their supplies, in Europe by the end of the year 1918. If we wait until toward the end of that year before making an effort to get the tonnage our troops will not be available for a campaign until the year 1920. It is inconceivable that we can wait so long. The Allies demand our troops now; our acceptance of the proposition of the Ministers of Munitions in Paris will guarantee, as far as such a matter can be guaranteed, the proper equipment of these troops in artillery and ammunition; we know approximately the amount of tonnage that is necessary to move them within the time demanded; all shipping men are agreed that with a full understanding as to the existence of the military necessity the necessary tonnage can be provided. Every day of delay, so long as the submarines continue in action as now, reduces the amount of shipping available. There should be no further delay. We ought to be able to determine very promptly the last ton of shipping that can be made available from vessels controlled by the United States. The difference must be made up by our Allies. But, whether we are to make a strong effort in 1918 or a still stronger one in 1919, the shipping must be made available now.

"I recommend that our Government take up at once with the Government of Great Britain the question of the immediate organization of a Commission to obtain tonnage for the transportation of American troops, as recommended

²No copy of this letter accompanied General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.

by the Inter-Allied Committee on Maritime Transportation, and approved by the Inter-Allied Conference.

"SUMMARY

Conclusions.

[“]1. A military crisis is to be apprehended, culminating not later than the end of the next spring, in which, without great assistance from the United States, the advantage will probably lie with the Central Powers.

[“]2. This crisis is largely due to the collapse of Russia as a military factor and to the recent disaster in Italy. But it is also largely due to lack of military coordination, lack of unity of control on the part of the Allied forces in the field.

[“]3. The lack of unity of control results from military jealousy and suspicion as to ultimate national aims.

[“]4. Our Allies urge us to profit by their experience in three and a half years of war; to adopt the organization, the types of artillery, tanks, etc. that the test of war has proved to be satisfactory. We should go further. In making the great military effort now demanded of us we should demand as a prior condition that our Allies also profit by the experience of three and a half years of war in the matter of absolute unity of military control. National jealousies and suspicions and susceptibilities of national temperament must be put aside in favor of this unified control; even going if necessary (as I believe it is) to the limit of unified command. Otherwise, our dead and theirs may have died in vain.

[“]5. The securing of this unified control, even unified command in the last resort, is within the power of the President if it is in anyone's power. The military men of the Allies admit its necessity and are ready for it. They object to Mr. Lloyd George's plan of Rapallo (which, however, I would accept if nothing better can be done) for the reason that, on last analysis, it gives political and not military control. I asked Sir Douglas Haig and General Robertson what would happen if the military advisers of the Supreme War Council recommended and the Prime Ministers accepted a military plan which the British Commander-in-Chief in the field and the Chief of Staff did not approve. They said that it would be impossible to carry it into execution without their approval; that they would have to be relieved and the advisers of the Supreme War Council put in control. In the present temper of the English people such an issue could not be forced without the probable defeat of the Government. In general, they hold that the problem now is a military one and that in some way unity of control must be obtained through an unhampered military council.

“The difficulty will come with the political men. They have a feeling that military men, uncontrolled, may direct military movements counter to ultimate political interests. They do not fully realize that now the only problem is to beat the Central Powers. They are thinking too much of what they want to do after the Central Powers are beaten. They do not realize, as the Central Powers do, that national troops as a body can only be efficiently employed in the direction in which national interests lie,—with, in this war, the sole exception of our troops which will fight best where they get the best military results. There need be no political fear that great bodies of English or French troops will be ‘switched off’ to help the territorial aspirations of the Italians, nor vice versa. It is not merely a political necessity, it is also a military one which any commander-in-chief must recognize, that the English Army must fight with its back to the Channel, the French Army must fight with its back to Paris, the Italian Army

must continue to fight Austria in the only direction by which it can reach her. This does not prevent troops of any of the four—English, French, Americans, Italians—being detached in accord with some coordinated plan from their main army where they are less needed to operate on another part of the front where they are more needed. The English failure to accomplish results at Cambrai in the last days of November was likely due to lack of reserves which might have been thus furnished.

“But, even as to the political men, I think they may now be ready to yield to intelligent pressure. Probably no English or French Premier could, of his own motion, propose what would look to the man on the street (the man who overturns governments) like a deliberate surrender of control of some national interest. But it is not unlikely that those same Premiers are looking to the President of the United States to help them do, with the acquiescence of their peoples, that which they know ought to be done.

“And it would seem that the Allies would take in good part the exercise of this pressure by the United States now when they are making this great demand upon our resources.*

“6. To meet a probable military crisis we must meet the unanimous demand of our Allies to send to France the maximum number of troops that we can send as early in the year 1918 as possible. There may be no campaign of 1919 unless we do our best to make the campaign of 1918 the last.

“7. To properly equip these troops, so that we may face the enemy with soldiers and not merely men, we should accept every proffer of assistance from our Allies, continuing our own program of construction for later needs, but accepting everything from them which most quickly meets the immediate purposes of the war and which will most quickly enable us to play a decisive part in it. This should be the only test.

“8. To transport these troops before it is too late we should take every ton of shipping that can possibly be taken from trade. Especially should every ton be utilized that is now lying idle, engaged neither in trade nor in war. The Allies and the neutrals must tighten their belts and go without luxuries and many things which they think of as necessities must be cut to the limit. Every branch of construction which can be devoted to an extension of our ship-building program, and which is not vitally necessary for other purposes, should be so devoted in order to meet the rapidly growing demands for ships during 1918. The one all-absorbing necessity now is soldiers with which to beat the enemy in the field, and ships to carry them.

Recommendations:

“1. That our military program for the first half of 1918 be the despatch to France of 24 divisions, the last to arrive not later than the month of June; these to be accompanied or preceded by the proportionate number of service of the rear troops.

“2. That the artillery troops precede the other troops of the corps, to receive instruction with such artillery material as may be available in France.

“3. That every effort be made to secure the additional tonnage indicated in paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 10 from Paris to the War Department.

“4. That the Government of the United States concur in the resolution adopted by the Inter-Allied Conference in Paris by which an Inter-Allied

* Everything contemplated by this paragraph (5) was accomplished by the creation of the Inter-Allied High Command which, perhaps, might never have come—or have come too late—were it not for the prior existence of the Supreme War Council. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.]

organization is created to handle the question of shipping 'with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for the transportation of American troops', as quoted in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 10 from Paris to the War Department.

That the very best man obtainable in the United States should represent us on that Commission.

"5. That an exact inventory be taken of the capacity of all vessels now in use by the War Department and that before sailing a certificate be required that they are loaded to full capacity.

"6. That every effort be made to speed up completion of facilities at ports of debarkation in France. This, together with using fullest capacity of vessels, will, in the opinion of shipping men who have inspected these ports, increase in effect our present tonnage as now operating by from thirty to fifty per cent.

"7. That the *Leviathan* (the former *Vaterland*) be used as a station ship at Brest, if we continue to use that port for our deep-draft transport fleet. All troops from the other vessels can be berthed on her pending evacuation from that port.* This will greatly hasten the turn around of the rest of the fleet. It will avoid the danger of a terrible disaster resulting from the torpedoing of a vessel carrying 10,000 men.

"8. That a careful study be made of the relative advantages of Southampton as the port of debarkation of the deep-draft transport fleet. This fleet cannot carry cargo to Brest. To Southampton it could carry steel billets to meet our obligations to England for steel used by her in filling our orders. Our other transports can do the same for France.

"9. That a more satisfactory and efficient plan for port administration in France be devised. It would seem that General Atterbury, assisted by a high-grade terminal expert at each port, could have entire control of discharge of transports, troops and cargoes, until men and supplies are delivered at their destination.

"10. That the resolution of the Ministries of Munitions, as quoted in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 10, in respect to our supply of artillery and ammunition for all our troops arriving in France during 1918, be at once accepted with reference to every item with which we can be supplied more quickly in this way than by following our own program. Everything should be subordinated to the quickest possible equipment of our troops with its artillery.

"11. That, if tonnage requirements make it necessary, approval be given to the plan worked out by a Board of Officers under General Pershing for a reduction in the strength of a division from 27,000 men to about 22,500; the elimination of the cavalry; the reduction of the reserve supply from 90 days to 45 days, and increasing the number of troops sent via England to 30,000 per month.

"12. That, unless the division be materially reduced or its complement of artillery be materially increased, our General Staff study out a new combat

* This was before the establishment of facilities for caring for large numbers of troops on shore at Brest. A crying need at that time was a quicker "turn-around" for our transports. Railway facilities from the port, which had never done commercial business on a scale, were poor. There was a tendency to hold transports till rail transportation for the troops could be provided. It was thought that if the latter could be at once transferred to a floating barrack they would be away from the port before the arrival of a new convoy, even with a quicker "turn-around". Improvements in port and rail facilities made this unnecessary. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.]

scheme by which the four combatant divisions of a corps fight together on the line, with reduced front and extended depth. The front occupied by a division in combat is determined by its power in artillery. An American division from fifty to one hundred per cent stronger in personnel than an English or French division, but no stronger than they in artillery, cannot cover its full division front.

"13. That the aviation program worked out in Paris, and which I understand is now on its way to the United States, be approved.

"14. That the tank program communicated in my despatch No. 12 from Paris be approved and every effort made to hasten it. In this war of machines this weapon has become all-important. The prolonged artillery bombardment to destroy wire entanglements before an attack makes a surprise impossible. It becomes possible through the use of the tanks and saves costly expenditure of ammunition. In the attack on Cambrai late in November (which would have been successful with a few more light tanks and reserves to follow the attack) it is estimated that the use of tanks to destroy obstacles saved 2,000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, or more than the value of all the tanks engaged.

"15. That, having in view Conclusion No. 5, above, the Government of the United States represent to the other governments concerned the great interest which it has in securing absolute unity of military control even if this should demand unity of command; and that for this purpose the Supreme War Council be made a military council* with the representation on it of the Commanders-in-Chief of the respective armies in the field, and their Chiefs of Staff or representatives.

TASKER H. BLISS,
General, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army."

The report is quoted in full because the problems to which it refers were the ones which, during the black days of 1918, engaged the most earnest attention of the Supreme War Council. And it is of passing interest to note the extent to which the forecast of the Military Situation of 1918 was actually realized:—the transfer of German divisions from the Russian front to the West; the spring drive; the culmination of the enemy's efforts by the end of the spring; the crying need for American men—men—men, whether their training and equipment was completed or not; the demand for tonnage and the cordial willingness of the British authorities, when the crisis came, to provide the shipping for the transportation of American troops, etc., etc.

Two ideas in the report deserve more than a passing attention. The first one relates to the composition and functions of the Supreme War Council.

During my first visit to Europe I found an apparently invincible repugnance to the creation of a unified command. Military men, indeed, admitted its advantages—some, even, its necessity—but, practically, it was little more than an adhesion to the theoretical correctness of the principle. One and all believed that the peoples them-

* See note on page 22. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State. Reference is to p. 209.]

selves would not consent to anything which would look (or could be made to appear) like the surrender, by one or another of them, of some national interest. Moreover, even with those who accepted the theoretical advantages, an impassable barrier was met when the question was asked, "Who, or what nation, shall exercise the supreme command?"

Those sentiments were, naturally, even stronger with the political leaders and would-be leaders.

But, those of us who believed that a spirit was at work, growing out of repeated disaster, which aimed at creating an organ for a sort of pseudo-unified control and command, thought at first that the Supreme War Council was intended to play this part. This was evident in all my interviews with military men during the months of November and December.

And it was only in that belief that in my first report I recommended in conformity with the general military opinion in Europe that the Supreme War Council be reconstituted and be composed of the military commanders-in-chief. This, to be sure, would not give unity of command because, as General Petain pointed out in our interview of November 25, there would be no one with unquestioned power to give orders to all the armies. But, it would be a long step towards unity of plans and coordination of movements, of which, theretofore, there had been a grave lack.

At that time few people realized—no one, apparently, except the much decried politicians themselves—that, in a great Alliance, back of all unity of command on the battlefield, back of every great strategical combination made by that unified command, there must be unity of national purposes, fully supported by each separate national will.

It was the general lack of this unity of national purpose and will in Alliances that caused Napoleon to say that he would rather fight two nations than one and, better still, three than two. And it was on this lack that the Germans for a long time, and justifiably so, placed their reliance.

It was the political leaders who first read aright the antecedent causes of the Italian disaster at Caporetto; who realized that it was unity of political control that might have warded off the Russian *débâcle*, might have prevented the Roumanian collapse and that would give its real value to unity of military control on the Western front.

Had the Supreme War Council attempted to work on any other theory it would have proved the final and fatal disaster of the war. But it did not do this. At no time did it attempt to make plans of campaign. It established a unified purpose, one on which the Allied and Associated Powers came to a common agreement, to be attained by a campaign waged by all the Powers, and left to the respective

commanders-in-chief to prepare and execute the detailed plans for attaining the common purpose. It made no detailed plans for the opening campaign of 1918 but established a common policy which all the powers agreed upon as wise. This policy was expressed in detail and conveyed to the commanders-in-chief but it was never decided upon without full previous consultation with those commanders. There were some who thought that a failure to comply with one of these details of policy led to the initial disaster of March 21, 1918. The Supreme War Council in no way interfered with the plans of the local commander of the Army of the Orient at Salonika. It gave advice, based on a broader knowledge of the political and military situation in Europe; if the local plans called for additional Allied assistance it determined, after consultation with the military chiefs, whether such assistance could be given, or whether the local plans should, if necessary, be modified accordingly; it decided the approximate time when the general political and military situation warranted the final successful drive against Bulgaria.

Therefore, the great value of the Supreme War Council consisted in bringing together the political heads of the governments in constant and amicable discussion of the great problems of the war as seen from their point of view, and in causing each of them to consider these problems not only in the light of its own interest but in that of all the others,—that is, in the light of the common purpose of beating the enemy. It made this one unique in the history of alliances and enabled the Allied and Associated Powers, after many disasters that might have been avoided, after incalculable losses of men and money that might have been saved, to snatch victory from the very jaws of despair.

More than once, before the creation of the Supreme War Council one or another nation undertook a military project growing out of some national aim of its own. There might be unanimous objection on the part of the political and military leaders of the other nations; but they shrugged their shoulders and made no organized opposition because, perhaps, it might invite opposition when they wanted to make some such movement of their own. Could these political men have met and conferred, long before, as they began to do on December 1, 1917, it is not only conceivable but probable that they would have foreseen the approach and the causes of the great Russian collapse; that they would have devised a plan that would have relieved Russia of an unendurable strain before her people in despair broke all bounds, that would have retained a defensive Russian Army but one capable of a strong offensive unless the Germans maintained a large force on that front, that would have released millions of Russian peasants and artisans to produce the things of which the Allies had such need

as well as to meet their own requirements and that would have relieved them from the intolerable burden which has sunk them in the gulf of Bolshevism. All this might have been done and still Russia could have played a more really effective part in the war than she did.

Such constant meetings of the Allied political and military minds would most certainly have stopped the Gallipoli adventure before it had passed the stage of a paper plan. It might have prevented the entry of Roumania into the war at the psychological moment to give Germany a great victory, with abundant supplies of which she stood in great need, reinforcing her own and depressing the Allies' morale. Finally, it might have resulted in giving Cadorna the little that he needed to hold his advanced position rather than the larger forces they had to send in order to prevent the great disaster in Italy from becoming a fatal one, at a time when all their troops were needed on the western front to meet the approaching German drive.

It was for these reasons that, beginning with my actual service on the Supreme War Council, I modified the views as to its composition and functions which I had expressed in my report of December 18, 1917. If it was ever intended that the Council should work on the lines originally assumed by myself and many others, it was saved by its own conservative wisdom, by not interfering with the commanders in the field and by confining itself to matters of broad policy.

But I never changed my views as to the necessity of absolute unity of command.

The Supreme War Council, with its resultant unity of political control, partially opened the door leading to the unified command. The way was further paved by the discussions leading to the attempted creation of a general reserve to be controlled by Marshal (then General) Foch. Military men knew perfectly well that in the battle that was then approaching, success or failure depended upon the existence and the control of a general reserve. They knew that the commander of this reserve was to all intents and purposes an Allied commander-in-chief because, no separate commander could make a plan and execute it without knowing in advance what the commander of this reserve would do. Therefore, when these separate commanders-in-chief agreed to the creation of a general reserve they were surrendering in advance, perhaps without realizing it, their objections to an Inter-Allied commander-in-chief.

The processes of evolution which brought the Supreme War Council and the unified command into existence were long and difficult.

The war against the Central Powers was fought by a Coalition and, for purposes of war, coalitions are notoriously weak. No matter what, nor how vital, may be the common object which binds its members together, in the back of the minds of the political leaders

there are other separate and national aims which they expect to attain from the common success. Often these aims are such that, prior to the war, insistence upon them would have separated the members of the subsequent coalition into hostile camps. And when the war comes and the coalition is formed and these separate—often selfish—national aims come more and more to the front there is a tendency to pull apart, an indisposition to coordinate efforts to a common end until, finally, one or another may see in a separate peace the better way to obtain its aims and the coalition is ruptured.

Napoleon was a great psychologist. He thoroughly understood the inherent weaknesses of national political human nature. His career, better than that of any other, illustrates the point now being emphasized. He himself, towards the end, fought coalitions with coalitions. In some of his campaigns he brought together under his single control a group of peoples, naturally hostile to each other, heterogeneous and dissimilar in national instincts and longings, but not so heterogeneous and dissimilar as the forces recently gathered from the ends of the earth—white, black, yellow and brown—to defeat the Central Powers. When he was successful in the management of such a coalition, his success was due to absolute unity of command and, as a consequence of this unity, coordination of effort. He had both political and military unity of control. He used the single undivided strength of his combinations to take instant advantage of whatever weakness may have been developed in the looser combination opposed to him. And when he failed, it was due to the same cause which held the Allied and Associated Powers together to the end, and which overcame any disposition of his opponents to pull apart and held them together to the bitter end—overwhelming and absolute fear. No nation any longer trusted him. They all feared him. They knew that it was their ruin or his. None could have the slightest hope that by a voluntary separate peace it could attain its own ends better than by adhering to the alliance. All knew that their sole hope was in the alliance.

So, the Allies held together without unity of command, with little effort at coordination, and with consequent waste of life and money. They held together through disaster after disaster greater than those which have dissolved former coalitions. They were fighting, literally, for their national lives. It was not until after many of these disasters had occurred that the step was taken that might have averted all of them. It was not until it seemed that the last dollar was extracted, the last available man put in the field, that it was seen that all resources must be pooled, which meant putting them under one control.

But it must not be assumed that unity of effort and control, in any real sense, was practicable before it actually came. It was not solely the wise and thinking men that had control in this matter. The political repugnance to it in all Allied countries had to be removed.

The presentation of facts made after the Conference of Rapallo, November 7, 1917, should have removed this repugnance, could anything have done so. Yet, notwithstanding all the facts of experience, the announcement of the creation of the Supreme War Council met with a storm of criticism which was only allayed, and then largely only on the surface, by the adhesion of the American government to that Council and its agreement to take official part in it. And among all the facts that stand out in the cold light of experience, two are of vital importance.

The first one is that, from the beginning of the war, all of the political and military combinations of the Entente were based on the assumption of a powerful Russia operating actively with the Allies. Had there been one common unified plan the defection of Russia would have instantly made evident the necessity of modifying the plan to meet this defection. Mr. Lloyd George, a consistent and insistent advocate of unity, said that a single commander-in-chief in the field would know what to do (and would do it instantly) who had made a plan based upon the arrival of an auxiliary army at a given date and place, but which failed to arrive at all. But the Allies did not have one common plan. Each had its own plan and these were attempted to be stitched together like the pieces of a patch-work quilt. But, as Mr. Lloyd George again said, stitching is not strategy, either political or military. Because there was not one plan but several; because there was no one to modify one or several plans to meet the radically changed conditions, the Allies continued through 1917 to follow the same lines with Russia out that they had followed with Russia in. As I have said before, could the heads of governments have frequently met about a table and discussed these problems, with assistants in constant session to work out details for them, there is no slight reason for believing that the disintegration of Russia might have been prevented; in any event, the new political conditions would have been at once recognized and steps taken to meet them.

But there is a still graver fact which experience had shown, and which confronted the Allies not only at the time of the creation of the Supreme War Council but from the earliest days of the war,—a fact which pointed to the necessity of unified control more clearly, perhaps, than any other. This fact was the Blockade.

It had been quickly realized by all the Allies in the very earliest days of the struggle that the blockade was the most effective, the most certain in its results, of all the agencies of war available to them.

Could they prevent the Central Powers from winning a conclusive military success in the field and at the same time effectually cut off all supplies for them from the outside it would be only necessary to wait for the end. That end might, in the opinion of some, be more inglorious than a decisive victory won by force of arms in the open field, but it was more certain and, in the long run, less costly. When the time came to give the *coup de grâce* it would be found, as it was in fact found after the most heroic and costly sacrifices of mighty armies in the field, that the enemy resistance was no more than that of a fragile and empty egg-shell.

In these days of wars between nations in arms it is not possible for any of them, even one with the most varied and abundant resources, to store up in peace the supplies necessary for an enormous and continued demand in war. There is always something that must be obtained abroad. And the withdrawal of men from productive labor makes it more and more difficult for a nation to utilize its own resources. Science may do much to provide substitutes for lacking material, but in war there are time limits, even if no other, to the operations of science. And this was true, in this latest war, of the Allies as well as of the Central Powers. It was this which forced a more and more stringent blockade, regardless of previous rules or of national interpretations of them, much to the irritation of the United States and which continued until the United States learned that a ruthless blockade was to her own interest as well as to that of the European Allies.

And the character of this latest and, probably, of future wars justifies the extreme blockade. It will make, and it is to be hoped that it will make, future wars more difficult in their inception because, unless the whole world accepts this new rule, it will require a nation or an Alliance strong enough to defy the rest of the world, in order to block all avenues of commercial access to the nation with which it is at war. But it will do it if it can.

And the reason is not far to seek. With the modern nation in arms, every old woman who is able to knit a woolen sock for the soldier at the front, every child able to knit a mitten, every old man able to cultivate a bushel of potatoes or wheat beyond his own needs—each and all of them is a soldier; their work is commandeered and directed by the government for the purposes of the war. The non-combatant merchant deals in the goods that the government permits him; the farmer sows the crops that the government orders him. Every one is drafted for the war;—the labor of some at the front, the labor of others at the rear in order to enable the former to stay at the front. Horrible as we may think it all these have been treated in this war as soldiers and with little distinction, and it is to be feared that it

will be as bad or worse in the next one, unless the good God gives us sense to at least try some plan by which another such war may be made impossible.

Until recently nations at war settled their differences by a sort of prize fight. They raised limited armies which marched and counter-marched and fought battles, until one side or both had enough of it and they agreed to quit with a certain division of the purse. The non-combatant had so little to do with the war that he was regarded as really a non-combatant. He was really the body of the contestants and the rules of war, like the "gentlemen's rules" of the prize ring, were made to protect him against unfair blows. The prize-fighter must not hit below the belt; the soldier must not use noxious gas. But suppose the prize fighter, after he has come to blows with his adversary and there is no escape, discovers that it is no longer a fight for a purse and half the gate money but a fight for life. From that moment neither contestant will regard the rules but will do whatever he finds necessary to save his life and destroy his adversary.

It is the unhappy fact that the rules made to govern the parties in one war result in large part from the violations of the rules made for a previous one waged under different conditions. When this war began the use of noxious gas was contrary to the rules. One side violated the rule and began to use it; then the other side used it; and now all the world contemplates its use in future war. And so the modern blockade which grew out of a gradual violation of rules made for guidance in wars of a different character has doubtless come to stay for future wars, so far as the circumstances of the moment will permit it to be applied.

From 1914 to the end of 1918 the principle of this blockade involved the shutting off of Germany and the other Central Powers from everything coming from the outside—food, clothing, fuel, material for munitions, everything. It was justified and necessary because the war in its actual effect was against the nations, against every man, woman and child in them, and not merely against the armies in the field.

Now, here was an agency which, more than any other, required in its application absolute unity of purpose and object and a common plan which no commander in the field, no minister in the Cabinet, should for a moment have lost from sight. Bad as it may be, lack of unity may lead to a defeat here or there without necessarily prejudicing the general success. But an extreme and successful blockade can permit no failure, anywhere, in its operation.

In the great siege to which the Central Powers were then being subjected there were times when it seemed that their peoples must

be eating their last crop. The Allied navies had shut them off from all lands beyond the seas from which, in times of peace, they had drawn so much of their food and raw material. On land they were shut in on the east by Russia, and fear prevented the then neutral Roumania from giving them much assistance. On the west, in Belgium and France, they were blocked by the armies of three Allies while, in the southwest, Italy shut them in. There was little for them to gain in Serbia except the bare soil, while the Allied fleets prevented the smuggling to them through that territory of supplies from the outside world as they prevented it, to a large extent, through the neutral territories of Switzerland, Holland and Scandinavia.

When this circle was so nearly complete the signs began to appear of the black fates of death impending over Russia. She was like one of Homer's demi-gods on the plains of Troy, leaning on her spear, faint and spent with the toils of combat, and bleeding from many wounds. She had mobilized—no one knows how many soldiers. Some say 20,000,000, and the least estimate is 12,000,000. Relatively a small part of this number—whatever it may be—engaged in the actual war; and then only to bring to her and her Allies disaster and to the enemy encouragement and hope. More than that, the Russian collapse would, in time, have opened to that enemy the great granary of Europe.

Meanwhile the Central Powers had thrown an overwhelming weight against Serbia, crushing her and at the same time unlocking the door to the East and giving access to abundant stores of grain, cotton, meat, and raw material for her war manufactures. More than that, it revived the exhausted Ottoman Empire resulting in the tying up of hundreds of thousands of the finest troops of the Allies.

The story of Roumania is but a repetition of the others. With the Allied promises of assistance unredeemed she was overrun in one campaign and her rich stores of food and raw material passed to the Central Powers to feed their armies and civil populations, and to provide their further military equipment.

During all this time the Allies were butting against an impregnable wall in the west—impregnable so long as the civil populations behind it were fed and clothed and warmed. Germany, trusting in this wall, had withdrawn the forces which she had used to crush the powers on her east and south. To be sure, her central position facilitated this rapid movement from one front to another. Nevertheless, the Allies could have relied for a time on a similar wall and have transferred forces that might have kept their weaker associates in safety and have made the blockade real and effective.

All of this might have been done had there been in the earlier days a Supreme Council the object of which was to sink national differences and aims and bring about international unity.

All of the foregoing facts together with the disaster of Caporetto had passed into history before the close of the year 1917. It would seem that then, if ever, national repugnance to an international unified control of the situation should have been turned into cordial acceptance of the Supreme War Council. Yet its creation was a contributing cause to the downfall of one Allied government and for a moment seemed likely to wreck another one. It was accepted coldly and had to win its way to popular approval. And to those who were privileged to take part in its work it was an inspiration to see the spirit with which the great political leaders of the Allied world approached and conducted their task. Matters of gravest importance to the safety of the world were settled with cordial unanimity in a few minutes which, did they have to be handled by diplomatic despatches, through the hands of jealous general staffs and of suspicious Cabinets—jealous and suspicious only because they could not get together and work together—would have taken precious days or weeks.

II.—ACHIEVEMENT OF UNIFIED COMMAND

1. *The Military Situation in November, 1917.*

In the autumn of 1917 the Central Empires had been defeated on the Marne, had received a check so costly as to constitute a real reverse at Verdun, and had lost a small amount of the territory of France occupied by them in 1914-16; still the general situation was in their favor. Their definitely successful campaigns against Roumania and Serbia, and the Russian *débâcle* and revolution, culminating in the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, had practically realized the Pan-German dream of "Mittel Europa" and had placed within their control the petroleum of Roumania and enormous new sources of food supply, especially wheat lands. Moreover they held in France, Belgium and Italy large territories of enemy country, which deprived the Allies of much needed coal and iron deposits and gave the Germans useful bases for their submarine campaign and for a possible ultimate invasion of England; if the control of the sea should by any means be obtained. The Central Empires had only to hold on to what they had already won; the burden of the offensive had been definitely imposed upon the Allies, and with the promise of food and petroleum supplies from the Balkans and Russia—without which it had been possible to support the populations of Germany and Austria for nearly three years—there seemed good

ground for believing that the defense could be maintained almost indefinitely.

The initial German successes at Verdun and the British campaign on the Somme had proved that an attack could be made almost inevitably successful if sufficiently organized and supported by heavy artillery; but that the cost in men was sure to be out of all proportion to the ground gained and that a rapid and well conducted retreat for a short distance would always secure a time of repose, since it would require the preparations for the attack and the organization of lines of communication and supply to be begun all over again.

The elimination of Russia, Roumania and Serbia from active operations deprived the Allies of the numerical superiority they had had in 1916 and 1917, and made it improbable that they would have sufficient man-power to take up the offensive effectively until the entry of the American army as a fighting force on the Western front. The strength of the American army and its efficiency were still problematical and could not be definitely appraised.

2. *The Necessity for Unity of Command and of Policy.*

The need for unity of command within any single theatre of operations had always been an axiom of the military art and had been recognized as a "*sine qua non*" to success by the military students of all time. The extension of the principle of unity of command to all theatres of operations along a very wide front, made possible by the invention of modern facilities for rapid communication, was one of the important lessons of our Civil War. It was evident to many observers that the World War was furnishing the Allies many examples confirming this principle and that the unfavorable position in which they found themselves in the autumn of 1917 was in great measure due to the fact that each of them had tried to fight his own war in his own chosen theatre of operations with very ineffective and occasional efforts at coordination, until some disaster to one imperatively required others to come to his assistance.*

It was evident, even early in 1915, that the World War was to a great extent to be one of exhaustion, one in which all the material resources as well as the man-power of each nation engaged would have to be utilized to the fullest extent possible. As each nation

*Von Kluck's army escaped and the battle of the Marne was prevented from being a full and definite success by Marshal French's failure to attack energetically on September 5th, 1914, as requested by Marshal Joffre,—requested because he could not order.

The costly and unfortunate Gallipoli campaign would probably not have been considered twice had the general situation been under unified control.

And it is equally true that with such control the elimination of Russia, the annihilation of Serbia and Roumania might have been in a large measure avoided. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

necessarily had a surplus, or at least a preponderant proportion, of certain materials and facilities, and suffered from a deficiency in others, the fullest and most effective utilization of all the resources of all the Allied nations could only be attained through some agency cognizant of the requirements of all and the relative importance and urgency of the special requirements of each—a body capable of ensuring a unity of policy and the best utilization of the resources of each for the common good of all.*

3. *Opposition to Unity of Command.*

However, as I have before stated,—this unity was not practicable in any real sense, before it actually came. There was a good deal of political repugnance to it which had to be overcome. This repugnance was unmistakably manifested at the time the Supreme War Council was formed. It was one of the elements which contributed to the downfall of one Allied government; another was probably saved from overthrow by the brilliant speech of the Prime Minister in which he was able to announce the adhesion of the United States to the Supreme War Council initiated at Rapallo.

Even after the Supreme War Council became a fact and had been in operation for some time, my colleagues at Versailles in discussing the question of having an Interallied Commander-in-Chief, while acknowledging as an academic fact that such a command was desirable, expressed the opinion that it would be impossible because of the deep-rooted opposition to it by both military and civilian officials supported by a powerful element of the public press. This opposition grew out, in large part at least, of one of the underlying causes of the weakness of all coalitions. During the early part of the war, when the British forces on the ground were relatively so insignificant, these forces had to follow the fortunes of the French armies. These armies were fighting to save Paris and thus prevent its possible neutralization for the further purposes of the war. During this time the Channel ports,—which were as much an object of solicitude for the safety of Great Britain as was the safety of Paris for France,—had been in great danger. Her people demanded that this danger should not be incurred again. Consequently, as the British forces in France increased in strength they became more and more tied to the Channel ports as a dependent base and their front of operations was necessarily determined with respect to that base.

Each country naturally feared for itself in case the other were rendered helpless. So, the British front came naturally to be marked out as one in Northern France and in Flanders, while the French front was equally naturally marked out as on the Northeast and East

* The need for such an agency had been recognized in 1915 by Lord Kitchener. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

of Paris; and this latter position was further indicated in the minds of all Frenchmen by their determination to recover the Lost Provinces, even if they gained nothing else from the war.

The Belgian front and line of operations was determined for her by the fact of the German invasion and consequent occupation of all her territory except a small corner about Nieuport, where the remnants of her army stood at bay.

Italy entered the war with "Italia Irredenta" as her objective, and against her traditional enemy, the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

All were fighting the war for the common purpose of beating a common enemy, but also with the further object of securing certain national aims. And with these various war aims in view, the British army on the continent hammered away at the Flanders front; France dealt her blows north and east of Paris; while Italy pursued her war against Austria in the Julian Alps and about Valona.

In addition to all this, any threat against India, by propaganda or force of arms, aroused the greatest apprehension in all English minds. Moreover, British commercial interests could not keep their eyes off of the enormous domain represented by the German colonies. The trade of these colonies was the source of great potential wealth to whatever nation possessed them. For the same reason, these interests regarded with great dislike the possibility of the penetration of German commercial influence in the Ottoman Empire as well as its resultant danger to the security of trade routes with India.

And with it all, there was the possibility, even probability, that the adjustments made after the war would be based on the then *status quo*.

All these interests dominated in maintaining the fronts up to the end substantially as they were at the beginning; England fighting on the continent with her back to the Channel, in Asia Minor to maintain the safety of her route to India against possible encroachment by any country, and elsewhere to oust Germany from her colonial possessions; France fighting with her back to Paris; and Italy in the only direction in which she could reach her ancient enemy.

And, until a Supreme Interallied Council could show that it would operate with a general view to all of these interests and not to the advantage of one as against another, the fear was very natural that supreme and unified command vested in a general of one nation might sacrifice other national interests in order to secure those of his own. As time went on a strong group in England opposed the costly British offensive in Flanders; it favored a defensive attitude which would enable forces to be withdrawn to support the Italian

advance toward Vienna. But in the minds of others there was a fear that this might favor Italian interests at the expense of those of the others; that the war might be ended on the basis of the *status quo* without either England or France gaining all their objects, thus leaving, possibly, France still without her lost provinces and England still in fear of seeing the Germans in occupation of the Channel ports and of the Belgian coast, with Antwerp as a "loaded pistol pointed at her".

Nothing but disaster, so great as to imperil the whole Allied cause, could overcome the opposition to abandoning these natural and individual objects of each nation and to subordinating the operations of each national army to a general control by any Allied Council or by any one commander-in-chief. Disasters came fast enough. But it was only the one at Caporetto which was sufficiently illuminating to make the Supreme War Council—a political Supreme Council in which each of the principal Allied Powers was represented—acceptable to the majority; while the success of the German drive in March, 1918, was still necessary to make possible the acceptance of an Interallied High Command for the national armies operating on one continuous front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

4. Unity of Command and of Policy are Gradually Achieved.

So General Cadorna received no assistance, and his army suffered the almost decisive defeat of Caporetto. It was saved from annihilation only by French and British help gathered together after the disaster had been inflicted on Italy and sent hastily to the Piave. The British and French lines in France had to be thinned and the Prime Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, etc., met at Rapallo and adopted there the protocol creating the Supreme War Council.

As already stated this Rapallo agreement met with opposition. Many held that it showed an unpatriotic tendency to surrender the control of national armies. By tacit consent the future was left to show how useful or harmful the Supreme War Council would prove in practice; it was saved by its own conservative wisdom, by not interfering with the functions of the military commanders in the field, and by confining itself to questions of broad policy and of general utilization of resources and distribution of forces. The Supreme War Council was created to secure coordination, political and otherwise, on the Western front, but in practice it extended its functions to all the others. And it made possible unified command on the principal front when the terrible experience of March, 1918, came.

The first step toward unity of command was the decision to create a General Reserve under "an Executive * composed of the Permanent Military Representatives of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States of America, with General Foch for France" as presiding officer; and which was to exercise its functions "after consultation with the commanders-in-chief" and with certain other limitations. This step met with opposition. Its principle was approved, but commanding generals objected to the "ear-marking" of certain of their divisions for use with a general reserve; and the matter had not yet been settled when the German avalanche fell on General Gough's army on March 21st, 1918.

The American and Italian armies had, for the moment, no direct concern in this matter, and the measures to be taken to meet the emergency were a question for adjustment between the French and British authorities. Mr. Clemenceau for the former and Lord Milner for the latter met at Doullens on March 26th and signed the convention making General Foch nominally Commander-in-Chief. But he was limited to "advisory and co-ordinating" powers; and as he could issue no orders, he could not co-ordinate.

The inefficacy of this effort toward securing unity of command, without arousing the opposition of the narrow nationalistic elements in the armies and civilian populations, led to the conference at Beauvais, April 3d, which was attended by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau, Generals Foch, Sir Douglas Haig, Pershing, Petain, Sir Henry Wilson and myself. General Foch explained very dispassionately his difficulties and said that the false position he occupied made him little more than another element of delay and discord; that under these circumstances he considered it would be better for him to resign his position. This led to a new convention, signed within the hour, charging him "with the duty of co-ordinating the action of the Allied armies on the Western front; and with this object in view" conferring "upon him all the powers necessary for its effective accomplishment"; but it was still considered necessary to add the limitation that "each Commander-in-Chief shall have the right to appeal to his government if in his opinion his army finds itself placed in danger by any instructions received from General Foch". The principle of separate national control of each army was dying hard. Nothing less than the good sense, kindly tact, personal magnetism and thorough professional qualifications of General Foch could have

* Thereafter designated in American and British records as the Executive War Board. See p. 86, *et seq.* T. H. B. [Footnote in the original. Reference is to pp. 251 *et seq.*]

secured the degree of co-operation necessary to insure the successes, the prestige of which eventually made him indeed the Interallied Commander-in-Chief on the Western front.

In the course of the discussions of the Fifth Session of the Supreme War Council at Abbeville, May 1st and 2nd, the definition of the Western front as extending "from the North Sea to the Adriatic" raised the question of General Foch's relations to the Italian army. The Italians, not fully realizing the extent of the powers conferred upon General Foch by the Conference of April 3d at Beauvais, had requested that these powers be extended to him with reference to their own front. When it was pointed out that this would give General Foch the power to remove troops from the Italian front in his discretion as well as the power to send troops to that front, the Italian Representative said that they could not consent to the exercise of such a power, but finally accepted the following agreement:

"(a) General Foch is Commander-in-Chief of the Italian troops on the French front, just as he is of the other Allied troops.

"(b) The powers of co-ordination conferred on General Foch by the agreement of Doullens are extended to the Italian front.

"(c) Should circumstances bring about the presence on the Italian front of Allied armies fighting in the same conditions as in France, Signor Orlando would agree that there should be a General-in-Chief of the Allied armies on the Western front, and that this General-in-Chief should be General Foch."

This, it will be seen, gave to General Foch over the Italian front only the advisory and ineffective co-ordinating powers that had been originally given to him on the Western front by the Conference of Doullens. It was only on the condition that independent Allied armies be sent to assist the Italian Army in Italy that General Foch could exercise the full powers of an Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The authority of General Foch as Commander-in-Chief of all Allied troops on the Western front was never accepted for the Belgian army; but this army actually did co-operate with him to the extent requested by him.*

*General Foch's authority as Commander-in-Chief was never extended beyond the Western front, and even there it was limited as concerned the Belgian army and the Italian army in Italy. A French general, General Sarrail (afterwards succeeded by General Guillaumat, and he in turn by General Franchet d'Esperey) had already in 1916 been appointed Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Orient, which included all Allied troops in the Balkan Peninsula except the Italian division stationed at Valona and in its vicinity. General Allenby (British) was recognized in the latter part of 1918 as Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief of all troops in the region extending from Egypt in the South to the Black Sea in the North. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

III.—ORGANIZATION AND BUSINESS METHODS OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

1. *The Conference at Rapallo.*

The Caporetto disaster threw the Italian army into confusion and, for a short time, made its escape doubtful. The British and French governments rushed troops to their assistance and General Foch the French Chief of Staff, visited the Italian General Headquarters and arranged for a complete rehabilitation of the Italian army, including a system of schools for the training of officers.

The heads of the British, French and Italian governments, the ones who had participated in stemming the flood of invasion, met in conference at Rapallo and considered ways and means of insuring closer co-ordination and unity of action in waging the war. The formation of the Supreme War Council was decided upon, and the session of the Rapallo Conference on 7th November, 1917, became the first session of the new body.

The Supreme War Council came into being in accordance with the following joint resolution of the governments concerned:

“DECISIONS OF A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS ASSEMBLED AT RAPALLO ON NOVEMBER 7TH, 1917

“I. The representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments assembled at Rapallo on the 7th November, 1917, have agreed on the scheme for the organization of a Supreme War Council with a Permanent Military Representative from each Power, contained in the following paragraph.

“SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF A SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

“II. (1.) With a view to the better co-ordination of military action on the Western front a Supreme War Council is created, composed of the Prime Minister and a Member of the Government of each of the Great Powers whose armies are fighting on that front. The extension of the scope of the Council to other fronts is reserved for discussion with the other Great Powers.

(2) The Supreme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war. It prepares recommendations for the decision of the Governments, and keeps itself informed of their execution, and reports thereon to the respective Governments.

(3) The General Staffs and Military Commands of the armies of each Power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective Governments.

(4) The general war plans drawn up by the competent Military Authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the high authority of the Governments, insures their concordance, and submits, if need be, any necessary changes.

(5) Each Power delegates to the Supreme War Council one Permanent Military Representative whose exclusive function is to act as technical adviser to the Council.

(6) The Military Representatives receive from the Government and the competent Military Authorities of their country all the proposals, information, and documents relating to the conduct of the war.

(7) The Military Representatives watch day by day the situation of the forces, and of the means of all kinds of which the Allied armies and the enemy armies dispose.

(8) The Supreme War Council meets normally at Versailles, where the Permanent Military Representatives and their staffs are established. They may meet at other places as may be agreed upon, according to circumstances. The meetings of the Supreme War Council will take place at least once a month.

“III. The Permanent Military Representatives will be as follows:—

For France	General Foch
For Great Britain	General Wilson
For Italy	General Cadorna.

Rapallo, November 7, 1917.”

For the same reason that made it impracticable for the chiefs of staff of the other national armies to act as Permanent Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council, General Foch was relieved from his duty and General Weygand thereafter (until his appointment as chief-of-staff to General Foch after the Conference of Doullens, March 26, 1918) acted in this capacity. When General Sir Henry Wilson was appointed Chief of the British Imperial Staff he also was relieved and succeeded by General Rawlinson. The undersigned was designated as the American Permanent Military Representative on November 17, 1917. At the request of the British Government the United States Government gave its adhesion to the Supreme War Council on November 17, 1917, and from that date the political members of the Council were:

For Great Britain

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M. P.
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury;

For France

Mr. Georges Clemenceau,
President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War;

For Italy

His Excellency V. E. Orlando,
President of the Council of Ministers;

For the United States

President Woodrow Wilson.

They were assisted, respectively, by the

Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., Secretary of State for War (afterwards Secretary of State for the Colonies);

Mr. S. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Baron S. Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and

Mr. E. M. House, during the 2nd Session of the Supreme War Council of December 1, 1917, and the 8th (Armistice) Session.

The only resolution adopted by the Supreme War Council, at its session of November 7th, 1917, at Rapallo, was the following:

"TERMS OF REFERENCE TO THE PERMANENT MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

"1. The Supreme War Council, assembled at Rapallo on the 7th November, 1917, directs its Permanent Military Representatives to report immediately on the present situation on the Italian front. In consultation with the Italian General Headquarters they should examine into the present state of affairs, and, on a general review of the military situation in all theatres, should advise as to the amount and nature of assistance to be given by the British and French Governments, and as to the manner in which it should be applied.

"2. The Italian Government undertakes to instruct the Italian Supreme Command to give every facility to the Permanent Military Representatives both in regard to documentary information and movements in the zone of operations.

Rapallo, November 7, 1917."

*2. The Supreme War Council.**

It will be noted that, while chiefly concerned with watching over the "conduct of the war", the Supreme War Council was nevertheless a political body. The decision to give it a political character was sound, in accord with the military principle that war is but a continuation of political policy in a new form, and affording reasonable assurance that it would not be an organization "which should either supersede or interfere with the unfettered activity and independent position vis-à-vis of the several governments and staffs, or again which would in any way derogate from the authority or ultimate responsibility of each of the Allied governments over its own forces and to its own people" †. This political body had the wisdom not to attempt to direct military operations in the field, but to limit itself to reaching decisions as to:

(a) Questions of policy affecting the military situations.

* See Appendix A. [Footnote in the original. Appendix A is not printed; it is a summary of action of the Supreme War Council.]

† Speech of Mr. Asquith before the House of Commons 19th November, 1917. [Footnote in the original.]

(b) Distribution of the available man-power, equipment, supplies and shipping among the various theatres of operations.

(c) The character that military operations should assume, in view of the forces available, in each theatre of operations.

It will be seen that these are all questions of a general character, which could have been decided only by the political heads of the governments. The Supreme War Council did not supersede the commanders-in-chief but gave them for their guidance an expression of the definite policy of the Allied Governments. It was not to act as a commander-in-chief, but as an agency for the adoption and maintenance of a general policy for the Allies in the prosecution of the war, consistent with the total resources available and the most effective distribution of their resources among the various theatres of operation.

While paragraph (1) of the resolution quoted above shows that the immediate problem was "co-ordination of military effort on the Western * front", paragraph (2) extends "its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war", and it was found from the outset that the general military situation had to be considered in reaching a decision in any particular case. Indeed, at the first session it was agreed, as suggested by Mr. Lloyd George, that "the Supreme War Council should concern itself with all the fronts where the Allied armies were fighting in common".

The original resolution of the Rapallo Conference provided that the new body should consist of "the Prime Minister and a member of the Government of each of the Great Powers, whose armies are fighting on that (the western) front". The first session, being the one of the Rapallo Conference, was attended only by the representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy.

The formation of the Supreme War Council was announced by Mr. Lloyd George in a speech made at a diplomatic luncheon in Paris on 12th November, 1917. He was criticized by a section of the English press and in the House of Commons, on his return to London, for this speech and for his assent to imposing this inter-allied control upon the British forces; and, to aid in meeting this, he requested the adhesion of the United States to the plan of Rapallo in time for him to announce the fact in his speech defending his attitude to be made on the 19th of November in the House of Commons. Mr. House, then chief of a special American Mission in Europe, was notified on 17th November, 1917,³ that the President

*Defined by resolution passed 2nd May, 1918, at the Fifth Session of the S. W. C. at Abbeville as extending "from the North Sea to the Adriatic", but not such prior to that resolution. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss' report.]

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, p. 308.

approved participation by the United States in the Supreme War Council and that he and the undersigned were designated as our political and military representatives. In those capacities we attended the second session at Versailles, France, on December 1, 1917. But at no time did the United States Government have a representative at any session of the Supreme War Council who could speak for that Government as the Prime Ministers of the Allied Governments could speak for theirs. The resolutions passed at the various sessions were, therefore, cabled to Washington by me, as the American Military Representative, immediately after their adoption by the prime ministers of the other powers, for acceptance or rejection by the President as the fourth member of the Supreme War Council.*

Representation on the Supreme War Council was limited to the Great Powers because, if all the smaller Associated Powers were represented, it would be so large as to be unwieldy, with the necessary result that it could not reach a decision promptly. Moreover, the war was being financed by the Great Powers and, to a large extent, was being fought by them who in fact, found it necessary to assist the smaller Powers with men and matériel,—they being unable to wage even their small share of the war without such help. It was therefore not a practical injustice to limit them to participation in its deliberations when matters especially concerning them were under consideration, and provision was made for the presence and hearing of their representatives on all such occasions.

It was decided that the Supreme War Council should normally meet at Versailles, France, and here the Military Representatives and other permanent personnel were stationed. In reaching this decision the conferees were actuated by the desire to prevent any appearance of the Council's being under the special influence of any one government, as might have been the case if its home were established in any one of the capitals, and at the same time to give it a central location, conveniently accessible to the Governments most concerned and to the Headquarters of the various armies on the most critical front. Nevertheless, when convenience required it, sessions were held at other places.

3. The Military Representatives.

A general officer with a suitable staff was designated by each of the Great Powers to take station permanently at Versailles and act as

* By common acceptance, and in fact as the necessary consequence of the basic idea that the recommendations of the Military Representatives and the Resolutions of the Supreme War Council should represent a common purpose, all such action was required to be unanimous. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

military adviser to the political representative of his government. The four Military Representatives constituted a permanent committee, constantly in session, informed at all times as to the military situation on all fronts and at home, and prepared to advise their own governments as to the attitude and interests of each other government in regard to any military or politico-military inter-allied question arising or that might arise. They were also the joint military advisers of the Supreme War Council, submitting their recommendations to the latter in the form of unanimously adopted joint notes. When there was a difference of opinion among them, or when advice on some particular subject was asked by one or another government or later (after the Armistice) by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the recommendations were put in the form of special reports. The Military Representatives were especially enjoined "to bear in mind that their function is to advise the Supreme War Council as a whole and not merely as the representatives of their respective nations on the Council.*" They were required "to view the problems confronting them, not from a national standpoint, but from that of the Allies as a whole"*. In short, the Military Representatives based their recommendations, as a rule and mainly, upon the military factors of the case, leaving to the Supreme War Council itself to determine the political practicability of carrying them into effect. In the very few cases where the recommendations of the Military Representatives failed to receive the definite approval of the Supreme War Council, this failure was due to the latter's belief that the recommendations were politically impracticable.†

The Supreme War Council did not usurp any of the powers of a commander-in-chief in the field, and it delegated to its Military Representatives no duty of execution; charging them however with the duty of following the execution by each country of the part allotted to it in any general operation or undertaking and keeping it informed as to the progress made in carrying out any such operation. Being preoccupied with none of the duties of command or of the detailed operations of a campaign, which necessarily demanded the continual attention of the commanding generals of the various national armies, and of the commanders-in-chief on the different fronts, the Military Representatives were able to study with more care and more general information than any others the progress of events on all the various fronts taken as a whole. They were

* Speech of Mr. Clemenceau at the second session, December 1, 1917. [Footnote in the original.]

† See Appendix B. [Footnote in the original. Appendix B is not printed; it is a summary of the operations of the Military Representatives.]

thus able to advise the Supreme War Council as to the relative effort that should be made on each front regarded as a component part of the whole and as to the character—offensive or defensive—that military operations there should assume, and to suggest measures that would bring conflicting demands of different commanders into harmony. The Military Representatives as a body therefore occupied with relation to the Supreme War Council, a position somewhat similar to that of chiefs-of-staff to their own governments, but having nothing to do with the administration of the troops nor of the preparation or execution of detailed plans.

The Military Representatives met as often as necessary to consider the questions referred to them and to draft their recommendations. They took turns in presiding at their meetings, in the order of the entry of their respective countries into the war.* Joint Notes and recommendations were signed by all of them.† During the temporary absence of any one of them because of sickness or for any other reason, his chief of staff was authorized to attend the meeting and sign for him,‡ but not to preside at a meeting, the chairmanship passing to the next Military Representative on the roster.

During the continuation of the Supreme War Council the following officers were, successively, Military Representatives:

France.

General Foch
 General Weygand
 General Vidalon
 General Belin
 General Desticker

Great Britain.

General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., K. C. M. G., D. S. O.
 General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, G. C. V. O., K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
 General the Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.

Italy.

General Cadorna
 General Giardino
 General di Robilant
 General Cavallero

United States of America.

General T. H. Bliss

* Resolution of the Military Representatives at their Third Meeting, December 12, 1917. [Footnote in the original.]

† Resolution of the Military Representatives at their 31st Meeting, May 19, 1918. [Footnote in the original.]

‡ Generals Desticker and Cavallero were designated as Military Representatives after the signing of the Armistice. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

4. *The Joint Secretariat.*

Continuous record of the discussions and decisions of the Supreme War Council and of the Military Representatives was provided for by the formation of a Joint Secretariat in accordance with the following resolutions adopted at the Second Session of the Supreme War Council on December 1st, 1917, at Versailles: ⁴

"3. In order to facilitate the reception and distribution of the information referred to above, each section of the Supreme War Council will comprise a permanent secretarial staff.

"4. The permanent secretarial staff of the respective countries will, in concert, organize a Joint Secretarial Bureau for the production and distribution of the notices, agenda, protocols, and procès-verbaux of the Supreme War Council, and for such other collective business as it may be found desirable to entrust to it."

Each Military Representative designated one of his staff as secretary for his section. The four secretaries so named constituted the Joint Secretariat contemplated in the above resolution and organized a system of records and of preparing agenda for the Supreme War Council and all its immediately dependent agencies, which it may be of interest to outline, since it was found to be both practical and generally satisfactory and would be applicable to any interallied boards or commissions that may be constituted in the future. In fact, the methods adopted by the Supreme War Council were subsequently adhered to for the work of the Peace Conference.

Since each section necessarily had a considerable amount of correspondence with its own government and its own army headquarters which was of no interest to the other sections and in some cases of a character such that it could not properly be given to them, and since it was foreseen that upon the dissolution of the Supreme War Council each government would want a complete record of its operations, the idea of a single central room of archives or record files was from the very beginning considered inadvisable. Each section, therefore, kept its own records according to the methods in vogue in its own government service; joint records, such as minutes, joint notes, joint reports, etc., being made in quadruplicate and translations into the various languages compared by the four secretaries acting together. In this way there was an authenticated and identical copy of such joint records for file in each section.

The system adopted by the Joint Secretariat, either in compliance with instructions received in the form of resolutions of the Supreme

⁴The following omission indicated in General Bliss' report.

War Council and of the Military Representatives, or as a result of the experience of the secretaries themselves gained in the performance of their duties, may be briefly outlined as follows:

(a) The meetings of the Supreme War Council were presided over by the Prime Minister of the country in which the particular session was being held.

(b) The meetings of the Military Representatives were presided over by the Military Representatives in turn, their names being arranged on a roster in the order of the entry of their country into the war.

(c) In the absence of a Military Representative his Chief of Staff was authorized to replace him and to sign joint recommendations for him; but the Chief of Staff could not act as Chairman of a meeting and the chairmanship fell to the Military Representative present who was next on the roster. The presence of three Military Representatives was necessary to constitute a quorum.

(d) The secretary whose chief was to preside at any meeting was responsible for the preparation in advance of the agenda for the coming meeting. In the case of the Supreme War Council inquiry was made of the governments as to the questions they wished to put on the agenda. In the case of the Military Representatives and other inter-allied committees, the agenda were made up on consultation with the Military or other technical Representatives; also by direction of one or another of the governments. The agenda were issued as long as possible before the meeting in order to permit each representative to prepare himself on the questions to be discussed. It was a general rule that the action which any representative proposed should be taken, was reduced to writing and circulated with the agenda for the information of his colleagues. Experience showed that it was almost imperative to have a written text to discuss in order to arrive at a conclusion within a reasonable time.

(e) The resolutions passed and decisions reached were reduced to writing at the meeting, or by the Joint Secretariat immediately after the meeting, in order to prevent any subsequent discussion arising from a difference of opinion as to the precise sense of the meeting.

(f) The minutes for each meeting were written up immediately thereafter by the secretary whose chief had acted as chairman and were circulated among the different sections, usually within 24 hours of the close of the meeting. This first draft of the minutes was subject to correction by the persons who participated in the meeting, provided the corrections were submitted within a reasonable length of time.

(g) The Military Representatives signed their own joint notes and recommendations and the minutes of their meetings in quadruplicate. Members of other inter-allied committees signed only their joint notes or recommendations, one copy for each government.

(h) Each secretary was charged with the duty of communicating such part of the record to the members or representatives of his government as concerned them.

5. Organization of the British Section.

The British Section was the first to be fully organized and in operation. It consisted, at the beginning, of 26 officers and 104 enlisted men and clerks. Being intended for what might be called war plans work rather than for the executive work necessary to coordinate the operations of a campaign, its organization differed from that usual in the staff of a commanding general and contained certain special features.

The officers were divided into a committee on the military affairs of Allied and Neutral countries, a committee on the military affairs of the Enemy and Neutral countries, a committee on Man Power and Matériel, a Political Branch, and a Secretariat and Administrative Branch.

(a) Allied and Neutral Branch.

It was the duty of this branch to study the military situation on all fronts, from the standpoint of an imaginary generalissimo. The situation was repeatedly summarized from this point of view and studies were made as to possible action that might be taken by the Allies and the best way to counter the possible moves by the enemy, as anticipated by the Committee on Enemy and Neutral affairs.

These reports were submitted whenever any marked change in the situation or other emergency made it seem advisable. Unless such an occasion arose these reports were regularly submitted weekly.

In view of the broad scope of the studies made, different officers of the committee specialized on the different fronts where operations were going on.

(b) Enemy and Neutral Branch.

This branch functioned in the same manner as the Allied and Neutral Committee except that the situation was viewed, as far as available information permitted, from the point of view of the Commander-in-chief of the enemy army. The work of these two committees was, therefore, complementary and their internal organization was the same. The positions of the Allied and Enemy armies in each theatre of operations were kept posted in a single common map room for the use of both committees. It may be stated that such studies in any of the Military Sections were cordially placed at the disposition of all the Sections.

(c) Man Power and Matériel Branch.

This committee was divided into three sub-committees: the first to deal with Allied and Enemy man power problems; the second, with the question of munitions and armament; and the third, with questions of supplies and transportation. It was the duty of this committee to keep the essential facts relating to its work constantly

up to date and tabulated for ready use by the Military Representative and the other members of the Section.

This committee issued weekly Allied and Enemy Strength returns for all fronts, compiled from the information obtained from their own war office and General Headquarters, and from the other sections of the Supreme War Council. These estimates included combatant strength, auxiliary personnel, heavy guns, light guns, machine guns, airplanes, tanks, etc.

(d) Political Branch:

The duty of this branch was to study the political situation in all countries in so far as it might affect the Military Situation and render such assistance as might aid the other branches and Committees in their appreciations. A weekly appreciation was prepared both from the Allied and Enemy point of view.

(e) Secretariat and Administrative Branch:

The Secretariat's duties have already been described under "Joint Secretariat". A limited number of officers under the Secretary were necessary for the administrative work connected with the maintenance and records of the clerical force and enlisted men.

6. *Organization of the French Section:*

The French Section was divided into a Western Committee, an Eastern Committee, a Committee on Economic and Political Affairs, and a Secretariat and Administrative branch. It consisted of approximately half the number of officers and clerks and enlisted men in the British Section.

The Western Committee kept all information concerning affairs on the Western front and was supposed to be prepared at all times to make an estimate of probable developments on that front. The Eastern Committee had similar duties in regard to the Eastern fronts from Archangel to Egypt. The Economical and Political Committee was chiefly concerned with the collection and digestion of information relative to the state of public opinion and the financial conditions of the enemy countries and of the small powers. The duties of the Secretariat and Administrative Branch were the same as in the other sections.

7. *Organization of the Italian Section:*

The Italian Section, originally 7 officers, consisted at the Armistice of 10 officers and about the same number of enlisted men and clerks. Due to this relatively small number no special internal organization was ever adopted for it. After the coming to France of the Italian divisions this section undertook the duty of representing the Italian Government with the French Military authorities in regard to these troops.

*8. Organization of the American Section:**

The American Section consisted of 12 officers, 19 army field clerks, 16 enlisted men, and 2 civilian employees. It was the last section to arrive at Versailles and its internal organization, which is shown in the accompanying diagram (Appendix 1) [*Appendix C*], was modelled largely on that of the British Section, although the small number of officers and enlisted men available made it impossible to produce any extensive statistical statements, the information in regard to the other Allied armies being readily obtainable from the reports of the other sections and the information in regard to the American Army being formulated at the American General Headquarters, and furnished, periodically, through the courtesy of General Pershing and his staff. It was thought that a large statistical branch would merely have produced a duplication of the work thus already being done in a more satisfactory manner.†

9. General Remarks:

The interchange of information and opinions among the Military Representatives and their staffs was constant, free and frank; and the relations that existed between them throughout the period of the war and of the Peace Conference, whatever the difference of opinion on any questions under consideration, was always most cordial and friendly.

* See Appendix C. [Footnote in the original. Appendix C. is not printed; it is a diagram of the organization of the American Section.]

† The commissioned staff of the American Military Representative comprised the following officers:

Brig. General P. D. Lochridge,	National Army
Colonel B. H. Wells,	Infantry, N. A.
(On request of General Pershing, Colonel B. H. Wells left the American Section on July 26, 1918, to become Chief of Staff of the 6th Corps.)	
Colonel S. D. Embick,	Signal Corps (temporary commission)
Colonel U. S. Grant, 3d,	Eng., N. A., General Staff
Colonel W. S. Browning,	Field Artillery, N. A., General Staff
Colonel J. M. Coward,	C. A. C., N. A., General Staff
Colonel W. B. Wallace,	Infantry (temporary commission), General Staff
Lt. Colonel Arthur Poillon,	Cavalry
Major C. M. Exley,	Q. M. C., N. A.
Capt. B. A. G. Fuller,	Infantry, R. C.
1st Lieut. P. A. Bedard,	O. D., R. C.

The reputation which I think I am justified in saying that the American Section enjoyed for tact in dealing with its colleagues, for soundness of judgment, for—in short—general “level-headedness”, is due to the professional accomplishments, the loyal devotion to their work and the untiring zeal of these officers. More than one of them sacrificed uncomplainingly the promotion that I am sure would have come to them in field service. They sacrificed these chances in order to put all their energy into the work which the American Section was doing in furthering the great object for which the Supreme War Council was created,—to bring about harmony and cordiality in the relations and purposes of the Allies.

The American Military Representative owes everything to their patient, loyal and intelligent assistance. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

After the selection of General Foch as Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief for the Western Front, and at his request, each section had a liaison officer at his Headquarters, who kept the Military Representatives constantly informed as to the progress of events and who facilitated the free exchange of opinion between the Supreme War Council and the High Command as to the military situation.

IV.—AUXILIARY INTER-ALLIED COMMITTEES AND COUNCILS

1. *The Naval Liaison Committee.*

In his criticism of the proposed Supreme War Council made in his speech in the House of Commons on the 19th of November, 1917, and which was a covert attack representing the extreme nationalistic as opposed to the rational inter-nationalistic view, Mr. Asquith called attention to the fact that, while a body of military advisers was provided for the Supreme War Council, naval interests, which were particularly important to Great Britain, were not represented. This objection was met by the formation in London of the Inter-Allied Naval Council, on which Admiral Sims represented the United States. Since the approval of the heads of the Allied Governments was necessary to insure the execution of any action recommended by this Council it frequently referred questions to the Supreme War Council, and its relations to the latter gradually became similar, as concerned naval affairs, to the relations of the Military Representatives, as concerned military affairs. In order to insure close and cordial cooperation between the Inter-Allied Naval Council in London and the Military Representatives a naval liaison committee was formed which periodically met at Versailles and facilitated the interchange of views.

2. *The Inter-Allied Aviation Committee.*

In Joint Note No. 7, (January 9th, 1918), adopted by the Supreme War Council at its Third Session, February 1st, 1918, the Military Representatives made the following recommendations:

“The Military Representatives consider that the question of placing Inter-Allied aviation on a definitely co-ordinated basis is a matter of great urgency. With this object they recommend that a small, strong Inter-Allied expert committee should be formed to report to the Supreme War Council. The Committee should meet at regular and frequent intervals at Versailles or wherever may be convenient. Each Section of the Supreme War Council should have upon its permanent staff an officer who should be an ex-officio member of that Committee. The Committee would, as a first step, draw up a statement of the existing state of affairs, the projects under way, the present state of, and future possibilities in construction, and would make definite recommendations as to their co-ordination on the most efficient lines. When the Supreme War Council had determined on their air Policy

and Strategy of the future, the Committee would advise as to execution and report as to progress. Instances of the questions in need of most urgent consideration are:—

“(i) the minimum necessities of the National Air Forces of each front;

“(ii) the speedy creation of Inter-Allied strategic formations and their employment;

“(iii) the systematic and scientific obliteration of areas in enemy territory vital to his munition supply;

“(iv) the concentration of Air Force in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to break the various vulnerable links of Turkish communications.”

In the course of the three meetings of this committee views were exchanged on many subjects of technical and general interest with regard to the development of aviation. Special efforts were made to co-ordinate the programs of production of aviation matériel. In connection with the utilization of airplanes for counter-submarine work it was decided that this service could not be separated from the elements of the various navies charged with other anti-submarine activities.

In the spring of 1918 the question of obtaining ground for the airdromes of the various armies in France had become quite acute. This committee was able to effect a compromise in this matter satisfactory to all three armies and which would provide for the increasing needs of the American aviation as well as for the new airdromes that would be needed with any marked changes in the line occupied by the contending armies.

The Committee interested itself especially in the formation of an independent bombing force and in the designation of priority among various military objectives as targets for such a force. This discussion finally took form in Joint Note No. 35 of the Military Representatives August 3d, 1918, in which it was recommended

(a) That an independent bombing force should be created as soon as available matériel and personnel made it possible.

(b) That in anticipation of the constitution of such a force it would be expedient for the Supreme War Council to decide whether the enemy should not be called on to desist in his night attacks on defenseless towns and advised that the Allies would take retaliatory action if he did not.

(c) That this bombing force should be under the command of an officer designated by the Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief and subject to the latter's immediate control.

(d) That the operations of this separate bombing force should be guided by some general plan previously conceived with regard to their effect on the rest of the campaign.

The complete organization of this bombing force was prevented by the exigencies of the campaign, then active on all fronts. But to a

certain extent it was carried into execution and the French independent air force and British bombing squadrons were placed at the disposition of General Pershing in the great assembly of aviation in the St. Mihiel operation.

3. The Inter-Allied Transportation Council.

The captures of rolling stock made by the Germans in the early years of the war, the unusual wear and tear on the rolling stock remaining, and the small facilities that could be devoted to the repair of old and to the manufacture of new rolling stock had resulted in a very marked reduction in the railroad facilities of the Allied countries. Moreover, the movement of the French and English divisions to Italy in the autumn of 1917 had brought such a strain on the available matériel that it interfered with the regular transportation in other places. This alone would have justified a careful study of rolling stock and other matériel on hand with reference to its best utilization, and such a study was made absolutely necessary by the possibility of having again to reinforce the Italian front, or at some future date the army in the Balkans. These facts were brought to the attention of the Supreme War Council at its 2nd Session, December 1, 1917, resulting in the passage of the following resolution:

"The Supreme War Council decide that it is desirable that the whole question of Inter-Allied transport by sea and land shall be examined by a single expert, who shall report to it on the subject at the earliest possible date. It agreed that if the British Government can spare his services, Sir Eric Geddes should be designated to carry out this investigation, and that, in the first instance, he shall examine the transportation problem as affecting the Italian and Salonika situations.

"The representatives of the respective Governments undertake to give instructions to their technical experts and administrators to collaborate with Sir Eric Geddes, or, if his services cannot be made available, with such other expert as may be mutually agreed upon."

As a permanent solution of the problem did not promptly result, the Military Representatives, in Joint Note No. 8 (January 9th, 1918), made the following recommendation to the Supreme War Council:

"The Military Representatives consider that the question of placing Inter-Allied Transportation on a definitely co-ordinated basis is a matter of great urgency. With this object they recommend that a small strong Inter-Allied Expert Committee should be formed to report to the Supreme War Council. The Committee should meet at regular and frequent intervals at Versailles or wherever may be most convenient. Each Section of the Supreme War Council should have upon its permanent staff an officer who should be an ex-officio member of that Committee. The Committee would, as a first step,

draw up a statement of the existing position of affairs, the projects now under way, the present state of and future possibilities in construction, and would make definite recommendations as to their co-ordination on the most efficient lines.

"When the Supreme War Council had determined on the Transportation Policy and Strategy of the future, the Committee would advise as to execution and report as to progress.

"Instances of the questions in need of most urgent consideration, are:—

"1. The co-ordination and improvement of railway communications behind the British, French and Italian fronts, and the machinery necessary for their employment as one system.

"2. Rail and shipping facilities in Greece to serve possible alternative lines of defense to that at present being held.

"3. Railway scheme to assist in the more rapid defeat of the Turkish forces in Palestine.

"4. Suggestions as to points on the enemy systems of communications where the maximum effect could be obtained by aeroplane attack."

This note was discussed by the Supreme War Council at its 4th Session in London, March 14th and 15th, 1918, in connection with a detailed report on the transportation situation which had been made by Major General Sir P. A. M. Nash and which included a recommendation for a similar council but with executive authority to act on its own responsibility in certain matters. The following action was taken:

"Resolution No. 6. Creation of an Inter-Allied Transportation Council.

"The Supreme War Council approve the recommendation of Major General Sir P. A. M. Nash for the creation of an Inter-Allied Transportation Council at Paris, under the Supreme War Council, consisting of a representative of each of the four Allied Governments, and charged with the functions set forth in section 3, Paragraph 11, of General Nash's Report:—

"I recommend that an Inter-Allied Transportation Council should be created at Paris under the Supreme War Council, consisting of a representative of each of the four Allied Governments. This Council should be charged with fulfilling the following main functions:—

"(i) (a) To advise the Supreme War Council at Versailles of the transportation aspect of all plans of campaign on the Western front.

"(b) To negotiate with the Allied Governments concerned as to the provision of such additional railway facilities as are necessary to give effect to any accepted plan of campaign, or to relieve the general position, and to arrange for any extraneous assistance required in men or material.

"(ii) (a) To prepare, when called upon to do so, schemes for the consideration of the Supreme War Council for all large movements of troops between one section of the front and another.

"(b) To make, when instructed to do so, necessary preparation with the Inter-Allied Governments concerned for the carrying out of such movements, including when necessary a redistribution of mobile resources of railway matériel and personnel.

“(iii) The study of the enemy positions regarding transportation facilities of every kind and advise the Supreme War Council as to the enemy’s capabilities of concentrating and maintaining their forces on any particular sector of their front, and as to the points at which and methods by which the enemy’s railway communications can be attacked from the air with greater effect.

“(iv) To prepare schemes to develop continental railway lines of communication so as to relieve sea lines of communication, and to negotiate with the Governments concerned regarding the best utilization of the Allied railway resources to economize sea transport.

“(v) To watch the performance of the different agencies operating the lines of communication on the Western front, bringing to the notice of the Governments or armies concerned cases in which the fullest use does not appear to be made of available resources and suggesting remedies.”

The Inter-Allied Transportation Council so formed rendered extraordinarily valuable services to the Allied cause, the principal of which were:

(a) Co-ordination of the Military use of the railroads behind the entire Western front so as to ensure their most effective utilization with the rolling stock available.

(b) Ensuring the most effective utilization of the facilities already existing for making repairs* and the increase of these facilities so as to bring back into service a large part of the cars which had remained idle for a considerable length of time.

(c) The location and construction of an emergency railroad line joining the communications of the British Army with the communications of the French Army, and thereby in some measure remedying the disadvantage in which the Allies found themselves in sending reserves and munitions from one part of their line to another ever since the German offensive of March had made the Paris-Amiens Railroad impracticable throughout its northern section.

(d) The solution of the problem of increasing the capacity of the railroads between France and Italy.

It is of interest to note that in this latter matter the solution suggested by the American members of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council was practically the one adopted. The work connected with this was provided for by Joint Note No. 33, July 5, 1918, of the Military Representatives, which read as follows:

“MEASURES IMPERATIVE TO TAKE IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY OF THE MODANE LINE WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE STRATEGIC DEMANDS

“The Permanent Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council having considered Joint Note No. 19† of the 5th of March,

*As a result of co-ordinated use of facilities a great deal of thitherto unserviceable rolling stock was repaired and put into commission prior to the armistice. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

†Joint Notes No. 19 (March 27, 1918) and No. 22 (April 18, 1918) referred to the above recommendations as to the measures that should be taken for the support of the Italian Army in case of an enemy offensive on that front and for the maintenance of the coal supply for Italy; both of which emphasized the necessity for improving the Trans-Alpine Railroad service. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report.]

1918, Joint Note No. 22* of the 18th of April, 1918; and, after examining:—

(a) the report drawn up by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council relative to measures to be given effect to on the Modane Line with a view to increasing its carrying capacity, (Annexure 'X'),⁵ and

(b) the explanatory memorandum hereto attached (Annexure 'Y');⁵

are of the opinion that:—

“(1) Given the great and ever increasing strategic importance of the Modane Line and the necessity of increasing its carrying capacity as a counter-balance to the greater facilities of transport between the fronts which the enemy possesses to-day, it is urgent that all the measures proposed by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council be approved, put into execution and completed with the least possible delay.

“(2) For reasons indicated in the Report of the said Council and the explanatory memorandum annexed, the work in question should be of a frankly Inter-Allied character, and should therefore be carried out by the joint contribution of means and labour by all the Allies acting as one.

“(3) The proportion of this contribution as regards both means and labour should be studied by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council in consultation with the competent authorities and, subject to the recommendations of the Permanent Military Representatives, should be given final endorsement by the Governments concerned.

“(4) The measures necessary to give effect to this important question should be regarded as very urgent and the sanction of the various Governments to this Note should be accorded at the earliest possible moment.”

The question of the payment for the materials used for the improvements made to these railroads between France and Italy arose after the Armistice and was the subject of Joint Note No. 47, 1st December, 1919, of the Military Representatives.

On the recommendation of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council the Military Representatives also submitted Joint Notes as follows: No. 23 (April 18th, 1918) for the utilization of valuable Belgian railroad resources, and No. 24 (April 18th, 1918) recommending the increase of shipments of railroad stock from the United States, adopted May 1st, 1918, by the Supreme War Council at its Fifth Session.

*See footnote on previous page 80. [Footnote in General Bliss' report. Reference is to the preceding footnote.]

⁵Not printed.

4. *The Inter-Allied Committee on Tanks.*

In their Joint Note No. 9 (January 9th, 1918) the Military Representatives recommended:

“The Military Representatives consider that the question of placing Inter-Allied Tanks on a definitely co-ordinated basis is a matter of great urgency. With this object they recommend that a small strong Inter-Allied Expert Committee should be formed to report to the Supreme War Council. The committee should meet at regular and frequent intervals at Versailles or wherever may be most convenient. Each Section of the Supreme War Council should have upon its permanent Staff an officer who should be an ex-officio member of that Committee. The Committee would, as a first step, draw up a statement of the existing position of affairs, the projects now under way, the present state of and future possibilities in construction, and would make definite recommendations as to their co-ordination on the most efficient lines.

“When the Supreme War Council has determined on the Tanks Policy and Strategy of the future, the Committee would advise as to execution and report as to progress.

“Instances of the questions in need of most urgent consideration are:—

1. The minimum necessities of the National Tank forces at each front.
2. The speedy creation of Inter-Allied reserve formations and their employment.
3. Suggestions for the immediate creation of Allied anti-tank measures.”

This Joint Note was adopted by the Supreme War Council on 1st February, 1918, during the 3d Session.

This Committee was useful in securing the following:

(a) The adoption of types of tanks to be used by the different Allied Armies.

(b) The adoption of a doctrine and tactics for the employment of tanks, and the establishment of an Inter-Allied school for the training of tank personnel.

(Joint Note No. 30, 30th May, 1918, of the Military Representatives adopted by the Supreme War Council at their 6th Session, 3rd June, 1918.)

(c) The adoption of a policy for the distribution among the different armies of the tanks to be produced by the Inter-Allied factory at Chateauroux. The Armistice was signed before the products of this factory became available.

5. *The Inter-Allied Anti-Aircraft Committee.*

On the recommendation of the Chief of the Anti-Aircraft Service of the British Army meetings were arranged at Versailles for the chiefs of the same service in the other principal Allied Armies.

While the Committee so formed had no official recognition from the Supreme War Council and while it made no recommendations requiring action by the chiefs of the governments, the exchange of views made at its conferences and the technical reports considered, undoubtedly assisted in co-ordinating the methods of training and the types of material adopted in the different armies for these new technical services, the chief of the service in each army being for the first time cognizant of exactly what was being done in other armies.

6. The Allied Maritime Transport Council.

In my original report to the Secretary of War, submitted December 18, 1917, after the return of the House Mission, I recommended "that the Government of the United States concur in the Resolution adopted by the Inter-Allied Conference* in Paris by which an Inter-Allied organization is created to handle the question of shipping 'with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible, for the transportation of American troops', as quoted in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 10 from Paris to the War Department. That the very best man in the United States should represent us on that commission."⁷

The adherence of the United States to the Allied policy referred to resulted in the formation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council which sat in London and was clothed with considerable executive power.

On March 6, 1918, I was advised by cablegram from the Acting Chief of Staff with regard to the question of requisitioning the Dutch shipping in ports of the United States and was instructed in this connection as follows:

"The political and military aspects of this problem as well as the shipping aspect should be considered with particular reference to the need for every available ton of shipping for War Zone use later in 1918 and the recommendation made by the highest Allied authorities in conference. Request that you lay matter before Supreme War Council and Inter-Allied Shipping Council and that you cable their recommendations as promptly as possible".

The military aspects of the question were studied by the Military Representatives and their opinion was stated in Joint Note No. 17 which contained the following conclusion and recommendation:

"The Military Representatives are therefore of opinion that, owing to the urgent need of tonnage of all sorts for the transportation of matériel and personnel from the United States, the action recommended by the American War Trade Board to requisition the use of

*Session beginning November 29, 1917. [Footnote in General Bliss' report to the Secretary of State.]

⁷ *Ante*, p. 213, last paragraph.

400,000 tons of Dutch shipping now lying idle in American ports, is essentially desirable from a military point of view and the Military Representatives recommend that the matter be considered by the Supreme War Council for decision as to whether such action is otherwise consistent with the best interests of the Allies from the political, naval and economic points of view".

The matter was considered on March 15th by the Supreme War Council at its 4th Session, held in London, with the following result:

"The Supreme War Council have carefully considered the memorandum of the Allied Naval Council, setting forth the disadvantages of drawing Holland into war, whether as an ally or as an enemy. They have also considered Joint Note No. 17 of the Permanent Military Representatives on the possible military consequences of such an eventuality. The Supreme War Council are of the opinion that the risk of Holland being drawn into the war in consequence of the requisition of Dutch shipping is a remote one, and that, in view of the urgent and immediate need of shipping as set forth in the Note of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, the risk is one that should be accepted. They therefore recommend that the policy of requisitioning Dutch shipping should be adhered to."

The Allied Maritime Transport Council operated as an entirely independent body from the Supreme War Council; and it was only on occasions, when the military situation required that priority be given to certain demands for shipping, that the Military Representatives made any recommendations in regard to this subject.*

V.—THE EXECUTIVE WAR BOARD

It was foreseen that the collapse of Russia and Roumania would liberate a large number of German divisions, which up to that time had been needed for the campaigns on the Eastern front. The number of divisions that would become available in this way for a German offensive on the Western front in the spring of 1918 was variously estimated at from forty to fifty. If thus utilized, they would transfer the numerical superiority on the Western front from the Allies to the Germans until such time as the American army in France could be sufficiently organized and trained, and in sufficient numbers, to reestablish the equilibrium or bring about Allied superiority. Since weather conditions would probably prevent active operations on the Italian front until late in the spring it also seemed probable that the German forces which had been engaged in the autumn in the drive against the Italian army would be withdrawn

*Among these occasions may be mentioned: The repatriation of Czecho-Slovak troops from Russia (Joint Note No. 25, April 27, 1918, of the Military Representatives, and Resolution No. 4 of the Supreme War Council at its 5th Session, May 1, 1918); and the loan of British shipping for the transportation of American troops. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

for further reinforcement of the German army in France early in the spring.*

The Allied reserves had already been depleted in October, 1917, by 6 French and 5 English divisions, sent to reinforce the Italian army after the Caporetto disaster. It was evident that the maintenance of a separate reserve, for each national army of sufficient strength to make the position of that army perfectly safe, in case the great German offensive should happen to strike its line, would be impossible and that some plan for mutual support, as had already been necessary in the case of Italy, was imperatively demanded by the certainty that the German command would try to profit by their temporary numerical superiority to get a decision before the United States should have been able to develop her full military strength.

With these facts before them the Military Representatives recommended in paragraph 1 (i) of Joint Note No. 1 (December 13, 1917) "the use to the utmost of all possible mechanical means in order to provide the maximum mobile reserve"; and in Joint Note No. 14 (January 25, 1918) they made the following recommendation:

"The Military Representatives are of the opinion that the formation of a general reserve for the whole of the Allied forces on the Western front, both in France and Italy, is imperative.

"The Military Representatives recommend that in view of its urgency the creation of this reserve should be decided at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council and, so as to prepare for this decision, the governments should inform the Military Representatives as soon as possible of the views of their Chiefs of Staff and Commanders-in-Chief on this subject, in particular with regard to the number, situation and command of this reserve."

The formation of such a general reserve was taken up at the Third Session of the Supreme War Council, held at Versailles January 30th to February 2nd. While the general principle met with almost immediate approval, considerable discussion arose as to what units should compose it and who should control or command it. It was evident that the divisions needed for the creation of such a force would have to be taken from the reserves then available behind the different national armies—in other words, would have to be taken away to some extent from the control of the various commanders-in-chief—and that the individual or body controlling this reserve and authorized to decide the time and place of its use would exercise most of the essential powers of a commander-in-chief. It was these facts which caused

*Actually, 47 German divisions from the Eastern and Italian fronts participated in the German offensives of March, April and May. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

most of the difficulty in securing the approval of all the commanders-in-chief to the details of a plan which, in theory, they approved.

Only the Supreme War Council itself had, at that time, authority to do this and it might not be able to convene quickly enough to meet an emergency. Some new agency had to be created and the Allies were not yet prepared for the selection of a Commander-in-Chief. On February 1st it was agreed that each member of the Supreme War Council should discuss the subject with his own military advisers and present his views at the meeting on the next day. This decision was arrived at after much discussion and difference of opinion as to the agency for the control of the General Reserve. Had they been then ready to designate an Interallied Commander-in-Chief there would have been no difficulty; but for this they were not yet ready. The report made by the American Military Representative contained the following:

"1. I think that one single general principle should guide the Supreme War Council in determining the important question of the control and direction of the Interallied General Reserve. That general principle is unity of control and direction so far as it is possible to attain it.

"2. The Supreme War Council has already laid down the rule that the Allied Generals-in-Chief and their General Staffs must make their detailed plans in conformity to the general plans adopted by the Supreme War Council in representation of the Allied Governments. These plans must be submitted to the Supreme War Council in order that it may be assured that they are properly co-ordinated, and that all tend harmoniously to the successful accomplishment of a common object. The Supreme War Council cannot depart from this rule without abdicating its essential functions.

"3. It is not wise to waste effort by doing a thing which it is not necessary to do. It is, therefore, not wise to create an organization to do that which another organization has already been created to do. It is not wise to superimpose one agency upon another agency doing the same thing. The only possible result of such action will be to produce unnecessary confusion, friction, and delay, at a time when there should exist the utmost clearness of cool and unbiased vision, the utmost harmony, and the utmost rapidity of action.

"4. The Supreme War Council was created in order to secure unity of control, and unity of action. It was created, not to assume the functions of command and of execution which belong to Commanders-in-Chief and the General Staffs of the National Armies in the field, but it was created in order that a certain general control of the common allied military efforts might be transferred from the local theatres of war at the immediate front, where that control could not be exercised in the light of a general view of the entire situation, to a point further removed from that front and from which the situation on all fronts could be seen with equal clearness and each local situation be thus brought into its proper perspective.

"5. If the Supreme War Council, through its own military agency and in harmonious co-operation with the Commanders-in-Chief and with the General Staffs, is not able to undertake the solution of all questions relating to the Inter-Allied General Reserve, including its control and direction, I do not know of any organization which can undertake it. If the agency created to assist it under its immediate direction is not competent for the purpose, let the Supreme War Council change this agency to whatever extent it may find desirable; but, whatever be the final constitution of this agency, it is neither necessary nor wise to superimpose another agency on it. If the Supreme War Council cannot itself solve the problem of a general reserve, it will have failed in the principal function which, as I believe, it was created to perform, viz., the securing of unity of control and action; because, in the approaching campaign, the control and direction of a strong General Reserve is the only thing that will secure unity of purpose over three theatres of war which are now to be regarded as a single theatre.

"6. The Supreme War Council has already directed that the general attitude on the Western front shall, in general, be a defensive attitude. Therefore, the primary object in the creation of an Inter-Allied General Reserve must be the preservation of the integrity of a defensive line at the point or points most seriously threatened. It cannot be supposed that those who control and direct the reserve will use it to precipitate an offensive contrary to the accepted general plan. They can only direct it, in its entirety or in part, towards the threatened point where it immediately falls under the sole command of the Commander-in-Chief of that part of the front. If, when the enemy has been decisively repulsed, there should appear an opportunity for a decided offensive, it must be assumed that, if there then be any considerable force of the reserve still unengaged, those who control it will immediately send it to the Commander-in-Chief who is in a position to make the offensive.

"I, therefore, propose for consideration by the Supreme War Council the following—

Draft of a Resolution

"1. In order to secure unity of control and the maximum effort at the point or points of the Western front that may be most seriously attacked, the Supreme War Council directs the formation of an Interallied General Reserve.

"2. Its Military advisers, after full conference with the Commanders-in-Chief, their Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of Staff of the respective Governments, shall advise the Supreme War Council as to the strength, composition, and point or points of initial concentration of the General Reserve. The Supreme War Council, if it approves, will then give the necessary directions to carry these recommendations into effect.

"3. The Military advisers shall constitute a committee for the sole purpose of deciding to which Commander-in-Chief or to which ones of them, and the time when, the General Reserve or part of it shall be assigned to assist in the defense; after which the control by this committee shall cease. After approval by a majority of its members, the orders of the committee for the

movement of the General Reserve shall be given through that one of its members who shall be designated by the Supreme War Council for that purpose. The moment this movement of the General Reserve or any part of it shall have begun, it will come under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to whose assistance it is assigned. Until such movement begins, the General Reserve will for all purposes of discipline, instruction, and administration be under the orders of the respective Commanders-in-Chief, but no movement can be ordered except by the committee.

"4. On the advice of its Military Advisers and after approval, the Supreme War Council will give instructions to the Governments and Commanders-in-Chief concerned to prepare and have available at the designated places the means of transportation necessary for the most rapid movement of the General Reserve.

"5. At any time during the formation or existence of the General Reserve as an independent body, the Supreme War Council may, in its discretion, give any instructions relating to it."

As a result of the discussion which ensued the Supreme War Council passed the following resolution * relative to the formation of the General Reserve and its control, which it will be seen substantially followed the recommendations of the American Military Representative:

"Resolution No. 13.

"1. The Supreme War Council decides on the creation of a General Reserve for the whole of the Armies on the Western, Italian, and Balkan fronts.

"2. The Supreme War Council delegates to an Executive composed of the Military Representatives of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States, with General Foch for France, the following powers to be exercised after consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armies concerned:—

(a) To determine the strength in all arms and composition of the General Reserve, and the contribution of each national army thereto.

(b) To select the localities in which the General Reserve is normally to be stationed.

(c) To make arrangements for the transportation and concentration of the General Reserve in the different areas.

(d) To decide and issue orders as to the time, place, and period of employment of the General Reserve; the orders of the Executive Committee for the movement of the General Reserve shall be transmitted in the manner and by the persons who shall be designated by the Supreme War Council for that purpose in each particular case.

(e) To determine the time, place, and strength of the enemy counter-offensive, and then to hand over to one or more of the

*February 2, 1918. [Footnote in the original.]

Commanders-in-Chief the necessary troops for the operation. The moment this movement of the General Reserve, or of any part of it, shall have begun, it will come under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to whose assistance it is consigned.

(f) Until the movement of the General Reserve begins, it will, for all purposes of discipline, instruction, and administration be under the orders of the respective Commanders-in-Chief, but no movement can be ordered except by the Executive Committee.

3. In case of irreconcilable differences of opinion on a point of importance connected with the General Reserve, any Military Representative has the right to appeal to the Supreme War Council.

4. In order to facilitate its decisions, the Executive Committee has the right to visit any theatre of war.

5. The Supreme War Council will nominate the President of the Executive Committee from among the members of the committee."

"Resolution No. 14.

"The Supreme War Council designate General Foch as President of the Executive Committee for the General Reserve."

In compliance with these instructions the Executive War Board convened and took action as follows:

1st Meeting—3rd February, 1918

Inauguration of Board. Exchange of views on subjects requiring first consideration.

2nd Meeting—5th February, 1918

(1) It was agreed that a Joint Letter should be sent to each of the Commanders-in-Chief by the Executive Committee stating that it had been decided to form a General Reserve of so many Divisions, and that the contribution of each National Army should be of so many Divisions. It was agreed to fix the figures later.

(2) It was agreed that the distribution of the General Reserve should be considered and fixed at a later meeting.

3rd Meeting—6th February, 1918

(1) The text of a Joint Letter by the Executive War Board to the Commanders-in-Chief on the composition and the positions of the General Reserve was discussed and adopted.

(2) It was agreed that the use of the General Reserve should be discussed at another sitting.

4th Meeting—2nd March, 1918

(1) The replies of the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief to the Board's letter having been received, were read and considered.

(2) The fact that the British Commander-in-Chief had not yet replied was noted. The British Member of the Board, General Rawlinson, expected a reply by the next day. He did not think

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig would be able to make the contribution asked of him.

(3) Question of the 35th Italian Division was considered.

5th Meeting—4th March, 1918

(1) The reply of the British Commander-in-Chief to the Board's letter was considered.* It was noted that it substantially amounted to a statement that he could not make any contribution to the General Reserve as contemplated by the Supreme War Council.

(2) A report to the Supreme War Council, to the effect that the Executive War Board found itself unable to proceed with the formation of a General Reserve because of the refusal of the British Commander-in-Chief to contribute his quota to it, was adopted and signed with the proviso that it should be held 24 hours pending a conference which General Rawlinson expected to have with Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. As no change in the latter's attitude resulted from this conference, the report was sent to the Members of the Supreme War Council.

(3) The return of a second British Division from Italy was considered.

6th Meeting—8th March, 1918

The Executive War Board took the following decisions:—

(1) "The Executive War Board has been unable to form a general Reserve on the basis of its letter of 6th February and has

* Extract of letter 2nd March, 1918:

"An enemy offensive appears to be imminent on both the English and French fronts. To meet this attack I have already disposed of all the troops at present under my command, and if I were to earmark six or seven divisions from these troops, the whole of my plans and dispositions would have to be re-modelled. This is clearly impossible, and I therefore regret that I am unable to comply with the suggestion conveyed in the Joint Note.

"I would also point out that I foresee a wider employment, etc. of Allied Reserves than that foreshadowed in the Joint Note.

"In the event of the enemy making a sustained attack in great force on any of the Allied Armies on the Western front, it might be necessary to despatch a considerable force to the assistance of the Army attacked, and to maintain that force by a rotation of divisions. But this force could not be earmarked or located in any particular areas prior to the delivery of the German offensive or the development of the enemy's intentions, for the situation might well demand the ultimate employment of the whole of the resources of any one army.

"For such a purpose or to meet any emergency on the Franco-British front, I have arranged as a preliminary measure with the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies for all preparations to be made for the rapid despatch of a force of from six to eight British divisions with a proportionate amount of artillery and subsidiary services to his assistance.

"General Petain has made similar arrangements for relief or intervention of French troops on the British front. These arrangements, both French and British, are now being completed, and zones of concentration opposite those fronts which are most vulnerable and likely to be attacked are being provided."

[Footnote in the original.]

so reported to the several Governments, whose instructions it awaits.

(2) "If any member of the Board has a new proposal to make in respect to the formation of a General Reserve, he should submit it in the form of a Draft Joint Letter.

(3) "General Rawlinson having asked that the question of the withdrawal of the 7th Division (British) in Italy be examined by the Executive War Board, the Executive War Board decided that the question could not be treated apart from that of the General Reserve. If it was to be treated apart, the Supreme War Council ought to refer it specially to the Executive War Board."

The attitude of the British Command as indicated in the foregoing paraphrase of the minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Executive War Board was probably influenced by the vague fear which still existed in the minds of some that the divisions "ear-marked" for the General Reserve might be entirely withdrawn from the particular national army to which they belonged and attached somewhere beyond the control of the Commander-in-Chief of that Army; although to explain that there was no intention of doing this was one of the objects of the conference between the British Military Representative and the British Command.* That this was never intended by General Foch or the Executive War Board is shown by the maps giving their proposed distribution.† It was intended to place the divisions of the General Reserve, taken from any national army, somewhere in rear of the sector occupied by that army where it seemed, in view of the general situation, that they would be most usefully employed in case of a German attack against that sector, but also where they could be moved with the greatest rapidity to reinforce the division of the General Reserve taken from another army in case the attack should develop against the sector occupied by that army. As stated below, the divisions of the British army proposed to be taken for the General Reserve would have been stationed at Amiens and its immediate vicinity, and the corresponding French divisions were to be at a point between Paris and Rheims. Could this disposition have been made, there would have been approximately a quarter of a million troops available and quickly ready to check the disastrous German drive of March 21st.

The British Command had arranged with the French Command for mutual assistance to be given, according as the attack should develop against the British or against the French. But, it had been pointed out at the Third Session of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, January 30-February 2, that the whole purpose in view

*See Appendix L. [Footnote in the original.]

†See map in Appendix D. [Footnote in the original; Appendix D is not printed.]

was "that a certain general control of the common allied military efforts might be transferred from the local theatres of war at the immediate front, where that control could not be exercised in the light of a general view of the entire situation, to a point further removed from that front and from which the situation on all fronts could be seen with equal clearness and each local situation be thus brought into its proper perspective." Nothing could accomplish this except absolute unity of control of the General Reserve. Very often it appeared that an attack proceeded for a considerable time before it became evident that it was the real main attack of the enemy. Subordinate attacks or deceptive preparations for such attacks were made at other points or other sectors. Each national commander naturally held on to his own troops to the last minute believing that the real attack would ultimately develop against him and that the one being made against his colleagues was merely a subordinate one. These commanders were necessarily tied up and influenced by an intense preoccupation with the situation on their own front. And, it was only the immediate and startling success of the Germans, beginning with March 21, which left no room for doubt where the main attack was being made. It was then only that French divisions were rushed in to fill the breach,—rushed so hastily that they arrived on the field without their artillery and reserve of ammunition. Had the recommendations of the Executive War Board been carried into effect, the General Reserve would have been ready at the locations best suited for their prompt use, and just where the whole Entente world would have liked to have them.

The statement of the British Command that arrangements had been made for mutual assistance by the French and British was an acknowledgment of the necessity of the General Reserve; but the arrangement which they made lost most of the advantages of a General Reserve. And the statement of that Command that the divisions of the General Reserve "could not be located in any particular areas prior to the delivery of the German offensive or the development of the enemy's intentions" is shown to be in error by the fact that the proposed location of the divisions of that Reserve was one to meet all of the requirements of the situation.

At its 4th Session in London on March 14th and 15th, 1918, the Supreme War Council passed the following resolutions in regard to the Executive War Board:

"Resolution No. 1 (Allied General Reserve: transport of British and French Divisions from the Italian to the Western Front: employment of Italian troops on the Western Front.)

"1. The creation of a General Reserve for the whole of the armies on the Western, Italian, and Balkan fronts, as decided at Versailles on the 2nd February, 1918, is maintained.

"2. In view of the great enemy concentration on the Western front, and the likelihood of an early attack on the British section of the line, the proposals of the Executive War Board for the composition of the General Reserve require modification.

"3. The British and French divisions now on the Italian front, together with the British division which has just left that front, and a quota of Italian divisions, to be determined by the Executive War Board, shall form the nucleus of the General Reserve.

"4. The Executive War Board are at once to decide the following questions:—

- (a) The number of divisions to be allotted as the Italian quota of the General Reserve.
- (b) The desirability of an immediate transfer to the Western front of some of the British, French, and Italian divisions now on the Italian front.

"5. To assist them in carrying out the above decision, the Executive War Board, or a Committee of General Officers nominated by them with the approval of their Governments, are at once to confer with the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army.

"6. The decision of the Executive War Board on the above points will immediately be notified to the four Governments, so that, if political considerations are involved, the Governments may intervene.

"7. In the event of the Executive War Board being unable to reach a unanimous decision on Resolution 4 (paragraph 4 above of this same resolution), the question will be decided by communications between the Governments or at a meeting of the Supreme War Council.

"8. The nucleus of the General Reserve will be formed from such divisions as may be decided as provided above, and the General Reserve will thereafter be gradually expanded as the arrival of fresh divisions from the United States of America by relieving the pressure on the other armies, enables further divisions to be released."

"Resolution No. 7 (Committee to proceed to Italy.)

"With reference to paragraph 5 of the Resolutions adopted by the Supreme War Council at the Second Meeting of the 4th Session in regard to the Allied General Reserve, the Supreme War Council approve the proposal that the following General officers should form a Committee, which should proceed at once to Italy in order to confer with the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army:

General Maistre,
General Rawlinson,
General Bliss,
General Giardino."

"Resolution No. 8 (Functions of the Executive War Board: creation of an Allied General Reserve).

"The Supreme War Council took note of a statement made by General Foch with regard to the functions of the Executive War Board and the creation of an Allied General Reserve."

In compliance with the above instructions the Executive War Board held meetings as follows:

7th Meeting—21st March, 1918

"The Executive War Board assembled to decide the questions submitted to its decisions by the Supreme War Council at its meeting of Thursday, 14th March, 1918. (Resolution No. 4)

"After having considered the recommendations of the Meeting of General Officers which convened at Turin on the 20th of March, answers:—

"(a) 'The number of divisions to be allotted as the Italian quota of the General Reserve'.

"General Giardino estimates that the number may be 4 Italian divisions on condition that only 2 French divisions are to be assigned to the General Reserve. General Diaz did, in fact, state that if—as the Governments indicated it in their Resolution No. 3—all the French and English divisions in Italy should be placed in the General Reserve, he will not be able to furnish any Italian divisions for this General Reserve.

"Generals Bliss, Rawlinson and Foch estimate that the number of divisions to be put in the General Reserve should be 4 Italian divisions and, for the present, 2 French and 1 English division.

(b) 'The desirability of an immediate transfer to the Western front of some of the British, French, and Italian divisions now on the Italian front'.

"General Giardino considers as opportune the immediate transfer of 2 Italian divisions and thereafter, of 2 French and 1 English division if the military situation permits it. General Bliss, General Rawlinson and General Foch consider it opportune that 2 Italian divisions, 2 French divisions and 1 British division be transferred. Since these divisions are part of the General Reserve, the Executive Committee will fix the order of the transfer of those units, having agreed that the transportation will begin with the 2 Italian divisions if the military situation permits."

8th Meeting—23rd March, 1918

The Executive War Board took the following Resolutions:

"In view of the proportions reached by the battle now being fought *, the Executive War Board decides that it is absolutely necessary to bring back at once from Italy:—

2 French divisions

4 brigades of British Field Artillery not in divisional cadres

1 British division.

"As any delay might have the most serious results, the Executive War Board direct the execution of this movement."

Owing to its inability to obtain the participation of the British Commander-in-Chief in the formation of a General Reserve, the

* It was the third day of the great German drive. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

British Government failing to force his compliance with the scheme proposed by the Executive War Board acting under instructions of the Supreme War Council, the General Reserve had not been formed when the German offensive was launched on March 21st. Had it been formed early in February as the Executive War Board with its limited powers tried its best to do, the defeat of the British 5th Army on March 21st would most certainly have been promptly checked. The map of the Executive War Board shows that the location which it assigned to the minimum of 7 British Divisions in the proposed Reserve was at Amiens and the immediate vicinity while a minimum of 10 French Divisions were to be placed between Paris and Rheims;—both groups where they could be moved in any direction with the greatest promptness.

In Joint Note No. 12 the Military Representatives had given it as their opinion that "France will be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions", two of which were:

"That every possible measure shall be taken for strengthening and co-ordinating the Allied system of defences, more particularly in the sectors most liable to a heavy attack.

"That the whole Allied front in France be treated as a single strategic field of action, and that the disposition of the reserves, the periodic rearrangement of the point of junction between the various Allied forces on the actual front, and all other arrangements should be dominated by this consideration".

By adopting this joint note the Supreme War Council had made it the official statement of their policy for the conduct of the war in the spring and early summer of 1918. The rapid success of the German offensive in March developed the fact that a part of the British Army had not complied with the first of the above conditions; and it was the British Commander-in-Chief whose opposition had prevented the formation of the General Reserve, which if ready might have saved the Amiens-Paris railroad and have stopped the German advance before it ruptured the line at the junction of the French and English armies.

Under the Beauvais Agreement, April 3d, 1918, General Foch, as Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western front, had taken over the duties with which the Executive War Board has been charged; and at its Fifth Session at Abbeville, May 1st and 2nd, 1918, the Supreme War Council agreed (Resolution No. 2):

"That, in view of the extended powers conferred on General Foch by the Doullens and Beauvais Agreements, the Executive War Board, set up at the meeting of the Supreme War Council held on the 2nd February, should be dissolved.

"The Executive War Board is therefore dissolved."

VI.—THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AND THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1. General Remarks.

In the preceding pages a general idea has been given of the scope of the work which fell upon the Supreme War Council and the method pursued in performing it. In further illustration of this, a brief account of the relations of the Supreme War Council to the conduct of the war on the different fronts is given.

In a study presented to the Supreme War Council by the Military Representatives, at the request of that Council, it was held that France and Italy still remained the main theatres of the war. The decisive victory of the war—provided the enemy powers continued to hold together—was to be obtained by the decisive defeat of the Germans on the Western front, and this defeat at any point would necessarily entail the total collapse of enemy resistance on the remainder of that front and in all other theatres of war. It was, of course, always possible that a successful offensive on the Italian front or in the Balkans might cause the enemy coalition to crumble before a defeat could be inflicted on the French front; but in the general conditions which then existed there was nothing whatever to indicate this except as a remote possibility.

Nor was there anything at that time to make at all sure that the crushing of Austrian resistance on the Italian, or Turkish resistance on the Mesopotamian front would also crush Germany which was the real foundation of the hostile coalition. It was true that had the main effort, at one time, been diverted to the Italian front not only might Austria be thrown out of the coalition, but success there might afford an opportunity for a fatal thrust on the southern flank of Germany. But, with the disaster of Caporetto it seemed that this opportunity had been finally lost. It was, therefore, believed that the decisive defeat of the enemy coalition could only be achieved somewhere on the Western front between the North Sea and Switzerland; and that for this final struggle the Allies must concentrate their resources in man power and matériel on that front. Nothing should be allowed to absorb resources which were required by the armies of the Entente in France. It was assumed that the defeat of the Central Powers in any of the subsidiary theatres of war could only be a step on the road to the defeat of Germany; it could not bring about the final decision. Therefore, the part to be played by operations in the other theatres was assumed to be mainly that of contributing to the moral and material exhaustion of the enemy, thereby making his decisive defeat on the Western front the more easy. Until the time came for the final thrust on all fronts it was not realized how completely the military resistance of the enemy, after his exhaustion by

the determined Allied offensive of the summer and early autumn of 1918, had become like that of an empty eggshell. It was, however, assumed that as soon as the time came for final offensive operations in France, the operations in Italy and in every other theatre of war must be characterized by the utmost vigor in order to take advantage of any specially favorable development in any of those theatres and also to prevent the German armies in France from obtaining any assistance from their allies elsewhere.

Agreement on a military policy for the beginning of the campaign of 1918 was first reached by the Allies when the Supreme War Council, on February 1st, 1918, accepted Joint Note No. 1 of the Military Representatives of December 13, 1917. It was based on a deliberate and express acceptance of the view that the arrival of American troops was necessary, first, to hold out against the anticipated German attack and, second, to be able thereafter to take a decisive offensive.* In brief, this policy was:

1) To provide for a co-ordinated system of defense from the North Sea to the Adriatic.

(a) By reconsidering the existing lines of defense and constructing additional and successive defense lines to check an attack by the enemy.

(b) Providing the maximum mobile reserve and means to afford rest and opportunity of training for reserves.

2) To develop rail and sea communication between different sections of the front and make preparations for the movement of troops between these different sections, especially in respect to the Italian front. This defensive policy was not to preclude any minor forms of active defense that any Commander-in-Chief might think necessary to maintain the offensive spirit of his troops.

3) A defensive policy for the Balkan front.

The foregoing marked the beginning of a co-ordinated Allied policy. On the 31st of January, 1918, the Supreme War Council accepted Joint Note No. 12, January 21st, 1918, of the Military Representatives, which outlined the military policy for the beginning of 1918 and until the circumstances of the campaign should indicate a change. Again, in this note, a defensive policy for the Western front was advised and while it was not thought at that time that even with the maximum effort assumed as then possible for the United States in man power and matériel a complete victory over

*See remarks at the conference held at 10 Downing St., London, November 20, 1917, pp. 5 and 6 [*ante*, p. 204]. See also the declaration in Joint Note 12 to the effect that France could be made safe during 1918 only under certain specified conditions, the first of which was that the French and British forces in France should "receive the expected reinforcement of not less than two American divisions a month"; and many other subsequent declarations. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

the Central Powers could be obtained in 1918, it was realized that unforeseen developments in that year might afford an opportunity for final success. Therefore, the Military Representatives advised that the Allied Armies on the Western front, far from being passive should, on the contrary, take advantage of every occasion to impose their will on the adversary. It was held that "the policy of a strong defensive not only does not preclude, but actually prepares for any offensive measures in any theatre of war that may be decided upon for 1918 when the present political situation in Russia, and the military situation in Italy, are more clearly defined". In the note the Military Representatives, while advising energetic offensive action in Palestine and Mesopotamia, maintained that no troops, excepting possibly surplus mounted troops, could be with any degree of safety moved from the Western to the Eastern front. The principle of treating the Western front in France as a single strategic field of action, also agreed upon at the meeting of the Supreme War Council of January 21, 1918, now brought up the question of how the separate Allied Armies could operate successfully under three separate, independent commanders. The introduction to this report deals at length with this subject and shows how matters progressed and necessity finally forced the acceptance of a single commander for the Western front in France.

2. *The Western Front.*

In order that there may be no confusion as to the term "Western Front" it must be remembered that, prior to the German offensives of March and April, 1918, the term "Western Front" applied to the sector from the North Sea to Switzerland; but, during the remaining period of the war it applied to a sector which really included two theatres of operation, namely, the sector from the North Sea to the Adriatic. The term, therefore, required some qualification. As a result of the Abbeville Agreement of the Supreme War Council in its meeting at that place, May 2nd, 1918, the Western front became officially the sector from the North Sea to the Adriatic and subsequently in referring to the Western front the term was qualified by "in France" or "in Italy" when mentioning one of the divisions of what was considered one strategic field.

(a) Operations in France and Belgium.

The High Command having been established (nominally on March 26th, 1918, but actually on April 3d, 1918), the Supreme War Council now gave to the Commander-in-Chief a free hand in the conduct of operations in this theatre and every effort was made by the Military Representatives to assist the Commander-in-Chief in carrying out his policies. In addition to advising the Supreme War Council on all matters of policy pertaining to the general

conduct of the war, the Military Representatives consulted freely with the High Command on any matter when it seemed possible that their advice or the studies of their respective sections might be useful.*

(b) Operations in Italy.

The attitude of the Supreme War Council, with respect to operations on this front was to hold here only sufficient troops to maintain a safe defensive attitude. The question of reinforcements for the Italian front first came before the Military Representatives in December of 1917, when Italy made an urgent request for a sixth British division then on the Western front in France. The question being referred to the Military Representatives, they prepared Joint Note No. 3, which was accepted by the Supreme War Council February 1, 1918. This note advised against sending further reinforcements to the Italian front.

On December 1st, 1917, the Supreme War Council instructed the Military Representatives to examine the situation on the Italian front from an offensive as well as a defensive point of view and report upon it at an early date. As the result of this mandate the Military Representatives prepared Joint Note No. 6, which was accepted by the Supreme War Council at its session of February 1st, 1918. In this note the Military Representatives expressed the following opinion:

"1. The situation appears to be restored on the Italian front. During the last six weeks the Italian Army has shown very considerable powers of resistance which ought to be sufficient to hold, with the help of the Allied forces, the line Piave-Grappa-Altiplani.

"2. It does not at the present moment appear possible, or desirable, to take the offensive in Italy. The duty of the Allied forces is to maintain a defensive of the utmost tenacity with the object of preserving the line which they now occupy and which protects the port of Venice. With this object the line must be strengthened with every engineering device and with successive and mutually supporting lines behind it so that the ground can be defended inch by inch. As a measure of precaution, the works undertaken behind the Bachiglione and on the Mincio-Po line must be hurried on without delay.

"3. The Allied reinforcements are sufficient in the existing situation of the Italian front. In any event, the general situation at the present would not allow them to be increased.

"4. The re-organization and training of the Italian Army must be pushed forward with the utmost dispatch to meet any eventuality that may arise on the Italian front, as well as to facilitate the withdrawal of all or part of the Anglo-French in Italy at the earliest possible date."

*As illustrations of this see appendix E and F [not printed], the subjects of which were presented to the Inter-Allied Command on April 25, 1918, and June 6, 1918, respectively. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

Nothing subsequently developed to cause the Supreme War Council to change its attitude with respect to the Italian front and, with the exception of a few American troops sent to the Italian front for the purpose of bettering the Italian morale by giving to the forces on this front a more completely Allied aspect, no further reinforcements were sent to Italy. On the contrary, a number of divisions, among which were four Italian divisions, were taken from the Italian front and sent to the front in France.

3. Operations in the Balkan Peninsula.

In Joint Note No. 1 of December 13, 1917, the Military Representatives advised a defensive attitude in the Balkans. The note stated that in the event of a serious attack by the enemy in this theatre, in which it might be impossible to adequately reinforce troops there available, it was necessary to consider the possibility of a systematic and pre-arranged retirement from part, at any rate, of the existing front.

In explanation of this general view, it must be kept in mind that the Germans had already begun the withdrawal on a large scale of their forces on the Russian front. Exactly what they were doing with them, or intended to do, was not known. From time to time a new German division was identified on the Western front in France. But whether these represented all the divisions that had been withdrawn from the East no one could tell. Others might at that moment be en route towards the Balkans or Italy or towards both. Their arrival would be known only when they suddenly appeared and, probably, only when they appeared in a drive actually begun. The means of detection of newly arrived enemy troops on either of those fronts were by no means as easy as on the Western front. Not infrequently, reports came to us at Versailles of the arrival of fresh German divisions in Italy, which afterwards proved incorrect. Moreover, the movement from the East towards France might easily continue until the Germans had there obtained a formidable superiority and still leave divisions to throw against the Army of the Orient or against the Italian front. And there were some who believed, then and now, that this would have been a wiser move for the Germans to make, provided their transportation facilities permitted it. The morale on neither of the (for the time) subsidiary fronts was very good. Some believed that a few good German divisions thrown without warning against the front in Macedonia would break it. The political situation in Greece was such that this might throw her out of the war, make many fine harbors available as German submarine bases—all with a tremendous reflex action on the Allied morale. Similar action might break the Italian front with similar results. The Italians themselves believed this to be the real danger,

which accounted for their unwillingness to send a large force to France and on the contrary caused them to demand reinforcements. Therefore, for the time, it seemed that the most that could be done on these two fronts was to strengthen the positions and hold on.

In Joint Note No. 4, of December 23, 1917, approved by the Supreme War Council on June 3, 1918, the Military Representatives recommended the holding of a line from Stavros to Monastir for which purpose they stated that they believed sufficient allied forces were on the ground to successfully withstand the enemy forces then present in that theatre. They advised, however, that since reinforcements for the Balkans were not available the possibility of a retirement must be faced. While recognizing the desirability of holding on to both Salonika and Valona they urged that the mainland of Greece be denied to the enemy. It was requested that the Commander-in-Chief at Salonika be asked for his plan and that he be advised that it must include arrangements for rebasing himself on Greece and not on Salonika alone.

As a result of the enemy pressure still being exerted in France, the Supreme War Council at its 5th Session agreed that a French and British general officer should be sent at once to Salonika, where, in association with the general officer commanding the Italian forces at Valona they should confer with General Guillaumat in order, if possible, to arrange for the immediate withdrawal of some Allied battalions from that theatre to the Western front. No withdrawals resulted, however, from the foregoing action.

The Supreme War Council at its 7th Session on the 2nd, 3d, and 4th of July, 1918, passed a resolution directing that:

"1. The Military Representatives shall report as to the desirability of undertaking an offensive in the Balkans and a diplomatic representative shall be attached to the Military Representatives for this inquiry.

"2. Pending the result of their inquiry no general offensive will take place."

The report drawn up as a result of the foregoing resolution embodied the following recommendations:

"(a) That it is desirable to make energetic preparations to enable the Allies to begin an offensive operation in the Balkans not later than October 1st, 1918, provided that these preparations do not entail the transfer of any men or material from the Western front, or the diversion of any tonnage which would otherwise be available for the continuous transport of men and material at the maximum rate indispensable for the realization of the plan of operation on the Western front, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

"(b) That it is necessary, in principle, to give the General Commanding in Chief of the Allied Armies of the East a free hand to carry

this offensive into execution at the moment which he may consider most favorable, provided new and unforeseen circumstances do not compel the Supreme War Council itself to fix the date, or to abandon the operation altogether."

In Joint Note No. 37 of September 10, 1918, on the subject of the military policy of the Allies for the autumn of 1918 and for the year 1919 (it being still held by the Allied High Command that preparations should be made for a possible campaign in the latter year), attention was invited to the preceding recommendations and the Military Representatives added, in substance, that it was not possible to foresee what the actual operations should be, on account of the uncertain political conditions in which some of the Allies' enemies were then involved, and that, therefore, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Macedonia should not, in preparing his offensive operations, lose sight of the necessity which still existed of improving his lines of communications and of establishing new bases in Old Greece in accordance with the directions laid down by the Supreme War Council contained in Joint Note No. 4 of the Military Representatives.

An Allied offensive in the Balkans began on September 15th, 1918, and resulted, as is well known, in Bulgaria's collapse.

4. *Siberia and North Russia.*

(a) *Siberia:*

At the close of the year 1917 and beginning of the year 1918 the Allies watched day by day the Germans withdrawing an increasing number of divisions from their Russian front and adding them to the forces which it was evident that they intended to employ in a tremendous effort early in the latter year. The situation was such as to cause the Allies the gravest apprehension. They were ready to clutch at every straw which seemed to afford the slightest chance of supporting their sinking weight.

In the month of February, 1918, the American Military Representative was informed that one of the Allies was strongly pressing the Government of the United States to participate in an Allied expedition to Siberia by way of Vladivostock. It was his first definite information that such a project was being considered, although for some time it had been a matter of more or less informal discussion among his colleagues. On receiving this information he brought the matter up for formal discussion with his colleagues and then learned that more or less elaborate, though unofficial, studies had been made on the subject.

It was represented that enormous stores of military supplies of all kinds had been brought to Vladivostock during the régime of the Czar and that the general collapse of the transportation system, both before and after the revolution, had prevented their being brought

into European Russia. There was reason to believe that the new government might dispose of these stores to the advantage of Germany and to the detriment of the Allies. It was believed that great quantities of them were still to be found at Vladivostock and along the railway at least as far as Harbin.

This situation gave a valid reason for the military occupation of Vladivostock and the railway as far as Harbin, as a similar one gave a military reason for the subsequent project to occupy the ports of Murmansk and Archangel. But, as far as these situations alone were concerned, neither of them gave a reason for a further advance into the interior.

With reference to Siberia, the studies showed that no other Allied troops than those of Japan (except, possibly, in very small numbers) could be made available for this expedition. In fact, it was urged that one advantage of this movement would be to utilize Japanese troops relatively near to their home base but who could not be brought to any of the other fronts without a cost in money and tonnage, combined with difficulties of supply, that would be prohibitive.

At that time there was, in the mind of many, a misconception as to the extent of the revolutionary feeling in Russia, whether Bolshevik or otherwise, and the American Military Representative always held that the plans for intervention in that country and the ultimate objects were too largely based on that misconception. The others believed that the great mass of the people in European Russia and, especially, in Siberia wanted nothing but a leader and some support from the outside to overthrow a government whose local iniquities were then beginning to appall the world. Too little weight was given to the fact that the great mass of the 180,000,000 people living in Russia knew little of these iniquities and suffered little or nothing from them; while they attributed all of the evils from which they suffered to war in the abstract. People who believed that were not likely to rally to the support of anyone who proposed further war.

Whether the basic idea was incorrect or not, it was assumed that, after getting possession of the military stores at Vladivostock and Archangel, an Allied force of only a few divisions could work its way along the trans-Siberian railway as far as Cheliabinsk, occupying the important centers of population on or near that railway, and thus furnishing nuclei about which the orderly elements would rally and thence, by a process of peaceful penetration, their influence would be carried into European Russia. The occupation of the Siberian railway, it was believed, would first of all deprive the Germans of any possible hope of the grain supply of that great province. Furthermore, it was believed that the influence permeat-

ing the rest of the empire from the restoration of orderly government in Siberia would lead to a rehabilitation of a Russian Army to operate on the Eastern frontier of Germany. Could this be realized in time, it would prevent the further withdrawal of German divisions from that front and might possibly force the return of some that had already been withdrawn.

Thus, it will be seen that the original idea was not primarily to initiate a war against Bolshevism as such but was merely to bring about a renewal of a Russian thrust against Eastern Germany.

In the discussions which followed upon this subject, the American Military Representative held that the only certain or probable military advantage from the proposed movement would result from taking possession of the military supplies at Vladivostock and Harbin and prevent their sale to the Germans. He believed that, as conditions then were, the proposed movement along the entire line of the trans-Siberian railway was open to serious objections and might result in a situation quite the opposite to that which academic studies had made appear possible or probable. The Germans had at that moment just renewed the status of war with the Bolsheviks. The real object of the proposed movement was to consolidate all of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia in favor of the Allies; but it was proposed that the movement should be conducted almost entirely by Japanese troops, the long-time enemies of the Russians and towards whom the latter entertained a very bitter feeling. It was, therefore, necessary to consider whether the Germans as the declared enemies of the Bolsheviks might not be as likely to consolidate in their own favor the anti-Bolshevik sentiment as the Japanese would be to consolidate it in favor of the Allies. Moreover, the proposed movement would demand an increasing number of troops, especially should the original assumption as to the friendly attitude of the Russian masses prove to be erroneous. This increasing demand would cause an increasing drain on tonnage which, even without the losses due to submarine warfare, was not sufficient for the proper conduct of the war on the Western front. He, personally, believed that the war would be decided in 1918 for or against the Allies. It would take a long time, even if all calculations and assumptions proved correct, to bring any real Allied pressure to bear on Germany through Russia. Long before the lapse of this time the war might be over and might be lost due to this diversion of Allied strength.

Nevertheless, he believed that the seizure of the military stores at Vladivostock and Harbin would be a distinct advantage to the Allies and as this could be accomplished by the use of a relatively small Japanese force which could not be employed to advantage elsewhere

and which could be handled by Japanese tonnage he yielded his objections to the extent of agreeing to this occupation, with a further proviso that a strong civilian and military Allied Mission should accompany the expedition to Harbin, and which should report to the respective governments the facts which they might then have ascertained in regard to the real interior feeling of Russia, thus enabling those governments to decide whether the continuance of the movement would or would not be wise.

Consequently, on February 18, 1918, the Military Representatives adopted their Joint Note No. 16, as follows:—

“1. That the occupation of the Siberian railway from Vladivostock to Harbin, together with both terminals, presents military advantages that outweigh any probable political disadvantages.

“2. That they recommend this occupation by a Japanese force, after obtaining a suitable guarantee from Japan; together with a joint Allied Mission.

“3. The question of the further occupation of the railway shall be determined by the Allied Governments concerned according as the circumstances develop.”

By this time, however, the subject had been taken up by the respective governments by diplomatic correspondence instead of being a matter to be determined by the Supreme War Council, and nothing further was done in the execution of Joint Note No. 16.

The views of the American Military Representative received the approval of his Government.

However, on April 9, 1918, at a full meeting of the Military Representatives, there was presented the draft of Joint Note No. 20 for discussion. The subject of this note was “The Situation in the Eastern Theatre”. It emphasized the necessity of an immediate Allied intervention in Russia as the only course that would insure any “serious military resistance to Germany” from that direction. Here, again, was an evidence of the frequent tendency to divert efforts from measures to attain a common end, for the purpose of guarding some threatened national interest. In Joint Note No. 20 appeared very clearly the British fear of influences that might seriously threaten India. To be sure, such a threat by the Central Powers might cause the diversion of British troops from the Western front in order to protect and guard the threatened India, and thereby decide the war in favor of the enemy. But, surely, this was an argument in favor of permitting no diversion of effort from the Western front but rather of concentrating every effort there for the purpose of effecting a quick decision.

I explained to my colleagues that the instructions which I had received from my Government were to the effect that the whole question of intervention in Siberia was the subject of diplomatic

negotiation; that I, therefore, could not join them in signing the note but that, as it was a clear exposition of the situation from their point of view, I would transmit it, unsigned by me, for the information of my Government.

In any event, difficulties of finance practically prohibited intervention in Siberia on the scale which finally came to be demanded. Even if it were attempted by one of the Allies alone, that Ally would have to be compensated or financed; and this could only be done, either by granting concessions which were repugnant to the underlying idea with which the United States had entered the war, or by the United States assuming a financial burden which it could not then bear. It could only do this by largely ceasing its effort on the Western front.

(b) The Archangel and Murmansk Expeditions.

At a joint meeting of the Inter-Allied Naval Council and the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, March 23, 1918, the question of intervention at the northern Russian ports, Archangel and Murmansk, was first considered. The Joint Report prepared contained the following views:

"1. Intervention at Archangel.

"From the military point of view, under existing conditions no military resources whatever are found to be available for an expedition to Archangel.

"From the naval point of view, it would be extremely difficult to withdraw naval material, either transports or men-of-war, to devote to this expedition. The loss of this shipping, assigned to Archangel, would be heavily felt both in anti-submarine warfare and in transportation.

"The Council is conscious of the importance of preventing the stores accumulated at this point from falling into the hands of the enemy and is of opinion that all possible steps must be taken to insure the destruction of these stores.

"2. Intervention at Murmansk.

"The same considerations are equally applicable to Murmansk so far as a military expedition specially directed to this point is concerned.

"The Council is however of opinion, so far as this last place is concerned, that the naval steps actually being taken should be continued in order to retain this place in the possession of the Allies as long as possible."

However, as time went on, the threat of a German advance on Petrograd and the ports of Murmansk and Archangel, assisted by Finnish troops (that country having aspirations in the latter direction) came to be more and more real. Therefore, on June 3, 1918, the Supreme War Council adopted the Military Representatives Joint Note No. 31, as follows:—

"At their joint Meeting on the 23d of March, 1918, the Inter-Allied Naval Council and the Permanent Military Representatives con-

sidered the possibility of sending an Inter-Allied Military Expedition to Murmansk and Archangel with the object of protecting the stocks of military material warehoused in those ports.

"While recognising the impossibility for the moment of such an operation, the Representatives in their Joint Report of 23d March, 1918, expressed the hope that the naval effort at Murmansk would be continued in order to maintain Allied possession of that port as long as possible.

"The Permanent Military Representatives are of opinion that since the 23d of March the general situation in Russia and especially in the Northern Ports has completely altered.

"(a) The German threat to Murmansk and Archangel has become more definite and more imminent, Finland has completely fallen under German domination and is now openly hostile to the Entente and makes no concealment of its claims to Carelia, the Kola Peninsula and the Murmansk railway. The Germans are preparing for an advance on Petrograd.

"(b) We are urged to occupy these ports not only by the Allied Representatives in Russia but also by the majority of the Russian parties. Such occupation is an indispensable corollary of Allied intervention in Siberia.

"(c) It is hoped that the available Serbian and Czech units will render the land defence of the maritime bases possible without the transport of any considerable expeditionary force.

"(d) The Serbian and Czech units gathered at those points cannot be conveyed immediately to France and, should the German-Finnish Armies advance rapidly, they run the risk of capture unless organized and supported without delay. Further, the following considerations must be noted:—

a) The lines of communication both by land and sea terminating at the ports of Murmansk and Archangel are the only routes the Allies have left by which to penetrate into the heart of Russia to keep in touch with the various nationalities and to combat German influence.

b) These ports are the only free economic outlets towards Western Europe that are left to Russia and Siberia.

c) The occupation by Germany of Murmansk alone and its conversion into a first rate submarine base would make the sea route to Archangel impracticable for the Entente.

d) On the other hand, the occupation of Murmansk and Archangel by the Entente would protect the flanks of the Allied Armies which may eventually operate in Siberia and facilitate and expedite liaison with them.

e) The agreement of the Czecho-Slovaks to the maintenance of a portion of their forces in those regions will be conditional on the moral and material support of a few Allied units on the spot to co-operate with them against the Germans.

"Hence the Military Representatives are of opinion:—

1) That a military effort be made by the Allies to retain in their possession, first in importance, the port of Murmansk; afterwards or even simultaneously if possible the port of Archangel.

2) In order to limit this effort to the minimum, that it would be desirable to obtain from the National Czecho-Slav Council approval of the principle of retaining in these regions during the necessary time some Czech units, it being understood that the number of these units would be reduced to the minimum necessary and that the remainder would be sent to France as previously agreed.

3) Provided that the assistance defined above is obtained, the effort to be made by the Allies can then be limited to the sending to the Russian Arctic ports:—

- a) Of some English, French, American or Italian battalions, four to six in all;
- b) Of officers and specialists from the Allies or Czechs in France, to complete the instruction and cadres of the Serbo-Czech troops and to provide for the general administration and supply of the garrisoning force;
- c) Of the material and supplies which cannot be found there.

4) That the organization of the command can be effected in the following way:

There will be a single commander who will be charged with the direction of both naval defense and land defense of the Russian Arctic ports, as well as of the important points on the railroad which terminates at each of these ports.

This command will be exercised by a commander-in-chief designated by the British Government until such time as the Supreme War Council may otherwise direct."

At this time, the attitude of the United States Government with regard to its participation in the occupation of the northern ports of Russia was perfectly clear. It recognized that, at the best, only a limited force was available. It was not contemplated by it nor (so far as was known to it) by any other government to conduct operations into the interior of the country,—certainly not except with the cordial consent of the Russian people. It agreed to the occupation of the ports for the purpose of getting possession of valuable military material and of preventing, as long as possible with the available force, access by the Germans to them and the establishment by them there of bases.

During all of the discussions leading to the preparation and adoption of Joint Note No. 31, it was assumed that there would be an approximate equal participation by the various governments in the proposed expedition. But, following the action of the Supreme War Council of June 3rd, a request was presented by the British to the President of the United States asking that there be dispatched to the ports of Murmansk and Archangel an American force consisting of three battalions of infantry and machine guns, two batteries of field artillery, three companies of engineers and the necessary administrative and medical service. This contribution was

materially in excess of that which had been originally contemplated to be made by the United States. It led to requests from Washington for explanation and I accordingly, on June 22, 1918, sent a cable to Washington bearing on the general question of intervention at the Russian Arctic ports.

In this cable, besides giving an estimate of the situation with respect to the Russian Arctic ports, I expressed the opinion that the ports of Murmansk and Archangel could not be retained by the Allies without an unwise expenditure of military effort, unless the larger part of the forces required were drawn from Czech units then in Russia or from Russian sources; and further, that until definite assurance was had that such assistance would be obtained, Allied forces maintained at these ports should be sufficient only for defense against small enemy operations, or in the event of major enemy operations to insure removal or destruction of stores and destruction, insofar as practicable, of all port material that would be of service to the enemy in the establishment of submarine bases; that before entering on a new and vague plan calling for a large increase in the originally proposed American force the plan must be studied out and the common agreement of the Allies reached.

It will be remembered that a considerable force of Czech troops, which had joined the Russian armies prior to the revolution and which, subsequently to the revolution, had developed an increasing repugnance to fighting for or against any of the then factions in Russia, was gradually working its way toward the east in the hope that on arrival at Vladivostock they might be transported by the Allies to the Western front. At about this time, a part of this force was in the vicinity of Omsk (and perhaps had passed beyond it on its way to Vladivostock) while another part of it was farther to the west. It was hoped that this latter force might be diverted to the northwest and finally reach Archangel where it would join the small force of Serbs and Czechs already there.

The discrepancy between the contribution proposed by Joint Note No. 31 and that which was actually requested by the British led to an inquiry for explanation from Washington.

Military intervention at the northern ports of Russia was the subject of long and earnest consideration at the session of the Supreme War Council at Versailles July 2-4, 1918. At that session the American Military Representative explained that, probably, one of the reasons for failure thus far to take action by the Government at Washington was due to this discrepancy between the figures originally proposed and those which were finally demanded. It then became evident that General Poole, commanding at Archangel, had telegraphed to the British Government for additional forces with a

view to a more or less extended intervention. It was this which led to the British request of our Government for an apparently excessive contribution. After long consideration the three Prime Ministers drew up and sent a telegram to the President of the United States in regard to the intervention, without asking for study and recommendation by the Military Representatives.

In reply to requests for information I cabled on July 12, 1918, my views substantially as follows:

The Murmansk and Archangel plan was a compromise. Prior to July 2, when Sir Eric Geddes presented to the Supreme War Council the views of the British General Poole, commanding at Murmansk, my attitude toward this plan was as follows. My colleagues had steadily held to the view that sooner or later there would be intervention in Siberia. They believed that at any moment the attitude of Germany towards Russia might become such that the United States would approve of this intervention. I agreed with them to the extent that should such intervention come it would be desirable for the Allies to possess a point of support and access to Western Russia that would embarrass the Germans in their efforts to check intervention in Siberia and that would eventually permit military supplies to be carried into Russia directly from the west as well as from the east.

But I took no part in any plan based on the assumption of general intervention. The occupation of the northern Russian ports as part of a general plan of intervention would require a force large enough to move south and control or threaten railway communications between west and east.* I did not believe that this force could be sent in from the outside and kept supplied, but would have to be raised from the country from friendly Russians. I and my colleagues therefore agreed upon a small force of at most 6 and possibly only 4 battalions distributed among the four Allies which, with the land and sea forces already there, we believed sufficient to hold the northern ports during that winter. This plan was strongly supported by General Foch and the Naval authorities.

Under that plan the United States would send one or, at most, two battalions—probably marines. With this small contribution, we would, first, get possession of the large amount of military stores still held at Archangel and which would be of great value to the Germans should it fall into their hands. Second, we would retain access to Russia by way of Murmansk which was an ice-free port. From a humanitarian point of view I thought that this was very important. All reports indicated the approach of a severe famine in northern

* As a matter of fact, a force sufficient for this purpose was never sent to North Russia and for this reason, among others, the expedition failed. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

Russia. It might be necessary to send food, medicines and Red Cross assistance generally. This might give opportunity for peaceful American intervention of the greatest value to the orderly elements in Russia and to the Allies. Third, there was an incidental military advantage that would result from holding the northern ports in case, for any reason, intervention should be agreed upon.* It was assumed that this small force could hold the ports until after the opening of the campaign of the following year. By that time the question of general intervention would certainly have been decided. Should that intervention have come, it would have been a grave mistake to have surrendered the northern ports if we could possibly hold them.

The American Government had expressed sympathy with practical military efforts that could be made at and from Murmansk and Archangel, provided that they proceeded on the full sympathy of the Russian people and did not interfere with their political liberty. Murmansk was already in possession of the Allies and Archangel partially so. I assumed that no military movements from these places to the south could be made if the Russians were not sympathetic. I believed that the occupation of the Northern ports would be "practical military efforts," which would justify the small expedition proposed and the risks involved. After further discussion of the subject I concluded my cable with the statement that "on the whole I think we should be represented but only by our fair part".

On July 23rd a Washington cable to the American Section of the Supreme War Council stated that the President had decided to permit 3 battalions of infantry and 3 companies of engineers to participate in the Murmansk Expedition. The infantry was to come from General Pershing's forces, provided General Foch could spare them, and likewise the engineers, if General Pershing himself could spare these. No artillery was authorized.

From time to time after the dispatch of the above force to Murmansk, and in one way or another, efforts were made to convince me that I should urge my government to further augment the forces in Northern Russia. The expressed purpose for the increase in force urged was offensive Allied action by the Northern Russian Expedition and I consistently held to the view that the Murmansk and Archangel Expeditions were intended for a specific defensive purpose, namely: the retention of those ports and for that purpose should not be augmented. Further I made it clear that the Government of the United States had definitely declined to take part in organized intervention in the interior of Russia in adequate force from Murmansk or Archangel.

*It must be kept in mind that at this time there was no certainty that intervention on a considerable scale would not be finally agreed upon. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

5. *Utilization of American Troops.*

From the time when the United States entered the war the Allied authorities urged that the American man power be utilized to maintain the Allied divisions at their maximum strength and in the number then organized, the American recruits receiving their finishing training in the schools already established and in operation for the allied armies. Opinion as to just how this should be done, ranged from the proposal to feed the American soldiers individually into European units to that of assigning smaller American units, such as companies or battalions, to the European divisions. It was recognized by the American authorities that any such procedure would be entirely impracticable and would not secure the best utilization of American man power. It was very evident to both General Pershing and myself that, in order for the American effort to reach its full efficiency, the American Army concentrated for a definite operation of its own on a well defined section of the front must be organized at the earliest possible opportunity. The Allies were very persistent in urging their proposition in some form or other, claiming that the shipping obtainable would not be sufficient to transport a well balanced army, with its complement of heavy artillery and auxiliary and supply troops, in time to participate in the 1918 campaign which it was foreseen would be the critical period of the war for the Allies. They showed that their man power reserves were exhausted and that the casualties, which must be foreseen as the result of the anticipated German offensive, would reduce their armies to such an extent that they could not hold throughout the year the front then occupied. Thus they were reasoning on two erroneous assumptions, to some extent justified by their own experience, namely:

a) That the American Army, if organized as separate body, could not be relied upon to hold defensively its own part of the line until after six to nine months training in Europe; and

b) That even after this period the commanders of the larger tactical units and their staffs would not have sufficient experience to permit the utilization of the army, so formed, as an offensive force without inviting disaster.

On the 29th and 30th of January, 1918, at an informal conference held* by Mr. Lloyd George, Viscount Milner, Generals Haig, Robertson, Wilson, Pershing and myself, it was agreed, subject to approval by the American Government, that the British Government would furnish shipping for six American divisions to be trained with the British Army, in addition to the troops transported in accordance with the regular American schedule.

* In the Supreme War Council Building at Versailles. T. H. R. [Footnote in the original.]

The case of the Allies was stated and discussed at the 3rd Session of the Supreme War Council, January 31st, 1918, at Versailles. At the conclusion of this discussion and in regard to the question which had been twice asked by Baron Sonnino as to whether the American Government would allow the minor units of each division to be amalgamated with British and French divisions, in order that they could most effectively perform their part in the emergency which was assumed to be approaching within the next few months, I made in substance the following statement:

"To ask the United States formally to declare now and in advance of the emergency that it will permit its units to be amalgamated with British and French divisions is to make unnecessarily difficult the solution of the problem which you are studying, i. e., the most effective utilization of American man-power under present conditions. Everything possible is now being done to prepare for this effective utilization of American man-power without the formal declaration by my Government which Baron Sonnino appears to desire. Yesterday the British Government agreed to bring over six American divisions, with the understanding that they would train the infantry battalions of these divisions on the British front. If the German attack finds these battalions on the British front they will fight to the extent of their capacity wherever the attack finds them. Also, General Pershing entered into an agreement with General Petain by which the organizations of his divisions will receive their final training on the French line. It goes without saying that neither can be withdrawn for the purpose of forming complete American divisions under their own officers while the German attack is being made or is being prepared. If the crisis should come the American troops will undoubtedly be used in whatever way their services will be most effective, either in defense or offence, with the British and French troops with whom they are at the time serving. It is to be clearly understood, however, that this training of American units with British and French divisions, whether behind the lines or in actual combat on the line, is only a stepping stone in the training of the American forces, and that whenever it is proper and practicable to do so these units will be formed into American divisions under their own officers. Such a thing as permanent amalgamation of our units with British and French units would be intolerable to American sentiment."

The discussion ended there, and no further action was taken at this session.

The losses occasioned by the German offensive of March, 1918, amounted to approximately the combatant personnel of ten British divisions and exhausted their reserves of men. To make good these losses the Parliament passed a new conscription bill which drew into the army younger and older men; but these could not be trained and ready to take their share of the service until the latter part of July or the beginning of August. A message was received by me from the British Prime Minister in March, 1918, in which he stated the pre-

dicament in which the English Government found itself and especially urged that the American schedule of transportation be changed so as to increase the number of combatant men (especially infantrymen and machine-gunners) and correspondingly decrease the shipments of men of the other services and of material.

The nature of the shipping available was such that the greatest number of men could be transported in the least time by bringing over first infantrymen and machine-gunners in their regular organizations and leaving artillery personnel, guns, transportation and auxiliary troops until later. These infantry brigades, if placed in training with the British and French armies and concentrated in rear of their lines, would constitute a considerable reserve force which had already had many months training in the United States. It was found that, if this were agreed to by the American authorities, the British Government would feel itself justified by the emergency in utilizing for their transportation shipping which up to that time had been engaged in other very necessary traffic. The critical situation on the front and the fact that this offer of additional shipping from the British would actually expedite the getting of American troops to Europe, seemed to justify a departure from the priority list established for the American forces, and the Military Representatives therefore adopted Joint Note No. 18, March 27, 1918, which read as follows:

“(1) In paragraph 4 of Joint Note No. 12 dated 12th [21st] January, 1918, the Military Representatives agreed as follows: ‘After the most careful and searching inquiry they were agreed on the point that the security of France could also be assured. But in view of the strength of the attack which the enemy is able to develop on this front, an attack which, in the opinion of the Military Representatives could reach a strength of 96 divisions (excluding reinforcements by “roulement”); they feel compelled to add that France will be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, namely:

(a) That the strength of the British and French troops in France are continuously kept up to their present total strength, and that they receive the expected reinforcements of not less than two American divisions per month.’

“(2) The battle which is developing at the present moment in France and which can extend to the other theatres of operations may very quickly place the Allied Armies in a serious situation from the point of view of effectives, and the Military Representatives are from this moment of opinion that the above detailed condition (a) can no longer be maintained and they consider as a general proposition that the new situation requires a new decision.

“The Military Representatives are of opinion that it is highly desirable that the American Government should assist the Allied Armies as soon as possible by permitting, in principle, the temporary

service of American units in Allied Army Corps and Divisions, such reinforcements must however be obtained from other units than those American Divisions which are now operating with the French, and the units so temporarily employed must eventually be returned to the American Army.

“(3) The Military Representatives are of opinion that, from the present time, in execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise directed by the Supreme War Council, only American infantry and machine gun units, organized as that Government may decide, be brought to France, and that all agreements or conventions hitherto made in conflict with this decision be modified accordingly.”

The Secretary of War was then in Paris and, after conference with General Pershing and myself, cabled to the President a qualified endorsement on this joint note, as follows:

“The purpose of the American Government is to render the fullest cooperation and aid, and therefore the recommendation of the Military Representatives with regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine-gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units, when transported, will be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, and will be assigned for training and use by him in his discretion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always the determination of this Government to have its various military forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military situation permits, into an independent American Army, acting in concert with the armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in view.”

Joint Note No. 18 was submitted and the whole matter was discussed in full at the 5th Session of the Supreme War Council May 1st and 2nd, 1918, at which General Pershing was given an opportunity to state to what extent he thought the wishes of the Allies could be met without jeopardizing the timely formation of the American army. In consequence of this discussion the following resolution was passed:

“It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own Commander and under its own flag.

In order to meet the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, without losing sight of the necessity of building up an American Army, priority of transport be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service* with

*The word “service” meant service only during the period of training. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report.]

French and British Armies; on the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with their own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of the American Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

"It is also agreed that during the month of May preference shall be given to the transportation of infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such other troops as may be determined by the American Commander-in-Chief.

"It is further agreed that this programme shall be continued during the month of June upon condition that the British Government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June, with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June shall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander-in-Chief may determine.

"It is also further agreed that if the British Government should transport any number in excess of 150,000 in June that such excess should be infantry and machine-gun units, and that early in June there should be a new review of the situation to determine further action."

At the 6th Session of the Supreme War Council, June 2, 1918, the following resolution was passed:

"The Supreme War Council approves the following telegram to be sent to the President of the United States in the name of the Prime Ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain:—

"We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time seemed practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 Allied divisions are now opposed to 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up), there is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied. He therefore urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum number of infantry and machine-gunners, in which respects the shortage of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the immediate danger of an Allied defeat in the present campaign owing to the Allied reserves being exhausted before those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an Army as will enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He placed the total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done."

"We are satisfied that General Foch, who is conducting the present campaign with consummate ability, and on whose military judgment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is not overestimating the needs of the case; and we feel confident that the Government of the United States will do everything that can be done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation, and to proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies, calculated to provide, as

soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies regards as essential to ultimate victory."

The subsequent steps in regard to the shipment of American troops were taken by General Pershing with the French and English authorities without further intervention on the part of the Military Representatives and are fully described in his report.

VII.—THE ARMISTICE

1. *Preparation and Approval of the Armistice Terms.*

Under date of October 14, 1918, the United States Government sent its reply to the communications received by it from the German Government of the 8th [6th] and 12th of October, 1918.⁸ In this reply it was stated:

"It must be clearly understood that the processes of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and the advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments. And the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the Armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment of the Allied Governments".

Under date of the 20th of October, 1918, another communication was received from the German Government⁹ to which a reply was returned under date of October 23d¹⁰ and in which the following appears:

"He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible.

"The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated Governments the unrestricted

⁸ For the communications from the German Government, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 338 and 357, respectively; for the reply, see *ibid.*, p. 358.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 380.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds."

It is well to note the terms of these communications because of the unwarranted opinion, which has been expressed by some, to the effect that the Government of the United States forced the unwilling acceptance of an armistice on the governments with which it was associated in the war. The President's letter of October 23, 1918, plainly leaves the whole matter in the hands of the Allied Governments. It was only on the condition that "those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated" that the question of an armistice at that time would be considered at all. The American representatives who participated in the drafting of the armistice terms were guided by the spirit of this communication. They had no more to do with the formulation of the terms of the armistice than the representatives of any of the other participating powers, and more than once they yielded their own view to a different but unanimous view of their colleagues.

There is always a tendency for us to judge preceding events in the light of our subsequent knowledge. When the total collapse of Germany became evident there were many who had advocated the armistice as it was actually made but who then expressed wonder that more drastic terms of surrender had not been exacted. Twice there had been presented to the authorities formulating the Armistice terms the condition of absolute and complete disarmament and demobilization of all land and naval forces of the enemy. It had been rejected;—why? To those who were in daily association with the political and military leaders then assembled in Paris the reason was obvious.

In the early days of November, 1918, the extent to which the German people was beaten was not known to the outside world. Those people were wearing paper shoes, paper clothing, eating substitutes for food that an American farmer would not feed to his cattle or pigs. Yet, at that very time, legislators and economists of the Allied world were talking of anti-dumping laws as being necessary to protect their peoples against the commercial flood of manufactured fabrics and articles of all kinds with which they believed German ware-houses to be filled,—manufactured and stored during the war!

As for the German army, it was apparently being beaten. But, before, there was a time when it was apparently being beaten. For more than two years, up to the early days of 1917 it had held a fortified

line in France. It suffered much in holding it, but it also inflicted tremendous losses on the Allies who tried to drive it back. Then came the withdrawal to the "Hindenburg line". As the one side withdrew, the other pushed eagerly on. Our newspapers and the Allied newspapers were filled day by day with accounts—perfectly true accounts—of the capture of thousands of prisoners here and there, of many hundreds of pieces of artillery, and of great quantities of stores and ammunition. If one were to consult a file of newspapers of those days he would find the rapidly growing conviction that the Germans were hopelessly beaten. Editorial comment and countless cartoons scouted and ridiculed the idea that the Germans were making an orderly and successful withdrawal to a new position where they were again to hold the Allies at bay for many months and fill the graveyards of that fair land with another million of Allied dead.

When armies of the huge size of this war confront each other on a line hundreds of miles in length, with the advanced trenches along this line within pistol shot of each other, neither side can get up and withdraw in the course of a night and be at day-break beyond the reach of its enemy. The new position must first be fortified by weeks or months of labor; new artillery positions must be prepared with concrete platforms for the heavy guns; hundreds of miles of road must be repaired and others constructed. New stores of supplies and dumps of ammunition must be accumulated on the new position. Between the old and the new positions—a distance of many miles—every point from which the advance of the enemy can be checked must be fortified and held by its garrison till death or capture. On this depends the safety of its main army. Every town and village from which roads radiate must be held to the last; because, in these days of tractor-drawn artillery, of motor ammunition and supply trains and motor transportation for rapidly moving bodies of troops, the roads are more than ever of vital importance. Large parts of the stored supplies and of the ammunition dumps must be abandoned to the enemy, if they cannot be destroyed in time. Transportation is not available for them and reliance must be placed on new stores in the new position. An ammunition dump may cover many square miles. For miles the ground along the main roads leading to a position and the lateral roads in rear of it are dotted with piles of projectiles of every kind, covered with earth to protect them from air-plane attack and from which the shells are dug out as a farmer digs out roots for his cattle. Other piles are hidden far from the roads, in clumps of trees and in forests where they are invisible to the eager searcher in the air. Neither time nor means permit the removal of much of such material or its destruction, and it swells the list of the enemy's booty of war.

It is all this which accounts for the Allies' captures during the successful German withdrawal of 1917.

Until the end comes such a movement is apparently quite consistent with the belief either that an orderly but limited withdrawal is being made or that the enemy has met with his final defeat and is retreating to his own frontier and as much further as he may be driven before his surrender. But we know well enough what has happened when, suddenly, we read that our armies, which have been advancing at the rate of fifteen or twenty or more kilometers a day, and day after day, capturing many thousands of prisoners, hundreds or thousands of guns and great quantities of stores,—have suddenly come to a standstill, are gaining (if they gain at all) a few yards here or there after days of savage fighting and terrible losses and with, after a whole year of one prolonged battle, a gain of perhaps the width of the District of Columbia at some one point on a line 450 miles in length.

All of this happened in 1917. Was it to be repeated, even only partially, in 1918? Whatever we may think now, in the light of subsequent knowledge, it was not sure then. The Germans were making a well executed retreat. They were losing heavily, but they had lost heavily in the previous retreat of 1917. That they were beaten, so far as concerned their war aims, there was no doubt. But there is a wide difference between a beaten enemy and one that is "down and out". The German army was "down and out" on the signing of the armistice but not before. In the rapid retreat and rapid advance the Allies had necessarily left behind heavy artillery and other material necessary to break the German resistance if the latter's army of between three and four million men should be able to reach a prepared position, or one naturally suitable for defense, in German territory; while at the same time the Germans had this material, except such as was abandoned (as they had done in 1917), with them. The advance was costly for the Allies and they had reached a point where they were unable to make good the losses and keep up their fighting units.

The campaigning season was approaching its end. If the Allies should find themselves confronted by a position on which the Germans had "dug-in" it would be necessary to promptly break this resistance or face the certainty of another winter under arms. To break it required the long process of preparing positions, bringing up the heavy guns, the ammunition and stores of all kinds,—and for this precious time was lacking.

All of this brought the political leaders of the Allies face to face with the grave problem of the morale of their civil populations. Would their peoples accept even the possibility of another year of war when they knew that the enemy had agreed to peace on the basis

of the Fourteen Points which had been approved and accepted by the common people everywhere? There may have been then a few enthusiasts who believed that the enemy was finally "on the run" and who did not admit even a chance in his favor. But these were not found among the Allies and the great majority viewed the possibilities of the problem about as has been outlined above.

Thus, the Allied political leaders had, on the one hand, the chance of the enemy's complete annihilation; they had, on the other hand, the chance of meeting a check for the winter, with its consequent effect on their own peoples. On the one hand, they had their armies which, whatever we may think now, would have been in a serious condition were they to meet with the appalling losses of another desperate battle. Already, battles or campaigns had been stopped by popular demand resulting from such losses. On the other hand, they had behind them peoples hungry, cold, every household in mourning, dazed and stupefied by the incredible losses already incurred. Excluding the United States, the Allies of Europe and Japan had mobilized 35,404,864 men; of these 4,705,665 were killed and 10,870,025 wounded; while 4,941,870 had been captured or were reported missing, a large part of which number were dead at the time of the armistice. It is not necessary to repeat here the money cost of the war up to the armistice and the accumulated burden of debt under which the Allied world would stagger for generations unborn.

It was to peoples who had made these sacrifices and were to bear the resulting burden, and all to attain the objects set forth in the Fourteen Points, that the political leaders had to say whether they would discuss a peace proposed by the enemy on the basis of those Fourteen Points. Could there be any doubt as to their decision? What had they to gain, except revenge, by going to Berlin with a loss of another million men and a further burden of debt of an unknown number of billions of dollars? We might have secured at that cost a more complete military impotency on the part of Germany. But that might have been attained in the Armistice itself. It was my belief then, as it is now, that had the demand for disarmament and demobilization been made, as the one condition for an armistice, immediately after October 23, it would have been accepted. If declined, it would have given the only justification for continuing the war. It was not made because the Allied Nations had a lurking fear of the possibility that it might be declined while they believed that their war aims could be attained without taking this chance. They may have been right,—who can now tell? Those things will now lie forever "on the knees of the gods", a fruitful theme of speculation and controversy.

One thing is certain that, had the demand for disarmament and demobilization as the one essential armistice term been made and accepted; or, had the Peace Conference acted as promptly as it might have done*, Germany would long ago have been disarmed and without an army other than necessary for her admitted internal needs. Had this been done there would now be no biased contention in the United States that this government forced an armistice on the unwilling Allies.

Meanwhile, a meeting of the three prime ministers had been hastily summoned in Paris (not at Versailles) on October 5th, 1918. At this conference they did not sit as the Supreme War Council but as a Council of the Prime Ministers. The purpose of this conference was not made public, and, up to its final development, the only speculation that I heard was that the meeting was called for the purpose of arriving at an agreement about the situation existing at that moment in the Balkans. For a long time, in anticipation of the inevitable end, this had been the subject of anxious thought among the Military Representatives. They believed that it would be a great misfortune if the war, which began with an overt act resulting from the Balkan situation, should end with a sudden collapse of all resistance in that quarter and still find no general principles of adjustment agreed upon among the European Powers. But, up to the end, the demands of the war elsewhere absorbed all attention. It may be, too, that the underlying possibilities for controversy were so dangerous as to make the Allies indisposed to attempt the settlement of this burning question until forced to do so; this attitude being due, perhaps, to a desire not to bring on the consideration of any question having in it the seeds of dissension before the Alliance had attained the principal object of beating the common enemy.

Nevertheless, there were some who believed that, whatever might have been the ostensible purpose of the meeting which so hastily assembled the Prime Ministers in Paris, there was also another object

* On February 12, 1919, the Supreme War Council adopted a resolution in which the following appears:

"2. The armistice with Germany shall be renewed for a short period terminable by the Allied and Associated Powers at three days' notice.

"3. Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions of the preliminaries of peace shall be drawn up at once by a Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council; these, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans, and the Germans shall be at once informed that this is the policy of the Associated Governments."

These terms were not presented to the Germans except with the final treaty of peace on June 28, 1919; and, of course, no attempt could be made to enforce their execution until the long delayed ratification by the necessary number of the Allies and the exchange of these ratifications in this year of 1920. [Footnote in the original.]

in view, and, perhaps, the more important of the two. Rumors of appeals from the German Government to that of the United States, made or to be made, were rife. The moment was provocative of suspicion. There were some who did not see how such an appeal could be made or entertained without the possibility of a separate peace or, at least, of such action as would reduce the Allies to playing second part in the making of a general peace.

I was, therefore, not very much surprised when, at 9:00 p. m., Sunday night October 7th, 1918, I received the following communication from the Council of the Prime Ministers:

"The conference of Ministers at a meeting held on 7th October, 1918, agreed to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles, with whom shall be associated representatives of the American, British, French and Italian Navies, the consideration of the terms of an armistice with Germany and Austria, on the basis of the following principles, accepted on the previous day:—

"Paragraph 1 Total evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Italy:

"Paragraph 2 The Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany:

"Paragraph 3 Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the Allies:

"Paragraph 4 The same conditions to apply to the Trentino and Istria:

"Paragraph 5 Servia and Montenegro to be evacuated by the enemy:

"Paragraph 6 Evacuation of the Caucasus:

"Paragraph 7 Immediate steps to be taken for the evacuation of all territory belonging to Russia and Roumania before the war:

"Paragraph 8 Immediate cessation of submarine warfare.

"Unnumbered Paragraph (It was also agreed that the Allied blockade should not be raised.)"

I recognized at once the importance and delicacy of the situation. I did not know whether this subject was or was not at that moment under consideration by the Government at Washington. When I received the above communication I was informed that a meeting of the Military Representatives would be held at 9:15 a. m. the following day for its consideration. I, therefore, at once cabled the document to Washington. I asked for immediate instructions, having stated that I should take no action whatever in this matter without formal instructions, but would keep my Government advised of whatever agreement was reached by my colleagues.

The document thus presented to the Military Representatives, was, of course, intended only as a basis for further study, and this accounts for certain oversights from the purely military point of view. Only

one paragraph in it required immediate action by the enemy, and this action was only tentative. The other paragraphs fixed no time limit. One of them would permit the German Army, with its organization and armament intact, to retire to any strong position behind the Rhine which it might select. No guarantees were exacted of the enemy except the evacuation of certain territory which she was sure to lose anyway. The Military Representatives and their Naval associates met the following morning, October 8th, and drew up the following document, in reply to the request of the Prime Ministers, which is embodied in my cablegram to the War Department dated the same day:

"In compliance with resolution of the three Prime Ministers communicated to you in my number 242 the below quoted document was drawn up this morning. It was not drawn up by the Military Representatives in their official capacity as connected with the Supreme War Council but by them as individuals associated with representatives of the four navies. It is not in the form of a Joint Note but is entitled 'A Joint Opinion'. I do not know whether the Prime Ministers intend to communicate it to the American government or not. The Americans have taken no official part in it nor is the American government committed to it in any way by any action here. I have informed the Prime Ministers in writing that I cannot sign it in the absence of instructions from my Government. The document follows:

"The Military Representatives and Naval Representatives meeting together on October 8th in accordance with the Resolution taken by the Conference of Ministers at their meeting held on 7th October, 1918, are of opinion that the first essential of an armistice is the disarmament of the enemy under the control of the Allies.

"This principle having been established, the conditions specified by the Ministers at their Meeting held on 7th October, require from a military point of view to be supplemented as follows:—

"Paragraph 1. Total and immediate evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Italy on the following conditions:—

"Subparagraph (a) Immediate re-occupation by Allied troops of the territories so evacuated:

"Subparagraph (b) Immediate repatriation of the civil population of these regions interned in enemy country:

"Subparagraph (c) No "Sabotage" loot or fresh requisitions by enemy forces.

"Subparagraph (d) Surrender of all arms and munitions of war and supplies between the present front and the left bank of the Rhine.

"Paragraph 2. Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany.

"Paragraph 3. Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the Allies, with the exception stated in Clause 18 below.

"It is understood that the Allies will not evacuate the territory in their occupation.

"Paragraph 4. The same conditions apply to the territory included between the Italian frontier and a line passing through the Upper Adige, the Pusterthal as far as Toblach, the Carnic Alps, the Tarvis and the meridian from Monte Nero, cutting the sea near the mouth of the Voloska (see Map of the Italian Military Geographical Institute 1 over 500,000).

"Paragraph 5. Serbia, Montenegro and Albania to be evacuated by the enemy—under similar conditions to those stated in Clause 1.

"Paragraph 6. Evacuation of the Caucasus by the troops of Central Powers.

"Paragraph 7. Immediate steps to be taken for the evacuation of all territory belonging to Russia and Roumania before the war.

"Paragraph 8. Prisoners in enemy hands to be returned to Allied Armies without reciprocity in the shortest possible time. Prisoners taken from the Armies of the Central Powers to be employed for the reparation of the wilful damage done in the occupied areas by the enemy, and for the restoration of the areas.

"Paragraph 9. All enemy surface ships (including Monitors, River craft, etc.), to withdraw to Naval Bases specified by the Allies and to remain there during the Armistice.

"Paragraph 10. Submarine warfare to cease immediately on the signature of the Armistice. 60 submarines of types to be specified shall proceed at once to specified Allied Ports and stay there during the Armistice. Submarines operating in the North Sea and Atlantic shall not enter the Mediterranean.

"Paragraph 11. Enemy Naval air forces to be concentrated in bases specified by the Allies and there remain during the Armistice.

"Paragraph 12. Enemy to reveal position of all his mines outside territorial waters. Allies to have the right to sweep such mines at their own convenience.

"Paragraph 13. Enemy to evacuate Belgian and Italian coast immediately, leaving behind all Naval war stores and equipment.

"Paragraph 14. The Austro-Hungarian Navy to evacuate all ports in the Adriatic occupied by them outside national territory.

"Paragraph 15. The Black Sea Ports to be immediately evacuated and war-ships and material seized in them by the enemy delivered to the Allies.

"Paragraph 16. No material destruction to be permitted before evacuation.

"Paragraph 17. Present Blockade conditions to remain unchanged. All enemy merchant ships found at sea remain liable to capture.

"Paragraph 18. In stating their terms as above, the Allied Governments cannot lose sight of the fact that the Government of Germany is in a position peculiar among the nations of Europe in that its word cannot be believed, and that it denies any obligation of honor. It is necessary, therefore, to demand from Germany material guarantees on a scale which will serve the purpose aimed at by a signed agreement in cases among ordinary civilized nations. In those circumstances, the Allied Governments demand that within 48 hours:—

"1st. The fortresses of Metz, Thionville, Strassburg, Neu Breisach and the town and fortifications of Lille to be surrendered to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief.

"2nd. The surrender of Heligoland to the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief of the North Sea.

"Paragraph 19. All the above measures, with the exception of those specially mentioned in paragraph 13, to be executed in the shortest possible time, which it would appear should not exceed three to four weeks."

It will be noted that this document is an elaboration of the bases laid down by the Prime Ministers; also, that the projects in these terms relating to the disarmament were more effective than those which were finally adopted by the Armistice Convention.

After the foregoing terms were adopted, the draft of the document was brought to me with the request that I sign it. Before it was presented to the Prime Ministers I again stated my inability to do so and attached to it a note addressed to the Three Prime Ministers in which I stated that I could not sign in the absence of instructions from my Government.

What was finally done with this document after its submission to the Prime Ministers I do not know. It may be that one of its main objects was accomplished by the one fact that I had cabled it in its entirety to Washington.

Under date of October 21, 1918, I received a telegram from Washington directing me to submit a summary of views in regard to the

armistice terms. In my reply, dated October 23d, I expressed the opinion that the armistice terms should be purely military in character and not embody terms intended to foreshadow the peace terms. It was my opinion that the armistice should be a cessation of all military operations, accompanied by the exaction of such guarantees as would make it hopeless for the Central Powers to attempt to resume the war and which would thus enable the civilian representatives of the respective governments to come together to consider and impose the terms of a wise peace. My general view, therefore, was that we should secure a complete military disarmament, so complete that there could be no hope on the part of the enemy of an attempt to resume hostilities, and then to proceed with the discussion and settlement of the terms of peace.

I met Mr. House on his arrival at Brest on the morning of Friday, October 25th, and handed to him a copy of my telegram to Washington of October 23d. At the same time, I informed him that the representatives of the Allies were then assembled in Paris to arrange the terms of an armistice. After our arrival in Paris, I had a conference on the morning of October 27th with Mr. House at his residence on the Rue de l'Université at which he discussed with me the views of the Commanders-in-Chief of the national armies and of the Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief in regard to the armistice. I then learned that none of them demanded what I believed to be necessary, viz.; a complete disarmament of the land and naval forces of Germany, leaving her, however, enough of her "home guard" troops to preserve internal order. The longest step, then under contemplation, toward attaining this took from Germany only a specified proportion of the equipment of her active army. I was of the opinion that it was dangerous to leave the German Army intact, with all of its organization perfected, with all its infantry rifles and ammunition, with at least half of its machine-guns, and with probably half its artillery,—to leave all of these with an army of between three and four millions of men to take up a selected position on the other side of the Rhine. I maintained that no one knew how many machine-guns and how many pieces of artillery might still be available in Germany for re-arming this intact army. On the other hand, if we could obtain disarmament and demobilization, we would be in a position to take any measures that common justice suggested and to obtain every one of our war aims.

In my opinion nothing but the complete disintegration of the German Army which immediately followed the armistice, saved us from a dangerous situation.

Mr. House then asked me to give him a memorandum expressing my views. I told him that my memorandum would express the same idea that was contained in my telegram to Washington of October

23d. I accordingly prepared and submitted my memorandum dated October 28th, 1918, as follows:

“Under ordinary circumstances the end of a war is indicated by two phases, viz:—

“a) An armistice, or a cessation of hostilities between the contending armies; and,

“b) A conference of the Powers concerned to determine and enforce the terms of peace. The extent to which the beaten party has effective participation in this conference depends ordinarily upon the extent to which he is beaten.

“But at the end of a great world-war like the present one, in which it may be assumed that one party is completely beaten and which will be followed by radical changes in world conditions the concluding phases are:—

“a) A complete surrender of the beaten party, under such conditions as will guarantee against any possible resumption of hostilities by it;

“b) A conference to determine and enforce the conditions of peace with the beaten party; and

“c) A conference (perhaps the same one as above) to determine and enforce such changes in world-conditions,—incidental to the war but not necessarily forming part of the terms of peace,—as are agreed upon as vital for the orderly progress of civilization and the continued peace of the world.

“Such I conceive to be the three phases that will mark the close of this war and which, if properly developed, will follow the war with an epoch-making peace.

“These phases should be kept separate and distinct. The conditions accompanying one should not and need not be confused with those of another.

“It is for the military men to recommend the military conditions under which hostilities may cease so that the political governments may begin to talk, without fear of interruption by a resumption of hostilities.

“What is the object to be kept in mind, in imposing military conditions to guarantee against resumption of hostilities?

“It is to ensure the ability of the powers associated in the war against the enemy to secure all of their just war-aims, for which they have prosecuted the war.

“It is conceivable that the enemy will accept one set of conditions that will ensure the attainment of these war aims, but will reject another set of conditions intended to ensure the same thing. In that case insistence on the latter will mean continued war with the attainment of the same aims at the end of it as might be obtained now, with the probability that the enemy may be less able then to meet some of the just demands.

“If it is considered possible that the enemy will accept certain so-called military conditions that have been proposed for his sur-

render, it is quite certain that he will accept others. In that case, the real question is 'Will these two sets of conditions equally accomplish the essential object, to-wit, cessation of hostilities without power on the part of the enemy to resume them?'

"Apparently, all are agreed that there must be a complete military surrender on the part of the enemy as a preliminary to anything else. How shall this surrender be effected and made evident?"

"It has been proposed, as one way to accomplish this, that there should be a partial disarmament by the enemy, accompanied by imposition of certain conditions which apparently foreshadow (and will be regarded by the enemy as foreshadowing) certain of the peace terms. This partial disarmament, apparently, leaves the enemy with the organization of his army intact, with his infantry armament intact, with an unknown amount of his artillery and half of his machine guns, and with apparently reserves of ammunition intact. If, during the subsequent period, this army can receive its missing armament, either from reserve stores of which there is no absolutely certain information, or from any other source, it is ready to receive it and then might again become a formidable object to deal with. If the enemy accepts such conditions, and is acting in perfectly good faith, it is even more certain that it will accept complete disarmament and demobilization without the imposition of conditions which, coming at the very first moment, may be very doubtful in their effect. If, on the other hand, the enemy accepts these conditions and is not acting in good faith, it will be because he thinks that these conditions are more favorable to his possible subsequent resumption of hostilities. If we secure partial disarmament accompanied by the other conditions proposed, and it does not prevent subsequent resumption of hostilities, then we will have failed in our purpose. If we secure complete disarmament and demobilization of the active land and naval forces no other guaranty against resumption of hostilities is needed and the powers concerned will be guaranteed the attainment of all their just war aims. If the enemy refuses complete disarmament and demobilization, it will be an evidence of his intent not to act in good faith.

"I, therefore, propose the following:—

"First, that the associated powers demand complete military disarmament and demobilization of the active land and naval forces of the enemy, leaving only such interior guards as the associated powers agree upon as necessary for the preservation of order in the home territory of the enemy. This, of itself, means the evacuation of all invaded territory, and its evacuation by disarmed and not by armed or partly armed men. The army thus disarmed cannot fight, and demobilized cannot be reassembled for the purposes of this war.

"Second, that the associated powers notify the enemy that there will be no relaxation in their war aims but that these will be subject to full and reasonable discussion between the nations associated in the war; and that even though the enemy himself may be heard on some of these matters he must submit to whatever the associated powers finally agree upon as being proper to demand for the present and for the future peace of the world."

This memorandum was presented to Mr. House on October 28th, and two days later while I was waiting to see him at his apartment, 78 rue de l'Université, where a meeting of the Prime Ministers was being held, he came out from the council chamber and handed me my memorandum stating that the Council had decided against the proposition for absolute and complete disarmament and demobilization of the enemy forces. In doing this they equally declined to accept the opinion of the Military and Naval Representatives expressed in their "Joint Opinion" of October 8th, which was "that the first essential of an armistice is the disarmament of the enemy, under the control of the Allies".

From the time of Mr. House's arrival in Paris until October 31, 1918, the general conditions of the armistice had been the study of the Council of Ministers assisted by such other persons as, from time to time, they called upon for information and advice. In this way a rough draft of proposed armistice terms was drawn up and was first presented at the first meeting of the Eighth Session of the Supreme War Council held at the Trianon Palace (Hotel), Versailles, on Thursday, the 31st of October, 1918, at 3 p. m. This meeting of the Supreme War Council and the subsequent ones up to the final adoption of the armistice terms, was attended by varying representation of other powers not formally represented on the Supreme War Council. At the 4th and last meeting of the Eighth Session, at which the armistice terms were approved, the other powers represented were Japan, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Serbia and Czecho-Slovakia.

At the first meeting of this Session, on the proposal of Mr. Clemenceau, who presided, the rough draft was taken up for consideration and the discussion of it began paragraph by paragraph. The discussion was concluded and the final modified draft approved * at the 4th meeting on the afternoon of Monday, November 4, 1918. In view of the possibility that Germany might refuse to accept the proposed terms of armistice and resume the war, at this same session there was approved the plan of further operations, prepared by direction of the Supreme War Council by Marshal Foch, General Wilson, General di Robilant, and General Bliss.

At the same meeting and after the same consideration, the terms of the armistice with Austria-Hungary were approved † by the Supreme War Council. The resolution adopted in regard to the armistice with Germany was as follows:

“(a) To approve the attached terms of an armistice with Germany.

* See Appendix G. [Footnote in the original; the terms of this draft are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, pp. 463-468.]

† See Appendix H. [Footnote in the original; the terms of the armistice are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, pp. 433-435.]

“(b) To communicate the terms of the armistice to President Wilson, inviting him to notify the German Government that the next step for them to take is to send a *parlementaire* to Marshal Foch, who will receive instructions to act on behalf of the Associated Governments.

“(c) To communicate to President Wilson the attached memorandum* of observations by the Allied Governments on the correspondence which has passed between the President and the German Government, in order that they may be forwarded to Germany, together with the communication in regard to an armistice.

“(d) To invite Mr. House to make the above communications on their behalf to President Wilson.

“(e) To authorize Marshal Foch to communicate the terms as finally approved to envoys properly accredited by the German Government.

“(f) To associate a British Admiral with Marshal Foch on the naval aspects of the armistice.

“(g) To leave discretion to Marshal Foch and the British Admiral with regard to minor technical points in the armistice.”

The conclusions in regard to the Armistice with Austria-Hungary were as follows:

“(a) To approve the attached terms of an armistice with Austria-Hungary.

“(b) That General Diaz, on behalf of the Associated Governments, shall, on the arrival of accredited representatives of the Austrian Supreme Command, communicate to them the approved terms of an armistice.

“(c) That the Italian Government, on behalf of the Supreme War Council, shall be responsible for communicating this decision to General Diaz.

“(d) To invite Mr. House, on behalf of the Supreme War Council to communicate this decision to President Wilson.

“(e) That an Admiral shall be associated with General Diaz in these negotiations.”

* Letter to President Wilson.

“The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the Freedom of the Seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.

“Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored, as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage caused to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and from the air.”

[Footnote in General Bliss' report: for President Wilson's address of Jan. 8, 1918, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 12.]

2. *Enforcement of the Armistice Terms.*

Marshal Foch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western front was charged with the enforcement of the terms of the armistice with Germany. As to this armistice the Supreme War Council had agreed "To leave discretion to Marshal Foch and the British Admiral with regard to minor technical points in the armistice."

As provided for in the closing paragraph of the Armistice signed on November 11th, 1918,¹¹ an agency known as the Permanent Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, with General Nudent (French), as President, was established with headquarters at Spa, Belgium, to supervise the execution of the Armistice, and to act as a channel of communication with the German authorities in regard to any questions arising in connection therewith.

3. *Renewals of the Armistice.*

The armistice was renewed on the 13th of December, 1918, the 16th of January, 1919, and on the 16th of February, 1919. The renewal of February 16th, 1919, provided that the Armistice be again prolonged for a short period of time, with no definite date of expiration, the Allied and Associated Powers reserving the right to terminate the same upon three days notice.

VIII.—THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AFTER THE ARMISTICE

In the Supreme War Council the Allied and Associated Powers had an agency which could act with decision upon important international subjects, owing to the fact that it was composed of the political heads of the principal powers; and which had associated with it technical advisers on military, naval and shipping affairs. Moreover, the representatives of the different nations had now formed the habit of working together effectively on matters of international interest and an organization had been built up by which the necessary authoritative records were kept and the decisions reached were communicated to the officers of each government concerned in their execution.

But, it must here be kept clearly in mind that the Supreme War Council, as such, was no part of the Peace Conference. It so happened,—happened, because it might just as easily have been otherwise—that the heads of the four governments who composed that Council were also the most important of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference. The function of this conference was simply and solely to make peace with the Central Powers. But, many military and politico-military questions kept arising which

* See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 494.

for the most part had nothing to do with the making of peace terms but which grew out of the war which those peace terms were intended to end.

Were the heads of governments then sitting at that time in their respective capitals, these questions would have been considered either by exchange of diplomatic notes or would have been sent as before, to the Military Representatives at Versailles for their joint note of recommendations.

But, as they were actually sitting in Paris, it was natural and, indeed, quite necessary for them, as heads of governments, to refer these questions to themselves in their capacity as members of the Supreme War Council and to its military and other advisers. If the result of this reference concerned the terms then being formulated by the Peace Conference, it was brought to the latter's attention; otherwise, action was taken in the usual course or procedure of the Supreme War Council.

Nevertheless, its general character, together with the scope of its work, ended with the Armistice. This was due to the fact that the questions arising no longer related to the conduct of the war against the Central Powers but were post-war and world-wide in their nature. This necessitated varying additions to the personnel, according to the problem under consideration, although the original personnel of the Council remained unchanged.

A summary of the reports of the Military Representatives made in conformity with these references by the Peace Conference will be found in appendix (I).¹² As these reports to a certain extent grew out of the work of the Peace Conference and in any event had nothing to do with the Supreme War Council as an agency for the effective prosecution of the war no further comment on them seems to be here necessary.

It is, however, desired to emphasize the fact that not only the Military Representatives and their staffs but the entire personnel of the Supreme War Council were imbued with the most earnest desire to aid as far as possible in bringing about the prompt and decisive defeat of the Central Empires; and, as a necessary outgrowth of this spirit they became at once a homogeneous and unified body able to decide upon united action. As enjoined by M. Clemenceau at the 2nd Session of the Supreme War Council on December 1st, 1917, they had been able to consider the good of the Allies as a whole and, when a difference of opinion arose, as it inevitably did from time to time, they were able to find a happy mean policy which secured effective action without one or another of them insisting upon some national aim incon-

¹² Not printed.

sistent with the interests of any other one of the nations concerned. It was in the same spirit of "give and take" that the political members discussed and solved their special problems which were often of graver importance than the military ones. The Supreme War Council has proved that such an international body can work in unison and harmony; and it is in the belief that the members of any similar international council will in the future be inspired by the same spirit, that the hope of an ultimately successful League of Nations must rest.

[Appendix L]

*The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss)
to the Executive Committee of the Supreme War Council*

VERSAILLES, *March 9, 1918.*

Subject: The Inter-Allied General Reserve

1. The American Permanent Military Representative, member of the Executive Committee, submits to his colleagues on the Executive Committee, the following views which he proposes for their consideration.

2. It is his view that the Supreme War Council in its Resolution of February 2¹³ decreed the creation of an Inter-Allied General Reserve and charged the Executive Committee with certain duties as to its composition and use. This decree and these instructions of the Supreme War Council are mandatory, and the Executive Committee cannot abdicate the duties and responsibilities with which it is charged, merely because a Commander-in-Chief has stated that he cannot agree with it as to one point, which point is a question of method and procedure rather than of general principle.

3. The letter of February 6¹⁴ was not final and conclusive, although it conveyed what was at that time the best judgment of the Executive Committee as to the formation of the Inter-Allied General Reserve. It was a basis of discussion with the Commanders-in-Chief, in which the Executive Committee formulated its ideas and submitted them in compliance with that part of the Resolution of the Supreme War Council which required that its "powers should be exercised after consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armies concerned." This means that the Executive Committee must give careful consideration to the views of the Commanders-in-Chief; but these latter have no power, by a mere difference of opinion, to abrogate the will of the Supreme War Council nor to discharge the Executive Committee from the execution of the functions imposed upon it by that

¹³ *Ante*, p. 255.

¹⁴ See pp. 256-258.

War Council. In case of an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the Executive Committee and the Commander-in-Chief, it is the duty of the former to exercise its best judgment, to organize the Inter-Allied General Reserve according to that best judgment, to report to the Supreme War Council that it has performed in full the duty which that War Council imposed upon it, and, therefore, to submit the organization which it thinks best for the Inter-Allied General Reserve, leaving the Supreme War Council to modify this organization at its pleasure.

The Committee created by the Supreme War Council is an executive one and not an advisory one; and it is the duty of an executive committee to carry something into execution. This particular Executive Committee is charged with the duty of carrying into execution the mandatory will of the Supreme War Council when it decreed the creation of an Inter-Allied General Reserve. The Supreme War Council is composed solely of the heads of the four great Governments which constitute the Alliance for the prosecution of the war,—that is to say, it is composed of these four Governments. The Executive Committee is, therefore, the agent for carrying into effect the expressed will of the Entente Alliance. This Alliance has not placed it in the power of any Commander-in-Chief to veto its will; nor has it given to the Executive Committee any authority to listen to or to be guided by any such attempted veto.

It has been suggested that, perhaps, if one Commander-in-Chief says that he is unable to contribute any troops to the Inter-Allied General Reserve, the other Commanders-in-Chief will do the same. Who is to decide this? Manifestly, it is neither the Commanders-in-Chief nor the Executive Committee, but solely the Entente Alliance itself. How can the Alliance determine whether a particular Commander-in-Chief can or cannot contribute troops to the Inter-Allied General Reserve? Primarily, it can do this only after consideration of the best judgment of its Executive Committee as expressed in the final organization prepared by the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee cannot, because it has no power to do so, be guided by the views of any Commander-in-Chief, who, in effect, opposes himself to the expressed will of the Entente Alliance. The Executive Committee must be guided by those views of Commanders-in-Chief which are helpful to it in its execution of the mandate of the Alliance as represented by the Supreme War Council. If those views are not helpful to it, the Executive Committee must use its best judgment in the formulation of an Inter-Allied General Reserve and allow the Commander-in-Chief to make his protest to the Supreme War Council.

4. The letter of February 6, which was the basis of discussion with the Commanders-in-Chief, having been submitted to them, certain

written and verbal consultations with the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief which followed resulted in an agreement with them which was a modification of the original scheme. The consultation with the British Commander-in-Chief has resulted in a statement by him to the effect that he has made plans to assist, if necessary, any other part of the Franco-British Front with a force which is substantially the same as that which was asked of him by the Executive Committee in the letter of February 6. But he declines to set this force apart in any particular area, for the reasons given by him in his letter to the Executive Committee. His views are not at all inconsistent with the performance of his share in the creation of the Inter-Allied General Reserve. His letter concedes in principle all that has been asked of him. It is not absolutely necessary that his Inter-Allied Reserve divisions should be stationed in any particular area or areas. It is sufficient for our purpose that they exist somewhere in his zone of operations. In case of difference of opinion on such a point it is better that the Executive Committee should subordinate its judgment to that of the local Commander-in-Chief.

It is true that the British Commander-in-Chief contemplates the use of his Reserve solely for the assistance of the French front, and that the French Commander-in-Chief contemplates the use of his Reserve solely for the assistance of the British Front. This is not a point in regard to which the Executive Committee need, at this time, urge any objection. The chances are very great that the British part of the Inter-Allied Reserve will eventually be used either on its own front or on the French Front; and there are the same chances that the French part of this General Reserve will eventually be used only on its front or on the British front. If the development of the campaign should ever make it necessary to consider the question of sending any of these forces to the Italian Front, the situation at the time would undoubtedly be such that this step would be taken only by the common consent of all. It is quite certain that if there were any reasonable doubt at the time, the Executive Committee, which must act unanimously, would not take such action. At any rate, this is a bridge which we need not attempt to cross until we come to it.

5. The Executive Committee has, therefore, succeeded in the execution of the task assigned to it by the Supreme War Council, to the extent of forming an Inter-Allied General Reserve consisting of a certain number of Italian, French, and British Divisions, subject to certain conditions desired to be imposed by the respective Commanders-in-Chief and which conditions are not inconsistent with the general principle of the Inter-Allied Reserve. These divisions are as follows:

- a) **ITALIAN FRONT:** Six Italian Divisions, plus four French Divisions (or as many as may not be withdrawn from Italy) now serving on the Italian Front;
- b) **FRENCH FRONT:** Eight French Divisions, being the maximum number which the French Commander-in-Chief has agreed, when necessary and possible, to send to the assistance of the English Front;
- c) **BRITISH FRONT:** Eight British Divisions, being the maximum number which the British Commander-in-Chief has agreed, when necessary and possible, to send to the French Front.

It seems reasonable to assume that if any British Divisions are returned to that front from the Italian Front, they will be available to increase that part of the General Reserve on that front.

Thus, the Inter-Allied General Reserve, subject to certain conditions which are not incompatible with the principle of a General Reserve, would consist of twenty-six divisions, having an approximately total strength of 316,000 men exclusive of Army Artillery and Aviation.

6. The American Permanent Military Representative, in his capacity as member of the Executive Committee, proposes that the Executive Committee report to the Supreme War Council that, in compliance with the latter's instructions—

a) It has constituted an Inter-Allied General Reserve consisting of twenty-six divisions, of which for the present ten are to remain in the Italian theatre of war; eight in the French theatre of war, and eight in the British theatre;

b) That all of the correspondence, or a résumé of it, between the Executive Committee and the respective Commanders-in-Chief, on the subject of the Inter-Allied General Reserve, be submitted to the Supreme Council in order that it, acting for the Entente Alliance, may pass upon the validity of any protest made against the proposed composition of the General Reserve.

TASKER H. BLISS

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

811.001 W 69/118½

Memorandum by the Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) of Interviews With the Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff), April 2 and April 6, 1915

The Ambassador called and showed me two small volumes entitled "When a Man Comes to Himself," President Wilson being the author. On pages 26 and 27 of these volumes appeared certain comments upon Russia and the Czar, which the Ambassador considered to be criticisms which might cause serious embarrassment in case the volumes reached Russia. He showed me that while the volumes appeared to be duplicates, they were evidently separate editions, in the second of which there was an attempt to soften the language regarding Russia, but that it still was objectionable.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that, while the volumes were published this year, the original copyright taken out by Harper & Brothers was in 1901, and therefore the statements could not be taken as representing the views of the President to-day.

He replied that it was to be presumed that the President permitted the publication and if so, it would represent his views. To that I answered that as the copyright was owned by Harper & Brothers, they may have published the volumes without the knowledge of the President, but in order to clear up the matter, I would submit the volumes to the President.

On the evening of April 2nd I submitted the two volumes to the Secretary of State, who transmitted them to the President, with a statement of the views of the Ambassador.

On April 5th I received from the Secretary the annexed note from the President¹ in relation to these volumes.

On April 6th I communicated the contents of the note to the Russian Ambassador in an interview at my office in the Department.

ROBERT LANSING

811.001 W 69/118½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Russian Ambassador has called on Mr. Lansing today and showed him two editions of "When a Man

¹ *Post*, p. 308.

Comes to Himself" pointing out the language which you showed me the other day. It seems that there are two editions—one is slightly different from the other.

The Ambassador calls attention to the fact that the a [*sic*] part of the remarks about Russia had been changed, but the change does not seem any more satisfactory than the original language.

I thought you ought to know that he had been here and expressed his embarrassment. He was afraid of the effect of the publication in Russia of extracts in regard to their people.

Mr. Lansing pointed out to him that the copyright is by Harper Brothers and taken out in 1901, and he also suggested to him that in the multitude of cares you had doubtless not had time to look over the speeches before they were reprinted.

I am wondering whether you will think it worth while to say anything to the Ambassador and whether if you desire to say anything, you would rather say it to him orally than in writing. I am inclined to think if you make any correction at all it would be better to follow Mr. Lansing's suggestion and see him personally—this not only has the advantage of leaving nothing that can be hereafter printed, but an explanation can be spoken much more impressively than it can be written.

If it is done at all it is probably best to do it at once as the Ambassador seemed quite agitated about it.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

811.001 W 69/1194

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 5 April, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you not say to the Russian Ambassador that this is the republication of an essay which I wrote and first published more than twenty years ago, and that the passage he refers to does not express my present opinion at all?

When the publishers proposed to me its republication I did not remember that it contained any such passage. I ought to have re-read it, but I did not have time. I never dreamed I had said anything like this. I could not have rewritten it, but I would have prevented its republication.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

123 F 84/16 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, *undated*.

[Received May 2, 1916—8:15 a. m.]

526. Took charge 28th on arrival. Dearing² had arranged with Foreign Office initial informal visits with Minister of Foreign Affairs and President Council of Ministers. Latter received me 3 o'clock afternoon 29th. He received me cordially; we exchanged views freely concerning relations between our countries, each expressing desire to promote existing friendly feeling. I expressed a desire and intention actively to endeavor to establish and foster direct commercial relations between the two countries without any intermediary whatever, in which he heartily concurred. Called on Sazonoff 6 o'clock, being accompanied by Dearing in both visits. Had conference hour and 20 minutes with Sazonoff, who was cordial, courteous, attentive, candid, responsive, but surprised me immeasurably when he said with the [apparent omission] positiveness that no commercial treaty can now be negotiated. I called his attention to Marye's³ report that Russia had been awaiting advances from us for negotiating new treaties and expressed willingness and desire therefor. He admitted so telling Marye but said that was 6 months ago and subject was never broached again by Marye, that too late now because Allies had called an economic conference for June 1st Paris, and Russia will negotiate no commercial conventions with any country before that conference. He intimated that such conference might determine to establish different commercial relations with Allies, with friendly countries and with belligerents. He also insinuated that when commercial treaty is negotiated it would specially export [*sic*] to those countries which extend like favors to Russia in import duties. He furthermore stated in good spirit that the denouncing by us of the treaty of 1832⁴ had created no resentment in Russia and had not interfered with the trade between the countries which he said would continue, he trusted, in the future as in the past. I said his position was surprising and disappointing to me to a degree and ventured further the statement that the principal object of my appointment as advised by yourself and President Wilson was to negotiate treaty on commerce and navigation. Attempted to impress him with friendly interest in Russia now cherished by our people with our appreciation of Russia's manifestations of good will

² F. M. Dearing, counselor of embassy.

³ George T. Marye, predecessor of Ambassador Francis in Russia.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1911, pp. 695 ff.

in the past and with expressed desire by our commercial classes to foster Russian commerce. He expressed gratification at such statements but remained firm in refusing consideration of the commercial treaty certainly until after the Allied conference at which Russia will be represented by comptroller of the Empire and four other potential [*sic*] officials. Expressed hope that my ambassadorial mission would prove agreeable and interesting and smilingly said duties of position would be sufficiently onerous without negotiating treaty. Said had heard rumor that my appointment was influenced by German sympathy and had questioned Bakhmeteff thereon but Bakhmeteff's reply said such rumor groundless and consequently Government here wholly uninfluenced by rumor which he did not credit. Returned to Embassy at 7:30 p. m., and immediately sent a note to Sazonoff as per arrangement asking when Emperor would receive me. Sazonoff forwarded same to Emperor immediately and am expecting reply to-day. Hope Emperor will receive me before returning to front but if so such action will be almost unprecedentedly prompt. Sazonoff in conference with Dearing March 30th expressed no opposition to negotiations commercial treaty although Dearing says that cannot recall that he definitely expressed willingness therefor, while expressing disappointment that Marye's negotiations had not been carried further. Consequently conclude Sazonoff's opposition is the result of recent conferences with Allies. Respectfully suggest I have lost no time since arrival morning 28th.

FRANCIS

711.612/2483

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, May 2, 1916.

[Received June 1.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I cabled you Sunday of my arrival and of my taking charge on April 28, and of sending a note on the same day to the Foreign Office and of my conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and also with the President of the Council of Ministers. My conferences with both of these officials was set forth almost in detail in the cablegram; consequently I shall not tire your patience in a résumé further than to say that the statement of Mr. Sazonoff was so surprising and inexplicable to me that I have been endeavoring since the interview to ascertain the cause for this change of position or of policy on the part of Russia toward the United States in regard to a commercial treaty.

I wrote you at length twice on the steamer while en route from New York to Christiania, and in both letters expressed my fear that certain interests in New York were making effort to have all trade

between our country and Russia pay tribute to England as an intermediary.⁵ Since arriving here my fears have not been dissipated; in fact I have heard many things which confirm the suspicions I have cherished.

The economic conference between the Allies which is fixed for Paris June first was, in my judgment, inspired by England, as that country is making decided effort to occupy toward Russia the position held by Germany before the war. It is true that both Sazonoff and Stürmer expressed themselves as favoring direct commercial relations between their country and ours, but the English influence here is very strong and a persistent effort is being made to strengthen it. The loan which was being negotiated in New York some eight weeks ago, but for some unaccountable reason has not been consummated, was alluded to by Sazonoff in my interview with him, and he expressed the opinion that it would be impossible for America to get what he called double security on any loan our banks might make to Russia. When I asked him what he meant by double security he said that our capitalists were demanding in addition to the obligation specific collateral. I told him that no country now engaged in war would be able to negotiate a loan in America without collateral and cited my experience and that of others with the Anglo-French loan which we were unable to sell at 98, as we endeavored to do; and in fact never since the expiration of the syndicate have we been able to dispose of those securities without loss. From 96¼ it declined to 93⅝, and when I left America was selling at 95. All of this I told Mr. Sazonoff, but he persisted in saying that Russia would make no loan that required any security other than the faith or credit of the government itself.

In talking with Mr. Meserve, a representative of the National City Bank, on Saturday he told me that Russia had agreed, or was about to agree early in March, to the requirements of New York bankers, but subsequently refused to do so, and the only way of accounting for the change in position was the influence of England which was desirous that all foreign relations of a commercial or financial character had by Russia should be through London.

In a talk with a gentleman today who has had a great deal of experience in Russia and is well known in the United States, the opinion was expressed that Bark, who is the Minister of Finance of Russia, is completely under British influence, and the same gentleman went so far as to state that in his judgment Sazonoff is held in

⁵ For letter of Apr. 10, 1916, to the Secretary of State, and letter of Apr. 8, 1916, to President Wilson, a copy of which was enclosed, see Hearings Before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, United States Senate, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 8704-8707.

the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs by British rather than by Russian support. If this is true, and I am not prepared to question it, we can account for Russia's change of front concerning the commercial treaty with the United States.

Mr. Sazonoff seemed to be prepared for my broaching the subject of a commercial treaty, because when I did so he very promptly stated that Russia would make no commercial treaty now with any country whatever. In addition to expressing sincere disappointment on the part of our government and our people generally, I made effort to impress upon Mr. Sazonoff that personally I so regretted his position that if not discouraged I was greatly chagrined because of the apparent impossibility of achieving what was my main object in accepting the Russian mission. Our interview was in good spirit on both sides, but there was no variation in his expression to the effect that nothing certainly would be considered until after the Paris conference.

The Embassy building is in very poor condition. I am sleeping in the Embassy and taking breakfast here, which is furnished by the wife of one of the messengers; my luncheon and dinner I get elsewhere. Of course I shall not keep up this manner of life because, regardless of my own pleasure and convenience, it is not becoming to an American Ambassador. I shall not go to a hotel; the Astoria has been requisitioned by the government for the exclusive accommodation of army officers. The Hotel de l'Europe is full to overflowing, and there is no other hotel in the city which would comport with the dignity of an American ambassador. Mr. Dearing has written you concerning the needs of the Embassy and I have only to add thereto that if we would make headway with the people of this great country it is advisable, if not necessary, that our representative here should live in a manner that would not reflect upon our country by comparison with the representatives of other governments. I have met no official Russians other than those mentioned above, but I have met many Americans whose number seems to be increasing from week to week.

Your cablegram of information sent via Tokio and also via London was received yesterday; ^o I am preparing a résumé of that information to send to the Foreign Office here for its information.

From the most recent dispatches we have had concerning the relations between the United States and Germany it appears that the Imperial Government is willing to make whatever concessions may be required in order to prevent a severance of diplomatic relations.

^o Not printed.

When in Stockholm I was met by several persons who came there from Germany to confer with me concerning the care of German and Austrian prisoners in Russia which, without exception, they presented as deplorable. We are organizing the inspection force and I shall be able to make more full report on this subject within a few days.

Respectfully yours,

DAVID R. FRANCIS

P. S. As I have not yet been presented to the Emperor, all communications addressed to any branch of the Russian government must still be signed by the Chargé d'Affaires.

D. R. F.

711.612/249½

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, May 7, 1916.

[Received May 31.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In my various communications addressed to you and Mr. Polk and Mr. Phillips from here, I have written nothing about the Jewish question which in our conferences in Washington appeared to us as the only stumbling block in the way of negotiating a commercial treaty.

My former letter expressed surprise over Mr. Sazonoff's remark that Russia would negotiate no more commercial treaties at this time. In the course of his conversation, after remarking twice or more that the treaty had been denounced by America, he said casually that he did not know why it had been denounced. Thereupon I broke into the conversation and asked him if he meant literally what he said, and when he repeated it I told him why the treaty had been abrogated by President Taft, thinking that might turn his attention to the Jewish question. He brushed it aside, however, and went on to talk about something else. That was the only mention of the Jewish question in my conference of an hour and twenty-five minutes with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I did not think it advisable to broach the Jewish question again; nor was the question touched upon at all in my talk with Minister of the Interior Stürmer, who is also President of the Council of Ministers. He talks English very badly, however, and most of our conference was translated by Secretary Dearing who accompanied me.

I am told by Harper who, as you know, accompanied me to Petrograd, and who has many friends and acquaintances here, that he had been informed that it was about decided that the Jewish Pale of residence will not be abolished until after the close of the war; when he talked to me in America he seemed confident that the Pale would be abolished

in the very near future. It seems that the army, which has great influence in Russia now, is skeptical about the loyalty of the Jews to the Russian cause. If that is true, the extension of greater privileges to the Jews will not be made very soon. The army influence appears to be exerted on the liberal side; it was on their advice that the Emperor went in person for the first time to open the Duma Feb. 27/Mar. 7. The army is very much in evidence here; soldiers are drilling by thousands in the streets every day, and the Emperor reviewed between thirty and forty thousand soldiers on the Champs de Mars May 1. At the Russian ballet which I saw last evening a large proportion of the men in the audience were in uniform.

I had a long and very satisfactory talk on Monday last with Montgomery Schuyler who was in charge of the inspection of prison camps here for several months; . . . He is here now representing the *New York Times*. He seems disposed to second my efforts to promote direct commercial relations between our country and the Russian people, and agreed with my opinion that British influence is being most aggressively exerted to prevent it. I see evidences of that influence, or hear of such, almost every day. Very few of the Russians, however, approve of it as there is a deep-seated resentment against any country occupying to Russia the relation which Germany held before the war. I shall do what I can to encourage such a sentiment. In my talk yesterday with Baron Korff, Master of Ceremonies, who will be in attendance on the Emperor when he receives me tomorrow, I again advocated direct commercial relations without any intermediary, and he was in full accord with such policy.

MAY 8, 1916.

I was called upon this morning by Mr. William P. Simms who has come to Petrograd as a representative of the United Press of America, for the purpose of establishing an office of that Association here. He has been its representative in Paris for six or seven years past, and is very familiar with conditions in France. He tells me confidentially that the conference held in Paris not a great while ago between representatives of the Allies cemented still more closely the bonds between them, and that at that conference a plan was made to have an advance made upon German forces simultaneously by all of the allied armies. It is reported that 20,000 Russian troops were landed at Marseilles some days ago and that others are en route there. A large number of Russian troops are passing through Petrograd daily; of course, no one knows their destination. Discipline camps are stationed throughout the city and in the suburbs where new men are being drilled. The Emperor spends most of his time at the front; he told me that he was in haste to receive me because he was going to

return to the front on Sunday,—I saw him on Friday. I am still endeavoring to ascertain more about the economic conference to be held in Paris between the Allies on May 19; that must be Russian time which, according to our calendar, will be June first, because the representatives from Russia have not yet left for Paris.

M. Viviani, ex-Premier of France, arrived here last Saturday, but his arrival was not given to the public prints; in fact, when he cleared from England in a man of war, it was announced that he was going to return to France. This information was imparted to me by Mr. Simms who came into Petrograd on the same train with M. Viviani.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID R. FRANCIS

763.72/2835½

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, July 25, 1916.

[Received August 19.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The resignation of Foreign Minister Sazonoff and the appointment of Minister of Interior Stürmer as his successor was announced in the papers Sunday morning, July 23, and was a great surprise to all classes of people and to every section of the country. On Monday, July 10, upon which day I was expecting a conference with Mr. Sazonoff concerning a plan between the allies and belligerents whereby America could extend aid to Poland, etc., the Embassy was informed by telephone that the Minister had been called to the front to confer with the Emperor. Mr. Sazonoff returned to Petrograd the morning of Thursday, July 13. I saw him that afternoon in company with Mr. Samuel McRoberts of the National City Bank of New York who had asked to pay his respects, and to whom the Minister extended a cordial welcome because Mr. McRoberts had formed an American syndicate which had loaned \$50,000,000 to the Russian Government. Mr. Sazonoff complained of being tired and said that on the following day, July 14, he would go to Finland for a rest of two or three weeks. He was in Finland when his resignation was announced and he is still there; his plan is to return to Petrograd on Monday, July 31.

Universal regret is expressed at the retirement of Mr. Sazonoff, which he and the Emperor and all members of the Government attribute to ill health. At the same time there are rumors to the effect that his parting with the Emperor on July 12 was not only friendly but affectionate, the Emperor, it is said, kissing him three times and expressing the highest appreciation of his public services. The day after the Minister's departure the Empress joined the Emperor at his military headquarters, and two days thereafter the

departure of Mr. Sazonoff from Petrograd for Finland he received a telegram asking for his immediate resignation. Whether this is true no one can say authoritatively. It is generally believed, however, that the Empress is very desirous for peace. She has long been suspected of German sympathies. One story is to the effect that when Minister Sazonoff was directed to submit to Russia's allies proposals of peace suggested by Germany, he refused to do so, whereupon Mr. Stürmer, President of the Council of Ministers, said he would submit such proposals if the Foreign Minister declined to do so, and that thereupon Mr. Sazonoff tendered his resignation.

. . . It is now thought that if peace negotiations are opened and the terms of peace agreed upon, Stürmer will be made Chancellor of the Empire, an office which has not been filled since the days of Gortshakoff.

This would indicate that the court party of the Empire is preparing to counteract what they fear will be a liberal movement on the part of the people after the close of the war. It is not charged that Russia is planning to make a separate peace with Germany. One report is to the effect that von Lucius, present Minister from Germany at Stockholm, has recently made a secret visit to Russia and has suggested terms of peace which are attractive to Russia and not objectionable to France, as they provide for ceding to France Lorraine which has belonged to Germany since 1870. It is not known what concessions, if any, are proposed to England, but it is said that Germany is willing to recognize the integrity of Belgium and to indemnify her for damages inflicted. England is to be propitiated by retaining the German South African colonies which she has captured. Japan will be appeased by being permitted to retain the territory she has captured in the Far East.

In the meantime Russia is marshalling the largest army ever assembled. She has already called 16,100,000 men and in a call issued ten days ago increased this number by 2,500,000, making a total of 18,600,000 men. What an army! What a menace this would be to other countries if these men were armed and well organized! It may be that the supporters of an absolute monarchy in Russia are asking themselves what such an army well disciplined and conscious of its strength will do in Russia when there are no more foreign enemies to fight. These soldiers are as fine looking men as I ever saw carry a musket. I have seen thousands of them coming into Petrograd in obedience to a call, fresh from the fields,—boys who had never before seen a village of over 2,000 inhabitants, with sunken chests, slip-shod gait and careless carriage. After three or four weeks of drill, equipped with military clothing, including boots of which they are very proud, they march through the streets with swinging gait, head high in the

air and chests out-thrown, singing, and their very countenances manifesting pride in their country and consciousness of their own power. After arrival in their barracks they have been given the most nourishing food, including meat which previously they had not had more than once a week,—soup and black bread had been the principal means of their subsistence.

The last call which comprised 2,500,000 men was to go into effect July 15/28, but yesterday the date when the call was to be effective was postponed from July 15 to August 15. This change of date may not have any significance but it was determined upon the day after Sazonoff's resignation and Stürmer's appointment.

Minister Sazonoff was and is a bitter enemy of Germany. . . . Sazonoff's treaty with Japan was considered a very severe blow to Germany; that was his conviction and the main reason he gave me for its consummation. The Russo-Japanese Treaty has not been talked about very much in Russia, but in Japan it has aroused the greatest enthusiasm; banquets have been held and toasts have been drunk to the new alliance.

You have probably seen before reading this communication thus far that I am disposed to share in the belief that the resignation of Sazonoff was forced and that the promotion of Stürmer is a triumph for the party of reaction and for the champions of absolute monarchy in Russia, although such a victory may be due in part to the strengthening of pro-German sentiment in the Empire.

Before closing I desire again to remind you that all the rumors outlined in the reports narrated above are given for what they are worth and that their truth is not vouched for in any degree. The official announcement and the talk among diplomats is that Sazonoff was compelled to resign because he was broken down in health. I spent several hours this forenoon conferring with representative commercial men in Petrograd, three of whom are bank presidents, and all of whom would be greatly concerned if not alarmed if they were made known as the sources of the above expressions. None of these rumors or reports are from American sources; all are from Russians who are men of substance and of representative character, whose loyalty to their country is unquestionable, but who are grieved to see their country take a step which in this age of progress they consider to be a backward one.

Minister of Finance Bark who negotiated the \$50,000,000 loan with the National City Bank syndicate is in France, after having passed a week or more in London. He left Petrograd about the middle of July and I don't think knew anything about the change in the ministry when he went away. England has been financing Russia for some time past, but reports are to the effect that Minister Bark has arranged

in France for sufficient credit to pay for the munitions of war furnished by that country to Russia. He has been considered completely under English influence and has not been held in the highest esteem as a financier. Mr. McRoberts, however, thought he was the ablest man he met in Petrograd, with the possible exception of Sazonoff.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

861.002/46½

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, August 14, 1916.

[Received September 9.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to my personal and confidential letter to you under date of July 25,—the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Stürmer, who is still President of the Council of Ministers, does not seem to have the respect of any of the prominent Russians whom I have met. His appointment is decidedly a reactionary victory. . . .

The generally accepted theory of Sazonoff's removal and Stürmer's appointment is that the former promulgated a statement concerning the autonomy of Poland with the approval of the Emperor, but without submitting same to the Council of Ministers of which Stürmer was President. That gave offense to Stürmer and his colleagues who complained to the Emperor who thereupon sent for Sazonoff and directed him to submit the plan to his colleagues in the Ministry which Sazonoff declined to do, stating that that would subject him to humiliation in the event they should insist upon a change. Whether that was the cause or not, however, it is generally believed that the reactionaries are in the saddle and were looking for an opportunity to unhorse Sazonoff who is looked upon as a liberal. In addition to that, Sazonoff was said to be under the influence of England and the same charge is made against the Minister of Finance, Mr. Bark, who has just returned from a visit to France and England, and whose resignation is said to be imminent. Baron Stürmer is said to have remarked after learning of the first victory or two of General Brousiloff in Galicia, "One or two more such victories and we can do away with the Duma". Whether these reports are true remains to be proven. There is no doubt, however, that the liberal or progressive element in Russia is greatly disappointed and chagrined at the removal of Sazonoff and the appointment of Stürmer.

I think in a former letter I stated that while the loyalty of Stürmer had never been questioned, that he and the reactionaries generally

were more disposed to sympathise with Germany than any other element in Russia. My view concerning the benefit to the plain people of Russia through their education and the broadening of their views by the war is stronger now than when expressed two or three weeks ago. I do not think there will be a revolution immediately after the close of the war; that would be premature, but if the Court Party does not adopt a more liberal policy by extending more privileges to the people and their representatives in the Duma, a revolution will take place before the lapse of even a few years.

In the meantime, not only are the Russian people acquiring more information concerning the resources of their own country, but it seems to me that the attention of the world is becoming directed or fixed more intently on Russia from day to day. European and American newspapers and periodicals all dwell upon the magnificence of this Empire, its undeveloped wealth and its immense possibilities. There will be great competition for the trade of Russia after the close of the war. American enterprise is already looking with covetous eyes on the mineral deposits, the great water power, and the opportunities for railroad construction which this country offers. Several Americans are going home by the steamer which takes this pouch, but there is not one of them who is not planning to return to Russia, as all think there is no field on earth to be compared with this. The National City Bank has decided to open a branch here and I think it is not only a good move for that institution but would prove highly beneficial to the commercial relations of the two countries. I have no intention or desire to violate the neutrality of America, but in my judgment American capital and ingenuity should be encouraged here in order to offset, if nothing more, the well designed plan of England, and perhaps France also, to capture the trade of Russia after the war through the operation of the resolutions passed at the Economic Conference of the Allies held in Paris June 14-17. There have been many Americans here, and perhaps there are some now, who are unwise enough to take advantage of the necessities of Russia to extort unreasonable prices for what they have to sell; that is a short-sighted policy, however, and one which I am advising all Americans to avoid. . . .

Yours sincerely,

DAVID R. FRANCIS

763.72/3172½

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, *January 29/February 11, 1917.*

[Received April 10.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: YOURS of December 28th⁷ came to hand January 14/27 and I was pleased to hear that your health is not bad and that you do not contemplate resigning. I was also appreciative of your statement that you read my personal letters, and that they are not tiresome, but give you an insight into the local situation which is interesting if not valuable.

I don't know what time you will receive this letter, but it ought to get to Washington not later than April 1st, as the pouch containing it will be sent by Lydig, who will leave via Vladivostok next Tuesday evening on the Siberian Express and who tells me he expects to arrive in Washington about the last of March. It is possible I may make him a courier only to Vladivostok or to Peking, but that will depend upon what I determine is the most expeditious plan.

Since writing you last there have been several very important changes. My despatches advised of the delivery of the general peace note and also of the note of the President concerning peace;⁸ I also wrote a despatch giving the details of the delivery to the Foreign Office of the address of the President to the Senate, but don't know whether you have received the pouch in which it was sent.⁹

The peace note of the President was not received by the Allies with unmixed approval. The criticisms were mainly based upon the statement or assertion that the statesmen of both sides of this contest claimed to be fighting for the same objects—the critics of the note were inclined to charge that such was the President's view also. In the address to the Senate, the "peace without victory" expression is what aroused opposition, which in some quarters was quite bitter. The peace note and the address to the Senate however were so completely overshadowed by the severing of our diplomatic relations with Germany that they were not discussed nearly so much if at all. I cabled you my opinion¹⁰ concerning the address to the Senate and either cabled the President direct or through you my feeling concerning the stand taken with Germany. I have not yet seen a word of the address of the President to the Congress on February 3rd,¹¹ but have been much pleased to learn through the indefinite and un-

⁷ Not found in Department files.

⁸ For these notes, see *Foreign Relations*, 1916, supp., pp. 94 and 97, respectively.

⁹ This despatch not printed; for President Wilson's address to the Senate, see *ibid.*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 24.

¹⁰ Cable not printed.

¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 109.

satisfactory telegrams in the Russian papers that the stand taken has met with the enthusiastic approval and support of the American people. One telegram says that the Senate approved by a vote of 78 to 5; I have never seen that the House has taken any definite action.

I gave a statement to the newspapers concerning the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Germany immediately after the receipt of cable so informing me. It was necessary to do that in order to give the Russian people a clear understanding of what the United States had done, as otherwise they would have thought we had declared war, and if so there would have been a demonstration in front of the Embassy which I should have been compelled to address. I talked at great length to the representatives of the press all during Sunday Feb. 4th, and after the receipt of the cables sent for my information and giving the instructions that had been forwarded to our missions in neutral countries, I was compelled to submit to second talks of half an hour or more with each representative who had seen me before the receipt of the cable and to whom I had been compelled to say that I could make no statement whatever as I had received no official information that we had severed diplomatic relations with Germany. Each newspaper man insisted on the authenticity of the news and it was very difficult to explain why I could not confirm it and consequently could give no expression on the subject.

The Russians are very much pleased with the stand we have taken and are already beginning to treat us as Allies. The French are delighted also and according to telegraphic reports there have been demonstrations of an enthusiastic nature in Paris. I don't like the position of England or rather the British Embassy here. Neither the British Ambassador nor the French nor the Italian has called nor have I met any one of them since Bernstorff was given his passports—it seemed to me that it would not have been improper for those Ambassadors to call and express gratification at least that our diplomatic relations with the arch-enemy of their countries had been severed. The Belgian Minister deBuisseret did call and expressed himself as being much pleased with the stand we had taken. The Siamese Minister called yesterday and stated that his Government had instructed him to ascertain what reply the neutral countries had made or would make to the suggestions of President Wilson that they take similar action to ours. I told him that no official information had been received on the subject and that all I knew concerning it was what had appeared through the public prints. He told me he had called upon me first, but proposed to call upon the Ministers of the other neutral countries and that when he left the Embassy he

would go to the Norwegian Legation; I requested him to phone me the result of his conference with Minister Prebensen, which he did later and informed me that the Scandinavian countries had come to no conclusion other than an agreement to confer and make a joint reply. Meantime I had telephoned to the Chinese Minister and called at his Legation where he informed me of the action taken by his government. He seemed very much pleased thereat and I was exceedingly also. I informed the Siamese Minister of the action taken by China and strongly urged him to recommend his Government to do likewise—he about promised to do so. You will observe from the editorial of the *Novoe Vremya* of today which I send by this pouch¹² that the motives of China are impugned from the Russian view-point and that this semi-official organ of the Government states that it will be the policy of Russia to aid Japan in being the heir to the German possessions in the East. It seems to me that we should have some voice in that matter. I account for the lukewarmness if not the opposition of the British Embassy in this way: England fears that America by coming into the war will be too potential a factor in the negotiations for peace. It may be however that the phlegmatic nature of the Englishman has not yet realized what it means for America to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, especially if such step should be followed by a declaration of war, which under the circumstances seems to me to be inevitable. The Allies should bear in mind that their united efforts for two and a half years have been ineffective in bringing the Central Empires to terms. They should also bear in mind that during that period, while they had been weakened by the loss of millions of men and the incurring of billions of debt, America has grown stronger not only in wealth and manpower but has learned more about making munitions of war than it had acquired during all the years of its existence. I must confess that I am not pleased with the attitude of our English Cousins. As I have written you more than once they dominate the situation in Russia. The French and the Italian Ambassadors almost hesitate to give the time of day without consulting the British Ambassador. British influence has permeated to such an extent Government circles that it brought about the appointment of Sazonov as Ambassador to St. James. Sazonov was removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mainly because he was supposed to be much under British influence. There is no question about his being an able diplomat, nor is there any doubt about his being exceedingly friendly to the English. I have written you time and again how direct commerce with America is interfered with by

¹² Not printed.

British dictation and if I have not written you that the people & the commercial circles here both are becoming restive under that domination, I certainly meant to do so. I do recall however having written to either you or Polk that the Russians are saying that if they were going to have a commercial master, there is no reason why they should have changed from Germany especially when the change has entailed such a great cost. It is true that England is financing Russia and has the power to require an approval of how the money advanced should be expended, and it must also be admitted that in doing so England is exercising a right which any country or Government might be expected to exercise under the circumstances. England should not forget however that she is only able to finance Russia and the other Allies by the assistance she gets from the United States. That assistance however will no doubt cease now when there is a prospect of our having use for all of our money to prepare ourselves and it may be that a realization or a fear of such a situation, is the cause of England being so luke-warm in the face of the strong probability of our declaring war against Germany.

The internal situation has quieted down somewhat since my last letter to you on that subject. The note of the Emperor to the new Premier Golitzine advising cooperation between the Government and the law-making bodies of the Empire had a very good effect. There is a slumbering opposition however to the influences controlling the Emperor, and if it were not that Russia is engaged in a life-and-death struggle, it might assume more definite form, and in fact "show its teeth".

The Russian papers have contained several telegrams to the effect that there will be a Coalition Administration in Washington in the event we should engage in war. One telegram today stated that Elihu Root would be Secretary of State and Theodore Roosevelt Secretary of the Navy. Of course I gave the report no credence and trust I was right. I write by this pouch a gossipy letter to Polk which I shall tell him to show you. I wrote Polk some time ago asking him whether it was expected that Ambassadors would tender their resignations at the expiration of the Administration but had no reply. Of course I shall be pleased to tender mine if expected or if customary, but otherwise I shall not do so and am moved to that course not so much by the desire to remain here but by a conviction on my part that I can serve our country quite as well here as anyone else. This may seem conceited but if I felt otherwise I would be equally candid. My relations with the Government are very friendly as I have written you and my relations with my Colleagues in the diplomatic corps are likewise. Minister Pokrovski and his wife will occupy seats in my loge at the ballet

this evening as will the Chinese Minister. About two weeks ago I entertained at a dinner the Ministers of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Servia, China and Siam. I wrote about this last week but fear that the pouch containing the letter will not be received for many weeks to come.

With sincere personal regards [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

FEBRUARY 13, 1917.

I am this day in receipt of notice from the Agent of the Norwegian steamers in Petrograd that service on that line has been resumed; consequently I send a copy of this letter in the pouch that goes by that route.

Last night there was a large banquet given at one of the principal restaurants of this city by the British Colony to the English members of the Allied Conference now in session here. Speeches were made by Rodzianko, President of the Duma; by an Ex Russian Minister of War and by a Russian Professor in Oxford University; also by Lord Milner, a British General and a British Admiral. The main object of this banquet appears to have been to cement the relations between England and Russia. The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan spoke and proposed the health of Sazonov who has recently been appointed Russian Ambassador to St. James. Sazonov replied; the main subject of the speeches of both Buchanan and Sazonov was, in addition to mutual expressions of admiration, to felicitate Russia and England on the complete understanding now existing between those countries and to express the hope that the relations will become still closer. Each of these two speakers stated that the other was a potential if not the main influence in removing the misunderstanding so long existing between England and Russia.

It will require many banquets and other instrumentalities to remove the prejudice existing in Russia against British influence or British domination, which appears to become more distasteful from week to week to the commercial interests of Russia.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

763.72/3787a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We have not, as you know, congratulated the Russian Government or people upon the establishment of democratic institutions in that country; merely recognizing the Government as the one with which we desired intercourse.

I thought, therefore, that it would be worth while, immediately after the declaration of a state of war, to send a telegram to Francis to be communicated to the Russian Government, going a little further than we did in the telegram of recognition.¹³ I submit for your consideration a draft of such a telegram but in doing so I realize that it can be very materially improved in language.

I hope, if you approve of the plan, you will make the corrections which you desire.¹⁴

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/3771

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I call your attention to the enclosed despatch just received from Ambassador Francis. It causes me serious concern. I wish we could do something to prevent the socialistic element in Russia from carrying out any plan which would destroy the efficiency of the Allied Powers.

My suggestion would be that a Commission, say of three men, be sent at once to Russia, if agreeable to that Government, and that one of the Commissioners be Samuel Gompers¹⁵ who would have a very decided influence with the labor element in Russia and prevent in a large measure, I believe, the tendency of the socialists toward a separate peace with Germany.

From despatches we have received, as you know, the German socialists are seeking to meet the Russian socialists, undoubtedly for the purpose of influencing them to support a separate peace between Germany and Russia.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, April 10, 1917—4 p. m.

[Received April 11—11 a. m.]

1169. Naval attaché cables his Department 13010, April 10, 1 p. m.:

I hear authoritatively that naval conditions precarious, military not wholly satisfactory. Social circles urging peace and fears are

¹³ Telegram No. 1271, Mar. 20, 1917, to the Ambassador in Russia, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 12.

¹⁴ On April 6 President Wilson replied: "I have suggested a verbal change here and there in this message, but of course approve it very heartily. Faithfully Yours, W. W." (File No. 763.72/3788½.) For the telegram as sent, see *ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁵ President of the American Federation of Labor.

entertained by some that army will be influenced thereby. Desirable that everything possible be promptly done to strengthen situation.

FRANCIS

763.72/3800½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 12 April, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The suggestion of a commission to Russia has come to me from a number of quarters and I am inclined to think that it would be a good plan to send one, and send it practically at once.

The important, perhaps the all-important thing is the personnel. Men of large view, tested discretion, and a sympathetic appreciation of just what it is they have been sent over for are the sort we need; and it is necessary, besides, that they should look the part.

House has suggested a prominent Jew (Oscar Straus), a business man (Willard Straight), a labor leader (Samuel Gompers), and an educator (Benjamin Ide Wheeler). What do you think, and whom would you suggest? . . . Crane has already gone to Russia and ought to be over there by this time, if his ship has escaped the submarines. Professor Harper of Chicago is widely known and trusted in Russia.

We must find the right men, and they must not all be Democrats,—need not any of them be Democrats,—but should all be genuinely enthusiastic for the success of the Russian revolution.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72/3800½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have your note of today in relation to the suggested Russian Commission and have been thinking over the personnel of such Commission. I think we may agree that Samuel Gompers is as available a man as we could get. In regard to Oscar Straus I should doubt very much the advisability of sending another Jew and I believe there is a measure of danger in overplaying the Jew element. I do not think Willard Straight is the man at all for the place and I doubt very much from my acquaintance with Dr. Wheeler whether he would be suitable.

I should think we ought to have, in addition to a labor leader, such a man as Doctor John R. Mott; a businessman like Cyrus Mc-

Cormick or Harold [*Howard*] Elliott; a financier like Bertrand; and a lawyer of prominence.

In regard to Professor Harper of Chicago, I have heard from several different sources that he is not as popular as I had supposed in Russia. I am therefore afraid to advise his selection. Of course I assume Mr. Crane would be joined to any Commission that might be sent.

As soon as you determine upon the make-up of the commission I will take it up with the individuals if you so desire, or, possibly, it would be more effective if you communicated directly with them.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/40314

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 19 April, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have been thinking a great deal about the personnel of the Russian Commission. I hope that in your conference with him to-day you will find Mr. Root a real friend of the revolution. If you do, the Commission that has framed itself in my mind would be as follows:

Elihu Root, New York,
John R. Mott, New York,
Charles R. Crane,
Cyrus H. McCormick, Chicago,
Eugene Meyer, jr., New York,
S. R. Bertron, New York,
John F. Stevens, New York,

and a representative of Labour whom I would suggest that we choose in this way: seek the advice of Mr. Gompers as to whom we could send whom the Socialists over there would not regard as an active opponent of Socialism. Gompers himself and the leaders immediately associated with him are known to be pronounced opponents of Socialism and would hardly be influential in the present ruling circles of labour at Petrograd. And yet we shall have to be careful, if we are to send a real representative of American Labour, not to send a Socialist.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

If you see no objections to this list, from an international or from a Russian point of view, I will be glad to write to these gentlemen and ask them to serve.

W. W.

763.72/3965

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *April 20, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In connection with the enclosed dispatch from Mr. Page, at Rome,¹⁷ which relates to the Russian situation, I have been wondering whether it might not be well for you to send to Prince Lvoff a message which would in reality be an address to the Russian people, expressing the confidence of the American people in the success of the democratic government which they have established and of our very sincere desire to aid them in their struggle against Germany.

I believe at the present time this would be a most helpful document to be published throughout Russia because of the very high regard in which the United States is held by the liberal element in Russia. Of course if it is to be done at all it should be done at once as I believe the situation is serious and the present Government needs support.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/4377a

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *April 30, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose for your consideration a telegram which I think should be sent to Mr. Francis.¹⁸ I learned from the Russian Chargé that his Government had cabled him as to this matter, and that the belief that joint conferences were being held here without Russia being a party was causing suspicion and a measure of offense. This unfortunate and ill-founded attitude had been first aroused by the recent conference between the premiers of Great Britain, France and Italy, to which Russia was not invited.

It is my opinion that no time is to be lost in removing the false impression which has been created. I have already told the French Ambassador and Mr. Balfour of this situation and they will act at once.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

¹⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 31.

¹⁸ The President replied: "I hope this admirable despatch will be sent at once." For text of the telegram as sent, see *ibid.*, p. 50.

861.77/97½

The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

[NEW YORK,] May 6, 1917.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am glad to learn that the Council of National Defense is sending a R. R. Commission to Russia.

Very definite instructions to them will be necessary to avoid confusion & interference between them & the President's Commission. They will report to different departments & be under different instructions in the ordinary course.

It is plain that we can't have three bodies dealing with the Russian Government at the same time—the regular Embassy the President's Mission & the R. R. Commission.

The President's mission must discuss the transportation subject with the Russian Government for that is the most important of all & if we cannot talk about that we will be discredited & of no account.

I suggest that the R. R. Commission be attached to the President's commission as expert advisers make preliminary reports to it for its information & make through it any communication which seems desirable to be made to the Russian Government.

I think Mr. Willard will understand the importance of this & of leaving no uncertainty.

I shall go to Washington in full time for final instructions but I understand the R. R. men are to leave Wednesday.

Faithfully Yours

ELIHU ROOT

861.77/97½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received from Mr. Root the enclosed letter ^{18a} regarding the Railroad Commission which is being sent to Russia. I judge from his letter that he feels that the usefulness and importance of his commission will be weakened by having in Russia contemporaneously another commission dealing with the technical side of a topic which he believes he is to discuss with the Russian Government. I enclose a suggested draft of an instruction to Mr. Stevens carrying out Mr. Root's idea (Draft "A"). I enclose also another draft of instructions to Mr. Stevens which would limit his efforts to a particular line, so that he and Mr. Root would not

^{18a} *Supra.*

find themselves embarrassed by dealing with the Russian Government on an identical matter. (Draft "B.")

I do not know what your views are, and I simply enclose these drafts as of possible assistance to you.

In view of the fact that the Railway Commission is to leave early Wednesday morning, this should receive your very prompt attention.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure 1—Draft A]

DEAR MR. STEVENS: In view of the fact that when the Railroad Commission and the commission under Mr. Root arrive in Russia there will be, counting the American Embassy, three bodies in that country conferring with the Russian Government on behalf of the United States, it seems advisable to clearly define the functions of the two commissions, in order that there may be no confusion in the mind of the Russian Government, resulting in one commission or the other being discredited by it.

I would be pleased, therefore, if, upon your arrival in Russia, you will let it be known that your commission is subsidiary to the Root Commission which is to follow, and that you stand in the relation of a body of experts to assist the Root Commission in the accomplishment of a special object, namely, aiding Russia to improve its transportation facilities by supplying from the United States men and material for constructing and operating certain railway lines of great importance to Russia in carrying on the present war. Upon the arrival of the Root Commission, therefore, you will report to it and carry out your functions under the direction and leadership of Mr. Root.

[Enclosure 2—Draft B]

DEAR MR. STEVENS: In view of the fact that when the Railroad Commission and the commission under Mr. Root arrive in Russia there will be, counting the American Embassy, three bodies in that country conferring with the Russian Government on behalf of the United States, it seems advisable to clearly define the functions of the two commissions, in order that there may be no confusion in the minds of the Russian Government.

I would be pleased, therefore, if, in your conferences with members of the Russian Government and other persons in Russia with whom it may be necessary to discuss the objects of your mission, you would have your commission restrict themselves to the topic of transportation, the supply of materials for the construction of railways, and the furnishing of men to manage and operate the lines. As Mr. Root has the rank of Ambassador and as his commission will deal with

general policies, you are instructed to confer freely with him and his commission upon their arrival in Russia, and thereafter to negotiate with the Russian Government in accordance with his general suggestions, which, I have no doubt, you will find most illuminating and helpful.

861.77/983

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 7 May, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think that Mr. Root's mistake about the character and functions of the commission of railway experts is a very natural one, but that it will be removed when Mr. Bertron repeats to him a conversation he (Mr. B.) and I had this afternoon.

This is my understanding of the mission of the railway experts: It bears no resemblance to that of the Commission of which Mr. Root is to act as chairman. It is not going to ask What can the United States do for Russia? but only to say We have been sent here to put ourselves at your disposal to do anything we can to assist in the working out of your transportation problem. They are to report nothing back to us. They are delegated to do nothing but serve Russia on the ground, if she wishes to use them, as I understand she does.

There would, therefore, be no propriety in making them subsidiary to the Commission or in giving them any connection with it of any kind.

If this is not clear to all concerned, I will of course take any course that may seem wise to make it clear.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

763.72/46753

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, April 25/May 8, 1917.

[Received June 20.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I enclose translation of an editorial from the Petrograd *Rjetch* of April 14/27th which is thought by some to reflect the personal views of Professor Miliukoff the Minister of Foreign Affairs. You will observe it savors of criticism of President Wilson in that he after advocating "a peace without victory" now appears to join with the Allies in wishing a decisive victory. Furthermore in mentioning the President's declaration concerning territorial questions it seems to draw the conclusion that the President classes Constantinople and the Dardanelles with the German colonies

in Africa to the neglect of Russia's claims to Constantinople. It asks what the President means by "all the principles of international policy must be revised" and by "It is inevitable that all nations should renounce their former outlook". It also makes other insinuations but none of the expressions would be important unless they were thought to reflect the views of Minister Miliukoff. As I cabled the Department on May 1st in my No. 1240,¹⁹ there has been what threatened to become a serious difference in the Cabinet concerning the foreign or annexation policy of Russia at the end of the war. Miliukoff has favored Russia having Constantinople as was promised to the Imperial Government by the Allies before the Revolution. Kerensky however advocates the Dardanelles being neutral and free to all countries and is also opposed to annexation to Russian territory after the close of the war—many of the banners yesterday in the great Labor Parade contained inscriptions of "Peace with Victory but without annexation or contribution". I learned in confidence yesterday that this difference in the Ministry had been adjusted and that in the near future a formal declaration of what Russia's objects are in the war, would be made and I was given to understand that such declaration would be against annexation of territory. The Ministry was said to have been about equally divided on this question. Sir George Buchanan told me a few days ago that he was not expressing any opinion on the subject because the Allies had promised Constantinople to Russia before the Revolution and when Russia's policy regarding Constantinople was well defined and well-known; he remarked however that he hoped or believed the result would be that the Dardanelles would be neutral.

APRIL 25/MAY 8, 1917.

The above was dictated May 2d, since which time there have been a number of important occurrences. On May 3rd or 4th, Miliukoff promulgated a statement without consulting the Workingmen's and Soldiers' Committee, and that statement aroused hostile demonstrations against Miliukoff, notwithstanding it only reiterated the declaration of the provisional Government of March 28/Apr. 10th. The offense seems to have been that the Provisional Government presumed to make a statement without consulting with and obtaining the consent of the Workingmen's Committee. In the midst of these hostile demonstrations, I called upon Miliukoff, who was in a meeting of the Council of Ministers in the War Department and told him and Goutchkoff in effect that having risked my judgment in asking my Government to recognize the Provisional Government and having

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 52.

done all I could to assist the Ministry, I felt considerable official and personal responsibility concerning a stable Government in Russia and that if more satisfactory evidence were not given of such Government, I should feel compelled to advise my Government not to extend the aid which I had been continuously recommending. Goutchkoff seemed very much pleased at the statement and asked me if I would make it public, but before I could answer, Miliukoff remarked that he trusted there would be no occasion for me to do so at least none existed at that time. He said that he expected hostile demonstrations against himself at the meeting of the Ministry to be held that evening, May 3rd, at Marinsky Palace at 9 o'clock when there would be a conference with the Executive Committee of the Workingmen's Committee; that his friends had desired to make a counter demonstration but he had advised against it. The conference did take place and at about 10 p. m. a large crowd including some soldiers in uniform and armed appeared in front of the Markinsky Palace, but the friends of the new government were there also and in larger numbers than its opponents. In response to loud calls for Miliukoff, Nekrasoff, Minister of Ways and Communications, appeared and addressed the crowd stating that the Government was confident of its position and would continue to direct affairs according to its best lights; that Miliukoff was in the meeting and was at that minute engaged in conference but would address the assemblage in a few minutes. Miliukoff appeared soon thereafter and was given an ovation; he spoke with more confidence and firmness than on previous occasions and was very much gratified at the reception his remarks met with. On his return to the Foreign Office after midnight, he found a crowd assembled there and made another talk. How much influence my talk with the Ministers had upon their assuming for the first time a rather independent position I cannot say but the report has gained circulation and credence that the stand taken by the Ministry was inspired if not demanded by the American Ambassador. I give you this for what it is worth and must rely upon your knowledge of my discretion in whatever I did or said. It seemed to me there was a crisis in the situation and I endeavored to meet it in the most effective manner. The following day, Friday, the hostile demonstrations continued for a few hours; in fact I passed one of these demonstrations on the Nevsky where there was a procession of workingmen, some of whom were armed and there was one black flag with an inscription anarchistic in tone. I communicated with Miliukoff by phone congratulating him on his success in the previous evening and was informed by him that an agreement had been reached with the Workingmen's Committee which would be promulgated within a few hours. As the day

wore on, friends of the new government and opponents of the anarchistic and extremely socialistic expressions of Lenin gained courage to such an extent that whenever a Lenin banner appeared on the streets it was captured and torn into shreds. On Friday evening late it became known that an agreement had been reached and the Saturday morning papers contained an explanatory note from the new government and also a proclamation from the Workingmen's Committee advising its friends to refrain from congregating in crowds and from carrying arms. That proclamation contained only one objectionable paragraph and that was a statement that no troops other than the small squads for police duty could appear upon the streets without the written consent of the Workmen. The result however was that the streets have been extremely quiet since Friday night; the Provisional Government expresses great satisfaction with the situation and [is] entirely confident in the observance of its authority. I have cabled these developments from day to day. This despatch may not reach you for several weeks and will of course be stale when read. Changes follow each other with great rapidity. The effect of our prompt and first recognition of this government is still being felt and in my judgment the American Embassy is respected to a greater extent and has more influence with the Provisional Government and with the people generally than any other mission in Russia. I am giving you not only my personal convictions but the opinion of all so far as I am acquainted therewith.

. . . There are still a great many tons of supplies on the Eastern Border of Russia awaiting transportation into the country; if the same is granted by the new Government it will be attributable to the work we have hitherto performed and to the fact that the new Government is more considerate of human suffering than was the old. At the same time, no government can be blamed for refusing to transport supplies to prisoners of an enemy country if such accommodation jeopardizes its own defense. In other words the great congestion in freight existing on the Eastern Border of Russia must be relieved gradually, and the instinct of self-preservation will prompt the government to give precedence to its own necessities. I am much pleased that John F. Stevens is coming to Vladivostok to take charge of the terminals and I hope to be able to persuade the Government to extend his jurisdiction into the interior of the country.

This situation is interesting to a degree and I could write at much greater length but have not the time to do so even if I thought you had the patience to read my detailed statement concerning conditions.

I have had not a word or a line from the Department or any other source in reply to the resignation which I tendered by cable February 25th.²⁰ May I expect one?

With kind personal regards [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

Don't understand that I wish to be relieved, when I allude to the resignation—In haste—

D. R. F.

[Enclosure—Translation]

Editorial From the Petrograd "Rjetch" of April 14/27, 1917.

The Press has published declarations apparently made by President Wilson to Balfour, the head of the English Mission which has arrived in America. The full text of the declaration is unknown and the communications in the papers cause some doubt as to whether the declaration has been correctly reproduced. In any case the general trend of the declaration is probably correct as it corresponds with Wilson's point of view concerning the problems of the war and in particular the problem of the future peace. President Wilson categorically declares a statement which can only be welcomed—that for humanity a lasting peace is of much greater importance than a peace concluded immediately with militaristic Germany. In other words, the President of the United States after rejecting "a peace without victory" fully joins in the views of the allies, that only a decisive victory can give a durable peace.

But what does he consider such a victory to be? Wilson's reply to this question in the text given by the papers is very incomplete. Is the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to the French necessary for a durable peace? The President replies that this question "is beyond the sphere of the international interests of America". He holds precisely the same view concerning the question of Germany's colonies in South Africa, which for an unknown reason he places in the same category as the question of Alsace-Lorraine. After Wilson's declaration that the United States does not intend to take a stand on these questions any more than on "the other territorial questions" (the press does not say which territorial questions are meant), it becomes impossible to understand his declaration in its entirety to the effect that owing to America's entering the war "all the principles of international policy must be revised" and that "it is inevitable that all nations should renounce their former outlook". So simplified a view of the problems of international diplomacy would of course greatly simplify America's problems. She would not have to consider which European

²⁰ Not printed.

agreements she would enter and which she would not. In substance it is not yet known whether America is a party to the allies' agreement not to conclude a separate peace. Under these conditions the announcement of the papers that there is to be a formal diplomatic "conference" in Washington seems inaccurate or at least premature. We know nothing of the participation in this conference of the other allies besides the British and French missions which happen to be now in America.

With all his precaution concerning the questions "which do not concern" America, President Wilson made an exception for one of them,—the question of the Straits. He fears to take a stand concerning Alsace-Lorraine. Just as carefully he avoids possible English claims. But on the probable settlement of the question of Constantinople, Wilson considers it possible to express himself freely. In addition he alters his former point of view to our disadvantage.

We would not like to think that there is expressed here a supposition, quite unfounded assuredly, concerning the weakening of Russia's rôle among the allies. We will not raise the question of the Straits in particular, but in any case the attitude toward this question should be the same as toward "the other territorial questions which do not concern America".

These objections excepted, we fully endorse the humanitarian efforts of President Wilson to conclude an "eternal peace". This problem must unquestionably be taken seriously. But as we have already had occasion to say more than once, the solution of the problem is indissolubly bound to those results of the decisive victory, which Wilson on the one hand will not consent to discuss, and on the other hand—with regard to Russia's vital interests—discusses too carelessly.

861.77/973

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root)

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. ROOT: I took the first opportunity to lay before the President your letter of the 6th in regard to the Commission of Railroad Experts.

The President said that he had had a talk with Mr. Bertron who would doubtless repeat it to you which explained the provinces of the respective commissions.

His purpose is that the Railroad Commissioners are not going for the purpose of asking how the United States can aid Russia, but to put themselves at the disposal of the Russian Government to assist

in solving the transportation problem, that is, they are delegated to do nothing but serve Russia on the ground.

In view of this particular field of service the President feels that it would be unwise to make the Railroad Commission subsidiary to your commission, which is essentially political in character. This would of course not debar conferences between the two commissions if it seemed advisable, although necessity would not appear to require them except of a most informal nature.

I can talk this matter over with you more fully when you come to Washington, which I hope will be soon, although one member of the Commission is still unnamed because of certain difficulties in finding the one best qualified. I will, however, advise you as soon as the list is complete and arrangements made for personnel and departure.

From every side I hear the strongest commendation of your willingness to serve as the head of this Commission. The only discordant note is from the pro-German element who dread your influence. As one man said to me today, "The best evidence of the wisdom of selecting Mr. Root is the character of those who oppose him."

With high appreciation [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72/4673½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 10 May, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think our list is now complete, namely:

Mr. Elihu Root,
 Mr. Charles R. Crane,
 Dr. John R. Mott,
 Mr. Cyrus H. McCormick,
 Mr. S. R. Bertron,
 Mr. James Duncan, as the representative of labor,
 Mr. Charles Edward Russell.^{20a}

I have only just learned of the willingness of Mr. Russell to serve and am sending him a note today to learn the earliest hour at which he would be ready to leave. I think it would be wise now to give out the names of the Commissioners and supply the Press with as full information as they desire about the several members. I am enclosing the account of Mr. Russell from *Who's Who*.^{20b}

Faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

^{20a} For the final composition of the Commission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 109.

^{20b} Not printed.

861.00/361

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *May 17, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose a telegram of the 16th from William English Walling to Mr. Polk ²¹ and also two telegrams (No's 1270 and 1288) from Francis which bear on the same subject.²²

It would seem that certain phrases uttered by you are being used by the radical socialists (probably under German influence) to force the Provisional Government to declare a policy which will remove the chief incentive to Russian offensive operations, namely, control of the Dardanelles and possession of Constantinople. It is an adroit scheme to advance argument of what is the use of Russia continuing the war and why should she not make a separate peace, if neither in territory nor in indemnity she can be compensated for the enormous expenditure of life and money which a vigorous prosecution of the war will entail.

It is an insidious and ingenious plan to win over the Russian people to the idea of a separate peace, which seems to me a very real danger and one that ought to be avoided, if possible.

Cannot some interpretation of the language, which is being used, be given which will remove the idea so industriously circulated in Russia before it has gone too far to counteract the effect?

Of course the only way in which that can be done is by a message from you to Francis for the Russian Government and for publication in Russia. I realize the difficulty of doing this, but the harm which is being done seems to me very great. It may cost this country millions of men if this movement for a separate peace cannot be checked. I feel that every day that the argument remains unanswered increases the peril.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/383½

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*WASHINGTON, *1 June, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY, I have read the attached paper with the profoundest interest.²³ I hope with all my heart that the new forces in Russia may be guided by the principles and objects it sets forth!

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

²¹ Not found in Department files.

²² *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 52, 53.

²³ Message from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Substance printed *ibid.*, p. 74.

763.72/5813a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The more I consider the matter the more I am convinced that it would be unwise for Mr. Root or any of the Diplomatic Mission with him to stop in Japan on their return to the United States. We are informed that they are leaving Petrograd about the 9th of this month. The present unrest in the Far East and the possible divergence of views of Mr. Root as to the policy of this Administration in regard to that region seems to me to make it unwise for him to represent the Government. If it is advisable to send a mission to Japan I think we should pursue the course of sending new men directly from the United States.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

861.77/1504

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In a conversation which I had with Mr. Root at luncheon on the 9th he asked me if I had seen the address issued by the Stevens Commission. I said that I had not. The following day he sent me a copy which I enclose.

I fear Mr. Stevens is assuming an authority and giving the Commission a diplomatic character which neither possess. I call your particular attention to the portion of the address marked in red,²⁴ by which he pledges the United States to do certain things, a pledge he had no power to make.

The pledge having been given I think that it would be unwise to repudiate it as the Russian people and Russian Government might misconstrue any repudiation of the Commission's promise. At the same time it would seem advisable I think for Stevens to be told, preferably by you as the Commission is not a diplomatic one, that he has no authority to carry on negotiations or enter into agreements for the United States.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

²⁴ Fifth paragraph, sentence beginning "To the end that."

[Enclosure]

*Message to the People of Russia From the United States Railway Advisory Commission*²⁵

The United States Railway Advisory Commission is accredited by the State Department of the United States to its ally Russia. The object of the Commission is, as has been stated, to advise with and to assist in every practicable way in the handling of the grave transportation problems which the war against a common enemy has thrust upon the railways of Russia. It seems fitting that upon this, the anniversary of our natal day of Independence, this Commission should convey to the people of Russia a message declaring not only its purpose but also something as to what it has accomplished and which it is believed will cheer the nation and convince it that the United States stands shoulder to shoulder with its great ally in the prosecution to a successful conclusion of the war against the venomous enemy of democratic freedom.

The Commission has been in Russia about five weeks. During this time it has met with the officials of the Russian Railways and has discussed fully and freely the various problems confronting the railways. It has been met everywhere and at all times with the utmost spirit of cordiality and cooperation on the part of those officials. It has found, what was no surprise to it, that as masters of technique the Russian railway officials have no superiors in the world. It has found that in many ways their practices are among the best and that from a basic standpoint the Russian railways are intrinsically sound—backed as they are by the enormous latent resources and the vast population of this wonderful country. At the same time, it believes that a judicious mingling of the best Russian and American railway practices will be of great benefit to the railways of Russia, and in this belief your officials are in hearty accord and have given their approval to the following suggestions made by this Commission.

An improved system of train operation, a better divisional organization, whereby closer supervision can be maintained, and a revision of engine runs whereby a greater capacity of each engine and car can be obtained, resulting in an improvement in the movement of traffic. The construction of locomotive erecting shops at Vladivostok where the immense number of locomotives coming from the United States can be erected and put into service much more speedily than has been the practice heretofore.

The working day and night of all locomotive repair shops so that the great number of out of repair locomotives may be reduced and

²⁵ Filed separately under file No. 861.77/151½.

that they may be put into service where they are so urgently needed. That the "per diem" rate, or charges of one railway against another for the use of cars, be doubled, and that also the charge for holding cars for loading or unloading be doubled. This to insure prompt handling and release of cars in a reasonable time. That a Supply Department under a General Storekeeper be installed, who shall be responsible for the maintenance and distribution of the vast amount of material and supplies needed for the operation and maintenance of the roads, the duties of such officer to include the reclamation of worn material and the reissuing of such as may be found serviceable.

But the great imperative immediate necessity which confronts the railways of Russia to enable them not only to maintain its armies at the front, but also to support in comfort its civil population, who equally with its soldiers are fighting the great battle for freedom, is a great increase in the number of locomotives and freight cars. On this point the Commission are entirely in accord with the railway officials and with the Russian people. To the end that this absolutely necessary want shall be supplied as quickly as can be done, this Commission has cabled the Administration at Washington advising the immediate construction of 2500 locomotives and 40,000 freight cars to be added to the equipment of the Russian railways. This means, of course, an extension of credit by the United States to Russia of some 750,000,000 millions [*sic*] of roubles. This matter has no commercial aspect for the Commission has pledged what to it is dearer than family or life itself, the good faith and honor of its country.

The Commission has under further consideration the furnishing of raw material, tools and shop machinery to any extent that may be found advisable after careful consideration with the Russian officials, and stands ready to aid [with] its advice and counsel in any and all matters it may be requested.

In closing it desires to express its hearty appreciation of the aid given it by the efficient Minister of Ways of Communication and his staff of able assistants. It knows that in their hands the future of the Russian railways is secure and it believes with the aid and material assistance which the United States is giving to its great Ally, that Russia will continue to sustain its part in the desperate struggle for freedom which is now convulsing the World.

THE UNITED STATES RAILWAY ADVISORY
COMMISSION TO RUSSIA

PETROGRAD, 4 July, 1917.

861.77/1514

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 14 August, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Root had called my attention already to the extraordinary action of Mr. Stevens but I thank you for sending me a full copy of Mr. Stevens' proclamation which I herewith return.

Will you not be kind enough to have the following cable sent to Mr. Stevens:

"The President appreciates very highly what Mr. Stevens and his associates are doing in Russia but thinks it wise to remind Mr. Stevens that it is important that the impression should not be created that he and his associates represent or speak for the Government of the United States. As the President explained to the Commission before they started, they were sent abroad merely to put themselves at the service of the Russian Government. Any assurances conveyed to the Russian people, therefore, as if authoritatively by the Commission would be a very grave mistake. The President does not wish in this way to discredit assurances already given but merely to convey a very friendly caution for the future."²⁶

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

763.72119/8553a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1917.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I beg to send you enclosed a copy of a telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia to the Russian Ambassador in Washington, which was handed to the Department by the Ambassador a few days ago.

With assurances [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko) to the Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff)

PETROGRAD, August 21/September 3 [, 1917.]

President Wilson's reply to the Peace Note of the Pope²⁷ was met in Russia with the greatest sympathy, and has been commented [on] in that spirit by the whole press, except only by the extremist organs.

²⁶ This message was sent Aug. 15, 1917, 4 p. m. See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, p. 196.

²⁷ For the Pope's peace note, see *ibid.*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 161; for President Wilson's reply, see *ibid.*, p. 177.

The Provisional Government notices with the sincerest gratification that the principles on which the President's answer was based fully coincide with the precepts adopted by the new Russia in her exterior policy. In this unity of ideas existing between ourselves and the great American Republic, we see the valuable pledge to our mutual cooperation in elucidating the aims of the present war, as well as in adopting a common political course.

Kindly transmit this first impression to the Government to which you are accredited, and also convey that at the present moment we are elaborating the project of a declaration in which will be stated the solidarity of the Provisional Government with the ideas expressed in the President's note.

TERESHCHENKO

861.00/807a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been considering the Russian situation and, although our information is meager and to an extent confusing, I have reached the following conclusions:

That the Bolsheviki are determined to prevent Russia from taking further part in the war.

That the longer they continue in power the more will authority in Russia be disorganized and the more will the armies disintegrate, and the harder it will become to restore order and military efficiency.

That the elimination of Russia as a fighting force will prolong the war for two or three years, with a corresponding demand upon this country for men and money.

That with Bolsheviki domination broken the Russian armies might be reorganized and become an important factor in the war by next spring or summer.

That the hope of a stable Russian Government lies for the present in a military dictatorship backed by loyal disciplined troops.

That the only apparent nucleus for an organized movement sufficiently strong to supplant the Bolsheviki and establish a government would seem to be the group of general officers with General Kaledin, the hetman of the Don Cossacks.

These conclusions present the problem as to whether we ought to take any steps to encourage the Kaledin party, and if so the nature of those steps.

I think that we must assume that Kaledin and his Cossacks know less about us and our attitude than we know about them, that through Bolshevik and German sources they are being furnished with false information and very probably have been told that we have recognized the Bolshevik Government and so are coming to the conclusion that further resistance is useless. Of course to have this

group broken up would be to throw the country into the hands of the Bolsheviki and the Germans could freely continue their propaganda which is leading to chaos and the actual disintegration of the Russian Empire.

A possible way of checking this is to get a message through to Kaledin (probably via Tiflis and courier) telling the true state of affairs, and non-recognition of the Bolsheviki and our readiness to give recognition to a government which exhibits strength enough to restore order and a purpose to carry out in good faith Russia's international engagements.

Whether such a communication is advisable is, I think, worthy of consideration, but if it is to be sent it ought to be done without delay as I am convinced that German intrigues and Bolsheviki false representations will speedily impair the morale of Kaledin's followers unless something is done to give them hope that they will, if their movement gains sufficient strength, receive moral and material aid from this Government. It seems to me that nothing is to be gained by inaction, that it is simply playing into the Bolsheviki's hands, and that the situation may be saved by a few words of encouragement, and the saving of Russia means the saving to this country of hundreds of thousands of men and billions of dollars. I do not see how we could be any worse off if we took this course because we have absolutely nothing to hope from continued Bolsheviki domination.

In regard to Kaledin and the Russian generals, Alexieff, Brousiloff and Korniloff, who appear to be with him or about to join him, I have inquired of Major Washburne, who knew them personally and more or less intimately. From him I gained the following:

Kaledin is a man of ponderous determination, who is unaffected alike by victory or defeat. He is a strong character who carried through his purposes regardless of opposition. As a commander he resembles Grant. He radiates force and mastery.

Alexieff is a modest, quiet man, but the most skillful strategist in Russia, if not in any of the allied countries. He listens patiently, talks little and reaches his decisions alone.

Brousiloff is the most brilliant general in the Russian armies and arouses the enthusiasm of the soldiers and his subordinates by his ability and forceful personality. As a strategist he is only second to Alexieff. While Kaledin is a man of the people, Brousiloff is of the aristocracy.

Korniloff is not the equal of any one of the three other generals in military skill or in personal popularity with the troops. He has, however, considerable influence with soldiers recruited in Siberia and Turkestan.

The foregoing indicates the elements of strength in the military group which seem to be gathering about Kaledin, and which will in all probability obtain the support of the Cadets and of all the *bourgeoisie* and the land-owning class.

I would like to talk this matter over with you after Cabinet meeting tomorrow if that meets your convenience.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/804d

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: After consultation with Secretary McAdoo today, and in line with our talk last evening, I have prepared the enclosed telegram which Secretary McAdoo approves.

If it meets with your approval will you be good enough to send it to the telegraph office of the Department so that it can immediately be put upon the wires? ²⁸

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

*Draft Telegram to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*²⁹

For Crosby.³⁰ The Russian situation has been carefully considered and the conclusion has been reached that the movement in the south and southeast under the leadership of Kaledine and Korniloff offers at the present time the greatest hope for the reestablishment of a stable government and the continuance of a military force on the German and Austrian fronts. While there can be no certainty of the success of Kaledine it is not improbable that he may succeed. From Moscow and Tiflis come very favorable reports as to the strength of the movement and as to the weakening power of the Bolsheviki.

In view of the policy being pursued by Lenine and Trotsky which if continued will remove Russia as a factor in the war and may even make her resources available to the Central Powers, any movement tending to prevent such a calamity should be encouraged even though its success is only a possibility.

²⁸ On the same day President Wilson replied: "This has my entire approval." For correspondence previously printed concerning the Kaledin movement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 306-322, *passim*, and *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 40, 587, 588, 601-603, 609, 611, 650.

²⁹ This telegram was sent Dec. 13, 1917, 2 p. m. (file No. 763.72/8200a).

³⁰ Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and delegate of the Treasury to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance.

It would seem unwise for this Government to support openly Kaledine and his party because of the attitude which it seems advisable to take with the Petrograd authorities, but it is felt that the Kaledine group should be shown that the Allied Governments are most sympathetic with his efforts. Without actually recognizing his group as a *de facto* government, which is at present impossible since it has not taken form, this Government cannot under the law loan money to him to carry forward his movement. The only practicable course seems to be for the British and French Governments to finance the Kaledine enterprise in so far as it is necessary, and for this Government to loan them the money to do so. In that way we would comply with the statute and at the same time strengthen a movement which seems to present the best possibility of retaining a Russian army in the field.

You will, after conferring with the Ambassador, take this matter up with the proper British and French authorities having charge of financial matters and report as soon as possible their views and whether or not they are willing to adopt the course above outlined and if so, to what extent financial aid will be required.

In view of the fact that this matter relates to credits to foreign governments and at the suggestion of Secretary McAdoo, who approves of the policy, I am addressing this telegram to you directly assuming that you will before taking the matter up with representatives of Great Britain and France confer with the Ambassador as to the politic course to pursue.

I need not impress upon you the necessity of acting expeditiously and with impressing those with whom you talk of the importance of avoiding it being known that the United States is considering showing sympathy for the Kaledine movement, much less of providing financial assistance.

763.72119/1059

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The communication of the Bolsheviks to "the peoples and governments of the Allied countries", contained in Mr. Francis' telegram No. 2163 of December 31st,³¹ impresses me with the adroitness of the author whose presentation of peace terms may well appeal to the average man, who will not perceive the fundamental errors on which they are based.

The address from beginning to end is to a class and not to all classes of society, a class which does not have property but hopes

³¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 405.

to obtain a share by process of government rather than by individual enterprise. This is of course a direct threat at existing social order in all countries.

In the second place the address discusses the rights of nationalities (though it does not use the term) without defining what a nationality is, and at the same time advances doctrines which make class superior to the general conception of nationality. Is the Bolshevik idea of nationality based upon blood, habitation of a particular territory, language, or political affinity? Accurate definition of the word is necessary to interpret the terms proposed, otherwise they are too vague to be intelligently considered.

If the Bolsheviks intend to suggest that every community (though they state no unit as a basis for independent action) can determine its allegiance to this or that political state or to become independent, the present political organization of the world would be shattered and the same disorder would generally prevail as now exists in Russia. It would be international anarchy.

Though founded entirely on the assertion of legality, the right of communities within a constituted federal union to determine their allegiance was denied by the Government of the United States in 1861 and the denial was enforced by military power. We, as a nation, are therefore committed to the principle that a national state may by force if necessary prevent a portion of its territory from seceding without its consent especially if it has long exercised sovereignty over it or if its national safety or vital interests would be endangered.

I can see that, where a particular region lies between the territories of two nations which the world has recognized as sovereign states, there may justly arise the question as to which nation should incorporate the region into its territory and that the decision may properly rest with the inhabitants of the region, but I do not see that the same question arises in the event that the inhabitants of a territory already under the sovereignty of a nation have the same right to become an independent state and to be admitted into the family of nations by a mere expression of popular will. Such a theory seems to me utterly destructive of the political fabric of society and would result in constant turmoil and change. It simply cannot be done if social order and governmental stability are to be maintained.

The suggestions of the Bolsheviks in regard to Ireland, India, and other countries which have been and are integral parts of recognized powers are in my opinion utterly untenable if it is desirable to preserve the present concept of sovereign states in international relations. However justified may be the principle of local self-government, the necessities of preserving an orderly world require

that there should be a national authority with sovereign rights to defend and control the communities within the national boundaries.

It is apparent, as I said at the outset, that the Bolsheviki are appealing in this address to a particular class of society, which they seek to arouse against the present order of things, enticing them with the possible abolition of the institution of private property and the possible control by that class of accumulated wealth and of its distribution. The document is an appeal to the proletariat of all countries, to the ignorant and mentally deficient, who by their numbers are urged to become masters. Here seems to me to lie a very real danger in view of the present social unrest throughout the world.

Of course the enforcement of the will of the ignorant, indifferent to all save their own pleasures, would be the worst form of despotism, especially as that class has always been controlled by violent and radical leaders. It would be a species of class-despot, which would have far less regard for private rights than an individual despot. This seems to be the present social program of the Bolsheviki, and they appear to be putting it into operation in Russia. It is essentially anarchistic rather than socialistic in character and will, wherever adopted, break down every semblance of social order and public authority.

I think in considering this address it might properly be asked by what authority the Bolsheviki assume the right to speak for the Russian people. They seized the Government at Petrograd by force, they broke up opposition in the army by disorganizing it, they prevented the meeting of the Constituent Assembly chosen by the people because they could not control it, they have seized the property of the nation and confiscated private property, they have failed to preserve public order and human life, they have acted arbitrarily without pretense of legality, in fact, they have set up over a portion of Russia a despotic oligarchy as menacing to liberty as any absolute monarchy on earth, and this they maintain by force and not by the will of the people, which they prevent from expression.

In view of present conditions I believe it would be unwise to make reply to this insidious address; but, if it seems advisable not to ignore it, I think the only course should be to state frankly the false premises upon which it is based and the vagueness of the unit of independent communal power which they propose to set up. In view of the threat against existing governments and the promised aid to revolutionists I would personally prefer to see the communication unanswered whatever the consequences might be. Lenine, Trotsky and their colleagues are so bitterly hostile to the present social order in all countries that I am convinced nothing could be said which would gain their favor

or render them amenable to reason. I feel that to make any sort of reply would be contrary to the dignity of the United States and offer opportunity for further insult and threats, although I do not mean that it may not be expedient at some time in the near future to state our peace terms in more detail than has yet been done.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/939½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall that after Cabinet meeting Tuesday you suggested, upon reading a memorandum³² which I showed you in regard to our attitude toward Russia, that it would be well to draft a telegram to Francis which could be, through unofficial channels, transmitted to the Bolshevik Government.

I considered the matter and consulted with Mr. Polk on the subject and we both reached the conclusion that the object would not be as well attained by a telegram of that sort as it would for me to issue a public statement of our attitude here and let Mr. Creel transmit it to Russia to his representatives there and we send it to Francis for his information. In that way it would obtain greater publicity and would, I think, accomplish every purpose that could be accomplished by unofficially delivering it to the Bolshevik Government, which would have a measure of danger and might cause irritation—while a statement would not.

I therefore drafted a proposed statement and would be glad to have your views as to this method of stating our attitude, and also as to the language of the statement.

I am leaving tomorrow noon, as I told you, for New York and will return Sunday night. Possibly by that time you will have had the opportunity to pass upon the statement.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Draft Statement To Be Issued by the Secretary of State

In view of the fact that there seems to be some confusion in the public mind as to the attitude of this Government in regard to the present Russian situation it seems to me advisable to make at this time a statement upon the subject.

³² No copy filed with this letter.

Although Russia appears at the present time to be separated or to be separating into distinct political groups, each of which claims authority over a portion of the territory of the nation, the Government of the United States is convinced that the spirit of democracy continues to dominate the entire Russian nation. With that spirit the United States feels a profound sympathy and believes in the ultimate effect of its cohesive power upon the Russian people as a whole.

The separate independent authorities functioning in different sections of Russia present a situation to the Government of the United States which causes it to pause before formally recognizing any one of those authorities as the *de facto* Government of the Russian nation. The evidence of the possession of a right to exercise sovereignty over all Russia by a particular group of citizens must be substantially conclusive before recognition, otherwise a foreign government might reasonably be charged with exercising through recognition an influence in favor of a group and with improperly interfering with the internal political affairs of Russia.

In applying this principle the Government of the United States awaits the full manifestation of the will of the Russian people because it is convinced that it is its imperative duty to avoid any interference or any appearance of interference with the domestic affairs of Russia, denying at the same time that the adoption of this course is in any way influenced by partiality for or opposition to any particular group or body. The determination of an agency to exercise the sovereign power of the nation belongs wholly and solely to the Russian people. As to that they ought to be supreme. With the popular determination of the governmental agency of all the Russian nation the United States, in accordance with its conception of independence and national sovereignty, has nothing and will have nothing to do. When undoubted proofs of the will of the Russian people are manifest the Government of the United States will gladly recognize the agents of the sovereign people of Russia as the Russian Government and enter into relations with that Government.

Even while the question of the governmental agency remains undecided the United States, appreciating the dominance of the democratic spirit in Russia and inspired by the most friendly and unselfish motives, is desirous of rendering such aid as it is able, provided its aid is acceptable to the Russian people, to relieve their reported needs which have unavoidably arisen out of the social and industrial disorganization consequent upon a radical change in political institutions.

The United States has only the kindest feelings for Russia. Its policy as to recognition or non-recognition of a government at the present time is founded on the principle that the Russian people are sovereign and have the right to determine their own domestic organization without interference or influence by other nations. Its desire to aid the people of Russia rests solely upon the fraternal spirit which it possesses for a great democracy which has endured so much in its struggle against autocracy both within and without its borders.

861.00/985½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 20 January, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The suggestion made by the Japanese government in this despatch ³³ seems to me very significant of possible coming events, and I would be very much obliged to you if you would tell me what reply you think should be made to it.

The fact that the Japanese are sending a larger naval force to Vladivostok than they at first led us to expect makes an uncomfortable impression on me, particularly in view of this latest request.

It seems to me clear that we should show very clearly in our reply that we should look upon military action in that quarter with distinct disapproval.

Faithfully yours,

W. W.

861.00/1047a

The Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Mr. Lansing, who will probably be confined to the house for the rest of the week, sent me some memoranda from you in regard to matters in the Department. Among them was the enclosed telegram with your note attached ³⁴ on the subject of possible landing of Japanese in Vladivostok. You may recall that on Saturday, the nineteenth, I sent you the draft of a telegram on this subject to our Ambassador in Tokio, which you approved, and it was forwarded on Sunday, the twentieth.³⁵ Will you be good enough to let me know whether this telegram which was sent, a copy of which is attached, will be sufficient for the moment, or whether

³³ Telegram of Jan. 17, 1918, from the Ambassador in Japan, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 29.

³⁴ *Supra*.

³⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 31.

you feel that further action is necessary? It seems that until we hear from Morris this might be enough.

In this connection, I should mention that a Mr. H. Fessenden Meserve, an American citizen, who is a representative of the National City Bank of New York in Moscow, asked for an interview with you and was referred to this Department. He called today and told me he had a personal message for you from the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I took the liberty of having him deliver the message to me in order to save your time. It is interesting as bearing on the question under discussion. He said, in the course of a long conversation, that the Japanese Minister asked him to see you and to say that he hoped that this Government would not send troops to Vladivostok or Harbin for the purpose of keeping order, as any such movement on our part would create a very unfavorable impression in Japan. He urged that the matter of keeping order and protecting life in Siberia should be left entirely with the Japanese. The Japanese Minister did not go into any details but rather intimated that if we did land troops the Japanese people would feel that we were doing work which properly belonged to them.

With assurances [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

861.00/1047½

President Wilson to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)

WASHINGTON, 28 January, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. COUNSELOR: Thank you for the enclosed.³⁶ I dare say that for the present we may let this matter stand as it does; but I hope that we shall soon have new material for judgment in the shape of further information from our Ambassador at Tokyo. I do not think that it will be safe or wise to leave the Japanese government in any doubt as to the impression such an attitude on their part makes on us.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

861.00/1333a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have read the enclosed memorandum³⁷ on *Revolutions in Europe* by Mr. William English Walling with great interest and care, and throughout the reading I felt that

³⁶ See *supra*.

³⁷ Not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

Mr. Walling had a keen appreciation of the forces which are menacing the present social order in nearly every European country and which may have to be reckoned with even in this country. It is really a remarkable analysis of the dangerous elements which are coming to the surface and which are in many ways more to be dreaded than autocracy; the latter is despotism but an intelligent despotism, while the former is a despotism of ignorance. One, at least has the virtue of order, while the other is productive of disorder and anarchy. It is a condition which cannot but arouse the deepest concern.

I think that Mr. Walling's views in regard to the Bolsheviks are helpful and sound, and after reading them I am more than ever convinced that our policy has been the right one and should be continued. In talking with the French Ambassador yesterday about Russia he said that he considered our course had been the wisest and that the other Governments had failed in dealing with the situation.

We will soon have to face this proposed socialist meeting at Stockholm and determine upon the attitude we should take in dealing with it. We must decide whether or not we are to permit Americans to obtain passports to attend the meeting there or anywhere else it may be held. The meeting of this element of society, imbued with the idea of an international social revolution, might become a very real menace to all existing forms of government, democratic as well as monarchical. And yet, if we prevent Americans from attending there is danger of seemingly confirming the charge that this nation is controlled by a capitalistic class. I see no middle course. No avoidance of a decision. I think that the subject ought to engage our attention because we should have a very definite policy determined before the time for action arrives.

I thank you for letting me see Mr. Walling's memorandum which is most instructive and of which I have taken the liberty to make a copy for future reference and in order to give to it more critical study.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/11651b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have had, this afternoon, interviews with the British and French Ambassadors in relation to Japan's desire to occupy Siberia with a military force.

Lord Reading informed me that he had seen you and had given you a copy of a secret telegram which he had received from Mr. Balfour and of which I received a copy this morning and append to this letter.³⁸

The French Ambassador gave me the substance of a telegram which he had received from his Foreign Office containing a summary of a telegram they had received from their Ambassador at Tokio. This latter is to me of especial interest in view of the avowal of Motono³⁹ to declare publicly the disinterestedness of Japan and also the pledge to carry on military activities as far as the Ural mountains—that is, to the confines of Asia. This memorandum I also enclose.

I also would call your attention to the enclosed telegram from Stevens, at Yokohama, which may not have attracted your attention, but bears directly on the present subject.

In discussing the matter with the French Ambassador, who was my first caller, I told him that I fully appreciated the attitude of the Allied Governments in regard to Japan and that it would appear Japan intended to act in any event. If that was so it was merely a question as to whether it was better to make Japan the mandatory of the other powers or to permit her to act independently, as I doubted the advisability of protesting in case she sent a military force into Siberia.

The Ambassador asked me in case it was decided that Japan should act at the request of the other powers whether the United States would be a party.

I told him I thought there was serious difficulty in the way—chiefly that such an agreement as was proposed would amount to a treaty and that would have to be submitted to the Senate, where there were several strongly anti-Japanese Senators who would oppose it. I said further that in case action was taken by the Allied Governments I felt we should not be asked to take any part.

The Ambassador seemed disappointed at first but he said finally that he fully understood the difficulty and also the opinion which I urged that it was better for us and more in accord with our general policy to not join in such an agreement.

When Lord Reading called I told him substantially what I had told the French Ambassador. He seemed to feel that in view of the telegram which the French Ambassador had received a new phase was put upon the problem and that if Japan was willing to make public such a declaration it might be the best policy to make her the mandatory of the Allied Powers.

³⁸ No enclosures with file copy of this letter.

³⁹ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

He said further that he fully agreed with my view as to the inadvisability of an agreement on our part which would compel Senatorial consent.

Since we talked over this matter yesterday I do not know as the conditions have materially changed, but certainly the French telegram has thrown a new light upon it and I think we should carefully consider whether or not we should urge the Allied Governments not to make Japan their mandatory.

My own belief is that Japan intends to go into Siberia anyway and that it might be a restraint upon her if she should make a declaration such as Motono proposed. So far as this government is concerned I think all that would be required would be a practical assurance that we would not make protest to Japan in taking this step.

As the whole matter is of vital importance and requires immediate action if any is to be taken I would be gratified if you would give me your views and guidance at the earliest possible moment.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/1246

*Draft Telegram to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*⁴⁰

The Government of the United States is made constantly aware at every turn of events that it is the desire of the people of the United States that, while cooperating with all its energy with its associates in the war in every direct enterprise of the war in which it is possible for it to take part, it should leave itself diplomatically free wherever it can do so without injustice to its associates. It is for this reason that the Government of the United States has not thought it wise to join the governments of the Entente in asking the Japanese government to act in Siberia. It has no objection to that request being made, and it wishes to assure the Japanese government that it has entire confidence that in putting an armed force into Siberia it is doing so as an ally of Russia, with no purpose but to save Siberia from the invasion of the armies and intrigues of Germany and with entire willingness to leave the determination of all questions that may affect the permanent fortunes of Siberia to the Council of Peace.

⁴⁰This paper bears the notation: "Handed me by Prest noon 3/1/18 R L." This telegram was shown to the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors, but was not sent. For the circumstances, see *infra*; also *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, vol. II, p. 68.

861.00/1246

*The Counselor for the Department of State (Polk) to the Secretary of State*⁴¹

WASHINGTON, *March 5, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I enclose two letters⁴² addressed to you which Crane brought to me and which I took the liberty of opening as I thought they might require immediate action. I must apologize for having taken the liberty, which possibly I should not have done, but the letter from Francis I thought might require immediate attention.

The British, French, Italian and Japanese called on me and discussed the letter you wrote them just before you left. They all seemed to be quite satisfied with the way that matter is being handled by the President.⁴³

I sent for the British, French, and Italian and read them the telegram prepared on the subject of Siberia.⁴⁴ They said they would communicate with their governments at once. The British and French I saw Friday and the Italian on Saturday. On Sunday the President sent for me to discuss the Siberian situation and was rather anxious that we should send the telegram to Japan on Monday. Monday morning he called me up and told me to wait until I heard from him again. Today he sent for me and gave me the enclosed message to be sent to Tokyo.⁴⁵ He also asked me to communicate it to the British, French, and Italian. It is a change in our position, but I do not know that it will materially affect the situation. I argued the question with him a little, but he said he had been thinking it over and felt that the second message was absolutely necessary. On reading it you will probably see what influenced him, namely, the position of this Government in the eyes of the democratic people of the world. The message will be sent today and I shall make my rounds this afternoon.

I do not think the Japanese will be entirely pleased, but it is not a protest, so they may accept it as merely advice and go ahead and do what they want.

I hope you are having a good rest and not thinking about the office. I am sorry to even bother you with this, but I know you are naturally anxious to hear what is going on.

Please remember me to Mrs. Lansing.

With warmest regards [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

⁴¹ Then in Augusta, Ga.

⁴² Not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

⁴³ The matter referred to is uncertain.

⁴⁴ *Supra*. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 68.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

861.00/1432½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I saw Lord Reading this afternoon. He handed me paraphrases of two telegrams which the Foreign Office had received relative to the situation in eastern Siberia.⁴⁶

As you should see them immediately I am not taking time to have them copied and I will appreciate it if you will kindly return them after you have considered them.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/1433½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 22 March, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am much obliged to you for sending these papers to me so promptly, but I do not find in them sufficient cause for altering our position. They still do not answer the question I have put to Lord Reading and to all others who argue in favour of intervention by Japan, namely, What is it to effect and how will it be efficacious in effecting it? The condition of Siberia furnishes no answer.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

861.00/1433½a

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*⁴⁷

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: If the reports, which persist, that the military prisoners in Siberia are being organized under German officers and have succeeded in occupying Irkutsk are confirmed, we will have a new situation in Siberia which may cause a revision of our policy. It would seem to me, therefore, that we should consider the problem on the hypothesis that the reports are true and be prepared to act with promptness.

The occupation of important points in eastern Siberia by a German military force and the helpless state of the Russians to resist the extension of the German power place the situation on an entirely different basis from the one presented by the chaotic state caused by

⁴⁶ Two telegraphic reports received by the British Foreign Office from Peking and Harbin; not printed.

⁴⁷ This paper bears the notation: "This was returned to me 3/26/18 by the Prest who said that he quite agreed but did not think the situation yet warranted change of policy R L."

quarreling Russian factions. The presence of the Germans and the possibility of their control of Siberia becomes a real menace to the peace of the Far East. The situation of Irkutsk is such that the Germans, if masters of the place, might invade Manchuria and obtain control of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

In view of these facts I do not see how Japan could be expected to refrain from taking military measures to resist further extension of the German power, nor do I think that we could reasonably oppose their resistance to the German advance in that region. In fact I believe that in the circumstances Japan will act whether we approve or not. Would it then be the better policy to approve or to be in opposition to Japanese intervention?

With the actual control by the Germans of so important a place as Irkutsk the question of the moral effect upon the Russian people of an expedition against the Germans is a very different thing from the occupation of the Siberian Railway in order to keep order between contending Russian factions. It would seem to be a legitimate operation against the common enemy. I do not see how we could refuse to sanction such a military step.

The question presented, if intervention in Siberia seems advisable, is whether Japan alone or the Powers arrayed against Germany acting jointly should constitute the expeditionary force employed to overthrow the German power. I think that we must concede that in any event the burden of this task must fall upon Japan. No Power has forces available for this undertaking sufficiently strong to be a real factor in achieving the end desired. Furthermore Japan seems to be opposed to joint action. In the circumstances are not Japan's sensibilities more important than the sensibilities of the Russian people?

If the reports turn out to be correct will we lose anything by making Japan the mandatory of the Powers, and giving approval to her sending an expeditionary force into Siberia to oust the Germans and to restore Russian authority in that region?

Ought we not to adopt this policy in the event that Irkutsk is actually controlled by the Germans?

I think that the situation requires careful consideration and a policy should be adopted in advance because no time ought to be lost to meet and offset the German activities in Siberia, if the reports prove to be correct.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/1865½

*The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Secretary of State*⁴⁸SUBSTANCE OF THE NOTE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS ON THE 25TH OF MARCH, 1918^{48a}

The German influence steadily penetrating into the Russian territories and threatening the general peace and security in the Far East, the two Governments will consider in common what measure should be taken in order to meet the situation and to do their part in the allied cause.

The co-operation between the two armed forces in the joint defensive movements against the enemy will be arranged by the competent Authorities of the two Governments who will from time to time consult freely upon all questions of mutual interest. The Arrangement reached by said competent Authorities will be put into operation only at such time as the two governments may eventually decide.

861.77/370½

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 369

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy have received a telegram from the Foreign Office, from which it appears that the Bolshevist Government asked the United States Ambassador in Russia for the services of American railway experts. The American Ambassador accordingly sent for one hundred of the three hundred American railway experts in the Far East to go to Vologda.

The Foreign Office point out that the transit westward of Siberian supplies and of the stores of the Allies at Vladivostock and Archangel will [not?] be facilitated by any improvement which is made in the Russian railway system, unless this is done under the control of the Allies.

The British Embassy are, therefore, instructed to call the attention of the Department of State to this matter and to express the hope that great circumspection will be used in the employment of the American engineers.

READING

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1918.

⁴⁸This paper bears the notation: "Handed me by Japanese Amb. May 18/18 RL."

^{48a}For texts of notes, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, p. 223.

861.00/1602½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 18 April, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would very much value a memorandum containing all that we know about these several nuclei of self-governing authority that seem to be springing up in Siberia. It would afford me a great deal of satisfaction to get behind the most nearly representative of them if it can indeed draw leadership and control to itself. A summary of what we know (stripped of the confusions of the cables) would be a most welcome thing as a support to my judgment in the premises.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

861.00/1894½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have had another séance with Lord Reading on the question of intervention in Russia, during which he read to me the enclosed memoranda.⁴⁹ These I agreed to submit to you.

In a previous interview I pointed out to him that the proposed intervention in Russia had become divided into two problems, the Siberian and the Murmansk, and that they seemed to me to require separate treatment; that the question of intervention in Siberia depended upon the certainty of military benefit which as yet was not evident; and that intervention by way of Murmansk was different since it was a question of ability to land a sufficient military force.

The British Ambassador, acting under instructions from his Government, persists in seeking to have us unite with Great Britain and France in the endeavor to obtain from Trotsky a request that we intervene on the condition that we obtain from Japan a declaration that the territory occupied would be restored to Russia without conditions after the war.

I pointed out to Reading that this confusion of the two problems was unfortunate, that I did not perceive how the conditional entry into Siberia by a Japanese force had anything to do with the occupation of Murmansk and the railway south, and that while intervention through the port of Murmansk might be desirable, intervention through Vladivostok or Harbin was very questionable in view of

⁴⁹ Two memoranda conveying reports received by the British Foreign Office from its representative in Moscow; not printed.

the inexpediency, if not the impossibility, of a Japanese force advancing farther west than Irkutsk.

Lord Reading said that he had already advised his Government as to my statement that the two problems were distinct and should be treated separately, but that he had not had a reply.

I told him that I could see no objection to securing a request from Trotsky that we should intervene via Murmansk, but that I was not at all sure we would gain anything by a request as to a conditional Japanese intervention in Siberia since to act upon such a request would array us against Semenov and the elements antagonistic to the Soviets. I said that if we took hold of either one or the other horns of the dilemma we probably would find ourselves in hot water.

In view of the present situation do you think it wise to advise Francis to unite through unofficial channels in obtaining from Trotsky a request for us to intervene by way of Murmansk? I do not feel that we should go further than this at the present time and I am not sure that this is expedient in view of the uncertainty of Trotsky's power. To bring Japan into the question seems to me to be unwise at the present time.

Will you please give me your opinion as to the course which should be taken?

Since writing the foregoing I have received the enclosed telegram from Ambassador Sharp.⁵⁰ Probably you have also received a copy.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/1895½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 20 May, 1918

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I do not know what to say by way of comment on these papers that I have not already said repeatedly. The two parts of this question (as you properly discriminate them) must not and cannot be confused and discussed together. Semenov is changing the situation in Siberia very rapidly, apparently; and General March and the Staff are clear and decided in their opinion that (1) no strong enough force to amount to anything can be sent to Murmansk without subtracting just that much shipping and man power from the western front, and (2) that such a subtraction at the present crisis would be most unwise.

They believe, moreover, that there is no sufficient military force, in Japan or elsewhere, to do anything effective in Siberia.

⁵⁰ Not printed.

Please follow very attentively what Semenov is accomplishing and whether there is any legitimate way in which we can assist.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

861.48/6143a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The very active propaganda now being carried on in the press respecting the attitude of the Administration towards Russia combined with the fact that Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and indeed the Russian people, are eagerly awaiting the announcement by the United States of a constructive plan for meeting the present chaotic conditions in Russia leads me to make the following suggestions:

(1) The creation of the "Commission for the Relief of Russia". This Commission to be organized generally along the same lines as the "Commission for the Relief of Belgium", except that all of the funds required should be furnished for the time being at least out of your War Fund. This would obviate the necessity of going to Congress for the present for an appropriation.

(2) An announcement by you that in order to give some tangible evidence to the world that the United States proposes to stand by Russia and to assist the Russian people in the circumstances in which they find themselves you had concluded to create this Commission and to request Mr. Herbert Hoover to act as its head and that the Commission would act in close conjunction with the State Department and be guided in all questions of foreign policy by the State Department.

I feel sure that you will agree with me that unless the policy of such a Commission is controlled through this Department, so far as it relates to foreign affairs, hopeless confusion will result.

Your appointment of Mr. Hughes to assist the Department of Justice in its Aircraft investigation effectively cleared up what bade fair to develop into a most distressing situation. As I pointed out to you after Cabinet on Tuesday, I see signs in Congress and outside of a similar situation arising in connection with Russia unless you give concrete expression to the splendid encouragement you have already extended to the Russian people. I feel sure that Mr. Hoover's appointment to head such a Commission would be widely acclaimed as another evidence of the determination of the United States to assist the Russian people towards the establishment of an orderly Government independent of Germany.

The creation of this Commission would, for the time being, dispose of the proposal of armed intervention. The British, French, Italian

and Japanese Governments could be told that armed intervention would have to depend on Mr. Hoover's recommendations after he had proceeded further with his work. Armed intervention to protect the humanitarian work done by the Commission would be much preferable to armed intervention before this work had been begun.

I know that you will hesitate to take Mr. Hoover from his present work. I have learned, however, that the organization of the Food Administration has proceeded to such an extent that, while much work remains to be done, nevertheless another man could easily step in and effectively continue the work. No doubt Mr. Hoover has told you, as he has me, that our food supply at the present time is most satisfactory and that the present problem is to dispose of properly the enormous supplies we have acquired through stimulation of production. I understand that Mr. Julius Barnes is considered the ablest of Mr. Hoover's assistants and best equipped for his position.

I should very much appreciate an expression of your views with reference to these suggestions.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/2145½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 17 June, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There seems to me to emerge from this suggestion ⁵¹ the shadow of a plan that might be worked, with Japanese and other assistance. These people ⁵² are the cousins of the Russians.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

861.00/2053

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It has occurred to me that you will wish to take especial note of this very interesting telegram from our Consul at Moscow, dated June 12th,⁵³ and accordingly I desire to bring it to your attention. It is the reply to an effort which I recently made to find out the attitude of the Russian Cooperative Societies on the present situation.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

⁵¹ See telegram of June 13, 1918, from the Minister in China, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 206.

⁵² The Czecho-Slovaks.

⁵³ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 205.

861.00/2148½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 19 June, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This despatch has interested me very much. These associations may be of very great service as instruments for what we are now planning to do in Siberia.

By the way, I saw Professor Masaryk today and he seemed to think well of the plan.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

861.00/2164½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I received yesterday from the British Embassy the enclosed paraphrase of a telegram from Lockhart at Moscow.⁶⁴

The situation of the Czecho-Slovak forces in western Siberia seems to me to create a new condition which should receive careful consideration. Prof. Masaryk assured me that these rebels against Austria-Hungary, collected from the Russian prison camps and from deserters, would not fight against the Russians but only sought to pass via Vladivostok to the western front.

Now it appears that their efforts to reach Vladivostok being opposed by the Bolsheviks they are fighting the Red Guards along the Siberian line with more or less success. As these troops are most loyal to our cause and have been most unjustly treated by the various Soviets ought we not to consider whether something cannot be done to support them?

There are, it seems, between 10,000 and 15,000 at Vladivostok and some 40,000 to 60,000 in western Siberia. In the latter territory Omsk and Tomsk are reported to be in their hands. Is it not possible that in this body of capable and loyal troops may be found a nucleus for military occupation of the Siberian railway?

I would like to confer with you on the subject after cabinet-meeting Tuesday if you find it convenient.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

⁶⁴ Not printed.

861.00/2215½

The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS you desired me, I have put into writing the substance of the confidential information which I communicated to you this afternoon under order of my government.

I now beg to enclose it herewith.

Yours sincerely,

K. ISHII

[Enclosure]

*Paraphrased Copy of Cablegram Received by Viscount Ishii From His Government*⁵⁵

As the result of the Versailles Conference, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the name of the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, had recently proposed to the Imperial Government to consent to undertake certain common action in Siberia, subject to the concurrence of the American Government. The Imperial Government still hold the same view as expressed to the American Government on the 19th March last⁵⁶ and attach great importance to the positive support of the latter in considering any action of intervention in Siberia. Accordingly, a reply has been sent in the sense that the Japanese Government, while deeply appreciating the proposal, could not feel at liberty to express their decision before a complete and satisfactory understanding on the question was reached between the three Powers and the United States.

763.72/10610½

*Lt. Col. Raymond Robins*⁵⁷ *to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1918.

SIR: Pursuant to your request I have the honor to present to you herewith a brief printed statement of my recommendations concerning the Russian situation.

⁵⁵ This paper bears the notation: "Sent me June 26/18 RL." On June 27 Secretary Lansing sent this telegram to President Wilson, who replied on June 28: "I have read this communication with genuine pleasure. Faithfully Yours, W. W." (File No. 861.00/2216½.)

⁵⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 81.

⁵⁷ In charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia, December 1917 to May 1918.

It seems to me that in all the confusion of statement and conclusion surrounding the Russian situation the following propositions are reasonably clear:

First, that Germany hesitates to employ in Russia armed forces in sufficient number to subjugate the land but desires—as clearly indicated by a consistent course of conduct in Ukrainia, Finland and the Baltic Provinces—to establish so-called governments of law and order which are too weak to support themselves in the great class struggle but which may be maintained and controlled by German force.

Second, that through such governments Germany hopes to control and utilize Russian resources and, if possible, Russian man-power against the Western Allies in this war, and to conclude the war with Russia completely under the economic dominion of Germany.

Third, that forcible Allied intervention opposed by the Soviets would be essentially analogous to what Germany is doing in the Ukraine, in Finland and in the Baltic Provinces.

Fourth, that such intervention unless welcomed by the great mass of the Russian people would be destructive in principle of the entire basis of President Wilson's democratic war policy.

Fifth, that forcible Allied intervention, if uninvited by the Soviet power, will certainly be opposed and will result in civil war.

Sixth, that forcible Allied intervention can not be justified upon grounds of military necessity, and will not prevent but will hasten and make easy the consummation of Germany's war aims in European Russia.

Seventh, that American economic co-operation with Russia will open the way for effective Allied intervention with force and the creation of an actual fighting front opposed to Germany in Russia.

The recommendations enclosed herewith are stated with as much brevity as possible.⁵⁸

Respectfully,

RAYMOND ROBINS

[Enclosure]

Statement of Recommendations Concerning the Russian Situation

AMERICAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

I.—RUSSIA WILL WELCOME AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

America's democratic war aims are such as to make allied intervention by force in Russia inconceivable unless desired by the great mass of the Russian people. Thus far there has been no expression

⁵⁸ These recommendations were transmitted by Secretary Lansing to President Wilson. On July 3 the President replied: "Thank you for having let me see the enclosed. . . . I differ from them only in practical details. Cordially and faithfully yours, Woodrow Wilson." (File No. 763.72/10614½.)

of any such desire, but there is now presented in the invitation coming from the responsible head of the Soviet Government for America's coöperation in economic reconstruction, the opportunity for taking a vitally important preliminary step toward complete economic and military coöperation in the creation of an effective Eastern front. This suggestion should be considered solely as a war measure, uninfluenced by altruistic concern for the Russian people.

The Russian people and their leaders are learning by bitter daily experience the necessity of organizing resistance to German power. When the peace written by Germany at Brest-Litovsk was signed the condition of the old army was such that it was utterly incapable of resisting any organized force. Demobilization was the first indispensable prerequisite for the creation of an effective force with which German power could be opposed. The next step is the reconstruction of the economic situation. Modern armies cannot survive unsupported by economic and industrial organization.

It was upon the plea of the necessity for economic reconstruction that the peace, frankly described as shameful, was accepted. The leaders of the Soviet Government realize that their social-economic revolution must fail, and that Russia will inevitably fall under the complete domination of autocratic Germany unless immediate and effective assistance in the reconstruction of economic life can be obtained. Their faith in the formulas of International Socialism naturally repels the suggestion of friendly coöperation with so-called Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments, but the compelling realities and necessities of life have led in this case, as in many others, to readjustment and compromise. Hence the present suggestion coming from the responsible head of the Soviet Government which is an earnest request for America's coöperation in the internal reconstruction of economic life.

It is my sincere conviction, if this suggestion is acted upon and such economic reorganization is accomplished as is needed to equip and support a revolutionary army, that such an army can and will be formed and that in such event the assistance of armed forces of the Allies will be gladly accepted by the Soviet Power. This Power can not be expected to countenance Allied intervention until convinced that the intervening force will not be used to destroy it.

II.—GENERAL PURPOSES OF AN ECONOMIC COMMISSION

The aims of an Economic Commission sent to Russia to coöperate in the problem of economic reconstruction will be—

First. To so reconstruct commercial distribution as to assure the consumption of Russian resources in Russia where they are vitally

needed, thus preventing such resources from being used for the support of the German people and the German armies.

Second. To control the use and disposition of surplus resources and through such control to prevent such use in the service of Germany.

Third. If possible to re-establish trade with Russia upon a basis which, while facilitating economic reconstruction in Russia, will at the same time furnish to the Allies for use in England and France necessary products shipped from Russia via Archangel, which otherwise would necessarily be brought to England from more distant ports requiring longer voyages and consequently a greater use of tonnage.

Fourth. To convince the Russian people that the interests of Russia and the Allies in overthrowing German autocracy are identical, and that American assistance is given solely with a view to hastening the day when Russia will be able to aid the destruction of the German menace.

Fifth. To encourage and assist in the organization of a voluntary revolutionary army, creating behind such an army the necessary organization for its economic support.

Sixth. To convince the leaders of Revolutionary Russia, whoever they may be, that the Allied Governments have no imperialistic purposes in Russia and will gladly send forces to assist the Russian people in opposing the aggression of German force; and through coöperation with these leaders, to obtain their consent to sending Allied troops which in coöperation with Russian forces may be sufficient to reestablish the Russian front.

Seventh. To obtain an accurate understanding of the fundamental social forces at work in Russia and to keep the American and other allied governments advised of the actual facts controlling the development of the Russian, social, economic and political revolution.

III.—THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

Russia is not suffering so much from a lack of resources as from the break-down of the ordinary processes of distribution. The Russian peasant finds himself with a large quantity of grain and a large amount of depreciated paper currency. If he takes his grain to the local center of trade he finds none of the necessities of his life for sale, and can not exchange his grain except for more depreciated paper money. Consequently the grain is not brought to market. In several instances where shipments of manufactured articles needed by the peasants have been sent to villages, theretofore suffering from the lack of grain, abundant supplies of grain have at once been brought from the surrounding country by the peasants to be exchanged for the manufactured articles.

While this is typical of the situation in many provinces, other neighboring provinces are facing famine conditions because of crop failures or other reasons, and have no grain with which to sow their fields or to feed their people. In a district near Samara, the handling of such a situation was attempted by the local peasant's coöperative society. Going to the peasants who lacked the seed wheat with which

to sow their fields, this organization proposed to procure the necessary seed-wheat, provided the peasants would advance the price of the grain which the society promised to deliver within a fixed period of time. Many of the peasants, ignorant of all methods of business involving even the simplest form of credit, refused this offer made solely in their own interest. A unit of the American Friends Society, which has been doing excellent work in that district, determined to bridge the gap; and sending a man to Omsk found no difficulty in purchasing the necessary seed-wheat, and after procuring the same transported and sold it to the peasants without loss in a majority of cases.

Meanwhile, the factories in the industrial centers have in many cases continued their operations and have produced manufactured articles that are lacking in the country districts. In illustration: The J. M. Coates Company, which produces 60 per cent of all the cotton thread produced in Russia, and which has large factories in Petrograd, continued its operations up to the end of February, 1918, and at that time had on hand the largest stock of manufactured products its books had ever shown. Owing to difficulties of communication, transport, and hauling, the distributing branch of the business had not been functioning. That efficient production is possible under Soviet rule has been demonstrated by the experience of the International Harvester Company which has largely increased its producing efficiency during the past six months under Soviet rule. This experience was made possible through tactful handling of a very difficult situation which resulted in effective coöperation from the Soviet authorities who in order to get results were willing when faced with the practical necessities of the situation, to modify the rigid formulas of their economic theory. No doubt the experience of this company is exceptional, but the tactful handling of daily problems as they arise through a competent American Economic Commission will be the most effective method of accomplishing similar results in like cases.

IV.—GOVERNMENT COOPERATION

Obviously nothing can be accomplished without the coöperation of governmental power. The commission must, therefore, go if it goes at all, willing to deal with the leaders of Revolutionary Russia actually in power, without regard to their principles or formulas of economic, social, or political life, so long as such leaders sincerely desire to re-create forces in Russia which will be used in resisting the force of German arms. Seeking such coöperation, the members of this commission will be asked to advise regarding problems of a most practical and controlling nature. They will be able to exert powerful influence to prevent large commercial transactions with Germany. All of this

work will from necessity be done under Government control and protection. Their advice re-enforced by the uncompromising facts of life will lead inevitably to the modification, adjustment, and softening of the hard and impossible formulas of radical socialism; and because of the necessity of finding it, a practical basis for progress will be found. The Russian Revolution has now reached the stage where it is to be controlled, not by theory, but by the unyielding necessities of life. This fact is becoming each day more clear to the radical socialistic group now in control of the Soviet Government.

It is apparent from the informality of the suggestion inviting American coöperation that formal recognition of the Soviet Government is not a necessary prerequisite to coöperation. Acting upon this informal invitation, a commission can proceed to Russia and be placed in direct touch with the entire situation without further formality.

American coöperation will give the Allies effective and controlling influence upon the internal situation. Such coöperation will be able to direct the forces supporting the Soviet Power against Germany. If effective, coöperation will ultimately compel the continued utilization against the Russian people of tyrannical German force, thus preventing German coöperation and increasing the bitter resentment against Germany which is steadily gaining ground in Russia. If the economic life of Russia can be sufficiently organized to make possible the support of an effective army, this growing resentment will surely crystallize in the organization of an army which will effectively oppose the German menace in Russia.

V.—ORGANIZATION OF COMMISSION

Through coöperation with the Government the work of such a Commission will be concerned with:—

- (1) Railway control, management and operation;
- (2) Reorganization of credit and finance, governmental and commercial;
- (3) Commercial distribution of grain and manufactured articles in exchange for grain;
- (4) Food administration and control;
- (5) Shipping and foreign trade, with particular reference to Allied war needs;
- (6) Industrial management and control in co-operation with labor;
- (7) Reorganization of manufacturing and coal mining industries;
- (8) Development of agriculture;
- (9) Prevention, or utilization, of speculative markets;
- (10) Education;
- (11) Propaganda.

To accomplish substantial results the most competent organizing and technical ability will be required. Members of the Commission must be men of liberal views and sympathetic understanding, capable of meeting fact conditions with practical ability to achieve results under difficult and complex circumstances.

Under the control of the Commission it will be necessary to create an extensive organization with representatives in all important centers of Russian life. For this purpose the distributing and sales organizations of large business concerns, both American and English, which have heretofore been organized in Russia and which are now in danger of being disorganized should be utilized and reorganized to meet the actual demands of the situation. There are many such organizations in Russia as, for instance, the New York Life Insurance Company, the J. M. Coates Company, and the International Harvester Company.

The organization thus created by the Commission will co-operate in the various local centers with various Russian agencies, including the local Soviets, the Peasants' Co-operative Societies and the local Zemstvos where they are functioning. Thus the commercial and industrial needs necessary for re-creation of commercial life may be effectively ascertained. Through co-operation in railway management the opportunity will be created of transporting manufactured goods from the place of production to the place of consumption. The Commission will be able to control the disposition of manufactured goods by the use of American credit and upon transportation of such goods to the local centers will, with them, be able to control the disposition of large food products.

These products should of course be primarily used for consumption in Russia and will be transported to the centers where food products are lacking. Any surplus will be available for export.

If export trade with the Allies can be re-established upon such a basis as to result in economic use of tonnage in bringing from Archangel products required in England and France it should be possible in exchange for these products to ship to Russia agricultural and other tools and machinery and manufactured products. This trade should be in the absolute control of the Commission, so that the distribution of the goods sent to Russia will be, in so far as possible, under the control of the Commission. With American credit and American goods the Commission will be able to control the disposition of Russian resources, vitally needed by Germany. In this connection it is encouraging to note that there are authentic reports to the effect that Germany has been endeavoring to make large purchases of American bank notes for the purchase of grain from the Ukraine peasants. This fact indicates that Germany has not at her

disposal the goods required by the Ukrainian peasants for which they would be willing to exchange their grain. Effective organization combined with the use of American credit and the control of American goods should effectively prevent the commercial exploitation of Russia by Germany during the balance of the war.

The work of this Commission will be so extensive that the burden of responsible supervision should not be placed upon any of the departments of the Government already so greatly overburdened with work. In order to meet this situation and at the same time to obtain proper co-ordination it is suggested that a separate and independent department of the Government be created under the Overman Act; that at the head of this department there should be a man enjoying the absolute confidence of the President, who shall be responsible only to the President; that there be associated with him representatives of the various Government departments having vital interests connected with the prosecution of the war which may be related to the work of the Commission.

The Commission should be responsible only to this independent department and, through it, responsible to the President. This department should be granted an appropriation by Congress adequate to effectively carry on its work. The very large amount of money which will be required is indicated by the character of the work to be done.

Independent facilities of communication in cipher should be established between the Commission and the department to which it is to be responsible.

Time is of the utmost importance. The Commission should be organized as quickly as possible and should proceed to Russia via Archangel so as to reach the center of European Russia without unnecessary delay.

RAYMOND ROBINS

JULY 1, 1918.

861.00/2292½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In connection with the Siberian Affair I would like to call your attention to two matters which I think should be considered at once.

First: As Chinese troops are holding the Manchurian Railway east, and I believe west, of Harbin, ought they or ought they not to be considered in connection with the guarding of the Siberian Railroad in aid of the Czecho-Slovaks?

Second: Ought we or ought we not to advise the Allied Governments, including the Chinese, of our program before we hear from Tokio? There is the possibility that the Japanese may consult them before we mention the matter. If they do, we may be embarrassed in our relations with those Governments who will consider us not frank. I am very sure that a secretive attitude will deeply offend Reading and Jusserand, and, to a lesser degree, Cellere and Koo. My own disposition is to be candid with them, now that the Japanese Government has had time to consider our proposed program.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/2294½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Japanese Ambassador called this afternoon. He said that he had not heard from his Government, but that it might possibly expedite a decision if some arrangement could be made as to the chief commander of the combined forces.

I told him that I had not discussed the subject with you because it did not seem of prime importance but that in view of his raising the question I would lay it before you. While making light of the matter to Ishii I think that it is really a serious subject which will have to be settled very soon. It presents considerable embarrassment, and, to tell the truth, I am at a loss what to say as I am sure the Japanese will expect to be in high command. Will you please be good enough to give me your judgment as to how I should treat the subject with the Ambassador?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/2599½

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

No. 913

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honour to inform you that, in reply to a note from the Japanese Ambassador, His Majesty's Government have accepted the view of the Japanese Government—so far as British troops are concerned—that the Supreme Command of the Allied forces operating in Siberia and based on the Pacific should be Japanese.

The Japanese Ambassador has been further informed that General Knox will be head of the British Military Mission attached to the staff of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief.

Believe me [etc.]

COLVILLE BARCLAY

861.00/2602½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On Friday, the 16th, I asked the Japanese Ambassador to come and see me in regard to a report that Japanese troops were being sent to Manchu-li on the Manchurian border not far from Chita, the western junction of the Eastern Manchurian and Amur River railways. He evidently anticipated the purpose of the visit for he brought with him a telegram from his Government. The substance of the telegram he sent to me last night, and I enclose it to you. He also said that the Japanese Government were sending between 3,000 and 5,000 troops to Manchu-li and that these troops were part of forces stationed in Manchurian garrisons further south.

I am also enclosing a letter from the French Ambassador on the Siberian situation which is in substance a repetition of statements made to me on Saturday morning.

To complete the documents in the case I am appending a telegram from Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of the 15th, and also a report by General Dietrichs in command of the Czechs at Vladivostok, forwarded by Consul Caldwell on the 15th.⁵⁹

A careful consideration of the facts as disclosed by these communications convinces me that the situation is developing in a way which differs considerably from the plan originally determined upon and compels a consideration of the policy which should be adopted in reference to the new conditions presented.

I believe that the evidence points to an intention on the part of the Japanese to send a larger number of troops to Vladivostok than the 13,500 already sent, while I feel sure that they will increase the force operating at Manchu-li in the event that the pro-German troops should be superior. Of course they assert that the Manchurian force will not go beyond Chinese territory, but in view of the importance of the Chita junction I am not sure that that is not their objective.

We are informed that on July 7 Irkutsk was captured by the Czecho-Slovaks, that between that city or between Lake Baikal and the Chinese border there are about 25,000 of the opposing forces largely composed of armed German and Austrian prisoners, and that that section of the railroad is entirely in their hands.

We are also informed that Czech troops, estimated variously at from 2,000 to 6,000, have reached Harbin from Vladivostok, which is

⁵⁹ For the latter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 346.

apparently an utterly inadequate force to push westward to Irkutsk in the face of the largely superior numbers near Manchou-li.

In addition to this the Germans and Austrians and the Red Guard are in strong force (estimated 80,000) north of Vladivostok along the Amur, so that it will require all the Czechs remaining in the city together with the allied forces landed to resist an attack on that port.

The question seems to be, therefore, what course should be taken to open a way to relieve the Czecho-Slovaks in Western Siberia. Under present conditions a military advance westward seems practically impossible. I do not see how we can permit a deadlock to continue, because to do so would destroy the whole value of the enterprise and seriously imperil the lives of all the Czechs west of Irkutsk, who will if captured be treated as traitors.

Frankly I think that the situation is getting beyond our control and that unless we revise or modify our policy to meet these new conditions we will be placed in a very embarrassing situation, especially so if any disaster should occur to the Czechs in the west.

I think, too, that whatever is to be done to relieve the Czecho-Slovaks must be done speedily since winter will set in within eight or ten weeks and the rigorous climate will cause great suffering unless we can reach them with supplies, of which, we are informed, they are so sorely in need.

I am not prepared to offer advice in the matter but I do feel that we must assume that Japan, with the pressure of the present situation together with the undoubted approval of the Allied Governments, will assert that military conditions require her to send a much larger force both to Vladivostok and to the western border of Manchuria.

If the Japanese Government indicate their purpose to take such action, what ought we to say?

If we reach the conclusion that Japan will follow this course in any event, would we or would we not be in a better position to control the situation in the future by asserting that present conditions require Japan to send sufficient troops to open the railroad to Irkutsk and to keep it open so that we can send supplies to the Czechs?

I raise these questions for consideration only and not as an expression of opinion. My only suggestion is that the situation calls for prompt consideration.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure 1]

The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS I promised you yesterday I beg to send you herewith enclosed a short sketch of what I explained to you verbally about the situation in the border town of Manchuli.

Yours sincerely,

K. ISHII

[Subenclosure]

The Japanese Foreign Office to the Japanese Ambassador (Ishii)

The forces of the Soviet, virtually under command of the armed German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners, have recently pressed back the Semenoff's troops to the borders of China. Part of the town of Manchuli has been bombarded by them and the Japanese residents numbering some two hundred fifty have been compelled to take flight to the town of Hailar. The Chinese troops stationed at Manchuli were powerless to cope with the Soviet forces and only succeeded by means of a compromise to check their invasion into the town.

It is further reported that part of the Soviet forces seem to have penetrated into the Chinese territory, proceeding eastward around the north of Manchuli.

[Enclosure 2]

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*⁶⁰

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to our conversation of this morning I beg to confirm that my Government has received somewhat serious news as to the situation of the eastern section of the Tcheck army in Siberia.

Part of this section (2,000 men we are told) moving west in order to join the western branch of the army has reached Kharbine. Their objective is now Tchita which is apparently the key to the situation, is an important railroad junction and is a strong position where the germano-bolshevik resistance is powerfully organized.

General Dietrichs, General Paris (who is French) and the Japanese staff have exchanged views and come to the conclusion that the contemplated advance is not possible unless the Tchecks are immediately reinforced by Japanese divisions.

My Government cables, that great as is their desire to abide without change by the views of President Wilson and not to trouble

⁶⁰ Filed separately under file No. 861.00/2600½.

him with new proposals, it seems impossible to them not to place the facts before him, and ask whether he does not think that something should be tried.

It is certainly necessary to leave troops in Vladivostok so as to defend the rear of the Tcheck army, and destroy the threat resulting from the enemy's being strongly established north of Kabarovsk, where it holds the line of the Amur. The Allied contingent will suffice for this task.

At Kharbine the Tcheck troops are at a stand still, owing to the very serious risk of being worsted by an enemy stronger than themselves and established in a region easy to defend.

That something should be done is rendered more evident, in our eyes, by the advanced season and the danger of the disorganisation and destruction of the several Tcheck groups scattered along the railroad.

It does not seem possible, under present circumstances to take Tchita and to progress towards the Baikal and Irkoutsk, that is to realize the very objective of the action agreed upon, without immediate and powerful reinforcements. These should amount, as we take it, to 3 or 4 Japanese divisions. Would the President agree to such an increase?

I commend this problem, my dear Mr. Secretary, to your immediate attention and I should be much obliged if you were so good as to let me know as soon as possible what are the views thereon of the President.

Believe me [etc.]

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure 3—Telegram—Paraphrase]

*Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*⁶¹

U. S. S. "BROOKLYN," August 15, 1918—2:16 p. m.

It is requested that the assistance to Czechs by American and other forces to be extended to Manchuria front and Baikhar region instead of being confined to Ussuri front. This is in reference to Communication from General Dieterichs and Czechs-Slovak forwarded by Consul to the State Department this date. Unable to learn where impression originated that assistance proposed is to be limited to any one area but in some way this impression has become widespread and appears to be generally accepted. It is even believed that American Forces are to remain at Vladivostok. It is possible that Japanese Officials know something not known to myself, and have communicated it confidentially to others.

⁶¹ Filed separately under file No. 861.00/2597½. Admiral Austin M. Knight was commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

The Czech General has asked for information and stated that all his plans depended upon the knowledge of cooperation to be expected. In replying to same, I informed him that I did not have any information beyond that given in the United States Government proclamation.

861.00/2659

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I lay before you a communication from the French Embassy in relation to the sending of High Commissioners to Siberia ^{61a} and also a memorandum from Mr. Phillips on the subject.⁶²

Personally I feel that in view of our policy it would be unwise to do this and that this is another move to impress our action in Siberia with the character of intervention rather than relief of the Czechs. The suggestion that our High Commissioner be the head of an international commission seems to be a bait to draw us into this policy which has been so insistently urged by Great Britain for the past six months.

It would relieve the situation if you authorized me to say to the Ambassadors that we did not intend to appoint a High Commissioner and to state to the press that at present we had no intention of making such an appointment.

If we decline to cooperate in this I believe that the Commission will have little weight.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/2660

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 23 August, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I hope you will do just what you here suggest. The other governments are going much further than we and much faster,—are, indeed, acting upon a plan which is altogether foreign from ours and inconsistent with it.

Please make it plain to the French Ambassador that we do not think cooperation in political action necessary or desirable in eastern

^{61a} *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 340.

⁶² Not printed.

Siberia because we contemplate no political action of any kind there, but only the action of friends who stand at hand and wait to see how they can help. The more plain and emphatic this is made the less danger will there be or [of?] subsequent misunderstandings and irritations.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

860f.24/9a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I hesitate to trouble you again with the subject of supplies for the Czecho-Slovaks, but I fear there is no other course. The Red Cross is sending underwear, socks, sweaters, shirts, cloth for suiting and gloves, together with some shoes and sole leather furnished by the Russian Embassy. Further than that there seems to be no effort to send supplies of any kind and no effort being made to send supplies of a military character. Unless supplies leave the United States within the next three weeks it will be impossible to reach the Czechs, because the winter sets in very early and most rigorously in that climate.

May I be so bold as to suggest that you designate some one person and clothe him with sufficient authority to get the information which seems to be necessary before any shipment can be commenced and to report to you? This seems to me to be the only solution of a situation which is at present chaotic, in which no one seems to have authority and in which there is no directed energy.

From a casual investigation, I am satisfied that there are supplies of a military character in this country which can not possibly be used by our armed forces and which can be most suitably used by the Czechs. This applies to rifles, ammunition, machine guns and various other necessary equipment of a military character.

Of course the work which the Red Cross is doing I feel should not be confused with or sub-ordinated to the direction of any person whom you may designate, and I think that it should be continued in the same independent manner, but I do feel that any other relief which it is contemplated should be sent to the Czechs should be supervised and directed by one person with sufficient authority to co-ordinate all the efforts which will be necessary to get any relief to them.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

860f.24/9½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 2 September, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: May I not ask you to have a full conference with Mr. Baruch⁶³ about this matter? He is at the centre of such information. He and I were speaking of it the other day, and I found that he was familiar with the available stocks in the hands of the War Department. His information and advice ought to enable us to get to a final action.

Am I not right in the impression that it was understood that the Japanese were to supply and supply at once the necessary military supplies for the Czechs?

By the way, it begins to look as if the plan of the Japanese were to do the fighting on their own plan and let the Czecho-Slovaks tag along, instead of acting themselves as a supporting force.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

860f.24/9½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am to see Mr. Baruch tomorrow in regard to the matter of supplying the needs of the Czecho-Slovaks, but, while I shall proceed along the lines already suggested, I wish to offer the following as a method which seems to remove the difficulty of coordinating the different sources of supply and also to secure speedy action, which is so essential in view of the near approach of winter.

I think that in view of the fact that we have recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a *de facto* government it might be possible to make them a loan sufficient to purchase the necessary supplies in this country. The entire responsibility and work of purchasing and arranging for the transportation of the supplies would by this method fall upon Professor Masaryk and his colleagues.

This course would have the advantage of giving substantial evidence of our opinion as to the probable success of the movement and our faith in the repayment of moneys loaned. But even if it was never repaid we would be no worse off than if we expend the amount on supplies and gave them to the Czecho-Slovaks.

Would you be good enough to let me have your opinion on this suggestion, and, if it meets with your approval, an authorization

⁶³ Chairman of the War Industries Board.

to lay it before Professor Masaryk either before or after discussing the plan with the Treasury as you think best?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

860f.24/10½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 5 September, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It is my judgment that we should avoid a loan, if possible, and handle this matter directly,—possibly in the way I have just suggested over the telephone.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

860f.24/10¼a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I saw Mr. Baruch this morning in regard to the Czecho-Slovak relief and he thought it highly essential that he should be put in touch at once with Professor Masaryk. This I have arranged.

I also took the liberty of telling him of the suggestion which I had made in regard to a loan and he said that he considered it the most practical and efficient means of arranging for the supplies and expediting their transportation. Of course the matter of purchase and allocation of tonnage would still be in Mr. Baruch's hands.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

861.00/2783f

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The telegrams which you have lately received, copies of which are enclosed, no doubt have greatly heartened you as they have me, particularly the one received through the Navy Department.⁶⁴ Our confidence in the Czech forces has been justified and the fact that now a Russian military force of equal strength has joined them combined with the gratifying reception given the Czechs by the civilian population of the localities occupied is strong evidence to prove that the Russians are entirely satisfied

⁶⁴No enclosures with file copy of this letter.

to cooperate with the Czechs in Russia and that assistance to the Czechs amounts to assistance to the Russians.

At the same time, the news received has presented certain problems which, if not met and overcome by us, may seriously impair our prestige not only with those we would help—the Russians and the Czechs—but also with the Allies and Japan. It is to you that liberal opinion throughout the world is looking for a sound, constructive plan for assisting Russia. Reactionary influences in Russia and elsewhere are at work to shake off your leadership and to take advantage of any opportunity offered them to make use of Russia rather than to serve her.

You have publicly declared that you intend to stand by Russia. You have stated that our military forces sent to Russia are to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance, and that you hope and purpose eventually to send economic and other relief to the Russian people, but that this would follow and in no way embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks. You have said you purpose not to desert the Czecho-Slovak army engaged in conflict with nationals of the Central Powers in Siberia and finally you have recognized the Czecho-Slovak Council, to which the army has sworn allegiance, as a *de facto* Government at war with the Central Powers. You have moved cautiously and deliberately and each declaration of policy has met with almost universal approval.

The problems presented by the late telegrams appear to me to fall under the following heads:

- (1) The Czecho-Slovaks—a military force operating in Siberia and the Eastern part of European Russia.
- (2) The civilian population of Siberia.
- (3) The civilian population along the Murman Coast and in the Archangel District.

(1) In order to render protection and help to the Czecho-Slovaks it is clear we must get them military supplies, viz; clothing, shoes, arms and ammunition. This can be done with the assistance of Mr. Baruch with whom I have consulted and I understand that you are prepared to supply the necessary money from your War Fund.

(2) The relief of the civilian population in Siberia does not involve the sending of great quantities of food from this country. Clothing, shoes, and certain specified commodities are required. Some months ago the United States Shipping Board chartered through the Russian Embassy certain vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet with the understanding that when these vessels were needed by Rus-

sia they would be returned to her. It seems to me that in good faith we are now bound to place these vessels at work carrying to the civilian population of Russia such supplies as we can spare them. Any other use of them would be making use of Russia and not serving her and would be most unjust.

(3) The rationing of the civilian population on the Murman Coast and in the Archangel District seems to me to be essential as well from a military as from a humanitarian standpoint. Certain foodstuffs have already been shipped to these points from this country by the British Government. Ambassador Francis' cables of the second and third instant from Archangel show how necessary it is that supplies be sent to that locality.⁶⁵ The coming on of winter and the consequent closing of the ports makes it imperative that such supplies as are shipped go forward before October first. The British Government is prepared to supply the transportation and has proposed that the ultimate expense of this rationing be borne jointly by the United States, Great Britain, and France. This seems to me to be equitable and accordingly I request authority to state that this Government will contribute its share. The total expenditure has been estimated at approximately \$15,000,000. However, as Ambassador Francis states, the plan is not to give away this food, except to prevent starvation, but to sell it and consequently a certain amount of the initial expenditure will be refunded. This expenditure being in the aid of and as a direct result of the sending of American troops to those points it would seem to me it might properly be met by the setting aside of \$5,000,000 from your fund for the National Security and Defense and I suggest that this be done.

A number of problems of considerable difficulty are presented by (2) and (3) *supra* and it seems to me it would be most helpful if these problems, which involve financial questions, methods of barter and exchange, et cetera, could be studied and solutions found by one of the established War Boards of this Government working under the direction of a man who thoroughly understands your policies and who is in close personal and official contact with the heads of the various governmental agencies concerned with these problems. It has occurred to me that Mr. Vance McCormick is peculiarly fitted for such work. He has the liberal point of view and his ability to work with the heads of the various boards and departments here has been well tested. His own organization—the War Trade Board—composed as it is of representatives of the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the Food Administration, and the Shipping Board, is almost ideally fitted to study

⁶⁵ Cable of Sept. 2, 1918, not printed; for the cable of Sept. 3, 1918, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 517.

these problems and to submit to you a report concerning them. I suggest therefore that he be requested to begin this work under your direction.

I would appreciate very much receiving instructions from you respecting the foregoing points.

I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

861.00/2760½b

The Secretary of State to the General Director of the Foreign Section of the Committee on Public Information (Sisson)

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SISSON: In the absence of Mr. Creel I am addressing myself to you in an urgent matter. I have just been offered an opportunity this morning to read the first installment of the data which the Committee proposes to release for publication tomorrow and which contains a scathing arraignment of Lenine and Trotsky and the Bolsheviki leaders.⁶⁶ It is not likely that the Germans will fail to bring this attack, published by a Committee of which three of the President's cabinet are members, to the attention of the Bolsheviki.

Mr. Poole, American Consul at Moscow, with the Department's approval, has courageously remained at his post to give countenance to his colleagues of the Allied Governments who are under arrest. Mr. Allan Wardwell and Mr. Andrews of the Red Cross and two Y. M. C. A. secretaries have remained at Moscow. At least two American women are reported to be still either at Moscow or Petrograd.

The publication of the data against the Bolshevik leaders includes an arraignment of their personal integrity. In my judgment it goes further, therefore, than any of the political activities which have been charged by the Bolsheviki against the British and French representatives now under arrest. In other words, what the Committee proposes will not only tend to arouse bitter animosity against Mr. Poole and the other Americans in Russia—where hitherto they have occupied a somewhat special position owing to the attitude of this Government—but will not unlikely imperil their lives and jeopardize further the already precarious position of the official representatives of the Allies.

If the data against the Bolshevik leaders is released on the date which I understand is proposed, namely tomorrow, September 15th,

⁶⁶ For this material as published, see War Information Series, No. 20, *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy* (Washington [Government Printing Office], 1918).

it will be impossible to communicate with Mr. Poole in time to secure the departure of himself and the remaining Americans in Russia. In the circumstances, I am unwilling to share responsibility for the consequences which may result from the publication of these documents.

On April 23, 1918, I telegraphed the American Ambassador at London⁶⁷ that no publication of this data was desired at that time or pending further conference. I assume, therefore, that the Committee's proposed action has been taken only after the British authorities at London have been properly informed of the Committee's intention. Please inform me definitely on this point.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/2761½

The General Director of the Foreign Section of the Committee on Public Information (Sisson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *September 14, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would suggest that Mr. Poole be instructed to place himself in the keeping of the Swedish Consul, and to have Mr. Wardwell and Mr. Andrews do the same, provided he and they cannot get out of the Bolshevick area.

That publication will add anything to their present peril is difficult to conceive.

You will put them in actual danger of being connected with the exposure (in which they have no part whatever) by pointing them out as your reason for urging an abnormal action.

A story that has been in the newspaper offices of the country for 24 hours cannot be suppressed by normal means.

My knowledge of London-Washington conference is confined to the fact that I asked permission to turn over to the British Government the part of my material it lacked, and that by your order to Ambassador Page and to me, I was not permitted to do so. I am,

Very sincerely,

EDGAR SISSON

861.00/2762½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *17 September, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It occurs to me to request you to make pointed inquiry of the British, French, and Italian governments as to what the so-called Allied Military Council at Vladivostok is, of

⁶⁷ Telegram not printed.

whom it is composed, and by whose authority it was formed and is undertaking to act, intimating at the same time that we recognize the authority of no such body and would be very glad to have the situation at Vladivostok cleared of unnecessary complications.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

763.72/134641

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 20 September, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for having let me see the enclosed.⁶⁸ I entirely agree with Baker's judgment in the matter of the expected request from Clemenceau. I say "expected" because I have not seen it and believe we have not yet received it, have we?

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

861.00/2772

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I know that you have read the enclosed telegram (23d, 10 pm) from Mr. Morris with the same anxiety that I have.⁶⁹ It presents very clearly a situation full of difficulties because the Russian communities of the Volga region, which have been friendly to the Czecho-Slovaks, being unarmed, will be at the mercy of the Red Guards, who have committed such monstrous crimes within the past six weeks in Moscow and other cities, if the Czecho-Slovaks withdraw to the east of the Urals.

I must confess that I sympathize with the spirit of the Czecho-Slovaks when they say that they cannot abandon their helpless friends to certain massacre and pillage. I believe that the world would be disposed to condemn such a course, and that the Czecho-Slovaks with their high sense of honor would rather die on the Volga than bear the charge of such ingratitude.

It seems to me that we must assume that the Czecho-Slovak force west of the Urals will remain there and do the best that they can to protect the friendly Russian communities from Bolshevik excesses.

The question is what ought we to do in the circumstances and what can we do in case we feel it our duty to assist them? It is an ex-

⁶⁸ Telegram No. 1899, Sept. 15, 1918, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, transmitting message from Secretary of War Baker, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 538.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

tremely difficult question to answer because I think that we must assume that, justly or unjustly, we will be blamed for the consequences unless we can show conclusively that it was utterly impossible to give aid to the Czecho-Slovaks in eastern Russia.

We could of course say, adhering rigidly to our announced policy, that it is their duty, regardless of their Russian allies, to join their compatriots in Siberia and that we ought not to be asked to come to their assistance if they do not follow that course. But I fear that such a declaration of attitude would be generally criticized and would place the blame upon us if disaster should fall upon the communities of eastern Russia.

Yet, assuming that we ought to aid these people if we can, what can we do? I do not see how, with the small force which we have in Siberia, we can do more than hasten arms and ammunition to them and refrain from urging them to withdraw at the present time. But, even with sufficient munitions and supplies, I doubt if so small a body of troops can avoid final annihilation unless a considerable force is sent to cooperate with them in repelling the Bolsheviks. Where is such a force to come from? A few thousands would appear useless. There seems to be only one source and that is Japan, and I feel quite convinced that the Japanese Government, even if it were physically possible, would hesitate to enter on so hazardous an adventure.

The more I consider the matter the more perplexing and distressing it becomes. We cannot abandon the Czecho-Slovaks on the ground that they will not abandon their Russian friends. Of course that would never do. And yet, what is the alternative, or is there any?

In view of the recent examples of the blood-thirsty character of the Bolsheviks, which has introduced a new factor into the problem of relieving the Czecho-Slovaks, I feel that we should give most careful consideration to the suggestions of Mr. Morris.

I would be grateful for your instructions or opinion as to the policy we should adopt in dealing with this new situation which was not foreseen when the *Aide-Mémoire* of July 17th⁹⁰ was prepared and which has resulted from the extreme terrorism which has recently been resorted to by the Bolsheviks.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

861.00/2783e

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Italian Ambassador told me today that his Government telegraphed him that they would send no High Commissioner to Siberia though urged to do so by the British and French Governments, and that they desired to conform their policy to ours in such matters.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

861.00/2900½

*The President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council (Masaryk)
to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: I beg to submit these Notes on the Memorandum of September 27th.⁷¹

I am [etc.]

T. G. MASARYK

[Enclosure]

Some Notes on the Memorandum of September 27th, 1918

After a careful perusal of the Memorandum, and after a comparison with the Statement of August 3rd,⁷² I come to the conclusion that the Memorandum gives only general direction, but that it radically changes the Statement of August 3rd; in this respect the question arises as to why is the Statement of August 3rd cancelled at a time when the whole situation, political and military, is changing so favorably.

I

The Memorandum very aptly emphasizes the difficulty of military activities west of the Urals, and expresses the view that our forces should retire to the eastern side of the Ural Mountains. Not long ago (Agreement with General Janin, September 21st) I myself viewed the possibility of retiring over the Urals, but only in case the Germans should conclude a military agreement with the Bolsheviks, and send their regular forces against us.

I need not say that I would not dare to decide such a strategical question here far from the scene of action; the military situation

⁷¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 394, footnote 2.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 328.

changes now almost every day, and new possibilities may arise while this is written. If, for instance, Bulgaria should leave the Austro-German Alliance, and, perhaps, even join the Entente, if Turkey should follow Bulgaria, and if Rumania should again declare war upon the Central Powers, (which she probably would do in case of Bulgarian and Turkish defection), the situation on the Volga would change radically. The Germans could hardly spare troops to send against us in such a case; and should Rumania move either against Hungary or in the Ukraina, our army, properly armed, could reach even Moscow. Of course, all this rests on many if's—but such is the kaleidoscopic situation which does not allow me to make a definite decision in this, primarily a military matter.

Moreover, I should consider it necessary to hear the opinions of our Commander-in-chief, General Janin, who is now on his way to Vladivostok, and of the Allied Commanders, now acting in Siberia, before I could come to the definite conclusion that the territory west of the Ural Mountains should be abandoned. The Memorandum gives no date for this proposed retirement; I therefore understand that a definite decision on this point is left for the future.

I know too well the history of the ill-reputed Austrian Military Court-Council, deciding strategical problems from Vienna, to be tempted to follow such course and try to make decisions on strategical questions here in Washington, thousands of miles away from the battlefield. The question of retirement over the Urals is a strategical one; the responsible commanders must decide when and in what manner—whether at once or in *étapes*—the retirement is to take place; perhaps it may be advisable not to surrender the Urals to the enemy at once, but to retire from Samara say to Ufa, and keep the passage over the Urals. All these questions of strategical detail must be left to responsible commanders.

The same applies to the question as to where to retire in Western Siberia.

The Statement of August 3rd accepts the westward move of our troops, and the strategical aid of the Allies has been planned in accordance with it; the Memorandum changes this one all-important point, arguing that military activities west of the Urals are impossible. In my opinion they are not quite impossible, if our troops get in time the necessary arms and ammunition and help in general; such activities will be made more possible if the Allies send some larger military assistance. I understood from the Statement of August 3rd that the United States would not send larger contingents, but that does not exclude other troops in such moderate numbers as would work no injury to the Western front.

II

The Memorandum says that the Germans should not be allowed to get supplies from Western Siberia. That is a very sound contention; but it is for the very same reason that we are trying to keep Samara; the region of the Volga (Samara-Saratov) is the best in all Russia. That is a well known fact. I have no statistics of this year's crop in that region, nevertheless I emphasize the great importance of Samara (being also a junction of the Turkestan Railroad).

III

At any rate, the suggested retirement of our troops, as I understand it, is not made a condition of the United States' help. The Memorandum states that the supplies cannot be sent west of the Urals. If I am right, the supplies are now sent to Vladivostok (or via Fusan to Harbin?) and then by the railroad to the west; if the materials can be brought to e. g. Chelyabinsk it should be possible to bring them a little farther to Ufa. Anyhow, the problem remains: to hold the Siberian railroad, and by that Siberia in general.

IV

The particular question of Murmansk and Archangelsk I can omit, as it does not directly concern our troops; I only would point to the fact that the Memorandum in this respect changes the Statement of August 3rd; but the question concerns the Allies.

V

From the Memorandum I infer that it has been drawn up without a consultation with the Allies; that puts me in a rather singular position. The Statement of August 3rd says that the action of the Allies will not be restricted by the United States and that they may use their own independent judgment in matters concerning Russia (Siberia): is that statement still valid?

VI

I hinted at the question of tactics: how will the Germans and Austrians take the voluntary retreat from Russia? And how will it be accepted by the Bolsheviks?

The recent reverses of the Germans in the West and the promising developments of things on the Eastern front needs must lower the Germano- and Austro-philism of the Bolsheviks: I would use this change and try to detach the Bolsheviks from the Germans and Austrians; I would try to get paid for the retirement, to put it

bluntly. That of course is not an easy diplomatic job, but I would try anything to help our common cause. I explained clearly enough my views of the Bolsheviks; I do not agree with them and their tactics, but, if I may use one of President Wilson's utterances . . . I would speak even with the devil. It is my conviction that the attitude of the Allies towards the Bolsheviks has been a wrong one from the beginning; it was and is not right to withdraw from Russia and leave her and the Bolsheviks entirely to the Germans and Austrians.

VII

I regret that the Memorandum proclaims the succor to the Russian people as impracticable; such a radical change from the stand of the Statement of August 3rd will have a very bad effect on the Russian people, if it becomes known, and will be used by the Central Powers against all of us. I am myself critical enough in the question of Russia's ability soon to rally, but I am far from being as sceptical as the Memorandum appears to be. But here again I am touching at a sore point—the lack of a uniform and clear plan of the Allies and the United States concerning Russia.

The Statement of August 3rd provides for help to the Russian people on a large and generous scale; it makes three promises to Russia: *a*) support for organization of self-defense, *b*) support for restoring her self-government, and, *c*) a very elaborate plan of economic and administrative commission is put forward. The Memorandum cancels these economic and humanitarian plans; from the short wording of the Memorandum it can be inferred that the support for organizing self-defense even in Siberia is now denied,—I do not make such a radical deduction, but the enemies will be sure to make it. I approve of a critical attitude towards some phantastic promises to organize a great Russian Army in a short time; and yet I myself think that a considerable Russian force could be organized in a few months,—at any rate, an attempt must be made in that direction. As I understand it, such an attempt made at least in Siberia will not contradict the Memorandum.

I presume that this Memorandum will not be published; but, as I asked, it should be sent to General Janin. I am sending him these Notes, asking him to devote his whole attention to the suggested plan of retirement over the Urals. That, with the restriction of the Murmansk and Archangelsk operations, and the abandonment of Russia (proper) to herself, seem to me to be the salient points of the Memorandum.

T. G. MASARYK

WASHINGTON, *September 29, 1918.*

861.00/5845a

113

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1919.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing for your consideration a report upon the Russian situation⁷³ which sets forth the present conditions, their causes, their importance to other nations and the necessity of correcting these conditions so far as possible, together with certain suggestions as to means which would seem practicable for the accomplishment of this change. I believe the time has come when it is important to lay the whole matter before Congress and to obtain, if possible, the necessary legislation to aid in the economic rehabilitation of the Russian nation. I would suggest therefore, if it meets with your approval, that this report to you be transmitted to Congress with a recommendation that it should receive its consideration and such action as is necessary.

You will perceive that the power to continue aid for Russia is about to end and that unless Congress acts we will be helpless to continue our present policy. If you approve of the report and are desirous of continuing to help the Russian people, of which of course I have no question, I would recommend the speedy transmission of the report by a brief message to Congress without going into detail.

In this connection I desire to call your attention to the enclosed resolution which has been submitted in the House of Representatives by Mr. Rhodes⁷⁴ and which impresses me still more with the urgency of our defining our policy as regards Russia.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/6107

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose a memorandum which I ask your authority to read to the Japanese Ambassador.⁷⁵ It means the withdrawal of all our forces from Siberia. I heartily recommend it for your approval. The Secretary of War has read it and is in thorough accord. He informs me the *Mount Vernon* is now approaching Vladivostok and is large enough to carry all our troops.

The truth of the matter is the simple fact that the Kolchak Government has utterly collapsed; the armies of the Bolsheviki have

⁷³ No enclosures with file copy of this letter; for excerpts from this report, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 451.

⁷⁴ H. Res. 398, 66th Cong., 2d sess., requesting the Secretary of State to supply information about the Government's Siberian policy.

⁷⁵ For text of the memorandum as transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador, see *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. III, p. 487.

advanced into Eastern Siberia, where they are reported to be acting with moderation. The people seem to prefer them to the officers of the Kolchak régime. Further, the Bolshevik army is approaching the region where our soldiers are, and contact with them will lead to open hostilities and to many complications. In other words, if we do not withdraw we shall have to wage war against the Bolsheviks.

I ask your early and earnest consideration and your authority to proceed.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/90801

Notes Prepared by Mr. Robert Lansing Concerning Certain Phases of the Negotiations and Conversations Relating to Military Intervention in Siberia in 1918

OCTOBER 3, 1921.

The following statements are made up from my private notes and from my personal correspondence.

In January, 1918, the disorders which threatened Vladivostok were so serious that the British and Japanese Governments, at the request of the Consuls at that port, dispatched war vessels to protect foreign residents and their property. At a conference of the American Ambassador at Tokio with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs about January 15th the latter stated that, in case it became necessary on account of the political unrest that, in case it became necessary on account of the political unrest to occupy Vladivostok and the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Amur branch, Japan asked to do this alone, and that a definite request to this effect had been made upon Great Britain. This same attitude of opposition to any joint military action was emphasized by a message to the President from the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered orally to the Counselor for the Department by an American citizen on January 24th, in which the Minister expressed the hope that the Government of the United States would not send troops to Vladivostok or Harbin for the purpose of keeping order as such a course would "create a very unfavorable impression in Japan."⁷⁶

The President was much disturbed by this attitude of the Japanese Government and the Division of Far Eastern Affairs openly opposed it, suggesting that an international commission ought to handle the matter, thus avoiding jealousies and suspicions.

Sometime prior to February 24th the Allied Governments decided to withhold consent to Japanese intervention in Siberia, a decision which the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs told the American

⁷⁶ See letter of Jan. 24, 1918, from the Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson, p. 351.

Ambassador that he deplored since it was becoming increasingly necessary and Japan had made all the preparations to act immediately.⁷⁷

Subsequent interviews on February 27th with the British and French Ambassadors⁷⁸ disclosed that by that time the question as to military intervention in Siberia had reached the stage of deciding whether Japan should be requested by the Allies to intervene or should be allowed to proceed independently. That Japan would send troops to Vladivostok and Harbin seemed to be an accepted fact.

In the circumstances the President decided that it was useless to oppose intervention by Japan and notified the Allied Governments that the United States had no objection to a request being made by them upon Japan to act in Siberia, but that the United States could not for certain reasons join with them in such request. This was on March 1, 1918.⁷⁹ Four days later Tokio was notified of the view of the Government of the United States that Japan should declare that, if she intervened in Siberia, she would do so only as an ally of Russia.⁸⁰

This message was shown to the British French and Italian Ambassadors before it was sent. The Italian Ambassador stated that his Government held that a condition to their consent to intervention had been and still was that "action should not be by Japan alone."

On March 24th I wrote to the President⁸¹ reviewing the chaotic state of affairs in Siberia and said "that in view of these facts I do not see how Japan could be expected to refrain from taking military measures." I stated that the question now presented was "whether Japan alone or the Powers arrayed against Germany acting jointly should constitute the expeditionary force." Two days later the President advised me orally that he was not prepared to change the policy adopted, which was against military intervention. This I think was due to the opposition of his military advisers who throughout were hostile to intervention.

Both the British and French Governments were at the time strongly advocating intervention in Siberia, as well as in other parts of Russia, and early in April the French Ambassador advised me⁸² that the American, French and Italian Ambassadors at Vologda had reached the following conclusions:

"1st. That Japanese intervention was more than ever necessary to
Combat Germany.

⁷⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 56.

⁷⁸ See letter of Feb. 27, 1918, to President Wilson, *ante*, p. 353.

⁷⁹ See *ante*, p. 355.

⁸⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 67.

⁸¹ See *ante*, p. 357.

⁸² See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 109.

"2nd. That it will only work its full effect if it bears the character of an inter-allied participation."

The French Government urged the cooperation of the United States in the expedition "even though it were merely nominal".

On April 25th Lord Reading advocated coöperation in Siberian intervention,⁸³ asserting that, if Japan acted alone, it would result in a large proportion of the Russian population going over to Germany. He pointed out how the Allies could operate at Murmansk and in Southern Russia but stated that the important step would be an advance through Siberia by a force predominantly Japanese and American. He then asked if the President would be disposed to agree to the sending of an American force to the Far East.

As the British plan contemplated the uniting of various Russian factions against Germany in order to make effective the economic blockade of that country, its feasibility did not appeal to the President.

On April 29th in an interview with the Japanese Ambassador⁸⁴ the Ambassador said to me in reply to a question as to the participation of the United States or of the Allies in a military expedition in the event that intervention in Siberia became necessary, that he personally would welcome it, and that he believed his Government would hold the same opinion, and that it was evident that the presence at least of troops of the United States, Japan and China would go far to remove the suspicion of the Russians as to the purpose of territorial conquest which might be inferred if Japan acted alone. He was asked to obtain authority from his Government to say this. He said that he would.

On May 16th the American Ambassador at Tokio informed the Department⁸⁵ that the Japanese General Staff in view of information received from the Japanese Ambassador at Washington were advocating a plan of Allied intervention under Japanese command.

While Japan had evidently ceased to object to joint action in Siberia, the President had not approved uniting with Allied Governments in requesting Japan to engage in an interallied expedition for the question was a subject of discussion with Lord Reading on May 20th.

In the early part of June reports arrived that the Czecho-Slovak forces in western Siberia were endeavoring to make their way to Vladivostok. Later, about June 20th, came the report that the Bolsheviks were opposing this movement and that the refugees had been compelled to fight the Red Guards along the Siberian Railway. On

⁸³ See *ibid.*, p. 135.

⁸⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 144.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

the 23rd I wrote the President⁸⁶ that this seemed to me to create a new condition in the problem of intervention in Siberia, and that means of giving the Czechs support should be considered.

On June 26th Viscount Ishii read to me a cablegram from his Government and later sent me a paraphrase of it which is as follows:

[Here follows copy of cablegram handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador, June 26, 1918, printed on page 365.]

A conference was held at the White House on July 6th in regard to the Siberian situation. An extract from my notes as to the Conference reads as follows:

[Here follow Secretary Lansing's notes on the conference as printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, volume II, pages 262-263.]

On the 8th I had an interview with the Japanese Ambassador, which I recorded in my private memoranda:

[Here follows Secretary Lansing's memorandum of his interview with the Japanese Ambassador as printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, volume II, pages 267-268.]

The day following this interview the British, French and Italian Ambassadors called upon me,⁸⁷ and Lord Reading, as spokesman, said that they wished to know whether the Allied Governments were not to take part in the initial landing of troops at Vladivostok or whether it was the purpose to confine the enterprise to Japanese and American troops.

I replied that the matter had not been discussed because it seemed useless to go into details until the Japanese had approved the general plan, but that we had always intended to lay the matter before the Allied Governments and to advise with them provided the Japanese accepted our program.

On July 24th the Counselor of the Department, the acting Secretary of State during my absence from Washington, sent me a copy of the following letter which he had addressed to the President, in which he detailed a conference that he had had that afternoon with the Japanese Ambassador:

[Here follows Acting Secretary Polk's letter of July 24, 1918, to President Wilson as printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, volume II, pages 301-302, together with its enclosure as described, *ibid.*, page 302, footnote 1.]

⁸⁶ *Ante*, p. 364.

⁸⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 269.

THE FAR EAST

JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES

811.52/299a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have had several conversations recently with the Japanese Ambassador. He is very anxious that we shall make another effort to bring the Japanese question to an end.

You will recall that it was agreed we should attempt to secure the ratification of a treaty which would guarantee to the Japanese now in the country equal treatment with other aliens and thus prevent any other state from passing such laws as California has passed.¹

In the original treaty proposed by them there was a clause which would have invalidated the California law insofar as it affected the right of inheritance. I explained to him that any attempt to interfere with the California law would, in all probability, prevent the ratification of the treaty and it was finally omitted. It was the fact that it was omitted that led the new Government over there to withdraw the proposition.

Ambassador Chinda now renews the proposition in another form. The enclosed draft,² as you will notice, only relates to the future. In Article III you will find the provision:—

“ . . . that the settlement of the question regarding Chapter 113,” (California anti-alien law.)³ “shall be sought independently of the present convention, and that nothing contained in this Convention shall in any wise or manner affect such settlement.”

I told him that I thought objection might be raised to this treaty on the ground it did not settle the question, but while he did not say so I think that his idea is that we can get a treaty ratified which will prevent any future legislation against the Japanese and it will be easier to settle this question.

In other words—that, having removed the fear of other legislation, the acuteness of this question will be over.

He also says that he believes simultaneously with this treaty a treaty could be signed such as we have signed with the thirty other countries, providing for investigation in all cases, and he is quite

¹ For correspondence previously printed on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1913, pp. 625 ff., and *ibid.*, 1914, pp. 426 ff.

² Not printed.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1913, p. 627.

anxious that such a treaty shall be negotiated between his country and ours. I think such a treaty would go a long way toward answering the "jingos" who are always insisting upon our getting ready for war with Japan.

I have explained to the Ambassador that it would be impossible to have this treaty ratified at this session and that, that being the case, it would not be wise to negotiate it before the conclusion of Congress. There is no immediate action necessary, therefore, and you can consider it at your leisure and let me know what you think of the proposal. Believing, as I do, that the states should not be permitted to raise international issues (which they cannot settle by themselves) I am favorable to the principle set forth in the proposed Convention, and I do not believe we will find any permanent settlement of the Japanese question short of some such action.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

811.52/300

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

27 JANUARY, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is, of course, something that (or, at least, something like what) we must at the opportune time seek to do for Japan, whose friendship we so sincerely desire and to whom we so sincerely desire to do justice.

But there are many things to consider first: among the rest her present attitude and intentions in China and her willingness or unwillingness to live up to the obligations she has assumed towards us with regard to the open door in the East.

I would be very much obliged if you would ask Mr. Lansing to prepare for our discussion a memorandum explicitly setting forth just what obligations in this sense she did undertake.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

811.52/300b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Now that Congress has adjourned and you are relieved somewhat from the pressure to which you have been subjected there is one matter which I would like to have you revolve in your mind.

I see but one way of relieving the Japanese situation on the Coast and that is by the dispersion of the Japanese in this country so as to relieve the economic pressure which has aroused protest. In dis-

cussing the subject with the Japanese I have tried to convince them that the question is not a race question, but purely an economic question and I have given them what seems to be conclusive proof, namely, that although we have Japanese in every state they have no trouble whatever with their neighbors except where they congregate in large colonies and thus create an economic situation. If it were a race question they would have trouble wherever they appear, but, being an economic question the trouble appears only when they are found in sufficient numbers to create economic embarrassment for Americans about them.

If I am right in this theory then the remedy for the difficulty would seem to be the dispersion of those in this country—emigration having now been stopped—among enough states to prevent economic complaint.

I venture to submit, therefore, for your consideration the following plan :

A diplomatic agreement between the United States and Japan that the two Governments shall cooperate for the scattering of the Japanese now in this country with a view to reducing the number in California by one-half, the reduction to be made where the concentration is greatest and where complaint has been aroused.

Japanese now residing in California are to be encouraged to move into other states, with the understanding that not more than one thousand shall go into any other state, not more than one hundred into any one county in such state, and that those going into a county shall be so distributed that not more than five per cent of the population of any organized city, village or voting precinct shall be Japanese.

I have talked over this plan with Ambassador Chinda but I have explained to him that it did not have your endorsement and was not presented as a proposition and should not be presented to his Government. It has simply been discussed by us unofficially in an effort to reach some solution of the difficulty.

If we can reduce the Japanese population in California by one-half and give assurance to other states now complaining that there will be no increase in their population and that this plan of scattering will be used as far as the two Governments can bring influence to bear, we may be able to secure a repeal of the anti-Japanese laws in California. These laws were not intended so much against present evils as against evils which the people of California feared.

For the same reason I believe that such a plan would prevent hostile legislation in other states because when Japanese have come into other states agitation has been commenced on the fear that they might come in numbers large enough as to raise economic objections.

Will you let me know whether you think there is any merit in the above plan and if so whether any modifications suggest themselves to you? If the plan seems to you improbable have you anything in mind that would give us a working basis for a settlement? The Japanese Government has exercised so much control over its citizens here that I believe it would be possible to carry out some such plan as this, and, if carried out, I believe it would go far toward restoring harmonious relations. As the "gentlemen's agreement" has prevented any new immigration, the number of those in the country would, by natural law, gradually decrease and this decrease would be accelerated by those who return to Japan, so that in the course of a few years we might expect the friction to cease entirely.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

811.52/302½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 8 March, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I should like to take time to think this over maturely. I have now no comment to make except this preliminary one: that there seems to me to be a danger that the attempt to disperse the Japanese in this country might lead to the very thing we wish to prevent. It might produce uneasiness in the States to which the Japanese were induced to migrate and to popular clamors there which legislatures might not withstand. Would we not beforehand have to canvass the matter with State authorities and work out a programme which we could be sure from the outset we could carry out. Otherwise the offense might grow greater, not less, in case of failure.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

711.94/259½

Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is the correspondence about which Frank Polk spoke to you and which I am enclosing for your information and files.

I think of you every day, but do not try to reach you directly as I know the burden you are carrying.

Sincerely yours,

E. M. HOUSE.

NEW YORK, May 16, 1917.

[Received May 17.]

[Enclosure 1]

The Japanese Ambassador (Sato) to Colonel E. M. House

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1917.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: For your kind reception and open-hearted talk which I had the pleasure of enjoying in New York, I wish you to accept my warm and sincere thanks.

According to your suggestion, I have since prepared a memorandum succinctly setting forth the point which found [*formed?*] a part of our conversation and I am taking the liberty to send it to you for whatever you may see fit.

Mr. Oscar S. Straus called on me two days after I had the pleasant interview with you, and he was telling me about his idea of making the most of the present trend of things for fostering better relations between our countries. It is indeed gratifying to find evidences indicating that a more serious interest in our relations is actually being taken in this country and especially among men of great influence.

With high regard [etc.]

AIMARO SATO

[Subenclosure]

Memorandum by the Japanese Ambassador (Sato)

The Japanese-American question which calls for an immediate adjustment, is that of the treatment of the resident Japanese in this country. What Japan desires is nothing more than the enjoyment of the most favored nation treatment. That desideratum may be attained, in my personal opinion, by the adoption of some of the following means.

1. By Treaty.

a. By concluding an independent treaty, mutually guaranteeing to the citizens and subjects, the most favored nation treatment, in matters of property and other rights relative to the exercise of industries, occupations, and other pursuits. Negotiations in this line, were for some time conducted between Secretary Bryan and Ambassador Chinda, which, however, for reasons I need not here state, have since been in abeyance.

b. By revising the existing commercial treaty between our two countries, so as to conform, in its stipulations, to similar engagements between Japan and various European powers, which guarantee in principle, the most favored nation treatment, in the enjoyment of property rights and in all that relates to the pursuit of industries, callings and educational studies.

2. By American legislation.

Although the subject is not fit for international discussion, it may be mentioned that a constitutional amendment restraining any state from making and enforcing any law discriminatory against aliens in respect to the property and other civil rights, will prove a far-reaching remedy. In fact a resolution with the same object in view has, I understand, been introduced in Congress lately.

In this connection, I may state the fact that the provisions of racial distinction in the present naturalization law, were, in a number of instances, made use of for the purpose of depriving Japanese subjects of the rights and privileges of a civil nature. Although the wisdom of the law is in itself a matter of national and not international concern, the unfortunate circumstance that certain provisions of that law furnish a pretext for the impairment of alien rights, should, I may be allowed to remark, constitute a fit subject for legislative attention.

The comparative merits of each means should be studied by both Governments in the light of expediency and feasibility. Whether the adoption of any one means will be sufficient to cover the whole ground is a matter upon which precaution forbids me to pass a final judgment at present, but I am strongly convinced that **each means will go a long distance towards a complete solution of the question.**

Before concluding, I desire to touch upon the subject of immigration. The question whether Japanese laborers shall be admitted or not, has been consummately solved by the continued faithful observance by Japan of the so-called Gentleman's Agreement. So far as the Japanese Government is concerned, it is no longer in the realm of living questions, and in my view, it would serve the best interests of both nations to leave the question as it is.

[Enclosure 2]

Colonel E. M. House to the Japanese Ambassador (Sato)

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Thank you for your letter of May 8th enclosing the memorandum.

I shall take up the matter informally with Washington when the time seems opportune. At the moment, I am afraid, it could not be given that calm consideration which its importance justifies.

Please be assured that I shall always do what I can to help maintain the good relations which exist between our two countries.

I shall remember with much satisfaction our conversation of the other day, and I shall look forward to seeing you soon again.

I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

NEW YORK, *May 10, 1917.*

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN CHINA

793.94/240

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *February 22, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Our telegram to Tokio¹ had the desired effect. It brought out the fact that the additional concessions were presented as requests—not as demands. They were presented at the same times that the demands were made but the Ambassador, who called today, in leaving the memorandum which I enclose,² explained that there is a material difference between the presentation of the requests contained in this article and the demands set forth in the memorandum left with us. He emphasizes the fact that he, himself, did not know of these additional requests; but when the papers kept reiterating them he made inquiry of his Government.

You have a flimsy of the telegram just received from Guthrie³ and from it I think you will draw the same inference that I did, namely, that they will not press these requests. I think our telegram will contribute something toward the disposition on their part not to press the requests.

I tried to get you by phone this morning but had to leave the house before you were able to come to the phone, and, having to go by and call on Solicitor Johnson (who, by the way is improved) I had not reached the office when you called me here.

I was going to ask you whether it would not be well to repeat to Peking our telegram to Guthrie and then give him the substance of our recent communication from Tokio. . . .

What answer do you think we ought to make to Guthrie's telegram, now that we have both it and the enclosed memorandum left by the Japanese Ambassador?

It seems to me it might be well for us to present your views on the subject now that these requests have been officially communicated and the following is the way the matter presents itself to me:⁴

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 93. For correspondence previously printed concerning the 21 demands, see *ibid.*, pp. 79 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁴ The references in the following paragraphs are to the sections of article V of the demands. For text of the demands, see the undated memorandum from the Chinese Minister, *ibid.*, p. 93.

(Sections Two and Seven need not be considered since they are not objectionable.)

One: As to the first, it may be assumed that the Chinese Government would not discriminate unfairly in the employment of advisors—an advisor, of course, having no power to compel the acceptance of the advice given.

I do not know of any other Government that asks for the employment of any of its citizens as advisors. Surely this Government does not although it is perfectly willing to have Americans employed by China in any capacity.

Third: The Japanese Ambassador informs us, as does Mr. Guthrie, that the paragraph in regard to the employment of Japanese police officers relates to Manchuria only.

That was the most menacing of the requests because it did not as published limit the area of their employment and left it to be inferred that Japan desired to share in the general police system of the country. Even as it is, it is objectionable unless it is understood that Manchuria is to pass over entirely to Japan. I am not sure but that it would be worth while for China to agree to the cession of Manchuria to Japan if, by doing so, she could secure freedom as to the rest of the country. As China probably would not be willing to give up Manchuria she would rightfully object to being forced to organize joint police control.

Fourth: The proposition that China should buy a certain percentage of her arms of Japan, or establish in China joint Chino-Japanese factories for the manufacture of Chinese arms is, to my mind, quite objectionable.

No other country is asking for any such privilege and it is so closely connected with the control of the country as to impair the political independence of China, not to speak of an infringement of the "open door" policy.

Fifth: The railway concessions asked for in Paragraph 5 ought not to be granted unless China desires to grant them.

In view of the experiences she has had I should think that China would quit granting railroad concessions and build for herself the railroads she needs. If she lets a concession to the capitalists of any country they insist upon extensions and then desire to control the territory through which they go, as, see for instance, the request now being made in the province in which the German road was built.

Sixth: The provision asked for in regard to the province of Fukien would virtually close that province to other countries because Japan would not be likely to allow foreign capital to go in there. This would bring another province under Japanese control.

In other words, there are two objections to the five requests made: First—that they menace the political integrity of China; and, Sec-

ond—that they interfere with the agreement for the equal treatment of all nations.

If you think it wise to bring this matter to the attention of Japan we can follow the plan adopted in the last telegram and express gratification that these are not made as demands but merely presented as requests, and, thus, our discussion of them upon their merits will not be objectionable.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

793.94/240

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

25 FEBRUARY, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have already discussed the matter here referred to, and, as you know, I fully approve of taking advantage of the opening to present to Japan very frankly our views on her "suggestions" or "requests". I think those views can be made very weighty and conclusive. We shall not have uttered a more important state paper.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

P. S. It is evident that things are being pressed at Peking. It would be wise to let Tokyo have our views by cable, I think, if it can be managed without the intervention of the Press.

793.94/240

The Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1915.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It seems to me that the suggestions made by Mr. Williams in his memorandum of February 26th, which is enclosed,⁵ are worthy of careful consideration.

This Government could take the position that, while, it has reason to complain of the Japanese "demands" on China on the ground that they infringe the treaty rights of the United States and are contrary to the formal assurances heretofore made by the Japanese Government, it appreciates the internal pressure of the increasing population of the Empire and the necessity for oversea territory to relieve this pressure by emigration.

It could be stated that in the opinion of this Government this necessity for expansion has been in a large measure the cause of Japanese

⁵ Not printed.

emigration to the United States, and the underlying reason for the controversies which have taken place over exclusion laws and California land-legislation.

I would suggest for your consideration whether it would not be well for this Government to state that if it refrains from urging its undoubted treaty rights relative to Southern Manchuria and Shang Tung, it would do so as a friend of Japan who is solicitous for her welfare, recognizing her economic situation and the relief which would doubtless result from an opportunity to develop Southern Manchuria through Japanese emigrants into that region.

It could be further stated that, if this Government adopts such a policy out of friendship for Japan and with an earnest desire to see her wishes accomplished, it may justly expect reciprocal friendly treatment on the part of the Japanese Government, and similar evidence of good will on their part.

It could be pointed out that this spirit of friendship could be shown by Japan by a declaration that in view of the announced attitude of the United States in regard to Southern Manchuria and Shan Tung that the Japanese Government:

- (1) Will make no further complaint in regard to legislation affecting land tenures in the United States unless such legislation is confiscatory in character, or materially affects vested rights;
- (2) Will reaffirm explicitly the principle of the "Open Door", making it particularly applicable to the territories affected by the demands;
- (3) And will prevent any monopolization by Japanese subjects of particular trades in these territories, and any preferential rates or treatment by Japanese railways or other transportation concerns for the benefit of Japanese subjects or their merchandise.

If a bargain along these lines could be struck it would relieve us of the vexatious California land controversy, and prevent in large measure future disputes which seem almost inevitable if the "demands" of Japan are permitted at the present time to pass unchallenged.

In any event can there be any harm in attempting to reach a reciprocal understanding, such as the one outlined above? We would certainly be no worse off than we were before; and I think, even if our proposal is rejected, we would be in a far better position to discuss Japan's conduct when a more propitious time comes to take up with other interested powers the question of the "Open Door" and the respective rights of the Powers secured through the application of that principle.

In view of the situation it has seemed to me advisable to wait until this matter could be considered before preparing a memorandum on the subject of the Japanese "requests".

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

793.94/240

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

10 MARCH, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am anxious to know whether our note to Japan about the "requests" she made of China has gone forward or not. The twelfth (Thursday of this week) is the day named in the despatches on which China must yield or ————? It would be well to have our note in Japan's hands by that date.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

793.94/240

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 12 March, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This note seems to me thorough and satisfactory,⁶ and I hope that it may be possible to despatch it promptly.

I have suggested a few verbal changes.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

793.94/258a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you—(1) flimsy of a telegram received from Guthrie;⁷ (2) Mr. Williams' comment on the telegram with his suggestion as to what may be done;⁸ (3) a confidential memorandum of an oral statement made to me this afternoon by Ambassador Chinda.⁸

The telegram from Tokio, as you will notice, suggests a way out so far as Fukien is concerned. This matter is treated at some length in the memorandum left by Chinda. The Tokio telegram throws some light upon the Japanese situation. It is evident that the suggestion made by Secretary Hay⁹ as to a coaling station has been in the back of the Japanese head ever since, and they have construed everything we have said in connection with this coaling station suggestion. They doubtless had that in mind last year when they ex-

⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 105.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁸ Not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 113, footnote 42.

pressed so much concern about the contract which Chinda [*China?*] was reported to have made with the Steel Company for an improvement of a harbor in Fukien.

I believe it would be possible to smooth out a good deal of our difficulty by the exchange of notes which would relieve the anxiety of the Japanese people on that point.

This Government has no desire to secure a coaling station on the border of Fukien, especially not with a knowledge of Japan's feeling on the subject—a feeling not so unnatural when you remember that Fukien is opposite Formosa.

You will notice on page eight of the memorandum that the Japanese Government seems willing to reconsider the proposal so far as it affects Fukien if it is understood that we will not be a party to any development on the coast which could be construed as a menace to Japan. It is possible that it could be so worded as not to seem to affect the United States, but, rather, be an agreement with China, our nation consenting to the agreement, by which all investment of foreign capital in harbor improvement, or the establishment of coaling stations or naval bases, should be prevented. How does it impress you?

I am surprised to learn from the memorandum that Great Britain, France and Germany have already secured agreements identical with those asked by Japan, in Fukien, if not even more restrictive, and at least one of them has been secured since the establishment of the "open door" policy.

You will notice that as to the advisors it is only suggestive and Japan disclaims any attempt to coerce China to accept the proposal. There is no objection to the offering of such a suggestion by Japan, and it would naturally produce irritation if China, in selecting advisors, ignored Japan.

In the matter of arms, the Ambassador explains that they did not insist upon any particular amount or proportion, but as all arms made in Japan are made by the Government they wanted to know in advance something about how much they would need so that they could make preparation for furnishing them. I believe that this can be obviated by language to the effect that Japan shall not be discriminated against in the purchase of arms and that she should receive notice a certain time in advance of the purchase.

In talking with Chinda I believe I discovered the reason for this particular request—namely, that China has been buying her arms of Germany and Austria and I think there was some discussion of plans for the establishment of armor plants by Germans and Austrians. It is not unnatural that they should object to having an enemy providing arms for China.

You will notice in Section 3, on page 4, the police proposal had reference only to Manchuria especially, and to Mongolia also in certain contingencies.

While I hope to have a moment's time with you tomorrow to consider this matter I thought I would better send these papers over to you tonight so that you will have time to think over them.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

793.94/2644

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *March 24, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It seems to me that it is very clear that the difficulties with regard to Fukien can now be easily cleared away; and I think the suggestions made by Mr. Williams, which as I read them are practically the same as these outlined in your letter, show the way. I am happy to think that we can easily come to an understanding on this point, and remove an impression which ought not to have been [permitted?] so long to exist; I mean the impression created by Mr. Hay's suggestion as to a coaling station in Fukien.

The other matters give me more trouble. Frankly, I do not think that the explanations of the other "requests" which are offered in Ambassador Chinda's note¹¹ are convincing, and I hope that a candid discussion of them by the two governments may result in putting them in a more satisfactory light. I quite understand the motives disclosed. I do not feel like criticising the Japanese Government in regard to them. But I think that the remedies and safeguards proposed in the "requests" go too far. Whatever the intention, they do, in effect constitute a serious limitation upon China's independence of action, and a very definite preference of Japan before other nations, to whom the door was to be kept open.

I shall look forward with pleasure to discussing these points with you when we get Japan's direct and official reply to our note of inquiry.

Perhaps we need not wait for that reply before supplying Guthrie with the answer and the representations he may make in the matter of Fukien.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

¹¹ Apparently referring to the memorandum of an oral statement by the Japanese Ambassador forwarded to President Wilson by Secretary Bryan on March 22. See footnote 8, *ante*, p. 409, and the telegram of Mar. 26, 1915, 3 p. m., to the Ambassador in Japan, *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 116.

793.94/2834

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have put into the form of a telegram the proposition in regard to Fukien, which you approved.¹²

You will notice that it is suggested that the arrangement be made between Japan and China, and that this arrangement be then approved by the United States. I submit this idea for your consideration. It seems to me it would be better for us to approve an arrangement between Japan and China than to have this depend entirely upon an agreement between Japan and ourselves. If Japan makes an agreement with China it prevents all other nations from securing concessions on the coast of Fukien, whereas, if it was simply an arrangement between us and Japan it would seem to be a discrimination against us by preventing us while the way would be left open to other nations.

I take it for granted that Japan does not want any other nation to establish a naval base there, and by making the arrangement with China all other nations can be excluded.

I have had in mind the following addition to the telegram, but, not having had your opinion on the subject I have not included it. If it embodies your wishes, the paragraph can be added. It is as follows:

"If the Japanese Government has any uneasiness as to the development of the interior of Fukien you might inquire whether it would not be advisable to propose that no railroad concession be granted to any foreign power, with the understanding that the Chinese Government shall, itself, build, own and operate any railroads that may be deemed necessary for the development of Fukien, such railroads, if built with borrowed money, not to be mortgaged or in any way pledged to the creditors."

Experience has shown that foreign governments demand a sphere of influence whenever they build a railroad, and these spheres of influence are a menace to the political integrity of China. The arrangement above suggested would probably be welcomed by China as a means of protecting herself from any further complication with foreign powers.¹³

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

¹² For the telegram as sent, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 116.

¹³ On the same day President Wilson replied: "I am glad to approve both the telegram in which you follow out my suggestion and the addition to it which you here propose. Faithfully Yours, W. W."

795.94/266a .

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the telegram which I have prepared on Fukien I only mention the one "request" which Japan has made of China—namely, the request in regard to Fukien.¹⁴

I am submitting for your consideration another telegram in regard to advisors, arms and police supervision.¹⁵ As Japan and China must remain neighbors it is of vital importance that they should be neighborly, and a neighborly spirit cannot be expected if Japan demands too much, or if China concedes too little. It is very evident that each country is suspicious of the other. China is afraid that Japan has ulterior motives, and Japan thinks that the Germans should [*would?*] do all in their power to create in China a prejudice against Japan, and it is equally natural that Japan should resent any partiality shown to Germany.

It occurs to me that an agreement might be reached on the propositions, if, instead of demanding the appointment of any specific number of advisors, of advisors in any particular capacity, there was an understanding that in the selection of advisors, both as to number and importance, Japan should not be discriminated against as compared with the leading nations.

In the same way, instead of agreeing that Japan should furnish a certain percentage of the arms purchased, China could promise not to discriminate against Japan in the purchase of arms, but fairly apportion the purchases among the leading nations or their nationals; sufficient notice—the time to be agreed upon—to be given in advance so as to permit proper arrangements to be made for the fulfilling of the contract.

In the matter of joint police supervision, the difficulty seems to lie in a failure to specify either the places or even to limit them to Manchuria and eastern Mongolia.

In the verbal explanation it has been stated that this only relates to these provinces and to only certain places in the provinces, but these restrictions do not appear in writing.

In the telegram which I enclose, which, like the telegram in regard to the coast of Fukien, has been submitted to both Mr. Lansing and Mr. Williams, I have included a suggestion in regard to police supervision. I am only putting these suggestions in the form of a telegram in order that you may have the idea fairly before you

¹⁴ For the telegram as sent, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 116.

¹⁵ For the telegram as sent, see *infra*.

and be in a position either to disapprove it entirely, or to amend the language if the idea is approved.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

(Mr. Williams suggests that Reinsch might make these suggestions to China if you approve of sending them to Japan.)

793.94/294a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Guthrie)

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1915—4 p. m.

Until our full communication¹⁰ has been received and answered we are not in position to consider definitely the requests relating to advisors, arms, and police supervision, but you might tentatively discuss the subject in the following sense if inquiry is made of you in regard to the subjects.

First: As to advisors, Japan disclaims any desire to insist upon an undue or unfair representation, as compared with other countries, and China, we may assume, does not desire to discriminate against Japan in the employment of advisors. It might be possible for the two countries to reach an agreement whereby China would promise that in the selection of advisors no discrimination would be made against Japan as compared with other leading countries, either as to the number of advisors employed, or as to the subject matter concerning which the advisors are selected.

Second: In the matter of arms a similar arrangement might be made. As Japan does not desire to insist upon the purchase from her of an unfair proportion of the arms, and as China has no reason to desire to discriminate against Japan in the purchase of arms, the agreement might be so worded that in the purchase of arms China would not discriminate against Japan as compared with the other leading powers, either in the amount or kind of arms purchased, due notice to be given of intended purchase.

Third: If China is disposed to concede police supervision language should be employed explicitly limiting the application of this request to Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, and to such places in these provinces as have a considerable percentage of Japanese subjects. It might be definitely based upon proportion—that is, the provision for joint supervision might automatically become operative when a certain percentage of the population was made up of Japanese subjects.

The above suggestions are made for your use in case the subjects are brought up for discussion before the matter can be fully treated in the correspondence between the two countries.

BRYAN

¹⁰The note to the Japanese Ambassador, Mar. 13, 1915, *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 105.

793.94/285a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you a flimsy of a despatch just received from Tokio. You will see that it puts the Japanese demand in a very different light. You will remember how the despatch from Peking¹⁷ construed it to mean that it was to turn over the entire Yangtze Valley to the Japanese.

Japanese capitalists have advanced about \$40,000,000 for the development of these mines and they are very important to Japan—she not having any iron ore near her. It seems to me that her desire to avoid foreign-owned mines in the immediate vicinity is not unreasonable, provided the concession which she asks is not larger than she describes.

The thing that disturbs me most in this eastern trouble is the feeling of suspicion on both sides—a feeling that does not give assurance of peace. These two nations must remain neighbors and unless they deal with each other in the spirit of friendship there is no way of avoiding great antagonism.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

[Enclosure—Telegram]

*The Ambassador in Japan (Guthrie) to the Secretary of State*¹⁸

TOKYO, April 6, 1915—12 noon.

[Received 8:30 a. m.]

Your telegram of April 2, 9 p. m.¹⁹ Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday informed me that Japan's demands touching the Han-yeh-p'ing works are confined substantially to the Taiyeh mine and two other mines in the immediate vicinity of the latter, all of which she believes should be worked together and that Japan depends for her supply of ore chiefly on these mines whose loss would destroy her iron industry. Kato says Japan's proposition is that if China agreed to the principle of joint control and operation of these mines a joint commission shall be appointed to determine the territory to be included in the concession: that he could not say it would be only "a few miles for it might include a few tens of miles but certainly it would not run into the hundreds."

Previous to my interview the British Ambassador had told me that Baron Kato had given him substantially the same information, Kato's

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

¹⁸ Filed separately under file No. 793.94/285.

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 119.

words being that "one could see from the Taiyeh mine the other two mines." The Ambassador also said that Great Britain had given Japan notice of her established rights in China and as she expected that these would be respected she had not taken any further action although she would have preferred that the negotiations had not been taken up at the present time or at the very least that the Allies had been consulted in advance.

Kato told me the negotiations are proceeding steadily though slowly; that China is willing to consent to the acquisition by foreigners of land leases which if long enough would be satisfactory to Japan but still objects to absolute ownership; that she is willing to establish numerous open marts but objects to the responsibility implied in permitting residents in remote country districts; that the differences as to extraterritoriality, land taxation and policing are very near adjustment and that the question of Fukien has not yet been taken up.

There has been uneasiness about the Han-yeh-p'ing works for some time, Japan fearing that the owners of the Taiyeh mine might sell its control to some hostile interest and it is believed that recently certain parties did actually endeavor to secure the adjacent mines.

GUTHRIE

793.94/2941

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 14 April, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I hope that you will send this telegram.²⁰

I am very uneasy about what is going on, as reported by Mr. Reinsch . . . I wish that you might find an opportunity to express to the Japanese ambassador the grave concern we feel at hearing that his government is insisting upon the acquiescence of the Chinese government in the "Requests," because they are so clearly incompatible with the administrative independence and autonomy of the Chinese Empire and with the maintenance of the policy of an open door to the world.

In short, I feel that we should be as active as the circumstances permit in showing ourselves to be champions of the sovereign rights of China, now as always, though with no thought of seeking any special advantage or privilege for ourselves. In this way only can we make good this message to Reinsch.

Has Reinsch been told definitely that it is not true that we have acquiesced in any of Japan's demands? Count Okuma has been

²⁰ *Infra.*

quoted in the newspaper despatches as saying that we had acquiesced.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

793.94/294 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1915—3 p. m.

Answering your April 14th, 7 p. m.²¹ You are authorized to give out informally and unofficially something in the following sense—

“The American Government has not surrendered any of its treaty rights in China or abated one iota of its friendly interest in all that concerns the industrial and political welfare of China. It is awaiting the results of the present negotiations in the confident expectation that the rights and obligations of the United States will not be affected or its interests impaired.”

For your own information will say that you have received copies of all our communications from which you will see that we have not acquiesced in anything that violates China's rights or disregards this Nation's interests.

BRYAN

793.94/317½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 27 April, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think this excellent,²² and I think all that you have said ought to be said. It certainly can give no offense as you have put it, and may do good.

But I was thinking yesterday in Cabinet, as Lane was presenting his views, that the real weakness of our influence in this matter lay in the privacy of our representations to Japan with regard to it. I think, therefore, that it would be wise to say to the Japanese Ambassador that our position with regard to these important matters, of which treaties with China as well as our general interest in the position China is to take in the economic development of her resources give us a right to speak, has been so generally misunderstood and so misleadingly speculated about that we feel that it may become immediately necessary to make our views public, perhaps in conjunction with other nations whose interests and sympathies are equally involved; and that we are on that account the more anxious to have a perfectly clear and cordial relationship of mutual under-

²¹ Not printed.

²² No enclosure with file copy of this letter.

standing between ourselves and Japan, so that it may be evident from the first that no friction from this source is involved so far as our two governments at present are concerned.

This, I am convinced, is the only means we have of reassuring China, our own people, and other governments at present less free than we to protest.

I think, too, that we ought to instruct Reinsch to assure the Chinese government that it has our sympathy in resisting any demands which too seriously impinge upon its sovereignty, its administrative independence, or its territorial integrity.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

793.94/326a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to the confidential memorandum left by the Japanese Ambassador on the morning of April 30th,²³ a copy of which I gave you at the Cabinet meeting, I beg to call your attention to the changes which have been made and to submit comments thereon.

I do not see that we have any substantial reason for objecting to the claim which Japan makes, that Japanese subjects should be permitted to buy land in South Manchuria; and the same as to paragraph "b" in regard to travel, residence, and the carrying on of business there.

Paragraph "c" raises two questions:—You will notice that the Japanese are to produce passports to the Chinese local authorities, and to observe China's police laws—"or regulations approved by the Japanese consuls" and they are to pay to Chinese authorities "taxes approved by the Japanese consuls."

I called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that the two clauses which I have placed in quotation marks are susceptible of abuse. To say that the Japanese shall not obey police laws unless those laws are approved by Japanese consuls is to take away from China the right to make laws controlling Japanese residents, and to say that Japanese need not pay taxes except as approved by the Japanese consuls is to say that in the sovereign matter of taxation the Japanese shall be subject to Japanese orders. If the Japanese desire to protect themselves against unfair legislation they might ask that Chinese police laws be not more severe against Japanese than against Chinese; or that the Chinese police laws shall not be

²³ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 128.

more severe than the police laws enacted by the Japanese for the control of foreigners residing in Japan. Japan has a right to object to discrimination as between Chinese and Japanese, and in view of the unusual punishment that may be employed in China, she might even justify a demand that her citizens be not subject to more severe laws than those prescribed by Japan herself under the same circumstances; but to say that the regulations must be approved by the Japanese consuls transfers the right of making laws to Japan, acting through her consuls, and may result in serious discriminations in favor of Japanese, which could not fail to create trouble in China.

In regard to taxation, it seems to me it would be sufficient to provide that Japanese should not be subject to greater taxation than Chinese. I suggested this to Chinda and he expressed a fear that China might institute special taxes, applicable only to the business in which Japanese are engaged; but this might be prevented by a provision that the taxes levied on industries in which Japanese are engaged should not be greater than taxes levied upon the same industries elsewhere.

In other words—what Japan has a right to ask is that there shall be no discrimination against Japanese, but not that exceptional rules shall be made in favor of her people as compared with the rules governing Chinese.

The long paragraph following gives, as I understand it, the rule in such cases, and the final clause of the paragraph indicates an intention to leave Japanese to the Chinese courts as soon as the Chinese judicial reforms are brought about.

I do not see that we need to refer to Section 3, in regard to Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Section 4 related to the Han-yeh-p'ing Company. I think it might be well to express gratification that that demand has been so modified as not to include an option on, or refusal of, mines in the "neighborhood." They drop that out of consideration for our suggestion. The demand as it now stands is very much softened. Paragraph "a" stipulates that China shall approve an agreement that may be concluded in the future between the Company and the Japanese capitalists. This leaves the matter to the Company and the capitalists. China can avoid the joint undertaking if the Chinese stockholders in the Company fail to conclude an agreement with the capitalists of Japan for the joint holding of the mines.

The provision "b", not to confiscate is, in my opinion, unobjectionable, but to insist that (c) China shall not nationalize the mines "without the consent of the interested Japanese capitalists"—is to deny to China the right of eminent domain, which is essential to sovereignty. Every nation, every state and every municipality ought

to have the right of eminent domain, and so far as I know, they have that right conditioned, of course, upon the payment of damages—no property being taken for public use without just compensation. I do not think that China ought to surrender the right to appropriate any property or industry within her domain upon the payment of just compensation to the owners.

Paragraph "d" is unnecessary. If this Company is a joint organization nothing can be done without the consent of both the Chinese and Japanese stockholders, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to say that no loan shall be permitted from any other than Japanese. If China permits the organization of the Company she ought not to prohibit the Company from borrowing from other than Japanese because that would permit the Japanese creditors to close out the Chinese holders at any time.

Section 6 deals with the provisions of former Article V, which covered the "requests". It seems to me that the language of these new requests which are to be "kept on record" is unfortunate. Take "a", for instance: It reads—"That the Chinese Government will, in case of necessity in the future, employ Japanese advisors." This might be construed to mean that China engages not to employ any advisors in the future except Japanese advisors, in case advisors are necessary. The Ambassador says that this was not the intention, but in view of the feeling over there it is not well to have any ambiguous language employed.

Our suggestion on that point is the only fair basis, it seems to me, namely: that China will not discriminate against Japan in the matter of advisors.

I do not see any objection to paragraph "b", provided it is understood that the land leased or purchased for school buildings and hospitals shall not be used for any other purpose—that is, that they shall not be used for commercial or military purposes. .

Paragraph "c" is very ambiguous and is quite sure to result in further irritation. Our suggestion here, too, seems to be the only rational basis of agreement—namely, that China shall not discriminate against Japan in the matter of purchase of arms.

The request for the establishment of an arsenal in China under Japanese and Chinese management is naturally offensive to China, and if she agreed to send military officers to Japan for that purpose, it would be difficult for the military officers to refuse to make the arrangement when they reached Japan.

The request for railways in south China, contained in paragraph "d", relates to lines about which Great Britain has been consulting, and Japan asks that she be granted these if no objection is made by other powers—evidently relying upon her ability to secure the consent of Great Britain.

In view of the fact that all railroad lines at once demand a sphere of influence, and in view of the danger that these spheres of influence will, if continued to be granted, ultimately deprive China of her own country, I am inclined to think we ought to advise China to build her own railroads with money borrowed by general loans and not by the mortgage of particular property. I think our capitalists will loan on China's credit and if our capitalists will loan on this security other capitalists will be compelled to loan on the same terms. This will make China's loans national, like the loans of other governments, and relieve her of the danger which follows in the wake of these concessions.

Paragraph "e", in regard to the freedom of preaching, is left for future discussion—that would seem to be the most easily granted of all the requests.

You will notice that the original proposal for joint administration of police is withdrawn, but I can understand why the Chinese would object more to the privilege which Japan asks for her subjects in Manchuria and Mongolia than she did to the demand for joint police supervision.

The provision as to Fukien is in line with our suggestion if the word "other" is left out, so that China will not grant the right to build shipyard, coaling or other naval or military establishment on the coast of Fukien to any Government. The last part of that clause, however, would seem to bind the Chinese Government not to allow any such establishment to be built with any foreign capital. It seems to me that it would be sufficient to provide that China should not give any agreement or pledge upon any harbor, coaling station, or naval base to any other foreign government.

You will notice that Japan makes no reference to the development of the interior of Fukien. This is in line with our suggestions.

The return of Kiaochou to China is, I think, a valuable concession and I do not see that there is any objection to the conditions—first, as to the opening of Tsingtao as a commercial port; and second, to the establishment of a Japanese concession—(that is a place for Japanese settlement)—in the locality to be designated by Japan. I suggested to the Ambassador that this, of course, did not mean that Japan would select the port, and he said, of course not. If the space selected is not too large and is intended for commercial use and residence, like the foreign settlement at Shanghai and the foreign settlement contemplated in these last proposals, I do not see any objection.

Taking the document as a whole, and considering the concessions which Japan has made, I think we are justified in believing that she will modify such of the demands as are still unreasonable, and that we ought to so change the letter that we wrote as to call attention to these points.

The Ambassador was very earnest in his expressions of fear that our reference to the use of the soldiers would be embarrassing, because his Government could not, at this time, withdraw the soldiers lest it might seem an act of weakness, and he evidently did not like to have us make a request which they would have to refuse. I believe that this new statement gives us ground enough for a strong letter and it would seem desirable to make it as soon as possible.

I would like your opinion on the points to which I have called attention, and the impressions which you have received from reading this latest statement from the Japanese.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

793.94/400a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1915—6 p. m.

The President desires that you call upon the Foreign Office and urge that the negotiations between China and Japan shall be conducted in a spirit of patience and friendliness, and be continued until an amicable solution of the existing disputes is found. China and Japan, because of their geographical position must remain neighbors and because of their mutual interests must be friends. It would be most unfortunate if they should be brought into armed conflict, especially at this time when so large a portion of the world is at war. Peaceful means are urged in the conviction that they will, in the end, prove best for both China and Japan and for the rest of the world as well.

BRYAN

793.94/405a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Wheeler)

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1915—6 p. m.

Please deliver the following message to His Excellency, Count Okuma, as a personal and unofficial communication from me:

"Relying upon the personal acquaintance with you, so pleasantly formed when I was in Japan, and the friendship for and confidence in you which have been built upon that acquaintance, I take the liberty of appealing to you personally and unofficially to use your great influence with your Government to have it deal with China in the spirit of patience. It would be most distressing if China and Japan who, because of their geographical position, must remain neighbors, and because of their mutual interests must be friends, should be brought into armed conflict, especially at this time when so large a portion of the world is at war. Fully sharing your well known attachment to the cause of international peace I most respectfully and most

earnestly urge you to counsel a continuation of negotiations until some amicable solution of existing disputes is found. I am sure that such a course will, in the end, prove best for both China and Japan and for the world as well.

With assurances of high esteem I am, Very sincerely yours,
W. J. Bryan."

BRYAN

793.94/393a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)²⁴*

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1915—7 p. m.

1519. Please call at the Foreign Office and inform the Government that we are both alarmed and distressed at the news from Japan and China. Ask whether the British Government will join us in a friendly but earnest appeal to Japan and China to continue their negotiations in the spirit of patience and friendship until a satisfactory conclusion is reached, representing that it would be unfortunate beyond expression if these nations should be drawn into armed conflict; and that as a friend of both nations we feel it our duty to ask the cooperation of other friendly nations in an effort to prevent such a calamity. A similar message is being sent to France and Russia.

BRYAN

793.94/402a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Wheeler)

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1915—7 p. m.

I am sending you a personal telegram to be delivered to Count Okuma, and for your information am repeating to you a telegram which we are sending to Great Britain, France and Russia. You will be governed by the purpose expressed in the telegram to Count Okuma and insofar as opportunity offers will urge patience and a continuance of the negotiations. It is of the highest importance that the friendly relations existing between Japan and China should not be interrupted.

The following is telegram sent to English, French and Russian governments.

[Here follows the text of the telegram to the Ambassadors in Great Britain, France, and Russia printed *supra*.]

BRYAN

²⁴ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Ambassador in France as No. 790, and to the Ambassador in Russia as No. 315.

793.94/339½

The Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] *May 7, 1915.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the event that the Allied Powers refuse to unite in a joint representation to Japan, which I am afraid will be their reply, I think that we should be prepared to act immediately.

I suggest, therefore, that a notice in the sense of the one annexed be sent to Tokio and also to Peking.²⁵ While it might not prevent Japan from carrying out her purpose of coercing China to submit to her demands, it would constitute a complete reservation of all possible rights affecting American interests and Chinese interests as well, so that any agreement forced upon China at the present time could properly become the subject of discussion in the future when the conditions are more propitious.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

793.94/392½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 8, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing a communication from Ambassador Page (London) . . . I have no doubt that the despatch had its influence in Japan in helping to reduce the severity of the demands. Our despatches from there indicate that the matter is now all settled, which is a great relief at such a time as this.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

I also enclose despatch from Tokio. Chinda called with a note²⁶ similar to Okuma's reply. I told him we were not contemplating sending any advice to China & that our information was to the effect that terms would be accepted by China. I expressed gratification that group five had been withdrawn.

[Enclosure 1—Telegram]

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*²⁷

LONDON, *May 7, 1915—7 p. m.*

[Received May 8—12:30 a. m.]

2062. Your telegram No. 1519, May 6th. Sir Edward Grey informs me that he gave the following memorandum to the Japanese Ambassador here yesterday. . . .

²⁵ For the note as sent on May 11, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 146.

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ Filed separately under file No. 793.94/565.

“His Majesty’s Government are very much concerned at the prospect of a war between China and Japan. They feel this may imperil the independence and integrity of China which is one of the main objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.²⁸ In view of Article One of the Alliance, we trust that the Japanese Government will not finally shut the door upon the possibility of agreements with China without consulting with us and giving us an opportunity of promoting a friendly settlement.”

Sir Edward Grey further informs me that the Japanese Government have withdrawn the demands classified under Group Five and left them for subsequent discussion and settlement, thus leaving a way open for the Chinese acceptance of the demands as they now stand.

Sir Edward Grey expressed the hope today to the Chinese Minister that his Government would find itself able to accept them.

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

[Enclosure 2—Telegram]

*The Chargé in Japan (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State*²⁹

TOKYO, May 8, 1915—2 p. m.

[Received 1:30 p. m.]

Your telegram May 6th, 7 p. m. and May 6th, 6 p. m. were not delivered to the Embassy till 2 and 6 this morning respectively. Telegraph authorities state delay caused by break of cable which necessitated their being sent by telegraph via Manila, Shanghai and Nagasaki.

I presented your personal telegram to Count Okuma at noon today expressing my profound regret at the unavoidable delay in its transmission. After it had been translated to him he asked me to express to you his sincere thanks and to say that he received it in the same friendly spirit in which it had been sent; that he felt sure that on reading the statement which Japan had given out you would realize that she had presented the ultimatum only after exhausting all methods of diplomacy and in the conviction that China’s negotiations were being carried on in a spirit of insincerity; that while the ultimatum had now been issued Japan had with it offered even further concessions which would make it possible for China to yield and that he had strong hope of a peaceful outcome.

An hour ago the British Ambassador read me a telegram he had received this morning from Sir Edward Grey reporting the latter’s conference on Friday with the Japanese Ambassador in London when

²⁸ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 104, p. 173.

²⁹ Filed separately under file No. 793.94/372½.

Sir Edward had urged strongly that war at the present time would be most serious for the whole Far East and might mean even the break-up of China and had counselled patience and conciliation. He read me also a telegram he had just received from the British Minister at Peking stating "I have strongly urged the Chinese Government to accept terms of ultimatum and I am convinced that they will do so". The British Ambassador himself appears confident of a peaceful solution.

WHEELER

793.94/392½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 10 May, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This needs no comment now, since the whole suspicious business has lost for the time being its critical character.

I think that Sir Edward Grey acted very well and very wisely in the matter, and I believe that your personal message to Count Okuma will have more than a temporary effect on his mind.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

793.94/343½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 10 May, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In view of the situation as a whole (I mean the situation of the world, politically) I think that it would be wise to file such a caveat as Mr. Lansing suggests.³⁰ It will not do to leave any of our rights indefinite or to seem to acquiesce in any part of the Japanese plan which violates the solemn understandings of the nations with regard to China.

It may favourably affect the Japanese official mind with regard to the wisdom of postponing the discussion of Group V for a very long time indeed.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

893.01/73

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose to you two papers which were handed to me today by the Japanese Ambassador and the British

³⁰ See p. 424.

Ambassador.³¹ They are in fact, if not in language, protests to the Chinese Government against the reestablishment of a monarchy.³²

To neither of the Ambassadors did I express any opinion as to what the attitude of this Government would be. I confess that I am at a loss to understand the purpose of Japan in this action which has been taken. Perhaps I am very suspicious and that it has the object of preserving the peace in the far east. My own view is that it is not an action on their part to which we should make any objection. In fact I believe if it accomplishes its purpose it will be beneficial. Our reports while varied tend to show that the proclamation of Yuan Shih Kai as Emperor would cause insurrections in various parts of China. He is, to all intents, Emperor at the present time and I can see no reason other than ambition for the continuance of his family in power for the assumption of the title.

I do not think it is necessary for us to take any action in the matter other than to acknowledge the receipt of these papers. As it is a matter, however, of considerable moment I would be obliged if you would give me your views on the subject.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

893.01/41 : Telegram

The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State

PEKING, October 28, 1915—12 midnight.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

Ministers of the Chinese Government today expressed to me great concern over the report, as yet unconfirmed, that the Japanese Government is making *démarches* at Washington, London, St. Petersburg, and Paris with a view to making joint representations to the Chinese Government, counselling suspension of monarchist movement as being inopportune and likely to lead to disturbances. The report further indicates an attempt on the part of the Japanese Government to have Entente Powers commit into its hands the conduct of affairs connected with contemplated change of Government under a promise by Japan to guard foreign interests generally in the Far East.

It is apprehended that the Japanese Government may be aiming to manipulate the present situation so as to give itself the position, vis-à-vis the Powers, of a maintainer of the peace of the Far East, and, vis-à-vis the Chinese, that of protector without whose assent and assistance no important action may be taken. The Ministers of the Entente Powers here have seen this danger for some time, but are, in

³¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 69 and 70.

³² For correspondence previously printed on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 44 ff.

the nature of things, powerless of themselves to prevent such a development.

The Chinese Government maintain that the question of the form of state is a purely domestic one, which could be turned into a matter of international action only for unjustifiable reason of foreign political ambitions, since they feel assured that no disturbances will occur unless through foreign instigation and that foreign interests are therefore in no sense endangered or involved at all. Japan's assertion of vital interest in domestic policies of China would in itself amount to a claim of virtual suzerainty.

I venture to suggest that even if the Department should consider it desirable to make some intimation to the Chinese Government in this connection, it would be highly important that any such action should be taken independently so as to avoid associating our Government with a program which has in view an ulterior object decidedly unfavorable to American interests.

REINSCH

893.01/74

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *October 29, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose a memorandum which the Chinese Minister read to me today stating it to be a confidential and personal communication from his Government.³³

It would appear from this that the Chinese Government had decided to establish a monarchical form of Government. Whether this determination was reached prior to the protest by Japan and the entente powers it is impossible to say, but in view of the usual delay of the Chinese in presenting communications of this sort I assume that this telegram came through before Japan and the other powers had acted.

I declined to give the Minister any opinion upon the matter, saying that I would take it under consideration. I assume that you have seen Minister Reinsch's telegram of midnight yesterday which deals with this subject.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

893.01/783

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *31 October, 1915.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I suggest this as a possible course of action in this delicate matter. I wish that this great change in China might

³³ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 71.

have been postponed, for certainly this seems a most inopportune time to add such fundamental reversals to the general upset of the world.

Could we not give a very plain intimation to the Japanese government and the governments which seem to be acting with it in this matter that we agree with the Chinese in their position that a change in their form of government, however radical, is wholly a domestic question and that it would in our opinion be a serious breach of China's sovereignty to undertake any form of interference or even protest without such evidences as are now wholly lacking that foreign interests would be imperiled which it is our privilege to safeguard; and at the same time intimate to the Chinese government, in the most friendly manner, our feeling that this is a most critical time in the affairs of the whole world and that her own international and national interests are in danger of being seriously compromised unless the present changes there can be guided with a very firm and prudent hand.

I must say that it would seem from what Reinsch tells us that they are handling the whole thing remarkably well.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

793.94/488 : Telegram

The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State

PEKING, December 4, 1915—2 p. m.

[Received 8:20 a. m.]

Referring to my cable of November 27, 10 p. m.³⁴ Situation still uncertain, but there are some indications that Great Britain is not receiving strong support from Russia in the endeavor to hold Japan to strictly joint action in Far Eastern affairs, since Russia appears to feel only a moderate interest in China proper as long as her position in the north is safe. This isolation of British influence, which was accentuated by the premature publication of the Entente plan, is believed to have encouraged Japan to make counterproposals involving complete freedom of action in China and the consequent tacit recognition of her practical suzerainty over China, which the Japanese press is already loudly asserting. The preoccupation of Great Britain in Europe, the fact that Japan could easily become dangerous to her in Asia, the indifference of Russia, the endeavors of Germany further to weaken British influence in China and to keep China from joining the Allies, leave growing material power of Japan the one positive factor in the situation, foreshadowing irretrievable loss of European influence in China should the war continue. American interests

³⁴ Not printed.

would suffer together with European and the question arises whether it is, under the circumstances possible to give sufficient backing to the European Entente Powers enabling them to preserve the status of International Rights in China and of Chinese sovereignty itself intact until the end of the war.

REINSCH

793.94/488½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 5 December, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Commenting on the enclosed,³⁵ do you not think it would be well for you to have a very serious conversation with the Japanese Ambassador about the Chinese situation? It seems to me clear that the interests and the treaty rights of the United States would be very directly and unfavourably affected by the foreshadowed change of political suzerainty in China, and that this is the time to let Japan understand, in all friendly frankness, how we should look upon efforts on her part to gain further control of China. Is not this your opinion?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

893.00/2624: Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, June 22, 1917—4 p. m.

[Received 9 a. m.]

My telegram of June 18, 4 p. m.,³⁶ and your telegram of June 19, 4 p. m. just received.³⁷

The draft which the Minister for Foreign Affairs handed me on June 18 with the statement that it was a copy of the memorandum handed on June 15 to the Secretary of State³⁶ contains the declaration "Japan possesses paramount interests both political and economic in China."

WHEELER

793.94/570

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose a copy of a communication which was read to me by the Japanese Ambassador on June 15th,³⁶

³⁵ Telegram from the Minister in China, *supra*.

³⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 259.

³⁷ Not printed.

in which his Government expresses a wish that we should confirm the statement made by Mr. Bryan in March 1915.³⁸

In view of what amounts to a request on the part of that Government I felt that it would be wise to reply and have therefore drafted a communication to be delivered to the Ambassador here, if it meets with your approval.³⁹

I also enclose a copy of a telegram received from our Chargé at Tokio⁴⁰ in which the word "paramount" appears, to which reference is made in the draft at p. 2a.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

793.94/570½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 3 July, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS I have just indicated to you, over the telephone, I entirely approve of this. I hope that you will re-read the latter portion of it, however, with a view to making the idea of Japan's political influence over China a little more prominent as the thing we have not assented to in the sense she evidently has in mind.

Faithfully Yours,

WOODROW WILSON

³⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 105.

³⁹ For text of the note as delivered, see *ibid.*, 1917, p. 260.

⁴⁰ *Supra.*

THE LANSING-ISHII NEGOTIATIONS

793.94/594¹

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), September 6, 1917*¹

The Special Ambassador and I conferred this afternoon for an hour and a half at the Department.

During the first part of the conference the subject discussed was to what extent Japan had rendered aid in the war, and how it might cooperate more fully with the Allies and this country.

I told him that I considered the great problem was transportation, and that it seemed to me Japan might be able to do more than she had done in this matter.

He replied that Japan was doing a good deal to aid and that they had chartered several hundred tons of shipping to the Allies which was being used in the Mediterranean trade.

He then spoke of the fact that we had embargoed iron and steel and that it was causing not only dissatisfaction but much distress in Japan on account of its absolute need in the shipyards of that country, which have been greatly increased in capacity.

I explained to him that this Embargo had been made necessary by the fact that steel was being used largely in the manufacture of munitions and in the increased output of shipping in this country; that of course we had to look out first for our own interests in that particular; that again transportation entered into the problem in that we had to depend upon scrap-steel on the Pacific coast for our shipyards there or else bring it from the east, which was very difficult as our rolling stock was short. I went on to say that possibly some arrangement could be made for the release of a certain amount of steel to Japan, provided Japan would transfer to us some of the ships already constructed, as it was a matter of immediate importance to us to obtain shipping, and it was a matter of immediate importance to Japan to obtain material. I said that while I could not speak with accuracy about these matters I believed that we might be able to supply steel to build vessels which would have a combined greater tonnage than the vessels they would transfer to us.

¹ For correspondence previously printed concerning the mission of Viscount Ishii, see *Foreign Relations, 1917*, pp. 258 ff.

The Ambassador said he was not sure whether this could be arranged, but he thought it was very well worthy of consideration and that we could take it up more in detail later.

It was very evident that the industrial situation in Japan was chiefly in his mind and I thought the suggestion such as I made appealed to him.

We further discussed the possibility of utilizing Japan's tonnage for the transportation to Russia of railroad material and munitions.

The Ambassador said he felt that this could very well be done and his Government would be glad to aid in the matter. At the same time he said it was a more or less technical matter and he could only speak as an amateur.

I told him I was in very much the same situation and that of course our conversation was entirely informal and tentative.

I asked the Ambassador whether he desired to discuss other questions than those immediately pertaining to the war, because if he so desired I was willing to do so—but I thought the supreme object of both Governments at the present moment should be the winning of the war and an understanding as to how we could cooperate to that end.

He said that in view of the fact that he had come here and been so handsomely received by the American people he thought it would be unfortunate not to consider some of the other questions as we had to look forward to a time when the war would be over. He said in the first place he ought to inform me that when he returned to Japan from France, where he was Ambassador in 1915, he stopped in London and saw Sir Edward Grey. Japan at that time had taken Kaio Chau and the German Islands in the South Pacific. He said he told Sir Edward Grey it was the intention of his Government to return Kaio Chau to China, but that no Government in Japan could stand if they did not retain some of the South Sea Islands as "souvenirs" of the war; that it had been a sacrifice for his Government to enter the war, which they were not compelled to do under their treaty of alliance—that is according to the letter of the treaty—but he thought they were according to the spirit. He then went on to say that Sir Edward Grey had practically consented in the readjustment of territory after the war; that the German Islands north of the equator should be retained by Japan, while those south of the equator should go to Great Britain.

I replied that I was glad to know this and appreciated his frankness in telling me, but that I could make no comment on such an agreement at the present time.

I asked him what further questions he wished to discuss and he said to me: "Have you anything to propose in regard to China?"

I replied that I had and while I realized that he would want to consider my proposition before making a reply I would like to present it. I said the proposition was this:

That the co-belligerents against Germany should, jointly or simultaneously, re-declare the "Open Door" policy in a statement which would have a very beneficial effect upon China and I believed upon the world at large, as it was in accord with the principles of commerce to which we all agreed.

The Ambassador seemed a little taken aback by this suggestion and said that of course he should like to consider it and that he appreciated the arguments in its favor although he said he did not know as it was absolutely necessary in view of the fact that Japan had always lived up to the principle.

I replied that Japan had always lived up to any declaration which she had made; that the good faith of Japan could not be questioned; and that upon that this Government always relied and felt no anxiety once the Japanese Government had passed its word.

The Ambassador replied that he felt that Japan had a special interest on account of its position in regard to China, and while its desire was to have China open and free to all countries he felt there might be criticism if there was a bare declaration of the "Open Door" policy without some mention of Japan's special interest.

I replied to him that we recognized the fact that Japan, from her geographical position, had a peculiar interest in China but that to make a declaration to that effect seemed to me needless as it was the result of natural causes and not political; that any such declaration might be interpreted as a peculiar political interest and I was very doubtful whether it would be wise to include it in a reaffirmation of the "Open Door" policy.

The Ambassador said that his Government was of course in favor of the "Open Door" policy; that they would maintain it as they had in the past, but he was not willing yet to say whether he thought it would be a real advantage to reaffirm it.

I said that the "Open Door" policy was peculiarly advantageous to Japan; that if we should return to spheres of influence in which the various powers had a paramount interest in certain sections of China the advantage which Japan had in geographical position would be destroyed; that Japan, with the industrial advantage which she had by reason of cheap and efficient labor and the short distance which she had to carry her goods to the Chinese markets, benefited more than any other of the countries by the "Open Door" policy; that so far as this country was concerned it might be considered advisable to reestablish spheres of influence, but that it was entirely contrary to our policy and principle and we were most anxious

to preserve the doctrine in dealing with China. I said I hoped he would give the matter very careful consideration and would be prepared to discuss it further at our next conference, which is to take place on Monday, September 10th.

During the course of the early part of the conversation the Ambassador said that through various channels the German Government had three times sought to persuade Japan to withdraw from the Allies and to remain neutral, but that in every case his Government had firmly rejected the suggestion.

I said to him that I could imagine their seeking some such step as they had planned to attempt it through Mexico as was indicated in the Zimmermann note.² I further said to him that it was a matter of no concern to this Government, in view of the fact that Japan's loyalty to an ally, and her reputation for good faith was too well established to be even suspected.

793.94/5941

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), September 22, 1917

Viscount Ishii called at 3:00 p. m. by appointment, and after some preliminary remarks he introduced the subject of the "Open Door" and the suggestion that a redeclaration at this time would be advantageous.

He said that he had heard from his Government and that they did not wish to do anything to affect the *status quo* in China and that it would be hard to explain to the Japanese people why a declaration was made at this time if the suggestion was adopted.

I told him that he must realize that in the present state of the world Japan and the United States were the only countries which could furnish money for the development of China's vast resources; that, if we permitted the gradual restoration of the policy of "spheres of influence", which seemed to be going on, the Allied Governments would look upon us as seeking to monopolize the opportunities; and that it seemed to me that we should unite in every possible way to dispel the impression that we would selfishly seek to take advantage of their wasted condition and build up our own fortunes without thought of those who were fighting the battles of this country and of Japan, as well as their own battles. I said that I thought this was a time when Japan and the United States ought to show a magnanimous spirit and say to them, "We will not take advantage of your calamities as we might do. We will seek no special privileges in China. When this

² *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 158.

war is over and you begin to rebuild your fortunes by commerce and trade, you will find the markets of China and the opportunities in that land as open and free to you as they are to us." If we redeclared the "Open Door" policy, I told him that is what it would mean, and I asked him if it was not worth while to gain the gratitude and confidence of the Allies by an announcement of our purpose to be generous and unselfish in this time when the future must look so dark to them.

The Viscount said that he appreciated all this and that he also realized what I had said before about Japan being the chief beneficiary from the "Open Door" which was manifestly true, but that the Japanese people would be likely to blame the Government if there was nothing said about Japan's "special interest" in China, that the opposition in the Diet would seize upon such an opportunity to attack the Ministry for making a needless declaration, while getting nothing for Japan.

I said to him that if he meant by "special interest" "paramount interest", I could not see my way clear to discuss the matter further; but, if he meant a special interest based upon geographical position, I was not unwilling to take the matter into consideration. I said further that I appreciated his difficulty which pertained to the political situation in Japan and would try and find some formula to satisfy the wishes of his people in case a redeclaration of the "Open Door" policy could be agreed upon in principle.

The Viscount said that he wished I would prepare such a formula first for his consideration and I told him that I would. He seemed to be much impressed with the idea that to redeclare the "Open Door" at this time would be accepted as a generous act by the Allies and strengthen the bond of friendship and confidence between the powers and Japan. He also said that he was convinced that Japan on account of its proximity to China would be especially benefited by a continuance of the "Open Door" policy, and that the only difficulty of the proposed redeclaration was that it might not appeal to the Japanese public and be used as a pretext to attack the Government.

In this conversation I also said to him that there seemed to be a misconception of the underlying principle of the "Monroe Doctrine"; that it was not an assertion of primacy or of paramount interest by the United States in its relation to other American Republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign powers from interfering with the sovereign rights of any nation in this hemisphere; and that the whole aim was to preserve to each republic the power of self-development. I said further that so far as aiding in this development this country was on an equal footing with all other countries and claimed no special privileges.

As for China I said that I felt that the same principle should be applied and that no special privileges and certainly no paramount interest in that country should be claimed by any foreign power. I also said that I appreciated the pressure of population in Japan and the need for industrial expansion, and that I believed that Japan had occupied Korea and was developing Manchuria chiefly because of this unavoidable necessity.

The Special Ambassador spoke of Manchuria and said that his country desired the "Open Door" policy to be applied there, that his Government sought no monopoly there, and that even if China was willing to cede the territory to Japan, Japan would not accept it.

I told him that I was glad to hear this frank declaration and I hoped that his view of the application of the "Open Door" policy was the same as mine. My view was that in China foreign commerce and trade should be entirely unhampered. He replied that was his view. I then said that I felt that when a railroad or canal was built in China by the nationals of one country special rates or other privileges should not be given to citizens of that country engaged in trade or industry in China, but that the citizens of all countries should receive identical treatment. The Ambassador assented to this with some hesitation, and seemed desirous to avoid a discussion of the application of the principle of the "Open Door".

We discussed other subjects, but they were of minor importance.

793.94/583a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *September 25, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS I informed you yesterday by telephone Viscount Ishii intends to leave Washington on Thursday, the 27th, and I am very anxious before he goes to submit to him a formula for a note relative to the "Open Door" policy.

I enclose memoranda of two interviews I have had with him on the subject—one dated September 6th and the other September 22d.³ These memoranda will explain the reason for the draft note to him which I enclose.⁴

I hope that you can return these papers to me with your views in order that I may submit a draft to him tomorrow—(Wednesday).

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

³ *Supra.*

⁴ Not printed.

793.94/583½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State[WASHINGTON, *undated.*]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for letting me have these. I spent half an hour with Viscount Ishii. I did most of the talking (to let him see my full thought) and he seemed to agree throughout in principle.

W. W.

793.94/594½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), September 26, 1917

Early this morning I sent to Viscount Ishii a draft of a note,⁵ embodying the formula which I had said in our previous conference I would prepare, and which, if it met with his approval and that of his Government, was to be formally communicated to him and by him formally confirmed.

By appointment the Viscount called upon me in the afternoon at the Department, because he was later to be received by the President. He brought with him the draft of note and said that in general it met with his approval but that he had a few changes which he would like to suggest.

Appended is a copy of the draft with the changes which were finally agreed upon between us. . . .

Having very quickly reached a complete agreement in regard to the form of the note we compared our respective copies to be sure our changes were alike.

The Viscount then said that he would at once cable the text to his Government and ask their consent to confirm it if it should be formally sent to him. He also said that he hoped that the text could be given publicity simultaneously in Washington and Tokio. I said that I would be very glad to have such an arrangement, as so important and epochal agreement should be given out to both peoples at the same time.

I further told Ishii that it was possible that China might be willing to send 40,000 or 50,000 troops to Europe to be used by the Allies in certain classes of work and that I thought, if it was decided upon, that this country and Japan would have to cooperate

⁵ This draft not printed.

and ought to cooperate in making such an enterprise successful. He seemed to be a little surprised at my statement but only asked how we could cooperate. I replied that we would have to furnish the money to equip and supply the force and that Japan ought to contribute by providing transportation. He said that the whole idea was new to him, and that he did not see how China could spare any troops at the present time of domestic unrest to go so far away. I replied that frequently troops were a cause of unrest, at least such forces as were of uncertain loyalty, and it might be well in some circumstances to have them otherwise employed than at home. While he did not dissent I saw that he was not favorably inclined to the idea.

The Ambassador said that, while I knew his Government was most anxious to cooperate in every possible way in the war, he was not sure that it had available ships to transport Chinese troops on so long a voyage. I replied that I did not expect him to decide so important a question now, that I had only mentioned it as a possibility, and that I would not have done so before the matter took shape but for the fact that I wished to lay everything before him with the same frankness which he had exhibited in our conversations. I went on to say that his sincerity and candor had profoundly impressed me and that his broad-mindedness and unreserved statements had done more than had been done by any representative of Japan to remove the suspicions which had unquestionably arisen in this country as to the purposes of his Government. I said further that I hoped he would carry back to Japan a similar feeling of trust and goodwill for the United States and could impress upon his countrymen that they have no truer or more loyal friends than the Americans.

The Viscount said that any doubts which had existed in his mind had been entirely removed by the genuine expressions of friendship and the lavish hospitality with which he had been received everywhere and that he would not only return to his country convinced of the goodwill of the United States but would endeavor to impress it upon the people of Japan.

I said to him that both our countries had suffered from the sinister activities of the Germans, who had undoubtedly been at work for a decade or perhaps two decades, poisoning the minds of both Governments and peoples with rumors of hostile intent and endeavoring to cause a barrier of suspicion between the two countries. We were both ignorant of these agents and naturally fell victims to the plausible stories which they told; we had been drifting further and further apart and seeing in the acts of the other evil motives which never existed; but those days had passed; we now knew the source of these

falsehoods, which are in line with the character of German diplomacy. I said—"We now are closer friends than ever before."

Viscount Ishii replied with warmth that he entirely agreed with me as to the vile part the Germans had played in our relations, and that he should use his whole influence to counteract the great wrong which had been done to both countries; that we had both been too easily deceived; and that, if we had only been frank with each other, all our differences would have long ago disappeared as they have now.

I then bade the Viscount goodbye with expressions of personal regard, which he returned in kind.

(He leaves tomorrow morning for New York and probably will not return to Washington.)

[Annex]

Draft of Note as Amended September 26, 1917

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

Charges have repeatedly been made of late, some accusing the United States and others Japan of seeking to take advantage of present world conditions to acquire political influence or control in China. The Governments of the United States and Japan having always recognized China as a sovereign and independent state, resent such accusations as offensive and as wholly unjustified.

In order to silence such mischievous reports, however, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries; and consequently the United States Government recognizes that Japan has a special interest in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous. The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives them such special interest they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare furthermore that they

always adhere to the principle of the so-called "Open Door", or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China, and that they will not take advantage of present conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the citizens or subjects of other friendly States. Moreover they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any other government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

They furthermore agree to bring this declaration to the attention of other interested governments and invite those Governments to give their adherence to these declarations.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

793.94/594½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), October 8, 1917

Viscount Ishii called this afternoon and submitted to me a counterdraft of the proposed note relative to a redeclaration of the "Open Door" policy.⁶

After reading the counterdraft I told him I would take it under consideration.

793.94/594½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), October 10, 1917

On the 8th Viscount Ishii left with me a draft of the proposed note from this Government to Japan, showing in lead pencil the changes desired by his Government in the note. (The document is hereto attached.)⁷

The Viscount called upon me this morning and asked if I had had an opportunity to consider the changes proposed. I told him that I had and that so far as striking out the second paragraph on the first page⁸ and making the insertion which he proposed it would be agreeable to this Government.

⁶ Counterdraft not printed.

⁷ Not printed; further citations in this document are to the draft as printed on page 440.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 440, par. 5 (beginning "Charges have repeatedly been made").

As to the next change, which appears on the third page of the document, I said that while I admitted the phrase which his Government desired to have eliminated⁹ would not materially affect the document, it seemed to me that both Governments were losing a very great opportunity of placing themselves in a generous light before the Allied Powers.

The Viscount replied he realized that, but that there were political reasons at home which he felt embarrassed his Government in accepting the phrase as it stood, especially as the preceding declarations cover the entire ground.

I said to him that while I felt that was so, the direct declaration that neither of the Governments would seek advantage during the war would receive the greatest applause in the Allied countries; that those countries were in difficult financial situations; that they were almost on the verge of bankruptcy; that Japan and the United States were the only countries who could use their resources in the development of China; and that it would be a noble and generous act to say to these countries—"You have been fighting our battles and we will not take advantage of your condition but will hold your rights sacred and give you every opportunity to recover from this war along commercial and industrial lines in the Far East."

The Viscount replied to this that he was in full accord with me, but in view of his Government's desires he could not commit them to an acceptance of the phrase; but that he would immediately telegraph and explain the advantage of retaining it.

I said to him that of course it might be found politically impossible to concede this request, although it affected both nations equally; that I only saw one other way of making the document complete in case that phrase was rejected and that was to strike out the word "other" in the 4th line from the bottom of page 3;¹⁰ and that while I hoped his Government would not feel compelled to reject the clause proposed, especially as it only applied to the present time, it might not be inadvisable to consider the alternative proposal of striking out the word "other".

The Viscount said he would bear this in mind and also communicate with his Government.

We then discussed the matter of better telegraphic communication between Japan and the United States, and I made the suggestion to him that it might be advisable to appoint a joint commission of four to consider the subject, in order that they might work out a general plan of wireless and cable communication which would ma-

⁹ Beginning "and that they will not take advantage," p. 441, l. 2.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 441, l. 6.

terially reduce the present rates and expedite the transmission of information.

The Viscount said he would communicate this to his Government at once and that it met with his approval.

I asked him if there had ever been any communication with any of the Allied Powers in regard to the military participation of Japan in the war. He said that almost three years ago the matter had been broached by Great Britain informally but that his Government had pointed out at that time the impossibility of maintaining a force at any considerable distance from Japan. I asked him if there had been any later communications and he said not to his knowledge. I therefore let the matter drop.

He left with the understanding that as soon as he had received a reply from his Government he would see me again.

793.94/594½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), October 20, 1917

Viscount Ishii called at the Department by appointment this morning.

He first said that I probably knew that the Japanese Naval Commissioner had arranged with our naval authorities to take over certain patrol duty in the Pacific now being performed by the *Saratoga* in order that the latter might be released for service in the Atlantic, but that his Government desired the arrangement be confirmed formally through the Department of State. I told him I would communicate at once with the Navy Department and take the necessary steps.

He then said that he had received a communication from his Government and that, rather than vary the language of the Root-Takahira agreement¹¹ by inserting the words "and sovereignty"¹² as I had suggested on the 13th, they would consent to retain the phrase "The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and"¹³ . . . He said further that his Government still insisted on the omission of the declaration on page 3¹⁴ . . . but were willing to strike out the word "other" in the fourth line from the bottom.¹⁵

¹¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1908, pp. 510-512.

¹² After the phrase "the independence or territorial integrity," which appears twice in the fifth paragraph of the draft note as printed on page 440.

¹³ *Ante*, p. 440, par. 7, l. 5.

¹⁴ See footnote 9, p. 442.

¹⁵ See footnote 10, p. 442.

I told him that I was of course disappointed at the omission of so important a declaration at this time, as I knew the President would be, but that the retention of the clause relating to "sovereignty" and the elimination of the word "other" indicated to me that his Government were desirous of reaching an agreement.

He said that I must know how sincerely he was in favor of the declaration and how he had urged his Government to retain it, but that they seemed to fear domestic criticism, although he seemed to be very vague as to what the criticism would be.

I said that, if the declaration had not been in the draft, it would matter very little, but having been submitted to Japan and rejected it might convey a very wrong impression, that the President felt this very strongly and I hoped they would exchange confidential notes on the subject as I had suggested.

The Viscount replied that he had already presented the suggestion to his Government and that they did not deem it wise to do so. He then produced the paper which is annexed ¹⁶ and read to me the argument presented against an exchange of confidential notes. He handed me the paper and I read it again.

When I had finished I told him that I did not consider the arguments very substantial, but that I would like to consider the matter further, and after doing so, I would consult with the President, who I knew would be disappointed that his Government were unwilling to take a course which would remove all possibility of future misunderstanding.

He said that he had hoped to persuade his Government to take one of the two courses which I had suggested, but that he had been unable to do so.

I told him I appreciated the efforts which he had made, that I thought the amendments which he had obtained from his Government had brought the negotiation to an almost successful conclusion, and that I was still hopeful of finding a way which would be satisfactory to both Governments.

I said that I would ask another conference as soon as I could explain the situation to the President.

793.94/594½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *October 20, 1917.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: If it meets with your approval I propose to request Viscount Ishii to file with his note of confirmation complet-

¹⁶ Not printed.

ing the exchange a confidential memorandum such as the one here enclosed.

I am hastening this matter as rapidly as possible because it takes him several days to communicate with his Government.¹⁷

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Draft of Confidential Memorandum to Accompany the Reply of the Japanese Government in Proposed Exchange of Notes

In the preliminary draft note dealing with questions relating to the Republic of China, which are of mutual interest to Japan and the United States and which, on September 26, 1917, was submitted by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan for their consideration, there appeared, following the declaration by the two Governments of their adherence to the so-called "Open Door" policy, a further declaration "that they will not take advantage of present conditions to seek special rights and privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the citizens or subjects of other friendly states."

For certain reasons of expediency, which have been orally explained to the Government of the United States, the Government of Japan considered it to be unwise to include the above-quoted declaration in the proposed note, and it was, therefore, stricken out by mutual consent.

In order, however, to avoid misconstruction being placed upon this amendment of the note, the Government of Japan desire to affirm that by doing so there was no purpose on their part to assert a contrary principle or policy, and that the elimination of the declaration has no significance whatsoever in determining the terms of the note as finally agreed upon by the two Governments.

793.94/5941

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), October 22, 1917

The Viscount called at the Department by request and I told him that the note as finally agreed upon on the 20th was acceptable in

¹⁷ In an undated memorandum received by Secretary Lansing on October 22, President Wilson replied: "Dear Mr. Sec'y: This seems to me to meet the case and has my approval. Woodrow Wilson."

itself, but that the President was seriously concerned over the elimination of the declaration following the one referring to the "Open Door" policy unless some statement was made in regard to it. I said that, as I understood that his Government were opposed to an exchange of confidential notes on the subject, I would suggest that there should accompany the Japanese reply a memorandum, which I could retain in my confidential files. I then produced a draft of memorandum such as I had in mind and read it to him. (A copy of the paper is annexed.)¹⁸

The Viscount, to whom I handed a copy, read it through very carefully and said that he would submit it to his Government.

I then handed him the redraft of the note which I had made on the 20th (of which a copy is annexed).

He spoke of the elimination of the word "other" and asked if I did not think it well to retain it. I told him "No", and he dropped the subject.

He asked if the ending of the note would be the same as the Root-Takahira agreement and I told him that I had not thought about the matter, but would let him know the next time we met.

[Annex]

Redraft of Note, October 20, 1917

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

In order to silence the mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of

¹⁸ *Supra.*

other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "Open Door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country a¹⁹ full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreements²⁰ reached by us.

793.94/594½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), October 27, 1917

The Viscount called this morning by appointment and said that he had heard from his Government as to the proposed memorandum submitted on the 24th [22d] by me, that he wished to repeat that the only thing his Government sought to avoid was the impression that we suspected Japan of improper motives, and that his Government were afraid that the memorandum might some day become public and people would believe that we did not trust Japan. He was, therefore, instructed to propose a protocol, which would be in the nature of a joint memorandum signed by both of us.

The Viscount then handed me the draft of a protocol (which is annexed)²¹ saying that he thought that it went even further than the memorandum.

I told him that I would like to study the protocol further and would communicate with him as soon as I had done so.

He also spoke about the communication which was to be made by the Department to him relative to the Japanese ship which the Navy had arranged should assume certain patrol duty about the Hawaiian Islands.

¹⁹ For "a" the word "the" has been substituted with the marginal notation in Secretary Lansing's hand: "Change agreed to, Oct. 31/17."

²⁰ The word "agreements" has been changed to "agreement" with a marginal notation as in footnote 19.

²¹ Not printed; for text of the protocol as finally agreed upon, see p. 450.

793.94/585½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I had this morning another interview with Viscount Ishii. As you know I submitted to him last Monday a memorandum relative to the important clause which had been stricken out of the note to be sent him. He submitted the matter to his Government and has received a proposed protocol instead of the memorandum suggested by me. I enclose a copy for your consideration.²² It is my view that this practically covers the ground and of course avoids the idea of suspicion as to Japan's purpose which might have been drawn from the memorandum submitted by us.

This protocol would be signed by the Viscount and myself and retained confidentially, but he informs me that his Government does not feel it would have to be kept as secret as a memorandum such as we proposed.

I would be obliged if you could indicate your wishes as soon as possible as Viscount Ishii is very anxious to set out on his homeward journey.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

793.94/594½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), October 29, 1917

At my request the Viscount called this afternoon and I informed him that I had given careful consideration to the proposed protocol which he had handed me on the 27th²³ and that I had also discussed the matter with the President, who agreed with my conclusions. I said to him that I should like to have changed the last paragraph so that it would read:

"It was, however, well understood that the principle enunciated in the clause which was thus suppressed was in perfect accord with the declared policy of the two Governments in regard to China."

I said to him that the objections to the clause as originally drawn were First, that it did not apply to the future and might be open to serious criticism; and, Second, that the words "actually pursued" would undoubtedly be discussed and very probably criticized both in Japan and in the United States, as some Japanese might question what

²² Not printed.

²³ See footnote 21, p. 447.

policy was actually being pursued by the Government of the United States, and, on the other hand some Americans might criticize the policy Japan was actually pursuing.

The Viscount said he understood thoroughly the objections and that he would immediately cable his Government and present our views as to the changes which should be made.

793.94/594½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), October 31, 1917

The Viscount came to the Department this afternoon by appointment and said that he was happy to state the suggested amendments in the confidential protocol were entirely acceptable to his Government, and he therefore concluded that the negotiation was ended successfully.

We then read over the note as drafted, after he had pointed out the change of the word "a" to "the" in the last paragraph, and the making of the word "agreements" to singular (agreement).²⁴ To both of these changes I agreed. We then read over the protocol and agreed as to its form. He asked me as to the ending of our note to him, and I replied it would be the usual form which appeared in the Root note to Takahira.²⁵

We also discussed the time of publication and he repeated to me that it would be necessary for his Government to submit the document to Great Britain on account of the treaty of alliance but that it would be a pure formality. As to the protocol he thought it needless to submit it to Great Britain as it was only to be used in case certain events arose and would be treated as confidential by the two Governments.

We further agreed to the exchange of notes on Friday, November 2d and that it would be possibly four or five days before the notes could be made public.

793.94/594½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conference With the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii), November 2, 1917

This morning the Viscount called at the Department and we read over the notes to be exchanged and the confidential protocol accom-

²⁴ See footnotes 19 and 20, p. 447.

²⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1908, pp. 510-512.

panying them.²⁶ We then delivered our respective notes to each other and signed the protocol in duplicate.

I then asked him about the publication of the notes and he said he had advices from his Government saying that they would publish on the morning of the 7th and that we should publish on the afternoon of the 6th, which would make the time the same. I told the Ambassador that I should make a statement to accompany the publication and I hoped he would be gratified with it.

He then read me a telegram which he had just received from Baron Motono²⁷ expressing gratification at the completion of the negotiations and congratulating and thanking the Government of the United States and myself.

The Viscount then handed me a statement²⁸ which he said would be made public in Japan at the same time as the notes, in relation to naval cooperation in the Pacific. The statement had been agreed upon by the Naval authorities of the two Governments. I said we would follow that course also.

The Viscount then spoke of the still pending negotiation between Ambassador Sato and the War Trade Board relative to the exportation of steel in exchange for tonnage. I told him I would see Mr. Jones on the subject and do what I could to bring the negotiation to a satisfactory conclusion.

793.94/5951

Protocol to Accompany Exchange of Notes Between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador on Special Mission (Ishii)

In the course of the conversations between the Japanese Special Ambassador and the Secretary of State of the United States which have led to the exchange of notes between them dated this day, declaring the policy of the two Governments with regard to China, the question of embodying the following clause in such declaration came up for discussion: "they (the Governments of Japan and the United States) will not take advantage of the present conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly states."

Upon careful examination of the question, it was agreed that the clause above quoted being superfluous in the relations of the two Governments and liable to create erroneous impression in the minds of the public, should be eliminated from the declaration.

²⁶ For text of the notes, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 264; for the protocol, see *infra*.

²⁷ Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

²⁸ Not printed.

It was, however, well understood that the principle enunciated in the clause which was thus suppressed was in perfect accord with the declared policy of the two Governments in regard to China.

ROBERT LANSING
K. ISHII

Done in Duplicate at
WASHINGTON, November 2, 1917.

793.94/608½

*Memorandum by Mr. Hugh S. Gibson, Division of Foreign
Intelligence, Department of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1917.

When the Chinese Minister called on the Secretary this morning he was handed copies of the notes exchanged with the Japanese Special Ambassador. The Secretary informed him that China had not been informed in regard to the negotiations in progress because it was felt that if she were informed and made no protest her responsibility would be engaged.

793.94/594½

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of an Interview With the
Chinese Minister (Koo), November 12, 1917*

The Chinese Minister called upon me this afternoon and delivered a memorandum ²⁹ setting forth the views of his Government in regard to the notes exchanged with the Special Japanese Ambassador.

After reading the memorandum I said to the Minister that I fully understood the reason for his Government's delivery of the memorandum, though as a matter of fact it was unnecessary since there was no thought by either Viscount Ishii or me to bind China in any way for we did not possess the power or have the intention to do so. I explained to him that, in order to avoid any question of China giving assent to the understanding reached in the notes, I had abstained mentioning the negotiations to him during their progress or advising his Government in any way of the subjects being discussed. I said that I did not want anyone to say that China had relinquished any right by not objecting to the understanding before its conclusion although cognizant of its negotiation. That my silence had been deliberate and because I wished to keep China from an embarrassing situation.

²⁹ *Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 270.*

I further told him that our traditional friendship for China was unchanged and that China's interests had been in my mind throughout my intercourse with Viscount Ishii; that, while this was so, he must realize that the present war had entirely changed conditions; that in financing it we had need of all our money at home; and that in view of this drain upon our resources China did not today offer the same attractiveness for investment to American capital as it had in the past. I pointed out to him that Japan and the United States were the only two countries which had surplus capital to invest at the present time, but that we were not anxious to send our money abroad if we had to enter into competition in placing it; that the time had passed when China could play off the United States against Japan in the matter of investments for we were no longer keen to encourage sending money into other countries when we needed it so much for carrying on the war.

I said that if we dropped out the field would be left entirely in the hands of Japanese, which I presumed China would not wish; that we were anxious to prove our friendship for his country by aiding her financially, but that the only way to do so in the present circumstances was to come to some arrangement for cooperation with Japan, as competition would probably defeat any loan in this country; and I assumed that China would prefer to have us participate even under those conditions.

The Minister listened intently but made no comment. He then said that his Government was particularly disturbed over the recognition of Japan's "special interests" in China, and asked what the phrase meant.

I replied that it was manifestly an axiom that geographical propinquity necessarily gave nations special interests in their neighbors, and that setting it forth was merely stating an axiom and nothing more.

The Minister said that he could not see, if it was an axiom, why it was stated; that it was the statement which disturbed his Government.

I replied to him that I thought he would agree with me that to concede a truth, which could not be successfully denied, in exchange for a declaration of a policy which restrained the other party was certainly a very desirable thing to do.

He asked to what I referred, and I said to the last clause of the notes in which the United States and Japan declared themselves opposed to "any government" infringing China's independence or territorial integrity, a declaration which applied to the parties to the understanding as well as to other governments. I told him that such a bargain seemed to me decidedly in favor of China, and I

believed that upon consideration his Government would come to the same opinion.

The Minister wished to know if the special interests applied to other neighbors such as Russia on the north, France on the south, and Great Britain on the west.

I told him that the axiom held good the world over, that we had recognized it in our relations on this continent, and that China might apply it with equal force to her neighbors.

I said that probably the Chinese Government had done wisely as a matter of precaution in sending the memorandum, but that no reservation or caveat could change the natural consequence of propinquity.

The Minister thanked me for my explanations but expressed no opinions of his own.

SHANTUNG

793.94/946

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose the public statement of the Japanese Government in regard to Shantung¹ which was given out in Tokio and which will probably be published here by the Associated Press tomorrow morning.

It does not seem to me satisfactory in that no time of surrendering sovereignty to China is indicated and the proposed negotiation for the surrender is to be based apparently on the . . . treaty of May, 1915,² and the supplementary agreement of September, 1918.³ There are other features of the statement which I do not like.

The issuance of this statement, however, puts us in a decidedly advantageous position. To remain silent in the face of the statement would be an admission on your part that it set forth the agreement reached at Paris. If it does not state the agreement fully or accurately, you are, in justice to yourself, bound to make public the terms on which you assented to the Shantung articles in the treaty. While there might have been ground for complaint if you had made public a statement as to Japan's promises before the Japanese Government had made one, there can certainly be none now, because to do so would be to admit that their statement was either inaccurate or incomplete.

We hold the strategic position and, I feel, we should use it. I would suggest, therefore, that you prepare a statement of your understanding of their agreement which can be published on the heels of their statement when it appears in our newspapers with the assertion that you find it necessary to do this in order to avoid the charge of having given your assent to the treaty provisions on the basis of the statements of the Japanese Government issued at Tokio.

For your information I am enclosing a copy of a draft of a declaration to be made by the Japanese regarding the Shantung question

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. I, p. 718.

² *Ibid.*, 1915, p. 197.

³ For substance of this agreement, see undated note from the Japanese Embassy, *ibid.*, 1918, p. 205.

which I submitted to Baron Makino, Mr. Balfour and finally to Mr. Clemenceau before my departure from Paris.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure]

Draft of Proposals for Japanese Declaration With Regard to Shantung Province

1. Japan claims no right of sovereignty in Shantung Province.
2. Japan will restore the Lease of Kiaochow and will relinquish to China all rights, title and privileges acquired by Japan from Germany within the Leased Territory, except as regards railways, on condition that China compensate Japan for properties thus relinquished and that China agree to make of the city of Tsingtao an international settlement and of the port an open port.
3. Japan will endeavor to make this restoration complete within two years from the signing of the Peace Treaty.
4. Japan relinquishes the benefit of any provision or provisions in the conventions and agreements between Germany and China which gave an exclusive preferential position in the Province of Shantung.
5. In the administration of the existing railways which have been conceded to her, Japan will not discriminate against the trade of China or of other nations.
6. The new railway lines, for the construction of which concessions have been accorded to Japan, shall be built by the Japanese for the Chinese Government.
7. Japan will use special police only along the railways and only to ensure security for traffic. These police shall be Chinese, with such Japanese instructors as the Directors of the Railway may select, these instructors to be appointed by the Chinese Government.
8. Japan will withdraw all military forces from Shantung as soon as practicable, it being the intention, if conditions permit, that the withdrawal shall be completed within a period of not more than two years.

793.94/964½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 6 August, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would be very much obliged if you would see that the enclosed statement with regard to the Shantung

matter ⁴ is given to the press and secures as wide publicity as the statement made by Viscount Uchida ⁵ which, I understand, appears in the American newspapers of this morning, provided, of course, that this form of statement meets with the approbation of your own judgment.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

⁴ For text of this statement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. I, p. 719.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 718.

LATIN AMERICA

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

[The following documents concerning the Monroe Doctrine represent discussion and do not necessarily reflect the official positions on policy taken by this Government. For any expressions of definitive official positions on policy respecting the matters discussed in these papers, reference is made to such documents as appear in the annual volumes of *Foreign Relations* for the years 1914 to 1920.]

710.11/1861

*The Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the
Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1914.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am submitting to you a memorandum upon the "Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine and Its Need of Restatement," since the questions, with which it deals, appear to me to require consideration and decision at the present time.

In all frankness I should say that my personal inclination has been against expanding our traditional policy in dealing with Latin America, and that I have been concerned over certain actions of this Government which seemed to be beyond the purposes of that policy. I approached the subject with this prejudice against any radical departure from established policy, but after taking into consideration the scope of the Monroe Doctrine, the present problems in Latin America, and the motives which to-day inspire our conduct in the international affairs of this hemisphere, I have been compelled to change my views.

It seems to me that the logic of the situation is irresistible, and that we must modify our present declared policy.

Whether this is to be done by a wider application of the Monroe Doctrine so as to include new methods of obtaining political control by European powers; or whether it is to be done by announcing a new doctrine, which will include the present standard of international duty, are questions which I am not prepared to answer without a more careful study of the subject. But that something should be done I am convinced, if this Government is to avoid the charge of insincerity and inconsistency in its relations with Latin America,

of which suggestions are already too frequent and not without apparent justification.

When you have had opportunity to examine the annexed memorandum I would like very much to discuss the subject with you.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Counselor for the Department of State
(Lansing)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] *June 11, 1914.*

PRESENT NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE, AND ITS NEED
OF RESTATEMENT

The Monroe Doctrine is in substance that the United States considers an extension of political control by a European power over any territory in this hemisphere, not already occupied by it, to be a menace to the national safety of the United States.

In 1823, when the doctrine was enunciated, the dangers of the extension of European political power on this continent lay in the possible occupation of unsettled regions and in the conquest of the territory of an independent American state.

Later, during the Polk Administration, another danger was recognized in the possibility of a voluntary cession of territory by an American state to a European power, and the Monroe Doctrine was shown to be broad enough to include this means of acquiring political dominion.

While the primary idea of the Monroe Doctrine is opposition by the United States to any extension of European control over American territory or institutions, the idea is subject to the modification that the control must possess the element of permanency.

When the hostile occupation of the territory of an American state or the coercion by force of its government by a European power is intended to be temporary, and is employed solely as a means to compel the government of the state to meet a particular international obligation, which it has wilfully neglected or refused to perform, the territorial occupation or coercion would not appear to be in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless the intention of temporary control must be beyond question, and any indication of converting temporary control for a particular purpose into permanent control for general purposes would bring the case within the scope of the Doctrine and

¹ Filed separately under file No. 710.11/185½.

create a situation, in which the United States might be compelled to intervene.

Just how far a European government should be permitted to exercise control over American territory or over an American government as a means of obtaining redress for an international wrong is a question which must be decided in each case upon the facts. If it may be reasonably presumed from the circumstances surrounding the assumption of control or from the length of time it continues that the intention is to make it permanent, denial of such intention by the controlling power should in no way interfere with the assertion by the United States of its established policy or with its insistence that the European aggressor immediately withdraw from the territory or surrender its control.

In dealing with the cases as they arise the two essential elements of the Monroe Doctrine must be constantly borne in mind; first, that the doctrine is exclusively a national policy of the United States and relates to its national safety and vital interests; and second, that the European control, against which it is directed, must possess the element of permanency, or a reasonable possibility of permanency.

While occupation and conquest, as means of obtaining political control over American territory by a European power, are acts of that power alone, voluntary cession, as a means, is the mutual act of the two governments which are parties to the transfer. As a consequence the inclusion of voluntary cession among the acts of acquisition, against which the Monroe Doctrine is directed, introduces the necessary corollary that it may be invoked against an American government as well as against a European government. It is manifest from this that the Monroe Doctrine is, as has been said, a national policy of the United States and also that it is not a Pan-American policy. The opposition to European control over American territory is not primarily to preserve the integrity of any American state—that may be a result but not a purpose of the Doctrine. The essential idea is to prevent a condition which would menace the national interests of the United States.

In case it should become necessary to enforce the Monroe Doctrine against another American republic, which has ceded or apparently intends to cede any of its territorial rights to a European power, the preventive action of the United States would appear to be a direct interference with the sovereign authority of the American republic over its own territory. Logically such action, in case a cession is made or intended, amounts to an assertion of the primacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. The primacy of one nation, though possessing the superior physical might to maintain it, is out of harmony with the principle of the equality of

nations which underlies Pan-Americanism, however just or altruistic the primate may be.

While, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism may come into conflict, the Monroe Doctrine will in case of conflict prevail so long as the United States maintains the Doctrine and is the dominant power among the American nations. The equality of American republics and, in a measure, their independence are legal rather than actual, but it is necessary to acknowledge their legal existence, if the theory of Pan-Americanism is accepted. The Monroe Doctrine, on the contrary, is founded upon no assumptions of this character but upon a fact, namely, the superior power of the United States to compel submission to its will whenever a condition arises involving European control over American territory, which, because of the permanent nature of the control, is considered to be a menace to the national safety of the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, should not be confused with Pan-Americanism. It is purely a national policy of the United States, while Pan-Americanism is the joint policy of the American group of nations. The Pan-American policy may support and may probably be considered as invariably supporting the idea of the Monroe Doctrine in opposing the extension of European political control over any portion of this continent. The reason, however, for such support will not be the national safety of the United States, but the mutual protection of American nations from European attempts upon their independence. In its advocacy of the Monroe Doctrine the United States considers its own interests. The integrity of other American nations is an incident, not an end. While this may seem based on selfishness alone, the author of the Doctrine had no higher or more generous motive in its declaration. To assert for it a nobler purpose is to proclaim a new doctrine.

As stated, this traditional policy, as originally declared and subsequently defined, relates to European acquisition of political power in America by means of occupation, conquest or cession of territory. There is, nevertheless, another method by which such power may be acquired, a method, which to-day can be more easily and more successfully employed than those to which the Monroe Doctrine has been in the past applied. It is a mode of extending political power, which, in my opinion, has caused much of the confusion and uncertainty as to the scope of the Monroe Doctrine because of its gradual development and the failure to recognize it as in practical conflict with that policy.

Within the past quarter of a century the rapid increase of wealth in the United States and the great nations of Europe has caused their people, in constantly increasing numbers, to seek investments in

foreign lands. No richer field has been presented than the vast undeveloped resources of the republics south of the United States. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been expended in these lands by the capitalists of this country, Great Britain, France, Germany, and other European nations in the construction of railways, the establishment of steamship lines, the development of mines, the cultivation of cotton, fruits, and other agricultural products, and the operation of various industrial enterprises.

In the opening up of these countries and the development of their resources their governments require financial aid, or seize the opportunity to replenish their treasuries. Eager investors, appreciating the natural riches of these regions and the possibilities of reward to those who obtain the right to exploit them, lend their money readily in exchange for special privileges, concessions and large rates of interest.

The governments of many of these republics, impoverished and improvident and frequently in the hands of unscrupulous and greedy men, careless of the future and heedless of their country's welfare, borrow beyond the limit of their capacity to repay, hypothecating every possible source of national revenue for years to come. As a result some of the smaller American republics, ruled by military dictators or oligarchies, who have enriched themselves at the expense of their countries, have become hopelessly bankrupt. In some cases the United States, in others a European power, is the chief creditor, to whose favor the insolvent nation must look for the means to continue its political existence.

With the present industrial activity, the scramble for markets, and the incessant search for new opportunities to produce wealth, commercial expansion and success are closely interwoven with political domination over the territory which is being exploited.

The European power, whose subjects supply the capital to install and operate the principal industries of a small American republic and furnish the funds upon which its government is dependent, may, if it so wishes, dominate the political action of the American government. To state it in another way, a European power whose subjects own the public debt of an American state and have invested there large amounts of capital, may control the government of the state as completely as if it had acquired sovereign rights over the territory through occupation, conquest or cession.

The question, which is unavoidable, but which can only be answered after mature thought for it is pregnant with difficulties and with seeming departures from the time-honored policy of the United States, is this—

When by reason of commercial and financial domination a European power becomes undoubted master of the political conduct of an American republic, is a condition presented which may justify the United States in applying to it the Monroe Doctrine with the same vigor, with which it would have applied the Doctrine if the European power had by force or treaty established a protectorate over the American republic?

If the conditions are compared, it is evident that in both cases a European nation has extended political control over American territory; and in both cases the element of permanency is present. They are to all intents identical in their results, though they differ in the means by which the results were obtained.

The United States would certainly oppose the surrender by an American republic of all or a portion of its sovereignty to one of the great powers of Europe. It would be a voluntary and peaceable act of the republic, but it would be manifestly contrary to the Monroe Doctrine. If voluntarily and peaceably an American republic becomes so financially dependent upon a European power that the latter controls the government of the former, is not that also contrary to the Monroe Doctrine? Is not one case as great a menace to the national safety of the United States as the other? If there is a practical distinction between the two cases, what is that distinction? If there is no practical distinction, why should the Monroe Doctrine not be applied to both?

These questions suggest the following:

Has the time arrived, as a result of modern economic conditions in Central and South America, when the Monroe Doctrine, if it is to continue effective, should be restated so as to include European acquisition of political control through the agency of financial supremacy over an American republic?

If a more radical change of policy than the one suggested by the foregoing query seems necessary and advisable under present conditions the question to be answered may be stated thus:

Should a new doctrine be formulated declaring that the United States is opposed to the extension of European control over American territory and institutions through financial as well as other means, and having for its object, not only the national safety and interests of this country, but also the establishment and maintenance of republican constitutional government in all American states, the free exercise by their people of their public and private rights, the administration of impartial justice, and the prevention of political authority from becoming the tool of personal ambition and greed, the chief enemies of liberal institutions, of economic development, and of domestic peace?

Stated in a more general way the question is this:

Do not the modern ideals and aims of government in the United States require us to abandon the purely selfish principle, which has so long controlled our policies in dealing with other American nations, and to adopt more altruistic and humanitarian principles, which will be in harmony with the sense of fraternal responsibility, which is increasingly dominant in all our international relations?

In the presentation of these questions there is no intention to advocate a particular policy in dealing with the international affairs of the Western Hemisphere. They are submitted solely for the purpose of suggesting possible changes in the Monroe Doctrine, either conservative or radical, which will be more in accord with modern ideals and conditions. It appears to me to be necessary, in order to avoid confusion and contradiction in the future conduct of affairs of the Department, to determine definitely whether the Monroe Doctrine should remain unchanged, should be restated, or should be superseded. Uncertainty as to the policy, which this Government intends to pursue, will undoubtedly cause embarrassment when special cases are presented for action. The subject, in my judgment, should receive prompt and careful consideration.

ROBERT LANSING

838.51/385

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *February 25, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose copy of a communication which we have received from the French Ambassador.²

Since receiving the communication I have talked with him and explained to him that it is impossible to grant the first request for a partnership for the reason that it would be violating the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and would open the door to all sorts of requests.

I told him that the Germans had already expressed a desire for a similar arrangement on the ground of their preponderating influence in business there.³

He did not press that matter and said that he would so inform his Government. I confirmed his views in regard to the equality of treatment mentioned in the latter part of the letter.

I think it would be well to write him a letter—it need not be long—stating these two ideas:

² *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 514.

³ i. e., Haiti.

1st. That the admission of any country to partnership in any political influence that we exerted there, would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine; and

2nd. That whatever influence we exerted would be impartially exerted for the protection of the interests of the nationals of all countries.

As you wrote the note to the German Ambassador do you desire to write this one—or shall I make an answer in the sense of the above?

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

838.51/385½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 26 February, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My own judgment follows and agrees with your reasoning in this letter altogether. I do not see what other course we can follow in the circumstances.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

710.11/188½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose a memorandum covering the subject of the Monroe Doctrine, its application, and the possible extension of the principle in a way to constitute a policy which may be termed a "Carribbean Policy", since it is limited in application to the territory in and about the Carribbean Sea.

Briefly, the memorandum is this:

The Monroe Doctrine is based on the theory that any extension by a European power of political control, beyond that which exists over any territory in this hemisphere, is a menace to the national safety of the United States. The means of extending political control, thus far recognized, has been by occupation of unattached territory, by conquest and by cession.

Recently the financing of revolutions and corruption of governments of the smaller republics by European capitalists have frequently thrown the control of these governments into the hands of a European power.

To avoid this danger of European political control by this means which may be as great a menace to the national safety of this country

as occupation or cession, the only method seems to be to establish a stable and honest government and to prevent the revenues of the republic from becoming the prize of revolution and of the foreigners who finance it.

Stability and honesty of government depend on sufficient force to resist revolutions and on sufficient control over the revenues and over the development of the resources to prevent official graft and dishonest grants of privileges.

The possession of the Panama Canal and its defense have in a measure given to the territories in and about the Carribean Sea a new importance from the standpoint of our national safety. It is vital to the interests of this country that European political domination should in no way be extended over these regions. As it happens within this area lie the small republics of America which have been and to an extent still are the prey of revolutionists, of corrupt governments, and of predatory foreigners.

Because of this state of affairs our national safety, in my opinion, requires that the United States should intervene and aid in the establishment and maintenance of a stable and honest government, if no other way seems possible to attain that end.

I make no argument on the ground of the benefit which would result to the peoples of these republics by the adoption of this policy. That they would be the chief beneficiaries in that their public and private rights would be respected, and their prosperity and intellectual development insured, is manifest. Nevertheless the argument based on humanitarian purpose does not appeal to me, even though it might be justly urged, because too many international crimes have been committed in the name of Humanity.

It seems to me that the ground of national safety, the conservation of national interests, is the one which should be advanced in support of this policy. It is reasonable, practical, and in full accord with the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

In considering this policy it should be borne in mind what has been done already in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and what may have to be done in the small neighboring republics. The Danish West Indies and the colonial possessions of other European nations in the Carribean should not be forgotten in considering this policy as through a change of their sovereignty they might become a serious menace to the interests of the United States.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure—Memorandum—Extract *]

PRESENT NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

This is not perhaps attempted openly at first but the result is the same though more subtly attained. In a large proportion of the instances to which the United States has felt called upon to apply the Monroe Doctrine the acts complained of have been direct political acts of a European Government, as, for example, the invasion of Mexico by France during the Civil War; British interposition in the boundary question of Venezuela; the offer of Italy to purchase the Island of St. Bartholomew in 1870; the attempts of Spain to reannex Santo Domingo and other former Spanish possessions in America. There have however been some instances of interference for the purpose of satisfying claims of foreign subjects, as, for example, the French claims based on Mexican bonds; and Spanish claims against Mexico of various sorts; and the French, German, British and Italian claims, including claims based on war damage and on Government contracts, but it does not appear that the United States protested against drastic action by these Governments on the ground of the Monroe doctrine, but, on the contrary, used its good offices to effect an amicable settlement. As a protest against the forcible collection of contract debts, Drago advanced the doctrine bearing his name. Now it is to political action growing out of investments in the Carribean countries that I make particular reference. The purchase of Government securities upon which payments of interest and sinking funds are defaulted, and the development of a concession, perhaps obtained in return for financing a revolution, which is infringed or annulled, open the offending Government to claims to the foreign bond holders or concessionaires who enlist the aid of their Governments.

Thus the European power, whose subjects supply the capital to install and operate the principal industries of a small American republic and furnish the funds upon which its government is dependent, may, if it finds it expedient to do so, dominate the political action of the weak and bankrupt government. To state it in another way, a European power whose subjects own the public debt of an American state and have invested large amounts of capital, would be able to control the government of the state almost as completely as if it had acquired sovereign rights over the territory through occupation, conquest or cession.

*The omitted portion of this memorandum is substantially the same as the first 15 paragraphs of the memorandum of June 11, 1914, p. 460.

The method of obtaining political mastery by means of financial control has been an increasing menace to the independence of the republics situated in or about the Carribean Sea. Revolutions have been frequent, due in the majority of cases to the desire of a factional leader by becoming master of the nation's revenues to amass wealth for himself and his immediate friends. A revolutionary chief finds little difficulty in financing his venture among foreign speculators in exchange for concessions or other privileges and the chance of large profits which will be theirs if the revolution is successful. As a result the people of these countries are the victims of constant strife between rival leaders, and their condition is little improved by the governments, which exist only a short time and which are used to enrich their rulers and those who have financed them.

The corrupt character of the rulers, and the powerful influence of foreign financiers who have aided the rulers in obtaining and will aid them in maintaining control, tends toward instability of Government in these same republics and not only threaten their national independence but prevents the people from developing intellectually or from attaining any degree of prosperity.

The United States in any circumstances would be desirous as a friend of an American republic, which is suffering from this state of affairs, to aid it in removing the cause. But in the case of the Carribean republics self-interest as well as friendship appeals. Since the construction of the Panama Canal it is essential for its safety that the neighboring nations should not come under the political domination of any European power either directly by force or by cession or indirectly through the agency of financial control by its subjects. While force and cession are not impossible means if the government of a republic is corrupt or weak, the greater danger lies in the subtlety of financial control.

To meet this danger the surest if not the only means, is the establishment of a stable and honest government which will devote the revenues of the state to defraying its just obligations, to developing its resources, and to educating its people, and which will protect individuals in their rights of life, liberty and property, and in the enjoyment of their political rights.

In order to accomplish this the first thing to be done is to remove the prize of revolution, namely, the control of the public revenues. If this can be done there will be few revolutions about the Carribean. In the second place the government must not be dependent on foreign financiers for its continuance in power. In the third place it must

possess a reliable and efficient military force sufficient to suppress insurrection against the established authority.

If there could arise in all the Carribean republics men of strong character, patriotic and honest, as there have in some, who are able to carry out such a policy, it would be well for all concerned. Unfortunately this is not the case, and the United States is of necessity forced to choose between permitting these republics to continue to be the prey of unscrupulous adventurers native and foreign, or to undertake the task of aiding in the establishment of a stable and honest government, upon principles which will insure political independence and prevent any possibility of European control.

It would seem, therefore, that in the case of the republics about the Carribean Sea the United States should expand the application of the Monroe Doctrine, and declare as a definite Carribean policy that, while it does not seek dominion over the territory of any of these republics, it is necessary for the national safety of the United States, and particularly in view of its interests on the Isthmus of Panama, that it aid the people of those republics in establishing and maintaining responsible and honest governments to such extent as may be necessary in each particular case, and that it will not tolerate control over or interference with the political or financial affairs of these republics by any European power or its nationals or permit the occupation, even temporarily, by a European power, of any territory of such republics.

NOVEMBER 24, 1915.

710.11/1894

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 29 November, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The argument of this paper seems to be unanswerable, and I thank you for setting it out so explicitly and fully.

This will serve us as a memorandum when the time comes, and the proper occasion, for making a public declaration of policy in this important particular. Just now, I take it for granted, it is only for the guidance and clarification of our own thought, and for informal discussion with our Latin American friends from time to time, semi-confidentially and for the sake of a frank understanding.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

THE PROPOSED PAN-AMERICAN TREATY¹

710.11/1903

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

28 JANUARY, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will remember that when you and Mr. Lansing and I discussed the Pan-American agreement you asked me to send you a copy and to add a fourth Article, embodying the substance of our recent peace treaties.

I have literally not had time until to-day to set about this, and now that I have begun I find myself at a loss as to just how to phrase it. Will you not be kind enough to complete what I have here (in the enclosed) begun and let me have it at your early convenience in order that we may push forward this important business?

Faithfully Yours,

WOODROW WILSON

[Enclosure]

Draft Article for Proposed Pan-American Treaty^{1a}

That the high contracting parties further agree that all questions, of whatever character, arising between any two or more of them which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomatic correspondence shall be submitted, first, to a permanent commission for investigation and, second, if the dispute is not adjusted through investigation to arbitration, provided that the question in dispute does not affect the honor independence or vital interests of the contracting parties or the interests of third parties, and the parties to this convention hereby agree where it has not already been done to enter into treaties, each with all the others severally, carrying out the provisions of this article.

¹ For papers previously printed on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1916, pp. 3-4.

^{1a} The portion of this article which is here italicized was written by President Wilson; the remainder of the article was written by Secretary Bryan.

710.11/1981

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

29 JANUARY, 1915.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Here are the four articles of agreement complete. I am sorry not to have had time to send them before.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

[Enclosure]

Draft Articles for Proposed Pan-American Treaty

I

That the contracting parties to this solemn covenant and agreement hereby join in a common and mutual guarantee to one another of undisturbed and indisputed territorial integrity and of complete political independence under republican forms of government.

II

That, to this end, and as a condition precedent to the foregoing guarantee of territorial integrity, it is covenanted and agreed between them that all disputes now pending and unconcluded between any two or more of them with regard to their boundaries or territories shall be brought to an early and final settlement in the following manner, unless some equally prompt and satisfactory method of settlement can be agreed upon and put into operation in each or any case within three months after the signing of this convention and brought to a decision within one year after its inception.

Each of the parties to the dispute shall select two arbiters and those thus selected and commissioned shall select an additional arbiter or umpire; to the tribunal thus constituted the question or questions at issue shall be submitted without reservation; and the decisions and findings of this tribunal shall be final and conclusive as between the parties to the dispute and under the terms of this convention as to the whole subject-matter submitted. The findings of such tribunal or tribunals shall be arrived at and officially announced and accepted within not more than one year after the formal constitution of the tribunal; and the tribunal shall be constituted not more than three months after the signing and ratification of the convention.

III

That the high contracting parties severally pledge themselves to obtain and establish by law such control of the manufacture and

sale of munitions of war within their respective jurisdictions as will enable them absolutely to control and make them responsible for the sale and shipment of such munitions to any other of the nations who are parties to this convention.

IV

That the high contracting parties further agree, First, that all questions, of whatever character, arising between any two or more of them which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomatic correspondence shall, before any declaration of war or beginning of hostilities, be first submitted to a permanent international commission for investigation, one year being allowed for such investigation; and, Second, that, if the dispute is not settled by investigation, to submit the same to arbitration, provided the question in dispute does not affect the honour, independence, or vital interests of the nations concerned or the interests of third parties; and the high contracting parties hereby agree, where this has not already been done, to enter into treaty, each with all of the others severally, to carry out the provisions of this Article.

710.11/198½

*The Secretary of State to the Chilean Ambassador (Suárez-Mujica)*²

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am enclosing, for your confidential examination, the draft of a proposed convention,³ copies of which are being sent also to the Ambassadors of Argentine and Brazil.

I would appreciate it very much if you would call at my house at six o'clock this evening so that we may go over the language together before the proposed convention is forwarded to your respective countries. I am requesting you to call at the house instead of the Department in order to avoid publicity, if possible.

I am [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

710.11/198½b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Brazilian Government has reported in favor of your proposition excepting the matter of arbitration upon which it is still deliberating.

²The same, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Argentine and Brazilian Ambassadors.

³Enclosure as in President Wilson's letter of Jan. 29, 1915, *supra*.

Argentina has reported enthusiastically in favor of all the propositions.

We have not yet heard from Chile. You remember it was the Chilean Ambassador who expressed the most objection both to the arbitration feature—that is compelling the arbitration of differences within a certain time—also to the guarantee of republican form of Government and the guarantee of integrity.

The Argentine Ambassador is quite anxious that we shall proceed with the treaty among the republics of the western hemisphere in order to produce an effect upon the European belligerents.

I asked the Brazilian Ambassador today to request the Chilean Ambassador to urge his Government to give us its opinion with a view of proceeding as soon as possible.

The Argentine Ambassador thought it might be well to have the plan presented to the other representatives soon so that they could consult their Governments. My own opinion is that the small countries will be very glad to approve and accept the plan *in toto*.

There are two questions:

First: How long should we wait on Chile?

Second: What we shall do if Chile postpones answer or answers unfavorably to some of the important parts of the plan.

Would the objection of one of the larger countries compel an abandonment of the plan, or would you want it presented to the others?

I think the treaty should be so drawn that those that do not sign now would be permitted to sign at any future time. If some of the countries are willing to accept the main propositions but are not willing to accept one or more of the minor provisions would it be best to so frame the treaty that each would bind itself to the others to such an extent as it is willing? I think this would be better than allowing the opposition of a few on some details [to] prevent the securing of such advantages as might come from agreement of all the nations on some of the provisions and of some of the nations on all the provisions.

I have referred to a number of questions which have arisen in the discussion of the subject with the three Ambassadors, but the most important thing to find out is whether we should wait on Chile before submitting the plan to the other countries. In submitting it we need not say that any of the nations have been consulted but send identical notes to all of them at the same time, submitting the plan as you have prepared it.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

710.11/199½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

8 MARCH, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is very good news indeed.

I think that we need not wait for Chile's reply after we have got the full assent of Brazil and Argentina; but I think we should have the cordial support of those two governments before laying the plan before the other governments. I am assuming that Brazil already knows that we are quite willing to entertain and discuss any modification of the arbitration clause that she may wish to suggest, provided we can be assured of the acceptance of the principle.

So soon as that is accomplished it is my idea that we should lay the plan before all the other governments (except, of course, Mexico) at one and the same time in identical notes, and that it would be well at that time to state to their representatives, unofficially and confidentially, that Brazil and Argentina had assented (and Chile, if by that time she had), for that would constitute a most influential argument for its universal acceptance.

I agree with you that it would be wise to draw and conclude the treaty in such a way that those not accepting it now would have an opportunity to accept and ratify it at any future time. But it is my present judgment that it would not be wise to let some enter upon other terms than the rest. I think the understanding should be the same for all who come in, otherwise some very confused responsibilities might arise. With several of the big States in and a number of the smaller ones, we could await the outcome with confidence.

With very happy expectations in this great matter,
Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

710.11/199½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I send you a flimsy of a despatch just received from Santiago.⁴ The Chilean Ambassador notified me yesterday afternoon that he had received an answer from his Government which he would be able to submit Monday. He said that it was in the nature of a counter proposition and I think eliminates

⁴Not printed.

the guaranty of territorial integrity and the guaranty of republican government.

He also said that he understood from Mr. House that the plan would not be presented to the other countries unless it had the approval of the three large countries—Brazil, Argentine and Chile to whom Mr. House confided the plan. The Chilean Ambassador also gathered the idea that the chief purpose was to have the South American countries join in the Monroe Doctrine and he did not seem favorably inclined to the idea of protecting each South American country against other South American countries.

The flimsy presents Chile's proposals in regard to the settlement of disputes between Chile and Peru. I wonder if it would not be well to take up this subject with Peru and see if any progress can be made toward settlement.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

710.11/200‡

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 5 April, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I shall await the note from Chile with deep interest.

Will you not be kind enough to have a talk with Ambassador Naón and ascertain whether he got the impression from House that the Chilean Ambassador seems to have got, that we would not propose our treaty to the other countries of South and Central America unless all three of the A. B. C. approved. I remember nothing of the kind, and think Mr. Suárez must be mistaken.

I think it would be wise, as you suggest, to approach the Peruvian government very tactfully and ascertain whether they are willing to treat matters in dispute between them and Chile as the enclosed despatch suggests.⁵

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

710.11/200‡a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you copy of the communication which we have received from the Chilean Ambassador;⁶ and I will call your attention to it proposition by proposition.

⁵ Probably the despatch from Santiago mentioned in the preceding document.

⁶ Not printed.

In the first place—you will notice that in the paragraph marked "1" he does not expect the matter to be proposed to the other governments unless it is approved by the three to whom it was first submitted—Brazil, Argentina and Chile.

I think it would be well for us to correct this impression and say to him that while we feel that it was wise to submit it to the three larger countries before submitting it to the others, we would not feel justified in refusing to enter into an agreement with such nations as would desire to become parties to such an agreement, merely because one or more of the nations did not see fit to join, and that we feel sure that no nation which for any reason feels that it cannot come in would desire to deny to the other nations such benefits as might result from the negotiation of such a treaty.

Second: You will notice that he objects—(and his Government supports his objection)—to a guarantee of a republican form of government.

There is force in the objection which he makes—namely, that the form of Government is a matter for the people of the country and not a matter in which outside countries should interfere. At the same time, as all these governments are republican in form and as none of them have any intention of returning to any other form I do not believe that the objection which he makes would be entertained by other countries and it would be a great advantage to have this endorsement given to the republican idea of government; and, moreover, we might have difficulty in securing the ratification of a treaty which pledged us to assist in maintaining the independence of a monarchy.

We might meet his objection, it occurs to me, by saying that the treaty will doubtless provide for its denunciation by any of the contracting parties upon notice—which is generally one year—so that any country desiring to change its form of government can give notice of its desire and withdraw, and when released from the treaty can then make such change in its form of government as it desires.

Third: The question which he raises about the guarantee of territorial integrity is more difficult to deal with, and yet I think it is even more important than the guarantee of a republican form of government.

The purpose of the treaty is to insure peace in the western hemisphere and nothing will go further in this direction than a guarantee of territorial integrity. While we are confident as to our own intentions, it will be a very acceptable thing to Latin-America to have us agree that we will respect the territorial integrity of all the other nations, and it will be a great protection to the little countries to have their territorial integrity guaranteed.

The thing that troubles Chile, of course, is the controversy between Chile and Peru and I suggest that we might meet this proposition as follows:

Let those nations sign which will agree to sign and let the guarantee cover all questions that may arise after the settlement of existing disputes or disagreements, each nation to set forth specifically the excepted dispute.

This will enable Chile to sign and in doing so make an exception of the dispute with Peru. Peru may or may not desire to make an exception of the dispute with Chile. If we make a guarantee covering all future disputes I do not think it will be necessary to go further than have the nations agree to use their best endeavors to reach a settlement of any disputes which may exist, without fixing a time limit on those disputes.

If Peru is guaranteed against any further invasion of its territory I believe it will be possible for the Peruvian government to accept the settlement offered by Chile, which is that the control of the disputed territory be submitted to an election within a year, no one being permitted to vote who is not a resident at the time the agreement is made; the nation securing the disputed territory to pay a fixed sum to the nation losing. The sum of ten millions is proposed, but Chile has indicated a willingness to go beyond that. If Peru can be assured of territorial integrity after the settlement of this dispute it is more than likely that a settlement can be soon effected.

While it would be desirable to have a time limit fixed for the settlement of existing disputes that is not so essential as the agreement that when the disputes are settled there shall be no more forcible taking of territory.

I believe that nearly all the countries would enter into such a treaty and it should be left open for others to sign afterwards.

You will notice that the Chilean Ambassador makes a distinction between original boundaries and disputes of territory arising from other sources. I see no insuperable objection to that distinction, but believe it would be better to let it rest with an agreement on the part of the nations to try and adjust their disputes. Possibly we might make the provision for arbitration as to original boundaries, and then add the promise as to other boundary disputes.

Fourth: You will notice that the objection he makes in regard to the provision of monopoly of arms. I do not think his objection is sound but as the purpose of this paragraph is to prevent the shipping of arms from one American country into another it might be sufficient if the agreement provided for legislation which would enable each country to so control the export of arms as not to permit export of arms to be used by one of the contracting parties as against an-

other. The Chilean Ambassador is afraid that we might have difficulty in securing the ratification of the treaty if it provided for a radical change in this respect, and he does not want to have the treaty fail on account of a provision which would incite opposition.

I might add, in closing, that the Argentine Ambassador is in favor of the draft of the treaty just as it was presented by you and the Brazilian is desirous of that form, with the exception of the question of arbitration of differences, and upon this they have not yet given their final answer.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

710.11/2024

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 22 April, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Just a preliminary word about the Chilean memorandum.⁷

I shall cable to House to-day to ask whether he intended to convey the impression the Chilean Ambassador received.⁸

My present judgment is, that it is best to draft something to which Argentina and Brazil will warmly subscribe and then go ahead with that, leaving Chile free to decide whether she will come in or not, either now or at some future time. I do not think that it would be wise to trim and dilute it to suit her special and singular case.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

725.3211/44: Telegram

The Chargé in Uruguay (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

MONTEVIDEO, April 23, 1915—5 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

Minister for Foreign Affairs has made confidential inquiry of me as to what would be the attitude of the United States towards Uruguay's associating herself with the A. B. C. combination. Uruguayan Government while assuming that the A. B. C. in its present form is countenanced and inspired by the United States desires to act in harmony with the wishes of the United States in this matter. If A. B. C. is inspired in desire to work with United States in development of common Pan-American policy Uruguay believes such policy should be directed on the basis of equality of American states

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ See letter of Apr. 3, 1915, from the Secretary of State to President Wilson. p. 475.

fitted to participate and would wish to enter. If A. B. C. contemplates acting as counterpoise to influence of the United States or has in view only the immediate interests of the constituent powers Uruguay would continue to pursue its entirely independent policy in cooperation with the United States.

In view of the forthcoming visit of Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs here and his meeting with Argentine and Chile Foreign Ministers at Buenos Aires next month Uruguayan Government considers its situation somewhat difficult. I am reliably informed that Argentine Minister here has informally sounded Minister for Foreign Affairs as to whether he would desire to go to Buenos Aires for the meeting. If the United States approves Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs would probably attend meeting and give his Government's adherence to A. B. C. Expression of our attitude is desired in order to enable Uruguayan Government more intelligently to shape its policy before the beginning of May.

Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs will be met at the frontier by the President of Uruguay and Minister for Foreign Affairs about May 7th. He will remain in Uruguay until May 18th and go from here to Buenos Aires and Santiago returning to Buenos Aires with Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs for meeting of the three Ministers. Original occasion of visit of Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Uruguayan boundary is celebration of completed delimitation of the line and out of this grew extension of itinerary.

SCHOENFELD

725.3211/44

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose flimsy of a telegram just received from Montevideo^o and I suggest the substance of an answer as follows:

It seems to me that we cannot undertake to decide even by suggestion who are to be included in the agreement proposed between the A. B. C. countries, although I see no objection to our confidentially calling Naón's attention to the fact that this inquiry was made.

We could answer Uruguay first, that we have no objection whatever to the agreement including as many countries as desire to enter into it and that, if invited to join, Uruguay need not hesitate out of any fear that the proposed agreement is in any way hostile or unfriendly to the United States.

Our understanding of the proposition is that these countries are to adopt among themselves the same form of treaty that we have

^o *Supra.*

adopted as between this nation and some thirty others. This will leave the A. B. C. powers to decide whether they desire to include any others and will leave Uruguay free to accept if invited.

I might unofficially call the Uruguay Minister's attention to the fact that if there is any objection at all to the inclusion of Uruguay it will probably be on the ground of setting a precedent—that is, if Uruguay is included because that country joins Argentina and Brazil, the same argument would include Bolivia, which joins Chile as well as Argentina and Brazil; and Paraguay, which joins the same countries that Uruguay does.

In all of this there is gratifying evidence of the success of the plan which you have in mind—of bringing all of the countries together in some satisfactory agreement.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

725.3211/46½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 26 April, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My advice in this case is, that first of all you talk with Mr. Naón and get from your talk with him an intimation as to what is involved and how to handle the matter.

Are you fully convinced that there is nothing in the proposed arrangement among the A. B. C. that will stand in the way of or embarrass our own American plan?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

710.11/203½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 27 April, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This seems to me excellent.¹⁰ I agree with you that it is wise to be explicit and that it is well to put these views in writing, as you have done.

I think it would be wise, however, to state that the provisions as to territory as you restate them in this letter are not definitively proposed (for we have not yet shown them to Argentine and Brazil, upon whose cooperation we are depending) but are formulated by way of suggestion of what we would be quite willing to discuss, if in that form they commended themselves to the Chilean government.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

¹⁰ Draft of letter to the Chilean Ambassador; for the letter as sent, see *infra*.

710.11/2033a

The Secretary of State to the Chilean Ambassador (Suárez-Mujica)

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have laid before the President your counter-proposition and at his request present the situation as he views it.

First: He has communicated with Mr. House and finds that Mr. House did not intend to convey the impression that the presentation of this plan to the republics of Latin-America would depend upon its acceptance by any one or more countries. The misunderstanding on this subject probably arose from the suggestion made by him to the effect that, if approved by the three countries to which he presented it, these three countries might assist in presenting it to the other countries.

The President would not feel justified in making the negotiation of a treaty so important to all the countries dependent upon the action of any one country—action that might be controlled entirely by circumstances which, while they might justify the decision of that country not to enter into the agreement, might not affect other countries. And, besides, it would be unfair to any country to assume that it would be willing to stand in the way of the negotiation of such a treaty merely because it, for any reason, was not able to join in the convention.

Second: The President feels that the agreement will be greatly strengthened by the guarantee of a republican form of government and he doubts whether it would be possible to secure the ratification of the treaty by the Senate if this guarantee were omitted.

While it is true, as you suggest, that the form of government is, in the first instance, a matter to be decided by the people of the country, still, in view of the fact that all of these countries have adopted the republican form of government, and in view of the further fact that the trend of the world is toward the idea of popular government, it would seem that the right of return to monarchy is one that need not be considered. It is not likely that officials of any government would be willing to create uneasiness in the minds of the people of that country by any action which would even suggest the possibility of an abandonment of the government's representative character.

Third: The President feels that the guaranty of territorial integrity is an essential part of the plan and that it would be unwise to eliminate it.

History has shown that nearly all wars have resulted in changing the territorial boundaries of the nations engaged—in fact, many

wars have had such changes as their object. Nothing would go further to insure peace among the nations of the western hemisphere than an understanding that force would not be recognized as a legitimate means of acquiring territory.

The United States is not only willing to give assurances of its purpose in this respect, but is willing, if desired, to join with the Latin-American republics in giving specific and definite assurances that no contracting state will be forced to part with any of its territory.

Fourth: It is necessary, of course, to recognize the fact that there are existing disputes in regard to territory and boundaries which have to be taken into consideration, and the plan you propose of distinguishing between disputes over original boundaries and boundary disputes arising from other sources may point to a solution. The guaranty of territorial integrity might, for instance, read something like this:

“One: All territorial boundaries now agreed upon shall remain unchanged, and their establishment shall be guaranteed by the contracting parties.

“Two: All disputes as to original boundaries shall be determined in accordance with the plan set forth in the proposition submitted by the President, such disputed boundaries to be set forth specifically by the nations concerned.

“Three: Territorial disputes which have arisen from any other cause than disputes over original boundaries shall be specifically stated by the parties interested, and shall be adjusted as soon as circumstances will permit; the parties to the dispute pledging themselves to put forth their best efforts to secure an early adjustment of these disputes, all boundaries, when finally determined, to be accepted in like manner as those already established, and to be for the future guaranteed.”

You will notice that the plan above outlined guarantees the permanence of the boundaries now agreed upon, provides for an early settlement of disputes over original boundaries and relieves from embarrassment those nations which have territorial disputes that arise from other causes.

The provisions relating to existing disputes have not been submitted to Brazil or Argentina but are suggested to you tentatively by way of indicating what we would be quite willing to discuss if, in that form, they commend themselves to your Government.

As to the matter of arms we do not anticipate any difficulty in securing the ratification of a treaty pledging the contracting governments to an endeavor to secure legislation which will enable each government to prevent the export of arms intended for use by one of the contracting parties against another of the contracting parties.

Your government has, within the last few months, given evidence of its adherence to this policy.

The provision above referred to, guaranteeing territorial integrity and national independence would, of course, be a protection to the contracting parties against foreign powers, as well as against each other.

While the United States has, for a century, borne alone the responsibility involved in preventing aggression from countries in the eastern hemisphere, and while the purpose of this Government in proposing this treaty is not to secure relief from these responsibilities, still it will be gratifying to this country to have the republics of Latin-America join in the upholding of what is known as the Monroe Doctrine, because such a recognition of the doctrine by them would prevent for the future any misunderstanding of its purpose and any underestimating of its value.

I have not mentioned the provision for embodying in the proposed treaty the principles of the treaties already negotiated, providing for investigation of all disputes. This we regard as of great value. The three countries so far interviewed agree to this and we have no doubt that all the rest will accept it.

The President hopes that your Government will, upon full consideration of the subject, find it possible to join in this treaty at this time. It will be a matter of sincere regret if existing conditions should compel your Government to postpone cooperation, but if, unhappily, such a course should be deemed advisable, the friendly relations existing between the United States and Chile, so firmly established and so frequently manifested, will prevent misinterpretation. Provision can be made in the treaty for the subsequent signing by such governments as do not become parties to the convention now.

Accept [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

710.11/204½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *May 19, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose you a copy of a memorandum which I have just received from the Brazilian Ambassador.¹¹ You will notice that in the first paragraph reference is made to the guaranty of national integrity and the control of the manufacture and sale of arms. In the last paragraph reference is made to the

¹¹ Not printed.

Monroe Doctrine. The second paragraph, while not very clear, indicates that they do not think it wise to have a time set for the arbitration of existing disputes. In view of Chile's objection to this and Brazil's attitude on the subject, why would it not be well to modify the arbitration section to read something as follows:

"All boundaries now agreed upon are guaranteed for the future; all differences now existing as to boundaries will be specifically set forth in the treaty according to the views of the parties interested and the boundaries, when fixed, will be thereafter guaranteed. The parties will endeavor, according to their several interests, to reach an early settlement of existing disputes; all disputes arising in the future to be submitted to arbitration, provided those disputes do not affect the constitutions of the respective countries."

Do you think that some such wording would answer for the statement of the proposition? As this treaty is to be agreed to by the nations entering into it, it is entirely possible that in the exchange of views it may be necessary to accept some change in the wording.

This memorandum does not mention the guaranty of republican form of government. I have asked Ambassador da Gama to say to his Government that the guaranty of a republican form of government having been formerly endorsed by Brazil, and not being mentioned in this memorandum, we assume that the former endorsement still stands.

Now that we have Brazil's answer do you not think it would be wise to communicate this plan confidentially to the representatives of the other Latin-American countries so that they can be securing the opinions of their respective governments? The sooner we can get this before the public the better, for the influence it may have across the Atlantic. I am not sure but it might be well to give it to the public at the time we present it, as was done when we announced the peace plan which provides for investigation in all cases. I shall be pleased to have your instructions in this matter.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

710.11/202

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *September 10, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The enclosed telegram has been received from Ambassador Fletcher. Will you kindly indicate to me what are your wishes in the matter?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The Ambassador in Chile (Fletcher) to the Secretary of State

SANTIAGO, September 9, 1915—1 p. m.

[Received 2:40 p. m.]

I believe Chilean Government can be brought to accept substantially the President's plan. Minister for Foreign Affairs is ready to open negotiations with me with that end in view. I have read the telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office and Suárez on the subject and the Minister has offered to place all the papers in my hands. Would the President and the Department like to have me proceed with the negotiations here?

FLETCHER

710.11/205½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 11 September, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am so exceedingly anxious to push this matter to an early settlement that I hope that you will authorize Fletcher to go ahead by all means, if you think we can do this without discourtesy to Suárez, through whom we have been able to do virtually nothing in this affair.

I regard it as of the utmost importance that these negotiations be completed and carried to a successful outcome at this particular time.

Am I right in understanding that Brazil has assented in all essential particulars?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

710.11/206½

*Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State*¹²

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Sometime early in January of this year the President requested me to see the Ambassadors of the A. B. C. Powers and ascertain from them whether or not they would be willing to join the United States in a convention which would guarantee the political and territorial integrity of the North, Central and South American Republics under republican forms of government.

Also if they would be willing to agree that all manufacture of munitions of war should be owned by the governments of the respective countries.

¹² A notation attached to this paper reads: "This is for a record which you told me you desired. E. M. H. I shall hope to see you tomorrow."

The President wrote these two articles himself and I took them first to the Argentine Ambassador whom we thought would perhaps be most sympathetic. The Ambassador received the proposal cordially, after I had outlined to him just what the President had in mind. I called his attention to the fact that there was a military party in the United States just as there was in other countries, and after President Wilson relinquished office, there was a possibility of a military policy being adopted. I said if this happened it was quite probable that instead of following the path laid down by President Wilson there might be a sentiment for expansion. I told him there was sure to be a large part of the people who would want to try out the military and naval machine. If this should happen, no one could tell the final outcome.

I told him, too, that the President thought the time had come when this nation should cease to assume a guardianship over its sister republics and to ask them to come into partnership. I explained it was the President's intention to approach the A. B. C. Powers first and later to approach the smaller republics, either directly or through the A. B. C.

The Ambassador was very much in favor of permitting the A. B. C. Powers [to] deal with the smaller republics, and it was tacitly agreed that this should be done. He spoke of writing to his government in regard to the proposal, to which I objected and asked him to cable it so we might hear in a few days.

He was filled with enthusiasm and declared that the proposal was almost epoch making, and that he was sure it would be cordially received by his people. He doubted, however, whether Chile would be agreeable because of her territorial aspirations. . . .

The Ambassador begged me to give him the original draft which the President had written, saying he believed it would be an historic document of enormous interest. I gave it to him and he wrote with his own hand a copy for me to use with the other Ambassadors.

I had a similar reception by the Brazilian Ambassador, and I gave him practically the same argument. The discussion followed largely along the lines I have mentioned with Naón.

The Chilean Ambassador was somewhat less receptive and showed a disposition to delay. He brought up at once the question of their boundary conflict with Peru—a subject about which I had informed myself in advance so as to be able to discuss the matter with intelligence.

I told him the President had in mind that there should be an article in the convention which would permit a reasonable time for the settlement of such disputes and a mode of procedure. This seemed to satisfy him.

All three ambassadors promised an answer within a few days. The one came first from Argentine and was entirely favorable. Then Brazil was heard from to the same effect. Chile, later gave an equivocal consent. This was a few days before my departure for Europe, and the President requested me to acquaint Mr. Bryan with what had been done and ask him to carry it to a conclusion.

Mr. Bryan was receptive, but suggested that his peace treaties should be also concluded between them. He wanted to know if there was any objection to this. The President said there was not.

I heard nothing from the matter while abroad until sometime in April when the President cabled me that the Chilian Ambassador had said he was under the impression that I had agreed in my conversation with him that the covenant should not be binding unless all of the A. B. C. Powers concurred. I cabled the President that there was no such understanding, and that probably the Ambassador had in mind the tacit consent that the smaller republics should be approached by the A. B. C. powers rather than by us directly.

This, Mr. Secretary, is a record of what occurred through me. I do not know what Mr. Bryan did.

Of course you understand that the President's purpose is to broaden the Monroe Doctrine so that it may be upheld by all the American Republics instead of by the United States alone as now.

Sincerely yours,

E. M. HOUSE

NEW YORK, *October 12, 1915.*

710.11/211½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *October 26, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS I telephoned you yesterday I took up the matter of the general Pan-American treaty with the Argentine Ambassador on the 20th, handing him the revised form which we had agreed upon—a copy of which I enclose.¹³ At the time he said that there would be, he feared, considerable objection to the arbitration provision in the second article in that it placed a time limit upon the settlement of disputed territorial claims.

The following day he sent me a counter-draft which I enclose for your consideration.¹³ I do not think that the terms of article two meet the essential feature of amicable settlement of disputes which the original draft covers by providing arbitral proceedings. I do think, however, that there is something to be said as to the removal

¹³ Not printed.

of the time limit since it might prevent objection particularly from Chile.

I shall endeavor to see the Chilean Ambassador today or tomorrow in regard to this matter and would like your comments on the Argentine Ambassador's counter-draft as soon as you can conveniently give them to me.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

710.11/212½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 27 October, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I agree with your judgment about this. I think the only concession we can afford to make, if these articles are indeed to serve as any sort of a model for the action of other nations at any time, is to remove the definite time limit in Article Two; and that Article Three should stand as in our original. The new Article Three proposed by the Argentine Ambassador seems to me distinctly inferior to the original. It does not include the necessary reservation of questions of national honour, etc., upon which our Senate would certainly insist, and it seems to end nowhere, but to leave the whole thing vague. Do you not think so?

Article Two should, I think, provide that disputed questions of territory should be settled as promptly as possible, i. e., diligently pushed to a settlement.

Faithfully Yours,

WOODROW WILSON

710.11/213½

The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1915.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: I enclose to you a copy of a memorandum which was agreed upon in our conversation the other day with the President.¹⁴ I gave a copy to the Argentine Ambassador who doubted the advisability of having a fixed time set for the settlement of boundary disputes. With him I am more or less in agreement but I do not approve of his counter-draft of which a copy is enclosed.¹⁵

I finally saw the Chilean Ambassador yesterday in regard to the matter and he is agreeable to have the matter taken up directly with his Government through our Ambassador, which I believe will

¹⁴ Not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

¹⁵ Not printed.

be the better way. I think I overcame his objection to the guarantee of political independence but I think there will be opposition to the submission to arbitration of disputed territory between Chile and Peru on account of the importance of the territory to Chile in its relation to the nitrate deposits. He asked me to delay two or three days before taking the matter up with his Government, in order that he could communicate with them in regard to it. I of course had no option but to agree to this.

I wrote the President the other day in regard to the Argentine Ambassador's conversation with me and his objection to a time limit in the matter of the settlement of boundary disputes, and he is agreeable to leaving it indefinite, with the understanding that they shall be settled as soon as possible.

I hope that I can push matters more rapidly now. The difficulty has been to get in touch with the Chilean Ambassador.

Is there any prospect of your being in Washington again soon?

With warm regards [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

710.11/214‡

Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

DEAR MR. LANSING: Thank you for your letter of October 28th with enclosures.

I am delighted to know that things are moving along so rapidly. I agree with the Argentine Ambassador as to the inadvisability of having a fixed time for the settlement of boundary disputes.

It is not an essential part of our proposal and the amendment he suggests is sufficient. The first article is the essence of the covenant, and if we can cling to that in its entirety, the President will have succeeded in his purpose.

My going to Washington is uncertain, but I hope to be there week after next.

With all good wishes [etc.]

E. M. HOUSE

NEW YORK, *October 30, 1915.*

710.11/214‡a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *November 3, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Chilean Ambassador called to see me yesterday and informed me that he had communicated with his Government and that the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs had said something to Mr. Fletcher about the proposed propositions for a Pan-American treaty, but had not intended to indicate to him that

the Government desired to transfer the negotiations to Santiago. I explained to the Ambassador that Mr. Fletcher had merely drawn that conclusion from having been approached on the subject and that of course it was in no way desired to have the negotiations conducted other than here in Washington if it was agreeable to his Government. . . .

The attitude of the Chilean Ambassador toward me in this matter is one of the greatest friendliness and from a conversation I had with him a short time ago I believe that he can be persuaded to advise his Government in favor of the propositions as drafted. He told me that the first proposition, granting territorial and political integrity, had been presented to him by Mr. Bryan with practically no explanation as to the meaning. After talking it over with him he felt that it was far less objectionable than he had supposed and he believed that his Government would not seriously object to it. Of course it is the first proposition which is the essence of the compact and if we can secure his adhesion to that we can, in all probability, remove anything objectionable in the other propositions.

I will at once redraft the propositions eliminating the matter of time in the settlement of boundary disputes, and submit to you.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

710.11/214½b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I send you herewith a revise of the four propositions to form a basis of a Pan-American Convention.¹⁷ I have drafted these after consultation with Ambassador Naón who is heartily in favor of the plan as you know, and who understands the objections which have been raised by the Chilean Ambassador in particular to the original form.

Article II, you will see, I have greatly abbreviated because if the time for settlement is eliminated it would be better for the negotiations in my opinion to take this shorter form and not enter into such details as the constitution of the arbitral tribunal which is to settle the disputes.

You will observe that I have added a new article (Article IV) in place of the one which covered the control of the manufacture and sale of arms and ammunition. In order to prevent hostile action between neighbors it is necessary, I think, to bind the parties not

¹⁷ Not enclosed with file copy of this letter; for a later draft of the articles for the proposed treaty, see p. 495.

to assist insurgents or revolutionists in the country. Such aid is a source of constant irritation in Central American countries and as you know it is one of the causes of disorder in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. I think, too, it is not unusual in South America. I believe that the article would be received with general approval and I cannot conceive of any serious objection to it.

If these articles, as revised, meet with your approval I will at once take the matter up with Ambassador Suárez with the hope that I can secure his adhesion and willingness to make a favorable report to his Government.¹⁸

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

710.11/2151a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In regard to the Pan American Treaty—I have seen, in addition to the Ambassadors, nine of the ministers, and given them copies of the four articles. They all express personal delight at the Treaty and feel sure that their governments will be glad to enter into such a convention. I have still the representatives of three other countries to see, and hope to do so tomorrow.

The number of persons who know of this plan makes the possibility of secrecy very difficult, in fact, some of the papers have already got hold of the fact that there is some plan on foot for a Pan American Agreement, or conference in line with the address which I made on Monday. I have, since being questioned by one of the reporters on the subject, notified all the Ambassadors and Ministers to be kind enough to keep the matter secret. I had already told them that the matter was confidential when I gave them the memorandum, but I am afraid that they have showed it to some of their fellow-countrymen who are here attending the Scientific Congress and so a considerable number are undoubtedly in possession of the fact that we are attempting to unite the Americas in an agreement of some sort. I thought I would tell you this so that you will understand if you see anything in the papers on the subject.

Yesterday Ambassador Suárez said to me that he was in hopes of receiving from his Government an acceptance of the plan and that he was most desirous to obtain it and felt sure if a little time was given he could do so. His change of attitude is certainly interesting.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

¹⁸ President Wilson replied on November 15, expressing his approval.

710.11/224a

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *January 6, 1916.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since I communicated with you this morning I have had an opportunity to look over some of the newspapers and I find a general idea prevails that the plan of a Pan American Treaty involves the guarantee of republican forms of government.

It seems to me it would be well, therefore, if possible, for you to make clear tonight¹⁹ that the plan does not contemplate a guaranty of republican forms of government, but removes from the benefit of the guaranty of territory and independence a nation which abandons the republican form. The guaranty of a republican form would, of course, be a direct interference with the internal affairs of a country and entirely contrary to the views which we have expressed and the course which we have followed in regard to the sovereign right of a people to decide their domestic questions without outside interference.

I make this suggestion in view of the opposition which may be aroused, not only in this country, but in other American republics, if it is thought that there is any plan to coerce the people of a sovereign state in the conduct of their internal affairs.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

710.11/230

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *January 24, 1916.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I send you herewith a telegram,²⁰ of which I assume you have received a flimsy, in relation to Chile's attitude in regard to the Pan American Treaty. I also send a communication which I have just received from the Brazilian Ambassador,²⁰ which indicates that influences are at work to defeat the purposes of the treaty. Da Gama assured me over two months ago, that there was no doubt but that his Government would endorse the principle of the treaty, as he had been assured by it to that effect. I do not know what influences are at work but I have my suspicions.

¹⁹ In President Wilson's speech before the Second Pan American Scientific Congress.

²⁰ Not printed.

I think the Chilean objection is directed to the Third Article proposed, which embodies the principle of the Bryan Peace Treaties and makes arbitration compulsory.

Please return these documents for the files, after reading.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

710.11/224½b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *March 9, 1916.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose a memorandum ²¹ which was handed to me this morning by the Chilean Ambassador in regard to the four articles which were submitted as a basis for a Pan American Treaty. You will observe that the second article of those we proposed is entirely omitted. That article, you will recall, deals with the endeavor to settle as soon as possible all boundary disputes by amicable agreement or by arbitration.

I will be glad to talk with you about this memorandum or, if you prefer, please give me your views in writing as to what comment it would be well to make to the Ambassador.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

710.11/264a

The Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *March 17, 1916.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Argentine Ambassador called here on Wednesday, the 15th, and I took up with him the subject of the treaties with the Central and South American Republics along the line you indicated in our talk on Tuesday.

He quite agreed with you that it would be well to go ahead without Chile . . . He suggested that as a possible compromise, the provision in regard to the guaranteeing territorial integrity could be drawn to provide for arbitration in case of disputes arising in the future, and that a clause should be added providing that in cases of existing disputes, these should be settled within a limited period through diplomatic channels. After these disputes were settled, then the treaty should apply to the disputed territory.

He has asked for an interview with you and will probably discuss this matter at that interview. In the meantime it would be worth while considering whether the compromise he suggests has any merit.

²¹ Not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

If, in your opinion, it has no merit, negotiations could be begun for concluding the treaties of the countries that have accepted the original terms.

Yours faithfully,

FRANK L. POLK

710.11/225 $\frac{1}{2}$

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I understand that Fletcher has arrived to make ready to go to Mexico. It occurs to me that he will know more familiarly than any of the rest of us do the exact sentiment of the Government of Chile with regard to the Pan-American agreement. It occurs to me that he ought to learn from House all that House originally ascertained when he began the negotiations about this agreement at my request, while Mr. Bryan was Secretary. I would appreciate it very much if you would write Mr. House a letter asking him to work with Fletcher and give him what knowledge he has concerning the matter. It is probable that Fletcher may be of real service to us in this matter of dealing with the Latin-American countries because of his long familiarity with the political atmosphere of the southern continent. Perhaps it would be well, also, to send for Fletcher and have him down here as soon as he has seen House.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

710.11/225 $\frac{1}{2}$ b

The Secretary of State to the Argentine Ambassador (Naón)

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: IN accordance with my promise, I beg to enclose for your information a copy of the proposed Pan American Treaty.

I am [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure]

Draft Articles for Proposed Pan-American Treaty

ARTICLE I

That the high contracting parties to this solemn covenant and agreement hereby join one another in a common and mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms of government.

ARTICLE II

To give definitive application to the guarantee set forth in Article I. the high contracting parties severally covenant to endeavor forthwith to reach a settlement of all disputes as to boundaries or territory now pending between them by amicable agreement or by means of international arbitration.

ARTICLE III

That the high contracting parties further agree, First, that all questions, of whatever character, arising between any two or more of them which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomatic correspondence shall, before any declaration of war or beginning of hostilities, be first submitted to a permanent international commission for investigation, one year being allowed for such investigation; and, Second, that if the dispute is not settled by investigation, to submit the same to arbitration, provided the question in dispute does not affect the honour, independence, or vital interests of the nations concerned or the interests of third parties.

ARTICLE IV

To the end that domestic tranquility may prevail within their territories the high contracting parties further severally covenant and agree that they will not permit the departure from their respective jurisdictions of any military or naval expedition hostile to the established government of any of the high contracting parties, and that they will prevent the exportation from their respective jurisdictions of arms, ammunition or other munitions of war destined to or for the use of any person or persons notified to be in insurrection or revolt against the established government of any of the high contracting parties.

710.11/2273

The Ambassador to Mexico (Fletcher) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 9, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. LANSING: No progress has been made in the negotiation of the Pan-American treaty during your absence. On the 27th of June Naón informed me that he was not willing to proceed to the signature of the treaty without consulting his Government, on account of the tense United States-Mexican situation. He promised to let me know as soon as he was in a position to proceed. He has not done so. Lauro Müller²² arrived in New York on the 18th.

²² Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Wright²³ had two interviews with him, but got nothing definite from him on the subject of the treaty. Ambassador da Gama seems to think that it would be unfortunate to go ahead with the treaty without Chile, and that we would lose all the ground we have lately gained along the lines of true Pan-Americanism. Mr. Lauro Müller is expected to return from French Lick in about a week.

In view of the check put on the negotiation by Mr. Naón's unwillingness to agree to sign, I could not open out the treaty to the other Republics. So the matter rests *in statu quo*.

Chile is definitely and decidedly opposed to the treaty. The *Mercurio*—speaking for the Government—characterizes it, in its 4th of July editorial, as a “convention which involves vague and indeterminate powers of intervention in the entire continent” and goes on to say that Chile does not desire to remain isolated; that she understands her continental duties and has lent her assistance or has taken important initiatives tending to establish that policy. But Chile sustains that the Pan-Americanism of concord and equality is a measure of union, but that Pan-Americanism of predominance is a serious obstacle to guaranteeing that cordiality which is indispensable in foreign affairs. A treaty which would give *de facto* preponderance to one part of the continent over the other would tend to destroy true Pan-American confraternity. It is becoming generally known among the diplomats in Washington that Chile objects to the treaty, and the British Ambassador insinuated to me that the negotiations which Chile is said to be carrying on now with representatives of the Deutsche Bank in New York for a loan might be attributed to the lack of agreement between Chile and the United States over this treaty. I do not believe this is the case, but on the other hand I feel sure that if we go on without Chile, that is, isolating her from the American concert, she will turn naturally elsewhere in finance and trade, and that gradually a spirit of hostility against the United States will be engendered.

My advices from Chile show that they believe we are going ahead with the treaty, and they feel that we are placing them unnecessarily in a false position. If, therefore, neither Argentina nor Brazil really means to go ahead, I think we should know it and act accordingly; otherwise we are uselessly and needlessly alienating the goodwill of Chile.

H. P. F[LETCHER]

²³ J. B. Wright, Acting Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, Department of State.

710.11/319a

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *April 8, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose for your consideration the report of a conversation which Mr. Polk had Saturday with the Brazilian Ambassador in regard to the Pan-American Treaty.²⁴

I assume from what Mr. Polk told me of his interview that Müller desired speedy action, that is, a negotiation of the treaty prior to Brazil's entering the war. It is just possible that the Brazilian Government would like to use the treaty as another excuse for declaring war against Germany, a course of action which it seems certain will be pursued, though I do not think so.

I am not prepared yet to give you my opinion as to the wisdom of signing such a treaty at the present time. It might in certain circumstances (for example, Argentina's friendliness for Germany) cause much embarrassment. It might of course draw some of the smaller American Republics into the war, but I am not at all sure that would be a benefit as we might have to aid them.

It requires, I think, very careful consideration before we decide.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

710.11/319b

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *April 17, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Ambassador da Gama has been absent from the city and also ill so that I have not taken up with him the Pan American Treaty. This enforced delay has given me time to think the matter over carefully, and there are some difficulties which seem involved if a general invitation is issued to all the countries to the south of us.

For example, it might be that a signatory to the Treaty would become an ally of Germany against her European enemies (I am thinking particularly of Mexico where the oil wells at Tampico may cause trouble). In that event would we be bound under the Treaty to maintain the guarantee of territorial integrity with force of arms? Or it might be that a signatory might permit its territory to become the base of German military or naval operations (as might be the case of Ecuador in regard to the Galapagos Islands, or of Colombia in regard to her coasts). Could we observe the territorial integrity of the nation permitting this? Or could we do so if a Latin Amer-

²⁴ Report not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

ican country permitted its territory to become a refuge for Germans where they could conspire and carry on their propaganda in this country and other countries?

Possibly this difficulty could be cured by limiting at present the signatories to such governments as declare war against Germany, sever relations with that Government, or declare a benevolent neutrality with the assurance that they will only enter the war on our side or as our ally.

Furthermore under the guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence would the other signatories be bound to declare war against Germany? If it could be so interpreted, what I have said above has no weight. But could it be, unless our territory or waters were actually invaded by the Germans?

These are the questions which have been running through my mind and I would like your opinion upon them.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

710.11/319½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 19 April, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The answers to the important questions you here raise are reasonably clear to me. (By the way, I do not find among my papers here the Brazilian proposals you spoke of the other day).

If any one of the signatories to our proposed Pan-American treaty should become an ally of Germany against her European enemies, we would undoubtedly be bound to protect her against any loss of territory or any curtailment of her political independence that any of the Entente group might attempt; but we would be obliged to do that in any case, under the Monroe Doctrine.

Should any one of the signatories permit its territory to be used as a base of military or naval operations against us, it would manifestly be acting in contravention of the patent meaning of the pact and we would be free to act as if there were no pact.

As for "influences" and propaganda, we could not prevent them, any more than Great Britain has been able to prevent them in the United States, where they were very formidable, though they of course did not have the countenance of the Government.

I do not see that the other signatories would in the present circumstances be obliged to declare war on Germany. They would be obliged to come to our assistance with arms only when our political independence or territorial integrity were evidently and immediately threatened.

These questions do not seem to me to constitute difficulties of practical importance. If we can meet Brazil's wishes sufficiently to get her adherence to the pact, I shall feel warranted in pressing on. It seems to me that this is the very time when such a league would make the deepest impression and have the greatest moral effect on both sides of the water.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

710.11/343a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1917—6 p. m.

Department is not sending to you the text of the Pan American treaty which you were informed prior to your departure from the United States would be cabled to you, as it does not desire you to take up this question with the Government of Brazil at this time.

LANSING

PURCHASE OF THE DANISH WEST INDIES

711.5914/30½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State ad interim

WASHINGTON, 16 June, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have read these papers through with close attention, and thank you for handing them to me.¹

As I said to you yesterday, I am, and have long been, deeply interested in the purchase of the Danish West Indies. I hope that you will take the matter up very seriously and that it may be possible to have a concrete proposal, if possible in the form of a treaty, to lay before the Senate at its next session.

Cordially and Sincerely,

W. W.

711.5914/46½

President Wilson to the Acting Secretary of State (Polk)

WASHINGTON, 30 September, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. POLK: Thank you for sending me the enclosed.² This is a matter I am keenly interested in and hope we can follow up in the right way and at the right moment to a consummation.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

711.5914/47½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Danish Minister (Brun)

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1915.

The Danish Minister called this morning to say that he had received from his Government another dispatch in regard to the suggested sale to the United States of the Danish West Indies. He said that he was under a considerable embarrassment about a question which his Government had asked but which he had hesitated to present to me. It was this: Whether he thought that in case the Danish

¹ Papers concerning negotiations with Denmark, 1899-1902; for correspondence previously printed on these earlier negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, pp. 457-544; for correspondence previously printed concerning negotiations with Denmark in 1915, 1916, and 1917, see *ibid.*, pp. 538-706.

² Telegram No. 173, Sept. 16, 1915, from the Minister in Denmark, *ibid.*, p. 595.

Government did not agree to a sale of the Islands whether the United States would feel it necessary to take possession of them.

I told the Minister that while I had not had in mind such action at the present time, as I had hoped that some form of negotiations would result in the transfer of the sovereignty of the Islands to this Government, that I could conceive of circumstances which would compel such an act on our part. He asked me what those circumstances were, and I replied that the possible consequence of absorption of Denmark by a great power would create a situation which it would be difficult to meet other than by occupation of the Islands, and such action would undoubtedly cause serious consequences.

The other circumstance was that if Denmark voluntarily, or under coercion, transferred title to the Danish West Indies to another European power, which would seek to convert them into a naval base.

He said that he appreciated our position and would communicate with his Government. I urged him to lay before his Government the possibility of preserving by special privilege all the commercial opportunities which the ownership of the Islands gave to Denmark, even if the sovereignty was ceded to the United States and that I was convinced that such transfer would be acceptable to this Government.

ROBERT LANSING

711.5914/48½

*The Danish Minister (Brun) to the Secretary of State*³

PARAPHRASE OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED ON NOVEMBER 25TH FROM THE
DANISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

“As I have already advised you in an earlier cablegram, the cession of the Danish West India Islands would in Denmark be felt as a great national loss, and only under the pressure of necessity would our country consider consenting to such a step.

When however the United States, in spite of their friendly feelings towards us and notwithstanding their respect for our sovereign rights, consider it possible that, in the situations which have been suggested, circumstances could compel them to occupy the islands, and as Denmark for this reason must count on being in the future so situated with regard to the islands, that it, if it declines to enter into negotiations, will constantly have to fear being drawn into an international conflict in the situations which have been suggested, then our country is placed in such a position that it will not be able to refuse to consider a proposition from the United States, if such a proposition should be made.”

³ This paper bears the notation: “Recd from Danish Minister Dec. 1, 1915 RL.”

711.5914/48ja

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *December 4, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall that I told you of the informal conversations I have had with the Danish Minister in regard to the purchase by this Government of the Danish West Indies. As doubtless the course of these negotiations have slipped your memory I will repeat what took place.

In October I spoke to the Danish Minister of the desire of this Government to consider the purchase of the Islands if agreeable to his Government, and that I would be pleased if he would communicate with the Danish Foreign Office in regard to this matter, keeping it of course entirely informal at present. Some days later he replied to my inquiry that his Government at the present time would not negotiate upon the subject as they had very large commercial interests which were vastly increased by the construction of the Panama Canal. I then suggested to him that we might, in case his Government would consider the purchase, incorporate certain commercial privileges in favor of Danish subjects, as our interest in the Islands was largely naval.

About the first of November he communicated this second proposition to his Government, adding what I had said in a general way that under certain conditions the United States might find it necessary to occupy the Islands in case Denmark should lose sovereignty over them.

On November 15th the Minister again called to see me about the matter and said he was under considerable embarrassment about a question which his Government had asked, but which he had hesitated to present to me. The question was this: "Whether he thought in case the Danish Government did not agree to a sale of the Islands the United States would feel it necessary to take possession of them."

In reply I told the Minister that while it had not been in my mind that action of this sort would be necessary, as I had hoped some formal negotiation would result in the transfer of the sovereignty, that I could conceive of circumstances which would compel such an act on our part. He asked me what these circumstances were and I replied that they were the ones to which I had previously called his attention, namely, the possible consequence of absorption of Denmark by one of the great powers of Europe. Such a loss of sovereignty would create a situation which it would be difficult to meet other than by occupation of the Islands, in view of the fact that Danish possessions would come under a different sovereignty in Europe and in case it did, the result might be very serious.

The other circumstance was that if Denmark voluntarily, or under coercion, transferred title to the Islands to another European power, which would seek to convert them into a naval base.

The Minister called upon me on the first and left a paraphrase of a cablegram received by him on the 25th ultimo from the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs of which I enclose you a copy.⁴

I also enclose a telegram just received from our Minister at Copenhagen,⁵ which is in line with the paraphrase.

I believe we are now in a position to enter into negotiations for the purchase of the Islands. You will observe that the question of Greenland is involved. I do not think it is of material importance, but propose to ask to what extent possession is intended, because much of the Island is still unexplored. I believe that Denmark will ask a very considerable sum for the Islands but we will know more when we begin negotiations.

If the reply to our inquiry in regard to Greenland is satisfactory I will, with your consent, proceed to the direct negotiations of a treaty of cession.

I think I should add that in my opinion the Danish Government very possibly considers the Islands a menace to their sovereignty in Europe in that if the Islands are coveted by another European power the easiest method, and possibly the only method by which they could obtain legal possession of the Islands, would be their absorption of the Danish sovereignty.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

711.5914/49½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 5 December, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am glad the Danish Minister gave you an opportunity to be so frank with him, and I hope he realizes how entirely friendly to Denmark the frankness was. It would appear from the enclosed message from the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs⁶ that he does.

I hope that you will do as you suggest, namely, first ascertain just what is meant by the occupation of Greenland and, should that matter be satisfactorily cleared up, proceed at once to the negotiation of a treaty for the purchase of the Danish West Indies. The opportu-

⁴ *Supra.*

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 502.

nity has apparently come, and we may be able to relieve the Danish Government of a considerable embarrassment.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

711.5914/531

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose for your information a memorandum of an interview which I had yesterday with the Danish Minister. My own belief is that Denmark will come to the figure of \$20,000,000 and that it will be possible to negotiate a treaty of cession with that amount as a consideration. I will advise you in case I hear further from the Danish Minister or from Mr. Egan.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of an Interview With the Danish Minister (Brun), December 27, 1915

The Danish Minister called on me this afternoon and stated that he had received word from his Government that they had made an offer to negotiate for the sale of the Danish West Indies on the basis of a hundred million kroner which, the Minister said, equal \$27,000,000. I told Mr. Brun that this Government would consider such an amount too great a consideration for the Islands—that we were not good bargainers, and when I suggested that \$20,000,000 might form a basis for negotiation I had stated the maximum sum which this Government was willing to consider—that he must understand, being here in America, the difficulties at the present time which the Government was having in raising sufficient funds for carrying out a policy of preparedness and that he must know that any such sum as \$27,000,000 would, in all probability, be disapproved by Congress; that I hoped, therefore, he would explain this fully to his Government and I thought when they understood the situation they would be willing to modify their figures.

The Minister also spoke to me about the desire of his Government to obtain from this Government an agreement by protocol that it would not object to the extension of Danish occupation of Greenland. I told him that the Danish West Indies and Greenland should be combined in one negotiation; that Denmark had something which we desired, and that evidently we had something which Denmark desired; that it seemed to me it would be possibly the most advisable way to incorporate the two subjects in one treaty rather than to

have a treaty of cession of the Danish West Indies and a protocol relating to Greenland. The Minister said he had no objection to adopting this course.

He also left with me a memorandum relative to Greenland⁷ which embodied instructions which he had received from his Government.

The Minister left with the understanding that he would communicate fully to his Government the views which had been expressed by me.

ROBERT LANSING

711.5914/54½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

HOT SPRINGS, VA., 29 December, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you very much for these memoranda. I think the tack you took with the Danish Minister a very serviceable one, and feel that, on the whole, the negotiations look quite promising.

Cordially and faithfully Yours,

WOODBROW WILSON

711.5914/55½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Danish Minister left with me this noon a paraphrase of a cablegram which he had received yesterday from his Government—a copy of which is herewith enclosed.⁷

You will perceive that the Danish Government continues to insist upon their previously stated consideration for the Danish West Indies, namely, 100,000,000 kroner, which is equivalent to \$27,000,000. I would like your views in regard to the matter. I confess that the amount seems to me large. At the same time I believe the purchase of the Islands would meet with general approval in view of the public opinion of the country in regard to national defense. I should dislike very much to see the negotiations fail, or the treaty if negotiated, fail on account of the amount agreed upon as the purchase price.

Do you think it would be well for you to take the matter up with Senator Stone, or any other Senators, in order to find out their opinion as to what the temper of the Senate would be in case we made a treaty on the basis of \$27,000,000?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

⁷ Not printed.

711.5914/56½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 7 January, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The acquisition of the Danish West Indies seems to me of sufficient importance to justify us in negotiating on the basis of twenty-seven millions. I think it would be a mistake to break off at this evidently opportune time on a question of money, within reasonable bounds.

I take it, from your letter, that your own judgment is the same.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

711.5914/57½

The Danish Minister (Brun) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1916.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: In accordance with our conversation on January 19th I at once cabled to the Danish Government suggesting that they should agree to a sum of 25 (twenty five) Million Dollars being named as a base for the negotiation and consideration of a treaty for the transfer of the Danish West India Islands to the sovereignty of the United States.

I am today in receipt of a cablegram from the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs authorizing me to agree to the said proposition.

The Minister adds that he will now expect to receive a draft of the treaty to be negotiated between you and myself, and he also submits to you that for reasons which I believe are obvious it is desirable that the matter should be proceeded with as speedily as possible.

Believe me [etc.]

C. BRUN

711.5914/57½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose for your consideration the draft of a treaty with Denmark,⁸ providing for the cession of the Danish West Indies, in consideration of Twenty-five Millions of Dollars. I hope you will find it possible to give this speedy attention, as I think we should close the matter up as promptly as possible, provided you agree with me as to the advisability of this action.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 604.

In regard to Article III,¹⁰ Item 3, my suggestion would be to make that conditional upon exhibition of the original documents, and their examination by our Minister at Copenhagen.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

711.5914/823a

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Stone)

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1916.

MY DEAR SENATOR STONE: With respect to the proposed treaty with Denmark ceding the Danish West Indies to the United States, which is now before your Committee, perhaps I may be allowed to say that it is, to my mind, of the greatest importance that the treaty should be reported out of the Committee as soon as possible, so that the treaty can be considered by the Senate before adjournment. I have already stated to the Committee orally that while one of the prior treaties for the transfer of the Islands was based on strategic grounds, and the other on political grounds, the present treaty is based on both grounds. The particulars as to both of these grounds I need not mention, as Senators who have followed the progress of the international relations of the United States and the expansion of American interests in Central America will readily perceive the force of these grounds upon which I hesitate to write in detail.

As to immediate ratification of the treaty by the United States, I may add that when the treaty was signed it was agreed that it should be submitted at once to the Senate, and the Danish Parliament, and prompt action by them urged, in order to avoid a delay which might develop unforeseen difficulties in the consummation of the treaty. As I have told you, ratification of the treaty by Denmark has been deferred by the Danish Parliament until a new election can be held in October and November. This, however, should not, I think, cause the United States to delay its action on the treaty, for to do so would not only be contrary to the arrangement made with the Danish Government at the time of signature, but such action, as I understand the situation, could not be supported by any good reason. Certainly it could not, I think, be looked upon by Denmark, in view of the arrangement at the time of signature, as in any way bringing pressure to bear upon her to ratify the treaty. In fact, to defer the ratification here might give the opposition in Denmark some capital for arguing that the transfer could be de-

¹⁰ Article III should begin after the phrase "parsonages appertaining thereto," *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 605, l. 8 (see telegrams, *ibid.*, pp. 607, 608).

ferred until the close of the present war, on account of the little interest shown in the matter by the United States. If it is the opinion of your Committee that the treaty should be favorably reported by it and passed upon by the Senate before adjournment, it seems to me wise that this action should be taken immediately, as otherwise opponents to the consummation of the treaty, if there are any—I know of none—will have opportunity to endeavor to show reasons why the treaty should not be ratified. What these grounds might be, I do not know, but it is conceivable that the terms of the treaty might become known through some source or other, and that as a result certain business interests in the Islands might feel dissatisfied with its provisions and might cause pressure to be brought to prevent the ratification of the treaty. You will doubtless be able to conceive of other conditions which might arise inimicable to the Convention.

On the whole, therefore, I am strongly of the opinion that your Committee and the Senate should act on this treaty at the earliest moment, as I can see no reasonable ground why such action should be postponed, while every reason persuades me that it should be immediate.

Believe me [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

711.5914/218a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *February 14, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I would like to call your attention to the enclosed telegram sent over from the Navy Department.¹¹ I think it would be very unfortunate at the present time that our naval officers are being so active in connection with the Danish West Indies, as it is almost certain to become public and if so may arouse considerable resentment in Congress and impair the course of the necessary legislation for acquiring the Islands. It seems to me that this matter of taking possession of the Islands rests primarily with you and before anything is done I would like to talk with you on the subject.

I suggest therefore that something be done to stop our naval officers from acting without authority in these matters.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

¹¹ Not printed; outlined plans of naval representatives in the West Indies for the formal transfer of the Islands.

711.5914/218½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 15 February, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would suggest that you have a talk with the Secretary of the Navy about this, telling him with entire frankness what you think the dangers and prudences of the situation are. He will see at once what is involved, and will wish, I am sure, to cooperate with you in every way.

I am sure that all that his officers are doing now is to keep an eye on what is happening in and about the islands and to get as much useful information as possible,—both very wise things to do, if wisely done. We have to be watchful at every exposed point as to what is afoot.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

711.5914/218½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: By the treaty of cession of August 4, 1916¹² we are bound to pay over to Denmark the twenty-five million dollars and take possession of the Danish West Indies before April 17th. That leaves us less than a month to make the arrangements for the formal delivery of the islands and payment of the money, which in view of the necessary communications with Copenhagen is a very short time. We ought to start without delay.

You have not indicated to me whether you have decided to have the War or Navy Department take control of the provisional government. That is of course the first question to be determined, because we must consult with the officials of the Department selected as to the formalities and the officers to administer the affairs of the islands. After this is decided I will name an official of the State Department to consult with an official of the other Department and also with the Danish Minister as to the procedure to be followed.

On account of the naval importance of the new acquisition as well as the marked efficiency shown by the naval officers in the conduct of affairs in Haiti and the Dominican Republic I personally favor the assignment of the duty of Government for the present to the Navy Department, although I realize that the War Department is especially equipped for administration of insular possessions. In voicing this opinion I do not intend to criticize in any way the War

¹² *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 694.

Department, which would undoubtedly do well in the administration of the civil government of the islands. My opinion is based on the fact that from the viewpoint of national defense the problems are essentially naval and that the administration of affairs and control of the public properties and improvements should be subordinated to the plans and purposes of the General Board of the Navy. I fear that with the War Department in control there might be failure to carry out these plans and purposes properly and there is always the possibility of friction as to the policies to be adopted.

I hope that you will be able to give me very promptly a decision in this matter as I feel that there is no time to lose in arranging for the formal delivery of the islands.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

711.5914/218½b

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *March 26, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the matter of taking over the Danish West Indies, I propose, if it meets with your approval, to send Mr. Phillips to go through the formalities of transfer. I had hoped that either you or I could do this, but of course that is out of the question now.

May I ask you to let me know if this meets with your approval, because the time to make the necessary arrangements is growing very short?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

711.5914/219½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *27 March, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I entirely approve. In view of recent despatches from Denmark, would it be possible to complete the transfer before the Congress meets,—I mean, of course, so far as the payment of the money is concerned and the formal transfer of title? I hope that this can be arranged.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

COLOMBIA

711.21/328a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been studying the proposed Colombian treaty,¹ of which I have had a very superficial knowledge since Mr. Bryan handled the matter without discussing it with me. As a result I know very little of the objections raised by the Senate. Whatever they were they seem to have been effective thus far in preventing consent.

As I recall the press reports, one of the objections, of which much was made, was the so-called "apology" (expression of regret) by this Government; and another was that the amount to be paid to Colombia was considered excessive.

The first objection might possibly be removed by an expression of mutual regret instead of one by our Government alone. Perhaps it will not be thought politic to do this, but I am so anxious to see the treaty accepted by the Senate that any suggestion which would remove objections seems to me worthy of consideration. I append a tentative redraft of Article I in line with this suggestion.²

In view of the known opposition in this country to the amount to be paid to Colombia might not the consent of that government be obtained to reduce it? Would it be worth while to attempt to have that government agree to such reduction? I believe that in view of the present financial situation of this Government as a result of the European War, the objection as to amount will be stronger than before. I would suggest, therefore, that whatever the total sum may be, this objection would be weakened by amending the terms of payment in some manner such as the following:

(a) Change method of payment of the indemnity in Article III. Instead of payment being made "within six months" the article to read "immediately upon the exchange of ratifications etc. the sum of five million dollars gold, U. S. money, and a similar sum on the same day of three successive years thereafter." If necessary, this might be changed to four successive years; again making the total twenty-five millions.

¹ For correspondence previously printed on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1914, pp. 146 ff., *ibid.*, 1915, pp. 259 ff., and later volumes.

² Not printed.

(b) To pay the indemnity not in U. S. gold but in Panama Canal Bonds.

(c) Make the following a condition precedent to the payment of any indemnity; by stipulating that

(1) the "material reparation" consist in the United States presenting Colombia with certain public works to be jointly agreed upon; such as the sanitation of Buenaventura and/or Cartagena; and/or the construction of a railway to link the capital with a port on the Pacific and/or the Atlantic; and/or a railway between Cucuta and Tamalamque; and/or a railway from Bogotá to deep water on the Magdalena River; or

(2) The indemnity to be paid to Colombia under United States supervision. An American Financial Advisor will be appointed who shall jointly approve and countersign drafts on the money which the United States will pay by installments into the Colombian Government's account with some reputable Trust Company in the United States.

I am writing you at this time in regard to possible changes in the treaty because as you know I am sending Mr. Leland Harrison to Colombia . . .

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

711.21/328½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 2 August, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Colombian Government is, of course, very sensitive about this matter and we, on our part, are, I think, pledged to the utmost to stand by the terms of the treaty as drawn. I think, moreover, that it is likely that the views of some Senators will prove to have been a good deal modified since the last session by a fuller knowledge of all that is involved.

I think, however, that it would not be wise to act in this matter as you suggest until you can have an interview with Senator Stone and find out exactly what the obstacles in the Senate were, and how they are likely to be most successfully dealt with. It would hardly do to act on the newspaper versions of what they were.

I wonder if you could obtain such an interview in time, or whether, lacking that, you could get from Senator Stone a letter giving the whole case as it stands in his view?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

711.21/329½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1915.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose to you herewith a copy of a memorandum³ presented by the Colombian Minister under instructions from his Government, in which he emphasizes the importance which Colombia attaches to the prompt ratification of the Treaty of April 6, 1914,⁴ now before the United States Senate.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

711.21/330½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

HOT SPRINGS, VA., 27 December, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for this. I think I appreciate, as I know you do, the importance of an early confirmation, or, rather, ratification, of the treaty with Colombia. I hope with all my heart that that most desirable consummation may be brought about.

Cordially and sincerely Yours,

WOODROW WILSON

711.21/331½

The Minister in Colombia (Thomson) to President Wilson

BOGOTÁ, February 2, 1916.

MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending by this mail to the State Department a despatch about the Treaty and the reported hopes of the Germans here that our Senate will fail to approve it,—some, I am told, saying that when the European war is finished Germany will settle the Panama matter.

I venture therefore to call your attention to the importance of the approval of the Treaty by our Senate from this point of view. I need hardly mention the German wireless station at Cartagena, nor various other German concessions and ambitions in this Hemisphere, but I will mention a confidential report from this Legation of April 30, 1913,⁵ that a subordinate of the German Legation here, speaking of the enterprise of the Hamburg-Colombian Banana Company in the Gulf of Darien, said that "the real reason . . . is . . .⁵ our desire to possess a coaling station of our own in the Carribean." I desire

³ Not printed.

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1914, p. 163.

⁵ Omissions indicated in original despatch.

also to call your special attention to a letter of November 29, 1912, addressed to the President of the United States by my predecessor, Mr. Du Bois, on file in the Department of State.⁶ Referring to the concession granted by the Colombian Government to this banana company of ten thousand acres, he says: "It is within easy access to coal deposits. The concession includes the widest privileges, railroads, telegraph, pier and wharf construction,—a very liberal banana concession," and he suggests that "Only the future will disclose what there is in this concession and the disclosure may come at a time least expected and least desired". Events since the beginning of the European war have emphasized the apprehension of Mr. Du Bois expressed nearly two years before that conflagration broke out.

On the directorate of the Banana Company appear the names of Herr Ballin, director of the Hamburg American Line, and of Herr Thomann, one of the largest stockholders of that line. Mr. Du Bois says that "during the first three months of 1912 the German Minister near the Colombian Government made an inspection along the Atlantic and Pacific Coast lines of Colombia, visiting every port and possible port; made a prolonged stay in the Gulf of Urabá; and secured statistics and photographs of the improvements being made at Puerto Cesar".

The German activities in the Caribbean, it would seem, should be sufficient to emphasize the necessity for having the friendship especially of Colombia and Costa Rica to strengthen our national defenses. I am also reporting by this mail that the attorney who secured a concession for a coaling station in Cartagena Bay (not yet approved by Congress) is also acting as attorney for the German Legation here; and it appears to me certain that the Germans have been making preparations in this country to test the strength of our support of the Monroe Doctrine and extremely probable, in such an event, that if our Senate rejects the Treaty, Colombia will not oppose, if indeed it does not assist, the landing of German troops on its soil for an attack on the Panama Canal.

Without taking into consideration the commercial advantages to be derived from the settlement of a question that has caused so much friction between the two Republics, it occurs to me that the friends of the Treaty might gain a few votes by pressing this argument at the present time when the Nation is aroused to the necessity for preparedness. Most of our national legislators are in total ignorance of what has been transpiring on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

⁶ Not found in Department files.

One point in the Treaty which seems to meet with some opposition is the expression of regret by the United States; if it should appear that this endangered the entire Treaty, I would suggest that the Senate amend it so as to make the expression of regret mutual on the part of Colombia and the United States. The present Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me confidentially last year that he desired this from the beginning but that the other members of the Commission on Foreign Affairs refused it positively when the negotiations were in progress. I believe that an amendment making the expression of regret mutual would now be accepted by the Colombian Congress.

I have [etc.]

THAD. A. THOMSON

711.21/333½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 1 March, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The earlier of these two letters seems to me of a great deal of interest and importance.⁸ I am ashamed to say that I have not followed recently the fortunes of the Colombian treaty in our Senate; but I deem the adoption of the treaty as originally drafted to be of capital importance, especially in view of what Mr. Thomson tells us of the activity of German influences in Colombia and the movement of opinion there.

I would very much like to have your advice and Senator Stone's as to whether I should address a special message to the Senate on this treaty; and I would be very much obliged to you if you would call the Senator's attention to the enclosed letter of February third [*second*] (not to the subsequent letter, which greatly weakens the force of the first) at the earliest possible moment, at the same time expressing my deep anxiety about the whole situation disclosed.

Do you think it would be serviceable to let Senator Lodge also see it?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

711.21/354½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: After consultations with Senators Swanson, Knox and Lodge I am convinced that the present Colombian

⁸ Letters from the Minister in Colombia to President Wilson, dated Feb. 2, 1916 (*supra*), and Feb. 4, 1916 (not printed).

Treaty could only obtain senatorial consent by the acceptance of several amendments, which would require the assent of Colombia, and would leave the finished treaty to my mind in a very confused and, if I may use the term—inartistic form. Such amendments I feel would also be viewed as criticisms of the Administration.

A careful canvass of the situation seems to assure thirty-seven votes in opposition to the treaty even as amended by the Committee.

My suggestion is that, since in any event the treaty will require further action by Colombia, the simplest and most expedient method is to negotiate a new treaty. With that idea in mind I send you a proposed draft.⁹ This treaty I can guarantee will be accepted by the Senate but of course I cannot speak for Colombia, though that Government will be very anxious to get the twenty-five millions.

The most radical change is the omission of Article I of the present treaty. I feel that in view of the proviso added by the Senate Committee as to denial of criticism of any Administration Article I means nothing. I understand that that proviso was a concession to Senator Knox. Its effect, however, neutralizes every expression of regret in Article I.

I enclose also a memorandum⁹ showing the original text, the Senate amendments, and in typewriting and pen deletions the proposed changes to be made in the old treaty. The enclosed clean draft on long paper incorporates all of these additions and changes.

At your convenience I would like to talk the matter over with you or to receive a memorandum on the proposed course of action and the enclosed draft.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

⁹ Not printed.

COSTA RICA

818.00/106½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 7 February, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am much obliged for this memorandum and entirely agree with Mr. Stabler's conclusions.¹ The sooner the intimation he suggests giving to the American [*United?*] Fruit Company is given the better. Their implication lies on the very surface of all the circumstances. A word to Mr. Untermeyer, who seems to speak as their attorney, might give them immediate pause.

I think the telegram to San José ought to be made a little stronger.² It ought to instruct the Minister to say to Tinoco that no government set up by him will be recognized, and no government which he takes part in originating or organizing, and that no contracts made by any citizen of the United States with such a government will be recognized by this Government as valid. We cannot be too explicit or too downright. I hope the message will go at the earliest possible moment.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

818.00/106½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I had a long talk this morning with the deposed President of Costa Rica³ who was introduced by his Minister. He made upon me a most favorable impression as a man of high motives and real patriotism.

The causes of the rebellion appear to be chiefly two, the avarice of Tinoco and his family and the opposition of certain interests to the numerous reforms in taxation and fiscal matters which the President supported and carried through. He appears to have been a real progressive in his ideas and sought to give the poorer classes a

¹Memorandum by J. H. Stabler, Division of Latin American Affairs, Department of State; not printed.

²For the telegram as sent, see telegram of Feb. 9, 1917, to the Minister in Costa Rica, *Foreign Relations, 1917*, p. 307.

³Señor Alfredo González Flores.

better chance than they have had before. He told me that the hostility of the privileged rich and the ignorance of the poor were the immediate cause of his overthrow together with the great confidence which he had placed in the loyalty of Tinoco.

I told him that we would not recognize Tinoco or any government growing out of the revolution and that privileges or concessions granted by such government would not be supported by this Government. He seemed very much pleased by this statement, and said that he was very grateful as a Costa Rican but he was strongly opposed to any intervention on our part. He did not seek to be reelected as President; all he wished was the restoration of constitutional government. If that could be done without him he was entirely satisfied.

Following your expressed willingness to see the President I asked Mr. Phillips to arrange a time when he could call upon you. I will be interested to know if he makes upon you the same favorable impression which he made upon me.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

818.00/107½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 20 February, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am glad you had this talk with the ex-President and formed a favourable impression of him. His explanation of the revolt is just what had formed in my own mind out of such information as had reached us.

I will be willing to see him, of course, as you request. It will add nothing to what we already know, but it may make an impression in certain quarters which it is desirable to make.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

818.00/200

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you know the situation in Costa Rica has been an increasing cause of concern and the course of action to be adopted more and more perplexing.

We are in this peculiar predicament. The policy of recognizing a government founded on unprincipled revolution is essentially bad and induces the hope of revolutionists in other small republics.

There is no doubt but that in this case Tinoco took advantage for his own benefit of the unpopularity of Gonzales and without a shadow of legality usurped the executive power. There is nothing to be said in his favor.

On the other hand, the people of Costa Rica in general appear to have peaceably acquiesced in the change of government although the failure of Tinoco to rectify immediately the economic situation seems to promise further political disturbances unless his Government is stabilized by recognition by this Government.

Furthermore, there is no doubt from the evidence in hand but that the Gonzales faction is friendly to the Germans, while Tinoco is wholly friendly to the Allies. It seems to be almost certain that the German element in Costa Rica is stirring up feeling against Tinoco and is financing a revolutionary movement, of which Castro Quesada (the Minister here), now in Nicaragua, would be the leader and probably the president if the revolution succeeded. . . .

Viewed solely from the standpoint of expediency, it would seem as if the recognition of Tinoco was, under present conditions, probably the better policy.

When we gave strong assurances to Gonzales not to recognize Tinoco we were not at war with Germany, and we were not acquainted with the relations of the influential German colony to the rival factions in Costa Rica. We know now that Tinoco has been all along staunchly opposed to the Germans, and that Gonzales and especially Quesada have been most friendly with them.

In these circumstances it would seem to be unwise to aid by action or inaction the restoration of a pro-German government even if it is morally and legally entitled to be restored. As to the danger which might result from following a policy now we are at war, which policy would have doubtless been the better in time of peace, I call your attention to the enclosed telegram of yesterday from General Plummer,⁴ who recommends the immediate recognition of Tinoco on military grounds.

Both the British and French have unofficially indicated their desire that we recognize the present government for reasons which I assume to be known—friendliness of Tinoco and hostility of Gonzalez.

I make no reference to the fact that the recognition of Tinoco would undoubtedly benefit the Costa Ricans by preventing another revolution which would not be bloodless, as I think that at the present time the greater issues must alone be considered.

Things are moving very rapidly in Costa Rica. The situation may change any day. A decision should be reached very promptly and action follow immediately.

⁴ Not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

I regret to have to ask you to go through so many papers but in this case I think that it is necessary as the state of affairs is very critical.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

818.00/287½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 29 December, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: What do you think about this? ⁵ To have anything at all to do with it is certainly to play with fire and to risk incurring the suspicion of every state in Latin America; and yet, if the man is sincere, what he purposes (always provided his programme does in all good faith include a free and constitutional election) must of necessity claim our sympathy.

Faithfully yours,

W. W.

818.00/280

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Upon receipt of the confidential telegram from Panama ⁶ in regard to Volio's revolutionary plans against the Tinoco Government, I at once cabled our minister ⁷ to give no encouragement to armed revolution and to prevent the censor from sending the filed cablegram to Castro Quesada, who is the moving spirit in this affair.

This I did in accordance with our policy not to countenance the use of force in gaining control of the government, a policy, which you may remember, I declared to Gonzales and Quesada when they called upon me several months ago. It seemed to me that we could not do less than pursue this policy in the case of the present movement.

We are in a peculiarly embarrassing situation in regard to Costa Rica, since our settled policy as to nonrecognition of Tinoco, which I feel we ought to continue, runs directly contrary to our interests in prosecuting the war. There seems little doubt (although I hope to be absolutely certain in a short time) that Castro Quesada and his party are pro-German and receiving financial support from the Germans in their revolutionary activities. Tinoco, on the other hand,

⁵ Projected revolution of Alfredo Volio; see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 348.

⁶ Telegram of Dec. 26, 1917, from the Minister in Panama (Price), *ibid.*, p. 348.

⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 349.

by inclination or for politic reasons, is pro-Ally. Gonzales, the deposed President, counts little, Quesada being the strong man. . . .

In these circumstances I do not feel that we should give encouragement to Quesada or, on the other hand, protect Tinoco. I, therefore, adopted the course which I have stated and which is consistent with our announced policy. I think until we are fully satisfied about Quesada and the Germans we should maintain this attitude.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

818.00/288½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 1 January, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You undoubtedly took the right course in this,—indeed the only course honourably open to us.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

HAITI

838.00/1275c

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: After a conference with Admiral Benson, who is acting Secretary of the Navy, he has submitted to me a memorandum embodying instructions to be sent to Admiral Caperton at Port au Prince. If you approve the instructions will you wire him to that effect as soon as possible?

I had a lengthy interview this morning with the Haitian Minister regarding affairs of that Republic. He tells me that the people there are doubtful as to our motives, although he personally realizes that we are acting in perfect good faith and are only attempting to assist Haiti. I assured him of our entirely unselfish motives and that in landing marines in Haiti we had acted on account of two reasons: first, that it was in the interest of humanity and, second, that in case we had not taken the step, in all probability some other nation would have felt called upon to do so. I further said to him that the intelligent Haitians should feel gratified that it was the United States rather than some other power whose motives might not be as unselfish as ours.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Draft Instructions From the Acting Secretary of the Navy (Benson) to Admiral Caperton

Conciliate Haytians to fullest extent consistent with maintaining order and firm control of the situation, and issue following proclamation:¹

“Am directed to assure the Haytian people United States has no object in view except to insure, establish, and help to maintain Haytian independence and the establishment of a stable and firm government by the Haytian people. Every assistance will be given to the Haytian people in their attempts to secure these ends. It is the intention to retain United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for this purpose.”

¹ This proclamation, with slight verbal changes, was issued by Admiral Caperton at Port au Prince, Aug. 9, 1915; see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 481.

838.00/1275d : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*²

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1915—3:32 p. m.

The Navy Department received late Saturday the following message which I did not see until this morning.

[Here follows text of telegram of August 7, 1915, from Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy, *Foreign Relations*, 1915, page 478.]

Admiral Benson informed me that he did not think we needed to occupy Mole St. Nicholas. I asked him to submit the matter to the General Board of the Navy Department which was then in session. He did so and brought back a report that "The General Board sees no necessity for naval purposes to have a station at St. Nicholas Mole." The report goes on to state the reasons for their decision which is substantially the same one which they reached on October 17 last year.

In view of the telegram from Admiral Caperton above repeated, and the report of the Board, it is proposed to send the following telegram to Admiral Caperton if it meets with your approval:

"Allow election of President to take place whenever Haitians wish. United States prefers election of Dartiguenave.

United States appreciates generous disposition of Haitian people regarding cession of St. Nicholas Mole, but wishes to assure them United States desire no Haitian territory and has no other motive than the establishing of a firm and lasting government by the Haitian people, and to assist them now and at all times in the future to maintain their political independence and territorial integrity unimpaired.

The United States will insist that the Haitian government will grant no territorial concession to any foreign governments."

I believe that the declaration in regard to Mole St. Nicholas and also our willingness to have the election of President proceed will have a very salutary effect upon public opinion in Haiti. I do not see why it would not be as easy to control a government with a president as it is to control the Haitian Congress and administrative officers. I would advise, therefore, sending the proposed telegram.

If possible it is advisable that an answer should be received by wire from you today in order that Admiral Caperton receive his instructions promptly.

ROBERT LANSING

² Then in Cornish, N. H.

838.00/1275½ : Telegram

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WINDSOR, VT., August 9, 1915.

[Received 6 p. m.]

Approve the message to Admiral Caperton except that I think it would be best, instead of saying that we did not wish the cession of Mole St. Nicholas, to retain the rest of the message as you have sent it to me and add that the Government of the United States would take up the question of the cession of the Mole later along with the other questions to be submitted to the reorganized Government with regard to its relations to the United States.

WOODROW WILSON

838.00/1275½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose to you a copy of the telegram which was sent last night by Admiral Benson to the Naval Commander at Port au Prince, after I had received your telegram and advised him of the change in the wording of the original draft.

We have had no further advices as to the situation, but I believe that unless there is a decided change we will be able to arrange matters very much as we please.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure—Telegram—Paraphrase]

The Acting Secretary of the Navy (Benson) to Admiral Caperton

Whenever the Haitians wish you may permit the election of a President to take place. The election of Dartiguenave is preferred by United States. You will assure the Haitians that the United States has no other motive than the establishing of a firm and lasting government by the Haitian people and wishes to assist them now and at all times in the future to maintain both their political independence and territorial integrity unimpaired. That the Haitian Government will grant no territorial concessions to any foreign governments will be insisted upon by the United States. The question of the session of Mole St. Nicholas will be taken up later by the government of the United States along with the other questions to be submitted to the reorganized government with regard to its relations to the United States.

BENSON

711.38/24a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose for your consideration a telegram to our Legation at Port au Prince,⁴ which directs our Chargé to negotiate and sign a treaty with the Haytien Government along the lines of the treaty which was sought to be negotiated a year ago last July. It, of course, makes several alterations and additions covering the ground far more thoroughly and granting to this Government a much more extensive control than the original treaty proposed. I enclose also the file copy of the instructions sent to our Minister July 2, 1914, and also a draft of convention, with the alterations and additions included.⁵

I believe that I informed you yesterday in our interview that the Haytien Congress adjourns next Tuesday and, therefore, if we intend to sign a treaty and have it ratified by that congress, which is so friendly to our Government, before our own Congress assembles in December, there is no time for delay. If it is to be done at all, it will have to be done immediately.

I confess that this method of negotiation, with our marines policing the Haytien Capital, is high handed. It does not meet my sense of a nation's sovereign rights and is more or less an exercise of force and an invasion of Haytien independence. From a practical standpoint, however, I cannot but feel that it is the only thing to do if we intend to cure the anarchy and disorder which prevails in that Republic. I believe it will be welcomed by the better element of the Haytien people, who now do not dare to take part in public affairs on account of the danger of assassination and massacre. It does not seem to me that the so-called Haytien revolutions are revolutions in fact, but, in reality, represent the struggle of bandits for control of the machinery of government which they utilize solely for the purpose of plunder. None of these so-called "generals" represent a principle or represent in any way the people of Haiti. The only possible way, it seems to me, of restoring to the Haytiens their political and personal rights and protecting them from the terrorism of unscrupulous military leaders is to obtain control, for a time at least, of the prize which these chieftains seek, namely, the public revenues of the Republic.

I have not been unmindful of the possible criticism which may be aroused in the Senate in case this treaty should be signed and submitted to them for action. As I said, it seems a high handed procedure, but I do not see how else we can obtain the desirable end of

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 431.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1914, p. 347.

establishing a stable government in Haiti and maintaining domestic peace there.

I have seen the French Ambassador this morning in regard to the contractual obligations of the Haytien Government to the Bank of Haiti, which is a French corporation. In that connection I enclose, for your information, a memorandum of the provisions of the contract, which was submitted to the Department yesterday by Mr. Casenave, the President of the Bank.⁶ In case this treaty should become operative there would have to be an exchange of notes between the French Ambassador and this Department, in which we would state that the bank would continue to be the depository of the public funds of Haiti. While I did not disclose to the French Ambassador the text of the treaty, I suggested to him that we might feel compelled, in the interest of the Haytien people, to take charge of their finances and support the established government. With this he was heartily in accord, provided that we would protect the Bank of Haiti in its rights. The Ambassador evidenced a sentimental interest in the Republic and expressed the hope that we would not endeavor to change its language from French to English. As to that I gave him assurance that we had no such purpose.

This newly proposed treaty I prepared as soon as possible. I regret that I have not been able to send it to you sooner or to talk over the details of the plan, because I realize it is establishing a policy considerably in advance of our Dominican policy. The necessity of speedy action is my excuse for, if anything is to be done, a decision must be reached without delay in order that action may be taken before the adjournment of the Haytien Congress.⁷

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

⁶ Memorandum not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

⁷ The President replied in an undated memorandum: "This is, I think, necessary and has my approval. Do you think it will affect Latin American opinion unfavorably? W. W." (File No. 711.38/24½.)

MEXICO

812.00/14496

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *March 5, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you fimsies of two despatches which bother me very much.¹ The last one is dated yesterday at six p. m.

Obregon, whether he intends it or not, is using language to arouse opposition to foreigners, and it is impossible, of course, for anyone to guess what may be the result. We are unfortunate in not having any Special Representative in Mexico City. We have a man, and I believe an excellent one, recommended by Senator Mark Smith, but he took sick on reaching Washington and is now in the hospital. He is the one who was intended for Mexico City and adjoining country.

I am wondering whether it may not be necessary to speak more emphatically than we have done. I have used all the adjectives that properly go with persuasion but things seem to grow worse instead of better and the representatives of other nations are very much concerned.

Mr. Lansing has suggested it might be worth while to notify Carranza and Obregon that in view of the language which is being employed by Obregon to excite hatred of foreigners, thus greatly increasing the risks, and in view of the interruption of traffic and communication by Carranza, thus further increasing the risks, that we would hold Carranza and Obregon personally responsible for injury that resulted from the methods which they are employing.

We have no soldiers nearer than Texas and are not in a position to protect Americans and other foreigners from riot, in case Obregon should succeed in stirring up riot—which he promises in advance not to resist—and I am not sure but we may be justified in bringing this pressure to bear upon Carranza.

They are proposing to evacuate, but before doing so they may create a condition there which will result in violence. The fact that the people of Mexico City are ready to welcome Zapata, whom they formerly so greatly feared, or Villa, who was also a terror to them,

¹ From the Brazilian Minister in Mexico, March 4, 1915, 5 p. m. and 6 p. m.; *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 656 and 657, respectively.

as a substitute for Carranza and his best general, Obregon—for Obregon seemed to stand highest among those supporting Carranza—this fact contrasts strangely with the predictions and fears expressed by the people of Mexico City before Huerta left.

Will you please let me know whether you have any instructions to give?

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

812.00/14504½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

6 MARCH, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I had seen these despatches and they had given me deep anxiety and perplexity, as they have given you.

Nothing better than what Mr. Lansing suggests occurs to me, and I hope that you will act at once on his suggestion.

In addition, I hope that you will say to Carranza that the extraordinary and unpardonable course pursued by General Obregon, under his command, has renewed the talk of joint action by several of the chief governments of the world to protect their embassies and their nationals at Mexico City, and that he is running a very serious risk.

Will you not be kind enough to ask Daniels if he has ships with long range guns (not necessarily battle ships) which he could order at once to Vera Cruz, and, if so, to let me know?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/14664½

The Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1915.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Looking to the possibility of the necessity of employing force in Mexico if Carranza and Obregon continue to pursue their present policy, I believe the following will result from such action:

1st. The Mexican people generally will consider that the United States intends to occupy the territory permanently or exercise control over the government, and will resent and resist any use of force regardless of faction.

2nd. The other Latin American republics will view the act with suspicion as to motives of the United States and it will create an undesirable impression in those countries.

3rd. There will be a considerable party in the United States which will advocate permanent control over Mexico and possibly annexa-

tion of portions of its territory. This movement will increase the feeling in Mexico and the suspicions in Latin America.

4th. The European governments will expect this Government to protect the interests of their nationals and seek to have it continue in control of Mexican affairs if force is employed.

The foregoing possible consequences of the exercise of force by this Government might be avoided by joint action by the United States and the A. B. C. powers. It could be introduced by a declaration of the four powers that the political and industrial conditions in Mexico could no longer be tolerated and that in the interests of the Mexican people and humanity the four powers had united to restore order and stable government in the Republic, and that they guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of Mexico when the purpose of their intervention had been accomplished.

The advantages of this course would be—

1st. To allay alarm in Mexico as to the ultimate purpose of intervention.

2nd. To remove Latin American suspicion of the motives of the United States, and to cause a friendly feeling particularly among the governments acting with the United States.

3rd. To deprive of force any agitation in this country favorable to continued American control over Mexican affairs.

The objections to joint action are—

1st. The judgment of this Government as to its action would have to be submitted to consideration by the other governments acting with it.

2nd. Freedom of action by this Government would be limited by the approval of the other governments.

3rd. It might possibly create a precedent for joint action which would embarrass the United States in the future.

4th. It would have the effect of substituting an international policy of Pan Americanism for the national policy of the Monroe Doctrine.

If the objections do not outweigh the advantages, and if the United States is compelled to employ force, would it not be well to approach at once the representatives of the A. B. C. powers with an informal inquiry as to whether a suggestion of joint action in Mexico would be favorably received by their governments?

They could be informed that all that would be required would be for their respective governments to send warships into Mexican waters to cooperate with the naval force of the United States, and that any military force employed would be furnished by the United States.

Unless the attitude of the South American Governments toward joint action is obtained now, I am afraid that it will be impossible

later for this Government to avail itself of that means on account of the necessity of immediate action, when the time comes to act.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

612.1123/1403

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 12 March, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Since the discussion in the cabinet this morning of the situation at Progreso I have been giving a great deal of serious thought to the questions then raised and have come to this conclusion:

I think that we are justified, in all the circumstances, in saying to Carranza that we cannot recognize his right to blockade the port to the exclusion of our commerce; that we just [*must?*] beg him to recall his orders to that effect; and that we shall feel constrained, in case he feels he cannot do so, to instruct our naval officers there to prevent any interference with our commerce to and from the port. He should be told, at the same time, that we are doing this in the interest of peace and amity between the two countries and with no wish or intention to interfere with her internal affairs, from which we shall carefully keep our hands off. I hope that your thinking has led you to a similar conclusion.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

612.1123/141a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you a copy of the telegram in regard to Progreso.² I feel as reluctant as you do to take such positive action, but I believe it as real a kindness to Carranza as it was to Huerta and I think the Huerta incident furnishes a very strong precedent. While Carranza may take offense at it, the chances are he will not, and we can assure Villa and Zapata of our purposes, and in case we came in conflict with Carranza we are in a position to restrain the employment of force within the smallest possible limit just as we did at Vera Cruz. At Progreso there would be no reason for landing a force or taking charge of the port. The people of Progreso are against Carranza, while at Vera Cruz Huerta was in possession.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 824.

As Mr. McAdoo told you, I am preparing to leave for Atlantic City at four o'clock this afternoon. Mr. Davis will telephone me if anything comes up that might require my presence here.

I am [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

812.00/14665½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 18 March, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is an important memorandum, and supplies much to think about.³ I do not yet allow myself to think of intervention as more than a remote possibility; but I suppose I must admit that it is at least a possibility, and, if it is, the possibility is worth preparing for.

On the whole, I like the suggestion Mr. Lansing makes. It is in thorough accord with what we are hoping for in the Americas. It would be, as it were, anticipating some of the things we are preparing the way for. At any rate, let us keep it in mind. Should the possibility loom a little nearer, I can well imagine that Mr. L. has pointed out the wisest and most practicable course.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/15134½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 2 June, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Here is the Mexican statement recast in a way which I hope meets entirely the views you expressed yesterday.⁴

If it meets with your approval, will you not be kind enough to let Tumulty know by telephone so that he may release it for the afternoon papers? I rather led them to expect it yesterday when I saw them.

And will you not see that correct copies are sent (they can be sent plain in the circumstances) to our several representatives near the principal factional chiefs, so that this may serve as a direct and personal reminder.

Cordially and faithfully,

W. W.

³ Mr. Lansing's letter of Mar. 8, 1915, p. 529.

⁴ For the statement as issued, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 694.

812.00/15122a Suppl.

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am just in receipt of your Mexican statement which you were kind enough to send over. I think the amendments you have made improved it, although, as you remember, it was quite satisfactory to me yesterday with the exception of one word.

However, as you ask for suggestions, permit me to inquire whether, on the first page, about one-third of the way down, it would not be wise to substitute the words "its authority denied" instead of "robbed of authority." This is merely a suggestion intended to avoid use of the word "rob." It is not, however, a material change.

The last sentence I notice you have substituted the words "for other means" for the word "elsewhere" which was under discussion. My object in calling attention to the word "elsewhere" yesterday was that it did not express what I understood to be your intention, namely, to leave yourself free to know what to do. The change which you have made removes the suggestion that you would necessarily turn to other persons than the present leaders in Mexico and to that extent corrects the commitment which might have been understood from the use of the word "elsewhere." The phrase "look for other means" does not quite express your thought as I understood it although it comes nearer to it than the word "elsewhere," if I understand your point in view.

What I fear is that the papers will attempt to put a construction upon it which will exclude the possibility of recognizing either one of the factions if, upon investigation, you should find it better to recognize one of those factions than to invite the organization of a new faction. It is possible that by the time you are ready to act Carranza might exert an influence that would justify his recognition. It is possible that it might be wise to encourage Angeles if he should show sufficient support.

I think the words "to decide what means should be employed" would leave us more latitude than the words "look for other means." However, this is merely a suggestion as you know your own wishes in the matter. It is merely submitted out of a desire to render you any assistance that I can.

I shall ask to have this note sent you at once and you can advise Mr. Tumulty as to the release of the statement. If he will then advise me when it is released, as it is, or with such changes as you may desire, I will have it sent to Mexico City, to Carothers and to Silliman.

I am [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

812.00/15133½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for letting me see these papers.⁵ I am entirely open to anything that events may open to us, even the recognition of Carranza if he should develop the necessary influence and begin to bring real order out of chaos. But I think our statement ought to precipitate things (in the chemical sense) and open up either this or some other channel of action.

Faithfully yours,

W. W.

812.00/15129a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Ambassador Naón⁶ called to express very cordial approval of the Mexican statement and to say that when you are ready to recognize anyone he thinks it would be wise for the ABC countries to recognize at the same time. In fact, he reminds me that this was contemplated in the agreement at Nicaragua and he has brought it to my attention since. I told him that I thought it would be very nice to have the ABC countries to recognize at the same time, and that it might be advisable also to notify all the other Latin-American countries having representatives in Mexico so that all could act simultaneously, and I know of no reason why the European countries might not be notified also, because the more complete the recognition the stronger the moral force of the government recognized.

You may be interested to know that Mr. Lansing came into the room just after I had dictated my letter to you in regard to the two suggested changes this morning. I showed him the statement and he read it through, stopping on the last sentence to suggest the very change which I had a few moments before mentioned in my letter. He even used exactly the same words, namely, "what means should be employed." I thought you might be interested to know that his judgment supports the change.

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. BRYAN

⁵ The papers referred to cannot be identified.⁶ Argentine Ambassador.

812.00/15127½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 2 June, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I like those suggestions very much indeed, and hope that when the proper time comes you will act on them.

Faithfully yours,

W. W.

P. S. It is very interesting that Lansing should have made the same suggestion about the closing words of the statement. It furnished me with exactly what I was looking for.

W. W.

812.00/15285½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State ad interim

WASHINGTON, 17 June, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have been feeling, the past twenty-four hours or so, that it was possible we were not using all the influences we might use in Mexico to guide what is taking place there.

Would it be possible to find some direct but unofficial channel through which we could convey to General Carranza this impression:

That it was within the possibilities that we might recognize him, as things are now apparently shaping themselves,—at any rate that that possibility was not excluded by anything we had yet determined upon,—but that he need not expect us to consider that course seriously unless he went the full length of conciliation and conference with all factions with a view to the accommodation upon which the opinion of the whole world now insists. He cannot in our view afford to insist upon establishing his own dominion unless he first makes a genuine effort to unite all groups and parties.

Cordially Yours,

W. W.

812.00/15286½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State ad interim

WASHINGTON, 18 June, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This telegram has my approval.⁷ Silliman, however, is not the best channel through which to make an impression. . . .

⁷ Telegram to Special Agent Silliman, *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 715.

I understand that Judge Douglas⁹ is going to start for Vera Cruz on Monday. Would it not be well to have a talk with him (not at your office, but at your house and as privately, as much away from the newspapers, as possible) and let him go down with a full understanding of our position, namely that Carranza must meet every honest advance half way if he expects to win our confidence, and that he must win our confidence, at least in some degree, if he hopes for ultimate recognition.

There is another matter which it might be well to add to the despatch to Silliman today and in your talk with D., namely the very bad impression that is being made by the exportation of food from Vera Cruz at the very time we are sending food in to the starving. It ought to be stopped at once.

Cordially Yours,

W. W.

812.00/15338½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State ad interim

WASHINGTON, 22 June, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am very anxious to have the foundations laid at once for the course with regard to Mexico which we outlined, or, rather, indicated, very briefly in conversation the other day. Do you not think it would be well to see the A. B. C. men now to ascertain whether they would be willing (that is, whether their governments would be willing) to cooperate with us in advice and political action (recognition and the like) in bringing order out of chaos there?

I do not feel particularly cordial to the Chilean administration just now because they have been making . . . difficulties about the general political understandings we have been trying for some months to establish in formal fashion between ourselves and Latin America; but of course it would be a mistake to leave them out in this Mexican business.

Our idea was, you remember, to include in the coöperative conference also the three ranking ministers next after them in the Latin American group; but it would be well to sound out the beginning of the alphabet first.^{9a}

Cordially Yours,

WOODROW WILSON

⁹ Judge Charles A. Douglas, legal adviser to General Carranza's representatives in Washington.

^{9a} For papers previously printed on the conference of the six diplomats, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 722-771, *passim*.

812.00/15338½

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*WASHINGTON, *June 25, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In connection with your note to me of the 22nd, relative to approaching certain of the representatives of other American States in regard to cooperating with us in advice and political action as to Mexico, I enclose a memorandum,¹⁰ showing the three Ambassadors and their present addresses and also the three ranking Ministers from other countries (the rank, of course, depends upon the dates of their assuming their posts in Washington).

My own impression is that the three Ministers are probably as available as any who could be selected. With Calderon¹¹ and de Pena¹² I have exceptionally intimate relations. Of course, this gives Central America but one representative.^{12a} I do not know as this is an objection, but if it is, I think that the excuse that length of service in Washington has governed their selection would overcome any objection which might be made, and prevent the criticism of favoritism.

It would seem to me that Dr. Naón and Mr. da Gama should be first approached. As you know, I am going to be in New York the night of Monday, the 28th, and I thought I might be able to arrange a meeting with Mr. da Gama there, if it met with your approval. If it does, will you please telegraph me to that effect, in order that I can arrange with the Ambassador to come to New York?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/15408½

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*WASHINGTON, *2 July, 1915.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It seems to me that the importance of attempting a settlement in Mexico grows daily more pressing, and that you would therefore be justified in asking these gentlemen to come to Washington to confer with you, one by one or in groups, as you think wisest. They will be complimented, I am sure, and will enter into the spirit of the thing.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

¹⁰ Not printed.¹¹ Bolivian Minister.¹² Uruguayan Minister.^{12a} Joaquin Méndez, the Guatemalan Minister.

812.00/154101a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1915.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Mexican situation has been much in my mind and I have been seeking to map out a course of action which will lead to definite results.

The condition precedent to any plan is, of course, that the old aristocratic party must not be recognized in a settlement of the present situation and that the restoration of responsible government must come through the revolutionary element now composed of hostile factions.

The problem is, therefore, the harmonizing of the factions representing the Revolution.

The present activities in this country of the reactionary Mexican element, manifested by the intrigues along the border, have and will have, I believe, a decided influence on the tendency of the revolutionists to unite and will induce them to listen more favorably to a plan of compromise, and this influence will be stronger if the reactionaries obtain a foothold in Mexico. However this influence will be more potent in the North than in the South which is not immediately affected by the reactionary movement. This difficulty is further increased by the character of General Carranza and the present successes of his military forces.

As you know the suggestion has undoubtedly by this time been made to Carranza that he invite the various revolutionary factions to meet in conference, discuss their differences and seek to compose them, each faction in such conference to be represented by only one conferee. The idea of the conference is to be consultative and in no sense conventional, thus eliminating any question of majority rule.

If Carranza adopts this suggestion and invites the other factions to confer, an armistice might be proposed during the progress of the conference, for I am convinced that the factions will accept the invitation.

In view, however, of the conditions prevailing in the South and the probable success of the Carranzista arms, together with the stubbornness of Carranza himself, I have little hope that he will adopt the suggestion for a conference or agree to an armistice. I think, therefore, we should plan to act on the supposition that a conference of the revolutionary factions will not take place.

On this supposition I would suggest that the attitude of this Government be embodied in the following propositions:

1. It is manifest that, in view of the personal animosities, jealousies and ambitions of the factional leaders nothing can be accomplished through them to restore peace and stable government.

2. Carranza, Villa, and other factional leaders must retire and not seek dominant leadership.

3. This Government will not recognize as legal any government headed or controlled by any one of these leaders and will exert its moral influence to prevent the establishment of such a government in any part of Mexico.

4. The determination of this Government to eliminate the present factional leaders by withdrawal of moral support should be notified in plain terms to the various factions.

5. An invitation should be issued to the factions by the American Government, agreeing to identical action, to meet in conference through their lesser chiefs for the purpose of organizing a coalition provisional government with the understanding that, provided such government is unquestionably representative of the bulk of the revolutionary element, this Government and the other governments cooperating with it, will recognize it and renew diplomatic relations with Mexico.

6. This Government will aid so far as possible such coalition government by preventing arms and ammunition from reaching parties hostile to it and by employing such other means as it may properly employ to insure the stability and permanency of such government until constitutional government can be restored.

This outline of action I submit with hesitation since there has been no opportunity to discuss the matter with you. It may, however, serve as a basis for discussion.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/15411½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

[CORNISH, N. H.,] 7 July, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I feel, as I have no doubt you also do, that the situation in Mexico grows daily more serious and dangerous. What would you think of designating someone (my choice would be Mr. Paul Fuller, Senior) to keep in touch with the representatives of the several factions so far as they are represented in this country, establish confidential relations with them, if possible, and so be our eyes and ears to watch for an opening for action?

I make this suggestion in the hope that it will commend itself to you.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/15411½ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1915.

The suggestion as to engaging a person to keep in touch with representatives of Mexican factions here seems to me very wise and Mr. Fuller to be the best fitted. I will, if you desire, ask him to come and see me, although I think a communication from you would be more effective in view of the fact that he would be your personal agent in the matter. I assume from your note of the 7th that you had not then received my letter suggesting a course of action in Mexico. I have seen the six diplomats who are communicating with their governments in regard to informal conversations. They all seemed to be personally gratified at the proposed identical action and believed that their governments would readily authorize them to confer.

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/15412½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

[CORNISH, N. H.,] 8 July, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You were right in thinking that I had not received your letter of the fifth, containing your interesting suggestions about Mexico, when I sent you my message of the seventh. I think that in any case, however, Mr. Fuller would serve us admirably in the way I indicated, not only, but also in preparing the way, cautiously and tactfully, for what we intend to do. I would be very much obliged if you would ask him if he can do us this great additional service, saying that you do so at my request and advice, as well as on your own judgment.

The suggestions contained in your letter of the fifth furnish an excellent foundation, it seems to me, for planning something definite and final in the Mexican matter, and run very nearly along the lines of my own thought. I would like you to consider the following:

What did Angeles and Bonilla have in mind? I suppose they are still in Washington, or near at hand; and it seems to me that, directly or indirectly, we ought to know everything that is in their mind, especially now that the Huerta cloud has again appeared on the horizon.

Do you know whether Iturbide really represents anything substantial? Is it possible that he is in any way in cooperation with the scoundrel, Huerta?

Is there not reason to fear that without the present factional leaders, who seem to represent the strongest that has been thrown to the surface, we would be in a wallow of weaknesses and jealousies down

there, unless some man (perhaps Angeles) could be commended by our confidence to the trust of the rest?

Should not the conference proposed in case Carranza does not act (as seems to me certain) be proposed by the A. B. C. group and their associates, and should not they and their associates in some way pre-empt and direct at that conference?

We must be careful not to act in a way which will wound sensibilities. Villa has again and again offered to eliminate himself, and if it should come to our requesting all the present leaders to withdraw in order to effect a satisfactory settlement, these repeated offers should be made the most of and the leaders of the other factions challenged to follow his example. We must play these men as they are.

After the six diplomats we have sounded hear from their governments (assuming, as I think we may, that they will hear favourably) I think their advice will probably be of a good deal of service to us in determining just how to approach the men we shall have to deal with in the way that will be most likely to appeal to them . . .

I shall be glad to have the benefit of memoranda on all or any of these matters, and thank you sincerely for the thought you are giving this perplexing matter.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/15629½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

[CORNISH, N. H.,] 29 July, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The many distressing and disturbing despatches pouring in from Mexico perplex me sadly as to what our immediate duty is. I note the messages you are sending to Villa and indirectly to Zapata, and I suppose that they represent all that we can do for the present. If anything else should occur to you as practicable, will you not let me have the suggestion to think over. I feel that a final crisis at Mexico City might make more deliberate plans at any moment next to impossible.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/15629½a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1915—11:53 a. m.

Six Latin American diplomats have agreed to be here Thursday, August 5th for informal conference. When do you think it would be well to make public announcement that conference is to take place.

Believe that announcement will have beneficial effect in Mexico and in this country, as indicating intention to proceed.

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/15630½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

[CORNISH, N. H.,] 1 August, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am very glad of this, and write to ask whether you think it would be best for me to be in Washington at that time or to wait until the deliberations and actions of this group seem to be approaching a point where they can offer practical advice. I should like to do what will best assist psychologically as well as practically.

I think that it will be wise to announce at once the approach of this conference and its objects, in general terms, not too fully disclosing what we wish to leave a little vague, viz. just what we expect the procedure and the action of the U. S. towards what the conference advises to be.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/15629½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1915.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In regard to the present situation in Mexico I do not think of anything further to be done with reference to relieving the very distressing conditions which exist, other than the action already taken. It is very possible when it becomes public that we are holding a conference with other American countries in regard to Mexico that the Mexican authorities will make a more earnest effort to relieve the suffering of the people. For that reason, I believe the announcement of the conference should be made as soon as possible.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

812.00/15714a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1915—6 p. m.

Held a two-hour's session with the six diplomats and Mr. Fuller in regard to Mexico. There was manifested unanimous feeling of gratification that this informal conference had been called, as indicating the attitude of the Government toward Pan-Americanism. We

made decided progress toward an agreement as to identical views in regard to the character of government which should be recognized. The conference adjourned until tomorrow afternoon. I believe that a definite and practical plan will result. Of course I shall agree to nothing nor take a definite attitude without fully consulting you. As, however, the meeting tomorrow will be a continuance of the preliminary discussion, I can see no reason for your immediate return to Washington. I will telegraph you if I should think it necessary or essential that you should be here.

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/15715½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I did not write you of the conference yesterday on Mexico as the session today was in continuance. Yesterday's session lasted two hours; today's three hours.

All the conferees were enthusiastic over the meeting, primarily on account of the evidence of the Administration's friendliness to the Pan-American idea. Should it fail in every other way, it has already done much to draw Latin-America near to us.

I explained fully at the opening of the first session that the conference was informal and advisory and that there was no purpose of joint action, but that it might result in identical action which would, however, be independent. I said that this Government had no intention to invade the sovereignty of Mexico but merely to aid the Mexican people in the present distressing condition by seeking to recognize a government which would restore peace, secure individual rights, and perform its international obligations; that we recognized the right of revolution against injustice and tyranny; that we recognized that the principle of the revolution, the restoration of constitutional government, had triumphed a year ago; that the factions of the revolutionists, which were now quarreling, were joint possessors of the sovereignty; that personal ambition and personal greed were the causes of the factions; that no one faction represented the revolution, but that all of them combined did represent it; and that, therefore, we must seek for a new government among the factions and see if their differences could not be adjusted at least sufficiently to have the greater part unite on a provisional government strong enough and honest enough to command respect at home and abroad and to obtain recognition.

To the foregoing statement all the conferees gave assent, and we proceeded to discuss the means to accomplish the end sought.

. . . the first session decided upon two definite steps: First, to send a communication to the factions inviting them to an immediate conference, the communication to be signed by all the conferees independently and severally, not jointly: Second, to work out at once a plan of selecting a government to be recognized by the countries represented in case the first step failed.

At the session today Mr. Suárez submitted a draft communication in Spanish to be sent to the factions, which he prepared at my request. After some correction and considerable discussion it was approved by all. I stated to the conference that before I could act, the plan and communication must be submitted to you. I, therefore, enclose a translation for your consideration.¹⁸

After a general expression of views, which again wandered into the field of abstraction, I suggested that a committee of three, Mr. Naón, Mr. Calderón, and Mr. Fuller, prepare the details of the course to be taken in case the first step failed. This seemed the only way of practical suggestion. I enclose a written declaration prepared by Mr. Naón which was approved by all. The report will be supplemental to the latter part of this declaration.

I believe the committee are to work upon it tonight and it will be presented to the conference, which is to meet in New York on Tuesday or Wednesday. The change of the place of meeting was at the request of the conferees and was due to the heat here.

In the discussions I found that there was unanimous agreement that Carranza was impossible, that even if he triumphed it would mean continued disorder. The disposition was to eliminate from consideration as the head of a government to be recognized all the present heads of factions and to seek a man who would draw the secondary chiefs to him. It was felt too that the man to establish the government must be named to us by Mexicans and, if possible, should be one with a measure of constitutional right. All were impressed with the necessity of haste on account of the distress in Mexico. . . .

I would be gratified if you would telegraph your approval of the Suárez communication to the factions, if you do approve, so I can notify the conferees and also call the meeting in New York to consider the committee's report on the second step.

I forgot to say that it is intended to send the communication not only to the heads of the factions but to the principal military and political chiefs as well.

¹⁸ For the communication as sent, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 735.

Secretary McAdoo telegraphed me asking me to meet him in New York on Sunday, the 8th, as you desired us to confer. I shall, therefore, be at The Biltmore Sunday morning.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure]

Extract From Proceedings of the Conference of Diplomatic Representatives

AMBASSADOR NAÓN: It seems to me this has been accepted: The recognition of a provisional government *de facto* in Mexico to be constituted by the agreement between all the factions within a reasonable time. If that government, from the agreement of all the factions, cannot be constituted, then to recognize a government organized by any of these factions strengthened by the concurrence of public opinion outside of the factions and on the basis of guarantees upon the life and property of foreigners and nationals.

812.00/15716½ : Telegram

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WINDSOR, VT., August 6, 1915.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

I do not see why Villa's arbitrary actions should in any way interfere with the success of the conference now being held. The object of that conference is to advise as to the best methods of handling just such matters after a plan has been agreed upon by which the various leaders are to be informed of what they are to expect from the United States and what it will be possible and impossible for them to accomplish if they resist the purposes expressed by the conference.

WOODROW WILSON

812.00/15751a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1915—3:35 p. m.

The following message is being sent to Secretary Houston at Woods Hole, Mass. :

"It is proposed that there be established under military decree in the State of Chihuahua, Mexico, a system of meat inspection embracing the vital and substantial features of the United States Meat Inspection Law and that qualified American veterinarians, approved by your Department will direct the slaughtering of the animals, the inspection of the meats, and will conform in all particulars with the regulations of your Department in order to institute and maintain the efficient

and sanitary operation of the plant. These qualified American veterinarians will be under the direction and supervision of an American veterinarian designated by you, and who will be officially appointed by the Chihuahua authorities. If this is done, will you permit entry into the United States from Juarez of meats so prepared when certified as required by your import regulations? This is a matter of profound importance at the present time when this Government is bending every effort to terminate the chaotic conditions in Mexico. The acquiescence on your part to this plan enabling the operation of the Juarez Packing Plant, even though it be but a temporary arrangement, will remove the greatest obstacle confronting the Department of State in reaching the results so much desired by the President. The military decree mentioned is the only form of law existing in Mexico today, and is identical to the decrees issued in the Philippines, Porto Rico, and Cuba, during the military occupations of those countries, and which were recognized by this Government."

The situation in northern Mexico caused by the desperation of Villa to maintain himself financially has resulted in arbitrary demands by him, and the solution offered in the message above quoted will give Villa legal means to dispose of cattle he has in the vicinity of Juarez, and will offer immediate relief to his strained financial condition. Would it not be well for you to communicate with Secretary Houston?

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/15751½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

[CORNISH, N. H.,] 7 August, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This message puzzled me a little. Do you think it wise to put Villa in the way of getting money just at the moment when he is apparently weakest and on the verge of collapse? What will be gained by that, if, should he be left alone, he may be eliminated by the force of events?

Reading some of the flimsy that came to-day leads me to ask, also, Are you sure that he has in fact been doing all the lawless things he is accused of having done? Does he not seem to have paid for what he seized?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/15716½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I received your telegram of the 6th in regard to the effect of Villa's arbitrary actions upon the work of the conference. The importance of it seems to be that as the preliminary

step was to secure a compromise between factions, it would very much embarrass that plan if Villa should prove himself to be unworthy of consideration by his continued acts of aggression against foreigners.

Fortunately, however, the situation is much clearer this morning. A despatch from Carothers¹⁴ states that Villa will remain at El Paso until he has had an interview with General Scott and that the meeting of miners, which he had summoned at Chihuahua, would be postponed until after such interview. Secretary Houston has also consented to the establishment under military decree of cattle inspection upon the border. This will relieve, to a considerable measure, I believe, Villa's desperate financial situation which has induced his arbitrary conduct.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/15752½ : Telegram

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WINDSOR, VT., August 8, 1915.

[Received 11 p. m.]

Approve communication drawn by conference and plan for session in New York on Wednesday to consider second step. Would suggest, however, that this point be dwelt upon: the first and most essential step in settling affairs of Mexico is not to call general elections. It seems to me necessary that a provisional government essentially revolutionary in character should take action to institute reforms by decree before the full forms of the constitution are resumed. This was the original program of the revolution and seems to me probably an essential part of it.

Approve instructions to Admiral Caperton.¹⁵

WOODROW WILSON

812.00/15751½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I received your letter commenting upon the telegram which I sent you on August 6th in regard to the exportation of cattle from northern Mexico.

¹⁴ Not printed.

¹⁵ See p. 523.

The reason for furnishing Villa with an opportunity to obtain funds is this: We do not wish the Carranza faction to be the only one to deal with in Mexico. Carranza seems so impossible that an appearance, at least, of opposition to him will give us an opportunity to invite a compromise of factions. I think, therefore, it is politic, for the time, to allow Villa to obtain sufficient financial resources to allow his faction to remain in arms until a compromise can be effected.

Much of our information in regard to the conduct of Villa comes from reliable and more or less friendly sources. I believe he is desperate on account of lack of money, but we will know much more about that after General Scott has had his interview with him today. So far as payments made by him for seized property are concerned, it must be borne in mind that these payments are in Villista money, which is worth, I am informed, about two cents Mexican for a peso, which is, by decree, declared to be worth sixty cents Mexican—that is, while Villa makes a pretense of paying, he is doing so in currency which is practically worthless.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/15864a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose you a stenographic report of our two conferences on Mexico held here in Washington.¹⁶ I do not know as you will care to read them, but I thought you might wish to see the lines along which developed the definite understanding which we reached.

Necessarily the report is more or less fragmentary on account of the informal nature of the conference; separate conversations going on at the same time, and some of them in Spanish, prevented a full and accurate report.

I endeavored, at the outset, to clear away as far as possible the discussion of principles and abstractions, in order that we could get down to the practical points to be discussed.

I also enclose a printed copy of the communication to be sent to the chiefs of the factions.¹⁷ . . .

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ For the communication as sent, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 735.

812.00/15753½ : Telegram

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*¹⁸

WINDSOR, VT., August 11, 1915—10 a. m.

[Received 10:23 a. m.]

I think it would be unwise for the conference to take for granted or insist upon the elimination of Carranza. It would be to ignore some very big facts. It seems to me very important that the plan now formed should leave the way of action open in any direction and not assume a beginning over again with a clean sheet of paper to write on. Carranza will somehow have to be digested into the scheme and, above all, the object of the revolution will have to be in any event conserved.

WOODROW WILSON

812.113/3691½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose a report, dated yesterday, from Mr. Canova,¹⁹ in response to an oral request for information in regard to the shipment of arms and ammunition to Mexico.

I think you will find the facts of extreme interest. I, myself, had no idea that any such quantity of war munitions was going to the different Mexican factions.

It has suggested itself to me that it might be good policy at the present time to place a general embargo on arms and ammunition exported to Mexico, on the theory that after the sending of the appeal to the leaders, which was adopted in the recent conference, and until this peaceful method of settling their differences had been tried, an armistice between the warring factions could be enforced by such an embargo. I am not at all convinced that this would be a wise course, but I think it worthy of consideration. If the situation on the border becomes more critical it would be very unfortunate to allow arms and ammunition to go to any of the factions in control of the border towns, because they would be used against our own forces in case of a clash.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

¹⁸ Then in New York.¹⁹ Not printed.

812.00/15864½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 16 August, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you sincerely for having let me see this.²⁰ There are peculiar difficulties in dealing with this matter, as well as many encouragements. The legalistic attitude is very unfortunate in these particular circumstances; and the apparent *cientifico* leaning even more so.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.113/3692½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 16 August, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: These figures are indeed extraordinary.²¹ Evidently a renewal of the embargo might be a very important weapon in our hands.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/16988

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose the reply of Carranza to the communication of the Conference of diplomats.²²

The position taken by Carranza is not unreasonable though it seems to me to be unwise since he fails to seize an opportunity which would give him exceptional advantage, and especially so in view of the desperate situation of the Villistas, who seem to be entirely disorganized and incapable of offering united resistance to the advancing Carranzista army.

Of course his invitation to meet in conference on the border to discuss Mexican affairs from the international standpoint with the sole object of determining whether the government, of which he is the head, is entitled to recognition as a *de facto* government cannot be accepted. The place of a meeting for such purpose could not in any event be Mexican territory. If Carranza had named Washington it might be at least worthy of consideration.

²⁰ The stenographic report of the conference on Mexico between Secretary Lansing and the six Ambassadors and Ministers. See Secretary Lansing's letter of Aug. 10, 1915, p. 548.

²¹ See Secretary Lansing's letter of Aug. 14, 1915, p. 549.

²² For this reply, see *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 746.

The proposal, however, shows a better disposition, it seems to me, than any previous action by Carranza. He says that he is willing to discuss the facts on which must be determined whether or not his government should be recognized. That necessarily involves the questions of its ability to restore peace, its stability, and its international responsibility. As a result such a conference would in fact review the entire domestic state of Mexico including the power of the factions and their complaints against one another.

The Carranzistas are undoubtedly stronger and more cohesive than they have ever been. In fact I have almost reached the conclusion that they are so dominant that they are entitled to recognition. If they are not recognized, I cannot see what will be gained by recognizing any other government, since the present war would continue and be prolonged by strengthening the opposition to Carranza, who, I feel certain, would win in the end.

The situation has changed materially since the communication was sent to the Mexican chiefs. Villa's power has rapidly waned, his forces have disintegrated, and many of his ablest lieutenants have abandoned him or are quarreling with him. As long as the Villista faction was capable of offering stubborn resistance to the Constitutionalists the desirable thing was to stay the strife by harmonizing the factional differences. That was the purpose of the proposed conference of leaders. Now, it seems to me, the problem is whether or not peace in Mexico will not be more quickly restored by giving moral support to the triumphing faction of Carranza.

The difficulty we are in is that we proposed a conference of Mexicans to determine a course of action. The weaker factions other than the Carranzistas have accepted the invitation. Can we consistently or honorably refuse to call such a conference? If we do call it, what will be the practical value of its deliberations? With the utter demoralization of the enemies of Carranza it would be absurd to assert that any government, which they could set up, represented the sovereignty of the Mexican people.

The conference might meet, however, to formulate the grievances, which the participants have against Carranza and which could be laid before him. Of course such a course would entirely change the purpose of the conference, but then conditions have materially changed in favor of Carranza.

I think, in any event, it is necessary to call the Ambassadors and Ministers together and lay before them the replies of the Mexican chiefs and also the present state of affairs in Mexico and the continuing successes of the Carranzista arms. But before doing this I would like to be prepared to present a course of action for consideration which would be practical and expedient in the circumstances.

As this involves the whole general Mexican policy I think that I should be advised as to your wishes in the matter.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/16989½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 13 September, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have already gone over this matter orally; but perhaps it is best for me to put down what I understand our course of action is to be:

We are to call our Latin American colleagues together and suggest to them a conference with representatives of Carranza at Washington, on substantially the basis he proposes, to discuss the advisability of recognizing him as the *de facto* head of the Republic; having it clearly understood that we think the acceptance of the Revolution absolutely necessary.

We are also to keep faith with the leaders of the other factions, who have accepted our proposal for a conference on Mexican affairs, and are to call such a conference of their representatives to be convened and held in Mexico; with the understanding that we wish from them any proposals they may wish to make, but with the intimation conveyed to them in some proper way that the best and most helpful thing for them to do is to let us know confidentially the terms upon which they will submit to Carranza in view of the probable necessity we shall be under, because of the utter alteration of conditions since our suggestion of a conference was conveyed to them, of recognizing him as the head of the Republic.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

812.00/16344½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

NEW YORK, September 18, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We have just finished the Mexican Conference, and I am sorry to say that we failed to carry out in full the program embodied in the Argentine Ambassador's Resolution which I sent to you.²³ The failure was due to the Brazilian Ambassador who is apparently opposed to all the revolutionary factions in Mexico

²³ See extract from the proceedings of the conference of diplomatic representatives, p. 545.

to the extent that he is unwilling to be in any way responsible for the recognition of any of them. I believe, however, that in case this Government determines to recognize a *de facto* government in Mexico he will advise his Government to follow our course.

The split came over notifying the representatives of the factions to meet us separately in conference. The Argentine Ambassador and the Ministers from Bolivia and Uruguay supported strongly the proposal. The Chilean Ambassador was not in entire accord but I believe would have submitted if da Gama had agreed. The Guatemalan, though he said nothing, was evidently favorable.

As a consequence, we got no further than to agree to recommend to our respective Governments the recognition of a *de facto* Government in Mexico as soon as possible. I enclose for your information, copy of the agreement.

It was further understood that independently we should collect all the evidence we could as to the facts showing which Government in Mexico, on account of stability, was able to give adequate guarantees to perform its international obligations. It was recognized there were various sources of information as to these facts. I expressed the view that I thought the two principal factions should have the opportunity to present by personal representatives the reasons why one should be recognized over the other, and that I thought it might be well for me to invite the Chiefs of these factions to send such representatives to Washington, before our next conference in order that I might have an interview with them and with any other members of the Conference who desired to participate.

Since the Conference adjourned I have been thinking it might possibly be better to orally communicate with the representatives of the two factions already in this country, and ask them for an interview of this sort. In this way we would not get into difficulties which might arise if we formally addressed either Carranza or Villa. I told the Conference that I should have to submit the question of such interviews to you for your approval before I took such a step. If you approve the latter of these plans of obtaining the facts as to the situation in Mexico, I would suggest that Mr. Polk ask Arredondo and Llorente to come and see him, and to tell them that I desire to see them in about two weeks, in order that they could present their case for recognition to me orally and in writing. In case the more formal method is adopted, I think telegrams should be sent to the *de facto* Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Carranza and Villa, asking them to send delegates to meet me at the time I suggest. Meanwhile, I think we should telegraph our various Consuls in Mexico as to the exact situation in their localities.

I am disappointed, naturally, that the plan that we had agreed upon was not carried through, but as it has failed, to an extent, I think we should follow out some such scheme as the one above proposed.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Text of Agreement by the Conference of Diplomatic Representatives

In view of the answers to the telegraphic appeal sent to the political and military chiefs of the factions struggling in Mexico, on the 11th of August last, the representatives who signed that appeal believe that the time has arrived to carry out the conclusion agreed upon in their last meeting in order to recommend to their respective Governments the recognition as soon as it will be possible of a Government in Mexico that shall have sprung from the independent and exclusive action of the Mexicans and that possess the material and moral capacity to protect the lives and property of nationals and foreigners.

812.00/17510½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With Mr. Arredondo, March 9, 1916, 4 p. m.

Mr. Arredondo called to ask in regard to the reports of the attack upon Columbus, New Mexico by Villista troops. I read to him the despatches from Cobb and Carothers, sent today.²⁴ I told him that I thought the attack was made in accordance with a definite plan on the part of Villa to compel this Government to invade Mexico, and that I sincerely hoped he would advise his Government to raise no objection to the pursuit by American troops into Mexico of the attacking forces; that it was beyond human endurance to be attacked in the way the American troops had been attacked and when they attempted to revenge the death of their comrades to be stopped at the border; that I thought the case of "hot pursuit" by a punitive expedition was a very different thing from the deliberate invasion by an expeditionary force with intent to occupy Mexican territory.

Arredondo replied that he considered this to be a just conclusion and that he would at once advise General Carranza of this view and express to him the hope that he would raise no objection in case it was proven true that the American troops had entered Mexico.

²⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1916, p. 480. For correspondence previously printed concerning the attack on Columbus, N. Mex., see *ibid.*, pp. 480-499.

I said to him that if there should be objection raised and serious trouble should result, his Government would be playing directly into the hands of Villa and would do the very thing that Villa wished them to do. He replied—"I know that is so and I will do what I can to avoid any trouble of this sort."

I told Arredondo that we had already telegraphed to Mr. Silliman²⁵ as to the facts but that I was not sure yet whether troops had actually crossed the border, although I believed that they had done so; that we did not seek the consent or cooperation of the Mexican Government as we felt it would cause resentment against Carranza and make the political situation most difficult.

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/17743

The Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Mr. Arredondo came in this afternoon. I first called his attention to the note from this Department, dated March 13th, which read as follows:²⁶

"The Government of the United States understands that in view of its agreement to this reciprocal arrangement proposed by the *de facto* Government, the arrangement is now complete and in force and the reciprocal privileges thereunder may accordingly be exercised by either Government without further interchange of views."

After some hesitation he said these two recent communications covering the proposed agreement was their reply.²⁷ I told him I assumed that this proposed agreement would cover future movements of troops and as to the present expedition, we would do everything we could to conform in general to the terms suggested by him. His reply was that the proposed terms were meant to cover this particular expedition and his suggestion was that the agreement should be made at once and that we could then slowly withdraw our troops so as to meet all the terms,—that is to say, that there should not be more than one thousand troops over the border and that they should not go more than sixty kilometers from the border into Mexico. I told him that this would be difficult, if not impossible, for obvious reasons. His point is that the chances of catching Villa are slight; that our troops may have to venture a great distance into Mexico; that Villa will hide in the mountains, and it will mean a campaign of months in the heart of Mexico. All this will be very dangerous

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 481.

²⁶ Printed in full, *ibid.*, p. 487.

²⁷ Communications to the Acting Secretary of State, *ibid.*, pp. 493, 495.

to existing friendly relations. He thought that our troops could not [*now?*] be secretly withdrawn and the statement then made that Villa had fled into the interior of Mexico. I told him he could tell General Carranza that this Government was most anxious to meet his views in every way possible; that the arrangement proposed would probably be satisfactory to cover all future campaigns, but as to this particular campaign I felt sure that you would wish to have reports showing the progress of this campaign and the chances of success before you could consider reducing the force in Mexico and withdrawing it to the limits suggested. I told him that I would communicate with you and I knew that you would give the matter very careful attention. He said that General Carranza was very anxious for a prompt reply and I told him that we would try to meet his wishes in this connection.

In leaving he again assured me that General Carranza was anxious to do everything he could to maintain friendly relations. This is where the matter now stands.

Yours faithfully,

FRANK L. POLK

812.00/18145½ : Telegram

*General Carranza to Mr. Arredondo*²⁸

[Translation]

MEXICO CITY, *May 8, 1916.*

Our enemies, having knowledge of the contents of the projected memorandum of agreement between Generals Obregon and Scott²⁹ have continued to organize bands on both sides of the boundary line for the purpose of attacking American detachments and towns in an endeavor to provoke an international conflict. It is urgent that you should speak with His Excellency Mr. Lansing in order to see whether it is possible that a quick agreement may be reached for the vigilance of the boundary and the reciprocal crossing of forces in pursuit of these bands, or at least that Generals Scott and Obregon could come to an agreement with regard to the location and adequate distribution of the forces of one and the other country in their respective territory on both sides of the boundary line in order to keep a watch over it. Please explain to the Washington Government that one Government and the other are equally obliged to prevent the organization of these bands and to endeavor to secure an effective vigilance as incidents such as the one occurring in Boquillas cannot be exclusively charged to the Government of Mexico because it is in

²⁸ This paper bears the notation: "Handed me by Mr. Arredondo May 9/16 am. RL."

²⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1916, pp. 527-547.

American territory that these bands are organized and are causing depredations in one country as well as in the other.

V. CARRANZA

812.00/18450

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Here is a draft of the reply to the Mexican note of May 22d.³⁰ I believe that it embodies the suggestions which you made to me this morning and sets forth clearly the case between us and the *de facto* Government.

I have not shown this draft to General Scott for the purpose of correcting any minor errors of fact in regard to the conferences at El Paso, because I thought it would be unwise to do so until it had received your approval as to substance. It was my idea after you had made such changes as you desire to submit it to him for the purpose of any corrections which might be necessary.

The note does not include reference to the two raids into American territory made during the past few days, but they can be inserted if so desired.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/18516½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 18 June, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have gone very carefully through this note and think it adequate and excellent. I have here and there altered the wording, but nowhere the meaning of it.

I showed it to Baker last evening, and he makes, after taking it away for careful perusal, the enclosed suggestion, which I think an excellent one. They might as well know at once all that they will be up against if they continue their present attitude.

How will you send this,—by post or wire?

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of War (Baker) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have read the note with great care. It seems to me fine in substance and manner and makes a strong case.

³⁰ For the Mexican note, see *ibid.*, p. 552; for the reply as sent, see *ibid.*, p. 581.

On the subject of the embargo upon shipments of arms and munitions³¹ would it not be better to say that while a part of its purpose was and is to prevent such supplies falling into the hands of enemies of the *de facto* Government yet so long as our commanders are menaced by subordinate commanders of the Mexican Government and the Mexican Government itself spends its efforts in threats upon us instead of action against the disturbers of our common peace, we do not propose to allow them to have any munitions from the U. S.

Might they not as well understand at once the fact.

Instances could be cited of the approval of the Chihuahua note by General Carranza;³² the approval of Trevino's orders to Pershing;³³ the Carranza uniform and papers of the Brownsville raiders³⁴ &c.

Respectfully,

NEWTON D. BAKER

812.00/18533a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As there appears to be an increasing probability that the Mexican situation may develop into a state of war I desire to make a suggestion for your consideration.

It seems to me that we should avoid the use of the word "Intervention" and deny that any invasion of Mexico is for the sake of intervention.

There are several reasons why this appears to me expedient:

First. We have all along denied any purpose to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico and the St. Louis platform declares against it. Intervention conveys the idea of such interference.

Second. Intervention would be humiliating to many Mexicans whose pride and sense of national honor would not resent severe terms of peace in case of being defeated in a war.

Third. American intervention in Mexico is extremely distasteful to all Latin America and might have a very bad effect upon our Pan-American program.

Fourth. Intervention, which suggests a definite purpose to "clean up" the country, would bind us to certain accomplishments which circumstances might make extremely difficult or inadvisable, and, on the other hand, it would impose conditions which might be found to be serious restraints upon us as the situation develops.

Fifth. Intervention also implies that the war would be made primarily in the interest of the Mexican people, while the fact is it would

³¹ For this portion of the note as sent, see *Foreign Relations, 1916*, p. 586.

³² See *ibid.*, p. 523.

³³ See *ibid.*, p. 595.

³⁴ See *ibid.*, 1915, p. 812.

be a war forced on us by the Mexican Government, and, if we term it intervention, we will have considerable difficulty in explaining why we had not intervened before but waited until attacked.

It seems to me that the real attitude is that the *de facto* Government having attacked our forces engaged in a rightful enterprise or invaded our borders (as the case may be) we had no recourse but to defend ourselves and to do so it has become necessary to prevent future attacks by forcing the Mexican Government to perform its obligations. That is, it is simply a state of international war without purpose on our part other than to end the conditions which menace our national peace and the safety of our citizens, and that it is not intervention with all that that word implies.

I offer the foregoing suggestion, because I feel that we should have constantly in view the attitude we intend to take if worse comes to worse, so that we may regulate our present policy and future correspondence with Mexico and other American Republics with that attitude.

In case this suggestion meets with your approval I further suggest that we send to each diplomatic representative of a Latin American Republic in Washington a communication stating briefly our attitude and denying any intention to intervene. I enclose a draft of such a note.³⁵ If this is to be done at all, it seems to me that it should be done at once, otherwise we will lose the chief benefit, namely, a right understanding by Latin America at the very outset.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/18533½

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 21 June, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I agree to all of this. I was myself about to say something to you to the same effect, though I had not thought of making an occasion of the sending of copies of our note to Mexico to the Latin American representatives, but had thought to wait until hostilities were actually forced upon us. As I write this "extras" of the evening paper are being cried on the Avenue which, if true, mean that hostilities have begun. At any rate, my doubt upon that point (the time for the notification you suggest) is so slight that I beg that you will carry out the plan you suggest at once.

Faithfully Yours,

W. W.

³⁵ For the note as sent, see *ibid.*, 1916, p. 592.

812.00/18534½

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*³⁶

The announced policy of the United States in its relations with Mexico has been and still is one of non-intervention. In using the words "intervention" and "non-intervention" the meaning of intervention should be clearly understood. To intervene in the affairs of a neighboring independent state means to interfere with its domestic affairs and the exercise of its sovereign rights by its people.

In June, 1915, when I became Secretary of State, I realized that the continued conditions of lawlessness and violence in the northern states of Mexico might at any time compel us to employ force to protect the American border and American citizens against the bands of armed men who were committing depredations in that region, and that, if we were compelled to send troops into Mexico, it could only be construed as intervention between the factions which were striving to obtain control of the government. Without a recognized government we could not cause a state of international war between the United States and Mexico.

In view of the policy of non-intervention and the satisfaction with which it had been received by the Latin American Republics to be forced to adopt a course of intervention although the actual purpose was protection of American rights and territory would have placed the Government in an awkward position. It would have been difficult to persuade the Latin American governments that we could only intervene in view of the fact that Mexico had no government which we could hold responsible for the crimes perpetrated. Suspicion and doubt would have been aroused as to our motives and we would have been charged with insincerity in announcing that we had no intention to intervene. This would have been very unfortunate for our efforts to secure a Pan American treaty, and would have materially affected the policy of Pan Americanism, which was being developed.

It was important, therefore, to recognize a government in Mexico as soon as opportunity offered in order to avoid a condition which forced us into the false position of intervention.

812.00/17714½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In view of your request this morning for a memorandum on the policy to be adopted in regard to Mexico I will

³⁶ This undated memorandum bears the notation: "Prepared to use with Prest. RL."

endeavor to present an idea which is not new but which in the present circumstances I think may be worked out in a new way.

The idea is simply the naming of a joint American-Mexican Commission of four or six members to study the various questions relating to the boundary troubles and the necessary means to prevent them in the future.

If the Carrizal incident was a clear case of Mexican aggression I doubt if I would be favorable to this policy, but it appears to me that Captain Boyd was possibly to blame.³⁷ At least there is sufficient contradiction in the statements of those present to put us on inquiry as to the facts before taking drastic action.

In regard to the creation and work of a joint commission I would offer the following suggestions:

1st. The proposal for such a commission should be made by the *de facto* Government in answer to our note of June 25th³⁸ as evidence of its friendly intentions. (I feel convinced that this can be accomplished through Arredondo and through the financial agent of Carranza, Dr. Rendon. In fact I know the latter is already making representations to his Chief in favor of a commission of some sort.)

2nd. The Commission should be composed of an equal number of Americans and Mexicans, and should sit in Washington as soon as possible.

3rd. The members should be diplomatic commissioners clothed with formal powers to negotiate a protocol or protocols *ad referendum*, and to make joint or several reports.

4th. The subjects to be considered by the Commission should embrace:

- (a) The Carrizal incident,
- (b) The raids which have taken place across the border.
- (c) The general state of lawlessness and brigandage which has prevailed in Mexican territory contiguous to the international boundary.
- (d) The treatment of Mexican citizens on the American side of the boundary.
- (e) Efficient means of suppressing the lawless elements and restoring peace and safety by cooperation of the military and civil authorities of the two countries.
- (f) The right to pursue marauders within a fixed or flexible zone without regard to territorial sovereignty, the pursuers to be properly restricted in dealing with the civil and military authorities of the other country.
- (g) The use of the railroads in exercising the right of pursuit.
- (h) A cooperative scheme of border protection which will insure safety to life and property.
- (i) Any other pertinent subject which will aid in the accomplishment of the ends desired.

³⁷ For correspondence previously printed on the Carrizal incident, see *Foreign Relations*, 1916, pp. 592-596.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 595.

Subjects *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* should be embodied in a report or reports. The other subjects included in a protocol or protocols of agreement.

5th. Until the Commission has met and completed its labors and the Governments have acted upon their reports and protocols the *status quo* as to American troops in Mexico should continue, and in case of raids into American territory American military authorities should be permitted to cross the boundary in hot pursuit of the raiders.

This in crude form is the general scheme which I have in mind as offering a possible amicable solution to the present difficulty.

At the same time I would not abate for one hour the military preparation which we are making, for this effort at peaceable settlement may in the end fail. If it does, we ought to be fully prepared, and I think that we will be by the time the Commission completes its work.³⁹ We certainly would be better off than we are now if force is necessary. I believe too that our increasing strength would have a salutary effect on the negotiations. . . .

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

711.12/39½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Ambassador Naón called to see me yesterday afternoon by appointment to discuss a plan which he has to visit Mexico and explain personally to General Carranza his views as to the friendly and unselfish attitude of this Government toward Mexico. He thinks that he can remove the suspicions of our motives, which he considers the stumbling block to a full and frank understanding being reached between the two Governments.

He would go to Mexico entirely on his own motion, carefully avoiding any intimation that he had consulted me before leaving. He will be careful to explain that he is in no sense acting as a mediator or intermediary (the fact is he does not approve mediation), and has only made the journey because of his sincere friendship for Mexico and his feeling that the spirit and purposes of the United States are misunderstood.

I told the Ambassador that I would talk the matter over with you and give him a definite answer later, but that I could not see any objection to his visiting Mexico as long as he did so without the sanction of this Government.

The Ambassador came from New York on purpose to lay this matter before me and returned yesterday afternoon. I shall be in

³⁹ For correspondence previously printed concerning the setting up of the Commission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1916, pp. 601, 603-608.

New York on my way to Henderson Harbor for several hours Friday evening and could arrange to see him then and give him a definite answer.

In case we decide to adopt the plan of seeking the appointment of a Joint Commission what would you think of the idea of explaining it to Naón and having him, if opportunity offers, urge the acceptance of the plan by Carranza in case he goes to Mexico?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/19156c

The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1916.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: You have doubtless seen in the papers the progress which has been made in the American-Mexican Joint Commission.⁴⁰ I had intended to write you before about the matter but in view of the absence of Polk and Phillips the routine work of the Department has occupied much more of my time than has been customary.

At the luncheon which I gave to the Commissioners at the Biltmore yesterday I was especially gratified at the tone of the remarks made by Mr. Arredondo and Mr. Cabrera. They indicated very clearly the desire of the Mexican Government to adjust not only the boundary difficulty but all other controversies which have arisen between the United States and Mexico.

I might say to you, very confidentially, that Rodgers, who has been representing us in Mexico City and who accompanied the Mexican Commissioners when they came to this country and who is now with our Commissioners at New London, informed me that Cabrera had told him that they were willing to go into every question which the American Commissioners thought important, provided publicity could be avoided, as he was fearful that it would cause political trouble in Mexico. He also said that General Carranza had indicated to him the same thing, and looked forward with confidence that all matters could be successfully adjusted.

Taking everything into consideration I think the prospects are bright for a definite settlement of the Mexican situation although it will take some time to work out the details. Of course from the very outset—that is, from the time we recognized Carranza—peace, the restoration of order, and the renewal of industrial activity in Mexico

⁴⁰ See report of the American Commissioners, submitted April 26, 1917, *ibid.*, 1917, p. 916.

has been practically a financial problem. It is that, particularly, which I hope to see solved.

Now that the weather is becoming cooler I presume you are thinking of returning to New York so that it will be possible for me to see you at no distant date. I have many things I would like to talk with you about, but at present cannot write them.

With warm regards to you and Mrs. House, from Mrs. Lansing and me, believe me—

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.00/197104

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

EN ROUTE, *October 26, 1916.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am taking the liberty of sending you a copy of a letter I have just sent to the Secretary of War. I do this for your information in order that we may all take counsel together and omit no precaution.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

[Enclosure]

President Wilson to the Secretary of War (Baker)

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Rumors have reached me from a number of different quarters that influences are at work from this side of the border to bring about from the Mexican side another raid into the territory of the United States by the irregular Mexican forces. These rumors may be ill-founded, but they are so persistent and definite that I do not feel it would be right to ignore them.

I, therefore, write to request you to apprise General Funston of these rumors and to instruct him to be unusually on the alert that every source of information may be taken advantage of and every precaution adopted that is possible in the circumstances, in order that every vulnerable point of the border where American property or lives are exposed may be safeguarded to the utmost.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

812.00/197104

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, *October 27, 1916.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have your letter of the 26th enclosing one to Secretary Baker, which I had already seen.

Yesterday afternoon I received a telegram from Secretary Lane, a copy of which I understand has been mailed to you.⁴¹ I at once showed it to Baker and we agreed that publicity would have the double effect of deterring the plotters from pursuing their purpose and of preventing hostile sentiment to you politically in case an attempt was made to carry out the plan. After dictating a statement for the press Baker left for West Virginia. I modified the statement to a certain extent and it was then given out.

In the evening I found that the opposition papers were intending to declare that the statement was made for political purposes and, in the absence of Baker, I felt it necessary to give out the comment to the Associated Press, which was printed this morning, (a copy is enclosed ⁴¹).

This morning Secretary Baker and I conferred on the subject and agreed to emphasize the fact that it was Mexican refugees in this country whom we suspected, that they were naturally hostile to the present administration and desired your defeat and would go any length to accomplish that end, and that it was unthinkable that any American could be so unpatriotic and heartless as to participate in a plot for political purposes, which if carried out would result in the loss of American lives.

This in brief is the situation and I am thoroughly convinced that it was the wise thing to do.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

812.01/A

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On May 1st General Carranza will be inaugurated as President of Mexico. The question arises whether Fletcher's presence at the ceremony will be a recognition of the *de jure* character of the Government and an acceptance of the Constitution.

I am enclosing a memorandum on the subject which recites in a general way the salient features of the situation.⁴²

It would seem as if it were advisable as a matter of policy that Fletcher should attend the inaugural ceremonies for we ought to do everything possible to avoid any action which can be seized upon as a pretext by the Mexicans for complaint.

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² Memorandum not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

If Carranza adopts the method referred to in the enclosed telegram from Fletcher⁴⁶ a reply can be drafted making the proper reservations as to American vested rights affected by the new Constitution. I enclose a form of reservation which might be employed.

As to whether Fletcher's presence would be a formal recognition of the *de jure* character of the Government, I think that the words "*de facto*" may be employed before and after the inauguration in such a way as to indicate that we consider the character of the Government has not changed by the ceremony of inauguration but only the title of the head of the Government who will be "the *de facto* President" instead of "The Chief of the Constitutionalist Army."

Of course the advantage to be gained in preserving the *de facto* status is that the obligation to obey any mandate relating to neutrality issued by such a Government is far less than if it is *de jure*. Against an obligation of that sort we should endeavor to guard ourselves as far as possible. Furthermore it would be consistent with the reservation of rights improperly impaired by the new Constitution.

As the time is very short will you please give me your views on this important matter as soon as possible so that I may telegraph instructions to Fletcher?⁴⁷

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

Form of Reservation

Recognition is extended to General Carranza as the *de facto* President of Mexico on the understanding and with the reservation that he is recognized without prejudice to the position heretofore taken by the Government of the United States in regard to the decrees of the provisional government and the provisions of the new constitution, if interpreted and applied so as to impair vested rights of foreign owners of properties in Mexico, as to which the Government of the United States reserves full liberty of action, because, as already stated by the Government of the United States, (see instructions to Ambassador Fletcher of January 22, 1917⁴⁸) it cannot acquiesce in the confiscation of or discrimination against the rights and interests of American citizens acquired either under the constitution of 1857 and the laws emanating therefrom or otherwise.

⁴⁶ Not printed; reported General Carranza's intention to announce his election and inauguration in a formal letter to the heads of nations (file No. 123 F 63/152).

⁴⁷ For the instructions as sent, see *infra*.

⁴⁸ For the purport of these instructions, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 947.

123 F 63/151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Fletcher)

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1917.

145. Your 76, April 10, 7 p. m.⁴⁹ You may attend the festivities in connection with the inauguration of President-elect Carranza.

In felicitating General Carranza, you will be careful to say or do nothing that would indicate a recognition of his government as *de jure* in character.

Everything should be done to hold the confidence and friendship of Carranza at this time. Although it may be impossible to accept those provisions of the new constitution which are in contravention of the international obligations of Mexico, it is desired for reasons of high policy not to force an issue on these questions. They will be met when they arise.

The Department relies upon your every effort to prevent matters of vital military importance coming to a head, in particular as regards the withdrawal of United States ships of war now in Mexican waters.

LANSING

711.12/225½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Mr. Tumulty informs me that you are to see Senators Hitchcock and Fall this afternoon in regard to the Mexican situation. I have not troubled you with the Jenkins case which is of considerable complexity as to facts and as to law because there was no possibility of that case developing a situation which could possibly warrant intervention in Mexico.⁵⁰ As to this I am sure that the Foreign Relations Committee is in entire accord.

The real Mexican situation is the whole series of outrages and wrongs which Americans in Mexico have suffered during the Carranza administration. There is no doubt that the complaints are numerous and justified and that the indictment which can be drawn against Carranza will appeal very strongly to the people and arouse a very general indignation. The danger is that Congress, in view of the facts which will be reported undoubtedly by Senator Fall's sub-Committee on Mexico, will demand drastic action or put us in a position where it will be very difficult to treat the matter with a proper deliberation.

⁴⁹ Not printed.⁵⁰ For correspondence previously printed on the Jenkins case, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. II, pp. 578 ff., and *ibid.*, 1920, vol. III, pp. 250 ff.

I have seen this coming for some time, knowing the vast amount of material collected by the Fall Committee and it was with that purpose that I sought to divert attention to the Jenkins case which I knew could not possibly result in a rupture between the two Governments.

I thought before you saw these two Senators you should be advised as to the real question which is, as I have said, Carranza's past record of hostility toward this Government and not the Jenkins case, which can be handled by the Department without endangering our relations with Mexico.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

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