



# LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

## **Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Regulation of armaments; atomic energy. Volume XX 1955/1957**

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955/1957

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84>

As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.

S I.1:955-57/v. 20

FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES

1955-1957


VOLUME XX

REGULATION  
OF  
ARMAMENTS;  
ATOMIC  
ENERGY



DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

Washington







S 1.1:955-57/V.20

DOCUMENTS COLLECTION

NOV 02 1993

University of Michigan - Flint Library

**DEPOSITORY**

**93 05 99**

**DOCUMENT**







## Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957

---

Volume XX

# Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy

*Editor in Chief*      John P. Glennon

*Editor*                 David S. Patterson



**DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9759**

**OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN**

**BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

---

**For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402**

# Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The importance of publishing the complete and comprehensive documentary record of U.S. diplomacy was set forth in an order by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925, and supplemented and revised by Department of State regulations in the *Foreign Affairs Manual*. (2 FAM 1350-1353)

The Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, is directed by the *Foreign Affairs Manual* to collect, edit, and publish the authoritative diplomatic record, including papers from other concerned government agencies. (1 FAM 857) Official historians of the Department of State seek out relevant official foreign affairs documentation in other agencies and documentary repositories bearing on subjects documented in the volumes of the series. The topics to be documented are determined by the editor of the series in concert with the compilers of individual volumes.

Secretary of State Kellogg's order, as codified in the *Foreign Affairs Manual*, remains the official guidance for editorial preparation of the series:

"The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy." (2 FAM 1352)

## *Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, Volume XX*

The documentation in this particular volume was compiled by David S. Patterson of the Office of the Historian from the Department's centralized and decentralized files and the records of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. For a complete listing of particular collections consulted within and outside of the Department of State, see the List of Sources.



In selecting documents for inclusion, primary emphasis was placed on records of high-level discussions within the U.S. Government and National Security Council and Department of State policy papers. Because President Eisenhower made the major decisions on arms control policy in this period, his opinions and decisions on the various initiatives and options submitted to him are central to the compilation. Documentation is also presented on U.S. participation in the international conferences on arms control and atomic energy matters held in New York, London, and Geneva and on U.S. diplomatic discussions with its NATO allies on these subjects.

Documentation on the decisionmaking process as it was affected by bureaucratic politics within the Executive branch is also included; particularly the interagency process headed by Harold E. Stassen, who spent much time trying to resolve interagency differences in the development of a coherent U.S. position in the U.N. Disarmament Committee. Many of the formal proposals and reports generated by this bureaucratic process are included in this volume. Similarly, nuclear testing, which required U.S. responses not only to Soviet initiatives but to growing public concern about the dangers of radioactive fallout, receives considerable attention. The volume includes documents on President Eisenhower's consultations with a wide range of scientific opinion on the testing question. Less important issues for senior policymakers and the available documentation are summarized in editorial notes.

While most of the documents that deal with arms control policies for this triennium are printed in this volume, a small portion are included in volume XXVII, Western Europe and Canada, which contains the compilation of documents on the United Kingdom. Three standards for the location of documents were followed:

- 1) Documents relating principally to disarmament or atomic energy are included in this volume, with the exception of documents involving formal heads of government meetings which will appear in volume XXVII. An editorial note on each meeting is printed in this volume, summarizing those documents.

- 2) Documents on U.S.-U.K. relations involving disarmament or atomic energy but having wider ramifications for the bilateral relationship (e.g., intermediate-range ballistic missiles, military strategy, and free world cooperation) are included in volume XXVII.

- 3) Documents on U.S.-U.K. relations relating to disarmament or atomic energy but also involving third countries (e.g., other nations in the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee, amendments to the Atomic Energy Act which relate to Canada, and NATO matters) are printed in this volume.

Moreover, because arms control was a crucial national security issue, some documents pertaining to arms control are included in volume XIX on national security policy. Printed in that volume are

summaries of oral briefings by Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles to the National Security Council on the Soviet nuclear program and nuclear tests.

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Incoming telegrams from U.S. missions are placed according to the time of transmission rather than the time of receipt in the Department of State; memoranda of conversations are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the Editor in Chief and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an omission in roman type. Brackets are also used to indicate text that has been omitted by the compiler because it deals with an unrelated subject. Ellipses are inserted to replace material that remained classified after the declassification review process. Ellipses of three or four periods identify excisions of less than a paragraph; ellipses of seven periods spread across the page identify excisions of an entire paragraph or more. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, drafting information, and, in the case of telegrams, the time of receipt in the Department of State. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies, indicates if the President or Secretary of State read the document, and records its ultimate disposition.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in this volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, describe diplomatic reportage and key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs of participants and other first-hand accounts, available when this volume was originally compiled in 1978–1979, has been used where possible to supplement the official record.



## VI Preface

---

### *Declassification Review Procedures*

Declassification review of the documents selected for publication is conducted by the Division of Historical Documents Review, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State. The review is made in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the criteria established in Executive Order 12356 regarding:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; and
- 9) a confidential source.

Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State and of other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and communication with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments. The principle of declassification review is to release as much information as is consistent with contemporary requirements of national security and sound foreign relations; some documents or portions of documents are necessarily withheld.

Dr. Patterson compiled this volume under the supervision of Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Neal H. Petersen provided initial planning and direction. Rosa Pace assisted with the preparation of the lists of sources, names, and abbreviations. Althea W. Robinson of the Editing Division of the Historian's Office performed the technical editing under the supervision of Rita M. Baker. Barbara Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief) oversaw production of the volume. Victoria L.V. Agee prepared the index.

**William Z. Slany**  
*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

# Contents

	Page
<b>Preface</b> .....	III
<b>List of Sources</b> .....	IX
<b>List of Abbreviations</b> .....	XV
<b>List of Persons</b> .....	XIX
<b>United States policy with respect to regulation of armaments and atomic energy</b>	
Review of basic disarmament policy; negotiations in the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission; proposals for inspection and verification; nuclear weapons tests; effects of fall-out from nuclear explosions; exchange of atomic information; peaceful uses of atomic energy; creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency .....	1
<b>Index</b> .....	783



# List of Sources

## Unpublished Sources

### Department of State

1. *Indexed Central Files.* Papers in the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1955-1957 are indicated by a decimal file number. Among the most useful of these files in the preparation of this volume were 030.13, 101, 103-AEC, 103-FOA, 110-DU, 110.11-DU, 330, 330.13, 398.1901, 398.1901-GE, 398.1901-IAEA, 600.0012, 600.12, 611.4112, 611.62A, 660.0012, 700.5611, 711.11, 711.5611, 740.5, 741.5611, 770.5611, and 990.8137.

2. *Lot Files.* Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

#### Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688

Consolidated collection of documentation in the Department of State on atomic energy policy for the years 1944-1962, as maintained principally by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs but also by other offices of the Department of State.

#### Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955-1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

#### Daily Summaries: Lot 60 D 530

Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication *Daily Secret Summary* and *Daily Top Secret Summary* for the years 1953-1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

#### Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133

Consolidated collection of documentation in the Department of State on the regulation of armaments and disarmament for the years 1942-1962.

#### INR Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

## **X List of Sources**

---

### **INR--NIE Files**

Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates, retained by the Directorate for Regional Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

### **IO Files**

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, comprising the official U.N. documentation and classified Department of State records on U.S. policy in the U.N. Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and ad hoc committees for the period from 1946 to currency.

#### **IO Files: Lot 60 D 113**

Consolidated files of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs for the years 1955-1957.

#### **IO Files: Lot 71 D 440**

Master files of classified records and correspondence of U.S. delegations to sessions of the U.N. General Assembly for the years 1945-1965, as maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

#### **PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70**

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the year 1955.

#### **PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487**

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the year 1956.

#### **PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548**

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957-1961.

#### **Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204**

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the heads of foreign governments for the years 1953-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

#### **Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149**

A complete chronological record of cleared memoranda of conversations with foreign visitors for the years 1956-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

#### **S/AE Files. *See also* Atomic Energy Files.**

#### **S/AE Files: Lot 68 D 358**

Files relating to atomic energy policy matters for the years 1950-1967, maintained initially by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs and later by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs.

#### **S/P--NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167**

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950-1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948-1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947-1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148

Miscellaneous files concerning subjects considered by the National Security Council during the years 1949-1962, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action for the years 1947-1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat,

S/S-OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171

Restricted data files maintained by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1957-1967.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's staff meetings for the years 1952-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1951-1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954-1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

**United States Mission to the United Nations, New York**

USUN Files

Files of the United States Mission to the United Nations, 1950 to present.



## **XII List of Sources**

---

### **Department of Energy, Germantown, Maryland**

#### **Records of the Department of Energy (formerly Atomic Energy Commission)**

Official documentation includes correspondence, memoranda, and minutes of meetings of the commissioners.

### **Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas**

#### **Dulles Papers**

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1952-1959, including General Memoranda of Conversation, Meetings with the President, General Telephone Conversations, and White House Telephone Conversations. Dulles was Secretary of State, 1953-1959.

#### **Herter Papers**

Papers of Christian A. Herter, 1957-1961. Herter was Under Secretary of State, 1957-1959, and Secretary of State, 1959-1961.

#### **President's Daily Appointments Record**

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-1961.

#### **Project Clean Up**

Project "Clean Up" collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1953-1961.

#### **Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records**

Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray), 1952-1961.

#### **Staff Secretary Records**

Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary (Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell), 1952-1961.

#### **White House Central Files, Confidential File**

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-1961.

#### **Whitman File**

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953-1961, as maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administration Series, and the International File.

### **National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.**

#### **JCS Records**

National Archives Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

## Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Conference Files: FRC 59-83-0066

Lot 62 D 181: Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1956-1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

IO Files: FRC 70 A 6871

Lot 60 D 463: Official United Nations documentation for the years 1946-1956, as maintained in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

National Archives Record Group 374: FRC 59 A 1673

Records of the Defense Nuclear Agency (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project until 1959, then Defense Atomic Support Agency). Headquarters Joint Task Force 7 general administrative files, January 1, 1952-January 31, 1956.

National Archives Record Group 374: FRC 61 A 1433

Records of the Defense Nuclear Agency (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project until 1959, then Defense Atomic Support Agency). Messages 1956-1958, correspondence 1957-1958, Task Group 7.1 correspondence 1956, and Task Group 7.2 strength report 1959.

National Archives Record Group 374: FRC 61 A 1740

Records of the Defense Nuclear Agency (formerly Armed Forces Special Weapons Project until 1959, then Defense Atomic Support Agency). Administrative files, personnel records, operations orders, and operations final reports on nuclear weapons and devices, prepared by Task Group 7.3, December 1950-May 1959. Covers primarily naval support in conducting nuclear weapons tests at the Enewetak Proving Ground in the Pacific.

## Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers, Dulles' Daily Appointment Book

Daily log of the meetings and appointments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for the years 1953-1959.

## Published Sources

*Note:* All the sources listed below were consulted at the time this volume was prepared in 1978 and 1979.

### Official Documentary Collections

United Nations. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955, 1956, 1957*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956, 1957, 1958

U.S. Congress, Senate, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, vol. 7 [1955]. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978

\_\_\_\_\_. *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, vol. 8 [1956]. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978

\_\_\_\_\_. *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, vol. 9 [1957]. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979

## XIV List of Sources

---

- U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*. 2 vols. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957
- \_\_\_\_\_. *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959
- \_\_\_\_\_. *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Department of State Bulletin*. Vols. XXIV and XXV. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955-1957
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*. 2 vols. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960
- U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, 1956, and 1957*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958 and 1959

### **Memoirs, Autobiographies, Diaries**

- Adams, Sherman. *Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration*. New York: Harper, 1961
- Berding, Andrew Henry Thomas. *Dulles on Diplomacy*. Princeton, N.J.: P. Van Norstrand, 1965
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Making of Foreign Policy*. Washington: Potomac Books, 1966
- Cutler, Robert. *No Time For Rest*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965
- Eden, Anthony, Earl of Avon. *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The White House Years. Mandate for Change, 1953-1956*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The White House Years. Waging Peace, 1956-1961*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965
- Hughes, Emmet John. *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years*. New York: Atheneum, 1963
- Killian, James R., Jr. *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977
- Larson, Arthur. *Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew*. New York: Charles Scribners, 1968
- Lodge, Henry Cabot. *As It Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the 50's and 60's*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976
- Macmillan, Harold. *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*. London: Macmillan, 1971
- Strauss, Lewis L. *Men and Decisions*. New York: Doubleday, 1962

# List of Abbreviations

- A**, airgram; Army  
**ACEP**, Advisory Committee on Export Policy  
**AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission  
**AF**, Air Force  
**AG**, Attorney General  
**ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ASM**, air-to-surface missile  
**ASW**, anti-submarine warfare  
**B-K**, Bulganin-Khrushchev  
**BBC**, British Broadcasting Company  
**BNA**, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**BOB**, Bureau of the Budget  
**BOMARC**, Boeing-Michigan Aeronautical Test Center missile; U.S. Air Force surface-to-air delta winged area defense missile  
**BOT**, Board of Trade (United Kingdom)  
**C**, Office of the Counselor, Department of State  
**CA**, circular airgram; Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State  
**CCSL**, Consolidated China Special List  
**CE**, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army  
**CEA**, Council of Economic Advisors  
**CEP**, circular error probable  
**CERN**, Conseil europeenne pour la recherche nucleaire (European Council for Nuclear Research)  
**CFEP**, Council on Foreign Economic Policy  
**CG**, Consultative Group of nations, based in Paris working to control the export of strategic goods to Communist countries  
**ChiCom**, Chinese Communist  
**CHINCOM**, China Committee of the Paris Consultative Group  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CINCLANT**, Commander in Chief, Atlantic  
**CINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific  
**CINCONAD**, Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command  
**circ**, circular  
**cirtel**, circular telegram  
**COCOM**, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group  
**COMINFORM**, Communist Information Bureau  
**CONAD**, Continental Air Defense Command  
**CPSU**, Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
**CS/E**, Allied Forces Southern Europe  
**CVE**, escort aircraft carrier  
**CW**, chemical warhead; chemical warfare  
**CY**, calendar year  
**D**, member of the Democratic Party in the United States  
**del**, delegate; delegation  
**Delga**, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation at the U.S. Mission at the United Nations  
**Dento**, series indicator for telegrams to the Denver White House  
**Deptel**, Department of State telegram  
**DEW**, distant early warning DFI, Division of Functional Intelligence, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**Dulte**, series indicator for personal telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington  
**E**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
**ECD**, Economic Defense Division, Office of International Trade and Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State  
**ECM**, electronic countermeasures

## XVI List of Abbreviations

---

- ECOSOC**, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
- ED**, Investment and Development Staff, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
- EDAC**, Economic Defense Advisory Committee
- EDC**, European Defense Community
- EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- ELINT**, electronic intelligence
- Emb**, Embassy
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- E.O.**, Executive Order
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/RA**, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/RPM**, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EURATOM**, European Atomic Energy Community
- E-W**, East-West
- Excon**, series indicator for telegrams dealing with the export control program
- FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FCDA**, Federal Civil Defense Administration
- FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FE/P**, Public Affairs Staff, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FOA**, Foreign Operations Administration
- FonOff**, Foreign Office
- FRC**, Federal Records Center
- FY**, fiscal year
- FYI**, for your information
- G**, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
- GA**, United Nations General Assembly
- Gadel**, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation at the U.N. General Assembly
- GADel**, U.S. Delegation at the U.N. General Assembly
- GRC**, Government of the Republic of China
- H**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
- HB**, heavy bomber; horizontal bomber
- HE**, high explosive
- HEW**, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
- HCR**, U.S. House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution
- H.J.Res.**, U.S. House of Representatives Joint Resolution
- I**, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency
- I/R**, Public Information Staff, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency
- IAC**, Intelligence Advisory Committee
- IAE**, Office of the Assistant Director (Europe), U.S. Information Agency
- IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency
- IAF**, Office of the Assistant Director (Far East), U.S. Information Agency
- IAN**, Office of the Assistant Director (Near East, South Asia and Africa), U.S. Information Agency
- IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- IBS**, International Broadcasting Service, U.S. Information Agency
- IC/DV**, Import Certificate/Delivery Verification
- ICA**, International Cooperation Administration
- ICBM**, intercontinental ballistic missile
- ICFTU**, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
- ICIS**, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
- ICS**, Information Center Service, U.S. Information Agency
- IIC**, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
- IL**, International List
- IMG**, Information Media Guaranty Program
- IMS**, Motion Picture Service, U.S. Information Agency
- INC**, International Nickel Company
- INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- IOC**, initial operation capability
- IOP**, Office of Policy and Plans, U.S. Information Agency
- IPS**, International Press Service, U.S. Information Agency
- IRBM**, intermediate-range ballistic missile

- IRD**, International Resources Division, Office of International Trade and Resources, Department of State
- IRI**, Office of Research and Intelligence, U.S. Information Agency
- ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- JCAE**, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JSOP**, Joint Strategic Objective Plan
- JSSC**, Joint Strategic Survey Committee
- kgs**, kilograms
- KT**, kilotons
- KW**, kilowatt
- L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- LOFAR**, low frequency acquisition and ranging
- M**, mass; missile
- MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group
- MDA**, Mutual Defense Assistance
- MDAP**, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
- MEEC**, Middle East Emergency Meeting
- MIG**, A.I. Mikoyan i M.I. Gurevich (Soviet fighter aircraft named for designers Mikoyan and Gurevich)
- mil**, military
- MRC**, Munich Radio Center
- MSA**, Mutual Security Act; Mutual Security Agency
- MSP**, Mutual Security Program
- mytel**, my telegram
- N**, Navy; nuclear-powered ship
- n.m.**, nautical mile
- NAC**, North Atlantic Council
- NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NBC**, National Broadcasting Company
- NEA**, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
- NESC**, Nuclear Engineering and Scientific Congress; Nuclear Electronics Systems Command
- niact**, night action, communication indicator requiring action by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
- NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate
- NOA**, new obligational authority
- noform**, not releasable to foreign nationals
- NPN**, U.S. Information Agency internal news policy note
- NSC**, National Security Council; NATO Supply Center
- NSCID**, National Security Council Intelligence Directive
- NTE**, Navy Technical Evaluation; not to exceed
- O**, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
- OAS**, Organization of American States
- OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
- ODM**, Office of Defense Mobilization
- OEEC**, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
- OFD**, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
- ONE**, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
- ONI**, Office of Naval Intelligence
- OIR**, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- ORIT**, Operational Readiness Inspection Test
- P**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
- PAO**, public affairs officer
- PC**, participating country
- PCG**, Planning Coordination Group, Operations Coordinating Board
- PL**, public law
- Polto**, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State
- PPS**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- PRECO**, Preparatory Commission for the first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency
- PWR**, power reactor
- QC**, quantitative control
- R**, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
- R and D**, research and development
- RA**, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
- reftel**, reference telegram
- ROK**, Republic of Korea
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State



## XVIII List of Abbreviations

---

- S/AE**, Office of the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs
- S/IAE**, Office of the Special Ambassador to the Negotiations for the Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency
- S/MSA**, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State
- S/P**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- S/S-RO**, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- SAC**, Strategic Air Command
- SACLANT**, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
- SACEUR**, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- SAGE**, semi-automatic ground environment system
- SCA**, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
- SEATO**, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
- Secto**, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
- SETAF**, Southern European Task Force
- SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
- SOA**, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
- SPD**, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
- SSM**, surface-to-surface missile battalion
- SSR**, Soviet Socialist Republic
- TAC**, Transit Authorization Certificate; Tactical Air Command
- TCP**, Technological Capabilities Panel
- Tedul**, series indicator for personal telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
- Topol**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the U.S. Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
- Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
- TS**, Top Secret
- U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State
- U/MSA**, Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State
- U/OP**, Operations Coordinator, Department of State
- UCEP**, unit circular error probability
- UK**, United Kingdom
- UN**, United Nations
- UNESCO**, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly
- UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
- urtel**, your telegram
- USA**, United States of America; United States Army
- USAF**, United States Air Force
- USIA**, United States Information Agency
- USIBS**, United States International Broadcasting Service
- USIS**, United States Information Service
- Usito**, series indicator for telegrams originating in USIA
- USMC**, United States Marine Corps
- USN**, United States Navy
- USOM**, United States Operations Mission
- USRO**, U.S. Delegation to European Regional Organizations; U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations; U.S. Permanent Representative to European Regional Organizations
- USRO/ST**, Office of Strategic Trade, U.S. Mission to European Regional Organizations
- USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- USUN**, United States Mission to the United Nations
- VOA**, Voice of America
- WEU**, Western European Union
- WPC**, World Peace Council

# List of Persons

*Editor's Note:* The identification of the persons in this list is generally limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary. Where no dates are given, the official held the position throughout the period covered by this volume.

- Adams, Sherman**, Assistant to President Eisenhower
- Adenauer, Konrad**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and, until May 1955, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Aldrich, Winthrop W.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom until February 1957
- Alphand, Hervé**, French Permanent Representative at the United Nations, June 1955-September 1956; thereafter Ambassador to the United States
- Amory, Robert, Jr.**, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
- Anderson, Clinton P.**, Democratic Senator from New Mexico; Vice Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, January 1955-January 1957; thereafter Chairman
- Anderson, Dillon**, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, April 1955-September 1956; thereafter Consultant to the President
- Anderson, Robert B.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until August 1955; Secretary of the Treasury from July 1957
- Baker, Vincent**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
- Barbour, Walworth**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 1955; Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, November 1955-February 1956; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission
- Beam, Jacob D.**, Director, Office of East European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, March 1955-October 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, October 1955-June 1957; Ambassador to Poland from August 1957
- Berding, Andrew H.**, Assistant Director, Office of Policy and Programs, U.S. Information Agency, until March 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
- Bond, Niles W.**, Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
- Bourgès-Maunoury, Maurice**, French Minister of the Armed Forces, January-February 1955; Minister of the Interior, February 1955-January 1956; Minister of National Defense, January 1956-June 1957; Prime Minister, June-November 1957; thereafter Minister of the Interior
- Bowie, Robert R.**, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 1955; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and Department of State representative on the National Security Council Planning Board, August 1955-October 1957

## XX List of Persons

---

- Brentano, Heinrich von**, West German Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 1955
- Bricker, John W.**, Republican Senator from Ohio
- Bridges, Styles**, Republican Senator from New Hampshire
- Brown, Winthrop G.**, Economic Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom with the personal rank of Minister
- Brownell, Herbert, Jr.**, Attorney General of the United States until November 1957
- Bruce, David K.E.**, Consultant to the Secretary of State, January 1955-March 1957; thereafter Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and Chief of Mission at Berlin
- Brucker, Wilber M.**, Secretary of the Army from July 1955
- Bulganan, Nikolai Aleksandrovich**, Soviet Minister of Armed Forces until February 1955; Chairman of the Council of Ministers and member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Burke, Admiral Arleigh A.**, Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 1955
- Caccia, Sir Harold A.**, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until November 1956; thereafter Ambassador to the United States
- Cole, W. Sterling**, Republican Representative from New York and member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, until December 1957; thereafter Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
- Coulson, John E.**, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 1955; Minister of the Embassy in the United States, October 1955-September 1957
- Cutler, Robert**, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs until April 1955 and from January 1957
- Davis, W. Kenneth**, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Development, Atomic Energy Commission, until February 1955; thereafter Director
- Dodge, Joseph M.**, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy until July 1956
- Dulles, Allen W.**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State
- Durham, Carl T.**, Democratic Representative from North Carolina; Vice Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, January 1955-January 1957; thereafter Chairman
- Eden, Sir Anthony**, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until April 1955; Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, April 1955-January 1957
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States
- Elbrick, C. Burke**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until February 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Farley, Philip J.**, Deputy to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs until October 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
- Farrell, Major General Francis W.** (Lieutenant General from 1957), Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Affairs until 1957
- Faure, Edgar Jean**, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, January-February 1955; Prime Minister, February 1955-January 1956
- Firehock, Colonel Raymond B.**, Deputy Staff Director of Harold E. Stassen's Special Staff, April 1955-June 1957
- Fisk, James B.**, Member, General Advisory Committee, Atomic Energy Commission; Member, Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization
- Flemming, Arthur S.**, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until February 1957

- Foster, Paul E.**, Special Assistant to the General Manager (Liaison), Atomic Energy Commission, 1955-June 1956; thereafter Assistant General Manager for International Activities, Atomic Energy Commission
- Gardner, Edward R.**, Deputy Director, Office of International Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, until May 1956; thereafter Director, Office of Special Projects, Atomic Energy Commission
- Gleason, S. Everett**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
- Goodpaster, Colonel Andrew J.** (Brigadier General from January 1957), Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Gray, Gordon**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1955-February 1957; Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization from March 1957
- Greene, Joseph N., Jr.**, First Secretary, Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany, until September 1956; Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, September 1956-October 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
- Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich**, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs until February 1957; thereafter Foreign Minister
- Gullion, Edmund A.**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- Hagerty, James C.**, Press Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Hall, John A.**, Director, Office of International Affairs (Division of International Affairs from November 1955), Atomic Energy Commission
- Hall, William O.**, Senior Adviser on International Organization Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Adviser to the U.S. members, Advisory Committee for the U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
- Hammarskjöld, Dag**, Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Herter, Christian A.**, Consultant to the Secretary of State, January-February 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board
- Hickenlooper, Bourke B.**, Republican Senator from Iowa
- Hollister, John B.**, Consultant to the Secretary of State, May-July 1955; Director, International Cooperation Administration, July 1955-July 1957
- Holmes, Julius C.**, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 1955; Consul General at Tangier, May 1955-July 1956; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from July 1956; Deputy Representative to the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament from July 1957
- Hoover, Herbert C., Jr.**, Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board, until February 1957
- Howe, Fisher**, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until March 1956; thereafter Director of the Executive Secretariat
- Hughes, Rowland R.**, Director of the Bureau of the Budget until April 1956
- Humphrey, George M.**, Secretary of the Treasury until July 1957
- Humphrey, Hubert H.**, Democratic Senator from Minnesota
- Jackson, William H.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 1955-January 1956; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, January-September 1956; Acting Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, September 1956-January 1957
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines**, Democratic Senator from Texas; Minority Leader of the Senate until January 1955; thereafter Majority Leader of the Senate
- Key, David McK.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until July 1955
- Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich**, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

## XXII List of Persons

---

- Killian, James R., Jr.**, Head, Technological Capabilities Panel, Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization, from June 1955; Chairman, President's Board on Foreign Intelligence Activities, from 1956; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for Science and Technology from November 1957
- Kishi, Nobusuke**, Secretary General, Japan Democratic Party (Liberal-Democratic Party from 1956); Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 1956-July 1957; Prime Minister from February 1957
- Knowland, William F.**, Republican Senator from California; Senate Majority Leader until January 1955; thereafter Senate Minority Leader; Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
- Kuznetsov, Vasilii Vasilevich**, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister and Representative to the U.N. General Assembly
- Larson, Arthur**, Under Secretary of Labor until November 1956; Director, U.S. Information Agency, December 1956-November 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to President Eisenhower
- Lay, James S., Jr.**, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
- Libby, Willard E.**, Member, Atomic Energy Commission
- Lloyd, John Selwyn**, British Minister of Supply until April; Minister of Defense, April 1955-December 1955; thereafter Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.**, Permanent Representative at the United Nations
- Loper, Major General Herbert B.**, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy and Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission
- Macmillan, Harold**, British Minister of Defense until April 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April-December 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 1955-January 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
- Makins, Sir Roger M.**, British Ambassador in the United States until October 1956; Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury from October 1956
- Martin, Joseph W., Jr.**, Republican Representative from Massachusetts; Speaker of the House of Representatives until January 1955; thereafter Minority Leader of the House of Representatives
- Martin, Paul**, Canadian Minister of National Health and Welfare until June 1957; Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly and Representative on the Subcommittee to the Disarmament Commission, 1955
- Matteson, Robert E.**, Director, Office of Research and Reports, Foreign Operations Administration, until May 1955; thereafter Staff Director of Harold E. Stassen's Special Staff
- Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Moch, Jules**, French Permanent Representative to the U.N. Disarmament Commission and Subcommittee
- Mollet, Guy**, President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe until January 1956; Prime Minister of France, February 1956-June 1957
- Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich**, Soviet Foreign Minister until May 1956
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Murray, Thomas E.**, Member, Atomic Energy Commission, until June 1957
- Nelson, Commander Curtis A.**, Division of Inspection, Atomic Energy Commission
- Noble, Commander Allan Herbert Percy**, British Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1955-1956; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from December 1956
- Norstad, General Lauris**, Air Deputy, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, until November 1956; thereafter Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

- Nutting, Sir Harold Anthony**, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Representative to the U.N. General Assembly and to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission until November 1956
- Patterson, Morehead**, Representative to the Negotiations for the Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency until December 1955
- Peaslee, Amos J.**, Ambassador to Australia until February 1956; thereafter Deputy Special Assistant to President Eisenhower
- Perkins, George W.**, Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, March 1955-October 1957
- Peterson, Val**, Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration until June 1957; Ambassador to Denmark from August 1957
- Phillips, Christopher H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Pinay, Antoine**, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 1955-January 1956
- Pineau, Christian**, French Minister of Foreign Affairs from February 1956
- Quarles, Donald A.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development until August 1955; Secretary of the Air Force, August 1955-April 1957; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Rabi, Isidor I.**, Chairman, General Advisory Committee, Atomic Energy Commission, until 1957; Member, Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization, 1955-1956; thereafter Chairman; Representative to Negotiations for the Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency from August 1955
- Radford, Admiral Arthur M.**, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until August 1957
- Ridgway, General Matthew B.**, Chief of Staff, United States Army, until June 1955
- Robertson, Reuben B., Jr.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 1955-April 1957
- Robertson, Walter S.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
- Rockefeller, Nelson A.**, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower until December 1955; Chairman, President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, until 1957
- Saltonstall, Leverett**, Republican Senator from Massachusetts
- Sandys, Duncan**, British Minister of Defense
- Smith, Bromley K.**, Senior Member, National Security Council Special Staff
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs until October 1957 thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- Sobolev, Arkadii Aleksandrovich**, Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations from March 1955 and Representative to the U.N. Disarmament Commission
- Spaak, Paul-Henri**, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs until May 1957; thereafter Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Foreign Affairs Officer, Atomic Energy Commission, until January 1955; Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, January 1955-June 1957; thereafter Officer in Charge, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
- Sprague, Mansfield D.**, General Counsel, Department of Defense, October 1955-February 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- Stassen, Harold E.**, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration until June 1955; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower from March 1955 and Deputy Representative to the U.N. Disarmament Commission from August 1955
- Stevenson, Adlai**, Democratic Party Presidential candidate, 1956
- Strauss, Lewis L.**, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission



## XXIV List of Persons

---

- Streibert, Theodore C.**, Director of the U.S. Information Agency until December 1956
- Taylor, General Maxwell D.**, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, and Eighth U.S. Army, until March 1955; Commander in Chief, Far East Command, April-June 1955; thereafter Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
- Thompson, Llewellyn E.**, U.S. High Commissioner to Austria until May 1955 and Ambassador to Austria until July 1957; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Twining, General Nathan E.**, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, until July 1957; thereafter Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Von Neumann, John**, Member, Atomic Energy Commission, until February 1957
- Wadsworth, James J.**, Alternate Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Deputy Chief of Mission of the Mission to the United Nations; Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations from January 1956
- Wainhouse, David W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until September 1955; First Secretary of the Embassy in France, September 1955-July 1956; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, July-October 1956; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Austria
- Walmsley, Walter N., Jr.**, Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in the Soviet Union until October 1956; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Waugh, Samuel C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until August 1955; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, August-October 1955; thereafter President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank
- Weiler, Lawrence D.**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Whitney, John Hay**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom from February 1957
- Wilcox, Francis O.**, Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, until September 1955; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Wilson, Charles E.**, Secretary of Defense until October 1957
- Zarubin, Georgii Nikolayevich**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States and Representative to the U.N. General Assembly
- Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich**, Soviet Minister of Defense, February 1955-October 1957
- Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich**, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission

# UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS AND ATOMIC ENERGY

REVIEW OF BASIC DISARMAMENT POLICY; NEGOTIATIONS IN THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION;  
PROPOSALS FOR INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION; NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
TESTS; EFFECTS OF FALL-OUT FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS; EXCHANGE OF  
ATOMIC INFORMATION; PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY; CREATION OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY<sup>1</sup>

## 1. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 4, 1955<sup>2</sup>

### SUBJECT

Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Dulles  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Mr. Murphy, G  
Mr. Key, IO  
Mr. Wainhouse, IO  
Mr. Bowie, S/P  
Mr. Smith, S/AE  
Howard Meyers, UNP

#### *Defense*

Secretary Wilson  
Deputy Secretary Anderson  
Major General Loper

---

<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 845 ff. Much of the documentation appearing in the *Foreign Relations* series for 1955-1957 concerns subjects relating to regulation of armaments and atomic energy.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-455. Top Secret. Drafted by Meyers on January 7. Another memorandum of the same meeting prepared for the file by Gerard C. Smith, January 5, is *ibid.*, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chronological File—Disarmament—General.

AEC  
Chairman Strauss

Mr. Dulles said the purpose of this meeting was to consider the reports on this subject prepared by the Department of Defense and by Mr. Bowie of the State Department,<sup>3</sup> and to decide what recommendations should be made to the NSC.

Mr. Bowie noted that the basic issue posed by the Defense paper was that it was not in the security interests of the United States to have any disarmament for the foreseeable future. This proposition ought to be explored, as well as what headway might be made in this Special Committee<sup>4</sup> on the disarmament problem, and finally whether decisions should be taken with regard to the meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee of Five which would soon commence in London.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Anderson said that the Defense position could be summarized somewhat as follows. Everyone would like to believe they could achieve true disarmament, with substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments of such nature that no country would go to war to settle its international disputes. There are two kinds of weapons: conventional and atomic. So far as the U.S. is concerned, basically we could be hurt most effectively by nuclear attack on the continental United States but had to take into consideration the fact that conventional armaments as well as atomic armaments could be used effectively on our allies. Consequently, a realistic disarmament plan could not divorce conventional and nuclear armaments. When considering a realistic disarmament plan, the Defense Department was concerned that the U.S. would probably adhere more conscientiously to a disarmament agreement than the Soviet Union. The nub of the problem was that, if it is not possible to have an effective control system which would be proof against evasions or violations, then was it in the U.S. national interest to agree to a disarmament scheme of lesser safety? The Defense Department did not believe it was in the U.S. interest to do this. Fundamentally there must be an effective control which would insure that there was a balanced reduction of conventional and nuclear armaments. While it was difficult to achieve such an effective disarmament system, we must face up to this problem rather than taking a lesser system as our goal. The United States was now at a point where

---

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the Department of Defense report, December 11, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1583. The report by Bowie, November 29, 1954, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 112)

<sup>4</sup> Regarding the Special Committee, created by NSC Action No. 899, September 3, 1953, to review NSC 112, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1210. For text of NSC 112, "Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," July 6, 1951, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. I, p. 477.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding this subcommittee, see Document 10.

it could expand its armaments rapidly. If we now should disarm under a disarmament agreement to which the United States really adhered, this would cause us to lose the convertability factor now built up in our industrial system which enabled a rapid change over to manufacture of armaments. This situation did not hold true for a totalitarian state, which can make such changes more easily and more rapidly.

General Loper said that one of the major points which the Defense Department had tried to make was that any effective disarmament plan required the Soviets to accept a control system of such extensive nature that its acceptance involved a radical change in the attitude of the Soviet leaders toward the rest of the world. If the Soviets in fact were really to make such great changes in their political and strategic orientation, there were other areas than disarmament in which the Soviet intent could be more easily ascertained without raising the very great problems which disarmament posed because of its necessary infringements on national sovereignty. Among such other areas would be the renunciation of the Comintern, agreement on an Austrian State Treaty or on a unified Germany, and willingness really to support the concept of free trade. Soviet agreements in these other areas would make a disarmament agreement come almost as a matter of course.

General Loper believed that the purpose of the Special Committee of the National Security Council was not to develop a detailed disarmament plan but to review basic policy toward control of armaments set forth in NSC 112. This document stated the general principles upon which United States policy in this field was based. The Defense Department believed that NSC 112 should be revised in at least two respects:

(a) it was not possible to establish a balance of military power by agreeing to numerical limits on armed forces. This would be only a temporary balance and could easily be upset to the advantage of the totalitarian nations, as Mr. Anderson had indicated.

(b) the United Nations Atomic Energy Control Plan, or any other plan, could not actually guarantee that nuclear weapons would be eliminated because of the impossibility of accounting fully for past production of fissionable materials. If the United States continued to say it wished to eliminate nuclear weapons, this would actually endanger the free nations because of this fact. It had been suggested that perhaps we should support a plan to reduce the number of nuclear weapons instead of to eliminate them. For that purpose, an augmented United Nations Atomic Energy Control Plan would probably be appropriate. General Loper believed that a number of working papers which had already been prepared in implementation of NSC 112 would be appropriate as the basis for a new disarmament plan.

Mr. Wilson remarked that history has demonstrated that armaments races have usually led to war, and there is also considerable evidence to support the argument that a disarmament agreement may create the same danger. He believed other issues must be settled before a disarmament plan could achieve its purpose. He did not see how there could be a partial disarmament plan which would be useful, because there was a great tendency to cheat in carrying out such an agreement. In this connection he referred to the Washington Naval Treaty and how the Germans developed pocket battle-ships as a means of getting around the limitations established in that treaty. If it were possible really to eliminate nuclear weapons, this might be all that would be needed in a disarmament agreement, but it must be recognized that if war should break out all nations which could do so would proceed to develop nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible despite any agreements previously reached to eliminate them. Thus, we were forced to consider the whole range of armaments and armed forces in developing a disarmament program. Mr. Wilson believed that we should not think that a disarmament agreement would be effective unless the causes of war themselves are eliminated. This conclusion led him to support the views previously expressed by Mr. Anderson and General Loper about the prior need for agreements in other fields before a disarmament agreement could be reached. He particularly wished to emphasize that the experience with the Communist countries after World War II and after the Korean armistice had made him most suspicious whether the Communists would keep any agreement which required such important restrictions on national sovereignty on their part.

Mr. Strauss said that the Atomic Energy Commission had examined this problem from the technical rather than from the philosophical point of view. He believed that complete technical disarmament was impossible because one could never assure that nuclear armaments had actually been eliminated. The AEC had developed a plan which was an attempt to find a middle ground between the positions taken by the Department of State and Defense. This had previously been circulated to the other departments (attached as Tab A).<sup>6</sup> Mr. Strauss read the plan and then remarked that if a proposal by the United States of this general nature should be refused by the Soviet Union, it would place on the Soviets the onus for failing to make progress in the disarmament field. Moreover, he noted that this plan would not require the United States to make any reductions in the nuclear field until the completion of extensive disclosures of infor-

---

<sup>6</sup> Tab A, AEC Draft Paper on International Control of Armed Forces and Armaments, December 15, 1954, not attached to the source text, is attached to another copy of this memorandum in Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chronological File—Disarmament—General.

mation in both the nuclear and conventional armaments fields and the verification of the accuracy and completeness of such disclosures. Thus, the most severe tests of Soviet intentions to honor a disarmament program would be provided before the U.S. began to limit its own nuclear capabilities.

General Loper remarked that the plan described by Admiral Strauss was acceptable, except for certain relatively minor matters, as a basis for the preparation of detailed working papers. For example, he did not agree with the position taken by this Atomic Energy Commission Plan that it was possible to determine a balance of armed forces on the basis of percentage reductions across-the-board.

Mr. Dulles said that he had two basic thoughts about this situation. First, he doubted that the U.S. could work out any disarmament plan with a powerful nation which we did not trust and which we believed had most ambitious goals. Second, he thought we had to keep trying to work out agreement on such a plan. He referred to past efforts in the disarmament field and how they had not really made progress because of the complexity of this problem. Moreover, if every last detail was not buttoned up, the Soviets would take advantage of any loopholes. Thus, between the complexity of the disarmament problem and the untrustworthiness of the Communists, he was not optimistic about any chances of success. On the other hand, this Special Committee could not decide that the problem was insoluble. The world would regard such a negative position as indication of U.S. desire to maintain its nuclear superiority or even as indication of U.S. intent to wage aggressive war. A decent respect for the opinions of mankind required us to try to solve the disarmament problem, as did our need to hold our allies with us. We could not in this group, however, pass on the details of such a disarmament plan but must probably be concerned with general principles and policies.

Mr. Wainhouse noted that we must try to solve this problem because, in addition to the points made by Secretary Dulles, the U.S. could not afford to hand the propaganda advantage to the Communists by not doing anything about the disarmament problem.

Mr. Dulles emphasized that, while what Mr. Wainhouse had said was true, we should not allow our propaganda desires to influence us to depart from a realistic and conservative attitude on this subject.

Mr. Bowie thought it was important, both from a public relations view and from the standpoint of our security, to explore all possibilities. Particularly, if we could find a way of removing the nuclear threat, we should explore that. The heart of the matter appeared to be whether it was possible to establish an effective inspection system and the feasibility of such an inspection system on the atomic side was made more difficult as time brought larger inventories of nuclear materials. He wondered whether it was possible to take the narrow end of

the wedge and to test inspection in a smaller area than that of across the board disarmament? Perhaps a possibility would be offered by examining an inspection system to assure the cessation of nuclear fuel production.

Mr. Dulles said that he was inclined to agree with General Loper's attitude with regard to Mr. Bowie's suggestion. He thought it was much easier for the Soviets to reach agreement with us in other areas than the armaments field.

Mr. Strauss believed that, theoretically, it might be easier to reach agreements with the Soviets in other areas than disarmament, but that in practice the Soviets appeared psychologically committed to maintain the Comintern and to hold to their attitudes on other political issues such as the German question. This made it harder for the Soviets to make concessions in these areas, while there might be a new inducement in the armaments field, if we could put the right kind of psychological pressure on the Soviets to make such concessions.

Mr. Dulles recalled that the President had said that if we could get rid of nuclear weapons, he would not be disposed to insist on reductions in the conventional armaments field. The reason for this was the President's belief that if we can insure that our industrial power could be kept intact, this would act both as a deterrent against a general war and as a major aid in winning a war.

Mr. Wilson said that he would like to hear the President bring this view up to date. He remembered that after the President realized the Soviets had a thermonuclear weapon, this had very much affected the President's views on many matters. He wondered what was the President's view on this subject now, particularly since it was clear that it was impossible to lose the secret of the atom and this meant that nuclear weapons would be developed and used eventually in another war.

Mr. Dulles asked what proposals should the Special Committee put up to the National Security Council at the January 20th meeting scheduled on the subject.<sup>7</sup>

Mr. Bowie suggested that it might be wise to bring in a qualified man of national prestige to take the lead in reviewing this problem and focus on a detailed plan, because of the variety of views now presented by the three concerned agencies.

Mr. Strauss noted that the Special Committee was supposed to review NSC 112 which was a matter of basic principles and not of a detailed plan. Could not this be done?

---

<sup>7</sup> A memorandum of discussion at the 233d meeting of the National Security Council, January 20, by Gleason, indicates that regulation of armaments was not discussed at this meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)



Mr. Smith said that it would help the working level people, who would have to work out a detailed plan from such general principles, if it could be made clear whether or not the Special Committee supported the Defense concept put forth in General Loper's paper that such a detailed plan should be so developed as to make it most unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Wilson said he would not buy such an approach. He believed we should work out a fair plan which would be acceptable both to the US and to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Dulles assumed that all agreed that we should seek in all sincerity to find an effective disarmament plan. If this assumption was not correct, then this question would have to be taken to the President.

Mr. Strauss, Mr. Wilson and General Loper all agreed that this plan should be sought as an honest effort. General Loper explained that the point of view expressed in his paper sprang from the military services' belief that any disarmament plan would not be in the U.S. interests without a basic change in Soviet intentions. However, this did not mean that we should proceed to develop a plan which was insincere and unfair.

Mr. Wilson suggested that the Special Committee should revise NSC 112 in broad terms, and then have working groups develop a detailed disarmament plan.

Mr. Dulles agreed and said that at this point, after the detailed plan had been developed, the Special Committee could examine the desirability of bringing in a new and top-level man to chair this review.

---

**2. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, January 14, 1955, 2 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Strauss  
Colonel Goodpaster

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, AEC. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

Admiral Strauss requested the President's signature to a letter establishing the amounts of nuclear materials to be produced during 1955. He left with the undersigned for the President a carbon of the letter with the most sensitive figures omitted. (Attached hereto.)<sup>2</sup>

Admiral Strauss next showed the President a chart indicating the increase that has occurred over the past few years in numbers of weapons and the projected increase for 1955.

Admiral Strauss next handed to the President for him to read a letter concerning a proposed series of nuclear tests. He indicated he had cleared the matter with Secretary Dulles, who favored having the tests as scheduled and having observers from NATO and other friendly countries. The President approved the letter.<sup>3</sup> Admiral Strauss left a copy of this letter with the undersigned (attached hereto).

Admiral Strauss next gave the President a letter (original attached hereto) calling for a committee to review security procedures respecting the AEC. He indicated he had spoken to Mr. Brownell about this, and that Mr. Brownell initially had great reservations, believing that if the committee were appointed, all clearance operations would cease until its report was in, but Admiral Strauss believed that he had been able to remove most, if not all, of Mr. Brownell's concern on this score. The President stated that he approved the recommendation in principle providing all the others mentioned (Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and General Cutler) agreed with the proposal.

Admiral Strauss referred to an offer the Soviets are reported just to have made to bring personnel from other countries into their atomic industrial plants and share with them their technical knowledge.<sup>4</sup> After discussion, the President and Admiral Strauss agreed that an appropriate statement would express gratification of this Soviet move and hope that it will be backed up with an offer to make a substantial amount of fissionable material available, as the U.S. has already done. The President referred to the success which the "Atoms for Peace" exhibit at the UN has had. He indicated he would favor additional exhibits being prepared and displayed to a large number of our own people. Admiral Strauss indicated that this could be done without much cost.

G

*Colonel, CE, US Army*

---

<sup>2</sup> None of the referenced attachments in the form of letters and charts are attached to the source text and have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> This sentence was added in handwriting on the source text.

<sup>4</sup> This information was reported in *The New York Times*, January 15, 1955, p. 1.

3. **Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wainhouse) and the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 19, 1955.

SUBJECT

Indian Scientist Bhabha as President of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy<sup>2</sup>

*Discussion:*

1. As you know, Admiral Strauss of the AEC at today's OCB meeting expressed strong objections to the appointment as President of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of the Indian scientist Bhabha. Bhabha is presently Indian representative on the Advisory Committee preparing for this conference.

2. We have been informed by USUN that it will be necessary to exert great pressure to avoid Bhabha's appointment to this post, and that our objections probably will have to be made public. USUN says that we can at this moment only be sure of support for our views on this matter from Canada and, probably, Brazil. The French are opposed to our intended nominee (Swiss scientist Von Muralt);<sup>3</sup> the UK originally wanted to nominate Bhabha; the Soviets have stated they will nominate Bhabha.

3. It is our view that the most important question in organizing this conference is to secure agreement to US proposals for the organization and rules of procedure and the appointment of US scientist Walter Whitman<sup>4</sup> as the Secretary-General of the conference. The Secretary-General is the most important officer, with the right to review papers submitted; pass on credentials of invitees, and appoint the technical secretary, chairman and rapporteur for each section, and the administrative secretary. The President's powers are those of control over conduct of the proceedings in plenary sessions, including authority to terminate debate on any given point or in general.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: General. Confidential. Drafted by Meyers. Concurred in by William L.S. Williams.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Howi J. Bhabha, physicist, was chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. For an account of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which met in Geneva, August 8-20, see Document 77.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander von Muralt, a physiologist.

<sup>4</sup> Walter G. Whitman, professor of chemical engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

*Recommendation:*

That you call Admiral Strauss;<sup>5</sup> explain the facts described above; stress that the most important objective State sees is securing agreement on the organization and rules of procedure of the conference and the appointment of Whitman as Secretary-General; and ask whether AEC will agree that in the event this objective is attained it would not be necessary to oppose Bhabha. You might wish to emphasize the political difficulties which the Department believes will be raised for the US should it become known that the US opposes the Indian representative for this position, which will enable the USSR to take credit for proposing Bhabha for this post while the US bears the onus of opposing the Indian representative; that it is doubtful in any event that we can prevent Bhabha's appointment.

---

<sup>5</sup> A handwritten notation in the margin reads: "He did."

---

**4. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 26, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

United States-United Kingdom Cooperation for Communication or Exchange of Atomic Energy Information

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated 13 November 1954 on the above subject.<sup>2</sup>

• • • • •

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the attached list of types of atomic information<sup>3</sup> be included in the agreement for cooperation as being descriptive of the types of information which will be made available. In this connection the agreement should state that the United States reserves to itself final decision on making any specific item of information available.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Country File: United Kingdom. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached to the source text and not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, for communication of atomic information, existing channels for communication of classified information be utilized, subject to the following:

a. Data on the tactical and strategical matters relating to atomic weapons to be communicated only through channels established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to be kept strictly in military channels.

b. Other atomic information within the scope of the cooperation to be subject to the procedures, practices, and regulations of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Arthur Radford**<sup>4</sup>

*Chairman*

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

5. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 235th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 3, 1955**<sup>1</sup>

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3.]

4. *Proposed Public Announcement of the Effects, Particularly Fall-Out, of Thermonuclear Explosions*

The President indicated that the OCB had prepared a statement on the reference subject which would be issued presently by the Atomic Energy Commission.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, he wanted the Council's advice, particularly on the question whether an announcement at this time on the effects of thermonuclear explosions would have an irritat-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on February 4.

<sup>2</sup> No OCB statement has been found in Department of State files, but an excerpt from the minutes of the OCB meeting of February 2 indicates "that Admiral Strauss had given the draft letter to the President covering the proposed nuclear explosion release and that the President agreed to read it and to give his decision soon." (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Atomic and Nuclear Energy) Eisenhower wrote Strauss on February 2 saying he had read his memorandum, called it "excellent," and questioned only the need for so many specific figures on the size of atomic or thermonuclear weapons, which might give some intimation of the extreme ranges of U.S. weapons tests. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, AEC) The statement finally released on February 15 was entitled "The Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Explosions". For more information on this statement, see Document 7.

ing effect on the existing international situation. In other words, was there any good reason for keeping altogether still on this subject or, alternatively, on saying a great deal more than was now included in the draft? There was one possible reason, continued the President, to push ahead. It was generally understood that the British, among others, tend to exaggerate the effects of fall-out from thermonuclear explosions. This he knew from a recent message from Sir Winston Churchill.<sup>3</sup> The British were going to make a statement, to be issued on February 15, which would give the British Government's views on the effect of thermonuclear explosions.<sup>4</sup> It would seem undesirable, thought the President, for the people of the United States to learn of these effects from the British Government rather than from their own Government, the more so since we would probably be obliged to state that the British exposition was substantially true.

Mr. Cutler then called on Admiral Strauss, who said that the President himself had largely covered the ground. He pointed out that the draft U.S. statement had been long in preparation, had been carefully worked over in the OCB, and was, he thought, in pretty good shape. The Civil Defense people have been screaming for months for some such statement as this. Secretary Hoover had pointed out that if it is determined to release such a statement, time should be allowed to place it in the hands of our diplomatic missions overseas and for its revelation to the British Government, although there is no necessity of waiting until or after the British issue their own statement on February 15. Admiral Strauss then summarized the contents of the proposed statement, which he described as written in simple and comprehensible language and as answering as many questions as we ourselves could ask. He proposed to release this statement on the 11th or 12th of February.

The President inquired whether, if we showed our statement to the British in advance of issuing it publicly, the British were not likely to ask for simultaneous release of our statement and their statement.

Secretary Hoover said that the arrangement to show our statement to the British in advance of its public release had come about as a result of a conversation at the recent conference in Paris, between Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson and Harold Macmillan. As a

---

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower presumably refers to a letter and enclosure British Prime Minister Churchill sent him on January 12. The letter did not mention fallout, but the enclosure, a printed document by Churchill entitled *Notes on Tube Alloys, 1954*, dated December 12, 1954, contains a paragraph summarizing the concerns of British nuclear experts on the dangers of fallout. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ERDA)

<sup>4</sup> The British statement, published in the annual Statement on Defense, was released to Parliament on February 17. The portions on the effects of fallout received no more attention from the press than the announcement in the same publication that Britain would begin to produce the H-bomb. See *The New York Times*, February 18, 1955, pp. 1 and 4.

matter of fact, since the British Government was including no appropriation for anti-aircraft defenses in its forthcoming budget, because it felt that there was no adequate defense against thermonuclear and atomic weapons, some facts had to be explained to the British public with respect to this omission. In answer to the President's question, Secretary Hoover expressed the opinion that the United States should release its statement before the British Government released its statement, although we were committed to cross-check our statement with the British prior to releasing it to our own public.

Admiral Strauss said he did not believe that we had made so firm a commitment to the British, while Secretaries Wilson and Humphrey observed that they could see no particular objection to the simultaneous release of the U.S. and British statements.

The President said that he could see none either, except perhaps that the release of two such statements simultaneously might suggest that this had deliberately been concerted, and give too great and alarming emphasis to the contents of the report and thus cause international anxiety as well as heighten the sense of fear at home.

Admiral Strauss commented that we have no particular reason to believe that the British will accept the U.S. findings as to the effects of thermonuclear explosions, which would probably be presented as less serious than the British would present them. Accordingly, it would be awkward if the release dates for the two statements were the same.

Secretary Humphrey inquired whether there was much new information in the proposed U.S. statement. Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative, and particularly, he said, with respect to the effects of fall-out. The President suggested that this matter be left to the State Department, with freedom to handle it as they saw fit, except that if the State Department agrees to the issuance of the U.S. statement simultaneously with the British statement, the British must agree to accept the findings in the U. S. statement.

Secretary Wilson thought that such procedure might cause difficulty with our loyal ally, Canada, and said he feared the danger of overemphasis and great public concern if both Britain and the United States issued statements on fall-out at the same time. Agreeing with Secretary Wilson, Mr. Cutler pointed out that Governor Peterson<sup>5</sup> was most anxious to issue a statement urging that the United States press ahead with renewed energy and zeal on its civil defense program. He wanted to issue this immediately after the AEC issued its own statement. All this, in addition to a British statement, would tend to snowball the sense of danger rather than to reassure the population. Furthermore, Mr. Cutler was concerned about the effect the snowballing

---

<sup>5</sup> Val Peterson.

of so many statements and the inevitable official or unofficial comments on them, would have on the Soviets and the Chinese Communists at this particular juncture in the world situation.

Secretary Wilson said that as far as he could see, the United States proposed statement wasn't going to be very reassuring in any event. Admiral Strauss replied that it would be reassuring in comparison with so much of the "scare stuff" which had recently filled the papers on the subject of fall-out.

Governor Stassen suggested that Governor Peterson be directed to wait ten days after the issuance of the AEC statement before he made any public announcement himself with respect to the Civil Defense program. During this ten-day interval the OCB would study and report to the President on the world reaction and the domestic reaction to the AEC statement.

Mr. Dodge said that, speaking as a former Director of the Bureau of the Budget, he was a good deal concerned lest the issuance of the statement cause a public demand on the budget for increased funds for civil defense. The President said with considerable emphasis that he couldn't help but feel that the Administration had woefully underplayed the civil defense program. The real answer, said the President, to the problem, as he had mentioned before, was an informed and disciplined citizenry.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

a. Agreed that a public announcement on the subject, along the lines proposed by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, revised in the light of the Council discussion, should be released prior to February 15, 1955, after advance notification to U.S. diplomatic missions and to the British Government.

b. Noted the President's directive that other governmental departments and agencies should defer any public announcements following upon the release of the Atomic Energy Commission announcement, pending Council consideration of a report by the Operations Coordinating Board on the psychological reactions to the AEC announcement within approximately two weeks following its release.

*Note:* The action in a above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, AEC. The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to interested Government departments and agencies and to the Operations Coordinating Board to prepare the report referred to therein.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1320, approved by the President on February 3, 1955. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>7</sup> For later discussion on this proposed public announcement, see Document 7.



[Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

6. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 9, 1955<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Review of NSC 112: Basic Disarmament Policy

PARTICIPANTS

Defense:

Deputy Secretary Anderson

Major General Loper

CIA:

Allen W. Dulles

AEC:

Chairman Strauss

Admiral Foster

Dr. Fine

NSC Planning Board:

Mr. Cutler

State:

Secretary Dulles

State:

Under Secretary Hoover

Deputy Under Secretary Murphy

S/P—Mr. Bowie

IO—Mr. Key

IO—Mr. Wainhouse

S/AE—Mr. Smith

S/P—Mr. Stelle

UNP—Howard Meyers

Secretary Dulles said that the papers drafted by Defense and State on this subject did not seem susceptible of fruitful discussion in the NSC tomorrow, both being long and complicated.<sup>2</sup> There were certain issues which had not yet received Presidential approval which could be separated out and presented to the NSC—some agreed to by the members of the Special Committee and some concerning which there was disagreement. What the US did in the disarmament field to a large extent was influenced by political, psychological and other factors. He did not believe we could afford to put this Government in the position of being opposed to disarmament, particularly in the light of President Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" statement of April 16, 1953 and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chronological File—Disarmament—General. Top Secret. Drafted by Meyers.

<sup>2</sup> The Department of Defense drafts are dated January 11 and 25. (*Ibid.*) The Department of State paper is a February 7 draft report on the review of NSC 112, prepared for the National Security Council by S/P in cooperation with IO and S/AE. (*Ibid.*, S/S—NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC-112) Earlier drafts of the Department of State paper are *ibid.*, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70. Comments on these drafts and the January 11 Department of Defense paper are *ibid.*, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chronological File—Disarmament—General.

“Atoms for Peace” address of December 8, 1953.<sup>3</sup> For himself, he believed that limitations and reduction of armaments historically derived from a feeling of trust among nations and confidence that it was not likely that a war would commence, rather than from an agreement with a hostile power where there was mutual distrust. There were certain practical problems which required answers.

First, did we stand by the idea that the US favored disarmament? In his opinion this was necessary in view of the President’s expressed approval of such a position.

Second, we had to be extremely careful in making proposals in the armaments limitation field not to walk into a trap, since we were dealing with the Soviet Union, whose Government we did not trust.

Third, would we continue to adhere to the position that the US should not consider limitations in the nuclear field except as linked to reductions of conventional armaments? He did not wish to suggest that the US should take the initiative in making such proposals at this moment, but at least should be prepared to deal with this issue should the question arise. He believed the President felt that, if it were possible to secure effective elimination of nuclear weapons, then he would not worry so much about limitations in the conventional armaments field since such an agreement would protect US industrial power against the danger of severe damage through nuclear attack.

Fourth, were we prepared to proceed in a disarmament program on the basis of working out each stage at a time, entering upon the first stage without necessarily having developed and agreed upon the latest stages, and proceeding in developing the latest stages from the experience derived through carrying out each preceding stage.

Mr. Anderson explained that the Defense Department felt that it would not be possible to carry out the initial stage of a disarmament program with confidence unless we knew in advance what would come next. Moreover, if we should separate the nuclear and conventional aspects of disarmament and proceed on the kind of step-by-step development noted by Mr. Dulles, then the Soviets might seek to overcome the present US nuclear superiority by hiding nuclear weapons, and thus heighten the very danger felt by the President of being able to wipe out US industrial superiority through attack with nuclear weapons. Finally, Defense had not yet arrived at the conclusion that this limited approach to disarmament was a feasible or effective way of dealing with the disarmament problem.

---

<sup>3</sup> For texts, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1953, pp. 179-188 and 813-822, respectively. The President’s December 8 speech proposed the creation of an international atomic energy agency under the aegis of the United Nations to provide peaceful power from atomic energy. The President urged the principal atomic powers to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of uranium and fissionable materials to this agency. Regarding this initiative, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1289-1295.

Mr. Strauss said that he was afraid of the concept that the initial stage in a disarmament program should involve cessation of the production of nuclear fuels. The US had gone to great trouble and expense to develop the mining and milling of nuclear materials in this country, an operation which was now beginning to pay off most successfully. If we should agree to stop production now, we would probably never be able to start up this US industry again. We might also never be able to recover our present impetus in nuclear weapons production if the US accepted this limited approach suggested by Mr. Bowie<sup>4</sup> and Secretary Dulles, then broke off further implementation of a disarmament program and started up production of nuclear fuels again. For these reasons, he wondered whether the President today would still hold to the view mentioned by Mr. Dulles, which implied willingness to abandon the present US approach of seeking across-the-board disarmament in favor of a limited approach in the nuclear field.

Mr. Bowie remarked that Mr. Strauss' objections regarding the difficulties of starting nuclear fuel production after once having stopped it would apply to any disarmament program, even existing US policy. All disarmament proposals have envisaged that if the other side did not carry out its agreements then rearmament would begin again.

Mr. Strauss agreed with this point but emphasized the difference was that Mr. Bowie's approach included no other limitations and therefore the Soviets might acquiesce in such a limited approach in the desire to hamstring our nuclear production without having to accept any other limitations on Soviet military strength.

Secretary Dulles remarked that the President, in his "Atoms for Peace" proposal, had already put forward the concept of a first limited step with the idea that successful implementation would enable proceeding further. Admittedly, a limited approach in the disarmament field involved more complicated questions than the "Atoms for Peace" approach, but this should be dealt with concretely and not as an abstract issue, in order to see whether the specific limited approach which might be developed would be in US interests.

General Loper stated that the Defense Department of course did not believe in implementing any disarmament program on the basis of proceeding by stages from less sensitive to more sensitive items. Therefore, the inspection of nuclear production facilities was presently conceived of as coming in a later stage because of its sensitive nature. Should this present approach be reversed, he believed this would raise dangers for US security.

Secretary Dulles thought that at present the US was not confronted with any practical proposal of a limited nature, except the

---

<sup>4</sup> The "limited approach" suggested by Bowie is summarized in Document 1.

Indian proposal for a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests.<sup>5</sup> The NSC had decided to oppose this Indian proposal after careful consideration on the merits, and not on the ground that this moratorium proposal failed to cover the waterfront but because it was not practical.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, in fact we had another precedent for examining a limited approach to disarmament which did not cover all aspects of this complex problem.

Mr. Anderson remarked that if he had written the present Defense paper on this subject, he would have placed greater emphasis on the need to explore this problem thoroughly to see if there was any possibility of developing a successful proposal in the disarmament field.

Mr. Strauss said that one of the difficulties of both the State and Defense papers was that they were drafted to meet an NSC deadline. Actually, much more time was required to examine these matters, and he suggested that perhaps the Special Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and himself, might be made a permanent body to continue such examination of basic disarmament policy.

Mr. Bowie thought that it would be better to continue this review under the direction of an individual of outstanding qualifications, since the members of the existing Special Committee had such demands on their time that they would not be able to devote an adequate amount of attention to this subject.

Mr. Anderson agreed with Mr. Bowie and said that the problems required further and continuing attention by a high level individual who would have access to the President and the ranking cabinet members concerned with these problems, being able to devote full time to these fundamental problems. He emphasized that the difficulties inherent in such a review did not minimize the necessity for expending great effort in this field.

Mr. Allen Dulles, while agreeing with the remarks of Mr. Bowie and Defense Secretary Anderson, urged that this individual who might be appointed to carry out this review should draw on the existing staffs of the concerned agencies, so that he could have the benefit of advice and aid from officers familiar with these problems. On the basis of experience, no one man would be able to cover all these issues and

---

<sup>5</sup> The Indian proposal was stated by Prime Minister Nehru in a speech to the Indian Parliament on April 2, 1954, and the Indian Representative to the United Nations, Rajeshwar Dayal, wrote Secretary-General Hammarskjöld on April 8, 1954, asking him to submit Nehru's remarks to the Disarmament Commission as a U.N. document. For extracts of Nehru's address and Dayal's letter, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. 1, pp. 408-413. A revised draft of the Indian proposal was submitted to the Disarmament Commission on October 27, 1954. For text, see *General Assembly Official Records: Ninth Session, Annexes, Agenda Items 20 and 68*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>6</sup> For reactions of the U.S. Government to the Indian proposal, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1388 ff.

their relation to the political, military, and economic problems of the world which related to the disarmament issue and from which it could not be separated.

Secretary Dulles said that the disarmament problem was one of such gravity that he agreed with Mr. Anderson that the US must be in a position of trying to solve these issues.

Mr. Anderson said that even if a new man were to come in to direct a continuing review of disarmament, it might well be desirable to help him by giving him guidance from the Special Committee or the NSC on many of the great issues inherent in the disarmament problem.

Secretary Dulles thought that, in this connection, it would be possible to draw out from the two papers presented by State and Defense certain issues which could be presented tomorrow to the NSC for advice and determination.

First, the US must continue to examine the disarmament problem and seek a solution, despite any skepticism which might exist concerning the success of our efforts in this field.

Second, it seemed to be agreed that a top-level individual should be brought into the Government to spend full time in carrying out such a review of the disarmament problem, since the issues involved are so complicated that the heads of the agencies concerned with this problem are unable to give adequate continuing attention to them. These agencies should contribute experienced personnel to this man's staff, so that the review of disarmament would keep in touch with the realities of the world situation.

Third, so far as the forthcoming London meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee of Five were concerned, the US positions would be in accord with the basic policy established by NSC 112. This basic policy still linked conventional and nuclear disarmament in terms of reductions in either field, and it seemed to be advisable to raise this issue with the President to see whether we should continue to adhere to this concept at the London meetings in the event questions concerning this linkage should be raised during these meetings. Moreover, adherence to NSC 112 policy raised the question whether it would be possible to take any one limited step in a disarmament program without considering what the other steps should be. The conclusion of the Special Committee appeared to be that this question was one which could not be answered in the abstract, and that it was necessary to examine in specific terms what such a limited step might be, while recognizing the danger involved in going down the disarmament path without knowing where we would come out at the end.

Mr. Cutler explained that he had briefed the President the other day on these issues, explaining the conflict of opinion.

Mr. Anderson remarked that we should be cognizant of the difference between (a) agreeing to take a limited step which would be taken in the context of existing safeguards under a general disarmament

program, or (b) if such a limited step is taken with lesser safeguards but as an element complete in itself without reference particularly to a general program. If the second position were adopted, Defense might have a different attitude on this question than had previously been voiced.

Mr. Strauss stressed his feeling that even this second approach might nibble away the strength of our existing position step by step without obtaining a quid pro quo from the Soviets.

Mr. Bowie thought that there was no way to proceed in this area without risk, and that we would have to look at this problem in the sense of balancing off such risks against the undoubted risks to the United States if we continued to adhere to our present positions in the light of the growing nuclear power of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Cutler agreed that he would try to draft a statement of the issues arising out of this review of NSC 112 (basic disarmament policy), for NSC consideration at the February 10 meeting, in such manner that this statement would fairly represent the views of State, Defense and AEC.

---

**7. Memorandum of Discussion at the 236th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 10, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

**2. Proposed Public Announcement of the Effects, Particularly Fall-Out, of Thermonuclear Explosions (NSC Action No. 1320)<sup>2</sup>**

Mr. Cutler reviewed the Council action on this subject at last week's meeting, and asked Admiral Strauss to bring the Council up to date on developments since that time.

Admiral Strauss said that after further discussions of the draft statement with the Secretary of State, certain revisions had been made. He had decided to omit the references to the genetics situation since the material on this subject in the report indicated that we knew very little about it. It had also been decided to omit a map which had been attached, on grounds that the legend on the map would be too difficult to read as normally reproduced.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on February 11.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1320, see footnote 6, Document 5.

Admiral Strauss went on to say that the present plan was that a shortened, but not otherwise greatly edited, statement would be reviewed this afternoon with the public relations people. If they approved, the President had given him permission to release the report. He would do so after the State Department had had a chance to talk with the British, although he would not delay issuing the statement in order to issue it simultaneously with the British statement on the same subject.

In conclusion, Admiral Strauss hoped that paragraph b of last week's Council action on this subject would be reaffirmed.

Secretary Dulles commented that this shortened version of the full statement would be more reassuring in tone and would give the right slant to the fuller statement.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>3</sup>

Noted an oral report by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, on the current status of plans for a shortened public announcement on the subject, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1320.<sup>4</sup>

[Here follows agenda item 3.]

4. *Atomic Power Abroad* (NSC 5507; NSC 5431/1; Memo for NSC from Mr. Cutler, subject: "Development of Nuclear Power", dated December 11, 1953; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 9, 1955)<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1324, February 10. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>4</sup> The AEC report, entitled "The Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Weapons", is not printed, but was published in full in *The New York Times*, February 16, 1955, p. 18. A copy is in Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Fallout. The report was pouched to all U.S. diplomatic posts on February 11 (*ibid.*, Central Files, 711,5611/2-1155) and was followed by Usito circular 269, signed by USIA Director Streibert on February 14, to 31 U.S. diplomatic missions giving background information and indicating purposes of the statement. (*Ibid.*, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Fallout: Reactions and Statements, 1955)

The AEC report summarized major characteristics of nuclear detonations, fallout radiation from in-the-air and surface detonations, the fallout pattern of the March 1, 1954, Bikini Pacific thermonuclear test, and the Nevada tests, radiostrontium and radioiodine fallout, and the genetic effects of radiation.

The AEC had previously released some information on occasion on the effects of nuclear testing. See, for example, extracts of the prepared statement on the subject by Strauss at a March 31, 1954, White House news conference in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 12, 1954, pp. 548-549, and *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1954, pp. 163-165. The AEC February 15 report did not provide much new information, but it gave statistics on fallout effects based on the March 1 Bikini test and was the first systematic presentation of nuclear weapons effects since the publication of the handbook, *The Effects of Atomic Weapons: Prepared for and in Cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950).

<sup>5</sup> NSC 5507, January 28, is a draft statement of policy on "Atomic Power Abroad" prepared by the NSC Planning Board. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507 Series: Atomic Power Abroad) For NSC 5431/1, see *Foreign Relations*,

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council very extensively and in detail on the contents of the reference report (NSC 5507). At the conclusion of his briefing he invited Admiral Strauss to add anything he wished to say against the inclusion of paragraph 15, which called for "sponsorship by the U.S. of a power reactor experiment to be undertaken in the U.S. at an early date, jointly by scientists from the U.S. and other countries, etc."<sup>6</sup> Admiral Strauss said his principal reason for dissenting from this proposal was that the concourse of scientists in such an experiment would constitute a Tower of Babel. Secondly, he opposed the proposal because it would involve giving foreign scientists very advanced U.S. designs. Thirdly, he believed that building such an experimental power reactor in the United States would constitute very poor public relations. It would be much more sensible to build these reactors in areas where they could actually be used—for example, in Brazil. In sum, concluded Admiral Strauss, the proposal in paragraph 15 seemed to him premature and impractical.

Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt the same way about paragraph 15.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the Chiefs felt that the United States would encounter great difficulties in selecting scientists from the various foreign countries to take part in such an experiment. If we

---

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1488. For the memorandum of December 11, 1953, see *ibid.*, p. 1296. The February 9 memorandum enclosed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 5507, which had been sent to the Secretary of Defense on February 4. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507 Series: Atomic Power Abroad)

<sup>6</sup> This paragraph went on to read:

"Initially the foreign participants might come from nations who have negotiated 'Agreements for Cooperation' with the U.S. Subsequently, as it might become possible to declassify the type of reactor chosen, scientists and engineers from all countries taking part in the International Atomic Energy Agency or the preliminary negotiations might take part. By building an experimental size reactor, the cost would be held down and the experimental nature of nuclear power at this stage of development would be made clear. Even an experimental reactor would be attractive, and would give invaluable first-hand engineering acquaintance with the practical problems of reactor design and construction. The technical and the security and legal problems of such a venture require further exploration, along with questions of location, timing, financing, and utilizing a power reactor experiment already contemplated."

"Agreements for Cooperation" in the above quotation refer to agreements between the United States and friendly governments in the field of the civil uses of atomic energy. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which permitted these agreements under specified conditions, is printed in *Atoms for Peace Manual*, pp. 209–251. The International Atomic Energy Agency in the quoted passage refers to President Eisenhower's proposal in his "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations on December 8, 1953. For early U.S. promotion of this agency, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1293.

<sup>7</sup> In the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, February 4 (see footnote 5, above), Radford had written that paragraphs 15 and 20, concerning the undertaking of a power reactor experiment in the United States (with participation by eligible foreign engineers and scientists) had "military significance and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the view of the AEC representative that they be deleted."



confine the number of countries to a small total, those not invited would take serious offense. If we invited the scientists of too many countries, the risk to our own security would be too serious. Admiral Radford went on to express the opinion that the proposal advanced in paragraph 15 would tend to retard rather than to advance the development of power reactors. He believed that there was a general feeling that we were more advanced than in fact we actually are in the field of nuclear power development. Admiral Strauss was inclined to differ with Admiral Radford, and stated that we were actually more advanced in this field than many people realized.

Secretary Wilson said that he had both a Department of Defense and a personal point of view respecting this problem. He certainly favored going ahead full steam with the development of nuclear power in the United States by using American firms. Indeed, this was going along all the time, though he wondered if we were not overextending the promotional aspects of the process. The real trouble with the proposal made in paragraph 15 was the trouble it would cause in the area of security. Accordingly, he recommended that we drop the idea of going ahead with building nuclear power plants abroad for the time being at any rate.

Secretary Dulles said that of course it was hard for a layman to combat the technical arguments against the practicality of going ahead with a program for nuclear power abroad. On the other hand, it would be altogether disastrous from the point of view of foreign policy if we should at this point give up the "atoms for peace" program. Secretary Dulles then quoted portions of the President's December 8, 1953, speech, as well as excerpts from his statements made when the construction of the nuclear power plant at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, was commenced.<sup>8</sup> The statements made in these two speeches had in each case been made with the full knowledge and approval of the technical people. The United States has thus held out this very great boon to humanity as something it was about to give to the world. If, having assumed this posture for over a year now, our proposal turns out to be a dud and a bluff, the United States would be in a very serious position. If in point of fact our speeches had got ahead of our performance, this might be a useful spur for the United States to keep its development of nuclear power abreast of its words on the subject. He dreaded to think of the results if the Soviets should get ahead of us in this area.

---

<sup>8</sup> President Eisenhower's address on the occasion of the ground-breaking ceremony for the Shippingport atomic power plant, September 6, 1954, was broadcast over radio and television from Denver, Colorado. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 840-841)

Admiral Strauss sought to explain the things that were being done already with respect to this program, citing research reactors, possible power reactors in countries such as Belgium which were technologically capable of building them, U.S. training schools, libraries, and U.S. negotiation with many other countries interested in the general field of power reactor developments. Admiral Strauss was sure that these foreigners would get more out of the programs he had mentioned than they possibly could by attendance at a power reactor experiment here in the United States.

Secretary Dulles inquired of Admiral Strauss whether he was to deduce from all this that the United States was actually going to build power reactors in technologically advanced countries such as Belgium, Britain, and Canada. Admiral Strauss replied that these countries were going to build their reactors with their own money, but with U.S. advice and technical assistance.

Turning to paragraph 10 of NSC 5507, Secretary Dulles inquired why, if Admiral Strauss was correct, paragraph 10 spoke of the possibilities of constructing large-output power reactors abroad as merely a matter which should receive continuing study.<sup>9</sup> This seemed to imply that we were not going to build any power reactors abroad.

Mr. Cutler explained once again that although technologically advanced countries would receive U.S. assistance in the task of building power reactors, the costs would be borne by the countries themselves rather than by the United States. There had been some question in the Planning Board as to whether this was a wise proposal in every instance.

Secretary Humphrey, however, expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles that as now written paragraph 10 was misleading as to U.S. intentions regarding the construction of power reactors abroad, and should therefore be deleted.

Mr. Cutler then called on Ambassador Lodge for any comments he would care to make.

---

<sup>9</sup> Paragraph 10 of NSC 5507 reads:

"The pressurized water reactor (PWR) (of 50,000-100,000 KW power output) is being built in the U.S. for experimental purposes rather than specifically to produce economic atomic power. Consideration has been given to the desirability of initiating now construction of a reactor of comparable size in some foreign power-short area. Such an action might have great psychological advantages. However, such a reactor built under publicity might operate irregularly or with lower performance and higher cost than predicted. It might even be a failure. Selecting a single location for a reactor without causing resentment among disappointed claimants would be difficult. Finally, there would be the problem of financing without U.S. subsidy. Nevertheless, the possibilities of constructing large-output\* power reactors abroad ought to receive continuing study.

\*"Like the shipping port [i.e. Shippingport, Pa.] PWR (50,000-100,000 KW)."

Ambassador Lodge said that when the President had made his famous atoms for peace speech, the entire atmosphere and attitude toward the United States in the UN had been transformed. Moreover, when Mr. Streibert's current exhibit on atomic energy had been shown to the UN, it had had much the same electrifying effect. This was the sort of thing which the United States should do in order to attract young leaders from all over the world to its camp, as opposed to the Soviet practice of attracting young men to Russia with the objective of making them into conspirators and revolutionaries. It would be a terrible mistake if the United States were ever to permit the Soviet Union to gain the lead over it or, indeed, to permit the Soviets to get even with us in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The President then spoke for a few minutes of his December 8, 1953, speech and of the several hopeful developments which had occurred in the wake of it. He added that he thought that the proposal for the power reactor experiment set forth in paragraph 15 was really just one additional "gimmick" in this list of developments, and one with which he said he was not very favorably impressed.

Secretary Humphrey again adverted to the real meaning of paragraph 10, and inquired whether this in fact did not prevent the United States from going ahead with the plans for the power reactor in Belgium or in other technologically advanced foreign countries.

The President called attention to paragraph 14,<sup>10</sup> after which Mr. Cutler once again explained the views of the Planning Board as to the meaning and intent of paragraph 10. He also called attention to the courses of action in paragraphs 19, 22 and 26,<sup>11</sup> as evidence of the

<sup>10</sup> Paragraph 14 reads:

"U.S. production capacities and efficiency in producing U-235 and, less importantly, in producing heavy water and processing spent fuel elements, gives the U.S. a commanding international position in the nuclear power field. While programs devised under NSC 5431/1 for research reactors and training will help less advanced countries to prepare for the advent of nuclear power, there are a few technically advanced nations which need U.S. assistance in expediting their own programs for power reactors. The programs of training and assistance which the U.S. has announced, together with this further cooperation with advanced nations, will be of great importance to foreign nations."

<sup>11</sup> Paragraph 19 reads:

"Make an early announcement of U.S. readiness to enter into discussion as to technological assistance to other countries in their power reactor planning and programs."

Paragraph 22 reads:

"Enter into discussions with nations in a position to undertake programs of developing nuclear power, looking toward 'Agreements for Cooperation' under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which will cover exchange of power reactor information, and the sale, lease, or other transfer (whichever is in the best over-all interests of the U.S.) of nuclear materials or equipment." A footnote to this paragraph added: "The Planning Board recommends that if this paragraph is approved, paragraph 11 of NSC 5431/1 should be amended to conform."

Paragraph 26 reads:

intention of the United States to go forward with a program for the ultimate development of nuclear power abroad. Secretary Dulles, however, replied that to him paragraph 26, which Mr. Cutler had cited, pointed to the conclusion that we would not build power reactors abroad since it called once again only for study of the desirability of the U.S. constructing such reactors abroad.

Mr. Cutler said that in those countries which were sufficiently advanced to make use of power reactors, the United States would go ahead to assist in building them. On the other hand, it was "a cruel deception" to hold out the promise of cheap power through atomic energy to countries which were insufficiently advanced in their technologies to make use of such plants.

The President said that he was not much impressed with Mr. Cutler's argument, since there would be a sufficient length of time during which the power reactor would be built to train personnel in the foreign country in question to run the plant after its completion.

Mr. Cutler asked the President if he were aware that in most cases where the United States built power reactors abroad it would require a U.S. subsidy to build them. The President likewise took issue on this point with Mr. Cutler, indicating that while nuclear power reactors might be uneconomic in the United States for some time, such reactors might prove quite economic in producing power for the countries of the Andes. In any event, the President insisted with great emphasis on his desire that the positive side of this program be stressed, and not the negative. In short, we should push ahead vigorously with the program for developing atomic power abroad for peaceful uses.

The President then indicated that he felt that the Council had had a sufficient discussion of the subject, and asked Admiral Strauss to make a report in lay language and with charts which would show what the United States had been doing in the over-all field of nuclear power, including costs of construction and prices relative to conventional power production costs.

Secretary Wilson thought that the President's suggestion was very desirable, but he wished to add some data provided by engineers and contractors which would indicate the probable costs of developing nuclear power programs, about which he expressed considerable anxiety. To Secretary Wilson the President replied by pointing out that while atomic submarines were anything but economical in their operating costs, they were of vast importance to the United States for a variety of reasons.

---

"Continue to study the desirability of the U.S. constructing large-output and small-output power reactors abroad."

Admiral Strauss said that he would be glad to comply with the President's request for a presentation on this program. But meanwhile he did wish to point out that a great many things had already been done to carry out the objectives of the President's atoms for peace speech. For example, there had been the sale to India of heavy water. We are also providing interested foreign countries with 200 linear feet of books containing declassified information on the subject of nuclear power. We were bringing some 300 foreign students to the United States to study this subject in courses which were opening in March.<sup>12</sup> The President expressed satisfaction, and asked that he be given a progress report on these matters which could be released to the public.

Secretary Humphrey expressed the opinion that most people don't have any true idea of the length of time it takes to reach an objective like this when you are in fact blazing new trails. The pace is often very slow, and the United States must certainly watch its step. The President replied that before he had made any of his speeches on atoms for peace, he had insisted on the most painstaking check by the technicians on every line he had written, precisely to avoid any suggestion of false optimism. Moreover, when you stop to consider the gravity of the present world situation, you would have to conclude that it was worth sticking out your neck a bit if we can achieve our great objectives as set forth in the nuclear power program.

Secretary Wilson said that while this was undoubtedly true, he was still greatly worried about the cost elements in atomic power. The President answered, with impatience, by pointing out that he had reports that people in Paris were paying \$62 a ton for coal at the present time. This seemed to him to indicate clearly that there are places in the world where atomic power might function economically even now. In any case, said the President, let us not give up our great lead in the vital area of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Cutler then suggested that, in the light of the discussion, the Council might decide to suspend consideration of NSC 5507 until such time as Admiral Strauss had made the report which the President had requested. The President said, however, that he wished to go ahead as fast as he could in our negotiations with the Turks, who were strong allies and in great need of additional power resources.<sup>13</sup> Mr. Rockefeller added that he saw no need to postpone action on NSC 5507 until

---

<sup>12</sup> The sale of heavy water to India by the AEC was announced on February 12. The AEC also gave the Japanese Government a library on atomic energy on November 12, 1954. The courses for foreign students at the new School of Nuclear Science and Engineering, located at the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago, opened on March 13. There were 31 foreign students. These matters are described, respectively, in *Atoms for Peace Manual*, pp. 303, 342, and 351-358.

<sup>13</sup> On May 3, the President approved a proposed agreement for cooperation with Turkey, and authorization for the agreement was completed the following month. For background and text of the agreement, see *ibid.*, pp. 428-437.

after Admiral Strauss had presented his report. Any modifications in the light of that report could be made subsequently. Mr. Cutler, however, said that he would very much prefer to go ahead and have the Planning Board begin its review of NSC 5507 before the Council agreed to permit implementation of any of the courses of action now set forth in the paper.

The President closed the discussion with a warm tribute to the kind of scientific and technical cooperation which the British had offered the United States in the whole long period since the beginning of World War II. Our own attitude in response to the British had been foolish and stupid, and we had lost a great deal in all these fields as a result of our "terrible attitude".

*The National Security Council.*<sup>14</sup>

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 5507) prepared by the NSC Planning Board including the participation of the AEC Observer and with the assistance of a Special Subcommittee, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 9, 1955.

b. Requested the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to make a report at the Council meeting scheduled for March 17, 1955,<sup>15</sup> on the status of all elements of the nuclear power program (including research and power reactors, training and educational programs, international conferences and negotiations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, etc.), with examples of the costs of constructing and operating research and power reactors in relation to the costs of producing power in selected foreign countries by conventional means.

c. Deferred action on NSC 5507 pending a revision in the light of the views expressed at the meeting.

*Note:* The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

[Here follows agenda item 5.]

6. *U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments* (NSC 112; NSC Actions Nos. 899, 1106, 1162, 1256; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 10, 1954)<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1326, approved by the President on February 10. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>15</sup> The NSC memorandum of discussion summarizing Strauss' report, which was postponed until the March 24 meeting, is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) Parts of this meeting are summarized in footnotes 2 and 4, Document 19.

<sup>16</sup> For text of NSC 112, see *Foreign Relations, 1951*, vol. I, p. 477. For NSC Actions Nos. 899, 1106, and 1162, see *ibid.*, 1952-1954, vol. II, Part 2, footnote 3, p. 1210; footnote 5, p. 1428; and footnote 6, p. 1472, respectively. The portions of NSC Action No. 1106 relating to the Geneva Conference and Indochina are printed *ibid.*, vol. XIII, p. 1491. NSC Action No. 1256, October 28, 1954, on "U.S. Position With Respect to Arms Reduction", is not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council extensively on the reference problem, while Mr. Lay handed out to the members of the Council a series of five questions relating to disarmament (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).<sup>17</sup> Mr. Cutler went on to explain the major differences in approach by the Departments of State and Defense, illustrating these differences by reading the conclusions from the position papers by each of the two departments for use at yesterday's meeting of the Special Committee for the Review of NSC 112 (Secretaries of State and Defense and Chairman, AEC).<sup>18</sup> At the end of his statement, Mr. Cutler read the set of questions which Mr. Lay had distributed, and explained that the Secretary of State had felt that these were questions which the Council might usefully discuss. He then asked Secretary Dulles to open the discussion.

The President intervened to say that the question which most interested him was the first question, which read:

"Should further review of U.S. disarmament policies be conducted under the direction of a person of outstanding qualifications, free to concentrate on disarmament and to devote a substantial part of his time to these matters for at least a year? In carrying out such review, each concerned agency (State, Defense, AEC) would furnish an adviser to such individual and stand ready to undertake whatever technical or other studies may be determined to be necessary." The President went on to say that we greatly needed such a man as was

---

D 95, NSC Actions) The memorandum of December 10, 1954, was drafted by Gleason; the enclosed memorandum by Cutler of the same date is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1952-1954, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1580.

<sup>17</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. The questions were apparently developed by Cutler, who had said "he would try to draft a statement of the issues arising out of this review of NSC 112 (basic disarmament policy), for NSC consideration at the February 10 meeting." See the memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

<sup>18</sup> The Department of State position paper, February 7, concluded that the "basic principles for U.S. disarmament policy set forth in NSC 112 now require modification". A policy review should seek to evaluate alternative approaches to disarmament such as: negotiating and carrying out a "limited first step toward disarmament, such as cessation of production of nuclear fuels, with adequate inspection; agreement to reduce nuclear weapons independent of agreement on conventional arms; general agreement on a detailed and comprehensive disarmament plan before putting part of the plan into effect; and the possible provision for cessation of nuclear fuel production accompanied by adequate standards. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 112)

The Department of Defense position paper, January 25, advocated "the regulation of all armaments and armed forces under an adequately safeguarded and comprehensive plan", and proposed as a first task the attainment of agreement among concerned major nations on such a disarmament plan. Such an agreement would provide for an international control organ within the United Nations with powers to implement and enforce the plan, to maintain ownership and control over all atomic energy material and facilities, and to prohibit effectively armaments and armed forces not permitted under the plan. The agreement would also provide for progressive disclosure and verification of information regarding armed forces and armaments, allow for suspension of the agreement in case of detected violations, and specify punitive measures to be taken in case of violations. (*Ibid.*, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chronological File—Disarmament—General)

suggested by this question. The Council had not discussed the problem of disarmament for some weeks or months now, and the President did not think it would be easy for the Council members to get their minds conditioned to the subject again unless they had the expert guidance of such an individual as was proposed in this question. Certainly disarmament was a subject with which some one exceptional brain ought to occupy itself exclusively. This was one of the most important fields in the entire Government.

Mr. Cutler again asked Secretary Dulles to comment, this time directing him to the first question. Secretary Dulles replied that it was a good rule of law that when the judge is persuaded to your side of the argument to keep still (laughter). Secretary Dulles then spoke of the meeting of the Special Committee to Review NSC 112, which had been held in his office the previous day, and pointed out that the suggestion for a single individual to devote himself to the disarmament problem had been made at that meeting by Admiral Strauss and had been seconded by Anderson and thoroughly approved by himself.<sup>19</sup> The problem of disarmament and arms control, continued Secretary Dulles, was as urgent and as difficult as any problem which society faced today. Judging from past experience, one would be tempted to say that it was an insoluble problem, and Secretary Dulles cited instances of historical failure which could so easily lead one to believe that arms limitation would come about more readily in a climate of mutual trust among nations rather than as the producer of mutual trust.

While, said Secretary Dulles, this was the historical situation, there were now a number of new factors. The so-called unconventional weapons were of transcendent importance among these factors. In view of the enormous ingenuity which had ultimately produced these new weapons, one was entitled to hope that there was sufficient human ingenuity to devise a solution to the problem they posed for the world. Secondly, the risks of not doing something in this field of disarmament were far greater than they had ever been before in history. This in itself added to our incentives to achieve a solution. In any event, we must accept the working hypothesis that a solution to this terrible problem *can* be found.

Secretary Dulles then expressed complete agreement with the President's judgment as to the importance of the first in the list of five questions on disarmament. Indeed, he said, this had been the unanimous view at yesterday's meeting. The problem was to find the man to head up the study of the disarmament problem.

---

<sup>19</sup> According to Meyers' memorandum, *supra*, it was Bowie who made the suggestion. He had earlier made the same suggestion in a meeting of the Special Committee reviewing U.S. policy on armaments; see Document 1.



The President then inquired if the forthcoming UN disarmament talks in London started on time, when would the conference convene? Secretary Dulles replied that the talks were scheduled to commence in London on February 25. The President said that he would prefer to postpone the disarmament meeting until such time as we could find the man to head up this new study and review of the disarmament problem. Secretary Dulles said that it would be a mistake for the United States to take the initiative in trying to postpone the London meeting. He thought perhaps the Russians themselves might exercise this initiative. The President said that he had meant to suggest only postponing further discussion of the disarmament problem in the National Security Council. Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with the President that it would not be profitable to discuss the remaining four questions which Mr. Cutler had suggested, since the members of the Council had had insufficient time to study these questions.

The President then commented that before the invention of the new weapons, the United States used to have such a vastly superior industrial base for war that it could be reasonably sure that no enemy could succeed in destroying the United States through recourse to war. With the new weapons this was no longer the case. While, continued the President, the Council would recall his view, expressed on past occasions, that if he could be shown a really foolproof system which would ensure the effective abolition of atomic and nuclear weapons, he would be perfectly willing to agree to their abolition, even though there were no simultaneous reduction or abolition of conventional weapons. Indeed, said the President, he would buy such a solution right this minute, except that he had now become convinced that it was not possible to devise a foolproof system to abolish nuclear weapons and to see that they remained abolished. Accordingly, he had now come to change his view and to revert to support of the position which the United States had taken in the UN, linking conventional and atomic weapons in any plan for the control or abolition of armaments.

Secretary Dulles launched into a discussion of the position taken by many people, that until you can get an absolutely foolproof system of disarmament you should not seriously take any steps in the direction of disarmament. While this point might be valid, Secretary Dulles pointed out that if no steps at all were taken and we continued in our present situation, we also ran very grave risks.

The President observed that every time recently that the subject of disarmament had come up in a conversation, he was reminded of the fate of Carthage. The Roman invaders had by false promises induced the citizens of Carthage to surrender their arms. The moment these arms were surrendered, the Roman legions attacked the city. Even in its comparatively defenseless state, however, Carthage had resisted the invaders for the period of an entire year.

Secretary Wilson said he agreed with Secretary Dulles' analysis, and pointed out that something must be worked out to try to solve the problem of disarmament, and that we could never afford to give up the effort.

Ambassador Lodge informed the Council that the British had told him that they were going to call their disarmament meeting on schedule in London for February 25, whether the Soviets attended the meeting or not. He predicted that little would be accomplished by the meeting except by way of propaganda-making. He added that the Soviet disarmament proposal of last October<sup>20</sup> would be high on the agenda of the London meeting.

Mr. Cutler then read from a section of the State Department position paper of the previous day, recommending what the United States position on disarmament at this meeting should consist of.

Secretary Dulles, referring to the Soviet proposal of October 1954, pointed out that this pronouncement was hailed in many quarters as marking a significant Soviet concession to international control and inspection of armaments. Ambassador Lodge commented that the chief usefulness of the London meeting would be to probe this very point. He added that he believed the Russians would feel obliged to come to London because they would look so bad if they stayed away from the meeting.

Admiral Radford pointed out the relevancy of our experiences over a year and a half with inspections in North Korea, as to Soviet intentions.

Mr. Cutler then turned the Council's attention to the first question on his list, and asked if there were any further discussion of the matter, suggesting that the members of the Council offer any suggestions they could think of for the individual in question, so that these suggestions might be given to the President next week. The President said that he wished to get started finding the right man at once. It might even be possible to find such a man in time to send him to London as an observer at the meeting on February 25. The President added that in his view the kind of man we needed was one who combined both an executive and a judicial temperament.

Secretary Humphrey observed that the problem of disarmament was decidedly a long-term proposition. At the end, we must not only arrive at the right conclusions respecting our own position on the problem, but we must also be prepared to sell such a position to the public. For this reason he recommended that the single individual selected to review the U.S. position might well be assisted by a com-

---

<sup>20</sup> Actually, the Soviet disarmament proposal was introduced in the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 30, 1954. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 431-433.

mittee of perhaps three civilians from outside the Government who would join in the report on this problem to the National Security Council.

The President said that if he did appoint such a man, that man ought not only to have free access to all departmental thinking on the subject of disarmament, but also access to all the views held by responsible people outside the Government. Secretary Dulles, while agreeing with the President's point, warned that it was essential that such an individual keep closely in touch with the views of the responsible Government agencies. He cited Mr. Grenville Clark's<sup>21</sup> solution of the disarmament problem—namely, world government—as an example of the danger of thinking on this problem in an ivory tower remote from the views of the departments and agencies of the Government who were most closely involved.

Mr. Cutler then re-read the recommendation made by the State Department as to the interim position the United States should take in the forthcoming UN meeting on disarmament, contrasting this position with that suggested by the Department of Defense. There ensued a discussion which resulted in changes in the State Department position designed to accommodate that position to the views of the Department of Defense. The final revision was found generally acceptable by the members of the Council.

Ambassador Lodge stated that as a practical matter, the United States delegation to the London meeting would not have to show its hand with respect to a firm U.S. position. Secretary Humphrey said he was glad to hear this, because it was obviously going to be impossible to get full agreement on a firm U.S. position prior to February 25. Ambassador Lodge commented that the London meeting would consist largely of a cold war exercise. To this, Secretary Humphrey replied that all the United States could really do at this time was to avoid freezing its position. Secretary Wilson agreed with Secretary Humphrey.

Mr. Cutler then inquired of Secretary Dulles whether he wished to discuss the second, third and fourth questions on the list. Secretary Humphrey said that he thought such a procedure would involve the Council's getting ahead of itself. What was the point of appointing a single individual to study these matters for the Council, and then going on to try to decide them itself? Secretary Dulles indicated that he was not inclined at this time to discuss the remaining questions on Mr. Cutler's list.

---

<sup>21</sup> Grenville Clark, prominent lawyer, was coauthor with Louis B. Sohn of *Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision: Detailed Proposals for Revision of the United Nations Charter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Law School, 1953).

At the end of the meeting, the President once again summarized the position he had taken earlier respecting the relationship between disarmament in the area of conventional versus nuclear weapons, and reiterated that he now found himself back in firm support of the position on this subject which the United States had consistently taken in the UN.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>22</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of a summary of the positions of the Departments of State and Defense as read at the meeting by Mr. Cutler.

b. Recommended that the President designate an individual of outstanding qualifications, as his Special Representative to conduct on a full-time basis a further review of U.S. policy on control of armaments, reporting his findings and recommendations to the National Security Council; such Special Representative to have:

(1) Full access to all pertinent information and views within the various executive departments and agencies.

(2) One qualified adviser each from the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency, to assist the Special Representative and make available whatever information or studies may be required from those respective departments and agencies.

(3) A panel of three or more qualified consultants from outside of Government, to advise the Special Representative.

c. Agreed that, pending the results of the review referred to in b above, the U.S. public position in the United Nations on the subject should be:

(1) To continue support of the current U.S. positions, including the UN plan with adjustments in emphasis to take account of presently-accumulated stockpiles and the existence of sufficient nuclear material for foreseeable peaceful uses.

(2) To avoid taking a position which would materially prejudice the possible introduction of later proposals.

*Note:* The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the President for consideration. The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

[Here follows agenda item 7.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>22</sup> Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1328, approved by the President on February 10. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

## 8. Editorial Note

From February 18 to May 15, the United States conducted Operation Teapot, a nuclear test series at Yucca Flat and Frenchman Flat on the Nevada Test Site in the continental United States. During the test period 14 nuclear shots and 1 non-nuclear shot were detonated. Several thousand scientific, military (army, air force, navy, marines), and civilian contract personnel participated in the organization, planning, and execution of the test series. Military exercises undertaken during and following the shots took place under the name Desert Rock 6.

Numerous weapons test reports, scientific studies on radiation and fallout, and other documents relating to the test series are located in the Defense Nuclear Agency Technical Library in Alexandria, Virginia.

Later controversy over the radiation effects of nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s and 1960s on the health of humans and animals in the area is documented in *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Congress, 1st session, Serial No. 96-129*, and *Joint Hearings Before the House the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Congress, 1st session, Serial Nos. 96-41 and 96-42*. The conclusions of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations are summarized in *"The Forgotten Guinea Pigs": A Report on Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation Sustained as a Result of the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program Conducted by the United States Government, August 1980* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980).

---

## 9. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President<sup>1</sup>

London, February 23, 1955.

DEAR GENERAL: Winthrop Aldrich gave a superb party last night (Washington's Birthday) opening the new Embassy. The Queen, the Duke of Edinburgh, and the whole cream of London were there.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series: Lodge. Secret.

I had a fine opportunity to bring your greetings to the Queen and to Sir Winston Churchill, both of whom reciprocated warmly.

Sir Winston brought up the question of exchange of atomic information and said that the situation was completely unsatisfactory from the British viewpoint, that they had had to do everything on their own, that they had made a lot of progress, but that the situation between our two countries was not in any way what it should be in this respect.<sup>2</sup>

I remember your mentioning the subject at the meeting of the National Security Council which I attended and felt, therefore, you should know this.<sup>3</sup>

I am sending a copy of this letter to Herbert Hoover, Jr., for his information.

With respectful regards,  
Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

---

<sup>2</sup> This paragraph and the following one are bracketed with the following notation in the President's hand: "To Adm. Strauss. DE."

<sup>3</sup> See agenda item 4, "Atomic Power Abroad," Document 7.

---

## 10. Editorial Note

The Subcommittee to the United Nations Disarmament Commission held 28 meetings (22d to 49th inclusive) at Lancaster House, London, February 25-May 18, 1955. The nations represented on the subcommittee, which was established by the Disarmament Commission on April 19, 1954, were the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the United States. For text of the resolution creating the subcommittee, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, page 413. Regarding the 1954 meetings of the subcommittee, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, volume I, pages 414-422 and 423-426.

Documentation on the London subcommittee meetings for both 1954 and 1955 is in Department of State, Central Files 330.13 and 600.0012, and *ibid.*, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Telegrams. A position paper prepared by the Regulation of Armaments Executive Committee, entitled Policy Guidance for United States Activities in the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee of Five at the Forthcoming London Meetings, dated February 15, 1955, is *ibid.*, PPS Files: Lot 66

D 70, Atomic Energy—Armaments. The United Nations Disarmament Commission kept a Verbatim Record of all the subcommittee meetings in mimeograph form. A set for the years 1954–1956 is *ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.1–86.

For texts of documents introduced into the London subcommittee meetings in 1955, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955, pages 892–900. Several of these documents are also printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, volume I, pages 447–454. Regarding the Soviet proposals of May 10, which introduced a new dimension into subcommittee discussions, see Document 24.

---

11. **Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 3, 1955.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you for sending me the excerpt from Cabot Lodge's letter<sup>2</sup> concerning Sir Winston Churchill's remark as to his unhappiness over the fact that we have not yet achieved that cooperation with the U.K. which is so desirable in the atomic energy field.

My purpose in this note is to tell you the reason and to suggest a course of action which might be helpful meanwhile.

(1) The reason why we have not progressed in our negotiations with the U.K. (per contra, we are very close to completing our agreement with the Canadians)<sup>3</sup> is that we must certify to adequate personnel security practices in the country to which we disclose "Restricted Data". I had a security team visit England and they have reported deficiencies in the U.K. personnel security system. Without going into detail, I might say that they have deviated from the standards agreed to in 1952 and that, furthermore, the great number of the employees in the British atomic energy establishment who would have access to information which we would be expected to transfer have been granted security clearance on the basis of investigations considerably below the standards set in our own procedures.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series: AEC. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 9.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to bilateral Agreements for Cooperation with Canada and the United Kingdom on civil aspects of atomic energy. These agreements were approved by President Eisenhower on June 15, 1955, and signed by representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States on the same day. The bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom contained additional limitations on the exchange of restricted data. For texts of these two agreements, see *Atoms for Peace Manual*, pp. 462–486.

We are negotiating actively to ameliorate this. Until this can be done, however, an agreement cannot be concluded.

This has no bearing on the *military* aspects of cooperation, however, and in that area, progress is being made. The Atomic Energy Commission has been giving serious study and consideration to atomic military information which the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan to convey to NATO.<sup>4</sup> I anticipate that this will be resolved very promptly and without any significant reservations on the part of the Atomic Energy Commission. Quite possibly, Sir Winston has no information that this matter is progressing so favorably. Attached is a summary of items which I anticipate the AEC will agree are suitable for communication to NATO.<sup>5</sup>

(2) I now come to a matter in which I think we could make a gesture which should be very pleasing to the U.K., particularly to Sir Winston. According to reports, the Australians have objected to large weapons testing in Australia where the British have hitherto conducted their weapons tests. My suggestion is that we might offer them the use of our Pacific Proving Ground (i.e., Bikini-Eniwetok) at a time which would not conflict with our own tests. They could not but regard this as a friendly gesture. If they accepted it, we would no longer be the sole target of Communist propaganda and the sole recipient of irrational protests from Nehru and others. . . .<sup>6</sup>

Will you let me know what you think of this?

Respectfully yours,

Lewis S.

---

<sup>4</sup> On March 2, the North Atlantic Council approved a proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States and NATO involving the transfer of atomic information. Secretary of Defense Wilson endorsed this agreement in his letter of transmittal to the President on April 2. President Eisenhower approved the agreement and on April 13 forwarded it to Senator Anderson, as required under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. For Wilson's and Eisenhower's letters and text of the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, pp. 686-689.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Attached to this letter is a memorandum for the record, dated March 4, by Goodpaster: "On reading the attached letter today, the President indicated, in connection with paragraph (2), that he thought the action proposed would be a good thing, and that it should be taken up with State. I so advised Admiral Strauss in order that he might do so."



## 12. Memorandum of Discussion at the 239th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 3, 1955<sup>1</sup>

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-2.]

3. *Psychological Reactions to the AEC Announcement of the Effects, Particularly Fall-out, of Thermonuclear Weapons* (NSC Actions Nos. 925 and 1320-b; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons", dated October 8, 1953; Memo for Executive Secretary, NSC, from Executive Secretary, OCB, subject: "Overseas Reaction to the AEC Report on the Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Explosions", dated March 2, 1955)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of the OCB report, and emphasized that the report confined itself strictly to the statement issued by the Atomic Energy Commission respecting the effects of thermonuclear explosions. The paper did not deal with the larger problem of the attitude of the peoples of foreign nations toward the prospect of nuclear warfare. Mr. Cutler then pointed out that the Planning Board had reviewed the OCB report and agreed with the recommendations in paragraph 8 thereof.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on March 4.

<sup>2</sup> NSC Action No. 925, October 7, 1953, "noted the President's directive that any public statements to be made by Government officials regarding thermonuclear weapons must be cleared in advance with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions) Regarding NSC Action No. 1320, see footnote 6, Document 5. For copies of the memorandum from the Executive Secretary, OCB, to the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the OCB report, both dated March 2, see Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member File.

<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 8(e) of the OCB report recommended a further report to the NSC in 90 days. That recommendation led to another OCB memorandum for the Executive Secretary, NSC, June 10, on the subject, "Follow-up Report on Overseas Reaction to the AEC February 15, 1955 Statement on the Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Weapons," dated June 8. This OCB report concluded: "There has been no significant or widespread foreign reactions [sic] to the February 15 statement in so far as radiation effects are concerned". The report noted, however, that "it appears that the generalized fears with respect to nuclear weapons are increasing throughout the world." (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member File)

The memorandum of discussion of the 255th meeting of the NSC on July 14 considered this report along with NIE 100-5-55, "Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World", dated June 14. The NSC memorandum of discussion of the July 14 meeting noted: "The only comment was made by the President to the effect that the people of the world are getting thoroughly scared of the implications of nuclear war. They were running for cover as fast as they could go." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

After a brief discussion, Admiral Strauss pointed out to the Council that the President's earlier directive of October 8, 1953, which required Government officials who proposed to make public statements with regard to nuclear weapons to check in advance with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. This directive, said Admiral Strauss, had been more often observed in the breach than in the observance, and accordingly he recommended that the Council reaffirm this directive. The Council agreed with Admiral Strauss' point.

*The National Security Council.*<sup>4</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the study on the subject, prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1320-b, enclosed with the reference memorandum of March 2, 1955.

b. Adopted the Recommendations in paragraph 8 of the above-mentioned OCB study.

c. Noted the President's directive that, in lieu of NSC Action No. 925 as transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 8, 1953, oral or written statements to be made public by Government officials regarding nuclear weapons, which contain information not previously made public officially, must be checked in advance with the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, who will coordinate the intelligence and foreign climate of opinion aspects with the Operations Coordinating Board.<sup>5</sup>

*Note:* The reference memorandum of March 2, 1955, subsequently circulated to the Council for information, and for implementation by appropriate agencies of the Recommendations contained therein, as adopted in b above and approved by the President. The directive in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

<sup>4</sup> Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1344, approved by the President on March 3, 1955. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>5</sup> At the meeting of the NSC on March 24, the President approved NSC Action No. 1360, "Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons," which revised NSC Action No. 1340-c as follows:

"Noted the President's directive that, in lieu of NSC Action No. 925 as transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 8, 1953, oral or written statements to be made public by Government officials regarding nuclear weapons, which contain information not previously made public officially, must be checked in advance with the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, who will coordinate the intelligence aspects with the Director of Central Intelligence and the foreign climate of opinion aspects with the Operations Coordinating Board.

"*Note:* The above revision of NSC Action No. 1344-c, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all recipients of the reference memorandum." (*Ibid.*)

13. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 240th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 10, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* (NSC 5431/1; NSC 5507; NSC 5507/1; Memo for NSC from Mr. Cutler, subject: "Development of Nuclear Power", dated December 11, 1953; NSC Actions Nos. 985, 1202 and 1326; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 7, 1955)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at very great length and in very great detail on the contents of NSC 5507/1 (copy of briefing notes filed in the Minutes of the meeting).<sup>3</sup> At the conclusion of his briefing, he called on the Chairman, AEC, to make the first comments.

Admiral Strauss described NSC 5507/1 as an excellent report. It was, however, so vital to the Atomic Energy Commission that he did wish to make a few comments and to suggest a few revisions. Thereafter, Admiral Strauss proposed a series of revisions in the language of the present draft, most of which did not occasion any significant Council discussion.

However, with respect to paragraph 25 on page 14, reading: "Encourage the private financing of the development of atomic power to the maximum possible extent without jeopardizing the early development of such power.", there was an exchange of views. Admiral Strauss said that he trusted that there was no implication in this paragraph that private enterprise had not played its full part or that reliance upon private enterprise would jeopardize the early development of atomic power. If there were, he wished to suggest language to revise the paragraph.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on March 11.

<sup>2</sup> For NSC 5431/1, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1488-1499. Regarding NSC 5507, see footnote 5, Document 7. NSC 5507/1 is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507 Series: Atomic Power Abroad. For Cutler's December 11, 1953, memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1296-1297. NSC Action No. 985, December 15, 1953, is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions. For NSC Action No. 1202, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1486-1488. Regarding NSC Action No. 1326, see footnote 14, Document 7. The March 7 memorandum enclosed a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated March 4. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507: Memoranda)

<sup>3</sup> Neither the briefing note nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

The President indicated that he was completely opposed to the language of the paragraph as set forth above, but for reasons different than those which worried Admiral Strauss. In short, he was strongly in favor of going ahead with the development of atomic power without too great regard for such considerations as the role of private financing, strongly as he believed in the principle of private enterprise. Admiral Strauss accordingly suggested that the Council agree to substitute for the language quoted above the language which came from the statement in the earlier policy adopted by the Council respecting the development of atomic power. This would call for language to indicate that without jeopardizing the early development of atomic power, the program to do so should be carried forward to the maximum extent possible through private, not Government, financing.

There being very little difference between these versions, the President said that he believed the real emphasis in any such course of action should be on the national interests of the United States. Accordingly, the paragraph should state in effect that the program for the development of atomic power should be carried forward as rapidly as was consistent with the interests of the United States, using private capital to the maximum possible extent. The emphasis, said the President, should be on getting the job done rather than on the role of private financing. The same emphasis, he continued, should be applied to the other portions of NSC 5507/1 where this subject was treated. The Council accordingly agreed to make the other necessary revisions to meet the President's point of view.

Admiral Strauss then directed the Council's attention to a bracketed sentence in paragraph 27-c, which dealt with the sale, lease or other transfer by the United States to friendly foreign countries of atomic materials or equipment. The bracketed sentence had been proposed by the Treasury and Budget members of the NSC Planning Board, but had not been acceptable to the others. It read as follows: "Other than in exceptionally compelling circumstances, any transfer by the U.S. to foreign governments of such materials or equipment should be by sale or lease." Admiral Strauss said he wholeheartedly subscribed to the position taken by the Treasury and the Budget, and wished the bracketed sentence to be included in the report. He saw no reason why the United States should not get some return from these atomic materials and equipment.

After some discussion and explanation of this paragraph, the President observed that once again all this indicated that the Government was trying to push its way into a very difficult and unexplored field of activity, and was setting up all kinds of generalizations in advance of undertaking to enter the field. It seemed much better to him, on the contrary, to make the decision to go ahead, and thereafter carry on on a "case-by-case basis". He said he particularly disliked the

notion that grants or gifts of such materials and equipment would be made by the United States only in "exceptionally compelling circumstances".

Director Hughes observed that the Budget had wished to include reference to this problem because it felt that if nothing were said about a preference for sale or lease, we would have all sorts of foreign countries lining up outside our doors looking for a handout, rather than to agree to rent or purchase atomic materials and equipment from the United States. It was at least useful to have the paper take note of such a possibility, although Mr. Hughes said that he was by no means prepared to die for the inclusion of the bracketed sentence.

The President turned to Mr. Hughes, and inquired with some asperity on what level Mr. Hughes imagined that the United States would conduct negotiations, say, with a country like Colombia, on ways and means of building a power reactor there. Did Mr. Hughes imagine that such discussions would be carried on by people of the rank of corporals, or did he not think that such discussions would be at a very high level, sufficiently high to safeguard the legitimate interests of the United States? The President added that he was willing for the paragraph to say that sale or lease of such materials and equipment were preferable, but the transfer by outright grant should be undertaken if such a course of action was estimated to be in the best interests of the United States.

Secretary Dulles strongly supported the President's point of view, and indicated with impatience that some people seemed to believe that our diplomats enjoyed squandering the assets of the United States. The President added with a smile that the Secretary of State had correctly described the views of the Treasury and the Budget. They seemed to believe that American officials always yearned to give away the property of the United States.

After further revisions had been agreed by the Council at the suggestion of Admiral Strauss, the latter said that he no longer cared to continue his opposition to the course of action set forth in paragraph 27-e, which called on the United States as soon as possible to design and construct in the U.S. a small-output civilian reactor as a step toward constructing small-output power reactors which gave most promise of being useful abroad.<sup>4</sup>

When Admiral Strauss had concluded his comments and suggestions for revision of NSC 5507/1, the President said that he had several general questions to ask. In the first place, he wished to know more about the so-called "Army package reactor" to which reference

---

<sup>4</sup> The minor revisions of NSC 5507/1, including subparagraph 27-e, became NSC 5507/2, with the same numbering of paragraphs and subparagraphs through subparagraph 27-g. For NSC 5507/2, see *infra*.

had been made earlier in the paper.<sup>5</sup> Admiral Strauss undertook to explain to the President the uses to which the military put such a reactor, notably in the provision of heat and fuel in difficult base areas such as Thule, in Greenland. The President said he could not understand why so expensive a device was necessary to provide this service. Was it not possible to ship in other fuels? This seemed rather a luxury to the President, although Admiral Radford defended the package reactor as currently used by the U.S. military. Admiral Strauss pointed out that in addition to the military uses of this reactor, it had "interesting" implications for civilian atomic power, and besides, it had cost only \$2 million. In that case, said the President, he was satisfied.

Prompted by a note from Admiral Radford, the President said that he had another question to pose for Council discussion. Inasmuch as many of the things which we propose to do in this paper were being done for psychological and political advantages to the United States, why could we not put a nuclear propulsion unit, such as was used in the *Nautilus*,<sup>6</sup> into a U.S. merchant vessel, which could thereafter sail around the world as an advertisement of the promise and progress of the U.S. program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy? Admiral Strauss quickly replied that conversations with regard to such a project were already on foot between the AEC and the Newport News Shipbuilding Corporation. The President appeared gratified, and smilingly said that Admiral Strauss always seemed to anticipate his own ideas. If this, however, were the case, why did we not give some indication of it to the press? We could at least inform the newspapers that this project was under study by the Government. Such a merchant vessel would, in the President's words, constitute "a travelling showcase".

Admiral Radford inquired whether the submarine type of propulsion unit, already developed, could not be transferred for use in a merchant vessel, and if so, how long would the operation require? Admiral Strauss replied that if one undertook to do this "as a stunt" it could probably be done in a matter of some ninety days. On the other hand, he personally much preferred to construct a new nuclear propulsion unit for the specific purpose of providing power for a merchant vessel. This would require perhaps a period of two years to build.

The President said that he rather hoped that something like this could be done prior to the opening of the Afro-Asian Conference in Indonesia next month.<sup>7</sup>

Admiral Strauss then asked permission from the Council to describe briefly the plans of the AEC for the forthcoming meeting of

---

<sup>5</sup> See paragraph 9 of NSC 5507/2, *infra*.

<sup>6</sup> The USS *Nautilus*, the first atomic-powered submarine, was launched at Groton, Connecticut, on January 21, 1954.

<sup>7</sup> The Asian-African Conference, with representation from 29 countries, met in Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24.

atomic scientists sponsored by the Swiss Academy in Geneva.<sup>8</sup> It was proposed to build a reactor in Geneva at a cost of between \$300,000 and \$400,000 for this occasion.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, if the State Department agrees, and can successfully negotiate the project with the Swiss Government, the AEC proposed to leave the reactor in situ at the conclusion of the meeting.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>10</sup>

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the reference report (NSC 5507/1) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 7, 1955.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5507/1, subject to the following changes:<sup>11</sup>

[Here follows the list of changes.]

*Note:* NSC 5507/1, as amended and adopted, approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5507/2; and referred for implementation to the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, advising with the Operations Coordinating Board in order to ensure that proposed actions in the field result in maximum psychological advantages to the United States.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>8</sup> Regarding this meeting, see Document 77.

<sup>9</sup> The press release by the AEC on March 23 announcing the proposed construction of this reactor is printed in *Atoms for Peace Manual*, pp. 358-359.

<sup>10</sup> Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1351, approved by the President on March 10. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>11</sup> The changes, 15 in all, are discussed in footnotes to NSC 5507/2, *infra*.

## 14. National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>

NSC 5507/2

Washington, March 12, 1955.

### PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

#### REFERENCES

- A. Memo for NSC from Mr. Cutler, subject: "Development of Nuclear Power", dated December 11, 1953
- B. NSC Actions Nos. 985, 1202, 1326, 1351
- C. NSC 5507 and NSC 5507/1<sup>2</sup>

The National Security Council, Mr. H. Chapman Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 240th Council meeting on March 10, 1955, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5507/1, subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1351-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5507/1, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5507/2, and directs its implementation by the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, advising with the Operations Coordinating Board in order to ensure that proposed actions in the field result in maximum psychological advantages to the United States.

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes the statement of policy (paragraph 7 of NSC 149/2) as transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 11, 1953, and NSC 5431/1.<sup>3</sup>

[Enclosure]

James S. Lay, Jr.<sup>4</sup>

### STATEMENT OF POLICY ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

#### General Considerations

##### *Introduction*

1. On April 29, 1953, the President approved the first statement of national policy on the development of atomic power for peaceful purposes. The basic concept of that statement is still valid as modified below:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507 Series. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> References A-C are identified in the NSC memorandum of discussion, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> For text of NSC 149/2, April 29, 1953, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 305-316. Regarding NSC 5431/1, see footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



The early development of atomic power by the United States is a prerequisite to maintaining our lead in the Atomic field. Such development should be carried forward as rapidly as the interests of the United States dictate, seeking private financing wherever possible.<sup>5</sup>

### *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*

2. The national resource represented by U.S. atomic facilities and technology can be a great asset in the effort to promote a peaceful world compatible with a free and dynamic American society. U.S. determination to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy, with calculated emphasis on a peaceful atomic power program abroad as well as at home, can generate free world respect and support for the constructive purposes of U.S. foreign policy. Such a program will strengthen American world leadership and disprove the Communists' propaganda charges that the U.S. is concerned solely with the destructive uses of the atom. Atomic energy, which has become the foremost symbol of man's inventive capacities, can also become the symbol of a strong but peaceful and purposeful America.

3. World acceptance of U.S. leadership in the peaceful use of atomic power may be endangered by USSR and possibly by UK activities in the near future. To preserve for the U.S. the essential psychological and political attributes of its leadership in this field makes important the acceleration<sup>6</sup> of U.S. programs and early tangible action in the international field.

### *The Priority of Military Needs*

4. Programs for the peaceful utilization of fissionable materials must be harmonized with military needs. Requirements for U.S. fissionable material (not of weapons quality) for research reactor programs will not cause any significant diversion of that material or of trained personnel from the U.S. nuclear weapons program. As for power reactors likely to be built in the next five years, limited utilization of U.S. raw and fissionable materials is already acceptable. As the U.S. reserve of nuclear weapons increases, such materials may be increasingly devoted to power production.

### *Statutory Provisions*

5. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permits cooperation with other countries or groups of countries in atomic power development. When U.S. fissionable material or classified information is involved, such

---

<sup>5</sup> This last sentence is a revision of NSC 5507/1, which reads: "Without jeopardizing such early development, it should be carried forward to the maximum extent possible through private, not government, financing."

<sup>6</sup> The word "immediate" coming just before "acceleration" in NSC 5507/1 was deleted in NSC 5507/2.

cooperation must be in accordance with statutory procedures which include negotiation of "Agreements for Cooperation" between the U.S. and other nations. In order to enter into an "Agreement for Cooperation", the President must determine that "the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security."

6. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, activities abroad by U.S. individuals, industry, and private institutions in the atomic energy field require prior arrangements or authorizations by the U.S. Government.

#### *Significance of Atomic Power*

7. a. Power plays a tremendous role in the increase of productivity. If the world economy is to expand, ever-increasing supplies of fuels for power will be needed. In many areas the high cost of power production, the prospect of future depletion of fossil fuels, and the utilization of the best hydro-electric sites make the development of alternate sources of energy imperative. For these reasons, rather than for immediate economic benefits, atomic power is attractive.

b. Atomic power can provide a major extension of available energy resources and will, in particular, have early value for areas with heavy demand and high-cost fuel (like the UK). Power shortages and high power costs in industrialized nations like Japan and Italy and in less highly developed nations like Brazil may well make them economically attractive locations for power reactors.

c. The ultimate economy of atomic power can be determined only as technological and engineering problems are solved. The development of economically competitive atomic power, through present techniques, will not revolutionize the world economy. In underdeveloped areas, the availability of atomic power will not ease the basic problem of finding capital for economic development. Atomic power plants will not make obsolete modern efficient hydroelectric and steam electric plants at any early date.<sup>7</sup> The principal causes for high power cost to the consumer are the transportation and production of fuel, old inefficient plants, small units which are less efficient and economical than large plants, low rates of use with resultant high unit cost of power, high cost of investment capital, and power distributing systems. As opposed to a new conventional plant, an atomic plant would be advantageous with respect primarily<sup>8</sup> to the cost of transportation and production of fuel. In technologically advanced countries these

<sup>7</sup> The words "at an early date" were added to NSC 5507/2.

<sup>8</sup> The word "primarily" was substituted for "only" in NSC 5507/1.

facts are recognized. In some less advanced countries there is a tendency to view U.S. proposals for international sharing of benefits of atomic power as a panacea for basic economic ills.

#### *Types and Sizes of Atomic Power Reactors*

8. Atomic power reactors are of various types, depending upon the nature and enrichment of the fuel, the nature of the moderator and coolant, etc. The power output of atomic power reactors may range from about 1,000 kilowatts up to several hundred thousand kilowatts. For convenience, atomic power reactors producing 1,000–20,000 kilowatts are defined as “small-output” and atomic power reactors producing 50,000 kilowatts or more are defined as “large-output”.

9. Generally speaking, the larger the output of the reactor the smaller the capital cost per kilowatt; therefore, large-output reactors offer the most promising approach to achieving economic electrical power. With the exception of its work on the Army package power reactor (1,500 kilowatts), which is a specialized (air-transportable) form of small-output reactor for military use, AEC has logically concentrated its developmental efforts upon large-output reactors.

#### *Reasons for Interest in Small-output Power Reactors*

10. A small-output reactor produces higher-cost power than a large-output reactor. However, its construction cost is much less than that for a large-output reactor (say, \$4–\$10 million<sup>9</sup> for a 10,000 KW reactor vs. \$50 million plus for a 100,000 KW reactor). So long as the economics of power reactors are uncertain, or in areas where power demand is small, small-output power reactors may be attractive in that they may provide the means of securing psychological advantage in international cooperation at a much lower cost per installation than for large-output power reactors.

#### *Present Status of U.S. Reactor Programs (Research and Power)*

11. *Research reactors* are not designed for production of power for civilian purposes. Research reactors are useful for research, medical, and related purposes, and for training personnel in reactor operation. Most research reactors presently available in the U.S. use small amounts of fissionable material of weapons quality, but research reactors can be designed to use small amounts of non-weapons quality fissionable material. Research reactors and the supporting training and information programs are a natural step in the development of any nation's capability to utilize atomic power when it becomes economically attractive.

<sup>9</sup> “\$4–\$10 million” was substituted for “\$10 million plus” in NSC 5507/1.

12. *Power Reactors* of any type can be built either for a large output or a small output of civilian power. Presently authorized U.S. programs for power reactors are unlikely to produce economically competitive atomic power for a decade or more, except in a few power-short or high-cost areas. However, a technological advance or break-through anywhere might appreciably shorten the time scale. Furthermore, if the presently authorized U.S. program should be expanded as proposed in the President's FY 1956 Budget, it might be possible to achieve competitive atomic power by 1960.

13. a. A private utility company, with the assistance of the U.S. Government, is now building at Shippingport, Pa., a large-output power reactor for experimental purposes, rather than to produce economic atomic power. The power output will initially be supported in part by the U.S. Government. The reasons for building this prototype in the U.S. include private capital participation, convenience, safety, security, and the avoidance of unfortunate repercussions from difficulties with an insufficiently tested power reactor abroad.<sup>10</sup>

b. Besides the successful submarine power reactors, one type of which now powers the USS *Nautilus* and another type of which is operating at the West Milton plant and will also power the USS *Seawolf*,<sup>11</sup> the only prototype of a small-output power reactor presently authorized by the U.S. is the Army package power reactor designed to meet unique military specifications. This reactor is not designed to produce power for civilian purposes, but might be adapted to civilian use.

c. If it were desired quickly to construct a small-output power reactor for civilian use, an earlier completion date could be achieved by scaling down the Shippingport-type large-output power reactor than by adapting the Army package power reactor or one of the submarine reactors.<sup>12</sup> However, construction of a small-output reactor by scaling down the large-output reactor before it is fully tested may involve high cost and difficult engineering problems. Nevertheless, these disadvantages should not preclude U.S. willingness to help foreign countries build such scaled-down reactors adaptable to their

---

<sup>10</sup> Paragraph 13-a was a revision of NSC 5507/1, which reads:

"The U.S. Government is now building at Shippingport, Pa., a large-output power reactor for experimental purposes, rather than to produce economic atomic power. The power output will be subsidized in part by the U.S. Government. The reasons for building this prototype in the U.S. include convenience, safety, security, and the avoidance of unfortunate repercussions from difficulties with an insufficiently tested power reactor abroad."

<sup>11</sup> The entire preceding portion of this sentence was added to NSC 5507/2.

<sup>12</sup> The words "or one of the submarine reactors" were added to NSC 5507/2.

needs. At the same time, immediate efforts to develop other and better small-output reactors should be encouraged.<sup>13</sup>

#### *Pros and Cons of Building Power Reactors Abroad*

14. a. Because of the Soviet programs described below, it is desirable for the U.S. to cooperate in the near future, in the construction of one or more power reactors, either large- or small-output, in some foreign power-short area. Such an action should have great psychological advantages. However, it should be recognized that a power reactor built abroad at this time might operate irregularly or with lower performance and higher cost than predicted. Selecting a single location for a reactor without causing resentment among disappointed claimants would be difficult. (The estimated cost of building reactors and of the subsidies to operate them is indicated in the Financial Appendix.) Nevertheless, the advantages to the U.S. of continuing its leadership by helping in the construction abroad of one or more power reactors should outweigh the disadvantages.

b. Consequently, the U.S., on the basis of discussions with the countries concerned, should seek to identify at an early date locations for a limited number of power reactors abroad. This identification should especially take into account economic conditions and appeal to the imagination of the free world.

#### *The Soviet Program*

15. The Soviet Union is continuing its atomic developments at a rapid pace and is seeking to reduce the present superiority of the United States in the atomic field. It must be anticipated that the USSR will make the maximum use of atomic energy not only for military and industrial purposes, but also as political and psychological measures to gain the allegiance of the uncommitted areas of the world. Although the USSR faces technical problems similar to those faced by the U.S., in a relatively short time the USSR may offer a small-output atomic power reactor to a country such as India, Pakistan, or Burma. If the United States fails to exploit its atomic potential, politically and psychologically, the USSR could gain an important advantage in what is becoming a critical sector of the cold war struggle.

#### *The U.S. Program*

16. U.S. production capacities and efficiency in producing U-235 and, less importantly, in producing heavy water and processing spent fuel elements, give the U.S. the ability to maintain a commanding international position in the atomic power field.

---

<sup>13</sup> The words "should be encouraged" were substituted for "must be undertaken" in NSC 5507/1.

17. U.S. cooperation with other countries in advancing the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be both *bilateral* under "Agreements for Cooperation" under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and *multilateral* through an International Atomic Energy Agency as proposed by the President on December 8, 1953.

18. a. The U.S. has already earmarked 100 kg. of fissionable material for eventual use by other countries for peaceful purposes. The U.S. is now negotiating bilateral "Agreements for Cooperation" with Belgium, the UK, and Canada covering the general field of power reactor technology. A number of other countries have indicated varying degrees of interest in bilateral "Agreements for Cooperation".

b. Negotiations for establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency are now in progress. To fulfill the expectations aroused by the President's speech, the Agency should be active in the field of atomic power as well as in the fields of research reactors, training, isotopes and exchange of information. The U.S. would make available only declassified information to the Agency, because it would be an international body with a broad membership. But in order to give the Agency the necessary support, the U.S. should make available power reactor information as rapidly as it can be declassified. If U.S. participation in a satisfactory International Atomic Energy Agency is negotiated, the U.S. will in time also find it necessary to make available fissionable material to support the work of the Agency in the field of atomic power. It is now tentatively planned that, if the USSR participates in the Agency, any materials allocated by the USSR, the U.S. and other participants will be transferred to the Agency and held in an Agency pool.

19. During the interim period of a year or longer while the treaty for an International Agency is being negotiated and the consent of the Senate sought, the U.S. should proceed vigorously with direct actions to demonstrate its resolve to assist other nations and maintain its world leadership in peaceful uses of atomic energy. Some of these activities might in due course be taken over by the International Agency.

20. Maximum psychological advantage should continue to be taken from the substantial actions of the U.S. in this field. The timing of release of declassified atomic energy information can be made a political and psychological asset to the U.S.

21. The U.S. should also constantly explore further possible ways of utilizing its atomic potential to its maximum political and psychological advantage (for example, applications of industrial radiation, nuclear propulsion, etc.).

### Objectives

22. In the interests of national security, U.S. programs for development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be directed toward:

a. Maintaining U.S. leadership in the field, particularly in the development and application of atomic power.

b. Using such U.S. leadership to promote cohesion within the free world and to forestall successful Soviet exploitation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to attract the allegiance of the uncommitted peoples of the world.

c. Increasing progress in developing and applying the peaceful uses of atomic energy in free nations abroad.

d. Assuring continued U.S. access to foreign uranium and thorium supplies.

e. Preventing the diversion to non-peaceful uses of any fissionable materials provided to other countries.

23. U.S. programs for development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be carried forward as rapidly as the interests of the United States dictate, seeking private financing wherever possible.<sup>14</sup>

### Courses of Action

24. As part of an over-all U.S. effort to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy:

a. Accelerate the early development of atomic power by the United States.

b. Continue activities in the development and application of research reactors.

c. Furnish limited amounts of raw and fissionable materials (not of weapons quality) required to effectuate "Agreements for Cooperation" (subject to military requirements for such materials, and recognizing that completion of construction abroad of only a few large-scale reactors is likely before 1960)

25. Carry forward the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy as rapidly as the interests of the United States dictate, seeking private financing wherever possible.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Paragraph 23 was a revision of NSC 5507/1, which reads:

"In developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, private rather than government financing should be used to the maximum extent possible without jeopardizing the early development of atomic power."

<sup>15</sup> Paragraph 25 was a revision of NSC 5507/1, which reads:

"Encourage the private financing of the development of atomic power to the maximum extent possible without jeopardizing the early development of such power."

26. Utilize the U.S. information program and participation in appropriate international conferences (e.g., the 1955 International Conference) to stress the benefits which might accrue from the development of atomic power, while making clear the problems associated therewith.

27. Initiate a program of U.S. assistance to other countries in construction of power reactors. To this end:

a. Continue current bilateral negotiation of "Agreements for Cooperation" with Canada, the UK and Belgium, which will cover, *inter alia*, the exchange of information on power reactor technology.

b. Make an early announcement of U.S. readiness to enter into discussions relating to cooperation with other countries in their power reactor planning and programs.

c. Enter into discussions with other free world countries responding to paragraph b above, looking toward "Agreements for Cooperation" which will cover exchange of power reactor information, and provide in accordance with paragraph 24-c above for the sale or lease or (where sale or lease does not serve the best over-all interests of the U.S.) other transfer of atomic materials or equipment.<sup>16</sup> In such discussions, seek opportunities for maximum U.S. cooperation in those power reactor projects abroad which offer political and psychological advantages.

d. Assistance to foreign governments involving U.S. Government grants in connection with the construction and operation of power reactors shall be in accordance with policies governing U.S. foreign assistance programs and from funds provided for such programs. Beginning with the FY 1957 budget, any foreign assistance funds required for this purpose should be specifically sought.<sup>17</sup>

e. Design and construct in the U.S. as soon as possible, within the acceleration program as proposed in the FY 1956 budget, a small-output civilian power reactor in the 10,000 KW range, as a step toward constructing small-output power reactors most promising for use abroad.<sup>18</sup>

f. In furtherance of this policy and in accordance with Sec. 142 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, continue the declassification of information on nuclear reactor technology, as security considerations will permit.

<sup>16</sup> Following the words "paragraph 24-c above," NSC 5507/1 reads: "for the sale, lease, or other transfer (whichever is in the best over-all interests of the U.S.) of atomic materials or equipment." The next sentence was in brackets in NSC 5507/1 and deleted in NSC 5507/2: "Other than in exceptionally compelling circumstances, any transfer by the U.S. to foreign governments of such materials or equipment should be by sale or lease." This bracketed sentence had been proposed by the Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget.

<sup>17</sup> Paragraph 27-d of NSC 5507/1 contained an additional sentence as follows: "[Determine by August 31, 1955, the selected free world countries for which such assistance will be required in FY 1957.]" A footnote to this bracketed sentence indicates: "State, Treasury, Budget and AEC propose deletion."

<sup>18</sup> In NSC 5507/1 this entire subparagraph was bracketed and a footnote indicated that the AEC proposed deletion of the subparagraph. For a later revision of subparagraph 27-e, see Document 114.



g. Encourage and facilitate participation of U.S. individuals, industry and private institutions in atomic power activities abroad, such encouragement to include governmental arrangements and authorizations as required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

28. Make an urgent study, including estimates of cost and time of completion, of installing at the earliest possible date a nuclear reactor propulsion unit in a U.S. merchant ship, which ship might travel throughout the free world to dramatize the U.S. program for developing peaceful uses of atomic energy.<sup>19</sup>

29. Initiate a program of aid in construction of research reactors in selected countries, under "Agreements for Cooperation" which will cover exchange of information, and provide, in accordance with paragraph 24-c above, for the sale, lease, or other transfer (whichever is in the best over-all interests of the U.S.) of atomic materials and equipment.

30. Continue training and educational exchange activities, such as reactor training courses for foreign scientists.

31. Take the necessary steps to proceed with the organization of an International Atomic Energy Agency which will be brought into an appropriate relationship with the United Nations.

32. If U.S. participation in a satisfactory International Atomic Energy Agency is negotiated, utilize and support such Agency as an instrumentality in the field of atomic power as well as in the fields of training, information, isotopes and research reactors, and be prepared to support its operations with limited amounts of fissionable material.

33. To safeguard against diversion of fissionable materials to non-peaceful uses, ordinarily require:

a. Chemical processing of used fuel elements in U.S. facilities or under acceptable international arrangements.

b. Adequate provision for production accounting, inspection, and other techniques.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> This entire paragraph was not contained in NSC 5507/1. Subsequent paragraphs in NSC 5507/2 were renumbered so that each was one number more than the corresponding paragraph in NSC 5507/1.

<sup>20</sup> A 2-page financial appendix to NSC 5507/2, including one table listing estimated expenditures for peaceful uses of atomic energy for fiscal years 1955 through 1959, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507 Series)

15. Letter From the Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission (Murray) to the President<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 14, 1955.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my letter of February 5, 1954,<sup>2</sup> I presented for your consideration thoughts concerning an attempt to negotiate a weapons test moratorium. May I take this opportunity of expanding on those thoughts, particularly in the light of the events of the past year.

The most important points to be considered in this connection are:

- (1) The United States is far ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the field of thermonuclear weapons.
- (2) Weapons testing is essential for rapid development.

As you know, the United States has exploded a total of fifty-six nuclear weapons. . . .

This testing has given us a weapons technology that is highly advanced. So much so, that we could accept a delay of a year or more in testing weapons of yields greater than a hundred kilotons without our progress being greatly hampered.

. . . . .

My second point is that testing is essential for the rapid development of nuclear weapons. Our scientists agree that, although some weapons development may continue without testing, the absence of such tests would slow progress to an appreciable degree.

It is my deep conviction that a moratorium on the testing of large thermonuclear weapons would lengthen the time during which the United States would maintain its advantage over the U.S.S.R. Our experience is so much more extensive than that of the Soviets that we could use tests of small weapons and components to much greater advantage than they.

Then again, the United States does not plan to test large thermonuclear weapons for over a year. From what we have been able to detect of the Soviet pattern we should expect their next series to take place this Fall. Thus, if a proposal to defer the tests of large thermonuclear weapons is made soon, the Soviets would be the first to be affected. If the Soviets agree to the moratorium and then violate it within a year, our position would be unchanged. On the other hand, if the Soviets do not violate their agreement, our next tests of large

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

weapons could be deferred as the time for them arrived. In any event, a Soviet refusal to consider this proposal would strengthen our position from a psychological viewpoint.

It has been suggested that an offer by the United States to limit tests to weapons with yields below a hundred kilotons would simply bring forth an attempt by the Soviets to whittle the upper limit to zero. This is described as placing the United States on a "toboggan slide". It seems to me that appropriate arrangements could be made which would prevent our being placed at a disadvantage in this way.

Another reason for such a moratorium follows from the fact that due to advances based on tests many nations, large and small, will eventually have thermonuclear weapons, because costs for such weapons are rapidly decreasing. The consequent threat to world peace is obvious. A moratorium on tests of thermonuclear weapons would tend to freeze technology and limit possession to nations now having them.

It is envisaged that a moratorium of the type proposed would include provisions for monitoring, preferably by the United Nations.

I continue to be a firm advocate of expanding our capabilities in the nuclear weapons field. Under this moratorium proposal preparations for tests next Spring would be continued with the same vigor as at present. Likewise we would continue with our intensive program of weapons development.

In conclusion, the information available to me supports the view that, with appropriate safeguards, a moratorium on the testing of large thermonuclear weapons would act to maintain and advance our weapons superiority over the Soviets, and thus would be in the interests of the United States. Moreover, it would be a forward step looking to eventual limitation of armaments.

Knowing of your strong interest and leadership in all that relates to world peace, I have taken this occasion to make my views known to you. I have already acquainted Chairman Strauss and Commissioner Libby with my intention to do so. It is my earnest and prayerful hope that these thoughts will be of assistance to you in your continual search for some solution to the ever mounting threat of atomic destruction.<sup>3</sup>

Respectfully yours,

**Thomas E. Murray**

---

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum from Eisenhower to Cutler, March 15, on Murray's proposals for a weapons test moratorium, the President wrote:

"1. Herewith a document, on the above cited subject, which I request that you have thoroughly studied.

"2. If you consider desirable, the matter can be made the topic of a National Security Council paper. D.D.E." (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records)

For a later discussion of Murray's letter, see Document 18.

## 16. Editorial Note

On March 19, President Eisenhower announced the appointment of Harold E. Stassen as Special Assistant to the President with responsibility for developing, on behalf of the President and the Department of State, studies and recommendations on disarmament. The position was announced as one of Cabinet rank. For Eisenhower's announcement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pages 343-344.

Stassen's appointment to the task of devising new approaches to the question of regulation of armaments resulted from the inability of the various agencies of the government, especially State, Defense, and AEC, to agree on new proposals and strategies. On at least two occasions, January 4 and February 9, Bowie urged the appointment of a qualified person of national prestige as a possible way out of the impasse on the armament question. See Documents 1 and 6. NSC Action No. 1328-b, February 10, recommended that the President select "an individual of outstanding qualifications, as his Special Representative to conduct on a full-time basis a further review of U.S. policy on control of armaments, reporting his findings and recommendations to the National Security Council." This action went on to specify the chosen individual's access to information and selection of advisers and consultants. Regarding NSC Action No. 1328, see footnote 22, Document 7.

Though the Departments of State and Defense and Atomic Energy Commission advanced several names for this position, none of them included Stassen's name as a possible choice. In any event, President Eisenhower apparently decided at an early date to appoint Stassen to the position. Stassen was then serving as Director of Foreign Operations Administration whose functions were soon to be transferred to the Departments of State and Defense. Secretary Wilson's and Admiral Strauss' suggestions for this Special Representative are listed in a memorandum from Robert Cutler to the President, February 16, not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler) A Department of State list of 12 names developed through informal discussions with O, S/AE, and S/P is contained in a memorandum from David McK. Key to Robert Murphy, March 4, with recommendation that this list be forwarded to the White House. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chronological File—Disarmament—General) By that date, however, Eisenhower had already decided to offer the position to Stassen.

On February 28, Eisenhower drafted a cable to Stassen, who was then visiting Karachi, Pakistan, and after cabling it to Secretary Dulles, then in Saigon, Vietnam, for his revisions and comments, had it sent to Stassen on March 1. (Telegram 1196 to Karachi, March 1; Department of State, Central Files, 101/3-155) Stassen replied from Karachi:

"As you are aware my basic inclination is to accept any responsibility which you decide you wish me to carry and then to endeavor to fulfill it in the manner you desire to have it conducted. This personal guideline flows both from my deep devotion to you and your objectives and from my understanding of the full measure of the responsibility which you, as President, shoulder for our country and for mankind. This concept of mine certainly applies to the development of policy on the question of disarmament which you describe and which I have studied for many years.

"I trust you also realize that this attitude of mine would apply equally to an assignment not of Cabinet rank as it is the task for you and not the rank that is decisive." (Telegram 1162 from Karachi, March 3; *ibid.*, 103-FOA/3-355)

Stassen added that he assumed he would have time to guide the substance of the President's mutual security program for fiscal year 1956 through Congress and ease the transition of Foreign Operations Administration to the form of organization determined before taking on the disarmament task. He preferred, if agreeable to the President, to postpone any announcement of his appointment until his return to Washington on March 13.

Copies of this Eisenhower-Stassen exchange of telegrams as well as Eisenhower's telegram to Secretary Dulles, February 28, and Dulles' reply of March 1, indicating his comments and revisions on the President's proposed message to Stassen, are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series: Stassen. The President incorporated all of Dulles' suggestions, including one giving the position Cabinet rank, in his telegram to Stassen of March 1.

Eisenhower and Stassen met in the White House on March 14 (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Records, President's Appointment Book for 1955) and agreed on Stassen's appointment and the general guidelines for the forthcoming reorganization of FOA. The President assigned Joseph Dodge to work with Stassen on the pending transfer of FOA functions. These facts are documented in memoranda of Eisenhower's telephone calls to Secretary Dulles, Dodge, and Stassen on March 15. (*Ibid.*, DDE Diaries) The announcement on March 19 of Stassen's appointment as Special Assistant to the President on disarmament matters indicated that Stassen would begin his new task immediately but would continue as Director of FOA for the time being.

17. **Report of a Conference Between the President and His Special Assistant (Stassen), White House, Washington, March 22, 1955, 12:10-12:25 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

In this conference Governor Stassen indicated the first steps he has taken toward setting up the disarmament study, the President spoke of objectives and techniques in carrying on the study, and it was agreed that Governor Stassen would make a first report focused on arrangements. Brief reference was also made to some future conference of the major powers.

Governor Stassen indicated that he had talked with Admiral Strauss, Secretary Wilson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Dulles, and Nelson Rockefeller. He wishes to have a supporting group of experienced men with brilliant analytical minds and he is asking Admiral Strauss to lend him two for this purpose, the military services one each, and the Department of State another two.<sup>2</sup>

The President noted that everybody understands that diplomatic negotiations are the function of the State Department, then went on to take note of an editorial today suggesting that Governor Stassen have the title "Secretary of Peace".<sup>3</sup> He said he liked the emphasis on the word "peace" because there can be no disarmament except that which is accomplished by a greater effort for peace. Governor Stassen commented and the President agreed that reference to his study should not be centered on disarmament alone and that he was already referring to his work as "on the question of disarmament". The President suggested that Governor Stassen ask Secretary Dulles if the latter would feel any embarrassment should the title "Secretary for Peace" be pre-empted at least for popular use even though not as an official title. He believed it would have great effect.

The President then remarked on the great necessity for educating the Nation on the factors of importance in disarmament—as to what proposals are legitimate and what are spurious.

Governor Stassen referred to tomorrow's Press Conference when the President will probably be asked about this appointment.<sup>4</sup> He believed the President should emphasize his (the President's) devotion

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diary. Top Secret. Drafted by Minnich.

<sup>2</sup> During the next month Stassen assembled a Special Staff to study the problem of disarmament. The members were as follows: Robert E. Matteson, Staff Director; Colonel Raymond B. Firehock, Deputy Staff Director; Edmund A. Gullion; Lawrence D. Weiler; Colonel Benjamin G. Willis, USAF; McKay Donkin; Frederick Janney; Captain Donald W. Gladney, USN; and John F. Lippmann.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Stassen's appointment was not mentioned at the President's press conference on March 23.

to peace. If asked about the "Secretary for Peace" suggestion, the President might respond, he believed, by saying that "as an informal name that certainly expresses it".

The President said that this was a field where the efforts of a splendid civilian advisory committee could be very properly enlisted. He referred to the peace plan suggested in 1953 and again recently by Charles (Electric) Wilson who might be asked to serve on such a committee. It might also include one or two eminent educators, an outstanding church man like Dr. Poling,<sup>5</sup> or perhaps three representatives of the three main religious groups, and perhaps one or two enlightened business men. He believed the committee might have a membership of about twelve. He noted the beneficial effect to be had from the challenge of meeting such a group perhaps every three months and reporting to it the progress made by the staff.

The President then at considerable length emphasized the importance of exploring every possible idea and having the assistance of people with great imagination. He believed everything should be done to get across the idea that the United States' attention is directed toward *not* just guns but the spiritual concepts underlying the free world effort. He said that if confidence can be had in the peaceful intentions of others then progress in disarmament can begin.

The President went on to suggest that the American Assembly<sup>6</sup> might be helpful.

The President indicated he did not wish to set a time for a first progress report until Governor Stassen had an opportunity to get organized. He believed a first report might be made on how Governor Stassen got set up, how he planned to carry on his work without cutting across the functions of existing departments and agencies, how he would draw on the assistance of Government agencies, the general public, and even the entire world—without getting into the activities of the United Nations. He thought Governor Stassen could profitably have discussions with world leaders like Mr. McMillen (?),<sup>7</sup> Prime Minister Nehru, etc.

Governor Stassen reported that Secretary Dulles and he thought the point might be reached where it would be wise to have a *probing* session with the Russians—not to negotiate agreements but to discover what is on their minds in a way that cannot be done at formal sessions where the Russian delegates are limited by their strict instruc-

---

<sup>5</sup> Daniel Alfred Poling, evangelist clergyman, columnist, and novelist.

<sup>6</sup> The American Assembly consisted of about 60 men and women from diverse walks of life who met to study, discuss, and disseminate timely information on contemporary problems facing the United States. Eisenhower founded the American Assembly in 1950 when he was president of Columbia University.

<sup>7</sup> Eisenhower was apparently referring to Harold Macmillan, then Minister of Defence in the United Kingdom.

tions. The President suggested that of course Governor Stassen would want to keep his own counsel on new ideas until he could talk them over with Secretary Dulles and perhaps also himself. The President commented that in many fields the United States Government sometimes appears to be talking in many tongues but that the field of disarmament was the most important of all for avoiding any such appearance.

The President suggested that Governor Adams in the immediate staff would be very helpful, that he (the President) would be always available, and that there was no reason to suspect anything but the utmost cooperation from all concerned. Governor Stassen indicated that he would emphasize his intent of submitting the results of the study to all departments for review and comment.

Pictures were taken of the President and Governor Stassen.

LAM

---

18. **Memorandum From the Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Gleason) to the Executive Secretary of the Council (Lay)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 28, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Moratorium on Further Nuclear Weapons Tests

A meeting on this subject was held in the NSC Conference Room on Friday, March 25, at 4 p.m. Present were:

General Cutler  
Mr. Gerard Smith, State  
General Bonesteel<sup>2</sup> (for General Loper), Defense  
Mr. Herbert Miller, CIA  
Commander Nelson, AEC<sup>3</sup>  
Mr. Theodore Babbitt, FCDA<sup>4</sup>  
The Executive Secretary, NSC  
The Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean-Up, AEC—Nuclear Testing. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel, III, Director, Office of National Security Council Affairs, Department of Defense, ISA.

<sup>3</sup> Curtis A. Nelson, Director, Division of Inspection, AEC.

<sup>4</sup> Director, Intelligence Division, Planning Staff, Federal Civil Defense Administration.



1. General Cutler read Commissioner Murray's letter to the President<sup>5</sup> on the subject which he described as "reasonable and temperate". He suggested that Mr. Smith comment first on this letter. Mr. Smith observed that the letter had initially run into unfavorable preconceptions in the State Department but that thereafter many individuals in the Department were inclined to believe that Commissioner Murray's reasoning was persuasive. Mr. Smith added that he himself was rather less persuaded than his colleagues in the Department although he admitted that this was certainly not a black and white problem. He then mentioned that he had written a memorandum on the subject for the Secretary.<sup>6</sup> General Cutler asked Mr. Smith to read this memorandum.

2. Mr. Smith read the bulk of his memorandum for the Secretary of State. The memorandum summed up developments since the last Presidential decision on this subject in June 1954. The essential point in the memorandum was that if the technical assumptions of Commissioner Murray's letter proved to be valid, the psychological and propaganda advantages of a moratorium might prove decisive. Accordingly, the memorandum recommended to the Secretary of State that the Department of Defense, the AEC, and the CIA study and report on the validity of the technical assumptions of Commissioner Murray's position prior to any final judgment regarding the U.S. position on a moratorium. Mr. Smith added that the Secretary of State had approved this memorandum. There ensued a discussion of the desirability of a proposed study by a national or international group of the radiological effects of the testing of thermo-nuclear weapons.

3. General Cutler then pointed out that quite apart from the validity of Commissioner Murray's assumptions, he greatly feared that a moratorium would jeopardize the one great weapon upon which the free world relied for its ultimate security. He then called on Commander Nelson to express the views of Admiral Strauss on the subject.

4. Commander Nelson said that it was not abundantly clear that we actually have a considerable thermo-nuclear lead over the U.S.S.R. as Commissioner Murray was generally contending. He too had a written report which he proceeded to read.<sup>6</sup> The judgment of this report was definitely unfavorable to a moratorium and Commander Nelson expressed the personal view that the technical arguments in Commissioner Murray's memorandum were not too well taken.

5. General Cutler then asked for a statement of the Defense Department position. General Bonesteel read a memorandum which

---

<sup>5</sup> Document 15.

<sup>6</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

General Loper had written.<sup>7</sup> In essence General Loper maintained views almost identical with those he held in June 1954 opposing the moratorium. The memorandum strongly questioned the validity of Commissioner Murray's technical assumptions and particularly stressed the importance of continuing tests in regard to the provision of nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

6. General Cutler thereafter called on Mr. Herbert Miller who explained that he had prepared no written report on the subject because the intelligence estimates on which the CIA had based its position with respect to a moratorium in June 1954 had not substantially changed.<sup>8</sup> Mr. Miller added he had only one additional thought to contribute: the possibility that the Soviets had devised an over-all military strategy which did not call for the development and stockpiling of multi-megaton weapons. In any event, it was the conclusion of CIA at this time that it was of critical importance to the U.S. to increase its lead in nuclear weapons and accordingly we should continue to test such weapons.

7. General Cutler then suggested that if it were determined to reject the proposals advanced by Commissioner Murray, a brief but carefully prepared answer should be made to the Commissioner's letter. He suggested this should take the form of (a) a statement of Commissioner Murray's proposals (b) a discussion of the validity of his assumptions and (c) conclusions and recommendations.

8. It was agreed that Mr. Gerard Smith would prepare the first draft of such a report. After consideration by the other members of the group, the report might be presented to the President for his consideration and for possible reference to the National Security Council by him. This draft, it was agreed, should be ready in two weeks.<sup>9</sup>

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>7</sup> General Loper's views in mid-1954 have not been found in Department of State files. For the views of the Department of Defense at the time, stated in letters from Acting Secretary of Defense Anderson to Dulles, May 17, 1954, and Secretary of Defense Wilson to Dulles, June 4, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1437 and 1457, respectively.

<sup>8</sup> For the CIA position on a moratorium in mid-1954, see Allen Dulles' memorandum to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, May 25, 1954, and Dulles' remarks in the extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 203d meeting of the NSC, June 23, 1954, *ibid.*, pp. 1463 and 1467, respectively.

<sup>9</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

19. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 7, 1955**<sup>1</sup>

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-6.]

7. *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* (NSC 5507/2; NSC Action No. 1358-c; Report to the NSC by the Chairman, AEC, on "An Analysis of Factors Involved in the Installation of a Nuclear Power Reactor in a U.S. Merchant Ship on an Urgent Basis", dated April 7, 1955)<sup>2</sup>

After Mr. Dillon Anderson had briefly stated the problem, he called on Admiral Strauss. Admiral Strauss said that before making his report on the reference subject he had some very good news which he would like to pass on to the Council. The AEC would announce today that five concerns or groups of concerns had come to the AEC with firm propositions for erecting five separate nuclear power plants in the United States.<sup>3</sup> Together, these business concerns would put up more than \$180 million, while the Government would be obliged to put up only something like 5 to 10% of this amount. All this, said Admiral Strauss, was very gratifying.

Admiral Strauss then said that he would give his "story" on the merchant ship reactor, pointing out that the Atomic Energy Commission itself had not yet acted on this project.<sup>4</sup> He indicated that it would take approximately 30 months to construct such a merchant ship reactor, and that the best kind of hull to contain it would be a Mariner

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5507/2 is printed as Document 14. NSC Action No. 1358-c, March 24, requested the Chairman, AEC, "to submit for early Council consideration a written report analyzing all factors which would be involved in carrying out the proposal contained in paragraph 28 of NSC 5507/2, including the impact upon other atomic energy programs." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions) Strauss' report to the NSC, dated April 7, has not been found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> At the NSC meeting of March 24, Strauss reported negatively on the merchant ship reactor, saying it would cost \$12 million, take 2 years to design a suitable reactor by which time the atoms-for-peace program would be so far advanced as to have no marked psychological impact, and the two U.S. companies best able to build such a reactor would have to abandon other high-priority defense projects. The President seemed reluctant to accept Strauss' recommendation, but Cutler, then others, argued that it might be possible to use the prototype reactor developed to design the propulsion unit for the USS *Nautilus*. Accordingly, Strauss was asked to bring in a written report analyzing the various factors involved so that the NSC could make a rational decision. (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Type dry cargo hull, although a suitably converted small aircraft carrier might do. The total cost of the project, including the cost of building the dry cargo hull, would amount to \$31 million.

While, said Admiral Strauss, proceeding with this project might conceivably have some adverse effects on certain military programs for nuclear propulsion, he did not regard this as a serious obstacle. Moreover, the cost of operation of the vessel after the reactor had been installed would be approximately the same as operating costs using conventional fuels.

The President looked pleased at Admiral Strauss' report and, turning to the Council, asked whether its members thought this was a good thing to do.

Admiral Strauss thought that he should note one possible psychological drawback. This merchant vessel was supposed to be a showcase of U.S. progress in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Supposing that the vessel was showing its wares at Liverpool and had orders to proceed to Le Havre, and something happened to the machinery. The repercussions might be very unfortunate.

The President replied that he was not very worried about such possibilities, and while \$31 million was "some money", he believed that, quite apart from the psychological and political advantages of such a ship, we would almost certainly learn a lot of practical value from the construction and operation of such a nuclear-propelled ship.

Admiral Strauss pointed out that this project would need to receive a very high priority from the President if it was to be successfully completed. Mr. Dillon Anderson then suggested to the Council the action on this item which had been proposed by the NSC Planning Board.<sup>5</sup>

The President said that he agreed with the proposed action, but cautioned that when an announcement of this project was made, care should be taken to put the estimated date of completion a little beyond the time actually estimated for the completion. Admiral Strauss assured the President that a cushion had already been placed in the time estimate for completing and installing this reactor.

Secretary Anderson said that certain questions had been raised by the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy as to the sufficiency of trained technicians to construct this new reactor without undue interference in important military reactor programs which were currently in process. Admiral Strauss replied that he was aware of such possibilities, but was not inclined to regard them with great concern.

Governor Stassen suggested that while a high priority should be assigned to this project, the priority should not be so high as to interfere seriously with other vital military programs.

---

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

The discussion ended with a warm endorsement of this project by the Vice President.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the reference report by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, distributed at the meeting.

b. Agreed to recommend that the President approve the steps outlined in paragraph 9 of the reference report by the Chairman, AEC; and direct their implementation under the coordination of the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in collaboration with other interested departments and agencies subject to:

(1) Avoiding any substantially adverse impact on current military programs for nuclear propulsion.

(2) Advising with the Operations Coordinating Board in order to insure that proposed announcements and actions on this project result in maximum psychological advantages to the United States.<sup>7</sup>

(3) Use of the Mariner type dry cargo hull, rather than the alternate use of a converted aircraft carrier as mentioned in paragraph 9-c of the reference report; and otherwise insuring that the project has no apparent military identification.

*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate action.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>6</sup> Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1377, approved by the President on April 7, 1955. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>7</sup> President Eisenhower first announced publicly the administration's proposed plans for a merchant ship powered by an atomic reactor in his speech at the Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press in New York on April 15, and he elaborated on the origins of the proposal in his news conference on April 27. See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 417-418 and 434-435.

## 20. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 14, 1955.

The Government of the United States has considered the aide-mémoire of November 29, 1954, delivered by the Soviet Government<sup>2</sup> and wishes to state the following:

1. The Government of the United States notes that the Soviet Government agrees that negotiations looking to international cooperation in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy can be fruitful without any prior commitment by the nations concerned to renounce the use of weapons.

2. The Government of the United States repeats the assurance contained in its note of November 3, 1954,<sup>3</sup> that it is willing to discuss the "principles" which the Soviet Government, in its aide-mémoire of September 22, 1954,<sup>4</sup> and November 29, 1954, states that it considers important in the establishment and operation of an international agency for the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, the willingness of the Government of the United States to discuss these principles should not be taken to mean that the Government of the United States in advance of such discussion has accepted these principles, as the Soviet Government apparently assumes in its statements in the sixth paragraph of its aide-mémoire of November 29, 1954. It is suggested that the receipt of the specific comments of the Soviet Government on the outline of the objectives and functions of an international agency, submitted by the Government of the United States on March 19, 1954,<sup>5</sup> would present a good opportunity for discussion of the aforementioned "principles" as they might apply to the actual organization and work of an agency for the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

3. The Government of the United States believes, as it stated in its memorandum of July 9, 1954,<sup>6</sup> that the nations most advanced in knowledge regarding the constructive uses of atomic energy have an obligation to make this knowledge available under appropriate condi-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Exchange of Notes. Top Secret. Drafted by Gerard Smith on April 12. Previous drafts of the aide-mémoire, including one dated March 15 which was circulated to the British and Canadian Governments for concurrence and one dated April 12 which was sent to Secretary Dulles for approval, are *ibid.* Merchant handed the aide-mémoire to Zarubin at 10:30 a.m., April 14. (Memorandum of conversation, April 14, 1955; *ibid.*, Central Files, 600.0012/4-1455)

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1567–1569.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1547–1549.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 4, 1954, pp. 486–489.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1372–1376.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1473–1477.

tions, for promoting the welfare of peoples generally. Accordingly, negotiations have been initiated, as the Soviet Government is aware, among the eight other nations "principally involved," looking toward the establishment of an international atomic energy agency. Pending further concrete indications of interest on the part of the Soviet Government in participating in the work of this proposed agency, negotiations will continue among these eight nations. Drafting of an agreement to establish such an agency is now under way. A copy of such draft agreement when completed will be furnished the Soviet Government upon request.

4. Encouraged by the recent affirmative vote by the Soviet Government in the United Nations General Assembly on the resolution concerning the "Atoms for Peace" program,<sup>7</sup> the Government of the United States wishes to renew President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8, 1953, to the Soviet Government that the powers principally involved begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. With material support for the agency by the Soviet Government, in addition to the support already announced by the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom, an international pool of fissionable material could be established in the near future which would provide a basis for encouraging the use of this material for the peaceful applications of atomic energy. In this event, the international atomic energy agency would be made responsible for the storage and protection of the contributed fissionable material and other atomic materials.

5. The Government of the United States notes that the Soviet Government does not object to a joint study by experts of the two nations of the problem of guarding against possible diversion of fissionable material from power-producing atomic installations and that the Soviet Government is of the opinion that the place and time of such a conference can be set without difficulty once agreement on an agenda has been reached. Attached to this note is a proposed agenda for such a meeting of experts. If this agenda is acceptable to the Soviet

---

<sup>7</sup> On December 4, 1954, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously approved Resolution 810 (IX) on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Following the vote the Soviet representative in the United Nations, Arkady Aleksandrovich Sobolev, said in part:

"My delegation's favorable vote signifies its approval of the principle of international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, a principle which it has always pressed and will continue to press. It must not, however, be taken to imply approval of those provisions which would limit and hamper the development of international co-operation in this field." Sobolev's statement, translated from Russian, is printed in *Atoms for Peace Manual*, p. 333. For text of Resolution 810 (IX) and additional references, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1578.

Government, the Government of the United States would be prepared to commence discussions on these topics at any time after May 1, and would be pleased to receive a Soviet delegation in Washington, D.C.

**[Enclosure]<sup>8</sup>**

**AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION ON SAFEGUARDING PEACEFUL  
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY**

*Safeguarding Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*

To discuss the safeguards required for the following peaceful uses of atomic energy under the auspices of an international atomic energy agency:

**1. Research and Development**

a. Reactors for production of radioisotopes for use in science, medicine, agriculture, and industry.

b. Reactors to provide neutron irradiations for scientific research and for testing materials and components for power reactors.

c. Reactors as pilot plants for the development and demonstration of economic atomic power.

**2. Large-Scale Utilization of Atomic Power**

a. Power reactors using as fuel either natural uranium or uranium partially enriched in U-235, but not containing thorium.

b. Power reactors using as fuel either plutonium, U-233, or uranium highly enriched in U-235, but not containing thorium or significant amounts of U-238.

c. Reactors containing the fertile materials U-238 or thorium for the specific purpose of producing fissionable material in addition to power.

Safeguards are to be considered in relation to:

1. The design and construction of reactors;
2. Allocation and preparation of critical materials;
3. Operation of reactors; and
4. Processing of irradiated materials.

---

<sup>8</sup> Secret.



21. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant (Rockefeller)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 2, 1955.

DEAR NELSON: Sherman Adams has sent on to me your memorandum of April 22<sup>2</sup> making two proposals for getting ahead with the Atoms for Peace program. As you know, we are about to ask the President to approve the Turkish agreement for a research reactor, the first of what we hope will be many international Agreements for Cooperation.<sup>3</sup>

I have given your proposals some thought and would like to go into them further with you after my return from the NATO Ministers' meeting in Paris. I expect to be back in Washington about May 16.<sup>4</sup> I think it would be well also to have Lewis Strauss discuss them with us. I understand that he is due back from Europe about May 19.

My preliminary reactions to your two proposals are as follows:<sup>5</sup>

A. *The proposal for a broad program of gifts of research reactors.* While recognizing the need to keep the "Atoms for Peace" program moving ahead, I am advised that some negative considerations are to be taken into account before deciding on any broad program to give away research reactors. For example, such a change in our policy might prejudice existing negotiations for research reactors to be bought by foreign countries such as pending arrangements with the Swiss, the Dutch, and the Italians.<sup>6</sup> A broad gift program would perhaps also discount specific gifts such as we propose to make to the

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, but a letter from Rockefeller to Dulles, May 4, identified its title as "International Peaceful Atomic Development." (Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Nuclear Power)

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower approved an Agreement for Cooperation with Turkey on May 3. One of the terms of this agreement allowed Turkey to engage U.S. companies in the construction of research reactors in Turkey. For background and correspondence on and text, see *Atoms for Peace Manual*, pp. 428-437; and Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1955, pp. 865-866.

<sup>4</sup> Rockefeller's letter to Dulles, May 4, cited in footnote 2 above, indicates that Rockefeller saw the Secretary on the afternoon of May 4.

<sup>5</sup> On April 29, Gerard Smith wrote a memorandum for Secretary Dulles which commented on Rockefeller's memorandum of April 22. Dulles' "preliminary reactions" to Rockefeller's proposals follow many of the points made in Smith's memorandum and appear to be based on it. (Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Power and Research Reactors)

<sup>6</sup> Agreements for Cooperation between the United States and Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy were signed on July 18, July 18, and July 28, respectively. These agreements are noted in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1 and August 15, 1955, pp. 210 and 290, respectively.

Philippines.<sup>7</sup> We should be careful to avoid “cheapening” this research reactor program.<sup>8</sup>

According to a recent survey made by this Department, the level of scientific competence of most countries appears to be too low to make profitable use of such a complex scientific tool as a research reactor. We are trying to improve this situation by training programs for foreign students. It will be some time, however, before these programs produce sufficient skilled cadres of scientists and engineers in many countries abroad to permit profitable use of research reactors.

B. *The power reactor information proposal.* Your proposal to announce United States willingness to transmit classified information in the power reactor field to certain foreign countries seems to be along the lines of the policy set out in NSC 5507/2 approved by the President in March of this year.<sup>9</sup> This NSC policy, however, is somewhat broader in scope and would permit us to go further than you propose—e.g., it permits us to supply fissionable material as well as reactor information to foreign countries.

I think it might be useful for the President to make a public announcement of the Courses of Action which he approved in NSC 5507.<sup>10</sup> If this were done there would be generated a new strong impetus for the Atoms for Peace program which all of us would like to see.

I will get in touch with you on this matter after the NATO meeting.

Sincerely yours,

**John Foster Dulles**<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> An Agreement for Cooperation on the civil uses of atomic energy between the United States and the Philippines was signed in Washington on July 27, 1955, and entered into force the same day. This agreement provided for an outright gift of a nuclear reactor for research purposes to the Philippines. Details are given in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1955, p. 249; and in a memorandum of conversation, dated April 8, between General Carlos P. Romulo, personal representative of President Ramón Magsaysay to the United States, and Secretary Dulles in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

<sup>8</sup> Dulles apparently persuaded Rockefeller during their May 4 meeting to put the gifts of nuclear reactors on a “matching” basis, for Rockefeller said in his May 4 letter to Dulles, cited in footnote 2 above, that he would modify his proposal to incorporate the idea. A memorandum for the file by Smith, May 5, indicates Rockefeller also told Smith on May 5 that he was going to pursue the matter in other parts of the government. (*Ibid.*, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Power and Research Reactors)

<sup>9</sup> Document 14.

<sup>10</sup> The President outlined the features of the U.S. power reactor assistance program in his commencement address at Pennsylvania State University on June 11. See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 593–600.

<sup>11</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

22. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations  
(Lodge) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

New York, May 3, 1955.

SUBJECT

Atomic Radiation<sup>2</sup>

DEAR FOSTER: Here is the choice concerning which is shaping up for the next session of the General Assembly as far as Atomic Radiation is concerned:

1. Some delegation, such as India or Pakistan, is almost certain to raise the problem of the effects of radiation on living organisms as a result of testing nuclear weapons. This would put us on the defensive.

2. Or, we can take the initiative, introduce an item of our own, thus warding off this pressure, controlling the situation so as to protect United States' security interests, and get credit throughout the world.

Obviously, we should take action number two.

We must not assume (as I believe some are doing) that one of our choices is doing nothing.

Anything which we propose will, of course, have to assure that our security interests are completely protected, and not be such as to require our revealing anything more than we already intend to do anyway. (This would be more difficult to do in the case of an Indian proposal.)

I propose, therefore, that the United States sponsor an item which would call for international coordination through the United Nations of national studies on the effects of radiation.

By so doing, we can divert attention from our own tests to those of the United Kingdom and the USSR, and at the same time avoid the pressures that are increasingly building up for a moratorium on tests.

Note also that when the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy meets, there will be already on the agenda items dealing with "radiation injury and protection", which will include "maximum permissible exposure standards". Unless we have headed it off, this is one factor which can especially lead to concerted action by numerous Delegations at Geneva to debate the effects of nuclear tests, and either a call for a moratorium or for scientific studies on the dangers of continued explosions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Radiation and Fallout. Secret. A copy was sent to Key.

<sup>2</sup> A telegram from Lodge to Dulles had earlier elaborated on Lodge's concerns about radiation and had suggested a U.S. initiative proposing an international study under U.N. auspices on the effects of radiation. (Telegram 680 from New York, April 13; *ibid.*, Central Files, 600/0012/4-1355)

The existing agenda for the Geneva Conference will also divert the Conference from the positive program of the President for peaceful uses into a psychological defeat for the United States unless the United States acts positively beforehand.

The step that I have proposed should thus be taken *before* the Geneva Conference to prevent it from being sabotaged. This means not later than July 15th.

If you agree, the views of Admiral Strauss and the Atomic Energy Commission staff will, of course, have to be obtained on the *technical* and *security* aspects of whatever form the final proposal takes.

I am sure the above is an accurate *political* diagnosis—and that is my special responsibility. I shall telephone you about this in a few days.<sup>3</sup>

Faithfully yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Dulles called Lodge on May 5 at 4:31 p.m.:

"The Sec. referred to L.'s letter of May 3 about the item on the agenda re fall-out. The Sec. said he does not think we can respond until after Strauss is back on May 19. It will be important then for L. to come down and have a talk. They [AEC] are extremely negative on anybody else getting into this field but it is a question of how negative you can be and get away with it. L. said they are making judgments on the political situation in the UN, and they don't know about it. L. will be down for Cabinet on the 20th, and they agreed to try to set a meeting up to discuss it then." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

See also Document 32.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

## 23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 10, 1955—6:11 p.m.

5743. For Wadsworth re disarmament. Your 4782.<sup>2</sup> Concur desirability exchange views UK re moratorium with objective coordinating

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2755. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved by Wainhouse. Repeated to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 4782 reported discussions between the U.K. and U.S. Delegations to the Disarmament Subcommittee on the questions of a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. Wadsworth noted British agreement with the U.S. positions on these issues, though the British were perhaps even more strongly opposed to any moratorium because of their need to develop thermonuclear weapons. The U.K. representatives were particularly concerned with developing additional arguments and tactics against these questions and coordinating with the United States the

and maximizing effectiveness presentation our position when Indian proposal<sup>3</sup> comes up full Disarmament Commission. Following we believe are major arguments against moratorium:

1. Nuclear weapons central part of defensive capability free world. Testing a vital element in maintaining and increasing this capability. Western nations not willing to hamper or jeopardize this strength unless as part of foolproof disarmament system. We have made concrete proposals for such a plan. Until that comes about, we must maintain our strength.

2. Our own studies have demonstrated that no significant health hazard results nuclear test explosions. We presently furthering such studies to provide additional information this matter.

3. In any event, such a moratorium would be extremely difficult to enforce and might be circumvented with impunity. It would require extensive inspection and monitoring system and could not rely on good faith alone. Record to date indicates there are nations unwilling to accept thoroughgoing inspection of type probably required, and capable of violating agreement.

4. Future test activities will also contribute importantly development nuclear weapons, including those with strictly defensive applications, and US cannot cease experimentation which might increase deterrent effects atomic weapons.

FYI. Department presently exploring possibility coupling opposition to moratorium with proposal in UN designed to meet widespread concern possible effects radioactivity resulting nuclear explosions through some limited international approach this question.

**Hoover**

---

opposition to growing public pressures for these proposals. (Telegram 4782 from London, April 27; *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Dulles called Lodge on May 5 at 4:31 p.m.:

"The Sec. referred to L.'s letter of May 3 about the item on the agenda re fallout. The Sec. said he does not think we can respond until after Strauss is back on May 19. It will be important then for L. to come down and have a talk. They AEC are extremely negative on anybody else getting into this field but it is a question of how negative you can be and get away with it. L. said they are making judgments on the political situation in the UN, and they don't know about it. L. will be down for Cabinet on the 20th, and they agreed to try to set a meeting up to discuss it then." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

See also Document 32.

**24. Editorial Note**

At the May 10 meeting of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Soviet Union introduced comprehensive proposals on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Briefly, these proposals amounted to the negotiation of a treaty for approval by the United Nations Security Council. This treaty would provide for:

“(a) the complete prohibition of the use and production both of nuclear and of all other weapons of mass destruction, and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;

“(b) a major reduction in all armed forces and all conventional armaments;

“(c) the establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee in the case of all States alike the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.”

The Soviet proposals elaborated at length on several measures involving budgets, force levels, conventional arms, prohibitions on production and use of weapons of mass destruction, procedures for dismantling of foreign bases, disclosure, inspection and control, and enforcement, all of which were to be implemented in two stages, the first in 1956 and the second in 1957.

The Soviet proposals are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, pages 900–905; and *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, volume I, pages 456–467.

---

**25. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, May 11, 1955.*

DEAR FOSTER: The publication of the Russian disarmament manifesto<sup>2</sup> today makes me feel like the man who was lying on the New York Central track, knowing that the express was about to come through—and stays there and is run over.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Confidential; Personal.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding this proposal, see *supra*.

Certainly you and I both have anticipated such a manifesto from Moscow. It is not particularly novel or particularly clever intrinsically. But it is undoubtedly extremely effective. Where others whisper in private, they act in public.

What bothers me about it is *not* primarily that they have scored again in the field of international propaganda.

What bothers me about it is *not* primarily that we have lost a magnificent opportunity—which we have had ever since Tuesday, March 1st,<sup>3</sup> when their attitude in London would have justified us in putting out a manifesto of our own.

What bothers me about it basically *is* that it will intensify the already dangerous tenderness of British and French public opinion towards Soviet proposals.

We are actually now on a downward spiral as far as British and French public opinion towards the Soviet Union is concerned unless we do something about it.

I say this as one who has completely agreed with your policy to defer to the French and the British on the public relations phase of disarmament. It would certainly have been quite a wrench for us last autumn to have said what we really thought and what our public opinion would have really liked when Vyshinsky made his thoroughly dishonest disarmament proposal.<sup>4</sup> Instead we started then to defer solemnly to French and British prejudices. Whenever we do this the whole Soviet cause gains in respectability and it becomes even more difficult for us later to espouse the position which we really think is right.

The Soviets will now come to New York with this new manifesto at their back—if, indeed, they do not come to San Francisco<sup>5</sup> with it and because of having been the tail to the British kite on this issue for so long, we will probably be compelled to be an even bigger tail to their kite now.

---

<sup>3</sup> The Russian draft resolution submitted to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on February 25 appeared to the U.S., British, Canadian, and French representatives to be a retreat from the Soviets' more flexible and cooperative posture during the 1954 meetings. By March 1, the discussions had come to an apparent standstill. The March 1 subcommittee meeting was characterized by Western representatives' searching questions of and critical comments on the Soviet position. On March 2, the four Western representatives decided to continue the meetings for the immediate future while pressing Gromyko for clarification of the Russian position. (Telegrams 3826, 3836, and 3838 from London, all March 2; Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-255)

<sup>4</sup> Lodge presumably is referring to the Soviet disarmament proposal submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 30, 1954. For the U.S. reaction to the proposal and its text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1954, pp. 619-626.

<sup>5</sup> The 10th anniversary meeting of the United Nations was held in San Francisco, June 20-26.

It all makes me wonder whether we would not have done better to have taken our own stand early and thereby at least prevented British public opinion from getting more and more friendly and respectful of the Soviet line.

It may be that Harold Stassen will produce a new idea which the President can then proclaim to the world and we can then get a fresh start. But *you* badly need a positive position for your opening speech in San Francisco. You must expect the Soviet line there to follow that of today's manifesto, with communist marchers in the street and all the rest of the dreary Picasso drill.

Once the British elections<sup>6</sup> are over, I really think it will be time to reconsider and time for us to take a line of our own, knowing that even if it does displease the British at the time, it will displease them even more the longer we wait.<sup>7</sup>

We always seem to treat their<sup>8</sup> protestations to us much more seriously than they take anyone else's—or than they expect theirs to be taken.

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

---

<sup>6</sup> The general election in the United Kingdom took place on May 26.

<sup>7</sup> Dulles' letter of reply to Lodge on May 18 reads in part:

"It is very irksome in this and in other matters to defer to our allies and certainly some reasonable balance should be found. After the British elections, we may, as you suggest, usefully reconsider whether the balance has been too much against our interest." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Strictly Confidential)

<sup>8</sup> The word "these" has been deleted and the word "their" has been inserted in handwriting on the source text.

---

26. **Letter From the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Wadsworth) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)<sup>1</sup>**

*London, May 11, 1955.*

DEAR CABOT: The more I think of it, the more I believe that we can find a way of turning this latest Soviet move<sup>2</sup> to our own advantage.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Ambassador Lodge. Personal and Confidential. A copy sent to Key was received May 16.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 24.



Although it is true that we do not have a firm coordinated policy in several of the points which they have included in their latest proposal, I don't think that that will necessarily paralyze our activities.

Most of the members of the staff were originally worried by the prospect of having to sit here and reveal, in one way or another, this lack of position, and most of their thinking has been along the line of getting out of here fast before too much harm has been done. As of this morning, everybody feels a lot better and all are agreed that we will make the best of it.

As I sleep on the thing over night, I cannot conceive of either the UK or France being willing to accede to a quick recess or adjournment at this time. Tony Nutting says that his first reaction is that this will make them a lot of votes and will virtually sew up the election for them. He is going to insert a section in a speech tonight, probably, which will take the same line as we plan to do in our public statement today, namely: "Patience has paid off—Western solidarity has caused the Russians to retreat from untenable positions".

One of the most significant features of our meetings since April 19 when the "French 75" plan<sup>3</sup> was tabled has been the silence of Malik on the perfectly normal question of how the United States felt about this proposal. I think we may assume that the Russians are so conditioned to believing that anything any one of us says has been checked and approved by all the others, that it just hasn't occurred to him that I have made no statement whatever in favor of the idea. You will remember that your own "tough" speech shortly before you left<sup>4</sup> was taken by Gromyko as a full Western position, even though your Western colleagues did not know you were going to make it.

What I would like to do is to drop the role of the Guy Who Wants to Go Home. This doesn't mean that I don't want to come home, because I do, and I fully realize the dangers of staying here and exposing lack of US policy. At the same time, I think we must recognize that when you take away all the non-essentials of the latest Russian proposal, you must admit that they have made tremendous concessions compared to the position which Malik was strenuously defending as recently as last Thursday.<sup>5</sup> It appears to me that it would

---

<sup>3</sup> The Anglo-French proposal to the Disarmament Subcommittee on April 19, provided, as one of its features, "that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the process of eliminating all nuclear stocks should be carried out at the same time as the final quarter of the agreed reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments begins, that is to say, when 75 per cent of those reductions have been completed." For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 453-454.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably Lodge's extensive remarks on March 9 to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, summarized in telegram 3965 from London, March 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 330/13/3-1055) Lodge left the talks shortly after he presided at the March 11 subcommittee meeting.

<sup>5</sup> May 5.

come with poor grace for the United States, at this end, to pull out of a conference which now seems finally to be getting somewhere.

Until the Secretary has made up his mind as to how this fits into the Big Picture, I would rather not say a word to my Western friends about leaving. After all, the way this particular small plant of machinery works will be dependent on the ultimate US policy on a détente, and until that is decided, I think our best stunt is to follow the President's line of being willing to go anywhere and do anything as long as there is the slightest chance of success.

In several of your letters you have asked me if you can do anything to help along. I believe that one of the most important things that can be done today is to persuade the United States Government that it must quickly take a position on these matters which have not yet been determined. You, of course, realize that there is considerable difference of opinion within the State Department, to say nothing of the independent and strongly held views of Defense and AEC. If you and Dave Key can be gadflies to the appropriate people who have been considering these matters it cannot help but be valuable. I would think that enlisting the aid of Harold Stassen, who has by now had a thorough briefing on all these matters, would be imperative. Then, when the Secretary returns I strongly recommend as rapid a decision as possible. It is all very well for Washington to tell us, as it did on April 12,<sup>6</sup> that they can give us no assurance that they can reach "firm conclusions" in the "near future". You and I know that political events are simply not going to wait for the bureaucrats, and there is no use playing the ostrich and pretending that they will.

These are the matters concerning which we have as yet had no policy determination and which are contained in the latest Russian proposal.

1. The actual time limits in which to carry out the whole disarmament program. This would be tied into Number 2 below.

2. Whether we can express specific support for force levels of 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men for the US, USSR and China, and 650,000 each for the UK and France.

3. Discontinuance of nuclear tests and setting up an international commission to supervise such discontinuance.

4. Liquidation of bases located in the territories of other States. This is not quite as important for immediate determination, since we can lump it into the conventional disarmament picture and make statements about abolishing bases as the threat of aggression disappears. However, it should be given considerable thought.

5. Beginning prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction after 75% reduction in conventional armaments.

---

<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

To my mind, there is nothing insurmountable about this list. True, it will take some firm, close military figuring, as well as some concentrated political analysis, but we still come back to the major point, which is how much do we want to demonstrate willingness to close the cold war and work cooperatively with the Russians for peace? Of course, we can't trust them, and they are so constituted that they may make a 90, or even 180 degree turn from today's policy at any moment. However, the fact remains that in the battle for men's minds this latest effort will make a profound impression. Even those people who will not be taken in by claims that this is a Soviet proposal will be forced to admit that they have, outwardly at least, acknowledged the error of their previous position and moved much, much closer to the Western positions.

I anxiously await your comments in re the above—I did not feel I should send these sorts of thoughts in a telegram, and I hope that the pouch system will prove fast enough to let you get in some good licks, if you feel such is desirable, before the Department gives us even an interim answer to our questions. I am sending a copy of this to Dave Key for his information.<sup>7</sup>

Sincerely,

**James J. Wadsworth**<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> At the top of the source text, which is Key's copy, is a handwritten note: "David: You have always been too understanding for words, so I'm sending this along as an analysis of today's thinking. Tomorrow's may be different. Jerry." A handwritten note by Wadsworth at the end of the source text reads: "P.S. Cabot will probably not receive this until Friday morning." Friday was May 13. The date of receipt in Key's office is stamped May 16.

<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

## 27. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, May 11, 1955<sup>1</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General, United Nations  
Ambassador Morehead Patterson, S/IAE  
Mr. William Hall, USUN  
Mr. Eric Stein, S/IAE

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, USUN Files, Atomic Energy, 1955. Confidential. Drafted by Stein.

## SUBJECT

## Review of Negotiations for International Atomic Energy Agency

Ambassador Patterson called on the Secretary General to inform him of the progress in the negotiations for an International Atomic Energy Agency. Ambassador Patterson reviewed the debate in the General Assembly last fall and said that following the adoption of the General Assembly resolution<sup>2</sup> the U.S. exchanged ideas with other governments and a draft of a Statute was given to the seven states of the negotiating group.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently these states were given certain supplementary provisions which were omitted from the original draft. Under the Statute the Agency will begin operating as a broker but the Board of Governors will have the authority to set up the necessary facilities for receiving and storing fissionable material at such time as it will be considered advisable. The draft Statute is a simple document based upon the idea that the Agency should be set up as quickly as possible; membership in the Agency would not impose any specific obligations and as many problems as possible would be left for decision by the Board of Governors once the Agency was a going concern. Mr. Stein added that the five governments<sup>4</sup> were asked to let us have their comments by the end of this month; when these comments are received we would hope to have a document agreed to in principle by the entire negotiating group, at which point we were thinking of extending the consultation to other members of the UN.

Mr. Hammarskjold expressed great pleasure at the progress of the negotiations. He said that the Agency must of necessity start as a brokerage enterprise and that it was most gratifying that the Agency would be given the authority, if and when circumstances warrant it, to go beyond the brokerage function; the important thing was to provide an opportunity for growth and development. He said that he was officially interested in two aspects: (1) that there be an efficient agency; and (2) in the tie between the UN and the Agency. He was entirely in agreement with our concept of seeking an agreement in principle within a small group so that the document on which broader consultations are held would have some standing; it will be made clear that the broader consultations will not be allowed to delay or impair the establishment of an efficient agency. He was delighted to hear that we were contemplating to consult with other UN members because that would

---

<sup>2</sup> U.N. General Assembly Resolution 810 (IX); see footnote 7, Document 20.

<sup>3</sup> Given to the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Belgium, South Africa, Portugal, and France on March 29. (Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—General)

<sup>4</sup> A March 30 memorandum from Spiers to Popper indicated that the draft of the statute was developed in close consultation with the British and Canadian representatives and then distributed to the other five negotiating states. (*Ibid.*) Presumably Stein is referring to the same five governments.

ease his problem with India and with others. He referred to the recent protest he had received from the Indian Representative concerning the lack of information on the present negotiations<sup>5</sup> and he felt that unless the Indians were given some satisfaction they will again seek to assume the role of mediator between the Soviets and the West and generally be troublesome. He said the Indians obviously were curious and would like to play a part in the negotiations. He said that the Indian Representative requested him to circulate the Indian protest to all members but that he talked the Indian out of it. However, it will be necessary for the Secretary General to reply to the Indian letter and the ideal reply would be to the effect that the Secretary General (a) was studying the problem of the relationship between the proposed Agency and the UN and (b) was told by the U.S. Government that broader consultations on the Agency's Statute were contemplated in due course.

The Secretary General thought it was important for him to initiate a study of the UN-Agency relationship in close cooperation with the U.S., so that the General Assembly debate next fall, which might very well concentrate on this point, could be given some acceptable direction. He felt that the Agency should not be a specialized agency of the UN, one reason being that specialized agencies have to report to the ECOSOC and this would not be a good idea in the case of the Atomic Energy Agency; in a sense the formal tie between the UN and the specialized agencies was too close; on the other hand, the "substantive" tie in the practical sense between the UN and the new Agency should be closer than the presently existing tie between the UN and the specialized agencies.

Ambassador Patterson said that we have been proceeding on the assumption that the relationship between the UN and the new Agency would be determined only after the Agency was established. Mr. Stein pointed out that there was a provision in the draft Statute which would authorize the Board of Governors to develop an arrangement with the UN. Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Stein pointed out that we would want to consider further the idea of a Secretariat study and that the problem of timing and publicity in connection with any such study was particularly important.

Mr. Hammarskjold said that he had been surprised by the degree of cooperation he has been getting from the Russian scientists Skobel'syn<sup>6</sup> and Vavilov<sup>7</sup> in organizing the Geneva Scientific Conference; with a bit of special handling he had managed to carry them along

---

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>6</sup> D.V. Skobel'syn, Soviet nuclear and cosmic ray physicist.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is either to V.S. Vavilov, Soviet physicist, or P.P. Vavilov, Chairman, Komi Affiliate, Siberian Department and Regional Affiliates of the USSR Academy of Scientists.

step by step on the entire arrangement; they have been paying lip service to their instructions and have been acting independently of their instructions. He was wondering whether it would not be a good idea for him to seek their support for Russian participation in the Agency.

Mr. Hall wondered whether these scientists in fact deviated from their instructions.

Ambassador Patterson said that he was not acquainted with the negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Agency since these negotiations have been handled separately. Mr. Stein added that as was announced by the Department of State, we handed a Note on this subject to the Russians a few weeks ago,<sup>8</sup> and the ball, therefore, was in the Soviet court. Ambassador Patterson thought that it was not very likely that the Russians would want to come into the Agency, at least at the start; we propose to have the Agency established and going and the Russians might choose to come in at a later date.

Mr. Hammarskjold thought that the Russians might conclude that they would have to pay too high a price for staying out; they might decide to come in at once or later on as they did in connection with the technical assistance program; he was, however, very much concerned that we do not end up with two agencies—a Western one and a Russian one; this, he thought, would be very bad.

Returning to Ambassador Patterson's statement that members of the Agency will not undertake any specific obligations when joining the Agency, Mr. Hammarskjold thought that there was an important policy question as to whether the emphasis will be put upon bilateral agreements in the atomic energy field or upon Agency operations; he hoped that the Agency would not be considered solely as means to obtain UN blessing for a program of bilateral agreements.

Ambassador Patterson said that we were in the process of negotiating several bilateral agreements as an intermediary program and pending the negotiations for the Agency. He said that we have not yet worked out the prospective relationship between the Agency and the bilateral agreements but that it might well be possible in some instances for the Agency to take over the servicing of the bilateral agreements; on the other hand, it has never been contemplated that the Agency would serve as an exclusive medium in this field.

Mr. Hammarskjold wondered how he could be helpful in the next stages of negotiations for the Agency; he thought, for example, that he might distribute to the UN members the draft Statute agreed to by the eight governments. He said that he would like to follow up this question and the question of the UN-Agency tie study with Mr. Hall. He expressed his appreciation for this exchange of views.

---

<sup>8</sup> Document 20.

28. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 12, 1955—8:10 p.m.*

Tosec 43. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. At this morning's NSC meeting there was informal discussion re latest Soviet disarmament proposal.<sup>2</sup> There was general feeling that London disarmament talks should recess if possible and hope was expressed that you might be able to bring some influence to bear on British and French to that end.<sup>3</sup>

At end of meeting Stassen handed me following memo re Soviet disarmament proposals:

"The Soviet proposals are very far-reaching and include a number of new elements. They may be pure propaganda, or they may indicate a serious opening for constructive negotiation. The US approach to the proposals must ever have in mind these two extremes of possible meaning. It seems quite clear without going into detail at the present time that the studies I am conducting will lead to a recommendation that neither of the current British and French positions nor the previous US position are acceptable for a future US policy. Furthermore, the important differences between State, Defense, and to some extent the AEC which have existed since 1951 cannot now be quickly resolved in any important characteristic. This entire subject will be a major item on the NSC agenda on May 26,<sup>4</sup> and presumably some further consideration subsequent to May 26 will be necessary before even the fundamentals of US position can be determined by the President. Therefore, I would strongly urge that the US Delegation in London, if unsuccessful in recessing the conference, use extraordinary skill in completely

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-1155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wainhouse and approved by Scott. Repeated to USUN and London for Wadsworth.

<sup>2</sup> At the 248th meeting of the NSC on May 12, Allen Dulles reported on "the chief elements of the Soviet diplomatic offensive." After mentioning other elements of this offensive, Dulles described the recent Soviet disarmament proposal:

"This latter statement, which had long been in preparation, Mr. Dulles described as very subtly drawn and very cleverly presented to the Western world. It was written in the third person in the form of a UN agreement rather than as a unilateral Soviet proposal. It accepted certain of the proposals on disarmament advanced earlier by Great Britain and France with respect to the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament. It also called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany, but with a "hooker" in the shape of a proposal that small military contingents be left behind. In addition, the Soviet statement called for the dismantling of U.S. bases overseas, and proposed a new formula covering the inspection of disarmament which fuzzed the issue but which was certain to provide European neutralists with something new to talk about." (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

<sup>3</sup> The London disarmament talks were recessed on May 18 with agreement to resume talks in New York on June 1. For Wadsworth's statement on the agreement by the subcommittee for a recess, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955, p. 901.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 34.

stalling the consideration and in giving no indication of the US position on any major facet of the Soviet proposals, nor on the UK and French positions, and further does not reaffirm the old US position. A recess to study the new Soviet proposals would be most desirable.

"A second technique would be to have the Soviets explain every part of their long proposal, but without questioning the elements too sharply so as not to add any more rigidity to Soviet position on the factors of their plan. Obviously, the current British election situation affects the psychological picture, but the very nature, complexity, and gravity of the entire subject should amply justify absolute insistence on slow and deliberate review prior to any indications of US position, even though the US Delegation is pressed to give early reactions."

Guidance we have given Wadsworth (Deptel London 5761, rptd Tosec 26, May 11),<sup>5</sup> and Wadsworth's own recommendation re stalling tactics (London tel 4967, rptd Paris 680)<sup>6</sup> accord basically with Stassen memo.

**Hoover**

---

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-1155)

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 11, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

---

**29. Memorandum for the Files, by William O. Hall of the United States Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, May 13, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Conversation Between Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Patterson on May 10th

Ambassador Patterson indicated that negotiations on the draft statute for the Atomic Energy Agency had been proceeding actively and well. He indicated that his main interest was in pressing for the completion of as many bilateral atomic energy agreements as possible before May 31st.

He said the Agency would not come into being until fall because of the Congressional recess and the necessity for further clearances, but that a demonstration of progress on the sharing of atomic energy could be achieved if a number of bilateral agreements were signed. He said the provision requiring the agreements to lie on the table for sixty

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, USUN Files, Atomic Energy, 1955. Confidential.



days while Congress is in session<sup>2</sup> made June 1st the probable last effective date for initialing agreements.

He recounted the negotiations with respect to the Turkish agreement, and the difficulties encountered in the Netherlands agreement where the U.S. had been unable to comply with the desire of the Netherlands for a power reactor because of the restrictions in the Atomic Energy Act on the amount of nuclear fuel which could be supplied to any one country. . . .<sup>3</sup> As the result of this restriction, the reactor agreements will have to be restricted to its use for research and isotope production.

The Ambassadors discussed at some length the question of permanent membership on the governing board of the Agency. Ambassador Lodge outlined the difficulties which had been encountered with Mr. Menon in the UN, and they canvassed the possibility of membership by Pakistan, the Philippines and Japan after they had both agreed that it probably would be politically desirable and almost necessary to include a colored and underdeveloped country among the permanent members on the governing body. Ambassador Lodge suggested that if the Agency could be located away from New York and if Ambassador Cooper could be asked to make it clear to Mr. Nehru that the U.S. would expect India to designate a scientist as its representative on the governing body, he felt on balance India probably was the most natural candidate for membership. He pointed out that, in the process of regular election, India would undoubtedly be able to serve as a member of the governing body and that it might be better if she were given the permanent status.

The Ambassadors then canvassed somewhat inconclusively the problems presented by the absence of a Latin American in the permanent members and Ambassador Lodge expressed the view that Brazil would undoubtedly be a good candidate and a member that could be counted on to support the U.S.

It was agreed that Ambassador Patterson would outline fairly fully to the SYG UN the plans for the Agency, and would also mention that the U.S. was intending to negotiate as many bilateral agreements as possible.

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to provisions contained in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (68 Stat. 940)

<sup>3</sup> The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not place specific restrictions on the amount of nuclear fuel which could be supplied to any one country, but section 123-a(3) required "a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to be transferred pursuant to such an agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose." (*Ibid.*)

Ambassador Lodge congratulated Ambassador Patterson on the excellent work he had done and assured him that the Mission would lend every support to his efforts to move the President's program along at a rapid rate.

---

**30. Editorial Note**

On May 14, the United States conducted Operation Wigwam, a one-shot, atomic depth charge detonated in the Pacific Ocean about 500 miles southwest of San Diego, California. Several planning documents, weapon test reports, and scientific studies on this operation are located in the Defense Nuclear Agency Technical Library, Alexandria, Virginia. A summary history of this operation, with particular focus on the participation of Department of Defense personnel, is *Prototype Report: DOD Personnel Participation, Operation Wigwam. Series Volume, Oceanic Test* (DNA Report 6000–F, May 30, 1980).

---

**31. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, May 16, 1955.*

DEAR FOSTER: At a talk last Thursday<sup>2</sup> with the President, he pointed out—in discussing the question of appearing in San Francisco—that he did not feel he could make such an appearance without having something substantial to say. Herewith is a suggestion for a statement by him which I believe would be substantial:

“I am instructing the United States Representative to the United Nations to introduce a resolution on behalf of the United States at the next meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Sep-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Personal; Secret.

<sup>2</sup> May 12.

tember to provide for a coordination of all national studies on the subject of the biological effects of atomic radiation."<sup>3</sup>

A moving argument can be made for this based on the world-wide apprehension concerning the harmful effects of atomic radiation and the need to get at the facts right away. National studies are much more effective and much more rapid than the highly theoretical international study which has been talked of.

By way of background, let me say that the Atomic Energy Commission has been very much opposed to *any* kind of international activity in this connection. At a meeting last Thursday morning with Dr. Libby and Admiral Foster of the Atomic Energy Commission, we reached substantial agreement on a *coordination of national studies*, as contrasted with a study *by an international body*, such as the U.N. I expect we can settle this at a meeting which you and I are having with Admiral Strauss on Friday, the 20th.<sup>4</sup> The idea is well on the way to being cleared by the affected officials in Washington.

In addition to having real appeal in itself, it has the great merit of "stealing a march" on the communists and neutralists who give every indication of intending to put in a resolution for an international study, thereby putting us in a most embarrassing position. It is important for the United States to "beat them to the punch."

It seems to me that:

this is a fine thing in and of itself; it is a fine thing because of the communist and neutralist activity which it would forestall;

and it would be a fine thing for the President to discuss in public.

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

---

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower did not mention the subject of atomic radiation in his speech at the 10th anniversary meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco on June 20. For text of his address, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 605-611.

<sup>4</sup> See *infra*.

## 32. Memorandum of a Conversation, United States Mission at the United Nations, New York, May 20, 1955<sup>1</sup>

### SUBJECT

U.S. Initiative in UN on Radiation Effects

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State	AEC
Under Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr.	Admiral Lewis L. Strauss
Assistant Secretary David McK. Key	USUN
Deputy Asst. Secretary D. W. Wainhouse	Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge
S/AE—Mr. Gerard C. Smith	Brig. Gen. C. S. Babcock
	Mr. James W. Barco

The Secretary referred to the announcement of the Foreign Minister of Sweden that his Government intends to propose UN action to investigate the radiation effects of nuclear tests.<sup>2</sup> He pointed out also that India has announced its intention of raising this question in the Disarmament Commission.<sup>3</sup> He said that we had been thinking that it would be in our interest to take the initiative in the UN on this subject and guide it in a direction not harmful to us. He had in mind proposing that national studies be submitted to the Disarmament Commission for collection and dissemination. He asked Admiral Strauss if he saw any objection to such an initiative on our part.

Admiral Strauss said that he did see objection and that he would like to explain why. Any report by an international body would be considered by a packed jury and, if it were adopted, the finding would undoubtedly be adverse to our possession of nuclear weapons. Admiral Strauss said, to avoid this, he would rather accept the onus of opposing anything introduced by Sweden, India or others. Admiral Strauss explained further that investigation of the effects of radiation on human genetics would probably not reveal anything for a long period of time, possibly for two hundred years. Tests that have been conducted during the last seven years with higher animal life had produced no conclusions. He pointed out that the use of antibiotics in modern medicine might be producing mutations<sup>4</sup> more serious than

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-2055. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. A shorter memorandum of this meeting, drafted by Gerard Smith, is *ibid.*, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, 10th General Assembly.

<sup>2</sup> This May 4 announcement was reported in telegram 981 from Stockholm, May 5. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 700.5611/5-555)

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Strauss asked that the remainder of the sentence after the word "mutations" be stricken and the following language be added instead: "in disease germs and bacteria which were resistant to antibiotics and potentially as dangerous to human health as the radiation hazard." (Memorandum from John A. Hall to Gerard Smith, June 1; Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, 10th General Assembly)

radiation, inasmuch as tolerance to certain diseases was being built up, but we would not know the results for many years. Admiral Strauss felt that not only would the results of investigation prove inconclusive but he feared that to make an investigation on an international scale would lead us into dangerous paths where demands for cessation of nuclear tests and the disclosure of information concerning our weapons would possibly result. We could not afford to be put in a position where we would have to agree either to cease tests as the result of political pressures or disclose information concerning our weapons to the danger of our national security.

Admiral Strauss also pointed out that the Atomic Energy Commission had requested the National Academy of Sciences to undertake a thorough investigation of radiation effects, that this investigation was underway, and when it was finished a report would be made public.<sup>5</sup> The only data in the report which would not be made public would involve information concerning our secret weapons. He therefore concluded that there was no need for action in this field beyond what we were already doing.

Ambassador Lodge asked Admiral Strauss if he would object to making the report of the National Academy of Sciences available to the UN. Admiral Strauss said that he would have no objection to doing this. Ambassador Lodge said that this was all we were proposing, that is, that States with experience in the atomic field should make reports to a UN body such as the Disarmament Commission which would collate these reports and disseminate them. This left the determination of what was to be included in the report in the hands of the national Governments, in our own case, in the hands of the Atomic Energy Commission. He felt if Admiral Strauss had no objection to this, we were in fact in agreement on what should be done. Admiral Strauss said that he objected to any international investigation. Ambassador Lodge said that we did not propose an investigation by an international body. The investigations would be in the hands of the Governments and they would report what they saw fit on the basis of their own findings. They could in fact do this anyway. In reply to the Secretary's question, Admiral Strauss said he felt he could live with such an arrangement.

The Secretary recalled that the International Council of Scientific Unions had been proposed as an appropriate body to undertake the collection of reports.<sup>6</sup> He felt, however, that the International Council

---

<sup>5</sup> On April 8, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences announced that it was undertaking a study of the effect of radiation on living organisms, and the AEC said it would cooperate with the National Academy in this study. See *The New York Times*, April 9.

<sup>6</sup> On May 12; Foster proposed that the International Council of Scientific Unions study the effects of radiation. Lodge approved the idea. (Memorandum of conversation, May 12; Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Radiation and Fallout)

of Scientific Unions was not subject to sufficient control to be entrusted with the job.

It was pointed out that there might be objection in some quarters to the use of the Disarmament Commission as the body to which the reports would be made. This was based principally on a desire to differentiate this subject from disarmament and to avoid giving the appearance of a piecemeal approach to disarmament. The Secretary also pointed out that establishing an Ad Hoc body raised the question of membership in the body with the inevitable logrolling, and that our experience in the UN indicated we would be best off with an established body such as the Disarmament Commission on which India was not now represented. It was the consensus that the Disarmament Commission was the most readily controlled body available and should be used. Our experience also showed, the Secretary felt, that we were better off in the UN when we ourselves took the initiative instead of trying to oppose or offer amendments to others' initiative.

It was understood that the timing of submission of the national reports would be in the hands of the national Governments although the timing of taking the initiative in the UN setting up the system of reports was important if we were to forestall initiative by others, possibly at San Francisco and at the Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. It was also suggested that if a final report were not to be made immediately we could submit information now already in hand on an interim basis.

The Secretary suggested that Ambassador Lodge might revise the resolution previously drafted in the Department to take into account the views expressed at this meeting and send the revised version to him and Admiral Strauss. Ambassador Lodge agreed to do this.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Both the draft resolution, dated May 18, and Lodge's redraft, dated May 24, are *ibid.*, 10th General Assembly.

33. **Progress Report Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1955.

SPECIAL STAFF STUDY FOR THE PRESIDENT—NSC ACTION NO. 1328<sup>2</sup>

A Progress Report on a Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament

Submitted to the President and to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense by the Special Assistant to the President, subject to review by the National Security Council.

Designed to facilitate the process of policy formation by bringing into focus areas of agreement and of disagreement and by suggesting solutions.

*I. The Most Important Objective.*

Under the current policies and the leadership of the President, the most important objective of the United States is peace—with security, freedom, and economic well-being—for the long-term future for the people of our country. This objective must be ever in mind in considering and in implementing the policy of the United States on the question of disarmament. It has been a constant and basic factor in the study which has resulted in the progress report here presented.

*II. Armaments, Tensions, and Dangers of War.*

A high and rising level of arms is a reflection of tension growing out of disagreements between nations, and it is in turn a source of increased tension. An arms race is thus both effect and cause. An intelligent and sound policy on the question of disarmament must recognize this dual characteristic of heavy armament.

A. Much of the confusion with regard to arms races—limitations of arms—disarmament—has come about through endeavors to treat the level of arms as all cause or all effect.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by the Special Staff on Disarmament, signed by Stassen, and submitted to the National Security Council on May 26. The report comprised three parts: Volume I, printed here; Volume II, containing related and supporting documents for Volume I; and Volume III, consisting of reproductions of charts used in a May 26 presentation before the National Security Council. Volumes II and III are *ibid.* Regarding the NSC presentation, see *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1328, see footnote 22, Document 7.

B. It should not be anticipated that any agreement on the level of arms at this time would, in and of itself, solve other issues which cause a danger of war.

C. It may be expected that an agreement on the level of arms would reduce the tensions caused by armaments, and thereby an arms agreement would contribute to a climate in which other issues may be resolved without war.

D. Modern thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems have this dual characteristic of cause and effect in an extreme degree, and such weapons can only be adequately considered in the context of the total posture and policy of the nations involved.

E. The tension between the USSR and the United States reflects basic and ideological disagreements of economic systems, social concepts, religious beliefs, political forms, and national objectives. This has led to an arms race of unprecedented peacetime proportions.

### *III. The Current Situation.*

Some of the pertinent fundamentals of the current situation, subject to review by the Departments and Agencies concerned, are stated for the purposes of this progress report in the following premises:

A. The United States has the capability to inflict devastating damage upon the USSR and upon Communist China, but does not have the capability, alone or with our NATO Allies, to destroy effectively nor to occupy forcibly the communist controlled one-third of the world.

1. The damage inflicted may bring about surrender or may result in a revolution consummated by elements not hostile to the United States, but neither of these prospects carry the degree of certainty necessary to qualify as a basis for United States policy.

B. The USSR has the capability to inflict heavy damage upon the United States and devastating damage upon Western Europe, but does not have the capability to destroy completely or defeat the United States, or the European NATO area backed by the United States.

C. The element of surprise is of very great importance in determining the extent of damage inflicted or received.

1. Thus, the positioning and the movements of armed forces, and accurate intelligence in this respect are of exceptional significance.

D. The advantage of thermonuclear weapons is heavily weighted in favor of the offense and adverse to the defense.

E. The major areas of the world are engaged in an arms race which adds to the total military capability each year and requires approximately \$90 billion per year, or 10 per cent of the world's gross national product.



1. The Federal Republic of Germany is beginning to rearm in accordance with Western European Union and NATO force goals, and this rearmament is considered by the USSR to be especially adverse to its security and its interests.

2. Japan is likewise beginning to rearm but with less clear outlook for early significant strength and without comparable indication of concern by the USSR.

3. The NATO Council has agreed for planning purposes on the use of modern weapons in defense of the NATO area and the SHAPE Command is actively planning for that end.

F. In 1946, the United States proposed the elimination of nuclear weapons under certain strict conditions of international inspection and control. In concert with its Allies it has considered and declared itself prohibited under the United Nations Charter from the use of nuclear weapons *except against aggression*, and on its own initiative has declared itself prohibited from the use of *all weapons, except against aggression*. The United States proposal, as elaborated into a *United Nations position* approved by all member states except the Soviet bloc, provides for the progressive and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces and the elimination of nuclear weapons, by pre-agreed and carefully safeguarded stages, supervised by an inspection and control system more extensive than the Soviet has yet been ready to accept.

1. Over the nine years, the United States position has continued to include the proposed elimination of nuclear weapons, but has been substantially modified through a contraction of the projected stages in which disarmament would take place; a progressive withdrawal from the concept of international ownership of the crucial elements in the nuclear production chain; implicit abandonment of insistence on waiver of the veto in Security Council enforcement action against violations of the disarmament treaty; the provision of a phased plan for disclosure and verification of military information and facilities; and by relating the reduction of conventional armaments, stage by stage, to the disclosure and verification process and to the elimination of atomic weapons.

G. Since the development of a thermonuclear weapon, and since the changes in nuclear technology began radically to transform the prospects for international control of atomic energy, United States policy on arms control has been under intensive review without agreement. There have been some important disagreements on elements of policy for the immediate future, including:

1. The feasibility under present world conditions of *any* disarmament.

2. The virtues of a provisional "limited" approach to the problem, particularly in respect to inspection versus a comprehensive step-by-step program negotiated as a package.

3. The merits and demerits, from the United States point of view, of early cessation of nuclear production.

4. The proper ratio between conventional and nuclear disarmament.

H. A partial disagreement has developed between the United Kingdom, France, and the United States in that the United States neither explicitly supported nor rejected the "compromise" proposal, advanced by the former on April 19, 1955, in London, which provided that the elimination of nuclear weapons be undertaken when 75 per cent of agreed cuts in conventional weapons had been accomplished and be completed concurrently with remaining conventional reductions thereafter.<sup>3</sup> The United States position has been that the elimination of nuclear weapons should occur *only* at the end of the process of reduction of conventional weapons.

I. The principal feature of USSR plans for almost nine years has been an unconditional ban on nuclear weapons. However, in 1954 (with some confused back-sliding at the beginning of the London 1955 talks), the USSR ostensibly accepted the principle of some reduction in conventional armaments prior to the effective date of prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. In the Ninth General Assembly, September, 1954, the USSR accepted the principle of a program in two stages, as projected in the Anglo-French proposal made in the London talks of 1954.<sup>4</sup>

The most recent USSR proposal (also for a two-phase program) was advanced in London on May 10, 1955, at the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee Session and released publicly in Moscow on the same day.<sup>5</sup> This proposal may be purely for propaganda purposes, or it may indicate a renewed effort to open serious negotiations, or it may reflect both motivations. In its present form the Soviet proposal is clearly unacceptable. It does have the appearance of adopting some of the positions previously taken by the Western countries.

1. It ostensibly accepts:

a. A program in two stages but would limit it to two years (1956 and 1957), while the Western proposals set no time limit for these complex and diverse operations.

b. The Anglo-French "compromise" formula for concurrent elimination of nuclear weapons and conventional disarmament through the last 25 per cent of the disarmament process, as described in H above.

<sup>3</sup> For the Anglo-French proposal of April 19, 1955, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 453-454.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the Anglo-French proposal submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee in London on June 11, 1954, and text of the Soviet draft resolution introduced in the General Assembly on September 30, 1954, see *ibid.*, pp. 423-424 and 431-433, respectively.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 24.

c. The Western proposal for specific numerical ceilings for all conventional armaments and armed forces, instead of its own proposition for a cross-the-board one-third cut. The figures as accepted by the USSR would be: 1,500,000 each for the United States, China, and the USSR; 650,000 each for France and the United Kingdom; and current establishments would be reduced to these levels by 50 per cent installments in each of two years, 1956 and 1957.

d. A single international control authority instead of two, as it originally proposed, one to operate at each stage.

e. The Western ideas on a freeze of conventional weapons, armed forces, and military expenditures, simultaneously with the first phase.

2. The USSR has also introduced some new elements into this plan:

a. A moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, beginning in 1956.

b. Provision for agreement in 1956 on progressive "dismantling" of military bases on foreign soil, with elimination of all bases to be completed some time after 1957.

c. Evacuation of all foreign troops from Germany.

d. Germany limited to internal police forces, and this limitation enforced by the Big Four powers.

e. The Chinese Communist Government would participate in the scheme as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations.

3. The USSR has thus placed disarmament in a political package in which it hints at the possibility of withdrawal of USSR troops from positions in Central Europe, in exchange for a pull back of United States bases abroad.

4. The Soviet plan does not provide for the cessation of nuclear production; nor would it cease nuclear weapons production until the second stage. Most important, the Soviet proposals on international control still appear grossly inadequate:

a. It would apparently apply only to facilities accepted by the USSR as "subject to control."

b. The inspection machinery would not be in place and operating before either the "freeze" or disarmament began.

c. It would apparently have only very limited application to atomic facilities. The new Soviet position now justifies this limitation not so much on the grounds of protecting Soviet sovereignty as on the grounds of the inefficiency of inspection for atomic materials in the light of changes in the means of production.

d. The Soviet offers a Korean-Armistice-Commission-type of control over "big" ports, railways, airdromes, etc., which is supposed to yield a cross-check on nuclear capabilities and intentions.

*IV. The Next Ten Years.*

At this point, ten years after the end of World War II, an estimate of the situation for the next ten years in the absence of an arms agreement should be projected as a prelude to establishing United States policy on the question of disarmament, although such a projection is obviously difficult to make.

A. Assuming the continuation of the present form and nature of government of the USSR, it is assumed for the purpose of this report, subject to a new national intelligence estimate, that the USSR will attain during the next ten years, and probably within the next five years, such capability of thermonuclear weapons and of air missile, and naval delivery methods, that it will have the power to destroy effectively the United States through a surprise attack.

1. This capability will be attained without an inter-continental ballistic missile. The development of such a missile by the USSR would accelerate the date.

B. The United States and its security partners will attain within five years, and continue to have for the second five years, a capability to destroy effectively the USSR with or without a surprise attack and will retain this capability even though an initial surprise attack is launched against the United States.

C. A number of other nations will attain an important nuclear weapons capability, probably including the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Japan, and Communist China, and possibly including Germany, India, and Argentina, notwithstanding some present policies or agreements to the contrary.

D. The competitive clash between the free and the communist systems will continue, with special intensity in the colonial areas, in the new sovereignties recently emerged from colonialism, in less developed countries generally, and in the two fractions of Germany.

E. Military forces of all major nations will be positioned and maneuvered to minimize being taken by surprise and to be prepared for swift retaliation.

1. These extreme levels of arms would also carry with them enormous potentials for major incidents and local triggering of war.

F. Mutual deterrence will be a powerful factor, but mutual fear and extreme tension will be widespread, and a portion of the military and civilian leaders in each major nation will advocate striking first to prevent being taken by surprise.

*V. A Cardinal Aim of United States Policy.*

The projected condition under which the USSR would have the capability of effective destruction of the United States through a surprise attack would be so adverse to United States survival that a cardinal aim of United States policy should be to prevent this condition from arriving and to safeguard against any surprise attack.

A. There are three broad methods of preventing the attainment of a future total weapons capability by the USSR.

1. Voluntary unilateral decision by the USSR.
2. Enforced unilateral action of the USSR through an ultimatum or through the use of external force.
3. Multilateral effective agreement with the USSR to limit arms. The first is highly unlikely; the second is quite certain to mean war. Maximum concentration on the third is indicated.

B. A secondary aim of United States policy should be to dissuade third nations from attaining a nuclear weapons capability, unless it be as an essential counterpoise to a growing USSR nuclear weapons threat.

*VI. Proposed United States Policy.*

If the foregoing assumptions and estimates are accepted, United States policy on the question of disarmament in the present state of world tensions should be directed primarily toward preventing the USSR from attaining a capability of destroying effectively the United States through a surprise attack, should be concentrated on the method of a multilateral arms limitation agreement to reach this aim, and should improve the prospects for peace and establish United States initiative toward that end.

A. The United States policy should be guided by these essential principles:

1. The security of the United States should not depend in any essential matter upon the good faith of any other country.
2. So long as the communist form of government continues, it should be assumed that the USSR and Communist China will act in bad faith at any time such action is considered by their rulers to be to their advantage.
3. It is not possible by any known scientific, or other, means to account for the total previous production of nuclear weapons material, and the margin of error is sufficient to allow for clandestine fabrication or secretion of a quantity of thermonuclear weapons of devastating power.
4. It is not possible by any known scientific or other means to be absolutely certain of the control of all future production of nuclear weapons material.

5. World government is neither feasible nor desirable with ideologies as fundamentally diverse as communism and freedom clashing in the world.

6. The risks to the present and future security of the United States should never be increased and should in some measure be decreased as compared to the risks inherent in a continuation of an absence of agreement.

a. The United States should never agree to and make any reductions or accept any controls in regard to its own armaments unless it has positive proof that the USSR is actually carrying out simultaneously at least comparable reductions or controls in regard to its armaments.

7. The United States should not advance or join in any proposals which it would not be willing to respect if agreed.

a. The United States should never cease searching for a sound agreement and should always be willing at an appropriate time and place to enter serious discussions in pursuit of such an agreement.

8. The substantial majority of the people of the United States and of the Congress of both political parties must be convinced of the desirability of any arms agreement entered into by the United States.

9. The United States must never renounce its basic philosophy of the nature of man, of his right to be free, of his existence under God, wherever he may live.

a. Thus, the United States must never in any manner directly or indirectly indicate agreement with or acceptance of the domination of the people of the satellite nations by the USSR nor concurrence in the totalitarian system within the USSR over its own citizenry.

B. The United States policy should be influenced by these desirable principles:

1. A favorable opinion of any arms agreement proposed by the United States should be held by the following:

a. The United Kingdom and Canada.

b. The substantial majority of the governments and peoples of the free countries now allied to the United States.

c. The majority of the governments and peoples of the neutral nations.

d. The majority of the people within the Soviet Union and behind the Iron Curtain.

2. All militarily significant nations should be included in any arms agreement.

3. The status of the United Nations should be maintained or improved by any arms agreement entered into by the United States.

4. No sudden economic shocks to the United States should flow from any arms agreement.

5. No false impression of security of the United States should be fostered.

6. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be seriously impeded by any such arms agreement.

7. The export and import of arms should be controlled.

C. Upon the basis of the foregoing analysis of essential and desirable principles, and upon the assumptions and estimates stated, the United States should now endeavor to reach an initial agreement with the USSR and with all major countries of the world on a first phase plan with the following features:

1. Stop the arms race through leveling off all armament efforts—nuclear, bacterial, chemical, conventional—by all nations at an early fixed date. This would include the cessation of all nuclear production, limited production of conventional weapons for replacement only, and no further expansion of foreign bases, paramilitary, or foreign stationed forces.

2. Establish an International Armaments Commission with the right to observe and inspect by land, sea, or air, with the aid of scientific instruments, all existing armaments and to communicate the observations to an international center outside the country being inspected, without interference.

3. Such inspection service to be in place and ready to function on the date fixed for stopping the arms race and to be a condition precedent.

a. Such inspection service to include specifically United States nationals within the USSR and within the entire Communist area, and conversely to include USSR nationals within the United States in a balanced proportion.

4. Require all nations to disclose on parallel dates in stages all existing armament and to submit to verification of the disclosure by the inspectors.

5. Stop all nuclear weapons testing as of the same fixed date the arms race is stopped.

6. Require an advance report to the International Armaments Commission of all projected movements of armed forces in international air or waters or in foreign air, land or waters.

7. Grant to the USSR and the United States the right to open the agreement to renegotiation at any time on six months' notice specifying unsatisfactory developments, and to terminate by renunciation without advance notice in the event of a violation of the agreement by the opposite party confirmed by the International Armaments Commission.

8. Grant to all other signatory nations as a group, or to the United Nations Assembly, the right to open the agreement to renegotiation by majority vote on six months' notice, but otherwise to continue in full force and effect upon each individual secondary signator without right of withdrawal.

9. Provide that a violation of the agreement by any signator shall be considered as a threat to the peace under the United Nations Charter, and, therefore, bring into play all of the peaceful settlement measures of the Charter and Article 51 on individual or collective self-defense.

10. Upon the cessation of nuclear production, provide that all available nuclear material not included in weapons shall be strictly and effectively controlled and shall be placed in a peaceful uses stockpile owned by the country of source but safeguarded in a diluted state and supervised by the International Armaments Commission. Renewed nuclear production to be permitted under control of the International Armaments Commission only when required for peaceful uses.

11. Give special consideration to the status of the United Kingdom in the entire arrangement, particularly if a substantial United Kingdom nuclear weapons capacity is attained prior to the effective date of an agreement.

D. The United States to make it clear that this first phase plan is considered by the United States as the prelude to future agreed reduction in the present level of armaments, conventional and nuclear.

1. The United States will give thorough sympathetic consideration to any proposal for a reciprocal, enforceable, balanced, equitable reduction below present armament levels.

2. Similar consideration will be given to reciprocal reduction of foreign bases, of armed forces located in other nations, and of long range bombers and missiles.

3. The United States anticipates that such further reduction may follow or parallel settlement of other issues causing international tension; for example:

- a. Geographically divided nations.
- b. Interference by international communist organizations.
- c. Special trade restrictions.
- d. Other nationals held in prison.
- e. Other violations of international rights and agreements.

4. United States consideration of other proposals to be guided by the principles set forth in V and VI above.

5. The United States to indicate that it anticipates making further early proposals for reduction if the first phase plan is agreed and successfully implemented and, in the meantime, withdraws for purposes of review all previous outdated proposals.

#### *VII. Discussion of the Proposed First Phase Plan.*

The first phase plan here proposed could be characterized as the establishment of a high open-arms plateau.

A. It would not ban nuclear weapons. This is a major change in a nine-year old policy of the United States. This is an essential change for the following reasons:

1. A ban cannot be made effective and guaranteed since pre-ban production in the Soviet Union could not be completely accounted for under any known scientific method of inspection and post-ban clandestine production of substantial quantities could not be eliminated with certainty.



2. In the absence of nuclear weapons, there is no effective manner of restraining aggression by the USSR and Communist China regardless of what levels of conventional arms might be agreed upon.

3. Even though banned, nuclear weapons could be and would be produced within a few months during the course of any war initiated with conventional weapons.

a. Nuclear weapons are *knowledge plus material*. The knowledge cannot be repealed. The material is available to every major nation and on every continent.

B. Both the USSR and the United States would be stopped short of the capability of mutual annihilation and neither would be required to trust the good faith of the other.

1. This would attain the cardinal objective of United States policy.

2. Further disarmament results would be desirable, but none would compare in importance to this first result.

C. The possibility of a surprise attack on the United States would be minimized. The positioning and the reporting of inspectors and the notification of projected international movements of armed forces would make a surprise attack on the United States almost impossible.

1. The United States would forego the opportunity to launch a surprise attack upon the USSR in exchange for substantial assurance against a surprise attack upon the United States.

D. The development of a nuclear weapons capability on the part of other countries would be minimized if not prevented, with the probable exception of the United Kingdom.

E. Some reduction in the financial burden of armaments would result.

F. The openness of arms and knowledge of their movements is far more important than their precise level.

G. World tensions would be reduced.

H. The security of the United States would be improved.

I. Skillful and thorough development of public understanding throughout the free world will be necessary in such a new policy and new plan. But it is realistic and based upon hard facts. It can be understood and will be supported by the people.

J. The affirmative initiative for such a realistic and far-reaching first phase plan will be recognized throughout the world as a serious and sincere endeavor and will tend to take the initiative away from the Soviet's current neutralist drive.

K. Fundamentally, it reflects a conclusion that there is a brighter prospect for peace through a policy of agreed strength than through a policy of agreed weakness. It is not expected that the United States will renounce its belief that all men should be free, but it is expected that the United States will continue to renounce the use of aggressive

force to set men free. It is not expected that the USSR will renounce its concept that all nations should be under the communist system, but it is expected that the USSR will renounce and refrain from the use of aggressive force to communize other peoples. In a world in which these diverse systems are in competition, weakness on the part of the United States, even though it be a mutual weakness, would be more likely to lead to war and to a lack of security. This is especially true because of the geographic location of the USSR and Communist China in the center of the Eurasian land mass where over two-thirds of the people of the world reside. It is especially true when we contemplate the unorthodox methods short of aggression which would be intensified by the communists without any effective restraint upon their center.

#### *VIII. The Mutual Advantage of the USSR.*

The foregoing sections have emphasized the advantages of the proposed initial plan to the United States. It is obvious that an agreement will not be reached unless it is also to the mutual advantage of the USSR. It is submitted that characteristics of mutual advantage are included.

A. The answer to the mutual advantage question depends in large measure upon the intentions for the future of the rulers in the Kremlin. If it is their intention to launch an aggressive war at some future timing of their choice, especially if it is their intention to do so with an initial surprise attack on the United States, then neither the proposed plan, nor any other plan acceptable to the United States will be acceptable to the USSR. But if this is not their intention, then the plan should have advantages to the USSR, for the alternative projected capability for mutual annihilation must be unattractive to them as well as to us.

B. The prospect, in the absence of agreement, of a nuclear weapons capability in Germany, Communist China, and Japan would be especially adverse to Soviet interests and would commend the proposed plan.

1. There are many indications of extreme concern of the USSR over German rearmament. An agreed leveling off as of the date of initiating effective inspection under the United States proposal would limit future German armament to a degree and in a manner much more attractive from the Soviet viewpoint than the Western European Union Treaty, and would include USSR participation on a reciprocal basis in the inspection of German armament.

2. Japanese rearmament will also be of increasing concern to the USSR, and it would be likewise limited by the first phase agreement contemplated.

3. The USSR will have difficulty in refusing to supply Red China with nuclear weapons in future years, and yet must have a reluctance to place such power in China with the possibility of a future clash of interests in the Far East.

C. There are numerous indications that the large burden of armament is causing at least as great, if not greater, difficulty in the communist area as it is causing in the free area. The agreed easing of this burden, even though in a small degree, may have an appeal.

D. The steady expansion of United States air bases surrounding the Soviet appear to be causing an extreme psychological reaction. The halting of this expansion of United States bases should be attractive to the USSR.

E. A nuclear war of mutual destruction would be to the disadvantage of the USSR as well as of the United States.

F. If the Soviet rulers believe in the ultimate success of communism over capitalism without war, they may consider that there is an advantage in minimizing the danger of the early outbreak of war and settling down to a long-term competition of systems.

G. The USSR appears to be eager to expand trade and to be handicapped by the East-West trade controls. Broadened and beneficial trade would be facilitated by such a first phase agreement.

H. The USSR as well as the United States would presumably benefit from an improved attitude of world opinion following such an agreement.

#### *IX. The Conditions for a Successful Agreement.*

If an agreement is reached, its success will depend not only on its own terms and fulfillment, but even more upon the development of alternative methods of settling international disputes without resort to war.

A. Abstention from the use of force is a prerequisite for the realization of a lasting peace, notwithstanding any agreement for reduction of armament. The use of any degree of aggressive force will almost certainly rapidly lead up an escalator to the full use of all available knowledge of weapons of destruction, and this means nuclear war.

B. World government is not feasible or desirable as a method of settling issues without the use of force.

C. The alternative methods of peaceful settlement of international issues are direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and the court. Each of these methods needs strengthening, and each can be strengthened if a limited arms agreement improves the climate.

D. The mediation method may be especially worthwhile under these circumstances. A mediation panel under the United Nations, through which unusually able nationals of countries not involved in a dispute could concentrate for months or years on particular issues and mediate between the sovereign states, may yield large dividends.

E. In the wake of such an arms agreement, a more universal membership in the United Nations would be of great value in improving the prospects for peace. The log jam of non-members might well be broken in this arms agreement process.

F. The proposed policy is further designed to avoid raising a false sense of security and to place reliance on inspection and continuing mutual desirability, rather than on the duration or terms of the agreement.

G. The proposed agreement would shift the emphasis to an effort to end world wars, rather than an attempt to ban nuclear weapons.

#### *X. Method of Seeking Agreement*

The aims of this proposed policy are of such extreme importance and their relationship to the future prospects of peace and security for the United States are so vital that, if the policy is adopted, the method of seeking agreement should be approached with the most thorough preparation and minute care.

A. The preparation should center on the steps which will provide the best prospect of USSR concurrence, with appropriate consultation with the United Kingdom, other United States partners, and the United Nations.

B. This does not mean that the public appeal aspects of the situation is ignored. But the best public relations will flow from genuine negotiations on a realistic plan, rather than from unrealistic or overdramatized presentations to the public.

C. Neither is the importance of the relations with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, the United Nations and other nations overlooked. But these also will best be served in the final analysis by a thorough approach to the USSR.

D. In exploratory bilateral conferences with the USSR, an endeavor would be made to clear away some of the underbrush of past unrealistic positions, to emphasize that one-sided agreement favorable to the Soviet is not a possibility, and to stir up thinking of mutual advantages in agreement.

1. So long as the Soviet rulers consider that there is a prospect of an arms agreement more to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the United States, they will not enter an agreement such as here proposed. If they consider that there is any chance of banning the bomb and throwing away United States superiority in this respect,

they will enter into no other agreement. If they consider that there is any likelihood of a weak inspection clause which they could and would violate, no sound agreement can be made.

2. If they conclude that the Soviet system cannot survive an inspection arrangement, no agreement can be reached, as the United States must never limit arms on a basis of trust of the USSR.

E. Similar exploratory talks would be held with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and possibly with Germany, India, Japan, Italy, Belgium, and others.

F. Concurrent with this process, a comprehensive program of bringing the basic facts involved in the issue to the people would be carried out.

1. A major worldwide program should be launched to develop understanding and conviction of the United States objective to prevent war and establish peace and that it is not possible or sound to ban modern weapons or to become weak when a diverse and evil ideology like communism is centered in a major nation.

G. These exploratory talks and exchanges would continue with the gradual development of the circumstances for the presentation of the plan. The best occasion for this would appear to be either the meeting of the Big Four, or the Secretary of State's session with the Foreign Ministers in anticipation of or ensuing from the Big Four Conference.

H. At an appropriate stage in the consideration, presumably after the presentation of the plan to the Soviet, it is suggested that the President would make a full dress, personal presentation to the Congress, and the Secretary of State would follow with a speech to the United Nations.

I. It should be possible to develop thorough consideration by the USSR, and overwhelming free world public support at the same time, with constant focus on an actual, realistic agreement as the goal.

J. The United Nations Disarmament Commission may be utilized as a partially active parallel process, but unless the United Nations membership is expanded to include major centers of military power now excluded, the future consideration of disarmament of other nations after an initial agreement between the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom should be taken up in a world disarmament conference more comprehensive than the United Nations membership. Such a world disarmament conference should not be held unless a previous agreement has been reached between the principal powers.

#### *XI. Supplemental Proposals.*

To make this plan more acceptable to those who have been thinking in terms of the banning of nuclear bombs, and a more far-reaching first phase reduction of arms, and also more palatable to the countries

who would be left without a nuclear weapons production, the following two supplemental proposals could be made, although neither is an essential part of the first stage plan.

A. Declare that in furtherance of the United States policy announced by President Eisenhower on April 16, 1953,<sup>6</sup> the savings realized by the United States under this stopping of the arms race would be used as follows:

1. First, to assure a balanced budget for the United States.
2. One-third of the remainder of the savings to be used for United States tax reduction.
3. One-third for expanded schools, hospitals, water development, highways, etc., in the United States.
4. One-third for accelerated peaceful development of other peoples for which *any* other peoples would be eligible and in which consumer goods and peaceful uses of atomic energy would be stressed.

B. The United States could further offer to supply, subject to Congressional approval, a very small quantity of atomic weapons for a United Nations police force, if the other nations decided to establish such a force exclusive of the United States and the USSR.

1. Such a small force, primarily equipped with conventional weapons, but with a very small nuclear capability, would help to avoid a sense of exclusion on the part of third nations, without involving either the United States or the USSR.

## *XII. The Special Staff.*

A Special Staff has taken an extensive part in the preparation of this report, but they are not to be considered as individually responsible for any of the conclusions or recommendations, nor are the Departments or Agencies bound in any manner by their participation.

The members of the Special Staff are as follows:

Edmund A. Gullion, Department of State  
 Lawrence D. Weiler, Department of State  
 Colonel R. B. Firehock, USA, Department of Defense  
 Captain D. W. Gladney, USN, Department of Defense  
 Colonel Benjamin G. Willis, USAF, Department of Defense  
 McKay Donkin, Atomic Energy Commission  
 Frederick Janney, Central Intelligence Agency  
 Robert E. Matteson, Foreign Operations Administration  
 John F. Lippmann, Foreign Operations Administration

It is suggested that this progress report be referred to the members of the National Security Council for their comment in meeting today

---

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Eisenhower's address, "The Chance for Peace," given before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953. See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179-188.

to furnish guidance<sup>7</sup> and that Departmental, Inter-Departmental, and Planning Board conferences, as appropriate, be held to explore all facets of the proposal, for a report back to the President at an early fixed date.

Respectfully submitted:

**Harold E. Stassen**<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> The preceding six words in the source text were added in handwriting.

<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**34. Memorandum of Discussion at the 250th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 26, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3.]

4. *U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments* (NSC 112; NSC Actions Nos. 899, 1106, 1162, 1256 and 1328; "Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament", dated May 26, 1955, from the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Anderson, in introducing this item, recalled to mind the efforts the United States had made since World War II in seeking agreement on a workable plan for control and regulation of armaments which would be consistent with U.S. security. He referred to the role of the Council in studying this problem during the past two years and to the President's decision, following the last consideration by the Council of this subject on February 10, 1955, to appoint Governor Stassen as his special representative to conduct a further review of U.S. policy on control of armaments. Mr. Anderson then introduced Governor Stassen.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 27. A note on the source text indicates that the summary of the NSC discussion on item 4 was written by T.B. Koons, NSC Special Staff Member.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC 112 and NSC Action No. 899, see footnote 4, Document 1. Regarding NSC Actions Nos. 1106, 1162, and 1256, see footnote 16, Document 7. Regarding NSC Action No. 1328, see footnote 22, *ibid.* The Progress Report is *supra*.

Following the presentation by Governor Stassen and members of his staff of the progress report on U.S. policy on control of armaments, Governor Stassen asked if the members of the Council had any comments to make or questions to raise.

The President opened the discussion by commending Governor Stassen and his staff for their very effective presentation. He indicated that he was in substantial agreement with the manner in which the report had emphasized that there was little chance of eliminating the danger we faced through attempting to reach agreement on the elimination or ban on the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The President went on to say, however, that he felt the presentation had perhaps not given sufficient attention to the development, as part of the plan, of ways to control means and systems of delivery, such as planes, submarines, and intercontinental missiles. He felt that clear agreements on this type of controls would be a very important supplementary part of any agreement. He went on to say that an international control commission should have the right not only to investigate the sites where nuclear devices were stored or produced, but also to investigate the related means by which they could be delivered. As an example, the President pointed out that such an international control commission should have the right to have radar establishments anywhere on any continent in any country, and that this would reinforce the early warning concept basic to the system Governor Stassen was proposing.

Governor Stassen replied that the President's points were good ones and important. He said that he felt such provisions were inherent in the system of control he was proposing. He referred again to one of the basic concepts of his presentation, namely, that if you could achieve an effective leveling-off and stabilization of further development of means of delivery, then you were in effect creating the major check to any further increase in the other side's capabilities to damage you.

The President commented that although we may at the present time tend to talk down our B-36's, he was nevertheless certain that if Governor Stassen were sitting as a member of the Soviet General Staff he would be pretty worried about their capabilities.

Governor Stassen returned to comment on the relation between a leveling-off of further advancement in means of delivery and the inspection provisions of the control system. He indicated again that the essential facet of the system, once the capabilities to inflict damage had been stabilized, was to give warning against, or to deter, any surprise attack. He noted that any nation would be required to report in advance flights of planes, movements of troops, activity by submarines, and other related military movements. He said that if, for exam-



ple, such movements had not been reported in advance, then one would have a very good indication of hostile intentions when they were discovered.

The President then asked whether the departments would now proceed to analyze Governor Stassen's report and give their opinions. Governor Stassen replied that his recommendation was that the departments should now undertake the study of the recommendations of the report as a matter of urgency, and report back to the President and the Council perhaps within four weeks time. He stated that he hoped it would be possible to get unanimity on some new policy proposal among the top two hundred policy-makers of the Government within a short period of time, so that if necessary such proposals would be ready in time for a meeting at the summit. Governor Stassen went on to say that of course this would be difficult and complicated, and that the departmental positions would have to be carefully worked out. However, he hoped that in the interim period, members of his staff would consult on an informal basis with the departments concerned before departmental positions became frozen, and that this would enable them to make adjustments and refinements in the proposal on which there could be general agreement, while clarifying the major areas of agreement and disagreement.

The President then indicated that he considered the departments would be acting very rapidly if they were able to conclude their considerations by July 1. He noted with approval that he had not observed any leakage to the public concerning the proposals Governor Stassen's group was working on, but expressed concern lest, due to consideration by so many people in the Government, various elements of it might leak out. He emphasized that if the Russians should get wind of some of the substance and assumptions on which we were working, then, of course, they would use this information on which to base their minimum positions and then attempt to force us back further into concessions we could not envisage.

Governor Stassen assured the President that consideration of this policy would be handled with the greatest discretion.

The Secretary of State then noted his agreement with the President on the very fine presentation made by Governor Stassen and his group. Secretary Dulles noted that it was not a simple matter, and raised many problems. Furthermore, he expressed the hope that during departmental consideration of Governor Stassen's plan, primary attention would be given to the main proposals, not the supplementary ones.

Governor Stassen expressed his agreement with Secretary Dulles, pointing out that a particular effort had been made in developing the proposals to state in clear and precise terms its basic aspects, so that it would be easier for the departments to establish points they questioned or differed upon.

Governor Stassen then went on briefly to review some of these salient points brought up in his plan. The first was that U.S. policy should no longer propose the elimination of nuclear weapons as part of a control-of-armaments system. Another point was whether or not we should shift, in our armaments control proposal, to concentration on control of delivery systems in order to eliminate the possibility of surprise attack. A third point concerned our willingness to accept this plan as a first phase. Another important aspect was the firm provision for U.S., and Soviet, participation in the control and inspection commissions, thus rejecting any more Korean-type neutral commissions. The relation of the future level of German and Japanese armaments was also an important aspect of the plan. A key element of the whole approach may be considered the bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which is fundamental to acceptance of the plan as a first phase which we would find in our interest for a certain number of years. Also the emphasis in the plan on demonstrating the mutual advantage, both to the United States and to the Soviet Union, should be noted.

The Vice President then stated that he wished to remind the Council of a political problem involved. He said that he felt the presentation indicated that the original bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would in the long run be inadequate unless all Communist nations were eventually included. This meant that Communist China would have to be in the system, and this would of course raise the question of U.S. recognition of Communist China, possibly of its admission to the UN, or other forms of relations.

Governor Stassen replied that he did not feel that this problem would arise immediately in the first phase. He stated that he felt during the first phase, say for five or possibly ten years, the bilateral arrangements between the United States and the Soviet Union would be sufficient for our purposes. He would in fact be retaining during this period our great nuclear capability, and therefore we would not be particularly worried should the Soviets smuggle a few bombs into the hands of the Chinese Communists. Such an action on the part of the Soviets would not basically affect the essentials of the provisions of the plan.

The question was then asked as to what action the Council should take on Governor Stassen's report. Mr. Anderson replied that he felt the Council should note the report as presented to the meeting, and refer it to the participating departments and agencies for further study

and consultation with Governor Stassen. Additionally, Mr. Anderson said that the Council might request Governor Stassen to submit through the NSC Planning Board for Council consideration on July 1 a further report following consideration by the departments and agencies, which would indicate the extent of agreement which had been reached and also set forth the nature of differences, if any, which had arisen.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>3</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the reference progress report, as distributed and presented at the meeting.

b. Referred the reference progress report to the participating departments and agencies for study in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament.<sup>4</sup>

c. Requested the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament to submit on July 1, 1955<sup>5</sup> a further report in the light of the views of the departments and agencies, indicating therein the extent of agreement within the Executive Branch and the specific areas, if any, of continuing differences of views with the precise description of such differences.

*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President (on May 31, 1955), subsequently transmitted to the appropriate departments and agencies for action. The action in c above, as approved by the President (on May 31, 1955), subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament.<sup>6</sup>

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>3</sup> Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1411, approved by the President on May 26. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>4</sup> Regarding later consultations, see *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> For Stassen's followup report, volume IV, see Document 40. For the NSC memorandum of discussion on this report, June 30, see Document 45.

<sup>6</sup> In accordance with NSC Action No. 1411-b, Stassen and his staff held meetings during the first 3 weeks of June with the various agencies and departments involved with the problems of disarmament. On June 3, they met with Allen Dulles and five other CIA officials, then with Secretary of State Dulles and six other Department of State representatives. Three days later, on June 6, they met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Quarles, and others in the Department of Defense. On June 21, they met with additional Department of State personnel. Minutes of these meetings are in Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Meetings of the Special Staff. On June 15, Stassen and his staff met with members of the Atomic Energy Commission; see Document 37.

**35. Memorandum of Discussion at the 251st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 9, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

**2. Report by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission**

Admiral Strauss informed the Council that he had gone abroad at the invitation of the British Government, but that his special purpose in visiting the UK was to satisfy his own curiosity as to the existence of any real basis for the spate of rumors in the press that Great Britain was substantially ahead of the United States in the field of atomic power production. After spending a week in visiting all the British atomic installations except the weapons installations, Admiral Strauss said he had reached the conclusion that while the British achievement does them great credit in terms of the money available to finance the operation, our own effort in the field of atomic power production was ten times as great as the British. Admiral Strauss added that of course the British plants were built and operated by the government; there was no private power production and hence no prospect of competition such as we envisage.

In any event, continued Admiral Strauss, the United States had nothing to worry about as regards the British effort in this field, except the possibility that two of the atomic power plants in the UK might actually be ready to operate late in the year 1956 or early in 1957. This would put the British six months ahead of the expected date when our own plant at Shippingport would be ready. Admiral Strauss said that of course he could accelerate the completion of the Shippingport plant by virtue of overtime and other emergency measures, but to do so would add several million dollars to the costs of building the plant. Instead of this means of staying ahead of the British, Admiral Strauss suggested another possibility. The reactor located at West Milton, New York, the prototype for the second submarine power reactor, was no longer necessary for its original purpose. Accordingly, it could be sold and converted in a few weeks to the production of atomic power on a small scale. If this were done we would not be placed in a bad public relations situation if the British succeeded in announcing that their plants had begun to produce power through atomic energy prior to the completion of the big Shippingport plant.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on June 10.

At the conclusion of his comments on what he had seen in the United Kingdom, Admiral Strauss went on to summarize atomic developments in Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain and Portugal.

At the conclusion of Admiral Strauss' report, Secretary Dulles commented that Admiral Strauss' trip had been very useful. The President inquired whether Admiral Strauss had detected any feeling that the British were still resentful that we had not been more helpful to them in solving their engineering problems in the atomic field. Admiral Strauss replied that he had not detected any disposition on the part of the British to blame the present Administration for the McMahon Act.<sup>2</sup> Besides, they realize that we have been able to give them at least some help on the side. The British he found to be amenable to reason, and not resentful.

The President commented that it was "pitiful" a few years ago when the British were desperately anxious to avoid making the same mistakes in the atomic energy field which we had earlier made. They invoked the Quebec Agreement<sup>3</sup> and made all kinds of pleas, to no avail.

Secretary Wilson, referring to Admiral Strauss' earlier report, inquired precisely why it would be such a serious matter for the United States if the British did succeed in opening a plant for the production of atomic power six months ahead of the United States. On the contrary, would it not be a good thing if the British succeeded in being first once in a while? Admiral Strauss said that he could only reply that he presumed the United States was desirous of protecting its preeminence in the general field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with Admiral Strauss' point.

The President said he doubted the wisdom of raising too many flags or blowing too many horns over the proposal for selling the West Milton, New York, prototype reactor for conversion to power production. Mr. Rockefeller agreed with the President on this point, and said there was danger that many people would realize that the West Milton reactor had been designed for purposes of submarine construction, and that they were trying to pull a fast one in announcing it as our first reactor for the production of power. Admiral Strauss commented that while Mr. Rockefeller might be right, the United States might find it advantageous to emphasize that it was converting a former military project to one designed for peaceful purposes.

---

<sup>2</sup> The McMahon Act, or Atomic Energy Act of 1946, prohibited all exchange of information on atomic energy with other nations, even in areas having no readily perceptible military bearing.

<sup>3</sup> At the Quebec Conference of 1943, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed an agreement providing for collaboration between the two governments in the field of atomic energy. For text, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, p. 1117.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>4</sup>

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, on his recent trip to Europe.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>4</sup> The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1413, approved by the President on June 9, 1955. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

---

**36. Memorandum From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, June 14, 1955.*

1. The following is written solely from the viewpoint of the United States representation in the United Nations.

2. The Stassen Report<sup>2</sup> has the great advantage that if the Russians agree to it, we will then have inspectors in the Soviet Union whose presence, (assuming that the report is technically correct), should make it impossible for a surprise attack to be made on us. This is a greater advantage for us than the presence of Soviet inspectors in this country would be for them, since, because of our system and traditions, we would never commit the act of aggression. The Stassen proposal, therefore, makes it more difficult for the aggressor than for the aggressee.

3. The Stassen proposal has the further merit that it enables us to have a showdown with the Soviet Union because, if they do not accept some plan of this kind, we then proceed against them in the United Nations on the basis that their failure to do so is a threat to the peace, bringing into play all of the peaceful settlement measures of the Charter and of Article 51 on individual or collective self-defense.

4. The possibility of a compromise inspection system midway between that proposed in the Stassen Report and the Korean Armistice Commission type of control over ports, fairways and airdromes which the Soviets suggest should be examined. But if, after a sincere effort to get an inspection system, the negotiations fail, it is better to have the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Lodge. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Stassen's May 26 progress report, Document 33.

showdown in the *United Nations* while we have the edge rather than wait and have an *attack* later when they are stronger than we. The Stassen Report estimates on nuclear strength five or ten years from now are conclusive on this point.

5. The references to the United Nations are satisfactory, with the exception of the suggestion on page 31<sup>3</sup> that the President should present the disarmament proposal to Congress but should not present it to the United Nations. Much as I hate to add to the burdens of the President, I think it would be a serious mistake not to have him present this scheme to the United Nations. He presented the atoms for peace proposal to the United Nations, and this one will certainly be far more important to the security of the United States. If he does not present it, it will be inevitably "down-graded" in the minds of officials and of the public throughout the world.

6. The report is not realistic as regards timing. It cannot be stated too vigorously that, whether we like it or not, disarmament *is coming up* in the General Assembly this fall—unless we can get an agreement with our allies and the Soviets not to have it come up. Wadsworth points out that both the French and the British think real progress was made in London, and are both enthusiastic and optimistic about pushing ahead vigorously. All these factors make it vital for us to have a United States position *by September* at the latest. In fact, we will be very much embarrassed without it.

7. It is quite conceivable that such a hue and cry could be raised in the United Nations as to induce the Soviets to accept some form of inspection. They could be placed in a terrible dilemma in which the acceptance of some form of inspection would be preferable to being branded before the world as an aggressor. But, of course, such a result cannot be achieved if they have the initiative and are challenging us on their London proposal.

8. Governor Stassen has rendered a great service in developing a scheme which holds out the prospect of bringing this desperately and vitally important matter to a head.

H.C. Lodge, Jr.

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Chapter X, section H, of the report.

**37. Informal Notes of a Meeting of the Special Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, June 15, 1955, 8 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

PRESENT

Chairman Strauss, AEC  
Commissioner Libby  
Commissioner Murray, and Members of Staff  
Governor Stassen and Staff

Chairman Strauss welcomed Governor Stassen and his staff and called on the Commissioners to express their views following their study of Governor Stassen's memorandum dated May 26, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

Commissioner Murray opened the substantive discussion by declaring that the question of a moratorium on nuclear tests was uppermost in his mind.<sup>3</sup> He noted the cardinal aim of the proposed disarmament policy and expressed his view that a moratorium on testing would greatly postpone the attainment by the Soviets of the ability to destroy the U.S. Mr. Stassen responded that under the proposed plan the moratorium would occur only when the inspectors were in place as part of the overall agreement. It could not be isolated from the other parts of the disarmament package. Mr. Murray stressed that time was essential. He hoped that some way might be found to stop the Soviets from testing this coming fall. He feared that if we wait longer the Soviets would approach U.S. technology. A moratorium on testing would be useless at a later stage but very important immediately. He thought we did not need access to all Soviet facilities in order to be sure that the Soviets were not testing weapons.

Dr. Libby expressed his belief that the U.S. was far ahead of the Soviets at this point and a moratorium by itself might cut down the current U.S. advantage. He stressed additionally the important peace-time uses for existing nuclear materials and said that there may even be peace-time uses for the hydrogen bomb. As a Scientist he was opposed to barriers being placed on any kind of investigation. Mr. Stassen noted that his report did not recommend banning atomic research but Dr. Libby replied that he was still thinking of peace-time use for a hydrogen bomb. Dr. Libby further stated that he was concerned with the problem of getting rid of nuclear materials. It seemed to him a "crime" to dump them into the ocean and referred to them as "treasures" for peaceful uses.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Meetings of the Special Staff. Top Secret. Drafted by Lippmann.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Document 33.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 15.



At this point, Chairman Strauss entered a caveat on the assumption that the U.S. is very far ahead. He based his thought on earlier experiences with Soviet advances in atomic and other weapons. He also stated that even the present Soviet weapons were fantastically terrible and reported that Commissioner Murray's views on the moratorium were not shared by the Commission, by State, or by Defense. He added a purely personal view that a moratorium without controls could work to U.S. disadvantage noting that research without testing was incomplete. He also noted that the Soviets had succeeded in building new types of airplanes without the U.S. having prior knowledge of them. They could likewise conceal important weapon production.

Mr. Stassen then asked the AEC view on the basic proposition in the report concerning unaccountability for previous and future production of nuclear weapons material. Mr. Strauss replied that the AEC agrees with these statements and has done so for a long time. He referred to a memorandum by Dr. Smyth in November 1953 which stated that no technical methods were known which could account for all past production of nuclear material.<sup>4</sup> As to the problem of future production, the Smyth memorandum called attention to the problem arising from the fact that power production on a wide scale will make available much fissionable material for weapons use. Mr. Strauss said the AEC had adopted this position two years ago and had never changed it. Dr. Libby subscribed to the same position and Chairman Strauss noted that it was never even possible to account for all the U.S. material despite remarkable care. With regard to paragraph 3a on page 22, Mr. Strauss thought the last sentence was a little too general. He granted that uranium could be found almost everywhere but not in concentrations which every nation could extract. Dr. Libby agreed and said that it was a long step from material to weapons. Mr. Strauss commented that the Russians had always been known as good mining people and that the area available for their prospecting was large. Mr. Murray also declared that peaceful atomic programs build up weapons materials and that ores were no problem. As he saw it, it was becoming easier every day to destroy the world. He thought that the Soviet stockpile could be multiplied many times if the Soviets found the key as the U.S. had. Mr. Stassen asked if the Soviets could know the answers without testing it. Dr. Libby doubted it and thought that tests were the only proof. Mr. Strauss said this was probably so unless the "U.S. did the testing for the Soviets," a possibility which he could not foreclose in view of their previous success at espionage.

---

<sup>4</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

Mr. Strauss commended Mr. Stassen's report for a remarkable presentation and Mr. Stassen asked for views as to the future situation. Mr. Strauss said that the future did not look attractive. (1) The atomic burden was very costly. (2) Military needs (so long as there were needs) would always have priority over the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and (3) when enormous quantities of weapons were stockpiled they might be expected to gravitate to the hands of lower level and less responsible commanders in all countries, thus enhancing the dangers of use. He thought that if the manufacture of atomic weapons could be ended *conclusively* it would be in the general interest. By "conclusively" he meant "in a manner which would not be to the disadvantage of the U.S. as has been the case with all the proposals to date."

Commissioner Murray warned against a trend even in our own thinking to view certain very damaging atomic weapons as being merely "tactical". Chairman Strauss indicated that when Commissioner Von Neumann<sup>5</sup> returned to Washington he would examine this report very closely and consult with Mr. Stassen. Mr. Stassen asked that the Commission submit its specific dissents by June 25 but Mr. Strauss said he could not promise a formal reply by such a date. He thought no comment was better than a cursory comment. Dr. Von Neumann would not be available until after July 4 and furthermore, had anything particularly disturbed the Commissioners present it would have come up in this meeting. The AEC could, if it was desired, prepare at a later time a more detailed staff study of the technical aspects. As for himself he could buy the report "almost in toto". Dr. Libby had nothing to add and Commissioner Murray indicated that he would submit a memorandum on the moratorium problem to Governor Stassen.<sup>6</sup> Mr. Stassen noted that if a policy were adopted the AEC would play a part in devising a detailed inspection system. Mr. Stassen inquired with regard to public opinion what the possibility was of getting outstanding non-governmental scientists to play a part of explaining to the public the impossibility of complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Dr. Libby thought there was an excellent possibility but he was not sure it would be too good an idea.

Two other specific subjects on weapons were raised. The subjects will be reported separately.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> John von Neumann was confirmed as member, Atomic Energy Commission, on March 14.

<sup>6</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>7</sup> Not further identified.

38. **Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 16, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Progress Report on the Control of Armaments Made to the President and the National Security Council by the Special Assistant to the President on 26 May 1955<sup>2</sup>

1. In response to your memorandum dated 2 June 1955,<sup>3</sup> subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the Progress Report on a proposed policy of the United States on the question of Disarmament, prepared by the Special Assistant to the President. Certain of these views were conveyed to Mr. Stassen during informal discussions held with him on 6 June 1955.<sup>4</sup>

2. A study of the report reveals that it contains merely a broad outline of a disarmament plan couched in most general terms. Therefore, considerable elaboration and clarification is required to determine its full impact on U.S. security. Pending receipt of additional information in sufficient detail to permit a sound military evaluation of the effects on national security, the following preliminary comments are made.

3. The Plan proposed in the Progress Report is based on the following premises:

a. A cardinal aim of United States policy should be to prevent the USSR from achieving a capability of effective destruction of the United States through a surprise attack.

b. The United States now has a meaningful superiority in nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery which gives the Free World a commanding lead, militarily, vis-à-vis the Communist Bloc, but that lead will decrease markedly with time.

c. A "leveling off" of all armaments at some near future date, including the cessation of nuclear production, would leave the margin of Free World superiority essentially unimpaired.

d. During the next ten years, the USSR will attain the capability of destroying effectively the United States through surprise attack; within five years, the United States and its Allies will attain the capability of destroying effectively the USSR, and will retain this capability even though a surprise attack were first launched against the United States.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. The transmittal letter from Wilson to Dillon Anderson, June 21, is filed with the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Document 33.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 6, Document 34.

e. By "leveling off" (in say, two years), both the United States and the USSR will be stopped short of a nuclear weapons capability sufficient for mutual annihilation. If this end can be accomplished, the cardinal aim of United States policy stated above will have been achieved.

4. The comments of a general nature which appear immediately below are considered to be pertinent to the Progress Report in its entirety.

a. The Report, by concentrating on the necessity for arriving at an armaments agreement primarily directed toward preventing wide-scale devastation which might occur in general war, tends to obscure the implications to United States security of a continuation of the Cold War, which is a more immediate prospect. In this connection, the Estimate of the Situation upon which United States basic national security policy is predicated (NSC 5501), states, in part, as follows:

"19. Despite the talk of 'coexistence', the Communist powers will continue strenuous efforts to weaken and disrupt free-world strength and unity and to expand the area of their control, principally by subversion (including the support of insurrection), while avoiding involvement of the main sources of Communist power. This strategy will probably present the free world with its most serious challenge and greatest danger in the next few years."<sup>5</sup>

b. The element of "surprise" is given primary emphasis in the Report. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not minimize the advantages which might accrue to an aggressor if he were unexpectedly to initiate hostilities with an all-out atomic offensive, they consider that "surprise" should be viewed as a relative term, the net measure of which is the ability of the "surprised" to react to the unexpected event. To safeguard against a "surprise" attack, current United States policy places emphasis upon an increasingly effective intelligence service, alert plans, civil defense plans, warning systems, and a vigilant state of readiness in the armed forces. Given a constant and determined effort along these lines, the effects of "surprise" can be minimized. An agreement for a limitation of arms, safeguarded by an adequate inspection system, should minimize the possibility that large-scale preparations for aggression could go undetected. However, since complete reliance cannot be placed on the effectiveness of such an inspection system, it could in no way supplant the other essential safeguards requisite to an alert military posture. For these reasons, it is considered that the United States, in assessing the benefits which could accrue from a limitation of armaments agreement, should not ascribe undue weight to its value as a safeguard against "surprise" attack.

c. There is frequent reference in the Report to the current world trend in armaments as an "arms race"—which lends an impression that the United States is seriously straining itself to keep pace with the Soviets in this field. Actually, the United States and its Allies have, as a matter of policy, endeavored to set a level of forces and armament expenditures which can be maintained over the long term, with due consideration for economic and other factors which affect the well-

---

<sup>5</sup> NSC 5501 is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.

being of their people. Barring unforeseen developments, substantial augmentation of these forces is not now contemplated, but their effectiveness will be improved through progressive re-equipment made possible and necessary by technological advances. This course has been deliberately chosen as best suited to the requirements and peculiar capabilities of the Western democracies. However, should the necessity arise and were the United States truly to embark on an arms race, its armaments output could be increased many fold—well beyond that of the Communist Bloc.

d. The tactics of the Soviets appear temporarily to have undergone change. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider there has been no evidence that their objectives have changed or that they are genuinely seeking an equitable and effective disarmament arrangement in the interests of easing international tensions. Many of these tensions, existent primarily as the result of their aggressive policies and actions, could be eradicated overnight by the Soviets if they were to conform to decent international behavior; others are susceptible of negotiation if the Soviets set their demands at a level such that agreements would redound to the mutual advantage of the parties concerned. It can be said that aggressive gains by the Communists have been limited mainly by the military strength of the United States as represented by its atomic superiority. On the other hand, experience has shown that past international agreement on the limitation of armaments has not averted war, but instead, has served to permit the rearmament of the violator without awakening timely counteraction by the intended victims of aggression.

5. With respect to the more specific features of the Plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the following are favorable aspects:

a. It is based on a sound assessment of Communist intentions, ambitions, and lack of good faith, and upon a generally acceptable statement of principles which should guide and influence United States policy on disarmament.

b. By prescribing no ban on atomic weapons, the Plan would serve to rectify a dangerous weakness in the current United States position on disarmament.

c. It insists on an adequate inspection system—competent, prepositioned, and unhampered. The assessment of this as a favorable feature is based upon the assumption that the phrase “leveling off of all armaments efforts” is intended to encompass all of the elements of a nation’s military strength and potential.

d. If implemented in full, without any concessions in the direction of balanced strength, it would leave the Free World, at least temporarily, in an over-all position of military superiority vis-à-vis the Communist Bloc.

6. As opposed to the foregoing favorable aspects, the following are considered to constitute weaknesses of the Plan:

a. The Plan makes “leveling off of armaments” an antecedent to the elimination of the more fundamental causes of world tension. The complexity of the problem and its far-reaching implications render the achievement of an effective arms limitation agreement a task of vast proportions, requiring the creation of an optimum climate as an essen-

tial precondition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it unlikely that such an agreement could be evolved before the resolution of the basic causes from which the present trend in armaments derives.

b. It assumes that the USSR may accept a possibly permanent position of military inferiority to the United States and enter into an agreement which would permit the retention by the United States of a complex of encircling bases and a legal superiority in nuclear weapons and means for their delivery.

c. Inasmuch as the same degree of inspection and control will be required for the monitoring of a "leveling off" agreement as for a "reduction" agreement, it is not apparent on what grounds the United States can support the plan now proposed in opposition to a comprehensive plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments. While it provides that we make it clear that the First Phase Plan is considered to be the prelude to a future agreed reduction in the present level of armaments, the plan fails to develop the United States position in the likely event that the Soviets (and possibly our Allies) demand firm commitments regarding certain of the suggested later phases as part of the first phase agreement; e.g., reduction of foreign bases and armed forces located in other countries, and balanced reduction of nuclear capabilities and other armaments below present levels, etc.

d. It does not establish as essential the early participation of Communist China, whose military power and aggressive policy is the greatest present threat to peace and stability in the Far East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hold that the United States should not become committed to any armaments arrangement in which Communist China is not controlled from the outset by the terms of the agreement.

e. It fails to provide special consideration for Germany and Japan, neither of whose military forces will have reached minimum programmed goals by 1957.

f. It assumes that the United States would be adequately protected against a Soviet violation of the agreement by the provision that either the United States or the USSR could renounce the agreement unilaterally in the event of a violation by the other party, confirmed by the International Armaments Commission. Aside from any consideration as to whether an international commission would be able to agree that a violation had occurred, it is extremely doubtful that the United States would really have freedom of action in the face of world opinion and pressure from its Allies. Rather, experience leads to the conclusion that present compulsions toward seeking an armaments arrangement would inevitably reappear, in magnified form, to influence the United States against unilateral withdrawal, with all the implications that could flow therefrom.

g. As implied in subparagraph 4 c above, the phrase "leveling off of all armaments efforts" needs clarification in order to indicate whether this process would apply to all aspects of military posture and potential. Unless it does so apply, many factors which can radically and rapidly affect relative military posture might not come within the purview of the control and inspection system; for example, research and development, industrial preparedness, and peace-to-war conversion capability.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have maintained that, in the absence of a revolutionary change in the ambitions and intentions of the Soviet regime, there is less risk to the security of the United States in the continuation of current armament trends than in entering into an international armaments limitation agreement. They concur, however, in the thesis that the United States should maintain the initiative and Free World leadership in the promotion of conditions under which armament limitations would not be to the disadvantage of our national security. As distinguished from a first-phase plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would favor, in principle, a comprehensive and carefully phased program for the international control of atomic energy and the limitation, reduction and regulation of all armed forces and armaments, if implemented subsequent to or in conjunction with the settlement of other vital international problems. They consider that the incorporation of certain features of the First Phase Plan into such a comprehensive control plan would not be an impracticable new approach to the problem. Of major importance, however, is the necessity of insuring:

- a. The concurrent elimination of aggressive and subversive activities on the part of the Communist world.
- b. A progressive rollback of the Iron Curtain and the creation of an Open World.
- c. That major issues having serious implications to United States national security not be left for subsequent and independent negotiations.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be incorporated in the Department of Defense position with respect to the Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament set forth in the Progress Report.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
**Arthur Radford**<sup>6</sup>  
*Chairman*

---

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**39. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Anderson) to the Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission (Murray)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 20, 1955.*

MY DEAR COMMISSIONER MURRAY: At the direction of the President your views regarding a moratorium on the testing of large thermonuclear weapons, as set forth in your letter to the President of March 14, 1955,<sup>2</sup> have been fully considered by the agencies concerned, and the consensus is that it would not be to our interest to make such a proposal at this time.<sup>3</sup>

The President has asked me to advise you that he has approved the above-mentioned consensus of agency views. The President has, however, directed me to forward your proposal to Governor Stassen, Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, for further consideration in connection with his current disarmament studies.

The President has expressed his appreciation of the deep concern for the peace of the world that has moved you to bring your proposal to his attention. He wishes to assure you that we will not cease to explore all avenues which offer hope of a solution to the threat of atomic destruction.

Sincerely yours,

**Dillon Anderson<sup>4</sup>**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 15.

<sup>3</sup> For the account of the meeting of the NSC Planning Board, see Document 18.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



40. **Progress Report Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 23, 1955.*

VOLUME IV<sup>2</sup>

Special Staff Study for the President

NSC Action No. 1328<sup>3</sup>

NSC Action No. 1411<sup>4</sup>

A progress report on a Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament.

Submitted to the President, and to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council.

The "Progress Report" dated May 26, 1955, has been studied in consultation with the participating departments and agencies,<sup>5</sup> and this further report is submitted in accordance with NSC Action No. 1411.

I

A. There is general agreement within the participating departments and agencies that the proposed new policy on the question of disarmament is preferable to the existing policy, which has become outmoded through the advance in nuclear science and does not now serve the security interests of the United States, and which is not conducive to developing public support for United States policies.

B. There is broad agreement among the participating departments and agencies upon the major premises and principles set forth in Volume I of the Progress Report as a basis for the proposed United States policy.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Lay to the NSC, June 23, indicating that the enclosed Volume IV of the Progress Report would be considered at the NSC meeting on June 30.

<sup>2</sup> Volume I of the Progress Report is printed as Document 33. Regarding Volumes II and III, see footnote 1 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1328, see footnote 22, Document 7.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1411, see footnote 3, Document 34.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding consultations between Stassen and the participating agencies and departments, see footnote 6, Document 34.

C. The proposed first phase plan has been modified and refined to take into account in part the views and suggestions of the participating departments and agencies.

D. The following questions reflect partial differences of view and remain for decision by the President, or for continuing study, as may be deemed appropriate. Recommended answers are proposed in Section V.

1. Would the security interests of the United States be best served under present world conditions by a continuation of the armament program without any agreed limitation of any kind, or by an agreement such as outlined in the proposed first stage plan?

2. Should a first phase plan include some definite reduction in nuclear and conventional armaments from their present levels?

3. Should a first phase plan in its initial step include Communist China, or can this inclusion be deferred until the major China political issues are resolved?

4. Should some distant prospect of complete elimination of nuclear weapons be held out notwithstanding agreed impossibility of security in such elimination?

5. Should some features be added to the first phase plan which would increase its attraction to the USSR and improve the chance of agreement?

## II

A. It is recommended that the proposed United States policy on the question of disarmament, including the first phase plan as revised and modified, be given limited approval at this time by the President for the purpose of consultation without commitment with the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Canada (the free nation members of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament), and that the Special Assistant be directed to report back to the President and the National Security Council on the results of such consultations for further consideration of the policy and the plan in the light of the views of these Governments and having due regard for any further study brought forward by any of the participating departments and agencies of the United States Government.

B. It is recommended that the Special Assistant be directed to carry on these consultations under the direction of the Secretary of State, and be further directed to carry forward a broad program of public information on the fundamental premises and principles involved, emphasizing the objective of peace, and in accordance with established guidelines of the Operations Coordinating Board, utilizing as appropriate and feasible the total facilities of the United States Government.

III

The first phase plan has been modified and refined to take into account in part the views and suggestions of the participating departments and agencies. Endeavor to negotiate a convention with the USSR and other major nations such as the preliminary draft submitted, designed to accomplish the following:

A. Improve the prospects for future peace and security for the United States through stopping the competitive buildup of armaments—leveling off total armament efforts—including nuclear, bacterial, chemical, and conventional—by all major nations at an early fixed date.

1. This leveling off to include:

a. The cessation of all nuclear production, except such supervised nuclear production as is incidental to the peaceful use of nuclear energy for power or research, and except such supervised nuclear production as may be subsequently required to provide essential nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

b. The cessation of all fabrication of nuclear weapons.

c. Limiting production of conventional weapons to production for replacement only, such replacement to be accomplished by category, rather than piece for piece, and to be under agreed criteria permitting a progressive modernization within an agreed time scale but should not be used to transform the power relationships existing between signators to the agreement.

d. No further expansion of foreign bases.

e. No expansion of foreign stationed forces.

f. No increase in armament budgets.

g. No addition to para-military forces.

h. No build-up of armament production facilities.

2. Establish minimum levels for German and Japanese armament, to which, but not beyond which, these states would be permitted to build, notwithstanding the general worldwide leveling off.

B. Require all signators to disclose on parallel dates, in stages, beginning with less sensitive categories, their existing armaments, armed forces, military appropriations and expenditures, and armament production facilities, and to permit verification of such disclosures by an International Armaments Commission within the limitations of Section III, J-4.

C. Stop all nuclear weapons testing as of the same fixed date the competitive armaments build-up is stopped.

D. Require an advance report to an International Armaments Commission of all projected movements of armed forces in international air or waters, or in foreign air, land, or waters.

E. Grant to those parties which have in being nuclear weapons and production facilities for nuclear weapons material the right to open the agreement to renegotiation at any time on six months notice specifying unsatisfactory developments.

F. Grant to all other signatory nations as a group, or to the United Nations Assembly, the right to open the agreement to renegotiation by majority vote on six months notice specifying unsatisfactory developments, but otherwise the agreement to continue in full force and effect upon such signators without the right of withdrawal.

G. In the event of a serious violation of the agreement confirmed as such by the International Armaments Commission, grant to all signators the right to terminate by renunciation without advance notice.

1. Further grant to each signator the right to file with the International Armaments Commission a specific claim of violation of the agreement by any other signator, and to take counterbalancing steps to maintain relative position including steps which would otherwise be in violation of the agreement, provided, however, that the International Armaments Commission shall be notified of such counterbalancing steps when they are taken.

H. Provide that a violation of the agreement by any signator shall be considered as a threat to the peace under the United Nations Charter, and, therefore, bring into play all of the peaceful settlement measures and other relevant provisions of the Charter and in particular Article 51 on individual or collective self-defense.

I. Provide that all available nuclear material not included in weapons shall be strictly and effectively controlled and shall be placed in stockpiles for peaceful uses owned by the country of source but safeguarded by being stored under such conditions as to render immediate use for weapons impossible but use for civilian purposes feasible, and such stockpiles to be supervised through a certified warehouse technique by the International Armaments Commission so devised as to be certain that the location and use of such material shall be fully known by the International Armaments Commission.

1. This supervised stockpile system to be established in such a manner that, granted the successful functioning of the arms agreement as a whole, and the resolution of major outstanding policy issues, and thus the establishment of the circumstances for the reduction of existing nuclear weapons, such reduction might take place through the future deposit of increments of nuclear material removed from weapons.

2. Such supervised stockpile shall also receive and account for any future nuclear material production, including production in civil reactors, permitted under the control of the International Armaments Commission as required for peaceful uses.

J. In order to insure faithful performance of the above measures, establish an International Armaments Commission with the right to observe and inspect by land, sea, or air with the aid of radar, sonic devices, photographic equipment, radiation detection and measurement instruments, and other scientific instruments, all existing armaments, and armed forces, and any geographic area, and to communicate its observations to an international center outside the country being inspected, without interference.

1. Such inspection service to be in place and ready to function on the date fixed for the stabilization of arms and to be a condition precedent.

2. Such inspection service to include specifically United States nationals within the USSR and within the entire communist area, and conversely to include USSR nationals within the United States in a balanced proportion.

3. During the period of stabilization and pending any reduction phase to take place subsequently, the inspection service of the Commission would be directed primarily to the prevention of surprise attack and aggression and to prevention of significant expansion of arms and armed forces in violation of the agreement. Its functions would include the following:

a. To detect and warn against significant conversion of industry and transport to warlike purposes; mobilization for surprise attack, and undue and threatening troop or weapons concentrations; movement of arms, armaments and armed forces in violation of the agreement; changes in allocation between peacetime and warlike uses of such key resources as steel, electric power, aluminum, chemicals.

b. Inspection of production of important categories of conventional weapons.

c. Inspection and verification of limitations on, and disposition of, conventional means for the delivery of nuclear attack.

d. Verification of budgets, appropriations and expenditures.

e. Verification that production of weapons in agreed categories was for replacements only.

f. Inspection of ports, railroad junctions, airdromes, highways.

g. Supervision of peaceful uses of nuclear material to guard against illicit diversions.

h. Policing of moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

i. Supervision and inspection of stockpiles for deposit of nuclear material.

4. In the first phase plan, inspection would not include the right to examine or copy nuclear weapons design, nor thermonuclear processes, nor the design and detail of other weapons.

## IV

A. The United States to make it clear that this first phase plan is considered by the United States as the prelude to the negotiation of agreement for future reduction in the present level of armed forces and armaments, conventional and nuclear, but that the United States does not anticipate that any appreciable reduction from present levels can be contemplated unless and until the major political issues causing international tensions are resolved, such as the divided states of Germany, China, Korea, Vietnam; foreign nationals held in prisons; interference by international subversive organizations; and other violations of international rights and agreements.

B. The United States to further make it clear that if such other issues causing international tension are resolved, and if the first phase plan is successfully and faithfully implemented, the United States anticipates agreement to proceed from the first phase (the opening up and leveling off of armaments) to further phases of pulling back and reducing both conventional and nuclear armaments. This process would proceed toward ultimate levels such as those discussed for conventional armament in the British and French, USSR and United States exchanges in London, and for nuclear armament to levels which, on the one hand, would deter aggression by any nation, but on the other hand, would not threaten the survival of any major nation.

C. In the circumstances indicated in paragraphs A and B, the United States would consider the progressive reduction of nuclear weapons to be accomplished by depositing them in the internationally supervised stockpiles as described in Section III above. This would be accomplished by feeding the nuclear weapons (either complete or separated into nuclear and non-nuclear components) into those stockpiles.

## V

It is respectfully suggested that the unresolved questions should be decided as follows:

1. Would the security interests of the United States be best served under present world conditions by a continuation of the armament program without any agreed limitation of any kind, or by an agreement such as outlined in the proposed first stage plan?

The projected future capability of the USSR to launch a devastating surprise nuclear attack upon the United States is so adverse to United States security interests that a limitation agreement such as proposed would be clearly preferable in the United States national interest. It would improve the prospects for a lasting peace, with security, freedom, and economic well-being.

2. Should a first phase plan include some definite reduction in nuclear and conventional armaments from their present levels?

The major issues such as Germany and China are of such magnitude, the circumstances of communist methods and objectives are so adverse, and the strategic position of the USSR and Communist China in the Eurasian land mass is so important, that no significant reduction in present armament levels of the United States should be contemplated in a first phase—even though it is matched by a USSR reduction.

3. Should a first phase plan in its initial step include Communist China, or can this inclusion be deferred until the major China political issues are resolved?

Communist China would not constitute a major threat to the basic security of the United States for a period of years, and therefore the inclusion in the initial step should not be a condition precedent, even though desirable. In any political settlement of outstanding issues with Communist China, however, agreement to join any existing international limitation of armaments should be included as a condition.

4. Should some distant prospect of complete elimination of nuclear weapons be held out notwithstanding agreed impossibility of security in such elimination?

The development of public understanding and support for United States policy can only come about through forthright information on the impossibility of secure elimination of nuclear weapons. Such information cannot be effectively disseminated if accompanied with an unsound reference to a distant prospect of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a course plays into the communist "ban the bomb" propaganda. Furthermore, so long as the USSR considers that there is any chance of getting United States agreement on future elimination of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely to agree to a sound and secure arrangement which includes the retention of a nuclear weapons capability.

5. Should some features be added to the first phase plan which would increase its attraction to the USSR and improve the chance of agreement?

The United States should not sacrifice its present relative position of strength for agreement, and, therefore, should not add special concessions to the USSR. Unless there is a genuine mutual desire to level off and limit armaments on the part of the USSR, it is preferable to United States security interests that there be no agreement.

Harold E. Stassen<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Documentation on the response to Volume IV follows. Additional documentation is in Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy; *ibid.*, Meetings of the Special Staff; and *ibid.*, Meeting of the Planning Board.

**41. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 27, 1955.

**SUBJECT**

U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding Volume IV of the "Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament",<sup>2</sup> prepared by the Special Assistant to the President for consideration by the National Security Council on Thursday, 30 June 1955. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views regarding Volumes I, II, and III of the Report in their memorandum to you, dated 16 June 1955,<sup>3</sup> subject, "Progress Report on the Control of Armaments Made to the President and the National Security Council by the Special Assistant to the President on 26 May 1955."

2. Volume IV contains a partial revision of Volume I of the Progress Report and is responsive to NSC Action 1411, which directs that Mr. Stassen submit on 1 July 1955 " . . . a further report in the light of the views of the departments and agencies, indicating therein the extent of agreement within the Executive Branch and the specific areas, if any, of continuing differences of views with the precise description of such differences."<sup>4</sup>

3. The statement contained in Section IA of Volume IV to the effect that "There is general agreement within the participating departments and agencies that the proposed new policy . . . is preferable to the existing policy," does not accurately reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked upon certain favorable features of the Plan, these remarks, in the over-all context of their comments, should not be interpreted as favoring the proposed new policy as opposed to the existing policy.

4. In their memorandum of 16 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to general comments on the Progress Report, set forth what they considered to be certain weaknesses in the First Phase Plan proposed therein. An examination of the First Phase Plan as now

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Volume I, see Document 33. Volumes II and III are not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers)

<sup>4</sup> All ellipses in this document are in the source text. Regarding NSC Action No. 1411, see footnote 3, Document 34.



modified (Sections III and IV, Volume IV) indicates that certain of these criticisms have been taken into account. With regard to these, the Plan now:

a. Makes special provision for the raising of German and Japanese forces;

b. Amplifies upon the intended meaning of the phrase "leveling off of armaments" and the intended scope of international inspection;

c. In addition to providing the right of renunciation, provides the right of a signator to take unilaterally certain counterbalancing actions in event of violation of agreements by another party has occurred; and

d. Indicates in broad outline the subsequent steps which might be proposed by the United States in the direction of reducing both conventional and nuclear armaments following (1) the successful completion of the First Phase and (2) the resolution of issues causing international tension.

However, the Plan does not make the elimination of the more fundamental causes of world tension a prerequisite to the "leveling off of armaments" nor does it establish as essential the early participation of Communist China—features which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider to be basic weaknesses of far-reaching implications.

5. In addition to their comments on specific features of the Plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their memorandum of 16 June, also made comments of a more general nature regarding the Progress Report in its entirety. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider these still to be generally applicable to the Report with its modified First Phase Plan.

6. Due to time limitations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not had the opportunity to analyze in detail all of the military implications and feasibilities of the Plan, as modified. However, they adhere to the view that an armaments control arrangement, to be negotiated and implemented under the given condition of Soviet bad faith, leaving other major issues for subsequent and independent negotiation, holds inherent risks to United States security interests. They consider that the First Phase Plan, as modified, would not diminish those risks and is therefore not suitable as a United States proposal for control of armaments or as a basis for the United States position in international discussions on this subject.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Arthur Radford**

*Chairman*

## 42. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 28, 1955.

### SUBJECT

Progress Report on the Control of Armaments by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament—Volumes I, II, and III, 26 May 1955, and Volume IV, 23 June 1955<sup>2</sup>

It is the purpose of this memorandum to inform you of the views of the Department of Defense on the armament regulation problem generally and on the approach to it recommended in the subject Report which is to be considered by the National Security Council on 30 June 1955.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their views on the preliminary proposals contained in Volumes I, II, and III of the Progress Report. After careful review with the Armed Forces Policy Council, I endorsed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted them to the Special Assistant on 21 June 1955.<sup>3</sup> Volume IV of the Progress Report, which is now at hand, contains certain revisions of the preliminary plan which meet some of the points raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have subsequently reviewed Volume IV and I am attaching copies of their two memoranda to me summarizing their views.<sup>4</sup>

It is the unanimous view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Armed Forces Policy Council, which I strongly endorse, that the basic philosophy of dealing with arms regulation in advance of the settlement of the major political issues causing international tensions is unrealistic and contrary to the best interests of our national security. Holding this view, it seems to me that I might be most helpful to you in this connection if I addressed myself to the stark realities of the military situation, leaving to later discussion the development of the political actions to be taken under the circumstances.

The Department of Defense subscribes wholeheartedly to the national objective of the subject Progress Report—a lasting peace, with security, freedom and economic well-being for the people of our country. It is our conviction that this basic objective would not be served by

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text by Goodpaster reads: "President informed of contents (by Dillon Anderson) 29 Jun 55. G".

<sup>2</sup> For text of Volumes I and IV, see Documents 33 and 40. Volumes II and III are not printed. (*Ibid.*, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers)

<sup>3</sup> For text of the JCS views, see Document 38. Wilson's transmittal letter to Anderson, June 21, is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records)

<sup>4</sup> Documents 38 and *supra*.

an arms limitation agreement under present world conditions, primarily because the atomic revolution in weaponry, combined with the Iron Curtain which the USSR maintains between the Free and Communist Worlds, seems to have made the enforcement of any such agreement impracticable.

A fundamental component of the policy the United States, in concert with our allies, has pursued in the search for a just and lasting peace has been the maintenance of sufficient arms strength to deter the Soviet Union from acts of overt aggression. Unquestionably, the military posture generated under this policy has been an effective restraint on Soviet imperialism. Thus, to the extent that confidence in our strength and in the righteousness of our basic objective has guided us and shaped our policy, we have been successful. Under these circumstances, there appears to be no good reason to abandon this policy.

Events of recent years, particularly the Soviet detonation of a thermonuclear device, have caused some of our allies, and even some of our own people, to be preoccupied with illusory short-cuts to security instead of facing up to the tougher problems of achieving a lasting peace. We must recognize and counter the danger that such fear complexes might cause the Free World coalition to abandon the determination which has brought us a considerable degree of success, and to substitute for it unrealistic or escapist concepts which could have disastrous consequences.

The Progress Report outlines a three-phase program: The first involving armaments limitation agreements which would call for leveling off total armament efforts under the surveillance of an International Armaments Commission; a second phase in which there would be a resolution of the major political issues causing international tensions; and, following this, a third phase in which there would be a progressive reduction of armaments.

The key issue here is one of proper sequence. It is the view of the Department of Defense that the proposed second phase should, in fact, be the first. This is based on our conviction, after careful study, that the same fundamentals which make resolution of major political issues a condition precedent to agreements to reduce arms, would apply equally to agreements to level off arms. We believe that any arms control arrangement will be hazardous until there is proof of Soviet intentions to live as a peaceful member of the World Community.

Furthermore, we doubt that the USSR would enter in good faith into leveling-off agreements which would seem to them to have the effect of weakening their position in the resolution of political issues. We conclude that any leveling-off agreements that could be made at this time would neither strengthen our negotiating position nor con-

tribute to the resolution of political problems. Moreover, we believe such agreements would be dangerous. In the light of the past ten years' experience, agreements on arms level-off or reduction would, in themselves, be a source of additional friction and tension. I, therefore, urge that level-off, as well as arms reduction agreements, follow rather than precede the resolution of major political issues.

In lieu of armament regulation as a first step toward our goal of a just and lasting peace, I suggest an alternate course which I believe entails far less risk and promises greater assurance of success, as follows:

(1) That the United States join the other great powers in disavowing aggression as a national policy and in reaffirming their pledges to seek resolution of world problems by peaceful means;

(2) That the United States seek four-power agreement to explore, through the United Nations or other appropriate international channels, mutual and reciprocal means of evidencing to each other and the whole world their good faith in the performance of this pledge; and

(3) That the United States, while seeking by every proper means to adjust political issues and promote a just and lasting peace, maintain, pending such adjustment, basic military strength necessary and adequate to destroy the military power of any nation which seeks world conquest through military aggression.

The Department sees no possibility of discouraging or preventing the USSR from building up and maintaining a substantially equivalent military position. Under such circumstances, non-aggression is no more than enlightened self-interest, and we should do our utmost to see that this is clearly recognized on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

There is an impression that such a formula calls for an all-out arms race that would result eventually in economic disaster. This is not so. The United States is not now engaged in an all-out arms race since it is not allowing its military effort to be an intolerable drain on its technological, economic and manpower resources.

Because an all-out arms race is neither necessary nor desirable, and because international control seems impracticable and dangerous, under present circumstances I believe deterrence by armed strength is our best real hope for peace. So long as the Free World, while disavowing aggression itself, retains the capability of destroying an aggressor, regardless of initiative, so long will deterrence be effective. This concept visualizes an armed truce, perhaps of many years, during which the great powers would work actively to resolve world problems. The period of truce would be a prelude to and an incentive for the realization of a world in which international differences would be adjusted by peaceful processes.

The Department recognizes that fear of massive surprise attack is one of the elements contributing to international tensions. It is our view, however, that in a military sense the subject Report places far

too much emphasis on the effective advantage to be gained by surprise. While we see serious difficulties under present circumstances in the way of creating an effective mutual warning system without the disclosure of vital technical, strategic and tactical information, we agree that the subject of reciprocal ways and means to minimize the effect of surprise should receive careful examination.

The Department has even stronger misgivings about the practicality of inspection and control plans as a means of enforcing arms limitations or reductions. Technology has come to play such a tremendously important role that, to be effective, inspection and control would have to cover a vast array of research and development programs and industrial processes. We see no prospect that the USSR would concede such access to and control over their technical and industrial affairs. Even the United States would find such an invasion of our scientific and industrial privacy extremely disruptive of our economic system. In a world where small packages of tremendous destructive power can be transported by ordinary, conventional means, it is difficult to imagine an inspection and control system that would be effective and fool-proof. We specifically disagree with any concept of limiting the forward march of technology in military fields, for example, by the elimination of further nuclear weapons tests.

The mutual deterrence course of action is a "fail-safe" course in that, if the USSR acts in bad faith, the U.S. position will be no worse than it would otherwise have been. On the other hand, the armament control course is not a "fail-safe" course in that, if the USSR acts in bad faith, the U.S. relative position could be irreparably damaged.

I respectfully recommend:

(1) That the first phase plan set forth in the proposal for the control of armament (Progress Report Volume IV) not be approved until major political issues have been resolved; and accordingly that the consultations with allies along the lines suggested in Volume IV not be initiated by the United States at this time;

(2) That the resolution of major political issues be clearly a condition precedent to any arms leveling-off agreements as well as arms reduction agreements;

(3) That non-aggression through mutual deterrence, rather than disarmament, be accepted as the only path to a just and lasting peace under present conditions; and

(4) That at the forthcoming four-power conference, the United States express its willingness to work with the USSR and others on a listing of all specific political problems which are, in the opinion of either side, currently contributing to international tension and to collaborate in good faith on the resolution of such problems.

C.E. Wilson

43. Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 29, 1955.

MEMORANDUM ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

1. The purpose of national armament is to defend the nation. That defense can be either by ability to repulse attack and/or by such ability to counter-attack as will deter an enemy from attacking.

2. Under modern conditions, offensive capabilities have been developed to a point such that the most effective defense is massive retaliatory power. An enemy will be deterred from launching an attack, however effective he calculates this would be, if he believes that he will be destroyed by retaliatory counter-attack.

3. The United States has greater ability to deter attack than has any other nation or any potential combination of nations. This is true now and for the foreseeable future. Our economic base, almost equal to that of all the rest of the world together, can support indefinitely the high cost of modern weapons; our inventive and mechanically-minded people will surpass, or surely equal, others in invention and putting inventions into efficient production and use, and our present<sup>2</sup> collective security arrangements permit of a wide choice of sites, at home and abroad, from which retaliatory blows can be staged, and these sites are so numerous and so widely scattered that they could not generally be put out of service by a simultaneous surprise attack.

4. The Soviet bloc economy cannot indefinitely sustain the effort to match our military output, particularly in terms of high-priced modern weapons. Already there is evidence that the Soviet economy is feeling the strain of their present effort and that their rulers are seeking relief. They have been conducting a vast propaganda effort to bring about the abolition of atomic weapons and they now offer to reduce land armies if they can thereby get relief in terms of new weapons.

5. The greater military potential of the United States, as indicated by the two preceding paragraphs, gives the United States its maximum bargaining power and this is a power which should not be cheaply relinquished. Even though it is not used in direct bargaining, it constitutes a strong pressure on the Soviet Union to bring about the reduction of United States armament which would almost automatically

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Disarmament. Personal and Private. The source text bears the typed notation "Draft #2." A covering note from Dulles to Hoover, Merchant, Bowie, Smith, and Murphy, June 29, requests their comments before a 3 p.m. meeting the same day, an account of which is *infra*. Only Bowie's response has been found. (Memorandum, June 29; Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Chronological Files) Copies of Dulles' draft were also given to Christopher H. Phillips and Dillon Anderson.

<sup>2</sup> The word "present" was added in handwriting to the source text.

follow from better international conduct by the Soviet Union. Mr. Molotov's portrayal at San Francisco of how "good" the Soviet had recently become was, as I said there, making a virtue of necessity and that, if we wished virtue to continue, we should also continue the pressure of necessity.<sup>3</sup>

6. While the United States can reasonably assure its defense by massive retaliatory power, no other free nation can do so. Therefore, our allies depend upon us. They cannot themselves either repulse, or deter, attack by the Soviet Union and there is no prospect that they will ever be able to do so. This places them in an uncomfortable position of dependence on the United States, a dependence which they naturally desire to see terminated if it can be done "safely." They are situated so that they are disposed to take more risks as regards "safety" than should the United States.

7. The frightful destructiveness of modern weapons creates an instinctive abhorrence to them and a certain repulsion against the strategy of "massive retaliatory power".

8. The result of Soviet disarmament propaganda; plus our allies' weakness and dependence on us; plus natural humanitarian instincts, combine to create a popular and diplomatic pressure for limitation of armament that cannot be resisted by the United States without our forfeiting the good will of our allies and the support of a large part of our own people, and thereby introducing into the situation elements of danger. Particularly, persistence in this course would endanger our system of foreign bases.

9. We must, therefore, propose or support some plan for the limitation of armaments.

10. Since, however, the present and likely future position, in fact, gives greater protection than any plan that rested upon agreement and supervision, we should not seek quickly or radically to alter the present situation. We should proceed cautiously so long as the present situation gives us important bargaining power and so long as Soviet leadership continues basically hostile, autocratic and controlled by those who are not inhibited by any moral scruples.

11. The major premise in any United States plan should be that, under present conditions, we cannot afford to take, and need not take, substantial risks. The minor premise is that Soviet creed and conduct, as they now are, when applied to modern conditions, do inherently import grave risks into any formal plan. The conclusion is that present steps to stabilize or curtail armament should be tentative and exploratory only until good faith and good will are demonstrated by the Soviet Union.

---

<sup>3</sup> For text of Dulles' address in San Francisco on June 24, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, pp. 6-10.

Any plan which implied the acceptability of the risks presently inherent in Soviet creed and conduct would involve giving up the greatest brake that there is against extreme emotional disarmament which would greatly endanger us and remove the greatest pressure that could be exerted on the Soviet Union to reform its ways.

12. It is suggested that while any present plan could and should hold out promise of future agreed stabilization and/or reduction of armament, the only phase now to be developed in detail, for present use, should be a phase designed to test out in the most simple way possible the possibilities of limited mutual inspection, and that there should not be any effort to agree upon any over-all plan until first a measure of inspection has been tried out and found to be workable.

13. Concurrently with this initial experiment in inspection and investigation, intensive efforts would be made to resolve some of the major political issues such as the armament of Communist China; the Soviet control of the satellites; the promotion of international Communism and the unification of Germany.

14. If and as the experiment in investigation and supervision proved workable and as political problems were solved, then the second phase of the armament program could be developed. This, as pointed out, would inherently involve some risks, but the risks might then be acceptable if satisfactory results came from the parallel efforts indicated by the two preceding paragraphs.

---

#### 44. Memorandum by the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, undated.*

**SUBJECT**

A meeting on disarmament in my office, Wednesday, June 29, 3 to 6 p.m.

**PRESENT**

Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, Mr. Robert Anderson, Admiral Paul Foster, and Mr. Dillon Anderson

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Disarmament. Personal and Private. Drafted by O'Connor. The source text indicates that copies were to be sent to Bowie, Murphy, MacArthur, and Wainhouse. The names of the four are bracketed, however, and a handwritten note by O'Connor in the margin reads: "The distribution—for Sec's records only. Bowie read and will circulate NSC—June 30—record of decision to all interested parties and summary of next steps. RO'C".



The meeting was opened by Robert Anderson in which he presented the Defense Department's point of view substantially as outlined in Secretary Wilson's letter to the President, which is attached.<sup>2</sup> Anderson did deviate from the Wilson letter on two points. First, he said that he felt personally that a cautious and experimental approach to inspection in a certain specified limited field might be satisfactory. Secondly, Anderson said that the Defense position that *all* political questions should be settled between ourselves and the Soviets before entering into any agreements on disarmament was not as sweeping as the language in Mr. Wilson's letter indicated. The Defense Department did not really feel that every outstanding political issue must be settled but did feel that substantial progress must be made on the major political issues before proceeding to any agreement on disarmament.

Stassen then stated his position which did not add anything new to the positions outlined in his various earlier memoranda.

Admiral Strauss was of the view that the President should reiterate his previous offer of matching deposits in nuclear material in some sort of world nuclear bank set-up.<sup>3</sup> Admiral Strauss thought that this would be a good propaganda position for us to be in and that it would have a beneficial effect on the whole disarmament picture.

I presented my own views substantially as outlined in the attached memorandum.<sup>4</sup> The upshot of the meeting was that we would try to present to Dillon Anderson prior to the Security Council meeting tomorrow a draft of a possible Council decision which would reflect the position taken in my memorandum. The final position of the Council will be attached hereto when it has been received.

JFD

---

<sup>2</sup> Document 42.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably reference is to Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address before the U.N. General Assembly on December 8, 1953. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 813-822.

<sup>4</sup> *Supra*.

45. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 253d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 30, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. *U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments* (NSC 112; "Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament", Volumes I, II and III, dated May 26, 1955, from the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament; NSC Actions Nos. 1328 and 1411; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 23 and 28, 1955; Memo for the President from the Secretary of Defense, subject: "Progress Report on the Control of Armaments by the Special Assistant to the President", dated June 28, 1955)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Dillon Anderson informed the Council that in accordance with prior NSC action, Governor Stassen had revised his earlier report to the Council on an acceptable disarmament plan, and had now presented Volume IV of his progress report on this subject,<sup>3</sup> which constituted the results of his discussions with the interested departments and agencies. He said that Governor Stassen would summarize orally for the Council the main features of the revised plan (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).

Governor Stassen proceeded to brief the Council on the contents of Volume IV of his progress report. Among other things, he noted and read a comment on this plan made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated June 16, 1955<sup>4</sup> (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). This comment indicated what the Joint Chiefs considered as favorable aspects of Governor Stassen's plan. It was based on a sound assessment of Communist intentions, ambitions and lack of good faith. It prescribed no ban on atomic weapons. It insisted on an adequate inspection system and, if implemented in full, it would leave the free world at least temporarily in an over-all position of military superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on July 1.

<sup>2</sup> For text of NSC 112, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. 1, p. 477. For Volume I of Stassen's progress report, see Document 33; Volumes II and III are not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers) Regarding NSC Actions Nos. 1328 and 1411, see footnote 22, Document 7, and footnote 3, Document 34, respectively. The memoranda from the NSC Executive Secretary to the NSC, June 23 and 28, are not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy) For Wilson's memorandum to the President, see Document 42.

<sup>3</sup> Document 40.

<sup>4</sup> Document 38.

After further comment on the views of the several departments which had resulted in the revision of the plan now set forth in Volume IV, Governor Stassen again referred to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, likewise from their memorandum of June 16, indicating the firm view that there would have to be concrete evidence of a revolutionary change in the ambitions and intentions of the Soviet regime before the United States could safely agree to enter into any kind of arms limitation agreement with the USSR. It was their view, said Governor Stassen, that it was better to continue with the present situation and the arms race than to enter an agreement with the Soviets. This course of action provided a more effective deterrent to war than the conclusion of an arms limitation agreement. Governor Stassen also referred to the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if any arms limitation agreement was entered into, Communist China should be involved in it from the beginning.

After summarizing the recommendations in Volume IV, Governor Stassen said that this constituted his review of the situation. The next question before the Council was where we went from here. The Council might wish to direct a continuing study of the disarmament problem; it might suggest a study of what further limited steps might be taken to test Soviet intentions; it might direct consultation on the problems presented by the Stassen plan with the UK and other U.S. allies.

At the conclusion of Governor Stassen's presentation, the President called on the Secretary of State for comment. Secretary Dulles wondered whether it might not be more useful to hear from the Defense Department first because, he said, the views of the State Department on Governor Stassen's disarmament plan appeared to be somewhere between those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those of Governor Stassen.

The President replied by pointing out that he was calling on Secretary Dulles for the very good reason that in the near future Governor Stassen might find himself acting, as it were, as an agent of the Secretary of State in discussion of the disarmament plan with our allies. The President expressed with conviction the view that the United States was going to get nowhere with its plans for disarmament unless it succeeded in getting a much greater degree of international support. He felt that there was no use whatever in developing a full program and plan for limitation of armaments before we had at least tried out the problem of obtaining support for such a plan from our major allies. He said he personally favored the idea of opening consultation on Governor Stassen's plan with the British, and again reminded Secretary Dulles that if this were to happen Governor Stassen would be acting under the direction of the Secretary of State. On the other hand, concluded the President, if Secretary Dulles would prefer

to have the Defense people speak first, it might be a good idea if Secretary Wilson were to discuss the main point made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department—namely, that major change in the attitudes and policies of the Soviet Union was an absolute condition precedent to any acceptable plan for arms limitation.

Secretary Dulles replied with emphasis that he did not agree with this general position of the Defense Department. The President added with even greater emphasis that he likewise did not share this view. He then called on Secretary Wilson to enlarge on this position of the Defense Department.

Secretary Wilson explained that Defense did not mean that all the major political controversies between the U.S. and the USSR would have to be settled before serious discussion of an arms limitation plan could commence. He merely meant that some evidence of progress in settling these issues should precede the conclusion of an arms limitation agreement. In the absence of evidence of such progress the Soviets would merely make use of negotiations on an arms limitation agreement to add to the existing frictions and tensions in the world. After all, said Secretary Wilson, he could not be very well impressed with the type of inspections which had resulted from the armistice agreement in Korea; nor was he pleased with the Soviet interpretation of the agreements respecting Berlin. It would be impossible to get the kind of inspection and supervision the United States requires on an arms limitation plan if such Soviet attitudes and policies did not significantly change. As a start, suggested Secretary Wilson, we should insist that the Russians make a complete disavowal of the Third International. The President interrupted to say that such disavowals had been made in the past and were not notably useful. Secretary Wilson, however, believed that the Soviet disavowal of the Third International in Mr. Roosevelt's time had been followed up to some extent by action to this end.

Secretary Wilson then went on to suggest as the next step that the Iron Curtain should be cracked and reversed. The President again interrupted to point out that the Soviets say that they are obliged to maintain this Curtain out of fear of the United States. All these points seemed to the President part and parcel of the same problem.

Secretary Wilson then said he would mention briefly what the United States could do if the Soviets made some of these concessions. He believed, he said, that we ought to change our attitude with respect to controls and restrictions on East-West trade; for example, maintaining our restrictions only on the sale to the Soviet bloc of actual munitions of war. To this we might add steps which would produce a freer movement of peoples and of information. A series of moves such as these by the U.S. and the USSR might ultimately lead to a world situation in which an arms limitation agreement would really prove

possible. After all, it was only too simple to break such an agreement if there were not good faith on both sides. Secretary Wilson then summed up the Defense Department opinion that some, at least, of the moves such as he had described should precede any agreement for the limitation of armaments between the U.S. and the USSR. There was no other safe way to approach the problem.

The President then inquired if anyone else wished to comment on the problem. Ambassador Lodge replied that he wished to warn the members of the Council that the Soviets would bring up the disarmament issue at the forthcoming Summit Conference if for no other purpose than to prosecute the cold war. To prove his point he quoted from Molotov's recent statement at San Francisco that the USSR had made a number of concessions in its May 10 proposals on disarmament, and that the next move accordingly was up to the U.S. and the Western powers. Ambassador Lodge predicted that a lot of specific points would be thrown up by the Soviets at Geneva, and that the U.S. must be ready with its answers. Over and beyond this, continued Ambassador Lodge, Governor Stassen would be well advised to study the matter of proceeding under Article 51 of the UN Charter if there were no arms limitation agreement concluded.

Admiral Radford then asked for an opportunity to amplify the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said that both he and the other Chiefs, individually and collectively, believed that this was the most important decision which they had been faced with in their period of service in this Administration. They were very concerned, therefore, that they had had so little time to get themselves adequately prepared on so grave a subject.

Admiral Radford then said that he would like to read paragraph 3 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense dated June 27, 1955,<sup>5</sup> in order to make clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree with Governor Stassen's view, contained in his progress report and earlier alluded to in his oral remarks, that there was general agreement in the Government that the proposed new Stassen policy was preferable to the existing policy as set forth in NSC 112 and in the Baruch plan.<sup>6</sup>

After Admiral Radford had read this paragraph, the President said that of course the Joint Chiefs had come to reject the Baruch plan in toto, whether or not they believed the Stassen plan was preferable. Admiral Radford admitted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the so-called Baruch plan, calling for the elimination of atomic weap-

<sup>5</sup> Document 41.

<sup>6</sup> Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. Representative on the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, presented the U.S. position on international control of atomic energy to the commission on June 14, 1946. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 7-16; or *Department of State Bulletin*, June 23, 1946, pp. 1057-1062.

ons and international control of atomic energy, was unworkable; but so likewise they believed that Governor Stassen's plan was unworkable. In order to make specific the Joint Chiefs' objections to the Stassen plan, Admiral Radford read from the JCS memorandum of June 16 listing the unfavorable aspects of the Stassen plan as outlined in paragraph 6. He explained that among other reasons why the Chiefs of Staff felt that China must be included in any workable arms limitation agreement from the beginning, was the ease with which the Soviets could hide nuclear weapons in the vast spaces of Communist China. He went on with an explanation as to why the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the feature of surprise attack had been somewhat over-emphasized, even though the danger of surprise attack had been emphasized in the report of the Killian Committee<sup>7</sup> and other relevant reports. Summing up, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that if the United States followed the courses of action recommended in Governor Stassen's plan, it would eventually reach a position of absolute military inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This would constitute a threat to the security of the United States.

The President replied with considerable warmth that so far as he could see, Admiral Radford believed that the United States should proceed as at present in the arms race despite the fact that this was a mounting spiral towards war. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff really believed this, the President said he wondered why they did not counsel that we go to war at once with the Soviet Union. In reply, Admiral Radford pointed out that the United States had very great military power at the present time. On the other hand, the Soviets were encountering considerable difficulties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly believed that an opportunity had now presented itself to reach important political settlements and agreements with the Soviet Union. If these were actually achieved it might lead to the formulation of an adequate system of supervision and inspection in an armaments limitation agreement.

The President said that he was at a loss to grasp what political agreement with the Soviet Union could lead to the adoption of an acceptable inspection system which was not already capable of being inserted in the agreement itself. He said he failed to understand Admiral Radford's position on this point. Admiral Radford cited Korea as an example of Communist violation of agreements setting up inspection.

---

<sup>7</sup> The Killian Committee, known officially as the Technological Capabilities Panel, was a 42-member panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, headed by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of M.I.T. The purposes of this committee were an examination of the present vulnerability of the United States to surprise attack and the Nation's technological capabilities to reduce that vulnerability. Information on the Killian Committee and portions of the committee's report are scheduled for publication in volume XIX.

Governor Stassen pointed out that any forthcoming agreement with the Soviet Union on an arms limitation inspection system need not contain the bad features of the Korean inspection system.

The President said that Governor Stassen's plan contained the safeguard that if the Soviet Union did not play a straight game with us in respect to inspections, we were legally entitled to abrogate the arms agreement. In reply to this point, Admiral Radford again cited the Korean armistice agreement. Legally we had a right to abrogate the armistice clauses relating to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission teams because the Communists were failing to observe them. Nevertheless, world opinion has prevented us from doing so. We might well face a similar problem if the Soviet Union violated the provisions of any arms limitation agreement. Both the President and Governor Stassen pointed out that the Stassen plan provided the U.S. with measures of relief short of abrogation in the event the USSR violated the agreement.

Secretary Wilson then said that he had another point in the argument which he wished to lay before the Council. In his view, he said, the reestablishment of any reasonable balance of power had not been worked out since the end of World War II. It was the considered military opinion that at the present time no effective military plan for the defense of Western Europe existed except plans which involved the use of atomic weapons. Without these weapons the Soviets had an overwhelming advantage over the free world nations. Our situation respecting balance of power in the Pacific, moreover, was such that we were practically impotent against the enemy there unless we had resort to our nuclear capabilities. How was it possible, inquired Secretary Wilson, to unscramble this problem of an arms limitation agreement until and unless the rearmament of Germany in Europe and the rearmament of Japan in Asia had proceeded far enough to achieve once again something like a genuine balance of power in these two areas? Japan and Germany must, therefore, be rearmed and admitted into the United Nations. The military believed that Governor Stassen's proposal for a leveling off of armaments at their present peaks was essentially just as difficult a business as the actual elimination or reduction of armaments.

The President said that he agreed with the difficulties inherent in Governor Stassen's leveling off plan, but pointed out that this plan at least had the advantage of providing a basis for negotiating. We have got to find out what these Soviet villains will do to find out what could be achieved by way of an acceptable inspection system. The President then said he would like to hear from Secretary Dulles with respect to an acceptable inspection system.

Secretary Dulles said that he believed that this whole issue of arms limitation was of tremendous importance for the entire future of the United States. Perhaps, as Admiral Radford had stated, there had not been adequate time to work on it. The President interrupted to say that he certainly agreed on this point. Secretary Dulles went on to say that nevertheless, and despite the shortness of time, he had at least a few very clear views on the disarmament problem. For one thing, the United States must certainly be prepared to make some positive move in the direction of disarmament. If we did not do so, Secretary Dulles predicted that we would lose very important assets, such as the support of our allies and the right to use bases in allied countries, which are the assets which make the U.S. power position in the world tolerable. Not only can we not stand still, said Secretary Dulles; we cannot afford, either, to wait until a whole series of political problems with the Soviet Union are settled before we move ahead on disarmament. Arms limitation and political settlements with the Soviet Union should go forward concurrently. Political settlements cannot be a pre-condition of U.S. movement in the direction of arms limitation.

Secondly, Secretary Dulles said he believed that the Soviets genuinely wanted some reduction in the armament burdens in order to be able to deal more effectively with their severe internal problems. Accordingly, the Soviet Union may be prepared to make concessions.

As to the problem of how the Council and Governor Stassen should proceed from here on out, Secretary Dulles said that there were two main parts of the problem. The first part was the substantive aspects of the Stassen plan, the idea of a leveling off at the existing levels of armament possessed by the U.S. and the USSR. The second major element in the problem was that of policing any plan that was adopted. In his opinion, continued Secretary Dulles, the acceptability of any substantive plan for arms limitation depended in fact on what we and the Soviets were willing to do with regard to the policing of the plan. Governor Stassen's present plan was one that best served the interests of the United States, since in essence it freezes our present nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. However, it was not a plan which would be readily welcomed by our allies or by world public opinion. Our allies want not a freezing of existing levels of nuclear armaments; they want these armaments to be eliminated or at least reduced. Accordingly the Stassen plan will not be welcomed by the British or the French. Moreover, as Admiral Radford had correctly pointed out, the Soviets would do their best propaganda-wise to get the British and French to bring pressure upon us to make concessions which might result in a considerable weakening of the advantages which the Stassen plan in its original form would confer on the United States.



Accordingly, Secretary Dulles recommended that heavy initial emphasis from now on be placed on the problem of inspection and policing. He pointed out that no detailed and concrete study of this problem had yet been made by Governor Stassen or anybody else. We must know where and how many inspectors will be put in place. We must understand what we are willing ourselves to accept. How will we react to a lot of Soviet representatives scattered throughout our industrial and military centers? All of this confronts the United States with a serious problem when you actually got down into such disagreeable details. Nevertheless, we must admit some willingness to be policed by Russians if we were to insist on policing them. Indeed, this problem of policing appeared so impossible to those who had formulated the Baruch plan that they concluded that the problem could not be solved, and they abandoned the attempt to do so in favor of the alternative of international ownership of atomic energy. Secretary Dulles said he believed this was the point that needed to be explored first, and also the point where any kind of disarmament plan was likely to break down. In any event, until the problem of policing had been resolved, the United States could not know whether it endorsed a leveling off plan or some other plan for disarmament.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Soviets in the past had always called for a disarmament plan first and solution of the inspection problem afterward. He would reverse this process and first study the problem of supervision and policing and thereafter formulate the plan that was to be policed. If we proceeded in this fashion, Secretary Dulles predicted that we would have world opinion on our side rather than on the Russian side.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles' statement, Ambassador Lodge said that he believed the Secretary of State was absolutely right in his contention that inspection was the crux of the problem. On the other hand, he said he wished to point out the apparent change in the Soviet attitude toward inspection as it was outlined in their May 10 disarmament proposal. Ambassador Lodge again quoted from Molotov's speech on this point at San Francisco, and indicated that the Soviets were attempting to convince the world that they actually favored real inspection.

The President then explained that he could not wholly agree with Secretary Dulles that the problem of policing and inspection could be so readily separated from the substantive content of the disarmament plan itself. As the President saw it, the type of plan we selected would obviously influence the kind of inspection system we required. He did agree, however, with what the Secretary of State and Ambassador Lodge had had to say about the difficulties of devising and operating an acceptable inspection system.

Changing the subject, Secretary Dulles reverted to Governor Stassen's query as to the desirability of talking with the British on the subject of the disarmament plan in the near future. He said that of course we might be able to do so, but he doubted the wisdom of this step until such time as we have "a national position" on the problem of disarmament.

Secretary Humphrey expressed emphatic agreement with the position on discussions with the British which Secretary Dulles had taken. He said it was essential that the United States know where it wants to go before talking with any other government. An agreement on disarmament, in his opinion, was worth nothing at all unless it was to the advantage of both parties and unless both parties really wanted it. If the U.S. and the USSR were unable to get along in the world together, no verbal agreement was worth anything. Nor, said Secretary Humphrey, could we proceed on any course of action which separated the problem of arms limitation from the problems of a political settlement. These two problems went together. In the meantime, while we were negotiating with the Soviets we must deal with them from a position of strength. We must not, therefore, reduce our nuclear capability. For all the problems it raised, nuclear energy was here to stay. In fact, it was our great strength and the strength of the free world.

With a smile, the President turned to Secretary Humphrey and said, don't change your speech when budget time rolls around.

Secretary Humphrey continued with the thought that it might be possible to contemplate limitation of the means of delivery of atomic weapons—aircraft, submarines, and the like—but not a limitation of atomic weapons themselves. The thing to do was to set up an inspection system over the means of delivery; but the United States simply could not afford to ban atomic weapons.

The President said that at least this much should be clearly understood by everyone present: The Russians were not deserting their Marxian ideology nor their ultimate objectives of world revolution and Communist domination. However, they had found that an arms race was much too expensive a means of achieving these objectives, and they wished to achieve these objectives without recourse to war. If the United States rejects this attitude and seems to prefer a military solution, it would lose the support of the world. Thus our real problem is how we can achieve a stalemate vis-à-vis the Russians in the area of the non-military struggle as we have already achieved such a stalemate in the military field.

Admiral Strauss then said that he had a suggestion to make. Secretary Dulles had stated that the United States could not stand still, and must make some move in the direction of disarmament. It was generally agreed that the Baruch plan for the elimination of nuclear

weapons was outmoded. The present outlook was very bleak. We were obliged to assume that the USSR would be acting in bad faith. It was very doubtful indeed if there would be any genuine major change in the Soviet attitude and policy. In the light of all this, Admiral Strauss said that the best solution was a return to the plan outlined by the President in his December 8, 1953, speech calling for creation of an atomic energy pool, to which both the Soviets and the United States would make a contribution and thus drain off some of the fissionable materials which would normally go into weapons. If we returned now to the plan advocated by the President in this speech, we would be making the best possible move. It would put the Russians at a great strategic disadvantage, and would take some of the heat of world opinion off the United States.

The President did not comment on Admiral Strauss' suggestion, but with regard to the next step suggested that the National Security Council have another meeting at which it would discuss acceptable methods of inspection and policing a disarmament plan. It should consider what kind of a system we think would work and modify our plan to conform to such a system of inspection, and if agreement could be achieved, present it to the Soviets. He inquired whether such a procedure seemed suitable to Governor Stassen, and said he would like to see included in future work by Governor Stassen's group the idea of common contributions to an atomic energy pool, as suggested by Admiral Strauss.

The Attorney General commented that the creation and putting into effect of a genuine system of policing and inspection of an arms limitation plan might well require an amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Secretary Wilson said that he wanted to make the point that even if atomic capabilities had not been developed by the U.S. and the USSR, the world would still face very much the same kind of situation with respect to arms limitation that it was now facing; so the real question was what can we do to reduce world tensions and to cut down the burden of armaments. Secretary Wilson said he believed that discussion of this problem for a few months more was desirable before negotiation either with our allies or with the Soviets. Secretary Dulles replied that while there was some time still for discussion, we certainly did not have months in which to make up our mind. The President said that he was much intrigued with the idea of trying to formulate a U.S. position on policing and inspection, and thought it desirable to talk this problem over with the British.

Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the first concern of any inspection system should be directed to the inspection of bases from which atomic weapons or guided missiles could be delivered. He said that we already know something about guided missile sites. Secretary Dulles

reaffirmed his view that any study of the methods of policing were bound to have a substantial effect on the substance of any disarmament plan which we formulated.

Governor Stassen argued that he had already given a good deal of time to the problem of policing and inspection, but that he had felt that there must be some agreement on the general features of a disarmament plan before proceeding further with the details of inspection. Furthermore, all the members of the Council should be mindful of the fact that this was a solemn moment in history, when the United States had very great power indeed and when both sides have tremendous military capabilities. Accordingly, it was absolutely vital, in the light of history, that an effort be made to get control of these great potentialities.

Secretary Wilson then said that in the course of future study of inspection and policing, could we not simultaneously list, one by one, the various outstanding political issues between us and the Soviet Union and see what can be done to try to solve these problems. Smiling, Secretary Dulles turned to Secretary Wilson and said, "Charlie, what do you think I do? Did you read my speech in San Francisco?" (Laughter)

The Vice President commented that he did not believe that there was anything more important from the political point of view than the formulation of an inspection system which offered the hope of penetrating the Iron Curtain. This also would be the best propaganda position for the United States.

At this point Mr. Dillon Anderson summed up the main positions taken by the National Security Council, and the remainder of the discussion was devoted to the formulation of the Council's action on Governor Stassen's progress report.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>8</sup>

a. Noted and discussed Volume IV of the "Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament", prepared by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament in response to NSC Action No. 1411-c, in the light of the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memoranda dated June 28.

b. Agreed that the U.S., in its own interest, should, as interrelated parts of our national policy:

(1) Actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments.

(2) Concurrently make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues.

---

<sup>8</sup> Paragraphs a-d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1419, approved by the President on June 30. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

(3) Meanwhile continue the steady development of strength in the U.S. and the free world coalition required for U.S. security.

c. Agreed that the acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.

d. Noted the President's directive that the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, in consultation with the interested departments and agencies, should:

(1) Develop methods of inspection which would be deemed feasible and which would serve to determine what would be acceptable on a reciprocal basis to the United States.

(2) Modify his proposed plan as necessary to conform with the above-mentioned inspection system.

(3) Take into account in his proposed plan the suggested incorporation of the international pool of atomic energy materials for peaceful uses outlined by the President in his speech of December 8, 1953.

(4) Report his proposed plan, as modified by the foregoing, and including the methods of inspection developed under (1) above, to the President through the Council for further consideration.

*Note:* The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament for implementation.

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

**46. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, July 13, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Implementation of NSC 5507/2<sup>2</sup>

**PARTICIPANTS**

AEC—Mr. Hall  
AEC—Mr. Gardner  
S/AE—Mr. Smith  
S/AE—Mr. Farley  
S/AE—Mr. Schaetzel

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, NSC 5507/2. Secret. Drafted by Schaetzel.

<sup>2</sup> Document 14.

In answer to Mr. Smith's preliminary inquiry about steps being taken to implement NSC 5507/2, Mr. Hall said that there had been discussion of one of the principal points in the Commission, namely the amount of fissionable material that could be made available for power purposes and that the next step was a discussion between Admiral Strauss and Admiral Radford. Mr. Hall said that the AEC was thinking of an announcement of this sort which might be made at Geneva either by Admiral Strauss on behalf of the President or possibly in Dr. Libby's concluding speech. He felt that discussion of the amounts of fissionable material required would incidentally demonstrate to other countries the necessity for the power bilaterals. Mr. Smith noted that the JCS and the President had approved in principle an allocation of fissionable material for power purposes but he gathered that the point Mr. Hall was making was that it was now necessary to get down to the actual kgs required for the next several years. This was so, said Mr. Hall, and he pointed out actual transfers of material would not be required before 1957 or 1958. He went on to say that Mr. K. Davis was working on the general letter of inquiry sent over by the Department on April 18<sup>3</sup> and that in addition to other information he thought we would get a figure within thirty days on the question under discussion. As a footnote, Mr. Hall said that a definite statement on this point at Geneva might undercut the interest of other nations in developing their own gaseous diffusion facilities. Mr. Farley observed that in discussions with the Germans there was some feeling that they were putting forward suggestions for U-235 production by centrifuges with the idea that this might make U.S. amenable to selling Germany U-235.

Mr. Hall mentioned in passing the discussion he had had the previous day with the Walter Kidde representatives on the Brazilian project. He said that they had not realized in the Commission the economic difficulties created by the ten year limitation. They had asked the company for a memorandum of their proposal.

Mr. Smith asked how the AEC was coming along on the declassification of power technology. Mr. Hall said this was being considered by Admiral Strauss and would be discussed in general terms at Geneva. He felt what Admiral Strauss would say there would unquestionably ease the declassification problem.

There was a reference to the standard form power bilateral and Mr. Gardner promised he would send over the most recent draft. Mr. Hall noted that if the declassification process moves rapidly enough the necessity for a separate power agreement might be limited to the material to be transferred and we could use the standard bilateral.

---

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

Mr. Smith then asked whether the Commission had given any thought to the financing of the peaceful uses as suggested in paragraph 27 (d) of NSC 5507/2 which called for the seeking of specific appropriations in fiscal year 1957. Mr. Hall answered in the negative.

Mr. Hall mentioned the idea that had been discussed by the Belgians for installing a power reactor in connection with the Fair in 1958.<sup>4</sup> He said that Westinghouse had been approached. The Belgians were thinking in terms of a 75,000 kw station. Mr. Hall said that he would send over the correspondence on this matter.

Mr. Smith then asked whether Mr. Hall felt that the State Department was at fault for not having solicited other nations to approach the United States in connection with nuclear power, bearing in mind the policy decisions contained in 5507/2. Mr. Hall replied certainly not. He noted that the President had made the offer of the United States clear in the Penn State speech.<sup>5</sup> The immediate step was to move ahead on the research reactor program and to see that we did not fail to live up to the commitments we had already entered into. He felt it would not be prudent to push in the power field for at least a couple of months.

Mr. Smith asked what the AEC program was for implementation of the research reactor agreements. Mr. Hall said that the first thing they wish to do was to advise the Embassies formally that the bilaterals were in effect and request that each Embassy identify an officer to work with the AEC. It was agreed that it would be appropriate for such a letter to go from the State Department to the Ambassador. In transmitting a copy of the first such letter the Department might appropriately indicate that while it is expected that in the technical field the relationship would be continuing and direct between the AEC and the Embassy, however, it would be expected that the AEC would advise the Department on all foreign policy matters. Mr. Smith raised the interest of ICA, for five million dollars of their money was involved. It was thought that in time it might be necessary to set up some sort of tripartite group (State, AEC, and ICA) to consider the financial or grant problems.

Mr. Hall noted that it might be of interest to indicate some of the ideas that they had on implementation of the U.K., Belgian and Canadian agreements. Responsibility would be placed in the General Manager's office. Normal channels for classified information would be used. The general channel for information would presumably be through Hall, S/AE and abroad. Mr. Hall inquired as to whether some thought might not be given to establishing a liaison man in London

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Brussels World Fair held in 1958.

<sup>5</sup> For text of Eisenhower's commencement address at Penn State University on June 11, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 593-600.

and Brussels, perhaps jointly financed by State and AEC. AEC wants to be sure that a finger is kept on everything, especially security. Mr. Smith said that they should bear in mind that Mr. Robinson<sup>6</sup> was now a Foreign Service Officer and we could not anticipate that he would be available for more intensive work in this field, but would presumably move increasingly into the political sphere. Mr. Hall agreed with Mr. Smith's suggestion that we ought to get a man such as we presently have in Canada. As Mr. Hall saw it the task of a liaison officer in London or Brussels would be both administrative, reporting, and channeling classified material.

Returning to the question of general implementation, Mr. Hall said he was resisting the idea of putting this function in the hands of the Licensing Division. Mr. Smith inquired as to whether the Licensing people were advising Mr. Hall about arrangements such as the authorization to Walter Kidde and Company to negotiate in Brazil. Mr. Hall responded that this had been a sort of procedural breakdown. He thought we could expect improvement in the future and also that he did not believe any other licenses of this sort had been issued.

Mr. Smith asked what had been done on the 10,000 kw power reactor called for in the NSC decision. Mr. Hall said he did not know but we would have to ask Mr. Davis.

Mr. Smith noted that the contemplated Strauss speech in Geneva might raise problems with the Belgians. Mr. Hall agreed that this was so but that anything we did to carry out the NSC paper would tend to diminish Belgium's privileged position. It was a problem that had to be faced. He agreed that we certainly could inform the Belgians in advance of what was to be said.

Mr. Smith then inquired as to what was happening regarding the teams that might be sent out to maintain momentum in the program. He noted that Strauss had a somewhat negative view of this suggestion originally, while on the other hand, Mr. Hall had been somewhat favorably inclined. Mr. Hall said that he agreed that there was a value in having a man in the field who was competent to say "no" as far as excessively ambitious ideas were concerned, but he was not sure due to staff shortages that this type of consultation could be carried on in connection with the research bilaterals. Mr. Smith observed that in the next year it might be necessary to have technical people in the field.

Mr. Smith asked if Mr. Hall could tell him what Admiral Strauss intended to say tomorrow in connection with the progress report before the NSC on 5507/2. Mr. Hall replied that he wasn't sure, he thought that it was merely a question of bringing the Council up to

---

<sup>6</sup> Howard A. Robinson, First Secretary of the Embassy in Paris.



date and report that things were proceeding pretty well. It was, of course, possible that he might get into the statement to be made at Geneva.

Mr. Farley asked whether it might be possible to consider briefly and on a very preliminary basis some of the questions that were arising in connection with a common European atomic authority. He noted the support this general idea had in the Department in particular and in the entire Executive Branch and in the Congress, and also mentioned the Secretary's instructions to pursue the matter with AEC. Mr. Hall recalled that a provision had been written into Dr. Libby's speech, and while this had been deleted, AEC General Counsel, Mitchell,<sup>7</sup> still thought it might be appropriate. Mr. Smith said that there would be a security problem and it would be necessary to consider the engineering sense of any such proposal.

Mr. Hall said categorically that it would be impossible for the Belgians to cooperate in the sense of transmitting classified information, even if the other countries were to negotiate with us agreements similar to the present Belgian bilateral. He went on to question the general idea of cooperation which involved the transmittal of classified information. Mr. Farley called attention to the NATO analogy which allows highly classified American information to be transmitted to a regional group. Mr. Smith said that if we were to get along with declassification this might tend to provide a solution. Mr. Hall inquired whether in an engineering sense regionalism was a useful idea.

It was agreed that there would be a meeting on Friday,<sup>8</sup> to include EUR, with the AEC to pursue the question of European integration.

As a final question Mr. Smith asked whether there had been any disposition on the part of the AEC to speed work on the PWR. Mr. Hall said on the contrary, the Bureau of the Budget requested the AEC to make savings of one-hundred-fifty million dollars and to accomplish this the Bureau suggested that the period of development and construction of AEC reactor projects could be stretched out.

---

<sup>7</sup> William Mitchell.

<sup>8</sup> For the record of the meeting of Friday, July 15, see the memorandum of conversation, vol. IV, p. 313.

**47. Memorandum of Discussion at the 255th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 14, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3.]

*4. Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs (NSC 5431/1; NSC 5507/2; Progress Report, dated June 20, 1955, by the OCB on the subject)<sup>2</sup>*

Mr. Anderson<sup>3</sup> briefed the Council on the high points of this progress report and then asked Admiral Strauss if he wished to make additional comments (copy of Mr. Anderson's brief filed in the minutes of the meeting).

Admiral Strauss stated that on next Monday at West Milton, New York we would begin to sell electric power from the reactor there which had been the prototype for the submarine propulsion unit. The electric power generated by this reactor, said Admiral Strauss, would be sold to a private power company (Niagara-Mohawk) at the rate of three mills, fixed by the Federal Power Commission in the light of prevailing rates in this region of New York State. This meant that on Monday there would go into action the first commercial use of atomic power. Admiral Strauss said that he proposed to make as much of a play on this development as possible, stressing the theme of "swords into plowshares."<sup>4</sup>

With feeling the President expressed the hope that as a result of what Admiral Strauss had described the Administration would not be charged with selling public power to a private company. Admiral Strauss re-assured the President on this point but the President said that he wanted to be dead sure that the first statement about the West Milton project was full and contained all the facts including the fact that we had been offered as much as eight mills for the electric power but had not taken it because the Federal Power Commission had established the rate of three mills. The President again earnestly requested Admiral Strauss to see that all the facts were given to the public straight in the initial statement. If this were the case he would

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on July 15.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC 5431/1, see footnote 2, Document 13. NSC 5507/2 is printed as Document 14. The OCB Progress Report is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Atomic and Nuclear Energy.

<sup>3</sup> Dillon Anderson.

<sup>4</sup> For speeches by Senator Anderson and Strauss at the inauguration of the commercial use of atomic power at West Milton, New York, July 18, see *Atoms for Peace Manual*, pp. 533-538.

stand by what was done but he declared that he did not wish to appear to be a fool because he was not acquainted with the background.

Admiral Strauss then said there were one or two other points in the progress report on which he wished to comment. He pointed out that the cut-off date for the report was June 15 and that quite a lot of encouraging progress had been made since that time. The number of schools for foreigners who wished to study atomic energy materials had increased in numbers. So likewise had the bilateral agreements between the United States and foreign countries in the atomic energy field. Indeed, said Admiral Strauss, tomorrow we expect that the three most important ones will come into effect; namely, with the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Canada.

Also since June 15, continued Admiral Strauss, the President had approved the allocation of 100 kilograms of U-235 for the purpose of providing fuel for the reactors which were scheduled to be built in the some twenty countries with which the U.S. had reached bilateral agreements.

As for the small-scale civilian power reactor which was called for in NSC 5507/2, Admiral Strauss said there was not much progress to report because so much of the time and talent which needed to be put into the construction of such a reactor had actually been devoted to the development of the small mobile reactor for the U.S. Army. Admiral Strauss added his regret that the Atomic Energy Commission had even been given a directive to produce such a small civilian power reactor, particularly in such a short period of time. He did not believe that there was really much of a substantial demand for such small-scale power reactors.

The President expressed sympathy for the difficulties which Admiral Strauss had reported and suggested that he provide the Council in the near future with a written report<sup>5</sup> explaining the lack of progress on the small-scale civilian reactor on the grounds that the necessary time and talent had had to be devoted to the Army's mobile reactor. The President thought that the point could be made that the experience gathered from the construction of the mobile reactor would subsequently be useful in the production of the civilian power reactor.

Admiral Strauss concluded his report of additional progress by stating that the project for the construction of an atomic reactor for use in a merchant vessel which had had such great difficulty was now about to get back on the ways.

---

<sup>5</sup> Strauss' written report, entitled "Report on the Status of the Small-Output Power Reactor", referred to in paragraph 27-e of NSC 5507/2, undated, was presented to the NSC meeting on November 10. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507 Series)

Secretary Humphrey reverted to Admiral Strauss' statement about the reactor at West Milton, New York, and inquired whether the electric power generated in this reactor and sold for three mills would actually cover the production costs. Admiral Strauss replied that the operating costs were being paid by the General Electric Company, and that the reactor would be operated anyway in order to test it. The whole project had been set in operation for quite other than economic purposes, and it was particularly important to get the power reactor in operation prior to the opening of the Summit Conference. Admiral Strauss expressed the hope that while the President was at Geneva, he would also find time to take a look at the reactor which was being constructed there in time for the scientific meeting which opened on August 8.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, and an oral report by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, on developments since the Progress Report was submitted.

b. Noted that the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, would submit a written report on the background and status of the small-output civilian power reactor referred to in para. 27-e of NSC 5507/2.

*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, AEC.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>6</sup> Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1424, approved by the President on July 15, 1955. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

---

#### **48. Editorial Note**

Between July 18 and 23, the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union attended the Geneva Conference. The delegations at this Geneva "Summit" Conference, as it is usually called, were headed by President Eisenhower; Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Edgar Faure, French Prime Minister; and N. A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers.

Disarmament was the major subject of discussion at the fifth plenary meeting on July 21 and, to a lesser degree, at the sixth, seventh, and eighth plenary sessions on July 22 and 23. The most dramatic statement on disarmament was President Eisenhower's proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union should agree to supply the other with a complete blueprint of military establishments and then allow unarmed planes to fly over the other's territory and take photographs. Such reconnaissance flights, Eisenhower argued, would reduce the possibility of major surprise attack and serve as a first step toward the attainment of a comprehensive and effective system of inspection, which was indispensable for any viable arms limitation agreement. Eisenhower also urged the heads of government to instruct their representatives in the United Nations Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission to give high priority to the study of inspection and reporting. A key portion of his speech, which became known as the "Open Skies" proposal, reads:

"I should address myself for a moment principally to the Delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries possess, admittedly possess this new and terrible weapon in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world or reciprocally to the risks and dangers of surprise attack. I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, and we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves, immediately. These steps would include: To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide them to each other. Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, and so lessening the dangers, relaxing tensions, and making more easily attainable a more definite and comprehensive and better system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would, I think, be but a beginning.

"Now, from my statements, I believe you will anticipate my suggestion. It is that we instruct our representatives in the Subcommittee on Disarmament in discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to give priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting. Such a study could well include a step by step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

"The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.

“The successful working out of such a system would do much to develop the mutual confidence which will open wide the avenues of progress for all our peoples.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510)

For documentation on the conference, including the discussions pertaining to disarmament, see volume V. Additional documentation, particularly on the origins of United States disarmament proposals before the conference, is in Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, under the following folder titles: Disarmament Policy, U.S. Disarmament Proposals, Four Power Meetings (Heads of Government), Country Files—France, and Country Bilateral Conversations—United Kingdom.

---

#### 49. Note From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 29, 1955.*

The Government of the United States has considered the memorandum of the Soviet Government dated July 18, 1955,<sup>2</sup> and has the following comments to make:

1. The Government of the United States is pleased to note the readiness of the Soviet Government to deposit 50 kilograms of fissionable material into an international fund under an international atomic energy agency—the deposit to be made when agreement has been reached on the creation of such an agency.

2. The Government of the United States notes that the Soviet Government is now willing to participate in negotiations on the creation of an international atomic energy agency. As pointed out in the United States note of April 14, 1955,<sup>3</sup> the United States and other countries principally involved have been developing a draft statute for such an international agency. A copy is attached.<sup>4</sup> This draft is now under confidential study by the other nations principally involved. It is

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Exchange of Notes. Top Secret. Drafted by Gerard Smith on July 28. On July 29, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walworth Barbour gave two copies of the note to Soviet Chargé Sergei Striganov. A copy of the draft statute for the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency, dated July 6, was attached to each note. (Memorandum of conversation, August 1; *ibid.*) For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 22, 1956, pp. 625–626.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 624–625.

<sup>3</sup> Document 20.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

planned to submit a draft statute to all nations qualified to join such an energy when such study has been completed. The attached draft reflects current views as to the desirable nature of such an agency and covers various points made in the negotiations between the other nations principally involved since March 19, 1954.<sup>5</sup> Comments of the Soviet Government on such draft would be welcome. It is hoped that the Soviet Union will be one of the states sponsoring such international agency.

3. The Government of the United States notes the statement in the Soviet memorandum of July 18, 1955, that questions of the development of international cooperation in the field of peaceful utilization of atomic energy are directly dependent on the solution of the problems of reduction of armaments and the banning of atomic weapons. The Government of the United States hopes that the Soviet Government by this statement is not reverting to its earlier position that the establishment of an international atomic energy agency must be preceded by an agreement to ban the use of nuclear weapons. It is the understanding of the Government of the United States, as set out in its note of November 3, 1954,<sup>6</sup> that the Soviet Government no longer insists on such a condition. It is believed that the peaceful uses of atomic energy should not be withheld from the peoples of the world pending solution of difficult disarmament problems.

4. The Government of the United States notes the acceptance by the Soviet Government of the United States agenda<sup>7</sup> (attached to the United States note of April 14, 1955) for a joint study of the problems involved in safeguarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In view of their special competence in this field it is suggested that experts from the United Kingdom and Canada be invited to participate in such technical meeting. Early views of the Soviet Government on this point are requested.

A preliminary meeting of experts at Geneva following the United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy is agreeable to the Government of the United States. In view of competing demands on the time of these experts, it is suggested that such preliminary meeting last no longer than five days. If additional time is required, a second meeting can be called at a mutually agreeable time and place.

---

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the initiation of these negotiations, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1376.

<sup>6</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 1547.

<sup>7</sup> Printed as the enclosure to Document 20.

**50. Editorial Note**

On August 1, the United States Senate confirmed Harold E. Stassen as Deputy Representative on the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. Background of this appointment is in memoranda of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' telephone call to Henry Cabot Lodge, July 27, 5:57 p.m., and Stassen's call to Dulles, July 28, 6:22 p.m., both in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations; a memorandum of conversation by Dulles, July 27, of a meeting with the President at 9:45 a.m. that day; and a memorandum of conversation by Dulles, July 29, of a meeting held at the White House with Eisenhower, Dulles, Lodge, and Stassen on that day at 9:45 a.m. The President's draft letter to Stassen, July 28, outlining the appointment is attached to Dulles' memorandum of July 29. (*Ibid.*, Meetings with the President)

Eisenhower's draft letter of July 28 said that Stassen would sit for the United States in the forthcoming subcommittee meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. He would serve under Lodge's direction in his work relating to the United Nations, and in all other matters relating to negotiations with other governments he would be under the direction of and report to the Secretary of State. These relationships were confirmed in Eisenhower's letter to Stassen, August 5, in Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-555.

Dulles' memorandum of July 29 indicates that the President signed Stassen's nomination during the succeeding Cabinet meeting and would send it promptly to the Senate. Department of State *Bulletin*, August 15, page 264, notes the Senate confirmation of Stassen's appointment on August 1. A copy of Dulles' letter to Dag Hammarskjöld, August 23, informing the United Nations Secretary-General of Stassen's appointment is in Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-2355.



51. **Letter From the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 5, 1955.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In contemplation of the August 29th meeting of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission,<sup>2</sup> it is suggested for preliminary consideration that the position of the United States should consist of these four principal components:

1. The formal presentation to the Subcommittee, in accordance with the directive of the heads of governments at Geneva on July 23rd, of the proposals made by all of the four heads of governments at that conference.

2. A proposal, since all members of the Subcommittee have agreed that inspection, supervision, and control is a vital element of any limitation of armament or disarmament plan, that a reciprocal exchange be arranged for a small technical panel to visit examples of objects of control within each country, and to test sample methods of inspection, within each country, and from these visits, tests, and studies, to endeavor to design and recommend from the technical standpoint the most effective and feasible system of inspection, reporting, and control that might be reciprocally installed, in conjunction with a future limitation of arms or disarmament agreement.

3. Pending the outcome of the study of the technical exchange panel and of further review by the United States Government, place in a reserved and inactive status the previous United States positions (including particularly the previous United States position for the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons).

4. A suggestion that a drafting commission for the preparation of a proposed convention for an international armaments commission be constituted, with representation of each of the five members of the Subcommittee, and that this drafting preparatory commission consider the questions of membership in such international armaments commission, voting methods, relationship to the United Nations Security Council and to the United Nations Assembly, duration, right of withdrawal, and other questions involved in the drafting of a convention.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Secret. A handwritten note on another copy of this letter indicates that Stassen delivered it to Secretary Dulles in person at 11:30 a.m., August 5. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission) Stassen also wrote an identical letter to Lodge. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> The four heads of government at the Geneva Summit Conference proposed this meeting in their July 23 directive. For the second item of this three-part directive, which addresses disarmament, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1955, pp. 176-177.

Each of these four positions can be taken within the existing National Security Council policy.<sup>3</sup> Taken together, they would maintain a desirable initiative and a momentum in our work both privately and publicly, and these positions would leave a wide range of flexibility for future United States decisions and would involve no commitment as to the future position on substance.

The second proposal would also serve to test out the willingness of the Soviet Union to come to grips with the problem of inspection.

Dependent upon the response and upon an appraisal of the timing in relation to the total USSR situation, major segments of the substance of the recommended United States policy, such as a willingness for reciprocal cessation of the fabrication of additional nuclear weapons after an effective inspection system is in place, could be decided and announced by the President, the Secretary of State, or Ambassador Lodge. Such additional initiative in the unfolding of United States policy could then be followed up in the Subcommittee and the Assembly as appropriate.

Detailed position papers will be prepared on each of these suggestions, and on other anticipated proposals of the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada.<sup>4</sup>

Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to NSC Action No. 1419, taken at the NSC meeting of June 30; see Document 45.

<sup>4</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

**52. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, August 11, 1955.*

DEAR GOVERNOR STASSEN: Herewith some comments on your letter to me dated August 5, 1955:<sup>2</sup>

Paragraph 1 appears satisfactory.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Stassen's letter to Lodge, August 5, is identical to the one he wrote to Dulles, *supra*.

As regards Paragraph 2, it would be necessary to know of what the "small technical panel" would consist, how many persons, what states of origin, how selected, how brought into existence, how paid, and what type of professional competence would be demanded (industrial, military, scientific, etc.). It also raises the question as to how objects of control are to be selected—what type and number, whether military or non-military, nuclear or conventional.

Paragraph 3 appears satisfactory, subject to the reservation that I am not positive that I am acquainted with all previous United States positions. It also is not clear what effect this "inactive status" will have on former United Kingdom, French and Canadian positions. If you plan to get three-power agreement to this before August 29, you run the risk of serious delay.

As regards Paragraph 4, I suggest that it would be important to consider membership for at least one Latin American country and possibly an Asian country.

I see no mention of bilateral talks, which I think are of fundamental importance.

I am afraid that the Soviet Union may try to use either Paragraph 2 or 4 to delay and confuse the issue and thus cause us to lose the position of unprecedented advantage that the President's aerial photography proposal at Geneva has won for us.<sup>3</sup>

In disarmament talks in the past, there have been two great problems: The first was Soviet intransigence and the manifest unfairness of Soviet plans. The other has been the tenderness of the British and French towards Soviet proposals and a consequent readiness to take Soviet schemes uncritically and at face value.

At one stroke the President ended all this. The advantage which this has won for us must be maintained. This means in essence a strategy of keeping constantly focused on his proposal, of forcing the pace, of getting a decision in the Subcommittee, in the Commission, and then in the General Assembly—all at the forthcoming Tenth Session.

Our allies are, in effect, committed to the Eisenhower plan—our could easily become so if you bring this up first. Nothing, therefore, must be done to give the allies the chance to wriggle away or to let the Russians change the subject.

In one way or another we must "worry" the aerial photography proposal like a dog with a bone.

---

<sup>3</sup> For excerpts of Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal at the Geneva Conference, July 21, see Document 48. The full text of his proposal is printed in volume v, pp. 450-453.

I am thinking in terms of: 1. A report to the Disarmament Commission certainly not later than November 1; and 2. the text of a resolution on the aerial photography plan which the Subcommittee and the full Commission would support and co-sponsor when it came into the Assembly.

This resolution should then be adopted by an overwhelming vote and would become the new World Disarmament Policy—which nations would ignore only at the price of world condemnation.

It may be doubtful that you will get an agreement with the Soviet Union either in bilateral or five-power talks. But I think you will get agreement from them through the pressure of world opinion—providing it is applied vigorously and skillfully.

I know from conversations with you that you are aware of the need for speed, and I thought that it would be helpful to set before you some of the problems as they have become evident to me here and in London.

With kind regards,  
Sincerely yours,

H.C. Lodge, Jr.

---

**53. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 12, 1955.*

DEAR CABOT: Thank you for your letter of July 29, 1955<sup>2</sup> concerning the relationship of recent Soviet proposals to the draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I hope the following comment may be helpful in making preparations for the next General Assembly.

It is United States policy to have the Soviets adhere to the Statute if that can be accomplished without compromising either our national security or the President's objective to establish a genuinely effective agency to promote the peaceful uses of the atom. The differences between the recent Soviet proposals set forth in their memorandum of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Exchange of Notes. Top Secret. Drafted by David H. McKillop, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

July 18, 1955<sup>3</sup> and the provisions of the draft Statute do not seem impossible of reconciliation provided the Soviets are sincerely interested in joining an effective agency. As you know, we are awaiting a Soviet reply to our note of July 29, 1955,<sup>4</sup> a copy of which you have. The reply of the Soviets should help to clarify some of the ambiguities in their memorandum of July 18 as to the bona fides of their intentions towards the Agency.

Our note of July 29 was drafted on the basis that we would adhere to the course of action for distributing the draft Statute worked out prior to the receipt of the Soviet memorandum and which was outlined in Mr. Christopher Phillips' letter to you of July 29, 1955.<sup>5</sup>

Unless the Soviet reply should indicate that general distribution of the draft Statute would jeopardize the prospects for an early reconciliation of our differences with the Soviets relative to the Agency, we still plan to make the draft available for comment to all States eligible for Agency membership about August 21,<sup>6</sup> immediately after the Geneva Conference on atomic energy. This date would permit interested countries to consider the draft well in advance of the opening of the General Assembly.

Your comments are always welcome, and we will keep you informed of any developments necessitating a change of the policy I have outlined.

Sincerely yours,

**John Foster Dulles**<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 22, 1956, pp. 624-625.

<sup>4</sup> Document 49.

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department of State files, but a letter dated July 25 from Phillips to Lodge, reads in part:

"Plans for the distribution of the Statute are being finalized along the following lines. The United States will distribute the present Statute of the Agency, not including, however, Annex II, which lists the members of the First Board, to all states now eligible for membership in the Agency at an appropriate date during the month of August. The exact date of distribution will be determined in consultation with the Atomic Energy Commission in the light of developments at the Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses and the current state of our negotiating situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on the Agency. It is expected that plans for distribution will probably be announced at Geneva either during or immediately after the Peaceful Uses Conference. The Statute will be distributed by the Department to the Embassies in Washington for comment and simultaneously will be circulated for information by the Secretary General to the Delegations in New York. Naturally the Secretary General would have to be furnished a copy of the Statute for his information in sufficient time to arrange the distribution in New York.

"The question of whether or not the Secretary General can be furnished a copy of the Statute in advance of the Soviet Union will, of course, depend on developments in our negotiating situation with the Soviets on this matter." (Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Exchange of Notes)

<sup>6</sup> The United States distributed the draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency to other members of the United Nations and specialized agencies on August 22. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, pp. 666-672.

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**54. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 15, 1955.*

DEAR HAROLD: I have your letter of August 5, 1955,<sup>2</sup> in which you outlined a suggested position for the United States in the meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee which will begin August 29th. Perhaps it would be useful for me to comment on the points included in this position as you presented them.

1) We agree that the US should make a formal presentation of the President's July 21 proposal<sup>3</sup> to the Subcommittee, and that we should expect the other representatives similarly to put forward the proposals made at Geneva by their heads of government. In presenting the President's proposal, we should be prepared to spell it out in some detail, and to deal with its relationship to eventual broader disarmament objectives. A position paper on this subject will be required for interdepartmental review.

2) The Department agrees that a primary objective should be to focus attention on the problem of inspection. The proposal you put forward for a reciprocal exchange of pilot inspection by a panel is a good one, and the Department believes it might serve as an effective channel towards agreement on some of the technical elements of control. Here again our position would have to be worked out carefully and in some detail before the proposal is tabled.

3) We agree that pending further studies of inspection, previous United States positions on disarmament should be placed "in a reserved and inactive status", if it is agreed that this means that the United States, without either reaffirming or withdrawing these previous positions, states that it would be premature to arrive at decisions on their continued validity before we have assessed the possibilities of establishing an inspection system adequate to assure reasonable knowledge of possible violations. We might, of course, even at this time reiterate our present view that there are as of now no known inspection procedures which could provide adequate support for an agreement to eliminate atomic weapons. One consideration which must be kept in mind is that many of our previous positions have been taken jointly with the United Kingdom, France and Canada. It will be important for us to seek to the degree possible a common approach with them vis-a-vis our previous proposals. A position paper will be required on this matter.

4) It is the view of the Department that a suggestion for a drafting commission for the preparation of a convention is premature. We believe that before progress could be made in such a task it would be necessary to have considerable agreement on the responsibility and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, U.S. Disarmament Proposals. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 51.

<sup>3</sup> For portions of Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, see Document 48.

scope of an international armaments commission, i.e., what kind of inspection it will carry out or what kind of regulation of armaments system will it supervise?

5) We believe consideration of the possibility of putting forward other segments of the substance of United States policy on disarmament should be deferred pending decisions by the National Security Council and the President on such policy and in the light of the developing international situation.

6) We agree that detailed position papers should be prepared on the anticipated proposals of the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, which should include papers on elements of the Soviet May 10 proposals<sup>4</sup> as well as those put forward by the other heads of government at Geneva. Since many of these proposals, including the Soviet May 10 plan, are based on or incorporate elements of previous United States positions, it will be necessary to prepare these US position papers in the light of the comments made above in paragraph 3.

Sincerely,

Foster

---

<sup>4</sup> See Document 24.

---

**55. Letter From the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 17, 1955.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Confirming and supplementing our discussion in your office on August 3rd, I am proceeding with the implementation of the directive from the President and the National Security Council of June 30, 1955, (NSC Action No. 1419)<sup>2</sup> to design an effective, reciprocally acceptable inspection system. The cooperation of the Department of Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this continuing study will be very much appreciated. Participation in this stage of preparation of our report will not be taken to prejudice in any manner the right of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a fresh look at our comprehensive report for comment or recommended modification prior to its presentation to the President.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—NSC. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1419, see footnote 9, Document 45.

The enclosed memorandum of assignment<sup>3</sup> will indicate the specific nature of our continuing studies, and I would welcome any recommendations as to any part of this total problem which the Department of Defense would wish to submit in this preliminary stage of the preparation of a comprehensive inspection system. I would further like to request that the Department of Defense undertake to develop studies and make recommendations with respect to the military portions of the comprehensive study which I have initiated. In view of the anticipated time schedule of negotiations and of United Nations' consideration, I trust these recommendations and studies can be made available to me on or before October 15, 1955. In this connection, the attached memorandum of assignment is intended to serve as an over-all guide but should not be regarded as restrictive insofar as the military portions of the study are concerned.

It is my contemplation that the total of all the segments of inspection will be fitted together into one comprehensive inspection, communications, and reporting system, and will be submitted to the Departments and Agencies concerned for their comment at least thirty days in advance of consideration by the President.

The special task groups engaged in the inspection study under the NSC action include the following:

- Nuclear matters—Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Chairman<sup>4</sup>
- Steel—Mr. Benjamin Fairless, Chairman<sup>5</sup>
- Power and Industry—Mr. Walker Cisler, Chairman<sup>6</sup>
- Air—General James H. Doolittle, Chairman<sup>7</sup>
- Navy—Admiral Oswald S. Colclough, Chairman<sup>8</sup>
- Army—General Walter B. Smith, Chairman<sup>9</sup>
- Budget and Finance—Dr. Harold Moulten, Chairman<sup>10</sup>
- Communications—Dr. James B. Fisk, Chairman<sup>11</sup>

Specific military studies and the development of military portions of the inspection plan by the Department of Defense will be taken into account in the comprehensive inspection plan by the groups indicated above. As I have previously indicated, the Department of Defense will

---

<sup>3</sup> The memorandum, entitled "Implementation of NSC Action No. 1419", dated August 4, and an earlier draft, dated July 5, are not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—NSC)

<sup>4</sup> Professor of physics and director of the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley.

<sup>5</sup> Former chairman, president, and chief executive officer of U.S. Steel Corporation.

<sup>6</sup> President of Detroit Edison Co.

<sup>7</sup> Former aviator and vice president and director of Shell Oil Co.

<sup>8</sup> Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.), and dean of faculties at George Washington University.

<sup>9</sup> General, USA (Ret.), and vice chairman, American Machine and Foundry Co.

<sup>10</sup> Retired economist and president emeritus of The Brookings Institution.

<sup>11</sup> Vice President—Research, Bell Telephone Laboratories.



be given an adequate opportunity to comment on the results of the entire study after it has been assembled and integrated in comprehensive form.

Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

56. **Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 17, 1955.*

The Government of the United States refers to the memorandum of the Soviet Government dated August 13, 1955,<sup>2</sup> and notes that the Soviet Government is giving study to the draft statute of an international atomic energy agency transmitted with the note of the Government of the United States dated July 29, 1955.<sup>3</sup> The Government of the United States will be pleased to receive the views of the Soviet Government on this draft.

Pursuant to suggestions advanced during discussions at the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations,<sup>4</sup> the Government of the United States, which together with other governments principally involved<sup>5</sup> has developed the draft statute, considers that a stage has been reached at which it is appropriate to solicit the views of other states. It is planned that, on or shortly after August 22, copies of the draft statute will be transmitted on a confidential basis to all states members of the United Nations or of its specialized agencies in order that they may express their views.<sup>6</sup> The draft to be made available to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Exchange of Notes. Secret. Drafted by Farley. Information on the source text indicates that Stoessel gave two copies of this document to Soviet Chargé Striganov on August 17. This note is also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 22, 1956, pp. 626–627.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 626.

<sup>3</sup> Document 49.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding these discussions, which occurred during consideration of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 810 (IX), see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1551–1553 and 1578–1580.

<sup>5</sup> Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

<sup>6</sup> See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 53.

such other governments will differ from the statute transmitted to the Soviet Government on July 29 in the following two respects:<sup>7</sup>

a. Article VII(A)2 will be amended to provide that *five*, rather than four, states which are principal producers and contributors of raw materials will be selected for the Board of Governors in category 2; and

b. Annex II will list the names of the states proposed for inclusion on the first Board of Governors in categories 1 and 2. A copy of the draft Annex II as it will be distributed is attached to this note.<sup>8</sup>

With regard to the question of participation in the meeting of experts to be convened in Geneva on August 22,<sup>9</sup> the Government of the United States accepts the suggestion of the Soviet Government that experts from Czechoslovakia also participate. The Government of the United States refers to its proposal in a note dated August 12, 1955,<sup>10</sup> that experts from France be invited, and requests an early statement of the views of the Soviet Government on this proposal and the other proposals relating to arrangements for the technical meeting raised in its note of August 12.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 1, Document 49.

<sup>8</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, p. 672.

<sup>9</sup> Regarding this meeting, see Documents 58 and 61.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Exchange of Notes)

---

## 57. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 19, 1955.*

### SUBJECT

Progress on International Atomic Energy Agency

I wish to advise you of two developments in the negotiations to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency as first proposed by you in your speech of December 8, 1953, before the United Nations General Assembly.

On or shortly after August 22, 1955, a draft statute establishing such an agency will be circulated on a confidential basis to all members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies for comment. This draft statute has been developed under the leadership of Morehead Patterson and has the general agreement and sponsorship

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret.

of a negotiating group of states consisting of the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Belgium, South Africa, Australia and Portugal. A copy has already been sent to the Soviet Government, and we remain ready to negotiate with them when their comments are received.

Also on August 22, a closed meeting will commence in Geneva between our technical experts and atomic energy experts from the USSR. Experts from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Czechoslovakia will also be present. These talks will be confined to a study by experts of one objection which the Soviets have raised against your proposal. The Russians claim, in seeking to justify their reluctance to join with us in advancing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, that such uses will inevitably build up military stocks of atomic material. We say that safeguards against such diversion of material from peaceful uses of atomic energy can be devised by our scientists. Talks on this technical point should give us an opportunity to assess the genuineness of recent Russian professions of interest in getting ahead with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In view of the technical nature of these talks, Lewis Strauss and the Atomic Energy Commission are taking the lead in preparations. No "atomic secrets" will be exchanged, of course, and our representatives will avoid discussion of general questions relating to the Agency or to disarmament and the control of military uses of atomic energy.

I believe that these developments mark significant progress toward making a reality of your vision of peaceful cooperation in achieving the benefits of atomic energy.

JFD

---

**58. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 20, 1955—11:35 a.m.*

593. For Rabi, USDel Peaceful Uses Conference. Following letter instructions signed Murphy August 19:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901-GE/8-2055. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Farley.

*Begin text.*

1. I am pleased inform you you have been designated Representative of US for purpose conducting Technical Atomic Energy talks with representatives USSR which are scheduled begin Geneva August 22, 1955.

2. Following instructions presented for your guidance as US Representative. I shall appreciate your communicating substance hereof to other members Delegation.

3. Objective this Government is explore in preliminary fashion, with representatives other nations taking part this study, technical safeguards which are feasible and necessary insure nuclear fuel can be made available for reactors under auspices IAEA without prejudice to security nations of world. No assumptions are to be made about agency itself except

A. An agency will come into existence.

B. Any nuclear installations under auspices of agency shall be previously made known to agency in complete detail, such detail to include following: reactor design and operation information; fuel element design; any auxiliary chemical processing plant or fuel element preparation plant design, and operation information; means of transfer fissionable material in any form to and from installation in question.

C. Some agency system of supervision will exist.

4. Main technical emphasis of meeting will be concerned with physical security of fissionable materials and detection any violation procedures established by agency.

5. These discussions are preliminary in nature and may or may not be followed by more comprehensive discussions. Present discussions are to be narrowly technical scope and are to be limited discussion agenda presented to USSR in US Government's note April 14, 1955 accepted by USSR July 19.<sup>2</sup> Discussions should not be carried to point commitments and any discussion limitation on complete freedom of US in atomic energy field must be avoided. Any discussion of relationship agency to UN must be avoided.

6. Over-all problems of international control atomic energy, as well as problems relating to prohibition or testing nuclear weapons, are specifically to be excluded discussions.

7. There will be no discussion classified information or Restricted Data in any meetings attended by representatives USSR, Czechoslovakia, or France. In preliminary discussions involving US and UK and/or Canada, if necessary for proper coordinated planning, classified information may be discussed if commonly held.

---

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. aide-mémoire is printed as Document 20. Regarding the Soviet memorandum to the United States, dated July 18, not July 19, see footnote 2, Document 49.

8. You should obtain further instructions from Department in event above prove insufficient during course of study.

9. Upon completion talks you are requested prepare official report covering results study for submission to Secretary of State and Chairman AEC.<sup>3</sup>

10. You and your colleagues enter upon these important discussions with assurances my keen interest and wholehearted support. *End text.*

Deletion in paragraph 5 proposed Urtel 549<sup>4</sup> received too late to obtain change before signature. Suggest any desired agreements re future meetings etc. be worked out ad referendum.

Word "control" in paragraph 6 garbled in transmission Urtel 542<sup>5</sup> and correction received too late.

Following advisers designated: Davis, Staebler, English, Dodson, John Hall, Smith, William Hall, Robinson, Stevens.<sup>6</sup> Stevens included as precaution view Urtel 394.<sup>7</sup> Omission Zinn error here and will be corrected soonest.

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 61.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 549 from Geneva, August 19, Rabi and Strauss suggested the deletion of "Discussions should not be carried to point of commitments and" in paragraph 5, since the agreement to meet again might be considered a commitment. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901-GE/8-1955)

<sup>5</sup> The corrected version of telegram 542 from Geneva, August 18, specified the addition of the words "control or" after "relating to" and just before "prohibition" in paragraph 6. (*Ibid.*, 398.1901-GE/8-1855)

<sup>6</sup> The members of the U.S. Delegation were Richard W. Dodson, Secretary, General Advisory Committee, AEC; Spofford G. English, Chief, Chemistry Committee, AEC; Walter H. Zinn, Director of Argonne National Laboratory, AEC; Francis B. Stevens, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State; W. Kenneth Davis; John A. Hall; William O. Hall; Howard A. Robinson; Gerard C. Smith; and I.I. Rabi. (Despatch 16 from Geneva, August 23; *ibid.*, 398.1901-GE/8-2355)

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 394 from Geneva, August 10, requested Stevens' services through the technical talks in Geneva. (*Ibid.*, 398.1901-GE/8-1055)

59. **Letter From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 23, 1955.

DEAR MR. STASSEN: In Secretary Wilson's letter of August 10,<sup>2</sup> he promised to forward the recommendations of the Department of Defense which you had requested with respect to certain military aspects of the position of the United States Delegation in the forthcoming Disarmament Subcommittee talks. These were:

(a) Whether or not the force levels proposed by the United States in 1952<sup>3</sup> should be withdrawn during the forthcoming sessions of the Disarmament Subcommittee, or whether they may be allowed to remain in force as tentative or preliminary objectives for relative ultimate armed force personnel ceilings;

(b) A detailed definition of the term "complete blueprint of our military establishments" which could be submitted by the United States in amplification of the President's proposal at Geneva;<sup>4</sup>

(c) Comment on an approach which the United States might take to the Disarmament Subcommittee meetings outlined in your letter to the Secretary of State of 5 August 1955.<sup>5</sup>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined these problems and their views, in which the Department of Defense concurs, are contained in two memorandums dated 19 August, subject: "Disarmament Policy Planning" and "Disarmament". Copies of these documents are transmitted herewith. The first of these memorandums, subject: "Disarmament Policy Planning" deals with items (a) and (c) above, while the second memorandum entitled "Disarmament" is concerned with item (b). With reference to this latter problem, you will note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have drafted an outline plan<sup>6</sup> which is considered to be a practical step toward implementation of the President's proposal. The detailed definition of the term "complete blueprint of our military establishments" which you requested is contained in paragraph 2 a of the latter memorandum and, as indicated, this definition has been

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Military. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Inspection—NSC)

<sup>3</sup> At the 12th meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, May 28, 1952, the U.S., U.K., and French Delegations introduced a tripartite working paper proposing the fixing of numerical limitations on all armed forces. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 365-372. For additional documentation on the proposal, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 954-955 and 989.

<sup>4</sup> Contained in Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal.

<sup>5</sup> Document 51.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Military)

developed as an integral part of the Outline Plan and should not be utilized out of context. It is considered that a United States proposal based on the outline suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would, within the requirements of national security, demonstrate convincingly to the world the absolute sincerity of the President's Geneva proposal and the genuine desire that it be implemented as an initial step toward world peace.

I would appreciate your affording the Department of Defense the opportunity to comment on the detailed position papers which may be prepared, based on the recommendations transmitted herewith and those of other governmental agencies.

Sincerely yours,

Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.<sup>7</sup>

[Enclosure 1]

**Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>8</sup>**

*Washington, August 19, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Disarmament Policy Planning

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, subject as above, dated 10 August 1955,<sup>9</sup> the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the specific problem outlined in subparagraph a of the first unnumbered paragraph of that memorandum and regarding the proposals contained in the letter from Mr. Harold E. Stassen to the Secretary of State,<sup>10</sup> which was enclosed with your memorandum.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have on two occasions expressed the view that the United States should neither propose nor accede to a proposal for the establishment of a specific ceiling on the level of armed forces. Reference is made to their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense of 20 May 1952, subject "Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces,"<sup>11</sup> and of 9 March 1955, subject "British Proposal for

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>8</sup> Top Secret.

<sup>9</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>10</sup> Reference is presumably to Stassen's letter to Dulles, Document 51.

<sup>11</sup> Printed as an enclosure to Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett's letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, May 21, 1952, *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, p. 941.

Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments.”<sup>12</sup> In the May 1952 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain considerations which led them to conclude that, from the military point of view, it would not be in the best interests of the United States to introduce in the Working Committee of the Disarmament Commission a proposal for fixed numerical ceilings for the armed forces of the United States, United Kingdom, France, USSR, and China. They stated then that, if for overriding political considerations, the proposal were to be introduced, it should be clearly regarded and handled as a political expedient suitable for use only as a counter proposal to the Soviet proposition for reductions on a percentage basis, and not one suitable for implementation. In the March 1955 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting upon a British proposal for fixed numerical ceilings, referred to their previously expressed views and stated that those views were considered to be equally applicable to this proposal.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that some form of numerical limitation on armed forces will inevitably constitute one of the components of any comprehensive system for the reduction and control of armaments and of armed forces. However, the disarmament arrangement presently under consideration by the United States Government for introduction in disarmament discussions contemplates no reduction in armed forces prior to the resolution of certain of the major issues causing international tension. Rather, the arrangement now being considered envisages a Leveling Off of armaments in a first phase as a goal in itself, which might be followed by a gradual reduction of armament and armed forces to be contingent upon a parallel resolution of international issues. It would, therefore, seem inconsistent to continue to support or adhere to proposals for reduction of armed forces to fixed numerical ceilings, since this could involve the United States in commitments to details which might apply to later phases of the concept now under consideration regarding which the United States position has not yet been developed. Further, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously noted, the ceilings thus far proposed have been determined arbitrarily and bear no relation to strategic considerations or to the specific security requirements of any state. When originally introduced, the figures were suggested only as a working formula to provide a basis for discussion with the full recognition that, in fixing limitations on the armed forces of states, a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic would have to be considered. Since then, and without any real development and application of the foregoing factors, these figures, originally selected at random, have tended through usage to acquire an aspect of realism and to be viewed as definite and acceptable goals.

---

<sup>12</sup> Not found in Department of State files.



4. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraph, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would favor the withdrawal now of the United States position regarding fixed numerical ceilings on armed forces. However, they are not in a position to evaluate all of the factors which bear upon this problem and are therefore unable to judge whether it would be politically expedient for the United States to so withdraw its position. If it is deemed infeasible to take this action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, in any international discussions on this subject, the United States take the position that the ceilings proposed be treated as originally intended, i.e., as illustrative, as the basis for discussion, and as a line of departure in developing realistic force level figures should agreement on other substantive features of an arms arrangement be achieved.

5. There are no objections from a military point of view to the proposals contained in the letter from Mr. Stassen.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that detailed position papers will be prepared on each of the proposals contained in Mr. Stassen's letter. They request that they be afforded an opportunity to comment upon these papers where appropriate.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Arthur Radford**<sup>13</sup>  
Chairman

[Enclosure 2]

**Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the  
Secretary of Defense (Wilson)**<sup>14</sup>

*Washington, August 19, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Disarmament

1. Reference is made to your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 July 1955,<sup>15</sup> which requested the preparation of a practical outline to implement the broad concept of the Presidential proposal made at Geneva on 21 July 1955 regarding disarmament, and to your memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 10 August 1955,<sup>15</sup> which requested *inter alia* a detailed definition of the term "complete blueprint of our military establishments". A

<sup>13</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>14</sup> Top Secret.

<sup>15</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

reply to the remainder of the latter memorandum is being provided by separate correspondence.<sup>16</sup>

2. In approaching the problems presented in the above referenced memorandums, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were assisted by additional guidance provided by the Chairman with respect to the President's statement at Geneva. As a result, the following terms of reference for the attached outline plan<sup>17</sup> were adopted:

a. The term "blueprint of military establishments" is defined as consisting of the complete order of battle of all major land, sea, and air forces, and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations.

b. Each nation will station observers at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to verify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization.

c. Each country shall permit unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance by the other country.

3. Paramount in any consideration of capabilities for "great surprise attack" today are the long-range striking forces of both countries. Consequently, the plan for implementation of the Presidential proposal should provide for safeguards against surprise long-range attack by surveillance of such forces and their support, and measures to detect preparation for such an attack.

4. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a concept which most nearly satisfies the President's intent and your request would be an exchange of information in progressive stages from least sensitive to most sensitive, covering those items which are most likely to provide against the possibility of surprise attack. Therefore, there is attached for your consideration an outline plan which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider to be a practical step toward implementation of the President's proposal.

5. It is considered that this memorandum, together with the attached outline plan constitutes the detailed definition for "complete blueprint of our military establishments" as requested in your memorandum dated 10 August. This definition has been developed as an integral part of the outline plan for implementation of the Presidential proposal and should not be utilized out of context.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
**Arthur Radford**<sup>18</sup>  
 Chairman

<sup>16</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>17</sup> The attached outline plan, not printed, was submitted by the United States to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee on August 30 as U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/31. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 501-503.

<sup>18</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

60. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, August 25, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Advance Consultation on Meetings of U. N. Subcommittee on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Harold E. Stassen  
Mr. Sergei Striganov, Chargé d'Affaires, Soviet Embassy  
Mr. Aleksandr Zinchuk, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy  
Mr. Edmund Gullion  
Captain Donald Gladney, USN  
Mr. Walter Stoessel, State Department

The Soviet representatives called at Governor Stassen's request. Governor Stassen explained that the Secretary of State and the President desired him to consult with the Soviet representatives informally in advance of the meetings of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission beginning on August 29.

Governor Stassen referred to the successful visit by the Soviet farm delegation to his own part of the country.<sup>2</sup> Striganov reported that the Soviet Agricultural Mission was "very pleased" with its tour.

Governor Stassen said that it was his understanding that the next meeting of the Subcommittee was procedurally a continuation of the meetings which had been held earlier this year in London. According to the arrangements in effect, the chairmanship was to rotate and it was the turn of the USSR representative to take the chair for the opening New York meeting. Mr. Striganov confirmed that this was his understanding. The Governor indicated that the Subcommittee delegations would consult further to establish whether the first meeting would confine itself to ceremonial and procedural matters or would begin substantive discussion.

The Governor then stated that "in the spirit of Geneva" the U.S. Government would do its part to see that the meetings at New York would be marked by concrete and practical work which would enable us to make progress toward the goal of regulation and reduction of armaments.

He said that in conformity with the recommendations of the Heads of State meeting at Geneva, the United States Government assumed that each representative on the Subcommittee would present the proposals of his country on arms control. He noted that common to all of the proposals was an emphasis on the cardinal importance of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. Secret. Drafted by Gullion on August 26.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

inspection, although the various delegations did not have identical views on this point. The United States expected, therefore, that inspection would receive priority study in the Subcommittee meetings.

The United States would go into the question of inspection and would be prepared to explain and develop President Eisenhower's Geneva proposals. Governor Stassen noted that Premier Bulganin had said that the Soviet Government would continue to study the President's proposals. He stated that the United States, at the New York meetings and subsequently, would be glad to cooperate in such studies.

The Governor then noted that both premier Bulganin and President Eisenhower had found merit in the concept of reciprocal visits and technical exchanges between the USSR and the U. S. The recent trips of the agricultural missions were examples of successful operation in this field.

In the interest of facilitating agreement on the international control of armaments and armed forces, the United States was considering a plan for creation of technical panels of experts to test the various methods of inspection which might be employed in the control of arms and armed forces. This would involve limited test operations and reciprocal visits to specified sites within participating countries.

Governor Stassen then stated that pending further study and understanding of the role of inspection and of its capabilities and in view of the changing technological situation, the United States would consider positions it has taken heretofore in the U. N. and the Subcommittee as reserved and inactive. This means that we would not withdraw and not reaffirm the positions, but that many of them required new study in the light of the new aspects of the inspection program.

The Soviet Chargé inquired whether he correctly understood that the inspection panel idea would be discussed further at New York. Governor Stassen said that this was the case and in fact that the United States did not intend to make a formal proposal on this subject on the first day of the meeting.

The Soviet Chargé also inquired about the composition of the test inspection panels, whether they would be "mixed" or whether they would be "national" delegations.

Governor Stassen indicated that they would probably be mixed and that the membership would include members of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission.

(In the course of the interview, the Soviet representatives repeated substantially these same inquiries two or three times and it was evident that the panel proposal particularly preoccupied them.)

With respect to informing the public about the progress of the meetings, Governor Stassen said that this was a matter for discussion among all the delegations. He thought that some consideration might be given to some arrangements for briefing the press like that used at Geneva. This, however, required further study.

Governor Stassen noted that the informal and social conferences at Geneva had proved productive. He was confident that this would also be true at New York. He would like to have some members of the Soviet Delegation as his guests at an early opportunity and suggested one o'clock luncheon on Monday, August 29th. He asked if the Charge knew when the full Soviet Delegation would arrive. Mr. Stassen said that Ambassador Sobolev, the USSR Representative to the United Nations, who would be "one" of his country's principal representatives, would be in New York on the 26th. In response to the Governor's question, he said that he did not know when all persons would arrive in New York for the Soviet Delegation. He undertook to inform his Government and Ambassador Sobolev promptly in view of Governor Stassen's plans for an early meeting.

In conclusion, Governor Stassen reiterated United States willingness to cooperate in any further study by the USSR of President Eisenhower's proposals. Mr. Striganov confirmed that he had understood this point. The Governor said that in the interests of a constructive meeting he had thought such advance consultation would be useful. Mr. Striganov expressed his appreciation of this initiative.

---

61. **Letter From the Representative at the Technical Atomic Energy Talks (Rabi) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, August 27, 1955.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I herewith report completion of my assignment to represent the United States in meetings held August 22-27 with representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, USSR, UK, and U.S., for the purpose of mutual consideration of the problem of preventing diversion of fissionable material from installations devoted to the peaceful application of atomic energy.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901-GE/8-2755. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> For the U.S. position at this conference, see Document 58.

Full reports on this meeting have been transmitted during the course of the discussion by telegraph to the Department of State and the verbatim records of the meetings have been forwarded to the Department of State.<sup>3</sup> Recordings of all statements have been made and will be forwarded to the Department of State. The United Nations will bill the United States for the common costs.

Attached as appendices to this document are the following:<sup>4</sup>

- Tab "A"—Agreed-upon agenda
- Tab "B"—Representatives of participating governments
- Tab "C"—Department of State Instructions to the United States Delegation
- Tab "D"—Meeting Procedures and Arrangements

The meetings were held in the Council Chamber of the Palais des Nations on August 22, 23, 25, 26 and 27.

The text of the press releases issued in connection with meetings have been fully reported separately to the Department of State and are included in the verbatim records. The verbatim records which, as noted above, were forwarded to the Department of State, are provisional in character only and will be replaced by the final corrected verbatim records within the next ten days. These records reflect the attitudes expressed in the meetings. It may, however, be useful to add certain tentative impressions which developed from the meetings and which may not be fully reflected in the verbatim record:

1. The attitudes of the Soviet Delegation reflected the post-Geneva desire of the Soviet Government for apparent free and sympathetic relationships with the U.S., with the exception of a single meeting on Wednesday. The Soviet Representative and his advisors were careful to avoid any direct conflict of views with the U.S., leaving the door open to later agreement without however committing themselves to any of our proposals.

2. There was a continuation of the general atmosphere which was present at the atomic energy conference and in the Advisory Committee meetings which preceded the conference. A minimum of political overtones were introduced by the Soviet Delegation. When their attention was drawn to their transgression of the Terms of Reference of the meeting, they quickly withdrew or minimized such statements.

3. The Soviet Delegate reiterated at several meetings his desire for additional meetings for technical explorations of these and related problems.

4. At no point in the discussion was there any indication that the Soviet Union would not join the International Atomic Energy Agency, although no special enthusiasm was shown for the idea of an Agency. Neither was the possibility of inspection and control denied, although

<sup>3</sup> No verbatim records have been found in Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> All tabs listed were attached to the source text, but are not printed.

there was no affirmative enthusiasm for such inspection and control. There were indications that the Soviet Union might prefer an Agency whose functions were restricted to the policing of bilateral agreements.

5. The Soviet Delegates purposely or not established the impression that they were not well prepared and that their instructions were not adequate. Similarly, I gained the impression that there was a lack of coordination between the positions of Czechoslovakian and Soviet Delegations. I would make the following recommendations to the Department and the Atomic Energy Commission:

1. It would be desirable, if the Soviets requested one, to agree to another meeting.

2. If another meeting is held, it should be closely tied in with other discussions on the Agency statute with the Soviet Union. Consideration should be given to whether it would not be desirable to tie the technical discussions into the Agency negotiations.

3. In the intervening period before any such meeting, the United States Government should undertake more adequate technical preparations than had been undertaken for the current meeting. As specified in my memorandum to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated August 25, 1955,<sup>5</sup> it is recommended that an engineering study be authorized to develop in greater detail the U.S. technical suggestions outlined in this series of meetings.

4. Any future meetings in this field should be closely coordinated with the discussions on disarmament and the U.S. position in the Disarmament Commission.

5. Copies of the Verbatim Records of this meeting should be made available to the individuals currently developing the disarmament policy of the United States and determining the nature of the participation of the U.S. in an International Atomic Energy Agency. I have appreciated this opportunity to serve the United States as Representative in these discussions. If I can provide additional information or elaboration of these tentative judgments, I shall be pleased to provide it.

Sincerely yours,

I.I. Rabi

---

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

62. **Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 27, 1955.*

DEAR HAROLD: I have your letter of 17 August concerning the contribution of this Department to your comprehensive study as well as your letters which request the cooperation of the Services with the Military Task Force Groups of your staff.<sup>2</sup>

Let me assure you of the continuing cooperation of the Department of Defense and re-emphasize my determination that this Department should carry out its responsibilities with regard to the implementation of NSC Actions 1328 and 1419.<sup>3</sup> In order that these special Task Forces may receive the information they require, I have requested the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force to afford these Groups the opportunity for staff consultations and to make available information to authorized individuals as appropriate. A copy of my memorandum is forwarded herewith.<sup>4</sup> If you and your staff have additional requirements, I am sure that you will not hesitate to bring them to my attention.

I note that your major letter of 17 August requests that "the Department of Defense undertake to develop studies and make recommendations with respect to the military portions of the comprehensive study," using the Memorandum of Assignment which you inclosed as an over-all guide. We accept and welcome the responsibility, which we feel rightly rests with the Department of Defense, for the development of these military portions of the comprehensive inspection plan. The necessary staff studies are being initiated and their results will be made available to you by 15 October as you request. However, since the Department of Defense has been made responsible for drafting the technical military aspects of the over-all plan, it would appear logical that our recommendations in this respect should be incorporated in the over-all draft plan prior to its consideration as a whole by the various interested agencies of the government. Subsequently, we

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Military. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Stassen's letter to Wilson is printed as Document 55. In another letter to Wilson, also dated August 17, Stassen requested the cooperation of the Department of Defense with the Task Force engaged in the Army portion of the inspection problem. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Army) No further letters from Stassen to Wilson requesting the Services' cooperation with the Task Forces have been found.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding NSC Actions Nos. 1328 and 1419, see footnote 22, Document 7, and footnote 9, Document 45, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Dated August 27, not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Military)



would hope that the comments of the Department of Defense on the entire paper as well as those of other agencies would be taken into account prior to the drafting of a formal proposal for consideration by the President and the National Security Council. In connection with all of this, I should like to emphasize my concern, discussed with you during our recent conversation, lest the work of the Military Task Forces of your staff may duplicate and perhaps impinge upon the responsibilities of this Department referred to above.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

---

63. **Memorandum of a Conversation Among the Secretary of State, the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge), and the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen), Council of Foreign Relations, New York, August 26, 1955, 6:30 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

We discussed the matter of presenting the United States position to the United Nations Subcommittee when it meets on Monday, August 29. I said that I felt that the essential thing was to present the United States case simply so that it could go ahead to the General Assembly on simple lines comparable to those of the Soviet Union. It had a simple slogan "Ban the Bomb". We also needed something simple such as the inspection theme which President Eisenhower had presented. I did not think it useful at this stage to get into complications. In this connection, I referred to the so-called "panel" program<sup>2</sup> and said that I doubted that it was useful to present this as it would enable the Soviet to bog the matter down in discussion of details while they went ahead with their own simple "Ban the Bomb" program. It was agreed that this panel program would not be presented to the United Nations Subcommittee at this time and that the United States would, in essence, present the President's Geneva program.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on August 28.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a U.S. proposal to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee to establish a technical exchange panel composed of technically and scientifically qualified individuals from the member nations of the subcommittee who would study the problems involving inspection methods and then report back to the subcommittee. For additional information on this proposal, see Document 65.

I raised the question as to the use of the phrase "order of battle",<sup>3</sup> which had been used by Defense in the development of the President's program, and Mr. Stassen said it had been agreed not to use this phrase but rather to use the military explanation of the phrase.

We discussed the question of giving publicity to what occurred at the meeting of the Subcommittee. I reaffirmed that I felt we should not get trapped into the situation that prevailed in London when the Soviets gave the story to their own press and we felt inhibited. Ambassador Lodge pointed out that the rules as regards to privacy had been established by the United Nations itself and that the Subcommittee could not change the rules. However, I said that it was a question of construction of the rules, that lawyers often referred to the "practical construction" of the contract and that I felt that what we could plausibly argue for was for the acceptance on our side of the practical construction which had been given to the United Nations rules by the Soviet Union. It was agreed that we were to proceed along these lines.

JFD

---

<sup>3</sup> The phrase "order of battle" appears in the August 19 memorandum from the JCS to Wilson, printed as enclosure 2 to Document 59. It also appears in the outline plan which was attached to that document but is not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Military)

---

## 64. Editorial Note

The Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission held 18 meetings (51st to 68th inclusive) at United Nations Headquarters in New York between August 29 and October 7. The 50th meeting was held in New York on June 1 to assess the work of the subcommittee since it had convened in London on February 25. Verbatim records of all these meetings are in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.50-68. Several proposals, working papers, and memoranda submitted to these meetings are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, pages 498-516 and 522-528. The Second Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission (DC/71), dated October 7, is in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/1-100. A position paper on disarmament, dated September 7, for the tenth regular session of the General Assembly is *ibid.*, Lot 71 D 440, Position Papers.

65. **Letter From the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New York, August 31, 1955.*

DEAR FOSTER: In accordance with our telephone conversation yesterday,<sup>2</sup> I am forwarding to you herewith a preliminary draft of the statement I would propose to make in the Subcommittee at the future appropriate session on the presentation of the technical exchange panel to study inspection and the placing on a reserve and inactive status our pre-Geneva United States substantive positions, pending the outcome of the inspection study.<sup>3</sup>

As I indicated to you on the telephone, I have never contemplated that this technical exchange panel study would be a subject of United Nations Assembly consideration or contention, but that it would be a method of proceeding with the Subcommittee work and would apply only if the Subcommittee were unanimous.

I am not certain that you have seen the reporting cable<sup>4</sup> to the effect that the British Cabinet has given a preliminary review to the technical exchange panel study and think well of it.

It will among other things accomplish these results:

1. Provide a practical and necessary step in proceeding with the Subcommittee study of inspection.
2. Maintain United States initiative in a constructive manner in the Subcommittee.
3. Further spotlight the importance of inspection.
4. Provide an affirmative cover for the United States action in placing its outdated positions on the elimination of nuclear weapons and on rigid armed force ceilings in a reserve and inactive status.
5. Ascertain the willingness of the USSR to proceed in a practical way to study inspection methods.
6. Further open the Iron Curtain and obtain as a minimum some useful information.
7. Provide a constructive exercise in which the United Kingdom, France, and Canada can participate and ease their sense of non-participation in the President's Geneva proposal.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/8-3155. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles called Stassen in New York on August 30 at 6:15 p.m., and Stassen reported on the meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee that day. They also talked about Stassen's suggestion for a technical exchange panel representing different countries involved in inspection. Dulles said he did not mind a general statement suggesting inspection panels but objected to detailed statements on it until the basic issues were understood and accepted. He also asked Stassen to send him his conception of these exchange panels. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, August 30; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Military)

<sup>4</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

We are now consulting on the draft of the United Nations resolution supporting the President's Geneva proposal,<sup>5</sup> and at an appropriate time subsequent to the tabling and discussion of this resolution in the Subcommittee, I would anticipate making the statement along the lines of the attached draft.

Sincerely yours,

**Harold**

---

<sup>5</sup> For the U.S. proposal, entitled "Outline Plan for the Implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva Regarding Disarmament" (U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/31), see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 501–503.

---

**66. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 1, 1955.*

DEAR HAROLD: I have your letter of August 31<sup>2</sup> and enclosure.

I remain convinced that it will militate against the President's program if we go out for this panel proposal on the scale and to the degree your draft suggests. I would see no objection to setting up a group to study inspection methods and that group would probably use the material which I understand you are having prepared through your own panels.

However, to go on and give the study group authority themselves to become a pilot plant inspection group in the five countries<sup>3</sup> seems to me to be so spectacular and so farreaching that it will greatly dilute attention to and interest in the President's proposal. Also, I fear there would be criticism of a proposal which gave the Soviets access to four countries whereas we would only have access to one.

It is my view that anything done now or in the near future until the President's plan has been adopted by the UNGA should be limited to study along the lines contemplated by the middle paragraph on

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force. Secret. Dulles also sent a copy of this letter to Lodge at the United Nations.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> The five countries mentioned in Stassen's proposal were the member states of the subcommittee: the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

page 3,<sup>4</sup> and that the study group should not be authorized themselves to operate as inspection teams in the different countries even on a sample basis.

I have necessarily dictated this hastily as I leave, and Mr. Hoover, who is familiar with my views, can follow up, if needed.

Sincerely yours,

Foster

---

<sup>4</sup> This middle paragraph reads:

"How, then, shall we proceed with our work? The United States Delegation has a suggestion to make. It is that we here in this Subcommittee do unanimously agree to establish a technical exchange panel with specific terms of reference to study the inspection methods and to report back to this Subcommittee within a fixed period of time." (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Military)

---

67. **Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 9, 1955.*

DEAR HAROLD: This is in reference to our recent conversation<sup>2</sup> on the matter of the views of the Department of State and the Department of Defense on the proposal for a Technical Exchange Panel, which was the subject of the Secretary's letter of September 1, 1955.<sup>3</sup>

We have now consulted with the Department of Defense on this matter and it is agreed that the following express our combined views:

1. The United States should propose in the Disarmament Subcommittee that there be established a study group composed of technically and scientifically qualified individuals from each of the countries represented on the Subcommittee. This group would study inspection methods and report back within a specified period of time to the Subcommittee. Such a group might be called a "Study Group on Inspection and Reporting Techniques".

2. No proposal should be made at this time for a Technical Panel which involves exchange of visits and field testing of inspection methods at actual installations.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

In connection with the problem of providing the delegation with concerted guidance, and to avoid your getting conflicting views during the Subcommittee meetings, let me suggest that the Department of State should coordinate with the other interested agencies in order that you may receive cleared government positions.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

---

**68. Letter From the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen) to the Acting Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 13, 1955.*

DEAR HERBERT: Thank you for your letters of September 9th and 12th.<sup>2</sup>

In view of the position of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, currently no proposal will be made for a technical panel which involves the exchange of visits and field testing of inspection methods at actual installations.

Under these circumstances, I believe it is better that the United States should make no proposal of any study group at the present time until we see what the Soviet reaction may be to the Eisenhower plan, as the proposal of an anemic study group will militate against getting a favorable Soviet response to the Eisenhower plan and would weaken the United States position in world opinion. In this connection, I would appreciate it if State would give careful consideration to an interesting alternative advanced by Mr. Berding<sup>3</sup> of USIA at the last meeting of the President's Special Committee on Monday, September 12th.<sup>4</sup> He suggested that the technical panel should be specifically

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-1355. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Hoover's letter of September 9 is *supra*. His letter of September 12 has not been found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> Berding proposed an aerial test inspection within the framework of the President's Geneva proposal which is set forth in an attachment to a memorandum of September 14 from Joseph S. Toner, Executive Secretary of Stassen's Special Staff on disarmament problems, to the Special Staff. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Aerial Inspection)

<sup>4</sup> The President's Special Committee, consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice; AEC; CIA; JCS; and USIA, was established in accordance with Presidential instructions transmitted to Stassen by letter of August 5. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 330.13/8-555)

asked as its first move to exchange blueprints on one port and one airdrome, and then exchange aerial photography of that same port and same airdrome. It was his view that this would add to the world-wide pressure for acceptance and implementation of President Eisenhower's proposal, and it would be very favorable for United States opinion objectives on a world level.

With reference to the last paragraph of your letter of September 9th, I believe it is quite clear that it will facilitate the work of the United States in this field if we continue in accordance with the original National Security Council action<sup>5</sup> and in accordance with the President's letter setting up the special inter-departmental committee, and work out the coordinated positions through this means rather than place this burden upon the Department of State. In other words, I believe the President's letter, which was carefully worked out with Secretary Dulles, Secretary Wilson, Ambassador Lodge, and the President, is the right and wise way to proceed, and the functioning of the Special Committee which has been established has already demonstrated to such in its initial stages.

With reference to your letter of September 12th, my cable No. 267<sup>6</sup> of the same date to you, which crossed your letter, indicates the manner in which I am proceeding in accordance with our conference to enlist United Kingdom support and joint action, and I will today in legend form indicate the type of action the United States will contemplate in support of the Eisenhower proposal, but without tabling a resolution and leaving flexible room for maneuver of the United States in relationship to its Western associates and the U.S.S.R. between now and the December action contemplated in the General Assembly.

Sincerely yours,

**Harold**

---

<sup>5</sup> Reference presumably is to NSC Action No. 1419, especially subparagraph d. Regarding NSC Action No. 1419, see footnote 9, Document 45.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 267 from New York, September 12, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9-1255)

**69. Memorandum for the File, by the Secretary of State's  
Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 14, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Discussion with Dr. Rabi—Technical Planning for IAEA

Dr. Rabi came in to discuss where we go from here in the matter of technical planning for the IAEA. I suggested that while the engineering study was going forward in the AEC<sup>2</sup> we needed a parallel political study on the feasibility of various methods of controlling the diversion problem. He agreed and expressed the hope that the bilaterals<sup>3</sup> would merely be interim to an ultimate multilateral approach. I pointed out that the multilateral approach should be such as to ultimately be evolveable into a comprehensive international system of the control of atomic energy. Rabi said that we must get these controls working before our reactors are constructed abroad. He believed that even a country like India, when it had some plutonium production, would go into the weapons business.

I asked him if he thought it would be feasible to require nations receiving assistance from an agency to renounce the rights to construct weapons. He thought not, saying this would have to be done by some collateral agreement which he thought would only be successful if it was universal.

Rabi felt that we shall be designing our own reactors so that diversions therefrom could be easily detectable and that reactors which we might build abroad under bilaterals should also be so designed. I pointed out that I believed that no thought had been given to this problem in the current design activities of American manufacturers.

Rabi pointed out the sources of strength in the present American position—not only that we had a near monopoly of enriched material but also our ability to lend technological help. Unless we see to it that controls are established during this present preliminary stage, he believes that the situation will shortly get out of control. He expressed the opinion that the Russians had a community of interest in controlling this question with us.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Control and Inspection. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 61, recommendation 3.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to agreements for cooperation in civil uses of atomic energy between the United States and individual countries, which were authorized under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.



He asked about the possible overlap between our efforts to set up controls and the work of Stassen's technical panels. I told him I had made inquiry as to what they were doing and would let him know but that I felt we had one segment of the problem and it would admit of separate treatment from that of the over-all disarmament problem.

I undertook to have the State Department request AEC to make the engineering study which Rabi has proposed.

---

70. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, September 19, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

President's Proposal in Disarmament Subcommittee

PARTICIPANTS

S—The Secretary

U—Mr. Hoover

S/P—Mr. Bowie

IO—Mr. Wainhouse

JCS—Admiral Radford

Defense—Mr. Gordon Gray

Gov. Stassen<sup>2</sup>

Col. Firehock

Admiral Radford stated that he was concerned about the British, French and Canadian attitude on wanting to broaden the President's proposal to include countries other than the US and USSR. He felt that to include other countries before the President's plan was agreed to and put into operation would open the gateway to a host of problems and bog down the plan.

The Secretary stated that the President's proposal is not an answer to the disarmament problem and was never offered as such. He was concerned about how terribly complicated the matter had become. His effort now must be directed toward getting the President's proposal back on the tracks.

The Secretary stated that he did not think we could get a resolution on the President's proposal through the General Assembly without loading the proposal down with amendments and splitting us off

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9-1955. Secret. Drafted by Wainhouse.

<sup>2</sup> A notation on the source text indicates that Stassen and Firehock joined the meeting later.

from the UK, French and Canadians. To press forward with a resolution, he went on to say, would be premature and would get us into difficulties. There are many implications of the plan about which we are not clear and which we must think through.

Admiral Radford commented that the President's proposal got off the tracks because it was being discussed in the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament although it is not a disarmament problem. Moreover, he could not understand why the British regard their not being included in the plan at this juncture as detrimental to their prestige.

The Secretary referred to a conversation which he had with Sir Robert Scott<sup>3</sup> who expressed two concerns which the British have—one is that we might get out of Europe, and the other is that we might deal directly with the Soviets.

Mr. Gray stated that Defense and State are being called upon to give answers to terribly difficult questions with "dreadfully short deadlines", referring particularly to the pressure which was placed upon him in connection with getting out the Outline Plan for the Implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva.

Admiral Radford shared Mr. Gray's feelings about being given dreadfully short deadlines and stated that the Outline was whipped out in a hurry. He saw no objection to using this Outline as a working paper but it had never occurred to him that Mr. Stassen wanted to use the paper as document in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. The Outline as introduced in the Subcommittee, he remarked, omitted the last two paragraphs, one of which was important.<sup>4</sup> [Admiral Radford was referring to the following paragraphs: "*Limitations*. It is recognized that world-wide implementation of this outline plan would eventually involve inspection of forces and facilities outside the continental limits of the US and the USSR, and that such would necessarily be contingent upon the consent of the governments concerned; *Future Procedure*. Upon successful accomplishment of the herein-described actions, procedures may be agreed upon for further exchanges of information of more sensitive nature, based upon demonstrated proof of good faith."]<sup>5</sup>

[At this point Mr. Stassen and Colonel Firehock joined the meeting.]

Mr. Stassen stated that the Soviets in the Subcommittee were showing unusual reserve and respect for the President's proposal. He did not know whether this was due to a desire not to tangle with the President because of the world-wide popularity of the proposal or for some other reason. The Soviets seemed to be afraid that the adoption

<sup>3</sup> Minister of the United Kingdom in the United States.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding the U.S. outline plan, see footnote 17, Document 59.

<sup>5</sup> All brackets are in the source text.

of the President's proposal would not lead to reduction of armaments. He wondered whether that fear was not heightened by the speech which Secretary of the Air Force Quarles made on September 2, 1955.<sup>6</sup> Mr. Stassen stated that there was great need for care on the kind of speeches government officials make on disarmament.

Mr. Stassen went on to say that our Allies are seriously concerned about the impact of the slogan "Ban the Bomb". Public opinion in European countries has been enamoured with the slogan. It is for this reason that Mr. Nutting (UK) has suggested that a committee of scientists be appointed to study the matter of inspection and control of nuclear weapons. This would allay the fear that the President's proposal means giving up the quest for a control system which would include the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Stassen reported that the task forces expect to bring in their segmental reports by the middle of October. He will then develop a comprehensive report to submit to the interested departments for comment and after that take up the comprehensive report in the NSC.

Mr. Stassen asked whether the Secretary expected him to go to Geneva. The Secretary assumed that the disarmament item will arise sometime in the middle of November and said that Mr. Stassen should be in Geneva.

Mr. Stassen stated that the Subcommittee would make a report to the Disarmament Commission and that the Disarmament Commission would report to the General Assembly after Geneva. He inquired whether the Secretary anticipates a report from the Subcommittee for Geneva. The Secretary gave no indication of his views on this.

Mr. Stassen referred to the press problem and said that the Allies, from the very first, were and continue to be sticky about our press policy.

Mr. Stassen said that he would like Ambassador Amos Peaslee to join him as a senior adviser. Ambassador Peaslee has broad international experience and it would be helpful if he, Stassen, could get him on his staff.

The Secretary showed Mr. Stassen the section on disarmament in his UN speech. The Secretary incorporated various suggestions that were made.<sup>7</sup>

The Secretary said that the real approach to the disarmament problem is to create conditions where armaments haven't got the same utility. He does not believe that nations do anything which is not in their vital interest and what we must do is create conditions that

---

<sup>6</sup> Quarles' speech is summarized in *The New York Times*, September 3, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Secretary Dulles addressed the U.N. General Assembly on September 22 during the general debate phase of proceedings. For text of his address, see *Department of State Bulletin*, October 3, pp. 523-529.

would eliminate the need for the use of armaments. The idea that we would do anything to give up our armaments as such is not in our national interest.

Mr. Stassen commented that if you adopt the Eisenhower proposal and have no agreement on attacking forces you would eliminate the virtue of the proposal. That is why you have to go on with armaments limitation.

The Secretary reverted to his doubts about a resolution in the General Assembly. He said that originally he thought that such a resolution would be desirable and was not now excluding the idea of a resolution. Mr. Stassen said that he would not write-off the idea of having a resolution and that Ambassador Lodge also wants it. Mr. Wainhouse suggested that the matter of tabling the resolution should await the outcome of the Geneva Four Power discussions. We could then assess all the considerations, to see whether a resolution should be tabled. The Secretary expressed the view that the Soviets will not buy the Eisenhower proposal. He felt that they are going to finesse it and that they do not want to do anything that would offend President Eisenhower.

Mr. Wainhouse raised the question of coordinating the Government's position on the disarmament problem while Mr. Stassen was in New York operating in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. Mr. Wainhouse felt that the State Department should coordinate such positions with the other interested agencies. Mr. Stassen, however, felt that this should be done by the President's Special Committee. There was no opportunity to discuss this point further since Mr. Stassen was obliged to leave to catch a plane for New York.

---

## 71. Editorial Note

On September 19, N.A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, wrote to President Eisenhower on the subject of disarmament. Bulganin's letter reviewed the discussions on disarmament at the Geneva "Summit" Conference and in the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and he expressed his disappointment at the lack of progress in the subcommittee negotiations. Bulganin then wrote:

"I must frankly say that the delay is occasioned to a considerable degree by the fact that the members of the subcommittee so far do not know the position of the representative of the United States with regard to those provisions which we had all the grounds to consider as

agreed. As is known, the representative of the United States completely put aside the questions of reduction of the armed forces, of armaments, and prohibition of atomic weapons, having expressed the desire to discuss first of all and mainly your proposal concerning the exchange of military information between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. as well as of the mutual exchange of aerial photography of the territories of both countries. In this manner the impression is left that the entire problem of disarmament is being confined by him to these proposals."

Bulganin went on to review Eisenhower's proposals presented at the Geneva Conference on aerial photography and the mutual exchange of information on their armaments and armed forces, and he set forth reservations and objections to these proposals. He then advanced suggestions on the levels of armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and he renewed the Soviet proposition contained in its proposal submitted to the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission on May 10 for the creation of control posts at key transportation facilities "designed to prevent dangerous concentration of troops and combat equipment on large scale and thereby remove the possibility of sudden attack by one country against another."

Bulganin's letter was delivered by Soviet Chargé Striganov to Acting Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr., on September 20 for transmittal to the President, who was then vacationing in Colorado. The original of this letter (in Russian) is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-1955. The English translation was sent in to President Eisenhower in telegram 510, September 20. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/9-1955) For text of the letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, pages 644-647, or *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, pages 516-521.

Eisenhower suffered a heart attack on September 24 and therefore sent only an interim reply to Bulganin on October 11. (*Ibid.*, pages 528-529) He did not send a more complete reply until March 1, 1956; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1956, pages 514-515, or *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, pages 593-595. Even so, Bulganin's September 19 letter and Eisenhower's October 11 response initiated an exchange of many letters on disarmament between the two heads of government which continued through March 1958, when Nikita S. Khrushchev succeeded Bulganin as Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers.

**72. Memorandum of a Staff Meeting, New York, September 21, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. Stassen made the following points:

1. The Soviet did want to get Five Power agreement on goals for reduction and elimination. This letter<sup>2</sup> admits that they haven't succeeded and shows that our tactics have been successful.

2. Therefore, they have to come in on a discussion of the President's proposal and try at that level to swing the discussion back to May 10.

3. There are three questions: What does the Secretary of State say tomorrow?<sup>3</sup> Should it be released? What kind of an answer does the President give and when does he give it?

4. Mr. Stassen felt that there should be no early release of it; that the Secretary of State if it had been released should counter it by counter arguments and that the President should not get into negotiation by letter.

5. Stassen said that they are tapering off on elimination and using prohibition of use. The letter does not bring up political issues. There is no need for a hurried response. We can easily surmount this one. This is definitely an answer to the Eisenhower proposal.

6. Stassen would not recess the Sub-Committee because of the implication that the Soviets would wish to place that we were stalling. There is no need for a comprehensive plan. We would never have gotten a letter if they hadn't felt we had made headway. They really don't hit the bases question as the staff thought they would. We have them admitted that they want to move on reductions and they admit that they can't. Allies will be easier to handle with this than they were before. This is not a rejection. It is continuing negotiation. Our reaction should be reserved. If the Five Powers had agreed on everything the Soviets had wanted, think what adverse reaction throughout the world regarding a unilateral let-down by the free world. Fact is we have them talking now about aerial photography.

7. Secretary Dulles didn't quarrel with HES' analysis of the Bulganin memo. He favored the simplicity of the Eisenhower proposal and wanted to keep out ground troops.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Name File—Official Correspondence—Matteson. No drafting information or list of participants is given on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> See the editorial note, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding Dulles' address, see footnote 7, Document 70.

73. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 22, 1955—6:01 p.m.*

197. For Stassen. Following replies Sobolev and Moch questions (your 312)<sup>2</sup> now approved State, Defense and AEC.

Sobolev second question:<sup>3</sup>

1. "This question of the Soviet delegate, it would appear, might have two different premises. If the question assumes that the USSR and the US have agreed to the Eisenhower proposal and have proceeded to implement this proposal and that a general disarmament convention is being drafted with many states as parties to it (including members and non-members of the United Nations), and if the question then seeks information as to whether it is the view of the United States that aerial reconnaissance should be a part of the inspection and control over all states in such a disarmament convention, the answer is affirmative. The United States believes that aerial reconnaissance is an essential part of the permanent inspection and control procedures over all states in a permanent disarmament convention.

2. But if the question of the Soviet delegate is directed toward the initial proposal of the President, then I wish to make it clear the President's proposal is that a beginning should be made by agreement between the USSR and the United States within the framework of the United Nations for an exchange of military blueprints and of aerial reconnaissance, including photography, from one end to the other of each country. It is this proposal as further described in this subcommittee which constitutes the gateway through which progress can be made toward the limitation and reduction of all armaments and armed forces.

3. The United States believes further that the agreement between the USSR and the US putting the President's plan into effect without delay might also provide for the adherence and participation, as agreed, of designated countries on an equitable basis once the plan is in operation between the USSR and US.

4. The United States further believes that, as soon as the plan is in operation, the countries participating in it and other states concerned might proceed at once to negotiate concerning the participation and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9-1955. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wainhouse and Spiers.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 312 from New York, September 19, gave the draft of proposed answers to Sobolev's and Moch's questions in the subcommittee. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Sobolev's second question asked:

"Is the aerial reconnaissance to be confined to the territories of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, or is this form of control to extend also to the other States parties to the disarmament convention?" (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.59, p. 19)

contribution which countries, including members and non-members of the United Nations, other than those originally designated, may make on an equitable basis."<sup>4</sup>

Moch question:<sup>5</sup>

"As I have explained in my reply to Mr. Sobolev, the proposal of the President is directed toward providing against the possibility of a great surprise attack of any kind with any weapons."

With respect Sobolev first question<sup>6</sup> following answer formally approved AEC this morning and is concurred in by State and Defense:

"The proposal of the President is directed toward providing against the possibility of great surprise attack. For this purpose, necessary information regarding all weapons, including atomic, hydrogen, conventional and other types, would be exchanged. Such details as numbers, characteristics, and designs of nuclear weapons, which details do not bear on the President's immediate objective—prevention of a great surprise attack—would not be exchanged. Other precise and specific information to be exchanged would be a matter of exact agreement between us, under the principles enunciated by the President. The information would be reciprocally exchanged in progressive stages. The acceptance by the Soviet Union of the President's proposal would then lead to detailed negotiations. There would be very many important details but we are confident we could reach agreement on details, because the acceptance of the proposal itself would be evidence that we both have the same objective in this matter, we have similar information, related problems, and a common interest in providing against the possibility of great surprise attack."

We prefer language contained in para 3 of reply to Sobolev's second question as quoted above to that suggested urtel 323.<sup>7</sup> Con-

<sup>4</sup> Stassen used almost the exact words of paragraphs 1-4 when he responded to Sobolev's second question at the 63d meeting of the subcommittee, September 23. (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.63)

<sup>5</sup> Moch's question was:

"I wonder whether the United States representative can clarify a point for me. Several times in his statement he stressed that this plan would make it possible to prevent a surprise attack. Similar formulae occur in the Soviet note of 10 May, but in the latter the surprise attack was regarded as a concentration of troops and conventional matériel possibly supporting a thermonuclear attack. Is the United States representative using the expression "surprise attack" in this sense or does he also include attack in a possible future war, a war which might be conducted by means of thermonuclear weapons only without employing conventional armaments?" (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.59, pp. 12-13)

<sup>6</sup> Sobolev's first question reads:

"It is important that we should receive some clarification as to whether the part of President Eisenhower's proposal dealing with the exchange of information about armed forces, which Mr. Stassen has introduced in the Sub-Committee, covers information about atomic and hydrogen weapons as well as conventional armaments." (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.58, p. 16)

<sup>7</sup> The reply to Sobolev's second question in telegram 323 from New York, September 21, reads:



cerned that UK, France, Canada, etc. will interpret this as allowing them to participate in negotiations on President's proposal from out-set.

Hoover

---

"The proposal of the President was directed toward providing against the possibility of a great surprise attack of any kind and by any weapons, whether primarily by land or sea or air or by a combination of all three, whether primarily against one nation or another nation or a group of nations. It is the view of the United States that the possibility of a great surprise attack must be provided against in the context of all weapons of today as well as in the context of future weapons which can now be foreseen. Peace is the objective. The assurance that there will be no great war any more is the aim. A great surprise attack would certainly mean war. The prevention of a great surprise attack would be an important assurance of peace. This is the purpose of the proposal of President Eisenhower." (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9-2155)

---

74. **Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, September 27, 1955.*

DEAR HAROLD: The Department of State agrees with the belief you express in your letter of September 13, 1955<sup>2</sup> that there should be no proposal for a technical study group made in the Disarmament Subcommittee at this time. The Department believes that consideration of the Technical Exchange Panel, as well as Mr. Nutting's suggestion for a scientific committee to study the problem of inspection as it relates to the feasibility of elimination of nuclear weapons,<sup>3</sup> should proceed in the President's Special Committee on Disarmament problems. The desirability of putting forward either of these ideas could be reassessed later in the light of developments in the Subcommittee.

We concur also in the decision reached at the meeting of the President's Special Committee on Monday, September 19, in respect of Mr. Berding's suggestion for a limited tryout of blueprint exchange

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Document 68.

<sup>3</sup> Nutting, who discussed his proposal with the Western delegations to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission in late September, formally introduced it to the subcommittee on October 7. The proposal asked the subcommittee to "consider setting up a group of eminent scientists representing each of our five countries" to investigate and report on the problem of prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. For Nutting's proposal, see U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.68, pp. 13-15)

and mutual aerial photography,<sup>4</sup> that no action on this proposal be taken now but that the Special Committee keep it under review.

With reference to the next to the last paragraph of your letter, the Department believes that in providing guidance or in answering queries you put to us from New York it should undertake to coordinate with the Department of Defense and the AEC, so that these communications may be regarded by you as constituting interdepartmentally cleared positions. The suggestion is not intended to duplicate the functions of the Special Committee, but only to provide a procedure for rapid handling of communications with you in New York.

Sincerely yours,

**Herbert Hoover, Jr.**

---

<sup>4</sup> Berding's suggestion is discussed in Document 68. No formal record of the meeting of the President's Special Committee on September 19 has been found in Department of State files.

---

**75. Memorandum for the File, by the Secretary of State's  
Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 27, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

President's Proposal File<sup>2</sup> —Discussion with Mr. Hoover

On September 27 Mr. Hoover advised me that he had discussed the ICA<sup>3</sup> proposal for handling the financing of the President's research reactor plan with Hollister and Strauss. He said that the President had determined that all atomic energy matters would be handled by the Atomic Energy Commission. He said that a number of agencies were trying to get into the atomic energy business. He feels that the matter should be centralized in AEC and if it needed advice it would obtain it from ICA. He said that he had told Strauss that he had better organize for this job because we could not stop other people from trying to get into the act forever.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Power and Research Reactors. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> A handwritten notation above the preceding three words in the source text reads: "Research reactor implementation."

<sup>3</sup> The International Cooperation Administration was a semiautonomous organization in the Department of State established by Executive Order 10610 of May 9, to administer foreign aid.

I pointed out that we could work out a program under any organizational set-up chosen. However, I pointed out that Strauss has historically been negative on foreign atomic energy activities and that if the President's program was to avoid a negative implementation the AEC would have to reform. I pointed out the delays which AEC allows in certain cases involving international problems.

---

**76. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, September 28, 1955—1 p.m.*

340. From USDel Disarmament Subcommittee. Re: Summary Four-Power meeting<sup>2</sup> afternoon 27 September, Moch chairman.

Moch recounted highlights of personal conversation with Malik and Soviet Delegation who inquired if four Western powers had as yet discussed Bulganin letter.<sup>3</sup> Moch replied negatively. He further stated Soviets are anticipating early discussion of letter. Soviets inquired why Bulganin letter was released to press. Soviets further expressed concern three Western Foreign Ministers are meeting in New York and wondered why this could not be extended include Mr. Molotov. Moch's reply was this would be premature at this time.

Moch asked Soviets specific questions with following answers: was aim of Bulganin letter to place discussions on bilateral basis? Soviet replied in negative and stated letter was distributed to French and British as well. Moch inquired about use of words "prohibition of use" of nuclear weapons rather than "elimination". Did this indicate a change in Soviet position? Soviets startled, and asserted they did not attach so many shades of meaning to words and that their position remained specifically as May 10 proposal. It was Moch's view that Soviet answer was sincere.

Soviets were asked if aerial inspection could be effective as a system of control. Reply was they stood on their May 10 proposal as best system of control which would be effective perhaps until intro-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9-2855. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the four Western powers, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France, represented on the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. These four powers met on a regular basis during the meetings of the subcommittee to discuss developments in the subcommittee and try to develop agreement in advance on positions to be taken at future subcommittee meetings.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 71.

duction of guided missiles. Moch asked if letter indicated that agreement could now be reached on such subjects as levels of armed forces if discussion of methods of control of elimination of nuclear weapons were set aside. The answer was "no", that entire problem must be discussed and agreed upon comprehensively.

Nutting (UK) observed that any establishment of force levels must be geared to requirement for support of retaliatory nuclear airpower.

Stassen stated that decision to publish Bulganin letter was agreed between Molotov and Secretary Dulles to avoid unfortunate conclusions that might arise as result of piecemeal release or leaks to press.

In reply to a question by Stassen, it was Moch's view that Malik would not head up subcommittee delegation and Nutting added Malik had told him he contemplated one more month's stay.

Regarding possibility earlier advanced by UK of private meeting of subcommittee to discuss Bulganin letter, it was UK belief upon reflection that it might be inappropriate at this time. Rather than ask Soviets blunt question of whether or not they have abandoned elimination of nuclear weapons, we should wait until such time as we have prepared a Western position on levels of arms to include retention of nuclear weapons and ask them for Soviet view.

Regarding continuance of subcommittee meetings, British view that continuance beyond 8 October would unnecessarily subject us to Soviet attempts to split Western position. This would place US in precarious position since many of our views remain unreconciled. Schedule proposed by Nutting would be: Adjourn subcommittee 8 October, subcommittee report to be available to Foreign Ministers at Geneva and to Disarmament Commission immediately afterwards. Interim report to contain proviso that a postscript would probably be added as result of Foreign Ministers meeting.

Stassen preferred not to submit subcommittee report to Disarmament Commission until after the Geneva meetings because of unfortunate de-valuing effect it would have on meeting of Foreign Ministers. Moch suggested as compromise that informal report be sent seven other delegates to Disarmament Commission, who could be studying it prior to final official report. Moch considered here important subcommittee meetings continue without recess because of possibility adverse public opinion might draw conclusion shutdown was result of either President's illness or effect of Bulganin letter.

Essential we keep moving forward and maintain flexibility of position. Moch most anxious introduce his synthesis into subcommittee or GA. Would prefer Four-Power concurrence but is prepared go it alone. Nutting suggested continued consultations on part of four powers as substitute for subcommittee sessions to consolidate views already near agreement. Nutting observed British public opinion at present time is prepared to accept fact elimination of nuclear weapons is

impossible. Stassen extended invitation to four Western powers for Air Force briefing on aerial photography. Discussion of Western power views of Italian approach to disarmament subject of separate telegram.<sup>4</sup> For subcommittee meeting 28 September, Moch will review various aspects of prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Stassen saw no objection to Moch or Martin<sup>5</sup> referring to Bulganin letter in subcommittee, but in view of President's illness and consequent absence of specific Presidential comment thereon, he did not wish table it at present time.

Tentatively planned on subcommittee meeting Friday, September 30, as well.

Lodge

---

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 339 from New York, September 27, summarized the possibility of Italy having closer association with the subcommittee. Stassen raised and supported the idea. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9-2755)

<sup>5</sup> Paul Martin.

---

77. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 261st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 13, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. *Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy<sup>2</sup>*

At the outset of his remarks the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission indicated that he had brought with him colored photographs of the highlights of the exhibition at Geneva which he would show to the Council at the end of his statement.

After pointing out that the Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses had been initiated by the United States at the Bermuda Conference in 1953, and had been "adopted" by the United Nations in 1954, Admiral Strauss said he believed that the success of the Conference had resulted largely from the new climate of opinion which had emerged from the preceding Heads-of-Government Conference in July at Geneva.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on October 14.

<sup>2</sup> The Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva, Switzerland, August 8-20. For Strauss' public statement on the results of this conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 10, 1955, pp. 555-559.

Admiral Strauss went on to point out that the Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses was probably the largest scientific gathering that the world had ever seen and was certainly the largest conference ever sponsored by the United Nations. Eleven hundred ten (1110) scientific papers had been presented during the fourteen days in which the Conference was in session. The U.S. Delegation, consisting of 287 scientists, had been carefully selected not only for scientific competence but also with an eye to the suitability of the members to obtain security clearances. The dropping of . . . had been necessitated by his inability to secure a "Q" clearance. . . .

While making it clear that the U.S. Delegation had not gone to Geneva in order to win prizes, Admiral Strauss said that our United States exhibit was certainly the largest and most impressive. Next in order was the Russian exhibit which Admiral Strauss found more interesting than the British exhibit. The French, the Germans, the Scandinavians, the Belgians, and Canadians all had exhibits which would be shown in the subsequent photographs.

Admiral Strauss indicated that the development of atomic energy in order to provide power was by all odds the subject of greatest interest and importance at the Conference. The exhibits indicated a wide variety of approaches by the several nations to the problem of providing atomic power. The United States, of course, was in the process of trying to explore all possible approaches to the attainment of atomic power at economically suitable cost. We are building as many different kinds of atomic power plants as our scientists, technicians and engineers can think of. The British, on the other hand, worried as they are over the prospective loss of many of their sources of conventional power, are putting their money on a single approach to the development of atomic power. . . .

As for the Russians, it was now perfectly clear that they could be described in no sense as technically backward. The Soviet equipment exhibited at the Geneva Conference was, for the most part, mass produced—not in laboratories but in manufacturing plants.

Admiral Strauss said that he would summarize the significance for the United States of the Conference in the following terms:

In the first place, the Conference had provided the United States a handsome dividend in the shape of a victory for our fundamental national policy. The Conference had done much to counter Soviet propaganda that the United States was interested in atomic energy for warlike purposes only. Scientists and visitors from other countries were perfectly astonished to see how true was the reverse of the Soviet charge. They could be counted upon to carry back to their own countries the undoubted evidence of United States progress in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Secondly, in the realm of pure science, the Soviets had astonished us by their achievements, notably with the photographs they exhibited of their new cyclotron. While this was a copy of our cyclotron at Berkeley, California, it was twice as big. It must have cost approximately forty million dollars to build and it had required a vast amount of steel and of copper for its construction. Admiral Strauss felt that it was still something of a mystery as to why the Soviets had built it. It could have no military significance and was only useful for developments in the realm of pure basic science.

A third by-product of the Geneva Conference was the creation of a situation in which there were no nations who could be described as "have not" nations with respect to information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The United States had additionally supplied a number of research reactors.

Lastly, the Conference had clearly revealed that the Soviet scientists were, in the main, young men. This reflects the correctness of our earlier estimates on the extraordinary number of young engineers and scientists being turned out by the Soviet Union. It was also a strong warning to us that we must step up the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians graduating from our own schools. Expressing great concern at the comparatively small number of scientists and engineers being trained in the United States, Admiral Strauss said that the root of the trouble was to be found, not in the universities and institutions of higher learning, but in our high schools. After citing statistics to illustrate the problem, Admiral Strauss said that he had no clear idea of how to solve the problem and that he was not really the man to try. However, he had picked up the ball and would run with it until he could give it to somebody else.

The Vice President inquired of Admiral Strauss as to the reasons for the shrinking in the number of courses in mathematics and the basic sciences in American secondary schools. After citing statistics on this matter, Admiral Strauss said that he would gather these statistics together and present the results to the National Security Council at an early date.

Secretary Wilson said he was inclined to believe that there was too much of the "pursuit of happiness" by young people in our secondary schools. Our young people were allergic to the hard work required by courses in mathematics and the sciences. Governor Stassen was more inclined, he said, to attribute the source of the difficulty to the lack of competent teachers in the scientific field. Teachers of science and potential teachers in this field had been lured into industry by the prospect of much higher wages.

Agreeing with Governor Stassen's point, the Vice President suggested that the problem raised by Admiral Strauss could presumably be placed on the agenda of the White House Conference on Education

to be held in December. Mr. Dillon Anderson reminded the Council that a Subcommittee of the National Security Council Planning Board, consisting of representatives of the Department of Defense and of the Office of Defense Mobilization, were engaged in a study of scientific manpower in connection with the Planning Board's review of basic national security policy.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Flemming pointed out that President Sproul<sup>4</sup> of the University of California had recently been invited to be head of a committee appointed by the President to investigate this problem. Admiral Strauss said he was delighted to have this news and would be more than pleased to give to President Sproul and his committee the task which had fallen upon him. Mr. Allen Dulles emphasized the importance of giving the President's committee a clear idea of the great progress which the Soviet Union had made in producing large numbers of young scientists and engineers.

At the conclusion of his report Admiral Strauss showed colored photographs of the most interesting and significant exhibits at the Conference and paid tribute to the work of Mr. Streibert and his agency for the success of the U.S. effort at the Geneva Conference.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>5</sup>

Noted and discussed the oral report on the subject by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

*3. Report by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament*

Governor Stassen asked Mr. Lay to distribute to the members of the Council a written report on disarmament problems which took the form of a preliminary draft memorandum from Governor Stassen to the Secretary of State on the subject, "The Big-Four Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Geneva in Relationship to the Agenda Item of Disarmament". (A copy of the memorandum is included in the Minutes of this Meeting.)<sup>6</sup>

Governor Stassen then stressed that his memorandum report was purely informational in character. It would, accordingly, require no decisions by the National Security Council at this meeting. Under the aegis of the Secretary of State, preparations had been going forward as

<sup>3</sup> Reference is apparently to the ODM-Defense working group, which submitted its report on maintaining U.S. technological superiority to the NSC Planning Board on December 21. Documentation is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Gordon Sproul, President of the University of California.

<sup>5</sup> The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1450, approved by the President on October 19. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>6</sup> Not attached to the source text. A fourth preliminary draft of Stassen's memorandum to Dulles, October 12, is *ibid.*, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Problems Committee.



to how to deal with the disarmament item at the Geneva Conference. The present report was a contribution to these preparations. Meanwhile, said Governor Stassen, the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament was in recess. While Governor Stassen stressed the purely informational character of the present report, he said he believed that it might prove necessary to obtain a few decisions or a consensus by the National Security Council on various aspects of the disarmament problem before Secretary Dulles left for the Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting.

After a brief description of the work of his own staff and of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, Governor Stassen said that he would summarize briefly the contents of the present report.

The first section of the report constituted an effort to estimate the aims of the U.S.S.R. in relation to the disarmament issue at the Foreign Ministers' meeting. These aims were set forth on Pages 1 and 2 of the memorandum and there seemed to be pretty general agreement among the departmental representatives as to the nature of Soviet aims.

Section II of the memorandum on Pages 3 and 4 set down suggested goals for the United States, the United Kingdom and France on the disarmament item at the Foreign Ministers' meeting. This section, said Governor Stassen, was still under very active consideration although there was approaching agreement at the staff level on its content.

Section III of the memorandum on Pages 5 through 9 consisted of specific suggestions for the position of the Western Big Three in view of the preceding sections on Western goals and on estimated Soviet aims. These specific suggestions all pointed to obtaining the passage of a resolution of disarmament in the United Nations General Assembly. It was obviously in our interest, said Governor Stassen, to seize the initiative in this matter rather than leaving it to the Soviet Union. A preliminary draft of such a United Nations resolution was set forth in Annex I<sup>7</sup> of the memorandum. Governor Stassen then said he would run through this annex briefly and in so doing would touch upon some of the issues which might have to come before the National Security Council for resolution. For example, on Page 2 of the annex, we confronted the serious questions which arose around the issue of the elimination and prohibition of stocks of nuclear weapons. In this area the representatives of the Department of Defense and of the Atomic Energy Commission had raised very serious questions in the course of the drafting of the resolution.

---

<sup>7</sup> Annex I is attached to the fourth preliminary draft of Stassen's memorandum to Dulles, October 12.

Further questions were bound to come up on this as well as other important issues. Accordingly, Governor Stassen said that he believed that when the Secretary of State went to the Foreign Ministers' Conference, he should have in his brief case a certain number of thoroughly-staffed new positions which he might, if he chose, put forward at the Geneva discussions on disarmament. If the Secretary of State so desired, agreement on these positions could be secured in advance of the meeting. Indeed, the present memorandum offered an instance of an attempt to set forth such new positions for the Secretary of State. An attempt had been made to test whether or not we could induce the Soviets to open the door for acceptance of the full proposal on disarmament made by President Eisenhower at the Geneva Heads-of-Government Conference, by getting their preliminary agreement to a much more modest aerial inspection and exchange of military information in an area of perhaps a hundred or two hundred miles in breadth. This suggestion was designed to rally world public opinion to his side and to provide the Secretary of State with a negotiating point vis-à-vis the Soviets.

Another suggestion concerned a matter about which the Secretary of State had already expressed great concern. Namely, if things were allowed simply to drift along as they were now doing, it was inevitable that other nations than the three now possessing them, would in due course learn how to make and stockpile atomic weapons. The problem was how to prevent this development and the President's Special Committee<sup>8</sup> had been studying the problem. Was it possible, for example, that we could extend President Eisenhower's inspection proposal beyond the United States and the U.S.S.R. to include all nations potentially capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons? While this problem was being studied, Governor Stassen said that the results of the study had not yet been put down on paper.

In conclusion, Governor Stassen said that this was where the matter now rested. He said that he had brought it before the National Security Council because it had been agreed that in the absence of the President, it was desirable for all the members of the Council to know about and to discuss such matters.

The Vice President inquired of the Secretary of State as to the place on the Geneva Agenda to which the disarmament item had been assigned. Secretary Dulles replied that it was Agenda Item 2, although the third item, that is, increased contacts between the East and the West, would be dealt with by the experts concurrently with the Foreign Ministers deliberations on the first two items on the Geneva Agenda. Secretary Dulles stressed his hope of confining the Conference to a period of not much more than three weeks.

---

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 4, Document 68.

With respect to the draft resolution which had been outlined by Governor Stassen, as well as Governor Stassen's suggestions, Secretary Dulles said it was important for the Council to realize that all these things were still in an embryonic stage as far as we in the State Department are concerned. However, since these matters must soon be discussed by the U.S. authorities with the British and the French, Secretary Dulles said that he would welcome any ideas or suggestions which came from those around the table.

Secretary Wilson commented that he thought rather well of the British suggestion (referred to earlier by Governor Stassen) for the setting up of an international group of scientists to study intensively ways and means of detecting past, present, and future production of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup>

Admiral Strauss said that he took the completely opposite view and hoped that we would do our best to get the British to call off their proposal. We in the United States, said Admiral Strauss, were extremely apprehensive over the creation of such an international scientific group although we did favor the creation by each nation of a group of its own scientists who would study the difficult question of detecting the production of fissionable materials. Admiral Strauss explained that our worry over such an international group arose from the impossibility of being able to agree to furnish to such an international group of scientists certain information in our possession. On the other hand, of course, we did not want the United States to seem to be placed in the position of being opposed to seeking a means of detecting the past and present production of fissionable materials and of nuclear weapons. As yet, of course, as all of the Council members were aware, our American scientists have been unable to discern any means whatsoever of detecting past production of fissionable materials.

Mr. Nelson Rockefeller warmly endorsed the alternative suggestion of setting up a series of national scientific groups to study the detection of the problem. He believed that public opinion would find this solution just as acceptable as the solution represented by a single international committee. Secretary Dulles thought a solution to the problem might be found along the lines of the study now being conducted to investigate the genetics effects of nuclear fall-out.<sup>10</sup>

Secretary Dulles then explained that there were a good many pros and cons on the issue (outlined by Governor Stassen) of whether or not to try an aerial arms inspection in a quite small area by way of finding an entering wedge to induce Soviet acceptance of the full

---

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to Nutting's proposal to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on October 7; see footnote 3, Document 74.

<sup>10</sup> Regarding this issue, see Documents 22, 31, and 32.

inspection plan outlined by President Eisenhower at Geneva. On the negative side of the argument for such a small inspection plan was the possibility that if we propose such a plan, the Soviets might willingly accept it because it would enable them to avoid accepting anything more of the President's much more sweeping inspection plan. In short, said Secretary Dulles, he was inclined to doubt whether the President's Geneva proposal was "divisible".

Secretary Dulles then alluded to the immense technical problem raised by the President's Geneva proposal. It was obvious that if we ever arrived at some kind of world-wide system for the inspection and control of armaments and the exchange of blueprints and military information, vast technical problems would be involved. As it seemed to him, continued Secretary Dulles, the President's Geneva proposal on inspection was not really offered so much as a technical proposal or a cure-all as it was a means designed primarily to change the atmosphere of the world. In this respect it resembled the President's earlier "Atoms for Peace" proposal made to the United Nations. If this were actually the case, it would be rather foolish to cut down the dimensions of the President's Geneva proposal. The President had, in essence, said at Geneva to the Russians, "Come into my house and see for yourself whatever there is in it." If we now follow the suggestion made in the memorandum, we would be saying to the Russians, "Come into my house and see whatever there is in one room in that house". Over and above this argument against accepting such a modification of the President's original proposal, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the President's Geneva offer on inspection had put the Russians on the hook. They were plainly in a quandary. It was not easy either to accept or to reject the President's idea. Certainly, we do not now wish to let them off this hook. While perhaps something like the more modest inspection area might have to be offered to the Russians at some later stage in the disarmament negotiations, it seemed highly doubtful to Secretary Dulles that any such offer should be made while the exchange of correspondence between the President and Premier Bulganin is still going on.<sup>11</sup> At least no such modified offer should be made until the President is in the position of being able clearly to indicate his views.

In reply to Secretary Dulles, Governor Stassen pointed out another possibility. It was at least possible that if the Soviets were induced to try the experiment of arms inspection in a very limited area, far from being able to stop at this point, their acceptance might have the effect of forcing them into ultimate acceptance of the entire widespread inspection program proposed by the President. (An outline of such a small pilot test of aerial inspection and exchange of blueprints is

---

<sup>11</sup> See Document 71.

set forth in Annex II<sup>12</sup> of Governor Stassen's memorandum to the Secretary of State.)

Thereafter, at the insistence of Secretary Wilson, Council discussion centered on the last paragraph of the draft United Nations resolution (Page 3 of Annex I of the draft memorandum).<sup>13</sup> Secretary Wilson noted that this program called for the prompt implementation of the President's proposal on an aerial inspection and exchange of blueprints. Secretary Wilson said that he understood that if the Soviets accepted the President's proposal on aerial inspection, the United States would be willing to accept the Soviet proposal for ground inspection as set forth in their May 10, 1955 restatement. Accordingly, Secretary Wilson wondered why this last paragraph of the United Nations resolution was still confined to acceptance by the Soviets of the President's aerial inspection proposal and indicated nothing about United States readiness to accept the Soviet proposal for ground inspection. Should not the paragraph, asked Secretary Wilson, marry the two proposals?

In reply to Secretary Wilson's point, Secretary Dulles confessed that he was not very happy over this last paragraph in the proposed United Nations disarmament resolution. It had been added in point of fact as a result of his conference with President Eisenhower at Denver last Tuesday. In further answer to Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles emphasized that the Soviet's May 10 proposal for ground inspection was in a sense the price that the United States was willing to pay in order to induce the Soviets to buy the President's entire proposal of July 21, 1955. Therefore, it would be desirable not to indicate in advance our acceptance of the Soviet proposal by including it in the United Nations resolution but instead to await a Soviet request for inclusion of their May 10 proposal and predicate our acceptance of their proposal on Soviet agreement to accept all of the President's July 21 proposal.

Secretary Wilson said that Defense Department authorities thought it desirable to insure ground inspection and in this sense they favored the Soviet proposal.

At this point the Vice President called attention to the lateness of the hour and suggested that the discussion of this whole problem be carried over to next week's meeting of the National Security Council.

---

<sup>12</sup> Annex II is attached to the fourth preliminary draft of Stassen's memorandum to Dulles, October 12.

<sup>13</sup> The final paragraph of this draft U.N. resolution reads:

*"Requests, that the states directly concerned take steps to implement promptly the proposal on aerial inspection and exchange of blueprints of the President of the United States made on July 21, 1955, and that all states cooperate in facilitating such implementation as a beginning toward a comprehensive program for the control, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces."* (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Problems Committee)

The other members of the Council agreed with the Vice President and Governor Stassen pointed out that at next week's meeting it might be necessary to solve some of the differences which had emerged in the present discussion.

The Vice President then said that before concluding this morning's discussion of the disarmament item, the Council should hear the views of Admiral Radford.

Admiral Radford stated that unfortunately this was the first time he had seen a copy of the memorandum from Governor Stassen to Secretary Dulles. Governor Stassen interrupted to point out that a representative of Admiral Radford had been present at all meetings of the special committee which had been working on the memorandum.

Admiral Radford stated to the Council that ten years ago he personally had believed in the possibility and practicability of banning all nuclear weapons. He no longer thought so. It was certain that atomic and nuclear weapons would be used eventually in future wars. Moreover, he had believed that the National Security Council itself had in effect agreed that the attempt to ban nuclear weapons was essentially unrealistic. We must, accordingly, be extremely careful not to get ourselves in a maneuver which might be contrary to this consensus.

Secretary Dulles interrupted Admiral Radford to say that of course we were admittedly in something of a dilemma. We have invoked in recent years the inability to devise any sure scientific means of detecting the production of fissionable materials as the chief reason why we can no longer agree to the reduction or banning of nuclear weapons. Now the British have come along and said that, at the very least, we should continue to try to find a scientific means of detecting the production of fissionable materials. If success should attend this effort, the entire U.S. position would be exposed. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles said, he simply did not feel able, from the standpoint of public relations, to stand up and say to the entire world that nuclear weapons are here to stay forever.

Governor Stassen emphasized strongly against either the President or the Secretary of State getting up and saying publicly that nuclear weapons should not be banned. After all, we are gradually bringing the public of the free world along the path of recognizing that in point of fact nuclear bombs cannot be banned, but we should not make a positive declaration to that effect. As evidence of the educational process, Governor Stassen cited the fact that at its Margate Conference,<sup>14</sup> the British Labour Party had refused to endorse a resolution offered by Leftist elements in favor of banning the atomic bomb.

---

<sup>14</sup> The Labour Party held its annual conference in Margate, United Kingdom, October 10-14.

Admiral Radford stated with considerable emphasis that the national security of the United States today depended on these weapons and would continue to depend on these weapons for the indefinite future. He believed that the British and the French also now understand that their national security depends upon the existence of these weapons in the hands of the United States. Accordingly, he agreed with Governor Stassen that we were making progress.

Secretary Wilson said that he could confirm the general accuracy of Admiral Radford's position as a result of the points of view raised at the meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers from which he had just returned.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>15</sup>

a. Noted and discussed a preliminary draft of a memorandum to the Secretary of State from the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament dealing with the agenda item on disarmament for the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' meeting, copies of which were distributed at the meeting.

b. Agreed to continue discussion on this subject at next week's Council meeting.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>15</sup> Paragraphs a and b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1451, approved by the President on October 19. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

---

## 78. Editorial Note

From October 20 to 22, the special task groups on inspection appointed by Harold E. Stassen to implement NSC Action No. 1419 met with Stassen's Special Staff at Quantico, Virginia, for an intensive intergroup review of the entire inspection problem relating to disarmament. Regarding the appointment of these task forces, see Stassen's letter to Wilson, Document 55. Regarding NSC Action No. 1419, see footnote 8, Document 45.

Preparatory documentation for the conference includes preliminary reports, segment reports, and weekly progress reports prepared during September and October, and is in Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, under the following folder titles: Task Force—Communications Systems; Inspection—Task Force; Task

Force—Ground Forces; Task Force—Army; Task Force—Budget and Finance; Task Force—Budgetary and Economics; Inspection—Task Force—Nuclear; Inspection—Task Force—Navy; Disarmament Policy; Aerial Inspection; and Name Files—Official Correspondence. A verbatim transcript of the Quantico meeting; 11 preliminary summary reports, dated October 20–22; and a report of the Quantico session, dated November 10, are *ibid.*, Inspection—Task Force.

---

**79. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, October 26, 1955.*

DEAR FOSTER: The President brought up the disarmament question when I visited him in Denver on Monday, October 24th. I had not intended to bring it up, thinking it might distress him.<sup>2</sup> He expressed his approbation of the following plan, which I outlined to him after he had interrogated me:

1. That in the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly, I try to get acceptance by the USSR, UK, France and Canada of a resolution which, in addition to containing an endorsement of the President's plan, would contain the Soviet ground inspection item which the President has approved,<sup>3</sup> and such British and French ideas as are generally acceptable.

The President stressed that at Geneva both Eden and Faure had enthusiastically told him of their approval of his plan.

2. That if this attempt fails, I then try to get a US–UK–France agreement, similarly conceived, possibly still containing Soviet ideas.

3. That if this fails, and the Committee seems likely to adopt the regular routine resolution directing the Subcommittee merely to continue its studies, I offer an endorsement of the President's plan as an amendment.

The various fall-back positions would, of course, not be divulged at all.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The President was still recuperating from his heart attack of September 24.

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower's approval of ground inspection teams is contained in his letter to Bulganin, October 11; for text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 528–529.



If the Soviets object that the aerial inspection scheme does not cover outlying bases, our position, according to the President, should be that the US has no objection whatever to such aerial inspection but that we have no satellites, that all our arrangements with other countries are entirely voluntary and that this would be up to the countries where the bases are located to decide for themselves. He seemed quite sure that both England and France would agree to such inspection over their territory.

To carry out this plan, I must be in a position to get quick decisions from Washington. Some current bottlenecks are:

- a) An answer to the Soviet question as to whether the President's plan covers atomic installations or not;
- b) Language relating the President's plan to arms reduction;
- c) And the best formula for extending the President's plan to other countries.

I talked this over with Herb<sup>4</sup> on the telephone from Denver just after I had seen the President and he expressed general agreement with the idea.

It seems to me that getting an endorsement by the General Assembly of the President's plan would accomplish the following:

1. It would enable us to hold the Soviet Union to allowing aerial inspection over their country because, if they did not allow it, they would be violating a General Assembly resolution. This would put them in disrepute before the world, paving the way for various degrees of censure with the possibility of ultimately a branding by the United Nations as the troublemaker and war-monger of the world. As I do not think they want to risk such obloquy, I believe they will permit the aerial inspection.

2. This will effectively protect the United States from a surprise attack and this alone, in my opinion, more than justifies the existence of the United Nations and would be the most magnificent proof of the excellence of the Eisenhower Administration. Even if it had never done anything else, this alone would give it a secure place in history.

3. Such action by the General Assembly would give us a spectacular gain in the cold war, get for us the initiative as the great leaders for peace in the world and would also win resounding and widespread support from US public opinion.

---

<sup>4</sup> Herbert Hoover, Jr.

Needless to say, when I say "President's plan", I mean aerial inspection with exchange of blueprints.

With warm regard,

Faithfully yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

## 80. Editorial Note

John Foster Dulles, V.M. Molotov, Harold Macmillan, and Antoine Pinay represented the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France, respectively, at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva from October 27 to November 16. The Western powers' invitation to the Geneva Summit Conference had stated that East-West tensions should be approached in two stages: the development of agreements on the substantive issues and the methods to be followed in exploring solutions to them, and the second stage in which the problems would be discussed in detail. The Heads of Government summit meeting in Geneva, July 18–23, was supposed to foster the first, and the Foreign Ministers meeting later that year became the organizational format to promote the second. For the views of the United States on the initial purposes of the Heads of Government meeting, see the note of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Soviet Union, May 10, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, pages 832–833.

The directive of the Geneva Summit Conference, July 23, instructed their Foreign Ministers to discuss three major problem areas: European security and Germany, disarmament, and development of contacts between East and West. The directive to the Foreign Ministers further specified that they would meet "to initiate their consideration of these questions and to determine the organisation of their work." For text, see *ibid.*, August 1, 1955, pages 176–177.

The result of the discussions on these issues at the Foreign Ministers meeting in Geneva were inconclusive in terms of specific agreements, and the final communiqué of the meeting, November 16, concludes:

"The Foreign Ministers agreed to report the result of their discussions to their respective Heads of Government and to recommend that the future course of the discussions of the Foreign Ministers should be settled through diplomatic channels." (*Ibid.*, November 28, 1955, page 886)

For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting, see volume V.

---

**81. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to Chairmen of All Special Task Groups and the Special Study Staff<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 31, 1955.*

SUBJECT

The Follow-up on the Quantico Session<sup>2</sup>

The excellent session at Quantico and the significant accomplishment of the Special Task Groups lead to the conclusion that the following procedure would be most fruitful for the continued carrying out of the President's directive:

A. A special working group be established consisting of one representative from each of the Special Task Groups under the chairmanship of the working group member from General Smith's Task Group.<sup>3</sup>

1. This working group to proceed to fit together in one comprehensive inspection plan to apply to the Soviet Union and to the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe the inspection proposals of the various groups.

2. The regions to be established for the ground inspection service in a manner similar to the Smith Report, with such adjustments as may be needed to fit more readily the Navy requirements for regionalization and the communications flow, having in mind also the external communications net, and the relation to the external bases of the air inspection.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force. Top Secret. The source text is labeled "Draft." In a cover letter to Lieutenant General Doolittle, chairman of the Air Inspection Task Force, November 1, Stassen wrote:

"I am sending this memorandum to you in draft in order that you might make suggestions for its refinement, but you may proceed to move in general in accordance with the draft and work with your liaison officer on my staff to expedite the task." (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 78.

<sup>3</sup> General Walter Bedell Smith was chairman of the Army Task Group.

3. Anticipate that all ground inspection shall be under one command, that this will be established through the United States Department of Defense, that the United States would be the effective agent of the International Armaments Commission for the purpose of inspection in this territory, and that the United States would incorporate inspection personnel from states associated in collective defense agreements with the United States, and would also be required to associate some observers from the so-called neutral states.

4. Arrange the external and internal communications net to best fit with the potential of communications facilities, the external bases, and internal flight patterns of the air inspection and the regional and local ground inspection organization.

B. The Nuclear Task Group to proceed with the spelling out of the method of conducting a supervised stockpile of nuclear material in four countries, and within the USSR, United Kingdom, and United States, to be used if and when agreements are reached to place materials in such supervised stockpile.

C. The Industry Task Group to consider further the numbers and types of personnel needed for its inspection role and to consider other industries which would need special attention beyond the power industry supervision.

D. All Task Groups to prepare a statement of requirements for aerial inspection service and submit these to the Air Task Group for their consideration and accommodation.

E. The Air Force Task Group to specify their requirements for ground inspection and sea approach inspection and submit these to the Army and Navy Task Groups respectively.

F. All Task Groups to present to the Communications Task Group their requirements for communications facilities for appropriate accommodation.

G. The Communications Task Group to be assisted through photographic specialists in working out safeguarding arrangements for internal communications.

H. Special sub-working groups of any two or three or four of the Task Groups to be established when suitable to prepare segments of the total work.

I. The comprehensive inspection plan, after preparation by the working group, to be reviewed by the Task Group Chairmen under the chairmanship of General Walter B. Smith, and following this review, to be presented to the Special Assistant to the President, and subsequently to the President and the NSC.

J. The Nuclear Task Group to make a special study of the development of a bomb "Sniffer" and to advise whether a specific request of the Atomic Energy Commission should be made by the Special Assistant to the President in this regard.

K. A sub-working group of the Air Force Task Group and the Nuclear Task Group to make a special study of the problem and feasibility of the separation of nuclear weapons from their carriers in relation to an inspection system.

L. The Air Force and Navy Task Groups to each make a study of the requirement for reporting in advance on projected movements of carriers with a nuclear weapons capability in connection with an inspection system.

M. Each Task Group Chairman to advise on the anticipated time schedule involved in the rigid implementation of this follow-through assignment.

Harold E. Stassen

---

**82. Progress Report Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 1, 1955.*

VOLUME V

Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament  
(NSC Action 1419)<sup>2</sup>

Submitted to the Departments and Agencies concerned for a thirty-day review and for comment in writing to the Special Assistant to the President on or before December 1, 1955, such comment to be taken into account in a revision of this paper to be presented to the President, and to the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council on or after December 7, 1955.

[Here follows Part I, an introductory section providing background information on United States disarmament policy during 1955.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is a draft memorandum, dated November 1, by Joseph S. Toner, Stassen's executive secretary, indicating that a draft copy of volume V was submitted to the departments and agencies concerned for their written comments before its presentation to the National Security Council and the President. For Volume I of the Progress Report, see Document 33. Regarding Volumes II and III, see footnote 1, *ibid.* For Volume IV, see Document 40. Volume V was discussed by the National Security Council on December 22; see Document 90.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1419, see footnote 8, Document 45.

## II

## The Inspection and Control Method

On the basis of the totality of the studies conducted, a method of inspection has been developed responsive to NSC Action No. 1419, d-(1), which would be feasible and would be reciprocally acceptable to the United States. This method of inspection is being refined in a precise plan of inspection and its features are now sufficiently clear and definite to form the basis of important necessary policy decisions herein recommended as the basis of moving away from outdated and untenable policies to new policies which themselves should be of course considered to be subject to continuing review.

It is concluded that a comprehensive, effective, feasible, reciprocally acceptable international inspection and control system for armaments and armed forces could be established to serve certain limited but very important objectives of the United States, if agreed to by the USSR and by the other states involved.

The principal characteristics of such a system would be as follows:

A. It would be installed by stages.

B. Aerial and ground inspectors would be included:

1. The ground inspectors would operate through five regions and approximately 280 posts in the USSR and the Soviet European satellite area.

2. The aerial inspectors would base principally at four external bases with minimum use of USSR internal bases. Illustrative possibilities are:

- a. United Kingdom
- b. Turkey
- c. Okinawa
- d. Japan

3. Reciprocal inspectors in numbers, local posts, internal air bases rather than external bases, would be extended by the United States.

4. Escort personnel for all inspectors within the United States numbering approximately double the inspectors would of necessity be assigned, and similar escort relationships would be expected within the Soviet.

5. Verification and inspection personnel specializing in nuclear matters, steel, budgets and finance, electric power, transportation, and industrial production, would be included, but all would be under one inspection service command with one logistic support.

6. An internal and external communications net would be established which would assure reliable rapid communication with aerial and ground inspectors and control posts, and would provide automatic warning of interference or sabotage of the communications system.

7. The total inspection force required in the USSR and the Soviet European satellite area would be of an order of magnitude of 20,000 to 30,000 personnel, eight or ten squadrons of airplanes, three or four squadrons of helicopters, 4,000 or 5,000 vehicles, thirty or forty radio communications stations, and other related facilities, at an annual cost of \$600 to \$700 million.

8. Approximately 70% of the personnel on the inspection force in the USSR would be United States nationals, approximately 40% of the worldwide inspection personnel outside of the United States would be United States nationals, and between 40% and 50% of the worldwide cost would of necessity be borne by the United States.

9. Detailed statistics of electric power, steel, transportation, and industrial production would be required, which would reciprocally be feasible for the United States to furnish. This would be subject to spot-check verification.

10. Internal inspection of industrial production plants would in general not be included, but material intake, power use, and product output would be reported and be subject to external check.

11. Internal inspection of nuclear production plants and inspection of nuclear weapons would not be included, certainly not in the early and foreseeable stages.

C. The system established for the USSR and the United States would be acceptable and applicable to other states with significant military power or potential with comparative ease on a relative scale, taking cognizance of size of territory, level of armed forces, and degree of industrial and nuclear development.

D. An International Armaments Commission would be established, with a relationship to the United Nations, to supervise the comprehensive system, but it could not overrule the basic inspection of the USSR by the United States, and vice versa.

E. In each country being inspected, one state would be designated as the executive agent of the International Armaments Commission for purposes of inspection. The United States would be designated such executive agent for the USSR and vice versa. Nationals of other states would be included in the inspection service.

F. The states associated with the USSR and the states associated with the United States would in general be the inspectors of each other, and the neutral states would have minor observing roles and would further inspect each other in a manner agreeable to the United States and USSR.

G. Within the United States Government, the Department of Defense would be named as executive agent for carrying out both the inspection and the escort of inspectors.

### III

#### A Significant Equation

The more thoroughly United States defensive, retaliatory, and nuclear weapon capacity is dispersed, the more necessarily extensive a great surprise attack by the USSR would be required to be successful,

and the more certain preparations for it would be disclosed by an inspection system, and prevented. Thus, dispersal plus inspection is an important equation for United States security and for peace.

#### IV

##### The Intercontinental Missile

In the absence of a limitation agreement, it must be anticipated that within ten years the USSR will have intercontinental missiles with thermonuclear warheads in quantity. No effective defense now exists for such weapons other than their destruction before launching. The best theoretical defense, once they are launched, involves the defensive use of missiles with nuclear warheads above the defending country.

Intercontinental missiles cannot be perfected or produced in quantity without tests and without a scale of activity which would be detected by the inspection system contemplated.

#### V

##### Basic Principles and Premises

The totality of the further study sustains and confirms the basic principles and premises set forth in Volumes I to IV of the preceding reports.

A summary re-emphasis is as follows:

A. In the absence of any agreement on the inspection, limitation, control, or reduction of armaments and armed forces, the outlook for future decades includes increasingly great dangers of a nuclear war and is therefore very adverse to United States national interest. In such a situation, only a continued United States technological superiority in the competition for offensive and defensive weapons would provide the main protection for national security. While the maintenance of such superiority is by no means impossible, it might well become a diminishing factor as Soviet offensive powers increased.

B. An unsound agreement, not thoroughly covered by effective inspection and control, not maintaining a strong relative and actual defensive posture of the United States would be even more adverse, would increase the dangers of future war, and would itself be a source of added future tension through doubts, rumors, suspicions, and uncertainty.

C. A sound agreement, thoroughly and effectively inspected, added to substantial sustained alert United States military strength, would be highly desirable in the United States national interest, would reduce tensions, facilitate the settlement of other issues, and greatly improve the prospects of a just and durable peace.



VI

Recommended Policy of the United States

It is recommended that the following policy be now adopted, subject to continuing review and further modification, but as an essential step in moving away from outdated untenable policy and in maintaining a desirable negotiating initiative in the United States national interest.

A. The three priority objectives of the United States in its policy on the question of disarmament are as follows:

1. Open up the USSR and other communist controlled territory to effective inspection with related communication; establish current accountability of the movement of armed forces, especially those capable of carrying nuclear weapons in attack; continue to thoroughly disperse and alert United States armed strength, so as to provide against the possibility of great surprise attack.

2. Prevent, retard, or minimize the development of nuclear weapons capability by additional nations beyond the present three, USSR, United Kingdom, and United States.

3. Prevent, retard, or minimize the establishment of a substantial intercontinental missile capacity and of an expanded nuclear weapons capability by the USSR.

B. In order to attain these three objectives, the United States will take the following actions:

1. Continue to press for the acceptance of the President's July 21 Geneva proposal.

2. Agree to reciprocal inspection generally along the lines proposed in this report.

3. Accept modest initial reductions in conventional armed forces on a reciprocal basis if tied to the implementation of the President's proposal.

4. Provide that all future nuclear material production anywhere in the world will be for peaceful use, to take effect when an international atomic control agency can supervise the material subsequently produced, and maintain it in safeguarded stockpiles.

5. Develop a synthesis of the acceptable portions of the proposals of the United Kingdom, France, and the USSR.

6. Provide that satellites and intercontinental and outer space rockets shall be developed only through international collaboration for peaceful purposes and shall not be tested or produced for national weapon purposes.

7. Contribute to the openness of the USSR through expanded contacts and exchanges of citizens, culture, and information in various fields, including peaceful trade, if the President's July 21 proposal is accepted.

C. The fulfillment of these three policy objectives will be vigorously pursued with a sense of urgency of time and without subordination to other objectives except on decision of the President.

1. Special attention will be given to initiating joint action with the USSR on some inspection steps, even though very small, in the direction of these objectives.

D. The United States will not agree, in the absence of a new decision which it is anticipated would need to be based on facts not now foreseeable, to any of the following:

1. The elimination of existing stocks of nuclear weapons or the prevention of re-fabricating existing stocks.

2. The reduction or limitation of any armaments or armed forces if an adequate inspection system to verify the reduction is not in place.

3. The withdrawal of overseas bases prior to a major verified reduction of USSR weapons carrying capacity and the resolution of major issues between the USSR and the United States.

E. If an inspection system such as here described is installed, the United States will contemplate a gradual equitable reduction on a reciprocal basis of nuclear weapons carrying capacity and of conventional forces, but such specific reductions shall be the subject of National Security Council consideration in the light of conditions then existing, and no blanket commitments of figures or percentages or other indication of levels shall be made in advance of such National Security Council consideration.

F. Subordinate to these priority objectives, and to the extent either necessary to attain them, or feasible to gain in addition, the United States will take the following actions on an equitable basis:

1. Agree to the international inspection, limitation, and control in a similar manner, of all armaments and armed forces of all states, with significant present or potential military power, including Germany, China, Japan, and India.

2. Agree to effective inspection of United States bases overseas in a manner agreeable to the state in which the base is located as a part of a comprehensive agreement.

3. Agree to the cessation of national nuclear tests as a part of a comprehensive arrangement.

G. A special effort will be made by the United States to establish an agreed inspection and control method with the USSR and the United Kingdom to apply to fourth countries who wish to enter nuclear power production with the assistance of one or more of the three.

1. This effort will be harmonized with the endeavor to attain the comprehensive system, but will not be necessarily dependent on the attainment of such a comprehensive system.

H. Any agreement entered into by the United States should include appropriate provisions which would have the following effect:

1. Grant to those parties which have in being nuclear weapons and production facilities for nuclear weapons material the right to open the agreement to renegotiation at any time on six months notice specifying unsatisfactory developments.

2. Grant to all other signatory nations as a group, or to the United Nations Assembly, the right to open the agreement to renegotiation by majority vote on six months notice specifying unsatisfactory developments, but otherwise the agreement to continue in full force and effect upon such signators without the right of withdrawal.

3. In the event of a serious violation of the agreement confirmed as such by the International Armaments Commission, grant to all signators the right to terminate by renunciation without advance notice.

a. Further grant to each signator the right to file with the International Armaments Commission a specific claim of violation of the agreement by any other signator, and to take counterbalancing steps to maintain relative position including steps which would otherwise be in violation of the agreement, provided, however, that the International Armaments Commission shall be notified of such counterbalancing steps when they are taken.

4. Provide that a violation of the agreement by any signator shall be considered as a threat to the peace under the United Nations Charter, and, therefore, bring into play all of the peaceful settlement measures and other relevant provisions of the Charter and in particular Article 51 on individual or collective self-defense.

## VII

The foregoing policy decisions would place the United States in a position to take an essential initiative in its national interest, would erase policy clearly outdated and dangerous, and would provide ample opportunity for subsequent development of further policy and plans on the basis of experience and new facts, or for the modification and amendment under new circumstances or as a result of further study.<sup>3</sup>

Respectfully submitted:  
**Harold E. Stassen**

---

<sup>3</sup> Five annexes, which are attached to the source text, contain eight documents relating to disarmament for 1955. All these documents are discussed or printed in previous pages of this volume.

**83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, November 1, 1955—6:26 p.m.*

Gadel 76. Re radiation (Delga 175).<sup>2</sup> USDel can make following statement on moratorium: "The US believes that a moratorium on tests of nuclear weapons is an inseparable part of the disarmament problem and cannot be dealt with alone. Any agreed disarmament program must be predicated on equitable and effective inspection and control systems applicable to all elements of this agreed disarmament program. This moratorium question is, consequently, properly part of the efforts to reach agreement on disarmament carried on in the UN Disarmament Commission, its Subcommittee and other areas."

Foregoing is maximum we believe USDel could say on this problem now in light present stage disarmament review.

**Hoover**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-2855. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Meyers and approved by Bond.

<sup>2</sup> Delga 175 from New York, October 28, indicated that the problem of a moratorium on nuclear tests would probably arise during the forthcoming debate on radiation and asked for instructions. Since the Soviets had urged cessation of tests in their May 10 proposals as well as in their suggested amendments to the radiation resolution, Lodge said it would be useful if he could say that the United States supported cessation of tests as part of a comprehensive disarmament system. (*Ibid.*)

---

**84. Editorial Note**

On December 3, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 913 (X) on the "effects of atomic radiation." The First Committee (Political and Security, including regulation of armaments) had previously considered a formal proposal on the subject submitted jointly by Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States and sponsored also by Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. This draft resolution called for the establishment of a scientific committee consisting of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Japan, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and requested those governments each to designate one scientist on that committee. This committee would receive and assemble information on radiation furnished to it by the member states or specialized agencies.

India and the Soviet Union presented several amendments to the draft resolution in the First Committee. All of the Soviet amendments were rejected. The sponsors of the draft resolution amended their proposal to incorporate some of the Indian amendments, and India then withdrew most of its amendments. The First Committee also rejected a joint Indonesian-Syrian amendment and accepted one by 20 Latin American states, which added Argentina, Belgium, Egypt, and Mexico to the list proposed for the scientific committee.

The General Assembly adopted unanimously the resolution as recommended by the First Committee.

For background on this radiation resolution, see the position paper on atomic radiation, September 8, in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 71 D 440, Position Papers; and *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1955, pages 18–20. For Resolution 913 (X) adopted by the General Assembly on December 3, see *ibid.*, pages 21–22; and *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, volume I, pages 561–562. For information on the actual creation of the scientific committee on radiation, see Document 86.

---

## 85. Editorial Note

On December 7, Secretary of State Dulles approved a memorandum by Under Secretary Hoover, dated December 6, which recommended that the city of Manila, Philippines, be selected as the site for a proposed Asian Nuclear Energy Training and Research Center. The United States offered to contribute laboratory equipment and facilities, training personnel, funds for training, and the research reactor itself to the Philippines. In return the United States required the Philippine Government as host country to foster an international flavor for the Center perhaps through the creation of an international advisory council, permit free and equal access of all Colombo Plan country representatives participating in the Center, and be prepared to offer all basic facilities including site location. President Ramón Magsaysay indicated his acceptance of these terms on December 18, and the agreement was announced publicly in March 1956.

Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, and Ceylon had pressed for the location of the Center in their countries, but the United States preferred the Philippines and encouraged the Philippine Government to request location of the Center in their country. The United States preferred the Philippines because it was a member of SEATO, had good transporta-

tion facilities for access by the Colombo powers and university facilities well suited for the Center, and did not have a nuclear capability that might dominate the activities of the Center.

Documentation on the Asian Nuclear Center is in Department of State, Central File 990.8137. Hoover's memorandum to Dulles, December 6, is *ibid.*, 990.8137/12-755. It is attached to a memorandum from Walter Radius, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, to Jack C. Corbett, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, December 7, indicating Secretary Dulles' approval of Hoover's memorandum. The offer to the Philippines is contained in telegram 2136 to Manila, December 16. (*Ibid.*, 990.8137/12-1655) Magsaysay's acceptance is in telegram 1717 from Manila, December 18. (*Ibid.*, 990.8137/12-1855) The public announcement is contained in circular telegram 638, March 14, 1956 (*ibid.*, 990.8137/3-1456), and is summarized in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 2, 1956, page 544.

---

**86. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's Office, New York, December 9, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Preparatory Meeting for the Scientific Committee on Radiation<sup>2</sup>

Present were representatives of the Permanent Delegations of the Fifteen Members of the Radiation Committee. (List attached.)<sup>3</sup>

*Designation of Scientists*

Secretary-General Hammarskjöld said he had called this meeting to inform us that he intended to mail out a letter early in the week of December 12th inviting Governments to designate scientists to participate in the Scientific Committee. He would urge that consultations be held between Governments to assure a broad representation of the relevant fields amongst the scientists designated by various Governments. He said that the United States had already designated its representative and that his remarks accordingly would not apply to the U.S. Hammarskjöld said that his request for broad representation was

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/12-1055. Confidential. Drafted by William O. Hall on December 10.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding this committee's creation, see Document 84.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

based on the debate in the First Committee and that, to the extent that Secretariat assistance was needed in consultations, the officials of the Secretariat—Dr. Bunche, Mr. Tchernychev<sup>4</sup> and himself—would be available to consult with Governments. Hammarskjold then asked for comment on this point.

In view of his mention of the U.S. decision to designate a representative immediately, I stated that Dr. Shields Warren had been designated as the U.S. representative. I said that Dr. Warren had had as broad experience in the general field of atomic energy, medicine and biological research as any individual available in the U.S. I said that, further, he would have as his alternates men of broad experience—one in the physical sciences and the other in biological research. I said that all three of the U.S. representatives had worked extensively both in private research and for the Atomic Energy Commission, and accordingly the SYG could be sure that the U.S. representation would be on a broad scientific basis. (I spoke to Hammarskjold privately about this after the meeting and told him I felt it necessary to make the statement in the light of his remark lest the impression be left with the Member Governments that the U.S. somehow had disregarded the discussion in the First Committee. Hammarskjold said that he had not intended to embarrass the U.S. and that, in fact, he had spoken to the U.K., the Soviet and Canadian representatives stating that he hoped they would be able to provide as broad a representation as the U.S.; indicating however that it might be useful if their representatives were appointed from fields other than medical research. Hammarskjold expressed the view that most of the Delegations would probably designate individuals from the medical and biological fields, since these were the areas in which most individuals had had experience. Kitahara, Japanese Observer, informed me that the Secretariat had approached the Japanese, urging that they appoint an electronics expert, arguing that knowledge in this field would be helpful in working out plans for measurement of radiation. Kitahara said the Japanese were not inclined to take this very seriously. Ramsbotham, U.K., stated he would recommend that the British reserve their designation until all other representatives had been designated in order to assure adequate representation in the various fields of science on the committee. He indicated, however, that the British probably would designate a physicist.)

In response to a question from the Indian representative, who suggested that the first meeting would probably not be held until reports had been received from Governments, Hammarskjold said he

---

<sup>4</sup> Ralph J. Bunche and Ilya S. Tchernychev were Under Secretaries without Department in the U.N. Secretariat.

felt that the first meeting of an exploratory character to decide on working procedures and scope of the committee's program would be desirable in the relatively near future. I supported this view.

Hammarskjold then said he intended to appoint a young scientist from one of the small countries to serve as Secretary of the Committee. He said he intended to recruit this man two or three months before the committee meets to prepare the meeting. I stated I hoped there would not be too much delay in the first meeting while waiting for recruitment of the Secretary, as I felt that the first meeting need not be primarily scientific in character. Hammarskjold then said he would have a scientific secretary on hand shortly after January 1, and that he thought one month or six weeks would be sufficient for the Secretariat preparation. (I did not raise the question of meeting early in January at this point as I had previously consulted briefly with the Australians, and British, and found that they were thinking of a meeting in late February or March. I pointed out to Ramsbotham that such a date might result in a conflict with a spring Assembly. He indicated that the U.K. had not considered this and were not firmly wedded to a February or March date. I spoke briefly to Hammarskjold after the meeting and indicated that the U.S. would favor an early meeting without indicating any particular date. He said he hoped the meeting could be held early in February.) (In a private conversation after the meeting, Hammarskjold told me that he meant by small country a country which did not have any major atomic development. He specifically excluded the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.K., France and Canada.)

The only other matter considered by the meeting was a question from the Delegate of Belgium, who asked whether it would be possible for an alternate to sit in the committee, since the Belgians were giving consideration to the designation as their representative of a senior medical professor, who might find it difficult to attend all of the meetings of the committee. Hammarskjold said that this would certainly be all right, and indicated that some of the meetings would [be] held in New York and some in Europe, and various Governments might wish to have alternates sit in the committee, depending on the locale of the meetings. He said there should be, however, a senior member of the committee to whom communications could be addressed and who would be responsible for the country's work in the committee.

*Comment:* In his presentation to the committee the Secretary-General, while holding to his view that the members of the committee are primarily scientists and not representatives of Governments, has moved a good distance from the position which he took some days



ago in the Fifth Committee.<sup>5</sup> I have the impression that he is reconciled to dealing with the members of the committee as representatives of Governments.

Inasmuch as the Secretary-General stated that the secretary would prepare a program of work for the committee, the Department and AEC may wish to consider two courses of action to safeguard our position:

1. A presentation very early, and perhaps before the committee meets, of the U.S. program of work and specific suggestions.

2. An effort to obtain the nomination from a country friendly to the U.S. of a young scientist or scientists who would be qualified to be secretary of the committee. For example: Pakistan might be prepared to put forward one or more of its scientists for committee secretary. If this is to be done, prompt action would be required, and the approach to the Secretariat should be through the Delegation of the country of nationality of the young scientist. An alternative would be for the U.S. to submit informally to Ralph Bunche a list of young scientists from various countries who might be qualified for the position. Hammarskjöld has in mind the travel of the secretary of the committee, prior to the first meeting, to the U.S., U.S.S.R., Canada, France, and the U.K. for brief conversations with the senior representatives of those countries on the committee.

If the U.S. has definite views on rules of procedure and operations of the committee, I would suggest that we supply these to Bunche at an early date after we have an opportunity to discuss them with perhaps the U.K., Australia and France. I would also suggest it would be useful to have preliminary discussions in Washington or New York with those members of the committee who may be expected to support U.S. positions well in advance of the first meeting of the committee.

---

<sup>5</sup> Reference presumably is to Hammarskjöld's general observations on mainly administrative features of the scientific committee, which he presented as a paper to the First Committee during the debate on the draft resolution for the creation of the scientific committee. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1955, p. 20) He may have made similar observations to the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary).

87. **Letter From the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, December 11, 1955.*

DEAR HAROLD: I have read Volume Five<sup>2</sup> of your proposed policy of the United States on the question of disarmament with great interest and with appreciation for the complexity of the task.

In examining your report I have looked at it, of course, from the standpoint of the Department of State's primary concern with its foreign policy aspects and implications.

Since May 10, the Soviet Union has made much of the fact that its proposals are concrete, detailed, and in various respects adopt views previously put forward by us, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. The Soviet Union has claimed that the United States has turned its back on disarmament proper and is concerned only with inspection and control. They have pointed to the fact that the President's Geneva proposal is not disarmament. They have also supported their argument that we do not desire disarmament by stressing the fact that we have placed our detailed past proposals in a reserved status.

The foreign policy effects of the present United States position, in my opinion, have to date not been unfavorable largely because of two factors. The first is the impact the President's Geneva proposal has had on world opinion. The second is world awareness of an intensive United States review of policy as evidenced by your appointment as the President's Special Assistant for Disarmament and by the disclosure that you had in turn appointed the eight task forces to assist you in your work.

These two factors have given us a period of grace during which we could formulate a general position on disarmament. I believe that this period of grace is coming to an end. The United States can no longer, without detriment to its international stature, continue to reserve its positions on disarmament. Our proposals should advance the security interests of the United States and make a favorable impact on our Allies as well as the Russians. For this we need a concrete and positive program. I do not consider that your report, in its present form, lends itself to United States proposals of this nature.

In analyzing your report and recommendations, I found three general problems:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 82.

First, the outline of the inspection and control system is so general that it does not provide me with the details necessary to evaluate your policy suggestions, which logically should spring from the effectiveness of the inspection system itself.

Second, from a foreign policy standpoint, it seems necessary to be able to give some fairly clear indication of the United States attitude towards limitations or reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments. Your report does not clearly point out what you would propose be said in this respect and, in fact, suggests that we should defer discussing the question of force levels until after the whole inspection system is installed. In this connection, I think we must take account of the policy decision made recently when we accepted the United Kingdom's proposed language in the Four-Power resolution on disarmament in the present U.N. General Assembly. This language calls for priority attention to "early agreement on such measures of an adequately safeguarded disarmament plan as are now feasible".<sup>3</sup> I appreciate, of course, that this decision was made after your Report was submitted, but it does bear on the problem.

Third, while it is not clear what is proposed should be done in the nuclear field, it appears that no mention is made of the possibility of any ultimate reductions of nuclear weapons stockpiles as part of a general disarmament program. From the State Department's standpoint, it would seem advisable that some provision should be made for this ultimate possibility, under adequate safeguards.

These are the principal comments which I have to make on your report. I am attaching, in addition, more detailed comments to supplement these views.

Sincerely yours,

Foster

## Attachment

### Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State<sup>4</sup>

*Washington, undated.*

#### COMMENTS ON VOLUME V OF THE PROGRESS REPORT ON PROPOSED POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT

##### 1. Inspection

The outline of a possible system of inspection is very general, since the detailed inspection plan is apparently still in preparation. Without such a detailed plan and information as to the stages in which

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the four-power resolution in the United Nations, see the editorial note, *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> Top Secret.

it would be applied, it is not possible to arrive at an adequate judgment of the policy suggestions which are put forward. The outline of the proposed inspection system raises a number of important questions. How would the inspection system provide the kind of inspection and control necessary to police an agreement for limiting nuclear production to peaceful uses? Would the whole inspection system, involving some 20,000 to 30,000 US personnel in communist areas, be required for support of such preliminary steps as are involved in the President's proposal or in modest initial reductions of conventional forces? In what way would the proposed bilateral inspection system between the US and the USSR be expanded into a multilateral system? Until detailed proposals for an inspection system and its various phases are available only preliminary comments can be made on the policy recommendations in the Report.

## *2. Reductions of Conventional Forces*

The Report does not include among the "priority objectives" of the United States any reference to lessening of the burden of armaments. The NSC Action to which the Report is responsive states that the US in its own interest should "actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments." The Report proposes that the US should defer contemplation of other than modest initial reductions of conventional and nuclear weapons carrying capacity forces until after the whole inspection system is installed and in the meantime should avoid discussion of reduced force levels.

Avoidance of discussion or negotiation on force levels and reductions would be disadvantageous for both practical and political reasons.

a. (1) From a practical point of view, it is difficult to see how reduction of numerically superior Soviet conventional forces to a position of numerical equality with US conventional forces could fail to assist US security.

(2) It is conceivable that even if the NATO countries should maintain present levels of military expenditures, they might decide to spend a greater proportion for equipment and as a consequence decide to reduce the numerical levels of forces.

(3) Moreover, despite recent evidences of Soviet intransigence on major political issues, US allies and US public opinion continue to believe that the Soviets are not going to resort to military force. There will continue to be domestic political pressures among our allies and in this country which will tend in the direction of unilateral reductions of conventional forces and armaments.

(4) For these reasons it is in the US interest to use our bargaining position to secure agreements from the Russians for mutual reduction of conventional forces before that bargaining position deteriorates.

b. US avoidance of discussion of force levels will put the US in a poor political position. The US originally proposed *for illustrative purposes* the figures for US and USSR forces which the Soviets are now putting forth. It is obviously damaging that the USSR with a greater number of conventional forces should be professing to agree to a reduction which would place it on terms of equality with the US while the US gives the impression of backing away from such discussion. It is particularly damaging since the US has previously maintained that reduction of Soviet conventional superiority is a logical precondition to progress toward control or reduction of nuclear capabilities.

Before the US adopts a position with respect to reduction of forces, military advice is required from the Department of Defense as to whether reduction of conventional forces to the levels now proposed by the USSR would or would not be advantageous to US security on the assumption that for the foreseeable future both the US and USSR will retain massive nuclear capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have accurately stated that the levels proposed were set forward by the US merely for illustrative purposes and did not derive from any realistic military analysis. They should now be requested to undertake a military analysis of whether or not these or other agreed levels of forces would be acceptable from the point of view of the military security of the United States.

### 3. Nuclear Control

The Report makes the proposal that the US should agree that future nuclear production should be only for peaceful purposes at such time as an international control agency can supervise the material produced and maintain it in safeguarded stockpiles. In the previous volume of the Progress Report, it was proposed that nuclear production should cease, except for that incidental to peaceful uses. It is not clear whether the present proposal includes such cessation. Cessation of nuclear production, except incidental to peaceful purposes, would seem to have the practical value of (a) leading to a freezing of USSR capabilities, (b) preventing the achievement of nuclear weapons capabilities by countries which do not now possess nuclear weapons, if supervised effectively.

The proposed policy makes no provision for the possibility of eventual reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles as part of a general disarmament program. It may well be advisable to include some such provision. Eventual safeguarded reduction of stockpiles would be in the interest of the US, as indicated in somewhat different context in the President's December 8, 1953 atoms-for-peace proposal. If the US does not propose such reductions it will be accused of having abandoned reductions of nuclear armaments as even an eventual goal.

#### 4. General Comments

a. The Report does not mention reductions of conventional armaments (as distinct from forces) except for the possibility of eventual reduction of nuclear weapons carrying capacity.

b. The Report proposes a synthesis of acceptable portions of UK, French and USSR proposals. How would an acceptable synthesis be achieved which would dispose of the difficulty that these proposals call for prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, and this concept affects all other parts of the UK, French and Soviet proposals?

c. The Report calls for cessation of nuclear weapons tests as part of a "comprehensive arrangement". What kind of an arrangement is envisaged and at what stage in it would cessation of nuclear tests be agreed to?

d. Is the International Atomic Control Agency, mentioned in the Report, the agency of which the statute is now being negotiated or is it a part of the International Armaments Commission to which the Report refers in outlining the proposed inspection system?

e. Consultation with our allies will be required prior to taking definitive positions with respect to inspection or reduction of forces, in any case where the territory or forces of our allies are concerned. In view of the inter-dependency of forces developed under the NATO alliance, full consultation with the Organization as a whole would be requisite with respect to any aspect which bore upon NATO defense, including inspection of U.S. bases in the general NATO area and force reductions of any NATO country, including the United States, if its NATO contribution was thus affected.

---

#### 88. Editorial Note

The United Nations General Assembly at its 559th plenary meeting, December 16, approved Resolution 914 (X) by a vote of 56 to 7. This resolution on disarmament evolved from a draft resolution entitled "Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments; Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of the Disarmament Commission," which the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France submitted to the First Committee (Political and Security) at its 801st meeting on December 2.

This resolution became U.N. document A/C.1/L.150 in the First Committee and was subsequently revised twice to incorporate the views of other delegations. A/C.1/L.150/Rev.2 was introduced by the four Western powers at the 810th meeting of the First Committee on December 12 and was adopted at the 811th meeting of the Committee

on the same day by a vote of 53 to 5. Resolution 914 (X) approved by the General Assembly on December 16 contained the same wording as the draft resolution approved by the First Committee.

An important feature of Resolution 914 (X) was paragraph 1(b), which urged that the states concerned and particularly those on the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission:

“(b) Should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on and implementation of:

- “(i) Such confidence-building measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centres,
- “(ii) All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible.”

The debates in the First Committee are in *Official Records of General Assembly, Tenth Session*, agenda items 17 and 66, pages 213–296. General Assembly Resolution 914 (X) is printed in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955*, pages 12–13; *Department of State Bulletin*, January 9, 1956, page 63; and *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, volume I, pages 583–586.

---

89. **Informal Notes of a Meeting of the National Security Council Planning Board, Washington, December 21, 1955, 10 a.m.–12:30 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

#### INITIAL PRESENTATION

Governor Stassen opened his presentation with a statement of the need for the U.S. to keep the initiative it has attained on the question of disarmament. He remarked that the support won in the General Assembly and in the world could not be maintained by standing pat on present policy. He said the impossibility of banning nuclear weapons is generally accepted, the importance of preventing surprise is recognized, and the President's proposal is generally considered to be a sound beginning. The question which the Soviets and others are pressing is what comes next. He further said that it would be adverse

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Meetings of the Planning Board. Top Secret. Drafted by Lippmann. No list of participants appears on the source text.

to U.S. security to have many "fourth countries" attain a nuclear weapons capability. Such a development would multiply the chances of nations acting recklessly. Mr. Stassen said that the U.S. must now spell out further steps on the other side of the gateway. At this point he said that he did not agree with the JCS that the gateway must be in effect before negotiating other measures. He did not agree, however, with State that the President's proposal was something to be taken or left. He believed that the President's proposal was not a prerequisite step, but was rather an integral part of the whole.

Turning to Volume V,<sup>2</sup> the Governor stated that he had never proposed and would never propose broad language as a cover for free-wheeling action. The detailed implementation of the policy would have to be agreed upon by the Departments concerned. His aim was to move U.S. policy enough to get and retain a sound initiative. He then said that what was badly needed was a determination on the part of the Departments to help move policy rather than trying to delay or stop that movement. Mr. Stassen thereupon turned to the language in the paper<sup>3</sup> and went through most of the items, pointing out changes and significant language.

On Item 5 he repeated his remark that the President's proposal was an integral step and not purely a prerequisite. He called special attention to Item 7 as a big policy issue. He argued that very small reductions would have a considerable world impact, and that such reductions could take effect during the first year of experience in the implementation of the President's proposal. He also emphasized Item 8 as a very important question, stressing the need to minimize the possibility of nuclear weapons being held in the so-called "fourth countries". Within a comprehensive inspection system it would be, he argued, in U.S. interest for neither the U.S. nor the USSR to devote future nuclear material production for additional nuclear weapons. He granted that Item 8 (like the whole policy) might never be carried out, but called it an essential part of our posture in the world. (*Note: Either here or at a later time the Governor indicated that this proposal could be started when the President's plan went into effect.*)

Item 10<sup>4</sup> was another important issue, but one which could not be solved in this brief time. Mr. Stassen did not foresee any inspection system to deal with the ICBM after it had been produced and

---

<sup>2</sup> Document 82.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a report prepared by Stassen containing a detailed breakdown of Volume V and summarizing the comments of interested departments and agencies on specific provisions. The report was circulated to members of the NSC by Executive Secretary Lay under cover of a memorandum, December 16, for consideration at the Council meeting of December 22. The report recommended that the NSC approve most of the provisions of Volume V, some in revised form in light of comments received. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)

<sup>4</sup> Item 10 is the same as Part VI B 6 of Volume V.



deployed. He aimed at a policy of openness which could prevent massive production of weapons, and concluded that though postponed now, the issue must be met within six months to a year.

Item 20<sup>5</sup> on nuclear weapons tests was likewise to be postponed, but Mr. Stassen reported that the scientists were divided considerably on this matter, some believing cessation would be to the U.S. advantage.

### DISCUSSION

Mr. Reid<sup>6</sup> (Budget) asked about bringing Communist China into the system. Mr. Stassen replied that this was not politically possible now, and explained that China did not need to be tied in for about five years. He agreed that it could not stay outside the fold forever.

General Bonesteel (Defense) asked how long it would take to work out the many details indicated, and further whether decisions on principle would be communicated to other governments. Mr. Stassen said that this would not be done in the form presented in the paper, but that he would expect to begin talking with the countries most concerned, particularly with respect to moving together on the problem of "fourth countries" and the relation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Additionally, Mr. Stassen replied that if Item 7 were adopted he would seek agreement with our friends before February that the U.S. in its initial proposal would favor small reductions as a part of the tie-in to the President's proposal. (At this point there was a side argument with Bowie and Amory as to whether it was feasible or not to account for nuclear contributions to an international stockpile.)

General Farrell (JCS) queried the value of Item 7, and said the Services could not really consider this matter at this time based as it was on the first full year under the President's proposal. Mr. Stassen replied that it was necessary now to start talking about this subject and negotiate future steps. He asked the JCS to reconsider what price they would pay to achieve the great improvement in U.S. security which the President's proposal would bring. One price is some reduction in the U.S. armed posture. He urged the JCS to move with him on this problem. General Bonesteel interjected that the conventional reduction problem was intimately related to the ability of the U.S. to meet creeping Communist expansion. Reductions, he feared, might help the Communists advance piecemeal in the peripheral areas, referring to Korea, China, Vietnam, etc. Mr. Stassen noted that there was a question of the best possible U.S. security under the assumption that the President's proposal had been implemented, and repeated his question of how much that opening up was worth. This question was batted

<sup>5</sup> Item 20 is the same as Part VI F 3 of Volume V.

<sup>6</sup> Ralph W.E. Reid, Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

back and forth for a while. General Farrell resumed with a recommendation that Item 16 be deleted. Mr. Stassen, saying that the problem could not [be] deleted, wished that the JCS would supply their version of the right language for the issue of overseas bases.

Mr. Amory (CIA) opened up the question of Mr. Stassen's view on the possibility that free world armed forces would be reduced in the next period in any event. The Governor answered that on balance they would not, when German and Japanese additions were counted. Mr. Bowie (State) retorted with his opinion that there would be a decline in the forces we were now counting on. Mr. Amory turned to the question of the size of the inspection force, which he hoped would not be excessive. He argued the need for a breakdown of the system, and further information on the work of the task forces. He went on to state his view that we might have to pay the price of throwing China in to get the desired end result. Mr. Stassen countered that it was not worthwhile to recognize China now for this reason, and that China could not build its own air force, missiles or nuclear weapons for the next five to ten years at least. Amory countered that with respect to conventional forces, we had to count in China, Vietnam and North Korea. (At this juncture Bowie stated that he had never seen any specific studies on the effect of major mutual reductions of forces, and called for such a study. There was a bit of side argument about this point.)

Dr. Elliott<sup>7</sup> (ODM) stressed the importance to the U.S. of having intercontinental missiles in place by 1960. He feared that any steps along the lines proposed in Item 10 might be very dangerous. The Governor answered that these missiles could not be developed without considerable testing, which could be discovered by an inspection system. However, he noted that this major point was postponed for further study. He granted that the proposal would be no good if the U.S. Government continued to disagree on the matter for another five or six years. He called for maximum effort now to solve this problem in the national interest, and welcomed suggestions on it from any Planning Board member. Bowie then argued that the report did not meet this problem sufficiently, and Dr. Elliott renewed his argument that it might be very dangerous for the U.S. to stop its own developments in this field.

Commander Nelson (AEC) referred to Item 8, and asked what the timing would be on advancing the proposal therein. Mr. Stassen replied that the timing would be up to the President to decide, once approved, but that the proposal assumed it would be started before "fourth countries" obtained nuclear weapons. General Bonesteel sug-

---

<sup>7</sup> William Y. Elliott, Consultant on National Security Council Affairs, Office of Defense Mobilization.

gested that this development might be a net gain for the U.S., but Mr. Stassen disagreed and repeated his belief that it would provide greater chance for miscalculation, spreading small wars into large ones, and more illogical, if not mad, actions.

Mr. Bowie (State) expressed State's view that the "period of grace" was now over and that Volume V was inadequate. He asserted that the Volume called for a large inspection force and no significant reduction in armament. He characterized the inspection system as essentially a warning system only. He called attention to the UN resolution which gave an equal priority to "measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament".<sup>8</sup> Mr. Bowie believed that the State difference was in fact a basic dissent or divergence from Volume V. State, he continued, thought there had not been adequate studies on the matter of reductions—in particular, the prospects five to ten years ahead had not been fully taken into account. Bowie feared that partial proposals such as these might, if rejected by the Soviets, have a bad effect on the free world. He cautioned that the world as a whole was not as sanguine as we seemed to be about the results of an atomic stalemate, and would like to reduce both the costs and the risks of that situation. He again argued that Volume V did not meet this situation, and asserted that the token reductions called for would not convince anyone. He foresaw a very bad future situation if the U.S. could not do any better in this field. Bowie concluded that the clear serious differences in the government agencies on this question could not be compromised nor could decisions be reached by their agreement. He felt the basic differences must be posed more squarely and then resolved by the President's decision. Mr. Stassen commented that Bowie's remarks reflected the basic differences that existed within the Government. He himself was not seeking to compromise these differences, but to fit together a sound policy. He continued to reject the State position on major reductions at this time in the absence of the settlement of key political issues. He insisted that the U.S. act from a position of agreed mutual strength and not go down to a position of weakness, Mr. Stassen continuing to believe that his proposals would keep the U.S. initiative and leadership. Furthermore, he thought that if the U.S. would begin to talk about a lower level of forces it would then be even more difficult to keep up free world strength in the absence of an agreement. However, Mr. Stassen equally rejected the Defense position, which did not provide enough substance for U.S. leadership. He thought the U.S. could start a downward trend in armaments and proposed that all future nuclear material be used for peaceful purposes. The U.S., he said, should "wage peace" by maximum effort to get agreement. A

---

<sup>8</sup> See the editorial note, *supra*.

start on this problem would help resolve other political issues, which in turn might make greater disarmament possible. There was some further Stassen–Bowie argument on these points.

Mr. Dillon Anderson summed up with his view that the discussion had posed a number of questions which required further study. He personally had been much impressed with the “fourth country” problem and its dangers. He felt there was much disagreement on policy within the Departments—more than he had previously understood to be the case, and felt that the President must establish a U.S. position. He suggested a later meeting, perhaps sometime in January, at which decisions might be taken. Bowie called for a fuller report on the details of inspection, to which Mr. Stassen responded with a review of task force planning and his own expectation that the combined inspection system be reviewed in the Departments and actually “gamed” thereafter. Bowie continued to argue the importance of a fuller description of the proposed system which was not available to the NSC at this time.

The meeting was concluded with some remarks by Dr. Elliott to the effect of not placing too high a price upon favorable allied and neutral opinion as against the priority U.S. objectives.

---

**90. Memorandum of Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 22, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–4.]

*5. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments* (NSC Action No. 1419; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 16 and 21, 1955)<sup>2</sup>

The President inquired of Mr. Anderson what was the next item on the agenda. When Mr. Anderson replied, the President inquired how long Governor Stassen would require to present his report. Governor Stassen answered that this could be done in as little as five minutes. Secretary Dulles, however, stated that he did not believe that any useful discussion on the subject of disarmament could be carried

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on December 23.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1419, see footnote 8, Document 45. Regarding the memorandum to the NSC, December 16, see footnote 3, *supra*; the December 21 memorandum is not printed.

on in five minutes. The President accordingly suggested that the Council take a 10-minute break, after which he would return and remain a half an hour to hear Governor Stassen's report. In leaving the Cabinet Room, the President said in a hearty voice that he was a "pretty frail flower these days."

After the President's return, Governor Stassen proceeded to summarize the written report on the subject (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).<sup>3</sup> He made it clear that he expected no Council action on the recommendations of his report at the present meeting. After Council discussion, he indicated that he and members of the President's special committee on disarmament would undertake as a matter of urgency intensive discussion in the responsible departments and agencies. Thus he hoped to resolve disagreements or, failing that, to make completely clear the remaining issues. Perhaps within three weeks he could thus come back to the Council with a revision of his report and in expectation of Council action on it.

At the conclusion of his report Governor Stassen again said that between now and mid-January he would discuss unresolved problems with the departments and agencies and bring back a revised report to the National Security Council.

The President turned to Governor Stassen and told him that he would be very fortunate indeed if he could provide the Council with a satisfactory report before the arrival of Prime Minister Eden toward the end of January.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, said the President, the report just given by Governor Stassen was very valuable indeed, although the President said that he was puzzled by Governor Stassen's point of departure, namely, the creation and acceptance of a complete inspection system in the Soviet Union. It seemed to the President a very hard problem to find either the money or the manpower to carry out so elaborate a ground inspection system as Governor Stassen made the point of departure for any program in the direction of reduction of armaments. On the contrary, the President felt that we could do a pretty reasonable inspection job if the inspection was confined initially to aerial reconnaissance. Such reconnaissance would be bound, in the nature of things, to reveal a great deal about the status of Soviet armament.

The President went on to say in this connection that he was quite sure the Soviets had never given any thought to any inspection plan which involved the presence in the Soviet Union of anything like twenty to thirty thousand foreign inspectors. In all probability, on the

---

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Special Assistant to the President to the December 22 Session of the National Security Council, not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)

<sup>4</sup> Prime Minister Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom visited the United States from January 30 to February 3, 1956. Regarding his visit, see Document 105.

contrary, the Soviets, in the plan proposed by the Soviet Union, were thinking in terms of a mere handful of inspectors—doubtless as futile and useless an inspection as had been set up in Korea after the Armistice. It was essential that we be realistic regarding the probable Soviet attitude. What the President had in mind, he said, was “testing out with little steps, one at a time”. This was the proposal which the Soviets had brought up to him when he was at Geneva.

The President said that, nevertheless, all these points were mere details in comparison to the one big criticism he had of Governor Stassen’s report. The President said that we had initially proposed his plans for aerial inspection chiefly as a means of creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence. While he said that Governor Stassen had made a few allusions to the political situation between the U.S. and the USSR, he had by no means stated the necessity for developing two parallel programs, one to contain a series of political settlements and the other to contain progressive steps toward disarmament. If these two programs did not march along together, the President said that he was sure that there never would be created any atmosphere of confidence and, accordingly, any genuine progress toward disarmament. The President stressed the necessity, therefore, of developing theoretical programs to cover the area of political settlement and the area of disarmament. We could make no progress in the one program without concurrent progress in the other, and Governor Stassen’s report should emphasize this fact. Thus the problem was even more complicated than Governor Stassen’s report had indicated. In concluding, the President called for the views of the Secretary of State.

Secretary Dulles commenced with a tribute to the fine and useful job which Governor Stassen had accomplished. Nevertheless, it was easy to perceive in the report very serious difficulties. What principally concerned Secretary Dulles in the present draft report were certain inherent inconsistencies. Secretary Dulles then pointed out that when the National Security Council had discussed Governor Stassen’s previous progress report on disarmament some six months ago,<sup>5</sup> he, Secretary Dulles, had made the suggestion that we adopt the approach of trying to discern certain specific individual areas in the broad field of disarmament where an effective inspection system might conceivably be agreed to and worked out. Secretary Dulles still believed that this proposal was greatly preferable to the overall and general approach to disarmament which Governor Stassen had taken in his report. While of course, he said, it would be very useful to have the underlying studies, on which Governor Stassen had based his report, Secretary Dulles said that the over-all approach to which he had referred was

---

<sup>5</sup> Volume IV of Stassen’s progress report was discussed at the NSC meeting on June 23; see Document 40.

made very clear by the elaborate inspection system with which Governor Stassen's plan commenced. We can be absolutely sure that the Russians will never accept any arms inspection system which involved twenty to thirty thousand non-Russian inspectors on Russian soil. If we put forward such a plan we could be sure that we would be accused of making propaganda. Such an all-or-nothing proposition—that is, no steps toward disarmament until this elaborate inspection system was in operation—would make the United States a laughing stock. Moreover, Governor Stassen himself had not consistently followed his professed position that no steps toward disarmament could be taken until this great inspection plan had been accepted by the Russians and put in operation. To illustrate this inconsistency, Secretary Dulles pointed to item 7 of the recommendations in Governor Stassen's report, and said that this item did call for modest reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments before the inspection system was completely in operation.

Governor Stassen explained and defended the position that he had taken, and insisted that inspectors to the number of twenty or thirty thousand could not be described as unnecessarily large in view of the vast extent of the Soviet Eurasian empire. The President commented that this number, which amounted to two divisions, might not actually be inordinate, but he agreed with Secretary Dulles that the Soviets would never accept such a proposal.

Secretary Dulles professed to be unclear, from Governor Stassen's explanation, as to what, precisely, was Governor Stassen's position on the relation between the inspection plan and the first steps toward disarmament. Did Governor Stassen mean that the United States would refuse to accept any reductions, however modest, until the entire inspection plan had been fully accepted by the Soviet Union and was actually in force? Governor Stassen replied in the affirmative, whereupon Secretary Dulles said that he was compelled to describe this position as completely unrealistic. Over and above this, continued Secretary Dulles, he had thought that the United States had already committed itself to a partial and piecemeal approach to actual reductions. We should certainly not place the United States in the position that it wouldn't do anything at all until it could do everything. The President expressed his approval of Secretary Dulles' last point.

Secretary Dulles continued with the statement that in his view the great problem was to single out what kinds of installations and what kinds of armaments we can successfully and effectively inspect without having recourse to the full and all-out inspection called for by Governor Stassen.

The President stated that if the Soviet Union actually gave us a blueprint of their entire military layout and permitted us to conduct aerial reconnaissance over Soviet territory, some kind of agreement

with respect to the reduction of armaments and military installations would be feasible. Thus you would not be killing the whole plan from the very outset. We must not appear to the world, said the President, to be laying on the table so large and complicated an inspection system that other nations will accuse us of blatant insincerity. The United States would never get anywhere if it followed such a course.

Secretary Dulles, in illustration of his point of trying to secure inspection of specific military items and areas, cited submarine construction. He said he believed that it would be possible to control the construction of submarines by the Soviet Union without being obliged to have vast numbers of inspectors on Soviet territory. Perhaps, he added, there were a great many other military items which were in a similar case. He again emphasized his opinion that the case-by-case approach to inspection and disarmament was possible. The all-or-nothing approach was impossible.

Governor Stassen replied that he and his staff had given careful consideration to this very matter of inspecting and controlling the construction of submarines. He had come to the conclusion, however, that simply to agree to so limited an inspection might very well give rise in the free world to a quite false sense of security. Accordingly, this proposal had been rejected. The President commented that if we could get rid of submarines we could get rid of something that was extremely dangerous to us. He added, however, that he did not wish to say or do anything which would discourage Governor Stassen, and suggested that Governor Stassen's people get together with General Twining's experts on aerial photography and find out from them just exactly what we could and could not effectively inspect through the agency of aerial reconnaissance.

Secretary Robertson commented that in the interests of assisting Governor Stassen he would suggest that State and Defense get together promptly and agree together on certain basic assumptions with respect to the program of political settlements which the President had said should go hand in hand with the program of disarmament. Secretary Robertson said he had in mind such issues as Germany, Communist China, and such other matters as would have to be taken into consideration if the President's proposal were effectively to be carried out.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, transmitted by the refer-

---

<sup>6</sup> Paragraphs a and b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1496, approved by the President on December 28. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)



ence memorandum of December 16, in the light of the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 21.

b. Noted that the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, in the light of the discussion and after further consultation with the responsible departments and agencies, would submit a revised report for Council consideration prior to the forthcoming meeting of the President with the British Prime Minister.

S. Everett Gleason

---

**91. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, December 22, 1955.*

DEAR HAROLD: This relates to Volume V of your study of U.S. policy on disarmament<sup>2</sup> which I have just received.

I shall confine my comments to the implications of your suggested policy with regard to obtaining further U.N. endorsement of the Eisenhower policy—in the subcommittee, in the Disarmament Commission and in future General Assemblies.

The Tenth General Assembly has recently approved by an overwhelming majority (56-7) the US-UK-French-Canadian Resolution giving priority to President Eisenhower's plan for aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints,<sup>3</sup> and it is instructive to see why it did so, as follows:

a. One fundamental factor was the great merit of the President's plan itself, which was made particularly vivid by the Air Force exhibit across the street. But this alone would not have been enough. We were not in the situation which frequently arises in a national legislature in which the man who has a strong proposition merely insists on it and, because the proposition is so strong, eventually sees it prevail.

b. The large vote in the General Assembly was also due to our willingness to make mention in the resolution of other ideas—ideas which came from the United Kingdom, France, India and the Soviet

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Volume V is printed as Document 82. Regarding Stassen's report on Volume V, circulated December 16, see footnote 3, Document 89.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding Resolution 914 (X), approved on December 16, see Document 88.

Union. This resulted in a longer resolution which was somewhat cluttered up with verbiage, but the verbiage was harmless and brought us many votes.

c. The large vote was also due to the fact that we received Presidential approval to link some limited measure of disarmament with the "open sky" plan, as this was done in i and ii of operative paragraph 1(b). This had the great advantage not only of bringing us enthusiastic Anglo-French support, but of completely nullifying the propagandist argument which the Russians had made that the United States was not interested in disarmament but only in inspection.

For the future I suggest that we show:

a. an equal willingness to accept other ideas provided they are harmless,

b. that we recognize that we cannot avoid discussions of such things as force levels, nuclear control and nuclear tests,

c. that when it is utterly unavoidable that the Soviets will bring something up that will be embarrassing to us, we take the initiative ourselves and make a proposal of our own wherein we can safeguard the vital essentials of our military position and preserve our diplomatic position from embarrassment.

d. I suggest further that when you are sitting in London or in New York in the Subcommittee that your decisions be backed up promptly. It is difficult for some officials in Washington to realize that in an international forum the United States does not control the procedure and that, therefore, we are confronted with decisions which often come at a time which we do not like. In a discussion among Americans it may often be easy to get a postponement for a week. This is not the case in international affairs, and our success in securing implementation of the President's plan will be dependent in large measure on the extent and rapidity of your support from Washington in getting decisions for you.

e. You should be authorized to lift the "reservation" which we have placed on our previous policies, particularly with respect to reductions in conventional armaments, prohibition of nuclear weapons, reductions in nuclear weapons and the staging of a disarmament plan. I am aware of the considerations which led to the entering of this reserve, but we can get the same results without recourse to the "reserve" device which is so clumsy from a parliamentary viewpoint and so damaging to us in its cold war effects. The language which I used to meet criticism of it is, I think, the most effective that can be devised, but the "reserve" idea should be abandoned.

f. The Resolution adopted by the Political Committee requires us to consider now what concrete measures of disarmament we could really undertake under its operative paragraph 1 (ii): e.g., a census, or a "freeze"; regional reductions, token reductions, or some general pattern for the reduction of conventional armaments. I note that your Volume V anticipates "modest" reductions which would seem to be in line with the language in the Resolution.

g. We shall soon need a more definite policy with respect to prohibition of nuclear weapons. We have reiterated our stand for a general prohibition on use, except against aggression, but we will be

under increasing pressure to say whether the United States is for or against prohibition of the nuclear weapon, even as an ultimate objective. Volume V does not seem to give an answer on this point.

h. Similarly, the paper is not clear with respect to our policy on the reduction of nuclear stockpiles. We cannot advantageously negotiate proposals in the United Nations which do not deal more directly with these points.

i. Your paper refers to the necessity for preventing a spreading of nuclear weapons capability to additional powers. But it is not clear what you would propose to prevent it. This idea has also been expressed in the Disarmament Commission and Political Committee meetings and, here too, a definite policy line would be useful.

j. During the debates, I said many times that the force of public opinion would eventually cause the Soviet Union to accept the Eisenhower plan, supplemented by the Bulganin proposals. But Volume V, suggesting that the ground observers might number from 20,000 to 30,000, far exceeds any expectation I had formed of the probable size of that supplement. Some of the representatives of other countries commended the Eisenhower-Bulganin plan on the grounds that it would not constitute so massive an invasion of sovereignty as earlier proposals for inspection had contemplated. I do not know whether the Defense Department could pare down its estimate but it would certainly be easier to negotiate on the basis of a more modest figure.

k. I believe that Kuznetsov<sup>4</sup> was personally quite impressed with the shift in our position as epitomized in ii of operative paragraph 1 (b), and that you should take advantage of an opportunity when you meet the Russians to stress this point which brings the United States definitely nearer to what the Soviets said on May 10th that they wanted.

Volume V is, I assume, a preliminary outline, and more details will be supplied later. However, once debate in the United Nations gets beyond the broad concept such as the Eisenhower plan, it tends to center on the timing of arms reductions and of exchange of information and the relation between the two operations. I believe that our policy should be more precise on these points.

I understand that the next meeting of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission<sup>5</sup> will probably occur in February, probably in Europe. I believe our efforts in Washington might well be directed towards the points I have mentioned in this letter.

In the meantime, let me say how much I appreciate the complexity of your task, and all you are doing to cope with it.

Sincerely,

H.C. Lodge, Jr.

---

<sup>4</sup> V.V. Kuznetsov, member of the Soviet Delegation to the Tenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

<sup>5</sup> The words "United Nations" are crossed out and the words "Disarmament Commission" are inserted in handwriting on the source text.

**92. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the President's Special Assistant (Stassen), Washington, December 30, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

Harold Stassen dined alone with me, and we talked for a considerable time after dinner. Our conversation related principally to disarmament.

Mr. Stassen referred to the conviction to which his group had come that any substantial disarmament would not really be in the interest of the United States and that the optimum goal should be to try to stabilize the situation at about the present level. He said that to go below that level would be dangerous because of the greater ability of the Soviet Union quickly to reverse the field.

I said that if this were in fact our position, we would have to think hard about how to present it publicly. We could not go on much longer pretending that we were for reduction of armament, while using various excuses to avoid and postpone the issue.

I raised the question of piece-meal disarmament as indicated by the UN Resolution we had co-sponsored.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Stassen said this Resolution was not intended to envisage piece-meal conventional reduction but merely to indicate that conventional reductions need not wait upon atomic reductions, but that conventional reductions were to be taken as a whole and not piece-meal as in terms of submarines, heavy bombers, etc.

I said that that was not readily apparent from reading the Resolution.

I also said that if we were to retain the usability of atomic weapons, it would be necessary to internationalize them to a greater extent than at present and to make them clearly the tool of the community to maintain order.

Mr. Stassen said he liked this idea and thought that we should perhaps put some atomic weapons<sup>3</sup> at the service of other regional groupings.

I said that I thought the important thing was to vest the decision in a group of broader character than just the United States alone.

JFD

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Disarmament. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on December 31.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding U.N. General Assembly Resolution 914 (X), see Document 88.

<sup>3</sup> The word "power" is crossed through in the source text and "weapons" has been written in.

93. **Memorandum of a Meeting, Chart Room, Maiatico Building, Washington, January 9 1956, 12:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Relationship Between AEC and ICA on Atomic Matters

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman Lewis Strauss, AEC  
Admiral Paul F. Foster, AEC  
John A. Hall, AEC  
John B. Hollister, Director, ICA  
DeWitt L. Sage, ICA<sup>2</sup>  
William Sheppard, ICA<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Strauss stated that he had suggested this meeting because of some apparent misunderstanding of the staff of AEC and ICA as to the jurisdiction and duties of the agencies in atomic matters. Mr. Hollister stated that he understood there were three areas needing clarification:

1. The responsibility for arranging for the acquisition of research reactors under the President's offer in his Penn State speech.<sup>4</sup> He felt that if the ICA was expected to pay half the cost of the reactors it should have authority to implement the project with AEC technical advice, whereas if the AEC wished to implement the project completely it should ask for the appropriation and make the payments.

2. Training courses for those countries where there were bilateral contracts. Here again Mr. Hollister felt that if the ICA was to be asked to pay the expenses of the trainees it should have the authority to decide how the courses would fit into the aid program for the particular country.

3. The Asian nuclear center.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Hollister felt it was inconsistent for the AEC to take over complete handling of the bilateral programs and yet ask the ICA to take over the complete handling of the multilateral programs except, of course, for the technical advice.

The following conclusions were reached:

1. It was settled that the ICA would have no responsibility whatsoever for the acquisition of research reactors under the bilateral plans. Whether the funds required for fiscal year 1957 for the bilateral reactor program should be included in the MSP appropriation request (not to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, AEC-ICA Relations. Confidential. Drafted on January 16. No other drafting information is given on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Assistant to the Director, ICA.

<sup>3</sup> Assistant Deputy Director, Office of the Deputy Director, Management, ICA.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Eisenhower's commencement address at Pennsylvania State University, June 11, 1955, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 593-600.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 85.

exceed \$350,000 for each country, which would include costs of survey and consultant), would be settled later by Messrs. Hollister and Strauss. If it should be settled that MSP funds are to be used by AEC it would be understood that AEC would give ICA a statement of the countries for which such obligations would be required in fiscal year 1957 far enough ahead of the firming up of the Congressional request so that the amount might be decided on. It is understood that no money will be needed for this purpose in FY 1956 and that all MSP allocations to be made by the ICA would be made directly to the Atomic Energy Commission.

2. It was agreed that the ICA training program would be conducted in the future as it has in the past; that the number and selection of trainees for the training programs from various countries would be subject to the same process as the ICA now uses in selecting trainees and would be handled interdepartmentally in such a way that they could be fitted into a regular ICA country program. ICA would continue to determine the extent to which it can finance atomic energy trainees within the aid program for the particular country. Where ICA has discontinued technical assistance because of a country's ability to pay its own way, ICA should not be asked to pay for such trainees. If new countries are to be considered, the departments concerned should work the matter out on an ad hoc basis.

3. It was agreed that ICA would handle completely the Asian reactor problem provided, of course, that all technical advice would be given by AEC.

---

**94. Report of the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, undated.*

**SUBJECT**

Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)

**I**

The point has been reached at which a decision on U.S. policy on the question of disarmament is imperative.

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.

A. The old U.S. policy of eliminating nuclear weapons under effective controls and reducing force levels to one or one and a half million men is outmoded, untenable, and undesirable, under the present and foreseeable international situation.

B. Through a careful and persistent effort, including the placing of reservations on old positions, and an extensive educational program, world opinion has been prepared for the movement away from the old policy. These reservations must now be replaced by new policy.

C. A United Nations General Assembly resolution passed by a vote of 56-7 may be characterized as broadly confirming the U.S. analysis of the problem and the need of moving to new policy.

D. The Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission will resume in March, and the U.S. should have preliminary consultations with the U.K. and others in advance of these sessions.

E. The Prime Minister of the U.K. will consult in Washington on January 30th, and this will be an unusual opportunity to obtain the essential close cooperation of the U.K.<sup>2</sup>

F. Delay in U.S. decision would cause a serious loss of U.S. initiative in world public opinion, would result in a gain for the Soviet Union, and would prejudice many other important interests of the U.S.

G. The decisions recommended have in their broad sense been before the Departments since May 26, 1955; in their major outline were submitted on November 1, 1955; and in their precise wording, taking into account comments of all Departments, were distributed on December 16, 1955 in a memorandum for the December 22, 1955 meeting of the NSC.<sup>3</sup>

H. There will be ample opportunity to subsequently amend the recommended policy or delay its implementation during the inevitably extensive negotiations, if any scientific, military, or political developments, or any later recommendation of a department, leads to such future conclusion for revision.

I. The detailed implementation of the policy will itself be subject to interdepartmental agreement and NSC decision as appropriate.

## II

The policy recommended meets three essential tests:

A. When advanced it will attract the overwhelming approval and support of world public opinion for the United States position.

B. If accepted by the USSR and effectively implemented it will improve the prospects of peace and add to the security of the United States as compared to the situation which will prevail in the absence of any agreement.

C. If the USSR is sincerely interested in a durable peace, acceptance of the U.S. policy will be in its mutual interest as compared to the situation which will prevail in the absence of any agreement.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Eden's visit, see Document 105.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 90.

## III

Three general arguments which have been made in questioning the recommended policy affect many of its clauses and are discussed in some detail prior to consideration of specific paragraphs.

A. It does not go far enough, and should include major or drastic ultimate reduction in armed forces and armaments.

B. It goes too far, and should not involve any reductions or ceilings whatsoever on U.S. armed forces and armaments in the early stages.

C. It does not spell out in sufficiently complete and precise detail each item and the method and timing of implementation.

Each of these arguments has been considered thoroughly and has not been adopted for the reasons discussed in the following sections.

A. (It does not go far enough, and should include major or drastic ultimate reductions in armed forces and armaments.)

The conclusion of the extensive studies is that the issues between the USSR and the U.S. are inseparably intertwined with the levels of armaments and that so long as Germany is divided, the China-Formosa issue is unresolved, Korea and Indo-China are split, the European Satellites are within the Iron Curtain, and the world-wide Communist activity is rampant, the United States should not make major or drastic reductions in its armed forces and armaments even if the USSR agreed to do so under inspection. The resolution of these issues must occur in parallel sequence with future important reductions of armed forces and armament, and it is considered to be neither feasible nor fruitful to spell out theoretical situations now. Specific future developments and their interrelationship should be evaluated as they arise. The strategic position of the USSR and of Communist China, in the center of the Eurasian land mass where three-fourths of the population of the globe resides, would give to them a tremendous advantage if both sides were reduced to weak levels of arms. The nature of the totalitarian system would facilitate their rapid reversal of an agreed weak position at a future year, and the United States and other free world countries would have difficulty in rapidly rebuilding their armed strength. A weak armament position will enhance the value of subversive methods, at which the Soviet Union excels. A fresh proposal by the U.S. for major reductions, even though conditional on political settlements and inspection, would contribute to a letdown attitude in free world countries which may lead to unilateral reductions even though the USSR did not agree and did not adopt the inspection system. A major reduction or elimination of an important segment of armament, such as submarines or four-and-



more engine bombers, would lead to a false sense of security if not accompanied by a comprehensive inspection system to effectively safeguard against surprise attack by other means.

Thus the recommended policy might be characterized as one of mutual strength plus openness and thorough inspection against surprise, rather than mutual weakness plus openness and inspection.

It is recognized that this recommended policy will require the thorough preparation of world understanding. It is estimated that this can be done. Emphasis should constantly be placed upon the objective of peace with reiterated explanations that U.S. military strength does not serve an exclusively national purpose, but does contribute to free world security and to peace. It may also be desirable to emphasize the moral restraints with which this U.S. strength will be held, the intention to carry out collective consultation whenever feasible before using U.S. armed strength, the study of methods through which the use of a part of our military armament through the forces of collective security groupings, and the firm adherence of the U.S. to the restraining commitments of the United Nations Charter.

If the political climate changes and settlements are approached or reached which are significant, major reductions in armament can then be considered by the U.S. in relation to these political developments. It is believed that to propose such major reductions at the present time would be counterproductive.

Furthermore, if the USSR proposes acceptable political settlements along with more drastic but inspectable reductions in armaments, the U.S. can then give appropriate consideration to such propositions.

B. (It goes too far, and should not involve any reductions or ceilings whatsoever on U.S. armed forces and armaments in the early stages.)

The U.S. cannot hold the essential support of world public opinion unless it is made clear that the acceptance of the President's Geneva proposal for mutual aerial inspection would definitely end the competitive build-up of armaments and would turn the trend downward. The USSR has repeatedly argued that the President's proposal may lead to an acceleration and expansion of the arms race. Whether these assertions are made through conviction or for propaganda, this argument must be met. It is the established policy that the U.S., in its own interest, should, as interrelated parts of our national policy:

1. "Actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments." (NSC Action 1419)

This is a desirable policy. The future outlook in the absence of agreement, with ever greater capacity for mutual annihilation, is singularly unattractive. A determined effort to change the current trend

should be made, and as an essential part of that endeavor the U.S. must make clear its willingness to make modest initial reductions if the President's proposal is accepted. The opening of the USSR to aerial inspection and ground observers would be of great value to the U.S. If this can be obtained along with some reduction in U.S. forces plus U.S. aerial and related ground inspection, the interests of the U.S. and the prospects of peace will both be well served. Furthermore the making of such a proposal will itself serve the psychological interests of the U.S. It will assist in maintaining the essential climate for the continuance of U.S. bases on foreign soil and for the collective defense arrangements with other nations.

The U.S. must not present too tough and militaristic a front to the world. The U.S. should not say to the USSR that it must accept and implement the mutual inspection before we will negotiate any ceilings or reductions. Such a public posture, aggravated by multiple military statements of preparations to use nuclear weapons in various areas of the world, may not only lose essential free world support, but may also contribute to the loss of governments friendly to the U.S. from internal neutralist and Communist opposition. Such a public posture may also contribute toward a conclusion by USSR planners that war is inevitable, and such a conclusion on their part would tend to make war inevitable.

C. (It does not spell out in complete and precise detail each item and the method and timing of implementation.)

It is considered that the preparation to the National Security Council of greater detail at this time would militate against the successful development of policy and the carrying out of U.S. objectives. For example, the detail of modest U.S. reductions should be worked out with the Department of Defense, but this cannot be done effectively at a time when the Department of Defense position is opposed to any reductions whatsoever. The policy decisions are required first, and then the detailed implementation can be worked out with the Departments principally concerned, subject to such later review by the NSC as may be appropriate or necessary. The type of implementation contemplated is that if the USSR accepts the President's proposal, if the blueprints of military establishments are successfully exchanged, if the aerial inspection and ground observers are initiated, then during the first year of the inspection, the blueprint level would be reciprocally reduced to force levels of approximately 2.5 million men, the military budgets cut 5%, the major weapons carriers—planes, submarines, missiles—would each be levelled off or slightly reduced, and no new foreign bases would be established. But no decision of the NSC on such detail is requested at the present time.

Likewise, the details of timing and staging can be worked out with the Departments and in the negotiations with the other nations within the policy guidance contained in the recommendations submitted now to the NSC.

This policy can be carried out through various alternatives one of which would be the periodic deposit of substantial quantities of weapons grade 235 and Plutonium to the International Atomic Energy Agency or other instrumentality by both the USSR and the U.S. The quantities could be equal, greater, or somewhat less than the future current production of these materials, dependent on specific decisions and negotiations under the total situation then prevailing.

#### IV

##### *Discussions of Certain Major Proposals of Policy in the Light of Departmental Comments*

A. (Para. VI B 4 of Volume V) (Also, Item 8 of December 22, 1955 Memo)

"Provide that all future nuclear material production anywhere in the world will be for peaceful use; to take effect when an international atomic control agency can effectively supervise the material subsequently produced, and maintain it in safeguarded stockpiles of national ownership, within a comprehensive arms control system; all under detailed arrangements to be agreed to by the United States Atomic Energy Commission."

It is agreed that it is in the U.S. interest to retard or prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons into the armaments of multiple nations. It will not be possible to do so if the U.S. says in effect "we ask that you agree never to fabricate nuclear weapons, but we intend to make as many more as we wish in the future." It may be possible to obtain this agreement of "fourth countries" if the U.S. says in effect "we ask that you agree not to fabricate nuclear weapons, and we will agree to use our future production of nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes, provided the USSR agrees to do likewise and to exchange inspectors and make supervised stockpile arrangements for that purpose, but we will not destroy our existing weapon stockpile because these are needed to deter and counter the USSR weapons stockpile, since the elimination of *past production* of nuclear weapons cannot now be assured by effective inspection."

It would be in the U.S. interest if future production of an increased supply of nuclear weapons was effectively stopped on a mutual basis. This proposal will never be implemented unless the USSR accepts and places into effect the Eisenhower mutual aerial inspection plus an adequate inspection of future nuclear material production satisfactory to AEC and NSC. This proposal will have constructive value

for the U.S. from a psychological standpoint as soon as it is made. It is a dramatic and appealing follow up to the President's Geneva proposal and indirectly links that proposal to the President's Atoms for Peace proposal.

B. (Para. VI B 3 of Volume V) (Item 7 of Dec. 22, 1955 Memo)

Accept modest initial reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments on a reciprocal basis if tied to the first full year of experience in the implementation of the President's proposal, to be worked out in detail with the Department of Defense, contributing toward the early lessening of the burden of armaments.

(Para. VI E in Volume V) (Item 17 of Dec. 22, 1955 Memo)

If an inspection system such as here described is installed the United States will contemplate a gradual equitable reduction on a reciprocal basis of nuclear weapons carrying capacity and of conventional forces and conventional armaments, but such specific reductions shall be the subject of National Security Council consideration in the light of conditions then existing, and no blanket commitments of figures or percentages or other indication of levels shall be made in advance of such National Security Council consideration.

The U.S. must make it clear that if the beginning proposed by the President at Geneva is accepted, this will definitely be followed by reductions in armaments. The proposed reductions need not be and should not be large, but they must be concrete and specific. The failure to propose any reductions after our thorough review would tend to cast a worldwide doubt on the sincerity of the President's original proposal. Modest reductions reciprocally made would be in the U.S. interest. The combination of the aerial inspection plus modest reductions would improve the future security of the U.S.

Following such an initial agreement, study and negotiations could proceed on the political issues dividing the world and on the related question of any further reductions in armament.

The UN resolution specifically calls for priority to President Eisenhower's Geneva proposal and the ground control posts and "(ii) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible."

C. (Part of Para. VI A 1 of Volume V) (Item 2 of Dec. 22, 1955 Memo)

. . . "establish current accountability of the movement of armed forces, especially those capable of carrying nuclear weapons in attack;" . . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Ellipses in the source text.

There has been no dissent on this, but it is brought forward for emphasis as it will be an essential part of any effective program to safeguard against surprise attack. The details will be worked out with the Department of Defense and with reference back to NSC as appropriate and necessary.

D. All other recommendations appear to be sufficiently understood as presented in the December 22, 1955 Memorandum, and all are presented for action as indicated therein; with the continued postponement of the items so marked in the December 22, 1955 Memorandum.

## V

A. Upon the establishment of U.S. policy, it is suggested that after consultation with the UK, and to some extent with France and Canada, the U.S. position should be first presented direct to Premier Bulganin through a letter from President Eisenhower delivered and discussed by U.S. representatives. This would be the most effective manner of obtaining thorough consideration by the Soviet Union. It would have world wide value to the U.S. It would make more certain the correct understanding by the top Soviet leaders of the U.S. position. It would desirably label the added proposals as Eisenhower proposals, which would have world wide value to the U.S. It would make more certain the correct understanding by the top Soviet leaders of the U.S. position. [sic] It would minimize the possibilities of misunderstanding such as are frequently noted when the Soviet rulers receive complex information through their UN representatives. It would demonstrate continued U.S. initiative in this field and reflect persistent U.S. endeavors for peace. It would fulfill the promise of a further reply which President Eisenhower included in his acknowledgment which read as follows:

[Here follows text of Eisenhower's letter to Bulganin, October 11, 1955, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, pages 528-529.]

B. A preliminary draft of a letter from the President to Premier Bulganin, reflecting the U.S. policy recommended to the NSC is submitted.

[Here follows a draft text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Bulganin. The final text of the letter, March 1, is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume I, pages 593-595, and Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1956, pages 514-515.]

This preliminary draft letter is of course subject to rewriting and revision by the Department of State and other Departments concerned

and finally by the President, and it is submitted now to indicate the manner in which the recommended policy would be pursued and reflected to the USSR and to the people of the world.

Respectfully submitted,

Harold E. Stassen

---

95. **Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 20, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments and recommendations on a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, subject as above,<sup>2</sup> which is being scheduled by the Executive Secretary for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 26 January 1956.<sup>3</sup>

2. The report summarizes pertinent circumstances in the progress of disarmament negotiations. Further, it recommends the approval of specific policy statements, previously considered in the revision of Section VI of Volume V, sets forth arguments and counterarguments, and indicates disadvantages that would result should the proposed policy statements not now be accepted. The report concludes that the recommendations presented in the 22 December 1955 memorandum, and not considered in the current report, appear sufficiently understood and all are presented for approval or postponement of approval, as specified in that memorandum. Included in the report is the preliminary draft of a proposed letter from President Eisenhower to Mr. Bulganin. The letter is in draft form and while subject to revision, is ". . . ."<sup>4</sup> submitted now to indicate the manner in which the recommended policy would be pursued and reflected to the USSR and to the people of the world".

3. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the policy statements in the revision of Section VI of Volume V were

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—NSC. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> See Document 103.

<sup>4</sup> All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

submitted to you by a memorandum dated 20 December 1955<sup>5</sup> and transmitted with your concurrence and remarks to the National Security Council on 21 December 1955. In paragraph 3 of their memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented on the lack of clarity of the proposed policy as a whole; specifically, as to whether proceeding step-by-step from the President's Proposal to a comprehensive disarmament policy is to be adhered to. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, noting that there are no modifications in the policy statements in Mr. Stassen's latest report from those proposed in his 22 December memorandum, consider the views they previously expressed are even more valid in view of the elaborating information provided in this report.

4. For example, the following comments are addressed to certain of the numbered items presented to the National Security Council in Mr. Stassen's 22 December memorandum. After full consideration of his justification for their retention in the 26 January report, these items are unacceptable from the military point of view:

a. *Item 7: "Accept modest initial reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments on a reciprocal basis if tied to the first full year of experience in the implementation of the President's Proposal, to be worked out in detail with the Department of Defense, contributing toward the early lessening of the burden of armaments."*

Recommend deletion.

*Reason:* The Joint Chiefs of Staff still consider their previous comments to you a valid basis for deletion of this item. In Mr. Stassen's latest report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note for the first time that the modest initial force reductions being considered indicate personnel ceilings of 2.5 million men for both the United States and the USSR. For the United States this would mean a reduction in excess of 300,000 men, or more than ten percent of our present strength, without change in our world-wide commitments. Acceptance by the USSR of such a ceiling would involve a considerably greater reduction for them; however, because of the many variables involved, an improvement in our security position would not necessarily follow. In the light of experience in our relations with the Soviet Union, it would be hazardous to base a reduction of our forces on agreement of the Soviets that they would do likewise, without first proving the effectiveness of any agreed inspection and control system. The inspection and control system envisaged<sup>6</sup> as a part of the President's Proposal to provide against great surprise attack falls far short of providing this proof. In the

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—NSC)

<sup>6</sup> President's letter to Mr. Bulganin dated 12 October 1955 and U.S. Outline Plan for the Implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva Regarding Disarmament. [Footnote in the source text. References are to Eisenhower's letter of October 11, 1955 (which was delivered by the Embassy in Moscow to Bulganin on October 12), and to the U.S. outline plan submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee on August 30, 1955. Both are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 501-503 and 528-529, respectively.]

absence of proof, no other evaluation of the impact of such reductions on our security can be made than that an unacceptable risk would be involved.

b. *Item 16: "The United States will not agree, in the absence of a new decision which it is anticipated would need to be based on facts not now foreseeable, to any of the following: The withdrawal of overseas bases, as a part of a disarmament agreement, prior to a major verified reduction of USSR weapons carry-capacity and the resolution of major issues between the USSR and the United States."*

Recommend deletion.

*Reason:* The reasons previously given<sup>7</sup> for recommending deletion of this item from the proposed statement of United States policy on disarmament remain valid.

c. *Item 17: "If an inspection system such as here described is installed, the United States will contemplate a gradual equitable reduction on a reciprocal basis of nuclear weapons carrying capacity and of conventional forces and conventional armaments, but such specific reductions shall be the subject of National Security Council consideration in the light of conditions then existing, and no blanket commitments of figures or percentages or other indication of levels shall be made in advance of such National Security Council consideration."*

Recommend change to read: "If a reliable inspection system is installed, and proved, the United States . . ."

*Reason:* In its present context the phrase "such as here described" has no definite point of reference. The changed wording is in conformance with that part of the President's statement made at the Geneva Conference on 21 July 1955, which reads: "The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspection and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results."

5. This latest report by Mr. Stassen includes a suggested procedure for the initial implementation of the policy proposed. While he does not specifically recommend approval of his suggestion, its inclusion in the report invites discussion by the National Security Council. While recognizing that the manner of policy implementation is primarily within the province of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the substance of certain proposals set forth in the preliminary draft letter from the President to Mr. Bulganin would, from the military point of view, be unacceptable in its present form. As now worded, it appears not wholly consistent with the policy recommended for consideration and approval by the Council on 26 January. As an illustration, the draft letter would indicate United States willingness to enter into an agreement that "all future production of nuclear material anywhere in the world shall be devoted to peaceful purposes", with only two provisos: (1) "if the ground and

<sup>7</sup> Memorandum for Secretary of Defense dated 20 December 1955, subject: "Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)". [Footnote in the source text.]



aerial inspection system is agreed upon and implemented" and (2) "[if suitable technical inspection to verify the fulfillment of the agreement [is established]".<sup>8</sup> In contrast, item 8 of the recommended policy indicates that United States agreement on this provision would be forthcoming only "within a comprehensive arms control system". Other objections, from the military point of view, are evident and, under the circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that if such a letter is to be sent they will be given further opportunity to express their views.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the remarks you made in transmitting their comments on Section VI of Volume V, and on the revision thereto, to the National Security Council.<sup>9</sup> These remarks have emphasized that (a) each step we take with respect to any disarmament plan must enhance the security of the United States, (b) items proposed for approval are interdependent and do not lend themselves to decision on an individual basis, (c) consideration of individual items will militate against an objective evaluation of the policy as a whole, and (d) action to approve policy recommendations should be deferred until opportunity has been afforded to study the forthcoming inspection and control plan.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, at the meeting of the Council on 26 January:

a. You adhere to the position formerly expressed, as outlined in paragraph 6 above; and

b. In the event Council decision indicates approving action will be taken, the foregoing comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff constitute the basis for the Department of Defense position.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Arthur Radford**<sup>10</sup>

*Chairman*

---

<sup>8</sup> Brackets in the source text.

<sup>9</sup> Secretary of Defense Wilson's letter to Stassen, December 7, 1955, commented on Volume V, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson's memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, December 21, 1955, forwarded the JCS views on the revised Volume V. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)

<sup>10</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

96. Letter From the President to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 23, 1956.

DEAR FOSTER: I have given preliminary study to your memorandum.<sup>2</sup> I think it contains a good idea; I am certain that that part which stresses the importance of political leadership is absolutely correct.

Here and there I have scrawled some hasty notes on the paper, but my basic question is something of this sort:

When flatly rejecting technical inspection as providing any practicable basis for disarmament, we thereby give to the Russians a great opportunity for hurting us politically. Yet another part of the program *assumes* that we can have a sufficient inspection or knowledge of productive capacity in both countries to insure that the amount of fissionable material in the hands of the international agency will be greater than that possessed by any particular country. In fact, we apparently assume that the proportion would be so great that any individual country would be foolish to challenge the international power.

These conclusions seem to be somewhat contradictory between themselves.

Yet by no means do I think we should give up the idea that you have brought along this far. In spite of all that has been said about the inadequacy of technical inspection as a base for any kind of atomic disarmament, I am not so sure that this is true to the extent that we should reject the whole idea out of hand.

If inspection were as thorough, as constant and as widespread as it could be made, and if such a proposal were accompanied by disarmament in easily discoverable means of delivery, it might be a very effective thing indeed.

Certainly it would be sufficiently effective that we could better afford to insist upon inspection as a part of every program we propose, rather than to reject it. At least we would avoid giving to the Soviets a world of propaganda ammunition.

There would be the further advantage that if only general inspection systems were approved, and the results were somewhat less than satisfactory, then the international pool theory becomes an alternative that it seems to me the world would seize upon with great relief and enthusiasm.

As ever,<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles' untitled memorandum, January 22, and labeled draft #10, details how current trends with respect to nuclear weapons, unless counteracted, could become seriously unfavorable to the United States in several areas. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> The source text is unsigned.

P.S.: By this last paragraph I mean that now the only recourse would be to insist on such a large aggregate of material in the international pool that no single state could possibly have a greater amount.

DE<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

---

**97. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations  
(Lodge) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, January 24, 1956.*

DEAR FOSTER: Attached is a memorandum on the subject which we discussed on Saturday, January 14 at your house.<sup>2</sup>

1. The prime purpose of this suggestion is to enhance the security and national defense of the United States. This is because communist propaganda has, in the vernacular, "given the atomic bomb a bad name," and to such an extent that it seriously inhibits us from using it in case of need. Obviously, therefore, a measure which makes it easier for us to use the atomic bomb when we feel it is to our interests is advantageous to our national defense.

2. Another purpose of the suggestion is to promote world peace. The greatest single factor in the world today for peace is our atomic superiority. As the idea gains ground that we are inhibited from using the atomic weapon because of the bad name which it has received its influence as a peace preserver naturally diminishes. To remove—or reduce—the existing inhibition on its use, therefore, promotes world peace.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-2456. Top Secret. Lodge also sent a copy of this letter to President Eisenhower, January 24 with the following covering note:

"Attached is the 'line' to which, I think, the Soviets are sensitive.

"I suggest that all those in the United States Government who have anything to do with talking about disarmament to foreigners should stress this thought—that a nation which does not accept your plan lays itself open to grave suspicion.

"If we 'worry' this thought like a dog with a bone, they will either eventually give in, or the world will know whom to suspect. This would put us in a position to rally world opinion against them in the United Nations with a good chance of broad support." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Lodge)

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

From a strictly military point of view there are no short-range drawbacks to this proposal. The time factor involved is insignificant. Inherent in the proposal is the right of self-defense with the right of immediate reaction in the case of our self-defense. General Assembly action to prevent our use would require a two-thirds vote.

Foreigners could not justifiably complain that the proposal lacks substance—because it gets the General Assembly into the blood and sand of the arena just as intensely as it is possible to do without actually putting the defense of the free world against aggression at the mercy of a United Nations filibuster.

I suggest that the President make this proposal in June. The best place to make it is at the United Nations. If, however, he cannot do that, then thought should be given to calling all the diplomatic corps to the White House.

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

[Enclosure]

*January 24, 1956.*

Following are the bare bones of a statement for the President:

Although the atomic danger has grown greater than ever, the world has found no protection against it.

The Soviet proposal to “ban the bomb” is a mere slogan and is absolutely meaningless in terms of actually preventing the manufacture, stockpiling and use of atomic bombs.

The West’s proposal for disarmament plus inspection has not been attained because of Soviet unwillingness to agree to it.

Yet there is now enough fissionable material in the world to destroy all human life.

We must, therefore, constantly keep trying to find methods which will protect humanity from being destroyed. As none of the old proposed methods have been put into effect, we must look for new ones.

I propose, therefore, that the atomic powers, as the nations possessing fissionable materials, agree to internationalize the use of atomic weapons under the aegis of the United Nations, and I hereby pledge that, in accordance with such an agreement, the United States will internationalize the use of its weapons.

This internationalization would be in accordance with the Charter and in the spirit of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950<sup>3</sup> and

---

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the Uniting for Peace Resolution, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303–370.

would, of course, be supplementary to and not in substitution for the Charter provisions covering self-defense and regional arrangements.

My proposal means that we renounce the use of the atomic weapon if objection thereto is made by the United Nations General Assembly—the only world forum and the most representative existing body of world opinion. It means further that when there must be a resort to collective action against aggression, as the Charter provides, and when the speedy threat of the atomic weapon is thus required because its deterrent effect will prevent a world war, that the nations possessing atomic weapons withhold their use long enough to give the General Assembly time to forbid them from using these weapons.

What this interval of time shall be can be negotiated between the Powers. Obviously, it must be long enough for members to meet and to consider. Obviously, too, it must not be so long that the aggression which it is planned to prevent nevertheless takes place because the Assembly “fiddled while Rome burned”. The aggressor must not have the sole ability to act with speed. The Uniting for Peace Resolution says that the Assembly shall be called on 24 hours notice. I suggest for discussion that there then be 3 days deliberation.

The United States agrees to place the use of its atomic weapons under this United Nations ban only after deep and careful thought. No nation lightly surrenders its sovereign prerogatives. We too are reluctant to do it. We ask others to join us in doing it now because we are willing to do it ourselves and because we think it may prevent annihilation of the human race. Such a concession of national sovereignty seems small indeed when matched against the lives of all humanity. To paraphrase the words of the American Declaration of Independence, we make this offer not only because of a decent regard for the opinions, but also for the very existence, of mankind.

HCL

98. **Memorandum of a Conversation Among the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, January 24, 1956, 4 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Stassen opened the meeting by saying that the time had come when the United States must reach a decision on the question of disarmament. He noted that we had moved away from the old outmoded positions on disarmament and had placed reservations on those positions which needed review. He pointed out that it was time to move from these positions. He spoke of the need for the U.S. to retain the initiative in the disarmament negotiations. He noted that the proposed letter to Bulganin<sup>2</sup> does not prejudice the U.S. position and he argued that some such position is essential, for he said if we do not hold the initiative we will lose essential leadership of the free world to neutralistic sentiment. He stated that policy decisions taken now could be modified if future circumstances so indicated. He pointed out that if we cannot get the USSR to open up and accept inspection he would not propose any restraints on U.S. military strength.

The Chief of Staff, Army,<sup>3</sup> speaking for himself, said that he appreciated the magnitude of Mr. Stassen's job and that he was anxious not to be negative. He recognized the need for a U.S. initiative. On the other hand, he was strongly opposed to making any commitments prior to the development of and testing of a reliable inspection system. He pointed out that the U.S. has been disarming since 1945, and now the Army has no room left for even minor reductions in force levels. He noted also that there were many issues not yet resolved between the various departments, and felt that they should be resolved before we make any moves in the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. Stassen replied that he felt we cannot resolve too many minor issues before we make some major moves. We cannot stand still. He agreed that inspection is an essential ingredient in any disarmament policy, and pointed out that the U.S. had taken a firm position regarding the necessity for adequate inspection.

At this time, Admiral Radford entered and Mr. Stassen reviewed his earlier remarks. Admiral Radford was opposed to any commitments on disarmament and called attention to the unfortunate effect the 1.5 million force level had had.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Department of Defense. Secret. Drafted by Gladney.

<sup>2</sup> For Eisenhower's letter to Bulganin, January 28, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1956, pp. 191–193.

<sup>3</sup> General Maxwell D. Taylor.

Mr. Stassen remarked that he wanted to put something in place of the 1.5 million figure. He went on to say that a priority objective of the U.S. is to open up the USSR. Otherwise, no ceilings could be placed on U.S. forces. If we can obtain air inspection of the USSR, then he felt that we could take other steps. He pointed out the Soviet propaganda positions.

Mr. Stassen indicated that one desirable situation as far as the U.S. was concerned was to get an openness of the USSR. Radford countered with a statement that China is not in the picture, to which Stassen replied, "If we can maintain approximately our present strength, we can ignore China." Radford said that this would be OK if we maintained our present strength, but in that case you have no reduction that you can promise the Soviet Union as lying beyond the gateway to the President's proposal.

Mr. Stassen then asked Radford if he would settle for 2½ million. It was at this point that Radford pointed out that Russia has only matched the United States reduction of 700,000 since mid-1953, and then asked, "Don't we get any credit?" He made two other points—one was that he was not certain that we could be as flexible as Mr. Stassen claimed in the application of U.S. policy, and second, that he wasn't certain that we had seen the last of the proposal to limit armed forces to 1,000,000 or 1,500,000.

Mr. Stassen rejoined that we cannot accept the Soviet reduction unless we can determine it through inspection. He went on to say that the U.S. should not agree to a reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons, nor to the cessation of nuclear tests at this stage in the negotiations. But we can agree to some formulation for the peaceful use of atomic energy, but only when coupled with the Eisenhower proposal.

The Chief of Staff, Army, asked what was the probable size of the proposed inspection system. Mr. Stassen replied about 28,000.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, remarked that there were many issues which exist between the U.S. and USSR which create tensions and he wondered how we might determine the sincerity of the Soviet Union. He felt that this could only be done through a rigid inspection system, but even with inspection he felt that much depended on what the USSR would be doing in other areas. He felt strongly that we should not negotiate force levels until after we have proven the inspection system. He also remarked that we do not know the USSR, and therefore we cannot be sure of her intentions.

Mr. Stassen then read from his January 13 report to the NSC<sup>4</sup> and developed his argument against the criticisms that his plan either goes too far or not far enough.

---

<sup>4</sup> Document 94.

Admiral Burke repeated his earlier argument on being sure of the inspection system before negotiating on reductions.

To reinforce this argument, Admiral Radford read a part of the President's July 21 statement concerning reductions *after* an inspection system has been proven. He also spoke of the ineffectiveness of the Korean armistice, where the Communists had defeated the purposes of the inspection system.

Mr. Stassen remarked that we would lose out in world opinion if we attempted to cite Korea as an example. He then asked how long it would take to test an inspection system.

Admiral Radford replied that it would take at least one year to set it up.

Mr. Stassen asked how Admiral Radford felt about pilot tests on small strips of territory within the two countries, and of gaming an inspection system. Admiral Radford replied, "I am against these pilot strips and I wouldn't believe a war game result if I heard it." He went on to say we always lose out in the struggle for world opinion, and if we worry about world opinion we will go "down the drain."

Mr. Stassen replied that if we don't we will go down—we must keep the initiative.

Admiral Burke then spoke of his experience in negotiating with the Communists in Korea, the general point of which was that we can negotiate only when we can apply pressure. He went on to say that somehow we must ease the tensions that exist between the U.S. and USSR. He felt that we could gain by promises of small concessions and moving step by step. He was afraid to try to lay out a program for disarmament too far in advance, and he agreed that, if we can attain a sure inspection system and if tensions are eased, we can then reduce arms in some way. But in what manner and by how much would depend on the situation then existing. He felt that we can say no more now than that we are "willing" to reduce.

Mr. Stassen asked the questions: How can we reply to neutral nations when they ask us our position on reductions? What if someone says we seek only target information?

Admiral Radford replied that we are principally concerned with guarding against surprise attack. He noted that an inspection system would be expensive in manpower and would require long negotiations. He felt that the most we could say to neutral nations is that we will not increase our strength, and he repeated that since 1953 we had, in fact, reduced our armed forces by 700,000 men.

Mr. Stassen then asked the question: What is acceptance of the Eisenhower proposal worth to the U.S.? There was a general discussion, the tenor of which was that the Eisenhower proposal is a great



goal, but no answer was given to the question of worth. Admiral Radford stated that it was not, however, worth damaging U.S. security.

Admiral Burke said he wanted to see the whole of an inspection program before he had to agree to a small portion of it.

Admiral Radford and Admiral Burke both asked the question: What do we do if after one year of trying out the inspection system we find that it has not proved successful?

Mr. Stassen replied that we could withdraw from the agreement; and Admiral Radford rejoined that we could not because of the pressure of public opinion.

A member of the JSSC asked whether the first phase plan of Volumes I and IV which called for a leveling off would be an intermediate step.

Mr. Stassen replied that it would not. He felt that some reduction must be proposed now. He went on to say that if we do not agree to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, France and Japan will soon be making nuclear weapons.

Admiral Radford agreed that we could expect that, but he himself did not consider that to be very serious.

He and Stassen then had a short argument over the meaning of NSC Action 1419. Radford indicated that he saw no basis in the policy for advocating numerical limitations on armed forces. Stassen thought the policy did so.

The meeting then adjourned.

---

## 99. Editorial Note

Beginning on January 25, 1956, and continuing through August 1, 1958, the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held numerous hearings, including several public hearings in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, and St. Louis as well as Washington. This subcommittee, created with the adoption of Senate Resolution 93, 84th Congress, 1st session, on July 25, 1955 (subsequently extended by Senate Resolutions 185 and 286, 84th Congress, and Senate Resolutions 61, 151, 192, and 241, 85th Congress), was authorized to make a thorough study of the disarmament problem and of proposals aiming at arms control. Senate Resolution 93 provided that the subcommittee of twelve members should be chosen on a bipartisan basis: three from each party by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, two from each party from the Senate

Committee on Armed Services, and one each from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy by the President of the Senate (Vice President of the United States). The chairman of the subcommittee was Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. The title given to the hearings was *Control and Reduction of Armaments*.

The subcommittee presented four reports: *Interim Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament*, 84th Congress, 2d session, Report No. 1397; *Second Interim Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament*, 84th Congress, 2d session, Report No. 2829; *Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament*, 85th Congress, 1st session, Report No. 1167; and *Final Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament*, 85th Congress, 2d session, Report No. 2501.

The subcommittee also published a volume entitled *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55*, 84th Congress, 2d session, and ten staff studies on various aspects of the disarmament problem, which were prepared under the direction of the subcommittee staff with the cooperation of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. The staff studies were published in the final report cited above.

The public hearings were published in 1958 in 17 parts under the title *Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*.

---

## 100. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 25, 1956<sup>1</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Soviet Ambassador Zarubin  
Secretary of State Dulles  
Mr. Logofet (interpreter)<sup>2</sup>

After the Soviet Ambassador had made a statement from an aide-mémoire (attached), the President spoke as follows:

1. His remarks were necessarily of a very preliminary character.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Disarmament. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander Logofet, Department of State interpreter.

2. He was absolutely and most completely sincere in his conviction of the need for better relations between our countries.

3. He had been concerned with the deterioration in those relations since the meeting of last July.

4. He shared the view that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States wanted peace.

5. He would give serious study to the proposal now made by Chairman Bulganin and in due course make a written reply.<sup>3</sup>

The President then asked whether it was the view of the Soviet Government that the proposal should be kept confidential, at least for the time being. The President expressed the view that the matter could be developed more productively if it were treated as confidential, but that we would of course acquiesce in whatever the views of the Soviet Government were in this respect.

The Soviet Ambassador stated that he had no instructions from his Government on this point, but would immediately communicate with his Government, and in the meantime would not disclose the nature of the communication. He expressed his personal agreement with the point of view on this matter expressed by President Eisenhower.

I then indicated that perhaps the Soviet Ambassador had better follow the usual practice, which is that after talking with the President, visitors make no statement of their own, but leave it to the White House to make such statement as it deemed appropriate. The Ambassador said he would follow this practice.

Thereupon the President and I sought to formulate the statement which the White House would issue and it was agreed that Mr. Hagerty would put out a statement which would say in substance that there had been a friendly communication from Chairman Bulganin to the President which was another one of the communications which they had exchanged since becoming acquainted at the Summit Conference.

The Soviet Ambassador expressed his accord with a statement of this general character. Thereupon the Soviet Ambassador and the interpreter retired.

The President and I then discussed the situation briefly. I said that I felt it probable that this was essentially a propaganda move, but that, of course, we should not jump to that conclusion. I said I saw significance in the fact that this proposal was made as a bilateral proposal to the United States, apparently without corresponding the proposal to the UK and France, although this might come later.

---

<sup>3</sup> For text of Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower, January 23, which Zarubin summarized in the attached aide-mémoire, and Eisenhower's reply to Bulganin, January 28, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1956, pp. 191-195.

[Here follows discussion of intelligence gathering.]

JFD

**[Attachment]**

TRANSLATION OF AIDE-MÉMOIRE DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, JANUARY 25, 1956

Mr. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, in his message expresses concern over the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and expresses his ideas concerning possible ways of improving those relations.

Bulganin considers that the improvement of Soviet-American relations would be an important contribution to the cause of creating a healthier atmosphere in the entire international situation and to the cause of maintaining and consolidating world peace.

Bulganin's reasoning proceeds from the consideration that there does not exist and never has existed any irreconcilable difference between the peoples of our countries and that there are no boundaries or territories which might become an object of dispute or conflict.

Bulganin assures you, Mr. President, that the Soviet people welcomed with a feeling of complete understanding your statement at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers at Geneva, in which you said: "The American people would like to be friends of the Soviet people. There are no disputes between the American and the Soviet peoples; there are no conflicts between them; there is no commercial enmity. Historically our peoples have always lived in peace."

The military cooperation of our two countries during the years of the Second World War played a most important part in smashing the common foe.

It is highly regrettable that after the war the relations of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and the USA should have become impaired. The worsening of the relations between the USSR and the USA, whatever may be the reasons, is contrary to the interests of both the Soviet and the American peoples; it adversely affects the entire international situation, and a continuation of the existing status of Soviet-American relations cannot promote the settlement of unresolved international problems.

Bulganin considers that the improvement of Soviet-American relations is an urgent and necessary matter.

In the opinion of Bulganin, this objective may be helped by the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between our countries.

Bulganin has attached to his letter a draft of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the USA.<sup>4</sup>

This proposal aims at the improvement of Soviet-American relations in the interest of strengthening peace and further lessening international tension.

Bulganin expresses his hope that the proposal of the Soviet Government will meet with a favorable attitude on your part, Mr. President, and will find an affirmative echo on the part of the Soviet and American peoples.

---

<sup>4</sup> For the Soviet draft treaty of friendship, see *ibid.*, p. 195.

---

**101. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 25, 1956.*

**SUBJECT**

Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament

1. In their memorandum to you dated 20 January 1956,<sup>2</sup> subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their comments on a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 26 January 1956.<sup>3</sup>

2. During the past year, the Special Assistant to the President has, pursuant to his assigned functions, circulated a number of reports for comments of the interested departments and agencies. It is understood that another report is about ready for release which will recommend a United States position with respect to a comprehensive inspection system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that, in commenting on these reports and at the same time submitting their views on comments by other agencies of the Government, their basic position on the question of disarmament risks being obscured. Further, the necessity for formulating a United States negotiating position for forthcoming disarmament talks, with attendant pressures, will compel basic Council decisions in the very near future. In the light of the foregoing, they

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 C 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Document 95.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 103.

consider it necessary to present at the 26 January meeting of the Council, a more positive approach than is embodied in their more recent comments.

3. Attached hereto is a brief statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the problem of disarmament, which includes a concise and simplified statement of United States policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this statement with its Appendix, as approved by you, be presented for consideration by the National Security Council at its 26 January meeting. It is to be noted that paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the simplified statement of United States policy in the Appendix hereto are essentially paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) agreed to by the National Security Council in NSC Action Number 1419b. For this reason, they were not reworded, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer that paragraphs 1 and 2 be combined and modified to read as follows:

"1. Continue intensive efforts to resolve current major international issues to such an extent as to indicate evidence of Soviet sincerity as a prerequisite to:

"2. Seeking an international system for the regulation and reduction of ALL armaments and armed forces, taking into account the President's proposal for an international pool of atomic materials for 'peaceful use', under an adequately safeguarded and comprehensive plan."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Arthur Radford**<sup>4</sup>

*Chairman*

**[Attachment]**

**BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RELATIVE TO  
THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT**

1. With the termination of hostilities in 1945 the United States disarmed at a precipitous rate; Soviet military capability was not reduced comparably. By 1950 our military forces were down to the lowest level they had been since before World War II and moreover, by that time, the Soviets had developed an atomic bomb. During this five-year period, while the United States was sponsoring effective disarmament efforts in various ways, and while Soviet conventional military strength was pre-eminent, the governments of ten countries, with a population of nearly 700 million people, were overthrown and Communist regimes installed.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

2. When our military forces were at their lowest level the Communists commenced hostilities in Korea. Our initial weak military posture increased the time and effort required to terminate those hostilities. During the period 1950 to 1955, despite a Communist-initiated and Soviet-supported war, the United States continued its efforts, largely through the United Nations, to bring about an effective disarmament arrangement.

3. Recent United States actions in the disarmament field include:

a. A National Security Council decision<sup>5</sup> on 30 June 1955, which agreed the United States should: (1) actively seek an international system for regulation and reduction of armaments, (2) concurrently make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues, and (3) meanwhile continue the steady development of strength in the United States and the Free World coalition;

b. On the same date the President directed<sup>5</sup> Mr. Stassen to (1) develop feasible methods of inspection that would be acceptable on a reciprocal basis, (2) modify his (Mr. Stassen's) proposed plan to conform with such an inspection system, (3) take into account the President's proposals<sup>6</sup> for an international pool of atomic materials for peaceful purposes, and (4) further report to the President and Council after these steps had been completed;

c. At Geneva the President proposed<sup>7</sup> that the Soviet Union and United States exchange complete blueprints of their military establishments and provide within their countries facilities for aerial photography; and asserted that ". . ."<sup>8</sup> the United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspection and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results . . . .";

d. The acceptance of United Nations Resolution<sup>9</sup> of 12 December<sup>10</sup> which urges States concerned (1) to continue their endeavors to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan, and (2) as initial steps to give priority to early agreement on and implementation of (a) confidence-building measures, such as the President's "blueprint" plan, and (b) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible.

4. During the past ten years, while sponsoring disarmament on an international basis, the United States has practiced it at home. Ample proof has been given to the world that our position has been inflexible

---

<sup>5</sup> NSC Action 1419. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>6</sup> State Department *Bulletin*, dated 27 April 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>7</sup> State Department *Bulletin*, dated 4 August 1955. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>8</sup> All ellipses are in the source text.

<sup>9</sup> State Department *Bulletin*, dated 9 January 1956. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>10</sup> Regarding the U.N. resolution on disarmament, adopted by the First Committee on December 12, 1955, and approved as Resolution 914 (X) by the General Assembly on December 16, see Document 88.

only in the requirement for a foolproof system which would insure compliance with agreements. Soviet tactics permit no other realistic procedure.

5. Today Europe remains divided, insurrection smolders from Morocco to Egypt, the situation in the Middle East is critical, the Communists are making inroads in South and Southeast Asia, conditions in Korea and Vietnam are unstable, and hostilities threaten in the Taiwan area. These and other recent events give no justification for a view that the Communist objectives have changed, or that the Soviets are now willing in fact to scale down their military capability. They also influence materially the political thinking of the remaining Free World nations, and add to the feeling of insecurity among those that continue determined to resist Communist aggression. The strength and moral leadership of the United States are the indispensable factors in the several collective security arrangements. The military strength of the United States continues to be the major deterrent to aggression. Our military posture for the "long pull" was and is designed to meet these purposes.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore conclude that United States disarmament policy must give assurance, beyond question, that any plan derived therefrom would not diminish the security of the United States.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit for consideration a policy<sup>11</sup> which they feel, from a military security aspect, would permit such a plan to be developed.

## Appendix

### UNITED STATES POLICY ON DISARMAMENT

1. Actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of ALL armaments and armed forces, taking into account the President's proposal for an international pool of atomic materials for "peaceful use", under an adequately safeguarded and comprehensive plan.

2. Concurrently make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues.

3. Meanwhile, continue the steady development of strength in the United States and the Free World coalition required for United States security.

4. Continue to press for the implementation of the President's Geneva Proposal as a first priority objective of United States disarmament policy.

---

<sup>11</sup> Appendix hereto. [Footnote in the source text.]



5. Avoid the regulation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or tests, except as a part of the final phase of a comprehensive disarmament arrangement.

6. Recognize that the acceptability and character of any international plan for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.

7. Emphasize that "The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspection and reporting AND WHEN THAT SYSTEM IS PROVED, THEN<sup>12</sup> to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results".

8. Accelerate United States efforts to elicit favorable world opinion as regards the sincerity, soundness, and objectivity of our disarmament proposals derived from United States policy.

---

<sup>12</sup> Capitalized for emphasis. [Footnote in the source text.]

---

**102. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 26, 1956.*

DEAR HAROLD: I have reviewed your January 13 Report on Disarmament.<sup>2</sup> As I understand it, you are asking that the NSC now adopt those policy recommendations included in Volume V of your report (November 1, 1955) which you suggested should be acted on in your memorandum of December 16, 1955. I would like to supplement the views expressed on your policy recommendations in my letter of December 11, 1955.<sup>3</sup>

I continue to believe that adoption by the U.S. of the position which you recommend would not be sufficient to maintain for us our leadership in the free world coalition and to secure the essential support of world public opinion. If the U.S. proposals go no further than modest reductions in conventional armaments and forces and do not contemplate even eventual reductions of nuclear weapons stockpiles, I

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 C 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 94.

<sup>3</sup> Document 87.

cannot agree with you that they "will attract the overwhelming approval and support of world public opinion for the United States position." These limited proposals, coupled with the massive inspection system proposed, are likely to persuade many that the U.S. is not seriously interested in disarmament.

In principle, I approve of the positive steps you advocate. I agree that our proposals should include agreement, under safeguards, for:

- a. warning against surprise attack;
- b. initial reductions in the conventional field;
- c. cessation of nuclear production except for peaceful purposes.

I do believe, however, that each of these fields offers further possibilities which should not be foreclosed at this stage and which should be explored more intensively.

### *1. Warning against Surprise Attack*

At the last session of the Council,<sup>4</sup> the question was raised of the possibility of securing warning against surprise attack with a smaller inspection corps than the thirty-to-forty thousands called for under your proposed inspection system. The report of your Air Task Force suggests that a significant degree of warning against surprise attack could be achieved with less than a thousand inspectors in the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup> I think this possibility merits further examination.

### *2. Nuclear Control*

I support your proposal that future production of nuclear material be used for peaceful purposes only. Your idea of putting such material into national stockpiles under international supervision would be a step forward. But I think we should go further and consider a proposal for supervised reciprocal cessation of nuclear output, except that incidental to peaceful uses. The Nuclear Task Force report suggests that such cessation would facilitate control of nuclear material.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, I think we should explore further the possibilities of eventual reductions of existing stockpiles on a reciprocal basis. The Soviet Union would be far less of a threat to the U.S. if its nuclear capability were sharply reduced, even though nuclear weapons were not entirely eliminated.

---

<sup>4</sup> There was no discussion of armaments or inspection at the previous meeting of the NSC on January 8. Dulles is presumably referring here to the discussion of inspection at the NSC.

<sup>5</sup> The final report of the Task Force on Air Inspection, November 23, 1955, is not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force)

<sup>6</sup> The final report of the Nuclear Task Force, undated, is not printed. (*Ibid.*)

I am aware of the technical obstacles to accounting for all past production of nuclear materials. But since our stockpiles are presumably many times larger than those of the USSR, a plan for deposits by both sides from past production, even on a proportionate basis, would appear to serve our interests. The Task Force report would indicate that this measure would be feasible, even though it could not achieve total elimination of such weapons by reason of the unaccounted for residue.

I understand that your report proposes to postpone any decision on the issue of cessation of nuclear tests. In view of the recent U.S. resolution on disarmament,<sup>7</sup> I do not believe that a review and decision on this problem can be put off.

### *3. Reduction of Conventional Forces*

a. Your proposal for reducing only U.S. and USSR forces appears to be based primarily on control of levels of manpower or forces. I doubt whether this is a suitable basis for restrictions in the conventional field since the Soviets could train and maintain reserves so easily under their system in violation of any agreement. Moreover, I believe that any agreed reduction of armed forces cannot be confined to the U.S. and USSR and must at least include Communist China and, perhaps, the satellites.

b. If any control is to be achieved in the conventional field, I think it must be done in terms of major types of equipment required for the conduct of modern war. Under modern conditions, equipment such as tanks, heavy artillery, aircraft, weapons control systems and naval vessels are essential for an effective fighting force. The control and inspection of this sort of heavy and complex equipment, which requires time and large installations for manufacture, may provide the means for effective restrictions in the conventional field.

If stocks of conventional armaments were brought into balance on both sides at much lower levels, the greater economic potential of the U.S. would be of maximum military significance. Accordingly, I believe we should study the feasibility of major reciprocal reductions of armaments as a means of restricting military forces. The studies which you have requested from the Department of Defense in your letter of January 19<sup>8</sup> should be useful in this connection.

c. I do not think that your report considers or analyzes the possibilities of selective initial reductions of armaments and especially of delivery systems for nuclear weapons. It would certainly seem that it might be possible to inspect restrictions in or reductions of such items as large aircraft or even long-range guided missiles or submarines,

---

<sup>7</sup> Reference is presumably to the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 914 (X) sponsored by the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Canada and approved on December 16, 1955; see Document 88.

<sup>8</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

with more limited inspection forces than are contemplated in your proposal. In any event, I still feel that this is an area deserving more thorough analysis and consideration.

Sincerely yours,

**John Foster Dulles**

---

**103. Memorandum of Discussion at the 274th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 26, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. *U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments* (NSC Actions Nos. 1419 and 1496; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 16, 1955, January 13 and January 24, 1956)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Anderson summarized very briefly prior Council action on this problem, and then asked Governor Stassen to introduce his policy recommendations. Meanwhile, copies of the supplementary views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the views of the Secretary of State as set forth in his letter to Governor Stassen, had been handed out by Messrs. Lay and Gleason.<sup>3</sup>

Governor Stassen stated that his first comment would be his belief that the decision as to the U.S. policy on the control of armaments should be made by the National Security Council at its meeting this morning. Such action was necessary to carry out the intent of NSC Action No. 1419, which Governor Stassen read to the Council. In support of his contention that the time for decision had arrived, Governor Stassen pointed out that public opinion had been prepared for the decision, a UN resolution had requested it,<sup>4</sup> and the views of other friendly governments on the subject had been thoroughly explored. After praising the work of the eight task groups which had assisted him in the preparation of the recommended policy on disarmament,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 27.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action Nos. 1419 and 1496, see footnote 8, Document 45, and footnote 6, Document 90, respectively. Memoranda from Lay to the NSC, December 16, 1955, January 13 and 24, 1956, are not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)

<sup>3</sup> For the JCS supplementary views, January 25, see Document 101. For Dulles' letter to Stassen, January 26, see *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 88.

Governor Stassen indicated his belief that the recommendations he was setting before the Council were the soundest policies which the United States could devise at this time to meet this problem.

Governor Stassen then explained that he believed that this would be the appropriate moment to comment on the remaining differences of view within the departments and agencies as to the wisdom of his recommendations. These differences, he said, were sincerely held, and after he had outlined these, Governor Stassen attempted to answer each objection briefly.

Going on, Governor Stassen said that his policy recommendations had as their foundation stone President Eisenhower's disarmament proposal at Geneva. He added that unless the USSR opens up, and unless we manage to secure a very large measure of assurance against a Soviet surprise attack, it was better to reach no disarmament agreement whatever. This had been his initial belief, and everything that had happened since he made his first report on disarmament to the NSC last June indicated that it was still a valid proposition.

Turning to the matter of the size of the proposed inspection system, Governor Stassen admitted that it was on a very large scale. On the other hand, he said, he was opposed to half measures in the field of inspection. The Soviet bloc comprised a tremendous area of the world. To make his point Governor Stassen referred to two charts, one indicating strategic distances between the Western Hemisphere and the Soviet bloc, and the other providing statistics on the population, area, borders, major airfields, major rail junctions, and key seaports in the Soviet bloc. These statistics, Governor Stassen believed, justified the need for an inspection force of thirty to forty thousand people.

Thereafter, Governor Stassen said he would summarize the four major propositions which characterized the policy recommendations that he was suggesting the Council adopt. The first proposition was that if President Eisenhower's Geneva proposal was accepted by the USSR, the United States should agree that, when this aerial inspection was actually in the course of being implemented—that is, roughly, during the first year of its actual operation—the United States would have made modest reductions in its conventional forces if the Russians likewise did so. Such a modest reduction might bring our forces at the end of this first year from their current figure of 2.8 million down to 2.5 million. Meanwhile, the defense budget of the United States might have been reduced by 5%. Governor Stassen added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to any reduction of our forces whatever until the inspection system had been thoroughly "proved out".

The President interrupted to ask Governor Stassen if he understood correctly that the reduction Governor Stassen had suggested was to be accomplished by the end of the first year that the inspection

system had been in effect. Governor Stassen replied in the affirmative, provided the inspection planes were actually flying over the Soviet Union by the end of the first year.

Governor Stassen then turned to the second major proposition underlying his policy: If the Soviet Union opens itself up to aerial inspection as well as to *external* nuclear inspection, the United States would agree at this point in time (perhaps two years after initial acceptance by the USSR of the President's Geneva proposal) that all future nuclear production would be for peaceful purposes only.

The third major proposition: If the Soviets accepted the President's Geneva proposal on inspection, the United States would agree to the giving of reciprocal notice in advance of the movement of military forces.

The fourth and last feature of his recommendations, said Governor Stassen, provided escape clauses and counter measures for the United States if the Soviet Union actually violated the agreements on disarmament into which it had entered.

Having thus, as he said, dealt with the positive essentials of his policy recommendations, Governor Stassen said that he would next focus on the negative features—that is, on what the United States would not agree to do if his policy recommendations were adopted. First, no elimination of existing nuclear weapons. Second, no provision for stopping the tests of nuclear weapons. Third, no drastic reduction of armed forces and armaments in the present stage, say, for the period of the next five years. Fourth, no entering into an agreement that could not be effectively inspected and verified, on the ground that it would be better in such a case to have no agreement at all. Fifth, no disarmament agreement of any kind unless the Soviet bloc were "opened up".

Having thus balanced the negative and positive features of the policies he was proposing, Governor Stassen stressed the great importance to the United States of pressing ahead to get such a disarmament agreement as he was proposing with the Soviet Union. Admittedly no one really knew how the Soviet leaders would react to these disarmament proposals. But in the absence of any disarmament agreement the future looked very bleak indeed, for the prospect was that the U.S. and the USSR would achieve the mutual capacity to annihilate. Every effort should therefore be made to stop or to retard such a development. Efforts in this direction were an essential part of the United States policy of "waging peace".

Governor Stassen said that he would next like to consider briefly what initial steps could best be taken to carry out the proposed policies on the assumption that they were adopted. The first implementation step would be discussion by the United States of these policies with the United Kingdom, France and Canada. Thereafter there would be a

direct message on the subject from the President to Premier Bulganin. Perhaps the next step would be to send a knowledgeable group of the people who had helped prepare these policies to Moscow, where they would spend some time in probing the Soviet reaction to these proposals. Such a group might be headed by individuals like Generals Bedell Smith and Clay.<sup>5</sup>

After these developments would come the first small steps in the direction of disarmament that we wished to take and which we wished the Soviet Union to inch along in. Accordingly, the President's letter to Bulganin, of which Governor Stassen's report contained a proposed draft, would suggest the creation in the Soviet bloc of an inspection system. When this was set up, the experiment of "test strips" in each country might be begun. Governor Stassen provided a chart which indicated possible small testing areas in the U.S. and in the USSR. Yet another small step in the direction of disarmament which would be proposed to the Soviets would be the exchange of the initial groups of inspectors whose job it would be to test out how the inspection systems would work in both countries. These comparatively small groups of inspectors might ultimately become the heads of the inspection system if the complete system were finally adopted and put in place.

At this point Governor Stassen called to the Council's attention the fact that the United Kingdom had recently itself completed a study of the disarmament problem.<sup>6</sup> He believed that the reasoning of the British on this problem very closely paralleled the thinking in Governor Stassen's own report. Accordingly, he deduced that the UK could be expected to accept most of our own policy proposals without great difficulty. He added his belief, further, that a policy such as he proposed would carry the overwhelming force of free world opinion with the United States. Finally, he pointed out that acceptance of his policy recommendations would assure that the United States could maintain a maneuverable position—that is, if the situation warranted it, the United States could proceed forward to more farreaching disarmament moves or, on the contrary, could retreat if the situation indicated that the initial steps had proved too farreaching.

Accordingly, Governor Stassen stated that he was now recommending that the National Security Council approve the policy recommendations set forth in Volume V of his report, with four conditions: First, conditional upon agreement by the responsible departments and agencies as to details of implementation; second, upon condition that the approval was for purposes of consultation and negotiation; third, upon the condition that if the Soviets accepted the U.S. position the

---

<sup>5</sup> General Lucius D. Clay, former Commander in Chief, U.S. forces in Europe and Military Governor, U.S. Zone, Germany.

<sup>6</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

United States should have one more chance to take a hard look before actually going forward with the policy; and fourth, upon the condition that provision would be made for periodic reconsideration by the United States of the disarmament policies which it was pursuing.

When Governor Stassen completed his remarks, Mr. Anderson called attention to the letter which the Secretary of State had sent to Governor Stassen, giving his critique of Governor Stassen's proposed policy, and indicated that Secretary Dulles might now wish to elaborate on the points raised in this letter. However, the President interrupted to state that he would first like to put two or three questions to Governor Stassen. He asked first whether the 1922 arms limitation treaty with Japan contained any escape clauses for the United States. Governor Stassen replied in the negative, and the President said that in that case there was nothing that we could really do about the Japanese violations of the treaty engagements. He pointed out, however, his emphatic agreement with Governor Stassen that the United States must certainly do something about disarmament "or else" The President went on to say that his next question to Governor Stassen concerned the timing of the presentation of our proposed disarmament position to Moscow. Was this to be done after the U.S., U.K., France and Canada had all agreed among themselves? Governor Stassen said that the President's surmise was correct, and that the combined views might be presented to the Soviets some time during the month of February of this year.

The President said that his third question concerned the strip testing areas. While these experimental tests were to be undertaken, the President asked whether he was correct in his understanding that even if they were successful the United States would not agree even to Governor Stassen's "modest reductions" of conventional forces until such time as the entire over-all inspection system was actually being implemented. The President asked whether this would not be quite a considerable period of time, perhaps as much as two years. Governor Stassen said that the President's understanding of his position was accurate. The President then called on the Secretary of State to give to the Council his reaction to Governor Stassen's proposals.

Secretary Dulles began by stating that of course it was much easier to be critical than to be positive in commenting on this extremely difficult subject. While Governor Stassen and his people had certainly done an excellent job, he still had questions about the validity of their proposals.

In the first place, Governor Stassen's plan did not contemplate any appreciable reductions in armed forces and armaments until this vast and complicated inspection system had been accepted by the Soviets, installed, and in actual operation. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles said that he could predict that the USSR would never, never agree



to any inspection system of such a character and magnitude. Perhaps Governor Stassen was right in contending that nothing less than such an inspection system was any good, but we should understand clearly that in seeking such a system we are seeking something that can never be realized.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that the Council had never been presented with a really adequate study of a less elaborate inspection system nor a study of the possibility of more far-reaching reduction in the level of armaments. While, admittedly, we cannot control and verify the quantity of nuclear weapons which the Soviets might have hidden away, could we not, nevertheless, inspect and control the means of delivery of such nuclear weapons, namely, such things as long-range bombers and missiles? This, of course, said Secretary Dulles, was a judgment more in the military than in the political sphere, although it did seem clear to him that securing the control and reduction of long-range bombers, missiles, submarines, and the like, would clearly be in the interests of U.S. security. Moreover, it would be possible to inspect and control these means of delivery with a much smaller and less complicated system of inspection and verification than one which would require thirty to forty thousand people. Indeed, perhaps as few as a thousand inspectors in the Soviet Union would be sufficient to prevent a Soviet surprise attack on the United States.

In addition, with respect to the so-called modest reduction of forces contemplated in Governor Stassen's proposal, Secretary Dulles felt obliged to state that it was completely unrealistic for the Governor to choose precisely the most difficult field of inspection and control, namely, the field of ground forces. In this field the Soviet totalitarian system provided Russia with the greatest advantages over the United States, namely, the ability quickly and quietly to secure a very rapid expansion in the number of such forces. Historically, indeed, reduction of military manpower had always proved the hardest nut to crack in all past disarmament schemes. Yet Governor Stassen had picked this very nut as the one to try to crack.

Secretary Dulles then explained his second major point of criticism of Governor Stassen's proposals. He was sure that, from the standpoint of world opinion, there would be widespread doubt as to whether Governor Stassen's disarmament program could be regarded as genuine, sincere, or adequate. It simply did not attempt to reach what the people of the world regarded as the heart of the problem. It would not be looked upon as an honest U.S. effort to reduce the level of armaments and to mitigate the horrors of atomic war. In summary, said Secretary Dulles, while it was not within his particular capacity to make this judgment, it seemed very questionable to him that the security of the United States could not be significantly advanced by a much less sweeping inspection program than that presented by Gover-

nor Stassen—such as inspection and control of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. However, concluded Secretary Dulles, he would defer on this point to the expert views of the military.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his statement, Governor Stassen asked the President's permission to reply to the points raised. He first indicated that the policy he was proposing was of such nature that it would be possible for the United States to move in the direction recommended by the Secretary of State if we finally decide that we should do so. In short, we could reduce the magnitude and rigor of our requirements for inspection if it proved wise to do so.

Governor Stassen then said that he and his task groups had very thoroughly considered all the points in criticism which the Secretary of State had raised. Neither he nor the task groups felt that we could add to the future security of the United States by any disarmament agreement unless such an agreement made a surprise attack by the USSR impossible. This called for a very thorough and elaborate inspection system. Anything less than this in the way of an inspection system would merely create a false impression of our security.

Governor Stassen went on to say that of course Secretary Dulles might well prove correct in his conviction that the Soviet Union would never agree to an inspection system such as the proposed policy demanded. If this proved to be the fact, Governor Stassen said that his people felt that it was better to have no agreement at all rather than to achieve one which put the United States under a ceiling but permitted the Soviet Union to remain outside it. Nor, continued Governor Stassen, did he and his task groups believe that if the Soviets were sincere in this search for an arms limitation agreement they would not agree to an inspection system of the size and character that he was proposing. This was not unreasonable when one considered the length and breadth of the Soviet bloc.

As to the reaction of world opinion, Governor Stassen expressed the conviction that the United States could "sell" to the world the kind of program he was proposing if we went at it in the right way. There were a great many people in the world who would be glad to see the United States proposing to maintain agreed levels of armed strength rather than agreed levels of armed weakness. He also felt that assurance against surprise attack was more important than an agreement with the Soviet Union on any particular level of armaments. If, however, experience proved it desirable in subsequent months, the United States could ease up in its demands on the Soviet Union and could do this without any notable strain on public opinion.

When Governor Stassen had thus completed his rebuttal, the President said that he agreed with Governor Stassen that the size of the proposed inspection system would never in itself be the cause for acceptance or rejection by the USSR of these disarmament proposals

as a whole. Then the President went on to describe the objective of the United States in proceeding with proposals for disarmament. In essence, said the President, we are trying to lead the world back from the brink of disaster. He, for one, could not overemphasize the satisfaction he felt in the labors of Governor Stassen and his task groups. On the other hand, he could not but share the pessimism of the Secretary of State on the Soviet reaction to Governor Stassen's proposed position. Continuing, the President said that he was at least sure of one thing. At Geneva we had said that if the U.S. and the USSR could both take some steps in the direction of disarmament, the result would be to create an atmosphere of confidence which might prove to have extraordinary results. As things now stand, and in the absence of a disarmament agreement, the United States is piling up armaments which it well knows will never provide for its ultimate safety. We are piling up these armaments because we do not know what else to do to provide for our security. Hence the problem of disarmament requires the continued and most earnest consideration of us all. There should be no defeatist attitude toward the solution of the problem. We have simply got to find something that will work in this field. The Soviets cannot be wholly out of their minds. They must realize, as we do, the seriousness of the situation.

Secretary Humphrey insisted that the United States could never get into a situation in which limits would be placed on its nuclear capabilities and on the means of delivery if the Soviets were not thus limited. Our nuclear capability was our one great advantage over the Soviet Union. We cannot place limits on that capability and at the same time allow the Soviet Union limitless conventional forces. If they did so, Soviet military manpower would overrun Western Europe. The President pointed out that we could stop the Soviets from overrunning Europe by resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, although, of course, this would kill millions of people. Moreover, we might have to give up our bases in Europe, and that was a hell of a problem.

Secretary Dulles, turning to Secretary Humphrey, said that perhaps the latter was right, and that it wasn't enough to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, our industrial and productive capacity has been in the past and may well continue to be the decisive factor in a military victory, provided this productive capacity can be protected from destruction. To this point Secretary Humphrey replied by asking whether our productive capacity would continue to prove decisive if the Soviets managed to overrun Western Europe. The industrial potential of Western Europe added to the Soviet bloc would come pretty close to equalling the productive capacity of the United States.

Governor Stassen commented that in his view a disarmament agreement which was based on agreed levels of military weakness rather than strength would mean a deterioration in the total U.S. security position for the reasons that Secretary Humphrey pointed out. Indeed, said Secretary Humphrey, it would be fatal.

Secretary Dulles stated his belief that the United States in facing this problem must hold to a position which in the first place would enable us to use atomic weapons in a war which the Soviets started without using atomic weapons and, in the second place, to a position which will assure that we and our allies stick together. In short, we cannot find ourselves in a position (and we seem to be approaching this position at the present time) where our allies will not permit us to have recourse to nuclear weapons except to retaliate for their use by the Soviets.

. . . . .

Governor Stassen said that he would gladly admit the need for bringing world public opinion along in support of his proposed disarmament position. He believed that this was possible, and that the peoples of the world could be convinced that the proposed policy represented a genuine effort to promote world peace and not merely a design to enhance the national security of the United States.

The President said that of course the heart of the problem was this: We are trying to bargain in good faith with a fellow whose good faith we have every reason to doubt. As long as dictatorships continue to expand they do not collapse. This, said the President, was proved in history by Rome, by Genghis Khan, by Napoleon, and by other examples. The foregoing empires only failed when they built walls around their borders, physical or otherwise. Moreover, there was no way of telling how long this Soviet expansionism will continue by other than by military means. We had given Governor Stassen a pretty good "going over" at this meeting, and it was now time to provide him with some useful guidance. How were we going to give Governor Stassen's proposals some real appeal, both to our own people and to the people of the world? As the Secretary of State had written in his letter to Governor Stassen, it was essential that our disarmament proposals "maintain for us our leadership in the free world coalition and . . . <sup>7</sup> secure the essential support of world public opinion." This language, said the President, pointed out the enormous importance of the psychological and public relations aspect of the disarmament proposal.

<sup>7</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

Governor Stassen interrupted to point out that as the Attorney General had earlier suggested, we could go further in the direction of reductions in armaments if it proved upon trial that the present proposal was inadequate in this respect in meeting the expectations of world public opinion.

Referring to the previous discussion of surprise attack, the President expressed complete assurance that if the danger of surprise could be eliminated no one would attack. He also said he was sure that the proposed aerial inspection plan would prove quite effective with respect to the inspection and control of Soviet ground forces. Accordingly, we could probably eliminate the danger of Soviet surprise attack if we had in addition the kind of ground inspection that the Russians had been talking about.

At this point Secretary Wilson asked if he might speak for the Defense Department. He indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone over Governor Stassen's proposed policies with great care. The Chiefs and the Defense Department agreed that the U.S. security position would worsen in the future if nothing is done. Accordingly, no one should think that the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have failed to realize the great significance of Governor Stassen's proposed policy. As to the problem of selling this policy to the Soviets, Secretary Wilson said that we should take a second look at the proposed complicated inspection system. Such a second look might reveal that adequate inspection might be accomplished with many fewer than thirty or forty thousand inspectors, provided that the inspectors who were in the Soviet Union had complete freedom of movement. Governor Stassen replied that perhaps this might be so, but that any inspection system would require a very elaborate communications plan, and to carry out that communications plan in itself required the presence of many thousands of people.

The President said we had reached the point where a decision should be made as to what the Council did next. Mr. Anderson, however, pointed out that Admiral Radford had not yet been heard from.

Admiral Radford began by stating his regret that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had felt themselves obliged to take a rather negative position regarding Governor Stassen's proposals. The Chiefs had done so, however, because their study of the proposed disarmament policy had fortified their conviction that we are dealing with a people who had no intention whatever of keeping any agreement if they can get out of it to their advantage. Admiral Radford cited various historical instances in the period 1945 to 1950 to back up his contention, and went on to state that the sole reason why the atmosphere for negotiation on

disarmament was at the present time relatively favorable was because our own military strength vis-à-vis the Russians had developed so greatly in recent years.

As to the matter of world public opinion on disarmament, Admiral Radford commented that difficult as it was to assess such opinion, he believed that the attitude of world public opinion would be based on who people think has the greater total power, not on what people think you are going to do with that power.

Thereafter, Admiral Radford called attention to a number of the specific JCS comments on Governor Stassen's disarmament proposals, and especially emphasized the misgivings felt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the adequacy of the inspection system proposed by Governor Stassen. He pointed out that the decisions of the National Security Council with respect to disarmament would constitute the most important decisions that will be made in the lifetime of those around the table, and specifically referred to the proposed new approach to the solution of the disarmament problem which had been presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated January 25, 1956, and which had been handed out at the beginning of the meeting. He concluded his comments by restating the sincere feeling of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that once we make disarmament proposals to the Soviets along the lines indicated by Governor Stassen, we would no longer have the freedom to withdraw from a situation that might prove to be manifestly contrary to our national interests. This would be so because of the intensity of allied pressures upon us. In illustration of this point Admiral Radford cited the pressures brought on us by our allies to hew to the letter of our armistice agreement with the Communists in Korea despite the fact that the Communists were violating this agreement and that the security of our forces there was accordingly jeopardized.

When Admiral Radford had concluded his remarks, Secretary Wilson said that he wished to add a thought or two to these remarks. He felt it might be worth while for the Council to stand off and take a slightly different approach. He believed that in our present thinking we were inclined to exaggerate the importance of the inspection system. It was much more important to determine what we would do if the parties to a disarmament agreement violated its terms. Secretary Wilson felt it would be useful to make a careful analysis of all the earlier attempts in history to reach effective arms limitation agreements. It would also be useful to study the agreement made when the U.S. recognized the Soviet Union in 1937<sup>8</sup> and why the Soviets had violated this agreement. From such studies as these we might be able to figure out the basis on which we could work with people like the

---

<sup>8</sup> The United States recognized the Soviet Union in 1933.

Soviets. At least this is what we should seek to develop in furtherance of a solution to our problem. In support of his argument Secretary Wilson cited his own prior experience, as head of General Motors, in meeting sit-down strikes. The leadership of the unions in those days had been at least half Communist. To these leaders the end invariably justified the means. While Secretary Wilson had always thought it best to treat these leaders as though they were honorable men, he was always very cautious in what he had specifically agreed to with them.

Referring to the objections to his proposals entertained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Governor Stassen said he would merely assure the Joint Chiefs that they could modify the stand he proposed in the direction that the Joint Chiefs wanted, just as one could move from the position proposed by himself in the direction desired by the Secretary of State. Maneuverability toward less drastic or more drastic disarmament was a feature of the position that he had taken. He also assured Secretary Wilson that he and his task groups had thoroughly reviewed the history of the problem of disarmament. This review had reinforced Governor Stassen's conviction of the vital necessity of two things: First, an adequate system of inspection and verification, and second, legal measures of recourse in the event of violation of the agreement. History showed that previous disarmament plans had lacked these two vital elements.

The President said that we must now try to think of the next useful step, particularly to meet the problem posed by our allies and by world public opinion with respect to disarmament. Could we have something of Governor Stassen's policy proposals worked up in the form of a speech or a statement by the President which would provide a kind of test of the reaction of our allies and of world public opinion? As for the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Governor Stassen's proposed policy, continued the President, he could well have been a party to them and written them himself. Nevertheless, he believed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were looking ahead too far into the future. What we are really trying to do at present is to secure some slight easing of the world situation without damaging our own national security. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff would probably agree that we ought to try everything that will mitigate world tensions, provided this can be done without exposing our security. There were all sorts of possibilities if we once succeeded in creating a little atmosphere of confidence. After all, Khrushchev himself had remarked only the other day that the President and other high officials of the United States were genuine in their search for peace. Amidst some laughter, Secretary Dulles commented that Khrushchev's endorsement had not included himself or Admiral Radford. The President said that the fact of the matter was that Khrushchev's remarks constituted another Soviet shift. Indeed, they shifted from day to day. So, said the President, he

would suggest that if we put forward a disarmament proposal with a frank purpose, he thought we would have taken such a forward step that subsequently we might actually succeed in going a good deal further than now seems possible. In any case, he said, he was anxious to see what reception our proposals might have in the Soviet Union and in the world.

Secretary Dulles said that he was very much inclined to agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the unlikelihood of achieving any genuine international agreement with people such as the Soviets. Accordingly, he did not have any great hopes of moving very far in the direction of real arms limitation and control. Therefore, anything we do do in this area should be of such a character as to ensure the good will and support of our allies. We certainly must not end up in a situation where we have neither a viable disarmament agreement *nor* any allies. The desideratum is to recognize the fact that disarmament proposals are probably an operation in public relations rather than actual disarmament proposals. Until we can achieve good faith on the part of the Russians, he didn't really think that we could get disarmament. Nevertheless, we must seem to strive for it or else we shall be isolated in the world. While indeed we may fall between two stools, the best way to test the situation would be, as the President suggested, to prepare a Presidential speech or statement. Such a speech or statement should strongly emphasize our desire for world peace. We should strive to get such a speech or statement into such shape that it will have a resounding impact throughout the world and establish our high prestige among the nations of the free world.

To these remarks Governor Stassen replied by stating his own judgment that the best propaganda or public relations approach would come from simply advancing disarmament proposals that we are genuinely prepared to see carried out. He called at this point for the Council to give conditional approval to the disarmament proposals which he had submitted. Thereafter the proposed speech or statement could be drafted and referred back to the Council for its approval.

The President stated that he did not wish the Council to give a conditional approval to Governor Stassen's proposals at this meeting. What he had in mind, rather, was to see what we could present publicly of the proposed disarmament policy. He warned that he did not wish us to get too deeply committed by any public statement or speech. He again expressed great confidence in Governor Stassen and his staff, but it was essential, he said, to avoid any false step. The next move for Governor Stassen was to develop this speech or statement and to see whether, in the first instance, Governor Stassen could "sell" the speech to the President.



Governor Stassen said that he understood this to mean that the President would make the speech here in the United States after he had sent his letter to Premier Bulganin. Would it also be possible to discuss his proposed disarmament policy with the British? The President agreed that this could be done, only disclosure of our proposed positions to the British should be done step by step, so that not all of the position was revealed to the British at one time.

With respect to the proposed letter to Premier Bulganin, Secretary Dulles said that he desired to reserve his position. Such a letter might indeed prove the best way to handle the matter, but Secretary Dulles was not yet sure. Governor Stassen said that in the meantime, pending a decision, he would try to refine and improve the draft letter.

At this point Secretary Wilson said to the President that he wanted him to understand the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their conviction that we must guard against being trapped by the Soviet Union. Despite their somewhat negative reaction, Secretary Wilson said that the Chiefs of Staff were not being "parochial". To prove this point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had changed their previous language, to the effect that any disarmament plan must "enhance" the security of the United States, to the current language that it "must not diminish" the security of the United States. This, said Secretary Wilson, showed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were trying hard. Secretary Wilson closed by repeating his view that the inspection system should not be such a preoccupation that it led us to neglect the more important problem of what we should do if the Soviets violated a disarmament agreement into which they had entered.

At this point Admiral Radford asked permission to state to the Council some views which he entertained as a result of his recent trip. He pointed out that when he came back this time he felt that as far as the United States was concerned our situation in the world was not as good as it had been a year ago. There was very widespread lack of understanding of United States policy. Much of this misunderstanding, thought Admiral Radford, derived from the manner in which news of our policy was handled by the American press. There was very inadequate coverage in foreign newspapers of speeches by the President and the leading members of the Administration, because our press people here sent out to foreign countries only brief summaries of the content of these speeches and, moreover, these summaries often had a "leftist slant". To add to the problem, American newspaper columnists who were opposed to the policies of this Administration managed to secure very complete coverage in the foreign press. He had in mind the views of Marquis Childs, Walter Lippmann, Drew Pearson, and others. Admiral Radford confessed that he did not know the answer to the problem he was raising, but in any event we should not kid ourselves as to our ability to guide world opinion, in view of the manifest fact that our own

U.S. press is destroying that ability. In illustration of his point, Admiral Radford cited the case of Thailand, which was getting ready, in Admiral Radford's view, to move from a pro-American to to a neutralist or a pro-Chinese Communist position. . . .

The President said that on the other side of the picture he could cite examples of public opinion polls which, after Geneva, showed a very strong shift in the direction of the belief that the United States was genuinely seeking peace. Admiral Radford replied that while this might be so, it was his experience that there was still great confusion abroad as to what the United States actually stood for.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>9</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the recommendations in the reports by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament circulated by the reference memoranda of December 16, 1955 and January 13, 1956, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (reference memorandum of January 24, 1956,<sup>10</sup> and supplementary memorandum of January 25, 1956 circulated at the meeting) and the views of the Secretary of State (letter to Mr. Stassen of January 26, 1956 circulated at the meeting).

b. Noted the President's authorization that the recommendations by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament might be used for the purposes of:

(1) Preparation of a draft of a speech to be delivered by a responsible spokesman for the Administration which would enable the President and the Council to assess the probable effect thereof upon world opinion, Allied governments and Soviet leaders.

(2) Refinement and improvement of the draft letter to Premier Bulganin, enclosed with the reference memorandum of January 13, subject to future decision as to the form, substance, and desirability of sending such a letter.

(3) Preliminary consultation with the British, avoiding full disclosure of the proposed U.S. position in its entirety but exploring, step by step but without commitment, the specific items in the proposed U.S. position which are considered immediately desirable.

*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament.

**S. Everett Gleason**

<sup>9</sup> Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1510, approved by the President on February 1. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>10</sup> This memorandum transmitted the January 20 memorandum of the JCS to Wilson, Document 95.

104. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the President's Special Assistant (Stassen), Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, January 29, 1956, 4 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

I showed Mr. Stassen the draft (No. 11) of the paper on political moves in relation to disarmament.<sup>2</sup> He said he did not agree with it. In the first place he doubted very much whether it would ever be possible to get an international body with weapons power greater than that of the United States and that the idea would be strongly opposed throughout the country. In the second place, he said he thought that the disarmament program which they had worked out would be sufficient to satisfy world opinion which wanted to have the United States strong. I said I doubted very much whether the concept of the United States as a "benevolent dictator" would be good enough in the long run. I believed that there should be some organic and organizational control of atomic weapons on an international basis. I realized that the idea of power in the United Nations was for the time being quite academic and I had not intended to suggest it except as representing a theoretical goal which was useful to keep in mind. However, that was not essential, because it was now too remote. The scope of present practical action lay with the non-Communist members of the United Nations and with the members of the free world collective security organizations.

It seemed to me that our position with reference to nuclear weapons would be much better if some sanction for their possession and use could be obtained either under the United Nations Assembly "Uniting for Peace" Resolution<sup>3</sup> and/or by action by collective security groups.

I felt that President Eisenhower had a unique authority and that it would be a tragedy if it were not used to move the world ahead by climbing up at least one more rung in the ladder that led toward community control of this vast destructive power.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Disarmament. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Draft No. 11 has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the Uniting for Peace Resolution, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303-370.

Mr. Stassen seemed unconvinced, but said that in his draft statement on which he was working, he would attempt to bring something in with reference to the United Nations Assembly and regional groupings, and then he would let me see the result with opportunity to comment on it.

JFD

---

### 105. Editorial Note

Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, headed a British delegation visiting the United States from January 30 to February 3. During his stay in Washington, Eden, along with his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, and others in his party, met with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other American officials on several occasions to reaffirm the close relationship between the two nations and discuss foreign policy matters of common interest. Some of these meetings involved discussions on disarmament and atomic energy. Parts of two joint statements issued by Eisenhower and Eden, both dated February 1, contained references to disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. They are printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pages 214-221.

For full documentation on the Eden visit, see volume XXVII. Especially relevant are the memoranda of discussion on the subject of disarmament between the working staffs of the United States and United Kingdom preceding Eden's visit on January 23 (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-2356), January 24 (*ibid.*, 600.0012/1-2456), January 25 (*ibid.*, 600.0012/1-2556), January 26 (*ibid.*, 600.0012/1-2656), and January 27 (*ibid.*, 600.0012/1-2756); the memorandum of conversation among Secretary Dulles, Foreign Secretary Lloyd, and several of their respective staffs on January 31 at 2:40 p.m. (*ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648); and the memorandum of conversation among Secretary Dulles, Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., Lewis L. Strauss, Harold E. Stassen, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Prime Minister Eden, Foreign Secretary Lloyd, Ambassador Roger Makins, and others on February 1 at 12:07 p.m. (*ibid.*). All these documents except for the memoranda of discussion between the working staffs are scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.

106. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 3, 1956, 3:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

International Atomic Energy Agency

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Adm. Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament

Maj. Gen. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)

Amb. Wadsworth, U.S. Representative for IAEA

Mr. Merchant, EUR

Mr. Bowie, S/P

Mr. Hall, AEC

Mr. Wilcox, IO

Mr. Spiers, IO

Mr. Smith, S/AE

Mr. Farley, S/AE

Mr. Smith recalled that the meeting had been called at the invitation of the Secretary to consider plans for the twelve-nation discussions of the International Atomic Energy Agency beginning February 27, 1956.<sup>2</sup> Preliminary discussions with the U.K. and Canada were scheduled to commence on February 6. The basic question with regard to the United States position was whether the Agency should operate with limited controls designed merely to insure that nuclear assistance was not diverted to military uses, or whether the U.S. objective should be to attempt to keep fourth countries from producing nuclear weapons.

Mr. Strauss said that, in the Commission's view, the U.S. should as a minimum require controls to prevent diversion of Agency assistance to military purposes. Certain minimum controls—guarantees by recipients against diversion of assistance, and provision for inspection and accounting for nuclear materials—should be made mandatory in the Agency's Statute. The Agency should be given statutory authority to exercise broader controls, but these should not be mandatory in the Statute and the U.S. should seek to achieve that by persuasion rather than coercion.

With regard to U.S. support for the Agency, Mr. Strauss said that the Commission had just taken a decision that one thousand kilograms of U-235 should be allocated to the Agency. He added that consideration was being given to making this a donation; the value of this

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—General. Secret. Drafted by Farley.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 120.

material would be approximately twenty-five million dollars. In addition, the Commission believed that the U.S. should offer to match all other contributions of material (on a reimbursable basis) for a period of perhaps five years. Unclassified technical information and assistance necessary for the Agency's operations would also be provided. Mr. Strauss said also that the Commission believed that a sizable amount of material should be earmarked for EURATOM as an effective way of demonstrating U.S. support for European integration.

With regard to the proposals of the State Department for more comprehensive IAEA control, he said that he believed a "no weapons" pledge would not be feasible, and that France in particular could not accept such a pledge. Agency inspection of the United States power reactor program appeared difficult to accept. The United States would not accept sufficiently strict inspection and control of its own programs to satisfy prudent requirements for safeguards abroad, and reciprocal inspection would thus serve as an excuse for other countries to limit inspection and control to what the U.S. would accept.

The Secretary asked whether the one thousand kilograms for the Agency to which Mr. Strauss referred was a ceiling within which we would match contributions by other countries. Mr. Strauss said that the Commission proposed allocating twenty thousand kilograms for foreign atomic energy activities. One thousand kilograms would be earmarked initially for the Agency, and in addition the U.S. would match allocations from other countries. He pointed out that the U.K. would be able to make only small allocations for some time, so that in effect the U.S. was offering to match allocations from the USSR. Thus, the remaining nineteen thousand kilograms might be used to match allocations to the IAEA by the U.K. and USSR, to supply EURATOM, and to cover requirements under bilateral agreements. The proposed allocation of 20,000 kilograms of U-235 to foreign programs had been reported to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The view of the Department of Defense was currently being solicited. Gen. Loper said that the Department of Defense had not yet received notice of the proposed allocation, but that the matter had been given general study and he thought that a twenty thousand kilogram foreign allocation over a period of eight to twelve years would be consistent with military requirements. The Department of Defense understanding was that this material would be earmarked but not withdrawn from stock until needed by foreign users.

Mr. Smith observed that any reference to EURATOM in the U.S. announcement of the allocation would require careful handling. Amb. Wadsworth said that he felt this announcement would have very great effect on IAEA negotiations and that this effect should not be dissi-

pated through premature release. Adm. Strauss said that he thought the announcement would have to be made soon for practical reasons and that it would establish an excellent atmosphere for later steps.

The Secretary asked for Mr. Stassen's views as to the extent of controls over the atomic energy programs of other countries which the U.S. should seek. Mr. Stassen said that he believed the objective of the U.S. should be to prevent or retard the development of nuclear weapons in fourth countries. As a practical matter, the United States could not get the necessary controls unless the USSR agrees. We should propose a comprehensive control system and let the USSR bear the onus of rejection. The Secretary recalled that the United States had recently sent a note asking the Russians for their specific proposals as to effective inspection and control.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Smith pointed out that, if the U.S. objective is the prevention of new atomic weapons programs, then the minimum controls proposed by AEC would be ineffective. Assistance from the Agency, even though limited to peaceful purposes, would simply free the other resources of a nation to support a parallel weapons program. Mr. Strauss indicated personal agreement with this view but pointed out that it appeared extremely difficult to get agreement on a broader control.

The Secretary said that it would be difficult for nations to forego permanently their right to make nuclear weapons while the U.S., USSR and U.K. continued to make them. He thought it might be possible to get agreement by other countries to forego weapons production as an interim measure, looking toward the institution of international control of atomic energy which would apply to all countries including the present military atomic powers. Mr. Stassen agreed and pointed out that the U.S. should not be in the position of appearing to plan to manufacture nuclear weapons forever. Our approach should be to ask other countries to forego manufacture of nuclear weapons for a specified period, while we and the other major powers continue to work toward effective comprehensive control. It was in this spirit that he had recommended, as a priority disarmament objective of the U.S., that we *prevent, retard, or minimize* the development of nuclear weapons programs in other countries.

Mr. Smith said that we should consider what steps the U.S. might take at this time in anticipation of eventual broad agreement on control and as an earnest of our intentions. He proposed as one such measure a U.S. policy of using by-product plutonium from U.S. civilian power reactors solely for peaceful purposes, and thus separating the emerging U.S. civilian power program from our military weapons

---

<sup>3</sup> The Secretary is apparently referring to the U.S. note to the Soviet Union, January 27; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 22, 1956, pp. 628-629.

program and putting it on the same basis as the peaceful uses programs of other countries. He pointed out that the present U.S. military program did not rely on plutonium from civilian power reactors; thus the only sacrifice for the U.S. in separating our peaceful and military programs would be the possible need to spend some money on additional military plutonium reactors if needed.

Mr. Strauss doubted that the U.K. would be able to accept such a proposal. . . . Mr. Strauss said that the idea was one which appealed to him and one which he thought the President would support. General Loper asked whether plutonium would have any substantial use for peaceful purposes. Mr. Strauss said that while the present use as a reactor fuel was insignificant, it would probably become an important fuel once it was available for non-military use.

The Secretary indicated doubt as to the value of the proposed gesture. Countries such as India were concerned with whether or not the U.S. continued to produce nuclear weapons and would not care where we got the plutonium for such weapons. Mr. Smith said that the measure appeared important to him mainly as an earnest of our eventual disarmament intentions and of our sincerity in pressing ahead with negotiations for control of atomic energy. The Secretary said that if this matter appeared important on further study, it should be raised again, but that at present he did not think the U.S. should make such an offer. We should attempt to get other countries to accept a standstill agreement for say a five-year period, while the major powers attempt to work out effective initial control of both military and peaceful uses of atomic energy. He warned that there would be many problems to meet in negotiating agreement with the USSR on an effective inspection operation even limited to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

General Loper said that Mr. Robertson would shortly send a letter outlining the following Department of Defense position.<sup>4</sup> The Department of Defense favors a flexible approach to the control of peaceful uses of atomic energy. It believes that the arms control problem, which required stricter controls, should be kept distinct from Agency activities, and that Agency controls should not apply to military programs. We should seek a modest control arrangement initially; otherwise the establishment of the Agency might well be delayed. The present draft Statute appeared generally acceptable to the Department of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are presently studying the military risk which would be caused by diversion of nuclear materials so that fourth states would obtain nuclear weapons. If this risk appears significant, then more rigid mandatory controls might be required rather than permissive controls. The Department of Defense agrees generally with the AEC views on support of the Agency, including the concept of match-

---

<sup>4</sup> See *infra*.



ing contributions from other nations. The Department of Defense does not approve the proposal for a UK-US-USSR agreement that no material from their peaceful uses programs will be used for military purposes. Such an agreement would require inspection of the U.S. programs which should not be undertaken under the Agency but only under a broad arms regulation agreement.

The Secretary agreed with Ambassador Wadsworth's suggestion that the problem of controls be discussed with the USSR before February 27.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that it would be necessary to work out carefully the provisions which should be written into the charter to advance our objective of preventing other countries from developing nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that the Agency charter should be written to give necessary authority to the Agency but not to make obligatory the commitments we are seeking. He conceived the suggestion standstill agreement as a parallel agreement rather than one built into the charter. Mr. Smith observed that we have our most effective bargaining position at this time and we should seek to obtain control authority before we make firm commitments. He said that one approach which was being considered was to stipulate that Agency assistance would go only to countries not engaged in nuclear weapons production. The Secretary said that he was convinced countries would not come into the Agency if required to commit themselves for all time not to make weapons. What we must ask is that they agree, for a specified period of time, as a self-denying move, not to complicate the problem of nuclear disarmament by engaging in atomic weapons production, while the great powers try to bring the world situation and their own stocks of these weapons under control.

**107. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense  
(Robertson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 3, 1956.*

SUBJECT

International Atomic Energy Agency

Your memorandum on the above subject dated January 20, 1956,<sup>2</sup> incloses a proposed United States position on the statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and suggests an early meeting to decide if the proposed position should be recommended to the President.

I have recently requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military implications of the proposed IAEA statute and the suggested United States position relative thereto as set forth in the working paper. I should like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject before presenting recommendations to the President. Pending receipt of the Chiefs' views, however, I shall be glad to discuss the matter with you as early as we can find a time which is mutually convenient.

In advance of a discussion of the proposed United States position it may be useful for me to express the Department's general views regarding inspection and controls as related to peaceful applications. As long as the proposed inspection scheme does not, in fact, exercise or pretend to exercise restraint over military applications of nuclear energy, it would appear that a considerable degree of flexibility in the system could be accepted. If, however, the system is expected to exercise some degree of control over military applications, it should be a thoroughly effective and dependable system and should be adequately described by the statute itself. For example, to presume to prevent the development of nuclear weapon capabilities, but to fail to provide the authority and means for so doing would be highly misleading. If, as may be anticipated, no serious diversions are discovered under a "spot inspection" system such as authorized by the proposed statute, it could be assumed, quite erroneously, that a similar system would be adequate for the control of military applications within the major nations.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901/2-356. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

It seems clear that an inspection system designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weaponry in "have not" countries must infringe to a considerable degree on sovereign rights. Also, a system which would insure that the "have" countries do not convert the by-products of peaceful uses into weapons would certainly meet with great practical difficulty however desirable the idea may be from the political standpoint. I question seriously whether such a proposition, which would necessarily involve international supervision over many industrial plants in this country, would be ratified by the United States Congress. I foresee that an attempt to introduce these broader areas into the forthcoming discussions and subsequent negotiations will lead to a long postponement of the establishment of the Agency.

It seems to me that it would be in keeping with the spirit of the President's address of December 8, 1953, and United States policy as stated in NSC 5507/2<sup>3</sup> to forego the more ambitious plans for the IAEA as suggested in the working paper and to establish the Agency initially on a very modest basis. If the Agency operates successfully in a limited area its functions could be extended to include the other features suggested as we move toward the objectives of disarmament as set forth in current studies.

With these thoughts in mind, I have the following comments relative to the three questions raised in your memorandum:

a. I do not feel that the United States should try to establish the IAEA as a control organ to prevent the emergence of new atomic weapons capabilities in member nations.

b. The statute as now drafted appears reasonably satisfactory and appropriate for initiation of the twelve-nation discussions. On receipt of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the military implications of the statute I may suggest some specific changes. Initially, it would appear that the inspection authority prescribed in Paragraph D, Article XIII, is somewhat vague and might well be stated as a definite requirement rather than as an authorization. In other words, whatever the inspection measures may be they should be mandatory and uniformly applied to all recipient nations rather than permissive as now stated by the statute.

c. With respect to the scope and nature of the United States commitments to the IAEA, I believe they should include:

(1) An agreement to contribute to the pool of fissionable materials to the same extent as any other country.

(2) The continuation and expansion of educational and training courses in the peaceful application field, and the furnishing of all information in that field which is not classified nor contrary to laws and regulations concerning patent rights.

(3) The use of United States facilities for processing and reprocessing nuclear fuels in the absence of or pending the establishment of such facilities by the IAEA.

---

<sup>3</sup> Document 14.

(4) The arrangement of essential contacts with United States laboratories and industries to assist member states in the development and construction of peaceful use projects.

Pending the establishment and functioning of the IAEA, I believe it would be in keeping with national policy and to our best interests to continue vigorously with an assistance program through bilateral and regional agreements, such agreements to be transferred ultimately to the supervision of the IAEA if agreeable to the states concerned.

**Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.**

---

**108. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, February 3, 1956.*

DEAR FOSTER: Herewith the two suggestions concerning a reply by the President to Bulganin's speech<sup>2</sup> which we talked about on the telephone.<sup>3</sup>

There are two other points concerning the speech of which I am sure you have thought:

first, the letter should be well-tempered and should make it clear that we never despair, that the door is always open;

secondly, it should contain a brief, but devastating rebuttal to his contention that the Soviets have reduced their military activities and we have increased ours.

I believe that the Bulganin letter was largely motivated by apprehension as to what the "Open Sky" plan would do to them in the cold war. Now he has provided us with an ideal opportunity to wrap the "Open Sky" plan right around his neck, in full view of the public.

The trick is to do it sweetly and without giving him a chance to say that we want "open sky" *before* there is any disarmament or "open sky" with *never* any disarmament.

Faithfully yours,

**Cabot L.**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, President's Correspondence with Bulganin. Secret; Personal.

<sup>2</sup> No speech by Bulganin on disarmament at that time has been found. Lodge may be referring to Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower, February 1, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1956, pp. 515-518.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[Enclosure]

**Draft Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman  
Bulganin<sup>4</sup>**

*New York, February 3, 1956.*

Your proposal would, it seems to me, inescapably narrow the impact of the true spirit of the United Nations Charter. It now applies equally to all of the 76 Members. Your proposal would narrow them to two—or, if you include France and the United Kingdom, to four. Americans believe that the small nations have proven that they make a vital contribution to world peace and that it is not wise or just to put them in an inferior category.

You point out that “the United States of America, like many other states, after the creation of the United Nations became a party to a large number of both bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements”. But these agreements were in no sense a substitution for the ideals of the Charter. Regional agreements, such as those to which the United States is a party, are in amplification of the Charter’s aims. Agreements which fortify the aims of the Charter or which provide for its application in special circumstances are—you must surely recognize—at the opposite extreme from your proposal which would put two or four powers in a separate category from the rest of the world as regards the basic spirit of the Charter itself.

I agree heartily with your statement that “the U.N. Charter itself cannot be sufficiently effective if the two greatest powers in the world—the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.—do not harmonize their relations”.

But, as I said before, this must be by deeds. Frankly, Marshal Bulganin, we have had a plethora of words. If all we needed to keep the peace were words, it would have been guaranteed long ago. The time has come to do something concrete.

That is why I proposed the Open Sky plan for photographing each other’s military installations. The very simplicity and concreteness of this plan is what has commended it to the mass of men and women throughout the world and makes them eager to see it put into effect.

The objection which you make to it seems to me to be neither important nor well-founded. You ask the question:

---

<sup>4</sup> The source text bears the heading, Memorandum to Secretary Dulles from H. C. Lodge, Jr.

"What would the military leaders of your country do if it were reported to them that the aerophotography showed that your neighbor had more airfields?"

And then you answer your own question as follows:

"To be sure, they would order an immediate increase in the number of their own airfields".

Let me note in passing that in the United States the military leaders do not determine questions of this kind because here we have civilian control of the military. The establishment of airfields and the voting of appropriations therefor are matters within the jurisdiction of the Congress.

But the real fallacy in your comment on the Open Sky plan is that it seeks to magnify a wholly secondary aspect of the plan, and ignores the main purpose of it.

The main purpose of this plan is to convert air power into peace power. This would make it impossible for either of us to make a major surprise attack on the other. It would virtually eliminate the danger of aggression, and that is certainly more important than the mere number of airfields. Elimination of the danger of surprise attack is a matter of transcending importance. It would eliminate fear, which in turn would eliminate tension, which in turn would make possible far-reaching disarmament in addition to the disarmament measures which we are prepared to undertake now.

I realize that you have so far responded negatively to this idea. But I do not despair. I remember that initially your government did not endorse the Atoms for Peace plan. Yet you finally joined it. I therefore bring up again the "Open Sky" plan and urge you once again to join me in deeds which will make a reality of all the words to which your nation and mine have already subscribed.

---

### 109. Diary Entry by Ann C. Whitman, February 6, 1956<sup>1</sup>

President talked to Andy Goodpaster about the disarmament proposal of Harold Stassen.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diary. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Stassen's memorandum to the Vice President; Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense; Attorney General; Directors of ODM, Bureau of the Budget, USIA, and CIA; Chairmen of the JCS and the AEC; Representative at the United Nations Lodge, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, February 2, contained three attachments: a draft message to Congress, a draft letter to Bulganin, and a draft message to the people of the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/2-256)

President: "I am convinced that there has got to be something more of meat, if we are going to send a special delegation to Moscow, if I am to send a special message to Congress and appear before the American public. It is almost like using the Soviet approach and that I deplore—the technique of reiteration and reiteration.

"Harold Stassen is probably feeling a great deal of pressure because he must get ready for the next meeting (next Disarmament meeting of UN). We must do one of two things:

(a) Tell Stassen to continue for the moment on the same old line. (Difficulty about that is that we have promised to give Britain an answer this week regarding reduction of our forces to 2,500,000.) There is the added factor that nothing is so illusory as reduction of armament through reduction of men—the treaty of Versailles—all depends on how you use your forces.

(b) Second course of action, which is to see if we can push ahead instantly with such parts of the program as seem to us to have good sense, and then to add something else to it.

Lewis Strauss is suggesting something that, almost word for word, I suggested in September of 1953—that the U.S. stands ready to put into a common pool for the benefit of the world as much fissionable material as the rest of the world combined.<sup>3</sup> He further proposes that we make 20,000 kg. available for distribution in the world in power reactors (1,000 to the UN without cost, 5,000 to EURATOM) to be paid for, and the other 14,000 to be distributed throughout the world to be paid for, on terms acceptable to all the nations who want to participate. This would be a great step.

This is the only way we can justify plant.

Suggestion #1 President considers "too much talk about too little."

---

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower is presumably referring to the proposal in his "Atoms for Peace" speech to the U.N. General Assembly on December 8, 1953.

110. **Memorandum for the Record by the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 7, 1956.

At the President's request, I have studied Governor Stassen's memorandum, with attachments, relating to a major public initiative in the field of disarmament.<sup>2</sup>

I suggested to the President that he might wish to consider putting this matter in the form of a *sequence of concrete actions for peace*, and enlarging it to include other initiatives. In the field of disarmament, joint actions would be called for, beginning with inspection measures to build up confidence, and extending on to arms limitations. This might be a substitute for the "treaty of amity and friendship" advanced by Bulganin.<sup>3</sup> A second field for concrete action is the Atoms for Peace project, in which we are now probably ready to make allocations of many thousands of kgs. of nuclear material for peaceful (largely power) uses. Others might be invited to match our offers.

A further phase of the sequence of concrete actions would be in the area of an "international code of conduct"—which would go far beyond generalized precepts, into instances of behavior such as stirring up trouble in the Middle East, tension with regard to Formosa, etc.

The President indicated he was inclined to think that an approach of this kind could be very helpful in connection not only with disarmament, but also in connection with some of the major world problems we are now facing.

**A.J. Goodpaster**<sup>4</sup>  
Colonel, CE, U S Army

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> For Bulganin's draft treaty, attached to his January 23 letter to Eisenhower, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1956, p. 195.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



111. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 275th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 7, 1956, 4 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

The meeting was impromptu in its nature, resulting from the President's having asked me the day before to invite into his office for "a few minutes after Cabinet" the officials to whom Governor Stassen had sent the material on disarmament prepared in response to NSC Action 1510-b (copy attached), along with his covering note dated February 2, 1956, indicating the distribution (copy of which is also attached).<sup>2</sup>

The following were in attendance: The Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Attorney General,<sup>3</sup> Director of Office of Defense Mobilization, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Director of U.S. Information Agency, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Mr. Bernard Shanley (in and out), and Colonel Andrew Goodpaster.

The President began the meeting by stating that he had given considerable study over the week-end to Governor Stassen's material above described, and that in the first place he felt that Governor Stassen had done a good job in preparing the proposed messages with the material that he had, in order to see what it would look like in the form of actual draft documents. These had been circulated in order to obtain critical comment as to form and substance. The President said that nevertheless he feared there was not anything new in it except possibly the idea of seeking agreement upon limited test strips in which the inspection idea advanced at Geneva could be tried out on a small scale. He said that this idea and another one which had been proposed by Admiral Strauss had been considered rather seriously by him over the week-end as possible innovations which would support some kind of public announcement of progress in the development of policy proposals by the U.S. The method suggested of publicizing the proposals is one more applicable to a great change of policy, or to a great new proposal.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Dillon Anderson on February 9.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1510, see footnote 9, Document 103. For information on Stassen's covering note and enclosures, February 2, see footnote 2, Document 109.

<sup>3</sup> William P. Rogers.

The idea which had been suggested to the President by Admiral Strauss was as follows: that in connection with the ear-marking of 20,000 kilograms of fissionable material for domestic peaceful uses of atomic energy, there would be a corresponding offer to ear-mark 20,000 kilograms for peaceful uses elsewhere in the world, substantially as follows:

a. 1,000 kilograms to be an out-and-out gift to the International Atomic Energy Agency when the organization thereof is completed under the auspices of the U.N. (the value thereof to be 25 thousand dollars per kilogram—total of 25 million dollars);

b. 5,000 kilograms would be made available to EURATOM (but not as a gift);

c. The remaining 14,000 kilograms would be made available to the other nations in the world at reasonable cost for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

This would be a 5 year program and it would be combined with an offer to match within 5 years all contributions from all other nations in the world, and if the latter countries exceeded 20,000 kilograms in such period then we would match it. The President thought this program would have great appeal throughout the world. The President said that even with the development of these two ideas, he felt that the elaborate scheme for public announcements, radio addresses, messages to Congress, addresses to the United Nations, and sending a delegation to Moscow was somewhat like taking a sledge hammer to drive a tack. The President then went ahead to say that though he did not see at this time a clear alternative to the drift toward war which is manifest to serious students of international affairs, nevertheless we simply had to find some method for getting at this thing,—otherwise we are headed for an armaments race that would be ended in only one way,—namely, a clash of forces which could not result in victory for anybody, or at the least, stupendous expenditures for an indefinite period. He said he hoped that his advisers would give thought to this awful problem and bring forth any ideas which occurred to them as to how we could get the endeavors of mankind channeled for peaceful pursuits and the production of nuclear material channeled for peaceful uses. If we could only do the latter, he said, we could be safe in that our plants which produce this material could keep running for a long time, even without an effective disarmament agreement.

He explained that he had called the meeting in order to save further detailed work on the drafts which Governor Stassen had circulated, if it was felt that the lack of major new ideas or proposals made this unjustifiable.

Governor Stassen thereupon said that the Strauss' proposal was entirely OK with him, and could be brought into his over-all plan. He said he feared that the President had underestimated the degree of world impact that would accompany the announcements, speeches, etc., which he had prepared. In other words, the Governor felt there was enough new in his proposals that it would be accepted by the world as progress inspired by the President, and a significant step to succeed the dramatic announcement of the President's position at Geneva.

Governor Stassen said that we are now at a critical time—the big question in the minds of people all over the world, friends, neutrals, and enemies, was what is the U.S. policy going to be now? He said he had talked with Senator George and Senator Knowland about the matter, and they agreed with him that in general his proposals would be progress toward convincing the world of our good faith interest in disarmament. He spoke of a conversation he had had with Minister for External Affairs Lester Pearson of Canada, who had explained that as a result of his visit last year to Moscow he had become convinced that the Soviets were abysmally ignorant of our true position and attitude on the subject of disarmament. The French likewise are giving top emphasis to disarmament. He cited this as additional support for his views that his material would be an aid to elaborating and clarifying the real spirit of the President and the American people in reference to disarmament. He thought we have a sound basis for action in the work of the study groups.

Governor Stassen insisted that there were really two new propositions (at least new in the sense that they had not been announced to the world and proposed before, although both had been discussed in our own circles), which would be for the first time announced as a development of the American position,—namely,

- a. the small test area to try out inspection techniques, and
- b. the concept of mutual exchange of notifications between ourselves and the USSR of all major movements of armed forces—which could be preliminary to an attack.

The President said he thought that the latter point had been the subject of discussion with the Russians. Governor Stassen said "no". The President said nevertheless it had been discussed informally in Geneva with members of the Russian delegation. Therefore, said the President, we still have not got enough grist for a big announcement, and we would be, by following Governor Stassen's proposed course, like the mountain which labored and came forth with a mouse. The President said we need a concrete and understandable proposal which would be accepted and understood by the world as an American contribution toward progress in the direction of disarmament.

Secretary Dulles then spoke. First he said he agreed with the President that the substantive content of the proposal did not justify the proposed announcement. He said everything in substance had already been put forth and had already been rejected by the Russians and for the most part rejected many times. Then he turned to the proposal in Governor Stassen's material that we agree to work toward the reduction of our total force levels to 2½ million men in consideration of the same kind of reduction by the Soviet bloc. He said he was fearful of any such criterion of disarmament; that it was the old numbers racket, and there are so many ways that it could be evaded by the Russians that it was in his opinion unsound ground. He spoke of the possibility of reserves being built up and trained and not included at this or a later point. He mentioned the fact that our national guard would not be included, and that if we could handle numbers in this way, so could the Russians, and there would be no check on it, particularly where we are dealing with those whose good faith we do not accept. Secretary Dulles said that to look at numbers along with men under arms would be meaningless and a better test was the implementations of war on which the Western European Union limitations were postulated. Secretary Dulles also said that there was no way to have Governor Stassen's proposal on limitations on numbers of Chinamen. Dulles said he thought quite well of Admiral Strauss' proposal, and concluded these remarks by the statement that he felt that "Harold had done all that could be done with what we have at this time by way of the elements of the position."

The President then said that he was inclined to agree with Stassen that there was novelty and possibility of progress in the proposal that we develop these little inspection strips as a test, and he would like to see this explored, but not in such an elaborate fashion as Stassen had proposed in his February 2 material. The President said he felt it took more cross-checks or double-checks than merely force levels or even quantitative limitations on armaments to achieve reciprocal reductions or tearing down of the trend in the armaments build-up. He mentioned two other elements,—namely, the rate of expenditures (the French idea at Geneva) and the 4th element, that is an opening up of the Soviets to inspection. He said he felt that these four things could be done concurrently and that we could achieve real progress for genuine disarmament.

Governor Stassen said the Soviets are distorting our plan as simply reconnaissance, and claiming that we are saying nothing about a decrease in strengths. He said that an added new element in his plan is the idea of inspection around atomic plants, which can serve as steps toward verifying the use of atomic materials produced for peaceful purposes. He said we must consider what the future means if we have simply more and more missiles and weapons. He said that 4 elements

would be inspected to limit forces—men, armaments, money, and munitions production. Governor Stassen said that all of these elements were in his proposal, but they were all keyed to the President's inspection proposal that would lead to opening up the Soviet. Stassen then added that the concern of Dulles about reserve components, national guard components, etc., that are now in the Soviet picture had all been taken into account by his Task Forces, and that it was intended to insure that in the negotiations which would be in the succeeding phases that all related military components would be reciprocally reduced.

Secretary Dulles said that he had not understood that this was so, or that the action was contemplated. Governor Stassen said that if all the material had been read this point would have been clear. Secretary Dulles said that we must assure ourselves that the line of action we are proposing to enter can be carried through to reach a satisfactory solution. He did not feel that assurance now.

The President said we must not take the stand that we cannot disarm. Even if we cannot be sure we will be able to keep track of all elements of the other side's armed strength, our inspection proposal would let us know about movements and build-ups that threaten surprise attack.

Secretary Humphrey expressed the idea that we are on the wrong track in this business of reducing forces to certain levels of manpower alone. He said he thought there was a trap in it for us in that if we proposed the reduction by the Russians to the end that the Russians reduced manpower under arms, the area in which they have great superiority over us, then they could come back and propose that we either ban the bomb or reduce our superiority in the nuclear field to parity with them. Humphrey then posed the question as to how we would answer such a proposition. The President said the Soviets proposed simply renouncing use of the bomb, and he would not agree.

Governor Stassen pointed out that the Russians had already made the proposal as to the reduction of manpower in their May 10, 1955, announcement, and suggested that we might be nearer a psychological show-down than Humphrey had described.

The President then spoke, saying that if we could somehow eliminate the H-weapon, the world would be better off. He feared some of our thinking overlooked a transcendent consideration, — namely, that nobody can win a thermonuclear war. Therefore, he said "We've got to move or we are doomed".

Secretary Humphrey said he felt that our best way to get started was by gradual stages, including the "test strip" plan which he thought was a sound idea. Could we not, he said, spare the dramatic and negotiate toward such a beginning as the actual inclusion of the test strip plan.

The President said this idea was very appealing to him but only if all would agree we must move, even if only a small distance at first, in this matter.

Governor Stassen thought there should also be some reference to a decrease in strengths; otherwise the proposal would appear to be unfairly favorable to us. The President and Secretary Humphrey indicated general agreement. The President then said there had been always in his mind in connection with the proposal for exchanging blue prints the profound consideration that this would really furnish a test of the Russian good faith in the disarmament negotiations as distinguished from the pure propaganda of numbers.

Secretary Dulles then said that we must also realize that today the world is afraid of nuclear war and its consequences, and that this state of mind led many people and many governments—who do not take responsibility for maintaining peace—to go for superficial panaceas of the sort the Soviets were continually throwing about, such as the “ban the bomb” idea. He said we in the United States who take real responsibility must always explain the true meaning of proposals, and see that nothing unsound is done. We have the task of convincing the world that we genuinely desire peace and at the same time, coming forward with genuine proposals which might lead to world peace through some practicable plan for the reduction of armaments and tension and threats. In other words, it is up to us as the last best hope of the world for our way of life, to explain why the Russian panaceas being used for propaganda purposes will not work, and then to provide affirmative, saleable, understandable, and workable substitutes for such panaceas as “ban the bomb”. He thought if we approach the problem in this way, we can find more sound things to do, such as inspection, atoms-for-peace, etc.

Secretary Dulles then reiterated his view that he was for some kind of approach to limitation of the elements beyond which force levels would be postulated to include limitation on types of weapons, on submarines, on guided missiles and means of delivery, and other measurable elements of armed forces. He felt there might be some room for progress in the field of cutting down the quantity of fissionable material in the future that goes into weapons, or even to agree if this can be done safely that after a certain point all future use of fissionable material would be dedicated to peaceful purposes. He thought undue stress on numbers of men under arms was not good. The President agreed, pointing out that it encouraged our Allies to taper off.

Secretary Robertson then spoke and said he agreed with Secretary Dulles about the numbers game being a poor way to get at disarmament. He pointed out that we had come down from 4 million men to something less than 3 million men, and operating very thin, consider-

ing the nature of our commitments world-wide. He said it is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we should stay where we are at this level during the first year of any kind of trial inspection and only negotiate during that year on the degree, nature, and quantity of reduction in other elements that might be made.

The President said he could understand Secretary Dulles' apprehension about the numbers game, in which Secretary Robertson concurred. He said "Foster saw how the limitations passed on the numbers game got burned at Versailles", and made some further reference to the position taken at Versailles by Marshal Foch. He said, though, referring to men, money, etc., that if inspection verifies the information given, we could begin to make progress. The President, by way of summing up the discussion, said first that he felt sure that this was no time to put out a lot of material that looks like a big program and was really nothing concrete or new in it, and that the timing in his opinion would be bad for the release of the Stassen type of material. Our announcement should be quite modest in the beginning. He said let's adopt the idea of agreeing to a test strip where the techniques of inspection can be carried out. If this makes progress, we can think about going to see Bulganin.

Governor Stassen felt that now is the time to act. The U.N. resolution was a very favorable result for the U.S. Now we need a new impact. We should turn the level of arms downward.

The President restated his view that we should start modestly, then dramatize.

Ambassador Lodge spoke up at this time and called attention to the U.N. resolution adopted in December by a vote of 53 to 7<sup>4</sup> on this subject. He pointed out that only the Russians and the satellites disagreed with it and that they had to go along with nations such as India and other neutrals who frequently do not agree with us on the subject of disarmament or bombs. He pointed out that the resolution was amended to accept the President's concept of air inspection and the exchange of blue prints, announced in Geneva; that it also called upon all nations to work toward the reduction of such armaments as can be adequately safeguarded.

The burden of Lodge's comments was that some of the steps proposed in Stassen's material might be safely negotiated in a forthcoming meeting of the Disarmament Subcommittee in March in London, and that this could be done without taking any chance and we could be consistent with the UN resolution in the negotiating of some of these points because we have 4 qualifying conditions that must be met before we would have to agree to any of the steps,—namely:

---

<sup>4</sup> The vote was 56-7. See Document 88.

- a. they must be safeguarded;
- b. they must be safeguarded adequately to our satisfaction;
- c. they must be feasible;
- d. they must be feasible *now*.

He stressed the fact that we have *got* to have something to talk about on the reduction of arms (Part 2 above cited of the UN resolution). He said everybody expects that there will be talk in the negotiations by the United States on this subject of reduction of armaments, and that it is not enough to reiterate the aerial inspection or the exchange of blue prints ideas. He said that in the Subcommittee "they are all going to be after us on this, friends and enemies alike. We cannot afford to split off from the British and the French on this".

Then the President pointed out that the British and the French for the time being are pretty strongly committed to some kind of plan whereby reductions could be geared to the test of the number of men under arms (numbers racket).

Governor Stassen then spoke up and reminded the Council that Bulganin called specifically for something tangible in this matter of the reduction of armaments. Therefore, can't we, he asked, hold out some concrete prospect of turning down the trend of armaments build-up if we get the Soviets opened up. Otherwise we may lose world opinion.

At this point, Admiral Radford said our allies do not have the same kind of responsibilities that we have and we should always have this in mind in dealing with their proposals in the field of disarmament. Our allies do not have the same alternatives either, he said, or choices which must be made in the right way or else, in view of our responsibilities, the whole thing may be lost. He said it was the view of the Joint Chiefs that we cannot have an effective system of armed limitations and maintain the safety and security of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviet. The Joint Chiefs, he pointed out, do believe however that we can have an effective inspection which would minimize the danger of surprise attack and thus perhaps minimize the danger of all-out atomic war. He went ahead and said that if he were in the place of the Russians today he would start off the inspection proposal and then the arms limitations proposal for about a year or a year and a half, then he would accept it because at that time, in Radford's view, the Russians will have built up all elements of power to approach parity with our own, building vast fleets of large bombers designed for one purpose—for long range delivery of nuclear weapons. He pointed out that they are building submarines at an unprecedented rate (the rate is about 100 per year) and that these and other features of their preparatory program reminded him in deadly fashion of the activities going on in Germany in the early '30's. He said that from the nature of the speed-up and intensive building program of submarines, airplanes, and other weapons, it appears they are shooting at a target date for action.



Therefore, in Radford's view, a decision made by the President on this subject would be one of the most important decisions which had to be made during his service as President of the United States. He said he believed the Russians could wait one and a half years, and then accept our proposal to limit things from there on, and they would have us "at a hell of a disadvantage". Radford then spoke of the limitations which in his mind are inherent in the idea of inspections and exchange of blue prints. The substance of his view here was that inspections alone will not protect us; that it will only help to prevent, or enable us to get ready for a surprise attack. In conclusion, he said he was afraid if our proposals as set out in Governor Stassen's material were made to the Russians, his greatest fear would be that the Russians would accept, because as he saw it, by waiting a year and a half, and then accepting them, they would gain an unacceptable advantage over us. We would be unable to abrogate the agreement, since our Allies would hold that tantamount to war.

Governor Stassen said that the armament race and the disarmament race grew out of the kind of analysis that Admiral Radford had just made of the situation. He was working on some approach that would open up the Soviets and enable us safely to turn down this upward trend of arms build-up.

Admiral Radford replied that the trouble with any such efforts was that the Soviets were not people who would live up to agreements. He said there were many reasons why the Russians declined the President's "open sky" offer—that they did not want us to see how little they had at that time. By about a year and a half or so, they would have enough that they would perhaps agree to it, and be in a position thereafter to enjoy the advantage of which he spoke.

Governor Stassen then asked him whether or not he agreed with the idea of negotiating for the development of test strips. Radford replied that he did.

So apparently from the entire discussion, there seems to have emerged at least this clear decision,—namely, that we will propose and work sincerely for the development of test strips. Secretary Humphrey thought we should go through with a pilot trial, with the objective of reducing armaments as soon as the pilot trial demonstrates adequate safeguards.

Admiral Radford concluded his statement with remarks that under no circumstances should we agree that after a certain point further production of fissionable material would be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes, since inspection will not be sufficient to assure that material is not being diverted into weapons.

The President came back into the conversation and said that when he was told of the equivalent in tons of TNT now contained in our stockpile, and when he considered the possibility of the danger

upon this country of such a volume of destructive power, it was a completely staggering picture. "What is left of either country after the first 72 hours?" The President referred to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Report as indicative of the kind of world it would be in the event of the use of thermonuclear weapons.<sup>5</sup> He said the statesmen of today must search their hearts and brains for some way out of the collision course upon which these two nations are embarked. "What", he asked the group, "can we do about it?" An arms race, he pointed out, particularly when such weapons as we now have can be employed, can lead but to disaster. He asked what we can suggest as a kind of thing we can reduce.

The President thought Governor Stassen might make a proposal for a trial inspection while in London. He said we should then negotiate during the year on things our experience shows us we can adequately inspect for.

Governor Stassen then asked the President whether he would approve a second step beyond which I took it the President had approved (test strips),—the authority to agree and to explore and negotiate, but without commitments, during the first year of the test period, other kinds of reductions of armaments, mentioning an illustrative figure. There did not appear to be agreement on mentioning a figure.

I took it from the President's response that Governor Stassen would have good authority, and that this would be a broad determination.

Admiral Strauss then suggested that one of the proposals that might be made in the course of the negotiations in the Subcommittee could perhaps be his plan above stated of contributing 20,000 kilograms. The President thought only a generalized reference to atoms-for-peace should be made.

Secretary Dulles objected to any specific statement, and said he felt this was one which should be held up and dealt with later, and that Stassen's talk on this subject should be limited to generalities and not to specifics. The President appeared to agree.

Governor Stassen asked about replying to the Bulganin letter of last summer on disarmament. The President thought it must be answered promptly, but that a delegation should not be sent to Moscow at this time.<sup>6</sup>

Dillon Anderson<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Documentation on the Net Evaluation Subcommittee is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.

<sup>6</sup> No record of actions taken at this meeting is attached to the source text, but see *infra*.

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

112. **Record of Actions Taken at the 275th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 7, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows a note listing the participants at the meeting.]

*Action Number 1513. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments*

[Here follows a list of reference actions and memoranda, all of which are cited in footnotes 2 and 9, Document 103, and footnote 2, Document 109.]

a. Discussed the proposed public statements on the subject drafted by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament pursuant to NSC Action No. 1510-b-(1) and circulated by the reference memorandum of February 2, 1956.<sup>2</sup>

b. Discussed a proposal by the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy<sup>3</sup> that, in connection with earmarking a specified quantity of fissionable material for domestic peaceful uses of atomic energy, the U.S. might make a corresponding offer to earmark a similar quantity of fissionable material to be available over a period of years for peaceful uses elsewhere in the world, including use by the International Atomic Energy Agency when created.

c. Noted the following decisions by the President:

(1) That draft statements proposed by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament in the reference memorandum of February 2, 1956 will not be used.

(2) The draft reply to the Bulganin letter of September 19, 1955 should be prepared by the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament and submitted to the President at an early date.

(3) That the Secretary of State be authorized to inform the British Government that, in connection with forthcoming disarmament negotiations, the U.S. will not be in a position at this time to agree to negotiate a reduction of the total levels of U.S. armed forces based upon the criterion of manpower.

(4) That the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament be authorized to explore and develop, as a basis for negotiation with the USSR, his proposal for the designation of small strips of territory in the U.S. and the USSR within which the feasibility of inspection systems would be tested.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text, but the final page is marked "Revised 3/1/56", presumably to include new information contained in the final Note and following annex. The source text indicates that the President approved this record of action on February 15. An early draft of the record attached to a memorandum from Anderson to Dulles, February 8, solicited Dulles' comments on and suggested possible changes in and additions to the draft. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—General)

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1510, see footnote 9, Document 103. Regarding Stassen's memorandum and enclosures, see footnote 2, Document 109.

<sup>3</sup> Lewis L. Strauss.

(5) That the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament be authorized to explore and submit a report to the Council on the feasibility of measures for the reduction of major types of armaments, especially those capable of delivering nuclear weapons, in respects where inspection is shown to be effective.

(6) That the U.S. disarmament position in the forthcoming meeting of the UN Subcommittee should include:

- (a) Proposals for advance notification of projected movements of armed units through international air or water or over foreign soil.
- (b) Proposals for an exchange for a test period of a small number of inspection personnel who could be used as members of inspection teams if an inspection agreement is subsequently concluded.

*Note:* The Action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament and the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy. On March 1, 1956, the President, after consultation with the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved the supplementary policy on the subject contained in the Annex hereto.<sup>4</sup>

[Annex]<sup>5</sup>

ANNEX TO NSC ACTION NO. 1513

If the Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal, with accompanying ground inspection, is accepted, and if such a system is proven to the U.S. to be satisfactorily installed and operating, and assuming the political situation is reasonably stable, the United States, with the other nations concerned, would be prepared to begin a gradual reciprocal, safeguarded reduction of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures. For illustrative purposes, in the forthcoming session of the United Nations Subcommittee, the United States Representative is authorized to indicate that such reductions would presuppose, as a basis for measurement and in a specific manner to be mutually agreed, force levels of 2.5 million men for the U.S., USSR and China; corresponding appropriate levels for the UK and France and others to be determined after consultation with the representatives of these States.

<sup>4</sup> A note for the files, March 1, indicates that no memorandum of discussion was prepared of this March 1 meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

<sup>5</sup> Secret.

**113. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1956.

DEAR HAROLD: Supplementing my letters to you of December 12 [11] and January 26, my comments upon your memorandum of February 2<sup>2</sup> are as follows:

1. I believe that we should continue to support the proposal that the United States and the USSR accept mutual inspection so as to give insurance against great surprise attack, as proposed by the President. We must realize, however, that this proposal has been consistently rejected by the Soviet Union, at least as an isolated measure. Unless this proposal is clearly put forward in the context of a broader plan to supervise and control an agreed arms reduction program of substantial proportions, a wide sector of world opinion will consider our proposal as a mere delaying action.

2. We agree with the proposal that all future production of nuclear materials should be for peaceful purposes only, under effective inspection. As I understand your proposal, it would provide no limitation on the continuance or amount of such production. In our own interest, I believe we should now go further and propose that, under effective safeguards, all production of nuclear material should cease, except for amounts which may be currently required for non-weapons purposes. Material produced as a by-product of peaceful power reactors should be transferred to locations beyond national control under international supervision and earmarked for future non-weapons uses. Cessation of production should facilitate reliable inspection and control.

3. In this connection, I doubt whether other countries will agree to forego making nuclear weapons in perpetuity, if the U.S., USSR and U.K. are to continue indefinitely to have them in significant amounts. I suggest that we now propose that both the U.S. and USSR should undertake to make major contributions from existing stockpiles, in a ratio to be determined, to the internationally supervised depository from which withdrawals could be made only to meet proved peaceful

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—General. Secret. In a covering note to Dillon Anderson, February 8, Dulles wrote:

"As I think you know, I promised the British that we would let them know something about the figure on numbers which is being discussed in connection with disarmament. I understand that you will bring this up at the NSC meeting tomorrow.

"I enclose a copy of my letter to Mr. Stassen of February 7. I have read over the telephone to Admiral Radford paragraph 4 dealing with this topic. He thinks it is acceptable from their standpoint." (*Ibid.*) Disarmament was not discussed at the NSC meeting on February 9.

<sup>2</sup> For Dulles' letters to Stassen, see Documents 87 and 102. Regarding Stassen's February 2 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 109.

requirements. This proposal would have wide public appeal both as an initial measure for control of nuclear weapons and as a contribution to the diffusion of the benefits of nuclear energy.

4. In regard to your proposal for reducing the forces of the U.S. and USSR to 2.5 million and the military budget by 5%, I do not believe that it is practical to supervise and control an agreement which focuses upon the number of men in the armed forces, at least with any feasible inspection system. This is an extremely elusive element. Following the principle of the WEU, however, a certain size of military establishment can be postulated as a basis for determining the weapons required, but it is the weapons rather than the men which should be subject to agreement and control. Even on this basis, if agreement were confined to the USSR and U.S., the U.S. would want to maintain approximately the present level of forces and armament. We should, however, be prepared to consider a lower postulated number of men in the armed forces if an appropriate formula can be found which embraces Communist China. I think we should inform the British, French and Canadians to this effect.

5. We note that your plan suggests a possible control of certain types of armament, although you do not further develop the subject, and we know of no specific studies of it. This approach to reductions seems to us much better than through control of manpower, which, as I have said, is the hardest single element of military strength to verify and which tends to favor the Communist powers. We believe that reductions in terms of selected major weapons could be inspected and controlled much more easily and effectively than force levels.

We believe that U.S. security would be advanced by effective reductions in these fields, especially in delivery systems for nuclear weapons, such as planes, guided missiles, submarines, etc. The control of such selected items would provide a further safeguard against the nuclear threat and surprise attack and should also permit an inspection system much less pervasive and onerous for both the Soviet Union and the U.S. than reductions across the board, however modest.

6. We do not believe that the agreement to negotiate for settlement of serious differences should be made contingent upon the successful initiation of the provisions against surprise attack.

7. We doubt the desirability of restating in a new agreement the commitment against the use of force already contained in the United Nations Charter. In his letter of January 28, 1956, to Mr. Bulganin, the President rejected such verbal repetition.<sup>3</sup> Of course, it will be perfectly proper, as part of any new substantive agreement, to refer back to the United Nations commitment.

---

<sup>3</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1956, pp. 191-193.

8. The character of the "Armaments Regulation Council" is so vague that we cannot comment upon it usefully.

9. While we believe that an ultimate goal should be to create some world organization with preponderant power to enforce peace, we doubt that at this stage we should propose to furnish the Armaments Council with tactical nuclear weapons for enforcement purposes. We would, however, favor the United States agreeing to earmark a quantity of such weapons to be used by us, in conformity with our constitutional processes, at the call of the United Nations in pursuance of the Charter or the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution.

10. With respect to procedure, we would not want to express any opinion until the substance is settled. It is our impression that the present plan, and any likely to evolve from it now, will not justify the elaborate publicity program which is suggested.

I recognize that we must take a position for international negotiation in the near future based on those elements now under consideration which appear sound. But I believe that any program which can be put forward on the basis of studies and deliberations to date may not go as far as our national interest requires or as necessary to command wide support.

I recommend therefore that the whole subject continue to receive urgent study.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

114. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 9, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on February 10.

3. *Background and Status of the Small Output Power Reactor* (NSC 5507/2, paragraph 27-e; NSC Action No. 1424-b; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 9 and February 2, 1956)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Dillon Anderson briefed the Council at some length on the reference report (copy of briefing note included in the minutes of the meeting).<sup>3</sup> At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Anderson suggested that Admiral Strauss might wish to elaborate on what he had said.

Admiral Strauss said that there was no need to elaborate, but he did feel called upon to make some remarks, because he was facing at the moment what might be described as a "soft impeachment" on grounds of incompetence and insubordination. With respect to the "charge" of incompetence, Admiral Strauss said he was led to wonder whether the members of the NSC Planning Board were really qualified to make a decision as to the precise size and character of a power reactor appropriate for use in foreign countries. With further reference to incompetence, Admiral Strauss informed the Council that yesterday afternoon he had concluded a two-day hearing before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee on Capitol Hill.<sup>4</sup> At the conclusion of the hearing, Senator Anderson had astonished him by stating that in his opinion the Atomic Energy Commission was doing a magnificent job. This report, said Admiral Strauss, might seem somewhat immodest, but the Council should remember that he was defending himself. (This latter comment was made with a smile.)

As to the other "charge", of insubordination, Admiral Strauss said that the Atomic Energy Commissioners had considered that the overriding paragraph in NSC 5507/2 was the earlier paragraph, which directed that the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses should be accomplished as far as possible by recourse to private financing. With one exception, continued Admiral Strauss, namely the reactor being built at Shippingsport, Pennsylvania, the Commission had followed this directive and had managed to get private financing for the bulk of the projects designed to advance peaceful uses of atomic energy. As for the program for constructing a small reactor in the 10,000-kilowatt range for use abroad, as directed in paragraph 27-e of NSC 5507/2, it would have been futile to have proceeded on a crash basis to build such a reactor prior to the time when the law

---

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5507/2 is printed as Document 14. Regarding NSC Action No. 1424, see footnote 6, Document 47. Neither the January 9 nor February 2 memoranda is printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507)

<sup>3</sup> Neither the briefing note nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> These hearings for February 7 and 8 are printed in *Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, 84th Congress, 2d session, part 1, pp. 1-185.*



permitted the AEC to donate the nuclear fuel necessary to operate such a reactor. The decision permitting such donation had only recently been made.

Admiral Strauss then went on to assure the Council that of the several power reactors now in the course of development by private U.S. companies, some would certainly be suitable for use abroad as envisioned in paragraph 27-e. Moreover, foreign nationals were now being trained in U.S. atomic energy installations to operate such power reactors. Indeed, the Bureau of the Budget had just increased the funds available for such training at the Argonne Laboratory and at Oak Ridge. In summary, Admiral Strauss said he sincerely believed that the Atomic Energy Commission had carried out the directive given it in paragraph 27-e in the most intelligent possible manner and with the least reliance on public financing. Accordingly, he was prepared to "throw himself on the mercy of the court".

The President said that he was at a loss to understand the difference of view between the majority of the Planning Board and Admiral Strauss with respect to the implementation of the directive on the construction of small power reactors. However, he did recall that when the Council had initially considered the policy set forth in NSC 5507/2, there had been a strong emphasis on the desirability of private financing of the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses.

In order to assist the President, Mr. Anderson read paragraph 27-e and explained the view of the majority of the Planning Board that the Atomic Energy Commission had not literally complied with the directive in this paragraph.

The President nevertheless professed that he still could not comprehend the difference, in view of all the companies which Admiral Strauss had said were planning to develop and construct small output power reactors. Why should this be called a failure to carry out an NSC directive? Was it simply because these reactors would not be developed and built with public funds? In short, the President found it difficult, he said, to define Admiral Strauss' "crime". Admiral Strauss said that he too found it hard to define the crime. Moreover, he was now being indicted by his friends (on the Planning Board) at the very time that he had been busy fighting his enemies.

Governor Stassen said that the real problem was the lapse of the long interval of a year when nothing concrete had been done, despite foreign clamor, toward the actual construction of a small power reactor for use overseas. After all, we had only paper plans so far regarding this type of reactor.

Admiral Strauss denied the position advanced by Governor Stassen, and said that the latter should look more carefully into the facts of the situation. He went on to say that in his opinion there was nothing

"magic" about a power reactor in the 10,000-kilowatt range. He again wondered about the competence of those behind this judgment on the necessity for a power reactor of this precise range.

The President then stated that the crux of the problem seemed to be this: Was there any possibility that the AEC could speed up the development of a small power reactor which would be suitable for use in foreign countries?

In reply to the President, Admiral Strauss pointed out that the power reactor being built by Westinghouse for the Belgian World Fair would be completed not later than April 1, 1958. This date was likely to be well before any construction would start on power reactors in any foreign country outside the British Commonwealth. Indeed, the power reactors being built or planned in the U.K., Canada and Australia would be powered with our nuclear fuel. Admiral Strauss also emphasized that power reactors were not simple machines which could be turned over for operation to unskilled people. On the contrary, it required considerable training to operate such reactors. He feared that U.S. prestige would suffer a heavy blow if, for example, a reactor provided by the United States for Spain should blow up and kill thousands of people because it was operated by people with insufficient training.

Secretary Dulles said that he did not doubt for a minute that Admiral Strauss and the AEC were doing everything in their power to carry out the NSC directives in this field. However, it appeared to him that this was an instance in which our propaganda had outrun our technical ability. After the President's famous atoms-for-peace speech, it was essential to move as rapidly as possible in order to avoid disillusionment abroad and to forestall a prior Soviet offer to provide power reactors to foreign nations. The President agreed that this was a most important consideration, and Secretary Dulles renewed his plea that we get ahead with building a small-scale power reactor for use overseas just as rapidly as possible.

The President then turned to Admiral Strauss and asked him how many small-scale power reactors were now being developed or built, and how much help the Atomic Energy Commission was providing for these projects. Admiral Strauss said that the Commission was providing help in the form of research to every one of these projects. Otherwise, the most assistance had been given to the Shippingsport power reactor. There the AEC had provided the nuclear reactor, although the Duquesne Power and Light Company had given \$5 million toward meeting the cost of this reactor. Out in Nebraska a cooperative was now engaged in putting up a power reactor in an area where there was no private power company. This project was likewise receiving help

from the Commission. In answer to an inquiry of the President, Admiral Strauss stated that this was the only cooperative with which the Atomic Energy Commission was currently dealing.

Admiral Strauss then pointed to the plant which was going to be erected in New England by the Yankee Atomic Power Company. Their application had been approved only yesterday by the Commission. The project had the support of the entire New England delegation in Congress, both Republicans and Democrats. The Atomic Energy Commission proposed to assist the Yankee Atomic Power Company with the sum of about \$5 million. The total cost of the plant would be approximately \$60 million.

Turning to Admiral Strauss, the President said let's assume that you succeed in building the perfect 10,000-kilowatt range power reactor. Where would you then locate it? What foreign countries want them? This is part of the problem. If Westinghouse can build such a reactor for Belgium, why can it not build them for Holland or Argentina? Admiral Strauss pointed out that 100% of the expenses of the Belgian reactor built by Westinghouse was to be paid for by the Belgians. They had selected Westinghouse as the lowest bidder. Such a reactor could not actually have been built in Belgium until very recently because our laws would not have authorized our building such a plant in Belgium even if we had had a prototype to follow. At this point Admiral Strauss again reassured the President that small scale power reactors would soon be available in sufficient quantity to meet foreign demands. Moreover, we would be able to assure ourselves of adequate security measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear fuels for possible weapons use.

The President then said that he had another question. He wanted to know, in simple terms, what progress we must make in order to have available those power reactors which the State Department feels we need in order to assist in meeting our foreign policy objectives. Secretary Dulles added the comment that it was his understanding of paragraph 27-e that we were to build and get operating a small-scale power reactor in the United States first. This would constitute the model on which others would be built and shipped to our friends overseas.

Secretary Humphrey said that he was completely unable to comprehend what the argument was all about. He said he thought that Admiral Strauss' report showed a magnificent record of the development of small power reactors and, moreover, all of these were being developed under our system of free competition. All in all, it was a terrific accomplishment. The President said that he could not understand the fuss either. All he was trying to do was to discover what more we can do in this field than we are currently doing. Secretary Humphrey said that the Council should change the words of the

directive in paragraph 27-e and not change our basic policy with respect to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes so far as possible with private financing.

Governor Stassen pointed out his understanding that at the time the directive in paragraph 27-e was inserted in NSC 5507/2, this was done with the advice and agreement of Admiral Strauss and the Atomic Energy Commission. On the contrary, replied Admiral Strauss, the Commission had vigorously dissented from the directive in paragraph 27-e. Moreover, he had sent in an earlier report of progress (dated October 28, 1955)<sup>5</sup> which was not regarded as satisfactory to the Planning Board with particular respect to paragraph 27-e.

Secretary Dulles said he believed that it had become entirely academic to keep discussing this directive. He repeated that all he wanted to get across was the idea that everything should be done to complete a small-scale power reactor for use abroad as soon as possible. Secretary Dulles added that he did not doubt that this was being done, and he had not a word of criticism of Admiral Strauss. The President added that it was not a question of criticism, but rather of commendation for the manner in which Admiral Strauss had carried out this directive. What precisely, continued the President, did the Planning Board have in mind (a group which the President said he admired) that Admiral Strauss should be doing but was not? Mr. Anderson again attempted to explain the view of the majority of the Planning Board members with respect to paragraph 27-e. He said in effect that the course of action being followed by Admiral Strauss reached the objective set forth in paragraph 27-e, but did not reach that objective by the precise route recommended in this paragraph. Accordingly, he ventured to think that the Council might wish to revise the wording of paragraph 27-e.

Secretary Dulles said that he had always assumed, perhaps wrongly, that the directive in paragraph 27-e contemplated that the small-scale power reactor should be built with the utmost speed and with public rather than private funds. Admiral Strauss agreed with this interpretation of paragraph 27-e, but pointed out that this paragraph was in conflict with the earlier paragraph in NSC 5507/2 which directed that in so far as possible the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was to be carried out with private financing. The Commission deduced that from this conflict it was allowed a certain discretion in the course of action which it followed in the matter of developing the small output power reactor.

The President said that, this being the case, the thing to do was to correct the wording of paragraph 27-e. Moreover, said the President, he wished the Council record of action to contain a statement of the

---

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507)

importance of developing a small output power reactor as quickly as possible from the point of view of United States foreign policy. The revised wording of paragraph 27-e should omit any reference to the specific power range in kilowatts of the small output reactor.

Governor Stassen said that he recalled readily the circumstances which had led to the inclusion of paragraph 27-e when NSC 5507/2 was considered by the Council. At the time we greatly feared that the Soviets might beat us to the gun and offer a power reactor before we were in a position to do so ourselves. He still believed that it would be a very serious matter if the Soviet Union was in a position to provide such small output reactors before the United States was.

The President said that he was astonished to hear that the Soviets had not already made such an offer and, in any case, he would bet that they would do so soon if they had not done so already.

Admiral Strauss stated that there would be no sense in building a power reactor of the range of 10,000 kilowatts for use abroad if experience showed us that, for example, a reactor of 40,000-kilowatt power output would produce power more cheaply. In reply, Secretary Dulles pointed out that there was nothing in the directive in paragraph 27-e which states that we must build a 10,000-kilowatt range reactor abroad. We [should] build such a 10,000-kilowatt reactor here in the United States, and thereafter decide the best kind of reactor to be built for use overseas.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject submitted by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1424-b, in the light of comments thereon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 2, and by the NSC Planning Board as summarized at the meeting.

b. Agreed that the action being taken by the Atomic Energy Commission, as described in the report transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 9, is consistent with and represents substantial progress toward meeting the objectives of paragraph 27-e of NSC 5507/2.

c. Recommended that paragraph 27-e of NSC 5507/2 be amended to read as follows:

“e. Encourage and facilitate the development in the U.S., as rapidly as possible, of power reactors of an appropriate size and design for use abroad, in order to maintain U.S. leadership in this field in the interests of U.S. foreign policy. While private financing should be sought wherever possible as contemplated in paragraph 1 hereof, this course of action will be pursued with the expenditure of public funds where necessary to maintain U.S. leadership.”

<sup>6</sup> Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1516, approved by the President on February 19, 1956. (*Ibid.*, Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

*Note:* The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, AEC. The recommendation in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated as an amendment to NSC 5507/2.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

115. **Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 10, 1956.*

DEAR FOSTER: A copy of your letter of February 7 to Governor Stassen<sup>2</sup> is before me and I also have a copy of a memorandum to the President from Governor Stassen dated February 8 with its enclosure.<sup>3</sup> I would like to comment to you on both of these documents as I understand that there is a possibility that you may be conferring with the President this afternoon on the subject. I have not been able to discuss the matter with Governor Stassen.

Your letter to Governor Stassen appears to have been written prior to our meeting at the White House on the afternoon of February 7,<sup>4</sup> but having talked with you on the subject of the proposed cessation of the production of nuclear materials "except for peaceful purposes", I was under the impression that you had agreed with the point I had made that this proposal, as expressed, would very seriously impair both our future and our present defense postures. Apparently, whoever drafted your letter of February 7 was unfamiliar with the facts at that time.

I tried to make the same point at the Tuesday meeting at the White House and I believed that there was general concurrence with my exposition of the point that the proposal is loaded against our interest.

In any event, I would like you to review the formal recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission communicated to Governor

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers. Secret. A copy was sent to Dillon Anderson.

<sup>2</sup> Document 113.

<sup>3</sup> Stassen's February 8 memorandum has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. The enclosure, a revision of a draft reply to Bulganin, February 8, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/2-856)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 111.

Stassen by letter under date of February 7.<sup>5</sup> I sent you a copy of this letter, but believe it did not reach your office until after the White House meeting the same day. Besides dealing at some length with the dangers to our security involved in the proposal for the future cessation of the production of nuclear materials, my letter to Governor Stassen contained the following recommendations of the Commission:

(1) The proposed draft letter to Premier Bulganin and the draft messages from the President to the Congress and to the American people be not issued.

(2) Instead, a U.S. position paper on disarmament be approved by the National Security Council for the guidance of the U.S. Delegation in the forthcoming meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London in March.

(3) The U.S. position paper be discussed with the British, Canadians and French prior to disclosure to the Soviets or to the public.

(4) The proposal now under consideration for agreement for the cessation of all future production of nuclear materials for non-peaceful uses be not incorporated in the U.S. position paper.

If it should be decided to send a letter at this time to Premier Bulganin, I most earnestly urge that paragraph 5 of the redrafted letter of February 8 be omitted or substantially modified to meet our points. It was my understanding at the February 7 meeting that both you and the President wished to withhold for some future occasion the announcement of the allocation of nuclear materials to support foreign nuclear power programs and that it had been settled that no mention of this allocation would now be made. Accordingly, I recommend that paragraph 6 of the redrafted letter to Premier Bulganin be omitted.

Sincerely yours,

Lewis

---

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—General)

---

**116. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 10, 1956.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received from Mr. Stassen's office a copy of his Memorandum to you dated February 8, 1956, subject

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Secret.

"Letter to Bulganin on 'Disarmament'." <sup>2</sup> This Memorandum, with a revision of the Bulganin letter attached, states that the letter has been revised taking into account all of the departmental comments received and the discussion on February 7, 1956. <sup>3</sup>

In my written comments <sup>4</sup> and in our discussion of 7 February it was the position of the Department of Defense that we should avoid any commitment to reduce our forces except as a part of a comprehensive plan for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Department of Defense comments also pointed out the undesirability of undertaking a reciprocal test inspection or an exchange of technical missions prior to Soviet acceptance of your Geneva blueprint proposal. It is my view that the revision forwarded to you is not fully responsive to these considerations.

I fully concur in the desirability of an early decision on this matter. However, as I indicated to Mr. Stassen in my letter dated 7 February 1956, I consider this subject of such importance to the security of the United States as to merit full review by the National Security Council. Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the proposed letter to Mr. Bulganin be formally referred to the Council for further consideration prior to its being sent. <sup>5</sup>

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

**Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.**

---

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 111.

<sup>4</sup> Robertson's written comments, presumably the same as those contained in his letter to Stassen, February 7, mentioned in this letter, have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum for the record, February 11, Goodpaster wrote:

"I showed Secretary Robertson's letter to the President, who asked me to check to see if the Secretary of State had a copy of it. He said he had understood yesterday from the Secretary of State that the points raised by Defense had all been cleared up. I called the Secretary of State, found he did not have a copy, and sent him one, also advising him of the President's comment." (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament)



117. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Tokyo, February 22, 1956—7 p.m.

1964. Ref Embtel 1839.<sup>2</sup> In view snowballing anti-nuclear test publicity, Embassy-USIS believe in addition to cooperative measures proposed para 7 reftel<sup>3</sup> urgent consideration be given to problem of compensation to fishermen for direct and legitimate losses resulting from tests. It now appears inevitable that test series will create in Japan serious political and propaganda problems even without repetition of "Fukuryu Maru" incident.<sup>4</sup> Recognizing compensation involves difficult legal aspects, Embassy considers that problem should be dealt with on political level and divorced from question of legal liability as was case with Bikini payment. Political settlement without prejudice to principle of legal liability appears best means for heading off revival of Japanese bitterness and hysteria characteristic of Bikini incident and serious difficulties in our relations with Japanese Government. Risk thereof is sufficiently grave in our opinion to merit serious consideration of following:

Compensation problem appears involve two aspects which can be handled separately: (1) Losses resulting from inability to fish in restricted area and from need to navigate around area in order reach other areas; and (2) losses resulting from contamination of fishing grounds and catch. Former category of losses can be roughly determined in advance of tests and dealt with full even before tests begin. Embassy-USIS aware of difficulties in committing US Government to pay such claims on case-by-case basis. Not only would this appear establish legal liability but would involve handling demands likely to be unreasonable and exorbitant. Furthermore, possibility exists that fishing industry would take opportunity squeeze as much as possible and come up with claims for alleged damages which we not prepared

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/2-2256. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 711.5611/2-956)

<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 7 of telegram 1839, February 9, reads:

"7. Several forms of cooperation with Japanese might be considered: (a) Give ample notice of prohibited areas, timing of tests, etc., to assure fishing fleets warned prior departure from port; (b) invite observers if any foreigners are to be present at tests; (c) arrange periodic consultations on safety precautions and radiation standards; (d) conduct joint scientific survey after tests to determine whether normal fishing grounds contaminated; and (e) encourage Japanese to work out orderly procedures for application of these standards in order to avoid panic over irradiated fish."

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on the repercussions of the incident involving the *Fukuryu Maru* (*Lucky Dragon*), a Japanese fishing vessel exposed to radiation following a U.S. H-bomb test in the Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 1622 ff. Also see the memorandum of the telephone conversation between Secretary Dulles and Strauss, March 29, 1954, *ibid.*, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1379.

to honor. Rather than deal with such claims on case-by-case basis, Embassy suggests that US announce its recognition of inconvenience caused to fishermen from tests and its willingness turn over to Japanese Government on *ex gratia* basis lump sum to assist Government in compensating fishermen for added expenses due to detours. Do not believe this would involve large sum and sum could be determined through checking fishing in area during previous years. This method of compensation would go far meet legitimate complaints of Japanese fishing interests and demonstrate to public US concern and humanitarian attitude in contrast to Soviet callousness. At same time, we would avoid legal liability and involvement in processing claims.

Losses resulting from contamination involve even more sensitive political problem. Probably needless to point out that should unforeseen incident occur as result of tests (e.g. contamination of fish or injury to fishing craft) reaction here would be immediate and explosive and our efforts to counteract after the fact would very likely be almost completely unsuccessful. Scientific and technical arguments would be of little avail and the tremendous propaganda organization available to the anti-test groups here (backed by outraged public opinion) would be relentless. A scientific survey group composed of both US and Japanese scientists (who have during the past two years established closer relationships) established in advance to deal with this subject could be most useful in meeting situation. It would have respect of Japanese people, could calm their fears about minor radioactivity which sensation seekers are bound to find. Joint scientific survey could determine in advance radiation standards and after test study fishing grounds as well as check fish coming into Japan. In establishing joint survey, we could state in advance that some compensation might be required despite maximum precautions taken by both Governments. If survey determined real damages resulted from tests, we would be prepared compensate quickly—again on *ex gratia* basis—using findings of survey to determine amount of lump sum payment.

From viewpoint of meeting political and propaganda problem in Japan, most preferable action would be statement in advance of tests setting forth: (1) 1956 tests will be on substantially smaller scale than those of 1954 and US Government and scientific authorities taking maximum precautions avoid injury to fishing and shipping and restrict navigation near test area; (2) US recognizes certain Japanese fishing boats will inevitably be forced to detour from test area and therefore US is providing sum to Japanese Government to assist in meeting added expenses; and (3) US invites Japanese to participate in scientific survey to check contamination of fish or fishing grounds and will be guided by findings of survey in considering further *ex gratia* compensation.

If decision made to provide some form of compensation on grounds of political desirability, suggest statement be issued simultaneous with announcement of restricted area (Deptel 1796)<sup>5</sup> and safety precautions to be taken in order meet leftist propaganda and be of maximum positive usefulness in calming public opinion and government pressure on US.

Parsons

---

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/2-2156)

---

118. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 24, 1956—5:54 p.m.*

510. Re USUN's 623.<sup>2</sup> Since Japanese resolution submitted by Ambassador in Washington<sup>3</sup> Department suggests you thank Japanese observer for manner in which resolution transmitted and inform him that any formal comment on substance if made will first be made in Washington. In response observer's request for informal comments from UN angle you may wish mention that question cessation of tests may be discussed Disarmament Subcommittee in accordance GA resolution<sup>4</sup> and refer Lodge statement December 5<sup>5</sup> that US believes if agreement can be reached to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons within framework effective system disarmament and under proper safeguards, there should be corresponding restrictions on testing of such weapons.

USUN may also wish note to Kitahara<sup>6</sup> US consulted Japanese Government re issuance test announcement and gave Japanese prior notification re establishment danger area. US proposed Japanese membership UN Scientific Committee on Radiation and US representative

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/2-1756. Official Use Only.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> On January 14, Sadao Iguchi, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, presented to Deputy Secretary Murphy a note transmitting resolutions passed by the Japanese Diet the previous week calling for the discontinuation of all nuclear tests. (*Ibid.* 711.5611/2-1456)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 914 (X) approved on December 16, 1955; see Document 88.

<sup>5</sup> For Lodge's statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) on December 5, 1955, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1956, pp. 55-61.

<sup>6</sup> Hideo Kitahara, Japanese special observer at the United Nations.

has discussed matters mutual interest with Dr. Masao Tsuzuki<sup>7</sup> Japanese representative. Over past two years US and Japanese scientists have exchanged data on radiation standards, tolerance levels, etc.

Since resolution transmitted all recipients in confidence, we assume SYG will not circulate or take any action in connection with it.

While we cannot prevent USSR using resolution in Disarmament Subcommittee we should if possible attempt prevent or delay efforts by Soviets or SYG bring resolution to attention UN in other contexts.

Dulles

---

<sup>7</sup> Japanese doctor and author of *Medical Report on Atomic Bomb Effects* (1953) and *Atomic Bomb Effects from the Medical Standpoint* (1954).

---

**119. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 24, 1956.*

SUBJECT

Department of Defense Position on the International Atomic Energy Agency

Reference is made to my memorandum of February 3, 1956,<sup>2</sup> transmitting the general views of the Department of Defense on the proposed United States position concerning the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in the draft statute and working paper accompanying your memorandum of January 20, 1956.<sup>3</sup>

I am informed that at the meeting in your office on February 3, 1956,<sup>4</sup> with Mr. Stassen and representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, it was agreed that certain of the broader functions of the agency proposed in the working paper and discussed in my memorandum of February 3, 1956, should not be sponsored by the United States, and that the present inter-departmental position is that the statute as now drafted should substantially

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901/2-2456. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 398.1901/2-356)

<sup>3</sup> Dulles' memorandum of January 20 and the working paper have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. For the draft statute of IAEA, August 22, 1955, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, pp. 665-672.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 106.

represent the United States position for the forthcoming meeting of the twelve-nation drafting committee.<sup>5</sup>

It is the Department's position that the draft statute of August 22, 1955, represents the maximum functions which should be assigned to the agency at this time. Changes in the draft statute, except for clarity and in regard to organizational and administrative matters, should be in the direction of limitations rather than expansions for the reasons that:

a. The Department feels that one of the principal objectives of establishing such an agency is to promote world confidence in an international organization of this character. To that end the agency should be established as soon as practicable and on a basis of minimum interference with the sovereign rights of any country.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded, and I agree, that the military risk of such increase in nuclear weapon potential as may be occasioned by International Atomic Energy Agency assistance in peaceful use programs is not of such significance as to require or justify an extension of the agency's functions beyond those authorized in the draft statute.

There are certain changes in the agency's activities as would be authorized by the draft statute which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, and I agree, would further United States interests in establishing the agency and minimize such risks as may be occasioned through its activities. These are:

a. Elimination of the responsibility of the agency for storing and protecting materials as provided by Par. F, Article X, except to the extent necessary during the process of analysis and transfer from the supplier to the recipient.

b. Deletion of the provision that the agency shall establish a central pool as implied by Par. G and H of Article X.

For the foreseeable future there would appear to be no requirement for the agency to receive and safeguard a stockpile of fissionable or source materials for direct transfer from the agency to recipient countries or to establish its own facilities for the fabrication and reprocessing of fuels. It is recognized that one of the purposes of identifying a "peaceful use stockpile" is to provide concrete evidence of a turn from military to peaceful uses. However, until such time as a practicable and effective means of regulating armaments can be instituted it is unlikely that contributions to a central pool will be of such magnitude as to significantly affect the military posture of any nation. Accordingly, from the practical standpoint the establishment of an international pool would serve only to increase the cost of atomic developments in the recipient countries.

---

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the 12-nation discussions on the IAEA beginning February 27, see *infra*.

I recognize that the President's address to the United Nations General Assembly of December 8, 1953, implies a commitment on the part of the United States to the support of an international pool, and therefore that the political and psychological aspects of the matter may well outweigh these practical considerations. It is the Department's view, however, that regardless of the amounts of fissionable material and source materials which supplying nations may agree to contribute, the amounts held in the physical custody of the agency should be limited to the minimum necessary to uphold the international pool concept.

Although not directly related to the forthcoming discussions of the draft statute, there are two aspects of international cooperation in the atomic energy field which the Department considers basic to United States interests:

a. The United States should continue a vigorous program of direct cooperation through bilateral and regional agreements, and should give preference to this method over dealing through the International Atomic Energy Agency. In so doing, however, it should observe the general principles established by the agency with respect to reports, inspections, controls, and other miscellaneous details.

b. No commitment in connection with the establishment and functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency should in any way affect the relationship between the United States and any country with respect to agreements for the procurement of source materials by the United States.

**C.E. Wilson**

---

## 120. Editorial Note

Between February 27 and April 18, representatives of 12 nations held 18 working-level meetings in Washington to develop the text of a Statute for the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. The 12-nation group, composed of the United States, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India, and the Soviet Union, considered the previous draft statute distributed on August 22, 1955, in light of subsequent comments received from other nations during the meetings of the Tenth General Assembly of the United Nations and afterwards. The General Assembly discussions in October and November 1955 revealed opposition to the draft statute as prepared by an eight-nation negotiating group. Critics claimed that it did not give prospective

members sufficient input into the drafting of the Statute and the management of the International Atomic Energy Agency after it was created. In response, the negotiating group said it would invite all prospective members of the Agency to participate in an international conference to draft the final text of the Statute. The United States also initiated a *démarche* to invite Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India, and the Soviet Union to join the negotiating group at the working-level meetings in late February 1956.

Section II of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 912 (X), December 3, 1955, welcomed the progress made toward drafting the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute as well as the expansion of the negotiating group and recommended that the negotiating group consider the comments of other governments and "take all possible measures to establish the Agency without delay." Meetings of the expanded negotiating group were held on November 14, 1955, and January 23, 1956, to agree on provisional rules of procedure, a general approach to the issues, and a date for the opening of the working-level meeting.

Meanwhile, on November 30, 1955, Morehead Patterson resigned as Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations. On January 26, 1956, Ambassador James Wadsworth, Deputy Representative at the United Nations, was appointed to serve also as Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations. United States representatives met with representatives of the United Kingdom and Canadian Embassies during the week of February 10 to prepare for the working-level conference.

The working group unanimously adopted the text of a revised Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency for presentation at an international conference scheduled to convene at United Nations headquarters in New York in September 1956. Several of the 12 delegations reserved their positions on certain details, but all approved the Statute as a whole.

Morehead Patterson's progress report on the Agency submitted to President Eisenhower along with his letter of resignation on November 30, 1955, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 2, 1956, pages 4-7. Wadsworth's appointment as Representative for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations is noted *ibid.*, February 6, 1956, page 210. Press releases announcing the opening and conclusion of the working-level talks are *ibid.*, March 12, page 438, and April 30, 1956, pages 729-730. The text of the revised Statute is *ibid.*, May 21, 1956, pages 852-859. Summaries of these meetings, various documents relating to the meetings, and a verbatim record of these meetings on dictaphone belts are in Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, folders entitled Working Level Meetings,

1956, and IAEA Negotiations, Washington, 1956; and *ibid.*, Central Files, 398.1901–IAEA. For an extract of Wadsworth's report on the meetings transmitted to Secretary Dulles, see Document 138.

For information on the role of the United Nations, including the text of Resolution 912 (X), see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955*, pages 14–18. Regarding the negotiations at the international conference beginning in September 1956, leading to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, see Document 156.

---

## 121. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 28, 1956.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I now enclose a suggested draft reply to Bulganin with reference to disarmament.<sup>2</sup> The last paragraph also touches on the February 1 letter with reference to a "Friendship Treaty".

The disarmament portions of this letter are now agreed to by the Department of Defense and by Chairman Strauss and also by Mr. Stassen. The State Department also concurs, although I pointed out in my letter to the Acting Secretary of Defense that the acceptability to us of some of the changes they suggested was due to the fact that I think it inappropriate for you to commit your personal prestige and that of your office to certain matters which are controversial. I believe with respect to such matters it is generally preferable to follow normal diplomatic procedures.

If you approve of the enclosed draft, we will have it cabled to Moscow and released here after such delivery has been effected.

It may be useful to follow up with an actual manually signed letter which would be sent via the pouch.<sup>3</sup>

Faithfully yours,

**JFD**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, President's Correspondence with Bulganin. Personal and Private.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; it is identical to Eisenhower's March 1 letter to Bulganin. See Department of State *Bulletin*, March 26, 1956, pp. 514–515.

<sup>3</sup> The source text bears Eisenhower's handwritten notation: "OK/ But I do hope Stassen can carry to London something a bit more positive D.E." Dulles responded on March 1:

"I am sending off your reply to Bulganin on disarmament. I observe your notation.

"Here is the 'something a bit more positive' which I hope you will authorize Stassen to take to London. Defense still opposes it.



122. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 1, 1956.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In response to the President's request and my conversation with you on the morning of the 28th,<sup>2</sup> I have reviewed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the subject of proposing or acceding to overall force reductions by the U.S., USSR and China to a level of 2.5 million men each. We have taken into account in our review the existing national security policy and made an objective analysis of the situation which we would face militarily in the event we agreed to a reduction in the forces which we now have and which were designed to support our basic national policy. . . . It has been our conclusion that our basic national security policy is sound and cannot be supported by a lower level of armed forces than that which we now maintain in the absence of resolution of the outstanding issues between the Free World and the Communist bloc.

Our thinking with respect to proposing reductions in the hope of gaining a psychological advantage is necessarily conditioned by past experience with Communist negotiators. The Communists have not been deterred in their campaigns by rejection at Geneva of proposals to reunify Germany nor have they been badly handicapped in the Far East by their violations of the Korean Armistice. It is our belief that we must expect the Communists to reject any proposal not to their advantage, regardless of the psychological impact. Conversely, we must expect them to construe each concession to public opinion we may make as an indication of weakness to be further exploited.

---

"This will be discussed at two o'clock." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

Attached to Dulles' letter was a statement that was approved with very minor changes as an Annex to NSC Action No. 1513 that same afternoon. This annex is printed with Document 112.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-156. Secret. In a letter to Eisenhower, March 1, Robertson wrote:

"Pursuant to our telephone conversation of Tuesday [February 28] morning, I have conducted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff an objective analysis of the views on force levels previously expressed by the Department of Defense, with particular respect to the discussions on this subject in the forthcoming Subcommittee meetings. As suggested by you, I have forwarded to Mr. Dulles the results of our review.

"It occurs to me that you might be interested in seeing our conclusions prior to our meeting, which Admiral Radford and I have requested the Joint Chiefs to attend this afternoon. I am therefore enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Dulles. A copy is also being furnished to Mr. Stassen." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

<sup>2</sup>No record of this conversation has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

With particular reference to the propaganda aspect of proposing reductions, we are primarily concerned that our allies would regard such a move as evidence that tensions had been eased, and the necessity for their efforts to achieve an effective defense posture was less compelling. The neutral nations might be unimpressed by a proposal which calls for a combined reduction of about 4 million men in the Sino-Soviet bloc as compared to a reduction of 400,000 men on the part of the United States. Lastly, we believe that the proposal of any figure, even a freeze, might work to our great future disadvantage, even though rejected, by being remembered as a United States offer while the qualifications and conditions attached to the offer were forgotten.

While discussing the subject with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we had before us the Chief's study on the force levels requested by Harold on the 19th of January.<sup>3</sup> In response to that request, the Joint Chiefs had examined the impact on the security requirements of the United States of reductions in present levels.

In this study, the Chiefs demonstrate that the size and composition of our forces is not keyed to Soviet or Chinese manpower levels. Instead we have built a military establishment designed to have the capability of deterring aggression, providing a reasonable degree of protection to our people, and fulfilling our international commitments. We firmly believe that if the pressures applied by our allies for reduction of our forces cannot be withstood, we must maintain our deterrent and protective capabilities as primary obligations to the American people, and accept the reduction in our overseas commitments. A further military reason for adopting this view is that under imposed manpower ceilings, it becomes more important than even to obtain the maximum combat potential within the allowed level. In this respect, deployed forces are wasteful of manpower because of the numbers of men which must be diverted from combat to support duties.

Briefly, considering the strategic factors which influence, to a large extent, the size and composition of our overseas military deployments, the most important are the geographic positions of the United States and the USSR in relation to our allies overseas. The Communist bloc has common frontiers with our allies in both Europe and Asia. At the present time, no Western-oriented nation or combination of nations in Eurasia has the military capability to ensure its own security without assistance from the United States. . . .

It is our conviction that peace in Europe is the direct result of Soviet realization that World War III will eventuate if they aggress. The presence of our forces in Europe is tangible evidence both to our

---

<sup>3</sup> Neither the JCS study on force levels nor Stassen's request of January 19 has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

allies and to the Soviets that we will not surrender Europe short of war. We believe that a large part of the cohesion of NATO must be attributed to this demonstrated will of the United States to live up to its commitments.

We now have deployed in Europe almost 500,000 of our total of 2.9 million men. In terms of ability to apply military pressure on the Soviet bloc, their capability is limited to the relatively few who would take part in an atomic offensive. However, the presence of these atomic forces in Europe is extremely important to the overall U.S. war plans, and there is grave doubt as to whether we could retain the right to station them there if we should withdraw other forces which contribute to the defensive posture being built in Western Europe. Thus a reduction in this area would have extremely undesirable effects both militarily and politically.

For entirely different reasons, we face an equally difficult situation in attempting to effect reductions in our forces in the Far East. There the United States must depend on its own forces to accomplish the tasks required to support national policy. We must maintain in the area sufficient forces to defeat aggression locally or to carry the war to the aggressor in sufficient strength to make aggression unprofitable.

U.S. strategic, political and economic interests in the Far East are not shared in full by our European allies. We can expect little or no support from them if our interests in Asia are challenged. We must therefore maintain unilaterally the capability to protect our interests or be prepared to surrender them. Reduction of our forces in the Far East would impair our existing capability to defend our interests, and thus would radically affect the military situation in this area.

Despite the fact that our manpower levels are not determined by the levels maintained by the Communist bloc, we realize that we must consider the effect of reciprocal reductions. From the military point of view, it is simply a question as to the level at which reduction ceases to be advantageous to the United States and begins to work in favor of the USSR. Our national security policy has been directed toward maintaining our forces at that minimum level. Therefore, reduction to the 3 million level by the USSR and China would favor the United States, since this is our present level and that which gives us those capabilities which we feel are essential to our security.

Any general reduction in force levels below the approximately 3 million level would operate to improve the relative military power position of the Sino-Soviet bloc for a number of reasons. The primary military factor is that any reduction from this level would be at the expense of capabilities which have demonstrated their value in deterring Soviet aggression. Secondly, to accomplish their missions our forces must be deployed at great distances, requiring large numbers of supporting forces to maintain lines of communications, whereas the

Soviets, with the advantage of interior lines, can concentrate their manpower in combat forces. Thirdly, the Communists can exert close control on a bloc-wide basis over satellite forces which would represent the balance of power after reductions to arbitrary levels had been agreed. Our allies, on the other hand, because of differing national interests, must necessarily take as their firmest position that which is unanimously acceptable. Thus we are seldom in a position to make an effective, rapid response to a Communist move.

It has been the foregoing considerations which have led us to the firm conclusion that it would be incompatible with the security interests of the United States to propose, or commit ourselves to accept, reductions in our forces prior to an easing of existing tensions and a demonstration over a reasonable period of the adequacy of the inspection and reporting system. In his proposal to the Soviets at Geneva, the President stated: "The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results." We feel strongly that negotiations on force levels in advance of the proving of the system will lead to a commitment to reduce to an arbitrarily determined level rather than that level which the system itself may indicate is compatible with security.

For these reasons, the Department of Defense opposes Harold's proposed change, of which I assume you have a copy, for the position of the U.S. Delegate to the Subcommittee Meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. I am attaching to this letter our proposal for a U.S. position on this subject.

Sincerely,

**Reuben**

**[Enclosure]**

It is the authorized U.S. position that in connection with the forthcoming disarmament negotiations, the U.S. cannot at this time agree to negotiate a reduction of the total levels of U.S. armed forces based upon the criterion of manpower. Once the reliability of the Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal together with the accompanying ground inspection system has been tested and proved, the United States can then determine the extent to which the system will provide assured results. Once this determination has been made the United States will then be in a position actively to seek an agreement as to force levels which will be consistent with our security requirements. Negotiations on force levels prior to

this determination would give support to the unwarranted assumption on the part of our allies that world conditions permit a relaxation of their efforts to achieve an adequate defense posture.

---

**123. Letter From the President to His Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 10, 1956.*

DEAR GOVERNOR STASSEN: In connection with your services as Deputy Representative of the United States of America on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, I convey to you the following instructions, for your guidance at the forthcoming meeting of the Commission's Subcommittee in London:

1. In presenting the United States position and seeking to advance its interest in securing safeguarded disarmament, you will act on the basis of the statement of United States policy on regulation of armaments set forth in the Annex to this letter, of the detailed position papers now being prepared and cleared through the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, and of subsequent instructions given by the Secretary of State.

2. You should keep the Secretary of State currently informed of the progress of your discussions, both in the Subcommittee and outside its official sessions. Copies of any documents necessary for the information or consideration of the United States Government should be dispatched regularly, by telegram or air pouch of the American Embassy in London.

3. In the event issues arise which are not covered by your instructions, you should make, as appropriate, a reservation of the United States position, and should communicate immediately with the Department of State for additional instructions.

4. The members of your Delegation, having regard to their official capacities as representatives of the Government of the United States, should exercise care that the views they express are those of this Government, rather than the views of individual Delegation members, or of organizations or groups with which they may be affiliated. Any differences of opinion among Delegation members should be resolved in private meetings of the Delegation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament. Secret.

5. All relations with the press should be directed by you. If you, or member of your Delegation authorized by you, should make any statements to the press, the Department of State should be advised immediately of the contents of such statements. You should avail yourself of the advice of the Department of State, and of the American Ambassador, regarding press relations, statements, and public information matters generally.

6. You are authorized to delegate to a senior member of your Delegation the authority held by you in the event you are required to be absent or are otherwise unable to exercise the functions of your position. Work assignments of Delegation members should be made at your direction.

7. Upon your arrival at London, you should communicate with Ambassador Aldrich. As the accredited diplomatic representative of the United States in Great Britain, he is available for advice and assistance regarding any necessary relations with the British Government, and regarding the work, social obligations, and accommodations of the Delegation.

8. You are authorized to sign such statements of findings or recommendations as may be agreed upon by the Subcommittee, provided they are within the terms of your instructions.

9. Upon the completion of the Subcommittee's meeting, you should submit an official report covering the work of the Delegation and the course of the meeting, together with copies of relevant documents.

10. I am confident that the United States Delegation, under your direction, will reflect credit on the United States during this meeting of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament.<sup>2</sup>

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower<sup>3</sup>

## Annex

### *A. U.S. Policy on Regulation of Armaments*

The broad policies of the United States with respect to regulation of armaments are as follows:

1. The United States will continue to seek agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan, including effective measures of supervision and control.

---

<sup>2</sup> The subcommittee met at Lancaster House, London, March 19-May 4; see U.N. documents DC/SC.1/PV.69-86 and DC/83, and *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 595-630. Verbatim records of the meetings of the subcommittee are in Department of State. IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

2. The acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.

3. The United States should give priority to early agreement on and implementation of (a) such confidence building measures as the exchange of military blueprints, mutual aerial inspection, and the establishment of ground control posts at strategic centers; and (b) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are feasible and in accordance with approved U.S. policy.

### *B. Specific Proposals*

Toward these ends, and after consultation with the representatives of Canada, France and the United Kingdom, the U.S. Representative at the forthcoming meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee is authorized to advance the following proposals.

#### *1. Limitation on Use of Weapons*

The United States should reaffirm and seek agreement for its position that there should be no use of nuclear weapons or any other weapons in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

#### *2. Inspection*

a. There should be inspection for the purpose of

(1) Providing against great surprise attack;

(2) Ensuring compliance with such regulations, restrictions, and reductions of armaments and armed forces as may be agreed upon;

(3) Providing the necessary basis for successive steps in achieving a comprehensive system of disarmament.

b. The system of inspection should be only as extensive as is necessary to achieve its objectives.

c. The Soviet Union and the U.S. should immediately agree:

(1) in pursuance of President Eisenhower's proposal, and under procedures to be agreed, to permit mutual aerial reconnaissance of each other's territory; accompanied by

(2) in pursuance of Premier Bulganin's ground inspection proposal,<sup>4</sup> and under procedures to be agreed, the establishment in each other's territory of inspection teams for large ports, railway junctions, motor roads and airdromes.

d. The Eisenhower proposal is the place where a beginning can be made promptly because it would not require the sovereign decision of many nations, or raise the problems involved in negotiating agreements with some 40 to 50 other countries. However, if the Eisenhower proposal is accepted by the Soviet Union, the U.S. would be prepared

<sup>4</sup> Presented in the May 10, 1955, Soviet proposal in the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee and Bulganin's September 19, 1955, letter to Eisenhower.

to proceed promptly to negotiate both with other sovereign states involved and with the Soviet Union, for the appropriate extension on a reciprocal, equitable basis of the Eisenhower proposal and the Bulganin control posts to forces and facilities which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have outside their borders, and to the forces of other countries.

e. The U.S. position in the forthcoming meetings may include, as preliminary measures:<sup>5</sup>

(1) A proposal for an exchange for a test period of a small number of inspection personnel who could be used as members of inspection teams if an inspection agreement is subsequently concluded.

(2) A proposal for the designation of small strips of territory in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. within which the feasibility of inspection systems would be tested.

(3) A proposal that scientific research should be continued by each state, with appropriate consultation between governments, for methods that would make possible a thoroughly effective inspection and control of nuclear weapons material, having as its aim to facilitate the solution of the problem of comprehensive disarmament.

f. The U.S. position may include, as part of an air and ground inspection system, a proposal for advance notification of projected movements of armed units through international air or water, or over foreign soil.<sup>6</sup>

### 3. Control of Nuclear Materials

a. Assuming the satisfactory operation of an air and ground inspection system the U.S. would be prepared to work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons.

b. With this could be combined the U.S. proposal of December 8, 1953, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from existing stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency.

c. Ultimately all production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world should be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

### 4. Control of Major Weapons and Manpower

If the Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal, with accompanying ground inspection, is accepted, and if such a system is proven to the satisfaction of the U.S. to be satisfactorily installed and operating, and assuming the political situation is reasonably stable, the United States, with other nations concerned, would be prepared to begin a gradual reciprocal, safeguarded reduction of arma-

<sup>5</sup> Points (1) and (2) below were derived almost verbatim from paragraphs c-6(b) and c-4 of NSC Action No. 1513, Document 112.

<sup>6</sup> Derived from paragraph c-6(a) of NSC Action No. 1513.



ments, armed forces, and military expenditures. For illustrative purposes, in the forthcoming session of the Subcommittee, the United States Representative is authorized to indicate that such reductions would presuppose, as a basis for measurement and in a specific manner to be mutually agreed, force levels of 2.5 million men for the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China; corresponding appropriate levels for the U.K. and France and others to be determined after consultation with the representatives of these States.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> This paragraph is identical to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1513.

---

**124. Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

*Bonn, March 13, 1956.*

MR. SECRETARY: The coming disarmament negotiations in London<sup>2</sup> that will take place in a moment of increased international tension, will be of eminent importance for the further development of the global political situation and particularly for the policy of the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc. This development will also affect the future of Germany, whose reunification is the declared aim of the Free World. The negotiations, moreover, will involve essential questions of the military security of the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic is not represented in the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations and, therefore, has no possibility to express her views. I believe, however, that her cooperation is necessary in the interest and the spirit of Atlantic solidarity.

In view of the fact that no measures concerning Germany's political and military status and her territory can be taken without her approval, I should like to ask you to enable the Federal Republic to follow the course of the negotiations and to maintain her standpoint with the Western Governments in due time.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials with Dulles/Herter 1953-61. The following typed notation appears on the source text immediately before the letter: "The German Ambassador presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honor to forward the following confidential letter of Chancellor Adenauer to the Secretary of State." In a note to Merchant, March 14, Earl D. Sohm, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, noted that the letter had been delivered by Werner Rouget, Third Secretary of the German Embassy, on behalf of the German Ambassador. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

In my opinion, the seriousness of the situation and the importance of the disarmament negotiations urgently require to materialize our proved close cooperation also in this matter.<sup>3</sup>

Very sincerely yours,

Adenauer<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> In a letter to Dulles, April 20, Adenauer acknowledged U.S. cooperation on the matter:

"Thank you very much for the understanding with which you have received my message of March 13. I am very pleased that the Federal Government is being informed promptly and extensively on the negotiations of the Disarmament Committee of the United Nations in London. I consider this as a new confirmation of an established close political cooperation." (*Ibid.*)

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 16, 1956—11:17 a.m.*

5346. For US Del Disarmament. Following Recommendations in position paper on Restrictions on Nuclear Weapons Tests<sup>2</sup> approved by agencies concerned:

1. U.S. should state that if agreement to limit effectively nuclear weapons under proper safeguards is satisfactorily implemented as part of a comprehensive plan for regulation and control of armaments, including satisfactory operation of aerial and ground inspection, United States would be prepared to agree to restrictions on testing of such weapons. U.S. should make no commitment now as to nature or phasing of restrictions on testing of nuclear weapons within such a comprehensive plan.

2. If USSR should propose cessation or limitation of tests of nuclear weapons, as a partial measure of disarmament, U.S. should relate such a proposal to a safeguarded disarmament system including adequate inspection. U.S. should oppose implementation of restrictions on nuclear weapons tests as an isolated step. By itself such a step would not limit production of nuclear weapons and would not reduce

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-1656. Secret. Drafted by Baker and approved by Bond. Repeated to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

danger of surprise attack. However United States should indicate its interest in considering any such proposal by USSR within larger context and should refer to Indian proposal in this connection.

3. United States should point out need, in absence of such a comprehensive disarmament system, of taking measures essential to maintenance of its national defense and security of free world. Continued testing of nuclear weapons is one of these essential measures.

4. United States should emphasize that none of extensive data collected from all tests shows that radioactivity is being concentrated in dangerous amounts anywhere in world outside testing area. U.S. should cite its initiative in establishment of UN Scientific Committee<sup>3</sup> which will assist in compilation and dissemination of information on effects of radiation on man and his environment.

5. U.S. should seek a common Western position on this issue along above lines. To this end it should attempt dissuade France and UK from pressing for separate restrictions on nuclear weapons tests.

Hoover

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 84.

---

## 126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 16, 1956—6:54 p.m.*

5368. For USDel Disarmament. Re London 3762,<sup>2</sup> language of President's letter of March 1 to Premier Bulganin makes clear US would be willing put such arrangements into effect only after acceptance and operation satisfactory to US of air and ground inspection system. With reference to timing US position now is along lines of GA resolution that scientific search should be continued by each State, with appropriate consultation between Governments, for methods that would make possible thoroughly effective inspection and control of nuclear weapons material, having as its aim to facilitate the solution of the problem of comprehensive disarmament.<sup>3</sup> US might take position

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-656. Secret. Drafted by Baker and approved by Bond.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Resolution 914 (X), paragraph 4, as approved by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1955, contained the exact wording beginning with the word "scientific." See Document 88.

that such search could be construed as preliminary work toward such arrangements. If Soviets accept air and ground inspection system US would in absence unforeseen circumstances begin negotiations on suitable arrangements to be implemented when air and ground inspection system operating satisfactorily to US.

Hoover

---

127. **Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Paris, March 19, 1956—6 p.m.*

4310. London For USDel Disarmament. I saw Pineau today and took up with him United States memorandum on disarmament. I told him that we considered it a matter of first importance that the London meetings on disarmament not break up with an impression of serious disunity between the Western powers. I pointed out that we were relatively near agreement on immediate problem, i.e. stage one, and it did not seem worth while to have major public disagreement on more hypothetical questions involved in stage two and three. I said that the question of a permanent and total ban on the use of nuclear weapons was of great importance to the United States as we considered that it bore on the very safety and existence of our country. I told him that we could never even consider such a ban until there was foolproof control of all existing stocks.

I then asked him if I could pose a hypothetical question. Pineau said yes, and I asked him to consider the following circumstances. Assuming the third stage of the Moch plan<sup>2</sup> had come into effect and one day the United States discovered on their radar screens one or more missiles coming from the direction of Siberia toward the United States would he expect that we should refrain from using nuclear missiles in a defensive attempt to knock down the attacking weapons before they could reach their targets. Pineau replied that as he understood it the Moch plan did not require any such self denial on our part and we would continue to be free in such a case to use nuclear

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-1956. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London.

<sup>2</sup> The Moch plan, a proposed synthesis of disarmament proposals which the United Kingdom cosponsored as an Anglo-French working paper submitted to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission on March 19, is printed in *Documents of Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 595-598.

defensive weapons. I replied that if his thinking was correct, there certainly must be considerable misunderstanding between the delegations in London and I pointed out that unfortunately the Moch plan had been completed before the French had had a chance to receive United States views on disarmament. I admitted that the United States had only reached definite conclusions rather recently but I said that it did not seem proper for friends and allies to reach frozen positions on an important subject of this nature before they had the chance to thoroughly discuss and study their respective positions.

Pineau thoroughly agreed with the above and said that as he saw it the problem was the following: The French had some thoughts on the subject which had been developed with considerable care. They did not feel that any one power should have a total veto over what all the other Western powers should say. Therefore he felt that Moch would have to present the French position and the United States would then be free to present their views. Assuming that there would be divergencies he suggested that the proper procedure would be for one of the delegations, presumably the United States, to suggest that the conference be adjourned for a few weeks in order to allow time to try and reach agreement by private negotiation. During that period we would hope that by intense negotiations we could arrive at a common Western position which would be put up to the Soviets when the Disarmament Committee convened. He said that he would instruct Moch accordingly and advise him to accept such a postponement. He also said that he had already advised Moch to handle himself in such a way as to minimize any differences between the United States and the French and U.K. positions.

*Comment:* In view of the extensive publicity already given the Moch plan and in view of the fact that it represents standard Socialist thinking I feel it will not be possible to prevent Moch from submitting this text at this time. If USDel is really certain that they will have wholehearted support from U.K. I would think that tripartite negotiations or four-power negotiations including Canada during an adjournment of the Disarmament Committee would have a good chance of substantially modifying French position. I must re-emphasize, however, that eventual results would depend to a great extent on the degree of support for our position forthcoming from the U.K. reps.

Dillon

128. Letter From the Officer in Charge, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Meyers), to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)<sup>1</sup>

London, March 23, 1956.

DEAR FRAN: This is the third in my weekly "round up" letters.<sup>2</sup> The week was distinguished by the opening of the Subcommittee meetings, the introduction of the Anglo-French synthesis, the introduction of the two US proposals for preliminary measures on exchange of inspection personnel and test "strip" inspection, a US statement on force levels, and the fact that Mr. Gromyko said practically nothing other than to ask some pertinent questions about the synthesis and essentially not one meaningful word about the US proposals or views.

The above short-hand description of events is what appears on the record. It's what's behind the record that is more interesting. The problems of being on this delegation are illustrated very aptly by the following:

1. On Wednesday,<sup>3</sup> apparently because he thought it advisable to forestall possible Soviet support for the Eden Plan for test inspection in East and West Germany, the Governor introduced the two US working papers on preliminary measures without showing them beforehand to any of our Allies, and after having given the staff approximately 15 minutes in which to see them. There had been some discussion in the delegation of the way in which to present these papers, during which General Gerhart<sup>4</sup> and I both had stressed the need to avoid minimizing the pressure on the USSR of the President's proposals for guarding against surprise attack by offering these preliminary measures as a substitute. Moreover, while the other Western delegations had been advised on Wednesday morning that the US would at some time in the near future introduce these ideas, they were obviously surprised at the appearance of the two papers without previous transmittal to them. Fortunately, Robertson of Canada<sup>5</sup> made an effective speech in favor of the pragmatic approach taken by the US, which eased the situation. I believe the method in which the introduction of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-2356. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bond.

<sup>2</sup> See also Meyers' fourth and sixth letters to Wilcox, April 5 and 16, *infra*, and Document 133, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> March 21.

<sup>4</sup> Major General John K. Gerhart, MAAG Chief in the United Kingdom.

<sup>5</sup> Norman A. Robertson, Canadian High Commissioner in London.

these papers was handled of sufficient interest to warrant this description at some length and I understand that General Gerhart has messaged Defense on the same matter.

2. As you undoubtedly have noted from Embtel 4163 (Disarmament # 55)<sup>6</sup> the US statement on force levels did not contain any reference to "China". I am attaching a memorandum<sup>7</sup> which I gave Governor Stassen on this when I saw the statement, which I received approximately one-half hour before the Subcommittee meeting began. In this, I pointed out that the omission of China did not coincide with the delegation's instructions nor with Secretary Dulles' views as expressed most recently at his press conference in Tokyo.<sup>8</sup> As you will note in the reference telegram, Nutting referred to the US force levels as applying to the US, USSR, and China, but Gromyko noted that Mr. Stassen had expressed views on the levels of the armed forces of "two Powers".

3. Embtel 4162 (Disarmament # 54)<sup>9</sup> describes, among other matters, the reaction of our Western Allies to the Governor's definition of the forces included in the US concept of force levels. You will note considerable surprise that the US appeared to be excluding reserve and paramilitary forces, particularly the latter, since our Allies thought this would benefit the USSR and enable them to avoid including their security forces in the 2.5 million force levels. In the delegation prior to the Four-Power meeting, this issue was discussed at considerable length, with nearly all of the advisers urging that the question of application to paramilitary and reserves be settled in Washington. We took a line quite similar to that subsequently taken by the British, French and Canadians. In addition, the advisers questioned the advisability of making a statement of US views on force levels outside of the context of a broader US position. Fortunately, the views of the other Western representatives succeeded in modifying the Governor's approach, since he had rejected his own advisers' suggestions on this matter.

4. On the whole, the advisers, with the exception of Matteson, appear used by the Governor principally as sounding boards for each other, and have little or no effect on Mr. Stassen. He does not want a

---

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-2256)

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 600.0012/3-2356)

<sup>8</sup> At his press conference in Tokyo on March 19, Dulles remarked:

"I said that as far as ground disarmament was concerned, I thought it would be very difficult to arrive at limitations of ground forces unless China was limited, too. The President's proposal was designed as a beginning, to allay fear of a great surprise attack. China is not capable of surprise attack against the US so as far as the present stage is concerned, there is no problem as far as China is concerned." Meyers, who quoted Dulles' statement in his attached memorandum, perhaps derived it from telegram 2217 from Tokyo, March 19, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 110.10-DU/3-1956)

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/3-2256)

coordinated presentation of views, ostensibly so that there will be no "screening out" of suggestions but more practically, I believe, to avoid the presentation on paper of a possibly unanimous approach by State, Defense, and AEC representatives and his own staff. There is also an exceptional amount of "make work" assignments, which rarely bring practical application of the work which results. In all seriousness, however indiscreet I may seem to be in saying this, it looks as though the delegation advisers are here as nominal representatives of their Departments or Agencies but without any real influence on developments. This interpretation is supported by the operations in the Subcommittee itself, where requests for advice on tactics are made only to Matteson, although the rest of us do pass notes up, through me, in an effort to influence the course of action.

I have given considerable thought to the advisability of informing you in such detail on developments here within the delegation, but have concluded that it is most advisable to do so. I trust things will improve in subsequent weeks, but frankly I doubt it.

Respectfully,

Howard

---

**129. Letter From the Officer in Charge, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Meyers), to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)<sup>1</sup>**

*London, April 5, 1956.*

DEAR FRAN AND DAVID:<sup>2</sup> This is the fourth in my "atmospheric" letters.<sup>3</sup>

The past week has been distinguished by two events: the first was the introduction of the Soviet proposal; the second was the introduction Tuesday of the US working paper.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-556. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bond.

<sup>2</sup> Though Meyers' letter was addressed to Wilcox, the salutation also included presumably David Wainhouse.

<sup>3</sup> For Meyers' third and sixth letters to Wilcox, March 23 and April 16, see *supra*, and Document 133, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> The Soviet proposal introduced on March 27 and the U.S. working paper introduced on April 3 are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 603-613.



I have already forwarded to you a brief memorandum<sup>5</sup> which I wrote to Mr. Stassen on the meaning of the Soviet proposal. In sum, I believe that the Soviet tactic is their usual one in the disarmament sphere, in which they play propaganda, strategic objectives and possible negotiations simultaneously. Just which of these they wish to concentrate on will not be clear, in my opinion, for some time. I am convinced that the USSR will introduce another proposal, taking account of the nuclear problem which is so carefully omitted in large part from their present paper, and that this will give us a better line on Soviet intent. In this connection, I was most happy to see the two telegrams from the Department which requested correction of the impression that the USSR had gone a long way toward accepting the President's Geneva proposal and which noted the degree to which the USSR placed the German problem at the center of its proposals.<sup>6</sup> I think that both these telegrams had a most salutary effect here.

Regarding the introduction of the US working paper, I am attaching a copy of a memorandum from Ed Gullion and myself to the Governor.<sup>7</sup> Although our memorandum is more detailed than those of the other members of the delegation, it was interesting to note the unanimity of opinion on the part of the delegation advisers. All recommended against the introduction of this paper without at a minimum further "vetting". The telegram to the Department which described the Five Power meeting emphasizes that this paper was introduced because of Gromyko's line of questioning.<sup>8</sup> Before the paper was introduced, the Governor and I had a long conversation on the subject, in which he drew the analogy to the situation in San Francisco in which various working papers were introduced in order to stimulate revisions and eventual agreement.<sup>9</sup> In addition, he said that he was worried about the French attitude on the subject of force-levels. I, in turn, stressed the difficulty of drawing analogy here to the San Francisco situation, and said that I doubted our allies or the Russians would introduce revisions or suggest changes in the US working paper. Moreover, I believe that a perusal of the verbatim record of this meeting, when it arrives, will show that Gromyko was not pressing the French hard at all on the matter of force-levels.

In my opinion, this working paper was introduced for other reasons, largely of a "public opinion" nature. The Governor has in mind introducing revisions to the paper, and the staff will at least have an

---

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>6</sup> One reference is presumably to telegram 5760, March 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-3056) The other telegram has not been identified.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 660.0012/3-556)

<sup>8</sup> Reference is presumably to the subcommittee meeting of April 5, summarized in telegram 4393 from London. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/4-456)

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to the meetings commemorating the 10th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco the week of June 20, 1955.

opportunity to make comments, which may or may not be incorporated in the revisions. I might add that we had less than an hour within which to read the working paper and submit our views before it was introduced. Only one minor revision was made in the paper on which we commented before it was tabled in the Subcommittee; this was the citation of the force-level figure of 2.5 million as "illustrative".

Mr. Stassen has in mind introducing next week a "low-level working document" and subsequently substituting a concise US memorandum of approved position and "withdrawing" the working paper before the Subcommittee sessions end. This concise working paper presumably will contain Washington's comments and specific language approved by you. I believe that the USSR and the US have changed positions not only on substance but also on form, since the US working paper is exceedingly difficult to understand and that has caused considerable confusion both in the Subcommittee and among the press here.

I trust that I do not sound too much like an ancient on the Wailing Wall. I believe, however, that it is incumbent on me to keep you as fully advised as possible of developments of particular note.

Respectfully,

Howard

---

**130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 5, 1956—3:59 p.m.*

5866. For USDel Disarmament Subcommittee. In treatment Parts I and II Soviet proposals March 27<sup>2</sup> following general considerations might be taken into account.

1. On basis preliminary analysis, Department believes March 27 proposals despite many vague and unacceptable features constitute departure from past Soviet positions of degree similar to that represented by proposals of May 10, 1955 and, language-wise at least, appear significant further move by USSR toward more serious negotiating approach.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-556. Confidential. Drafted by Baker and approved by Bond.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, *supra*.

2. Department accordingly believes in treatment Parts I and II of Soviet proposals USDel should reflect attitude of giving serious consideration proposals, of recognizing forward movement and apparent flexibility they represent, and of willingness US maintain flexible position in course of negotiations designed seek clarifications and broaden areas of agreement.

3. A major objective of USDel should be to seek to determine to what extent Soviet position is negotiable in following major respects.

a. *Aerial inspection*—While emphasizing that aerial survey is integral initial component of any acceptable plan, seek determine under what conditions Soviets would accept and at what stage implement?

b. *Force levels*—To what extent might Soviets be prepared negotiate initial reductions without specifying ultimate levels?

c. *Adequacy of controls*—Are Soviet-suggested controls and objects of control initial, illustrative, or exclusive of additional essential safeguards?

d. *Nuclear controls*—Are Soviets prepared to proceed concurrently with or at least to negotiate concurrently about measures of limitation and control in nuclear field?

4. In course of seeking clarifications of Soviet proposals following more specific questions appear to be of particular importance:

a. What kinds of armaments would be subject to control—submarines, aircraft, small arms, etc.? As suggested London 4303,<sup>3</sup> question whether nuclear delivery systems included of particular importance.

b. By what formula would armaments subject to control be related to force levels?

c. Among clarifications regarding extent of control USDel might in particular seek to determine whether objects of control as defined by USSR negotiable to include other elements set forth in US positions.

5. USDel should take maximum advantage weaknesses and inadequacies Soviet position as revealed in probing suggested above to bring pressure upon Soviets to move further toward agreement.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-2856)

131. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the President<sup>1</sup>

London, April 9, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As we enter this fourth week of the Subcommittee's London session the presentations of the Soviet Union continue to be consistent with either an intention to seriously attempt agreement or an intention to play propaganda and divisive tactics. Neither alternative has thus far come into clear perspective. The Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to England<sup>2</sup> may show their hand to an increased degree.

The complete dropping of any nuclear provisions from the basic Soviet proposal in their Parts I and II are the most important London development as it is a change from their ten year position.

We have made headway in moving the Western Four governments closer together and in burying the unsatisfactory portions of the Anglo-French proposals. We have done this principally through taking a U.S. initiative basically along the lines of U.S. policy but without any commitment of the U.S. government through the use of a draft working paper technique.<sup>3</sup> We have also obtained a much better public understanding in Europe and in Britain of the U.S. policy. The enclosed press reports are some indication of this result.<sup>4</sup> We are constantly stressing that your objective on the part of the U.S. is a just and durable peace with freedom and that this affects our policy on this subject here as well as in other matters.

I have talked off-the-record to groups of the Members of Parliament and of other British leaders in sessions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the English Speaking Union, Chatham House, and in various private luncheons and dinners. Recognition of the logic of your policies is gradually growing. There is, of course, a lot of British uneasiness as you are well aware over the problems of the Near East and on their overall balance of payments and low reserves behind sterling. In the last three months, however, a small improvement in their gold and dollar reserves has occurred and Macmillan's budget message this week, I think, will generally have a cheering note.

Sincerely,

Harold

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Stassen. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> April 18-30.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the Anglo-French proposals and the U.S. initiative, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 599-613.

<sup>4</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

132. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the President<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 10, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is for your information.

You have expressed your interest on a number of occasions that we should make progress toward giving necessary atomic weapon information to NATO to make cooperation more effective.

Twelve days ago (March 29th) the Agreement for Cooperation regarding the transmission of atomic information between the United States and NATO became effective.<sup>2</sup> An Annex to this Agreement permits appropriate NATO authorities access to certain Restricted Data.<sup>3</sup> The Atomic Energy Act requires a joint determination by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission that the data transmitted will not reveal important information concerning the *design* or *fabrication* of the nuclear components of weapons.

We have made such a joint determination as to the transmissibility of a considerable list of items. They include information to SACEUR and SACLANT as to the numbers of atomic weapons to be made available in their support and the pertinent characteristics of those weapons, weapons safety measures, weapons delivery systems, etc.

These matters are, of course, separate from those concerning transmission of information to the United Kingdom and Canada in connection with our agreements with those countries, which are somewhat more inclusive.<sup>4</sup>

Respectfully yours,

Lewis Strauss

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, AEC. Confidential. The President initialed the source text.

<sup>2</sup> For the draft agreement for cooperation between the United States and NATO signed in Paris on June 22, 1955, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1955, pp. 687-689. Regarding the entering into force of this agreement on March 29, 1956, with the completion of notification by all NATO governments that they were bound by the terms of the agreement, see *ibid.*, April 23, 1956, p. 668.

<sup>3</sup> The secret Annex to the NATO agreement for cooperation is an enclosure to Strauss' March 3, 1955, letter to the President; see Document 11. The Annex is not printed.

<sup>4</sup> The agreements with the United Kingdom and Canada are not printed.

133. **Letter From the Officer in Charge, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Meyers), to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)**<sup>1</sup>

*London, April 16, 1956.*

DEAR FRAN AND DAVID:<sup>2</sup> Number 6 in my "atmospheric" letters<sup>3</sup> can describe a generally more favorable development here, (a) in terms of our relationship with our Western colleagues and (b) through clarifying Gromyko's position on a basis which could help us gain public support for our own approach.

I think that the Governor did a fine job this week. As our telegram of April 10 (Disarmament #104)<sup>4</sup> indicated, we were really headed for some difficulties in the Subcommittee and in the "off-the-record" meeting of April 12 because of differences in approach among the four Western powers. Our telegram 4584 (Disarmament #107)<sup>5</sup> indicates how we came out, but in my opinion does not give enough credit to Nutting, who really helped us out of a difficult situation with Moch, since the latter's instinct for a logical French categorization of issues could well have resulted in the apparent agreements among the five Subcommittee members being over-emphasized and taken out of context, the present basic differences between the quadripartite group, and the USSR being minimized, and the differences within the quadripartite being highlighted. I think that Moch behaved in these meetings in exemplary fashion, but it was Nutting who really pulled us through and secured agreement on the approach to be taken in the "off-the-record" meeting.

It is hard for me to tell the degree to which the Governor takes "hard" positions as a tactical means of gaining an objective lesser than the one he apparently seeks. In our Four Power meeting of April 10, described in our telegram 4551, he gave the impression of a much more inflexible US attitude toward disarmament and the relationship between disarmament and political settlements than he actually holds, but the following day took a somewhat milder position which contributed to the working out of agreement among the four Western powers. In this connection, Deptel 6060 of April 12<sup>6</sup> was helpful in confirming

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-1656. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bond.

<sup>2</sup> Though Meyers' letter was addressed to Wilcox, the salutation also included presumably David Wainhouse.

<sup>3</sup> For Meyers' third and fourth letters, March 23 and April 5, see Documents 128 and 129, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-1056)

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/4-1156)

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/4-956)

Stassen on the line he had taken in the off-the-record meeting of April 12. I do not believe that in my summary of this meeting, in our telegram 4610 (Disarmament #108)<sup>7</sup> I have given an adequate enough explanation of just what happened on this point of relationship between political settlements and disarmament. At one stage, Nutting had said that the UK would not commence the second stage of the Anglo-French plan unless there were reunification of Germany in freedom. Gromyko shortly thereafter asked Stassen if it was correct that the US paper was not dependent upon political settlements but that further measures of disarmament would involve a settlement of the German problem. Stassen replied that the US believed it would be desirable to have a prompt solution of the German problem tomorrow if possible, even though we did not solve any other problem. Contrarywise, it would be desirable to solve the German problem concurrently with other issues. He said that, parallel to this position, the US believed we could come down to 2.5 million men without previous settlement of any of the major world problems but could not go lower unless there were some important settlements of outstanding problems. He said the US was not rigid on details but believed that a start could be made on reductions, both conventional and nuclear, under the present world situation; that this start would improve the atmosphere for settling other international issues; and this in turn could lead to other disarmament measures.

As you can see, Mr. Stassen was quite careful not to hook further disarmament measures specifically to a settlement of the German problem, but to talk in terms of settling major international issues.

The off-the-record meeting on the 12th was useful because it produced the statements of the US position which I have described above, showed up Gromyko's position as calling for 1.5 million force levels without any political settlements while perpetuating the division of Germany and in effect forcing withdrawal of US forces from the continent, and induced strong French and UK statements on the German problem. However, none of the Western delegations believe that this is Gromyko's last position and consider that a more forthcoming proposal will be made, probably during the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit. No one is sure just what will be the nature of the proposal, although most of us believe that it will include something in the nuclear field.

Incidentally, there is one point on which the Governor and Nutting were in disagreement and on which I support Nutting's interpretation. This is the question of the extent to which the general Soviet position has a favorable impact on public opinion in Europe. Mr. Stassen believes that the USSR's position is so obviously impossible in

---

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/4-1356)

calling for very low force levels without doing anything in the nuclear field and without settling any major political issues that these deficiencies are recognized, while Nutting believes that the USSR approach has considerable popular appeal because it is simple and ostensibly is a concession seeking agreement in the conventional field while deferring the difficult nuclear questions. I believe that we will need to make careful explanations in our information media output concerning just what is the meaning of the present Soviet plan, as opposed to our more realistic and balanced approach, if we are to have favorable impact on public opinion.

One final point. I wish to call to your attention the statement made by the Governor in the April 13 meeting of the Subcommittee, page 4 of the verbatim.<sup>8</sup> It is not reported in the telegram on that meeting (Embtel 4633, Disarmament 109).<sup>9</sup> After referring to Section II, paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal, the Governor said:

"In this respect, we would understand the Soviet view as being similar to our own—namely, that the staff of inspectors of the international control organ would not be told: 'You shall proceed to see whether you can find the military units; the stores of military equipment and ammunition; the land, naval and air bases; and the factories manufacturing conventional armaments and ammunition'. That would not be the procedure. Rather, the nation being inspected would provide a list of these items to the inspectors of the control organ, and those inspectors would be given unimpeded access to the objects of control, in order to establish to their satisfaction the correctness of the information furnished by the nation being inspected. That, as we see it, is the procedure reflected in the United States working paper." It seems to me, as it does to Ed Gullion, that this is much too restricted in interpretation of what is required by the inspection and control system for safety's sake.

This is all for the present. I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Respectfully,

**Howard**

---

<sup>8</sup> The verbatim record of the 80th meeting of the subcommittee, April 13, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.80)

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 330.13/4-1356)



134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 16, 1956—8:56 p.m.

6182. For Ambassador and Stassen. Assuming the draft . . . to Parts III and IV of USSR proposal (ur 4583)<sup>2</sup> is made part of record,<sup>3</sup> the most immediate problem of avoiding deviation from Geneva position that reunification is linked to European security is met and serious dangers of discussing the relation between disarmament and reunification in connection with disarmament appears obviated.

I remain seriously concerned, however, at possibility those dangers may crop up again. Mollet statement in *U.S. News and World Report* and German Foreign Office statement thereon<sup>4</sup> indicate that either French or Germans might reopen this subject. Also disturbed at Nutting's statement (ur 4494)<sup>5</sup> after seeing Selwyn Lloyd that he was not sure it might not be desirable to make link between German reunification and disarmament stronger than before. The possibility exists that these matters may arise in connection with the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to London.

I think that, subject your views, it would be desirable to send Selwyn Lloyd a message from me before Soviet leaders arrive. If you and Stassen see no objection, please deliver it.<sup>6</sup> In addition, we are considering speaking to UK, French, Canadian, and German Ambassadors Washington on this subject.

Proposed text of message to Selwyn Lloyd follows:

"As Mr. Hoover wrote you,<sup>7</sup> in acknowledging your message of March 17,<sup>8</sup> we are appreciative of the efforts your representatives in the disarmament talks are making to keep the Western position a reasonably united one. In connection with the disarmament talks,

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-1156. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wolf and approved by Dulles. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Ottawa by pouch.

<sup>2</sup> Dated April 11, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Nutting introduced the reply of the Western powers, as reported in telegram 4583, into the subcommittee on April 23. (*Ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.82)

<sup>4</sup> In an interview with journalist Robert Kleiman, Mollet stated, among other things, that first priority should not be given to German reunification but to disarmament. (*U.S. News and World Report*, vol. XL (April 6, 1956), pp. 46-48, 50, 52, and 54) For the summarized April 4 statement of the German Foreign Office to this interview, see *The New York Times*, April 6, p. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-656)

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 4684 from London, April 17, indicates Stassen's concurrence in delivering the note to Lloyd; telegram 4702 from London, April 17, indicates it was delivered. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/4-1756)

<sup>7</sup> Hoover sent a note through Makins to Lloyd on March 19 indicating that Dulles would respond more fully upon his return from a trip to the Far East. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/3-1956)

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/3-1756)

however, I am seriously concerned at the way in which the question of relation of German reunification to disarmament has become the subject of discussion as a result of the Mollet interview in the *U.S. News and World Report* and the German Foreign Office reply thereto.

It would be only playing into Soviet hands if we allowed ourselves to be drawn into discussing the substance of this matter even tentatively in the disarmament talks.

I am gratified that agreement has been reached on the text of a reply to Parts III and IV of the Soviet proposal in the Disarmament Subcommittee, and I hope that it will become part of the record. However, there are other ways in which it might arise again.

The subject involves matters of highest policy. The position on the relationship of reunification of Germany to European security was agreed between the French, Germans, yourselves, and ourselves in preparation for the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers only after the most thorough discussion of the many grave aspects involved. I would hope that if there is any thought of modifying that position, or of relating reunification more closely to disarmament, it would be the subject of discussion and agreement at governmental level between all of us rather than be dealt with in connection with the disarmament meetings.

The question of accepting additional force limitations or weapons limitations in return for German reunification raises most serious problems which can only be solved over a period of time. In this respect, you are aware of our serious concern over discussing the concept of thinning out of forces or armaments with the Soviet. The Soviet proposal for limitations on nuclear weapons in Germany is, of course, most dangerous.

I hope that our representatives on the Disarmament Committee will be able to keep the discussion of this subject there centered on the questions within the competence of the Subcommittee. The relation of German reunification and European security to disarmament is very complex and involves so many other considerations that I believe we should exchange views on it through regular channels. I consider it most important, particularly in light of Franco-German differences on this subject that we should be very careful to abstain from dealing with the substance of this problem either in public or with the Soviets until it has been thoroughly discussed between us.

We would like to talk with Embassy as we did before Geneva on this subject, and would appreciate any views you may have to pass on through it. We shall also be talking privately with the French and German Ambassadors here, emphasizing the importance of not letting this subject get out of hand and affording the Soviet a major divisive advantage. I feel sure you will agree with me that this is a most serious problem on which we must proceed cautiously."

Dulles

135. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth), White House, Washington, April 19, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations

The President exhibited keen interest and gratification in the successful completion of the negotiations on the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute.<sup>2</sup> He felt that this marked a momentous step toward completion of this project which is so close to his heart.

I told him of the proposed September meeting in New York and suggested that consideration should be given to his appearance before this world forum. He expressed considerable interest and seemed to be favorably inclined to the idea.<sup>3</sup>

In connection with a possible U.S. announcement on material to be made available to the Agency, he felt that he might be able to make such an announcement at that time but that it should not include any specific figure as to amount. He thought that perhaps tripartite consultations might be held among the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., leading toward an agreement as to what should constitute an initial "kitty", with the United States being ready to assume, say, 75% of the total and thereafter match any other contributions equally. He urged me to keep in touch with Admiral Strauss and said that he would give both those matters very serious consideration.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—General. Confidential. Drafted by Wadsworth.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 120.

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower later declined the invitation to address the closing session of the conference on the Statute of the IAEA because of other commitments. For his October 23 letter to João Carlos Muniz, president of the conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 1027–1028.

<sup>4</sup> For the U.S. announcement on material to be made available to the IAEA, see Eisenhower's statement, October 26, which was read to the conference that day by Strauss, *ibid.*, pp. 1028–1033.

136. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>*London, April 25, 1956—3 a.m.*

4852. Paris pass USRO. Department pass Peaslee, DOD, USIA; pouch Ottawa. From USDel Disarmament. Disarmament No. 121. Impromptu discussion of disarmament developed between Khrushchev and Stassen near the end of the large Soviet reception tonight April 24th upon Khrushchev initiative. Present were Khrushchev, Bulganin (intermittently) Gromyko, Troyanovsky interpreting,<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Hayter<sup>3</sup> and two others of UK FonOff, Stassen, Matteson, also Mrs. Gromyko, Mrs. Stassen, Mrs. Hayter, and a few others in and out.

*Highlights*

1. Repeated opposition expressed to aerial photography.
2. Reiteration of desire to co-exist in peace.
3. Offer of reduction of armaments and manpower without inspection.
4. Suggestion of reducing armed forces in Germany.
5. Doubt stated as to US intentions in disarmament.
6. Favorable regard reiterated for President Eisenhower.
7. Calculation made that time was not ready and subcommittee could not agree.
8. Direction given that Gromyko should talk to the US further.

Responding to invitation Stassen, Gen. Gerhart, Matteson and wives attended general Soviet reception at Claridge's this evening April 24th. Tremendous crowd was on hand. Ambassador and Madame Malik received. Bulganin and Khrushchev were surrounded by solid mass in main hall. Stassen made no effort to push through to meet them. After about forty minutes in the hall including general conversation with Selwyn Lloyd, Clement Attlee,<sup>4</sup> Maudling,<sup>5</sup> Protitch,<sup>6</sup> Eddie Gilmore,<sup>7</sup> Gaitskell,<sup>8</sup> Fedorenko,<sup>9</sup> Irvin Levine,<sup>10</sup> Mr. and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Stassen. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow. A copy is also in Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2556. Another account of this Stassen-Khrushchev conversation is in telegram 2788 from London, May 14. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/5-1456)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to Oleg Aleksandrovich Troyanovsky, Soviet Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Sir William G. Hayter, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

<sup>4</sup> Leader of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom.

<sup>5</sup> Reginald Maudling, Minister of Supply in the United Kingdom.

<sup>6</sup> Dragoslav Protitch, Under-Secretary, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, and Representative of the Secretary-General at the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

<sup>7</sup> Eddy L.K. Gilmore, chief of the Moscow bureau of the Associated Press.

<sup>8</sup> Hugh T.N. Gaitskell, leader and treasurer of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom.

<sup>9</sup> Nikolai Timofeevich Fedorenko, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.

Mrs. Stassen began to leave and met Mr. and Mrs. Gromyko. Following a brief exchange Gromyko asked whether Stassens had met Chairman Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev. Stassen replied had met them at the summit conference at Geneva. Gromyko said no he meant this evening and upon being given a negative answer Gromyko rejoined, follow me. He led to the approach to a small room off the Claridge lobby, asked the Stassen's to wait with Mrs. Gromyko, went inside, came back out and took the Stassens in. Chairman Bulganin came across the room to speak to the Stassens and called over Mr. Khrushchev, Bulganin pulled up a chair for Mr. Stassen and Khrushchev immediately launched into a discussion of disarmament beginning with the statement that the Soviet Union was opposed to the aerial photography scheme and felt that the US attitude made the work of the subcommittee hopeless. Stassen began to respond and requested a Scotland Yard man to find and admit Mr. Matteson and General Gerhart. In a few minutes Mr. Matteson was escorted in and sometime later Scotland Yard reported that General Gerhart seemed to have left the reception. During the ensuing discussion Stassen three times stated he did not wish to impose on Mr. Khrushchev's time and Mr. Khrushchev rejoined that he wished to talk, that the subject was important, and that such occasions for discussions do not arise often.

Khrushchev launched into a vigorous attack on aerial photography. He stated the Soviet Union could not understand why the US insisted upon it. He said it was unacceptable to the Soviet Union and they had refrained from flatly and openly rejecting it only because of their regard for President Eisenhower. He said they had discussed it with Zhukov<sup>11</sup> and Zhukov was against it. He said the Soviet Union did not wish photographs of the US or of any other nation and did not see any good reason why the US should insist on photographs of the Soviet Union. Upon Stassen's thorough explanation of the US view including description that the jet age required rapid inspection and that the vast territories of the Soviet Union and China and of the world as a whole could not be adequately covered by men on foot or in jeeps but that they must have airplanes available for inspection Khrushchev then stated that he could understand the US viewpoint better but that the premise was that the US wanted to know everything, that this was sort of a mania of greatness, that the US should not seek to know everything, that the US should not try to look in everybody's bedroom and everybody's garden, that the US should not try to treat the Soviet Union as a rich man treats a pauper, nor in the way that Guatemala had been handled.

<sup>10</sup> Presumably Irving R. Levine, chief correspondent in Moscow for NBC News.

<sup>11</sup> Marshal Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, Soviet Minister of Defense.

Stassen responded that US views on adequate inspection were not based on any such premise, that they were based on the view that a disarmament agreement would be sound only if thoroughly inspected and only if each side could always be confident that the agreement was being respected, that the lessons of history showed that otherwise disarmament agreements became the center of suspicions, doubts and frictions, and did not improve the prospects of peace. Stassen added that he was surprised to hear Mr. Khrushchev give such a characterization of the US approach to the Soviet Union, that the US in fact recognized the Government of the Soviet Union, knew that Russia was a great country, that it had substantial strength and that it followed an economic, social and political system very different than the US but that such recognition of the Soviet Union as a major power was inherent in President Eisenhower's participation at the Geneva conference, and did not Mr. Khrushchev recognize this fundamental.

Khrushchev said that Stassen had a point in this comment but that perhaps President Eisenhower came to Geneva to size up these men who were running the Soviet Union and to gain an impression of their nature and ability, and that furthermore President Eisenhower was criticized in the US because he went to Geneva; Stassen described the naturalness of criticism of opposition parties and of the free press in the US and contrasted the two systems indicating it would always be difficult for Soviet leaders to understand the US system, that it was a system in which we believed, that it had been and was successful, that it was different in economic, social, political and religious matters. It must be expected there would continue to be a diverse viewpoint, but that it was evident, as President Eisenhower had pointed out, that a war would be very adverse to both systems, to both nations, and to a great portion of the world. Khrushchev said he agreed, that he knew there was only a small percentage of madmen in both countries who think otherwise. Nearly everyone knew that war was unacceptable and that co-existence was elementary. Stassen responded that it appeared to the US to be more a situation of competition rather than co-existence.

Khrushchev opined a criticism of Secretary Dulles' recent speech.<sup>12</sup> Stassen defended it and explained it and further stated that with our systems so different it should not be expected that Communists would approve of Secretary Dulles' speeches nor that Americans would approve of Mr. Molotov's speeches.

---

<sup>12</sup> Reference may be to Dulles' speech at a luncheon meeting of the Associated Press in New York on April 23, in which he discussed recent shifts in Soviet foreign policy and their implications for NATO, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 30, 1956, pp. 706-710.

Bulganin and Khrushchev both expressed doubt that the US really had any intention of a disarmament agreement. Stassen responded that the President's statements at Geneva were genuine expressions of US policy and that the President's March 5 letter conveyed the President's and the US policy specifically and definitely. Bulganin and Khrushchev both commented again that they had a high regard for President Eisenhower but said they had regarded the March 5 letter as simply a method of avoiding the acceptance of the offer of the friendship treaty.<sup>13</sup> Stassen pointed out that it was the fulfillment of the President's promise given in October that he would make a more thorough answer. Khrushchev then said they had not yet been able to prepare their reply because they had been so busy with visiting delegations and their own preparations for the UK visit.

Khrushchev then added that their doubt as to US intentions was affected by a number of other incidents. He said that they had had some cooks who wanted to visit the US. But the US had refused visas. He said cooks are only armed with knives and forks and spoons, and could not be harmful to the US. He said a US dealer in seed corn had visited him by the name of Kerst and he had decided to buy the corn but wished to send inspectors to look at it, and their visas had been first refused and then after a delay granted for only two inspectors, so he had said that Russia could get along without the corn, but that he had a very low opinion of this action of the US. He said the West had proposed a figure of 1.5 million armed manpower, and when the USSR accepted it the US changed to 2.5 million. He said the subcommittee seemed to split hairs and avoid agreements. Stassen explained the policies and transactions and reemphasized that the Soviet Union had never accepted the consistent US position regarding essential minimum inspection and that if they would accept this requirement the prospects for a mutually sound agreement would be favorable. Khrushchev reiterated Soviet skepticism that the US would carry out any disarmament agreement, and said the US would even permit Luxembourg to stop such an agreement.

Bulganin said that the USSR is now over thirty years old. It is in the prime of its condition. It is not afraid. He said "I will let you in on a secret. Any American who wants a visa can get it. That is our policy". Stassen commented that Bulganin and Khrushchev would have to admit that this was a big change for Soviet policy and that they should not be surprised if the US took a little time to analyze just what it meant and to consider US response to such a policy. Khrushchev admitted that this was a big change inside the Soviet [Union].

---

<sup>13</sup> The Soviet offer of a friendship treaty is contained in Bulganin's February 1 letter to Eisenhower, printed *ibid.*, March 26, 1956, pp. 515-518.

Khrushchev admitted that what Stassen had told him in 1947 was correct, that the US had not had the depression then predicted by Soviet economists and Western Europe had been rebuilt and had re-established its trade but he (Khrushchev) remained unwilling to agree that the US system could properly be called a people's capitalism.

Khrushchev then stated that the time did not seem to be ready for disarmament but that was all right because the Soviet could wait and perhaps later the time would be right. Stassen replied that the US could also wait but it would appear that in the meantime perhaps twenty other nations in addition to the UK, USSR and US would develop nuclear bombs and the dangers to peace would become extreme and the developments would be adverse to the interests of all three—the UK, USSR and the US. Khrushchev said that may be true but what can be done about it.

Stassen said common ground should be reached on disarmament between the positions of the Soviet Union and the US including an intelligent use of aerial survey and a moderate beginning reduction of a nature that could be made without a prerequisite of political settlements. This agreed system should then be expanded to all nations with a significant military potential.

Khrushchev reiterated that until there was confidence the Soviet Union was opposed to aerial photography. Khrushchev then said if the Soviet Union would reduce a million men in its armed forces and reduce armaments correspondingly, would the US make a reduction and if so, how much. Stassen inquired what type of inspection, and Khrushchev said none should be needed, let us simply reduce. Stassen pointed out that if charges were then made in the US that the Soviet Union had not in fact reduced, how could he answer them, and if some of the generals in the Soviet Union said the US had not reduced would this not cause trouble on both sides. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Government would handle its generals. If they did not accept the political decision they would be changed but that he recognized them as problem and some US representatives could come into the Soviet Union to observe the soldiers being sent home. Stassen said this was not adequate, that it was essential that the kind of inspection system be established which would last for future years. Stassen said the US was thinking of the kind of a foundation system which could be applied to other countries and could last for many years and improve the prospects for a durable peace.

Khrushchev said perhaps we could make a beginning by both reducing our armed forces in Germany. He said the Soviet Union is ready to do this. Stassen responded that any agreed reduction of armed forces in Germany would be very difficult unless the German problem was solved with the reunification of Germany in freedom at



the same time. Khrushchev reiterated that the Soviet Union was ready to reduce troops in Germany without waiting for a solution of the German problem.

Stassen suggested the beginning of inspection experiments with a demonstration strip and Khrushchev indicated that that might be a good idea but Gromyko interjected that it was not connected with a reduction in arms and Khrushchev added it would then not be desirable. Stassen then stated that he would be following up the disarmament subject with Mr. Gromyko in the ensuing days. Khrushchev agreed this would be desirable but added that he did not think much of the subcommittee procedure and stated that perhaps he should have some further talks. Stassen replied that if in reflection Khrushchev thought of some additional questions he wished to ask, and if it was agreeable with Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Stassen would endeavor to answer such additional questions but that otherwise he would endeavor to further the consideration of the subject by talking to Gromyko.

Khrushchev interjected that perhaps Stassen should visit Ambassador Bohlen and then an occasion for further talks could arise. Stassen responded that he liked Ambassador Bohlen but that he had no plans to visit him. At this point the discussions closed.

Stassen advised the press who crowded around him in the lobby of the hotel that Khrushchev had initiated the talk, that it concerned disarmament, that it was quite a thorough discussion, that he would report it to Washington and he declined to characterize it in any way in response to numerous questions as to whether it was encouraging, discouraging, opening up, closing down, blunt, surprising or revealing.<sup>14</sup>

**Aldrich**

---

<sup>14</sup> A note on the source text in the President's handwriting reads:

"The whole thing is the Khrushchev line. He began their talk at Geneva—after Bulganin had expressed great interest in aerial inspection. D.E."

137. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

London, April 26, 1956—11 p.m.

4914. Department pouch Ottawa. Pass DOD, AEC, USIA. From USDel Disarmament Subcommittee. Disarmament 128. Report on meeting of US and USSR Delegations, Lancaster House, 3 p.m., April 26.<sup>2</sup>

Stassen said various conversations to date have made positions of US-USSR quite clear and magnitude of differences seems quite evident. Said he believed most fruitful avenue of approach would be to consider question are there preliminary steps which US-USSR might take together to advance disarmament problem while approach is sought for more significant broad common ground. US-USSR appear well agreed on undesirability of war and dangers to both countries resulting from continued absence of agreement.

Stassen said Bulganin and Khrushchev made important and significant comment about preliminary steps when they stated Soviet readiness make force reductions and asked if US would do likewise.<sup>3</sup> Stassen said this comment leads to question of exploring whether USSR-US Delegations might recommend to their Governments possible formula for combining such preliminary steps as Bulganin [and] Khrushchev suggested with Eisenhower strip inspection demonstration (including aerial) and technical exchange proposals. Symbolic value of such actions if possible, Stassen said, might be significant even though the steps were very limited.

Gromyko replied first to question of possible reductions of US-USSR armed forces, said Khrushchev and [had] asked how would US react if Soviet cut armed forces voluntarily by specific amount. He remarked Stassen understandably did not spell out answer but seemed to show interest in idea, and this might be valuable sign.

If this question were studied and a common language found, this would be very good. Gromyko continued that if Stassen has any more concrete ideas subsequently, he would be very happy to listen and inform Soviet Government having in mind Stassen report to Eisenhower on Bulganin-Khrushchev talk.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2656. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Ottawa by pouch.

<sup>2</sup> Another summary of this meeting is the record of conversation, which, though unsigned, was presumably prepared by Benedict and Weiler, who are listed as reporting officers. (*Ibid.*, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Subcommittee Meetings)

<sup>3</sup> References to Bulganin and Khrushchev in the source text are to their conversation with Stassen on April 24; see *supra*.

Gromyko said Khrushchev in speaking of possible US-USSR armed force and conventional armament reductions was confining suggestion to those countries, although of course better if other countries brought in. He said Stassen reference to suggestion of reductions brought in other control and inspection questions that go beyond this. By this he said he meant ideas Stassen introduced sometime ago in subcommittee on inspection and control.<sup>4</sup>

Stassen reviewed section of Bulganin-Khrushchev conversation relating to Eisenhower test inspection proposals and Khrushchev reference to inviting some inspectors to "see soldiers coming home." He said Khrushchev showed some interest in test proposals until Gromyko advised him no reductions were involved. He said Khrushchev-Bulganin discussion on reductions did not have inspection and control attached, but would be voluntarily US-USSR actions. He said highly desirable other countries come in because neither US nor USSR would want to go far with reductions unless other countries included in agreement.

Stassen and Gromyko then agreed to resume US-USSR Delegation meeting after today's subcommittee session.<sup>5</sup>

The meeting resumed after subcommittee adjourned about 4:15. Stassen said he would endeavor be concrete in private consultations. Said he did not yet see any indications of sound common ground on major issues US-USSR might move to. He said common belief in destructiveness of war and desirability disarmament agreement reducing arms burdens, freeing resources, etc., had not yet led to specific form and substance of agreement in many years of attempted agreement. He said in this respect Bulganin-Khrushchev talk made even more clear degree of difficulties and large gap between governments at present time. He said after reflecting on Bulganin-Khrushchev conversation, basic question appears to be: Is there now anything to be done that would make any more likely motion toward agreement on disarmament and lessening of danger of war, having in mind view shared by Khrushchev that there will be serious future danger in the absence of agreement of 15-20 countries attaining nuclear weapons. He said any partial beginning only possible if it brings together suggestions

---

<sup>4</sup> Stassen introduced U.S. proposals on inspection and control in the subcommittee in the U.S. outline plan for the implementation of Eisenhower's aerial inspection proposal, August 30, 1955; the U.S. memorandum supplementing this outline plan on October 7, 1955; the U.S. working papers on technical exchange mission, March 21, 1956; the U.S. working paper on a demonstration test area, March 21, 1956; and the U.S. draft working paper on the first phase of a comprehensive disarmament agreement, April 3, 1956. For these proposals, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 501-503, 523-528, 599-600, 600-601, and 608-613, respectively.

<sup>5</sup> The verbatim record of the 83d meeting of the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission is not printed. (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.83)

favorably viewed by Bulganin-Khrushchev and by Eisenhower and respective Governments. He reiterated desirability explore possibility very small conventional reductions as suggested Bulganin-Khrushchev to be carried out concurrently with small beginning inspection and control steps proposed by Eisenhower. He remarked test strip and technical exchange mission proposals not yet commented on adversely by Soviet Union.

He said in speaking of token action he had in mind small step which even if it only covered ten thousand troops with their arms would be, like test strips, a symbol to world of our moving together and studying seriously the disarmament problem. Stassen added that such questions certainly would have to be studied by both Governments. However, such steps might increase confidence, get us working together rather than clashing and talking fruitlessly, and improve prospects future agreement on more significant disarmament issues.

Stassen said he desired make careful exploration with Gromyko to see if progress can be obtained on questions he had discussed, or any matters Soviets wished to raise.

Gromyko replied Stassen had brought in matter of control, even though it was of preliminary nature. This was not the idea Khrushchev had stated.

Gromyko then inquired if Stassen's comments were his own preliminary reactions to conversation with Khrushchev and Bulganin, or whether they represented official views US Government. Said it was important to know this, for ideas expressed to Stassen on Tuesday were the views of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and an important member Presidium. Said, of course, he would report any ideas Stassen had to Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Stassen said views he had expressed to Khrushchev and Bulganin Tuesday were established positions of US Government. Said he wished emphasize we are in situation in which President's March 5 letter Bulganin had given expression of US policy, and he could understand, as Khrushchev and Bulganin had stated, their busy schedule had not permitted response as yet, and that, of course, if there was to be any additional proposal from President to Bulganin, such would take form of specific written words in clear fashion. Stassen said his exploration with Gromyko at this time was in accordance with US policy to seek avenues for a sound agreement. Said he was not presenting a US proposal, but was exploring, in manner of San Francisco,<sup>6</sup> possibility US and USSR Delegations could find some approach to make progress.

---

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 9, Document 129.

Stassen said it was clear that Khrushchev's suggestion re small conventional reductions, if taken by itself and without inspection and as completely separate proposal, would not be acceptable to U.S. Said he had understood more clearly from Tuesday's<sup>7</sup> discussion with Khrushchev that President's original aerial inspection proposal was not acceptable to Soviets. Therefore, we were left with matter of seeing if some of the views held by Chiefs of both States might be brought together in a new combination and thereby bring improvement in the prospects for further progress.

Stassen said he understood when Khrushchev spoke of reducing Soviet forces to certain amount and inquired how much would US reduce, he was not talking of great reductions but more in the sense of: What do we do now? Stassen said he also noted expressions of Soviet discouragement with negotiating in subcommittee.

In reply Gromyko's earlier inquiry, Stassen said if it is question concrete written positions backed by formal government approval, such as we have been doing past ten years, this could be continued. However, both he and Gromyko recognize if this done it much more difficult to modify respective positions. It was in this light he was exploring question with Gromyko. Said he was also agreeable exploring question of procedure for negotiations. Stated he understood that it was Gromyko's feeling present sessions subcommittee have about reached end of their value, and would welcome any suggestions from Gromyko as to future procedures that might be helpful.

Gromyko said if Stassen had any ideas re Stassen-Khrushchev discussion he was prepared hear them at any time. Said Delegations could meet at lunch or in more formal meetings and that was not difficult problem. He said he would inform his government on views expressed by Stassen and that it was for this reason he had asked if Stassen's remarks were made after received official government reactions to Stassen-Khrushchev conversation. He added he would report in more detail on complete subcommittee series of discussions to Soviet leaders when he returns to Moscow.

Gromyko then said it was important for U.S. pay considerable attention to views expressed by Khrushchev and Bulganin to Stassen. This might lead to further steps "like what we call in physics a chain reaction".

Stassen replied U.S. had studied disarmament problem from point of view of seeing if one step could lead to another. He then obtained clarification from Gromyko that latter would not return to Moscow until current subcommittee session concluded.

---

<sup>7</sup> April 24.

Gromyko then stated that if up to now the Soviet position on aerial inspection had not been made clear "you now have a clear picture of what our position is". Stassen replied US now had clear picture Soviet views aerial inspection. Said he assumed Khrushchev's reference to "inspecting bedrooms" was for purpose of oratorical emphasis, and that Khrushchev aware US proposals do not envisage such extreme inspection as implied by Khrushchev remark. Stassen then inquired Gromyko's views on desirability further exploration before conclusion subcommittee session. Gromyko said he "had no objection" to meeting and exchanging views, particularly if US had further views on Khrushchev's and Bulganin's comments. Stassen inquired if Gromyko thought there was any need for him to restate any of Khrushchev's or Bulganin's views in order for Stassen make certain US understanding. Gromyko said if there were any clarifications that would be useful he would give them, but his impression was that Tuesday conversation Stassen with Bulganin and Khrushchev did not contain statements that were unclear to U.S.

It was agreed that US and USSR Delegations would meet at 11 a.m. Saturday, <sup>8</sup> at Lancaster House in order to take advantage simultaneous translation facilities.

**Aldrich**

---

<sup>8</sup> April 28.

---

**138. Report by the Chairman of the Delegation at the Working-Level Meetings on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Wadsworth)<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, undated.*

[Here follows the body of the report.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Working Level-Meetings. Confidential. Regarding the working-level meetings held in Washington February 27-April 18, see Document 120. The report was transmitted to the Secretary of State under cover of a letter by Wadsworth, April 26, which briefly summarized the salient issues at the meetings and recommended "the revised Statute as an acceptable basis for continuing negotiations to establish this Agency at an early date." (*Ibid.*)

*Conclusion*

The agreed Statute provides, in my judgment, a sound and workable basis for an effective Agency, provided that the powers granted by the Statute are actually exercised. I must point out, however, that despite an open challenge by the Indian delegate,<sup>2</sup> the United States has refrained from undertaking a commitment in advance as to the amount of fissionable materials it will contribute. There is understandable interest among many countries about the extent to which the United States will furnish nuclear materials through the Agency rather than bilaterally, and about the extent to which we will put our bilateral agreements under Agency safeguards. In view of the Indian reservations on control and safeguards, we must continue to reserve this position in order to maintain our bargaining power and protect our own security. At the opening of the September conference, however, we should be prepared to announce an initial substantial commitment. The full measure of our material support of the Agency, as well as our position on putting our bilateral agreements under the Agency safeguards system, cannot be determined until the adequacy of the safeguards and the responsibility and efficiency of the Agency's management are proven.

One outstanding aspect of these negotiations was the spirit of cooperation which prevailed throughout discussion of even the most controversial issues, which led to the final unanimity.

From the very outset, Ambassador Zaroubin, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, exhibited a willingness to be cooperative and to seek agreement. He actively sought consultations with the United States Delegation, and emphasized the importance of achieving unanimity. While he adhered tenaciously to many of the standard Soviet ideological positions, he was apparently given considerable leeway in his instructions to accept compromise, and, in fact, at times to suggest them. He initiated the suggestion that a final vote be taken on the Statute as a whole so that we could announce, despite certain reservations on details, that the Statute had been adopted unanimously. During the final meeting he reaffirmed his Delegation's reservations, but the tone of his statement was restrained and conciliatory and probably can be considered a foreshadowing of the positions the Soviet Union will take at the September conference. This statement suggests that the Soviet Union by its vote on the Statute as a whole has assumed an obligation to support that Statute at the conference in all its particulars except for those points on which it has entered specific reservations.

---

<sup>2</sup> Arthur S. Lall.

The Soviet Delegation's show of cooperation should be evaluated in the light of the worldwide approval of the President's proposal, and of the minimal commitments of the major supplier countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union deriving from the present Statute. These do not include commitments to furnish fissionable materials, to participate in an atomic pool, to submit bilaterals to Agency supervision, or to accept any form of inspection. The only specific commitment undertaken by adhering to the Statute is the obligation to pay the small assessment required for the administrative budget of the Agency. It seems clear from their conduct at the negotiations that the Soviets have accepted the fact that there will be an international agency in the peaceful uses field and that it would not be in keeping with their present posture to oppose such an agency to which most other countries look with real hope. They apparently intend to take an active role in the operation of the Agency, steering it as far as possible in the directions which best suit their interests and gaining as much propaganda benefit for themselves as possible; at the same time they have tried to make sure that their membership will put them under no obligation to make any substantial sacrifices for the Agency.

In spite of the degree of unanimity achieved, the reservations entered particularly by India and the Soviet Union presage a lively and spirited conference this September. The present text of the Statute, however, represents a sound and reasonable approach which should command widespread support even from the smaller and less developed countries. The safeguards provisions, while adequate, cannot be considered unduly onerous when viewed in the light of the gravity of the security problem or the benefits to be derived therefrom. Representation on the Board of Governors is equitable and quite generous from the point of view of the less developed areas of the world. With appropriate advance preparation and explanation of the U.S. point of view, there is every reason to expect that the September conference will adopt a Statute substantially similar to the present draft.

In closing this report, I should like to pay tribute to the ability, imagination, and energy displayed by the advisers provided me by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. I am particularly grateful for the understanding and support which I received at all times from you and Admiral Strauss.



139. **Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*London, April 29, 1956—7 p.m.*

4955. From: USDel Disarmament Subcommittee Disarmament 132. Dept pass Peaslee, DOD, USIA, AEC. Paris pass USRO. USSR Delegation—US Delegation bilateral session held Lancaster House, 11 am, April 28th with full agreement Western Four. US transcript of notes being pouched.<sup>2</sup>

*Highlights*

1. Stassen posed direct question of Soviet agreement test demonstration including aerial and technical exchange program proposals. Requested agreement technical representatives meet May 28th to work out details. Stated if Soviets wished to make concrete proposal for combining Eisenhower test demonstration including aerial and technical exchange mission with small token and symbolic reductions US would give careful consideration.

2. Stassen explored Soviet differences on voting procedure and on moving from stage to stage. Gromyko clarified Soviet view armament control organization should have only routine powers exercised by majority vote and all substantive matters go to Security Council thus safeguarding rights major powers. Also stated, of course, agreement would not be implemented if at any point any major power not satisfied.

3. Gromyko complained US paper<sup>3</sup> inflates control question so that control becomes main issue of paper.

4. Gromyko raised question of 15 percent reduction of military budgets, section IV March 27.<sup>4</sup> Replied to question indicating no inspection contemplated but verification of basis for comparing military budgets could be examined. Stassen outlined US views against such and uninspected armaments budget reduction agreement.

5. Gromyko raised question of other partial steps referring to Germany. Stassen recalled Nutting's negative response in subcommit-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2956. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris and Bonn and pouched to Ottawa.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. paper, submitted to the subcommittee on April 3, is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 608-613.

<sup>4</sup> For section IV of the Soviet proposal submitted to the subcommittee on March 27, see *ibid.*, p. 607.

tee<sup>5</sup> and reaffirmed US support of this response and opposition to Soviet proposals.

6. Gromyko raised question of prohibition of thermo-nuclear tests. Emphasized desirability of such an agreement if no other arms agreement possible for fairly lengthy period of time and stated thermo-nuclear test ban would at least do something to prevent or minimize problem of many other countries requiring thermo-nuclear weapons. Stassen spelled out the US opposition and US position.

7. Agreed to meet again Lancaster House, Monday, April 30th, 3 pm to explore other points in Soviet March 27th and US April 3rd papers.

*Note:* Gromyko was more forthcoming in giving Soviet reasons and analysis on issues than at any previous time in either subcommittee or bilateral discussions.

**Barbour**

---

<sup>5</sup> Nutting's response on the German question is contained in the verbatim record of the 82d meeting of the subcommittee. (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.82, pp. 38-40)

---

## 140. Editorial Note

From May 5 to July 22, the United States conducted Operation Redwing, a nuclear test series at Bikini and Enewetok Atolls in the Marshall Islands. During this testing period 17 shots were detonated, 6 at Bikini and 11 at Enewetok. The test series was organized under Joint Task Force 7 composed of several thousand scientific, military (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines), and civilian contract personnel. The commander of Joint Task Force 7 was Admiral B. Hall Hanlon.

Numerous weapons test reports, scientific studies on radiation and fallout, operations plans, histories and final reports of individual task units, task groups, and the task force are located in the Defense Nuclear Agency Technical Library, Alexandria, Virginia, and in the Washington National Records Center, Defense Nuclear Agency Records, RG 374: Lot 59 A 1673, Lot 61 A 1433, and Lot 61 A 1740.

In response to a request from President Eisenhower, a statement prepared by executive branch officials and released by the White House on October 23 summarized the United States testing program,

fallout from the tests, and long-range detection of the detonation of nuclear weapons. It is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 5, 1956, pages 706-708.

---

**141. Memorandum of Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 10, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

**3. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments**

Governor Stassen indicated that his report to the National Security Council on the recent disarmament negotiations in London would be divided into three parts. The first would be retrospective, the second would discuss where we now stood, and the third would include future areas of concentration of disarmament activity.

In retrospect, one of the chief objectives of the U.S. delegation to the London meetings was to concert our policies with the Anglo-French policies, so that the British and French delegations would not officially table their own disarmament plan, many portions of which were unacceptable to the United States. As a result of negotiations with the British and French, the latter not only modified their disarmament plan, but agreed to put it forward as a working paper rather than as a fixed position of their governments.<sup>2</sup>

The next big problem was the issue of the relation of German reunification to disarmament. This involved many consultations with the British and French, and Governor Stassen said that he had flown to Paris to deal particularly with the French on this subject. As a result of many conversations, it was finally agreed among the three Western powers that we would agree to commence a program for reducing the level of U.S. forces down to 2,500,000 prior to an agreement with the Soviet Union on a settlement of German reunification in freedom. However, it was the agreed position of the three Western powers that we would not reduce our forces below this level until the German reunification problem was solved along our lines. This agreement provided the basis for the four-power declaration on the German prob-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 11.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 127.

lem.<sup>3</sup> The net result of these negotiations with the British and French was that there was no divisive issue among the four Western powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada.

Governor Stassen then moved on to the second portion of his report—namely, where we were at the present time. As for the Soviet position, Governor Stassen observed that, apart from the effort to divide the four Western powers, the real Soviet position, when thoroughly probed, consisted of the following three points: First, the Soviets were very firm indeed in opposing President Eisenhower's Geneva plan for aerial inspection and reconnaissance; the depth of their suspicion of this plan showed up very clearly. Secondly, the Soviets were rigidly opposed to any tying-in of the issue of German reunification and the reduction of armaments. Thirdly, the Soviets had made their most significant advance in our direction when they came forward with a much more open, detailed and satisfactory program for ground inspection. They had even agreed that this ground inspection system should be in place and operative before any of the powers began to reduce the level of their forces. Parenthetically, Governor Stassen declared that the U.S. delegation had made clear that if the Soviet Union could be prevailed upon to make as great an advance in the matter of aerial inspection as they thus had on ground inspection, there was real likelihood for progress in the control of armaments. Another significant advance in the Soviet position as it currently stood was their abandonment of the "ban the bomb" prerequisite in their disarmament program. Governor Stassen speculated that the Soviets at long last had realized that there was absolutely no hope of ever inducing the United States to agree to an immediate and outright banning of nuclear weapons.

Moving to the third portion of his report, Governor Stassen first indicated that when the United Nations Disarmament Commission met again in the middle of June, the United States would be in pretty good shape for the sessions.

As to the future development of U.S. policies with respect to disarmament, Governor Stassen emphasized that he was not now seeking from the National Security Council any decisions as to the character of our policy. He was merely going to point out that, from the point of view of U.S. policy on disarmament, there were five major areas on which our activity should be concentrated.

---

<sup>3</sup> Introduced at the 86th meeting of the subcommittee on May 4, it said that progress from one stage to another on disarmament "must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems." For text, see U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.86, pp. 2-4; Annex 10 to U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/46; or *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 625-626.

*First*, we must try to wear down Soviet opposition to President Eisenhower's aerial inspection plan. We would have to be gradual in this effort, but we must try to make every effort to move the Soviets out of their position of rigid opposition. At this point, again parenthetically, Governor Stassen indicated his skepticism as to the complete stability of the present leadership in the Soviet Union.

*Secondly*, there are many indications that the Soviets are presently going to make a considerable reduction in the levels of their own conventional armed forces. Indeed, it was from their hints to him that the British had derived their view to which Secretary Dulles had referred in his earlier report this morning to the Council.<sup>4</sup> In any event, Governor Stassen pointed out the importance and the difficulty of the U.S. response to this probable Soviet move.

*Thirdly*, there seemed a clear prospect that if the Western powers and the Soviets continue much longer without any significant agreement respecting the control of armaments, other governments will make the decision to develop their own stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it must be an objective of the United States to try to get ceilings imposed on the development of further stockpiles of nuclear weapons and induce nations not now having such stockpiles to agree to abstain from manufacturing nuclear weapons and to devote their fissionable materials to peaceful purposes only. It seemed to Governor Stassen as much in the Soviet interest as in our own, to prevent the multiplication of stockpiles of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

*Fourthly*, and closely connected with the above point, the United Kingdom, having made the decision to forge ahead with the building of a stockpile of nuclear weapons, is somewhat concerned lest controls on the development of nuclear weapons come into effect before the UK has built its own stockpile to a point which would assure it of a position as the third power in terms of nuclear capabilities. At this point the President interrupted to indicate that if the controls did come into effect before the British had a sufficient stockpile of these weapons, the United States could provide the British with sufficient weapons to assure them of a secure third position in the world. Governor Stassen agreed that this might be done, but went on to point out our need for British support in the effort to curb the mushrooming of nuclear weapons throughout the world. He was also anxious, he said, to get Soviet support to place a ceiling on further expansion of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

---

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Dulles' report to the NSC on the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris on May 4 and 5. For documentation on this meeting, see volume IV, pp. 51 ff.

His *fifth* and last point, said Governor Stassen, was concerned with psychological factors and the factor of U.S. leadership. He said he believed that the time had come for the President to seize the leadership on a program which might be described by the slogan "atoms-for-police". The object of this program would be to make use of nuclear power to prevent the occurrence of aggression anywhere in the world. Some portion of the weapons in the nuclear stockpiles of the several nations should be earmarked and set apart for support of the resolutions of the United Nations against aggression. The idea was to provide an atomic shield against aggression. Quite apart from its central purpose, such a program would have the advantage of freeing certain nations, such as Turkey, from the heavy burden of maintaining a large military establishment. The resources which nations like this were now compelled in self-defense to devote to building up their military forces, could be diverted to vitally needed economic development. Thus the atoms-for-police program would be an important factor in countering the Soviet economic offensive aimed at the underdeveloped nations of the world.

In concluding his report, Governor Stassen expressed the belief that the program he had outlined was consonant with the views both of the President and of the Secretary of State on the subject of disarmament. He also indicated that subsequent development of a U.S. policy and program for armaments control would be formulated in complete collaboration with representatives of the responsible departments and agencies. Governor Stassen closed by stating that, despite the fact that the Soviets would continue to make propaganda out of the disarmament problem, they are at long last aware of the suicidal character of a nuclear war. In short, they are beginning to see the problem of a general war with nuclear weapons much as we see it in the United States.

After Governor Stassen had finished, the President expressed the thought that while the atoms-for-police proposal was an interesting one, it would have to be very carefully defined and developed. Where, for example, would one store the atomic weapons set apart for use in the event of aggression? From what bases would these weapons be launched in the event aggression occurred? Moreover, entering upon an atoms-for-police program would still require as a prerequisite an adequate inspection system in the nations which had stockpiles of atomic weapons. We would still have to have reasonable assurance of Soviet good faith. Nevertheless, the President assured Governor Stassen that all those around the table were well aware of what a difficult assignment he had and has. Everyone was also clearly pleased that the United States did not lose anything at the recent London discussions, and that the possibility existed that avenues of hopeful exploration for the future had been opened.

Admiral Radford expressed very great interest indeed in Governor Stassen's proposal respecting atoms-for-police. The notion of using nuclear weapons to prevent aggression had been part of the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1954. Admiral Radford, however, expressed, as he had many times in the past, his great concern that occasions might arise when aggressions occurred and the armed forces of the United States would not be permitted to use atomic weapons to meet such local aggression. He therefore again pleaded for a clear decision permitting the use of atomic weapons in defense against local aggression. If such a decision were not forthcoming, the Defense Department would have to continue an expensive program providing our armed forces with both conventional and nuclear armament. Accordingly, the right to use atomic weapons in instances of local aggression was still the key question, and the National Security Council could not continue to straddle it. The problem is not what we do in global war, but whether we can use nuclear weapons in military situations short of global war. We must be clear whether or not our armed forces can use nuclear weapons in this latter type of situation. Accordingly, Admiral Radford repeated his view that Governor Stassen's fifth point was by all odds the most important point. Certainly atomic weapons could be effectively used in defense against local aggression. But we must have the courage to make the decision to do so.

Secretary Wilson said that he had been watching "this business" for three years now. We have moved ahead considerably in emphasizing the importance of air power. It had been quite a severe struggle. General Ridgway represented a serious problem with his demands for a much larger ground force. Despite everything, Secretary Wilson believed that General Ridgway could readily justify his views on our ground forces, on the simple basis of our military commitments worldwide.

Admiral Strauss said he would like to be heard briefly on the subject of Governor Stassen's fifth and last point. He said he had first heard the expression "atoms-for-police" some two years ago from a man named Marshall in New York. Since that time the idea of using our atomic capabilities as a shield against aggression had formed a consistent part of our thinking. Accordingly, if we were now suddenly to adopt the atoms-for-police tactic, making it look as though it were a brand-new idea, this course of action would be certain to give color to the presumption that hitherto we had been thoroughly selfish in our attitude toward our atomic weapons capabilities. Admiral Strauss repeated that the United States had always thought of its nuclear stockpile as a means of defending the free world against Communist aggression.

Governor Stassen acknowledged the reality of the danger alluded to by Admiral Strauss, but noted the need for additional impact on a program for using atomic weapons to prevent aggression. The slogan and program of atoms-for-police was a device for packaging an idea so that it would penetrate throughout the world. What was needed was an impact for this program similar to that provided by the President in his atoms-for-peace speech.

Secretary Humphrey said he wished to go back and discuss briefly the point that Admiral Radford had earlier made on the necessity for a decision on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States to deter or counter aggression. Secretary Humphrey said that Admiral Radford's point was of tremendous importance to the United States from the financial and budgetary point of view. It was quite possible that Admiral Radford's proposal might tie into the anticipated Russian announcement of the unilateral reduction of the level of the Soviet armed forces. Should we not, therefore, give very great thought as to how far the United States can go in matching this Soviet move? Could we not reduce numbers and increase the mobility of smaller U.S. forces, and at the same time assure that these forces would have the right to make use of their nuclear armament? Such small U.S. mobile forces, thoroughly equipped with nuclear weapons, should be our objective.

The President informed Secretary Humphrey that the matter was not nearly so simple as he imagined. For one thing, the United States would be obliged to overcome the strong opposition of some of the governments of its allies to the use of bases in their territory for launching nuclear attacks. While, said the President, he agreed with Secretary Humphrey's general theory, we could not overlook all the political problems which were involved in it. We must proceed so that we are sure of retaining the friendship of the free world.

Secretary Humphrey said he too understood the President's point; but could we not have as our own objective the proposal that Admiral Radford had made and that he, Secretary Humphrey, so strongly supported? He therefore counselled that we clarify our position on the use of atomic weapons for the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that they could take the necessary steps in the direction of the ultimate objective of smaller, more mobile U.S. forces equipped with atomic weapons and in a position to use these weapons in the event of peripheral aggression.

Admiral Radford said that he also recognized the political problems to which the President had pointed. Nevertheless, he said, it would make an enormous difference to us if, through a decision on the use of nuclear weapons, we could reduce the number of our soldiers around the world.



Governor Stassen commented that in addition to the points made by the President there was also a danger in this plan that if the United States continued to stress the reduction of ground forces we might have a much tougher time inducing the Soviet Union to agree to the reduction of strength in the air. To this Secretary Humphrey replied that he could not see why we had to be involved with the Russians. Could we not proceed unilaterally to cut the levels of our conventional armed forces? Why did we have to wait for the Russians to do it? He again advocated clarification of our instructions on this subject to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so that they could go ahead with such a program.

The President again warned that such a course of action should not be carried out in a hurry. The United States must move very slowly in this area. Even so, we had already made real progress in convincing our friends of the validity of our views on the use of atomic weapons. For example, the NATO powers were now clamoring that we share atomic weapons with them; whereas only a couple of years ago they had recoiled in horror from all thought of employing nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hoover said that he was aware that Governor Stassen had been devoting a great deal of thought and energy to the further development of American policy on the control of armaments. He hoped he would make a report to the responsible departments and agencies and would continue to work with them in further formulations of the U.S. position. He suggested that, in any case, there should be a thorough analysis of any forthcoming U.S. position on disarmament before this Government became committed to any new aspects of its disarmament policy, either publicly or internationally.

The President expressed his agreement with the suggestion made by Secretary Hoover.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>5</sup>

a. Discussed the subject in the light of a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament on the recent disarmament negotiations.

b. Noted the President's directive that the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, utilizing the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, prepare at an early date a report<sup>6</sup> on the U.S. response to a possible Soviet announcement of a unilateral reduction of conventional armed forces and a reduction in or withdrawal of Soviet forces in East Germany.

<sup>5</sup> Paragraphs a-d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1553, approved by the President on May 16. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions) See also the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, approved as a supplementary policy to this action on November 21, Document 165.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 143.

c. Noted that further recommendations as to additions or modifications in U.S. policy on control of armaments would be developed by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, utilizing the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, for Council consideration prior to any public discussions or international commitments regarding such additions or modifications in policy.

d. Noted that the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament would continue, in conformity with the President's letter of August 5, 1955,<sup>7</sup> to advance understanding and support at home and abroad of established U.S. policy on control of armaments, utilizing the cooperation of the departments and agencies concerned.

*Note:* The actions in b, c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament for implementation.

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-555)

---

**142. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 6, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Proposed British Announcement on Test Limitation

**PARTICIPANTS**

Secretary of State  
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
Adm. Strauss, Chairman, AEC  
Mr. J.C.A. Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy  
Gerard C. Smith, S/AE

The Secretary advised Sir Roger Makins that the United States did not like the idea proposed by the U.K. Government to announce its present willingness to open negotiations looking to an international test limitation and control agreement.<sup>2</sup> He stated that it was his under-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Gerard C. Smith.

<sup>2</sup> In a conversation with Hoover, Smith, and Makins on June 2, an officer of the British Embassy informed the Department of State informally that the British Government planned to join to its forthcoming announcement of a British thermonuclear test in 1957 a statement indicating its decision to initiate negotiations for a possible limitation of thermonuclear testing. (Memorandum of conversation by Smith, June 2; *ibid.*, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Nuclear Weapons Tests)

standing that the present rate of testing could be continued indefinitely without any danger to humanity from radiation effects and that the excerpt from the Medical Research Council report<sup>3</sup> appeared to support his understanding. The Secretary suggested that the cessation of testing might have a different result from that hoped for by the U.K. He recalled the President's recent statement that one of the purposes of the present U.S. test series was to develop techniques for reducing the fall-out problem.<sup>4</sup>

Adm. Strauss stated that the maximum permissible level of Strontium 90 which he had been informally advised the AEC had used was below that used by the U.S. by a factor of 100. An informal paper setting out Adm. Strauss' technical conclusions on the subject of the harmlessness of current testing<sup>5</sup> was given by the Secretary to Sir Roger Makins. The statement reads as follows:

Commenting on the paragraph attached as Annex A to Sir Roger Makins' letter<sup>6</sup> and without having seen the further contents of the report of the British Medical Research Council from which it is excerpted, it can be said that testing could be continued at the present rate, *and indefinitely at the present rate*, without increasing the exposure of human beings throughout the world to radiation from Strontium 90, above the level cited in the report of the British Medical Research Council (100 micro-micro curies per gram of body calcium), a level which is extremely conservative.

The Secretary then urged most strongly on the British Ambassador that the U.K. not issue the proposed statement. He added that if contrary to his high hopes, the U.K. did not go along with the U.S. request and a decision was made to proceed, he hoped that the U.S. would have opportunity to see the proposed language with the view of possibly suggesting changes.

The British Ambassador asked if the U.S. did not want to propose language changes at this point. The Secretary said no. Thereupon Sir Roger asked what the Secretary and Adm. Strauss would think about casting the British announcement in the following terms:

<sup>3</sup> A special committee of the British Medical Research Council prepared a report on the hazards of fall-out from test explosions, which the British Government released on June 12. The report is summarized in *The New York Times*, June 13, 1956, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> For the transcript of the President's press conference on May 23, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 523-524.

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>6</sup> Makins' letter to Dulles, June 4, included a summary of the report of the special committee of the British Medical Research Council. The letter quoted the conclusion of the report on the possible dangers of radiation released in test explosions of radioactive strontium. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Weapons—Test Moratorium)

Annex A to Makins' letter is a summary of the calculations and assumptions on which the conclusion of the British Medical Research Council was based.

"As the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons on December 6, 1955, 'Her Majesty's Government are prepared at any time to discuss methods of regulating and limiting test explosions which take account of their position and that of other powers.'"<sup>7</sup> The Secretary and Adm. Strauss said that this sounded all right and the meeting concluded.

---

<sup>7</sup>In the House of Commons on June 7, Eden included this statement almost verbatim in his announcement of British nuclear test explosions for 1957. (*Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 553, col. 1283) A memorandum from Gerard Smith to Secretary Dulles, June 7, indicates that Ambassador Makins had just informed him of the contents of the British announcement. Smith added:

"His Government realized the difficulties in this matter for the United States and had done their best to meet these difficulties by the language chosen." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

---

### 143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the President<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 29, 1956.

#### SUBJECT

Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1553<sup>2</sup>

#### I. The Situation

A. The Soviet Union's May 14 announcement of intention to reduce its armed force levels by 1,200,000 men and to carry out corresponding reductions in conventional armaments, restated in the June 6th letter of Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower,<sup>3</sup> together with other factors—such as the missile development—the Soviet expansion of economic activities in the uncommitted and free areas of

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is a covering memorandum from Stassen to the NSC, June 29, indicating that the memorandum to the President was prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1553 after consultation with the eight task force groups, preliminary discussions with members of the NSC, and a discussion session with the NSC Planning Board and the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems. Stassen also suggested that the NSC should be prepared to discuss the recommendations in his memorandum to the President anytime after July 12, as the President might determine. The NSC did not discuss the memorandum until its meeting of November 21. See the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165.

<sup>2</sup>Regarding NSC Action No. 1553, see footnote 5, Document 141.

<sup>3</sup>For the Soviet statement on the reduction of force levels on May 14, and Bulganin's letter to Eisenhower, June 6, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 630-639 and 643-645, and Department of State *Bulletin*, August 20, 1956, pp. 300-305.

the world—their Siberian new industries program—and also the U.S. current successful series of tests at Eniwetok—the trend of our Western Allies to reduce their force levels—combine to indicate that it is timely and mandatory for the U.S. to add to and to revise, in an adequate and far reaching manner, the U.S. policy on the questions relating to disarmament.

B. The developments in the past year since the President's effective leadership at the Summit Conference at Geneva, point to less danger of early deliberate major war, provided the U.S. maintains a powerful and alert striking force. However, there would appear to be increased dangers to future U.S. security in two forms which are relatively unmet, and which require U.S. decisions on policies and courses of action. These two relatively unmet dangers are as follows:

### 1. *Weapons Development*

Within a matter of months other nations will be deciding to build nuclear weapons of their own, and once they have so decided it will be difficult to reverse their decisions. Many nations have the capacity to marshal the necessary assets, to use either their own or other scientists and engineers under contract, and to build elementary nuclear weapons within three years from the time of decision. If this is done thermonuclear bombs could be fabricated within another two or three years thereafter. Furthermore, the USSR, UK and U.S. within a matter of three to ten years are quite certain to build missiles capable of traveling through outer space with reasonable accuracy for thousands of miles with thermonuclear warheads.

Thus, *under current trends*, a relatively near future situation in which fifteen or twenty nations have nuclear bombs and both sides of the world have intercontinental missiles must be contemplated. Under these circumstances the potential for igniting a world war will be magnified, and U.S. future security will be seriously impaired.

### 2. *Soviet Economic-Political Offensive*

A major shift in the Soviet Union to special economic action, coupled with subversive and political moves, if not successfully countered, could lead to a communist takeover of significant uncommitted or free areas and this would pose a major threat to the longer term security of the U.S.

The recent developments in Egypt and Iceland<sup>4</sup> are vivid examples of an early stage of this new Soviet offensive. Indonesia is apparently an intense target for a similar effort. Afghanistan presents another pattern of Soviet economic moves with political objectives.

C. Some of the important relative facts which bear upon these unmet dangers are as follows:

---

<sup>4</sup> Presumably reference is to the increased trade between Egypt and the Soviet bloc nations, the conspicuous Soviet presence during the June 1956 celebrations in Egypt over the final removal of British troops from the Suez Canal, the fall of a coalition government in Iceland, the call for revision of the U.S.-Iceland agreement of 1951 by the Icelandic Parliament, and the leftist gains in the Icelandic parliamentary elections.

1. It is known that preliminary discussions have been held within the Cabinet of France on whether or not to begin to build nuclear weapons. A decision by one government would place increased pressure on other governments. The expansion of nuclear weapons capability among free nations would almost certainly lead to the establishment of a nuclear weapons capability by Communist China. Germany and Japan would then not be far behind in their decision, and if necessary either one could work through a third country to carry out the development.

2. The USSR and the U.S. would both suffer a vast net loss through a major war, and both can anticipate economic progress under conditions of peace. There is a mutual national interest to be served by preventing war, even though very little other mutual interest exists.

3. The U.S. is currently running approximately an annual 1.6 billion dollar adverse balance in international payments reflected in increased foreign ownership of U.S. assets and increased potential foreign demand on U.S. gold. Such an imbalance was needed to some extent after the war to restore a basis for payment and trade, but it can not be permitted to continue for the next four or five years without an important weakening of the basic financial and economic strength of the U.S.

4. Cooperation with the U.S. in the immediate postwar period meant assistance in rebuilding war torn economies. From 1950 to date, when the military threat was uppermost, cooperation with the U.S. meant greater security. Now, with the advent of thermonuclear weapons and the shift of the Soviet to economic warfare, cooperation with the U.S. means an extra heavy defense burden to carry semi-obsolete arms, extreme restrictions on trade with the communist one-third of the world, and no special trade or payments benefits not available to all nations. Thus an economic and political deal with the USSR by a third nation, made contrary to U.S. interests, currently results, generally speaking, only in economic advantages and no penalties to such a third nation.

5. Access to the U.S. market is one of the most important economic privileges in the world.

6. The new five year plan of the Soviet Union places great stress on the further expansion of communist industrial capacity.

## II. The Concept

A. An adequate U.S. policy should have the following characteristics:

1. Decrease the danger of a future nuclear war.
2. Maintain maximum feasible U.S. security currently and in the foreseeable future.
3. Reflect a moral leadership in keeping with the traditions and principles of the United States.
4. Establish a constructive U.S. initiative which will appeal to the people of the U.S., and also to the people of the mutual defense free nations, the uncommitted areas, and even the communist territory.
5. Facilitate necessary U.S. unilateral decisions, and encourage free world cohesion, even if no agreement is reached with the Soviet Union.

6. If the Soviet Union does agree to the U.S. proposals, the result must be a sound and reliable system of armament control.

7. Enhance the prospects of a desirable solution of the difficult political issues such as China, Germany, and the Near East.

8. Provide a favorable opportunity for the U.S. and the free world to succeed in the long range economic competition and in the political rivalry, notwithstanding the anticipated subversive element in Soviet activities.

9. Maximize the prospects for acceptance by the Soviet Union of a sound agreement with effective inspection, to provide against the possibility of great surprise attack and to reciprocally reduce the levels of armaments, armed forces and military expenditures.

10. Facilitate favorable development of any tendencies for liberalization within communist societies and increased independence of satellite governments.

B. If these characteristics are to be fulfilled, it would seem that U.S. policy should include the following:

1. Greater reliance by the U.S. and the free world on the power of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in a form that does not include multiple "fourth nation" manufacture and possession of such weapons.

2. Maintenance of U.S. nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and delivery capacity in a manner so dispersed as to foreclose their elimination by any conceivable attack, whether delivered by surprise or otherwise.

3. Decrease the total amount of manpower and of resources devoted by the free world to military purposes, especially through the more rapid phaseout of semi-obsolete armaments and the accelerated organization of highly mobile units with large firepower and small numbers of manpower.

4. Maintain a non-nuclear deterrent force in the U.S. only in relation to probable requirements versus small nations which have neither nuclear weapons nor mass manpower.

5. Establish appropriate graduated economic penalties for potential use versus nations that take action seriously adverse to U.S. and free world interests in the comprehensive competition with Communism. Maintain appropriate incentives of aid or trade or credit, or a combination of these, for nations which do cooperate.

6. Reduce the very large overseas dollar expenditures for U.S. military purposes.

7. Increase U.S. private acquisition and development of essential raw material resources abroad.

8. Make an extensive informational effort for improved worldwide understanding of these U.S. policies and objectives, with emphasis on the mutual interest in peace and progress.

9. Take feasible measures, covert and overt, to remove the super-secret nature of the communist areas of the world.

10. Improve civilian defense, with particular attention to dual purpose, peace and war, survival installations such as underground municipal parking centers, major street underpasses, and subsurface levels of new buildings. Establish an effective arrangement for internal security forces to function in the eventuality of a surprise attack.

## III. The Courses of Action

The following courses of action do not constitute one inseparable package. Some, however, are inseparable from others. Thus the stopping of tests of nuclear weapons is inseparable from the control over future production of fissionable materials under effective inspection. Furthermore, U.S. willingness to implement the entire package is considered to be essential for effective U.S. leadership adequate to the circumstances.

A. The U.S. should propose an agreement by all states that after July 1, 1957, all production of fissionable materials shall be subject to effective international inspection, and thereafter all such future production shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. The installation of the inspection system to be reciprocally instituted promptly and to be completed prior to July 1, 1957.

B. The U.S. should express willingness to join with the states which now have nuclear weapons (U.S., USSR, UK) to each provide to the United Nations a small force equipped with nuclear weapons (such as one squadron each) and to maintain such force under the United Nations flag at United Nations bases for operation under the Security Council in accordance with Sections 43, 44 and 45 of the United Nations Charter.<sup>5</sup> Such forces could also be used in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1950.<sup>6</sup>

C. The U.S. to consult with other NATO members toward the establishment of a small elite NATO force equipped with nuclear weapons, consisting of volunteer personnel from all NATO members, supported by financial contributions from all members, and functioning under the direct command of SHAPE. (This will help to maintain the spirit of NATO and will be a factor encouraging further integration of Europe.)

D. The U.S. should negotiate an arrangement with the UK to assure a reasonable UK posture of nuclear weapons prior to July 1, 1957, contingent on UK support for the courses of action herein, and contingent on the acceptance of the relevant proposals by the USSR.

E. The U.S. to propose that all states possessing nuclear weapons on July 1, 1957 negotiate an agreement for equitable reciprocal transfer of fissionable materials in successive increments, from previous production, over to supervised peaceful purposes, thereby reversing the trend toward larger stockpiles of fissionable materials devoted to

<sup>5</sup> Articles 43, 44 and 45 of the U.N. Charter discussed the procedures for the collective use of armed force to maintain international peace and security.

<sup>6</sup> Regarding the Uniting for Peace Resolution, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303-370.



weapons purposes. A very substantial nuclear weapons capability would always be maintained by the United States (and by the USSR and UK) in the foreseeable and conceivable future.

F. The U.S. to express willingness to agree with other nations not to test nuclear or thermonuclear explosions after July 1, 1957, and to permit an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the commitment.

G. The U.S. to propose that all states agree that any research or development activity directed toward sending objects through outer space or traveling in outer space shall be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes, and shall be open to international participation on a reciprocal basis. Further provide that no outer space tests or long or medium range missile tests will be conducted without appropriate international participation and that an effective inspection system be installed to verify the fulfillment of the commitment.

H. The U.S. to continue negotiations in accordance with existing policy for the installation of the Eisenhower type aerial inspection system, to be combined with the Bulganin type ground control posts and with financial inspectors, for an effective method of providing against the possibility of great surprise attack, and to verify agreed reductions of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures on a gradual and safeguarded basis.

I. The U.S. to insist that all agreements be subject to withdrawal upon a one year written notice, and to be subject to suspension or partial suspension in such a manner as to safeguard against one-sided consequences of violations.

J. The U.S. should be willing to favorably consider the progressive development of an inspection and control system which would contribute to providing against great surprise attack, if the system could be safeguarded against providing a false sense of security, even though at the outset it was not adequate for a permanent arms control system. Partial aerial surveillance coupled with ground posts and radar installations, under some circumstances, could fill such a description.

K. The U.S. should consult with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to ascertain whether an agreed course of action could be developed toward the limitations of both indigenous and foreign troops and armaments in all of Germany under effective inspection as a part of a move toward the reunification and freedom of all of Germany.

L. If the principal measures of the foregoing courses of action are accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States should consider the application of such of them as appropriate to China.

M. Early consideration to be given, through appropriate channels of the U.S. Government, of the related questions of courses of action in the economic, military, political and psychological areas involved within the overall concept expressed in Part II.

Harold E. Stassen

---

**144. Letter From the Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission (Murray) to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 3, 1956.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Two circumstances in combination have led me to write this letter. First, the Atomic Energy Commission now has a requirement from the Department of Defense to develop a . . . megaton weapon. Second, a recent test at the Pacific Proving Ground, which I witnessed, indicated that we can manufacture weapons with this yield in a form which can be delivered by our presently available aircraft. Even larger weapons are technologically feasible.

My basic question is, whether the stockpiling of a weapon of this size is in the national interest. The more particular questions are two:

- (1) Is a weapon of this size necessary or useful for military purposes?
- (2) Would its use be consistent with the dictates of the moral law with regard to the moderate and discriminating use of force in warfare?

. . . bombs we now have in stockpile are already large enough and may possibly be too large.

I stated this conviction at some length in testimony before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 12, 1956.<sup>2</sup> A copy of my prepared statement was sent to your office at that time.

I have made every effort to have the Commission as a body bring to your attention this vital question of setting an upper limit on the size of nuclear weapons. Since these efforts were unsuccessful I felt it my duty personally to present the question to you.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 84th Congress, 2d session, April 12, 1956, pt. 6, pp. 333-370.*

I know your deep and continuing concern with the problems of nuclear warfare and your exceptional competence to evaluate both the military and moral aspects of our nuclear weapons policy. I am also aware of the fact that you alone in the ultimate instance can take effective action to insure that our nuclear stockpile is assembled in accord with the dictates of military reason and moral principle. This is why I presume to urge the matter upon your attention.

Your splendid recovery from your recent illness has been a source of gratification to me as to all the American people. Please God it may continue in order that the nation may have your wise leadership toward the goal of a just and lasting peace.<sup>3</sup>

Respectfully yours,

Thomas E. Murray

---

<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower responded to Murray on July 14, as follows:

"I have read with care your letter to me of July third setting forth views in connection with a thermonuclear weapon of very large size, and have referred the matter to the National Security Council with a request for a careful review.

"You may be sure that I am sensible of the motives that inspired your writing to me, and that, while the National Security Council is giving attention to the matter, I shall also be giving it careful consideration." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, AEC)

---

145. **Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the President**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 20, 1956.

Major points for consideration with Secretary Dulles with regard to the June 29, 1956 Memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

1. It should be made clear that the UN force and the NATO force are steps that the U.S. is willing to take, but that it is up to the other nations whether or not they wish to move in this manner. The U.S. should not urge or press other nations to agree to this.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament. Confidential. A July 25 note in Goodpaster's handwriting, attached to the source text, reads:

"I reported to the President that the attached had come in, and that H.E.S. would come in to discuss them, in the near future.

"(When H.E.S. had last met with President, latter had asked him to make notes of comments of State, Strauss, Radford.)" (*Ibid.*)

Stassen's notes on comments for DOD and JCS are in his memorandum to the President, *infra*. For his notes on comments for AEC, see Document 147.

<sup>2</sup> Document 143.

*Recommendation:* This should be accepted as it is the concept of the Memorandum.

2. Should the stopping or limiting of nuclear tests be inseparable from other sections? Foreign policy problems of testing are becoming more difficult.

*Recommendation:* The stopping of tests should be inseparable from other nuclear sections. If broader agreement cannot be reached, a separate limitation on numbers and size of tests, with inspection to verify fulfillment, should be considered.

3. Could the NATO atomic force be of ground forces instead of or as well as air forces?

*Recommendation:* This is a question of the compromise of weapons information. A special analysis of this will be made.

4. Progressive installation of an inspection system should be acceptable, with caution against a false sense of security.

*Recommendation:* A balance between the State view and the Joint Chiefs view should be struck. This should be possible if constant education on the limitations of effectiveness of inspection in the early stages of installation is carried on to safeguard against a false sense of security.

5. Interested in the comments of the other departments.

*Recommendation:* The views of DOD and AEC be discussed preliminarily with Secretary Dulles.

HES

---

146. **Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the President**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 20, 1956.*

Major points for consideration with the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff with reference to the June 29, 1956 memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament. Confidential. Attached to the source text is the note by Goodpaster quoted in footnote 1, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Document 143.

1. Opposition which stems from their apprehension that the United States would not use its rights for suspension or termination, if the agreement is not being respected by the communists, and concern that the U.S. position may be watered down in the course of negotiations to one that is unsound and dangerous.

*Recommendation:* Future officials of the United States can take unwise action in many different ways, with or without an arms limitation agreement now, and there is no way to guarantee now against future officials. A sound policy now, leading to either a sound agreement or to no agreement, is preferable to the alternative of leaving a vacuum of undecided policy, with adverse effects at home and abroad.

2. Effective inspection as a requirement should be stressed in every paragraph.

*Recommendation:* This should be accepted as it is the intention of the proposed courses of action.

3. Nuclear tests should never be stopped, but possibly we could reduce the size.

*Recommendation:* The U.S. should propose the circumstances under which tests would be stopped.

4. The setting up of a UN force or a NATO force should not in any way restrict the U.S. rights and authority to use U.S. national nuclear and thermonuclear capability, and this should be made clear.

*Recommendation:* This should be accepted.

5. The progressive installation of the air inspection would lead to a false sense of security.

*Recommendation:* Progressive installation of air inspection, with radar and ground stations, would improve present security, especially against great surprise attack, and it should be possible to safeguard against a false sense of security.

HES

147. **Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the President**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 20, 1956.

Major points for consideration with Admiral Strauss with reference to the June 29, 1956 memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

1. The July 1st target date (Courses of Action III A) should be qualified by adding:—*or as soon thereafter as effective inspection can be installed*—as in Admiral Strauss' judgment it will take 18 to 24 months to install the inspection after agreement.

*Recommendation:* This qualification be accepted, but a target date should be retained for psychological reasons.

2. The U.S. portion of the UN force should be based inside the United States, it should be clear that it could not be used without the express approval of the U.S., and its weapons should be of elementary nuclear type and not the latest thermonuclear design. It should be expected that the Soviet Union and the UK would take similar action. Otherwise people might fear that whoever commands the UN force may become too powerful.

*Recommendation:* These qualifications be accepted.

3. The NATO force would require the production of elementary nuclear weapons of a type that would not compromise our best weapons designs. This could be done, but it would use more fissionable material than the modern weapons require. The number of weapons assigned to the force should be small. One other method would be to keep the weapons in the custody of a unit of U.S. personnel within the NATO force.

*Recommendation:* That the number of weapons be small and that if NATO accepts the concept, weapons be built that would not compromise U.S. design of modern weapons.

4. Admiral Strauss has been for the UK suggestion in D since 1949.

5. Admiral Strauss wishes it to be reemphasized that the stopping of tests is inseparable from the agreement on the other nuclear sections and that the July 1, 1957 date be qualified as in Paragraph A.

*Recommendation:* That this suggestion be accepted.

HES

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament. Confidential. Attached to the source text is the note by Goodpaster quoted in footnote 1, Document 145.

<sup>2</sup> Document 143.

148. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 2, 1956.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of Defense has reviewed the revised draft Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency of April 18, 1956,<sup>2</sup> and considers the provisions of the Statute generally acceptable. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, and I agree, that the revised draft Statute provides functions for the Agency which are more comprehensive and less desirable militarily than those previously favored by the Department of Defense. It is the Department's position, at this time, that any further changes in the Statute should limit rather than expand the Agency functions.

The Aide-Mémoire of June 1, 1956, to the USSR<sup>3</sup> on the application of standardized safeguards to bilateral agreements and the USSR reply of July 3, 1956,<sup>4</sup> have been noted. In this connection the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, and I agree, that membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency should not preclude bilateral or multilateral arrangements in the atomic field outside of the framework of the Agency. A requirement that all bilateral or multilateral agreements be made within the framework of the Agency is undesirable from a military point of view.

It is also noted that Ambassador Wadsworth has recommended that at the opening of the September conference, the United States should be prepared to announce an initial substantial commitment of fissionable material to the Agency pool. I reiterate my view as expressed on February 24, 1956,<sup>5</sup> that regardless of the amounts of fissionable material and source materials which supplying nations agree to contribute, the amounts held in the physical custody of the Agency should be limited to the minimum necessary to uphold the international pool concept.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—General. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> For the revised draft Statute of the IAEA, agreed upon by the working group at its April 18 meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 21, 1956, pp. 852–859.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. aide-mémoire to the Soviet Union, June 1, is printed *ibid.*, October 22, 1956, p. 629.

<sup>4</sup> The Soviet reply to the United States, July 3, is printed *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Wilson's February 24 memorandum to Dulles is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901/2–2456)

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**149. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant (Peaslee)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 15, 1956.*

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Following upon the Secretary's recent discussion with Governor Stassen,<sup>2</sup> I wish to pass along more detailed comments on the recommendations contained in Part III of Governor Stassen's memorandum of June 29, 1956, to members of the National Security Council.<sup>3</sup>

*Paragraph A* is generally acceptable. The language of the proposal, however, should be clarified to indicate whether it is intended to conform to the language of the President's letter of March 1 to Premier Bulganin.

*Paragraph B* requires further consideration and revision. A separate UN nuclear force raises questions of security loss involved through the access of foreign nationals to such weapons, and possibly of unfavorable reaction in Congress. Its implementation under Article 43<sup>4</sup> would place it under the general strategic direction of a rotating command including the Soviet Union, and use of the force would be subject to the veto. The proposal might further be attacked by some states as an attempt to obtain the moral sanction of the UN in support of the use of atomic weapons.

*Paragraph C* should be deleted, since many problems going beyond the field of disarmament are involved in consideration of a NATO nuclear force, and further study is required.

*Paragraph D*, suggesting an arrangement with the UK to assure it a reasonable posture of nuclear weapons, does not appear to be a disarmament proposal. The UK reaction to the U.S. disarmament policy in toto should be ascertained before this question is further considered.

*Paragraph E* is generally acceptable. The meaning of "supervised peaceful purposes" should, however, be spelled out more clearly.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. A covering note from Peaslee to the NSC and the members of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, August 17, indicates that this letter as well as an August 14 letter from Wainhouse to Peaslee and Peaslee's August 16 reply to Wainhouse were transmitted to these two bodies in connection with a memorandum from Peaslee to the President's Special Committee, August 15, on an armament regulation program. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament) The source text is identified as Enclosure 1.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this discussion has been found in Department of State Files.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Stassen's memorandum to the President, printed as Document 143, a copy of which was transmitted to the NSC on June 29.

<sup>4</sup> Article 43 of the U.N. Charter provided for member states' contribution of armed forces and other assistance to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, to maintain international peace and security.



*Paragraph F* requires further study and consultation with the UK in particular to ascertain whether an acceptable scheme for test limitation can be devised. Such a proposal should not necessarily be linked to control of future production of fissionable materials. Before the United States opens any negotiations looking to a test cessation, however, we should have a clear idea of what would be involved in such an agreement and what its effect would be on prospective weapons development.

*Paragraph G* is generally acceptable. International participation is probably feasible in testing or production of outer space objects, but probably could not be enforced in all research or development activities. The proposal to devote outer space objects exclusively to peaceful purposes should be stated as including missiles.

*Paragraphs H and J* might be combined and drafted along the following lines:

“The U.S. should continue negotiations looking toward the installation of the Eisenhower aerial inspection system, to be combined with the Bulganin ground control posts and with financial inspectors, for an effective method of safeguarding against the possibility of great surprise attack, and to verify agreed reductions of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures on a gradual and safeguarded basis. The U.S. should make clear, however, that acceptance of such a system as a whole is not a condition precedent to any progress towards conventional or nuclear controls. The U.S. should be willing to consider favorably the progressive development of an inspection and control system which would be adequate to verify fulfillment of any agreed measures of disarmament even though at the outset it was not adequate for a permanent arms control system. Partial aerial surveillance coupled with ground posts and radar installations, under some circumstances, could fill such a description. Inspection need not be more extensive than necessary to ensure compliance with any agreement.”

*Paragraph I*, relating to suspension of withdrawal from the agreement, is generally acceptable.

*Paragraph K* should be deleted since it is inadvisable to raise the question of force levels with the government of the Federal Republic at this time.

*Paragraph L* might be deleted as being unnecessary since paragraphs A, E, and possibly F and G appear to include Communist China. You will recall that NSC Action 1513 of March 1, 1956,<sup>5</sup> provides that reductions of conventional forces to 2.5 million men should apply to the U.S., USSR and China. Consequently, it would appear that any conventional reductions would have to apply to China, and that other provisions involving the application of an effective inspection system might well have to include China.

---

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1513, Document 112.

*Paragraph M* appears to relate to matters which concern agencies beyond those represented in the President's Special Committee and which are not directly a part of the disarmament policy review.

In addition to the above suggestions, it would appear desirable to include policy recommendations on levels of armed forces or reductions in conventional armaments since these questions will necessarily arise in any disarmament negotiations.

It would also be useful to indicate more clearly the relationship between the various proposals. It might be helpful to state, for example, that the U.S. is ready to enter into conventional reductions or nuclear controls or both, depending only on the possibility of agreeing on effective safeguards.

Sincerely yours,

**Robert Murphy**

---

**150. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant (Peaslee)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 16, 1956.*

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have reviewed the proposal for a small United Nations "Atoms for Peace" police force contained in Governor Stassen's memorandum of June 29, 1956 to the members of the National Security Council,<sup>2</sup> and described in greater detail in his memorandum to Secretary Dulles dated July 16, 1956.<sup>3</sup> The Department's conclusions are set forth briefly in a separate letter relating to Governor Stassen's proposals as a whole,<sup>4</sup> but I should like to explain more fully the reasons underlying these conclusions as they relate to the proposed United Nations police force.

In general, I have always felt that the concept of a United Nations military force is a good one. I am confident that at such time as it is feasible for the United Nations to develop armed forces, even on a limited basis, it will be a stronger organization in the service of peace. Nevertheless, I do have doubts about both the timing and the form of the proposal.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/7-1656. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Document 143.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330/7-1656)

<sup>4</sup> *Supra.*

In addition to questioning whether such a proposal would have a substantial deterrent effect on the development of weapons capability by non-nuclear nations, I think it is unlikely under present international circumstances to have a favorable psychological impact. A proposal such as you envisage might readily be interpreted as an attempt by us to get the moral sanction of the United Nations in support of the use of atomic weapons. It is also possible that if such a proposal were made in the foreseeable future it would be thought of as addressed to the Arab-Israeli conflict or other problems of the Near East. If so, it would certainly incur strong Arab opposition.

As to the form and content of such a proposal, I doubt seriously that we should base such action on Article 43.<sup>5</sup> Article 43 has been a dead letter for so long that few would seriously believe it was intended as a constructive proposal. Moreover, while it is doubtful that it would be possible to implement such a proposal at this time, its discussion might stimulate a revival of the Military Staff Committee<sup>6</sup> which would bring up the question of Chinese representation in an acute form. Moreover, forces operating under the United Nations flag would, according to the provisions of Articles 46 and 47,<sup>7</sup> be under the strategic direction of the United Nations Military Staff Committee whose chairmanship is rotated monthly. In that sense our forces could be under the strategic direction of Soviet, French, UK or Chinese representatives. As you are aware, the Military Staff Committee operates under the United Nations Security Council where the veto applies.

We have also considered as a possible alternative the desirability of making such a proposal pursuant to the Uniting for Peace resolution. In view of the fact that the Soviet Union has always boycotted the Uniting for Peace program and has held consistently that it was illegal, such an announcement on our part would be interpreted by others largely as an empty propaganda gesture devoid of intention to implement it constructively.

For several years after the adoption in 1950 of the Uniting for Peace program, the United States sought actively to encourage other Members of the United Nations to earmark forces for possible use in the event of aggression. We did not succeed largely because Member States wished to avoid committing themselves in advance without knowing the aggressors or the circumstances surrounding the aggression. This feeling will probably be reinforced in the present General

---

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> For documentation on the Military Staff Committee of the U.N. Security Council, including the U.S. role in creating and supporting it, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 719 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Articles 46 and 47 of the U.N. Charter set forth the functions and powers of the Military Staff Committee.

Assembly, with a majority of its Members seeking increasingly to remain aloof from the East-West differences. It seems to me, therefore, that, while a proposal along the lines you suggest has merit, we must defer it for the time being.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**151. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Anderson) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant (Peaslee)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 24, 1956.*

DEAR AMOS: Thank you for your letter of August 15 and the memorandum to the members of the National Security Council which accompanied it.<sup>2</sup>

I particularly appreciate your invitation to comment on it. Both because of the frequent attention the National Security Council has given to this subject over the past eighteen months and because of my own belief in the profound importance of this subject, I have followed with great interest the recent work of Governor Stassen, yourself and the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems.

It appears to me that there exists a basic stumbling block which at present prevents progress toward the type of policy decisions which Governor Stassen and you have had in mind. Furthermore, a reading of Governor Stassen's June 29 memorandum and the agency replies it called forth<sup>3</sup> suggests to me that even any fundamental consideration of a change in our current disarmament policies is also rendered unlikely until this obstacle is removed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> No August 15 letter from Peaslee to Anderson has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. A memorandum from Peaslee to members of the NSC, August 17, transmitted a memorandum from Peaslee to members of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, August 15; see footnote 1, Document 149.

<sup>3</sup> For Stassen's memorandum to the President, June 29, see Document 143. Comments on this memorandum by the AEC, Defense, and JCS are summarized in Annex A attached to Peaslee's memorandum to the members of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, August 15.

I refer to the lack to this day, for presentation to the Council, of any *interdepartmentally agreed* inspection system. Until the responsible departments have agreed on the precise characteristics of such a system, assured themselves of its desirability and feasibility, and of the practicability of its reciprocal adoption by the United States and the Soviet Union, I would suggest that it will remain well nigh impossible to proceed toward major policy decisions in this area. The Council has never considered an inspection system, agreed upon intergovernmentally, which deals both with the problem of great surprise attack and the ICBM.

Since I understand that the work of the Task Forces<sup>4</sup> has virtually ceased in this area, you might wish to seek guidance from the President on the manner in which an interdepartmentally agreed inspection system could best be developed and presented to the Council for consideration.

Sincerely,

Dillon

---

<sup>4</sup> See Document 78. The agenda and summary minutes of a later meeting of the combined task force groups on May 29 are not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force)

---

**152. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 31, 1956.*

DEAR HAROLD: 1. We have noted that in their comments on your disarmament proposals the Atomic Energy Commission recognized "that there may be overriding political considerations that would make it advisable for our Government to propose negotiations looking toward an agreement for limitations on testing of nuclear weapons."<sup>2</sup>

2. We believe there are political considerations which make it highly desirable that the US take the initiative with regard to nuclear tests. The Soviets have come out for discontinuing tests of atomic and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The quotation is from Strauss' letter to Stassen, July 26, in which Strauss commented on Stassen's June 29 memorandum to the President. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Defense—Classified)

hydrogen weapons independent of general agreement on disarmament.<sup>3</sup> Eden has stated that the UK is prepared to discuss the matter of tests separately from a disarmament convention.<sup>4</sup> The Canadians and the French have stated that the question of suspension of tests should be promptly taken up in the UN.<sup>5</sup> The general growth of world opinion against tests has been demonstrated by the Indian proposals, the Japanese Diet resolutions, the Indonesian Parliament resolution,<sup>6</sup> and statements of various other countries. The US is now virtually isolated in its opposition to any limitation on nuclear weapons tests except in connection with broader disarmament agreements.

3. Furthermore, public opinion, including US opinion, has become increasingly concerned with effects on health and genetics arising from radiation. The reports of the UK Medical Research Council and the US National Academy of Sciences,<sup>7</sup> although generally reassuring on the particular effects of weapons testing, have focused new public attention on the hazards of radiation.

4. In this situation it would be of utmost political advantage if the US were to make a unilateral announcement of temporary cessation for a one-year period of thermonuclear and large-yield nuclear tests. Such a US announcement would undercut Russian propaganda, put the Soviets on the defensive, and help us with other countries and in

---

<sup>3</sup> A draft agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces introduced in the Disarmament Subcommittee by the Soviet Union on March 27 proposed a discontinuation of tests of thermonuclear weapons, and a statement by Soviet Representative Gromyko to the Disarmament Commission on July 12 called for an agreement providing for the immediate cessation of all atomic and hydrogen bomb tests. These proposals are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 607 and 682, respectively. Bulganin raised the subject again in a letter to Eisenhower, September 11, which reads in part:

"It is a known fact that the discontinuation of such tests [of atomic and hydrogen weapons] does not in itself require any international control agreements, for the present state of science and engineering makes it possible to detect any explosion of an atomic or hydrogen bomb, wherever it may be set off. In our opinion this situation makes it possible to separate the problem of ending tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons from the general problem of disarmament and to solve it independently even now, without tying an agreement on this subject to agreements on other disarmament problems." (*Ibid.*, pp. 688-694)

<sup>4</sup> Eden presented his thoughts on nuclear tests and disarmament to the House of Commons on July 23 and 24. See *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 557, cols. 46-47 and 207-209.

<sup>5</sup> The views of the French and Canadians in the United Nations are summarized in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956*, pp. 99-102.

<sup>6</sup> An Indian proposal for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests introduced in the United Nations Disarmament Commission on July 12 (U.N. doc. DC/98) is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 665-667. Regarding the Japanese Diet resolutions, see footnote 3, Document 118. Documentation on the Indonesian Parliament resolution has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>7</sup> Regarding the report of the Medical Research Council, see Document 142; the report of the National Academy of Sciences is discussed in *The New York Times*, June 13, 1956, pp. 1, 18-20.

the forthcoming UN General Assembly. If the Russians conducted any large-yield tests after such a US unilateral renunciation they would be in a very difficult propaganda position. Even if, in their current series, they were the first to conduct only small-yield tests after such a US announcement they would be open to effective political attack.

5. We believe such an announcement could not be harmful on security grounds, . . . and we have no plans for tests in the Pacific proving grounds for a period of well over a year.

6. A US initiative of this nature would, of course, have to be thoroughly worked out with the British since it would have an obvious effect on UK plans . . . . There are some indications, however, that the British are not completely happy about their plans . . . and we think there are possibilities that we might be able to get them to go along with us in some such announcement.

7. I am attaching a draft of a proposed US announcement which the Secretary has approved as a basis for discussion with you and the agencies concerned,<sup>8</sup> with a view towards submitting it to the President. We would appreciate your reaction to this proposal. We are discussing it informally with AEC and Defense.

Sincerely,

**Bob**

**[Enclosure]**

#### DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States is determined to pursue every possible avenue to bring the nuclear threat under effective control and to assure the dedication of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. An essential part of any international program to control the nuclear threat will be a control over weapons tests. In order to facilitate agreements in the disarmament field, the United States is taking the following actions:

1. For a period of at least one year, the United States will abstain from conducting any tests of nuclear weapons with a yield equivalent to 100 kilotons or more of high explosive. Existing means are adequate to detect explosions of this size anywhere in the world.

2. Certainty in checking on testing of weapons with smaller yields will require detection facilities within the territories of present or potential nuclear powers. In order to enable such tests to be effectively restricted, the United States proposes that representatives of the USSR, the UK and the US, the countries which presently conduct nuclear

---

<sup>8</sup> A draft agreement identical in wording to the one printed below, which was attached to a memorandum from Murphy to Dulles, August 8, is stamped "approved—John Foster Dulles, August 29, 1956." (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/8-856)

weapons testing, should meet promptly to agree on the technical facilities needed to detect any nuclear weapons test and on conditions for limiting such tests.

3. After the period of one year, the United States will continue to abstain from weapons test in excess of 100 kilotons yield so long as this appears justified by the actions of other powers having nuclear weapons programs.

---

**153. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 7, 1956.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will recall that President Eisenhower's letter of 1 March 1956 to Chairman Bulganin expressed the belief that disarmament should be sought primarily, though not exclusively, in terms of limitation on armaments rather than on men. You will also recall that the United Kingdom, motivated by the same general reasoning, advanced for our consideration a plan for establishing allowed levels of conventional armaments based on manpower ceilings.<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of 11 May 1956, commenting on the UK plan<sup>3</sup> stated it would be undesirable for the UK to introduce its plan at that time. It further stated that the subject was under review within the Department of Defense.

NSC Action No. 1513-c<sup>4</sup> authorized me to explore and submit a report to the Council on the feasibility of measures for the reduction of major types of armaments, especially those capable of delivering nuclear weapons, in respects where inspection is shown to be effective. In carrying out this task, it will be necessary to devise a means of establishing allowed levels of armaments. It is further noted that the Annex to NSC Action No. 1513 refers to an illustrative manpower ceiling as a basis for measurement for reductions of armaments and military expenditures.

It is therefore requested that you develop and inform me as soon as possible of measures which you find feasible for establishing the relationship between levels of manpower and armaments. In the event you conclude that there are no satisfactory methods for establishing

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The British plan is not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> For text of NSC Action No. 1513 and its Annex, see Document 112.



such a relationship, I should like to have your recommendations for any other method of arriving at armaments levels to be allowed under a comprehensive disarmament system.

As you know, the necessity of consultations with the Western members of the UN Subcommittee in advance of the UN General Assembly imposes a time problem, and therefore I would appreciate your estimate of the date on which a reply may reasonably be expected.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,

Harold E. Stassen

---

<sup>5</sup> See Document 164.

---

**154. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, September 11, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

PRESENT WERE

The President

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Lewis L. Strauss Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President

Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President

Amos J. Peaslee, Deputy Special Assistant to the President

William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President

REFERENCE

Memo to Members of the NSC from Mr. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President, dated June 29, 1956, enclosing a memorandum to the President, subject: "Report Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1553"<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, US Policy Progress Reports. Top Secret. Drafted by Jackson. This memorandum was given to the President for his approval on September 17 and was circulated to several of the participants on September 18; see footnote 2, *infra*. Another account of this meeting drafted by Goodpaster, based on a report of the meeting by Sherman Adams, is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

<sup>2</sup> Document 143.

Governor Stassen outlined the purposes of the meeting by presenting to the President a paper<sup>3</sup> requesting answers to the following questions:

1. May quiet exploratory consultations, beginning with the British, be carried out, with participation by the Departments primarily concerned, by the Special Assistant to the President and the Deputy Special Assistant with the President, the Secretary of State and all Members of the NSC kept advised of the course of such consultations?

2. What portions of the June 29th recommended courses of action are to be included in these consultations?

3. May such consultations be conducted on the basis of draft documents for the establishment of an armament control organization within the United Nations, such documents to reflect previous decisions of President Eisenhower and the current decisions of the President?

The meeting concerned itself first with paragraph A under Courses of Action on page 12 of the reference Memorandum, which provides as follows:

"The U.S. should propose an agreement by all states that after July 1, 1957, all production of fissionable materials shall be subject to effective international inspection, and thereafter all such future production shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. The installation of the inspection system to be reciprocally instituted promptly and to be completed prior to July 1, 1957."

Admiral Strauss contended that no inspection system could be completed by July 1, 1957. Admiral Radford went even further and questioned the practicality of ever achieving a reliable inspection system.

It was pointed out by Governor Stassen and Secretary Dulles that the meeting was only proposing that quiet exploratory consultations, beginning with the British, be carried out, with participation by the Departments primarily concerned, by the Special Assistant to the President and the Deputy Special Assistant; with the President, the Secretary of State and all members of the NSC kept advised of the course of such consultations.

Governor Stassen described the methods of inspection contemplated, the competence of the special task groups that had worked on the inspection problem and the types of scientific instruments and modern inspection methods that would be used.

Governor Stassen raised the question of the 2-1/2 million force level for illustrative purposes and as a first stage base for measurement as previously proposed, and the President confirmed that this decision

---

<sup>3</sup> The paper, entitled "Decisions Respectfully Requested of the President", September 11, and initialed by Stassen, listed the three questions presented in the memorandum printed here. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Stassen)

of March 1st<sup>4</sup> could continue to be used in U.S. consultations and negotiations.

•        •        •        •        •        •        •

Admiral Radford supported Admiral Strauss by saying that the size of the U.S. stockpile has a vital bearing on the probability of our winning a global war. We are short in defensive weapons and we would have to revise all our war plans if we stopped atomic stockpiling . . . . From the standpoint of defense, the U.S. needs large stockpiles of nuclear weapons at various places all over the world.

The President at this point indicated disapproval. He said that some other way must be found. He said that from the standpoint of preserving our economy alone some alternative must be found. He referred to Secretary Humphrey's grave concern respecting our mounting expenditures and the growing foreign claims on United States gold. Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson asked whether the President's Geneva aerial photography proposal was to be a condition precedent to any agreement of any kind in the disarmament field. The President stated that it was not to be a condition precedent, that it would be a desirable agreement and should continue to be supported on that basis, but that other beginnings should be examined on their own merits, and that alternative proposals for agreement should be considered by the United States.

The President emphasized the importance of avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of many nations and agreed upon the likelihood that, if nations once decided to build nuclear weapons, it would be extremely difficult to stop them, as they then would want more and more weapons for both offensive and defensive purposes. He conceded that a general limitation of armaments pursuant to a broad inspection system would be necessary. The inspection system and the limitations of armament must cover not only fissionable materials but the means of delivery.

Paragraph E on pages 13 and 14 of the reference Memorandum reads as follows:

"The U.S. to propose that all states possessing nuclear weapons on July 1, 1957, negotiate an agreement for equitable reciprocal transfer of fissionable materials in successive increments, from previous production, over to supervised peaceful purposes, thereby reversing the trend toward larger stockpiles of fissionable materials devoted to weapons purposes. A very substantial nuclear weapons capability would always be maintained by the United States (and by the USSR and UK) in the foreseeable and conceivable future."

---

<sup>4</sup> See Document 112.

Governor Stassen stated that in his opinion this paragraph E was merely a restatement of the position taken by the President in his "Atoms for Peace" speech of December 8, 1953, and his reference to that speech in his March 1, 1956, letter to Chairman Bulganin.

Paragraph F on page 14 of the reference Memorandum reads as follows:

"The U.S. to express willingness to agree with other nations not to test nuclear or thermonuclear explosions after July 1, 1957, and to permit an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the commitment."

In the discussion of this paragraph F, Admiral Strauss raised the question of whether the U.S. could ever stop testing nuclear weapons to detect deterioration of stockpiled materials and to effect improvements in control of fallout and in other directions. Discussion followed of various methods of limiting and supervising tests. There was also further discussion of July 1, 1957, as the proposed date for cessation both of production of fissionable materials for war use and the cessation of testing. Mr. Dulles suggested that the proper phrasing might be December 31, 1957, "or as soon thereafter as an effective inspection system has been installed."

Paragraph G on page 14 of the reference Memorandum reads as follows:

"The U.S. to propose that all states agree that any research or development activity directed toward sending objects through outer space or traveling in outer space shall be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes, and shall be open to international participation on a reciprocal basis. Further provide that no outer space tests or long or medium range missile tests will be conducted without appropriate international participation and that an effective inspection system be installed to verify the fulfillment of the commitment."

In the discussion of this paragraph G, Governor Stassen explained the recommendation with regard to missiles and sending objects through outer space, and the President gave some indication of concurring in the necessity of a policy in this field being included in any U.S. position.

The question of an effective inspection system was again raised at this point. Admiral Radford pointed out the danger that both production of fissionable materials and testing might be undertaken in China. Admiral Strauss then mentioned briefly some of the detailed problems involved in any system of inspection. Mr. Stassen brought out that paragraph L on page 16 of the reference Memorandum specifically mentioned for consideration the applicability of the proposed courses of action to China.

In conclusion, the President restated the position he had previously taken in the meeting. The United States must make some kind of approach to limitation of production of fissionable materials exclusively to non-weapons purposes and limitation or cessation of testing of nuclear weapons, both conditioned upon prior installation of effective, reciprocal inspection and detection systems. The President spoke of the rising concern of people everywhere over the effect of radiation from tests, of their reaction each time a test was reported, and their extreme nervousness over the prospective consequences of any nuclear war. At the same time the President emphasized the vital importance of an effective inspection for every portion of every agreement affecting armaments signed by the United States, the crucial nature of safeguards against surprise at-tack, and the contributions such safeguards would make toward a durable peace.

• • • • •

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen both expressed the view, with which the President seemed tentatively to concur, that the substance of paragraphs A, E and G of the reference Memorandum should permit of ready acceptance by those present at the meeting. Mr. Dulles thought that paragraph F should be restudied and the President concurred.

The President then directed that representatives of State, Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Chiefs, at high enough level to express the views of their respective departments and agencies, meet with Governor Stassen and his staff to prepare for submission to the President on or before October 15, 1956, a joint paper, with dissenting views if necessary, carrying out the President's suggestion that an approach must again be made to the limitation of production of fissionable materials exclusively to non-weapons purposes and limitation or cessation of testing of nuclear weapons, both conditioned upon prior installation of effective reciprocal inspection and detection systems.<sup>5</sup>

**W.H. Jackson**

---

<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum to Dulles, Wilson, Stassen, Strauss, and Radford, September 15, Jackson noted: "In accordance with the President's previous direction, it is understood that this report will be scheduled for consideration at a meeting of the National Security Council." (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Jackson)

For subsequent decision in the NSC, see Document 165.

**155. Memorandum From the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Jackson)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 17, 1956.*

During his meeting with you and Governor Stassen today, the President indicated that, on further reflection, he had come to the rather clear view that the United States could not undertake disarmament or restriction of armaments in any major fields (other than small test or laboratory-type projects) without assured provision for aerial inspection.

Governor Stassen commented that we could move progressively into the field of aerial inspection, and could delay reduction in armaments until aerial inspection is initiated. The President thought his earlier statement would apply to "any disarmament move."

With the qualification of this later conclusion of the President, he indicated agreement with your record of last Tuesday's meeting.<sup>2</sup>

**A.J. Goodpaster<sup>3</sup>**  
*Colonel, CE, US Army*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Jackson. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*. On September 18, Jackson sent his memorandum of the September 11 meeting to Dulles, Wilson, Stassen, Strauss, and Radford and in a covering memorandum also added the following statement:

"After approving this summary, the President indicated that on further reflection he had come to the view that the United States could not actually undertake to disarm or to restrict armaments in any major fields, other than test or token disarmament projects, without assured provision for aerial inspection." (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, US Policy Progress Reports)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**156. Editorial Note**

Between September 20 and October 26, representatives of 81 nations attended an international conference at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York to work out the final text of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Regarding the previous negotiations on the draft Statute, see Document 120.

At this conference a number of amendments were proposed to the draft Statute, and an amended version was adopted unanimously by the conference on October 26. Eighty of the 81 nations had signed the

Statute during the following 90 days when the Statute was open for signature. Various articles of the Statute, including amendments, are summarized in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956*, pages 104–107.

A listing of the United States Delegation to the conference is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 17, 1956, page 459. The welcoming address by Lewis L. Strauss at the conference on September 20 and a statement on September 24 by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, whom President Eisenhower appointed as Representative and Chairman of the Delegation on August 2, are printed *ibid.*, October 8, 1956, pages 535–540. Correspondence with the Soviet Union relating to the creation of the Agency is printed *ibid.*, October 22, 1956, pages 629–631.

Eisenhower's letter to João Carlos Muñiz, president of the conference, October 23, and his enclosed statement to the conference, October 26, which Strauss read to the delegates at the closing session, are printed *ibid.*, November 19, 1956, pages 813–815, and *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pages 1027–1033.

The Statute is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1956, pages 820–828.

Instructions to the United States Delegation were contained in a letter from Acting Secretary Hoover to Wadsworth, September 18. (USUN Files, IAEA) The basic position paper, dated September 14, is in Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Conference. Additional documentation on the conference is *ibid.*, and in Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Director General, and IAEA—General.

---

157. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 298th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 27, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on September 28.

4. *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* (NSC 5507/2; Annex II to Part 3 of NSC 5611; NSC Action No. 1360, Progress Report, dated August 15, 1956 by the Operations Coordinating Board on "Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs")<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Lay briefly explained the nature of the progress reports and the difference between them and then said that Admiral Strauss would summarize the content of the State-AEC Progress Report on NSC 5507/2. Admiral Strauss proceeded to read a summary report several pages in length. He was interrupted from time to time by questions from the President with respect to the power reactor program, the atomic propelled merchant ship, and other matters. Admiral Strauss concluded his report by reading verbatim the second paragraph of Part 2 of the Progress Report (Evaluation of Policy).<sup>3</sup> He then asked if there were any further questions.

The President replied that he had two questions in particular in mind. The first dealt with the newly erected atomic power plants in Great Britain. If one disregarded the capital costs, said the President, could these atomic power plants produce electricity at costs which were competitive with electric power produced by conventional fuels? Admiral Strauss replied in the negative and followed with a brief explanation. He indicated that electric power produced by these plants would be very expensive power, perhaps costing between twenty and thirty mills per KW. The President then inquired as to the size of the British plants which he said he thought were very small. Admiral Strauss pointed out that the President had been misinformed and that these plants would actually produce 60,000 KW, the same amount that our Shippingport reactor was originally designed to produce although the latter installation would, when completed, produce 100,000 KW. The President then went on to say that essentially what he was trying

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5507/2 is printed as Document 14. The Joint Progress Report (State Department and AEC) on Implementation of NSC 5507/2, Annex II to Part 3 of NSC 5611, August 13, is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up) NSC Action No. 1360, March 24, 1955, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions) The OCB Progress Report on Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs, August 15, 1956, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507 Series)

<sup>3</sup> The second paragraph of Part 2 of the joint State-AEC Progress Report reads as follows:

"The strong emotional response to Atoms-for-Peace which has been exhibited since the President's speech of December 8, 1953, is gradually being moderated. While some disappointment of expectations of other nations has accompanied this moderation, it is basically healthy. This moderation represents a gradual necessary recognition that atomic energy will not solve all the economic problems of underdeveloped areas, that many technical problems must be solved in developing nuclear power plants, that strict control and safeguards must accompany nuclear power facilities if dangerous diversions to unauthorized military use are to be avoided, and that health and safety standards must be devised and strictly adhered to." (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)



to find out was whether our Shippingport plant would be more economical than the British atomic power plants. Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative.

The President said his second question concerned the weight of the atomic fuel which had been sent to Belgium as a one-time fuel for their new reactor. Admiral Strauss said that the atomic fuel sent to Belgium would weigh approximately 24 pounds and that it should last between two and three years.

Dr. Flemming said that he had read somewhere in the press that Admiral Strauss had authorized a study with respect to the possibility of developing an atomic-powered tanker. Admiral Strauss answered that Dr. Flemming was correct and that he had authorized a feasibility study for a very large atomic-powered tanker. Such a tanker, however, was probably five years off.

Secretary Humphrey said that he was a good deal worried about the possibility that the atomic fuel furnished foreign powers for peaceful uses might be turned by these nations to use in weapons. Admiral Strauss replied that none of the atomic fuels thus far sent abroad were of the sort that could be converted to weapons use. The uranium we had sent was not of weapons grade and could not be enriched without more U-235 which these nations cannot get. Admiral Strauss went on to explain the principles governing our release of atomic fuels to foreign powers and expressed the opinion that we were secure against the likelihood that these fuels could be turned to weapons use as long as we adhered to the aforementioned principles and that there was an inspection system.

Governor Stassen likewise expressed anxiety that the general spread of knowledge and the possible availability to other nations of other sources of uranium, might ultimately result in the development of weapons capabilities by nations which did not now possess such capabilities. Secretary Humphrey added his own skepticism as to the likelihood that certain nations would loyally observe any inspection system to which they initially agreed. Admiral Strauss admitted that there could be no final assurance that none of these nations would disregard the terms of the contract but he presumed that we would not do business with a nation whose good faith we had reason to doubt. Governor Stassen stated his position that unless an overall inspection agreement were achieved, the capability to make atomic weapons would ultimately spread to nations which do not at the moment possess this capability.

Admiral Strauss then pointed out that the report which he had just summarized was a joint report by AEC and the Department of State. Possibly, therefore, Secretary Dulles desired to add a comment. Secretary Dulles turned to Under Secretary Hoover and asked him if he had anything to add to the remarks made by Admiral Strauss.

Secretary Hoover said that he would merely emphasize the great danger that a lot of people in the world would come to feel that it would presently be possible to build power reactors which would be economically competitive with power obtained from fossil fuels. This could be very disillusioning, thought Secretary Hoover, because it was unlikely for at least five years—short of a scientific breakthrough—that economically competitive power could be obtained from atomic power reactors.

Governor Stassen reminded the Council of recent Soviet atomic agreements with East Germany and with Egypt and warned of the possibility that the Soviets might out-distance the United States in the field of peaceful uses.

The Council discussion of this item was concluded by Mr. Lay who emphasized certain aspects of the OCB Progress Report which had not been touched upon in the prior discussion.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>4</sup>

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission on implementation of NSC 5507/2, contained in Annex II to Part 3 of NSC 5611; and the reference Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board on related nuclear energy projects.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>4</sup> The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1611, approved by the President on September 27. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

158. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

Premier Bulganin's Letter of September 11 on Disarmament<sup>2</sup>

Premier Bulganin's letter of September 11, continuing the exchange on disarmament, indicates a slight liberalization of Soviet views in two respects:

(a) Apparently the Soviets may be willing to reach an agreement on conventional arms based on the US-proposed levels for the five major powers<sup>3</sup> without waiting to resolve differences as to the levels for other countries such as Germany.

(b) The letter constitutes the strongest Soviet statement to date of willingness to seek partial agreements without waiting for agreement on the disarmament question as a whole.

Otherwise the letter consists largely in a repetition, perhaps in firmer language, of previous Soviet positions.

Unlike the last Bulganin message, which went to the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany as well as to the United States, the letter of September 11 was addressed only to the United States. The timing of a reply, therefore, is a matter of concern mainly to the United States.

The question of timing has been discussed with Governor Stassen's staff and with representatives of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. It is the consensus, in which I concur, that no reply to Premier Bulganin's letter of September 11 is necessary at the present time. I believe that the nature and timing of the US response can be determined in the light of the further study which, in accordance with your instructions, is being given to the US position on disarmament and in the light of further discussion thereafter with the British, French and Canadian Governments.

JFD

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Secret. The President initialed the source text.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 152.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. nonbinding draft working paper on the first phase of a comprehensive disarmament agreement, which was submitted to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission on April 3, specified for illustrative purposes that the reduced manpower levels at the first disarmament phase would be: France, 750,000; U.S.S.R., 2,500,000; United Kingdom, 750,000; United States 2,500,000; and China, 2,500,000. This draft working paper is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 608-613.

159. Letter From the Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission (Murray) to the President<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, October 4, 1956.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your personal efforts and continuing leadership toward control of nuclear energy in the interest of world peace again leads me to present my views on the subject of a limitation on nuclear weapons testing.

I believe we should negotiate safeguarded agreements with the USSR and other nations to limit tests of nuclear weapons to yields not greater than one hundred kilotons. Such agreements would of necessity have to provide for carefully considered inspection measures which are capable of detecting any violation. Plans could be made and development programs continued so that such a violation would be followed by resumption of U.S. testing above one hundred kilotons within a few months. Moreover, our next series of tests of devices above one hundred kilotons is not scheduled until 1958.

In the meantime I would hope that you will consider taking independent action to discontinue tests of multi-megaton thermo-nuclear weapons while at the same time greatly accelerating tests of very small weapons. I stated this view at some length in testimony before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 12, 1956. A copy of my prepared statement was sent to your office at that time.<sup>2</sup>

I recently again stated my views on tests to the other members of the Commission in connection with Governor Stassen's request for a Commission position.<sup>3</sup> It is my prayerful hope that these views may be of some assistance in your efforts to find a solution to the ever-mounting nuclear threat of world destruction.<sup>4</sup>

Respectfully yours,

**Thomas E. Murray**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 144.

<sup>3</sup> No record of Murray's views on tests in connection with Stassen's request has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> Eisenhower responded to Murray in a letter of October 5, as follows:

"Your letter written yesterday has been delivered to me. I appreciate your sending me your views regarding the testing of nuclear weapons of different sizes.

"Because of the bearing of your letter on the responsibilities of the National Security Council and of Governor Stassen's office, I have arranged for your views to be made available to those groups. In addition, I shall bear in mind the specific proposal you discuss as my own personal consideration of the matter continues." (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records)

160. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 12, 1956.

DEAR ANTHONY: I was very much interested in the thoughts expressed in your letter of October fifth<sup>2</sup> and wanted to tell you promptly of my views on the announcement you have proposed.

In the first place I am in hearty agreement on the desirability of keeping before the world the high degree of cooperation and mutual confidence in the United States–United Kingdom relations which is typified by our joint efforts in the military atomic field; this is valuable evidence of the continuing strength of a relationship which lies at the heart of the defense efforts of the free world.

On the other hand I am sure that you are aware of a number of sensitive issues, both in our domestic political situation and in our relations with our other allies, which the proposed announcement might raise. In particular I have reservations about the desirability of such an announcement at this moment. It would seem unwise to invite speculation and debate at this time on the delicate matters which are the subject of your letter and risk the freezing of attitudes and positions in a way which might well impede further fruitful progress in this field.

Therefore I wonder whether you would agree to holding in abeyance the proposal which was the subject of your letter with the understanding that we would continue our study of the question and that at a later date we might again examine the advisability of proceeding.<sup>3</sup>

With warm regard,

As ever

DE<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret. A copy of this letter was sent to Secretary Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Eden responded to Eisenhower on October 29, as follows:

“Thank you for your message of October 12 in reply to mine, in which I proposed an announcement of the programme for adapting certain R.A.F. aircraft.

“In view of what you say, I accept that we should leave this in abeyance for the time being.” (*Ibid.*)

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

**161. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to Emmet J. Hughes<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 15, 1956.*

DEAR EMMET: In view of the repeated attempts of Adlai E<sup>2</sup> to wiggle out of the untenable position of his initial proposal on stopping tests,<sup>3</sup> and his endeavor to infer that the administration was considering some different position, the rather thorough discussion of this subject and the official United States position taken on April 23, 1956 in the London talks,<sup>4</sup> prior to the campaigning, is forwarded for your information.

The position which I then expressed has never been changed nor have I or the President's Study Groups recommended any different position at any time.

Sincerely,

**Harold**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Hughes was a speech writer for President Eisenhower and subsequently author of *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (New York: Atheneum, 1963).

<sup>2</sup> The words "Adlai E" have been inserted in Stassen's handwriting on the source text.

<sup>3</sup> Stevenson first proposed a ban on further H-bomb tests in his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21. See Walter Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Toward a New America, 1955-1957* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), pp. 115-118.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Stassen's statement to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, April 23. (Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File)

---

**162. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss), Washington, October 22, 1956, 11:40 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

Admiral Strauss came to see me and reported a talk which he had had with the President at the White House. He said the President had indicated to him that he thought we should not push for an American to head up the International Atomic Energy Agency and also expressed some doubts about a Canadian. He thought a Belgian might be

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential.

acceptable and Strauss thought there was a good Belgian. Strauss said that he would rather like to present, on behalf of the President, the atomic energy communication from the President to Muniz,<sup>2</sup> and I indicated that would have my approval.

JFD<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Eisenhower's letter to João Carlos Muñiz, president of the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, October 23, and his enclosed statement to the conference, October 26, which Strauss read, see Document 156.

<sup>3</sup> Initialed for the Secretary presumably by John W. Hanes, Jr., his Special Assistant.

---

**163. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 24, 1956.*

DEAR FOSTER: There was a telephone conversation between Jerry Wadsworth and myself yesterday afternoon after the meeting at the White House. Jerry inquired as to my views with respect to the Zarubin proposal that we should make an arrangement concerning the selection of the Executive Secretary and his deputy for the Preparatory Commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency.<sup>2</sup> Jerry confirmed that the suggestion had nothing to do with the selection of the Director General which was a misapprehension that I had originally entertained. I told him that I thought an arrangement which would give the U.S. and the USSR these two places on the Secretariat would greatly dim the prospect of getting our own nominee selected for the post of Director General. Jerry said he concurred with that view.

Under the circumstances, I most strongly recommend to you that we try to get a friendly and acceptable individual—not an American—named to the Executive Secretariat and that we reserve all the influence we can muster to put behind an American for the top billet. I hope that you will consider instructing your representatives at the U.N. to exert themselves to the utmost to gain that objective. I feel that our strength is underestimated by our own people, in view of all that

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Director General.

<sup>2</sup> Annex I of the Statute of the IAEA, provided for the creation of a Preparatory Commission, which would "remain in existence until this Statute comes into force and thereafter until the General Conference has convened and a Board of Governors has been selected in accordance with Article VI" of the Statute. For text of Annex I, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1956, pp. 827–828.

we have done and that we are going to announce later this week. There must be *some* appreciation, if not for past favors, then for future ones.

There is reason to believe that Stub Cole would accept such an appointment as a patriotic duty. No one else I can think of would give us so much assurance of Congressional support which will be extremely important during the first few years of the life of the Agency. Cole has a long background of familiarity with the subject. I have known him for 14 years and his qualities of judgment and loyalty commend him to me for this post if he can be had.

It would seem to me best not to move into the area of second and third choices while there remains any prospect of putting the best man into this billet.

Sincerely yours,

Lewis

---

**164. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, October 30, 1956.*

DEAR HAROLD: Reference is made to your letter of September 7, 1956<sup>2</sup> regarding methods to be used in determining the relationship between levels of manpower and armaments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, and I concur, that although a weapons/manpower ratio can be applied in the conventional armaments area, the many variables in nuclear weapons prevent the development of a realistic system of computation of nuclear weapons/manpower relationship. The problem therefore becomes mainly one of finding an approach which provides a method offering satisfactory safeguards for enforcement under a comprehensive disarmament system and offers minimum security risk for the United States if the method should be subverted or circumvented by the Communists.

It is fully recognized that every possible avenue should be explored to preclude a surprise nuclear attack on the United States and its Allies. The advantages to be gained by continuing to exhibit interest and leadership in the establishment of an acceptable armaments con-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 153.



trol system are also recognized. While we continue this vigorous initiative, however, the United States and free world strength must be maintained. We must avoid erosion of this strength by proposals calling for less than adequate control at the start. In the absence of any confidence in the good faith and integrity of the USSR, it is considered mandatory that adequate safeguards be installed at the outset to provide against the probability of Soviet circumvention.

Under these circumstances the problem of reducing the probability of a surprise nuclear attack through the limitation of nuclear delivery systems appears to be the most satisfactory first step. The Inclosure hereto outlines a method for initial limitations of nuclear delivery systems. Upon the satisfactory implementation of the first step, the proposal provides for, as a second step, additional limitations of delivery systems, concurrent with limitations in the manpower/conventional armaments area. Provisions are also made for controlling future production of nuclear weapons materials as well as past stockpiles.

The Department of Defense is of the opinion that in arriving at any acceptable agreement with the Soviet Union on a satisfactory armaments control system, the methodology by which each participating state reduces its armaments is secondary in importance to the degree to which such reductions are verified.

The method outlined in the Inclosure represents an approach to the problem which appears worthy of further consideration. The concept of this method is in consonance with NSC Action 1513<sup>3</sup> and the President's policy statement of 18 September 1956 on control of armaments.<sup>4</sup> It is not intended as a final immutable formula complete in every detail, but rather as another idea to be considered in the search for an acceptable system.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

[Enclosure]

#### A METHOD OF DETERMINING LEVELS OF ARMAMENT UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT SYSTEM

1. During the course of staff discussions with the British in January 1956, the United Kingdom submitted for U.S. consideration a proposal for computing numerical levels of conventional armaments

<sup>3</sup> Document 112.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to Eisenhower's statement following the White House meeting on September 11, which Jackson communicated to Dulles, Wilson, Stassen, Strauss, and Radford on September 18; see footnote 2, Document 155.

under a comprehensive disarmament system.<sup>5</sup> The basic concept of the U.K. proposal was that limitations on armed forces and armaments would be expressed initially in terms of manpower, with the armament levels to be determined by establishing a ratio of weapons to men. The U.K. proposal did not attempt to control or limit nuclear weapons.

2. Although the weapons/manpower ratio is applicable in the conventional armaments area, it is not feasible to apply the same general yardstick to the weapon systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Because of the many variables in nuclear weapons, little meaningful control would result from any attempt to establish a nuclear weapon/manpower ratio. Also, the relationship of manpower to armaments in the missile fields seems totally unpredictable at this time.

3. The initial effort in any limitation and control of armaments should be made in the field of those armaments capable of long-range delivery of nuclear weapons in a surprise attack.

4. From the viewpoint of the United States, the basic objectives of any armaments limitation and control system should be:

a. To reduce initially the capability of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, in terms of major armaments capable of delivering nuclear weapons, through a gradual and safeguarded method, to a level below that necessary to inflict critical damage on the United States and its Allies.

b. To reduce the remaining atomic delivery capability, conventional weapons, and the armed forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a point which should eliminate the capability of the Communists to (1) obtain a victory in military conflict with the Western powers or (2) use the threat of military forces to obtain their objectives in conditions short of military conflict.

c. To allow maximum flexibility of U.S. forces and weapon systems, to include modernization.

d. To eventually complement the reduction in armaments by a corresponding reduction in military manpower.

5. The proposed method for control and limitation of armaments of major powers is broken down into three phases as outlined below. It is emphasized that this method must be considered within a comprehensive disarmament system and not in isolation.

---

<sup>5</sup> The British proposal was discussed with U.S. representatives in working level meetings, January 23-27, before the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in late January. The British proposal is best detailed in the British undated paper, "Numerical Levels of Conventional Armaments—Summary," attached as Annex A to a memorandum of conversation of the January 26 meeting (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-2656), and a longer undated version of this summary, entitled "Numerical Levels of Conventional Armaments," attached as Annex A to a memorandum of conversation of the January 27 meeting. (*Ibid.*, 600.0012/1-2756)

Phase I

A. Set up the initial organizational structure required to implement the Armaments Control Plan. The executive body will consist of representatives from the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, Canada and France as permanent members.<sup>6</sup> Representatives from these states, hereafter to be called "Participating States," will constitute the Executive Committee. Unanimous agreement of the Executive Committee is mandatory on all matters of armaments control.

B. The Executive Committee will devise an inspection plan for the initial verification of the military blueprints<sup>7</sup> in Phase II, and continuous verification for adherence to the Armaments Control Plan.

C. Effective with the commencement of negotiations for this Plan, Participating States shall not give, sell, lease or otherwise transfer any nuclear weapon delivery systems, or parts thereof, to include plans or specifications, to any other state, for a period of three months.

D. Upon agreement to an effective inspection system each Participating State will submit to the Executive Committee a complete set of military blueprints.

E. The Executive Committee will prescribe the procedures for the investigation of any alleged violation(s), and based on the findings thereof, the Executive Committee will determine if the Armaments Control Plan should continue, and if so, under what conditions.

F. When the Executive Committee determines that Phase I has been completed satisfactorily, the earliest possible date for the beginning of Phase II will be determined, which will take into consideration the time necessary to develop the organizational structure for the implementation of Phase II.

---

<sup>6</sup> In view of the political difficulties involved, negotiations toward an agreement may proceed with the understanding that if the principal measures are accepted by the Soviet Union and other key states, such of these measures as appropriate should be applied to Communist China in such manner as the political problems then permit. If application of the essential parts of the agreement to Communist China proves infeasible the United States should reserve the right to refrain from carrying out the commitment until all states having significant military potential become participants. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>7</sup> As defined in Second Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, DC/71, dated 7 October 1955, Annex 20. [Footnote in the source text. Annex 20, entitled "Outline Plan for the Implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva Regarding Disarmament", submitted by the United States to the subcommittee on August 30, 1955, reads in part:

"The term 'blueprint of military establishments' is defined as consisting of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and paramilitary; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations." (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/31)]

## Phase II

(Approximate Duration One Year)

A. Participating States will place in operational storage,<sup>8</sup> on an orderly time schedule, ten per cent of each type<sup>9</sup> of nuclear weapon delivery systems as declared in the military blueprints submitted to the Executive Committee in Phase I. Such armaments will be stored in the geographical confines of the mother country (e.g., U.S. nuclear weapon delivery systems will be stored in the United States), but in the custody of the Executive Committee.

B. Concurrently with the implementation of the provisions of paragraph A, above, complete inspection of military blueprints will be conducted and the unimpeded right of access to verify such blueprints (for inclusion and omission) by aerial and ground inspection will be granted, thus providing a foundation of good faith on the part of Participating States for the further expansion of armaments control.

C. Production of new armaments by each Participating State will be permitted. Since the lethal destructive capability of nuclear weapon delivery systems of any category generally does not increase radically in any given year, each Participating State will be permitted to substitute a modernized type of nuclear weapon delivery system for its predecessor on a like for like basis; e.g., one heavy bomber for one heavy bomber. Quantitatively, no more than 20 per cent of any category nuclear weapon delivery system can be modernized in Phase II. In no case will any Participating State at the end of Phase II have in its active inventory of nuclear weapon delivery systems more than 90 percent of those categories of weapons so declared in the initial exchange of military blueprints, or as amended as a result of subsequent inspections.

D. Upon unanimous determination by the Executive Committee that Phase II has been satisfactorily completed, Phase III will commence.

---

<sup>8</sup> *Operational Storage.* A condition wherein the elements of a system are delivered to a specified storage point, placed in a minimum state of preservation, where such procedures are applicable, and accessible to designated personnel for preventive maintenance. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>9</sup> "Type" is considered to be a specific model within a category of nuclear weapons delivery systems, e.g., a B-52 as well as a B-36 within the heavy bomber category. [Footnote in the source text.]

### Phase III

(Approximate Duration 18 Months)

A. Participating States will place in operational storage, on an orderly time schedule, an additional 15 per cent of each type of nuclear weapon delivery system as declared in the military blueprints submitted to the Executive Committee in Phase I, or as amended as a result of subsequent inspections. In no case will any Participating State have in its active inventory at the end of Phase III more than 75% of the weapon delivery systems declared in the initial exchange of blueprints, or as amended as a result of subsequent inspections.

B. The Executive Committee will implement a previously developed weapon/manpower formula in the conventional armaments area, generally along the lines of the U.K. proposal, based on weapon/manpower ratios developed from verified military blueprints. This will be applied in the reduction of conventional armaments. For illustrative purposes such reductions would presuppose, as a basis for measurement and in a specific manner to be mutually agreed, active military force levels of 2.5 million men for the US, USSR and China;<sup>10</sup> 750,000 for the UK and France. The force levels of other participating states would be considerably below the levels of the major members of the Executive Committee, account being taken of agreed criteria including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors, and providing that the first phase levels of the active military forces of these states shall not exceed 500,000 unless special circumstances require an agreed exception. Excess conventional weapons will be placed in operational storage in a manner similar to that in effect for nuclear weapon delivery systems.

C. The Executive Committee will determine the procedure necessary to control not only future production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, but also existing stockpiles of such material.

D. Upon completion of Phase III, the Executive Committee will evaluate the methodology used, and the degree of good faith manifested by each Participating State in implementing the control of armaments during Phases I, II, and III. Based on these findings, the Committee will determine what additional procedures or actions should take place.

---

<sup>10</sup> See first "Footnote," Page 2. [Footnote in the source text.]

165. **Record of Action of a Special Meeting, Washington,  
November 21, 1956, 10 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

ANNEX TO NSC ACTION NO. 1553<sup>2</sup>

1. The United States should propose that subsequent to December 31, 1957—or as soon as possible thereafter and within one month after the establishment of a satisfactorily functioning inspection system to verify the commitment is accomplished—all future production of fissionable materials:

- a. Shall be subject to effective international inspection; and
- b. Shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision.

The inspection system, including appropriate ground, aerial, and scientific components, should be promptly and reciprocally installed and its effective operation in states having significant military potential should be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States (and other key states), prior to the taking effect of commitment b. The continuing effectiveness of the inspection system and the continuing adherence of essential states having a significant military potential, shall be a condition for the continuation of the commitment.

2. In studies and negotiations now under way relating to possible extensions of US-UK nuclear weapons cooperation, the United States should give early consideration to the effects upon the UK posture of the UK becoming a party to an agreement based on current U.S. disarmament proposals. The details of any arrangements for possible further assistance to the UK in the nuclear weapons field should be specifically approved by the President prior to any commitment to the UK. At an appropriate time Congress would be requested to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to the extent necessary.

3. The United States to propose that upon implementation of 1 above, agreed, equitable, proportionate transfers of fissionable materials shall be commenced by states possessing nuclear weapons, in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, either national or international. The agreed transfer rate should

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. A covering memorandum attached to a copy of this record of action indicates that the President, Acting Secretary of State, Stassen, Strauss, and Radford attended this meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File) A memorandum of conference prepared by Goodpaster indicates the time and place of the meeting and that it was also attended by Secretary of Defense Wilson, Bowie, Peaslee, William Jackson, and Goodpaster. (*Ibid.*, DDE Diaries)

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1553, see footnote 5, Document 141.

provide for the retention in the early phases of such a program of a very substantial nuclear weapons capability on the part of the United States.

4. The United States to express willingness, contingent upon the agreement and implementation of 1 and 3 above, to agree with other nations to limit or to eliminate nuclear and thermonuclear test explosions thereafter, provided an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the commitment has been installed. Pending such agreement the United States should propose that the nuclear powers provide advance notice and permit limited international observation of tests.

5. It is the purpose of the United States, as part of an armaments control system, to seek to assure that the sending of objects into outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes and that under effective control the production of objects designed for travel in or projection through outer space for military purposes shall be prohibited.

Therefore, the United States to propose that, contingent upon the establishment of effective inspection to verify the fulfillment of the commitment, all states agree to provide for international inspection of and participation in tests of outer space objects.

6. The United States to continue negotiations in accordance with existing policy for the installation of the Eisenhower-type Geneva proposal, to be combined with the Bulganin-type ground control posts as a means of building international confidence and good will and lessening the prospect of war, which would facilitate reduction of armaments.

7. The United States should insist that all agreements be subject to withdrawal upon notice of major violation and to complete or partial suspension for lesser violations, and a permissive procedure shall be included for stating in advance the intent to give notice of withdrawal if the agreement is not respected. This is necessary in order to safeguard against one-sided consequences of violations and to provide for the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as expressed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.<sup>3</sup>

8. The United States should propose the progressive development and installation of an inspection and control system which would contribute reciprocally during the stages of its installation to increased safeguards against great surprise attack, and the United States should be willing to begin minor mutual reductions of armament and armed

---

<sup>3</sup> Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reads in part:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

forces during the progressive installation of such an inspection system as a means of beginning such an opening up of the Soviet Union. Such minor reductions shall not in any event be greater than to reach the 2,500,000 force level approved for a first stage in NSC Action No. 1513.<sup>4</sup> Partial aerial surveillance coupled with ground posts and radar installations, under some circumstances, could fill such a description of a progressive development of an inspection system, but ground posts and radar installations without an aerial component would not be adequate. It is vitally important that there must be effective inspection for every portion of every agreement affecting armaments signed by the United States.

9. If the principal measures of the foregoing courses of action are accepted by the Soviet Union, such of them as appropriate should be applied to China at such time and in such manner as the political problems permit. If application of the essential parts of the agreement to Communist China or other satellites of the USSR with a significant military potential proves infeasible, the United States should reserve the right to refrain from carrying out the commitment. The failure to successfully apply necessary limitations to China within a reasonable time shall be grounds for termination of any limitation on the United States. Care should be used in the time and manner of expressing the foregoing reservation to guard against the injection of Communist China into the negotiations contrary to the U.S. position on the political problems.

---

<sup>4</sup> Document 112.

---

**166. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 5, 1956.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference Mr. Murphy's letter of 27 November in response to Mr. Robertson's letter of 23 October,<sup>2</sup> I feel it is necessary at this time further to clarify our proposal regarding amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/AE Files: Lot 68 D 358, Amendments to Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed. (Both *ibid.*)



Upon reassessment, considering the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,<sup>3</sup> I have determined that from the Defense point of view our present requirement is limited to legislative authority permitting transfer of atomic weapons to Canada in time of peace. It is therefore my present intention to press for Congressional action only on this much of our original proposal<sup>4</sup> during the forthcoming session of Congress.

I fully realize, however, that there are important political implications to any legislative action dealing with this subject. I therefore suggest that after you have been able to assess the political aspects of this latest proposal, it would be desirable if we could meet to discuss it with a view to making a joint recommendation to the President.<sup>5</sup>

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

---

<sup>3</sup> No information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject has been found between the time of a May 29 memorandum to Secretary Wilson, enclosed with Robertson's October 23 letter, and the date of this letter.

<sup>4</sup> Expressed in Robertson's October 23 letter.

<sup>5</sup> In a letter to Wilson, December 21, Dulles responded that he agreed there were important political implications to any proposed legislative changes and had asked his staff to arrange an early meeting to discuss the matter in order to make a joint recommendation to the President. (Department of State, S/AE Files: Lot 68 D 358, Amendments to Atomic Energy Act of 1954)

---

167. **Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, December 26, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Nuclear Tests

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster, The White House

Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Secret. Drafted by Murphy. Retyped in S/S-RO on December 29. A handwritten notation by Goodpaster at the end of the source text reads: "Revised version. Previous text destroyed (I destroyed cy #2 of 7, series A) G". A memorandum from Greene to Goodpaster, December 31, regarding the December 26 memorandum of conversation reads:

"We have revised the memorandum of conversation concerning nuclear tests, to take into account the corrections you telephoned to my office on Saturday [December 29]. A copy of the revision is enclosed.

"All copies of the previous version have been recalled and destroyed." (*Ibid.*)

The President referred to 25 nuclear tests proposed by Admiral Lewis Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission starting May 1st, all of which were to take place in Nevada with no exceptions. He expressed some doubt as to the advisability of these tests. Practically all of these explosions would be small.

The Secretary said he saw no difficulty with tests contemplated for Nevada, mentioning that there recently had been tests inside the Soviet Union which had provoked little comment.

---

**168. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 11, 1957, 4:45-4:55 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Disarmament and European Security

**PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S. Side:*

The Secretary of State  
Assistant Secretary, C. McCardle  
Assistant Secretary, Francis Wilcox  
Acting Assistant Secretary C. Burke  
Elbrick  
Mr. William R. Tyler, WE

*French Side:*

Mr. C. Pineau, French Foreign Minister  
Mr. H. Alphand, French Ambassador  
Mr. C. Lucet, French Minister  
Mr. F. de Laboulaye, Counselor of  
French Embassy  
Mr. J. Beliard, Press Officer, French  
Foreign Office

Mr. Pineau paid tribute to the Secretary's remarks at the NATO Meeting in Paris in December 1956 with reference to European security.<sup>2</sup> He said that they had greatly reassured the French Government.

Mr. Pineau suggested that problems of disarmament and European security should be kept under constant review by the four Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Western Germany. The Germans are particularly worried about this question because they are not members of the United Nations and, as such, do not participate in the work of the subcommittee on disarmament. Such a review would, however, be also of interest to the three other powers, as, according to Mr. Pineau, the Subcommittee on Dis-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-1157. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and cleared by Elbrick.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting held in Paris, December 11-14, see volume IV.

armament in the UN is staffed by people who are specialists in disarmament and who, in consequence, tend to lose sight of certain concrete problems affecting Europe.

The Secretary said he had discussed this with Mr. Stassen who was in close touch with Mr. Moch. The Secretary said that he was sympathetic to the idea of consulting with the Germans, who were naturally concerned with these matters. Moreover we also had an interest in being closely informed on what the Germans had in mind and might be intending to do. The Secretary referred to certain disturbing aspects of Chancellor Adenauer's remarks on the banning of nuclear weapons, as reported in the press. The Secretary asked Mr. Pineau whether the suggestion he was putting forward was a French suggestion or a German one. Mr. Pineau answered that it was a French suggestion but that the Germans knew about it and that he had reason to believe that they would be glad for such talks to be held. In discussing the venue of such talks, the Secretary thought they might be usefully held here in Washington. He said that perhaps the German Ambassador here might be informed of the idea and it could be suggested that the talks be held here. If this were acceptable to the German Government, a working group could be set up. The Secretary stressed the need for avoiding any publicity on these talks and Mr. Pineau agreed.

---

**169. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, January 17, 1957—7 p.m.*

Delga 536. Re Disarmament. Kuznetsov and Sobolev (USSR) at their request talked to Lodge and Stassen regarding disarmament at UN at 10 am January 17.

Kuznetsov said he wished to discuss four points:

1. Would the US clarify the reaffirmation of the Eisenhower Geneva proposals on the one hand and the reference to progressive inspection?

2. In a reduction to the level of 2.5 million how much air inspection and other inspection would be needed?<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/1-1757. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the U.S. proposals for progressive inspection and force levels, see point 8 of the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 112. The United States submitted these and other disarmament proposals in a memorandum to the First Committee of the

3. What was the US opinion on the 1.5 million final level and on the USSR proposals on 1/3 reduction in Germany, reductions in Warsaw Pact and NATO Pact territory, and European aerial photography.<sup>3</sup> USSR had noted that Ambassador Lodge's opening statement<sup>4</sup> had not covered these points.

4. The USSR was willing to consider a procedural resolution and did the US have a reaction to the Soviet resolution including the Special Assembly provision.<sup>5</sup>

Lodge responded that he would ask Stassen to comment on the first three and he would cover the resolution.

Stassen stated with reference to (1) That the US continued to be willing to implement the complete Eisenhower Geneva proposal as a first step, but US did not insist that this must be an exclusive gateway. If an agreement could be reached on adequate inspection for some other first step, this would be considered. The US continued to believe that a comprehensive inspection system must include an aerial component.

(2) The inspection system could be progressively installed concurrent with first step reductions to two and a half million measurement. Precise method of progressive installation was a matter of technical agreement involving military experts. US did not have a rigid pattern in mind.

(3) It continued to be US view that reduction below 2.5 million level required progress in settling some of political issues. US did consider that successful implementation of a first step of arms reduction would improve climate of negotiations for political settlements. But at present time with unsettled Far East and China issues, divided Germany and Near East problems, US could not agree to levels of one and a half million even under an inspection system. US policy was to contemplate reductions below two and half million with parallel political settlements under an adequate inspection system. US had not commented on European disarmament portions in Soviet November 17 proposals because such discussion seemed more appropriate for subcommittee and US was not clear whether Soviets envisioned reunification of Germany in connection with its proposals for arms reduction. US position that reunification of Germany was essential

---

U.N. General Assembly on January 12, 1957; see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 731-734.

<sup>3</sup> The Soviet proposals on these matters were submitted as a declaration on the question of disarmament and reduction of international tension by Bulganin along with his letter to Eisenhower, November 17, 1956, printed *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 721-729, and Department of State *Bulletin*, January 21, 1957, pp. 90-93.

<sup>4</sup> For Lodge's opening statement made in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on January 14, see *ibid.*, February 11, 1957, pp. 225-228.

<sup>5</sup> The Soviet draft resolution introduced in the First Committee on January 14, calling for a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 737-738.

and would improve security of Europe and of world and would in fact be mutually desirable was well known to Soviet Union and had been thoroughly discussed at summit meeting and at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. The US continued to contemplate that European settlement could include ceilings and control and inspection over armaments in Europe and a European security arrangement.

(4) Ambassador Lodge advised the Soviets of the Western and Indian agreement on a procedural resolution (see following telegram),<sup>6</sup> gave Kuznetsov a copy, and said the US was willing to have the USSR cosponsor and would like to put the resolution in Friday. Kuznetsov said that the Soviet delegation would study the draft, and would advise during the day whether it was necessary to obtain Moscow reaction, in which case Friday wouldn't give enough time.

Kuznetsov noted absence of reference to a special session of the GA on disarmament. The US view was explained that such a special assembly or broad convention should only come after agreement by principal powers concerned on substance. The example of the IAEA negotiations was noted. Some reference of this kind was possible. The US considered it more desirable to leave out reference to special assembly at the present time.

In closing, Stassen asked whether the Soviets had any reaction to the nuclear portions of the Eisenhower proposals. Kuznetsov stated that he did not have any other than that it was better to start with the prohibition of nuclear tests.

Stassen also confirmed that the US considered that a sound adequately inspected opening step in either the nuclear or conventional or surprise attack problem or a combination of all should be favorably considered.

(Kuznetsov advised officer of US Mission later in day that he had sent resolution to Moscow. Kuznetsov has been advised that India and Japan have agreed to cosponsor.)

**Lodge**

---

<sup>6</sup> Delga 537 from New York, January 17, quoted the revised text of a U.S. draft resolution on disarmament. The revised text incorporated changes suggested by India and was also given to France, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Soviet Union, Australia, El Salvador, Japan, Norway, and Yugoslavia. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-1757)

170. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the President's Special Assistant (Stassen), Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, January 20, 1957, 11 a.m.-1 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

I conferred for about two hours with Mr. Stassen, from 11:00 to 1:00, at my house on Sunday, January 20th.

We discussed primarily the disarmament situation and a draft cable . . . .

I referred to the talks which we had had about Canada, etc., during the week with the Defense officials and Admiral Strauss and the feeling then expressed that it would be undesirable to open up problems of this kind with Congress close on the heels of the Egyptian fracas<sup>2</sup> and the feeling by many members of Congress that the British and the French had violated their agreements with us with respect to the use of matériel for NATO purposes only.

Mr. Stassen pointed out that the British did not want to be in a position where there was in effect agreement between the Russians and ourselves and they would seem to be in the role of obstructionists at that juncture. I said I could appreciate their concern but doubted that favorable Congressional action could be obtained on the basis of what to many must seem like a very remote contingency. Mr. Stassen seemed not to be persuaded that this was impractical. He pointed out that similar doubts had been held with respect to getting Congressional approval for the President's "Atoms for Peace" plan and yet this had been proved to be easily possible.

I said that whoever might be right about this I thought it was a mistake to have the British come here under the illusion that we thought that an exception in their favor could be readily obtained from Congress. I said this would also raise the question of other NATO arrangements. Mr. Stassen said that he recognized this and felt that we would have to include some plan for what he called an "elite" corps drawn from other countries who would have atomic weapons.

I pointed out that this opened up a very complicated vista and Stassen agreed but still felt that we should proceed.

I went over the draft telegram and Stassen concurred in it, but suggested a minor change at the end, to which I agreed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> The words "close" and "heels" have been inserted in handwriting, the latter word replacing the word "eve" which was deleted from the source text. "The Egyptian fracas" refers to the Suez crisis in October 1956.

Mr. Stassen thereupon discussed the general question of limitation of armament in Europe as related to the reunification of Germany. He felt that we might have to agree to take our troops out of Germany and agree to a sharp limitation on German armament in order to get reunification. I said there was not only the problem of German reunification, but also the problem of the status of the satellites. If there were really independent governments in Eastern Europe, then the problem of Western European security would take on a different complexion. I doubted, however, that it was wise to think in terms of United States withdrawals from Europe merely on the assumption that Germany would be reunified. Mr. Stassen asked whether I did not feel that the independence of the satellites would come about if Soviet forces were withdrawn from the satellites. I said that that was an oversimplification. There were too many ways of keeping control. I pointed out that there were no Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia. It was like the problem of disarmament "controls"—full of practical complexities.

I mentioned Pineau's suggestion of a four-power group, including Germany, dealing with disarmament as it related to German reunification.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Stassen thought this a good idea and again suggested the desirability of his going to Bonn for a conference with Adenauer, Von Brentano,<sup>4</sup> etc. I made no comment.

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 168.

<sup>4</sup> Heinrich von Brentano, West German Minister of Foreign Affairs.

---

#### 171. Memorandum for the Record, by the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 25, 1957.*

Governor Stassen called me yesterday to report action at the United Nations on disarmament. Working closely with Ambassador Lodge he was approaching agreement for the United States with co-sponsors on a resolution of a procedural nature referring all substantive proposals to the Disarmament Committee for consideration.<sup>2</sup> The co-sponsors are the UK, France, Canada, India, Japan, Norway, Brazil, El Salvador, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding this resolution, which the U.N. General Assembly passed on February 14, see footnote 5, Document 169, and footnote 2, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Another cosponsor of the final resolution was Australia.

The resolution includes a specific passage as follows: "and give continued consideration to the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the USSR, for establishing control posts at strategic centers."

In addition, the sponsors have agreed not to ask for a separate vote on any other issue (such as testing).

In all, Governor Stassen considers this to be a favorable outcome from the standpoint of the United States. He said he had cleared all of this action with State, Defense and Admiral Strauss. I asked if he had talked with Secretary Dulles, and he said he had been unable to get him but would call him before the day was out. He said he felt confident this action was in accord with Secretary Dulles' views.

I advised Governor Adams and the President of the above.

G  
Brigadier General, USA

**172. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, January 26, 1957.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The United Nations Political Committee (where the essential decisions take place) has just voted a so-called "procedural" resolution which refers all disarmament proposals to the Subcommittee.<sup>2</sup>

1. It is significant that all proposals for ceasing H-bomb tests are "buried" by being identified by date alone. This is noteworthy because of the great support in the U.N. for ceasing tests.

2. It contains special mention of the "open sky" plan.

3. The resolution passed unanimously. None of the many "pet" projects were brought to a vote.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Lodge. The President initialed the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding this resolution, see footnote 5, Document 169. On February 14, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the proposal as Resolution 1011 (XI) by a vote of 76-0. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 747-748, or *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956*, pp. 103-104.



Knowing the popularity of stopping H-bomb tests, I would have settled for a resolution in which this was avoided. But not only did we get this: we also got special mention of "open sky" voted unanimously. This is the first Russian vote in any way friendly to "open sky".

Our United States tactics consisted in getting Indian approval for our resolution, then getting Japan. After these had been secured I felt sure that the U.S.S.R. would come along.

The fact that Harold Stassen was able to give me prompt decisions made all the difference and I wish to pay tribute to the results he has achieved in developing a positive United States position which enables us really to take the initiative—something which was impossible under the old state of affairs. This also made it possible to get maximum results from my tactics and my connections here. He was at all times most intelligent and cooperative.

It is all a tribute to the intelligent policies you have launched and the practical system you have set up.<sup>3</sup>

I thought you might like this first-hand report. I enclose a copy of the resolution.<sup>4</sup>

With warm and respectful regard<sup>5</sup>

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

---

<sup>3</sup> This and the preceding paragraph were bracketed and the following words added in the President's handwriting in the margin: "extract & send to Sec. Dulles."

<sup>4</sup> Not attached to the source text.

<sup>5</sup> This phrase of the complimentary close was in Lodge's handwriting.

---

173. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss), Department of State, Washington, February 14, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

Admiral Strauss showed me a recent letter from British Minister Noble to Mr. Stassen<sup>2</sup> with reference to the possible separation of control of atomic testing from the general question of disarmament. He said that unless I felt otherwise, he would like to mention to Caccia

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chronological File. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Disarmament Policy)

that he hoped that the British would not take any decision in this respect without previously giving the United States a chance to be heard further. I said I saw no objection to his expressing his views in this sense to Caccia, but that I would like to have a memorandum of the conversation for our records.<sup>3</sup>

[Here follows discussion regarding EURATOM.]

---

<sup>3</sup> No record of a conversation between Strauss and Caccia has been found in Department of State files.

---

#### 174. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*London, March 4, 1957—noon.*

4623. In my initial courtesy call on Macmillan Friday afternoon,<sup>2</sup> conversation generally confined to amenities. PM was cordial and in good spirits, although I thought he seemed somewhat tired. He is evidently greatly looking forward to the Bermuda meeting,<sup>3</sup> but did not raise matters of substance in connection with the issues which will be discussed there. He expressed hope that agenda could be restricted to as few subjects as possible.

Macmillan referred to forthcoming further round of disarmament talks here and noted his concern at possibility Soviets might at some time decide to talk seriously on disarmament. He speculated on dangers which would result from any appreciable disarmament at this time in the light of the uncertainties of the international situation, mentioning obvious Soviet superiority if arms should be mutually reduced to extent, as he put it, that both sides should be left with walking sticks. While at one point in discussion this subject he appeared to place reliance on trip-wire concept of European defense, he readily agreed in response to our comment that force shield in Europe is essential.

PM also raised subject of situation which has developed with the UN as instrument for execution Western policies and objectives. He did not dwell at any length on familiar UK theme that original Western controls over UN actions have been frustrated in recent past, creating dangerous situation for Western powers in future. He confined himself

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-457. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> March 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 179.

to referring to procedural difficulties in operating body such as UN which has not built up background of parliamentary practice and regulation essential to such institutions.

Whitney<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> John Hay Whitney presented his credentials on February 28.

---

**175. Memorandum of Discussion at the 315th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 6, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

*1. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments* (Annex to NSC Action No. 1553; NSC Actions Nos. 1419 and 1513 and the Annex thereto)<sup>2</sup>

Prior to the opening of the Council meeting, Governor Stassen asked the undersigned to distribute to key members of the National Security Council a lengthy document entitled "Briefing Book—Disarmament—March 5, 1957" (a copy of this document is filed in the minutes of the meeting).<sup>3</sup>

After a brief introduction by Mr. Cutler, Governor Stassen indicated that he was prepared now to report to the National Security Council on the preparations which he had made for the forthcoming London meeting of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. He emphasized that these preparations, which he would now present to the Council, had previously been gone over with the Secretary of State.

Governor Stassen then referred to a series of basic decisions made by the President on November 21, 1956 (NSC Action No. 1553 and Annex thereto). These, he informed the Council, formed the policy basis for his forthcoming negotiations. He pointed out that since this date there had been extensive meetings of the staff of the interdepartmental committee as well as of special task groups. Governor Stassen requested that during his formal presentation members of his staff

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on March 7.

<sup>2</sup> For NSC Action No. 1553, see footnote 5, Document 141. The Annex is printed as Document 165. Regarding NSC Action No. 1419, see footnote 8, Document 45. For NSC Action No. 1513 and its Annex, see Document 112.

<sup>3</sup> Neither the briefing book nor the minutes have been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

might come into the Cabinet Room to assist in the presentation. At its conclusion, these staff members would be invited to leave, so that there would be no problem respecting Council discussion.

Governor Stassen proceeded to brief the Council along the lines of an outline, a copy of which is included in the minutes of the meeting. For his description of a possible program for the progressive installation of an inspection and control system to safeguard the United States against surprise attack, Governor Stassen called on Colonel Willis. The latter set forth the current concept for a "Progressive Installation of Aerial Inspection", with particular reference to the capabilities of the Soviet Union for an attack against the United States.

At the conclusion of Colonel Willis' brief statement, Governor Stassen called on Mr. Tidwell, of CIA,<sup>4</sup> for a discussion of the Soviet guided missiles program. Mr. Tidwell stated that the information which he had presented came from a National Intelligence Estimate on the subject now being compiled.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Tidwell's comments were followed by a brief statement on Soviet submarine capabilities and the presentation of the concept for a progressive installation of inspection, including both the aerial and ground elements.

After further comments and elucidation by Governor Stassen, Mr. Peaslee was invited to discuss briefly the contents of Tab H of the "Briefing Book—Disarmament" referred to above. Tab H was entitled "Draft of Provisions for a Disarmament Treaty and Statute of Armaments Regulation Organization". At the conclusion of Mr. Peaslee's remarks, Governor Stassen's staff members were invited to leave, and Governor Stassen closed his formal statement with some remarks on plans for the departure of the delegation to the London meeting. He then said that the subject was open for general discussion.

Secretary Dulles observed that it was, of course, very important that we should all have a clear idea of where we wanted to go in the forthcoming negotiations. He said he believed that Governor Stassen would be the first person to agree that such a presentation as Governor Stassen had just provided was merely an illustrative exposition. There was certainly no reason to think that the Soviets would accept the general plans that Governor Stassen had described, because they would believe that his approach to a progressive installation of an inspection system would be too favorable to the United States. So, while Governor Stassen's plan was interesting and useful, it was not at all likely to eventuate in the near future as a reality.

---

<sup>4</sup> William A. Tidwell, Office of the Assistant Director, Office of Research and Reports, CIA.

<sup>5</sup> NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field", dated March 12, not printed. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

As far as the actual negotiations at London were concerned, Secretary Dulles said it was his understanding that the U.S. delegation would limit itself to the presentation before the Subcommittee of disarmament proposals which had been approved by the National Security Council and the President. While certain other matters related thereto have been explored by Governor Stassen and his interdepartmental committee, Secretary Dulles stated that there would be no formal presentation of these other matters at the London meeting unless they likewise had been approved by the Council and the President in the meantime. Secretary Dulles stated that this applied particularly to the matters presented and discussed by Mr. Peaslee (Draft of Provisions for a Disarmament Treaty and Statute of Armaments Regulation Organization). In short, this material would not be used in London without prior consultation back in Washington. Secretary Dulles pointed out that he had only seen this particular material yesterday, and he further believed that it was not desirable for the NSC to make a decision at this time on the matters presented by Mr. Peaslee. Secretary Dulles expressed special concern over the problem of Communist China in the general context of a disarmament proposal.

Governor Stassen pointed out that the matters discussed by Mr. Peaslee had been developed by a joint departmental group. They had not, however, been approved at the top level in the several responsible agencies. Secretary Dulles said that of course staff people could not commit the Department of State, and so he presumed that they could not commit the Department of Defense. The State Department needed more time to study these matters, and Secretary Dulles repeated his previously expressed view on the light in which material presented by Mr. Peaslee should be handled, including the reminder that the Tab H material went beyond any NSC decisions taken to date.

Admiral Strauss said that apropos of the Secretary of State's point, he would like to call attention to the statement in Tab E of the "Briefing Book"—that is, the proposal contained therein that "all future production of fissionable materials shall be used exclusively for national or international non-weapons purposes under international supervision, beginning one month after the establishment of an effective inspection system to verify the commitment." What precisely did the term "establishment" mean? Here was an area in which the definitions of words became very important. Did "establishment" merely mean the creation, or did it mean the actual installation and effective operation, of an inspection system? Governor Stassen replied by saying that the matter which occasioned Admiral Strauss' anxiety had been handled on page 2 of Tab H by language which specifically safeguarded the U.S. national interest. Indeed, this was an example of the very meticulous work which his lawyers had done.

Governor Stassen also expressed his agreement with the proposition that no commitments could be made on behalf of the United States at the London meeting on any matter not covered by the aforementioned NSC Actions setting forth our disarmament policies, unless these other matters had received the approval of the President and the Secretary of State.

Mr. Cutler expressed his understanding that Governor Stassen's report was merely an explanatory report, and that none of the papers in the "Briefing Book" were to be considered binding on the U.S. Government, and that no commitments and no action was expected by the National Security Council at the present meeting.

Secretary Dulles referred to a point earlier made by Governor Stassen, that certain matters not covered by approved NSC policy might be the subject of discussion by Governor Stassen at London with our allies. Secretary Dulles believed that if this course of action were followed, it must be pursued with great caution in order to avoid any possibility of appearing to make any U.S. commitment to our allies. If such views are advanced and discussed, the discussion must be explicitly made on a purely personal basis unless, again, we here back home provide approval in advance.

The President expressed his agreement with the point made by Secretary Dulles. Paraphrasing Secretary Dulles' remarks, he stated that in effect the Secretary had stated that all such proposals were to be presented at London on a purely personal basis by Governor Stassen and his associates. They were not to be presented on any other basis without the approval of Governor Stassen's chief.

Secretary Dulles said he had one other important matter to comment on. This bore on the Executive Branch's relations with the Senate. Up to this time our disarmament projects have not been taken very seriously in the U.S. Senate. None of the Senators think that disarmament will come to anything, and they are relatively indifferent to what we say. If, however, there should be forthcoming any indication that the Soviets might really be willing to come some distance toward meeting our disarmament position, we should have to lay the groundwork as to the possible wording of a treaty before the Senate. The Senate would obviously wish to be associated in the preparation and development of so significant a treaty.

The President commented that the Senate should be made aware that they are welcome to participate in such deliberations now if they wished to go. Secretary Dulles replied that this matter had been discussed by him only yesterday, and he didn't believe that any of the Senators were ready to go now. The President agreed that it was unlikely.

Secretary Wilson said he had some general thoughts to lay before the meeting. He said that of course he understood the vital need to protect the United States from being outwitted by the Soviets in the development of a disarmament program. He also knew that it was the purpose and objective of the United States to "cool off" the armaments race. Nevertheless, he believed in the desirability of what he called "a look at the books". It might be highly advantageous if the powerful countries of the world were to make a clear statement of their existing armaments prior to the inspection process. If such matters were handled in good faith, the whole world would gain by it. In short, we might make a little more progress toward our objective if both sides tried to do something more than gain an advantage the one over the other.

The President observed that he had supposed that Secretary Wilson's "look at the books" was the essential idea in his earlier proposal for an exchange of blueprints.

Secretary Wilson said that he had also another point, relating to the possibility of reducing the level of U.S. armed forces to 2.5 million. He said he believed that we were going to be compelled to reduce to that level anyway because of budgetary considerations and in terms of our ability to finance our level of forces and at the same time to do the other things we needed to do in the area of national defense. Accordingly, if we had to go down to the 2.5 million level anyhow, could not this fact be made the basis for some kind of advantageous deal with the Soviet Union?

Governor Stassen pointed out that he and his associates had had firmly in mind over the last two years that the prospects for a workable disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union were very thin indeed. The only reason that we do not think such an agreement is wholly impossible is our belief that it is in the mutual interest of the United States and of the Soviet Union not to become involved in a ten-year armaments race. It is this belief which has caused us to continue our patient probings in the effort to change the course of armaments development in the world.

Secretary Wilson said that of course we were already in an armaments race with the Soviet Union. The only hopeful sign was that both our people and the people of the Soviet Union were tired of bearing the weight of developing armaments.

Secretary Humphrey referred to Secretary Wilson's earlier point about the reduction of the level of U.S. forces to 2.5 million. He said he thought that this was an important and useful suggestion. After all, the Council knew that we were going to have to reduce the level of our armed forces very quickly as well as very substantially. If we have got

to make this reduction in any case, we might at least plan to do it in such a way as to derive maximum benefit from the reduction in terms of world public opinion.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

a. Noted the statement by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament of the approved U.S. policy on control of armaments in the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553 and relevant previous NSC Actions Nos. 1419 and 1513 and the Annex thereto.

b. Noted and discussed the presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament on the proposed U.S. position at the forthcoming London meeting of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission; with the understanding that the example of a progressive installation of an inspection system and the working paper on draft provisions for a treaty and statute were for illustrative and planning purposes and were not submitted as proposals for action by the Council or approval by the President at this time.

c. Noted the President's statement that:

(1) The U.S. position at the forthcoming UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting should be based solely upon the approved policy referred to in a above.

(2) Modifications or additions to the above-mentioned approved policy should be submitted in advance for consideration by the National Security Council and approval by the President.

(3) When the illustrative example of the inspection system and excerpts from the working paper on draft provisions presented at this NSC meeting are used in discussions with any other nation, such use should be on a restricted working-paper and personal basis which would make clear that (a) neither of them represented official proposals, positions or commitments of the U.S. Government and (b) they would have to be referred to governments for specific authority, if the discussions indicated that progress were probable.

(4) Appropriate members of the U.S. Senate should be advised of the negotiations in advance of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting and that there would be further consultation as to Senate representation on the delegation at such time as negotiations indicate any real possibility of progress on this subject.

*Note:* The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament.

[Here follow agenda items 2 and 3.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

<sup>6</sup> Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1676, approved by the President on March 8. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)



176. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 6, 1957—5:18 p.m.

6112. Re disarmament. Following text of letter sent by Stassen to Noble March 6.<sup>2</sup>

*Begin verbatim text.*

Thank you for your letter of February 7, 1957,<sup>3</sup> noting the acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of the formula agreed ad referendum at our meeting of January 31.<sup>4</sup>

I am authorized to inform you that the United States Government also accepts the formula and welcomes the support which the United Kingdom is prepared to give to the United States disarmament proposals. Also, your understanding with respect to negotiations in regard to the United Kingdom nuclear posture in the event of an affirmative reaction by the USSR corresponds to our own.

I have also taken note of your statement to the effect that the United Kingdom wishes to review the whole question of limiting nuclear test explosions in the light of the technical discussions which took place in Washington. For our part, we are considering the views expressed by you and your associates during these discussions. You will recall that the United States position is that no test limitation should become effective prior to implementation, under adequate inspection, of agreements regarding the cessation of nuclear production for weapons purposes and transfers of fissionable material from previous production to peaceful purposes; we have not yet been able to see a solution to the difficulties attendant on an independent test limitation agreement.

It is my understanding from a statement which you made towards the end of our meeting of January 31 that you would recommend to Her Majesty's Government that there be further consultations between our two governments before the United Kingdom made any public statement regarding any new proposal on the question of limiting nuclear test explosions. I would appreciate your informing me at your convenience if Her Majesty's Government agrees to this position.

*End verbatim text.*

[Here follows the text of Noble's February 7 letter to Stassen.]

**Dulles**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-657. Top Secret. Drafted by Baker, cleared by Toner and Wolf, and approved by Walmsley.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles noted in a memorandum to Stassen, March 5, that an enclosed draft reply to Noble, which already had the concurrence of Stassen, DOD, and AEC, constituted a satisfactory response to Noble's February 7 letter. (*Ibid.*, 600.0012/3-557)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)

<sup>4</sup> Attached to Noble's letter, not printed. Noble headed a British delegation which met with Dulles, Stassen, and other American officials in Washington, January 30-31, to discuss disarmament policy. Summaries of the meetings are in telegrams 5290 and 5323 to London, January 31 and February 1. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 600.0012/1-3157 and 600.0012/2-157, respectively)

**177. Editorial Note**

The Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission held 71 meetings (87th to 157th inclusive) in London between March 18 and September 6. Instructions for these negotiations are contained in Secretary of State Dulles' letter to Harold E. Stassen, dated March 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-557) The Fourth Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, dated August 1 (U.N. doc. DC/112) and the Fifth Report of the Subcommittee, dated September 11 (U.N. doc. DC/113), are *ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/112 and DC/113. Several proposals, working papers, memoranda, and statements made during these meetings are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, volume II, pages 752 ff. Verbatim records of all these meetings are in Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.87-157.

---

**178. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 20, 1957.*

DEAR HAROLD: I regret the delay in furnishing comments on your letter of 20 February 1957<sup>2</sup> dealing with armaments/manpower ratios. The subject has been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their views are reflected herein.

A basic fault found by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the ratios contained in the attachment to your letter is the inclusion under the heading of Conventional Armaments of components of nuclear weapons delivery systems. From the military point of view, it is necessary to make the distinction between nuclear weapons delivery systems, including all the components, and individual items of conventional equipment. I fully recognize that under present policy, movement in either the nuclear or conventional field of disarmament may be undertaken independently. It is not my desire to restrict the area of your negotiations in this respect. However, in dealing with conventional armaments, all weapons having a nuclear delivery capability should be excluded.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

In studying this problem, it is necessary to relate the measures to be taken in limiting manpower and armaments to the progressive installation of a system for inspection and verification. It would seem that in taking the initial step of agreeing to reduce to the level of 2.5 million while concurrently installing the control system, the method of determining allowed levels of armaments should, from the administrative standpoint, be as free of complexity as possible and should, from the military standpoint, be addressed primarily to those weapons systems which would be used in launching a great surprise attack. It was on this basis that my letter to you of 30 October 1956<sup>3</sup> was prepared. You will recall that in the enclosure thereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that an agreement be sought whereby, in the early phase of a disarmament arrangement, a percentage of atomic capable delivery systems be placed in operational storage under international control during a period when the degree of integrity and good faith of the participating states was being observed. Annex II to DPC Note 113, R-1, of 27 February 1957,<sup>4</sup> submitted by the Defense Representative on the Special Committee, was an effort to modify this approach to meet the 21 November 1956 decisions of the President.<sup>5</sup> I urge consideration of this method of taking the first step in a disarmament agreement rather than the computation of numerical ratios of manpower to armaments to determine allowed levels.

With regard to the limitation of conventional armaments, it is recognized that a common yardstick will be necessary to establish the level of armaments to be allowed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a formula generally along the lines of the UK proposal,<sup>6</sup> and based upon weapons/manpower ratios developed from verified blueprints, might be applicable in the reduction of conventional armaments. They are of the opinion, however, that acceptance of any specific criteria or formula at this time, in advance of agreement as to the general principles involved, particularly the principle of exchanging blueprints as part of a disarmament arrangement, would be unsound from the standpoint of national security. For the same reasons, they feel that it would be untimely to advance or to concur in any specific figures such as you propose in your letter of 20 February 1957.

In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not address themselves to the specific numerical ratios in the schedule attached to your letter of 20 February 1957. However, I am sure you appreciate the military problem involved in such a task, and the varying effects that changes in ratios would have on individual countries with differing strategic requirements. For example, because of our dependence on

---

<sup>3</sup> Document 178.

<sup>4</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/2-1256)

sea communications, one of our basic objectives must be to control the threat posed by the large Soviet submarine fleet. To this end, it might be to our advantage to obtain as high a charge against manpower for submarines as we reasonably can. On the other hand, in view of our strength in aircraft carriers, we might want the manpower charge per carrier as low as possible. In each case, we can expect the Soviet position to be diametrically opposed. In advancing figures for illustrative purposes or for negotiation, these considerations would have to be taken into account in order to safeguard United States strategic requirements. The Department of Defense finds it impossible to provide militarily meaningful modifications or amendments to the specific ratios proposed in the absence of a blueprint of the Soviet military organization and agreement as to types of weapons to be so limited.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the approach which you propose, using numerical ratios not based on verified military blueprints, as a basis of measurement in determining allowed levels of conventional armaments does not meet the security requirements of the United States. In view of their statutory responsibilities as principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and to me, I believe further Council consideration should be given this matter prior to indicating to the United Kingdom a position of the United States with respect to the acceptability of their proposal in the first phase of a disarmament agreement. This action appears to me to be in keeping with the intent of NSC Action No. 1513 c (5),<sup>7</sup> dealing with measures for the control of armaments. In the interim, it is suggested that the considerations enumerated herein form the basis of your position with respect to the United Kingdom proposal.<sup>8</sup>

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

---

<sup>7</sup> Document 112.

<sup>8</sup> When Stassen requested clarification of certain points in this letter in telegram 5095 from London, March 22 (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3-2257), the Department of Defense responded as follows:

"The views expressed to you in Defense letter of 20 March are to be considered advisory. Defense and JCS recognize that your guidance refers to all armaments and armed forces but wish to make clear that most armaments having a dual conventional nuclear capability are designed primarily for use as nuclear delivery vehicles. Thus they should be treated as part of a nuclear system since, until fissionable material brought under control, capability is of nuclear order rather than conventional. Recognize necessity of exploration of all facets of this problem." (Telegram 7101 to London, April 8; *ibid.*)

**179. Editorial Note**

From March 21 to 23, President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan met in Bermuda to discuss foreign policy matters of mutual concern. Documentation on these meetings is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII. Among the many topics discussed during these meetings, the following related directly or indirectly to regulation of armaments and atomic energy: force level reductions, missiles, nuclear warheads, armaments research, development, and production, nuclear weapons testing, and nuclear weapons to fourth countries. Particularly relevant documents are Benson E.L. Timmons' memorandum of conversation in the President's quarters, Mid-Ocean Club, dated March 22 at 3:20 p.m., on guided missiles and nuclear weapons testing; Gerard Smith's memorandum of conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club, dated March 23 at 11:15 a.m., on the French nuclear weapons program and nuclear testing; and two conference papers: "Agreed Note on Military Nuclear Programmes of Fourth Countries", dated March 23, and "Agreement for Prior Consultation about New Proposals regarding Nuclear Tests", undated.

A joint statement by Eisenhower and Macmillan following the Bermuda meetings on March 24 included a declaration on policy regarding nuclear tests (annex II); it is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pages 211-212.

---

**180. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, April 2, 1957.*

DEAR FOSTER: I trust you have been able to get a bit of rest after the strenuous schedule of SEATO and Bermuda.<sup>2</sup> Best wishes to you and to Janet.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-257. Secret; Personal.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles attended the Council of Ministers of SEATO in Canberra, Australia, March 11-13, and accompanied President Eisenhower to Bermuda for his meeting with British Prime Minister Macmillan, March 21-23.

The first two weeks of this session have been quite different than the preceding Subcommittee series. There has been a lack of recriminations from the Soviet and a more sensible approach to procedures than before.

The nuclear testing issue has been a very active one and has tended to be much more intense outside the Subcommittee than inside. The Bermuda communiqué, the Japanese interventions, and the House of Commons debate have all spotlighted this subject.<sup>3</sup> Their proposal for a cessation of tests appears to be motivated in part by a real concern over the prospective spreading of the nuclear weapons into the control of additional governments, and the consequent danger that developments not initiated by either the US or USSR might involve the USSR in a nuclear war in which they would suffer great devastation.

I have spent considerable time with the British in developing more general understanding and support for the US position on nuclear testing. The Labor Attaché of the Embassy requested that I talk to George Brown, the Minister of Defense of the shadow cabinet,<sup>4</sup> and after I cleared with Commander Noble and found that he wished me to do so, I met with Brown and the Labor Attaché and answered his questions about US nuclear testing policy. He has advocated within the Labor Party a position more in the direction of the governmental policy, and is in opposition to the position of Bevan,<sup>5</sup> et al. His consultation with me, for his own sake, should be kept confidential.

We are now working over a cable which will go forward in the next few days asking consideration for certain USDel recommendations in this nuclear testing area.<sup>6</sup>

The next item on our agenda is the field of non-nuclear armaments and armed forces, and this may give us the best indication of the current Soviet intentions.

We are maintaining a regular liaison in London with the missions of the Disarmament Commission countries, and of those that have manifested a special interest, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, India, Sweden, Iraq, Norway, Colombia and the Philippines. We have asked the Department in Washing-

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the Bermuda communiqué, see the editorial note, *supra*. The Japanese "interventions" presumably refer to longstanding opposition to nuclear testing in Japan and to the joint resolution submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by Canada, Norway, and Japan on January 18 (A/C.1/L.162 and rev 1) and referred to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission calling for the registration of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests. This draft resolution is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, p. 738. Regarding the House of Commons debate on nuclear testing, see *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 566, cols. 178-181, 321-325, 1135, and 1144-1147. See also footnote 3, Document 152.

<sup>4</sup> George A. Brown was also Labour member of Parliament.

<sup>5</sup> Aneurin Bevan, Labour member of Parliament.

<sup>6</sup> See *infra*.

ton to cover China since the Nationalist Government, of course, has no mission here in London. We made an agreed Western Four report to NATO during the first week.

The essential Western unity has been maintained very well thus far, although there have been difficult moments stemming in part from the fact that Moch does not personally support the position of his government on some of the key items, and some of the Foreign Office personnel below Noble were at first in considerable disagreement with the position of the UK Government on testing at the time of Bermuda.

Sincerely yours,

Harold

---

**181. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, April 13, 1957—3 p.m.*

5610. In addition to normal distribution please pass to Admiral Strauss, Dr. Libby and Robert Cutler. USDel Disarmament No 119. Subject: Nuclear Tests.

1. USDel, with thorough discussion by its members including State, Defense, and AEC members, has been endeavoring to carefully examine the nuclear test situation from the standpoint of the security interest of the U.S. On the basis of such examination, the chairman of the USDel forwards the following observations.

2. A number of govts beyond the nuclear three are at the point of making decisions to fabricate and test nuclear weapons.

3. A strong majority and perhaps as much as two-thirds or more of the UN General Assembly are in favor of the cessation of nuclear tests at least until more knowledge of the health factor is obtained.

4. The USDel at the UN was able to avoid a vote on this issue at this Assembly through referring all proposals by unanimous agreement to the subcommittee, and this is not likely to succeed again if the subcommittee does not make concrete progress.

5. The spreading of nuclear power plants will place into the hands of many nations the most important materials for future nuclear weapons fabrication.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-1357. Secret.

6. It is important to the future US national security that nuclear weapons should not be spread into many hands.

7. It is important to US national security that the US should be able to carry out tests in the spring of 1958 without the necessity of defying UNGA resolution in order to do so.

8. The unusual world wide public interest in nuclear testing can be used as a favorable element in obtaining the adherence of non-nuclear states to a treaty along the lines of US policy on the stopping of production of nuclear material for weapons purposes, and for the general abstention from nuclear weapons capability on the part of such non-nuclear states.

9. There is a better prospect of obtaining Soviet agreement to a limited treaty generally along the lines of US policy now than there has been at any point in the past eleven years.

10. Therefore, it is suggested that consideration begin to be given in Washington to a US position which would provide,

(a) If an agreement is reached for the establishment of an effective international control and the establishment of a control body to administer such control, satisfactory to the US, and

(b) If such a limited agreement includes the commitment to cease producing nuclear materials for weapons purposes and to begin transfers along the lines of US policy, and

(c) If the limited agreement includes the beginnings of reductions of armaments including nuclear delivery capabilities, and of armed forces and military expenditures under inspection along the lines of US policy, and

(d) If the agreement includes the beginnings of serial inspection, a commitment to progressively expand it, and improved safeguards against surprise attack,

(e) In that event, the limited treaty may include, effective as of August 1, 1958, or as soon thereafter as the treaty enters into force by the ratification of the essential govts in accordance with their constitutional processes, a limited suspension of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests for 12 months, such limited suspension to be verified by the control organ, and during such limited suspension the control organ, with a requirement of unanimous major power vote, shall either establish a new limitation agreement under inspection, or a continuing cessation under inspection, or the limited suspension shall automatically terminate and all states will be free as now to test by national decision.

**Whitney**



**182. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, April 17, 1957—4 p.m.*

5700. USDel Disarmament No. 131.

1. In view of Zorin statements at luncheon April 16 (Embtel 5619)<sup>2</sup> reflecting the importance in Soviet view of spread of nuclear weapons and some search on his part for clarification, a bilateral session was held at Lancaster House in the Chairman's room following adjournment of the subcommittee session April 16. Stassen, Peaslee, Matteson, Owsley (State), Abbott (DOD),<sup>3</sup> Goodby (AEC);<sup>4</sup> and Zorin and five of the Soviet delegates present. Akalovsky (US) interpreted.

2. Stassen opened discussion with statement he wished to clarify US position in response to questions raised by Zorin at luncheon and in subcommittee, and to invite further clarification by Zorin.

3. Zorin had spoken of US bases, the placing of US nuclear weapons in hands of other states on the periphery of the Soviet Union, and of Soviet view of these as threat to USSR security. Stassen emphasized that US position was defensive, that foreign bases and forces on foreign soil reflected different strategic and geographical situations of Soviet Union and US. Soviet Union had extensive geographical spread from border of Poland to Siberia, from Murmansk to borders of Iran. US in contrast had smaller geographical territory located within one continent. US had vital interests as well as geographical territory to safeguard. US had released the Philippines to full independence and had not taken any additional territory in areas like Africa and Near East after World War I and World War II. As President Eisenhower had stated to Chairman Bulganin at Summit meeting basic vital interests of Russia and the US were not in conflict, it should be possible to maintain peace, and the US must be expected to safeguard its territory and its vital interests in a manner in keeping with its own strategic position.

4. Stassen stated furthermore that Zorin apparently misunderstood present situation in that US had not delivered nuclear weapons to other states, that US law as now on the books prohibits delivery of US nuclear weapons to other states, but of course US law did not

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-1757. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Ottawa, and Tokyo.

<sup>2</sup> Reference should be to telegram 5691 from London, April 17, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Thomas W. Abbott, USAF, Adviser to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

<sup>4</sup> James E. Goodby, Office of International Affairs, AEC, and AEC Adviser to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

prohibit possession of nuclear weapons by US forces on territory of other states with consent of such other states. Stassen also emphasized difference between developments which had occurred and would likely occur in the absence of agreement on the subcommittee's work, as compared to results which would flow from a sound though limited agreement in the subcommittee's work.

5. Zorin conceded that strategic positions of US and USSR were quite different, but Soviets proceed from premise that security of US is not threatened because USSR has no bases on periphery of US. Presence of bases along borders USSR on other hand did constitute threat. Zorin referred not only to US bases, but bases of other countries using weapons supplied by US. Presence of units armed with nuclear weapons was special problem for USSR and other countries friendly to USSR. In addition, presence of US troops and troops of other nations stationed in foreign territories—e.g., Germany especially presence of atomic units, made solution of problems affecting US and USSR more difficult. Question of stationing troops was one that has been raised for some time but special problem of atomic units has become urgent only recently.

6. Zorin stated that presence of USSR troops in Germany and Warsaw Pact countries—although this was answer to stationing US troops in Germany and NATO countries—was also an impediment to our reaching agreement in subcommittee and, therefore, USSR proposals contemplated mutual reductions of troops in those areas. Because not realistic at this time, USSR did not contemplate complete troop withdrawal in a limited agreement although this had been previous Soviet position.

7. On prohibition use of atomic weapons, Zorin felt US laws were not enough to solve problem which had become matter for international solution. Neither was article 51 alone sufficient as it was pre-atomic. USSR has long thought start should be made by undertaking solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons. Now question should be one of how to formulate this solemn obligation in order guarantee security of all nations to some extent at least. USSR considers that formula stated in their proposals May 10, 1955 should go long way towards satisfying all requirements or at least some restrictions should be agreed.

8. As regards prohibition use nuclear weapons, Stassen stated that leaving matter for decision of Security Council was not acceptable since any one of 5 permanent members could stop use which would mean increased danger of conventional war on part of other nations counting on veto in Security Council preventing use of nuclear weapons. Any beginning of a conventional war by other states would include a danger of spreading to a major nuclear war.

9. Zorin suggested reduction of forces of major powers—especially United States and USSR—in Europe should lessen tension and permit solution of political problems and development collective security agreement in this part of world. Establishment of zone of limitation and inspection of military forces and armaments should set stage for collective security agreements, and political settlements. He said the United Kingdom had earlier proposed this.

10. Stassen inquired whether this element of Soviet proposals was considered indispensable part of any limited general agreement in subcommittee work or merely a desirable part.

11. Zorin replied that answer to this question would depend on determination of a number of parallel questions. Zorin further countered with question whether United States considered it possible to include something of these proposals in an eventual agreement.

12. Stassen replied he would not give categorical answer today but wished to acquire more thorough understanding of Soviet position in matter since it was after all Soviet proposal. Stassen stated that negotiations affecting political questions such European security and other European problems would not take place in subcommittee. He asked, however, whether problems to which Zorin referred as being easier of settlement included reunification of Germany.

13. Zorin reiterated point that reduction in armed forces stationed in foreign territories—particularly in Germany within a limited general disarmament agreement—would facilitate solution of various problems of regional security and that this armaments limitation can and should be negotiated in subcommittee.

14. Stassen restated that solution of political and European problems are not subject for subcommittee discussion.

15. Zorin said Soviets do not suggest solution of political problems be sought in subcommittee, but only that settlement of question of stationing of forces would lead to settlement of political problems. As regards problems establishing zones of armaments limitation and inspection this is included directly in subcommittee's terms of reference and has previously been proposed by Western powers including especially the United Kingdom.

16. At conclusion of meeting Zorin confirmed his intention return Moscow over Easter recess and that in fact he might wish stay even day or two longer in which case Roschin<sup>5</sup> (Counselor, Soviet Embassy, London) would carry on in his place.

**Whitney**

---

<sup>5</sup> Aleksei Alekseevich Roshchin, Soviet Minister-Counselor to the United Kingdom.

**183. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, April 20, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Disarmament

**PARTICIPANTS**

*Department of State*

The Secretary  
Mr. Robert Bowie, S/P  
Mr. Andrew Berding, P  
Mr. Walter N. Walmsley, IO  
Mr. Charles Stelle, S/P  
Mr. Gerard Smith, S/AE  
Mr. Ronald Spiers, UNP  
*Disarmament Staff*  
Governor Harold Stassen  
Mr. Robert Matteson  
Col. Ray Firehock  
Col. Benjamin Willis  
Mr. John Lippmann

*Atomic Energy Commission*

Mr. Lewis L. Strauss  
Admiral Paul Foster  
General Starbird  
Mr. Edward Gardner  
*USIA*  
Mr. Abbott Washburn  
*Central Intelligence Agency*  
Mr. Allen Dulles  
*Department of Defense*  
General Alonzo Fox<sup>2</sup>  
General Herbert Loper

The Secretary said that disarmament negotiations in London seemed to be sufficiently serious and have enough potentiality to warrant a stock-taking over the Easter recess. Whereas he had tried conscientiously to follow the cable reports which had been received, there was no substitute for personal talks.

The Secretary asked Governor Stassen to begin with a summary of the situation as he appraised it.

Governor Stassen said that he appreciated the opportunity to have a direct exchange of views and thanked the Secretary for the chance to return for this session. After he had received the Secretary's cable,<sup>3</sup> he had discussed the status of the negotiations separately with the heads of each of the other Western Delegations. He would like to give a very brief background statement and then focus on several of the key issues. He said at the beginning of the current negotiations the other Western Delegations had felt that in view of the current atmosphere the situation was almost hopeless, that there would likely be a short series of meetings and a quick adjournment. He had then counselled a careful exploration before reaching adverse conclusions. Gradually it became apparent that the Soviets were showing some interest

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2057. Top Secret. Drafted by Spiers on April 24.

<sup>2</sup> General Alonzo P. Fox, USA, Military Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 7370 to London, April 17, requested Stassen to return to Washington to report personally on the negotiations during the April 18-23 recess. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-1757)

in the possibility of reaching a first step agreement. At that point several of the other delegations and particularly Moch swung to an opposite extreme of optimism. Governor Stassen said that he had then cautioned against too optimistic a reaction and had pointed up the many difficulties in the way of an agreement, even for a limited first step. He said that at the recess for Easter another phase in the negotiations was just beginning. There was a substantial element (mostly trade and commercial) in the UK and France, which was against the reunification of Germany. They feared the future competition and were concerned of new future danger from Germany. They blamed Germany for their present difficult status. Since they believed that a first step disarmament agreement would facilitate reunification, these elements were opposed to such an agreement and were beginning to bring their influence to bear on their respective governments. Macmillan had sounded a somewhat different note in his statement in Commons last Wednesday to the effect that too narrow an agreement would be undesirable.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Delegation had begun an endeavor to convince the UK and France of the soundness to their national interest of a first step agreement which would be in the U.S. national interest. There were some other counter-balancing elements in the total situation since Adenauer had given a favorable view of U.S. policy as it was being presented in London in a public statement a week ago.<sup>5</sup>

Governor Stassen referred to the fact that Zorin had asked to see him on April 12 and had told him that the U.S. proposals were receiving serious study in Moscow.<sup>6</sup> Three days later Zorin informed Moch about his Easter recess trip to Moscow.<sup>7</sup> In Governor Stassen's view the important thing to look for now was what Zorin would come back with. There were certain important indications of a changing attitude on the part of the Soviets. They seemed to be ready for more inspection than heretofore, although they seemed also to be uncertain as to how much inspection they could accept and what its effect might be on the Soviet system. They recognized dangers to their regime in the opening up for inspection. They were also seriously thinking of what the effects of reductions might be on the European scene. They appeared to be worried about public resistance against the Soviet in East

---

<sup>4</sup> In the House of Commons, April 17, Macmillan said, among other things, that he favored full disarmament, and he rejected the abolition of nuclear weapons "without such corresponding reductions in conventional forces as would make Europe safe from Soviet aggression." (*Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 568, 5th Series, cols. 2038-2050)

<sup>5</sup> In a speech in Cologne on April 13, Adenauer argued that it was unrealistic to renounce in principle nuclear weapons given the present world situation. (*The New York Times*, April 14, p. 24)

<sup>6</sup> Stassen's conversation with Zorin following the subcommittee meeting of April 12 is summarized in telegram 5597 from London, April 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-1357)

<sup>7</sup> Moch's account of Zorin's travel plans is reported in telegram 5647 from London, April 15. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/4-1557)

Germany and Poland. Secondly, the Soviets seemed to be worried about the development of a multiple nation nuclear weapons capability. In his view, the Soviets were now giving serious thought to reaching a limited agreement. He thought that there was a reasonable probability that through arduous and careful negotiations a small first step that would be in the U.S. interest could result. He emphasized that by the nature of the situation such an agreement could not be overwhelmingly in the U.S. interest. However, he stressed that the Soviets had indicated the separability of certain of the points which had been heretofore the greatest obstacle to reaching agreement, such as the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and the abolition of all foreign bases. Governor Stassen thought that the developments in London were relevant to four U.S. objectives that the Secretary of State had enunciated: (1) stopping the spread of nuclear weapons development on the part of other countries; (2) reducing the possibility of surprise attack on the U.S.; (3) a beginning of the opening up of the Soviet Union; and (4) setting the stage for later negotiations on some of the outstanding major international political problems with which the U.S. was concerned. These, Governor Stassen said, were the U.S. foreign policy objectives which could be advanced by a limited first stage agreement without an unacceptable U.S. price in return. We have now reached a crucial turning point. When Zorin returns it may be either to close up the Subcommittee negotiations or to enter on a new stage of tough bargaining. Governor Stassen said that the latter eventuality would require a careful overall review of U.S. policy on disarmament in Washington.

The Secretary asked for more detail about what might be in such an opening step. Governor Stassen said that it would consist of first, a cutoff of nuclear production for weapons and, secondly, some kind of a limitation or cessation on nuclear testing. Governor Stassen emphasized that he did not think that any first step would have great significance in terms of the reduction of nuclear capability for either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. themselves. The important factor in his view, was what could be done in order to get the "fourth countries" to go along, sign the treaty, and stay out of the nuclear weapons production field. He was of the opinion that there would have to be some further movement in the U.S. position if this was to be accomplished. With respect to the cut-off on nuclear production, Governor Stassen said that the Russians were worried about the fact that there was no limitation in the U.S. position on further production of nuclear weapons from existing stocks of fissionable material on hand at the time of the cut-off and that the UK and France were also suspicious of this question in the U.S. position. Something will have to be done to assure other coun-

tries that we are not contemplating the continuing production of unlimited supplies of new weapons from fissionable materials on hand after the cut-off date.

The Secretary asked for Stassen's views on what the first step on nuclear testing would consist of. Governor Stassen reviewed the present U.S. policy on this question and observed that this would not be attractive enough to get the "fourth countries" to go along. The Soviet Union has moved slightly in its own policy, having indicated a willingness to accept a limited moratorium if a complete cessation were not acceptable to others. Governor Stassen then explained the meaning of his suggestion contained in Disarmament Telegram 119.<sup>8</sup> He said that Moch had told him that France would be ready to test its first weapon within two years, and that if some definite action were not taken by at least six months before the end of this period, it would be impossible to stop France from developing a weapons program. This would mean that Germany would also insist on going into production, and that the spread to many states would be almost inevitable. Governor Stassen emphasized that his twelve month limited suspension proposal would entail only a limited risk during the portion of year during which a nuclear inspection system was being installed.

Mr. Strauss observed that there would be other substantial penalties involved in acceptance of such a policy. Once a moratorium had been accepted it would not be easy to resume testing and a year of development would have been lost. The Secretary observed that he did not see how the "fourth country" problem would be solved if only a one year suspension were involved during which time countries could go ahead on the preparation for resumption of testing. Governor Stassen said that during these twelve months an inspection system to insure that all new fissionable production went for non-weapons purposes would be in the process of installation. The "fourth countries" would have taken commitment not to produce weapons. They would want to see how it worked out with the three nuclear weapon states. The treaty would include the escape clause for suspension or withdrawal if it did not work out. He thought that if, at the end of the twelve months period the three testing Governments had agreed on a system for test limitation of a small amount of fallout per year for each of the three, the "fourth countries" would be willing to stay with the agreement, depending, of course, upon the nature of the health reports which were then being received. Mr. Strauss observed that the U.S. was now in a position to make a family of weapons which would not produce as much strontium 90. This would not have been possible without a vigorous testing program. A discussion of the most recent

---

<sup>8</sup> Printed as telegram 5610 from London, Document 181.

British Atomic Scientists report on the health factor ensued.<sup>9</sup> Mr. Strauss minimized the health danger. Governor Stassen said that a major international scientific debate on this was underway; he had read the reports and believed the most that could be said was that the scientists did not know with certainty the extent of the health danger either genetically or of bone cancer and leukemia.

At the Secretary's request, Governor Stassen went on to the problem of conventional weapons, stating that the U.S. Delegation had put the emphasis, as urged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on nuclear weapons delivery systems. He had in the Subcommittee given alternative explanations of methods of accomplishing such reductions, as explorations and without commitment of the U.S. Government, such as the placing of 10 percent of these armament systems in "disarmament depots" while the inspection system was being installed. He noted that the Soviet Union had not objected to his proposal.

The Secretary asked what connection had been made between the armaments and the manpower reductions. Governor Stassen replied that it was felt by the Joint Chiefs that until a report on what the Russians had was received it would be impossible to work out a meaningful arms-manpower formula. That was why the U.S. proposed that an armaments report "blueprint" would be made during the third month of the agreement. This report would serve as the basis for negotiation of an arms-manpower formula. In the interim, governments would accept an arbitrary 10 percent cut. The Secretary observed that the calculation of such a formula need not be influenced by what the Russians have and that a formula could be arrived at through a process of simple reasoning. The Secretary said that he was concerned lest the U.S. end up with manpower reductions which would be meaningful for us but not for the Russians. He stressed again that the only effective limitations were limitations on armaments. The Secretary asked whether Governor Stassen had discussed with the Soviets a system of selective arms reduction which would concentrate on specific long-range delivery systems. Governor Stassen said that he had, and that the Russians had agreed that we should concentrate on the important arms categories, although they had, of course, made no firm commitments and neither had we.

Returning to the question of nuclear testing, Mr. Strauss said that he wished to emphasize the distinction in his mind between cessation and limitation. He would be willing to go along with a limitation on testing but he felt that cessation would mean the end of the U.S. weapons development program since scientists would drift away from the laboratories. The Soviets, on the other hand, were under no such

---

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to the British Atomic Scientists Association's report on strontium 90, summarized in *The New York Times*, April 17, 1957, p. 3.



handicap. They could break any agreement and end up far ahead of us. Some type of limitation, either on the size of weapons, the number of shots, or the amount of fallout produced, was an entirely different matter, in his view. Governor Stassen said that he thought it would be possible to keep the laboratories going under the system he proposed in Disarmament Telegram 119 if at the end of a year an agreed and monitored limitation were put into effect. Mr. Bowie pointed out that it could well be our position after further review during the twelve month period that the cessation could go on indefinitely. Mr. Washburn observed that if the moratorium were successful for one year the public pressure against resumption would be tremendous.

General Loper asked whether the first steps to which Governor Stassen referred would include conventional reductions and the provision for transfer of nuclear weapons materials to peaceful uses. Governor Stassen said that it did include these elements, as well as a beginning on aerial inspection and an agreement on its progressive installation.

General Fox explained the JCS view which had been contained in the October 30, 1956 letter to Governor Stassen.<sup>10</sup> Whereas this letter proposed a 10 percent reduction in nuclear delivery systems, to be followed by a further 15 percent second stage reduction, the JCS felt that the U.K. arms-manpower formula should be applicable to all other armaments. This distinction had not been made clear in Governor Stassen's proposals in London and he wished to emphasize that the JCS felt that there was a point beyond which we should not go in applying the percentage concept.

The Secretary asked how it would be possible to decide just how much 10 percent would be, since we would have no prior information on the total arms the Russians had. Governor Stassen stated that this could be determined on the basis of the report of an armaments "blueprint" which was due within the third month after the effective date of the treaty and which would be verified during the remaining nine months of the first year. The risk involved was self-limiting because of the "operational depot" idea.

Going on to the area of inspection and control, Governor Stassen outlined the U.S. views as they had been presented in London on ground and aerial inspection. The Secretary asked what implications Stassen's discussions on aerial inspection would have for the dividing line in Germany. Governor Stassen replied that he had been careful to avoid any measurements on the basis of the dividing line. He said that furthermore his discussions of the first step in progressive aerial inspection had been carefully presented as a "concept" and not as a detailed concrete proposal. He said the zone in Europe was described

---

<sup>10</sup> Document 164.

by latitude and longitude, the center was in the area of Vienna and Stockholm and did not fall on the dividing line in Germany. He remarked that the Canadian Cabinet had specifically endorsed the first step aerial inspection suggestions and had agreed to the inclusion of some of Canada in the Siberia-Alaska zone.

The Secretary said that he would give some further time for questions to Governor Stassen, after which he would like to hear the Governor's ideas about any modifications in his existing instructions which Stassen might consider appropriate. He emphasized that this meeting could not, of course, change these instructions since they would have to be considered by the NSC and the President. The Secretary believed it would be helpful to have Governor Stassen's views outlined in writing.

General Fox asked when, in Stassen's time table, the whole of the Soviet Union would be subject to aerial inspection. Governor Stassen said that no position had been taken on this, although he had repeatedly said that the U.S. still felt that it would be preferable to have total aerial inspection from the very beginning. With regard to the Secretary's request for his ideas as to possible modifications in instructions, Stassen thought that in general it would be best to await Zorin's return and carefully explore the Soviet post-recess position before we made any new move in U.S. Governmental proposals. However, he did feel that the testing problem would be a crucial one if Zorin came back ready to negotiate further. Secondly, he thought that it would be necessary for us to give an indication of a willingness to set some time or quantitative limits on the further production of weapons from fissionable material stocks that existed prior to the cut-off date upon installation of the inspection system. Mr. Strauss said that the present pipeline ran directly from production facilities to weapons and that there was no excess materials so that this should not present a serious problem. Governor Stassen asked whether we could say that we would accept two months limitation. Mr. Strauss said that he would like to consider this matter further and to discuss it with Mr. Allen Dulles before giving a firm answer, since the Russians might be able to deduce some sensitive information from such a statement. He said that it would be accurate to say that even the material which we will allocate to our allies abroad for power programs will come out of our current weapons production. Governor Stassen suggested that Mr. A. Dulles, Mr. Strauss and he meet on Monday<sup>11</sup> to discuss the matter.

Governor Stassen said that he had a few other general impressions which would interest the group. He said that it was clear to him that the Soviet Union was very much concerned about a rearmed and

---

<sup>11</sup> No record of this proposed April 22 meeting has been found in Department of State files.

uncontrolled Germany. The Soviet Union was also quite concerned about the "fourth country" problem and had repeatedly expressed its concern about the implications of having nuclear weapons in the hands of "irresponsible" powers not so much by what they could do in total, but the danger that their actions might lead to involvement with the U.S. The Secretary observed that this was an important common ground between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Strauss asked for clarification on a number of the details in Disarmament Telegram 119. He said that he was very reluctant to consider any policy change in this area but that in response to the query of the Secretary of State he would consider the matter most carefully. Governor Stassen pointed out that he had not asked for a decision in this telegram. He felt that any further thought on this matter would have to depend on the nature of Zorin's instructions upon his return from Moscow. As a result of this trip, the Soviets may well conclude that they do not wish to pay the price in terms of opening up the Soviet Union, for the possible advantages to them in limited agreement. The Secretary said that even if there were no substantial disarmament agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R any steps forward towards the elimination of the "fourth country" problem would justify our taking some risk. Mr. Strauss said that there was no 100 percent assurance that the "fourth country" problem could be solved. He said that in his view France or any other number of countries could build an old fashioned gun-type weapon in a short time even without tests, provided the material was available. Governor Stassen said that there would be little incentive for such a violation if a first step agreement could be reached. The risks of detection would far outweigh the advantage which would be gained by getting a small stock of bathtub-type weapons. If France and Germany would go along with such an agreement, he thought that no other country would refrain from going along. Public opinion in all countries would be on the side of joining such a first step under such circumstances, with the escape clause to fall back on.

The Secretary asked General Loper to have the Department of Defense staff draft a paper on this subject which could be cleared with Governor Stassen before he returns to London on Tuesday.<sup>12</sup>

Governor Stassen said that there was one final question which he wished to raise. The U.S. presently had no position for reductions beyond the 2.5 million. Some indication of a second stage would be necessary if Zorin indicated a willingness to move further. He asked the Department of Defense to begin to study this. General Fox noted

---

<sup>12</sup> No Department of Defense paper on this subject drafted before Stassen's return to London on Tuesday, April 23, has been found in Department of State files.

that the DOD's present instructions were that specific discussions of a second stage would depend on the status of solution of political problems.

The Secretary said he thought that it was most imperative to move towards a solution of the "fourth country" problem, towards control of long-distance delivery systems, as well as installation of an inspection system which would guard against surprise attack. In his view, an approach which involved numerical levels of man-power and armaments presented almost insoluble problems. Consequently, he was not certain that a discussion about a second stage would be fruitful and he did not think that we would be able to reach such an agreement in our lifetime. There were other problems which were more capable of being dealt with and he would hope that these problems would not be tied up with those which were less tractable and thus prevent the solution of any of them. Governor Stassen said that he had been urging this approach on Moch and Noble who had a tendency to think in too comprehensive terms. He had cautioned them that if too much were attempted only failure could result.

Mr. Strauss asked if he could have a copy of the latest revision of the draft treaty. The Secretary said that he would not wish to have a treaty discussed in the Subcommittee in London. If this became public knowledge there would be too much excitement in Congress.

Governor Stassen said that only the partial provisions had been discussed with other Delegations and that these did not even have position paper status. They were labelled as preliminary drafts of working papers of partial provisions. Governor Stassen said that he would like to discuss privately with the Secretary the question of Senate representation in London and a few other points. The Secretary agreed, but stated that he felt that Senate representation would be premature, although he would be willing to reconsider the matter if Zorin's new instructions made this appear desirable.

The Secretary noted that there were a great number of press people waiting outside for the meeting to break up and said that he would like to work out a line with Governor Stassen and Mr. Berding.<sup>13</sup> He asked that the others say only that the meeting had been held to receive a first hand report from Governor Stassen.

---

<sup>13</sup> For text of a statement agreed upon by Dulles and Stassen and read by Berding to news correspondents following this meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 13, 1957, p. 772.

184. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles'  
Residence, Washington, April 21, 1957, 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Call by Dr. Matsushita, Special Envoy to United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Matsushita, President of St. Paul's University, Tokyo (Prime Minister's Special Envoy to United Kingdom)

Mr. Shimoda, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., Embassy of Japan

The Secretary

Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

The Secretary invited Dr. Matsushita to call on him at his home today at 4:00 p.m. The Secretary stressed that the President and he feel it is imperative to find some way to stop the creation and possible use of atomic weapons. He said that in his speech on the following day<sup>2</sup> he would say that the use of such weapons would be disaster.

The Secretary said that the greatest difficulty results in the possession of atomic weapons by the Soviet Government, whose words can not be relied upon. How to accomplish the United States objective is not clear. The United States believes that the only safe method lies in a system of inspection and control. The Secretary informed Dr. Matsushita that Mr. Stassen had reported that the London Conference is slightly more encouraging, but it is still not clear whether a system of inspection and control can be obtained. Until we achieve this, we can not be sure that the Soviets will not get ahead of the free world, which would mean disaster.

Dr. Matsushita referred to the new Japanese proposal to figure out a way to detect the presence of atomic weapons.<sup>3</sup> He added hopefully that if such were possible, perhaps the world powers would stop testing and instead develop a system of control.

The Secretary explained that the United States is more concerned about the spread of atomic weapons than testing, because this could put the weapons into irresponsible hands. He added that perhaps too much stress is placed on testing, since if properly handled, testing involved little risk.

Dr. Matsushita replied that there is some disagreement among the scientists. Since the United States has a heavy responsibility in the defense of the free world, it probably underestimates the dangers of

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-2157. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons. This conversation was reported to Tokyo in telegram 2298, April 21. (*Ibid.*, 770.5611/4-2157)

<sup>2</sup> For text of Dulles' speech to the annual luncheon of the Associated Press in New York, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, pp. 715-719.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

tests. Japan, however, which experienced these weapons, perhaps overestimates the dangers. The Secretary referred to the United States initiative in cooperation to establish an international body to accumulate and evaluate information regarding the extent and dangers of radiation.<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Matsushita explained that in his conversation with European scientists he understood that continuation of the tests at the present rate for a long period of time is impossible from the viewpoint of safety. He added that Japan is very much concerned. The Secretary responded that it is a proper subject for concern. However, it is desirable not to view the tests out of relation to other dangers. He explained that the entire armament problem is somewhat like a chess game. He doubts that even the Soviets plan to use the atom bomb. The Soviets are anxious, however, to expand their armament position to the point where the free world feels checkmated and would then have to admit defeat and submit to Soviet domination. The Secretary said that this possibility is a greater danger than the risk of the possible use of the weapons or the risks involved in continuation of the tests. The Free World can not permit the Soviets to develop such a position.

The Secretary said that the situation is made more difficult by the inability of the free world to trust any promises by the Soviets. The Soviets are atheists and use any trick to achieve their ends. He alluded to the fact that the Soviets agreed during the armistice concluding the war with Japan in August 1945 to release all Japanese war prisoners. One month later, however, when Mr. Molotov was asked in London about releasing Japanese prisoners, he replied that that clause was included in the armistice for the sole purpose of obtaining Japan's surrender. The free world would be foolish to stop the tests merely on the promise of the Soviets to stop.

Dr. Matsushita explained that he could see completely the point of view expressed by the Secretary. In fact, he said, he was in the unfortunate position of having to agree with everything the Secretary said. However, Japan considers continuation of the tests a great danger, although it may not come for some time.

The Secretary explained that much of the testing by the United States has been for the purpose of developing a bomb with very little radiation. The last United States test in the Pacific demonstrated progress in this direction. He explained that widespread availability of atomic weapons could put the weapons into the hands of some coun-

---

<sup>4</sup> Presumably a reference to Resolution 913 (X) on the "effects of atomic radiation," cosponsored by the United States and adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly on December 3, 1955. See Document 84.

tries with little at stake. The U.S.S.R. has a great stake. Through forced sacrifice, the Soviet people have made industrial progress of which they are proud and would not want to have wiped out.

Dr. Matsushita commented that the majority of the Japanese people are sympathetic with and friendly to the United States. The Japanese know that it is in the best interests of Japan to work closely with the United States. However, the Communists take advantage of every possible opportunity. If the Communists were to take the lead in eliminating the atomic danger, this could increase the neutralist tendencies in Japan. Dr. Matsushita explained that he had accepted his assignment by Prime Minister Kishi because he was convinced that liberty-loving people should lead the movement. He added that the United States at times may not like some of the Japanese courses but the long-term interests of United States-Japanese relations indicate the desirability of a sympathetic attitude on the part of the United States. He explained that intelligent people know the Soviets can not be trusted. The Japanese, however, have suffered the atomic bomb and the public is emotional on the subject.

The Secretary referred to a recent statement by Prime Minister Macmillan that the free world remains so because the United States possesses atomic striking power.<sup>5</sup> The Secretary said that United States policy must take a sober view of the rights and wrongs; we can not have a policy which merely responds to the psychological and emotional waves of another country.

Dr. Matsushita stated that the solution is partly a matter of technique. Responsible people in Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom must continue to put the blame where it belongs. The Secretary responded that the question of technique was initiated following the Bermuda Conference, when it was stated that registration of tests is a first step in the right direction.<sup>6</sup> The United States and the United Kingdom always announce in advance that a test will be made. The Soviets, however, are not willing either to register or to announce any tests in advance. The Secretary said he is convinced that the Soviets will not be satisfied unless the United States is put in a position of having to discontinue all research on atomic matters. In a free country, this is too great a risk, and re-assembly of scientific workers would be

---

<sup>5</sup> In a speech on April 17, Macmillan argued that his government favored disarmament covering both nuclear and conventional weapons, but he rejected the abolition of nuclear weapons "without such a reduction of conventional weapons as would make Europe safe from Soviet aggression." (*The New York Times*, April 18, 1957, p. 4)

<sup>6</sup> The final sentence of Annex II to the joint statement by Eisenhower and Macmillan, dated March 24, at the conclusion of their Bermuda meetings reads:

"We would be willing to register with the United Nations advance notion of our intention to conduct future nuclear tests and to permit limited international observation of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the same." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1957, p. 212)

very timeconsuming. He explained that United States policy continuously evaluates all aspects of a course of action and that the United States follows a policy which it believes best not only for the United States but for the entire free world. However, the United States is never rigid in its decision but always willing to follow an alternative course which has been demonstrated to be correct.

Dr. Matsushita expressed his great satisfaction for the opportunity to discuss these matters with the Secretary on such short notice, and he was grateful to the Secretary for giving his time on such an important day as Easter Sunday.

---

**185. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Augusta, Georgia, April 23, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

OTHERS PRESENT

Governor Stassen  
Mr. Hagerty  
General Goodpaster

In responding to a question by the President, Governor Stassen said that all delegations at the Disarmament Subcommittee Conference in London seemed to be making a much more serious approach to the problem this time than heretofore. This seriousness was shown beginning with the setting up of the agenda, which was done in a businesslike way. It was further shown in the Subcommittee's handling of suggestions received from four countries not on the Subcommittee. Governor Stassen interjected that his own setup, in which he is working under the Secretary of State's supervision, is proving successful.

Governor Stassen said that he himself had gone quickly to the substance of the problem in his own discussions in the Subcommittee, and that he had spoken quite frankly on two or three key issues. In response to this approach, Zorin (the Soviet delegate) had indicated he was prepared to consider making the Soviet proposal for complete elimination of nuclear weapons "separable" from other elements in the disarmament proposals. Governor Stassen said he had also told Zorin that we are not going to agree to their proposal that foreign

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 24. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Dulles, Wilson, and Strauss under cover of an April 27 memorandum from Cutler. (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, General Memcons)



bases be abolished, and Zorin had expressed agreement to lay aside this question. Further, whereas the Soviets had called for an agreement which would establish from the outset all the stages and steps incident to control of armaments, Zorin had indicated some readiness to consider our approach through successive stages, in which performance on one stage could be observed as a basis for deciding what further steps might next be taken.

Governor Stassen said that the discussions are not yet at the point of developing specific language: to date the whole matter have been one of probing.

Governor Stassen reported that Secretary Dulles gives very high priority in any agreement to provisions which would prevent the spread of atomic weapons to fourth countries, and high priority also to provisions which would save us from surprise attack. He stresses the importance for many reasons of the "opening up" of the Soviet Union which the inspection operation would accomplish. (The President commented that the Soviets would seem to have more to gain from preventing the spread of atomic weapons to fourth countries than do we, and that this might prove a valuable bargaining point.)

Governor Stassen said the British and French initially had expected only a short, fruitless meeting. Then they began to get quite optimistic, and it has been necessary to hold them down a bit. He said that some British and French opinion now indicates reservations concerning German reunification. It fears a furthering of present tendency for the Germans to best them in commercial competition. Governor Stassen said he has pointed out the importance of the common market in this regard. The President added that a reunified Germany will have to carry its own defense burden in larger measures than at present; a lessening of their present competitive advantage should result.

The President asked as to indications of any Soviet readiness to accept inspection. Governor Stassen said they have indicated willingness to give a good deal on this issue, but seem genuinely worried as to whether they could sustain their regime under such circumstances. They show signs of wanting a first step agreement, coupled with worry over its effect on internal stability of their system. He said he had indicated to them that if they lay aside the unacceptable proposals mentioned earlier, we might be prepared to agree initially on less than complete air inspection throughout their entire country, so long as there is an undertaking to expand progressively the geographical area to be inspected. He said that he had shown the Soviet delegation as an illustrative possibility the two zones for an initial inspection program that had been discussed here, and they had shown immediate and vivid interest.

Governor Stassen, referring to the provision for the stopping of atomic materials production for weapons purposes, said the Soviets had probed as to whether we have a stockpile of fissionable material not yet fabricated into weapons (which could be used to continue to make weapons, or put in the hands of our allies for them to make weapons). He said the Departments are studying in Washington as to whether we might be able to let them know that the stockpile is in weapons. He said the French are less than two years from the point of being ready to test a weapon (I believe he used the figure eighteen months). If they are to stop this development, they should stop soon. If the French were to conduct a test, it is hard to see how the Germans could be stopped from carrying out this development. The President again commented that he thinks Russia has more to fear than we from fourth nation development of nuclear arms. Governor Stassen said he thought this was particularly true in their minds with regard to Germany and Japan. He quoted Zorin to the effect that the Soviets recognize the U.S. tries to take a responsible attitude in world affairs. They are fearful, however, that an irresponsible country might do something which would draw the U.S. into conflict with them.

The President asked whether, in Governor Stassen's talks with State, Defense, and AEC in Washington, these representatives had indicated they saw anything sinister or dangerous in the Soviet attitude. Governor Stassen said that he believed Admiral Strauss felt that if testing were discontinued it would be practically impossible for him to hold his scientific forces together. The President said this would seem to mean that any first agreement must be so strong and effective as almost certainly to lead to further steps. Governor Stassen said he felt the Joint Chiefs were concerned that we would not hold the Soviets to the full requirements of the first agreement, or take all action in our power should they depart from these provisions. The President said he saw real reasons for concern on this and other scores in the Defense field. If the agreement were obtained, public support of adequate defense might well drop markedly, and we might fall to too low a strength in defensive forces. Governor Stassen stressed the need to make clear that a first agreement is not itself the millenium.

Regarding plans for the reduction of forces, Governor Stassen said that three months after a treaty became effective blueprints would be exchanged. Nine months later, each country would put ten percent of its military equipment into moth balls, within its own country but under international inspection. Following this twelve-month period the question of the next step would arise. The Russians show great suspicion on this matter, indicating that it is simply a way to get intelligence about them. We are saying that world opinion would decide whether the first stage was being carried out in good faith, and would create great pressure for a next stage. Governor Stassen said

that the next stage might, according to the JCS, be fifteen percent additional reduction. The President said that if a ten percent reduction were really carried out, the logic of the development would carry the process on. Governor Stassen said that the first treaty would cover the initial activity, and the initial organizational setup. A new treaty would then be in order to carry the matter further.

The President then discussed briefly with Governor Stassen the program of meetings that he is conducting, and Governor Stassen described the daily meetings of our own delegation, a noon meeting of the Western countries, an afternoon meeting three or four times a week with the full delegation, and private bilateral meetings from time to time as seems appropriate. He said that he has established liaison with the delegations of some seventeen countries in London to keep them in the picture constantly.

Responding to a question by the President concerning nuclear tests, Governor Stassen said that the position as developed in his "precept" prior to the London meeting is being put forward—if agreement were reached to discontinue production for weapons purposes, and to start to make transfers over to peaceful use from existing stocks, and a start were made on such transfers, and fourth countries accepted abstinence from production, we would then be prepared to stop or limit our tests. He said that the French and some other delegations are pressing for a greater degree of commitment. He said that we are now studying within the U.S. Government, whether we might propose a twelve-month moratorium on testing conditioned on agreement to cut off production for weapons purposes and to make transfer to peaceful use. He said that the intricate interrelationship of stopping weapons production and stopping tests is being very carefully studied by U.S. agencies, without, of course, raising it with foreign delegations.

The President said he thought the U.S. might be the hardest to convince on the limiting of tests. Our scientists are fascinated by the research they are enabled to carry out through this means—research which has a very large nonmilitary as well as military significance. Other countries tend to view the testing as simply military in purpose. In further discussion, the President said that he sometimes thinks that unlimited right of inspection may be almost an essential to any disarmament agreement.

Governor Stassen brought up the question of the limit of reduction of military forces. He did not think that a plan to go down to purely internal forces would be sound. Some forces patterned for defense against external attack must be retained for the foreseeable future. The President said that the tendency, once a limited disarmament has been initiated, could be to keep going on down in strength. Governor Stassen referred to the experience at the time of Hitler, in which other nations were so weak that someone willing to break

agreements was able to place himself quickly in a relatively very strong position. After further discussions, the President and Governor Stassen agreed that the first step in disarmament is likely to be the hardest.

Governor Stassen indicated that Zorin had said on April 12th that the U.S. proposals were being very carefully reconsidered in Moscow and that he would go back to receive the results of this study. Secretary Dulles had then thought that this was a good time for Governor Stassen to come back. Governor Stassen said that there is evidence of a minority in the Soviet Union who say simply that the U.S. is preparing for a day when it will move to smash Russia. In the early days of the negotiations Zorin was watching carefully to see if the U.S. was serious. As both sides avoided propaganda activity over the initial negotiations, the impression of seriousness grew. Zorin, for example, asked if the Senate would ratify the agreement once reached. Governor Stassen told him that if the President and Secretary Dulles considered that the agreement was sound, and approved it, they would be able to gain the necessary support of the people and of the Senate. The President confirmed that he felt support could be rallied on a disarmament agreement evaluated as sound.

Governor Stassen said the next step will be to complete the discussion of the inspection organization, and then take up the question of missiles and rockets. Zorin may be expected to have a reaction to indicate when he comes back. If he takes an obstinate stand on any collateral issue, this will be evidence of Soviet rejection of the idea of trying to reach agreement. If he continues with serious discussion, this will tend to indicate that the Soviets see some possibility of achieving progress in disarmament.

Governor Stassen and Mr. Hagerty then drafted a statement for the press, and checked it with Secretary Dulles by phone. The President approved it, and Mr. Hagerty released it to the press.<sup>2</sup>

**G**  
*Brigadier General, USA*

---

<sup>2</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 13, 1957, p. 772.

**186. Editorial Note**

From April 24, 1957, to March 14, 1958, the United States conducted Operation Plumbbob, a nuclear test series at Yucca Flat, Frenchman Flat, and Jackass Flat on the Nevada Test Site in the continental United States. During the test period 34 shots were detonated. Several thousand scientific, military (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines), and civilian contract personnel participated in the organization, planning, and execution of the test series. Military exercises undertaken during and following the shots took place under the name Exercise Desert Rock 7 and 8.

Numerous weapons test reports, scientific studies on radiation and fallout, and other documents relating to the test series are in the Defense Nuclear Agency Technical Library in Alexandria, Virginia.

For summary history of part of this operation, see S. Weary, W. Ozeroff, J. Sperling, et al., *Prototype Report: Plumbbob Series, 24 April-7 October 1957*. Regarding congressional hearings on the radiation effects of nuclear tests in the 1950s and 1960s on the health of humans and animals in the area, see Document 8.

---

**187. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, April 27, 1957—11 a.m.*

5847. USDel Disarmament No. 148. Ref London Embtel 5838 (USDel Disarmament No. 145), and London Embtel 5845 (USDel Disarmament No. 147).<sup>2</sup>

1. Following Zorin request, bilateral session held with SovDel at Lancaster House, April 26. Stassen, Peaslee, Matteson, Owsley (State), Higgins (DOD),<sup>3</sup> Goodby (AEC) and Zorin and seven of the SovDel present. Akalovsky (US) interpreted, Eden (US)<sup>4</sup> reporting officer.

2. Zorin opened session and proceeded to outline Sov position along following lines: After consulting with Sov Gov't it was still Sov position that agreement on at least basic disarmament issues was

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2757. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed. (Both *ibid.*, 330.13/4-2657)

<sup>3</sup> Commander Elmore F. Higgins, USN, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

<sup>4</sup> Arthur Eden, senior research analyst on Stassen's Special Staff.

needed but subcommittee meetings showed insufficient basis for reaching comprehensive agreement, revealed Western support for partial agreement, and taking a realistic approach the USSR was prepared to consider a partial agreement which encompassed three factors; reductions in conventional forces and arms, nuclear weapons, and control.

3. Zorin stated Sov impression that US wants to move toward partial agreement was reinforced after reading recent Eisenhower and Dulles statements during Stassen conferences in US.

4. Stassen concurred that results most likely if we focused on partial agreement which would in turn facilitate later steps. He reaffirmed that his trip to Washington decided after Sov announcement of Zorin trip. He said the US took a positive attitude toward efforts to negotiate a sound partial agreement.

5. Responding to direct question Stassen stated that first partial agreement should include appropriate features of the three issues outlined by the Sovs; i.e., reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces, nuclear weapons, and control. It should be possible to include more.

6. Zorin handed Stassen aide-mémoire<sup>5</sup> which he stated contained not only proposals but supporting motivations (forwarded separately as USDel Disarmament No. 147). He then commented on specific Sov proposals.

7. Proposed forces and conventional arms reductions were based on strategic considerations: Larger Sov territory, US separated by oceans and surrounded by friendly countries, USSR ringed by hostile military blocs. Sovs therefore unable to agree to equal level of forces if there is no substantial forces reduction. Stated need to agree on two-stage reductions; i.e., 2.5 million and 1.5 million. Sovs would propose armaments and budgets be reduced 15 percent in first stage rather than 10 percent as proposed by US. Further reductions to follow additional manpower cuts.

8. Zorin stated liquidation of some military bases, including Big Four reductions in Germany, closely connected with conventional reductions.

9. Zorin alluded to difficulty of reaching comprehensive nuclear agreement. Emphasized need to take concrete steps to halt nuclear race and prevent "fourth countries" from having such weapons. Two steps in Sov memo, he said, would take care of this problem: Cessation or suspension of tests and a declaration on prohibition of use of

---

<sup>5</sup> The Soviet aide-mémoire given to Stassen on April 26 is quoted in full in telegram 5845 from London, April 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2657) It is printed as a Soviet memorandum submitted to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/55) on April 30 in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 778-787.

nuclear weapons. These two proposals are minimum for agreement. Test cessation could be worked out even before first stage as a separate measure.

10. In control field, Sovs proposed a control organ be established within the framework of the Security Council. Proposal indicates territories in which control posts should be established.

11. Zorin said USSR desirous of meeting US position on including aerial inspection in partial agreement. Sovs adopted US approach of delimiting zones by longitudes and latitudes. Do not include North Pole in aerial zones and prefer to focus on areas with greatest concentration of forces. Details of Sov inspection zone proposals outlined in aide-mémoire. Zorin displayed color maps of the aerial zones. Zorin said the zones were subject to negotiation.

12. Sovs also indicated limited number of control posts in first stage.

13. Zorin referred to Sov declaration calling on states to reject war propaganda and spreading ideological struggle on plane of interstate relations.

14. March 18 proposals<sup>6</sup> remain in force and can be considered in negotiations for partial agreement or a supplementary agreement. Zorin mentioned European zone of limitation specifically, which is excluded from current memo.

15. In response to Zorin request for preliminary comment, Stassen outlined three-step US procedure relating to latest Sov paper. US would first study proposals and endeavor to thoroughly understand new Sov position; then begin to convey US reactions; and finally proceed with serious negotiations in an endeavor to reach partial agreement on the differences of position.

16. Stassen stated appeared to him best way to proceed was for the US to make no comments at this session, to read the documents first, and then meet with the Sov delegation on the morning of the 27th at Lancaster House to begin to ask the Sov questions for clarification in endeavor to attain an understanding of the new Sov position. Zorin concurred in this procedure.

(Reftels being rptd by London to Moscow.)

**Whitney**

---

<sup>6</sup> For the Soviet proposal on reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which was introduced in the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/49) on March 18, see *ibid.*, pp. 752-757.

**188. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, April 28, 1957—1 p.m.*

5854. USDel Disarmament No. 151.

1. Following are highlights of bilateral meeting between Zorin and Stassen each accompanied by six members delegations at Lancaster House, afternoon April 27. Full account being pouched.<sup>2</sup>

2. Stassen gave USDel provisional and preliminary reaction to Soviet memo of April 26.<sup>3</sup> Acknowledged impression seriousness of proposals for partial agreement but said memo revealed many difficult issues which would present hard negotiating problems and may mean agreement impossible.

3. Stassen stated Soviet formula for prohibition on use of atomic weapons unacceptable in its present form. US cannot be expected commit itself not to use atomic weapons if vital interests attacked by aggressor using such weapons; or other weapons, especially if US reduced forces in accordance with agreement. On the other hand, there might be some improvement over vague formula not to use nuclear weapons except against aggression.

4. Any provision for nuclear control in a partial agreement ought to contribute to solution of "4th country" problem, with which Soviet said it was concerned. Stassen suggested exploring possibility that nations not possessing nuclear weapons might agree not to possess, manufacture or use them, if the nuclear-weapons countries had undertaken to halt further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, etc. along line of US proposal.

5. Zorin said all nations were interested in preventing "aggression" but the word could not be defined. USSR therefore had sought to find formula to keep A-weapons from being used. He indicated that if the proposals contained in Soviet memorandum were unacceptable, further negotiation might turn up compromise formula.

6. Stassen noted that in Soviet proposal cessation of nuclear weapons production seemed linked with complete elimination and prohibition which impossible to ensure under known methods of control. However, if the principal nuclear-weapons states undertook to halt production of further fissionable material for weapons, other states might accept further forms of prohibition. If the nuclear powers did not do this, other countries, e.g. France and West Germany, and many others would very probably undertake nuclear weapons manu-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-1757. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.



facture. Some curb on weapons production could be included in a first phase partial agreement, if not in its first year, under inspection procedures which would be compatible to the US, USSR and UK.

7. Zorin replied that Soviet did not believe halt of weapons production possible in a partial agreement unless complete prohibition and elimination were also provided. He argued that controls necessary to insure fissionable material for weapons production curb would mean close supervision and control of a country's entire atomic economy. Stassen explained that such onerous controls were not necessary and not contemplated. Zorin then said that if US could supply any formulation of the kind of undertakings it had in mind which might be entered into by "fourth countries", the Soviet delegation would be glad to examine it together with reconsideration of whole problem of nuclear controls in a partial agreement.

8. Stassen noted except for aerial inspection USSR permitted less inspection in the partial plan than in its earlier proposals. Negotiations would have to reconcile differences on extent of controls. He noted that zones of aerial inspection conceived by Soviet left great areas for Soviet forces in Soviet hinterland uncovered, but blanketed Western European forces right to the oceans. Also Stassen noted inclusion further territories and capitals, including Paris. Zorin replied that number of forces and capitals included in Western and Russian areas under its inspection scheme were roughly equal and exact definition of the zones could be subject to further negotiation.

9. On question of levels of forces, Stassen commented on the disproportion between suggested one-third cut for troops on German soil and reductions to ceilings of 2.5 million and 750,000 in a first phase agreement. Also pointed out that discussion of one-third cut for Germany involved difficult political issues which made the inclusion of such a provision in a partial agreement the more difficult. Zorin said proposition took account of extensive cuts already made by Soviet Union and those contemplated by UK. Did not think size of cuts could be obstacle to first phase agreement. However, amount of reductions was negotiable. In response to query from Stassen as to whether the Soviet proposal on troops in Germany was indispensable to Soviet partial plan, Zorin refrained from saying that it was, or was not, but said it would contribute to beneficial trend in foreign affairs which he saw in the making. In response to another question, he confirmed that the suggestion for cuts in the forces of NATO and Warsaw countries was an additional proposal, not an alternative one. He pointed out, however, that no figure was stipulated for size of cuts.

10. Stassen referred briefly to other issues: The US and Soviet positions on nuclear test explosions were still opposed and there was also the important question of levels of forces to be reached after a first phase. In reply to Zorin's question he said he hoped some provision

could be made on these problems in a partial agreement. He understood Soviet concern about reductions to follow after a first phase, but emphasized that 1,500,000 was an unacceptable figure.

11. Zorin said that he hoped that the item "zones of inspection" might be concluded in the next sub-committee meeting, and that SovDel might or might not introduce its new partial plan. He stated a strong belief in utility of bilaterals and requested a continuation of such sessions as well as parallel subcommittee and five power sessions.

**Whitney**

---

**189. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, April 28, 1957—2 p.m.*

5857. USDel Disarmament No. 153.

1. It is the appraisal of the USDel that the most recent Soviet memorandum and the Zorin explanations<sup>2</sup> indicate a serious intention of the Soviet Union to endeavor to negotiate a partial agreement. It is a "hard bargaining" opening in such a process of negotiation. It pointedly avoids the completely unacceptable proposals for complete elimination of foreign bases and complete elimination of nuclear weapons and for the initial inclusion of the Peoples Republic of China. Negotiability of other issues has been stated by Zorin. It will be extremely difficult, however, to attain the essential objectives and fit together terms under which additional states would be willing to abstain in the nuclear weapons field and which, at the same time, are acceptable to the United Kingdom, U.S. and Soviet Union.

**Whitney**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2857. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See telegrams 5847 and 5854, Document 187 and *supra*, respectively.

190. **Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 1, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Senatorial Support for Ratification of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

It is our judgment that the International Atomic Energy Agency Treaty is bogged down badly. Hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate are tentatively scheduled to start on May 10.<sup>2</sup> It is reported that there is a general lack of enthusiasm in the Senate. Lewis Strauss and I have talked to Senators Hickenlooper and Knowland who appear to be not very sympathetic. Apparently, a number of Senators have been persuaded by a former employee of the Atomic Energy Commission that there are substantial objections to the Treaty. The Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission believe there are solid answers to the objections which have been raised and they are being supplied to all members of the Senate.<sup>3</sup>

However, as things now stand, the Treaty seems to have a poor chance of obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote—in the absence of a strong intervention on your part.

In view of the urgency of this matter and the shortness of time before the Hearings start, it is recommended that you call in Senators Knowland, Hickenlooper and Bridges to impress upon them the vital significance of prompt ratification in the International Agency and to urge them to take up the cudgels for this Treaty. I believe they would respond.

Senator Bricker has expressed the idea that if the Treaty is to be ratified, certain reservations should be attached. He has not advised us of the nature of these reservations. You may want to include Senator Bricker in this meeting.

Against the possibility that these Senators may want to raise specific objections, it is suggested that Lewis Strauss and I participate in such meeting. Ambassador J. J. Wadsworth, who was the U.S. Representative at the conference in New York last fall which adopted this Treaty, would also be available.

**Christian A. Herter**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.

<sup>2</sup> The hearings began on May 10 and continued throughout the month.

<sup>3</sup> Hickenlooper submitted 48 questions to Herter regarding the IAEA statute on April 29. Herter responded to Hickenlooper with detailed answers to the questions on May 3. (Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57-D 688, IAEA—General)

**191. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 2, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

## OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter  
Admiral Strauss  
Governor Adams  
Mr. Harlow  
Ambassador Wadsworth  
General Goodpaster

The meeting was concerned with the resistance being manifested in the Senate to prompt ratification of the International Atomic Energy Agency treaty. Admiral Strauss reviewed certain of the questions of challenges being raised against the treaty—that it is a “give away” (which it is not); that third countries would be enabled to develop atomic weapons (they will in any event, and the treaty provides a means of instituting inspection); that Red China can join the Agency (we retain the right to pull out at any time on due notice—here the President added that to get in they would have to subject themselves to inspection with much of the same result as his own air inspection proposal); that the Agency is not necessary since we have bilateral agreements (we have these with some, not all, free world countries, and many countries are not subject to inspection); that the satellites could obtain our contributions of fissionable material (in fact, we can direct our contributions to countries with whom we have bilateral treaties); that the treaty, once approved, could be amended to include provisions adverse to U.S. interest (amendment requires a 2/3 vote, we would be free to drop out of the organization in such case, and amendment could only bind us upon our ratifying it).

After some further discussion it was agreed, and the President arranged by phone, for the President to meet with Senators Knowland and Hickenlooper on this matter at 11 o'clock tomorrow.<sup>2</sup>

**G***Brigadier General, USA*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 2. The conference was held following the NSC meeting. Another meeting was held later that day with the President, Strauss, Gerard Smith, Wadsworth, and Goodpaster, during which they discussed the arguments raised against the IAEA statute. (Memorandum of conference by Goodpaster, May 3; *ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Eisenhower met with Knowland and Hickenlooper on May 3 from 11:02 to 11:42 a.m. (*ibid.*, Eisenhower Records, President's Appointment Book for 1957), but no record of their conversation has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

**192. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, May 5, 1957.*

DEAR FOSTER: Since our conferences in Washington on April 20<sup>2</sup> and April 23,<sup>3</sup> I have been following through on the guidance and directives which you gave me and have been concentrating on the priority US objectives which you outlined.<sup>4</sup> The new Soviet paper which Zorin brought back from Moscow and handed to me on April 26 has been reviewed bilaterally and multilaterally. As you anticipated, the fourth country problem is an important mutual interest between the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is clear that the new Soviet paper is a negotiating document and the Soviet Union will move on any of the provisions, but does have important limits on the amount it will move in the total situation and limits on some specific provisions.

We now have quite a clear view of the kind of partial agreement which would on balance be acceptable to France and the Federal Republic of Germany and other key non-nuclear countries, to the USSR, and to the UK; and which would serve the priority US objectives without an excessive price, and thus, on balance would be in the US national interest.

I also have views on the method of negotiation from this point forward which would yield the best chance of moving toward such a partial agreement. These will be further clarified after Monday's sessions and Tuesday's US Delegation review.<sup>5</sup>

If you were so inclined, I would like to go over both the substance of such a partial agreement and the negotiating method, with you personally, and reshape it with your counsel and direction, before submitting it to the Department concretely and before putting it into the interdepartmental consideration as you requested in Washington. If you think well of this, I believe I could get away from London at any

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-557. Top Secret; Personal.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 183.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conference has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> No specific paper listing Dulles' directives and priority U.S. directives has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, but see Document 183. For Stassen's review of Dulles' priority objectives, see Document 195.

<sup>5</sup> The subcommittee meeting on Monday, May 6, was devoted almost entirely to the response of the British representative, Commander Noble, to the Soviet proposals of April 30. Stassen remarked in part: "I intend to discuss the important Soviet proposals (DC/SC.1/55) of 30 April at an early date, but not today." (Department of State, Disarmament Files; Lot 58 D 133, Subcommittee Meetings, London, 1957, DC/SC.1/PV.110) No record of a U.S. Delegation review on Tuesday, May 7, has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

time after our Wednesday afternoon session, May 8th, and could arrange on general grounds a four or five days recess of the Sub-Committee.<sup>6</sup>

The Soviet continues to show signs of some skepticism as to the US intentions in these negotiations. Your statement about carefully measured steps carefully taken has been of great assistance in drawing out the Soviet position. It is now quite definite that the Soviet will give consideration to our legitimate security concerns if the US will give consideration to their legitimate security concerns, and that the emphasis which you placed on mutual interest in certain situations is bringing about a favorable movement toward a partial agreement.

I know I need not emphasize that there remain very great difficulties in the way, as you are fully aware of this. But our US Delegation is now unanimous that we have reached a different situation than at any time before in the eleven years of talks, and that there are definite possibilities of advancing important US objectives.

Robert Bowie's debriefing of the NATO sessions in relationship to our work was very helpful to our Delegation.<sup>7</sup> Thank you for asking him to come over to London.

I trust you had a good trip to Bonn and have a pleasant flight back home. Reports here of your Bonn leadership have been excellent.

Sincerely,

**Harold**

---

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 7854 to London, May 8, Dulles responded to Stassen's suggestion as follows:

"Reference your letter May 5, I feel your return at present would give rise to undesirable optimistic speculation. Also I feel that unless some preparatory work is done it would not be practical to get within a few days the new position needed for your purposes. I wonder whether under the circumstances it would not be better for you first of all to cable or mail in concrete terms the elements of the partial agreement which you think would be acceptable to us and have some chance of achievement. Then this could be studied here for a few days and after it has been studied then you could, if it still seems desirable, return in person." (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-857)

<sup>7</sup> No record of Bowie's debriefing has been found in Department of State files. Regarding the NAC Ministerial meetings in Bonn, May 2-4, see vol. iv, pp. 167-169.

193. **Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)**<sup>1</sup>

London, May 7, 1957.

DEAR CHRIS: Thank you for your thoughtful letter of May 3rd<sup>2</sup> enclosing a copy of an evaluation of the Soviet disarmament proposals of April 26th drawn up in the Department.<sup>3</sup>

Your estimate in the Department runs along very much the same lines as the estimate developed here in the Delegation. It also checks quite well with the evaluation by the other Western Delegations, although the British are showing rather more reserve and we are not certain of the complete motivations for their position.

I am enclosing an interim memorandum of some of our further appraisal of the Soviet proposals. We are also developing the USDEL recommendations to the U.S. government. I wrote to the Secretary while he was at Paris with some suggestions for his consideration as to the procedure to be followed.<sup>4</sup>

I have asked Lawrence Weiler, a member of the Delegation who has been one of the State Department personnel on our Special White House Study Group to bring this letter to you, and copies of the memorandum to the Department. He will be available for staff level discussions in the Interdepartmental work. He is thoroughly familiar with all of the various bilateral and multilateral discussions in London.<sup>5</sup>

Sincerely,

Harold

[Enclosure]

INTERIM APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF  
APRIL 26, 1957 AND OF THE RELATED SITUATION

1. *The key sentence in the Soviet paper is the following:*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-757. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Delivered by hand 5/8 12:25 pm."

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 600.0012/5-357)

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>5</sup> A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Would like to see Weiler if available. C.A.H." No record of a meeting between Herter and Weiler has been found in Department of State files, but Weiler later confirmed to the editors that he met with Herter upon his return to Washington on this occasion.

"The Soviet Government proposes that the governments of the States represented in the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission should reach an agreement on partial disarmament measures".

2. *The primary Soviet concern* for their own future security is that the spread of nuclear weapons, through their production by additional countries and/or through the transfer by the U.S. and the UK, and through the consequential delivery of nuclear weapons to China and some of the Eastern European force by the USSR, is likely to result, from either careless, irresponsible, or headstrong action, by some state other than the U.S. and the USSR, in the triggering of hostilities which would then involve the U.S. and the USSR in a nuclear war; and this would occur under circumstances in which the U.S. would have a posture that would result in the substantial destruction of the Soviet Union.

3. *It is the Soviet estimate* of the U.S. position that the U.S. is also concerned about the fourth country spread of nuclear weapons production, but that the U.S. does not put as much weight on the spread through nuclear weapons transfer, does not realize the countering pressures for Soviet delivery to Warsaw states and China, and that the U.S. does have some concern over a future potential of surprise attack upon the U.S.

4. *The Soviet Union is prepared* to reach an agreement for partial measures which would serve the mutual interest against fourth country spread of nuclear weapons production, which would decrease the other stated dangers to Soviet security, and which would reciprocally decrease the stated grounds for concern for U.S. security.

5. This is the basic reason for the extensive offer to open up Siberia, in delayed response to the original Eisenhower proposal at Geneva.

6. If these Soviet objectives can be served in some degree, all portions of the Soviet position in the April 26th paper are negotiable in some degree, but the Soviet will bargain hard to get the maximum advance on their security objectives and to pay as small a price as possible for U.S. and free world security objectives.

7. The Soviet is uncertain and uneasy about the effect which a partial agreement would have on their regime within the USSR and their relations with the Satellites.

8. The specific wording of the Soviet proposal need not be given undue attention if the objectives in paragraph two above are served, but the amount of movement that the Soviet will make on their total position is limited and the amount they will move on some of their points is quite narrow.



9. There will be almost as great difficulty in fitting together provisions for a partial agreement satisfactory to France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the UK, as there will be for the USSR.

*Note:* Important factual correction of Department memorandum, paragraph III (f). The Soviet proposal does include 28,000 square miles of Soviet territory in the European zone of aerial inspection.

---

**194. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, May 9, 1957—noon.*

6100. Eyes only for the Secretary from Stassen.

1. Separate from the concrete terms which I am cabling in response to your message in Deptel 7854,<sup>2</sup> it is my judgment that it would assist in reaching a sound, partial agreement for first steps with the USSR if at some appropriate point in the negotiations I was authorized to indicate to Zorin that if the subcommittee reached agreement on the draft of partial measures for the first step, the Foreign Ministers might then meet to finalize and sign the agreement and, following these signatures, to engage in some discussion on the major political problems between East and West and, if fruitful work appeared possible, then Foreign Ministers then to establish negotiating groups of subordinate officials to follow through in search of solutions of such political problems.

2. The implication would not include a commitment for such a meeting and would renew the lines of the February 26, 1957 note from Lodge to Kuznetsov in this regard.<sup>3</sup>

3. My principal reasons for believing this would help in reaching agreement are because it would help to allay the continuing suspicion by the Soviet that the U.S. is not in fact serious even now in these negotiations for partial agreement; a suspicion that is fed by speeches such as those Army Secretary Brucker has been giving recently;<sup>4</sup> and second, if we are right that the major Soviet motivations in the matter of a partial agreement and of being willing to begin to open the Soviet

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-957. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 192.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

Union is to avoid the dangers of a nuclear war in which the Soviet would be destroyed, then they are aware of the added necessity of subsequent negotiations to resolve the most intense political issues.

4. I will of course not make any such references to Zorin unless you specifically authorize me to do so.

**Brown**

---

**195. Policy Recommendation Prepared by the Chairman of the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*London, May 9, 1957.*

**PART I OF THREE PARTS**

Responding to the request of the Secretary of State,<sup>2</sup> Chairman USDel forwards an appraisal in concrete terms of the inseparable elements of a partial agreement for first steps which we estimate would be acceptable to France and the Federal Republic of Germany, other states with a significant nuclear military potential, the USSR, and the UK. It constitutes a program which will advance the priority US objectives as stated by the Secretary of State:

- a) To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to many additional states;
- b) To increase the safeguards against attack upon the US;
- c) To begin to open up the Soviet Union and to open Eastern Europe;
- d) To improve the basis for subsequent and separate negotiation of political settlements and evolution of conditions in Eastern Europe in accord with the US national interest;
- e) To generally lessen the dangers of a nuclear war and facilitate the maintenance of peace.

It will maintain very great US military capability.

The concrete inseparable terms are consistent with the fundamentals of present NSC decisions and present instructions to the USDel, and do require supplementary instructions on important items.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Secret. Transmitted in telegrams 6122, 6123, and 6124 from London, May 9. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 330.13/5-957)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 192.

1. The agreement for partial measures would include specific authority for a signator to suspend partially or completely the commitments and obligations taken, upon written notice by it to the control organization of either an important violation by another signator, or a written notice by it of action by a non-signator which prejudices the security of the notifying state and thereby requires the partial or complete suspension of commitments. This provision to include a procedure for advance notice of intention to suspend so that an opportunity for prior correction of the adverse condition may be afforded.

2. All signators (except the US, UK and USSR) to agree that they are prohibited from the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.

3. The US, UK and USSR (states which have nuclear weapons in their possession on the effective date of the treaty and which continue under the terms of the treaty to possess such nuclear weapons) agree that they are prohibited from use of nuclear weapons except:

a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter if an armed attack occurs of such nature and magnitude that, in the decision of the using state, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons; or

b) the attack includes the use of nuclear weapons or

c) in accordance with a decision of either the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council.

4. The USSR, UK and US to take a further commitment that after the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of this commitment (estimated as July 1959), the three will devote all future production of fissionable material exclusively to non-weapons purposes, and will transfer to non-weapons purposes any fissionable material not already contained within nuclear weapons; and will commit themselves to cooperate in the design and installation of such a necessary inspection system.

5. Upon the establishment of satisfactorily functioning inspection system and the cut-off on production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes, the USSR, UK and US will commence agreed equitable proportionate transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling either national or international; provided, however, that these transfers shall be carried out to only a limited degree and each of the three will be maintaining a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty for the partial agreement is concerned.

6. Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 1958), the USSR and US and other states concerned will move promptly to install and begin to operate an aerial inspection system in accordance with the approved Eisenhower method in initial zones, including

a) all of the Soviet Union north of the Arctic Circle (including the Murmansk Kola Peninsula and Dikson areas) and all of the Soviet Union east of 108 degrees East Longitude (from Lake Baikal to Bering Straits); and an equal geographic area of Alaska, Canada, and Western US.

b) all of the Soviet Union west of 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude (Minsk-Zhmerinka line) and all of the territory of Europe between 2 and one-half degrees East Longitude and 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude and between 42 degrees, 20 minutes, North Latitude and 63 degrees North Latitude. (Labelled as the Russian and European zone for convenience in this cable).

7. In addition, upon the effective date of the agreement, the parties will move promptly to establish ground control posts in Soviet bloc and West within the aerial zones, including appropriate radar equipment for added warning safeguards against the potential of great surprise attack.

8. In addition, ground control posts will be promptly established in the area of the Soviet Union west of 35 degrees East Longitude and in the UK, and at the embarkation ports of eastern US.

9. Three months after the effective date of the agreement (estimated as October 1958), signators would furnish blueprints of military forces and armaments, exclusive of nuclear weapons.

10. Within the following nine months after furnishing the blueprints (estimated July 1959), the USSR and the US would (in the manner outlined by the US JCS in the Secretary of Defense letter of October 30, 1956)<sup>3</sup> place in internationally supervised national storage in disarmament depots 15% of the major designated armaments reported in their blueprints, including nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles, and would reduce their armed forces to two and one-half million and would bring the level of their military expenditures down by 15%.

11. Other states signators would make similar (but not precisely the same) agreed reductions under similar reporting and verified inspected conditions.

12. All signators specifically recognize the essential requirement of an effective inspection system to verify and guarantee in the case of all states alike the fulfillment and observance of each commitment, each signator undertakes to cooperate in the thorough reciprocal installation and implementation of such inspection, and the continued operation of such inspection is an essential requirement for the continuation of the commitments under the agreement.

---

<sup>3</sup> Document 164.

## PART II OF THREE PARTS

Further responding to the request of the Secretary of State, Chairman USDel forwards Part II of an appraisal in concrete terms of the inseparable elements of a partial agreement for first steps which we estimate would be acceptable to France and the Federal Republic of Germany, other states with a significant nuclear military potential, the USSR, and the UK, and which will advance the priority US objectives as stated by the Secretary of State.

13. Upon the completion of such initial year reductions each state would file a certificate that it had carried out the reduction, and mobile inspection teams would then have access to the objects of control in all areas of the signator states to verify the fulfillment of the reductions.

14. Upon the initiation of the aerial inspection and the installation of the ground inspector posts in the areas indicated in Part I, (estimated September 1958) (and the commitment of the USSR to the other inseparable provisions of this report) all states involved would be prohibited from maintaining or from stationing nuclear weapons in that part of the Soviet Union and that part of Europe included within the Russian-European aerial inspection zone.

15. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of worldwide levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US by 15% for armaments and to the force level of 2.5 million, (estimated as July 1958 to July 1959) both would also reduce the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone by 20%.

16. At the end of the first year's reduction in armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures (estimated as July 1959) progressively expand the aerial inspection system beyond the original two zones, into a series of additional zones culminating in the complete coverage of the Soviet Union and (if the political situation permits) China, and, reciprocally of the Free World areas including the US and the UK. The ground control posts to also be progressively expanded and increased to complete effective coverage.

17. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of worldwide levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US by 15% for designated armaments and to the level of two and one-half million for forces, including the parallel 20% reduction of the armaments and armed forces which the Soviet Union and the US had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, make an agreed reduction in air bases on both sides within the Russian-European aerial inspection zone of a magnitude of approximately 10%.

18. Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty (estimated as July 1958) all signators would be committed to a temporary suspension for 12 months of all nuclear tests and during such 12

months to cooperate in the design of an agreed inspection system which would support the nuclear materials cut-off commitment, and which would also verify either an agreement for limitation on the amount of fissionable material released per year into the atmosphere by the three in future tests, or to verify a continued limited suspension of tests. The agreement to be so drawn that a failure to agree upon and to install the inspection system involved for these two commitments or the failure to agree on either a limitation of tests or further suspension of tests beyond the 12 months would automatically result in no legal commitments against tests after the 12 months.

19. If the first year's reductions in armaments, armed forces and military expenditures are verified to the satisfaction of the permanent members (including the US) of the armament regulation Board of Control, then, and only then, (estimated as July 1959 or later), a second reduction of armaments and armed forces and military expenditures of the USSR and the US to be arranged, but only with the US consent, and not, in any event, going below a force level of 2 million, and to be further conditioned upon the assurance of application of the treaty and the inspection system to all essential, significant military states and areas, and therefore requiring prior solution of the political problems in a manner satisfactory to the US insofar as they apply to this subject.

20. During the period of fulfillment of the reduction of levels of designated armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US on the basis of measurement to a level of 2 million (estimated as July 1959 to July 1961), both would also reduce the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone by an additional 20%.

21. Upon the fulfillment of such second reductions and the verified certification that they have been carried out, including the second reductions of specified other militarily significant states who must as a prerequisite have complied, and the partial political settlements necessary thereto having been reached, the armaments regulation organization to consider, but only with the consent of the US, further reductions, and not, in any event, to consider further reductions to any levels lower than 1.5 million for the Soviet Union and 1.5 million for the US unless and until a supplementary treaty is negotiated and ratified by the usual constitutional processes.

22. In the event further reductions of levels of armaments and armed forces are carried out beyond the 2 million level, during the fulfillment of such reductions, both the USSR and the US would further make parallel inclusive reductions of the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, but not in any event under the terms of the treaty, by more than 20%. (Even in these ultimate circumstances at

least 40% of US forces would remain in the Western side of the Russian and European zone including Germany, insofar as the terms of the agreement would be concerned).

23. The signators agree that within 3 months after the effective date of the treaty (estimated to be October 1958) they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to design inspection controls (and upon reaching an agreed definition, to install them) to fulfill a commitment that sending objects through outer space and sending unmanned objects over distances in excess of medium range at any altitude, shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes, and further designed to verify and insure compliance with a commitment not to build or to install intercontinental ballistic or guided missiles or rockets.

24. The armaments regulation organization administering the system to be established in accordance with Article 26 of the UN Charter<sup>4</sup> within the framework of the Security Council, and to operate through an executive council or board of control on which the affirmative vote of the US and of the Soviet Union is essential for significant decisions.

25. Such board of control to have authority to establish a system for the advance notification by signators of any intended major movement of armed forces over foreign soil or over international waters or through international air space as a part of the system of protection against great surprise attack.

26. The essential details for the evolutionary development of an effective and sound inspection system are to be worked out in keeping with the foregoing outline and consistent with the studies of the eight US Presidential Task Groups chairmanned by Gen. Bedell Smith, Gen. James Doolittle, and Dr. Ernest Lawrence and others.<sup>5</sup>

27. Authorize the armaments regulation organization through its board of control to establish an appropriate system regulating the export and import of armaments, to take effect after the exchange of military blueprints.

### PART III OF THREE PARTS

Further responding to the request of the Secretary of State, USDel forwards recommendations for the method of negotiation as Part III of this report.

---

<sup>4</sup> Article 26 of the U.N. Charter provided for the formulation of plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Article 47 provided for the creation of a Military Staff Committee consisting of "the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives" and listed its general responsibilities.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 78.

A. The negotiating method of reaching a partial agreement to serve the U.S. priority objectives, as outlined in Parts I and II, would in each instance involve the USDel advancing initial restricted proposals providing for some bargaining latitude between the present U.S. position and the outlined basis for the negotiated agreement.

B. A parallel negotiating process, centered in the Sub-Committee, conducted with the other Western members as well as with the Soviet Union will continue to be essential, since on each of the major issues each State has tended to take a one-sided first position from a narrow national viewpoint.

C. As tentative agreements are reached on the substance of particular sections the major drafting work to reflect the conclusion into treaty language will be carried out by Ambassador Peaslee working with the Legal Department of the UK Foreign Office and with specific draft language forwarded by each Delegation to the capitals of the Sub-Committee States for approval before incorporation in the draft treaty.

D. When the work reaches an advanced point a formal Sub-Committee report of progress to the UN Disarmament Commission should be made to supplement the informal liaison which the USDel officers are maintaining with the member states who are not on the Sub-Committee.

E. As this process continues, it will be a special matter for the Secretary of State to conclude as to the point at which the U.S. Senate is to be consulted more thoroughly.

---

**196. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 17, 1957.*

DEAR FOSTER: I have reviewed Harold Stassen's tentative reformulation of the U.S. position on limitation of armaments, which you inclosed in your letter of May 11.<sup>2</sup> Because of its far-reaching security

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-1757. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> On May 11, Dulles sent identical covering letters to Wilson and Strauss along with Stassen's May 9 paper, *supra*. Dulles' letters read in part:

"I think it important that we should make maximum efforts to avoid the substance of this Stassen proposal getting out into the press because it is still highly tentative and because of the possible bad effect of publicity upon the bargaining position at London. I think we should produce a fairly quick reply." (Department of State, Central Files, 300.13/5-1157)



implications I have requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the proposal. While awaiting their more detailed analysis, I think it may be helpful to give you my preliminary views regarding certain aspects of the program.

As a general comment, the proposal projects the U.S. position well beyond that contemplated by our existing disarmament policy which, as you know, was arrived at after prolonged study and deliberation within our government. The Department of Defense viewed the proposals which were approved by the President on 21 November 1956,<sup>3</sup> as representing the outer limits which the U.S. could safely adopt for its position in the light of the present world situation. Mr. Stassen's suggested program would materially expand those limits while the Soviets, on their part, do not appear to have made similar significant advances from their basic position.

While I am aware that the U.S. has favored the reciprocal establishment of zones for testing the mechanism of inspection and control, I consider that the zonal arrangement in the European area, as first proposed by the Soviets and as revised in Mr. Stassen's proposal, has inherent dangers which outweigh any possible advantages which might accrue. The provision for the very substantial reduction of forces and the prohibition against our stationing of nuclear weapons in the zone would so reduce the effectiveness of the NATO forces in the area as to render them incapable of a sustained defense. Further, the concept of such a zonal arrangement in Europe has, in the past, only been associated with an overall European Security System in which German reunification was implicit. While I do not presume to gauge precisely the political repercussions which might ensue, I feel that the mere announcement that the U.S. is sponsoring such a proposal in the context of a disarmament agreement would generate reactions, particularly in West Germany, which might well jeopardize the solidarity if not the continued existence of NATO. The advantage from the security standpoint of moving toward the Soviet position in this regard is not apparent.

The Department of Defense has recommended that the U.S. not undertake a commitment to reduce its forces to any specific level beyond the 2.5 million level, in the absence of a resolution of some of the major outstanding political problems now dividing the East and the West. It is noted that the suggested proposal projects the reciprocal reductions first to a 2.0 million and ultimately to a 1.5 million ceiling, contingent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. I consider that it is not in our interest to undertake such a commitment at this time. It is

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165.

almost inevitable that the pressures to fulfill such a commitment would be of such proportions as to restrict our future freedom of action, even though the requisite pre-conditions had not been met.

The proposal to undertake a commitment to suspend nuclear tests for 12 months would implicate the U.S. in a situation from which, due to the compulsion of public opinion, we would find it difficult to withdraw, except in extreme circumstances. Meanwhile, it is probable that our technological force would disintegrate and our capacity to resume testing, should that be indicated, would be seriously crippled. While I consider that our present position in regard to testing may be susceptible of certain adjustments, I feel that for security reasons we must confine such adjustments to the area of limitations, as distinguished from cessation of testing. Accordingly, I would recommend that a commitment to suspend testing under the conditions stated not be undertaken.

In my opinion there are large areas of possible agreement between the East and the West which, if identified and worked out, would be to the mutual advantage of both parties. Obviously the big element that is lacking is confidence on both sides. Nevertheless, this may be the time when constructive steps can be taken to establish confidence and make some progress. It is very important to make sure that such steps as are taken will contribute to the building up of mutual confidence and not be the cause of additional misunderstanding and consequent tension. An essential factor in building confidence is the ability of each party to fully satisfy himself by audit and inspection that the other is living up to his commitments no matter how small they may be.

It seems to me that it would be a mistake to attempt to settle too many things too far ahead or in too much detail, as such agreements might be found difficult for either party and therefore the agreements in themselves would add to friction and tension rather than to taking the heat out of the world.

My observation of long-term agreements is that they only stand up if they continue to be of mutual advantage at all times. I am sure this is especially true in regard to agreements between nations.

Moreover, while nations go on through the years, individuals that have the political responsibility and power in those nations go through their normal life cycle or tenure in office. It is neither sound nor realistic for one group of men on either side to try to bind their nations too far into the future especially when a long history of mutual confidence and satisfactory relations does not exist. In all nations the time will come when other men will have the political responsibility and power. These men are bound to take a new look at their political problems, and they will not respect agreements which they do not believe are in the interest of themselves or their nations.

Upon receipt of the views of the JCS I will make them available to you.<sup>4</sup> I am sympathetic to the desire for progress toward achieving a partial agreement in the disarmament field. However, I do not consider that it would be in our best interests to make substantive concession in such highly sensitive areas as Harold proposes as an opening step.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

---

<sup>4</sup> See Document 202.

---

197. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles' Office, Department of State, Washington, May 17, 1957, 3 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

*Department of State*

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Reinhardt, C  
Mr. Bowie, S/P  
Mr. Wilcox, IO  
Mr. Smith, S/AE

*Disarmament Staff*

Governor Stassen  
Ambassador Peaslee  
Col. Firehock  
Col. Willis

*Atomic Energy Commission*

Chairman Strauss

Capt. Gardner

*Central Intelligence Agency*

Mr. Allen Dulles

Mr. Amory

Mr. Walmsley, IO  
Mr. Stelle, S/P  
Mr. Greene, S/S  
Mr. Wolf, RA<sup>2</sup>  
Mr. Owsley, UNP  
Mr. Baker, UNP

Capt. Fuetsch<sup>3</sup>  
Mr. Weiler  
Mr. Lippmann

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-1757. Secret. Drafted by Baker. Another account of this meeting by Cutler is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Disarmament Talks. See also footnote 1, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph J. Wolf.

<sup>3</sup> Captain Bernhart A. Fuetsch, member of Stassen's disarmament staff.

*Department of Defense*  
Secretary Wilson  
General Loper  
General Fox  
*The White House*  
General Cutler

Secretary Dulles opened the meeting stating that it seemed desirable before crystallizing any position to have a general assessment of the situation from Governor Stassen and to learn the background of his thinking with regard to the proposals which he had made for consideration within the government. Following such an exposition and clarification of Governor Stassen's proposals, he suggested that the Departments involved would probably want a few days to think over the situation, and that a further meeting might be held around the middle of next week to consider the United States position. He asked whether Mr. Stassen believed the Soviets were interested in getting somewhere.

Mr. Stassen said he believed the Soviets were interested in attempting to reach agreement, and that all of the western four delegations were of this opinion. He mentioned that Zorin had told him the night before that he was returning to Moscow for consultations during the recess.

Mr. Allen Dulles asked whether Soviet motives in seeking agreement appeared to be basic or merely tactical.

Mr. Stassen replied that their motives appeared to be basic and arose in part from the fact that in the cases of Suez and Hungary the Soviets looked down the barrel of atomic war.

Mr. Wilson suggested that the Soviets were not in an easy position in the arms race, and cited the fact that they had recently reneged on their bonds, to which Mr. Stassen agreed but added they had reneged on their bonds before.

Mr. Allen Dulles asked if the Soviets appeared to be in a hurry to reach agreement. Mr. Stassen said not exceptionally so, but also they were not wanting to stall. Correspondingly, he said, the Soviets were constantly wondering whether we want to stall and whether we are serious.

Mr. Wilson read a letter he had addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting their comments on various zones of aerial inspection.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Stassen was asked if he would care to give a general report and exposition of his proposals of May 9.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Stassen expressed appreciation for the opportunity to do so. He stated that since his consultations here at Easter the US delegation had sought to move toward implementation of the policy objectives

---

<sup>4</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 195.

set forth at that time; namely, (1) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to multinational hands, (2) to increase safeguards against surprise attack, and (3) to open up the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The delegation had begun with that guidance to re-examine our position and that of other countries.

The Soviet proposals of April 30 had been presented to the US delegation privately on April 26. In three successive bilateral discussions following, the US delegation had sought to examine the exact meaning of the Soviet proposals, the reasons that lay back of them, their negotiability and their acceptability to other countries. The mutual interests of the USSR and the western powers had been the theme the delegation had sought to emphasize in these discussions.<sup>6</sup>

Following these consultations each member of the US delegation had drawn up a paper recommending elements of a first stage plan that might be acceptable to the USSR, France, the UK and Germany and which might fulfill the priority objectives of the United States.<sup>7</sup> French views were given careful consideration because Moch has informed the US delegation that France will decide in two months whether to embark upon a weapons program. If it does so, Germany will join in such a program or follow closely. If these two go, many other nations will follow suit. On the basis of these factors and studies, on the basis of the statements at the NATO meeting of Foreign Ministers and in response to Secretary Dulles' request for recommendations in concrete terms, the delegation had arrived at the recommendations transmitted on May 9. The delegation believed the British and others would, in the first instance, want more than these recommendations called for, but that they would settle for this kind of program as a final position.

Governor Stassen then proceeded to read paragraph-by-paragraph his recommendations of May 9, adding comments on certain of the paragraphs as follows:

*Paragraph 1.* The suspension provision was particularly important to fourth countries, who under it might be more easily induced to abstain from nuclear weapons programs on a trial basis.

*Paragraph 2.* This prohibition on use of nuclear weapons is the key to the program as a whole. The French and the Federal Republic will take this provision, and if they do so the other countries concerned will come along. Moch had given him a letter last night, cleared with Pineau and read by the French Council of Ministers affirming French willingness to accept such an abstention in the kind of program Mr. Stassen proposed. Mr. Stassen had talked with the German ambassa-

---

<sup>6</sup> For summaries of the U.S.-USSR bilateral sessions, April 26 and 27, see Documents 187 and 188. A summary of a May 2 session, in telegram 5964 from London, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-257)

<sup>7</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

dor who will report back on the question, but the indications are that the Federal Republic would also abstain with some objections from the German Straus.

*Paragraph 3.* This limitation on use would not be worded to include the US, UK and USSR by name, but would be worded to have this practical effect in any proposal put forward. While others were prohibiting use, we would thus be limiting use. Such an undertaking would serve to bring the Charter up-to-date for the atomic age. It would be only a moral prohibition, but it would establish a moral climate which would permit others to abstain from the manufacture and use of such weapons.

*Paragraph 4.* The provision for transfer of stockpiles to peaceful uses would take effect only after a year during which all materials could be gotten into weapons. It would serve to allay French, German and Soviet suspicions about the continued ability to produce nuclear weapons after the cut-off date from existing stockpiles. This provision, however, would be tough to negotiate with the UK because they want to attain major nuclear capability. The UK, however, must be permitted only limited nuclear capability if France is to abstain.

*Paragraph 5.* This paragraph adds to present policy a clear statement regarding retention of a substantial nuclear capability. It may be desirable to put in a percentage to further define this principle.

*Paragraph 6.* Elaborating upon aerial inspection, Mr. Stassen stated that the Soviets in effect are saying that "if you will increase our security, we will increase yours". The greatest Soviet fear is that in Europe, states other than the US or USSR will start a war which would involve the two. The Soviets are aware that our main concern is surprise attack over the polar regions. They are willing now for the first time to trade, on the toughest bargaining terms possible, security for us in the north for security for themselves in Europe.

The Soviets will not give us access to the centers of their power for aerial photography, but they will give us the arctic circle a zone 2½ degrees east of their present proposed zone in Europe, though they would initially ask more in all respect. It is significant that their latest proposed zone in Europe for the first time departs from the demarcation line in Germany and its center point runs half way through East Germany. A movement of 2½ degrees would place the center of the zone on the German-Polish border.

On our side a corresponding zone should be granted in Alaska, Canada and the United States. The US is open now. There are only six spots in the US which planes cannot now fly over and photograph: Hanford, Las Vegas, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Savannah and the White House. At present airplanes can from the sides of all six of these zones photograph the entire zone legally. In defining a zone in the US we should stay away from the US industrial heartland; i.e., Detroit, Pitts-

burgh, St. Louis triangle, but must of necessity include some, but not all, SAC bases. Similarly, we must keep out of the Soviet heartland but include some of its long range bases.

In area, China and the Soviet Union equal the area of the free world. Mile for mile, exchanges in areas of comparable importance are accordingly required. As a second phase, Mr. Stassen was thinking of an exchange of inspection over China for inspection over the Seato countries. Then might come the rest of Russia (except for its heartland) for the rest of Europe and North Africa. Finally, the heartland of the US might be inspected at the time of extension of the system to the heartland of the USSR. It would be inadvisable, however, to specify such later steps in the present negotiations.

*Paragraph 8.* These ground control posts would extend over the Leningard complex and to the Moscow line. We should, however, ask for more first.

*Paragraph 11.* The same formula could not be applicable across the board because France and the UK do not have the reserve armaments that we do, and in the case of Germany the question would merely be that of a ceiling upon new armaments and would not involve any cuts at all.

*Paragraph 13.* There would be no mobile posts until one year after the agreement had gone into effect.

*Paragraph 14.* The proposed European zone would not include France beyond Paris, the southern parts of Italy, Greece or Turkey, the northern part of Iceland or the UK. The delegation proposed a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in a limited zone in Europe as a substitute for the Soviet demand for a prohibition of use of nuclear weapons or a prohibition on stationing them outside national borders. This prohibition on stationing them in a limited zone would be essential to get a French or German abstention from weapons production, since neither France nor Germany could abstain if nuclear weapons were stationed throughout the other.

*Paragraph 18.* Working out this test moratorium would be critical in the fourth country problem. An initial suspension would be necessary to get fourth countries in. A further step would then be necessary in a year to hold fourth countries in the agreement.

*Paragraph 19.* This second stage provision was one of the most important. You could at this point say adherence of a unified Germany, for example, was essential, or put in any other political conditions you wished such as adherence of a unified Korea or adherence of a government satisfactory to the US in China. It would seem realistic that at this point with 15% of major armaments in depots, force levels down and being verified, tests suspended, inspection extending part way into the USSR, and a cut off being worked out, you could put in political conditions.

*Paragraph 21.* The reason for stating the percentages of reduction in Europe is to show Europe the US had no intention of withdrawing from Europe, and by inference no intention of withdrawing in other areas of the world.

*Paragraph 23.* The proposal is only for a technical committee because all you could now get would be a technical committee.

*Paragraph 25.* This is important as a safeguard against surprise attack because you cannot allow, for example, Soviet submarines and maneuvers extending to the coast of the US without notice.

In concluding his presentation, Mr. Stassen reaffirmed that the program could, in the opinion of the delegation, be negotiated, and that it would fulfill US objectives.

It was then suggested by the Secretary that each paragraph again be considered in a period of questions which might be addressed to Mr. Stassen regarding the meaning of specific provisions. Major questions raised with respect to the various paragraphs were as follows:

*Paragraph 1:* Admiral Strauss asked whether advance notice of suspension was mandatory, and if so, how much. Governor Stassen replied that none was necessary.

*Paragraph 2:* Secretary Dulles asked whether it was intended that this prohibition of use of nuclear weapons should survive a war. Mr. Stassen said yes. Secretary Dulles asked whether it would then mean that we would use but our allies could not use such weapons in war. Mr. Stassen said we could if we wished in that event invoke the suspension clause. Admiral Strauss mentioned that there were developing peaceful uses of large nuclear explosions.

Mr. Strauss asked whether fourth countries would be prohibited from research and development. Mr. Stassen said you could not prohibit what you cannot inspect, and accordingly could not prohibit research.

Mr. Strauss asked whether they could develop nuclear weapons short of tests and whether they could manufacture non-nuclear hardware. Mr. Stassen said they could not manufacture such hardware, and the extent to which they could have programs of development would depend on the legal definitions agreed upon.

Mr. Wilson asked whether fourth countries could possess nuclear weapons. Mr. Stassen said paragraph 27 would not permit import or export of anything not allowable under the treaty. The delegation believed the Soviets would have to spread weapons if they were allowed to spread in the free world, and that the Soviets fear what a fourth country could do in initiating a US-USSR conflict in that event.

Secretary Dulles asked if the provision covered possession of such weapons did it mean they could not be used in war. Mr. Stassen replied that under the suspension clause all limitations would be out the window in any major war.



*Paragraph 3:* Secretary Dulles asked whether a limitation of this kind would have much effect in keeping the French from making weapons, and whether the moral limitation might not help the Soviets by going against the idea of adequate defenses for the western allies.

Mr. Stassen said such a provision would, in his opinion, help in securing the abstention of the French and other fourth countries. Many countries believe we are engrossed with nuclear weapons. Especially they read our statements about the cheapness of such weapons and fear we would exercise no restraint in their use. There is a need for us to establish a code of circumstances relating to their use. Some want us to limit ourselves to using them if they are used against us. The US delegation has privately pointed out, however, that such a limitation would, for example, make it impossible for us to stop China from going into Southeast Asia, and that as a deterrent we need such weapons. The provision has limited meaning but it has a reassuring effect.

Secretary Dulles agreed that it would reassure, but was not sure whether it would not also create a moral commitment on our part to keep conventional forces to repel attack.

Mr. Stassen said it would be possible to safeguard against this inference.

*Paragraph 4:* Admiral Strauss asked whether the wording meant the commitment to the cut-off was to precede or to follow agreement upon the inspection system.

Secretary Dulles said the provision might be clearer if stated in such a way as to reverse the order of commitments.

Mr. Stassen said it was like a commitment to pay a man one hundred dollars next time you met him in Chicago plus the further commitment to try to get to Chicago.

Admiral Strauss said the provision on immediate transfer of stockpiles was impractical from the standpoint of maintaining stockpiles required for efficient operation.

Mr. Wilson emphasized the need for clarity, and the difficulties that could follow an imprecise agreement. He said there should be no loopholes.

Mr. Stassen added that the provision did not prevent refabrication.

Admiral Strauss said he had examined the Subcommittee record and would like to discuss with Mr. Stassen privately some of the cautions necessary in discussion of refabrication. He also noted use of the term "nuclear material" in the cut off provision, a much wider term than fissionable materials.

Mr. Stassen said no distinction was intended, and this was an editing mistake in the cable.

Admiral Strauss suggested that the time might have come to clarify the meaning of transfers on an "equitable" basis.

Secretary Wilson believed we should try to make reductions on matching terms by quantity.

Mr. Stassen pointed out we are not committed to transfer anything unless there is agreement on what is equitable, but that the hope of reductions by the three nuclear powers makes it possible for fourth countries to accept a commitment to abstain.

Secretary Dulles noted that paragraph 4 did not mention the UK problem. The provision that the three powers had to make transfers to peaceful uses seemed to contradict the provision that the three would retain very substantial nuclear capability, since the UK could not attain substantial capability if transfers were required.

Mr. Stassen said he believed we could take care of the UK by the formula on equitable transfers, and that it could also be several years before such transfers began. He further believed the UK would want to make at least some transfers since its position as a member of the club of three would make it unwilling to say it was so low in supply that it could not transfer anything.

*Paragraph 6:* Secretary Dulles said he doubted there would be time for discussion of this question of aerial inspection in any detail.

Mr. Wilson agreed, saying the Joint Chiefs would evaluate this question for him within the near future.

Secretary Dulles asked the meaning of the reference to "the approved method".

Mr. Stassen said these involved designated ports of entry, taking monitors aboard, establishing bases for landings, and abiding by rules of air safety. He said the Joint Chiefs had worked this out in a paper of August 30, 1955 following the Geneva meeting.<sup>8</sup>

Secretary Dulles asked if Mr. Stassen's proposal covered means of communication.

Mr. Stassen said Mr. Fiske of the Bell Laboratories was chairman of a task force which had worked out this aspect. Their plan provided a method by which failure of a communications station would itself be a warning.<sup>9</sup>

Secretary Wilson said in an international document the provisions might be easier to sell if they did not have President Eisenhower's name attached, and merely said an agreed method.

Mr. Stassen said this was purely an internal document.

Secretary Dulles said that Mr. Stassen should have his staff put the proposal in the form of an international document.

---

<sup>8</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>9</sup> The final report of the task force on communications, contained in "A Plan for a Comprehensive Armament and Armed Force Inspection System, 20 January 1956," pp. 75-90, is not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Comprehensive Inspection Plan)

Mr. Stassen said the delegation would do a draft on the basis of decisions to be taken.

Secretary Dulles asked the basis for measurement of the zones as between Russia and ourselves. Mr. Stassen replied that it should be mile for mile of comparable importance with the USSR and China measured against the free world, and that this appeared to be a logical basis since the areas were the same and the Soviets would be anxious to look at widely dispersed points in the free world such as North Africa, Dahrán, and the Philippines. He added they would not forget that the Philippines were bombed from Australia in World War II.

Mr. Allen Dulles emphasized the need to equate strategic factors.

Secretary Wilson said area in square miles was not the complete answer and such factors as population as well as strategic importance should be weighed or we would be trading a horse for a rabbit.

Mr. Stassen pointed out the Soviet fear of aerial photography of their heartland, and suspicion that the United States after getting the pictures would withdraw from the surprise attack warning system. Especially, he said, they fear developments in Europe.

Secretary Dulles asked why if the Soviets fear Europe most Mr. Stassen's proposed areas did not include US bases in the UK, for example.

Mr. Stassen said the Soviets feel the US will act responsibly, and that even an irresponsible administration would not attack unless prepared to follow through on land in Europe to finish them off. The Soviets fear most situations that could arise in Germany or Poland, and look to the general situation in Europe as the greatest danger.

Mr. Allen Dulles said this surprised him.

Secretary Dulles said it surprised him, too.

Mr. Allen Dulles said their propaganda at least reflected fear more of US bases.

Mr. Stassen said they appeared to be concerned about our bases only as they might be used as an outgrowth of a war begun by other states.

*Paragraph 8:* Secretary Dulles noted that ground posts were to be established beyond the zone of aerial inspection and asked whether this was feasible and wise.

Mr. Stassen said he did not believe the French and Germans would accept aerial inspection unless by some device we are able to get further into the USSR than the Soviets will accept aerial photography. Ground posts would extend the range of coverage.

Secretary Wilson recalled that this idea was proposed by the Soviets themselves.

Mr. Stassen said the Soviets are uneasy about even what the zones of inspection they proposed in their April 30 paper means for their regime, but they have concluded the increased security of an

agreement would be worth the risk. Mr. Stassen added that he believed with such an opening up of the region the Soviets would lose Poland by the kind of evolutionary liberation of which the Secretary had spoken.

Secretary Dulles asked whether we could get radar at these posts.

Mr. Stassen said no, that we could get radar installations only in the zones of aerial inspection.

Mr. Cutler asked as an example what a ground control post would do in New York.

Mr. Stassen said it would serve only to give warning of the embarkation of any expeditionary force. The Soviet proposal for such posts at points of embarkation emphasizes their fear of a ground follow up for any attack.

Mr. Allen Dulles commented that weather conditions are such over much of the Soviet Union that ground posts would be needed to supplement aerial inspection.

Secretary Wilson said ground posts in the US would be quite unpopular and it would take time to sell the idea.

Mr. Stassen recalled that while polls showed only 40% of the American people would have been prepared to accept the Eisenhower plan when it was advanced, this percentage subsequently grew.

*Paragraph 9:* Secretary Dulles observed that this proposal would require elaboration.

General Fox asked if the exchange of blueprints was to precede verification. Mr. Stassen said verification would in the plan begin 9 months following the exchange.

In response to a question as to the meaning of blueprints, Mr. Stassen said they were in effect an order of battle, and that the Joint Chiefs' paper of August 30, 1955<sup>10</sup> spelled out the definition.

*Paragraph 10:* Secretary Wilson said he was bothered by the proposed 15% reduction in military budgets because money is of different value at different times, and because figures on budgets are not reliable. He mentioned that the Japanese had two budgets to conceal their preparations for World War II.

Secretary Dulles said the provision was totally meaningless, since expenditures could for example be transferred to the constituent states of the USSR. He assumed Mr. Stassen had included the idea as a harmless concession to the French.

Mr. Stassen said he had done it partly for that reason, but partly also as across check upon other means of inspection. His task groups had recommended checks on (1) arms, (2) men and (3) budgets, assert-

---

<sup>10</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

ing none was completely reliable, and the third least reliable, but the cross checks afforded by the three constituted a pretty thorough system.

Secretary Dulles said the Soviets could easily compel their factories to produce at half price, whereas General Motors would not do that.

Secretary Wilson said there had been a 15% increase in two years in prices of<sup>11</sup> metals and essential elements for defense.

Admiral Strauss asked whether nuclear delivery systems included submarines.

Mr. Stassen said yes.

Secretary Wilson suggested a provision for disclosure of the budget as a check without promising to do anything about the budget.

Mr. Stassen said you would probably have to agree to do something to get access to the Soviet budget.

*Paragraph 12:* Admiral Strauss asked whether this paragraph applies to both nuclear and conventional. Mr. Stassen said it did. Secretary Wilson again said it was important to make all paragraphs clear.

*Paragraph 13:* Admiral Strauss asked if the inspection teams are to go in only after a year.

Mr. Stassen said mobile teams go in at that time, but that you would have ground posts from the outset.

Admiral Strauss asked whether the mobile teams would only look once at the end of a year. Mr. Stassen said no, they would continue to inspect continuously after that date.

Secretary Dulles asked whether the teams would verify the full inventory of armaments or only the part laid up in storage.

Mr. Stassen said they would verify the entire inventory of armaments and also force levels. The placement of armaments in internationally supervised storage could be verified as it was done.

Secretary Dulles said he had real skepticism about verifying inventories and asked Wilson if he knew yet what he had by way of inventory. Wilson said he was closer to it all the time, but after Korea it was pretty difficult.

Mr. Stassen pointed out the storage provision gave a very limited margin of error and that we would retain tremendous nuclear capability while beginning the opening of the USSR.

*Paragraph 14:* Secretary Dulles observed that the Soviets would be eager to get such a provision prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons, and that he would like to tie that in with the reunification of Germany.

---

<sup>11</sup> The words "prices of" are inserted in handwriting on the source text.

Mr. Stassen said continuation of such a commitment could be tied in, but unless we do something now to restrain stationing weapons there we will not get abstention from weapons production by the French and Germans.

Mr. Bowie said he would think France and Germany would be more willing to abstain if we keep our weapons there.

Mr. Stassen said France will fear Germany might take over our weapons on its soil.

Secretary Wilson asked if anybody had figured out how you unify a country when half its economy is communized and the other half free.

Mr. Allen Dulles said Austria had been unified.

Mr. Stassen said paragraph 14 is essential to get French abstention, and necessary to get us protection from Soviet surprise attack since they believe the greatest danger is here. He believed the greatest leverage on the problem of German reunification could be gained by threatening to lift the abstention in a year.

*Paragraph 15:* Secretary Dulles noted there were no problems of interpretation here but he had certain policy questions.

Mr. Stassen said future stages may not move at all, but we must show fourth countries we will go further if we can. We must also by designating a force level show them we have no intention of withdrawing anywhere in the second stage.

*Paragraph 18:* Admiral Strauss said the Soviets should be required to meet the conditions mentioned in the paragraph before the suspension of tests. The year suspension would seriously affect the laboratories and test organization.

Mr. Stassen said we must act now on tests to stop France, which will otherwise decide on its weapons program in two months and test in 18 months. The laboratories could work 12 months on the results of the last test and on future plans. This step would bring world opinion behind the US position and afford a boost toward further agreement.

Admiral Strauss said once there was a moratorium, we could not because of this public opinion resume tests, and we would toss out all possibilities of gaining further information such as we gained, for example, in learning to make clean weapons.

Secretary Wilson suggested it might be possible to have certain limits established.

*Paragraph 19:* Secretary Dulles said the proposals became rather problematical here, and these were merely indicative of an intent to proceed. He observed that we are operating in a field where public opinion is powerful and it is hard not to fulfill expectations.

Secretary Wilson said if you plan too far ahead you lay the groundwork for future misunderstanding, and that a government cannot bind succeeding governments.

Secretary Dulles said that Secretary Wilson need not give a lot of study to these later phases and should not be delayed in his analysis of the first stage by awaiting conclusions regarding these.

Secretary Wilson said he wished the second phases did not exist.

Mr. Stassen said the question cut two ways and it was equally important to show that we will go on, and that we will not go too far.

Secretary Dulles said study only the paragraphs through 18 and the subsequent paragraphs which relate to the first phase.

Secretary Wilson recalled the problems created for both State and Defense by leaks which resulted from planning far in advance a year ago. He could have a study of the first phase, however, by the latter part of next week.

It was agreed that further consideration should be given to the proposals at that time.

---

198. **Record of Actions and Decisions Taken at a Meeting in Secretary Dulles' Office, Department of State, Washington, May 17, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows a list of participants which is identical to the one printed *supra*.]

SUBJECT

Governor Stassen's Disarmament Proposals

The following are actions and decisions of the meeting:

Mr. Stassen and his staff are to re-cast his May 9 proposals<sup>2</sup> along the lines of an international document to show what it would look like if it were to be negotiated and thus eliminating many of the purely American domestic short cuts in it. In this process they will:

*in paragraph 2:* Elaborate the concept of manufacture and use of nuclear weapons before and/or during hostilities.

*in paragraph 4:* Specify that re-fabrication of existing weapons is not excluded and re-arrange the order of the developments to make clear that an inspection system must be designed and installed first.

*in paragraph 12:* Make clear that paragraph 12 applies to both nuclear and conventional armaments.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-1757. Secret. Prepared by Greene. For a summary of this meeting, see *supra*. A footnote to the source text reads: "IO—Messrs. Owsley and Baker are preparing a summary record of the meeting."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 195.

Admiral Strauss will promptly consult with Governor Stassen on the restricted data<sup>3</sup> implications of some of the latter's proposals and thereafter formulate the AEC position on those proposals by May 22.

Secretary Wilson will get the JCS and Defense comments on the first 18 paragraphs (and executing provisions of the last paragraphs) of the Stassen proposals ready by the middle or end of next week but will not attempt detailed analysis of the latter phases of the Stassen proposals which are largely designed for political purposes.

JG

---

<sup>3</sup> The word "data" is inserted in handwriting on the source text.

---

**199. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 18, 1957.*

DEAR CHARLES: Thank you for your thoughtfulness in giving me a copy of your letter of May 17 to Secretary Dulles<sup>2</sup> regarding my report from London.<sup>3</sup> Following up as indicated by Secretary Dulles at his May 17th conference with us,<sup>4</sup> may I write you certain clarifying comments for your continued consideration.

My report encompassed somewhat more than a tentative reformulation of the United States position on limitation of armaments. It is an estimate, carefully made after thorough study in which the entire United States delegation in London participated, of the kind of a limited first step agreement which could now be negotiated with and accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the other states with a significant present or potential military capability. It is recommended to be in the interest of the United States to negotiate and accept such a limited first step agreement primarily because it will advance these high priority United States objectives which were set forth and emphasized by Secretary Dulles:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean-up, Disarmament. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 196.

<sup>3</sup> Document 195.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 197.



(a) It will prevent the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of additional states beyond the three. France is ready to decide within the next two months to begin to manufacture nuclear weapons and to test within the next 18 months, if no agreement is reached. If France makes this decision the Federal Republic of Germany will decide to do so, after their elections, and then many additional states will make the same decision; and the Soviet Union will consider itself forced to provide such weapons also to other Communist states, particularly China, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. There would then be a high probability that Israel would acquire them either by their own manufacture or from France, and that Egypt would acquire them from the Soviet Union as a counter. This spreading to multiple hands greatly intensifies the danger of the outbreak of a war, even if the United States and the Soviet Union would both wish to avoid a modern war. The outbreak of a war including the use of nuclear weapons has a high degree of probability of involving the United States and the Soviet Union, with vast devastation on both sides of the world.

(b) As the combined intelligence report indicates,<sup>5</sup> it would provide major assurance against the possibility of great surprise attack upon the United States, since the staging areas for such an attack would be promptly covered by the initial aerial inspection and radar stations; along the entire Arctic ring, including the Murmansk-Kola Peninsula; deep into Siberia, including Kanchatka; and the Soviet submarine fleet would be controlled and reduced and accurate information would be obtained on all the major submarine bases of the Soviet.

(c) . . . As you are aware, the reciprocal U.S. territory now has "open skies" with only a few spot exceptions.

(d) . . . .

Measured against these very important advances in U.S. objectives, and the improved prospect of a lasting peace, the "price" that the U.S. would pay seems to me to be well within reasonable limits. I of course do not suggest that it would not pose some problems for the U.S. But the 2.5 million force level and the sequestering of 15 percent of armaments will leave the U.S. with a tremendous military capability. The safeguarding clause on the right to suspend any of the commitments protects against future uncertainties or violations by others. The one year limited suspension of nuclear testing, beginning approximately July 1958, will not cause any great change in our weapons program, and will help make it possible to secure the abstention of "fourth countries" and to bring multiple nations and world opinion swinging behind U.S. policy. The suggestion of future lower force levels, if the first steps are carried out to the satisfaction of the United States, is conditioned on satisfactory settlements of political issues such as the reunification of Germany, and simply indicates an affirma-

---

<sup>5</sup> The undated combined intelligence report, prepared by Tidwell (CIA), is not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)

tive willingness to move forward which is in line with the Joint Chiefs paper of 1952.<sup>6</sup>

While there are always problems in maintaining public understanding and public support, I am convinced the U.S. will maintain better public support at home and abroad for adequate defense appropriations over a long period if it shows a willingness to join in some reductions conditioned on such a sound and safeguarded method.

It does seem clear that President Eisenhower's emphasis of his conviction that agreement in this field would come about with the evolutionary development of the inspection system, and Secretary Dulles' clear statement on carefully measured steps carefully taken, and your own express conclusion that an agreement must be mutually advantageous to both sides, all point to the advisability of now moving toward the kind of a first step agreement which can be negotiated with and acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and other states having a present and potential military significance.

There are many indications that this is the time that we either make a genuine beginning on a safeguarded control of modern armaments, or we enter into the most dangerous and widespread custody and possession of such weapons.

If there are any aspects of the interrelated sections of the recommendations on which you have additional questions, I will be pleased to talk further with you or with the Joint Chiefs.

Sincerely,

**Harold E. Stassen**<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Reference may be to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, May 20, 1952, printed as an enclosure to Lovett's letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, May 21, 1952, in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 1, p. 941.

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

**200. Informal Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 22, 1957.*

Modifications and clarifications of the May 9, 1957 cable<sup>2</sup> to take account of views expressed by the Secretary and by Defense and AEC.<sup>3</sup>

*Paragraph 1*—The provision for advance notice of intention to suspend should be optional and not a mandatory requirement. Actions by either a signator or a non-signator which prejudice the security of a signator state may be ground for partial or complete suspension of commitments.

*Paragraph 2*—The "prohibition" clause to the non-nuclear-weapon signators is not to prohibit their use of nuclear weapons in the event one of the three nuclear-weapons-states associated in a collective security agreement uses nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances the signators, such as the NATO states, are to be free to use nuclear weapons if the United States uses them. Furthermore, the right of preparatory training for such use is to be definitely preserved as to such non-nuclear-weapon signators.

It should also be clear that the forces of one of the three nuclear-weapons-states may possess nuclear weapons on the soil of a non-nuclear-weapons state, unless within a zone in which the stationing of nuclear weapons is specifically and separately prohibited for all.

*Paragraph 3*—The exceptions in the manner of use of nuclear weapons by the three nuclear-weapons-states is to be restated so that the exceptions are:

(a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if an armed attack occurs which includes the use of nuclear weapons, or

(b) if such an armed attack is of such a nature and magnitude that, in the decision of the using state, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons.

It should further be made clear that this provision will not imply any obligation to maintain forces of a non-nuclear nature for purposes of repelling non-nuclear attacks. Within the limits otherwise imposed

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/2-2257. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Stassen's cable, transmitted in telegrams 6122, 6123, and 6124 from London, is printed as Document 195.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 196 and 197.

by the partial agreement, it is for each of the "three" signators to decide the most effective distribution of its armament between the nuclear and the non-nuclear.

*Paragraph 4*—The commitment to cooperate in the design and installation of a necessary inspection system, is also to specifically include a commitment to cooperate in the maintenance of such a necessary inspection system, and these commitments are to be stated prior to and be prerequisite for the "cut-off" date.

*Paragraph 5*—The commitment for transfers of fissionable materials should call for transfers over and above certain minimums of material, thereby providing a saving clause for the UK and likewise making it clear that transfers are not contemplated to the extent of elimination or substantial elimination of nuclear weapons capability. The reservation of intention to maintain a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty or the partial agreement is concerned will be a footnote. The right of refabrication of weapons after the "cut-off" date should be definitely maintained.

*Paragraph 6*—For the method of aerial inspection, reference will be made to an annex to the treaty, which annex will spell it out in precise details along the lines of the Joint Chiefs and Doolittle<sup>4</sup> detailed work.

*Paragraph 6 (a)*—For the western half of this initial zone, consider the area of Alaska; and of Canada west of a line from 130 degrees west longitude-70 degrees north latitude, to Edmonton, and from Edmonton to 95 degrees west longitude on the Canadian-US line; and the continental United States west of 95 degrees west longitude.

*Paragraph 6 (b)*—The Russian-European zone to be for a European decision in which the US is willing to join. So far as the US is concerned it may be independent of the rest of the agreement, or incorporated in the first step if the Europeans wish it to be so.

*Paragraph 9*—The "blueprint" is to refer to an inventory of major designated armaments, and of the armed forces, and to be spelled out in detail in an annex worked out by the technical experts. It is, of course, to be exclusive of nuclear weapons.

*Paragraph 10*—The internationally supervised national storage is to be only of a percentage of the major designated armaments as reported in the inventory. The military expenditure reduction is to be a supplementary consequence and not a prime factor. The right to check on and endeavor to follow up Soviet military expenditures should be

---

<sup>4</sup> The air section of the inspection organization, prepared by J. H. Doolittle, chairman of the Task Force on Air Inspection, is contained in "A Plan for a Comprehensive Armament and Armed Force Inspection System, 20 January 1956," pp. 150-161. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Comprehensive Inspection Plan)

sought, along with a check up of use of major material such as steel and aluminum. Military expenditures is not to be looked upon as a major reliance for inspection purposes.

*Paragraph 11*—The Federal Republic of Germany would, of course, not be making agreed reductions, but rather would be accepting a ceiling for its rearmament, in conjunction with the first step partial agreement.

*Paragraph 12*—This general inspection commitment should apply to both conventional and nuclear aspects of the agreement.

*Paragraph 14*—This restriction on stationing nuclear weapons in the Russian-European aerial inspection zone, applies only to the nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs. It does not restrict the stationing of dual purpose delivery systems, and does not prohibit the preparatory training of armed forces in the zone for the contingent eventuality of war. The provision does safeguard against the hasty triggering of nuclear weapons in close proximity in the central European area, which could otherwise occur without deliberate decision by the top command in either the US or the USSR. Such a local triggering could institute a nuclear war which the responsible leadership of neither country intended. It also provides additional assurance to fourth countries, such as France, that if they abstain from nuclear weapons production the German armed forces are not likely to have nuclear weapons placed within their control by either the United States or the Soviet Union.

*Paragraph 15*—This is intended to indicate that there will be some reduction in the major designated armaments in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, but that such reduction will be of such a modest amount as to negate any implication of future complete withdrawal.

*Paragraph 16*—The commitment to progressively expand the aerial inspection system and to progressively expand the ground inspection system would not include the precise steps or timing for such expansion.

*Paragraph 17*—This provision would indicate on the one hand some reduction in bases, but on the other hand would affirm that the reduction would be of such small magnitude as to reflect the fact that complete elimination of foreign bases is not contemplated in any disarmament agreement which the US would accept.

*Paragraph 18*—It would be made clear that the temporary suspension for twelve months of all nuclear tests contemplates the possibility of resuming limited testing by the three after such temporary suspension, but that such limited testing would be with unilateral restraint, with due regard to health, and with advance notice of intention to test. Or such resumed testing would be specifically limited under inspection to an agreed safe amount of fissionable material.

*Paragraphs 19, 20, 21 and 22*—The effect of these four provisions is to indicate a willingness to move further in the event of full compliance with the first step, and in the event of satisfactory political solutions, but at the same time to make clear that a reduction to a point of extreme weakness or of internal security forces definitely is not contemplated in US policy, even under the most favorable circumstances.

*Paragraph 25*—The system of advance notification is to be developed along the lines of the Doolittle and Colclough report,<sup>5</sup> to cover submarines as well as bombers, and to add to the safeguards against great surprise attack.

HES

---

<sup>5</sup> The Navy section of the inspection organization, prepared by Oswald S. Colclough, chairman of the Task Force on Navy Inspection, is printed *ibid.*, pp. 126-149.

---

---

**201. Memorandum of Discussion at the 324th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 23, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments* (NSC Action No. 1553; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 10, 1956; Annex to NSC Action No. 1553)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Cutler explained the nature of the report which Governor Stassen would present to the Council. He pointed out that Governor Stassen had submitted a paper with the title "Policy Recommendation to Washington", dated May 9, 1957.<sup>3</sup> The Council was not now asked to make any decision on this recommendation. The decision would be made at special meetings to be held on Friday morning, in the Secretary of State's office, and on Saturday morning, in the President's office.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, Governor Stassen's report would simply bring the Council up to date as to what had been happening at the London

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on May 24.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC Action No. 1553, see footnote 5, Document 141. The memorandum from the Executive Secretary to the NSC has not been found in Department of State files. For the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, see Document 165.

<sup>3</sup> Document 195.

<sup>4</sup> For the informal record of the May 24 meeting, see Document 204. For the record of the May 25 meeting at the White House, see Document 206.

meetings of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, after which he would answer questions. (A copy of the aforesaid Policy Recommendation is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Governor Stassen directed his opening remarks to the mechanics of the current sessions in London, which had lasted for eight weeks. The U.S. Delegation consisted of eleven members, representing all the responsible departments. The Delegation had operated smoothly under the guidance of the Secretary of State and in terms of the directive given to Governor Stassen in NSC Action No. 1553 and the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553. The U.S. Delegation met every morning, and two cables were dispatched daily to the Department of State. There were regular meetings in the morning between the U.S. Delegation and the other three Western powers. The Five-Power meetings in the afternoon occurred at three o'clock. In addition to these regular meetings, Governor Stassen indicated that he had held many bilateral sessions with the Soviet Delegation. He always briefed the other allied powers on what occurred at these bilateral sessions.

Governor Stassen said that he and the U.S. Delegation were concentrating their efforts on achieving the top priority U.S. objectives in the disarmament negotiations, viz., measures to prevent fourth powers from obtaining nuclear weapons; measures to increase the security of the United States against surprise Soviet attack; measures which would begin to open up the Soviet Union to inspection; and, finally, cautious steps designed to achieve a limited initial disarmament agreement.

With respect to the problem of preventing fourth powers from obtaining nuclear weapons, Governor Stassen stated that the positions of France and Germany were crucial. The French have already decided to begin the fabrication of nuclear weapons in two months' time if some kind of disarmament agreement were not concluded by the United States and the United Kingdom and the USSR. Governor Stassen estimated that the French would be able to manufacture a nuclear weapon 18 months after they commenced the effort. If the French went ahead to manufacture nuclear weapons, it was highly likely that the Germans would do the same. For this reason, said Governor Stassen, there had been heavy concentration on trying to develop an initial partial agreement with the Soviets which would be satisfactory to powers like France and Germany, and which would otherwise advance the priority objectives which he had earlier mentioned.

Governor Stassen then indicated that one of the hopeful developments at London had been a series of "plain talking" sessions with the Soviets, in which the latter had abandoned their propaganda techniques of previous meetings of the Disarmament Subcommittee. Governor Stassen described the general Soviet position as something like the following. Their prime concern was that incidents might occur in

Europe which, although not of U.S. making, might nevertheless get out of hand, involve the United States, and ultimately result in the nuclear devastation of the Soviet Union. The Soviets likewise recognize that the great area of U.S. anxiety is the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. In essence, therefore, the Soviets have indicated to us that they are prepared to move in directions which will lessen the aforementioned anxiety of the United States if in turn the United States will move to lessen the aforementioned Soviet concern.

With respect to the problem of a surprise attack from the Soviet Union, Governor Stassen said that he had been governed by the recent reports of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee to the National Security Council.<sup>5</sup> These reports had quite clearly indicated the area of concern for the United States with respect to surprise nuclear attack, and accordingly they indicated the areas overseas where it would be in the interests of the United States to establish aerial and ground inspection. Pointing out that he had also exercised the very greatest caution in dealing with the Soviets, Governor Stassen uncovered a chart with the title "Progressive Installation of Aerial Inspection".<sup>6</sup>

Governor Stassen next confirmed Mr. Culter's statement that his report was a broad progress report and not a report requiring decisions. The decisions would be developed at the special meetings on Friday and Saturday. Thereafter, Governor Stassen illustrated, with the assistance of a chart, a plan for the gradual opening up to aerial and ground inspection of certain areas in the Soviet Union. In addition to considerable portions of Eastern Siberia, the area also included the northern Arctic coast areas of the Soviet Union as far as Norway. The earliest date for the establishment of an inspection system in these areas was stated to be July 1, 1958.

In response to the aforementioned plan, Governor Stassen indicated that the Soviets had come back at the end of April with a counter-plan which moved the inspection zone back approximately five degrees from the westernmost point. While this was not encouraging, the Soviet proposal (a copy of which is included in the minutes of the meeting)<sup>7</sup> had at least this one notable advance: The Soviet memorandum marked the first time that the Soviets had abandoned measuring demarcation lines for inspection zones based on the border between the Federal Republic and East Germany. Governor Stassen had

---

<sup>5</sup> Documentation on the Net Evaluation Subcommittee is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.

<sup>6</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>7</sup> Presumably a reference to the inspection zones proposed in the Soviet memorandum to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, April 30, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 784-785. The minutes of the meeting, including a copy of the Soviet proposal, have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.



made clear to them that the United States would never agree to a demarcation line consisting of the border between the two Germanys. In general, Governor Stassen expressed the belief that there remained a field for negotiation between the inspection zone proposals made by the United States and by the Soviet Union. Referring to his chart and a map, Governor Stassen indicated that our proposed zone covered, according to the estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, the areas of the Soviet Union in which approximately 75% of the armed forces of the Soviet Union were currently deployed. He admitted, however, that the Soviet forces could be redeployed elsewhere.

Governor Stassen then turned to what he described as another great area of difficulty—the area of nuclear weapons and of nuclear power. The Soviets, he said, had indicated great apprehension over the possibility that their atomic economy might be taken over by some international inspection agency. On the other hand, Governor Stassen believed that negotiations for the cutting off of the use of fissionable material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons could be satisfactorily worked out with the Soviets provided that, at the time the inspection system is put into operation, there could also be a partial suspension of tests of nuclear weapons. Such a suspension might run from July 1958 to July 1959. However, Governor Stassen admitted the difficulty that the United States would encounter from world public opinion in resuming nuclear weapons tests if the Soviets proved not to have acted in good faith. There was also a serious problem of retaining the interest and services of our nuclear scientists if the testing of new weapons and devices were prohibited.

Governor Stassen indicated that the first actual cut in arms would range somewhere between 10 and 15% of the major armaments of the powers which were party to the agreement, particularly nuclear-capable weapons. The 10 or 15% of the armaments would, according to this plan, be placed in depots subject to international inspection but actually located within the boundaries of the nation from whose armed forces they had been removed. Here, Governor Stassen admitted the risk that the Soviets would incorrectly report on the total levels of their armaments. He went on to say that as a first step, if this plan were adopted, the level of the personnel in the armed forces of the United States and of the USSR would be reduced to 2.5 million.

With respect to the problem of nuclear weapons, Governor Stassen said that in the current London meetings the Soviets had finally abandoned their demands for an immediate agreement to outlaw all nuclear weapons. He had made it plain to the Soviets that we would never negotiate an agreement with them on the basis of a complete ban of nuclear weapons. The Soviets had likewise abandoned their insistence that the United States abandon *all* its overseas bases, and now were calling for a reduction in these bases but not for their

complete elimination. The Soviets were now supporting a position that no nuclear weapons were to be stationed outside the borders of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR. Accordingly, it appeared to Governor Stassen that when the first aerial inspection zone was established in Europe, nuclear warheads would be withdrawn from the agreed zone, although nuclear-capable weapons would remain and there would be continued training in the use of nuclear-capable weapons minus their nuclear warheads.

The French, the British and the Soviets, continued Governor Stassen, all seemed to believe that if the first step in some such disarmament program as this were faithfully carried out, and there could be simultaneously settlements of political issues between the Soviet Union and the West, we might look forward to further and sharper reductions of the level of armaments.

Referring to the matter of the use of nuclear weapons, Governor Stassen said that the U.S. Delegation had made it perfectly plain to the Soviets that we would never agree to forgo all use of such weapons. We might, however, agree to certain limitations on the use of such weapons; for example, limitations to use in the case of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

With respect to further steps in disarmament if the first step were faithfully carried out, Governor Stassen indicated the "old level" of 1 to 1.5 million. Apropos of this, however, he added that he did not feel that we needed to mention a figure as low as 1 million, although of course the next step would have to be a level somewhere below 2.5 million. Governor Stassen did not feel that this further step in the reduction of force levels would require us to withdraw our armed forces from Europe or other areas of the world which we considered vital. We would also have to make clear that this further step in disarmament would require political settlements between the Soviet bloc and the West.

In concluding, Governor Stassen stated that the great question now before the United States in these disarmament negotiations was whether or not we could take a first step in disarmament while convincing the American public that this was *only* a first step and thus avoid arousing false and dangerous hopes. Also, we must be sure that if we take this first step our armed forces remain on the alert. For the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the great question posed by these negotiations was whether or not the Soviet regime could succeed in surviving even such a relatively modest initial opening up of the Soviet Union. Governor Stassen added that the Soviets had shown very great concern on this point.

At the conclusion of Governor Stassen's remarks, the President questioned whether the proposed agreement by the three powers on the use of nuclear weapons was properly part of a disarmament plan.

In the President's opinion, this was primarily a political question. Governor Stassen explained that it had been necessary to put the agreement on the use of nuclear weapons into the disarmament plan in order to provide evidence that the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR were placing restraints on themselves in return for asking all other powers to forgo the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The President commented that, even so, he felt that this problem was "a tricky one".

The President then changed the subject by stating that he had read just the other day in a newspaper that the Kremlin was reported to be about to tear down the Iron Curtain. Mr. Larson undertook to comment for the President on the newspaper story of the creation by the Kremlin of a State Committee for Cultural Relations with foreign countries. The President asked Governor Stassen if he had picked up any evidence at London that it was the intention of the Soviets to tear down the Iron Curtain and to liberalize their courses of action and open up the Soviet Union. Governor Stassen replied that he had picked up nothing concrete on this alleged plan, and that the proof of this pudding would have to be in the eating.

The President went on to say that his next question was concerned with what part of the United States would be opened up to Soviet inspection if the initial disarmament step were taken. Governor Stassen replied that the extent of the areas of the United States to be opened up to Soviet inspection had not been clearly decided. In general, however, they would probably include Alaska, a portion of Western Canada, and portions of the Western part of the United States. Involved in the question of how much we would be prepared to exchange with the Soviet Union by way of areas open to inspection, it should be remembered that the United States was already much more open than the USSR. Nevertheless, Governor Stassen felt that we should not open the heartland of the United States to Soviet inspection until the Soviets had opened their heartland to U.S. inspection. This would probably not occur until the last stages of a progressive disarmament plan.

The President then asked further questions about the precise areas in the Soviet Union to be opened up to inspection with the first disarmament step. Governor Stassen indicated, by reference to the map, the areas that the Soviets had offered in Siberia and the additional areas which the United States desired to add along the Arctic coast up to Norway, which area would include installations on the Kola Peninsula. He added that we had not yet talked to the Soviet Delegation about these additional areas.

Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State if he wished to make any comments. Secretary Dulles replied that it was only fair to point out that there remained very considerable differences of view in the

U.S. Government as to how the disarmament plan should be developed. He was therefore holding a meeting of responsible officials tomorrow in his office, with the objective of trying to iron out these differences as far as that was possible, and to bring before the President on Saturday the basis for a policy decision which Governor Stassen could take back to London. For this reason, Secretary Dulles did not think it was particularly useful to discuss the question of disarmament further at today's meeting. Secretary Dulles added that he and Governor Stassen were to appear before a group of Senators on the subject of disarmament this afternoon. Originally the group was to be small in size, but Secretary Dulles understood that it had grown now to consist of some 30 Senators. This seemed a pretty large group in which to hope to make much progress.

In bringing the discussion to a close, the President said very forcefully that he wished to express one thought about the meetings to be held on Friday and Saturday for policy decision. This thought was the absolute necessity of some kind of a halt in the arms race. The President went on to state that he received from Secretary Humphrey every day or so a message delineating the severe financial and budgetary problems facing us. He agreed that if our spending goes unchecked, the effects will be very terrible for the United States. While we should not incur serious risks in reaching a disarmament agreement with the Soviets, we certainly could not stand pat and refuse to respond to Soviet offers by some kind of U.S. counter-offers. So what we are engaging in is no mere intellectual exercise or empty debate. We have got to do something.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>8</sup>

a. Noted and discussed a progress report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament on the recent meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee in London.

b. Noted the President's restatement of the necessity of achieving some kind of halt to the current arms race without incurring serious risks to U.S. security.

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>8</sup> Paragraphs a-b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1722, approved by the President on May 25. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

202. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 24, 1957.*

DEAR MR. DULLES: Inclosed herewith are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Mr. Stassen's proposals for a limited first step agreement on limitation of armaments, which you inclosed in your letter of May 11, 1957.<sup>2</sup> In accordance with your suggestion at the May 17 meeting,<sup>3</sup> I requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address their comments only to those portions of Mr. Stassen's proposal which pertain to the first phase. In general, I share the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over certain aspects of the program. I feel too, that the danger posed by the "4th country" problem is not of such immediate import as to be controlling in any current formulation of United States disarmament policy.

Further consideration of the views I presented to you in my letter of May 17<sup>4</sup> has not tended to alter my conviction that it would be injudicious, in an opening step, to undertake the settlement of a wide range of problems, particularly where the execution would be projected well into the future and hence subject to evolving conditions which cannot now be forecast. I still consider, however, that there remain areas of a more limited scope which provide a basis for the negotiation of an acceptable first stage agreement.

I believe that the proposals approved by the President on 21 November, 1956,<sup>5</sup> should constitute the fundamentals of the U.S. position, perhaps adjusted in some details in the light of the deliberations which have taken place in the interim.

I recommend that the United States position not project the reciprocal force reductions in specific figures beyond the 2.5 million level or armaments reductions beyond those corresponding with the force reductions. I would have no objection to a statement which would establish future reductions as the desired goal, the specific levels to be a matter for future negotiation conditioned upon the satisfactory execution of the first stage commitments.

With regard to the establishment of zones, as contemplated in Mr. Stassen's proposal, I believe that such a project would create problems both at home and abroad. I feel that a zonal arrangement as regards the USSR and the North American continent would not necessarily be to the strategic disadvantage of the U.S. However, the zones in Siberia

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2457. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 196. For Stassen's proposals, see Document 195.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 197.

<sup>4</sup> Document 196.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165.

on the one hand and Alaska and the United States on the other, as proposed by the USSR, are generally viewed by the United States public as widely disparate from the standpoint of relative strategic importance, as distinguished from mere mileage. Since Mr. Stassen's proposal contemplates the coverage of an area in the U.S. approximating that proposed by the Soviets, I feel that it would meet with an unfavorable public reaction in this country. We should not establish or accept the principle of a zonal arrangement on the basis of equal geographic areas which have no relation to strategic importance or forces and facilities to be inspected. Further, I do not consider that a zonal arrangement would provide adequate assurance that disarmament commitments outside the zone were being fulfilled.

As to the zones in Europe, the United States and our allies have, in the past, presented this concept solely in terms of a security system associated with the reunification of Germany. The special provisions for the thinning out of forces and the prohibition against the stationing of nuclear weapons in the area would have an immediate impact on the effectiveness of the NATO forces. In his informal memo to the Secretary of State of May 22,<sup>6</sup> Mr. Stassen states that the European zonal arrangement may be independent of the rest of the agreement. I believe that the European zonal arrangement should be separated from the remainder of the proposed agreement and treated in a separate forum in which all affected nations would be represented.

Current U.S. policy proposes the progressive development and installation of an inspection and control system concurrently with the reduction of forces to the 2.5 million level. This policy also states that there must be effective inspection for every portion of any agreement affecting armaments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that Mr. Stassen's proposal does not meet these requirements in the first stage. If the zonal arrangement is to be proposed it should provide for the unrestricted movement of the ground inspection teams from the outset, as well as for overflight. Further, in order to provide an effective inspection and control system, the progressive expansion of the zones to encompass all of the areas subject to inspection should proceed as the reductions in forces take place and not await the completion of the first stage reduction. With the progressive expansion of the zones, overflights and unrestricted movement of the ground inspection teams should be permitted within the expanded areas. While I do not consider complete aerial photography of the USSR as essential to verify the first stage reduction, I do feel that the right to conduct aerial surveillance and to use air transport are essential elements of the verification system.

---

<sup>6</sup> Document 200.

As I indicated in my letter to you of May 17, I feel that the U.S. position regarding the limitations on testing of nuclear weapons is susceptible of adjustment. I believe that the U.S. could agree as an interim measure to an arrangement whereby the countries concerned would commit themselves to (a) advance notification and international observation of tests; (b) a specified test limitation one approach to which could be the release of fissioned material in the atmosphere in a given period and (c) the establishment of an international agency which would be capable of monitoring tests and detecting the violations of the agreement.

With regard to the provisions of the proposal concerning the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons by the "have not" as well as the "have" nations, I consider that the U.S. should not undertake any further restrictions than our present position contemplates, i.e., there should be no use of nuclear weapons or any other weapons in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

In my opinion the risk to U.S. security interests entailed in a first stage agreement involving reductions to the 2.5 million level can be kept within acceptable proportions, if the U.S. adheres to the basic principle underlying our November 21, 1956 policy—the essentiality of an effective inspection system (and one in which we have full confidence) for each phase of every agreement. We should not accept the doctrine advanced by the Soviets in this regard—that partial disarmament warrants only partial inspection measures.

I appreciate the importance of moving in the direction of a limited first step agreement, and believe the November 21, 1956 policy with the variations I have outlined above should be generally recognized as equitable and reasonable. Accordingly, I recommend that the provisions of the November 21 policy, modified as I have indicated, form the basis of the proposed United States position.

Sincerely yours,

Donald A. Quarles

[Enclosure]

**Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)**<sup>7</sup>

*Washington, May 22, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Disarmament

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 17 May 1957,<sup>8</sup> subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Governor Stassen's latest disarmament proposal and your interim reply thereto.<sup>9</sup> They strongly concur with the preliminary views you have forwarded to the Secretary of State.

3. Detailed comments on Governor Stassen's proposal are appended herewith.<sup>10</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff have confined these to the proposed first stage reductions (July 1958 to July 1959). They are of the opinion, however, that his proposals for subsequent reductions in U.S. forces below 2.5 million, plus progressive restrictions on nuclear weapons and missiles would completely negate present U.S. military planning and prevent the fulfillment of collective defense obligations throughout the world.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted several aspects of Mr. Stassen's outline plan upon which they wish to offer additional comment:

a. They are concerned with the nuclear restrictions without any clear indication of adequate inspection.

b. They are concerned with the indefinite nature and inadequacy of the provisions for the specifications of the inspection system.

c. They are concerned over provisions which establish a time phasing differential for aerial and ground inspection, and the implications that the ground inspectors may not have unimpeded access to objects of control.

d. They are concerned with the zonal arrangements in Europe. In this most sensitive area the provisions are such that the strength and morale of the NATO would be almost immediately destroyed.

e. They note the apparent preoccupation with the necessity of preventing a nuclear capability for fourth countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not visualize the security of the U.S. being jeopardized if such

---

<sup>7</sup> Secret.

<sup>8</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>9</sup> Documents 195 and 196, respectively.

<sup>10</sup> The undated enclosure, entitled "Comments Regarding Military Implications of Governor Stassen's Latest Disarmament Proposal", is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2457)



countries are successful in achieving this capability. In their opinion it is extremely unlikely that the USSR would provide such weapons to her satellites and therefore, from the military point of view, the fourth power problem is of far greater concern to the USSR. Nuclear weapons in the hands of our Allies should strengthen our alliances. If a disarmament system incorporates safeguards which are adequate to control the two principal nuclear powers they would certainly be adequate to sufficiently control fourth powers.

5. The new proposal by Mr. Stassen is intended as a counter-proposal to the partial disarmament plan submitted by the USSR on 30 April 1957. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that the latest Soviet proposal indicates any relaxation of their position. The Soviets have seemingly accepted some features of the U.S. aerial inspection proposal but have in fact retrogressed with respect to ground inspection. The Joint Chiefs of Staff see nothing in the USSR proposal to cause them to feel that the U.S. should recommend concessions from the approved national policy. Mr. Stassen's proposal is inconsistent with that policy in many respects and is so vague and general with respect to some aspects, such as time phasing and inspection provisions, that in its present form the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it completely unacceptable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reiterated time and again that any disarmament plan must be based on effective inspection for each progressive step and strongly recommend that the United States continue to insist that every portion of every agreement affecting armaments be covered by effective aerial and ground inspection.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
**Arthur Radford**<sup>11</sup>  
*Chairman*

---

<sup>11</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**203. Letter From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Whitney) to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*London, May 24, 1957.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Yesterday I called on Harold Macmillan at his request "just to chat". We had a most friendly and interesting conversation, lasting over an hour, and covering a wide scale of subjects. He was relaxed and amiably disposed toward friend and foe, even though Salisbury<sup>2</sup> was at that moment reviving antagonisms which should have been left to die long since. He said that he was "more comfortable" now, having passed successfully through a trying period. At the end, he invited me to see him whenever I had anything important. "Selwyn will understand", he added. I'm pleased about that, because obviously his door had to be opened by him.

The chief thing he had on his mind was suggested to him by your letter on his Bulganin reply.<sup>3</sup> He thought he caught from you a glimmer that maybe the Soviet leaders are beginning to think seriously about disarmament. If they are, he reasoned, no good will come out of it at the present conference level; it will take a discussion among the leaders of States.

For awhile, as you know, the Government here has been toying with the idea of talking to the Soviet in the U.N. over the Middle East. I opposed this very strongly with Selwyn Lloyd and the P.M. said he became convinced this was wrong. But what does interest him now is the idea of a "Summit" meeting limited to the one subject of disarmament and he said he would be interested to know your thinking about this. The timing would be to "start to begin" discussions about it a year or eighteen months from now.

There is a strong feeling here that the Russians do have a real economic problem, and an awakening fear of tightening atomic pressure. This is tied to a belief that the Committee direction of internal communism is not working and that either the cult of Stalin must be restored, or Khrushchev must build himself into a figure of worshipful size. A meeting at the top level on this most dramatic of all issues would, of course, be a fine piece of personal promotion for him.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Whitney. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The Marquis of Salisbury, Lord President of the Council, resigned from the Macmillan government on March 29 because of his opposition to Macmillan's decision to release from detention the Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios. He was also critical of the government for its decision to accept Nasser's terms for the use by British shipping of the Suez Canal, and he introduced a motion in the House of Lords on May 23 censuring the Macmillan government on this issue.

<sup>3</sup> Reference presumably is to Eisenhower's letter to Macmillan, May 10, scheduled for publication in volume xxvii.

I guess that this is discussed with me because it is so tentative, and so fraught with wild hopes and bottomless traps that it is not the time to put anything on paper. What Macmillan wanted was the *trend* of your thinking on this subject. I have addressed this privately to you rather than through telegraphic channels, in view of its combustible nature.

I cannot evaluate the seriousness of this approach: how spur-of-the-moment, or how politically motivated. I simply pass it along with my own thought that he would probably be quite satisfied if I were to report that you were not thinking along this line at the moment.<sup>4</sup>

I hear from travellers—and from Cliff—that your health is excellent again, for which I am thankful. I can imagine that these days are not very elevating for the spirit, however!

With warm regards and respect, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Jock

---

<sup>4</sup>Whitney sent a copy of this letter to Dulles and attached to it a personal note, which reads in part: "I think I can guess at the answer. However, there is a lot of pressure here, as you know, for 'talks' and this business will crop up from time to time." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda)

On June 5, Dulles replied as follows: "I have your letter of May 24th. Thank you for sending me this copy of your letter to the President. We talked it over briefly yesterday evening. The time may come when some 'Summit' meeting on disarmament would be appropriate, but not, I think, until much more preparatory work has been done. As the President and I were saying, such a meeting must be a success, for a failure would have very grave consequences indeed." (*Ibid.*) For Eisenhower's reply, see Document 234.

---

## 204. Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary Dulles' Office, Department of State, Washington, May 24, 1957, 2 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

*Department of State*

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

Mr. Bowie

Mr. Reinhardt

Mr. Walmsley

Governor Stassen

Ambassador Peaslee

The Vice President

*White House*

General Cutler

AEC

Admiral Strauss

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2457. Secret. Drafted by Greene.

*Defense Department*  
Secretary Quarles  
Admiral Radford  
Mr. Sprague

*CIA*  
Mr. Allen Dulles

(Numerous working level officers from the agencies were also present.)

SUBJECT

Disarmament Proposal

In preparation for a meeting with the President on May 25,<sup>2</sup> the group discussed for three and one-half hours Governor Stassen's May 9 proposals as modified by his May 22 memorandum to the Secretary of State.<sup>3</sup>

The discussion brought out various issues and the areas of agreement and disagreement thereon which would be submitted to the President and which are described in the attached sheets.

JG

**[Attachment]**

2.<sup>4</sup> All signators (except the US, UK, and USSR) to agree they are prohibited from the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.

*Suggested Issues:*

1. To what extent does the spread of nuclear weapons capability to fourth countries present a substantial threat to US security?
2. How should the use of nuclear weapons by fourth nations be treated?

*Basis of Agreement or Disagreement:*

1. Quarles, Radford (and apparently Strauss) questioned whether spread to fourth nations is a serious threat to US security. The Secretary, Allen Dulles and Stassen considered that the spread does entail serious risks for US security and that no undue concessions were being made by us on this point.

2. All agree that the proposal should be modified to allow the use of nuclear weapons by fourth countries in case of an attack on the same basis as they would be usable by one of the three countries possessing nuclear weapons.

---

<sup>2</sup> See Document 206.

<sup>3</sup> Documents 195 and 200.

<sup>4</sup> The numbers at the beginning of these paragraphs refer to the numbered paragraphs in Document 195.

5. Upon the establishment of satisfactorily functioning inspection system and the cut-off on production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes, the USSR, UK, and US will commence agreed equitable proportionate transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling either national or international; provided, however, that these transfers shall be carried out to only a limited degree and each of the three will be maintaining a very substantial nuclear weapons capability in so far as the terms of the treaty for the partial agreement is concerned.

*Issues:*

1. What should be the basis of the respective transfers by the US, USSR, and UK?
2. Should the amount of the specific transfers be stated in an initial agreement or determined later?

*Substantial Consensus:*

The initial agreement should fix the ratios, and preferably the exact amounts, of the specific transfers by the US, USSR, and UK. As an initial negotiating position, the US should request that the USSR transfer amounts equal to our own transfers. The UK transfer should be nominal. If agreement cannot be reached on the above basis of equality, Stassen should request further instruction.

6. Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 1958), the USSR and US and other states concerned will move promptly to install and begin to operate an aerial inspection system in accordance with the approved Eisenhower method in initial zones, including

a) all of the Soviet Union north of the Arctic Circle (including the Murmansk Kola Peninsular and Dikson areas) and all of the Soviet Union east of 108 degrees East Longitude (from Lake Baikal to Bering Straits); and an equal geographic area of Alaska, Canada, and Western US.

b) all of the Soviet Union west of 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude (Minsk-Zhmerinka line) and all of the territory of Europe between 2 and one-half degrees East Longitude and 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude and between 42 degrees, 20 minutes, North Latitude and 63 degrees North Latitude. (Labelled as the Russian and European zone for convenience in this cable.)

*Suggested Issue:*

Scope of aerial and ground inspection zones.

*Areas of Agreement or Disagreement:*

1. In view of the effects on our NATO allies and the complexity of the multi national interests involved, the European-Russian aerial and ground control zones should be treated separately from the US-USSR zone in so far as possible, and should be handled in a way allowing Europeans to have a full voice in the development of the position.

2. As an initial negotiating position for American-Russian aerial and ground control zones, the US should propose that our side include continental US, Alaska, and Canada, and the Soviet side include all Soviet territory. If the Soviets continue to refuse to deal on this basis the US should move to a limited initial zone—in order to start an inspection technique—which would comprise roughly the entire area north of the Arctic Circle, all of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, the Kamchatka Peninsula, and the Kuriles Islands. Stassen felt that since the Russians have come forward with an offer of inspection over a large area of the USSR, the US should counter initially with an offer of a large area of the US before moving to a very limited inspection zone. Stassen also believes that the Soviets will not agree to a US-USSR inspection zone without simultaneous agreement on a European zone.

10. Within the following nine months after furnishing the blueprints (estimated July 1959), the USSR and the US would (in the manner outlined by US JCS in the Secretary of Defense letter of October 30, 1956<sup>5</sup>) place in internationally supervised national storage in disarmament depots 15% of the major designated armaments reported in their blueprints, including nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles, and would reduce their armed forces to two and one-half million and would bring the level of their military expenditures down by 15%.

*Issue:*

What kind of reductions in armaments should be provided in the agreement in the initial stage while the inspection system is being installed?

*Basis of Disagreement:*

1. Quarles believes that the agreement should leave to each country to decide for itself what armaments should be put in depots. He asserted that the timing of inspection would not justify any specific prior agreement regarding types and amounts of weapons to be mothballed.

---

<sup>5</sup> Document 164.

2. Stassen considered that the agreement should specifically provide the amounts of designated armaments to be put in mothballs on the ground that this was necessary as a beginning and would not entail undue risks in view of the method of mothballing, the size of the reductions, and the immediate subsequent inspection.

Paragraphs 16, 19, 20, 21, and 22. These paragraphs all deal with a second phase following the successful implementation of the first phase.

*Issue:*

Should our position contain such detailed provisions regarding a second phase of reduction?

*Consensus:*

1. It is not wise to spell out in this much detail a second phase of reduction.

2. US should state that it would be prepared to negotiate for major reductions in armaments and armed forces if the first phase succeeded.

3. Stassen thought a reference to a floor of 1.5 million was most desirable; Quarles felt the figure should not be less than 2 million.

18. Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty (estimated as July 1958) all signators would be committed to a temporary suspension for 12 months of all nuclear tests and during such 12 months to cooperate in the design of an agreed inspection system which would support the nuclear materials cut-off commitment, and which would also verify either an agreement for limitation on the amount of fissionable material released per year into the atmosphere by the three in future tests, or to verify a continued limited suspension of tests. The agreement to be so drawn that a failure to agree upon and to install the inspection system involved for these two commitments or the failure to agree on either a limitation of tests or further suspension of tests beyond the 12 months would automatically result in no legal commitments against tests after the 12 months.

*Issue:*

Should nuclear tests be suspended, even temporarily, prior to adequately inspected cut-off of output of nuclear weapons and the beginning of inspected transfers from weapons stockpiles to peaceful uses?

*Basis of Disagreement:*

1. Strauss considers this issue should be answered "no", but suggested some intermediate positions.

2. Stassen considers his proposal to be necessary for coping with the Fourth Nation problem and for obtaining Russian agreement.

3. Quarles believes that the agreement should contain (a)<sup>6</sup> positive provisions, including setting up an International Commission to monitor and eventually to control tests and (b) undertaking that next tests would be 12 months ahead coupled with a U.S. statement that we might cancel tests if there were further agreement.<sup>7</sup>

23. The signators agree that within three months after the effective date of the treaty (estimated to be October 1958) they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to design inspection controls (and upon reaching an agreed definition, to install them) to fulfill a commitment that sending objects through outer space and sending unmanned objects over distances in excess of medium range at any altitude, shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes, and further designed to verify and insure compliance with a commitment not to build or to install intercontinental ballistic or guided missiles or rockets.

This paragraph deals with the control of rockets intercontinental ballistic and guided missiles.

*Issue:*

Should this type of weapon be separated out for special treatment?

*Basis of Agreement and Disagreement:*

The Secretary, Allen Dulles, and Stassen favored this paragraph which reflects existing policy already put forward in the Disarmament meeting. Quarles expressed some doubt.

---

<sup>6</sup> Section "(a)" was inserted in handwriting and deleted from its position immediately preceding the word "contain".

<sup>7</sup> Section (b) of this paragraph originally read: "undertaking to suspend tests for 12 months if coupled with a US statement that we would thereafter resume tests in the absence of further agreement." The deletion and addition of words to this section were handwritten.



205. **Editorial Note**

Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, visited the United States May 24–29. During his visit Adenauer had several talks with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles on disarmament, especially as this matter related to NATO and free world security and the reunification of Germany. Part IV of the joint declaration by Eisenhower and Adenauer, May 28, gave their understanding of the relationships between both first step and comprehensive disarmament agreements, and the problem of the reunification of Germany. The communiqué and joint declaration, Adenauer's addresses to the House of Representatives and the Senate, both on May 28, Acting Secretary of State Herter's farewell statement, May 29, and a list of the members of Adenauer's official party, dated May 24, are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 17, 1957, pages 955–960. The communiqué and joint declaration are also printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pages 420–423.

For documentation on Adenauer's visit to the United States, see volume XXVI.

---

206. **Memorandum of a Conference, White House, Washington, May 25, 1957, 9–11:20 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

The President, Secretary Dulles, Admiral Strauss, Deputy Secretary Quarles, Admiral Radford, Allen W. Dulles, Harold E. Stassen, and Robert Cutler. There were also present in the room Under Secretary Herter, Assistant Secretary Bowie, Counselor Reinhardt, General Fox, General Loper, General Persons, General Goodpaster, and Captain Blouin

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clear Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers. Secret. Drafted by Cutler. A notation on a cover sheet, presumably in Cutler's handwriting, reads in part:

"RC's summary memo of decisions. First draft prepared immediately after WH Cabinet Room Conference. Second draft attached, prevision [?] prepared in conference in Cabinet Room 3:30–6:30 May 25 by persons noted on first page in ink and approved by P[resident] 7:10 pm."

There is no notation of persons in ink on the first page of the source text. The first page of the source text does have a handwritten notation: "As approved by P[resident] at 7:10 pm." The initials "D.E" appear in the President's handwriting following paragraph 5 of the source text.

1. The conference considered the Stassen "Policy Recommendation to Washington" of May 9, 1957 (12 pages)<sup>2</sup> as modified by the Stassen "Informal Memorandum" to the Secretary of State of May 22, 1957 (4 pages).<sup>3</sup>

2. The Secretary of State referred to the "Policy Recommendation" paper and proceeded to take up each numbered paragraph, beginning with 1, through 27. The Preamble and Part III of the "Policy Recommendation" paper were not considered and should be omitted from the paper as revised to reflect the decisions. The "Informal Memorandum" was not separately considered, but portions of it affecting paragraphs in the "Policy Recommendation" were mentioned.

3. The following paragraphs were either agreed to or modified in some minor way not requiring detailed mention in this memorandum:

Paragraphs:

1;

3 (as modified by the "Informal Memorandum");

4 (as modified by the "Informal Memorandum" and by a provision that nuclear weapons may be refabricated);

7 (subject to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone);

8 (subject to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone and eliminating the clause referring to "embarkation ports of Eastern United States")

11 (as modified by the "Informal Memorandum");

12;

13 (subject to modification conforming to the revision in paragraphs 9-10);

14 (subject to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone);

15 (subject to modification conforming to the revision in paragraphs 9-10 and to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone);

17 (subject to modification conforming to the revision in paragraphs 9-10 and to modification conforming to the separable treatment to be accorded the European-Russian zone);

24;

25;

26;

27.

4. The substance of the agreements affecting the other paragraphs (2, 5, 6, 9-10, 16-18-19-20-21-22, and 23) are set forth in the attached pages.

<sup>2</sup> Document 195.

<sup>3</sup> Document 200.

5. The Pres. requests the USDel promptly to<sup>4</sup> revise the basic paper referred to in 1 above, in the light of this memorandum, so that the President may have<sup>5</sup> a complete corrected text.<sup>6</sup>

*Paragraph 2. (as modified by the "Informal Memorandum")*

1. This paragraph should be modified to allow the use of nuclear weapons by fourth countries in case of an attack, on the same basis on which they would be usable by one of the three countries possessing nuclear weapons in case of attack.

*Paragraph 5. (as modified by the "Informal Memorandum")*

1. This paragraph should be modified so that the initial agreement will fix the specific ratios between the contributions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes; clarifying the present language, "agreed equitable proportionate transfers."

2. Unless the Soviets insist on a 50-50 ratio, the following ratios of the quantity in each increment are approved: U.S. 55 and U.S.S.R. 45, with whatever amount the U.K. may transfer to be in addition to the amount so transferred.

*Paragraph 6.*

This paragraph should be modified in a number of ways:

*1. The European-Russian Zone*

In view of the effects on our NATO allies and the complexity of the multi-national interests involved, the European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be treated separately from the U.S.-Canada-U.S.S.R. aerial and ground control zone, insofar as possible. Negotiations and arrangements for a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be handled in a way allowing our NATO allies (and other affected non-NATO nations) to have a full voice in the development of the position.

*2. The U.S.-Canada-U.S.S.R. Zone*

Initially the U.S. will propose that our side include the continental U.S., Alaska, and Canada, and that the Soviet side include all Soviet territory. If the Soviets should continue to refuse to deal on this basis, the U.S. will accept a limited initial zone,—in order to start an inspec-

---

<sup>4</sup> The words "Pres. requests the" and "promptly to" were added in the President's handwriting and the words "should at once" following "USDel" were deleted.

<sup>5</sup> The word "promptly" immediately following this word has been deleted from the source text.

<sup>6</sup> For the completed corrected text of the revised basic paper, prepared by the U.S. Delegation to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission and communicated to Secretary Dulles on May 31, see Document 212.

tion technique. This limited zone will comprise roughly the entire area north of the Arctic Circle (except Sweden and Finland), all of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and all of the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands. In conducting U.S. Del. negotiations concerning the area of the zone, the greatest caution should be exercised relative to offering more U.S. territory in exchange for more Siberian territory.

*Paragraphs 9-10.*

1. These paragraphs require major modification, because:

a. "Blueprint" includes both a statement of fixed military installations and also an inventory of military forces and major designated armaments (including nuclear weapons-delivery vehicles but excluding nuclear weapons), together with these locations.

b. No "blueprint" relating to the *whole* U.S.S.R., or calculations of percentage reductions based on such "blueprint", would be reliable, until aerial and ground control inspection systems covering the *whole* U.S.S.R. territory were established and operating.

c. A list of armaments prepared by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., as a basis for agreeing to armaments reductions, will state specific quantities of identified types of armaments, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture. Such list will not relate to a percentage of the nation's total armaments or of the nation's armaments located within a certain zone.

2. The following first step is approved:

a. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree on a U.S.-Canada-U.S.S.R. zone for aerial and ground control inspection.

b. Each of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. furnish to the other a "blueprint" (as described in 1-a above) of the total military installations, armaments, and military forces located within such inspection zone.

c. The initial agreement will include commitments for each of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to reduce military forces to 2.5 million, and a list (as described in 1-c above) of armaments scheduled for reduction; the armaments so listed bearing a rough relation to the stated reduction in military forces.

d. After the treaty becomes effective, each places the armaments set forth on its list in an internationally supervised national storage depot within its own territory.

*Paragraphs 16-19-20-21-22.*

1. The initial agreement should not spell out in detail a second phase of reduction.

2. The U.S. Del. may state that if the first stage under the agreement is carried through successfully, the U.S. would be prepared to negotiate for further major reductions in armaments and armed forces. (The possibility of a reduction in the second phase to not less than 2 million men may be discussed, without any commitment.)

3. A hope might also be expressed that further reductions in armaments and armed forces might be negotiated, if the second phase under the agreement is carried through successfully, but no floor below 1.5 million should be indicated.

*Paragraph 18.*

This paragraph should be modified as follows:

Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty (estimated at July, 1958), all signators would be committed:

- a. to cooperate in setting up an international inspection commission to monitor tests;
- b. to refrain from further tests until 12 months after such effective date;—with the understanding that the U.S. intends, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary by the end of such 12 months' period, thereafter to resume testing;
- c. if tests are resumed, to give notification in advance of such tests and approximate yields; to provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and to place limitations upon the amount of radioactive material to be released in the atmosphere.

*Paragraph 23.*

This paragraph should be modified to read as follows:

“The signators agree that within 3 months after the effective date of the agreement (estimated to be October, 1958) they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space should be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.”

Add at the end of the policy recommendation paper a new paragraph reading:

“The specific provisions of this paper are considered as inseparable parts of a whole, unless the contrary is stated.”

207. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles'  
Residence, Washington, May 26, 1957, 9:35 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Governor Stassen  
Mr. Elbrick

Mr. Stassen gave the Secretary General Cutler's notes on the conference yesterday, which had been initialed by the President last night.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary said he had spoken to him this morning about getting them all together so that there would be in one document the net results of the meetings. Mr. Stassen said he would get his delegation working on this immediately and send the draft to the Secretary,<sup>3</sup> who after he was satisfied with it could send it to the other Departments concerned, and then back to him. Mr. Stassen said the President had talked to Cutler and changed the language slightly, from "should" to "request". Mr. Stassen said Messrs. Bowie, Reinhardt, Strauss, Allen Dulles, Quarles, and General Loper had all been present when Cutler went over the draft of the notes. Mr. Stassen said he would try to pouch a draft back Monday.<sup>4</sup> The Secretary said this was not an ultimatum; if Russia came back with something solid, we should consider it.

The matter of an approach to Zorin was discussed. Mr. Stassen said he would talk first with the three Western powers re his telling Zorin that the Subcommittee meetings would be "window dressing"; if they felt they wanted to be present, he would do it that way. Mr. Elbrick said he was sure they would want to be there, and the Secretary said it would be better to have them there; they would be suspicious if Stassen met with Zorin alone. It was agreed that Stassen would see the Western powers first to agree on Western procedure, and then the four would see Zorin.

The matter of procedure with NATO was discussed. The Secretary said that first the Western NATO members of the London group should be apprized of our position. Mr. Stassen said he would not spell the whole position out at once to allow for a bargaining position within his position. The Secretary said it was awkward as we had to have a trading position with the Russians; particularly on the question of zones, he said Stassen would probably want to fall back gradually and make maneuvering proposals. The Secretary said this would have

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-2657. Secret. The drafting officer is not identified but was probably Elbrick.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> See Document 212.

<sup>4</sup> May 27.

to be in executive session to keep public opinion from being aroused unnecessarily. Mr. Stassen said the first thing would be to get a Four Power agreement as to the method by which to approach NATO. The Secretary said this could be an apple of discord for NATO. Mr. Elbrick said that NATO's being asked to formulate ideas would be the best way to give the NATO countries the feeling that they were being consulted before the fact. Mr. Stassen said if he got agreement among the four in London, he would go to Paris for the presentation to NATO and give them a background briefing of the history of the negotiations for disarmament beginning with our proposals at the Geneva "Summit" conference. The Secretary said as a first step this was all right, but the question was what did we want NATO to do. He said he felt we must convey to the Soviets and our allies the sense of urgency about getting started, control that which could be controlled as soon as possible if the whole project was not to collapse; we could not keep the talks going indefinitely without any progress. The Secretary said we must see if our allies would permit our going along alone with Russia, and whether the Soviets would do so without a prior solution to the European problem.

Mr. Stassen mentioned the possibility of NATO setting up a side negotiating group in London; he said Germany was considering sending a man to their London Embassy to deal with these matters—if other nations did that, it would be a way of coordinating. (This would really mean 7 nations—Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Iceland are not in any zone and might agree merely to regular diplomatic consultation.) The Secretary mentioned that the Italian Ambassador had seen him at a party yesterday and excitedly mentioned that he wanted to see him about getting in on the discussions. Mr. Stassen mentioned that in a public statement Adenauer had come close to our position and stated that German reunification was not a prerequisite to a first step in disarmament, but that for any comprehensive plan it would be. Chancellor Adenauer's proposal for a Four Power Foreign Ministers meeting was discussed.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Stassen mentioned that the public opinion in the European countries might help the nations to a decision; they would fear failure.

Guidance for Ambassador Perkins was discussed. Mr. Elbrick said the Council meeting would be Wednesday. Mr. Stassen said he could go to Paris then and discuss with NATO the type of negotiating contact it wanted. It was agreed that the presentation would be made as coming from the Four Powers in London, not just the US. The Secre-

---

<sup>5</sup> Adenauer's thoughts on the relationship between disarmament and German reunification and on a Four-Power Foreign Ministers meeting were reaffirmed in the joint declaration with President Eisenhower on May 28; see Document 205.

tary said Perkins should know what the desired outcome was. Mr. Elbrick said it would be for the Council to organize a working group to sit in Paris or London to formulate ideas for a European inspection zone to pass to the four negotiating powers and keep in touch with them. The Secretary said it would be useful to talk to Spaak in advance, and it was agreed that Perkins should do this rather than Stassen; Stassen should always act in terms of a member of the team of four—they would be suspicious if he talked alone to Spaak. The Secretary said it was difficult to keep our position obscure to maintain our trading position. Mr. Stassen said what a wonderful job the Secretary had done in connection with the disarmament talks this last week. Mr. Stassen said he would send a cable as soon as he had spoken to the Western powers tomorrow morning at 9, and send it to Perkins for information.<sup>6</sup> The Secretary said we did not know how our allies felt re separating the two zone questions. Mr. Stassen said he felt the UK was at cross currents, was not really clear itself, but would come along with us. Mr. Elbrick said they too were undoubtedly under pressure from Italy. The Secretary said they might be distrustful of our working with the Russians as they would not be able to go so fast, and they might ask us to hold back; or they might realize the great complications and the possibility of jeopardizing the whole affair. The Secretary mentioned the importance of keeping in touch with SACEUR. Mr. Stassen said there was the possibility that the free world does not want the degree of inspection needed to be useful reciprocally from the other side; in this case, nothing could be accomplished. The Secretary asked whether Northern Italy was included in the European zone. Mr. Stassen said it always had been, although it would not need to be. He said the Russians had been thinking of Foggia, from whence the Germans launched long-range bombing raids in the last war.

At this point the Secretary dictated a draft cable of instructions for Perkins, which Mr. Stassen agreed with. Mr. Elbrick was to return at 12:30 to go over the draft with the Secretary.<sup>7</sup>

Following this, Governor Stassen raised the question of Senate participation. The Secretary said he felt it would be helpful if we could get two such Senators as Mansfield and Saltonstall<sup>8</sup> into the picture, perhaps on a basis of their first being allowed to see on a confidential basis our State Department documents on this subject, with an invitation to one or both of them to be in London as much as was feasible consistent with their participation in essential Senate matters.

---

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 6481 from London, May 27, repeated to Paris for Perkins as telegram 1007. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.134/5-2757)

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 4734 to Paris, *infra*.

<sup>8</sup> Mike Mansfield (D.–Mont.) and Leverett Saltonstall (R.–Mass.).



208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 26, 1957—2:35 p.m.

4734. Pass USRO for Perkins from Secretary.

(1) Stassen returns London tonight with new US position and will propose to other three Western members Subcommittee that there should be presentation to NATO, presumably Wednesday.<sup>2</sup>

(2) With respect to the nuclear aspects of our position, these are substantially unchanged in that they will seek to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers and this will, we hope, be made tolerable by the agreement of the three powers now processing such weapons to stop after a fixed date any further use of fissionable material for weapons purposes and gradually to draw down the present weapons stocks by agreed proportionate transfers to a peacetime internationally inspected stockpile. There will also be some limitations on the use of nuclear weapons in war, although these will be more formal than substantive.

(3) With respect to the inspection zones, we believe the problem of a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be treated separately from the US-Canada-Soviet aerial and ground control zone insofar as possible, and that negotiations for and substance of a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be handled in a way allowing our NATO allies to have a full voice in the development of a position. SACEUR would also presumably be brought in.

(4) We feel that if the whole project of disarmament is not to collapse there is imperative need to make some concrete progress and that we should seek to make progress as rapidly as possible wherever it is possible. We further feel that the complications of what might start out as primarily an Arctic zone are far less than of European-Soviet zone. Also we feel as regards European-Russian zone that the Continental West Europeans, including the German Federal Republic, Italy, and Benelux should be in a position where they not only can, but will have to, assume a greater measure of responsibility and that the four Western Powers at London, and particularly US, should avoid being in a position where we in effect are taking the initiative on the Continental zone and merely having from time to time reports and superficial consultation as to what we are doing and planning.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-2657. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by Elbrick and in substance by Stassen. Repeated to London for Stassen.

<sup>2</sup> May 29.

(5) This approach will, we think, make it desirable and perhaps necessary that NATO should itself establish a working group which while not formally a part of the UN Subcommittee will in fact be able to participate effectively in any European-Russian zone negotiations, and have a responsible representation continuously in London or Paris.

(6) We appreciate that it may strain NATO to organize this appropriately. On the other hand, it provides NATO with an important new opportunity.

(7) You may, if you think it can be done in complete confidence, and indicating this procedure is not firm until it is considered by three Western Powers in London, let Spaak know on Tuesday of the general lines of our thinking as above described so that he will know what to expect from the presentation which Stassen et al. will be making on Wednesday. We think you can do this better than Stassen himself who should only function in this matter as part of the Four Power Western team now in London. If, following his talk with other three powers in London, Stassen feels even this confidential and tentative approach is not advisable at this time, Stassen should inform you and Department Niact.

Dulles

---

**209. Memorandum of a Conversation, Soviet Embassy, London,  
May 28, 1957, 2:45 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

**PARTICIPANTS**

Messrs. Zorin, Roshchin, Shakhov, Temirhaey, Pisarev, and Romanov—USSR Delegation

Messrs. Stassen, Peaslee, Goodby, Weiler, Akalovsky (Interpreter) and Cdr. Higgins—U.S. Delegation

1. Governor Stassen indicated that, as he had said on the previous day, he wished to consult with other nations that might be involved in an agreement. Therefore, at this juncture, he wanted to advise the Soviet Delegation that, if it was agreeable to them, he would like to have no session on Wednesday<sup>2</sup> so that he could go to Paris and consult with the NATO Council. He further stated that he might wish

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Chron File. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky.

<sup>2</sup> May 29.

to ask the Soviet Delegation to meet with the U.S. Delegation on Friday for some bilateral discussions and that it might be helpful to the U.S. Delegation to have no Sub-Committee meetings until Monday. Governor Stassen stated that he was not certain at this point how much he could present to the Soviet Delegation on Friday, but that he thought that some discussion might be valuable. He said that if he should be prepared for extensive discussion by Friday, two bilateral meetings might be necessary on Friday—one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Governor Stassen emphasized that this statement did not mean that he intended to table the new U.S. decisions in the Sub-Committee's session on Monday. He personally preferred to have more time for U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks before tabling the U.S. position officially. At this time he only wanted to advise the Soviet Delegation of this situation and would appreciate it if Mr. Zorin could agree today not to meet tomorrow. It would be helpful to the U.S. Delegation if the Sub-Committee did not meet until Monday, but Governor Stassen said that he did not expect Mr. Zorin to give an immediate reply on this point. He said this question could be decided upon later at the option of Mr. Zorin.

2. Mr. Zorin said that the Soviet Delegation proceeded from the premise that everything that can be useful for the preparation of a reasonable agreement should be done; however, it was another question whether the NATO consultations mentioned by Governor Stassen were useful. He realized that Governor Stassen was in a better position to judge, but he feared that if too many countries are involved into our Five-Power negotiations this would make our deliberations more complicated and even may make the achievement of an agreement more difficult, especially since among the nations Governor Stassen wanted to consult there were enemies of a disarmament agreement. As far as tomorrow's session is concerned, it was up to Governor Stassen to decide what he would like to do on that day, and if it was inconvenient for him to meet on Wednesday, the Soviet Delegation would have no objection to not meeting on that day. As to the other meetings, Mr. Zorin thought that it would be advisable to postpone the decision on this until later. He had no objection to a bilateral meeting with the U.S. Delegation on Friday if Governor Stassen should have something concrete to say.

3. Governor Stassen made an interjection at this point and said that he did not intend to ask in the Sub-Committee for a recess for the purpose of consulting NATO. He would simply say that there was some work to be done by the U.S. Delegation and that therefore it was desirable to USDel not to have a meeting on Wednesday. He did not want to put Mr. Zorin in a position where he would have to agree to some consultations to be conducted on the part of USDel. He did want, however, to advise Mr. Zorin personally of the purpose of this

recess as a matter of personal courtesy. Governor Stassen appreciated Mr. Zorin's agreeing to not having a meeting on Wednesday and said that he would not meet with the Soviet Delegation on Friday unless he had something concrete to say.

4. Mr. Zorin said that he wished to express another consideration which he thought Governor Stassen might wish to take into account during the further work of the Sub-Committee. He said that the Soviet Delegation would like to see the Sub-Committee, which had been instructed by the General Assembly to accomplish a definite mission, proceed with its deliberations without making them more complicated. If they should become more complicated, this might make the achievement of an agreement more difficult. He repeated his view that among the nations Governor Stassen wanted to consult, there were open enemies of an agreement. He said he did not wish to enter into the motives for this attitude on the part of some countries, but he did want to express his fear that the situation might become more complex and make our negotiations more difficult. This, he said, would not be in the interest of peace, nor would it be in the interest of the United States or any other member of the Sub-Committee. Mr. Zorin stated that, as he understood the U.S. position from statements made in the Sub-Committee, the U.S. wanted to have an agreement reached first among the members of the Sub-Committee and then have other states associate themselves with it.

5. Governor Stassen said that he appreciated the comments made by Mr. Zorin and said that he did not agree that any of the states he wished to consult was an enemy of disarmament. He thought that a reasonable agreement would have the support of all the states concerned. He continued by saying that it was his impression that the Soviet Union places much importance on the inclusion of the European area in an agreement. If a partial agreement affecting other countries was to be achieved, and if we expected these countries to sign such an agreement, then it would be wiser to consult these countries in advance. Governor Stassen said that by consulting he meant only an exchange of views rather than a subordination of the U.S. policy to the views of these countries. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union was of the opinion that a more limited agreement, not involving European territory, is preferable, then the U.S. Delegation was prepared to re-examine the situation and reconsider the extent to which other countries would be brought in.

6. Mr. Zorin stated that as far as consultations with other states involved are concerned, Governor Stassen would of course understand that the Soviet Union, when other countries and especially those allied to the Soviet Union are involved, also conducts consultations with those countries. The Soviet Union had submitted proposals that involved other countries, in particular countries belonging to the War-

saw Pact. However, it was up to the members of the Sub-Committee to introduce such proposals as would be acceptable to other countries and thus not to delay the negotiations in the Sub-Committee by carrying out consultations interfering with this work. The Soviet Delegation had no right to say whom the U.S. should consult; he only thought that from the standpoint of the Sub-Committee, there was danger that any agreement may be blocked by enemies of such an agreement, who in his opinion existed in Europe. This was especially true with regard to an agreement that might be reached in the near future. Mr. Zorin stated that he was not inclined to exclude Europe from an agreement. He indicated that the Soviet Union had submitted a broader and a more limited proposal, both of them including European areas. Consultations were an internal matter of each of the Delegations, and the Sub-Committee should not be dependent in its work on steps necessary to be taken by individual Delegations. He understood the difficulties involved and emphasized that the Sub-Committee's work is at the center or world attention. If he were to go for consultations to Warsaw, Berlin, or Prague, this would protract the negotiations in the Sub-Committee. This would not be desirable since, in his opinion, the Sub-Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible. The problem of how to combine the Sub-Committee proceedings with consultations conducted by individual Delegations was an internal matter of each of the Delegations.

7. Governor Stassen appreciated Mr. Zorin's statement that consultations were an internal affair of each Delegation. He then stated that in the meeting which was to take place that afternoon he intended to make a broad statement on the export and import of arms as well as on international movement of troops. He mentioned that he had made a similar statement on a previous occasion but that he thought it advisable to restate these ideas once again after his trip to Washington. This was a non-controversial subject and he did not expect any disagreement on this point.

The meeting ended at 3:20 p.m.

**A. Akalovsky**

**210. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Paris, May 29, 1957—8 p.m.*

Polto 2859. London For USDel Disarmament. NAC discussion disarmament began 10:15 a.m. today and concluded 5:15 p.m. Morning began with full statement by Moch and Stassen analyzing history and present status disarmament negotiations. Stassen concluded with proposal along lines Deptel 4734<sup>2</sup> that time had come for NAC to consider manner and form in which it should participate in preparation western position on European-Russian inspection zone. Statements were warmly received and provoked wide variety of comments and questions which Stassen and Moch undertook to answer in afternoon session. Full report above discussion follows separately.<sup>3</sup>

Regarding further consultation on disarmament, council agreed two distinct elements involved:

1. Keeping abreast of developments and trends in sub-committee negotiations.

For this purpose council agreed ad referendum that western four should send telegraphic report to Secretary General for NAC at least weekly, and more often if developments warrant, summarizing developments and trend. This report to be considered by council at each meeting and comments, questions, and suggestions sent to London as situation required. To supplement written reports, heads or members western four delegations should come to Paris from time to time for discussions with NAC and NAC might wish, on occasion, send representative to London for discussion with western four.

2. Participating in development western position on European-Russian inspection zone.

On this point council agreed, at instance Stassen, who pulled together various suggestion made by others that following questions should be put to governments:

(a) Are governments willing to contemplate in principle European-Russian inspection zone as part of world-wide first-step agreement?

(b) If so, do they wish western four to put forward specific suggestion for their consideration? (Submission suggested zone by western four had been proposed by Netherlands and strongly supported by

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-2957. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Ottawa, Oslo, and Brussels, and pouched to all other NATO capitals.

<sup>2</sup> Document 208.

<sup>3</sup> The discussion was reported in Polto circulars 14 and 15 from London, May 30. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-3057)

Belgium. Stassen emphasized that he did not think western four would wish to put forward suggested zone unless requested by NAC to do so and unless there was agreement in principle indicated above. He also pointed out that zones previously put forward by USSR and US had no further standing, Russian proposal being totally unacceptable and US proposal having been put forward for tactical purposes which had already been served.)

(c) If governments did not wish western four put forward suggested zone, how did they wish to proceed?

Council agreed attempt get government positions above questions by June 5 meeting, view urgency NATO action.

Finally, council agreed on brief communiqué to effect that Stassen and Moch had brought council up to date on status of problem of reduction and control of armaments.

**Perkins**

---

**211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 30, 1957—11:06 a.m.*

8377. For Stassen From Acting Secretary. I trust we shall receive promptly the revised basic paper incorporating May 25 decisions which you discussed with Secretary on Sunday.<sup>2</sup> President expects this to be agreed by interested agencies here and then submitted to him before you undertake detailed negotiations based on the revised policy.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-3057. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 206 and 207.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

**212. Memorandum From the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, May 31, 1957.*

Revised basic paper:

Assembled as requested by the President in paragraph 5 of the minutes of the May 25, 1957 Conference at the White House, written by Robert Cutler, cleared with the participating Departments and Agencies, and approved by the President;<sup>2</sup>

Prepared by the U.S. Delegation in accordance with the decisions reflected in the May 25 minutes, combining the "Policy Recommendation to Washington" of May 9, 1957,<sup>3</sup> as modified by the "Informal Memorandum" to the Secretary of State of May 22, 1957,<sup>4</sup> and as modified and supplemented by the detailed decisions recorded in the May 25 minutes.

1. The agreement for partial measures would include specific authority for a signator to suspend partially or completely the commitments and obligations taken. At the option of such signator this may be done upon written notice by it to the control organization of either an important violation by another signator, or a written notice by it of action by a signator or non-signator which prejudices the security of the notifying state and thereby requires the partial or complete suspension of commitments. This provision is to include a procedure for advance notice, at the option of the signator, of intention to suspend so that an opportunity for prior correction of the adverse condition may be afforded.

2. All signators (except the US, UK and USSR) to agree that they are prohibited from the manufacture, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons. It should be made clear that the armed forces of one of the three nuclear-weapons-states may possess nuclear weapons on the soil of a non-nuclear-weapons state, unless within a zone in which the stationing of nuclear weapons is specifically and separately prohibited for all. Furthermore, the right of preparatory training of forces of non-nuclear-weapons states in the use of nuclear weapons, and of equipping them with dual purpose means of delivery, is to be definitely preserved for the contingent eventuality of use in event of armed attack within the terms of paragraph 3.

3. The signators all voluntarily agree that they are prohibited from use of nuclear weapons except

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Document 206.

<sup>3</sup> Document 195.

<sup>4</sup> Document 200.



(a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter if an armed attack occurs which includes the use of nuclear weapons or

(b) if such an armed attack is of such a nature and magnitude that, in the decision of the using state, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons.

It should further be made clear that this provision will not imply any obligation to maintain forces of a non-nuclear nature for purposes of repelling non-nuclear attacks. Within the limits otherwise imposed by the partial agreement, it is for each of the "three" signators to decide the most effective distribution of its armament between the nuclear and the non-nuclear.

4. The USSR, UK and US to take a further commitment to cooperate in the prompt design, installation, and maintenance of an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the following provision (installation estimated as July 1959 or later) and one month after the installation of such an inspection system the three will devote all future production of fissionable material exclusively to non-weapons purposes including stockpiling, and will transfer to non-weapons purposes any fissionable material not already contained within nuclear weapons.

The right of refabrication of weapons after the "cut off" date should be definitely maintained.

5. Upon the establishment of a satisfactorily functioning inspection system and the cut-off on production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; the USSR, UK and US will commence agreed equitable proportionate transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling either national or international; provided, however, that these transfers shall be carried out to only a limited degree and each of the three will be maintaining a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty for the partial agreement is concerned.

The initial agreement will fix the specific ratios between the contributions of the US and the USSR of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes; thereby clarifying the language, "agreed equitable proportionate transfers."

Unless the Soviets insist on a 50-50 ratio, the following ratios of the quantity in each increment are approved: US 55 and USSR 45, with whatever amount the UK may transfer to be in addition to the amount so transferred.

The commitment for transfers of fissionable materials may call for transfers over and above certain minimums of material, thereby providing a saving clause for the UK. The reservation of intention to

maintain a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty or the partial agreement is concerned will be a footnote. The right of refabrication of weapons after the "cut-off" date should continue to be definitely maintained.

6. Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 158), the USSR and US and other states concerned will move promptly to install and begin to operate an aerial inspection system in accordance with the approved Eisenhower method in an initial zone or zones:

(a) The European-Russian Zone

In view of the effects on our NATO allies and the complexity of the multinational interests involved, the European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be treated separately from the US-Canada-USSR aerial and ground control zone, insofar as possible. Negotiations and arrangements for a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be handled in a way allowing our NATO allies (and other affected non-NATO nations) to have a full voice in the development of the position.

(b) The US-Canada-USSR Zone

Initially the US will propose that our side include the continental US, Alaska, and Canada, and that the Soviet side include all Soviet territory. If the Soviets should continue to refuse to deal on this basis, the US will accept a limited initial zone, in order to start an inspection technique. This limited zone will comprise roughly the entire area north of the Arctic Circle (except Sweden and Finland), all of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and all of the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands. In conducting US Delegation negotiations concerning the area of the zone, the greatest caution should be exercised relative to offering more US territory in exchange for more Siberian territory.

For the method of aerial inspection, reference will be made to an annex to the treaty. This annex will spell out the method in precise details along the lines of the Joint Chiefs and Doolittle detailed work.

7. In addition, upon the effective date of the agreement, the parties will move promptly to establish ground control posts in the zone or zones to be specified in the manner outlined in Paragraph 6, including appropriate radar equipment for added warning safeguards against the potential of great surprise attack.

8. In addition, and in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 6a, ground control posts will be promptly established in such areas of the Soviet Union, beyond the initial aerial zone or zones, as may be negotiated with the NATO nations having a full voice in these negotiations in the manner outlined in paragraph six.

9. Three months after the effective date of the agreement (estimated as October 1958), signators would furnish blueprints of military forces and armaments within the agreed zone or zones, exclusive of nuclear weapons.

(a) The term "Blueprint" includes both a statement of fixed military installations and also an inventory of military forces and major designated armaments (including nuclear weapons-delivery vehicles but excluding nuclear weapons), together with these locations.

(b) No "blueprint" relating to the whole USSR, or calculations of percentage reductions based on such "blueprints", would be reliable, until aerial and ground control inspection systems covering the whole USSR territory were established and operating.

(c) A list of armaments prepared by the US and the USSR, as a basis for agreeing to armaments reductions, will state specific quantities of identified types of armaments, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture. Such list will not relate to a percentage of the nation's total armaments or of the nation's armaments located within a certain zone.

10. The following first step is approved:

a. The US and USSR agree on a US-Canada-USSR zone for aerial and ground control inspection.

b. Each of the US and USSR furnish to the other a "blueprint" (as described in 9-a above) of the total military installations, armaments, and military forces located within such inspection zone.

c. The initial agreement will include commitments for each of the US and USSR to reduce military forces to 2.5 million, and a list (as described in 9-c above) of armaments scheduled for reduction; the armaments so listed bearing a rough relation to the stated reduction in military forces.

d. After the treaty becomes effective, each places the armaments set forth in its list in an internationally supervised national storage depot within its own territory.

Military expenditure reductions are to be a supplementary consequence and not a prime factor. The right to check on an endeavor to follow up Soviet military expenditures should be sought, along with a check up of use of major material such as steel and aluminum. Military expenditures inspection is not to be looked upon as a major reliance for inspection purposes.

11. Signators other than the USSR and US would make similar (but not precisely the same) agreed reductions under similar reporting and verified inspected conditions.

The Federal Republic of Germany, if it became a signator, would, of course, not be making agreed reductions, but rather would be accepting a ceiling for its rearmament, in conjunction with the first step partial agreement.

Similar exceptions may apply to other states, such as Japan.

12. All signators specifically recognize the essential requirement of an effective inspection system, to verify and guarantee in the case of all states alike the fulfillment and observance of each commitment. Each signator undertakes to cooperate in the thorough, reciprocal in-

stallation and implementation of such inspection, and the continued operation of such inspection is an essential requirement for the continuation of the commitments under the agreement.

This general inspection commitment should apply to both conventional and nuclear aspects of the agreement.

13. Upon the completion of such initial year reductions, each state would file a certificate that it had carried out the reduction, and mobile inspection teams would then have access to the objects of control in the required areas of the signator states to verify the fulfillment of the reductions.

14. If the negotiations conducted with a full voice of our NATO allies (and other affected non-NATO nations) result in arrangements for a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone in accordance with paragraph 6, it shall be a matter for subsequent US decision as to whether or not the US would agree that all states involved would be prohibited from maintaining or from stationing nuclear weapons in that part of the Soviet Union and that part of Europe included within the Russian European aerial inspection zone.

It would be anticipated that if such an arrangement is concluded, the right of preparatory training preserved in paragraph 2 and the right of stationing dual purpose delivery systems, against the contingent eventuality of war, would continue to be preserved.

15. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of worldwide levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US to the force level of 2.5 million, as specified in paragraph 10 (estimated as July 1958 to July 1959), both would also reduce the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the European and Russian aerial inspection zone if such a zone had been established under paragraph 6, to such minor extent as may be agreed with a full voice of the NATO nations in the development of the position.

16. At the end of the first reduction in armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures (estimated as July 1959) progressively to expand the aerial inspection system beyond the original zone or zones, into a series of additional zones culminating in the complete coverage of the Soviet Union and (if the political situation permits) China, and, reciprocally coverage of the Free World areas including the US and the UK to such extent as may be agreed to by the nations affected thereby. The ground control posts to also be progressively expanded and increased to complete effective coverage to such extent as may be agreed upon by the nations affected thereby.

17. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US to the level of two and one-half million for forces, including parallel reductions of the armaments and armed forces which the Soviet Union and the US had located in any European-Russian aerial inspection zone

which may be agreed upon in accordance with paragraph 6, by the USSR, the US and our NATO allies; it shall be a matter for subsequent decision, after the full voice of our NATO allies participates in the development of a position, as to whether or not to make an agreed reduction in air bases on both sides within the zone of a magnitude of approximately 10%.

18. Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty (estimated as July, 1958), all signators would be committed:

a. to cooperate in setting up an international inspection commission to monitor tests;

b. to refrain from further tests until 12 months after such effective date—with the understanding that the U.S. intends, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary by the end of such 12 months' period, thereafter to resume testing;

c. if tests are resumed, to give notification in advance of such tests and approximate yields; to provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and to place limitations upon the amount of radioactive material to be released in the atmosphere.

19. The U.S. Delegation may state that if the first stage under the agreement is carried through successfully, the U.S. would be prepared to negotiate for further major reductions in armaments and armed forces. (The possibility of a reduction in the second phase to not less than 2 million men may be discussed, without any commitment.) Such further reductions to be further conditioned upon the assurance of application of the treaty and the inspection system to all essential, significant military states and areas, and therefore requiring prior solution of the political problems in a manner satisfactory to the US insofar as they apply to this subject.

20. Any discussion of the possibility of a reduction in a second phase in accordance with paragraph 19 should not include any discussion of such reduction in relationship to Europe, and the initial agreement should not spell out in detail a second phase of reductions.

21. A hope might also be expressed that further reductions in armaments and armed forces might be negotiated, if the second phase under the agreement is carried through successfully, but no floor below 1.5 million should be indicated.

22. The initial agreement should not spell out in detail a third phase of reductions.

23. The signators agree that within 3 months after the effective date of the treaty (estimated to be October, 1958), they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space should be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

24. The armaments regulation organization administering the system to be established in accordance with Article 26 of the UN Charter within the framework of the Security Council, and to operate through an executive council or board of control on which the affirmative vote of the US and of the Soviet Union is essential for significant decisions.

25. Such board of control to have authority to establish a system for the advance notification by signators of any intended major movement of armed forces over foreign soil or over international waters or through international air space as a part of the system of protection against great surprise attack.

26. The essential details for the evolutionary development of an effective and sound inspection system are to be worked out in keeping with the foregoing outline and consistent with the studies of the eight US Presidential Task Groups<sup>5</sup> chaired by Gen. Bedell Smith, Gen. James Doolittle, and Dr. Ernest Lawrence and others.

27. The armaments regulation organization should be authorized to act through its board of control to establish an appropriate system regulating the export and import of armaments, to take effect after the exchange of military blueprints.

28. The specific provisions of this paper are considered as inseparable parts of a whole, unless the contrary is stated.

---

<sup>5</sup> See Document 78.

---

### 213. Editorial Note

On May 31, Harold E. Stassen, Chairman of the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission talks in London, handed to the Soviet Delegation and to the other Western delegations an informal memorandum (*infra*) outlining the new United States policy decisions reached at the White House meeting on May 25. Regarding the White House meeting, see Document 206. Stassen gave the memorandum to the Soviets despite instructions that the President expected the decisions to be approved by interested agencies and then submitted to him before detailed negotiations on disarmament began; see Document 211. Stassen responded on May 30 that he expected to cable a basic revised paper the following day. He added:

“USDel will continue to confine its activities to informal explorations and informal indications of potential movement, drawing out Soviets, and will not table proposals or undertake detailed negotiations based on the revised policy at this time.

"Estimate that we can maintain momentum and essential climate for another week without undertaking detailed negotiations based on revised policy.

"We are well advanced on the initial informal consultations and are pursuing them actively with the governments concerned. Preliminary reactions as favorable as could be expected." (Telegram 6580 from London, May 30; Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3057. The basic revised paper is *supra*.)

The Department of State first learned Stassen had given the memorandum to the Soviet Delegation on June 1, when John E. Coulson, British Minister in Washington, called on Assistant Secretary Wilcox to express his concern and to state that Stassen's move appeared to be inconsistent with the agreement that no substantive proposals would be made to the Russians prior to the completion of consultations among the Western members. (Memorandum of conversation, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-357) The Department of State notified Stassen of the British view, reminded him of the President's instructions, and requested clarification; see Document 215. Stassen defended his actions in telegram 6633 from London, Document 216.

The matter did not end there, however. Almost simultaneously, the Department of State received numerous reports of widespread Allied concern over Stassen's action. Essentially, the Allies admitted that Stassen had consulted with them individually and collectively, but argued that these discussions had not gone very far when he chose to submit the informal memorandum to the Soviet Delegation. Telegram 6180 from Paris, June 3, for example, summarized the "very strong and emotional reactions from French Government officials at all levels":

"Basic concern is that US should give vitally important new proposition on disarmament to Soviets before any real consultation with NATO allies. All French officials have characterized this action as very serious blow to NATO. Typical of statements which have been made are: Action 'worse than Suez' in damaging western alliance; greatest impetus yet given towards Europe becoming neutralist 'third force'; time for France and other European countries to seek new alliance; makes it practically imperative for France (and subsequently other European countries) to undertake own nuclear weapons program. In addition, French are discussing with Spaak (to whom they gave copy of memorandum), with Germans, and Italians." Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-357)

Documentation on this matter is *ibid.*, 300.13 and 600.0012.

**214. Informal Memorandum From the Chairman of the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen) to the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (Zorin)<sup>1</sup>**

*London, May 31, 1957.*

The Chairman of the US Delegation is pleased to inform the Chairman of the USSR Delegation that following a recent thorough review by the US Government of the various questions and proposals in relationship to disarmament and decisions by President Eisenhower during the recent recess of the Subcommittee, the US Delegation is authorized to resume negotiations in an endeavor to conclude a partial agreement for a sound safe-guarded first step in disarmament. In these resumed negotiations the US Delegation is further authorized to meet half-way on a reasonable basis the positions and proposals of the other members of the Subcommittee including the USSR.

The Chairman of the US Delegation therefore in this first substantive discussion since the recess presents this informal memorandum to the Chairman of the USSR Delegation and engages in this discussion between the two delegations.

1. The US recognizes a certain validity in the comment advanced in the April 30, 1957 proposal of the USSR<sup>2</sup> to the effect that the Soviet Union has a territory much larger than that of the US and has lengthy frontiers. The US Delegation responds to the other comment in this regard in the Soviet proposal, however, that the collective security arrangements in which the United States has entered are for the purposes of defense and are not to be considered as a threat to the USSR or to any state which abides by the Charter of the United Nations. The US Delegation further notes that while the territory of the US is smaller and its frontiers are shorter than those of the Soviet Union, it also has in other respects a different strategic position. Many of the natural resources on which its highly productive economy depends are located in distant areas of the world. It has vital interests and defensive treaty associations in a number of regions, and the defense arrangements for these vital interests and the defensive treaty commitments in fact in many circumstances require relatively more of armed forces and armaments than does an internal security arrangement wherein natural resources and vital interests are within a national border, even though that national border may be extensive. For

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-557. Regarding the origin of this memorandum, see *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> For the Soviet memorandum submitted to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on April 30, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 778-787.



these and many other reasons the US Delegation can not agree to any recognition of different force levels for the USSR than for the US. In fact for over two years, since May 10, 1955, the USSR has been making proposals and negotiating on a basis which recognized the equality of force levels for the USSR and the US.

2. Nevertheless the US has taken into account the Soviet Union's reaffirmation of first stage reductions to force levels of 2½ million men for the USSR and the US, but coupled with a statement of the Soviet interest in force levels lower than this, to 1-1.5 million men in what is described as a second stage of the implementation of the partial measures.

One of the important reasons for the US proposal that the first step of reductions should be of a more moderate nature to the extent of a force level of 2½ million men has been the essential requirement of adequate inspection in relationship to any disarmament commitment, and an awareness that the USSR did not wish to consent to a comprehensive initial inspection.

3. Therefore the US Delegation now states to the Soviet Delegation that on condition the first reduction under a partial agreement is carried through successfully to the level of 2½ million for armed forces, and the partial inspection is satisfactorily implemented and the essential states have adhered to the treaty, the US Delegation would be prepared to negotiate for further reductions in armed forces and armaments. The US Delegation views favorably the possibility of a second reduction under such circumstances to not less than 2.1 million men, and if this is executed successfully and the inspection expanded satisfactorily it would be the hope of the US Delegation that further reductions in armed forces might be negotiated, but not below 1.7 million. Reductions in armaments would be made correspondingly. The levels to correspond for the UK and France would be negotiated with these states. The legitimate security requirements of the nations concerned would be taken fully into account in light of responsibilities for individual and collective self-defense and in light of the political and military situations existing at those times.

4. In the matter of the corresponding reduction in armaments the US Delegation has also taken into account the Soviet proposal that the first reduction in armaments should be of a greater amount than suggested by the US, and that the specific levels be reduced by 15%.

One of the difficulties with this approach of 15%, since the USSR is only proposing partial inspection during this first reduction, is that it is not possible to know what the percentage of 15 represents. The US Delegation is frank to state that it does not know the precise amounts of Soviet armament, and at the same time it recognizes the Soviet reluctance from its viewpoint to report its complete armament at the present time.

Nevertheless the US Delegation wishes to move to meet the Soviet in regard to armaments reduction. The US therefore suggests that armaments to be reduced should be negotiated in specific quantities. The US is prepared to favorably consider initial reductions of substantial amounts of specific quantities of identified types of armaments significant in kind and of post World War II manufacture. If the Soviet will present its proposal in the form of such a specific list which it is prepared to reduce in relationship to the reduction in military forces to 2½ million, the US will present in return a proposed list of armaments which it would be prepared to reduce likewise substantial in amount of specific quantities of identified types of armaments significant in kind and of post World War II manufacture which it is prepared to have considered in relationship to its first reductions to the force level of 2½ million. Such specific lists would then be negotiated in relation to each other without regard to any percentage figure. Upon agreement on such a specific list there would be no possibility of later disagreement or confusion which might arise on any type of percentage calculation or less precise formula.

5. The armaments in these agreed lists could then be reduced by placing the items in the disarmament depots under international supervision in the fulfillment of the partial agreement in accordance with a reasonable time schedule. Their later disposal could likewise be by agreement when both sides certify that they have carried out the required reduction, and the international inspectors confirm that these armaments have been delivered to the disarmament depots.

6. The UK and France and other states would likewise present lists for first reductions of armaments which would need to be approved in the negotiations for their adherence to the agreement as the basis for their first reductions in armaments in relationship to their first stage levels of armed forces.

7. It is believed that this more simple and clear procedure will be better than any that either side has suggested heretofore. In the US view it is important that if a first step agreement is reached there be the maximum chance for its mutual fulfillment without any unnecessary room for subsequent disagreements over detail or for doubts to arise during the fulfillment.

8. In relationship to such reductions in armed forces and armaments, the consequential reduction in military expenditures should not present any difficult negotiating problem, the principle point for adjustment being the method and extent to which the budget and financial records would be reviewed in such a first step partial agreement.

9. The United States maintains its capability in nuclear weapons solely for defensive purposes. The United States is therefore not willing to completely renounce the use of such nuclear weapons and finds unacceptable the Soviet proposal for such a complete prohibition of

use. To the United States it is unthinkable for it to take a commitment which on its face would mean that even though its armed forces or its vital interests or its collective security partners are attacked by large military forces, and, in fact, even if such attacking forces included the use of nuclear weapons, yet there would be a clause in a treaty that the United States was prohibited from the use of nuclear weapons.

10. Thus the United States will not agree to a partial agreement which includes such a clause or such a declaration.

11. On the other hand, the United States Delegation recognizes a certain validity to the comment of the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter was drafted and agreed to prior to the advent of nuclear weapons, and that technically a reference to Article 51 means that a border incident or a very small armed attack across the border could be taken to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. The United States has no such intentions. The United States has demonstrated time and again the restraint with which it uses its military forces.

The United States further recognizes the vagueness of the word "aggression". The United States therefore expresses its willingness, if the Soviet wishes to do so, to include within a partial agreement a provision, the precise wording of which is to be negotiated, which would have the effect that all signators agree that they are prohibited from the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons of all types including aerial bombs, rockets carrying atomic or hydrogen warheads, irrespective of range, atomic artillery, and any other atomic and hydrogen weapons except (a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if an armed attack occurs which includes the use of nuclear weapons, or (b) if such an armed attack is of such a nature and magnitude that the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons, in the decision of the using state.

12. This formulation adopts indirectly a Soviet suggestion of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and combines it with a provision which to the United States is an inseparable parallel, especially when viewed with the prospect of reducing armed forces and armaments. Reference is made to the right to repel an armed attack when it is of such nature and magnitude that it cannot be otherwise feasibly repelled. It is the view of the United States Delegation that the best safeguard against the use of nuclear weapons is to prevent the beginning of armed attack and the beginning of war. Any war carries within itself great dangers of spreading. Any war in the modern age carries within it a great danger of becoming a nuclear war. Therefore, the United States intends to hold its military strength, whether of its present size, or of a reduced size under a partial agree-

ment for disarmament, in a manner which discourages any miscalculation by any state of an unfortunate initiation of an armed attack contrary to the United Nations Charter.

13. The question of nuclear tests has been discussed at considerable length. The United States Delegation is prepared to favorably consider the acceptance, within a partial agreement, of the USSR proposal for a temporary cessation of nuclear tests, provided the USSR is prepared to favorably consider the acceptance of the US proposal for the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, both reached through detailed arrangements substantially as follows:

a. The United States Delegation does not consider that it is possible to detect all nuclear tests without an appropriate inspection system. Furthermore, the United States does not consider that intelligence monitoring methods conducted by individual states is a satisfactory method of carrying out an international agreement. On the other hand, it is recognized that there are some disadvantages in waiting for the installation of an inspection system, after the conclusion of a partial disarmament treaty before there is a cessation of testing.

b. Therefore, for this part of a partial agreement the United States Delegation would be prepared to favorably consider the cessation of all nuclear testing by all parties for an initial 10 months period, commencing immediately upon the effective date of the partial agreement, combined with the commitment of the parties to cooperate in the design and installation and maintenance of an inspection system which would be capable when installed of reasonable certainty of detecting nuclear tests and would be capable of maintaining an accurate measurement of radioactivity in the atmosphere, whether from nuclear testing or from nuclear accidents or other nuclear events occurring after its installation.

c. The United States Delegation would be prepared to further grant, in the partial agreement, to the Board of Control, the authority upon the installation of such an inspection system to either order the continued cessation of nuclear testing for a period beyond the ten months, or to order a limitation of the size of future nuclear tests, or to place limitations upon the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere in future tests. If it is a limitation that is ordered, then to establish a method of advance notification of such limited tests and establish reciprocal limited access to them.

14. As indicated above, inseparable from the willingness of the United States Delegation to consider favorably such an arrangement is the requirement that the Soviet Delegation consider favorably the cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons through the installation and operation of an effective inspection system under which a "cutoff" would be effected beyond which all such fissionable materials would go exclusively for non-weapons purposes, national or international, under international supervision. It is the impression of the United States Delegation, in view of the fact that the Soviet included the

cessation of manufacture in the second stage of its March 18, 1957 proposal,<sup>3</sup> which was to be carried out in 1959, and from the lack of response of the Soviet to the earlier United States proposal for cessation of manufacture in which the date of March 1, 1958, for installation of the inspection system was used, that the Soviet is not willing to establish a "cutoff" during 1958. In an endeavor to meet the Soviet position in this regard, the United States is therefore willing to defer such a "cutoff" date and to establish March 1, 1959, for the installation of the inspection system and one month later or as soon thereafter as possible under the effective inspection for the "cutoff" date.

15. With respect to the inspection system, the United States Delegation further comments to the Soviet Delegation that it does not contemplate an inspection system so onerous as amounts to the management control of the entire atomic economies of our respective countries. It is the United States Delegation's view that a comparatively simple inspection system installed at the locations where fissionable materials are produced and used and at the stockpiles of such fissionable materials subsequently produced, can provide a sufficient degree of accuracy in accounting as to be adequately reliable. Such an inspection system would be compatible with both of the economic and social systems of our two countries.

Obviously, the precise inspection arrangement requires the work of technical experts, and necessitates agreement on the resulting design.

16. Subsequent to the fulfillment of the "cut-off" date of future production, the U.S. Delegation is willing that the US and USSR transfer to non-weapons purposes under international inspection any fissionable material previously produced and not already contained within nuclear weapons or not previously transferred to non-weapons purposes. On its part the US Delegation does not anticipate the US having any appreciable amount of such unused fissionable material on such a "cut-off" date, but adds this factor to its previous proposal as a suggested clarifying clause.

17. Also subsequent to the implementation of such a "cut-off" date, the US proposes that those states having nuclear weapons should commence agreed, equitable, proportionate transfers of fissionable materials from weapons in successive increments over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes including stockpiles either national or international.

18. The US is aware that in the Supreme Soviet in February 1955 it was stated that the Soviet Union was abreast of if not ahead of the US in the production of hydrogen weapons. The US also estimates

---

<sup>3</sup> For the Soviet proposal introduced in the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on March 18, 1957, see *ibid.*, pp. 752-757.

that the Soviet Union has expanded its production of fissionable materials since February 1955 and further estimates that the US has devoted more fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes since February 1955 than has the Soviet Union.

19. It is also well known that the United Kingdom had not had an opportunity to carry out the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes at as early a date as the USSR and the US.

20. The US does not have precise information of the quantity of fissionable materials which the Soviet Union now has devoted to weapons purposes. Neither does the US have precise information of the amount of fissionable material which the Soviet Union will produce between now and April 1, 1959. Since the UK is associated with the US in a collective security agreement an argument could be made that the transfers from weapons purposes to non-weapons purposes under all these circumstances should be made in increments which will equal on the one hand one half by the Soviet Union and on the other hand one half by the UK and US combined.

21. In the interest of negotiating a partial agreement, however, and of ending the nuclear arms race, the US is willing that the UK increment in such a program of successive transfers shall be separately considered and shall in effect reduce the amount which both the Soviet Union and the US transfer to any total increment of transfer. Of the remaining quantity of an increment in addition to the amount transferred by the UK, the US is willing to join 50% and 50% with the Soviet Union.

22. On the other hand, if it is the view of the Soviet Union that, because of the initiation by the US of this specific proposal for transfers, the US should carry more than half of this remaining percentage, the US would be willing that the agreement provide that the amount to be transferred after the UK transfer is subtracted from the total shall be transferred 47% by the USSR and 53% by the US.

Thus, for example, and not as a suggestion of total quantity, if 200 kilograms of fissionable material of a specified and comparable analysis is to be transferred in 1960 from weapons purposes to non-weapons purposes, the Soviet Union would transfer 94 kilograms and the US would transfer 106 kilograms.

23. It is the further view of the US Delegation that in connection with nuclear commitments and prohibitions, such as the foregoing, with the inclusion of provisions affecting prohibition of use, testing, cessation of manufacture, and transfers from weapons purposes, all signatories who had not previously produced nuclear weapons would as of the effective date of the treaty voluntarily agree in consideration of the mutual benefits, they renounce the manufacture, possession, or acquisition of nuclear weapons. It would be made clear, however, that this renunciation would not prevent the training of the armed forces of

such states in the use of nuclear weapons in precautionary measures for the contingent possibility of a nuclear war nevertheless occurring. It would also be clear that the renunciation of possession by a state would not prohibit the possibility of the possession of nuclear weapons on its soil by the armed forces of a state which had previously manufactured such weapons if the location of such weapons was not specifically completely prohibited within such zone.

24. It would also be clear that the "cut-off" date of fissionable materials would not prohibit the right to refabricate nuclear weapons, since such right of refabrication may well be exercised to make such existing nuclear weapons stockpiles into weapons which do not involve such large quantities of radioactive particles or weapons which might be designed for defense against aerial attack rather than for weapons designed for counter-attack, and for other reasons.

25. The US is willing to cooperate in the establishment of initial zones of aerial inspection and ground inspection in both a European-Russian zone and a US-Canada-USSR zone, provided the other states concerned in such zones consent, and provided the reciprocal and equitable character of the zones is reasonable and is precisely negotiated.

26. Neither of the two zones in the Soviet April 30 paper is acceptable to the US in the present form. In the US-Alaska-USSR area the Soviet has proposed that the initial zone include only 32 percent of the territory of the Soviet Union and this is of the relatively less developed area in which relatively less military forces are located. On the other hand it is proposed that 77 percent of the US should be in the initial inspection zone, including within that area the nuclear testing sites, a major atomic plant, many large air bases, numerous other important military installations, and a considerable number of key defense industries. It would appear more equitable if the first step involved relatively the same number of square miles on both sides of the collective security areas, but included within that similarity of square miles a similarity of percentage of the territory of the USSR and the US, and involved some comparable relationship and significance on each side of the specific areas proposed. These matters can be taken up in detail in negotiating on a reasonable basis.

27. In the European-Russian area the zone to be reasonable and acceptable must be moved to the east and to the north. Here again details could be included in detailed negotiations. The ground control posts would of necessity need to be considerably more extensive than the initial aerial and ground inspection sectors and have appropriate radar and other facilities.

28. The question of reduction in armed forces and armaments within any such initial zones will also involve the consent of the states concerned. It is at once clear that a reduction as proposed to the extent

of one-third of the forces of the US stationed in the territory of Germany would be unacceptable and unreasonable in relationship to the first reduction to a 2½ million force level. The question of reducing the number of military air bases on both sides in conjunction with such first reduction to levels of 2½ million men may be examined, with a recognition that if any such reduction of air bases in the territory of other states is included in a partial agreement it would be carried out with the consent of such other states.

29. In an agreement all signators should specifically recognize the essential requirement of an effective inspection system to verify and guarantee in the case of all states alike the fulfillment and observance of each commitment, and each signator should undertake to cooperate in the thorough reciprocal installation and maintenance of such inspection.

30. The Soviet Delegation is aware of the views of the US Delegation as to the importance of including an appropriate method for the control of export and import of armaments within a partial agreement. This has been discussed in the Subcommittee.

31. The Soviet Delegation is also aware of the US Delegation's views of the need to establish a system for advance notification of the international movement of armed forces.

32. The desirability of establishing an inspection system in the missile field and taking commitments in this regard, which we have previously discussed, is also reaffirmed.

33. In general the suggested method of organization of the regulation system previously presented by the US Delegation with reference to Article 26 of the UN Charter<sup>4</sup> and within the framework of the Security Council is reaffirmed, including an appropriate right of suspension. Many of these collateral matters can be negotiated after the main points are agreed upon.

34. The US Delegation comments on the references to propaganda in the April 30th proposals that the US is constantly endeavoring to improve the prospects for a lasting and just peace, and that the successful negotiation of a mutual agreement for partial disarmament through sound and safeguarded steps would be a concrete manner of lessening the dangers of war.

35. The US Delegation will be available for further informal explanation of these views, if the Soviet Delegation has questions. The US Delegation anticipates at a later and appropriate time tabling formal proposals in the Subcommittee and undertaking detailed formal negotiations. Such detailed negotiations in the view of the US Delegation should take the form, if progress is made, of the preparation of draft language for a treaty of partial agreement for the first steps of

---

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 195.



disarmament, which draft treaty, when approved by governments, would then be ready for signing as a commitment of governments for ratification through respective constitutional processes.

---

**215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 1, 1957—3:19 p.m.*

8429. Eyes Only for Stassen. Department disturbed by reports that "22 Point Memorandum" given to Zorin<sup>2</sup> before completion of consultation with Western Powers on all points in new US "Proposals" (USDel No. 236<sup>3</sup> and Paris 6149 repeated to London as 957<sup>4</sup>). Department attaches utmost importance to full Western consultations and requests report on circumstances in view especially discussions here with British and French during your visit and President's wishes expressed in Deptel 8177.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-157. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the memorandum of 35, not 22, points, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> USDel Disarmament 236 (telegram 6623) from London, May 31, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-3157)

<sup>4</sup> For portions of telegram 6149 from Paris, June 1, see footnote 5, *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 8177 to London, May 22, does not concern disarmament negotiations. Reference is probably to telegram 8377 to London, Document 211.

---

**216. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, June 2, 1957—noon.*

6633. Herter from Stassen. USDel Disarmament No. 240. Responding to Deptel 8429.<sup>2</sup> No "paper of U.S. proposals" has been

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-257. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

presented to the Soviets or the subcommittee as yet. Detailed negotiations with other states on the new U.S. proposals have not yet been initiated.

2. The British, French and Canadians have been thoroughly consulted on the outlines of the new U.S. position, and NATO has been consulted at the Council session in Paris on the outlines of the new U.S. position.

3. The Western Four agreed on the desirability and necessity of beginning to talk informally with the Soviets regarding the direction in which the U.S. was willing to move and to further explore the potentials for further Soviet movement and the lines of their position.

4. This necessity to begin talking with the Soviets became particularly acute after the stories from Washington that the new U.S. proposals had been thoroughly reviewed with Chancellor Adenauer.<sup>3</sup>

5. If the USDel had further delayed any talk with the Soviet Delegation there was danger of a complete breakdown in the atmosphere and the potential for a careful and constructive negotiation in line with the new U.S. decisions might have been lost.

6. The informal memorandum used as a talking paper<sup>4</sup> in the first broad talk with the Soviet Delegation clearly specifies its limited character, this was reaffirmed in the talks, and the vital necessity of not having the Soviet Delegation misunderstand the direction or extent of potential U.S. movement made the handing of a copy of the talking paper an imperative procedure.

7. The only procedural issue that has arisen with some members of the French and UK Delegations stems from their contention that it is not possible to use the talking paper approach when conferring with the Soviet Union and their contention that the Soviets will use such a talking paper from a strictly propaganda standpoint to embarrass the USDel. Our response to this has been three-fold.

a. The paper has been carefully drafted so as to contain more propaganda advantage to the U.S. than to the USSR.

b. If the Soviet Union now takes a propaganda only approach this is a cheap and quick way of finding out that they do not have a serious intention of negotiating a sound agreement.

c. There is no other feasible way of proceeding in such a complex subject than to be able to pass informal working paper language to prevent misunderstanding that can otherwise arise from oral conversations translated to a different language.

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 205.

<sup>4</sup> Printed as Document 212.

8. Moch knew and approved in advance of the USDel talking to the Soviet Delegation. Presumably Paris 6149<sup>5</sup> reflects an erroneous briefing of Pineau by someone in the Foreign Office and does not reflect any view of Moch.

**Whitney**

---

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 6149, June 1, transmitted Pineau's "strong objection" to Stassen's handing of the memorandum by the U.S. Delegation to Zorin and his insistence "on importance fullest consultation among four powers before any proposals submitted to Soviets." (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-157)

---

**217. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Paris, June 2, 1957—2 p.m.*

Polto 2883. Sir Frank Roberts<sup>2</sup> tells us that at dinner Jebb<sup>3</sup> gave Friday<sup>4</sup> evening for Sandys, Bourges-Manoury raised question of paper he understood Stassen had handed to Zorin. He expressed worries about certain points he understood were in paper, but particularly upset that position had been given to Zorin in advance of consultation with Allies. Line was apparently similar to that taken by Pineau with Yost Saturday morning (Embtel 6149 rptd London 957).<sup>5</sup>

Sandys indicated that UK also was disturbed about procedure. UK tried to calm French a bit by saying thought paper had not actually been given to Zorin.

Spaak was present and greatly disturbed that so soon after good first go-around Wednesday<sup>6</sup> substantive paper had been made available to Soviets on which there had been no consultation. Had thought plan was not to present anything specific to Soviets for some time and that there would be chance for exchange of views in NATO on general principles presented Wednesday and perhaps discussion of more specific Western ideas before anything presented to Soviets. While primary NATO interest was of course European inspection proposal,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-257. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.

<sup>2</sup> British Representative at NATO.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Gladwyn Jebb, British Ambassador in France.

<sup>4</sup> May 31.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 210.

thought it had been fully understood there was fundamental interest in all aspects any disarmament proposals as all affect military strength Western world in which NATO has vital interest. Thought should perhaps call NAC meeting Monday to consider this new disturbing development. Saturday morning Parodi<sup>7</sup> confirmed to Roberts that paper was given Zorin. Roberts says they have now also been so informed. Both UK and French NATO delegations have copies of paper and tell us it contains many substantive points not reported to NATO and hence not now even being considered by NATO govts as basis for future comment in NAC.

Coleridge<sup>8</sup> tells us as far as he now knows Spaak has not made up his mind about special meeting Monday on this subject.

I believe that in order to maintain excellent impression given by Wednesday session of desire of United States not to act without consulting its Allies, it is imperative that I receive urgently copy of paper given Zorin, be authorized to go over its points with Spaak, and tell him of basis on which it has been presented to Zorin.

If it is felt for some reason unwise similiary to inform NAC at this time, I shall need arguments to present to Spaak on this point, though I cannot guarantee he will be convinced. In any case, I hope we can start informing Allies here of substance of our position on specific points at earliest possible date. I do not think it can be long postponed and retain their confidence in our negotiating tactics.

Should emphasize that I think there is clear understanding here of difference between NATO position with respect European inspection scheme and other disarmament matters. But this understanding is based on belief as result statements made Wednesday that NATO countries would have opportunity to comment on other major points before they were negotiated with Soviets, though their views would obviously have much less weight than in case European inspection scheme in which their national interests would be directly involved.

Should also note that when it was pointed out to Roberts that it had been made clear to Zorin that paper given him was subject to amendment on basis views of Allies, he expressed great skepticism that we could be sure of retaining real flexibility of decision after presenting Soviets with position in writing. Believe many others would share his doubts.

With respect Arctic proposal (London's Embtel 6630<sup>9</sup>) would note that inspection of Norway involves SACEUR area and unlikely

<sup>7</sup> Alexandre Parodi, French Representative at NATO.

<sup>8</sup> Richard Duke Coleridge, Executive Secretary of NATO.

<sup>9</sup> Telegram 6630, June 1, contained a suggestion from the U.S. Delegation to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission that "this arctic zone should not get involved and stalled in NATO machinery" and that therefore a draft memorandum to Norway and Denmark the delegation had prepared should "not be circulated at this

Norwegians will respond without consulting NATO. Do not think it is in United States interest that they should do so. Question is rather who raises matter and in what context than whether NATO should get involved. Should point out also that at meeting Wednesday attention was called to fact that principles of inspection agreed for Arctic area were bound to set precedents for European arrangements and hence of great direct interest to all European members of NATO.

Regardless of whether Spaak calls special meeting on disarmament, matter is bound to come up either at special meeting which may be called to consider Near East notes (Topol 2348<sup>10</sup>) or at regular meeting Wednesday.<sup>11</sup>

Since dictating above have learned British or French have informed some other NATO dels of fact that substantive United States proposal has been handed Zorin.

Perkins

---

time to wider group and that wider group attention should be concentrated on European-Russian zone which they have had under study since Wednesday." (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-157)

<sup>10</sup> Topol 2348 to Paris, May 31, contained the text of the U.S. reply to an April 19 Soviet note on the Middle East. (*Ibid.*, 661.80/5-3157)

<sup>11</sup> Topol 2356 to Paris, June 2, replied that it was "unnecessary and premature to call special NAC meeting on subject" and preferable that the British and French raise subject "in first instance with US rather than in NAC." (*Ibid.*, 330.13/6-257)

---

**218. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, June 3, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT:

Stassen Memorandum Given to Zorin

PARTICIPANTS

M. Alphand, French Ambassador  
M. Lucet, French Minister  
M. Vimont, French Minister<sup>2</sup>  
Mr. Wilcox—IO  
Mr. Beam—EUR

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-357. Secret. Drafted by Beam.

<sup>2</sup> Jacques P. Vimont.

Ambassador Alphand said he had been instructed to register his government's protest with the Secretary over Stassen's submission to Zorin of the US "informal memorandum." He requested an interview with the Secretary on his return<sup>3</sup> but in the meantime wished to acquaint Mr. Wilcox with his government's feelings in the matter. He recalled Stassen had met with both the French and the British before returning to London and had most solemnly assured them that nothing would be presented to the Russians without full Western consultation. Stassen had further asserted that the May 27 Subcommittee meeting would be purely pro forma and that some time would elapse before the US would have anything to give to the Soviets.<sup>4</sup>

The Ambassador contended that Stassen had now presented to Zorin a plan with some new ideas about which the French had known nothing. This was a dangerous way to act. The French did not object to bilateral talks between the US and USSR, following full consultation with the other Western governments. In the Stassen memorandum the French, however, objected to the concept of an "atomic club" excluding certain powers, and to the aerial inspection of Europe, to which neither the French nor German governments agreed. As another new item Alphand also referred to zones where atomic installations would be prohibited. He said Stassen's discussion of controls was vague and in fact amounted to no controls at all.

The following were additional points in the memorandum which Alphand said his government objected to: Paragraph 23; Paragraph 11, which was vague in its definition of aggression; Paragraph 25, which would place the onus for a breakdown in disarmament on any power objecting to this particular concept.

Alphand stressed that there was no such thing as a personal approach to the Soviets who would exploit any statement or document as having official meaning. Stassen had said nothing to Moch about his intentions. The French government took the matter so seriously that it had considered instructing Moch not to attend further meetings of the Subcommittee; while he might now attend, he would remain completely silent.

---

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of conversation among Alphand, Lucet, Dulles, and Elbrick, June 5, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-557.

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of conversation among Stassen, Alphand, and others, May 24, reads in part:

"Mr. Stassen said that he had fully in mind the essentiality of prior Western consultations, to which he is committed, and expected that the Subcommittee meetings, until the Western position is developed, would be pro forma and few and short." (*Ibid.*, 330.13/5-2457)

A memorandum of conversation among Stassen, Coulson, and others, May 24, noted that Stassen "recognized the importance of consultations with other NATO members before tabling revised proposal in the Subcommittee." (*Ibid.*)

Alphand said it was most important that the press should learn nothing about the memorandum but he feared it might leak soon since Mr. Reston<sup>5</sup> had called him about a Stassen plan. He urgently requested that every step be taken to prevent a leak and that Stassen hold no further meetings with Zorin until full coordination had been arranged.

Mr. Wilcox said he did recall Stassen's meeting with the French and the British and the French concern over the Subcommittee meeting set for May 27. Mr. Pineau had made the same representations to our Chargé in Paris.<sup>6</sup> According to report from London, Stassen had given the same memorandum to the French, British and the Canadians.<sup>7</sup> Mr. Wilcox was distressed that the French government should feel this way about last weekend's events. He believed there must have been a misunderstanding and promised Alphand we would look into it. In the meantime we would inform Stassen of the French request to avoid leaks and to refrain from another bilateral talk with Zorin without further consultation.

---

<sup>5</sup> James B. Reston, chief Washington correspondent, *The New York Times*.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to telegram 6149 from Paris, June 1; see footnote 5, Document 216.

<sup>7</sup> No report from London of this action has been found, but it is confirmed in Walmsley's memorandum to Secretary Dulles, June 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-357)

---

## 219. Editorial Note

British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan learned on June 1 that Harold Stassen had given the Soviet Delegation to the disarmament talks in London an informal memorandum outlining the new United States policy on disarmament. To Macmillan, Stassen's action "was singularly inept," permitting "the disarmament committee to develop a kind of life of its own without sufficient control from the Governments concerned." After consulting with other members of his government, Macmillan wrote to President Eisenhower about the incident on June 3. As Macmillan recounted it, his letter:

"expressed my surprise that Stassen had taken this action apparently on his own account.

" "This is, after all, the greatest issue that faces the civilized world; it is one on which the freedom and survival of our island may depend: and, as we correspond on so many questions very freely, I would have hoped that we could have examined together the possible consequences of these proposals before they were put

forward. I would not be straight with you if I tried to disguise a certain feeling of distress that we were not told in advance that this document was to be given to the Russians.'

"What made Stassen's action even worse was that he had spoken fully to the NATO representatives on this question only three days before, without disclosing anything about his new move. I went on to explain to the President the difficulty which this might make for us; for amidst the whole series of complicated proposals the vital new point of Stassen's plan was that there should be an early date fixed when the production of fissile material for military purposes would be banned. This plan would

" 'raise some tremendous difficulties for us and for our European friends. A cynical critic might say that, at the end of the process which they envisage, two great nuclear powers would remain: the United Kingdom would be prevented from developing the nuclear strength which she is just beginning to acquire: and all the other countries of Europe would have signed away their right to defend themselves with these weapons for the rest of time, whatever changes may take place in the political conditions of the world.'

"However, I assured the President that like him I never thought it worth while to job backwards. The question was what were we to do next? Of course the Russians might reject the plan in toto, but I doubted whether they would do so.

" 'Their usual habit, once they have got a document, is to deal with it like a dog with a bone. They never surrender any bit of it which is in any way to their advantage. It is I think more likely that they will give it partial support. Indeed, there are great gains in it for them, especially as the conditions for inspection and control which they have always particularly disliked, have now been relaxed to a point at which evasion would be easy.'

"In the final passage of my message I reminded him that we already had received from the American Government what amounted to an undertaking that, whatever agreements might emerge, 'the development by the United Kingdom of nuclear weapon resources adequate to her needs should not be prejudiced.'" (Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959* (London: Macmillan, 1971), pages 301-302) Macmillan's letter is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.



**220. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, June 4, 1957—noon.*

6671. USDel Disarmament No. 245. Subject: Report of Four Power Meeting, June 3, 1957.

1. Noble opened session and asked for suggestion on the method of proceeding in the work assigned. Stassen suggested this week be primarily engaged in thorough Western Four power consideration of new positions with minimum of subcommittee sessions. Suggested therefore no subcommittee meeting on Tuesday<sup>2</sup> and entire day be devoted to Four Power consultations; subcommittee meeting on Wednesday and then, since Moch must go to France for personal engagement on Thursday, and since Monday is British holiday Whitsun, next subcommittee meeting be June 11th. Further, that the two subcommittee meetings this week be of generalized nature and not include discussion of new positions.

2. Moch said he did not wish to differ with this procedure but he did wish to advise his colleagues that putting the U.S. informal memorandum of May 31 into Zorin's hands had caused considerable agitation in Paris. Pineau said if any allusion was made to U.S. paper at subcommittee meeting, Moch should leave meeting because U.S. paper would not be studied in Paris until new French Government had been formed.<sup>3</sup> Moch added he must be in France on personal engagement of long standing to lecture at French university on June 6th and that he could not say whether or not he would be able to speak on the new U.S. positions when subcommittee convenes on June 11 (after Whitsun holiday) because must await formation of new French Government.

3. Stassen said he had no intention of discussing the informal talking paper in subcommittee at any time—that it was a talking paper, and that if we reached point where it was desirable put in a text for discussion in subcommittee, it would be a different text. Referring to suggestion that Soviets would not respect character of U.S. memorandum as "talking paper", Stassen said this could be the case, but if it were, it would mean that Soviets were not really interested in reaching agreement. If so, it would be well to find that out right away. Stassen suggested that on other hand, if Soviets were in fact interested in agreement, it was important they not misunderstand U.S. position.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-457. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Ottawa, Bonn, Moscow, and Tokyo.

<sup>2</sup> June 4.

<sup>3</sup> Guy Mollet resigned as Prime Minister on May 21 and a new cabinet headed by Bourges-Maunoury was formed on June 11.

That was reason, after reading paper to Zorin, it had been handed over to him. Stassen stressed fact he had made it plain that paper was not to be regarded as containing firm proposals, that it was in generalized and carefully hedged language, and that consultations with other governments might lead to amendments or modifications. Stassen felt however, that in view of fact that consultations with NATO and with Adenauer<sup>4</sup> were publicly known to have taken place, he felt it was important to acquaint Zorin with general nature of U.S. position if negotiations were not to break down.

4. Noble (U.K.) said that matter had caused astonishment within U.K. Govt, which thought that even talking papers should be discussed among Four Powers before treating with Soviets.

5. Moch said he did not fear discussions of paper in subcommittee nearly as much as possible public discussions in event of "an indiscretion in the press". If matter became public, it would undoubtedly be raised in French Parliament in debate in connection with formation of new government. In that event, *new govt* would undoubtedly be obliged take position inconsistent with certain of ideas expressed in U.S. memorandum, with result that position of new government would no longer be flexible.

6. Stassen expressed regret regarding colleagues' feelings in matter and stated he did not intend to hand any more informal talking papers to Zorin until colleagues agreed that he could do so. He hoped after his colleagues reflected they would recognize merit and necessity of this procedure and would approve of his further use of this method of work and exploration. He had not wished give talking paper of May 31 the increased status of having been cleared by Four Powers since process would take three to four weeks, with resultant suspension of negotiations, and this would undoubtedly give rise to complaints by Soviets that although they ready to move, Four Western Powers were not. Stassen emphasized that U.S. not committed by paper, that we could change any clause, and could move in any direction. He felt we were obliged indicate some general direction of movement rather than merely reject Soviet proposals.

7. Stassen suggested that no agreement would suit every government 100 percent. It would be necessary to look at agreement as package and then determine whether it would improve prospects of peace and reduce tensions. He did not think as Moch had suggested that any provisions of U.S. paper were contrary to NATO doctrine and that although it was perhaps too soon to know full NATO reaction, no objections had been expressed so far, following NAC consultations of May 29 of outlines of U.S. position.

---

<sup>4</sup> For a summary of Stassen's consultation with NATO, see Document 210. Regarding Adenauer's visit to the United States, see Document 205.

8. Stassen said that U.S. does not intend permit Soviet delegation to treat U.S. paper as formal U.S. proposals until it had been fully cleared with other three Western subcommittee members. U.S. believes that formal proposals would take form of draft treaty language which would be worked through by five subcommittee delegations and then referred to governments.

9. Stassen said principal question was whether our governments were decided on reaching agreement on partial measures in disarmament and that in considering this, it was necessary have in mind 11 years of failure and that way toward agreement was not easy, either in procedure or substance.

10. Stassen raised question of whether matter of personal appearances before subcommittee of Indian and other representatives should be reconsidered. It was agreed among four that no change in our position was desirable.

11. Stassen raised question of whether successful results of subcommittee session should take form of draft treaty between the five, or of a report to general assembly which would envisage a separate treaty conference. Moch was of view that we should endeavor negotiate treaty among five and join it to report to General Assembly.

12. Meeting concluded with stassen suggestion of full day of Four Power consultations tomorrow being accepted by all.<sup>5</sup> Stassen said he would not expect any new decisions tomorrow on the new U.S. position, but would like to see full understanding achieved and accordingly would want talk about position in some detail in preparation for Four Power decision at an early date.

Whitney

---

<sup>5</sup> Summaries of the Four-Power consultations held on June 4 were transmitted in telegrams 6705 from London, June 4, and 6713 from London, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-457 and 330.13/6-557, respectively)

---

**221. Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary Dulles' Office,  
Department of State, Washington, June 4, 1957, 3:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary

*The White House*  
General Cutler

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-457. Secret. Drafted by Greene.

Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Reinhardt  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Smith  
Mr. Beam  
Mr. Stelle  
Mr. Spiers  
Mr. Greene

AEC  
Admiral Strauss (part of meeting)

SUBJECT

Disarmament

The meeting discussed remedial measures which might be taken with respect both to the UN Subcommittee, particularly the Soviets, and our NATO allies, particularly the Germans, in the situation created by Mr. Stassen's May 31 memorandum to Zorin.

The Secretary decided he wanted to speak to the President before sending definitive instructions to Stassen on whether, and if so, how, to extricate himself from the memorandum.

The Secretary expressed his deep concern that Chancellor Adenauer may feel that the US has not kept faith with him in the matter of the European inspection zone, this having been included in Stassen's proposals to Zorin. He reiterated his doubt that negotiation for a first stage disarmament agreement could include a European inspection zone without becoming enmeshed in vital NATO strategic problems and in the problems of German reunification. Therefore, the Secretary felt that the European nations concerned should have the primary role in determining both whether proposals should be negotiated for a European zone and, if so, in what terms.

The Secretary postponed detailed consideration of instructions to Ambassador Perkins, which could also serve as guidance for Ambassador Bruce, and instructions to Stassen until he had talked to the President.

In this connection, the Secretary similarly wished to defer decision on what, if any thing, to do about paragraphs 25 and 27 of the memorandum to Zorin. He dictated a brief Eyes Only telegram to Stassen, saying that further instructions would be sent him in the morning.<sup>2</sup>

Admiral Strauss commented on those parts of the memorandum to Zorin which gave him difficulty; these comments are recorded separately.<sup>3</sup>

JG

---

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>3</sup> See Document 226.

**222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 4, 1957—5:11 p.m.*

8467. Eyes only for Stassen from Secretary. I feel your memorandum to Soviet Delegation of May 31 exceeded your authority both as to substance and procedure. We are urgently considering here what to do about it and you will get further guidance tomorrow morning.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-457. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles.

---

**223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 4, 1957—7:59 p.m.*

8482. Eyes only for Stassen from Secretary. With the personal approval of the President I send you the following instructions:

You will notify Mr. Zorin at the earliest possible moment that the memorandum you submitted to him was not only informal and unofficial, but had no approval in its submitted form either by the President or the State Department, and that there are some aspects of the memorandum to which this government cannot agree at this moment. Therefore, you will request that Mr. Zorin return the memorandum.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-457. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by the President.

## 224. Editorial Note

On June 4, President Eisenhower sent Secretary Dulles a draft response to British Prime Minister Macmillan's June 3 letter. Regarding Macmillan's letter, see Document 219. Eisenhower wrote that his reply was "Subject to such editing or minor change as you may deem desirable," but added: "If you think it better not to send even a tentative reply, please hold this up until evening when I will talk to you, but I am anxious that Harold know as quickly as possible that we did try to act in the spirit of our agreements at Bermuda." (Memorandum from Eisenhower to Dulles; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series) Regarding Eisenhower's meeting with Macmillan in Bermuda, see Document 179.

Dulles apparently had reservations about sending Eisenhower's version, for he called on the President from 6:05 to 6:57 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, President's Daily Appointments, 1957) The text of the letter was sent to London at 7:59 p.m. in telegram 8483, June 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-457) The next day, Ambassador Whitney telephoned Dulles from London at 12:12 p.m. to suggest further changes. (Memorandum of a telephone conversation, June 5; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) Dulles reported to Eisenhower at 12:37 p.m. that Whitney had "suggested changing the words astonished and chagrined" in the first sentence of Eisenhower's reply. Eisenhower commented that he did "not mind toning it down as long as" Macmillan knew "we can't forget what was said in Bermuda." (Memorandum of a telephone conversation; *ibid.*, White House Telephone Conversations) Dulles spoke with Whitney again at 1:08 p.m., presumably to authorize the alterations. (Memorandum of a telephone conversation; *ibid.*, General Telephone Conversations)

Dulles then telephoned Macmillan:

"The Sec said the Pres wanted him to tell him he was disturbed by his message and sent a reply which M will get from Jock but he (the Sec) wanted to say he talked with Stassen and he is instructed to try to get the paper back or to make clear it is not a definitive or authorized statement of our position. It was an indiscretion to put the paper in the hands of the Russians. They will use it and put our friends in a position where if they did not come along the Russians would have a document to use. . . . It took us by surprise and we are doing all possible. The Sec said he thinks M will find the aspects of that memo of which he complains were in fact cleared with Sandys when he was here. M said it is so big he thinks we ought to deal with it at a higher level. The Sec thinks possibly so. The Sec mentioned passing over it on the theory it was just talk and it did not make much difference what was talked about. M said wait to see what the Russians do. The Sec said they may take advantage of our withdrawing the paper to

blow it up and that will show they are in the propaganda game. The Sec said to treat it confidentially. It happened in the face of guidance not to let it happen. It was a mistake. They exchanged a few amenities." (Memorandum of a telephone conversation, June 5, 1:14 p.m.; *ibid.* Ellipsis in the source text.)

Whitney handed the President's message, *infra*, to Macmillan at 6:45 p.m. (London time), June 5. He reported that the Prime Minister "expressed great pleasure in conversation he just had with Secretary regarding this matter." (Telegram 6742 from London, June 5; Department of State, Central Files, 711-EI/6-557)

---

225. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 4, 1957—7:59 p.m.

8483. Please pass following to Prime Minister from President.<sup>2</sup>

Dear Harold: I have just received your cable of June 3 and to say the least I am disappointed<sup>3</sup> to learn of the developments you describe. They took place without the knowledge or authorization of any of us here in Washington. When Governor Stassen was here a number of meetings were held to outline positions as a basis for a possible future agreement that would be acceptable to us provided they were satisfactory to our allies. We had assumed that these positions would not be conveyed to the Russians as a statement of the United States position before they had been fully discussed with you and the French Government and with NATO. Also of course the Federal Republic of Germany is deeply interested in some of the possible implications of this disarmament matter.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-457. Top Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the drafting and transmission of this letter, see *supra*. The letter is also printed in its entirety in Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, pp. 303-304.

<sup>3</sup> At this point, the word "disappointed" has been inserted by hand to be substituted for the phrase "astonished and chagrined." The words "and chagrined" were inadvertently not deleted on the source text, but Secretary Dulles authorized Whitney to remove them. (Memorandum by Fisher Howe, June 5; Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-457) The phrase "and chagrined" does not appear in the version of the letter Macmillan printed.

I am particularly distressed if<sup>4</sup> matters have not gone ahead along this line and if the Russians have been informed on at least an 'informal memorandum' basis prior to the allied consultations which we had envisaged.

I assure you that the cooperative spirit so obviously present at the Bermuda Conference is something I regard as of the greatest value as between our two countries and I shall do my best to preserve it and live by it.<sup>5</sup> Already, before your letter was received, the State Department and other Departments involved have been studying the matter with a view to seeing what corrective measures were possible and Foster is working on that this afternoon.

I realize that once the Soviets have a piece of paper in their hands from the Head of the United States Delegation, it puts you and our other allies in an awkward position, one that is not easy to redress, but we shall do the best that we can.

With warm regard. D.E.

Observe Presidential Handling. Confirm date and time of delivery.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>4</sup> At this point, the word "that" has been deleted and the word "if" inserted by hand.

<sup>5</sup> At this point, the sentence "I might add that everybody here deplors this occurrence as deeply as I do" has been deleted from the source text by hand.

---

**226. Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat (Greene)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 5, 1957.*

**STASSEN'S MAY 31 MEMORANDUM TO ZORIN**

At a meeting in the Secretary's office on June 4,<sup>2</sup> Admiral Strauss took exception to parts of Stassen's May 31 memorandum to Zorin as follows:

*Paragraph 12:* The suggestion that we would be prepared to undertake a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is not authorized by any current policy and indeed is objectionable. The Secretary agreed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-557. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 221.



*Paragraph 13:* Subparagraph (a) reflects the possibility of agreement on cessation of testing before installation of an inspection system, whereas the approved policy clearly prescribes that the inspection system must come first.

Subparagraph (b) omits mention of the essential corollary of US agreement to a suspension of testing, namely, a declaration that unless an inspection system were operating at the end of the suspension period the US would immediately resume testing.

Subparagraph (c) exceeds agreed policy by referring to the possibility of a limitation on the size of tests.

*Paragraph 14:* Erroneously confuses two different types of inspection—of testing and of weapons production—which should be kept separate.

*Paragraph 15:* is of the greatest importance to the AEC in that the idea of a “comparatively simple inspection system” is erroneous. In the view of the AEC, an inspection system could not be simple at all.

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**227. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 5, 1957.*

DEAR MR. DULLES: Mr. Harold Stassen's paper regarding a partial disarmament agreement, as revised on May 31, 1957,<sup>2</sup> has been reviewed in the Department of Defense in the light of the decisions taken by the President on May 25, 1957.<sup>3</sup> In general, those decisions appear to be accurately reflected in the revised paper. It is considered, however, that certain modifications in language and substance are necessary in order to bring the paper completely into consonance with what we understand to be the intent underlying the decisions. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their recommended changes in the revised paper are attached in the inclosure hereto. I am in

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-557. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 212.

<sup>3</sup> Document 206.

general agreement with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommend that the modifications proposed by them be incorporated in the paper under consideration.

Attention is particularly invited to paragraphs 14, 15 and 17 of the paper which appear to suggest possible U.S. agreement to (a) prohibition against stationing nuclear weapons in an European-Russian zone, (b) specific reduction of forces and armaments in the zone and (c) a 10% reduction of air bases on both sides in the zone. It should be recalled that these elements of the proposal were not discussed specifically in the meeting on May 25, nor was it indicated that they were integral to the U.S. position on this subject. In his letter to you dated 17 May 1957,<sup>4</sup> the Secretary of Defense stated that "The provisions for the very substantial reduction of forces and the prohibition against our stationing of nuclear weapons in the zone would so reduce the effectiveness of the NATO forces in the area as to render them incapable of a sustained defense." In view of the serious implications of these provisions with respect to the continued effectiveness of the NATO forces, the Department of Defense considers that it would not be in the U.S. interest to suggest them for consideration in the formulation of the allied position or to imply that they would be acceptable to the U.S. as part of a first step agreement. Further, it is noted in your instructions to Mr. Stassen on May 26<sup>5</sup> you cautioned against the U.S. being in a position where we in effect are taking the initiative on the Continental Zone.

It is noted that Mr. Stassen, in a meeting on 31 May 1957, presented the Soviet delegate with an unclassified informal memorandum which outlined the U.S. position generally as developed in the meeting on May 25. In addition to the adverse repercussions which have been generated among our NATO allies this action has other unfortunate aspects. It was the understanding of the Defense representatives that a revised paper reflecting the May 25 decisions was to be submitted for final review by the interested U.S. government agencies before the U.S. position was presented to members of the Sub-committee in specific detail. Further, although the Allied position regarding an European-Russian zone has yet to be developed, the paper presented to Mr. Zorin appears to prejudge the outcome of the Allied deliberations in this regard. Certain of the language in the informal paper appears to go beyond the intent of U.S. policy as recently adopted. For example, in paragraph 12 the statement is made "this formulation adopts indirectly a Soviet suggestion of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons." Similarly, in paragraph 13, which deals with nu-

---

<sup>4</sup> Document 196.

<sup>5</sup> No written instructions from Dulles to Stassen, dated May 26, have been found in Department of State files, but see Documents 207 and 208.

clear tests, the statement is made that "the U.S. delegate is prepared to favorably consider the acceptance, within a partial agreement, of the USSR proposal for a temporary cessation of nuclear tests." No reference is made to the U.S. intention to resume testing after a twelve month period in the absence of any agreement to the contrary by the end of such period. Paragraph 28 refers to a reduction of armed forces and armaments and a 10% reduction in the number of military air bases in an European-Russian zone, although the U.S. and Allied position in this regard has not yet been developed. Finally, although the paper is labeled as an informal memorandum and not as the official U.S. position, it will be difficult for the U.S. to disassociate itself from the position set forth therein, particularly since the paper is an unclassified document and is subject to publication at the whim of the Soviet delegation.

Sincerely yours,

Donald A. Quarles

[Enclosure]

**Draft Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>6</sup>**

*Washington, undated.*

SUBJECT

Disarmament Planning (U)

REFERENCES

- a. Memo to the SecState from the US Delegation to the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament dated 31 May 1957
- b. Informal memo to the Chairman of the USSR Delegation from the Chairman of the US Delegation dated 31 May 1957
- c. Memo by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense, dated 22 May 1957, subject: "Disarmament"<sup>7</sup>

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Governor Stassen's latest partial reformulation of the U.S. position on limitation of armaments as submitted to the Secretary of State on 31 May 1957, and furnish herewith their views on that paper. These views apply also to Governor Stassen's informal memorandum to the Chairman of the USSR Delegation, also dated 31 May 1957.

---

<sup>6</sup> Top Secret.

<sup>7</sup> Enclosure to Document 202.

2. In general, the latest paper appears to remedy the majority of the objectionable features contained in the previously proposed U.S. position, as expressed in Governor Stassen's memorandum of 9 May 1957.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, comments will be limited to those aspects of the proposed reformulation, where the previous objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as expressed in reference c, have not been met.

3. Although the proposed timetable for the first phase or initial year of fulfillment is less definitive than that indicated in Governor Stassen's memorandum of 9 May 1957, the sequence of events as implied is still physically impossible to accomplish. Any effective inspection system is dependent to a considerable degree on the operation of a communication and radar net which will permit rapid and unimpeded transmission of vital information to other observers or home governments. Establishment of minimum operating conditions could not be obtained in less than 4 to 6 months, and in the Arctic areas this estimate is even more doubtful because of unfavorable climatic conditions. The proper placement of key communication and radar facilities is dependent upon the exchange of blueprints, which is not scheduled to occur until 3 months after the initiation of the inspection system. The exchange of blueprints for the area subject to aerial inspection should be accomplished at the outset of the agreement. After this exchange of blueprints, if a progressive installation phase of 4 to 6 months followed, it would allow (1) the minimum communication facilities to achieve limited operational status, (2) the establishment of support bases for aerial inspection, and (3) the development of control and identification procedures for aerial overflights. At this point, initial verification of reductions of armaments and forces could begin.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are still concerned with the European-Russian zonal arrangements as implied in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 17. If the NATO Allies (and other affected non-NATO states) have a full voice in the development of any European-Russian zonal arrangement there would be no immediate unfavourable political reaction by NATO members. However, there is opportunity for irreparable harm to the NATO alliance if the zonal arrangement did not function effectively. If this happened, the NATO alliance will have sacrificed a presently strong military deterrent now in place on the European continent for a transient false sense of security, and the NATO alliance will have presented the Soviet Union with the opportunity for piecemeal aggression in Europe. In summary, if the European-Russian zonal arrangement works out well no harm may be done to the Western world, specifically NATO. If the zonal arrangement does not work out properly, irreparable damage is done to NATO, psychologically and

---

<sup>8</sup> Document 195.

militarily. This risk is considered so serious that all proposals relating to the European-Russian zone should be kept separate and distinct from the other proposals relating to and essential to the success of any partial disarmament agreement. The other proposals should not be in any way dependent upon arriving at a successful arrangement for the European-Russian zone.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that once a moratorium on nuclear testing as set forth in paragraph 18 of reference a has been agreed to, it would be psychologically impossible for the United States to resume such testing at the end of twelve months, in the absence of agreement to the contrary. Such a moratorium tends to perpetuate itself once it is entered upon. The only escape from this moratorium would be provided by irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union was not observing it. Therefore, provisions for obtaining such irrefutable evidence through an effective inspection system must be agreed to prior to any suspension of testing.

6. Recommended changes to and detailed comments on individual paragraphs of reference a are as follows:

a. Paragraph 3 (b), line 1. Delete first "such".

*Reason:* To remove the connotation that the armed attack referred to would necessarily be of the same type specified in paragraph 3 (a), i.e., include the use of nuclear weapons.

b. Paragraph 5. Delete first sentence of last subparagraph.

*Reason:* Any discussions of minimum levels of fissionable materials involve the inherent danger of disclosure of the size of U.S. and UK stockpiles, without any assurance that an indication of the size of that of the USSR will be disclosed. The desirable "saving clause" for the UK is provided for in the second sentence which indicates the reservation of intention to maintain a very substantial nuclear weapons capability.

c. Paragraph 6, line 3. Insert after "aerial" the words "and ground".

*Reason:* To adhere to the basic principle that the aerial and ground inspection components of the inspection system are inseparable.

Paragraph 6, line 4. Insert after "system" the words, including appropriate radar and communication equipment, to provide adequate safeguards against the potential of great surprise attack,".

*Reason:* To insure that the radar and communication components are included in the inspection system.

Paragraph 6 continued, line 1. Insert after "aerial" the words "and ground".

*Reason:* To specify that the aerial and ground components of the inspection system are inseparable.

Paragraph 6 continued, line 4. Add ", and will include steps to expand by subsequent stages if the Soviets do not accept complete inspection of all of the USSR as an initial step."

*Reason:* To provide for the orderly expansion of the inspection system.

d. Paragraph 7 and 8. Delete.

*Reason:* Their provisions have been incorporated into paragraph 6.

e. Paragraph 9 (c), line 4. Delete "post". Change to read "World War II or subsequent".

*Reason:* Limited construction funds available to the U.S. Navy since the end of World War II have resulted in little construction of new ships. On the other hand, the Soviet Navy has out-built all the combined navies of the world since World War II. This would react to the disadvantage of the United States if storage of ships were limited to post-World War II construction.

f. Paragraph 14. Delete.

*Reason:* It is naive to assume that the United States could make a unilateral decision for maintaining nuclear weapons in the European-Russian zone once NATO had decided otherwise. However, if for political reasons it must be left in the agreement, it should be made quite clear with respect to this paragraph as well as paragraph 2, that prohibition of U.S. nuclear weapons within the European-Russian zone is militarily unacceptable since it would jeopardize the security of NATO.

g. Paragraph 16, line 3. Insert after "aerial", the words "and ground". Delete last sentence.

*Reason:* To specify that aerial and ground inspection components of the inspection system are inseparable.

h. Paragraph 26, line 3. Delete "keeping with the foregoing outline and consistent with the studies of" and insert "consultation with interested agencies including the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and".

*Reason:* The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have the primary responsibility for developing an effective and sound inspection system.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the contents of references a and b should be revised to reflect the foregoing views.

---

**228. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Bonn, June 5, 1957—10 p.m.*

4709. For Secretary's Eyes Only. From O'Shaughnessy.<sup>2</sup> Trimble being absent today on official business in Frankfurt I called on Chancellor Adenauer to give him the substance of the Department's 3443 June 4.<sup>3</sup> After a perfunctory greeting and before I could say a word,

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/6-557. Secret; Niact.

<sup>2</sup> Elim O'Shaughnessy, Consul General in Bonn.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 4868 to Perkins in Paris, repeated to London and Bonn as telegram 3443, June 4, reported that United States did not want to be the advocate of a European inspection zone in any first step disarmament agreement and preferred to defer to its

the Chancellor, who seemed extremely agitated and upset, launched into a long tirade against what he described as a paper which Mr. Stassen had given to the Russians and knowledge of which had come to him, Adenauer, through the French. The paper, a sixteen-page document containing thirty-five points, was, in his estimation, a complete sell-out of the Western position to the Russians and, he said, even embodied a proposal to the effect that "the Americans were prepared to give away all of their bases," in order to reach agreement with the Russians. I replied that I had no knowledge of such a paper, and managed at this juncture to give the Chancellor the substance of the Department's 3443. He said "that is all very well but Mr. Stassen's utterances and his paper are in complete contradiction to what the Secretary had assured me in Washington". I told him that the Secretary had specifically mentioned in the communication which I was to give to him, the statement that he stood by the commitments he had made to the Chancellor in Washington regarding phase one. Adenauer then said that he was comforted to hear this and could believe it only because of his strong faith and trust in you, but that he still could not reconcile Mr. Stassen's utterances and his "paper" with what he, Adenauer, believed to be US Government policy.

Again reverting to the so-called Stassen paper, he said that it was bound to leak to the press, that there would be interpellations in the Bundestag, and that he would be in a position of having said that US policy was one thing when what came out publicly was another. He inferred that he would look as if he had been duped. This, of course, would have a disastrous effect in the coming electoral campaign.

At this point he summoned Blankenhorn,<sup>4</sup> who had been recalled from Paris, and Grewe,<sup>5</sup> who had been recalled from leave, and asked them their views. As it turned out, Blankenhorn did all the talking and the Chancellor had Blankenhorn's remarks summarized in writing in the following form:

*Begin verbatim text.*

"At NAC meeting May 29 Stassen gave general report on status of disarmament negotiations without presenting content of his proposals which are to be made in coming negotiations with Soviets. Stassen confined himself to presenting two questions to NATO: 1. Do 15 partner states want air inspection zone extended over Europe? 2. If this is the case, do NATO partners want Western Members of U.N. Subcommittee in London to make appropriate proposals to NAC?"

---

NATO allies on that point. The telegram, drafted by Dulles, concludes: "We have given Chancellor Adenauer definite assurances that we would not seek any application of first phase to Europe as against his judgement on question of whether this would or would not advance German reunification. We must be scrupulous in adherence to this." (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-357)

<sup>4</sup> Herbert Blankenhorn, German Ambassador at NATO.

<sup>5</sup> Wilhelm Grewe, Chief of Political Division, German Foreign Office.

"It was agreed that consultation in NAC would continue June 5<sup>6</sup> with British and Canadian Members of UN Sub-committee present. On this occasion both questions were to be answered.

"48 hours after first consultation, Stassen transmitted to his three Western partners a 16-page proposal which went far beyond that which was discussed in NAC. As was confirmed to us in London, Stassen presented this proposal as 'informal memorandum' to Zorin on Friday.

"French Govt protested against this step by Stassen in Washington June 1.<sup>7</sup> State Dept responded to this protest by saying it knew nothing of this action by Stassen.<sup>8</sup>

"Today further consultative meetings were to be made. English and Canadian members of London Sub-committee were to appear in NAC but did not appear. Consultation is to continue tomorrow afternoon in NAC."

*End verbatim text.*

The Chancellor then said he too would like to make some remarks in writing and dictated the following:

*Begin verbatim text.*

"Ambassador Blankenhorn today wrote me the substance of the paper which Stassen presented to his Western colleagues in London Sub-committee as American proposals. A substantial part of these proposals is in direct contradiction to statements made to me by Secretary Dulles in Washington as the intentions of American policy and in contradiction to several points set forth in the joint Washington declaration.

"In the event that Mr. Stassen presented these proposals not only to his Western colleagues but also to chief of Soviet delegation Zorin, even if semi-officially, as proposals of American Govt, then it must be stated that these proposals are in large part in contrast to that which was stated in the Washington conversations and which was expressed in the joint Washington declaration."

*End verbatim text.*

Oddly enough, after handing me these two pieces of paper, he made Blankenhorn sign his contribution and also signed his own. I assume this was done to emphasize the importance he attached to these remarks.

The Chancellor then produced a copy of a letter to you, the text of which he asked me to telegraph. The text is in immediately following telegram.<sup>9</sup> The original will be delivered through the Ambassador in Washington.

<sup>6</sup> The NAC meeting was postponed until June 6. A full summary of that meeting is contained in Polto circular 16 from Paris, June 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-757)

<sup>7</sup> No document indicating a French protest in Washington on June 1 has been found in Department of State files. A French protest, transmitted to Washington in telegram 6149 from Paris, June 1, is briefly summarized in Document 216.

<sup>8</sup> No formal response has been found in Department of State files.

<sup>9</sup> See *infra*.



The meeting lasted a little over two hours and I can truthfully say that I have never in the past three years seen these three men as upset and distraught as they were this evening.

As I left, the Chancellor expressed the earnest hope that "Washington could furnish some statement which would clear up this mess". Also that Ambassador Perkins would be in a position to clarify matters at the NAC meeting tomorrow.

Trimble

---

229. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Bonn, June 5, 1957—10 p.m.

4710. For Secretary's Eyes Only. From O'Shaughnessy. Reference Embassy telegram 4709, June 5.<sup>2</sup> Following is text Chancellor's letter to Secretary which he asked be telegraphed immediately:

*Begin verbatim text.*

"My Dear Mr. Dulles: The news which has reached me in the last few days from London, Paris and Washington on the development in the field of disarmament disturbs me greatly. It appears that Mr. Stassen has transmitted to the Soviets in London proposals which, even if perhaps unofficial, are written and carry the full weight of his position as head of the US delegation, proposals which go far beyond that which you presented to me in our confidential conversation in Washington as the American foreign policy line.

"The NATO Council in Paris has the feeling it is being presented with a fait accompli of greatest importance by the presentation of these proposals.

"Our Ambassador in Washington informs me that the State Department on June 4<sup>3</sup> again reaffirmed the basic lines of the American disarmament policy as you had described them to me and which formed the basis for paragraph four of the joint declaration signed by President Eisenhower and myself.

"I ask you to understand, my dear Mr. Dulles, that this discrepancy in the positions can bring me not only into a personally most distressing but under certain circumstances even into a politically fatal position. The declaration of Washington received a very positive re-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/6-557. Secret; Niact.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of conversation among Heinz L. Krekeler, West German Ambassador to the United States; Elbrick; Walmsley; and Jacques J. Reinstein, Director of the Office of German Affairs, June 4, regarding the disarmament negotiations as they affected Germany, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-457.

sponse in the German public. If the proposals of Governor Stassen should become known, not only would the declaration be robbed of its value but it could conceivably become a dangerous instrument of all political forces working for a defeat of the present federal government and the abandonment of its foreign policy. The allegation would then undoubtedly be made that the introductory agreement already contains such substantial disarmament measures that Soviet interests in a comprehensive disarmament agreement would correspondingly be decreased and, as a result, the declaration on the connection between reunification and a comprehensive disarmament would be without meaning.

"Aside from the effects which Stassen's proposals would have in Germany, I am particularly disturbed by their international consequences. I envisage a new and severe shaking of mutual confidence in NATO. Some of the proposals, such as those on reduction of US troops in Germany and the possible abandonment of American bases, fill me with immediate concern for the security of free Europe.

"Under these circumstances in which I consider genuinely alarming, I consider it necessary to ask your immediate intervention. If the NATO alliance is not to break apart, we must arrive at a better and more effective coordination of our policies toward the Soviet Union."<sup>4</sup>

*End verbatim text.*

Trimble

---

<sup>4</sup> For Dulles' reply to Adenauer, see *infra*.

---

### 230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 5, 1957—11:56 p.m.*

3456. Eyes Only O'Shaughnessy from Secretary. Eyes Only Perkins. FYI only from Secretary. Reference Bonn's 4710.<sup>2</sup> Deliver following message to Chancellor immediately:

My Dear Chancellor: I have your personal message.<sup>3</sup> The memorandum which Mr. Stassen gave the Soviet Delegate was unauthorized and unknown to us in Washington. It exceeded his authority and as soon as the President and I learned of it we instructed Mr. Stassen to inform Mr. Zorin that it was not authorized or approved by the President or me and that its return was requested. Mr. Stassen has done this

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/6-557. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles and repeated to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in telegram 4710, *supra*.

and tells us that he has Mr. Zorin's agreement to treat the memorandum as non-existent.<sup>4</sup>

I also immediately instructed our NAC representative not to advocate any measures which you might deem detrimental to German reunification.<sup>5</sup>

I can assure you that neither the Federal Republic nor the NATO Council are presented with any *fait accompli*. Their judgment is being sought as to whether or not the first phase of disarmament proposals should include any measures geographically applicable to Europe. If this is not desired by you and other continental members of NATO, we have no slightest desire or intention to propose this.

I regret what has happened but believe we have acted firmly and promptly to correct situation.<sup>6</sup>

Faithfully yours, Foster Dulles.

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-557)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 4868, June 4; see footnote 3, Document 228.

<sup>6</sup> President Eisenhower also sent assurances to Adenauer. In response to a commercial telegram from Adenauer, May 30, not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, thanking him for his reception in Washington, Eisenhower replied to Adenauer on June 6 in telegram 3470 to Bonn, June 7, which reads in part: "Permit me to take this opportunity of repeating my assurance given to you in Washington that it is our purpose not to make to other countries governmental proposals involving Germany on which we have not first consulted your government. We shall seek better assurances of coordination, which will avoid the risk of unintentional lapses." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/6-757) A note from Fisher Howe to Murphy, Reinhardt, Bowie, and Elbrick, June 7, indicates that Secretary Dulles approved the quoted paragraph. (*Ibid.*) See also Document 239.

---

**231. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, June 7, 1957—9 p.m.*

6820. USDel Disarmament No. 270. Subject: Request for Instructions.

1. At USSR-US bilateral at Soviet request this afternoon, Zorin stated that past discussion between delegations had been helpful in furthering work and that Soviet Government had instructed Soviet Delegation to transmit memorandum as an informal document but at

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-757. Secret; Niact.

the same time, as an answer to the considerations set forth in the 31 May informal memorandum, namely "considerations of the US Government".

2. The memorandum as Zorin read it disclosed some movement of Soviet Delegation toward US positions on inspection of nuclear testing; on force levels; on list of non-nuclear armament; and on wider application aerial inspection. It rejected US position on modified restraint of use; on failure to provide for reduction of forces in NATO and Warsaw area; on failure to agree on one-third troop reduction in Germany; on attempt to legalize nuclear weapons: and it omitted cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

3. Stassen responded that Soviet Delegation was aware that talking paper informal memorandum was not a US Government proposal and that while he welcomed informal exchanges of views he would decline the memorandum in its present form since it referred to a US document that technically did not exist, and he asked that delivery of it be delayed until he could request instructions from Washington regarding it.

4. Zorin pressed for acceptance of the document and Stassen restated that he would defer accepting it until he received instructions from his government.

5. Request instructions whether USDel should continue to refuse to accept, or should accept and respond with a note stating that the USDel informal memorandum was an informal talking paper as the Soviet Delegation knows, and does not technically have any standing for purposes of a response.<sup>2</sup>

6. USDel does not have information as to whether the Soviet intends to publish or whether they intend to submit to the subcommittee next week. Stassen impression from portions of document read by Zorin is that it is not especially suitable for Soviet propaganda and would be generally interpreted as rejection of a number of major parts of US position but of some further movement in direction of US position.

7. Zorin re-emphasized at the end of the session the desire of the Soviet Delegation to work informally and the desire to continue the negotiations for an agreement for partial measures.

---

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 8610 to London, June 7, responded to this request for instructions as follows: "USDel may accept Soviet memorandum, informing others of Western Four simultaneously of intention to do so and to furnish them copies immediately. In accepting, you may state your understanding Soviets have no intention to introduce paper into Subcommittee or to publish it, in view informal nature of exchange. After examining contents of Soviet memorandum Dept will consider whether a note to Zorin is called for." (*Ibid.*) A copy of the translation of the June 7 Soviet aide-memoire that was handed by the chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the chairman of the U.S. Delegation on June 8, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/6-857) For the U.S. reply, see Document 236.

8. Full report of session follows in later cable.<sup>3</sup>

Whitney

---

<sup>3</sup> A detailed report of this meeting is contained in telegram 6822 from London, June 8. (*Ibid.*)

---

232. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 9, 1957.*

DEAR FOSTER: Supplementing and confirming our overseas telephone conversation,<sup>2</sup> my endeavor during these past two weeks was to bring the NATO Council into the negotiations without causing a break off with the Soviet Union, and to do so carefully within my instructions on both procedure and substance. This was a difficult move because of the antagonism of the Soviet Union toward NATO, and their impatience at being placed in what they called the impossible position of not being advised of U.S. positions that were widely known in states not on the Subcommittee. I considered that there was real danger that they would break off if many more days passed, and that this damage would be irretrievable and relatively indefensible to the general public, who would not understand that the new decisions made on May 25th about which they had read many stories, including comments by Chancellor Adenauer and members of the NATO Council,<sup>3</sup> would not have been told in any manner to the Soviet Delegation.

The discussion with the Soviet Delegation took place only after the other three Western Delegations had been consulted on all points, and was then conducted in a manner that did not give the Soviet the opportunity to fasten on to any new commitments of the U.S. Government that would be adverse to NATO or to the Federal Republic of Germany. The memorandum of the discussion, consisting of a copy of the talking paper which was read to Zorin, was handed to the Soviet Delegation to insure accuracy of interpretation, and to assure the maintenance of the qualifications which affect nearly every paragraph.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6-957. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this telephone conversation has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> For example, the comments of Stassen and European officials on the disarmament negotiations reported in the *London Times*, May 27, p. 10; May 28, pp. 6 and 10; May 29, p. 10; and May 30, p. 10.

The informal paper includes the specific statement in paragraph 35, "The U.S. Delegation anticipates at a later and appropriate time tabling formal proposals in the Subcommittee and undertaking detailed formal negotiations." The U.S. Delegation has consistently refused to respond on specific items of a commitment nature or on any detail in a form which could be accepted.

This discussion with the Soviet Delegation has fulfilled its purpose of keeping the negotiations going without any new commitments of the U.S. Government, and at the same time it has drawn out the Soviet position for certain significant U.S. gains.

We can now at last get rid of the 1952 U.S. paper on force levels of 1 to 1½ million without political preconditions,<sup>4</sup> and in its place can advance simply the willingness to negotiate for 2.1 and 1.7 with political preconditions.

The Soviet acceptance of the installation of inspection posts for nuclear testing will end the effectiveness of their propaganda line for cessation of tests without inspection.

Finally, their hints at wanting to know our view on political preconditions and on the conditions of a second step would appear to open a definite possibility for developing separate negotiations for the reunification of Germany on the pattern of the requirement of the adherence of a reunified Germany as a precondition for the second step.

It seems quite clear that both MacMillan and Adenauer were given erroneous briefings on the contents of the U.S. talking paper. I believe they will both support our position in the London talks when they correctly understand it.

Sincerely,

**Harold**

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding U.S. policy on numerical force levels in 1952, see the working paper submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the U.N. Disarmament Commission on May 28, 1952, and also the supplementary paper submitted by the same three countries to the U.N. Commission on August 12, 1952, in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 365-372. For background on the submission of the May 28 paper, see the memorandum from Acting Secretary of State David Bruce to the President, May 28, 1952, in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, p. 954.

**233. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 9, 1957.*

DEAR CHRIS: Thank you for your courtesy this morning<sup>2</sup> and particularly for advising me about the Macmillan and Adenauer messages.<sup>3</sup>

Confirming and supplementing my comment to you this morning, it is clear that Macmillan and Adenauer had been misinformed both as to the contents of the informal talking paper and as to the U.S. position in London.

The UK Delegation was advised clearly and accurately regarding the "cut-off" of fissionable material question in advance, they knew that it made no change in the arrangement to which they had agreed in February and as it had been discussed previously in the Subcommittee except to push the date back a year, which was favorable to the UK. They also knew that the agreement in Washington with the UK stood precisely as it had before. (See Embtel 6584 USDel Disarmament 234 reporting on US-UK Bilateral Discussion of May 29, particularly paragraph 2 and paragraph 5.<sup>4</sup>)

The UK Delegation and other Western Delegations had been consulted on all points in the informal talking memorandum before it was read to the Soviet Delegation on May 31st. (Embtel 6623 USDel Disarmament 236<sup>5</sup>). There is some indication that Duncan Sandys is the one who misinformed Macmillan. Sandys is against any first-step agreement of any kind. He also went to Paris to talk to various officials and to stir up opposition to the US position. I believe MacMillan now has the correct information and that Sandys is alone in the Cabinet against a first-step agreement.

Chancellor Adenauer in his messages seemed to have the impression that the U.S. Delegation informal talking paper proposed the reduction of troops in Germany and in NATO, proposed a European inspection zone, and was in other respects different than Secretary Dulles' statements to him. In fact the U.S. Delegation informal talking

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-957. Secret. A covering memorandum from Howe to Dulles, June 11, indicates that this letter was also distributed to Dulles, Murphy, Elbrick, Bowie, Wilcox, Reinhardt, and Smith. Another memorandum by Donald R. Toussaint of the Executive Secretariat, June 11, indicates that it was also distributed to officials in G, EUR, S/P, IO, and C.

<sup>2</sup> There is no record of a conversation between Stassen and Herter on June 9 in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to Macmillan's June 3 letter to Eisenhower (see Document 219) and Adenauer's messages transmitted in telegrams 4709 and 4710 (Documents 228 and 229).

<sup>4</sup> Dated May 31, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/5-3157)

<sup>5</sup> Dated May 31, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

paper memorandum rejected the reduction of troops in Germany, rejected the reduction of troops in NATO, made it clear that a European zone would depend on the consent of the NATO states, and declined to give any U.S. description of boundaries for a zone. The U.S. Delegation also awaited Canada's consent. (Embtel 6494 USDel Disarmament 228<sup>6</sup>) before proposing the North American Zone. The U.S. Delegation informal memorandum was drafted to be entirely consistent with what Secretary Dulles had said in Washington to Adenauer and was designed to maneuver the Soviet Delegation in line with this policy.

The problem confronting the U.S. Delegation was to bring NATO into full participation in the negotiations in an appropriate manner along the lines of Secretary Dulles' direction, without breaking up the negotiations with the Soviet Union. This was not only in accordance with U.S. policy, but in fact Chancellor Adenauer had the German Ambassador call on me in London to specifically urge that we not break up the negotiations before the German election because to do so would be very bad for his election situation. This was reported in USDel Disarmament #214, Embtel 6270, paragraph 2.<sup>7</sup> At this same conference the U.S. position was thoroughly explained to the German Ambassador.

Thus, when the first week of consultations with the NATO Council and the Western Four was completed, the impatience of Zorin, his complaint about being the last to learn, the statements that the Soviet Delegation was being placed in an impossible position, the rising tone of Moscow radio broadcasts, all indicated there was definite danger if a talk with the Soviet Delegation was delayed much longer the Soviets might break off on the grounds of the interference of NATO and Adenauer and their own complete lack of information of the U.S. position. Such a breakoff would have put the U.S. in a very bad world position and would have injured Adenauer's election picture since it had been publicly announced on May 25 that there were new U.S. decisions<sup>8</sup> and it would have been impossible to convince the public that a week or ten days later it was right for the Soviet Delegation in the Subcommittee to have no information whatsoever.

The talk with the Soviet Delegation was held with advance notice to the three Western Delegations and was carefully prepared. The talking paper was read to Zorin and a copy given to the Soviet Delegation so there would not be any misunderstanding of the complex and carefully hedged statements.

<sup>6</sup> Dated May 27, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/5-2757)

<sup>7</sup> Dated May 16, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/5-1657)

<sup>8</sup> For an account of the announcement of the decisions on disarmament reached at the White House conference on May 25, see *The New York Times*, May 26, p. 1.



The Soviet Aide-Mémoire of June 7<sup>9</sup> shows that the U.S. Delegation talk with the Soviet Delegation did have the desired effect of keeping the negotiations going, and of drawing out and exploring the Soviet position without committing the U.S. to any new position or to any position that is adverse to any of our NATO allies.

Furthermore, we now have three important gains. We are finally rid of the old 1952 U.S. paper on 1 to 1½ million force levels without political preconditions.<sup>10</sup> In its place we have simply a willingness to negotiate later regarding the 2.1 and 1.7 levels *with political preconditions*.

We now have a Soviet Position of accepting inspection stations regarding nuclear testing, thereby ending the effectiveness of their propaganda line that testing should be stopped *without inspection*.

We also have a broad hint of the willingness to enter political negotiations prior to a second step of reductions. It would appear that these political negotiations, separately conducted, could include the reunification of Germany question, Zorin said that he consulted with Poland, Czechoslovakia and China, and he did not mention the GDR.

In summary the U.S. Delegation endeavored within the limitations of its instructions on both procedure and substance to bring the NATO Council into the picture without breaking down the negotiations with the Soviet Union, and without making any new commitments of the U.S. Government.

Sincerely,

Harold

---

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-857)

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 4, *supra*.

234. Letter From the President to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Whitney)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 11, 1957.

DEAR JOCK: I have not had an opportunity to answer your fine letter of May twenty-fourth,<sup>2</sup> even though several of us have studied it carefully in our consideration of the whole business of disarmament. I was particularly glad that Macmillan called you in to talk the thing over on a preliminary basis. Such a practice is exactly in line with the hope both sides expressed in Bermuda that such matters would be discussed between us before being exposed to the world.

About a week after you wrote your letter, I had one from Harold Macmillan, who was protesting very bitterly an action of Stassen in presenting a tentative paper of his own to the Russian representative on disarmament before coordinating it fully with the British, the French and the Germans.

So far as I was concerned, I was wholly on Harold Macmillan's side—in fact, I was more than angry. I dictated a telegram to Harold Macmillan which expressed my feelings in no uncertain terms. Foster toned it down and later called me to say that you had telephoned upon receipt of the message urging that it not be delivered to Harold Macmillan until further softening because of the lessening of the furor about the incident itself.

My last few days have been terribly full, complicated by a day of illness yesterday, and I have not had time to catch up with all the loose ends attached to the incident.

Stassen is here for conversations and I assume has had some serious ones at the State Department. Nevertheless, it is going to be hard for me to forgive a man for what I believe to be, at this moment, one of the most stupid things that anyone on a diplomatic mission could possibly commit. I shall, of course, not close my mind completely, because I have not heard the other side of the story, but on the face of things it looks like he was more than clumsy.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Whitney. Secret. Eisenhower sent a draft of this letter to Dulles with an attached covering note, both dated June 11, requesting Dulles' suggestions for changes. (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda) Dulles made only minor changes on the draft which were incorporated in this letter.

<sup>2</sup> Document 203.

<sup>3</sup> Instructions on this matter, drafted by Dulles and read to and approved by the President, were transmitted to Whitney in telegram 8701 to London, June 12, which reads as follows: "Please in the highest confidence inform Prime Minister Macmillan from me that, with Presidential authority, I have had a very thorough review of disarmament procedures with Governor Stassen and that the President and I feel confident that there will be no repetition of unauthorized proceedings or uncoordinated submis-

So far as the meeting at the top level is concerned, such a proposition always presents to me a very special and difficult problem. As President, I have Constitutional duties which cannot be delegated. I must perform them or there would be varying degrees of chaos in a number of activities. I personally believe that any so-called "Summit" meeting should be preceded by one between the Foreign Secretaries, who would prepare the way for some success at the later one. To have a meeting of the Heads of Government (in my case also the Head of State), and to go back to the world with no more specific accomplishment than followed the Geneva meeting, would in my opinion sound the death knell of much of the stirring hope that is discernible in the world.

The trouble with a Foreign Ministers' meeting is that none of the other three has the same confidence of his Government as<sup>4</sup> does Foster Dulles. Selwyn Lloyd, Pineau and Gromyko are not in his class. Consequently, there would be grave doubt that this group would have adequate authority to settle such questions as the agenda for the Summit meeting and to work out certain international arrangements that would later be agreed upon, with every confidence on all sides that such arrangements would be honored.

Of course this letter is not to be used as a special basis for any further discussion between yourself and Harold or Selwyn Lloyd. However, in the event such a conversation does occur with Harold, you might ask, for your own information, a few questions that would tend to bring out his thinking about the questions I have raised.

Give my love to Betsey<sup>5</sup>—and warm regard to yourself, As ever,<sup>6</sup>

[Here follows a postscript, not included in the draft cited in footnote 1 above, regarding an unrelated matter.]

---

sions to Soviets of U.S. position papers." (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-1257)

<sup>4</sup> The word "that" has been deleted and the word "as" has been inserted in handwriting on the source text.

<sup>5</sup> Ambassador Whitney's wife.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

235. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, June 11, 1957, 5:37 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT

The Sec said he just finished nearly 2 hours with Stassen and he appeared very humble and contrite and wants to work so it does not happen again etc. The Sec told him re Julius Holmes and if they disagree nothing is to be done until it is referred back.<sup>2</sup> He will not put anything in writing without clearance and the Sec told him to sit down to work out an agenda before he goes back. So he will postpone his return until Thursday night.<sup>3</sup> The Pres asked if he sees he is foolish. The Sec thinks he does. He acts that way. The Pres asked if he tried to rationalize and the Sec said yes but he cut it short. He did not kick re Holmes going. The Pres suggested letting the interested people know he is aware he acted impulsively and is watchful from now on. The Sec said he told him if things got into a substantive jam re NATO he might talk there. The Sec said we may get into trouble re 4th country business.

[Here follows discussion of the forthcoming visit of Nobusuke Kishi, Japanese Prime Minister, to Washington, June 19-21.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Drafted by Bernau.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum of conversation by Dulles, June 11, Dulles told Holmes that he wanted him to go to London to monitor the disarmament talks, particularly in relation to NATO. Dulles thought there should be "an explicit and prior understanding of the relationship" between Holmes and Stassen, including the referral of differences between the two regarding procedure to Washington for decision. (*Ibid.*, General Memoranda of Conversation) Dulles confirmed this arrangement in a letter to Stassen, June 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-1257)

<sup>3</sup> June 13.

**236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 11, 1957—6:05 p.m.*

8686. For Acting Chairman, U.S. Delegation Disarmament.<sup>2</sup> You will promptly submit the following note to Zorin:

"The document which the United States Delegation received from you on June 8 has been transmitted to my Government. My Government has instructed me to state that it is receiving careful study.

My Government has also instructed me again to make clear that the informal paper of May 31, to which you refer in your memorandum of June 7 is without status as a communication between governments. It is for this reason that the United States Delegation asked that the memorandum be returned.

My Government has also authorized me to assure you that official proposals of the United States Government on the various aspects will be transmitted to you as soon as possible."<sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-1157. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Dulles, approved by Stassen, and repeated to Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Charles H. Owsley served as acting chairman of the Delegation during Stassen's consultations in Washington.

<sup>3</sup> The Soviet note replying to this U.S. note was transmitted in telegram 7010 from London, June 17. (Department of States, Central Files, 330.13/6-1757)

237. Department of State Position Paper<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 11, 1957.

US POSITION ON FIRST PHASE OF DISARMAMENT

General

1. The following paragraphs outline provisions of a first phase agreement on disarmament proposed by the United States. These provisions will be considered as inseparable parts of a whole, unless the contrary is stated.

The first phase agreement will become effective upon ratification by such states as may be agreed.

2. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the Control Organization, of either—

- a. an important violation by another party, or
- b. other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.

At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend, so as to afford opportunity for correction of the violation, or prejudicial action, prior to actual suspension of obligations by the notifying party.

3. Each party will agree:

- a. to cooperate in designing, installing, and maintaining effective inspection systems to verify compliance with the terms of the agreement by all parties, and
- b. that the obligations under the agreement will be conditioned on the continued effective operation of the agreed inspection systems.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. On June 8, however, Stelle sent Howe a draft paper, dated June 7, entitled "US Position on Disarmament." His covering memorandum, June 8, stated the paper had been written in S/P in response to a request from Cutler; incorporated the substance of a previous draft and AEC and Defense comments; had been coordinated with Murphy, IO, EUR, and S/AE; and would be discussed at an interagency meeting that afternoon. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6-757) Cutler had informed Dulles on June 7 that Eisenhower wanted "a complete, clarified revision of the policy guidance on Disarmament, agreed to by the interested agencies to reflect the work done in Washington earlier this week," and that the President had suggested its title be "Tentative List of Proposals for Discussion with Western Allies." (Memorandum from Cutler to Dulles, June 7; *ibid.*) No record of the interagency meeting mentioned in Stelle's memorandum has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. Cutler sent the revised guidance to the President on June 8, adding a list of unresolved questions which related to the addition of a subtitle and subparagraphs 11-b and 11-d. (Memorandum from Cutler to Eisenhower, June 8; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cutler) Eisenhower discussed the paper with Cutler on June 11; see *infra*. The text printed here reflects changes made in the paper during this conversation.

### Nuclear Provisions

4. The parties will not use nuclear weapons, except in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter against an armed attack—

- a. which includes the use of nuclear weapons, or
- b. which is of such a nature and magnitude that, in the decision of a party, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons.

(Note: It is understood that this provision will not imply any obligation (a) to maintain non-nuclear forces for repelling non-nuclear attacks; or (b) for any specific distribution between nuclear and non-nuclear armaments.)

5. The parties will agree:

- a. to devote all future production of fissionable materials exclusively to non-weapons purposes including stockpiling, starting one month after the installation of an inspection system adequate to verify compliance (hereinafter called the "cut-off date" and estimated as July, 1959, or later), and
- b. to cooperate in the prompt design, installation and maintenance of such an inspection system.

(Note: The obligations under this provision will not affect the use, after the cut-off date, of fissionable materials on hand at that date—(1) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture, and (2) to refabricate and maintain weapons then on hand or completed under (1).)

6. To provide for equitable transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production to internationally inspected non-weapons purposes, including either national or international stockpiling, the USSR, UK and US will—

- a. fix in the agreement the specific ratios of quantities of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and
- b. agree to commence such transfers in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios immediately following the cut-off date for production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Unless the Soviets insist on a 50-50 ratio, the US will agree on ratios of 55 for the US to 45 for USSR, and whatever figure for the UK may be agreed.

(Note: The quantities to be transferred under this first phase agreement will be such as to leave to each party affected a substantial part of its nuclear weapons capability.)

7. From the effective date of the agreement—

a. The parties not subject to paragraph 6 above agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons; and<sup>2</sup>

b. Each party agrees not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except in a situation where their use will be in conformity with paragraph 4.

c. Each party agrees not to transfer out of its control any fissionable material, or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for peaceful purposes.

This provision will not prohibit—

(1) Any of the states possessing nuclear weapons from introducing or maintaining such weapons on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapons state with its consent; or

(2) The preparatory training of forces of non-nuclear-weapons-states in the use of nuclear weapons, or equipping them with means of delivery for such weapons.

8. All parties will agree:

a. to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement (estimated as July, 1958), from nuclear tests until 12 months thereafter, with the understanding that the U.S. will resume testing immediately upon termination of the 12 months' period if a satisfactory agreement to the contrary has not been reached in the meantime.

b. to cooperate in setting up during the 12 months' period, or earlier if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests.<sup>3</sup>

c. if tests are resumed, to give notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such tests; to provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

### Inspection Zones

9. Upon the effective date of the agreement (estimated as July 1958), the parties concerned will promptly install and maintain, in an initial zone or zones specified in the agreement, an aerial and ground inspection system, including appropriate radar and communications equipment to provide safeguards against the potential of surprise attack. Details of the aerial and ground inspection system will be prescribed in an annex to the agreement.

#### a. *The US-Canada-USSR Zone*

Initially the U.S. will propose that the zone include the continental U.S., Alaska and, with its consent, Canada, and all Soviet territory.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the subsequent deletion of this subparagraph, see Document 242.

<sup>3</sup> This subparagraph was revised and inserted in this position paper to conform to the changes approved by Eisenhower in his meeting with Cutler on June 12; see *infra*. The version agreed to at the June 8 meeting reads: "to cooperate in setting up during the 12 months' period an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler)



If the Soviets should reject this proposal, the US will accept a limited initial zone, in order to start an inspection technique. This limited zone will comprise the entire area north of the Arctic Circle (except Sweden and Finland), all of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the Soviet territory East of 160 degrees East longitude, and all of the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kurile Islands. (This proposal is contingent upon the consent of Canada, Denmark, and Norway).

In conducting negotiations for a limited zone, the US will not offer more US territory in exchange for more Soviet territory, in the absence of further governmental decision.

*b. Inspection Zone Affecting Western Europe*

In view of the interests of our NATO allies and the complexity of the multi-national interests involved, any aerial and ground inspection zone affecting Western Europe should, insofar as possible, be treated separately from the aerial and ground inspection zones dealt with in a above, and will be handled in accordance with paragraph 10. Agreement on an inspection zone in Western Europe is not for the US a precondition for the first phase agreement.

*c. Extension of Zone*

If the first phase agreement does not provide for inclusion of the entire USSR in the inspection zone or zones, it may contain such provisions for subsequent expansion of the zone or zones as may be agreed in conformity with paragraphs a and b above.

10. Negotiations and arrangements for any aerial and ground inspection zone affecting Western Europe will be handled in a way enabling the West European nations affected to have a full voice in developing the position. Accordingly, the United States will leave to such nations the initiative on the following matters:

- a. Any provision as to the creation, extent and location of any such zone, or the types of inspection therein.
- b. Any provision restricting states possessing nuclear weapons from locating such weapons within the area of any such zone.
- c. Any provision for special reduction in the armaments and armed forces within any such zone.
- d. Any provision for reduction in air bases within any such zone.

If the European nations affected propose the adoption of any such provisions, the US will then decide on what position to take with regard to them.

Reductions of Armed Forces and Armaments

11. To provide for initial reductions of armed forces and armaments:

- a. Three months after the effective date of the agreement, the US, USSR and other parties concerned will provide each other with inventories of fixed military installations and numbers and locations of military forces and major designated armaments (including nuclear weapons delivery capabilities but excluding nuclear weapons) located within an agreed inspection zone or zones.

b. Within one year from the effective date of the agreement, the US and USSR will each: (1) reduce its military forces to 2.5 million; (2) deposit, in internationally supervised storage depots within its own territory, the specific quantities of designated types of armaments, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture (or naval vessels of types in active service), to be mutually agreed upon and set forth in the agreement.

c. Parties other than the USSR and the US will make reductions of forces and deposits of armaments or accept ceilings for their forces and armaments as appropriate to specific situations, as set forth in the agreement.

### Missiles

12. The parties will agree that within three months after the effective date of the agreement they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space should be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

### Control Organization

13. The Armaments Regulation Organization to administer the disarmament system will be established under the aegis of the Security Council, and will operate through a Board of Control on which the affirmative vote of the US and such other parties as may be agreed will be essential for significant decisions.

14. In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control will have authority—

a. To establish a system for the advance notification by parties of any intended major movement of armed forces over foreign soil or over international waters or through international air space, and

b. To establish a system for regulating the export and import of armaments, to take effect upon the exchange of military inventories.

### Second Phase Agreements

15. The first phase agreement should not spell out in detail any later phase reductions.

The US will, however, indicate its interest in further reductions of armaments and armed forces, on a basis to be agreed, as a second phase, taking into account progress towards solution of major political issues and satisfactory progress in fulfillment of the agreement. In that connection, the US—

a. may discuss, without commitment, the possibility of reductions in a second phase, if first phase reductions are carried through successfully, to not less than 2 million men;

b. may express hope that further reductions in armaments and armed forces might be negotiated, if second phase reductions are carried through successfully; provided that no floor below 1.5 million men is discussed.

---

238. **Memorandum of a Discussion Between the President and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler), White House, Washington, June 12, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE BASIC  
DISARMAMENT PAPER

I spent a half an hour with the President on the June 11 text of "U.S. Position on the First Phase of Disarmament".<sup>2</sup>

He again expressed the wish to have as a subtitle, "For Discussion With Our Allies". Following a considerable discussion on the telephone with the Secretary of State on this point,<sup>3</sup> he accepted the Secretary's position that this subtitle should not be used, and that this and other matters be covered in explicit written directions by the Secretary to the U.S. Delegate.

I gave the President the memorandum<sup>4</sup> indicating that the June 11 draft was based on informal views expressed by the Secretary of State which was participated in by representatives of the interested agencies, including myself and Governor Stassen, and that the Inter-agency Working Group believed that this text would be satisfactory to the Secretary of State.

I gave the President in writing Admiral Strauss' last minute indicated amendment of 8-b:<sup>5</sup>

"To cooperate in planning as feasible prior to the effective date of the agreement, for the installation of an international inspection arrangement to monitor tests, and to install the agreed system at the beginning of the 12 months' period."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum summarizing this telephone conversation, June 12, 10:44 a.m., is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversation)

<sup>4</sup> Cutler's memorandum to the President, June 12, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler)

<sup>5</sup> Cutler had also added Strauss' proposed amendment as a postscript to his June 12 memorandum to the President.

The President read it carefully and said he was perfectly willing to change 8-b to read as follows:

"To cooperate in setting up during the 12 months' period, or earlier if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests."<sup>6</sup>

**Robert Cutler**<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> The revised version of paragraph 8-b was incorporated in the position paper *supra*. The President also approved the entire paper, "U.S. Position on the First Phase of Disarmament." Telegram 8722 to London, June 12, reads: "For the exclusive information USDel revised basic policy paper based on May 25th presentation by Secretary to President in White House conference that date has now been finally approved." (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-1257)

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 12, 1957—11 a.m.*

3517. Eyes Only Ambassador from Secretary. Please in the highest confidence inform Chancellor Adenauer from me that, with Presidential authority, I have had a very thorough review of disarmament procedures with Governor Stassen and that the President and I feel confident that there will be no repetition of unauthorized proceedings and that every effort will be made to work out cooperatively a common position in so far as the Federal Republic is involved.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/6-1257. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles and read to and approved by the President.

240. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

London, June 16, 1957—4 p.m.

7000. For the Secretary (Eyes Only) from Stassen.

1. The Soviet formal confirmation in the June 14 meeting of acceptance of inspection posts in connection with a moratorium on nuclear testing<sup>2</sup> as developed in the May 31 and June 7 informal exchanges,<sup>3</sup> now places within reach a first step agreement worthy of serious consideration by the US Government, even though other highly desirable features should later prove to be unattainable.

2. Inspected nuclear testing moratorium and an Arctic-Siberian opening to inspection, with whatever lesser provisions were attached to it, would probably have such world appeal that all significant states would sign and ratify.

3. This would immediately retard, if not prevent, any serious spreading of nuclear weapons manufacture to additional states.

4. It would also increase the safeguards against surprise attack upon the US and through such increased security of the US and its retaliatory force the result would ipso facto decrease the dangers of a calculated war being initiated by the Soviet Union anywhere in the world.

5. In my judgment, the initial moratorium on testing could be negotiated between the 10 months that USDel has expressed and the 24 months of the Soviet position at a compromise of 18 months. Perhaps I can bring the initial moratorium down to the 12 months included in our policy decision,<sup>4</sup> but not yet disclosed to the Soviet.

6. On the initial inspection zone, Norway has already given consent and the indications are that Denmark will concur. The increased safeguards against surprise attack which would be attained by opening up the Soviet as deep as Lake Baikal . . . would seem to commend further checking with the US Senate as to whether under such a first step opening, the increased security against surprise attack would permit the opening of a part of the US territory on a concept that all of the US and all of the Soviet Union would be covered in the third step. Perhaps a briefing of key Senators by Allen Dulles would enlist the Western Senators' support.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-1657. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> For the Soviet proposal on the cessation of all nuclear testing, introduced in the Disarmament Subcommittee on June 14 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/60), see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, p. 791.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 214 and 231.

<sup>4</sup> See paragraph 8 of Document 237.

7. The UK will be reluctant to see a first step of these dimensions and so will France, but I believe that both will conclude that such a first step is better than none and both will also conclude that their public opinion and Parliamentary opinion would require their adherence.

8. These thoughts are, of course, particularly for your reflection and those to whom you wish to pass the information, and will not be transmitted by me to others here at this time.

Whitney

---

**241. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 16, 1957.*

DEAR HAROLD: I think now that we have removed the possibility that any more “flaps” can occur in disarmament negotiations, we can look forward to a bit smoother sailing in this particular business.

We have worked very hard to find a position in the disarmament area that is as liberal and broad-gauged as elementary considerations of security would permit. Frankly, many of our people are getting exceedingly weary of carrying the national and international costs of some of the programs in which we are now engaged. Any real progress toward a disarmament plan—one which could be accepted with confidence by the free world—would probably be of greater relative relief to us than to any of our friends. This is because in so many cases we are not only meeting our own costs but trying to help others.

I mention this only to show that we fully agree with your observation that “the real test is disarmament.”<sup>2</sup>

[Here follow Eisenhower’s thoughts on trade restrictions and West German purchases of tanks.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In a letter to Eisenhower, June 12, on “general matters,” Macmillan made the following observation on disarmament: “But of course the real test is disarmament. On this I was very grateful to you for your reply to my last letter. Very soon I shall be writing to you again on this for it is time, I think, that we gave it a lot of careful thought. The Russians will try to play us off one against the other and we must not allow this to happen.” (*Ibid.*)

I thoroughly enjoy and appreciate your letters.

With warm regard,

As ever

DE

---

**242. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 18, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Disarmament

I refer to the June 11, 1957, revised United States position on the first phase of disarmament.<sup>2</sup> I recommend that subparagraph (a) of paragraph 7, which reads "The Parties not subject to Paragraph 6 above agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons," be eliminated and that the other subparagraphs be re-lettered accordingly.

This recommendation is based on our belief that "Fourth Powers" such as France will find it difficult to accept a provision such as this which sets them off from the three which now have nuclear weapons. In the June 11 position the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and the United States will be able to continue to produce nuclear weapons until a nuclear control system is set up, rather than being enjoined from producing these weapons from the effective date of the agreement, as is proposed for others. In our view the combined effect of an agreement not to test weapons and not to use new fissionable material for weapons purposes after the cut-off date will in fact adequately take care of the "Fourth Powers" problem, and paragraph 7a is unnecessary.

The above view is concurred in by Chairman Strauss, by the Department of Defense, and by the Director of CIA.<sup>3</sup>

JFD

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 237.

<sup>3</sup> A notation on the source text in the President's handwriting reads: "approved. D.E."

**243. Editorial Note**

On June 18, the United States Senate gave its consent to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency by a vote of 67–19. For text of the Statute, see *Congressional Record*, June 17, 1957, pages 9236–9241. Hearings on the Statute were held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee beginning May 21, and before a special subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee established on May 21 and headed by Senator J. William Fulbright. For minutes of the hearings, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series)*, volume IX, 85th Congress, 1st session, 1957, pages 519 and 553.

The Foreign Relations Committee reported the Statute favorably to the Senate on June 14, with an “interpretation and understanding” that any amendment to the Statute would be submitted to the Senate in treaty form and that the United States would withdraw from the Agency if the Senate disapproved an amendment adopted by the Agency. The Senate rejected by a 31–55 vote an amendment introduced by Senator John W. Bricker that the United States should not make special fissionable materials available to the Agency except to the extent and under the terms and conditions authorized by Congress. For Senate floor debate on the issue, see *Congressional Record*, June 17, pages 923 ff., and June 18, pages 9429 ff. For text of President Eisenhower’s remarks at the ceremony following ratification of the Statute on July 29, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pages 571–572.

---

**244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 18, 1957—7:19 p.m.

8878. Please deliver following message from Secretary to Macmillan soonest and inform Stassen.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–1857. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Spiers, Bowie, and Dulles. A copy of this telegram is initialed “DE” in the President’s handwriting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)



*Verbatim text.*

"The President has asked me to reply further to your letter of June 3.<sup>2</sup> I have given thoughtful consideration to the issue you raised at the end of your message about the possibility of commencing now the discussions foreseen in the exchange of letters between Mr. Stassen and Commander Noble of last February and March.<sup>3</sup>

In thinking about this matter, I have reviewed this exchange of letters, including the commitment we undertook at that time: to enter into negotiations with you with a view to ensuring that adoption of the United States proposals would not prejudice the development by the United Kingdom of nuclear weapons resources adequate to your needs. We agreed to undertake these negotiations in the event of an affirmative reaction from the Russians to our proposals.

The timing of such negotiations was fully discussed in January and the decision reflected two primary factors: first, it would be hard to estimate either your resources or your needs without knowing when such agreement was likely to take effect, and, second, unless there were favorable prospects for an overall first phase disarmament agreement, measures preparatory to the necessary action by Congress in amending our law would be premature.

I have gone over this situation again with Lewis Strauss who feels that talks now would be premature and perhaps creative of undesirable speculation and resistance if, as seems likely, your sending of a team on this topic to Washington would almost surely become public here or in London. Naturally, it is our instinct always to respond favorably to any suggestion that we should talk with you about any subject but in this particular matter the issues are so sensitive and existing Congressional prohibition so clear that the matter of timing becomes very important.

Of course, we would want to and plan to have further talks as soon as there is an affirmative Soviet reaction to the cutoff idea which would both make the talks practical and also create a climate more conducive to the positive solution for which we hope.

Please let me know if you do not agree.

Faithfully yours, Foster Dulles"

**Dulles**

---

<sup>2</sup> See Document 219.

<sup>3</sup> The February 7 letter is not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy) The March 6 letter is printed in Document 176.

**245. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, June 20, 1957—7 p.m.*

7147. For the Secretary from Stassen.

I. Dinner invitation at No. 10, June 19th (Embtel 6989, para 4 and Embtel 7111<sup>2</sup>) developed into three-hour discussion of the U.S. position on disarmament in which Selwyn Lloyd participated, and at the conclusion it appeared:

(1) The Prime Minister will recommend to the Cabinet at noon on June 24th that the new U.S. position be generally supported and decision of the Cabinet may be taken on Tuesday, June 25th.

(2) The need of the U.K. for "a little bit" of fissionable material before any cut-off, and some "defense know-how" information, is of very great concern and your message to the Prime Minister on June 19th<sup>3</sup> will be studied for a few days before reply.

(3) British public and Commons opinion very worrisome to the Prime Minister.

(4) The U.K. agrees on the importance of safeguarding against the spreading of nuclear weapons into multiple hands in the interests of peace.

(5) Since the foregoing conclusions appeared to develop at least in part during the evening, presumably they may be modified by further reflection of the PM between now and Monday or Tuesday.

II. Upon arrival at No. 10 at 8:15 was ushered into the Cabinet room where the PM and the Foreign Minister were seated with various papers in front of them. I suggested at once that I would wait outside until they were finished and then join them for dinner. The PM said no, they wished to begin talking with me and their first question was with regard to the Reuters ticker on the President's press conference,<sup>4</sup> and whether it meant that the U.S. had changed its position from what the U.K. had been advised in the consultations during the past three weeks. I responded that I felt confident that if there had been any change I would have been advised prior to the press conference; that I believed the full text of the press conference would make it clear the temporary suspension of testing was interrelated to other matters; and that I would advise them further tomorrow.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-2057. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. A copy of this telegram is initialed "DE" in the President's handwriting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

<sup>2</sup> Telegrams 6989, June 20, and 7111, June 19, are not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-1557 and 101/6-1957, respectively)

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>4</sup> For the President's remarks on disarmament at his news conference on June 19, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 470, 472, and 476-479.

(1) The Prime Minister then referred to his visit that noon with Anthony Eden and proceeded to speak for 10 or 15 minutes in an apparently depressed mood of the burdens and cares of public office, of the problems of the U.K., of the incessant questioning in Commons, of Ernest Bevin's death in office,<sup>5</sup> of Cripps breaking in office,<sup>6</sup> and of the necessity of at least three more months of recuperation before Sir Anthony would have sufficient vitality to do any work, but concluded that Sir Anthony was relaxed and that while he did not expect to live long, the PM had endeavored to cheer him up in that he might now live a long time.

(2) I endeavored to make some counter balancing contribution to this part of the conversation on a more cheerful perspective for the U.K., for free countries generally, and for men in public office.

(3) The PM then turned specifically to the disarmament subject, referred in passing to the fact that Selwyn Lloyd had seen Zorin for two and a half hours that afternoon, and then said that the PM would never sign an agreement which would permanently relegate the U.K. to a third rate stature as a power without nuclear weapons; his successor might do so, but he would not.

(4) I responded that U.S. policy contemplated no such situation and neither did any other proposal in the subcomite from any Govt. He rejoined that if nuclear testing were stopped tonight and if no outside source of fissionable material for the U.K. was found, he would stop the U.K. nuclear weapons program because it would not be sufficiently substantial to be worth the expense.

(5) I responded that the U.S. policy had at no time contemplated that nuclear testing would be stopped tonight; that a temporary suspension would only begin upon the ratification of a treaty with other important related matters and such negotiation and ratification of the treaty could not possibly take place sooner than one year; that any cut-off of fissionable material would be at least two years off; that it was my understanding that they had very successful nuclear tests; that they were highly competent in the nuclear weapons field; that they already had substantial quantities of fissionable material, that their production was going up rapidly; that the U.S. had always contemplated there would be three nuclear powers, and this was clearly verified by the fact that from the beginning the U.S. discussion of the problem of spreading nuclear weapons had been labelled by the U.S. as the "fourth country problem" which was self-evident in relationship to the U.K. as the third nuclear weapons power.

---

<sup>5</sup> Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951.

<sup>6</sup> Sir Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1947-1950.

(6) Lloyd confirmed that the U.S. had always spoken of "fourth country problem" and that it had always been evident that the U.K. was contemplated to be the third nuclear weapons power. The PM then reiterated that he had just looked at the production figures that day and if testing and production stopped tonight he would stop the U.K. weapons program as not being substantial enough to justify the expense. I explained again that immediate cut-off was not now nor had it ever been contemplated; that the negotiation and ratification of a treaty would be at least a year and the installation of inspection at least a year after that. The PM asked if I was sure that the President's press conference did not indicate a forthwith temporary suspension of testing, as if this was the U.S. position, he could not hold the House of Commons for the essential kiloton tests this autumn for the U.K. I stated again that I was confident that the full text of the President's press conference would show that U.S. policy had not been changed.

(7) The PM then said that the McMahon Act<sup>7</sup> which had cut off the U.K. from the U.S. in the nuclear weapons field had been an act which deeply split the U.S. and the U.K. in a manner harmful to both countries and to the Free World. He spoke at length on this subject and seemed to be reflecting his talk with Sir Anthony Eden that day. He said a U.S. sergeant sits in the U.K. with a small box and the U.K. must spend millions of pounds to learn independently what is in the box.

(8) I stated that I had no authority to take up with him the questions of fissionable material or of know-how, and that I was aware that he had a letter from the Secretary of State that day on this subject. He said he would take a few days' time to study the letter and to review the situation before he replied to the letter, and he acknowledged recognition that I did not have negotiating power on this subject.

(9) He then asked what position the U.K. would be in if the USSR accepted a cut-off, if the President recommended some fissionable material but if Congress turned it down. I stated that he should have confidence in the entire matter in the President and Secretary Dulles, that he would find that in vital matters, Congress would follow the leadership of the President and the Secretary of State when the President and Secretary concluded the manner and time of acting in an important situation. I told him for example of the reports in the British newspapers that the Senate would defeat the President on the IAEA status, whereas I was confident the Senate would ratify the treaty with more than a two to one vote.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

<sup>8</sup> Regarding Senate consent to the IAEA treaty, see Document 243.

(10) The PM then asked a series of questions on the manner in which the new U.S. policy would work if the Soviet accepted it and began to exact affirmative reactions to the importance of opening up the Soviet; to increasing safeguards against surprise attack; to avoiding miscalculations or incidents which expanded into war. He asked a series of elementary questions which I carefully answered in accordance with US policy.

(11) He then asked Lloyd for the drafts of the Four Power answer to the Soviet (Embtel 7065, USDel No. 309<sup>9</sup>) and it soon became apparent that the PM and the Foreign Secretary had personally worked over these drafts at some length. The PM commented that he thought it was a good paper, that they would have a few clauses they would like changed in slight degree, but that he believed he would recommend it to Cabinet on Monday.

(12) He then commented that perhaps he could delay the commons questions by asking their reference to the new Canadian Govt and providing time for that govt to review disarmament policy. Lloyd concurred but interjected on the importance of not delaying the USSR too long or not delaying too long for their own U.K. public opinion.

(13) The PM agreed in response to my comment that NATO should be advised before the Four Power paper is tabled, and Lloyd interjected that individual NATO nations should not be given a veto over the Four Power work in the subcomite.

(14) It was then after 11 o'clock and with the PM repeating reluctance to conclude the discussion, and accompanying me to the door expressing appreciation of the thorough discussion and a conclusion that our two countries should stand together on this very important policy of this age. The talk ended.

*Comment:* I am not certain whether his extreme statements about the weak and poor condition of the U.K. were for purposes of exciting my sympathy in reporting to my govt, or whether they reflected his own worry and uncertainty. I also am not certain whether his constructive conclusions in fact were developed during the three hours, or whether they had been previously reached and were simply reviewed through this discussion process. If it is the former, presumably subsequent reflections of the PM or discussion with other Cabinet members may change his tentative conclusions.

**Whitney**

---

<sup>9</sup> The Western draft working paper on the suspension of nuclear tests is contained in telegram 7065 from London, June 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-1857) This working paper, introduced after minor stylistic changes in the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on July 2 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/59), is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 802-803.

246. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Caccia), Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, June 23, 1957, 10 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

I learned through Mr. Murphy that the British Ambassador was leaving at noon for England. Accordingly, I asked him to call to see me with reference to Mr. Macmillan's suggestion in his message (delivered to the Department on June 21<sup>2</sup>) that he might like to come over and talk with the President and me about certain aspects of the disarmament matter.

I said that Stassen was optimistic which was a good quality in a negotiator on this subject. However, the President and I did not fully share his optimism as to timing and I felt that probably a very considerable amount of time would elapse before it was ascertained, if at all, that the Soviets would accept a cut-off date and would accept adequate inspection to supervise this as well as a temporary suspension of nuclear testing.

I pointed out that a meeting on disarmament between Mr. Macmillan and the President would cause tremendous speculation and a feeling that important action was imminent and it would require full explanation to the French and the Germans; also probably to the Congress and to the public. I said that Chancellor Adenauer was in a particularly sensitive position as a result of the pending elections. I added that if a talk at this juncture seemed important, it might be better for me to come over as I could readily give as a reason the desirability of my attending one of the NATO meetings and that would afford me an opportunity to talk with Mr. Macmillan either in Paris or in London.

Sir Harold said that he did not have the impression that the Prime Minister desired any early meeting, but merely wanted to be sure that there could be a meeting if it seemed that the progress being made made such a meeting important from the standpoint of the United Kingdom.

I then dictated, in the presence of Sir Harold, a message to the Prime Minister which Sir Harold felt was appropriate to the present situation.<sup>3</sup> He said he would report more fully personally.

[Here follows a paragraph regarding Pakistan.]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

<sup>3</sup> See *infra*.

(Following the departure of Sir Harold Caccia I read to the President at Gettysburg the text of my proposed message to Harold Macmillan. The President suggested one slight change of language which I made and I then arranged to have the cable dispatched through the American Embassy at London.)

JFD

---

247. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 23, 1957—2:17 p.m.*

9024. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Please deliver following personal message from me to Prime Minister.

"Dear Harold: I have your message with its suggestion of a possible talk here by you with the President and myself with respect to the impact upon the UK of a nuclear weapons cut-off date.<sup>2</sup> I have talked to the President about this.<sup>3</sup> Both he and I are of course always anxious to talk with you and we wish that we could do so more often. However, we do not yet seem to have invented a way to have informal talks without many complications. If you could make this invention, the President would be most happy.<sup>4</sup> As it is, we have to think hard about the reactions of the French and Germans and also of what explanations to give to the public and to our Congress.

Of course we do not think of these complications as encroaching in the slightest on our plan, indeed our strong desire, to talk together about this matter whenever and as soon as it becomes relevant. Perhaps however the right time has not yet arrived, as neither the President nor I in fact consider that matters are moving so fast as to indicate there will be soon any firm, and sufficiently meticulous, agreement with the Russians.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.4112/6-2357. Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Dulles. Cleared by Beam.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Dulles' telephone conversation with the President, June 23, 12:30 p.m., in which Dulles read and explained to the President his draft cable to Macmillan, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

<sup>4</sup> According to the telephone conversation cited in footnote 3 above, "The Sec said he would put into the cable a sentence about not being able to have talks be casual as they should be and if a way could be thought of that would be fine." This sentence in this message is presumably the one Dulles added to his draft.

I have talked this matter over very fully with Harold Caccia this morning (Sunday)<sup>5</sup> as he leaves for London and he will give you more intimately our thinking.

Faithfully yours, Foster.”

Dulles

---

<sup>5</sup> See *supra*.

---

**248. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, June 24, 1957, 9 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Strauss  
 Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence  
 Dr. Mark M. Mills<sup>2</sup>  
 Dr. Edward Teller<sup>3</sup>  
 General Goodpaster

Admiral Strauss reviewed public statements that have been made regarding fall-out from large weapons, including a recent statement on the progress being made in developing “clean” weapons<sup>4</sup> . . . .

Dr. Teller said that we have been seeking to develop tactical weapons, easily packaged, which could be used for the defense of our allies and for air defense . . . . While any estimate of time required to achieve this is extremely uncertain, he thought that a matter of six or seven years would be the best probability. . . . It cannot be done simply on the basis of theory and calculation. Some tests must be conducted as experiments, the results of which would guide further work . . . . He said we can easily demonstrate . . . .

Dr. Lawrence said it would be wonderful to have a United Nations team attend our tests, and the President strongly agreed . . . .

Dr. Teller then went on to say that, in the last month, we have started some thinking on how to use atomic explosions for peaceful purposes. Examples of such use cited at this point and later in the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

<sup>2</sup> Head of the Theoretical Division, University of California Radiation Laboratory.

<sup>3</sup> Physicist and Associate Director, University of California Radiation Laboratory.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably a reference to the President’s “recent statement” on fallout at his news conference, June 5, printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 429–430. See also *ibid.*, pp. 434–435 and 443–444.



meeting included the use of . . . thermonuclear weapons in deep, large cavities (perhaps lined with steel) filled with water to produce steam, to break up taconite ore, to release oil from oil strata, to cut through large earth barriers and modify the flow of rivers . . . .

The President said that no one could oppose the development program they had described. We are, however, up against an extremely difficult world opinion situation and he did not think that the United States could permit itself to be "crucified on a cross of atoms," so to speak. He added that the proposals for stopping testing are in the context of stopping war. We have not thought of stopping tests without some kind of package deal.

. . . Dr. Teller said that he did not think an agreement to stop tests could be policed with certainty.

The President returned to the question of world opinion, saying that we are witnessing not only intense Soviet propaganda but an actual division of American opinion and other opinion as to the harmful effects of testing. He asked if we could not find the places where weapons and instruments for tests were being made. . . .

Admiral Strauss returned to the President's question as to what would be the best line to follow in these circumstances, and suggested that the President might invite UN observers to be present at the next Pacific tests, and invite them to prepare instrumentation and monitor the resulting radioactivity (through use of rockets) to show how low it is. The President asked if we could say that there would be no possible harm to humanity in general from the tests. He was told that we can say this is essentially correct, although there may be some miniscule effects—extremely low in relation, for example, to the difference in radioactive exposure of people at sea level as against people at the elevation of Denver, Colorado.

Dr. Teller commented, in reference to discussion of Dr. Pauling's recent statement,<sup>5</sup> that there are 5,000 scientists on the Berkeley Campus and only 27 of them signed his statement. This 27 included no biologists and no physicists engaged in atomic studies.

The President recognized that the Pauling comment may be quite invalid but he said that so many nations and people are reading in the press these fearsome and horrible reports that they are having a substantial result. All present stressed the need to clarify this matter publicly. The President said he thought he could do this at his next press conference, if he were asked a question such as "Why has the United States declined to join unreservedly in a banning of tests?"<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Regarding this statement on the radiological hazards associated with nuclear testing, see *The New York Times*, June 4, p. 17, and June 12, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> For Eisenhower's comments on nuclear testing at his next news conference, June 26, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 497-499, 500-501, and 504-505.

. . . He could say that we invited the UN to put in instruments to verify this. Dr. Lawrence said there should be no implication that the testing that has been, and is now being, conducted will have any appreciable adverse effect . . . .

The President suggested that perhaps in the long run we may want . . . to turn over our techniques to him. The scientists thought (and commented to me after the meeting) that our weapons incorporate other technological advances of great value that we do not wish to give to the Soviets.

Dr. Teller said he has had a great deal of concern as to the situation that might exist if the Soviets secretly were to continue testing and developing . . . bombs and peaceful uses of . . . atomic explosions while we, having stopped our tests, are left only with . . . weapons which we are inhibited through world opinion from using.

. . . . .

**G**  
*Brigadier General, USA*

---

**249. Memorandum From the Senior Member, National Security Council Special Staff (Smith), to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, June 26, 1957.*

1. The information which was given to the President on June 24 by Admiral Strauss and three ranking nuclear scientists, Drs. Lawrence, Mills and Teller, reopens the issue of nuclear testing, in my opinion, from both a technical and a moral point of view.<sup>2</sup>

2. The scientists, summarizing the knowledge gained primarily within the last 30 days, made two crucial statements:

a. . . .

b. An agreement to stop tests cannot be policed with certainty, a reversal of an earlier view which was necessitated by recent experiments with "the deep cavity technique" of using . . . thermonuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Tests. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

3. The scientists raised the moral issue of the use of nuclear weapons in the following way:

a. If we know how to make . . . weapons, but fail to do so and to convert existing weapons into . . . ones, then the use of dirty weapons in war would be a "crime against humanity".

b. If we live up to an agreement to stop our tests and the Soviets continue (secretly and illegally) testing and develop . . . bombs, we may face a situation in the future in which world opinion would inhibit us from using our . . . weapons, while the Soviet Union would not be restrained from using their . . . weapons. Technically, it is possible to add materials to . . . weapons which would result in radioactive fall-out.

c. In the long run it might be advantageous for us to know that all nuclear powers possess . . . weapons. . . .

4. Our present position on first phase of disarmament (June 11 policy statement<sup>3</sup>) states in paragraph 8 that, as part of a package deal, we will agree to refrain from nuclear tests for 12 months after the effective date of an arms agreement, upon the condition that the parties to the agreement cooperate in setting up an *effective* international arrangement to monitor tests. This position, in substance, has been made known to our allies, the Soviet representative and to the public in general.

5. The President told the scientists that our proposals for stopping tests are in the context of stopping war, that we have no thought of stopping tests without some kind of package deal. The President volunteered, at his next press conference if he were asked, to explain that we declined to join in unreservedly abandoning tests because our tests are projected to clean up weapons and thus protect civilians in the event of war.

6. The situation thus created is as follows:

a. The scientists wish to continue testing for 6 to 7 years.

b. The President, acknowledging the uninformed pressure of world opinion, is thinking in terms of halting testing in return for real control of nuclear weapons.

c. Mr. Stassen is in London offering a suspension of tests to the Russians in return for their taking limited steps toward future control of nuclear weapons.

7. Several alternatives, none of them easy, present themselves.

a. We could frankly explain the new situation, the advantages of clean bombs, continue our testing and let those who would criticize continue to do so.

b. We can continue our present position in London and take the risk that the conditions attached to our agreement to suspend tests will be unacceptable to the Russians—therefore no suspension would take

---

<sup>3</sup> Document 237.

effect. Additionally, we might inform Mr. Stassen of the new situation and instruct him to so conduct the negotiations that Soviet acceptance would be remote.

8. The over-all implications of what the scientists have told the President are very disturbing. Their judgment that no policing of nuclear tests can be relied upon must be accepted. The risks involved in illegal and undetected Soviet testing were considered by the scientists to be very serious. The scientists obviously would wish to continue testing for professional reasons. In addition, there may be an unconscious desire to reduce the horror of nuclear weapons which they are responsible in large part for creating. Any attempt to insure that only clean weapons were in the hands of the nuclear powers appears impossible in the light of the fact that it is a simple operation, apparently, to convert . . . weapons into . . . ones. Moral restraints which would bear on our use of weapons would certainly not apply to the Soviet Union if an advantage could be gained by them in using dirty weapons. As knowledge spreads . . . . In the talks leading up to a decision on our offer to suspend nuclear tests, few of these problems, as far as I know, were discussed.

#### *Recommendation*

Admiral Strauss should be given an opportunity to present the case against suspension of tests to the same group which made the decisions now embodied in the June 11 paper. Discussion of this crucial issue would be facilitated if the Chairman of the AEC were asked to prepare a short discussion paper of the reasons against a suspension of tests. Adequate staffing of this paper prior to a discussion in the presence of the President would result in information which is not now generally known to those officials dealing with disarmament.

**Bromley**

11:30 a.m.<sup>4</sup>

P.S. The President's press conference statement (attached)<sup>5</sup> have overtaken some of the above information. The policy issue remains.

**BKS**

---

<sup>4</sup> The time and the following postscript have been added in handwriting.

<sup>5</sup> The President's press conference statement, June 26, is not attached to the source text, but is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 498-499.

250. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 26, 1957—6:58 p.m.*

9159. Deliver following message from President to Prime Minister Macmillan.<sup>2</sup> Confirm date and time delivery,<sup>3</sup>

"June 26, 1957.

Dear Harold: I am delighted that you are prepared to join with us in putting forward in the Disarmament Subcommittee the proposals which Harold Stassen has been discussing with you and our French and Canadian colleagues in London. We hope that this will pave the way for rapid progress in the Subcommittee.

Your concern about the possible effect on your nuclear position of the putting into effect of a program such as we propose is fully understood. I am, of course, happy to reaffirm the agreement which was reached in the exchange of letters between Harold Stassen and Commander Noble last February and March. Your willingness to go along with our proposals in this respect will, I hope, be a significant step looking to increasing world security. Certainly, it will show the world our good intentions. Whether or not the Soviets will respond by accepting either the basic concept, or an adequate inspection system to support it, is, I fear, quite problematic. But we shall see.

As ever, Ike E"

Observe Presidential handling.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-2657. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling.

<sup>2</sup> A suggested draft of this letter, which was attached to a covering note from Dulles to Eisenhower, June 26, is identical to the message below. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

<sup>3</sup> According to telegram 7343 from London, June 27, the President's message was delivered to Macmillan's office on June 27 at 1:05 a.m. (London time).

**251. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the President<sup>1</sup>**

London, July 1, 1957.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: May I express to you my deep appreciation for your thoughtful and generous comments in your recent press conference regarding my work here.<sup>2</sup> Your remarks strengthened my hand during one of the more sensitive and crucial phases of this complex negotiation.

A very substantial and continually growing support has now been firmly enlisted among the Western and free world countries for the major portions of the policies which you decided on May 25. This has been done in accordance with the effective and welcome instructions from Secretary Dulles, and through the coordinated endeavor of the entire U.S. Delegation working as a team. Other free world states are increasingly concluding after study that the U.S. program will enhance the prospects of a lasting peace.

Your June 26th letter to Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>3</sup> brought about a firm UK decision to move with us. The new Canadian Prime Minister,<sup>4</sup> who I had first met in 1948, invited me to talk with him while he was here for the Commonwealth Conference and I believe that when he returns to his new Cabinet in Ottawa they will support the "open sky" proposals. France has taken the initiative on a European-Russian aerial inspection zone, and has held firm in general support of U.S. policies notwithstanding some efforts internally to persuade the new Prime Minister to shift. An extended conference with the NATO Council on Saturday, June 29,<sup>5</sup> with the backing of Canada, France, and the UK, has appeared to clear the way for NATO Council approval. Foreign Minister Brentano of the Federal Republic of Germany took a much more affirmative position in a closed meeting of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee on June 28, and the German press is beginning to reflect a different tone. General Norstad has presented a thoughtful and constructive summary of views to the NATO Council.<sup>6</sup>

New obstacles may arise, or some of the barriers that are now being lowered may suddenly stiffen, but as of today it looks as if, with free world backing, we are entering the phase of careful and thorough

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Stassen. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to Eisenhower's remarks about Stassen at his press conference on June 19, printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 470-471.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> John George Diefenbaker.

<sup>5</sup> A detailed account of this NAC meeting was transmitted in Polto circular 25 from Paris, June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-2957)

<sup>6</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

formal presentation to the USSR. I will not endeavor to anticipate their response. I see no reason to be either optimistic or pessimistic but every reason to be persistent and particular. The U.S. Delegation is attempting to be ready for each of the alternative possible Soviet reactions to each major point.

You have my assurance of my continued concentrated and careful endeavor to consummate your policies, moving in accordance with the instructions of Secretary Dulles.

Sincere best wishes to Mrs. Eisenhower and to you, and the hope that the congressional session closes with reasonable success, and that a more restful autumn will follow.

Sincerely,

Harold

---

252. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 1, 1957.*

DEAR FOSTER: On 12 June 1957, Mr. Stassen called on Mr. Quarles<sup>2</sup> and stated he felt it would be very helpful if we could place in his hands a U.S. proposed list of equipment to be deactivated concurrently with the first stage reduction of forces, as set forth in paragraph 11(b) of the U.S. Position on the First Phase of Disarmament.<sup>3</sup> He confirmed this request in his cable from London (7050) dated 18 June 1957.<sup>4</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a list of armaments<sup>5</sup> which they would propose be placed in storage in connection with a force level reduction to 2.5 million. This list, together with the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which I am in general agreement, are attached in the enclosure hereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious concern regarding a premature disclosure of the list. They recommend, and I agree, that the list should not be introduced into the Disarmament Sub-Committee until such time as progress in the negotiations of other crucial items warrants such action. In this connection, it is noted that Mr. Stassen

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-157. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> Document 237.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-1857)

<sup>5</sup> This list, an appendix attached to the enclosure, is not printed.

reported on 26 June (London cable 7285<sup>6</sup>) that the current discussion is directed toward the principle of such lists in a first step, and does not involve at this time any exchange of actual lists.

The list of equipment submitted herewith is tentative in nature and is designed for discussion and coordination with our principal allies. The Department of Defense would expect to be kept advised of the progress and results of such consultations, and be afforded an opportunity to revise the list, if this appears to be indicated, before it is introduced in the negotiations. Similarly, after the lists have been exchanged in the Sub-Committee the U.S. delegate should, of course, make no agreement as to the final lists to be adopted until they have been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The relative advantages and disadvantages of the Western Four presenting their lists of equipment of the Soviets first (as Mr. Zorin has suggested) and of a simultaneous presentation of all lists in the Sub-Committee have been weighed. It is our view that the latter procedure should be followed. For this reason, there should be no disclosure to the Soviet delegate of the nature or content of the U.S. list of equipment until the formal and simultaneous exchange takes place.

Because of their concern regarding the consequences, both at home and abroad, of a premature disclosure of the list of equipment they have submitted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that it not be forwarded to Mr. Stassen for discussion with our allies until such time as we deem it appropriate. I would suggest, therefore, that we consult and arrive at a mutual determination as to the propitious time to take this action.<sup>7</sup>

Sincerely yours,

**C.E. Wilson**

---

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-2657)

<sup>7</sup> In a letter to Stassen, July 3, Dulles attached the enclosure (including the list of armaments) printed below and asked for Stassen's comments on it as to timing and tactics. Dulles said it should not be discussed with U.S. allies and in fact should not become known that he had such a paper. (*Ibid.*, 600.0012/7-157)



[Enclosure]

**Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the  
Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>8</sup>**

*Washington, June 27, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Disarmament Planning (U)

1. In response to a memorandum dated 20 June 1957, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject as above,<sup>9</sup> the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a tentative list of armaments which could be placed in storage in connection with a force level reduction to 2.5 million as set forth in paragraph 11 b of the U.S. Position on First Phase of Disarmament.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff question the advisability of introducing any list of armaments into the current disarmament negotiations at the present time. There are many critical unresolved issues still before the conference. The matter of determining specific quantities of designated armaments to be deposited in internationally supervised storage depots should be among the last issues to be introduced in the present disarmament negotiations, and such introduction should be dependent upon previous agreement upon other crucial items in the U.S. Position on First Phase of Disarmament approved by the President on 12 June 1957. In any event, the initial list of armaments proposed by the United States should be presented first to the western members of the Disarmament Subcommittee for thorough discussion and coordination of lists. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considerable misgivings with respect to the effect of a premature disclosure of such a U.S. list. During the process of coordination of armaments lists with our Allies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would expect to be kept fully informed of the Status of Allied consultations. Until the results of these consultations have been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no U.S. list should be discussed with or given to the Soviets either on a formal or informal basis.

3. After determination to exchange a list of armaments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge strongly that the list by the United States be presented to the Soviet Delegate only with a simultaneous presentation by the Soviet Delegate to the United States Delegate of a similar list. The U.S. Delegate should make it clear that the list proposed by the United States is being submitted only for the purpose of negotiat-

---

<sup>8</sup> Top Secret.

<sup>9</sup> Quarles' memorandum on disarmament planning, June 20, has not been found in Department of State files.

ing a mutually agreed list to be incorporated in any agreement. The Department of Defense should ask the Department of State to emphasize to the U.S. Delegate that any mutually agreed list should be provisional in nature, pending review by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. The numbers of armaments in the tentative list prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff bear only a general relation to a reduction in manpower from 2.8 million to 2.5 million. In order to provide a list indicative of a general order of magnitude, the reduction of approximately 300,000 men from the Services was apportioned in direct relation to each Service's present strength. This theoretical apportionment of the overall personnel reduction and the resultant list should be recognized as being only a rough approximation and must not be constructed as a final solution to the problem. Any list of armaments actually to be placed in storage would, of necessity, be based upon the actual force structure existing at that time and would have to reflect appropriate consideration of specific agreements reached and of the list provided by the USSR. In addition, a meaningful list of armaments to be stored can be reasonably determined only when the timing of such action can be predicted with considerable certainty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in finalizing such a list, would retain those armaments required to insure the maximum offensive and defensive capabilities of those forces allowed under the terms of any agreement reached, and would expect the USSR to do the same.

5. For the foregoing reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly urge that the provisional list of armaments provided herewith not be forwarded to Mr. Stassen until such time as determined propitious by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe Mr. Stassen's query, concerning the dosing of U.S. bases in the European area, refers to a proposal to close four fighter bases in England. This action has been held in abeyance at the request of SACEUR, pending completion of his dispersal requirements. If action of this kind is planned later, Mr. Stassen could be advised by the Secretary of Defense.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing form the basis of your reply to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Arthur Radford**<sup>10</sup>  
*Chairman*

---

<sup>10</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 1, 1957—1:26 p.m.

4. Eyes Only for Stassen from Secretary. We are sending you paraphrase of memorandum of conference of June 24, 1957, with the President of Strauss, Lawrence, Mills, and Teller.<sup>2</sup> You should know that this conversation made deep impression on President and that since then he has had serious mental reservations as to the correctness of our proposal to suspend testing.

You should also know that at the meeting which we had with the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee,<sup>3</sup> Cole and Durham being also present, there was considerable skepticism both as to the wisdom of suspending testing and as to the practicability of having an inspection system which could not be evaded by the Russians.

I think you should know this as background to your thinking and because it emphasizes that this is an area where I do not think that any concessions can be made or the impression given that the kind of inspection required is simple and can be necessarily remote.

The scientists mentioned have been talking along the same lines to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and to some other Senators on the Subcommittee.

The situation is developing here in a way which suggests that it may be desirable for me to make a full scale half-hour talk outlining and explaining our basic position on disarmament. I would like your views about this both as to the doing it at all and if so the date which would fit in with your operations.

Then Lyndon Johnson has not yet been willing to name any Democratic Senators to specialize on disarmament and perhaps go to London. He has indicated he would do so only if we formally told him that such a trip to London was called for.<sup>4</sup> This we are reluctant to do because in fact the matter can be followed and studied very much from

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Document 248.

<sup>3</sup> Dulles briefed the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 27. For text, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, vol. IX, pp. 701-730.

<sup>4</sup> In identical letters to Senators Knowland and Johnson, June 21, Dulles suggested "the desirability of obtaining closer Senatorial participation," and he added: "While it is my judgment that it would be premature at this time for Senators to join the Delegation at London, I hope that it will be possible for some of the designated Senators to participate in these talks if that becomes desirable." (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-2157) Memoranda of telephone conversations from Knowland to Dulles, June 24 at 5:03 p.m., and from Dulles to Mansfield, June 25 at 8:55 a.m., conveyed Johnson's

here just as the President and I are doing it, and the trip to London is more for atmosphere and background than for substance of policy. However any views you have on this point will be welcome.

Dulles

---

reaction on the matter. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

---

**254. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 2, 1957—noon.*

36. Eyes only for the Secretary from Stassen. Please deliver to the Secretary personally 9 a.m., July 2nd.

1. Acknowledging your Deptel 04 of July 1st.<sup>2</sup> Will look forward to receiving memorandum of conference, and in the meantime on a basis of surmise from the public statements which I have seen, I send this immediate comment for your consideration and, if you so decide, for the information of the President and others.

2. It would appear that perhaps some parts of the inseparable facts have not been explained in full to the President and to the Senators.

3. It has always been contemplated in our US studies and recommendations that nuclear research would go on and that the testing of nuclear reactions which would have a non-military and peaceful use, . . . would go on under international agreement and observation.

4. . . .

5. For example, the Anglo-French plan of March 19, 1956<sup>3</sup> which was presented after extensive US work in reorienting Anglo-French thinking to the facts of modern developments has under the third stage of disarmament, paragraph 1, the following. Para "prohibition, under control, of nuclear test explosions for military uses; nuclear explosions directed towards the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses may take place under controls, subject to the approval of an international scientific committee. Simultaneously, prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0012/7-257. Top Secret; Niact.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 595-598.

6. The US delegation could not under the then US policy join in the Anglo-French document because of a number of sections which were not in line with US policy. But the US Del since I have been its chairman has never made any contrary comment to the sense above quoted paragraph.

7. On the other hand, from a standpoint of arresting world public opinion and turning it toward US leadership, it is important that the temporary suspension for 10<sup>4</sup> months which I have now advanced within the authority of paragraph 8 of the June 11th paper reflecting the May 25 decisions should be at this moment in the negotiations a focal point for attention without introducing confusing or retracting psychology. As you are aware, I have always opposed within the US Government establishing this first suspension on any long period such as two years. It has always been my view that the US needs complete bargaining power during the first year to shape the second step in keeping with our own national security and in the light of the most up-to-date scientific, military and political information then available. This complete power of US decision as to where to go beyond the first year, even after a treaty is ratified, I have always maintained in the negotiations.

8. You and the President should also know if you are not now aware of it that there is also US research going on and testing regarding methods to make bombs more poisonous, more radioactive, more dirty, as well as to make them clean. This research in greater radioactivity, in my view, should stop if a first step agreement is reached. Furthermore, to the best of my information, the Department of Defense has been resisting the refabrication of dirty bombs now in the locker which could be made more clean under research proved out more than a year ago.

9. In all Western governments who have recently begun to consider this matter in seriousness, there is now a growing appreciation of the value of safeguards against surprise attack, against incidents getting out of hand, and against the wide spreading of nuclear weapons into multiple and less responsible hands. See Paris Polto 25 on NATO council session.<sup>5</sup> These values must always be kept in the equation of decision on a first step, as you have often and ably pointed out personally.

10. It would be my further view that a 30 minute presentation by you to the American people would be very desirable. It would carry great weight. It would clarify much of the confused thinking. It would show that the US is seeking an agreement which will serve our sound

---

<sup>4</sup> The number "1.6" has been deleted and the number "10" has been handwritten on the source text.

<sup>5</sup> Dated June 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-2957)

national interest, and is doing so on the only basis that is ever feasible in this type of international negotiation, and that is to find the ground where our national interest coincides with the national interest of other nations involved. Such a presentation by you would be helpful within the next few days at your discretion.

11. When I receive the memorandum of the conference I will comment further,<sup>6</sup> but trust you do not mind this immediate and preliminary response.

12. In response to your inquiry regarding the Senators, I believe the value of their spending a few days here at an early date is that they would give their own concentrated attention to this subject, and it is so complex that it requires concentrated, sequential study to thoroughly understand the US national interest. It would also reveal to them that we are not soft in firm persistent negotiations with the Soviet Union and the other Western States. They could then follow the Washington end of the cables and consult in the future decisions in Washington more intelligently and with a greater sense of participation.

**Whitney**

---

<sup>6</sup> No further comment by Stassen on the memorandum of the scientists' conference with the President has been found in Department of State files.

---

**255. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 8, 1957—8 p.m.*

213. USDel Disarmament No. 389. Subject: 132nd Meeting Subcommittee, 3:30 p.m., July 8, 1957. Zorin made hour and ten minute statement of Soviet position principally reaffirming Soviet recent positions, with no new concrete positions, no moves backward, and a general statement that Soviet Union firmly convinced that today a real possibility of first step agreement could be seen and Soviet Delegation was prepared to cooperate in a new formulation on renunciation of use linked with a cessation of production.

Zorin noted Soviet concession to West requirement for controls on test suspension but while subcommittee could be on threshold of agreement West continued to bar progress by linking test suspension

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-857. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, Paris for Embassy and USRO, Moscow, and Tokyo, and pouched to Ottawa.

to other elements of partial agreement, particularly cessation of production with its necessarily complicated inspection system. Criticized US position for (1) attempting to legalize nuclear weapons through use formula; (2) reserving right to refabricate old weapons stocks; (3) providing for stationing of atomic weapons in other states and (4) including right to train other nationals in weapons use.

Zorin criticized Four Power test paper<sup>2</sup> for vagueness and failure to state length of proposed test suspension. Asked for a test suspension for a definite period of time. Queried if US prepared to increase suspension period beyond ten months. Said he noted other Western states had not yet commented on any specific period of time.

Zorin throughout indulged in mild propaganda; US nuclear scientists engaged solely in production and development of nuclear weapons; spurious effort of US scientists to justify on humanitarian grounds desire to continue tests for four to five more years in search for so-called clean bomb.

Element of flexibility in Zorin's speech in comments to effect that (1) Soviet viewed favorably West acceptance of Soviet test suspension proposal, although tied to impossible conditions, and (2) Soviet willing to continue seek formula for weapons use, but it must "include a serious obstacle" to atomic war.

Western four individually with brief comments reserved judgment and five agreed not to meet until Wednesday<sup>3</sup> to allow time for study of Soviet statement.

**Whitney**

---

<sup>2</sup> The Western powers' statement on nuclear test suspension introduced in the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on July 2 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/59) is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 802-803.

<sup>3</sup> July 10.

---

**256. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 9/10, 1957—midnight.*

246. USDel disarmament No. 393. Subject: US-USSR Bilateral, July 9, 1957, Lancaster House. Highlights:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-1057. Secret. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO, Bonn, and Moscow.

1. Stassen and USDel met with Zorin and advisors at Lancaster House from 5 p.m. until 7 p.m. today, primarily to discuss Soviet statement of July 8 in subcommittee<sup>2</sup> in response to Zorin request and with agreement of Western Four.

2. Zorin expressed surprise at Western dels reaction to statement because everything in statement was already in memo of June 7.<sup>3</sup> Just as Stassen was placing in record positions which had been explained to SovDel on May 31, Soviet Union was placing in record positions contained in memo of June 7. In some respects, July 8 statement represented advance from June 7 position.

3. Zorin had impression that positions set forth in Four Power joint statement July 2<sup>4</sup> aggravated situation in comparison to May 31 memo, leading him to believe that US had not succeeded in negotiations with other Western dels in securing approval of positive positions taken on May 31.

4. Stassen pointed out that in the July 8 statement Zorin had cast reflections on motivations of US. Zorin did not answer this point.

5. In response to Stassen question as to places where July 8 statement represented progress from June 7 position, Zorin made two points: (a) July 8 statement raised possibility of agreement on inspection provisions relating to tests before suspension of tests, thus making possible longer period than ten months for suspension (b) Zorin called attention to careful wording of his suggestions that at this juncture the powers should at least undertake to exert every effort to secure agreement on complete prohibition of atomic weapons, etc. (see verbatim July 8, page 11.<sup>5</sup>) This created basis for future negotiations.

6. Zorin believed that Four Powers statement represented step backwards from May 31 positions for two reasons: (a) In joint statement suspension of tests is now connected not only with cessation of production but also with reduction of armaments (b) Committee of Experts to study techniques of controls would delay progress.

7. Zorin stated that Soviets June 7 represented change in Soviet position in response to May 31 memo from US. No further advances could be expected until US response to Soviet June 7 memo.

8. Stassen stated US did not look on Four Power statement as step backward but rather as generalized statement of May 31 positions. Likewise, scientific experts would in fact accelerate agreement. Stassen asked whether Soviet Union would take positive attitude toward meeting of technicians if prior agreement could be reached on length of suspension.

---

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 231.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> The verbatim record of the 132d meeting of the subcommittee, July 8, is not printed. (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.132)



9. Zorin suggested possibility that other Western dels in subcommittee were lagging behind US and USSR, and suggested possibility of further bilateral meetings between Soviets and other Western dels. Stassen stated US had no objections. He suggested best way to insure positive attitudes from other Western dels would be for Soviet to give positive reactions on positions advanced by US. Failure of Soviet Union to give such positive responses leads other Western dels to question whether Soviet Union might not raise further objections if Western dels agreed to US suggestions. During discussion of important specific issues, Stassen suggested that Soviet Union formulate new wording in connection with use of nuclear weapons. Stassen further asked whether US position on cutoff of production fissionable materials would meet with agreement.

10. In response to question from Zorin, Stassen expressed view that prospects for agreement were good if each of five governments were intelligent in its conclusions about its national interests. US proposals were sound. Zorin at end of meeting suggested that question of tests should be decided without connection with other questions but that parallel agreements could be made on other questions.

Memorandum of conversation being pouched.<sup>6</sup>

Whitney

---

<sup>6</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

---

**257. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Moscow, July 12, 1957—5 p.m.*

84. The only subject of interest that developed during my call on Gromyko today was disarmament. He said the discussions in London were going much too slowly and that although Soviet proposals had been put forward on June 7 the U.S. Delegation had responded to them only in part and had not dealt with them fundamentally. When I stated I had not yet had an opportunity to study the papers in detail but had the impression that the problem of inspection and control still appeared to be one of the major obstacles he observed that the Soviet Delegation had accepted one of our suggestions, namely aerial inspec-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-1257. Confidential. Repeated to London.

tion, but the American Delegation seemed to have lost interest in this plan. He referred specifically to the Soviet proposal concerning aerial inspection in Europe and part of Siberia and the U.S., to which I replied that I understood that we did not consider this proposal was a balanced one that was fair to both sides, and I assured him that the U.S. continued to be extremely interested in the subject of aerial inspection. In concluding the discussion of this subject I expressed the view that it seemed important to make a first step. Gromyko replied that we must always keep hope but he would not be frank if he did not say that the work of the sub-committee seemed to have slowed down and was not progressing satisfactorily. Although I opened up the subject of the new developments in the Soviet Government<sup>2</sup> Gromyko did not respond and as this was a formal call I did not press him.

Thompson<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the Soviet announcements of major changes in leadership positions in the Soviet Government beginning on July 3, see vol. xxiv, p. 142.

<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson presented his credentials on July 16.

---

**258. Memorandum for the File, by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 15, 1957.*

MEETING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

PRESENT

Dulles, Murphy, Bowie, Farley, and Smith  
Cutler, Lay  
Wilson, Radford, and Loper  
Strauss, Starbird

*The Military Point of View*

1. It is important now to develop the technique of making a very large clean bomb by a test which will involve no greater an explosion than we have heretofore used in tests. Later the decision can be made how many . . . bombs to stockpile.

2. The military need for a . . . bomb relates to:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, Chronological. Top Secret.

- (a) hard targets in border areas between friendly and hostile territory;
- (b) the greatly increased projected cost of carrying vehicles;
- (c) the weight limits of . . . pounds will probably be diminished in these new very expensive carrying vehicles;
- (d) concern over retaining U.S. deterrent capability under a limited defense budget and with diminished military personnel in view of USSR technical understanding of the nuclear art.

#### *The AEC Point of View*

1. To develop a stockpile of . . . bombs would probably set back the current program to develop small clean bombs by one year.
2. To test the feasibility of a . . . bomb, it is necessary to use an explosion something in the range of . . . , no larger than we have already tested.
3. The making of just one such test to ascertain and establish the principle and technique would not postpone the . . . bomb program; it would be the subsequent stockpiling that would effect such postponement.

#### *State Point of View*

1. Why is it important to make such a test in 1958 when no decision has yet been made whether or not to stockpile . . . bombs?
2. Development for stockpiling of . . . bombs would postpone the . . . bomb program (which is a desirable program to go forward with despite the Chiefs' willingness to risk its postponement).
3. Publicity as to a . . . bomb program would reverse the world's understanding gained from the President's statements with either very unfortunate repercussions to his prestige and people's belief that he knows what he is saying. Such publicity could hardly be avoided. Questions might be put to the President which he would be compelled to answer.

There is no real difference between deterrence and effectiveness (see page two of the July 3 draft).<sup>2</sup> The criterion is the judgment of the Russians as to what we have as an effective weapon which is the true deterrent.

At the conclusion in response to the Secretary of State's question whether the urgency to test the very large clean bomb technique was so great as to do it at this time, Strauss pointed out that such a test could be made in the 1958 series using a number of . . . less than that before used and trying to keep away from using . . . terms. Such a test, Strauss said, would establish the principle and technique but the test vehicle might not stay within the . . . pound carrying vehicle

---

<sup>2</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

limitation. The single test would not cut down or postpone the . . . bomb program. It would be necessary to use a configuration as big as . . . in order to establish the principle.

Quarles suggested that the important decision now to make was to include one test for next year, well within the prior limits of explosiveness, to establish the principle and technique of making a large clean bomb.

The Secretary of State requested the Chairman, AEC, to draft a paper which would set forth what might be done by the AEC in making such a test in 1958 that would not interfere with other important programs or compromise the position already taken by the President.<sup>3</sup>

Robert Cutler<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Strauss' paper on this subject has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, but the recommendations therein were incorporated in a draft prepared by the Department of Defense, which served as a first draft for the Report to the President. See Document 263.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Bonn, July 18, 1957—7 p.m.*

203. I had long talks this morning, first with Blankenhorn, later with Chancellor. Chancellor is quite exercised over what he regards as an unnecessary and unskillful approach suggested in NAC document 2 (United States Disarmament No. 409<sup>2</sup> of which we have no copy Bonn) now before NAC for consideration. His views fully stated in following aide-mémoire given me today.

*Begin verbatim text.*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-1857. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO and London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 417 (USDel Disarmament 409) from London, July 16, enumerated the approved Western four-power proposals on inspection zones and missiles being sent to NATO. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/7-1657)

I.

The German Federal Government has no apprehensions in respect of the principle of an aerial inspection in Europe as part of a first phase of disarmament. Nevertheless, the Federal Government is of the opinion that such an inspection cannot achieve its objective, namely, to offer security against surprise attacks, unless a broad belt of Soviet territory is covered by it. If an inspection zone between the 5th degree western longitude and the 60th degree eastern longitude should not be obtainable, the space contained between the 5th degree eastern longitude and the 35th degree eastern longitude should be the absolute minimum. This ought to be the extreme offer which might be conceded by the West for a European Zone.

For some weeks now there has been talk of linking up measures of aerial inspection with a ground control. This combination has first been submitted as a request to the NATO Council by the standing group.<sup>3</sup> This combination can also be found in the proposals of the Four Western delegations submitted to the NATO Council for consideration on 16 July and to which the member countries of NATO were to have defined their attitude by 22 July. This plan contemplates fixed control posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways and important airfields, as well as ground teams "having an adequate and agreed degree of mobility". It is added that those mobile control teams "will be established by agreement anywhere in the territories of the states concerned, and without regard to limits of zones of aerial inspection".

The Federal Government has the following apprehensions in respect of the institution, within the framework of a "first step", of mobile ground controls of the kind proposed:

1) Such a system is extremely complicated. Preparations for its implementation will require a great deal of time, probably years.

2) It is most improbable that the Soviets will be prepared to recognize such a mobile ground inspection for the entire area of the aerial inspection zone. Will they not avail themselves of the possibility, suggested in the plan, to request a zone of mobile ground control which is substantially smaller than the aerial inspection zone and which would be confined approximately to the German Federal Republic, the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia? We very much fear that the Soviets will do so. This would involve the danger that the territories named and in particular also the German Federal Republic would be subjected to a statute which would

---

<sup>3</sup> The Standing Group, the executive agency of NATO consisting of representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, submitted a memorandum to the Secretary General of NATO, July 10, which is quoted in full in Polto 105 from Paris, July 11. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/7-1157)

come very close to neutralization. It would, on the other hand, be very welcome to the Soviets if in this way they obtained internationally recognized inspection and control rights also in the countries of the Eastern bloc, especially in Poland.

3) A mobile ground control could scarcely be dissociated from existing frontiers and lines of demarcation (iron curtain). In order to be able to move and to carry out the necessary investigations, the inspection teams will need the permission of the appropriate authorities of the territories concerned. It would probably be very difficult in connection with such a ground control to find legal forms of including the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, which would not amount to a recognition of the regime established there.

## II.

Following the discussions that took place in Washington in May 1957, the German Federal Government has proceeded on the assumption that the conduct of negotiations on the United States side aimed at initially proposing in London a zone of inspection confined to Arctic territories, and that negotiations concerning a European zone of aerial inspection were to follow only in the second place, viz., if the Soviets should oppose the first proposal. The German Federal Government has not been informed of any change in this plan of negotiations.

The policy of the Federal Government has been based on the above assumptions since May of this year. All the public statements made have explicitly or implicitly proceeded from that assumption. We would get into a difficult position if negotiation tactics were now suddenly changed and if as early as the initial stage all the negotiation proposals were submitted simultaneously for the Soviets to choose from.

From the point of view of negotiation tactics it seems to us to be very disadvantageous to put the proposals on the table all at once and thus to renounce the possibility in the course of negotiations to make any concessions that are not yet known beforehand and are therefore depreciated to a certain extent. With this in view it would seem to us to be preferable to proceed step by step, to negotiate on every proposal thoroughly and not to make the proposals that are acceptable only in the last resort until all the other possibilities have been exhausted. This applies particularly to the question of the extension of the European aerial inspection zone to the West and to the East.

*End verbatim text.*

It would in my opinion be mistake to view Chancellor's objections lightly. He feels strongly about them and is fully supported by his advisors. He would press them even more vigorously if he did not

hesitate to provoke what might develop into a public division between himself and United States Government. He may do so anyhow through his NATO representatives.

He wishes London Disarmament Conference could soon be recessed to give time for Western governments to reflect on developments to date and especially future tactics. Thinks good excuse for this would be desirability delegates consulting closely with home governments before preparing UN report. I reminded him of his request to Secretary at Bonn NATO meeting that talks continue during German electoral campaign.<sup>4</sup> He rejoined that there was distinction between his request they not be "broken off" and an uninterrupted continuance.

Bruce

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding the NAC Ministerial Meeting in Bonn, May 2-4, see vol. iv, p. 167.

---

**260. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Bonn, July 18, 1957—7 p.m.*

205. Re Embassy telegram to Department 203.<sup>2</sup> Following are random comments on same subject by Chancellor and Blankenhorn.

*1. Chancellor:*

a. SPD desires the neutralization of Germany, in fact has done so for long time. This would later result in communization of Europe. Some day there will be a relaxation of tensions by Soviets but not now. If SPD wins elections, ruinous conditions will ensue, and Western powers will gravely suffer.

b. Disarmament conference cannot achieve real result until German elections are over, for if Soviets think there is any chance whatsoever of SPD victory, they will not be so foolish as to commit themselves now.

c. The West is exposing its hand, the Soviets are revealing nothing. West is raising peoples' hopes by exaggerated optimism, disappointment will increase neutralization sentiment in Federal Republic. Unfounded optimism is very dangerous.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-1857. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

d. Additional caution should characterize Western conduct disarmament negotiations because of state of political flux in Soviet Union.

e. Democracies handicapped in dealing with dictatorships, since representatives being decent themselves disclose their ultimate intentions and positions too frankly to dictatorships' emissaries who possess no real mandate from home government, and whose duty it is to discover plans of adversary without revealing own.

## 2. *Blankenhorn*:

Chancellor feels he has accomplished much this year, i.e. military service accepted by public, shock and apprehensions about fall-out almost over, and NATO becoming more popular.

Above represents enormous change in public sentiment. But to go too quickly in arousing grandiose hopes may turn German people against constructing adequate defense system.

NATO has been given too little time for consideration of latest U.S. delegation proposal. Could we not concentrate in first phase on air inspection plan plus fixed control system re airfields? NATO should know more about inspection arrangements envisaged by U.S. Large numbers of Soviet inspectors in two Germanies would raise serious problems for Federal Republic.

**Bruce**

---

## 261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 22, 1957—6:06 p.m.*

662. For Stassen from Secretary. While it is true that policy directive does not use the word "coterminous", it speaks of "an aerial and ground inspection system" and "the aerial and ground inspection system".<sup>2</sup> Uniform coupling of aerial and ground inspection in a single

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-2257. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles, this telegram is apparently in response to telegram 593 from London, July 21, which explained "the reasons for the rather generalized language on the relationship of aerial and ground inspection in the four power reports to NATO." (*Ibid.*, 330.13/7-2157)

<sup>2</sup> See paragraph 9 of the June 11 position paper, Document 237.



zone or system makes it we think abundantly clear that US position is that the two must be combined and that one without the other is not adequate.

Defense and CIA feel strongly on this point and State while having no independent position on the merits agrees with their interpretation of the President's June 11 Directive.

If you question this we will of course raise it with the President and put any viewpoint you may wish to have before him but I doubt this would be a necessary or useful exercise.

We of course do not impose our views upon others and para. 10 expressly leaves to the Western European nations the initiative with respect to types of inspection. But I do not think there should be any doubt in minds of our allies and most importantly in mind of Soviet Union that we consider ground and air inspection a related whole and that insofar as relates to reciprocal US and Soviet zones will insist upon it. We have already indicated, Deptel 221,<sup>3</sup> that if Canada will accept only aerial overflight we would be prepared to have them join on this basis, and we would of course consider the views of our other allies if they felt differently about any inspection zone which involved them.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 221 to London, July 9, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/7-957)

---

## 262. Editorial Note

On July 22, Secretary of State Dulles delivered a radio and television address on disarmament. In a letter to President Eisenhower, July 16, enclosing a draft of his proposed speech, Dulles wrote in part: "I have checked with Stassen as to timing and he agrees that this is a good time for such a speech." He continued, "Of course the speech follows closely the official position which you have approved, on the basis of which Stassen is operating." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series) In a note to Dulles, July 17, Eisenhower replied: "I think this is fine and should be given. I have made a few little pencilled suggestions." (*Ibid.*) For text of Dulles' speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 12, 1957, pages 267-272.

## 263. Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles visited Canada July 26-28, then flew from Ottawa to London to participate in disarmament discussions July 29-August 2. Although President Eisenhower and Dulles had often discussed the prospect of Dulles making a trip to London, it was not until after he left for Canada on July 26 that the decision was finally made for the Secretary to continue on to London. The President and the Secretary agreed that the talks had reached the stage where Dulles should report the United States position firsthand and obtain personally the allies' views. As Dulles later explained, it was the "mass of cables coming in about these complicated subjects from so many points" that persuaded Eisenhower to send him to London. "No particular incident," he added, brought Eisenhower "to that conclusion, but merely recognition of the fact that there were so many points to be buttoned up at the same time. It could be done more effectively with me" in London. (Background briefing for the British press, reported in telegram 903 from London, August 2; Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-257)

Dulles apparently wished to ensure there would be no confusion about his role at the disarmament talks, for on July 26, Acting Secretary of State Herter sent the following memorandum to the President: "In the course of his telephone call this morning, the Secretary suggested that it might be useful for him to have some further delegation of authority from you. I, therefore, suggest to you the memorandum for the Secretary of State enclosed." (Undated memorandum; *ibid.*, 700.5611/7-2657) Eisenhower initialed Herter's draft without change. Dulles' instructions thus read:

"In the course of your consultations on the disarmament question during your mission in Europe beginning July 29, 1957, I believe that you should have a reasonable degree of flexibility. Accordingly, you are authorized during this mission to make such modifications or elaborations in the United States position as approved in the document dated June 11 as you deem to be within the spirit of that document and essential to the achievement of a sound and coordinated Western position for presentation in the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee." (Memorandum from Eisenhower to Dulles, July 26; *ibid.*, 330.13/7-2657)

In a telephone call that evening, Herter informed Dulles, who had arrived in Ottawa, that he had just discussed the Secretary's instructions, the press release to be given out in connection with Dulles' trip to London, and a letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan about the trip (*infra*) with the President. Dulles approved all these matters. In addition, "Mr. Herter said that the President had stressed he hoped we could have the utmost flexibility in regard to testing." (Memorandum

of a telephone conversation, July 26, 6 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) Afterwards, Herter sent Dulles the following memorandum:

"This memorandum is a reamplification of my rather cryptic message on the telephone. While reviewing the memorandum of instructions to you with regard to flexibility, the President said that he hoped that we could maintain considerable flexibility with regard to nuclear testing both as to the length of time and the many conditions with which it is coupled since he feels that we are at a continuing propaganda disadvantage in appearing to have too rigid a position." (July 26; *ibid.*, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

Additional documentation on Dulles' visit is in Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU and 330.13.

---

#### 264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 26, 1957—8:34 p.m.

837. Please deliver at earliest moment following message from President to Prime Minister Macmillan. Advise date and time delivery.<sup>2</sup>

"July 26, 1957.

Dear Harold:

In order to renew our contacts with our delegation in London and to make certain that in the highest echelons our thinking along disarmament is well coordinated, I have asked Foster Dulles to come to London at the beginning of the week for a brief visit. As you know, Foster has my complete confidence and I am hopeful that his visit there will prove fruitful in keeping us marching together.<sup>3</sup>

With warm personal regard, As ever Ike E."

Herter

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/7-2657. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling.

<sup>2</sup> According to telegram 763 from London, July 27, the President's message was delivered to Macmillan's office on July 27 at 11:30 a.m. (London time). (*Ibid.*, 110.11-DU/7-2757)

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum for the record, July 27, prepared by Fisher Howe and attached to the source text, Ambassador Whitney telephoned Herter to convey Macmillan's feeling that there should have been some consultation concerning Dulles' impending visit, and he asked that the press release be changed to include mention of consultation with the British Government. Herter argued, however, that it would be highly inadvisable in terms of the purposes of the Secretary's visit to include such a change, and Whitney accepted his argument.

**265. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 29, 1957—9 p.m.*

Dulte 1. Eyes Only Acting Secretary from Secretary. No further distribution. Your Top Secret memorandum of July 26<sup>2</sup> is still cryptic. When I last spoke to the President it was following the presentation by Lawrence and Teller and the President then seemed to question the wisdom of any suspension of testing.<sup>3</sup> Does your July 26 memorandum indicate that we should consider accepting suspension of testing for longer than twelve months and also consider waiving the general "inseparability" concept and particularly the inseparability of testing suspension and "cut-off" of new fissionable material for weapons purposes. Or is it primarily his concern that the form of our presentation should appear to be more flexible without however such changes.

FYI. While I welcome some flexibility I would hesitate to change fundamentals unless the matter had been carefully reviewed with hearing to Strauss and Radford.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-2957. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding this memorandum, see Document 263.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 248.

---

**266. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Acting Secretary of State, White House, Washington, July 30, 1957, 4:10 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

I took up with the President three matters:

1. The Secretary's telegram (Dulte 1)<sup>2</sup> asking for clarification with regard to the cryptic message which I had sent him on July 26 concerning flexibility with respect to the cessation of nuclear testing.

As a result of this conversation, the President dictated a memorandum which has been incorporated in Tedul 5 to London.<sup>3</sup> The

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Nuclear Testing. Top Secret. Drafted by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Tedul 5 to London, July 30, conveyed the message regarding "flexibility" in the attached enclosure. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/7-3057)

original of the President's memorandum is attached herewith. The corrections were made by the President himself and the last sentence was deleted by him after I had indicated that that sentence would in effect negate the instructions previously sent the Secretary with regard to flexibility in his London conversations.

. . . . .

I showed the President Admiral Strauss' comments on this cable and he approved them and asked that they be forwarded to the Secretary.<sup>4</sup> In discussing the matter, however, he commented on the fact that he was somewhat disturbed by the fact that the scientists today in this field seemed to be running the Government rather than acting as servants for the Government.

[Here follows discussion of the third matter on an unrelated subject.]

C.A.H.

[Enclosure]

**Draft Message From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London<sup>5</sup>**

*Washington, July 30, 1957.*

"At conference with the President he agrees generally with the statement quoted below from Admiral Strauss.

(quote statement)<sup>6</sup>

"With respect to the flexibility mentioned in my former message<sup>7</sup> the President by no means meant to convey the thought that we should abandon the "inseparability concept" as between testing suspension and "cut-off" of new fissionable material for weapons pur-

---

<sup>4</sup> Strauss' comments to Dulles were transmitted in Tedul 6 to London, July 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 741.5611/7-3057)

<sup>5</sup> Top Secret.

<sup>6</sup> Included in the subenclosure, not printed.

<sup>7</sup> A handwritten note on the margin of the source text reads: "Herter Memorandum for the Secretary of July 26."

poses. He was more concerned that we had publicly fixed ten months as the limitation of a suspension period presumably<sup>8</sup> not susceptible in any way to negotiations.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> The words "suspension" and "presumably" have been handwritten on the source text.

<sup>9</sup> The above two sentences were transmitted in Tedul 5 to London, July 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/7–3057) An additional sentence deleted from the source text reads: "Our fundamental concepts as now understood will continue to guide our general conduct in negotiations unless and until some revision has been approved by all interested agencies of government."

---

**267. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 30/31, 1957—midnight.*

Dulte 4. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President:

I have had a busy twenty-four hours here in London. Selwyn Lloyd, contrary to my request, met me at the airport, and then after a dinner I had with Stassen and others Lloyd came to the Embassy and we talked for upwards of an hour. He expressed himself as very unhappy about the state of the disarmament negotiations. He said he had great difficulty getting the Cabinet to go along so far. They feel that there is little likelihood of an ultimate Russian agreement but that we may be giving away a great deal from a public relations and political standpoint.

We have spent most of today in meeting with the British, French and Canadians. I find there are very sharp differences of opinion with respect to zones of inspection, methods of inspection, whether "inventories" should be limited to areas subject to inspection and verification and whether there can be a peacetime transfer of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. The zone of inspection issue is the most difficult involving as it does tremendous public relations problems. I was surprised to find that Lloyd, although he spoke last night so strongly about incurring losses in the name of disarmament, was in fact unwilling to stand firm on matters where he agreed we ought to stand firm. I pointed out that if already we were doing unsound things because of

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7–3057. Secret; Eyes Only. A covering note from Howe to Goodpaster, July 31, forwarding a copy of this telegram to the President is initialed "DE" in the President's handwriting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

public pressure we will go on and on to do more unsound things until finally we will have sacrificed much and in the end found that there was not really a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.

The Four Western Power meeting broke up without any agreement. I have been working tonight on possible new formulations and we shall have another go at it tomorrow. In order to avoid a public embarrassment we are having a Five Power luncheon, i.e. with the Russians tomorrow.

And now at midnight I go to bed hoping that sleep will bring counsel.

Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

---

**268. Telegram From the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 30/31, 1957—midnight.*

Secto 7. USDel Disarmament No. 458. Subject: Four-Power meeting, July 30, 1957, 3:00 p.m.

*Highlights:*

1. The Secretary led US Delegation in Four Power meeting at Foreign Office today. Principal matters discussed were aerial and ground inspection zones, formula on non-use nuclear weapons and inventories of military installations and armed force.

*Details:*

2. Discussions of inspection zones centered around paper drafted by USDel based upon previous UK and French papers on tactics for presenting Western proposals on zones to subcommittee. Paper follows by pouch.<sup>2</sup>

3. Moch objected to principle of linking ground and aerial inspection in same paper, preferred speak only of aerial and prepare subsequent paper on ground inspection. Moch felt this would lead to neutralized zone in Europe. The Secretary explained that aerial and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-3057. Secret. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO, Bonn, Moscow, and Tokyo, and pouched to Ottawa.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

ground inspection would of course be coterminous for inspection in entire territories of US, Canada and European Allies together with all of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In case of more limited zone, US paper emphasized ground inspection only in proposals involving the US. The Secretary further explained this based on US position that aerial inspection without mobile ground inspection was inadequate.

4. Selwyn Lloyd suggested that unless aerial inspection zone proposed for Europe public might view Western proposals as retreat because of Soviet acceptance of principle of aerial inspection in Europe.

5. The Secretary related that proposals went much further than previously since all of Europe was being proposed for inspection. Furthermore US had accepted principle of ground inspection as well as aerial inspection which represented evolution since original Open Skies proposal.

6. Moch expressed belief Western Four must define what they meant by ground inspection since French had contemplated fixed control posts rather than mobile inspection teams. The Secretary agreed this was heart of matter and referred to paragraph in US paper under discussion which proposed that working group of experts be set up to examine technical problems. Secretary recalled that Selwyn Lloyd had proposed this previously and pointed out that since character of inspection might have serious political implications it would not be profitable to go into area of inspection zones in Europe until nature of ground inspection could be further defined.

7. The Secretary emphasized that almost every conceivable political problem existed in Europe and that agreement in principle to a European inspection zone might reap a harvest of liabilities. Soviet strategy might well be that of proposing that West yield on a series of political problems before Soviet would agree to establish aerial and ground inspection systems. USSR could thereby use good hopes of Western democracies as lever to gain political ends. The Secretary stated his judgement was USSR would be unwilling to accept the kind of inspection which the West would require.

8. Regarding tactics on presenting Western proposals on aerial and ground inspection to the subcommittee, the Secretary stated that he felt the Western Four should first propose a large area of inspection involving all of Europe, all of the Soviet Union and the US and Canada. If the Soviet Union was not willing to accept this proposal, the West should offer the USSR the alternative of an aerial inspection zone in an area free of political problems. Such an area would be the Arctic, although from the point of view of gaining experience in techniques and providing a trial period of cooperation with the Soviet Union any other area similarly devoid of political difficulties would be acceptable; the US was not seeking a special preference for itself in this matter.



9. Selwyn Lloyd reiterated opinion that the Western Four should propose inspection zone in Europe extending from Atlantic to Urals. He felt public opinion would understand this proposal. There also should be reference to acceptance of the Bulganin fixed control posts for the purpose of warning against surprise attack. At suggestion of Secretary, UK drafted proposal along lines of sixth report to NATO (July 16).<sup>3</sup> Paper follows by pouch.<sup>4</sup> Reference made, as in US paper, to a more limited zone of aerial inspection in Europe which would extend over a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union. Preliminary discussions were held on this paper but completion of discussions was put over to meeting to be held on July 31.

10. Draft Four Power proposals briefly examined with special attention to unresolved questions concerning a formula on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Selwyn Lloyd expressed reservations on US proposal, fearing that this would weaken the deterrent. Moch likewise expressed reservations but said he could accept "double negative" proposal prepared by French Delegation. Secretary stated he would recommend dropping the entire topic from Western proposal since Soviets apparently had already rejected it anyway. Moch and Lloyd agreed to do this although stating they could re-affirm the classical Western formula on non-use of nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression.

11. The Secretary stated that US not willing to provide inventories of its military establishment until it had right to verify accuracy of Soviet inventories. US therefore could not accept proposals for exchange of military inventories of entire territories of US and USSR unless entire territories of both under inspection. He believed concept of verification of inventory within zone should be retained and put into a context which would not involve reductions in armaments and armed forces. Selwyn Lloyd expressed the opinion that there was great force in this explanation.

12. The Western Four agreed in a brief discussion of the report due to the Disarmament Commission on August 1 that they should stand firm on a sentence in the report to read: "The subcommittee is continuing its work and will submit a further report".

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Western powers' proposals on inspection zones and missiles transmitted to NATO by the United Kingdom and summarized in telegram 417 from London, July 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-1657)

<sup>4</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

13. It was agreed that the US would seek a postponement of the subcommittee meeting of July 31 and instead US would act as host for luncheon of five principals of subcommittee. It was also agreed that the Four Powers would meet again at 11:00 am, Wednesday, July 31. The meeting ended at 7:30 pm.

Dulles

---

**269. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany<sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 31, 1957—5 p.m.*

104. Eyes only O'Shaughnessy. Please have following message from Secretary delivered urgently to Chancellor:

"My Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I came over to participate in the disarmament talks at this stage. I remember well the degree of trust in US that you expressed in relation to this matter, and wanted personally to be sure that nothing might occur here which could be embarrassing to you.

You will have received by now the text of the paper on which the Western Four (Canada ad referendum) found agreement today with respect to safeguards against surprise attack.<sup>2</sup>

There would be three possible zones.

One would be the large area which would include in effect all of Europe, all of the Soviet Union and all of North America.

The Soviet Union has made it abundantly clear that they would not now accept any system of inspection which would cover all of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless we feel it important from a public relations standpoint to make it evident that so far as the West is concerned we have nothing to hide, and will be willing to subject everything to scrutiny if only the Soviets will do the same.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-3157. Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department of State as Dulte 6 which is the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Text of the Western powers' paper transmitted to Bonn as telegram 103 was repeated to the Department of State as Secto 9 from London, July 31. (*Ibid.*) This text, which was submitted with only a few changes as a Western working paper to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/62/Rev. 1), is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 837-839.

On the assumption that the Soviets will reject the broad combined areas of Europe, North America and Siberia, we proposed two alternatives, one of which is precise, i.e., the northern area comprehending the area north of the Arctic circle plus Alaska, Eastern Siberia, etc. We also suggest a possibility of a smaller European zone but we are not now precise in this matter beyond stipulating that it must cover significant portions of the Soviet Union and the satellites. This is in line with the NATO "fall-back" position.<sup>3</sup>

We do not believe that the Soviet Union in connection with a partial European zone will accept inspection of a significant part of the Soviet Union.

One of the problems has been to express our views about the nature of inspection.

It is the considered and firm view of our military people that an aerial inspection of the Soviet areas is not worth much unless there is a possibility of investigating in situ suspiciously dangerous circumstances as revealed from the air. Therefore, so far as we are concerned, we must insist upon a measure of mobility covering the Soviet areas which are subjected to inspection in reciprocity to US areas subjected to inspection. We feel that there is great danger that the American people will regard any form of aerial inspection as providing insurance against surprise attack and that our defense efforts and appropriations might lag in reliance on a kind of inspection which would not be dependable unless there was a ground complement with a measure of mobility.

On the other hand we agree that uncontrolled mobility granted anywhere to Soviet inspection teams could become a danger. Therefore in this draft we provide for mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority. No one will have authority to roam about at will. We further provide that the degree of mobility would require in all cases concurrence of the countries directly concerned.

I would point out that the suggestion of a European zone is dependent upon Soviet commitment either to an all-Soviet inspection or an Arctic circle inspection and that this in turn is dependent upon agreement on the details of the installation, maintenance and operation of the system of inspection. Therefore there is in effect a built-in deferral of the European zone. While I hope that the Soviets will accept a system of inspection acceptable to us, I have great doubts and I am confident that they will be even more sensitive than you are to mobility. Therefore their attitude on this subject will presumably have to be developed before you are faced by the problem.

---

<sup>3</sup> Text of the NAC position on inspection zones is contained in Polto 233 from Paris, July 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-2457)

In the second place I would point out that any mobility within the Federal Republic is made subject to your agreement, and you can be confident that you would not in this respect be isolated but that the US would fully support your reasonable views on this matter.

I have in all these respects had very much in mind our Washington talks.<sup>4</sup> I believe that your position is protected and I hope you can agree with the paper which we hope to put to the Russians tomorrow afternoon.

Faithfully yours, Foster Dulles''

Dulles

---

<sup>4</sup> Regarding Adenauer's visit to the United States, May 24–29, see Document 204.

---

**270. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 31, 1957—9 p.m.*

Dulte 7. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President:

We have had on the whole a pretty good day. The formulation I worked out last night about inspection zones was accepted by the British and the French and the Canadian Ambassador ad referendum.<sup>2</sup> We have sent a copy of it to Adenauer with a personal message from me which you may get through the Department.<sup>3</sup> We are hoping we will be in shape to move ahead at least by Friday.<sup>4</sup>

The French with British support have raised some objections to certain other features of our program about "traffic in arms", "military movements—across boundary lines and in international waters" etc. These are not essentials and I think we can probably give in on them as I believe the objections are from the British-French viewpoint quite valid.

I gave a luncheon today for the other four delegations and had a most interesting talk with Zorin. I shall try tomorrow to prepare a memorandum of the conversation which is I think of sufficient interest

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7–3157. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the paper cited in footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> August 2.

to bring to your attention.<sup>5</sup> At the moment I merely say he asked pointblank and categorically whether we would separate suspension of testing from the other provisions. I gave him a categorical "no". I elaborated by saying that the only justification for suspending testing was that the likelihood of war was diminished. If we cannot diminish the likelihood of war then it is better to go on testing so that the weapons will be more adaptable to purely military purposes and less weapons of vast massive destruction. Zorin made no comment but was obviously under instructions to put this question and get the answer.

Jock and I are leaving now for a private dinner with Macmillan and Lloyd.

Unless there are unexpected obstacles I think I should get away from here by Friday.

Faithfully yours, Foster.

Whitney<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> No memorandum of this conversation has been found in Department of State files, but see *infra*.

<sup>6</sup> Dulte is a series indicator for personal telegrams from Secretary Dulles and usually bear his signature.

---

**271. Telegram From the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, August 1, 1957—11 a.m.*

Secto 15. USDel Disarmament No. 463. Secretary-Zorin talk July 31, 1957, 1:15 p.m. At Luncheon today for Secretary and subcomite principals at Ambassador Whitney's residence, Secretary had informal conversation with Sov Rep Zorin.

1. Zorin indicated interest as to US proposal on zones and its timing.

2. Secretary broadly outlined zones as indicated in Dep Secto nine<sup>2</sup> and stated US proposal would be presented in subcomite in day or two.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-157. Secret. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO, Bonn, and Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 31, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/7-3157)

3. Zorin expressed concern about rebirth of militarily strong Germany and desire of Soviet Union for East-West collective security system in Europe, such as Eden plan for thinned out zone. Stated Adenauer's policy might involve the US in conflict with Soviet Union.

4. Secretary stated all Soviet proposals to this effect presented so far perpetuated partition of Germany and unacceptable. Suggested Soviet Union study thoroughly Western proposals at 1955 Foreign Ministers conference in Geneva,<sup>3</sup> especially in view of Molotov's dismissal.<sup>4</sup> Expressed doubt Khrushchev and Bulganin had been thoroughly informed by Molotov in 1955 as to exact Western position. Stated source of danger not Adenauer's personality but rather perpetuation of partition of such important country as Germany. Expressed firm belief Adenauer is man of peace and opposed to violence.

5. To Zorin's remark that reunification was problem to be settled between two Germanys, Secretary pointed out responsibility of Four Powers for reunification had been stated in Potsdam and reaffirmed at summit meeting in Geneva.

6. Zorin replied conditions had changed since then and Adenauer and Grotewohl<sup>5</sup> were realities that had to be taken into account.

7. Zorin probed separability of suspension of tests and cessation of manufacture in US position. Queried whether US willing accept unconditional suspension of tests and reiterated previous Soviet positions on test suspension and cessation of manufacture.

8. Secretary said US position unchanged since suspension of tests alone would not reduce danger of war and prevent spreading of nuclear weapons into irresponsible hands. Stated if tests were suspended without cessation of manufacture weapons could not be improved and this would be detrimental to our deterrent.

9. Zorin inquired whether Secretary's coming to London was indication that subcomite was to be raised to Foreign Ministers level.

10. Secretary denied but said Foreign Ministers meeting possible in future if results in subcomite warranted. Said main purpose for coming was to consult with USDel.

11. Secretary emphasized importance of control to prevent surprise attack and unlikelihood of formula being devised for reduction and balance of armed forces.

12. Zorin agreed control important yet collateral problem. Most important was to bring about conventional reductions and "take measures against nuclear weapons."

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, October 27–November 16, 1955, see vol. V, pp. 632 ff.

<sup>4</sup> The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party dismissed Molotov from the Party's Presidium and Central Committee on July 3 as part of a general shake-up of the Soviet leadership.

<sup>5</sup> Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic.

13. Secretary reiterated his position and supported it with historical examples.

14. Zorin stated subcomite working under UNGA resolution and instructed to develop system of reductions rather than of supervision.

Detailed memorandum of conversation follows by pouch.<sup>6</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>6</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

---

**272. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Bonn, August 1, 1957—3 p.m.*

54. London Eyes Only for the Secretary. Washington Eyes Only for Herter. Paris Eyes Only for Perkins. London's 104 July 31, repeated information Department Dulte 6.<sup>2</sup> Following is text of Chancellor's reply to Secretary's letter transmitted in reference telegram:

"My Dear Mr. Dulles:

"I thank you for your letter in which you explained motives for formulation of new Western proposal at London disarmament conference, which was given me yesterday evening between ten and eleven o'clock. I have no objection to basic features of proposal; on contrary, I hope they will lead to positive result in negotiations.

"I understand text of memorandum to mean that in no case will European inspection zone be proposed unless Soviets simultaneously agree to Arctic inspection zone or to even larger one covering both US and USSR.

"As far as extension of European inspection zone is concerned, I agree with you that also here, a zone should be proposed preferably including all Europe. Moreover, I also agree with view expressed in your letter that it should not at first be stipulated in memorandum which smaller European zone could be used in negotiations as ultimate fallback position. There was unanimity in NATO Council that extreme minimum should be zone between the 5th and 35th degrees east longitude. Before precise details are presented on this in London negotiations, NAC should again take up this question. I strongly fear

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-157. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Paris and to the Department of State, which is the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Document 269.

that European inspection zone which does not cover all Europe as, for example, zone between the 5th and 35th degrees of east longitude or even narrower zone, could lead to dangerous domestic political reactions in Germany. Fear could arise that such narrow inspection zone could lead to military thinning out and to jeopardizing previous NATO forward strategy.

"Opposition in Germany, which at moment is advocating disarmament, inspection, and military thinning-out, with reference to alleged questionable value of NATO defense, would then most likely reverse its position and accuse Federal Government, NATO, and Western powers of having given up previous strategic defense concept and made Germany into battlefield of future wars. It would then maintain this development was confirmation of their earlier arguments.

"I believe, therefore, question of extending zone should once more be reviewed carefully with these thoughts in mind.

"Formulations in memorandum on mobile ground inspection are in contradiction to decision recently taken by NAC.<sup>3</sup> I therefore consider it necessary to obtain approval of these formulations by NAC or from all member governments. I completely respect point of view which you advanced, which from standpoint of American military security speaks for combination of air and mobile ground inspection. Fears which we have relate primarily to possibility that such intensive inspection system in restricted part of Europe would approach in alarming manner a system of demilitarization or neutralization. In no case, therefore, could we agree to proposal which envisages system of ground inspection within zone which is smaller than zone subject to aerial inspection and which, in particular would cover Germany and, at most, one or two satellite states. I understand memorandum to mean this possibility will in no case come into question, and that for moment possibility is being considered of proposing area to be covered by ground inspection which would exceed that covered by aerial inspection. I would, therefore, welcome it if NAC were also brought into this last phase since I fear NATO solidarity would be jeopardized if other Members of Council feel they have been bypassed."

**Trimble**

---

<sup>3</sup> The position of the NAC on mobile ground inspection is contained in Polto 245 from Paris, July 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7-2557)



273. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany<sup>1</sup>

London, August 1, 1957—7 p.m.

109. Eyes Only Perkins—deliver by 9 am August 2. Eyes Only O'Shaughnessy. Deliver following reply from Secretary to Chancellor urgently. Perkins should privately show this letter before tomorrow's meeting to Blankenhorn, who may otherwise not be informed as Chancellor is out of town, but should not give him copy thereof.

*Begin text.*

"Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I greatly appreciate your prompt reply<sup>2</sup> to my letter of yesterday.<sup>3</sup> I know how busy you must be. I believe that in the light of your reply we can indeed make a movement toward a positive result at least showing an affirmative position to the world. Permit me to comment on your letter.

1. I confirm your understanding that in no case will a European inspection zone be offered or committed except on condition that the Soviets accept either the Arctic zone or the larger one covering both the US and the USSR.

2. The only defined European zone to be proposed tomorrow will cover all of Europe with mutually agreed exceptions. Switzerland, for example, may have to be an exception.

3. As you say there should not be and will not be presented now any defined smaller European zone, although an undefined zone, to include significant parts of the Soviet Union, will be suggested as a possibility. Also, I secured this afternoon the agreement of the British and the French, and of Canada ad referendum, that the fall-back European position of 5th to 35th degree of east longitude will not be presented until after the Soviet rejection of the larger zone has taken place and been reported to NATO giving it an opportunity again to take up the question.<sup>4</sup>

4. It is my understanding that the 5th to 35th degree of east longitude is a minimum fall-back position and that no narrower zone is contemplated. If you will look at the map, I think you will see that a

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-157. Secret. Repeated niact to Paris and to the Department of State as Dulte 11, which is the source text.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in telegram 104 from London to Bonn, Document 269.

<sup>4</sup> The agreement of the British and French and of the Canadians ad referendum is reported in Secto 17 from London, August 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-157)

zone running to the 35th degree is by no means a narrow one but includes much of the Soviet Union with Odessa and Leningrad and goes close to Moscow itself.

5. With respect to the matter of mobility, there must of course be a degree of defined mobility in every form of inspection. It is stipulated that this is to be subject to agreement as part of the essential details of the installation, maintenance and operation of inspection. It goes without saying that this phase of the matter will not be dealt with without the fullest consultation with NATO because it obviously affects its military structure and planning and has political implications.

6. I note that you cannot envisage a system of ground inspection within a zone which is smaller than the zone subject to aerial inspection. I agree in order to clarify this matter the Western Four this afternoon accepted (Canada ad referendum) my suggestion to modify the text so as to specify that "the areas open to ground inspection shall not be less than the areas of aerial inspection".<sup>5</sup> This precludes the possibility you understandably fear of a system of ground inspection within a zone which is smaller and narrower than the zone subject to aerial inspection. I think you need have no doubt but what [*that*] NAC will be brought into the development of this phase of the matter also.

We are now planning to present this matter to the Soviet Delegation Friday<sup>6</sup> at 3:30 in the UN Subcommittee, following which I shall return to Washington.

With every good wish, I am  
Faithfully yours, Foster Dulles''

*End text.*

**Dulles**

---

<sup>5</sup> This modification is reported in Secto 17.

<sup>6</sup> August 2.

274. **Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, August 1, 1957—9 p.m.*

Dulte 14. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President:

Today has been highlighted by an exchange of messages between Adenauer and myself<sup>2</sup> and Pineau's arrival here.

The Chancellor is obviously and understandably worried about the European zone. If matters had not gone as far as they have it would surely have been preferable for US to start with a relatively innocuous zone and not think of tackling the problems inherent in inspection in the heart of divided Europe. As it is, I think he realized that he must go along and I think we have done everything possible to protect his position. I interpret his reply to me as authorizing us to go ahead subject to two conditions which the four Western powers agreed to this afternoon.

Pineau arrived for luncheon with me at the residence. He showed his preoccupation about Algeria but otherwise was quite silent.

Then we had the four Western power meeting where he appeared and recapitulated the French objections to almost everything.

The fact is that as soon as you scratch beneath the surface of generalities and approach practical details the measure of disagreement is immense. For example, the French having for long accepted the figure of 750,000 for manpower now say that this must exclude reserves called back into active service. Of course this makes a mockery of the figure but the French cannot carry on the Algerian war within the ceiling about which they had been talking for the past two years.

I sometimes tend to wonder as to whether it is prudent to try to carry on so elaborate an effort which evokes so much allied disagreement even before we have a case to present to the Russians.

Last night I had an intensely interesting dinner with Macmillan and Lloyd. We covered the waterfront in an atmosphere of greatest intimacy and frankness. It was very much worthwhile and I think alone justified my coming here. I will tell you more of this when I get

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-157. Secret; Eyes Only. Another copy of this telegram is initiated "DE" in the President's handwriting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 169.

back which I hope will be sometime Saturday.<sup>3</sup> Possibly we shall stop at Bermuda for a swim.

Faithfully yours, Foster.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles

---

<sup>3</sup> August 3.

<sup>4</sup> The telegram is unsigned.

---

**275. Telegram From the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, August 1, 1957—9 p.m.*

Secto 18. USDel Disarmament No. 467. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Department pouch Ottawa. (For delivery to Perkins 9:00 a.m., August 2, 1957) Subject: Four-Power meeting, August 1, 1957, 3:30 p.m. Secretary, Lloyd, Pineau and Johnson<sup>2</sup> present.

*Highlights:*

1. Secretary led USDel at second Four-Power meeting today.<sup>3</sup> Final version working paper on zones agreed by US, UK, France, for presentation subcommittee tomorrow if NATO, Canada responds favorably by meeting time. Pineau presented French views on number of subjects. General agreement Western Four reached on disposition of proposals regarding a) advance notification of troop movements; b) exchange of arms inventories; c) export-import of armaments; referral to governments being required in some cases.

*Details:*

2. Lloyd, summarizing, said UK, France, US now agreed on new U.S. formula on use (Secto 12, USDel 462<sup>4</sup>) with Canada still to be heard from.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-157. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Tokyo, and Moscow, and pouched to Ottawa.

<sup>2</sup> David M. Johnson, Canadian Representative on the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

<sup>3</sup> An account of the morning four-power meeting is in Secto 19 from London, August 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-157)

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 31/August 1, midnight, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/7-3157)

3. Four discussed program of work for immediate future, agreed Western Four paper in treaty form would require considerable time to prepare and gain necessary approval. But all felt some type of informal Four-Power paper embodying Western proposals highly desirable if possible before recess and, in any case, before General Assembly convenes. Lloyd suggested recent British white paper on disarmament<sup>5</sup> as type of document required.

4. Secretary expressed view informal paper possible to achieve in perhaps two to three weeks. Suggested subcommittee might then recess to permit Soviet study of Western proposals and Western drafting of concise paper which he estimated would probably take about one month.

5. Secretary suggested West might usefully press Soviets to agree to working groups of experts who, during recess, could begin to get down to details on questions where agreement in principle now exists.

6. Stassen, in response Secretary's question, said remaining items in Western position for presentation are: a) zones of inspection; b) exchange of arms inventories; c) limits on transfer of fissionable material from one nation to another; d) formula on use; e) miscellaneous items. If Western Four can agree these matters and prompt NATO response obtained, he estimated oral presentation could be completed within two weeks.

7. Pineau commented on (a) latest version of inspection zones paper; (b) nuclear testing proposal; (c) definition of manpower; (d) advance notification proposal.

8. Zone paper. Pineau said France accepts July 31 working paper on zones.<sup>6</sup> He added that in French view phrase "significant part of territory of Soviet Union" in 11.3, must not be understood as "restrictive" and West must press for largest possible portion of Soviet Union. He said smaller area of inspection, greater is danger of demilitarized areas developing. Position on relation of fixed to mobile control will also depend on size of zone. If area is small, mobility question is especially important for same reason as above. If area is larger, danger of demilitarization developing decreases. Size of zone would also determine extent of exchange of military information. However, he repeated France has no fundamental disagreement on present Western zone position.

9. Testing. Pineau reiterated that French testing position depends on link with nuclear weapons cut-off. Expressed French concern that test cessation must be real step toward disarmament, not just move designed stop countries not now testing from making tests. He said

---

<sup>5</sup> Reference is presumably to the British White Paper on Defence, printed in *The New York Times*, April 5, p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 269.

very difficult for France agree to more than 10 month test cessation, with understanding cessation could be extended additional 8 months. Cut-off must occur no later than 18 months after treaty goes into effect. Said test problem not one applying only France, but also to many other countries close to testing for first time.

10. Manpower. Pineau said very important reservists called back to active duty not included in manpower ceiling figures. Believes precautions this effect must be taken now so as not to restrict later interpretation. Figure must not include those called back from reserve nor those who obliged continue service beyond time required. If this exception not made, France would be required make four hundred thousand man reduction.

11. Advance notification proposal. Pineau said this proposal much more to advantage Soviet Union than West, particularly dangerous for countries trying protect overseas territories. As example, said notification French troop movement would be immediately passed to rebels in Algeria.

12. Procedure. Pineau expressed view very few substantive matters still to be settled by Western Four. Believed possible draft informal working paper with positive tone that would have good effect on public opinion.

13. Status of latest working paper on zones. Secretary reported general acceptance July 31 zone paper by Federal Republic with two qualifications: a) Specific dimensions of smaller European zone should not be put forward until Soviet response made to other zones, and until NATO has chance to review situation in light of Soviet response; b) must be made clear that area of ground inspection will be least coterminous with aerial inspection area.

14. Lloyd and Pineau agreed with Secretary that tactic requested in 13 (a) acceptable. Johnson said Canadian Government has wanted presentation 5-35 European zone immediately after Soviet rejection other zones, and must therefore reference his government regarding this change.

15. On 13 (b) Lloyd and Pineau agreed to Secretary's redraft third sentence section III, 4, of July 31 working paper, reading, "it is understood that ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the territories of the states concerned without being restricted to the limits of the above described areas, but the areas open to ground inspection shall not be less than the areas of aerial inspection."<sup>7</sup> Johnson said he must also reference his government this change and will seek reply on both points by tomorrow morning.

---

<sup>7</sup> This is the wording in the working paper submitted to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, p. 838.

16. Secretary reported NAC will meet tomorrow morning on zone paper changes. Said he does not anticipate difficulty on final version. Secretary expressed opinion Western side would experience serious difficulty if not able present zonal proposals in subcommittee tomorrow. Lloyd and Pineau agreed with emphasis on need to proceed Friday.<sup>8</sup>

17. Western Four agreed that if necessary clearances obtained enabling presentation zone paper, US would present it. Others would support.

18. Exchange of inventories. Pineau agreed to exchange of arms inventories in zones, provided zones remain as large as area now contemplated by Western proposals. Secretary said he would seek promptly necessary change in present US policy this question. Lloyd said new position not yet technically approved by UK military but does not anticipate difficulty. Johnson said new formulation would be referred his government.

19. Export-import of armaments. Western Four agreed in principle to change sense of Article IX, paragraph (b) of draft Four Power proposals (revision II) from "to establish system for regulating export and import of designated armaments," to, "to study system for regulation export and import of designated armaments".<sup>9</sup> Generally agreed that effective implementation original US proposal would be impossible to accomplish in first-step agreement, but some recognition Western desire to solve this problem would be valuable to include.

20. Four agreed hold further meeting 12:30 tomorrow, followed by working lunch at 1:15, during which it was expected NAC response<sup>10</sup> would be received.

21. Publicity on zonal proposals. If zonal proposals presented subcommittee tomorrow, four agreed release text to press shortly after conclusion of meeting.

**Dulles**

---

<sup>8</sup> August 3.

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to the Western working paper, eventually submitted to the disarmament subcommittee on August 29, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 868-874.

<sup>10</sup> See Document 277.

276. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Bonn, August 2, 1957—3 p.m.*

55. London for Secretary. Paris for Perkins. Department for Herter. Following is text Chancellor Adenauer's reply to Secretary's letter August 1 transmitted in London tel 109.<sup>2</sup>

"Dear Mr. Dulles: I particularly welcomed your quick reply to my letter of yesterday. I am particularly pleased at the new and clear addition to the Western proposals that the territories to be covered by ground inspection shall not be smaller than that covered by aerial inspection. It is also extremely valuable to me to read your assurance that all important details of the inspection system will be subject to fullest consultation in NATO. I should like to recommend, if the Soviets should go so far in negotiations, that details of an inspection system should at first be worked out and tried out in an area where no special political difficulties exist.

I further appreciate your statement that if the Soviets reject the entire European zone, detailed discussions will then take place in NATO about the smaller solution. As things now stand, I believe after careful reflection that I can agree to the Western proposals. Ambassador Blankenhorn has instructions to indicate this in the NATO Council."

**Trimble**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/8-257. Secret; Priority; Niact. Repeated niact to Paris and to the Department of State as telegram 386, which is the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Document 273.



**277. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Paris, August 2, 1957—4 p.m.*

Polto 310. London for USDel Disarmament. Pouched all other NATO capitals and Moscow Polto un. NAC meeting August 2 disarmament.

Council today accepted Western Four proposal on inspection zones (USDel Disarmament 460 and 461, as amended<sup>2</sup>) and approved telegram to this effect from Spaak to Western Four.<sup>3</sup> (Prior to meeting, I spoke with Spaak and German, French, Canadian, United Kingdom, and Italian PermReps. Dutch and Norwegians also contacted. All indicated would have no objections to advance.)

Germany led off with prepared statement contained immediately following telegram.<sup>4</sup> Only other substantive comments came from Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy. Belgium and Netherlands noted that paragraph 3<sup>5</sup> did not refer to specific zone and asked whether Western Four agreed with NAC that 5-35 was minimum European zone. Italy asked whether "as agreed" at end first sentence paragraph 4 meant "as agreed in future".

United States said would try to answer questions which had been raised. While we had not attended meetings of Western Four, had been present for discussions United States side during recent London consultations. Could assure Council that real effort had been made to meet NAC desires. On specific questions raised today, was sure that Italian understanding phrase "as agreed" was correct. Intent was "as will be agreed" or "as may be agreed."

Re German position on linkage of zones, United States thought Western Four paper made clear that there was firm link between European and Western hemisphere-USSR zones, i.e. European zone could not be accepted unless Soviets agreed to one of two zones described paragraph 1 Western Four paper.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-257. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London and Bonn.

<sup>2</sup> Neither USDel Disarmament 460, Secto 9 from London, July 31, nor USDel Disarmament 461, telegram 845 from London, July 31, is printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/7-3157) Some amendments on inspection are noted in Secto 18 from London, Document 275.

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in Polto 306 from Paris, August 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-257)

<sup>4</sup> Transmitted in Polto 311 from Paris, August 2. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>5</sup> Discussion of specific paragraphs in this telegram can be compared with corresponding paragraphs in the version submitted to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 837-839.

Re Belgium-Netherlands question, United States thought Western Four did regard 5-35 as minimum. Western Four were not thinking of going below that zone or even of going that far as yet. There was clear agreement that Western Four would not move from position set out in document before Council until Soviets had responded to proposals made therein. Thereafter Western Four would consider Soviet response and consult NAC before proceeding further.

Re German point on mobile inspection, United States remarked that this had been most difficult problem in London because, on one hand, inspection without mobility was not valid and, on other hand, Western Four very aware of NAC's concerns and desires this matter. Proposal had therefore made clear that no form of mobile ground inspection could be agreed to unless it had been accepted by countries directly concerned. Western Four had also included in paper proposal for detailed study of inspection system because they realized that in all probability nature and extent of inspection zones would depend upon details of inspection to be carried out therein.

When it appeared that there were no further comments or questions, Spaak circulated draft telegram to Western Four which, after discussion, Council approved without substantive changes (text contained Polto 306).

United States asked whether last sentence of telegram applied only to Europe or whether Council expected also to be consulted re details inspection system in Western hemisphere-USSR zone. United Kingdom thought might be distinction between two: That Council would like to be informed re Western hemisphere but had right to be consulted re Europe. France, on other hand, saw no advantage making this distinction. NAC competence not limited to Europe. Moreover, if system established in Arctic, for example, would create precedent for Europe. There appeared to be general agreement with French view and sentence was left unchanged.

Canada proposed number of changes designed give NAC response "more positive tone". Suggested that first sentence paragraph 2 be dropped and opening paragraph be modified to read "NAC has no objection to latest proposals . . . <sup>6</sup> and is satisfied that they should be presented by Western Members UN subcommittee". Also suggested that third sentence paragraph 2 recalling Council's previous observations on mobile ground inspection be dropped. Finally, Canada suggested that second sentence paragraph 2 be modified to refer to "a limited system of mobile ground inspection". United Kingdom objected to insertion of word "limited" on ground that Western Four had not as yet worked out details of system at all so that reference to "limited" was not really meaningful. United States also expressed

---

<sup>6</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

doubts but pointed out nobody thinking of "unlimited" mobile ground inspection. Spaak then proceeded to defend his original draft in toto. His main point was that, in his judgment, statement that Council "has no objection" was strongest statement that could be made on behalf of Council as whole. Implied that he had in mind here not only views of Germans for example, but his own. Canada did not press proposed changes.

At conclusion of meeting Spaak asked whether press could be informed that today's meeting had taken place. Noted that press already aware meeting scheduled for today.

After some discussion, was agreed on United States suggestion that, if queried by press, could be stated that Western Four had put certain questions to Council and answers had been sent to London. In course discussion Italy called attention to press reports, particularly in London papers, "accusing" NATO of slowing down disarmament subcommittee proceedings. Pointed out that NAC had in fact moved very rapidly on all matters put to it by Western Four and expressed view that this should be widely publicized, perhaps in connection with advising press regarding today's meeting. Spaak disagreed. Thought it was basically up to Western Four what should be said about their consultations with NAC. In any case was opposed to saying anything specific about today's meeting, so as not to give Soviets any pretext for rejecting Western offer. There might later on, however, be an occasion when NAC role in negotiations could be explained. Was confident that anyone who looked at record could see that Council had not held up negotiations. United Kingdom rep said he had reported to London Council concern over press reports referred to by Italy and had asked Foreign Office try to set press straight. Said was obvious that NAC had not held up negotiations.

**Perkins**

278. **Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, August 2, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH  
ADMIRAL STRAUSS

Admiral Strauss has returned from a conference with the President to discuss with him the position which should be taken by the United States Delegation to the United Nations with respect to the selection by the Governing Board of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I was to have attended this meeting with Admiral Strauss but had to leave the White House because of an urgent appointment with Senator Johnson at the Capitol. Admiral Strauss knew my point of view and likewise brought to the President's attention the two memoranda of conversation which the Secretary had made on October 21 and 24, 1956.<sup>2</sup>

As a result of this conversation the President agreed that:

(a) the position of the United States Delegation should be to put forward the name of W. Sterling Cole as a candidate on behalf of the United States; and

(b) the Soviet delegation should be advised that the United States did not wish to make any commitments with respect to any other staff personnel but would, of course, feel that the Soviet Government was entitled to representation appropriate to the degree of support of the Agency which the Soviet Government would evidence by making fissionable material available to it.

The President further made the condition with respect to the above that prior assent be received of Congressman Joseph Martin to Congressman Cole's name being put forward, since the President had some years ago agreed with Congressman Martin that he, the President, would not consider nominating for federal office members of the House of Representatives. Strauss did not at the time make the distinction that this was not a Presidential appointment. This, however, was done in a later conversation between General Persons and Admiral Strauss. The latter is now making arrangements to see both Congressman Martin and Congressman Cole.

C.A.H.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901-IAEA/8-257. Confidential. Drafted by Herter.

<sup>2</sup> Neither found in Department of State files.

279. **Memorandum for the Record, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Howe)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, August 2, 1957.*

IAEA

In elaborating on his memorandum of conversation with Admiral Strauss of August 2<sup>2</sup> Governor Herter indicated that it was his understanding that we should put forward the Cole candidacy and proceed to get him elected using the most favorable tactics, but nevertheless backing him to the hilt. He felt the President was inclined to want to avoid any kind of a "deal" with the Russians.

Governor Herter thought that, to comply with the President's wishes, Ambassador Wadsworth should be instructed to go back to the Russians and inform them that he had received instructions to put forward the candidacy of Cole and at the same time to make plain that any further discussions with the Russians on IAEA staff would need to await evidence of the amount of cooperation and contribution the USSR is going to make to the new agency.

Governor Herter asked me to convey a copy of his memorandum of conversation with Admiral Strauss of August 2 to the Admiral requesting his initials or written concurrence and at the same time, convey a copy to General Goodpaster, indicating to Admiral Strauss that we were so doing.<sup>3</sup>

**Fisher Howe**<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901-IAEA/8-257.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Howe to Goodpaster, August 2, indicating that a copy of this memorandum was enclosed and that another copy had been sent to Strauss for him to indicate his concurrence. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901-IAEA/8-257) Strauss' concurrence has not been found in Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**280. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 3, 1957.*

MY DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: I dictate this on the plane as I return from London. I went there having very much in mind our talks at Washington and the confidence you reposed in our purpose to conduct the disarmament talks in such a manner as would not prejudice the Federal Republic and tend either to perpetuate the partition of Germany or to demilitarize and neutralize the German nation which I am confident is destined to play a great role in the defense, and the peaceful spread, of freedom in the world.

I found in London a situation of some confusion, not altogether surprising in view of the complexity of the problem and the many nations involved.

It might perhaps have been better, as you indicated, if no partial European zone were to be suggested in the first stage. However, the Subcommittee and NATO had gone so far along this path that it was not practical to have retraced our steps and indeed it would not have been in the interest of the cause which the free nations espouse in common if at this point we had seemed to become totally negative to the idea of a European zone smaller than the whole of Europe.

However, we did, I think, take adequate steps to protect against the dangers inherent in such a limited concept.

First of all, the limited concept will not be considered at all unless the Soviets first reject the all-European concept. Also they must have accepted either the US-Canada-USSR zone or the Northern (Arctic) zone.

A further pre-condition is that they must agree that any limited European zone must include a significant part of Soviet territory as well as the countries of Eastern Europe.

We furthermore stipulated, as you and I agreed, that ground inspection must cover *all* of any given inspection area so that there will be no danger of a strip of ground inspection running through the center of Europe and tending to consolidate the partition of Germany and also tending to demilitarize the inspected strip. I made this even clearer in my official presentation of the Four Power paper when I said:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-457. Personal and Confidential. A covering letter from Dulles to Ambassador Bruce, August 4, requested Bruce to read and deliver the letter to Adenauer, unless he had serious reservations about its contents. (*Ibid.*)

"It is assumed that the areas which I have described would have both air and ground inspection and that the areas open to aerial inspection shall all of them be open also to ground inspection. . . .<sup>2</sup> The normal and usual condition would be coincidence between land and air inspection areas. The reference to ground inspection areas not being less than the areas of aerial inspection is designed to indicate the uniformity of ground inspection throughout substantial areas and not a concentration in one particular zone which might carry with it political implications."<sup>3</sup>

It is of course provided that the mobility of the ground inspection would require in all cases the concurrence of the country directly concerned.

Also I obtained the express agreement of the other three Western Powers at London that if the conditions precedent to consideration of a limited European zone are met by the Soviet Union, the situation would at that point be further considered by NATO before any automatic presentation of the 5-35-40 zone.

I am highly skeptical that the Soviets will at any early date meet the conditions prerequisite to the study of a limited European zone.

There are, I know, some Western Powers which would like to put forward quickly the limited European zone, but I believe that that situation is now under control of the North Atlantic Council.

I hope that the Western Powers can complete the presentation of their whole disarmament position within the next two weeks or thereabouts and that then there may be a recess. However, I cannot forecast this schedule with assurance.

I know that it must be awkward to have these problems which so deeply affect Germany pending at a time of German general elections. I believe, however, that no further matters peculiarly affecting Germany are apt to come up between now and mid-September.

With much appreciation of your prompt cooperation, I am  
Faithfully yours,

**John Foster Dulles**<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

<sup>3</sup> The full text of Dulles' statement to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.143), is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 839-845.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

**281. Memorandum of a Conference, White House, Washington, August 9, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

*Morning Conference on August 9, 1957.*<sup>2</sup>

PRESENT

The President, John Eisenhower,<sup>3</sup> J.F. Dulles, Gerard Smith, and Robert Cutler

1. The draft report (dated July 26, 1957) by the Special Committee, composed of the Secretary of State (Chairman), the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission recommending a test for a large clean bomb<sup>4</sup> was discussed.

2. It was understood that if this test were to be made, it would be included in the 1958 Pacific test series.<sup>5</sup>

3. The President was very much in doubt whether it was desirable to test larger bombs and whether there was a need for a large clean bomb. He indicated that our statecraft was becoming too much a prisoner of our scientists. He had publicly stated that we were not going to test any more large bombs and that we were trying to clean up small bombs.

4. . . .

5. The President then read the paragraphs containing the recommendations which limit clearly the project to a test. He stated that he thought the recommendation was satisfactorily limited.

6. As Mr. Dulles is leaving at 2:00 p.m., he will sign the report and leave it in escrow with Gerard Smith to be turned over later to the President when desired. I think the President has tentatively approved this recommendation but wishes to talk with Admiral Strauss first about it.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Cutler. Copies were given to Major Eisenhower and Gerard Smith.

<sup>2</sup> For the discussion on disarmament at this morning conference, see *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Major John S.D. Eisenhower, the President's son, was serving temporarily as Acting Staff Secretary.

<sup>4</sup> Undated, the report is attached to a July 26 memorandum from Lay to Dulles, Wilson, and Strauss. (Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records) The wording of this draft report is identical to that of the report printed as Document 285.

<sup>5</sup> In a separate memorandum, attached to the source text but not printed, Cutler summarized discussion at this August 9 morning meeting on the AEC proposal for the 1958 Pacific test series. He noted:

"The President indicated strongly that he would like to curtail the length of the testing period and the number of test shots, and directed that Admiral Strauss, Mr. Smith, and I come back at 2:30 p.m. this afternoon for a discussion of this matter."



*Afternoon Conference on August 9, 1957.*

PRESENT

The President, John Eisenhower, J.F. Dulles, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Gerard Smith, and Robert Cutler

1. The President approved the recommendation of the Special Committee and directed that the signed copy in the possession of Gerard Smith be appropriately released from escrow and delivered. . . .

**Robert Cutler**

---

**282. Memorandum of a Conference, White House, Washington, August 9, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

*Morning Conference on August 9, 1957.*

PRESENT

The President, John Eisenhower, J.F. Dulles, Gerard Smith, and Robert Cutler

**DISARMAMENT**

The following changes in the June 11 U.S. position on a first phase of disarmament were discussed:

1. Paragraph 8 refraining from nuclear tests. The present text provides for a suspension of testing for twelve months, the parties being then free to resume testing unless an adequate system is in effect at the end of the period to police testing and the cut-off procedure is agreed upon (par. 5). The French and the British are in disagreement over this provision. Because there is no identifiable time for the cut-off date, the British are satisfied with the provision because they can go on stockpiling weapons material while the parties argue about a cut-off inspection system. The French, on the other hand, feel they will be prejudiced if the cut-off inspection system discussions are dragged out over a period of years, and wish a more determinable date for the cut-off to be established. Therefore, Moch is anxious to have the period for suspension of testing last no longer than eighteen months unless a fixed cut-off date is agreed to during the period tests are suspended.

The President suggested that the U.S. should announce that it would be willing to suspend for 24 months (twice the present period) provided that at the end of that time inspection systems both for

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament. Top Secret. Drafted by Cutler.

testing and for cut-off were established and in operation (and a cut-off date fixed), or testing would be resumed. He also suggested that the period of suspension might be extended beyond 24 months by unanimous agreement. Of course, if there was a violation of the testing suspension either party could begin testing again.

2. Minor disarmament considerations will be brought up later before the President, but were mentioned as follows:

(a) The provision that after the cut-off date no country could transfer to another country fissionable material (par. 7).

(b) The provision for notification for the movement of troops across land, sea, or air boundaries (par. 14-a). The French and the U.K. object because they feel the need of moving troops to places like Algeria or Oman, thus disclosing their hand; whereas, movements within the Communist Bloc land mass would not raise the same question.

(c) The provision relative to the control commission establishing a system to regulate the traffic in armaments (par. 14-b). The French and British wish to limit this to a study of such a system.

(d) The provision relative to the use of nuclear weapons (par. 4). . . .

*Afternoon Conference on August 9, 1957.*

PRESENT

The President, John Eisenhower, J.F. Dulles, Admiral Strauss, Gerard Smith, and Robert Cutler

1. Admiral Strauss explained the difficulties of a two-year period of suspension because top scientists would be lost to AEC if there were to be no tests and experiments over such a long period. The President thought the world situation was so difficult that attention should not be paid to this point.

2. Admiral Strauss introduced the thought that we could announce (and the British would join with us) that in our future tests we would not add any net increase in fissionable material in the air i.e., putting in only additional fissionable material to make up for the decay of previously exploded fissionable material.

3. The President noted that he was prepared to suggest the willingness of the U.S. to announce that it would suspend for 24 months as indicated in the second paragraph of (1) in the Morning Conference report. Admiral Strauss said that if that was the President's decision, the AEC would certainly abide by it and work under it. (The President mentioned that Defense was not represented, and I subsequently suggested to Gerard Smith that a short memorandum of the three Presi-

dential decisions taken this afternoon<sup>2</sup> be made by him and gone over with Strauss and Quarles before any public announcement in London of the disarmament point.)

RC

*Addition to General Cutler's memorandum on Disarmament, dated August 9, 1957.*

The President was concerned that world opinion understand the United States position on continuing tests while striving for a disarmament agreement including test suspension. It was important, appropriately in time and manner, to announce that we would work unceasingly for a safeguarded disarmament agreement, including suspension of tests under conditions described above in this memorandum, but that it would take a year before multilateral agreement therefor could become effective. Until that time, the United States would continue as heretofore to test, especially to achieve clean devices. He felt a frank statement to this effect would provide flexibility and help with world opinion. Such announcement should be worked up by State, Defense, and AEC.<sup>3</sup> It was not clear to me whether this announcement would accompany or follow the 24-month proposal.

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference presumably is to the President's approval of the recommendation of the Special Committee on "clean" bombs, noted *supra*; the decision to suspend nuclear testing for 24 months, discussed in this memorandum; and the 1958 Pacific nuclear test series, Operation Hardtack, noted *supra*, and summarized *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> The President's statement, August 21, authorizing the inclusion of a suspension of testing of nuclear weapons for a period up to 2 years under certain safeguards and conditions, is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, p. 627.

**283. Memorandum of a Conference, White House, Washington, August 9, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

*Morning Conference on August 9, 1957.*

PRESENT

The President, John Eisenhower, J.F. Dulles, Gerard Smith, and Robert Cutler

1. The proposal of the AEC for (Hardtack)<sup>2</sup> the 1958 test series in the Pacific extending over four months embracing 25-26 shots and requesting authority to use an additional amount of fissionable material over that originally indicated was discussed.

These points were made:

(a) Why was it necessary to have so many shots? Could the series not be limited to not over twelve or so?

(b) The danger is that these tests will continue for a longer and longer period of time and use more and more fissionable material.

(c) The difficulty in appearing honest before the world while carrying on such long drawn-out tests.

(d) The President indicated strongly that he would like to curtail the length of the testing period and the number of test shots, and directed that Admiral Strauss, Mr. Smith, and I come back at 2:30 p.m. this afternoon for a discussion of this matter.

*Afternoon Conference on August 9, 1957.*

PRESENT

The President, John Eisenhower, J.F. Dulles, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Gerard Smith and Robert Cutler

1. The President approved the proposal for the test program Hardtack in 1958 with 25 test shots and a four-month test period, but urged Admiral Strauss to try to fire the test shots in a shorter period.

2. The President directed that the news about the approval of Hardtack and the inclusion therein of the large clean bomb test be not made public until the form of announcement was agreed on among State, Defense and AEC.

RC

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Cutler. Copies were given to James Lay, Major Eisenhower, and Gerard Smith.

<sup>2</sup> The name eventually given to the nuclear test series at the Bikini and Enewetok Atolls, April 28-August 18, 1958, was Operation Hardtack I.

284. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, August 9, 1957, 2:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Strauss  
Mr. Gerard Smith (State Department)  
General Cutler  
Major Eisenhower

REFERENCE

Letter to the President from Admiral Strauss, dated August 2, 1957<sup>2</sup>

SUBJECT

Operation Hardtack

*Numbers of Weapons*—The first question which had disturbed the President with relation to Operation Hardtack was the number of weapons involved. The President felt the number 25 was high. Admiral Strauss explained that the number had been arrived at arbitrarily, that he had two laboratories, each of which had requested 20 shots, and had received a request from the Department of Defense for 10 shots. This figure he had, at first glance, cut in half. Admiral Strauss further explained that he had every intention of shaving down below the mark of 25.

*Duration*—The next question of concern was the duration of the atomic tests, lasting from 1 May probably through August. The President felt that an excessive amount of time consumed in testing served to magnify our efforts to the world at a time when disarmament negotiations are under way. Admiral Strauss' explanation was a requirement for perfect meteorological conditions for each experiment, particularly for the large yield weapons. The Admiral pointed out that on occasion he had been required to wait for two weeks for firing a given shot. He expressed the opinion, however, that he would be able to condense the four-month period of time to some extent.

*Size*—In answer to the President's question on the necessity for tests of large yield weapons, Admiral Strauss had the following to say:

1. AEC and State Department cannot justify a need for the very large weapons. The requirement to test . . . weapons comes primarily from the Department of Defense which is interested in ascertaining the size of yield which may be carried in the B-52. The weight of the bomb is estimated at. . . .

. . . . .

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Major Eisenhower. The source text is initialed "DE" in the President's handwriting.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

3. Inaccuracy of delivery means can be compensated for in part by increasing the size of the weapon. (The President pointed out, however, that the scaling laws apply on a cube root basis, which would give a . . . weapon a radius of damage only about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  the size the radius of damage of the . . . )

Admiral Strauss then mentioned a compromise which he felt he could use to advantage. . . .

*Altitude*—The question came up as to the height at which the high altitude test shots will be burst. Admiral Strauss gave as the top figure . . . feet, rocket delivered.

*Type*—Admiral Strauss estimates that all the weapons tested, with the exception of a few of the smaller ones, will be of the thermonuclear type.

*Public Relations*—The main dilemma in conducting tests of this magnitude in 1958, as the President sees it, is that of planning and carrying out extensive tests on the one hand while professing a readiness to suspend testing in a disarmament program on the other. From much of the world this paradoxical conduct may bring accusations of bad faith. The President is agreed, however, that having gone this far, it is necessary to carry through with Hardtack. Several measures will be followed to place this decision in the best possible light:

1. Observers from various nations will be invited to witness the shots.

2. Our position in the disarmament talks must be that we cannot suspend testing until a date at least a year from now. Until that time we, as others, will continue to test as necessary.

3. The United States will maintain a flexible attitude in these negotiations for disarmament, and would agree to accept the inevitable inefficiency which will result from a two-year layoff. As to the problem of losing the best scientific talent as a result of the two-year layoff, it was agreed that the bulk of the best talent could be retrieved and the result in organizational setbacks would just have to be accepted.

4. The testing schedule will be kept confidential until more thought can be given as to how to announce it.

5. The time span for the tests will be condensed to the maximum extent within the power of the Atomic Energy Commission.

6. The statement *may* be made, in which the British will probably join us, that we will put no more radio-activity into the atmosphere than is taken care of by normal decay of that contamination already in the atmosphere.

*Conclusions*—The President granted authority to continue the Hardtack tests within the following limitations:

1. Testing of large yield weapons will be accomplished with weapons no larger than that exploded in 1954.

2. The time span for the series of tests will be condensed to the maximum extent.

3. Announcement of the tests will be withheld and the matter will remain confidential until full details of the announcement are worked out.

**John S.D. Eisenhower**  
*Major, U.S. Army*

---

**285. Report to the President From the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, undated.*

On July 18, 1956, you directed the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to make a study and recommendations thereon<sup>2</sup> with respect to a letter addressed to you by Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas E. Murray . . . .

. . . . .

Our recommendations have been postponed until the present

. . . . .  
. . . the feasibility of developing very high yield weapons with the objective of determining the upper yield limit of a weapon which would be compatible as to size and weight with the B-52 aircraft. . . . A broad program of developing "clean" weapons fostered by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense is in progress as a consequence of advancing technology in this field and in response to military requirements for applications in which reduced fall-out is essential. . . . A complementary or substitute "clean" weapon in the highest yield range corresponding with the delivery capability of the B-52 aircraft is not under development. From the military standpoint, there are two factors which make it desirable that the Strategic Air Command have the capability of delivering with

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret. Regarding the preparation of the undated draft report, identical to the source text, see footnote 4, Document 281.

<sup>2</sup> Eisenhower's directive on July 18, 1956, has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, but regarding Eisenhower's reply to Murray stating that he had referred the matter to the NSC for review, see footnote 3, Document 144.

certain of its aircraft a higher yield weapon than is now on hand. In the first place, such higher yield could be substantially more effective in destroying certain very hard Soviet military targets offering direct threat against the United States; . . . In the second place, the increasing complexity and cost of first line aircraft and the attrition which must be expected from Soviet offensive and defensive action make it necessary to base war plans on the arrival of reduced numbers of our aircraft over targets. This factor makes it necessary that our forces attain maximum unit effectiveness.

. . . On the other hand, military calculations show that if we substituted very high yield "clean" weapons . . . we could decrease the over-all intensity of fall-out in adjacent areas . . . employed, and by a factor of 30 with air bursts. There is, therefore, a sound military basis for the development of "clean" weapons of the highest yield deliverable by our aircraft. . . . This answer can be obtained with reasonable certainty if a research and developmental program were carried through the next Pacific test series. Decision may be made thereafter as to whether pre-production and production effort would be instituted; this decision based on the then applying climate of international relations, on the yield possible, and a later estimate of the strategic need for the potential weapon.

Should it become known that continued United States testing is directed in part towards development of a weapon . . . some unfavorable international and possibly national reaction might be expected. Certainly the Soviets could be expected to use this for any propaganda advantage which might be gained. Therefore, it is not believed necessary nor appropriate that the United States decide now to embark upon a program to develop and stockpile a . . . weapon . . . . Rather, we should proceed with our research and early developmental effort to a point where we know the characteristics of the weapon . . . .

. . . It is a moral responsibility of the United States to apply force, should the use of force become necessary, in such a manner as to minimize the effects on nonparticipating populations. The development program discussed herein has the objective of meeting that responsibility.

In view of the considerations outlined earlier it is recommended that:

a. There be a test in the next Pacific test series of a device . . . . The planned gross yield of the test device should be as low as possible consistent with securing the required information. . . .

b. If following completion of this test the Department of Defense considers it requires development of weapons on this or related pattern, we will submit to the President our recommendations as to the undertaking of a pre-production development program.



It shall be understood that the authorization recommended in the paragraphs above shall in no way be interpreted as establishing a requirement . . . nor for carrying on a pre-production developmental program for such weapon.

APPROVED:

Dwight D. Eisenhower

---

286. **Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, August 13, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Disarmament

There is attached as Annex A for your approval a revision of paragraph 8 of the June 11 policy paper on disarmament which reflects your decision on August 9, 1957 regarding an extension to 24 months of the nuclear weapons test suspension.<sup>2</sup>

On the basis of Secretary Dulles' recent consultations in London and further discussions within the Government, I am also prepared to recommend several additional changes in the June 11 policy directive as follows:

1. With regard to paragraph 7, relating to transfers of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials to other countries, delete the initial phrase "From the effective date of the agreement" and substitute the phrase "From the date of the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes". Since the reason for prohibition of transfer of fissionable material between countries is to enforce the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, it seems unnecessary, and undesirable from the standpoint of relations with our principal allies, to prohibit such transfers prior to the cut-off date. I recommend in paragraph 7 (b) the deletion of "peaceful purposes" and substitution of "non-weapons purposes" to make clear that fissionable material could be transferred to other states for such purposes as fuel for submarine propulsion reactors. I would also propose in paragraph 7(b) the insertion of the word "otherwise" to make

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Herter. Secret. The source text is initialed "DE" in the President's handwriting.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 282.

the obligations assumed with respect to fissionable materials consistent with those applicable to nuclear weapons. The revised paragraph would read:

“Each party agrees not *otherwise* to transfer out of its control any fissionable material or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for *non-weapons* purposes”.

2. The formula on use of nuclear weapons in paragraph 4 of the June 11 policy directive is considered by some of the Western delegations as too restrictive. Accordingly, I propose the deletion of paragraph 4 of the June 11 policy directive, except for the parenthetical note at the end, and would substitute the following formula:

“Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense.”

3. Because of the practical difficulties involved, it is recommended that the proposed Board of Control of the International Control Organ have authority only to *study* a system for regulating the export and import of armaments rather than to establish such a system. Accordingly, I suggest that paragraph 14 (b) of the June 11 policy directive be amended to read as follows:

“to study a system for regulating the export and import of armaments.”

Deputy Secretary Quarles and Chairman Strauss concur in these recommendations. We will be glad to discuss this matter with you at any time if you so desire.<sup>3</sup>

**Christian A. Herter**

### **Annex A**

#### **SUGGESTED REVISION OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE FIRST PHASE OF DISARMAMENT APPROVED JUNE 11, 1957**

8. a. The United States will announce that it will exert every effort toward the end that the first stage disarmament agreement can be put into effect by 1 November 1958, and that until the effective date of such an agreement it will continue its nuclear testing program.

b. As a part of the first stage disarmament agreement all parties will agree:

---

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum to the Secretary of State (directed to the attention of Gerard Smith), August 14, Major Eisenhower reported that the President had that day approved all the changes as recommended in the source text. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament) These changes were transmitted to Stassen in telegram 1277 to London, August 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-1457)

(1) to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement (estimated as 1 November 1958), from nuclear testing until 12 months thereafter.

(2) to cooperate in setting up during the 12 months period or earlier if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests.

(3) to refrain for a further period from nuclear tests if the monitoring system referred to in paragraph 8b (2) is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress satisfactory to each party concerned is being achieved in the installation of an inspection system for the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes agreed to under paragraph 5b above. Such an extension will be made only with the understanding that testing may at the discretion of each party be resumed 24 months after the effective date of the agreement if the inspection system for the cut-off has not been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned before the end of the 24 months and if the cut-off has not been put into effect.

(4) if tests are resumed, to give notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such tests; to provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

---

**287. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, August 15, 1957—4 p.m.*

1162. USDel Disarmament No. 506. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Subject: US-USSR bilateral August 14, 1957, 11:00 a.m., 44 Grosvenor Square, London.

*Highlights:*

1. With agreement of Western Allies (Embtel 1114, USDel No. 504<sup>2</sup>) USDel met with Sov Del for purpose of further defining Western position on reductions in armed forces beyond 2.5 million and 750 thousand men and of ascertaining whether Soviets prepared answer August 2 inspection zone proposals. Zorin stated USSR had not completed its consideration of August 2 paper and did not know when study would be finished. Zorin also said would like answer to Soviet aide-mémoire of June 7.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-1557. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO, Bonn, and Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Dated August 13/14, midnight, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8-1357)

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the Soviet aide-mémoire, see Document 231.

*Details:*

2. Stassen opened by asking for explanation of significance of Zorin's statement in subcomite meeting of previous day (147th meeting, 13th August), noting that questions had been raised on matter of force level figures on which agreement apparently had been reached. Stassen inquired whether Zorin's attitude reflected a change in the attitude of the Soviet Government towards reaching an agreement on partial measures of disarmament. Zorin replied that his remarks had not been directed at US Del affirmative attitude towards disarmament agreement but at what Sov Del felt was suggestion US-USSR on eve of reaching agreement. Zorin said attitude of other countries in subcomite showed there was no basis for thinking agreement about to be reached; this was why Sov Del used example of force levels. Zorin continued that USSR would not enter agreement which provided for reductions only to 2.5 million force levels or which required further negotiations and political preconditions before proceeding to further reductions in force levels. Stassen explained US policy was that parties to agreement would take into account progress being made towards settlement of political issues. US Del thought it obvious and natural that neither US nor USSR would ignore political situation when considering reductions in force levels. Stassen remarked that it would not be in interest of either side to be against settlement political issues.

3. Stassen made point that West had taken account of USSR aide-mémoire of June 7 in subcomite negotiations. Thus the August 2 proposal on inspection zones provided an answer to the way in which inspection should begin. Taking into account another aspect of the June 7 aide-mémoire, the US is also willing to consider a test suspension somewhat longer than the proposed ten months period. Replying to another question in the June 7 aide-mémoire, Stassen stated US desire was to reduce force levels below 2.5 million men under proper conditions. Finally, the US was leaving the way open for the deferral of certain measures which might be unacceptable at the very beginning of a disarmament agreement; this too was being done in light of the June 7 paper.

4. Regarding nuclear testing, Zorin said Sov Del would be prepared to discuss length and effective date of suspension if US had proposal to make; so far US position had been 10 months and nothing more. The most important question was the link between a suspension of testing and other parts of a disarmament agreement. The USSR thought that a suspension of testing would be the first step in halting the nuclear arms race and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. If the suspension of testing were tied to other complex issues there might never be a suspension.

5. Preliminary reaction of Sov Del to August 2 zone proposals was that inspection zones could not be accepted without agreement on other measures of nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament. USSR however was still studying August 2 paper and so Sov Del's views confined to preliminary reaction.

6. Stassen said that most effective way of proceeding in negotiations on suspension of nuclear testing would be for Sov Del to state what suspension period less than 2 years would be acceptable to USSR. In view of US a number of measures would have to be agreed in order to prevent spread of nuclear weapons. In this connection it would be useful to discuss timing and circumstances under which the USSR would be willing to have a cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

7. Zorin repeated his opposition to any requirement for separate negotiations preceding further reductions in force levels and reaffirmed Soviet position that agreement on suspension of testing could be separated from other problems. Zorin stated that progress towards agreement would depend on how the US would move beyond its position of last May. Sov Del considered next move was up to US since no reply had yet been received to Sov June 7 aide-mémoire. Stassen observed that points which Sov Del had put into subcomite had been answered by West.

8. Zorin remarked it would be impossible to continue discussion all points at this meeting and it was agreed to consider continuing the discussion at the Soviet Embassy on Friday, August 16.

Discussion ended at 1:15 p.m.

Barbour <sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Walworth Barbour became Minister-Counselor of Embassy on February 23, 1956.

---

**288. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, August 17, 1957—11 a.m.*

1213. USDel Disarmament No. 516. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Subject: Bilateral with Soviet Delegation, Soviet Embassy, August 16, 4:00 pm.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-1757. Confidential; Priority.

1. At four hour bilateral meeting with Soviet direct discussion centered primarily on question of forces stationed in Europe, Germany and foreign bases (on Soviet initiative) and relationship fissionable material production cutoff to other nuclear provisions of first stage agreement (at US initiative). There was some discussion also of certain additional matters related to August 15 subcommittee meeting, question of other parties to any first step agreement, and future work procedures. Significantly Zorin made no reference to a European zone, and no adverse comment on the Arctic zone.

2. Zorin opened session by stating he had certain questions re Stassen's statement at August 15 subcommittee mtg. Asked whether references to consequential reductions in foreign bases and forces overseas which would follow from 2.1 to 1.7 indicated these would be deferred beyond first stage, commenting that in May 31 talking paper US had rejected one third reduction Germany which Soviet interpreted as difficulty with numbers rather than timing in first stage. Stassen proceeded to draw out and probe Soviet position. He first explained difference was due to differing emphases, with emphasis on consent other states in informal paper whereas in subcommittee discussion emphasis was on fact lower force levels in future would consequently lead to reductions in bases and forces abroad. Pointed out US has promptly and firmly rejected Soviet proposal for one-third reduction of forces in Germany and reductions in foreign bases. Said if Soviet has some other different or more limited proposals, USDel would give due consideration to any proposals from Soviets and provide answers. Emphasized 2.5 million force level was not deep cut for US but was significant. Zorin pressed for US statement acceptance of principle of reduction foreign bases as part of first step agreement and asked for counter proposals. Stassen declined any counter proposals. Stressed need for agreement on general reductions, consequence of which would be certain local reductions in later stages. Commented US policy on issues of force reductions and foreign bases has not changed since late May. Stassen pointed out Soviet proposals to use December 1956 as a base referred to a time of unusually high Soviet force levels in Hungary. Stassen added that US and USSR could discuss together or each could decide unilaterally on reductions of forces beyond borders and bases which would be consequence of lower force levels. Zorin stressed importance including such European reductions in first step agreement, reiterating theme principal tension is in Europe and it must be reduced by reduction forces in Germany. Urged US indicate percentage reduction figure as basis for negotiations. Stassen developed motivations behind present stationing overseas of US forces recalled Korean war and Berlin blockade, said US believes there is greater concentration in central Europe now of Soviet forces than of US forces, and indicated US recognizes dangers in central Europe and

willing examine situation thoroughly. Zorin closed discussion of this general point with restatement importance reducing forces in Germany as matter of urgency.

3. Zorin inquired as to meaning of "small first step" in August 15 statement by Stassen in subcommittee. Stassen developed US position on essential elements in first stage agreement including cessation nuclear tests, reciprocal inspection (August 2nd), force level reductions, deposit of armaments, etc. Stressed importance of making beginning and said US re-examining proposals to see whether movement possible.

4. Lengthy discussion ensued on basic elements of nuclear provisions required in first step agreement. Zorin reiterated Soviet view on relationship of production cutoff to prohibition on use of nuclear weapons, destruction of stocks, etc., indicating latter could be written in as goal. Said timing on these steps may be different but essential to have link. Stassen elaborated reasons why Soviet position illogical and unrealistic by linking measure which was impossible to control (elimination of nuclear weapons) with other measure of cutoff of future production which could be controlled. Asked Zorin whether this was intentional Soviet block to first step agreement. Restated US position on timing nuclear provisions whereby cessation of tests would be first step. Second step would be formula on use nuclear weapons and third would be cutoff fissionable materials production for weapons. Stated Soviet Union needs to reconsider their position in light vital importance preventing spread nuclear weapons. Said Soviet position on this had not changed since March. A change was required to meet the US change on tests in May. Stassen said US recognized Soviets could not accept premature cutoff date. Asked what timing the Soviet would propose. Concluded this discussion on note that present negotiations highly important since France and other countries not discussing subject of nuclear tests idly and spread of nuclear weapons would be uncontrollable problem in future. Said that if either side believes agreement impossible should say so, otherwise serious negotiations should be pressed. US Government took a positive view toward agreement. Zorin replied that agreement was possible if West would show some movement on these issues.

5. In course of meeting Stassen urged Soviets to put forward new and constructive proposals on cutoff in nuclear production and to give positive response to August 2 Western proposals on inspection zones. Indicated US would probably be able to introduce certain new positions in subcommittee end of next week.

6. Stassen queried Soviets as to their views on association states other than Five Powers with first step agreement. Zorin side-stepped question by replying that if Five Powers, or even US and USSR alone, agreed on first step disarmament arrangement, other states would

follow this lead not through compulsion but through leadership. Commented in this connection that if Western Four sought full agreement with other Western powers and then sought to pressure Soviets to go along with them, this would not lead to agreement.

7. At conclusion of meeting Zorin suggested that next informal meeting should consider concrete proposals, Stassen said, concrete proposals by either side, to which Zorin agreed.

8. Full memorandum reporting discussion will be pouched.<sup>2</sup>

**Barbour**

---

<sup>2</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

---

**289. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, August 22, 1957—10 p.m.*

1351. USDel Disarmament No. 534. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Subject: US-USSR bilateral, 11 am, August 22, at 44 Grosvenor Square.

*Highlights:*

1. With the consent of Western three delegations, USDel met with SovDel for purpose of discussing new Western proposals on nuclear testing. Zorin asked series of detailed serious questions on Western proposals on testing in a businesslike manner; questions apparently developed by SovDel for purpose acquiring more information on new positions. The meeting consisted of three hours discussion plus hour and a half working luncheon.

*Details:*

2. Zorin opened by asking what was precise difference between former Western position on nuclear testing and position presented in subcommittee on 21 August.<sup>2</sup> Stassen replied that new position showed West now disposed favorably to consideration two year sus-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-2257. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Stassen's statement on the suspension of nuclear tests to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, August 21 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.149), is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 845-848.



pension of testing under certain conditions. New position showed West also willing agree cut in production fissionable material for weapons would not occur in first year of agreement. Stassen then suggested Zorin's detailed questions might be best way to further clarification Western position.

3. Control system for testing. Referring to the first paragraph of Western proposals on testing as presented in subcommittee on 21 August, Zorin noted that all parties to agreement would refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for 12 months provided agreement reached on installation, maintenance necessary controls; Zorin inquired when controls of testing would be established. Stassen answered that suspension of testing would go into force on same day as treaty, without awaiting establishment of control. However, there would be agreement that control would be established and both sides would move promptly and reciprocally to install an inspection system to monitor the suspension of testing. US did not consider it advisable or practicable to specify exact time for installation control system other than to say that if control not installed by time first year ended, this fact would be ground for dissatisfaction. Both sides must be satisfied with operation of inspection system before moving to second suspension period. Stassen expressed view that technical experts should meet to prepare details of inspection system in order to obtain clear understanding of what should be done. Referring again to the first paragraph of the new Western proposals on testing, Zorin inquired whether reaching agreement on controls meant agreement in principle only or whether there would be detailed specifications in the treaty on such matters as numbers and locations of control posts and types of instruments to be utilized. Stassen asked what the SovDel view on this would be. Zorin replied that it would be difficult for him to say which would be preferable and that he had asked the question seeking to understand the text of the Western proposals. Stassen replied that technical advice would be needed on this question and that the more exact were the details the less room there would be for misunderstanding. Stassen thought that the point may now have been reached where scientific discussions on this subject would be useful. If the USSR had a definite plan for a control system the US would study the plan and give its reaction to it. While the US did not ask for undue haste in any of these matters, it would think it unfortunate if there were undue delay.

4. Second suspension period. Zorin inquired whether a new agreement would be required after the initial 12 months suspension period in order to move to the second suspension period. Stassen stated that his own preliminary view was that the treaty might provide for a two-year suspension of testing while giving the President discretionary authority on the basis of specified conditions necessary for

entering the second 12 months suspension of testing. Stassen felt that the treaty could provide that at the end of the first year governments would say yes or no as to whether there should be a second year of suspension. Zorin noted that the Western proposals specified that parties concerned must be satisfied that various conditions have been met before agreeing to a second period of suspension. Zorin asked which countries were considered to be parties concerned. Stassen replied that each of the three nuclear powers would have to be satisfied as well as any state whose affirmative vote was required in the operation of a board of control. This would include France, but the US did not have a firm view of what other countries would be required; certainly fifty parties could not each be given the veto power.

5. Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons. Zorin observed that the Western proposals implied that a date would be established by which time the cut-off on production of fissionable material for weapons must be effected; if there was to be a date, what date was contemplated? In response, Stassen stressed the mutual interests of the US and USSR in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to many countries. Stassen said that a suspension of testing alone was not enough to prevent the spread and agreement on the cut-off would be required. The August 21 proposals had made it clear that if a controlled cut-off did not occur within two years of entry into force of the treaty, testing would be resumed. Stassen said, if the Soviet Union had some particular date in mind the US would be prepared to consider it.

6. Control of the cut-off. Noting that the Western proposals called for technical experts to meet for the purpose of designing an inspection system to verify the suspension of testing, Zorin inquired who would develop an inspection system for the cut-off and when would this be done? Stassen replied that it seemed logical to the USDel that a group of experts would design an inspection system for the cut-off and that these experts would begin their work promptly after ratification of the treaty. This type of inspection system was more difficult and complex, Stassen said, and for this reason the work on the control system could progress better after the treaty went into force.

7. Other measures of a disarmament agreement. Zorin remarked that the nuclear testing proposals had been introduced as one of a series of provisions which would form an agreement on disarmament; what other measures would the USDel think should be in this agreement? Stassen replied that there should be provisions that (a) in the first year the US and USSR would reduce their force levels to 2.5 million with further reductions to 2.1 and 1.7 million being contemplated; (b) there would be some for later under the condition stated in the subcommittee reduction in non-nuclear armaments in the first year with further reductions contemplated; (c) a beginning would be made

by inspecting one of the alternative inspection zones in the August 2 proposal; (d) beginnings on reductions of military expenditures should be contemplated; (e) a group of experts should meet to devise means of controlling development of missiles; (f) efforts would continue to be made to reach a later comprehensive disarmament program. Zorin asked whether the question of renunciation of use of nuclear weapons would be included. Stassen said that in a modified form the renunciation of use of nuclear weapons might be included or else the question could be postponed as being a matter to be worked out later under a comprehensive agreement. Zorin then asked whether numbers of bases, reductions of troops in Germany and other countries would be included. Stassen said that these questions were not essential from the standpoint of the US and were not included. He recalled his earlier discussions on this subject. Where serious political problems were involved, Stassen noted, it would be difficult to reach agreement on a first step of disarmament.

8. Zorin concluded by thanking Stassen for his clarification of the 21 August proposals and said that he might have other questions later. It was possible also that the SovDel might ask some of these questions formally in the subcommittee. Zorin thought it would facilitate the work if the final positions of the West on various matters could be made known. Stassen said that he thought the SovDel now understood the substance of the major Western positions and that the views of the USSR on any of these matters, including views on the August 2 paper on inspection zones, would also facilitate the work of the subcommittee.

9. The meeting ended at 3:25 p.m.

10. *Comment:* Worthy of note there were no remarks about a European zone, no negative attacks, and a serious tone in the approach to the problems.

**Barbour**

## 290. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*London, August 23, 1957—3 p.m.*

1365. For Gerard Smith. In accordance with Deptel 1510,<sup>2</sup> I have sent the following reply to David Ormsby-Gore emphasizing that we did not wish to make any mention of Congress. Macmillan is back at No. 10 today, and Ormsby-Gore said he felt that my response was satisfactory.

"Supplementing and confirming our discussions of August 15th and 19th,<sup>3</sup> and responding to your letter of August 16th,<sup>4</sup> the modifications in the US position on nuclear testing and related nuclear matters, which were reported to you on August 15th,<sup>5</sup> do not change in any manner the fistexchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and the President in June 1957.

"You have noted that the revised policy continues to link the nuclear provisions with a broader partial measures agreement, and that no date is now set for the 'cut-off' itself. It is made clear however that nuclear testing may be resumed if the installation of the inspection system for the cut-off and its implementation has not occurred within 24 months after the entry into force of the treaty. Each party concerned must be satisfied, not only at the time of the ratification of the treaty, but also upon the occasion of the passage from the first year to the second on the testing matter, and at the later date established for approval of the inspection system before the cut-off itself occurs.

"Ample time is thus provided in relationship to the exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and the President, which is neither contracted or expanded by the modifications in US policy or by our consultations and correspondence.

"May I add my personal appreciation of your cooperation in reaching agreement on the four delegation paper for forwarding to

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8-2357. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Dated August 22, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8-2057)

<sup>3</sup> Discussion between Stassen and Ormsby-Gore on August 15 is presumably the one reported in telegram 1221 from London, August 17, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8-1757) Discussion between them on August 19 is reported in telegram 1237 from London, August 19, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8-1957)

<sup>4</sup> Reported in telegram 1225 from London, August 18. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8-1857)

<sup>5</sup> The changes in the June 11 U.S. position on a first phase of disarmament, sent to the President in Herter's August 13 memorandum, were transmitted to Stassen in telegram 1277 to London, August 14. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8-1457)

NATO,<sup>6</sup> and in the priority partial presentation to the subcommittee on August 21st."<sup>7</sup>

Barbour

---

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 1301 from London, August 21, contains the text of the four-power draft working paper for forwarding to NATO. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8-2157)

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the proposals on the suspension of nuclear testing, which Stassen submitted on behalf of the Western powers to the disarmament subcommittee on August 21. (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.149) It is quoted in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 846-847.

---

**291. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, August 28, 1957, 10:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>**

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles  
Mr. Rountree<sup>2</sup> (part-time)  
Mr. Gerard Smith (part-time)  
Mr. Hagerty (part-time)  
Major Eisenhower

[Here follows discussion regarding the Middle East, extracts of which are printed in volume XIII, pages 659-669.]

*Disarmament*—(Here, Mr. Rountree was replaced by Mr. Gerard Smith)

The question at stake here was the timing and the issuing agency of a statement on U.S. government's reaction to Mr. Zorin's speech,<sup>3</sup> coupled with the Soviet announcement of successful testing of an ICBM.<sup>4</sup> Consulted on this matter was Mr. Stassen who talked to Secretary Dulles by phone during the meeting.<sup>5</sup> Thus, changes in wording were made in the basic press release. The final result of the discussion was that the release would be made by 12:00 noon this date (August

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. Drafted by Major Eisenhower.

<sup>2</sup> William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Zorin's speech to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, August 27 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/65/Rev. 1), is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 849-868.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding the Soviet announcement, see *The New York Times*, August 27, pp. 1 and 6.

<sup>5</sup> No record of a morning telephone conversation between Dulles and Stassen has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

28th) by the White House.<sup>6</sup> The reason for the immediate release by the White House is that it is a high priority matter when the coincidence of Soviet timing is considered, and is incapable of handling by any agency other than the White House itself. Mr. Hagerty was charged with informing Acting Secretary Quarles and Admiral Strauss of the release.

**John S.D. Eisenhower**  
*Major, Infantry, US Army*

---

<sup>6</sup> For Eisenhower's August 28 statement on disarmament, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 635-636.

---

## 292. Editorial Note

On August 28, President Eisenhower signed into law Public Law 177 providing for United States participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency. This legislation implemented ratification of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which the Senate had consented to on June 18 and the President had signed on June 28.

Regarding Senate consent to and ratification of the statute, see Document 243.

During hearings on this implementing legislation in the Agreements for Cooperation Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator John W. Bricker introduced an amendment requiring congressional approval of each future transfer of fissionable material by the United States to the Agency. Exempted from this amendment were materials already promised or pledged to the Agency by the United States. The Joint Committee adopted this amendment; and though the House of Representatives rejected it, it was retained and expanded in the Senate-House conference report to require congressional authorization of future materials not only to the International Atomic Energy Agency but also to other bodies such as Euratom. The Senate on August 19 and the House on August 20 adopted the conference report by voice votes.

For text of the International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act, see 71 Stat. 453. Regarding congressional actions, see *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 85th Congress, 1st Session . . . 1957* (Washington, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1957), volume XIII, pages 580-582.

**293. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, August 30, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

## OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles  
Governor Stassen  
Mr. Gerard Smith  
General Goodpaster

The purpose of the meeting was to enable Mr. Stassen to report the status of disarmament negotiations in light of Zorin's recent speeches. Mr. Stassen said that we have put our whole proposal before the Soviets<sup>2</sup> except for the matter of a European zone, which is being held up until after the German elections. He said he had formulated the following alternatives as to what the Soviets might be doing: first, they may be closing out the talks; second, they may be probing hard to see if we will make further concessions; third, these actions may be a front behind which they are preparing to make a further concession themselves. Mr. Stassen said he is inclined to think No. 3 is the most likely, but he is in a decided minority in so thinking. He said there have been similar instances previously, although they are much tougher in their line than before. Zorin, however, had said he would be present at the meeting on Tuesday,<sup>3</sup> and that his last statement did not mean that the last meeting was a final one.

Mr. Stassen felt we should not yield further, and the President said there is nothing we could offer. Mr. Stassen said there are two possibilities for consideration. The first is to make some of the provisions separable, and the second pertains to the European zone after the German elections. Regarding the first, he said that perhaps we could start the Arctic zone operation and agree to stop testing if the Soviets make concessions. Mr. Dulles asked whether we would not insist on a cut-off of production, and the President asked if we would not have to obtain their commitment at least to the principle. The President thought we will gain through putting a cut-off of production into effect (Mr. Stassen had suggested that this provision is perhaps not too important to the western world). Mr. Stassen then said that after the German elections we could "round out" the European zone, and Secretary Dulles recalled that we have said we would consult on a small zone, which must include substantial Russian territory.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 31.

<sup>2</sup> The Western working paper submitted to the disarmament subcommittee on August 29 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/66) is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 868-884.

<sup>3</sup> September 3.

Governor Stassen then said that there will be a better chance next week to see if Zorin's statements are a closing out of the present negotiations, or are just probing. He said we will then have to decide whether we try to require them to terminate the negotiations. Mr. Dulles said there is another alternative, additional to the three cited by Governor Stassen. That is an effort in the United Nations to set up a new forum for debating the topic, bringing in India and other countries. The President said he sees signs they are trying to obtain world support for simple pledges—which so far as he is concerned would be worthless in the case of the Soviets. Mr. Dulles said the Soviets have been taking the stand that the present negotiations are too much in terms of the USSR vs. NATO. Mr. Smith suggested that we might wish to have the Philippines and Sweden added to the subcommittee, and Mr. Stassen said the Soviets would probably try to have India added.

The President said that he has seen some favorable comment developing on the free world proposal just made in the negotiations. Mr. Dulles added that it was a great step forward to obtain NATO agreement on this proposal.

Responding to a question by the President, Mr. Stassen reported the large number of meetings that are being held (two or three in all on nearly every day). The negotiation is an exercise in infinite patience. He recalled that Zorin had said that it looks as though the West is proposing to give West Germany a veto on the plans being developed. He said that the Soviets give some indication that they think their position has been deteriorating since the United States made its statement about willingness to accept a two-year suspension. Many countries are now supporting our proposal for a cut-off of production. The President reverted to the question of a possible Soviet drive for "pledges." He thought that Ambassador Lodge should simply review the record of Soviet pledges since 1933 and subsequent violations. The President said that the United States should be ready to hit this proposal hard because many people are susceptible to the suggestion of simply making agreements not to use the weapons. Inspection is the key to the whole problem.

Secretary Dulles ended by saying that he has a question in his mind as to whether the Soviets will ever open up their country to the extent needed to institute this program. He recalled that they have practically closed down on cultural exchanges since last April.

**G**  
*Brigadier General, USA*



294. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, September 2, 1957<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State  
Governor Stassen  
Ronald Spiers, S/AE

The meeting was held at Governor Stassen's request to discuss with the Secretary the next steps in the Disarmament Subcommittee talks.

1. It was agreed that Governor Stassen should make a further affirmative statement in support of the Four-Power proposals at tomorrow's Subcommittee meeting. After the Subcommittee session an informal Five-Power meeting should be held with the Soviet delegation, and a recess until the end of September (or until after completion of the Assembly opening general debate) would be proposed in order to give the Soviets an opportunity to study the Western proposals further and perhaps to develop counter proposals. If the Soviets do not agree to such a recess, the U.S. delegation will seek to prolong the meeting until after the German elections.<sup>2</sup> If the Soviets wish a longer recess, the U.S. delegation will seek further instructions from Washington. Governor Stassen estimated that the British, French and Canadians would agree to such a procedure. He also suggested that the matter be discussed with Adenauer before we agreed to any complete break in the meetings. The Secretary stated that any recess should not seemingly be related to the German elections. We should also avoid any implication that we want to avoid a General Assembly debate on disarmament, since this would make a telling point for Soviet propaganda. The Secretary thought that we should propose that the Subcommittee continue in session between the end of the general debate and the beginning of the committee debate on disarmament, as a demonstration of U.S. sincerity of purpose.

2. With regard to the question of enlargement of the Subcommittee, the Secretary observed that IO did not favor any U.S. initiative in this direction. In his view, enlargement might be the death-knell for the possibility of serious subcommittee negotiations. On the other

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-257. Secret. Drafted by Spiers.

<sup>2</sup> The West German general election was held on September 15, with the Christian Democratic Union led by Adenauer winning an absolute majority of seats in the Bundestag.

hand, the Soviet proposal<sup>3</sup> might be difficult to defeat, and it might upon further consideration seem desirable for us to take the initiative in expanding the Subcommittee in a direction more favorable to ourselves.

3. The Secretary said that he wished to consider whether there were not some elements of the Western proposals which the free world might be able to put into effect among themselves, without waiting for Soviet agreement. This might constitute a useful attack on the "4th Power" problem. He was also considering whether we might not accept a self-imposed limitation on nuclear testing in such a manner that there would be no net increase in the radioactive materials in the atmosphere as a result of our tests, i.e. that no more fission products would be generated than would compensate for the decay rate. Governor Stassen felt that such steps would give further reason for reconsidering our present position to determine whether there was a more limited proposal which we should try out with the Soviets, e.g. limited aerial zones, suspension of testing or regional European reductions and aerial zones. He realized that nothing could be done on this before the German elections, and emphasized that these suggestions were for future consideration. The Secretary said that while in his view there was no necessary connection between aerial inspection zones and the cut-off, there was between the cut-off and suspension of tests. Governor Stassen suggested that it might be desirable for the Secretary to propose during his Assembly speech<sup>4</sup> that, for example, of the 2.5 million first stage force levels for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., no more than 10% would be stationed in Central Europe. Alternatively, it could be proposed that if the Soviets will withdraw their troops in Hungary, we will withdraw a specified number from West Germany. Governor Stassen said that he understood that the U.S. was contemplating limited withdrawals in Europe in any case.

---

<sup>3</sup> At one point in his speech to the disarmament subcommittee on August 27, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 864-866, Zorin proposed the enlargement of the disarmament subcommittee.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding Dulles' speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 19, see the editorial note, *infra*.

**295. Editorial Note**

On September 19, Secretary Dulles addressed the United Nations General Assembly. Much of his speech was on disarmament, especially the recent developments in the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. On September 16, Dulles had sent a draft of a passage of his proposed speech along with a covering memorandum to the President, who was vacationing in Newport, Rhode Island. In this passage he implied that the United States would be willing to discuss with other free nations the application of some of the principles on regulation of armaments worked out between them in preparing a Western powers' position at the London disarmament talks. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda) In his reply, September 17, telephoned to Dulles from Newport, the President wrote in part:

"I can see that the purposes you are seeking are laudable ones. Entirely aside from the economy you would achieve, you would be serving notice on the Soviets that their refusal to bargain in good faith in the matter of disarmament will result in much closer military and political collaboration between the nations of the free world, and this in turn would bring about a more widespread deployment of nuclear weapons in order that security might be achieved at the lowest possible cost. I think that such warning or implication could be conveyed in not more than a sentence or two, whereas I rather feel your passage could possibly create some misunderstanding, even among our own people." (*Ibid.*)

Dulles only briefly alluded to the benefits of collective security arrangements between the United States and its Western European allies in reducing the burden and risks of armaments in his speech, which is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 7, 1957, pages 555-559.

---

**296. Editorial Note**

British Prime Minister Macmillan wrote to President Eisenhower about nuclear disarmament around September 21. Part of Macmillan's letter repeated a proposal he had presented in a September 18 memorandum, which British Foreign Secretary Lloyd had discussed with Secretary Dulles in Washington. Macmillan later recorded that he "was anxious that we should not appear before the United Nations without some definite and 'constructive' plan." He therefore:

"proposed that we should make a gesture, which would be both practicable and imaginative:

"First, we would undertake to declare [all tests] . . . beforehand and register them with the United Nations, or some other body. Second, we would undertake to limit our explosions during the next two years unilaterally, whether the Russians agreed or not. Third, that the limit of our explosions would be such as would create an amount of radiation, etc., which would not exceed a specified figure.'" (Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, pages 313-314. Ellipses and brackets in the source text.)

Macmillan's letter and a note from Ambassador Caccia, dated September 21 and saying he had been asked to deliver the message to the President, are in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.

---

**297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 23, 1957—2:30 p.m.*

2305. Please deliver following personal message from President to Prime Minister. Confirm date and time of delivery.<sup>2</sup>

"September 23, 1957.

Dear Harold:

I have your letter on disarmament—dated the 21st I think.<sup>3</sup> I spoke briefly to Foster about it when I was in Washington this morning.<sup>4</sup> I am going back to Newport this afternoon and he in the meantime will speak to Lewis Strauss.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.4112/9—2357. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> According to telegram 2033 from London, September 24, this message was delivered to Macmillan on September 24 at 10:30 a.m. (London time). (*Ibid.*, 711.11-EI/2457)

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> A day earlier, on September 22 at 9:40 a.m., Eisenhower had conveyed a telephone message to Dulles in which he said that he was sympathetic to Macmillan's viewpoint. "However," he added, "I am doubtful about the propaganda value of saying that we would limit our tests to the number that would create only a specified amount of radiation. On the other hand, any joint statement announcing the intention to register in advance, to fix a reasonable limit and, incidentally, to state that this would never exceed a certain level of radiation, might have real worth." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

We have, together, already moved quite a distance in the direction you suggest and perhaps by putting it all together, and putting it in a fresh package with some little addition, it could be made into what would catch the popular imagination.

I shall be in touch with you later after I get a further report of the talk between Foster and Lewis Strauss.<sup>5</sup>

I share your happiness over our close working relations with reference to the Middle East.

With warm personal regard,  
As ever, Ike''

Dulles

---

<sup>5</sup> An undated letter from Strauss to Dulles and an attached undated draft statement are not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-2957) In a September 29 letter to the President enclosing copies of these documents, Dulles remarked in part: "I must confess I am somewhat disappointed that he does not seem to feel it is possible to go further with specific proposals to limit testing." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

---

**298. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 27, 1957.*

I have studied your informal memorandum of September 23, 1957,<sup>2</sup> with reference to "disarmament" and have the following comments:

(A) I do not believe that we should now alter, or consider substantial departure from, the Four Power Proposals of August 29, 1957, approved also by NATO. These proposals, made less than a month ago, after months of the most thorough and difficult negotiation within and between the NATO countries, have been hailed by President Eisenhower and myself as historic proposals of great significance. The Soviets have called them a "sham". If now we basically and precipitously alter them, that in itself will certainly be judged in the eyes of world opinion as substantiating the Soviet characterization of them and we shall be put in a humiliating public position.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Disarmament Talks. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-2357)

I believe that these proposals are in fact sound and of immense significance, and I believe that the United States should defend and support them. That is the position which I publicly took in my opening address at the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>3</sup>

(B) With respect to the substance of your proposals, a great deal could be said. However, it is perhaps sufficient to say this:

(1) It seems to me that the proposals would give the Soviet Union immediate and immense political successes without any corresponding gain for ourselves, e.g.:

(a) It would bring about a total suspension of testing without any agreement for "cut-off" or inspection against surprise attack;

(b) It would be a major step toward the neutralization and demilitarization of Germany and the freezing of the present partition of Germany;

(c) By adopting the procedure of bilateral talks with the Soviet Union, we would give what has, since 1945, been the great Soviet goal of dealing directly with us to the exclusion of our allies. This procedure would almost surely trouble, if not break, our NATO alliance. It was your bilateral talk in London that precipitated the grave crisis with the UK and Germany last June.

(2) France almost surely would not accept a suspension of testing without a cessation of production and some efforts at least to limit Soviet conventional power. France would feel that it would be placed in a position of permanent inferiority with no compensations. No French Government, we believe, can accept this. It was difficult enough to get the French to accept our present proposals.

(3) We can, I think, be certain that Adenauer would not accept the proposal of what you refer to as "a reasonable initial European-Russian inspection zone". I assume you refer to a zone substantially more restricted than the "5-35" zone which the Germans have already indicated they would accept as a fall-back position if the Soviets reject the all-Europe zone. Of course the Soviets have not responded to our invitation to propose such a small European zone if they did not want the all-European zone.

(4) We doubt very much that it is practical or desirable to propose the opening up to inspection of the western half of the United States as against Eastern Siberia and adopting in this respect the criterion of equality of square miles as the test which you feel the Russians will demand that we accept.

(5) The suggestions which you make insofar as they relate to nuclear testing, etc., seem contrary to what the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman of the AEC believe to be compatible with the essential security needs of the United States. But I shall, if you agree, get their specific comments.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Regarding Dulles' speech, see Document 295.

<sup>4</sup> Strauss' views on Stassen's informal memorandum of September 23 are contained in his memorandum to Dulles, September 28. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Disarmament Talks) Strauss' memorandum was attached to a note from Dulles to Eisenhower, September 29. (*Ibid.*) For the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Document 300 and its enclosure.

(C) The total impact of your proposals seems to me to reinforce the fear held by many both here and abroad that you feel that some agreement between the United States and the Russians is so sought by world public opinion that we should if necessary make such an agreement on Russia's terms. But world public opinion, now largely emotional, should not be our guide. We should try to guide it. The past record suggests that wars are not avoided, and safety not gained, by imprudent disarmament measures.

(D) Our position should never be inflexible and, as I think you know, we and the UK are now searching for some acceptable and significant formula for the limitation of testing. I suppose that, with the passing of time, the need for testing at anything like the present rate and dimensions would diminish, at least as far as the United States is concerned. There may be changes in the point of view of the French and German Governments. These, and other relevant factors, ought constantly to be taken into account. Certainly, my mind is not closed to the consideration of changes which in themselves have validity. But at the moment it seems to me that all of the considerations which led to our August 29th proposals are valid. The only new event to which you refer is the German elections, and I suspect that Adenauer's great victory will tend to reinforce him in his views rather than alter those views. With this possible exception, the reasons you give for change of our August 29th position are merely that these changes would make our position more acceptable to the Russians. This seems to me not to be an adequate reason.

John Foster Dulles <sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**299. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 28, 1957.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I had long talk yesterday with Harold Stassen. He said that he had had a prior talk with Sherman Adams which had indicated that there was doubt, which he shared, as to whether he should carry on in the disarmament work. In order to clarify the situation he had prepared a memorandum of his views. (I enclose a copy of this.)<sup>2</sup> I said that I had studied the memorandum and found myself unable to agree with it for reasons which I had put down in a

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-2857. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 600.0012/9-2357)

memorandum to him. (A copy of my memorandum is also enclosed herewith.)<sup>3</sup>

I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that Harold feels that we should seek some sort of an agreement with the Russians on almost any terms—their terms, if necessary. And indeed his memorandum means, in essence, that we accept their terms. My feeling is that this is a dangerous attitude; that the very process of seeking this agreement, by bilateral talks, will dangerously breach our relations with our Western Allies and after that is accomplished we may get no agreement at all, or at best an agreement which will have nothing in it worth while either in substance, or in means of verification of promises.

Harold recognizes that the difference of our viewpoints is perhaps irreconcilable and said that at your convenience he thought it would be useful if you had a talk with him and me. I agreed to this.<sup>4</sup>

I have meanwhile submitted Harold's memorandum to me to Lewis Strauss and to Defense so as to get their views.<sup>5</sup>

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>4</sup> See Document 304.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, *supra.*

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**300. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, September 30, 1957.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is in reply to your letter dated September 27, 1957<sup>2</sup> in which you requested the views of the Department of Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the courses of action proposed by Mr. Stassen in the memorandum<sup>3</sup> accompanying your letter. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which the Department of Defense is in agreement, are inclosed herewith.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-3057. Secret. In an October 1 letter to Eisenhower, Dulles enclosed copies of this letter and attached memorandum. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

<sup>2</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-2357)



Mr. Stassen's proposal for a two-year nuclear weapons test suspension in its essentials is similar to the proposal advanced by the Soviet Delegate in the Disarmament Sub-Committee in July 1957, which the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada have consistently opposed as an isolated measure for adoption outside the context of a disarmament agreement.

The Department of Defense considers that the United States position regarding a first phase of disarmament, as developed from the decisions taken by the President on June 11, 1957 and subsequently, provides a reasonable basis for negotiation assuming that the USSR is, in fact, intent upon achieving a limited disarmament arrangement. This position was adopted only after prolonged study and deliberation. The interrelation of its several elements was designed to assure that in the approach to a disarmament agreement no single element could be exploited by one side or the other, to meet its own interests, to the exclusion of the other elements which are requisites to a balanced program. The USSR has seized upon the suspension of nuclear weapons testing as a prime vehicle for propaganda purposes, while it has cynically rejected the Western Four lower proposals for a first phase disarmament agreement. This, taken in conjunction with the unreasonable conditions which render the Soviet proposals obviously unacceptable to the West casts grave doubts upon the sincerity of the USSR with regard to a disarmament arrangement as a whole. The Department of Defense therefore strongly indorses the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States not adopt Mr. Stassen's proposal for the suspension of nuclear testing without an agreement for the cessation of nuclear production and the other elements of our first phase disarmament proposals.

Although Mr. Stassen's proposal provides that signatory states undertake to make a sustained effort during the twenty-four months to reach agreement upon, and begin to implement, additional steps of disarmament, it is considered that there is little likelihood that such an undertaking would be more fruitful of results than past negotiations. The Soviets have not hesitated to ignore the previous directives of the United Nations to this same effect, and it is doubtful that they would attach any greater significance to the proposed undertaking. The agreement for an unconditional test suspension would constitute a propaganda victory for them and would avoid their commitment for other measures less favorable to their interests. Further, their success in this effort would doubtless be looked upon as a precedent setting the stage for singling out other elements of their proposals for exploitation, notably the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

While the Department of Defense would not advocate or sponsor a spreading of nuclear weapons production, it is not convinced that a net disadvantage to the security interests of the United States would

result if France, for example, were to embark upon such a program. In this connection, it should be noted that France has until now insisted that in the Western proposals there be a link between the suspension of nuclear testing and the cessation of production.

On balance, the Department of Defense considers that the security interests of the United States would best be served by adhering to the present position for a first phase disarmament arrangement. It is therefore recommended that this proposal not be adopted as United States policy regarding disarmament.

Sincerely yours,

Donald A. Quarles

[Enclosure]

**Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the  
Secretary of Defense (Wilson)<sup>4</sup>**

*Washington, September 30, 1957.*

SUBJECT

Disarmament (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 30 September 1957, subject: "Disarmament Planning."<sup>5</sup>

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that Mr. Stassen's latest disarmament proposal, as outlined in his informal memorandum to the Secretary of State, dated 23 September 1957, is inconsistent with the security interests of the United States.

3. In proposing to extract the nuclear testing provision of the Four Power Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957 for separate consideration, Mr. Stassen abandons the requirement for prior agreement by the USSR to all of the other provisions of the 29 August 1957 proposal. From a security viewpoint, no discernible change has taken place since 29 August 1957 in the international situation, or in the intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union, to warrant separation of the Four Power Joint Proposals. One of the requirements of the 29 August 1957 proposals, which resulted from protracted negotiation with our NATO Allies, was that all their provisions were "inseparable". This inseparability made the proposals barely acceptable for meeting the minimum requirements for national security and security of the Western Powers.

---

<sup>4</sup> Secret.

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

4. In extracting the nuclear testing provision from the Four Power Joint Proposals, Mr. Stassen has postponed consideration of the corollary provision for the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, to include the installation of a satisfactory inspection system to insure compliance. Mr. Stassen now feels that such an inspection system is not attainable in the first move, despite the fact that the Western Powers have agreed that it must be attained in the first twenty-four months of a first phase disarmament agreement in order for the agreement to be effective. Only this corollary provision assists in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear warfare; the cessation of nuclear testing per se need not contribute at all to the effective control of nuclear weapons.

5. Another aspect of this proposal is that, except for the starting date, it is in consonance with the Soviet Resolutions on Suspension of Nuclear Tests which was introduced into the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1957.<sup>6</sup> In completely acceding to the Soviet position of considering separately the suspension of nuclear testing as a prerequisite to any disarmament agreement, the United States would be placed in a weakened bargaining position in any future negotiations.

6. In stating that his proposal is in the best interest of the United States, Mr. Stassen indicates that France could develop a capability to test nuclear weapons by late 1958, or early 1959, if she chooses to do so, and once this point were reached, the wide spreading of nuclear weapons would then be beyond control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff question that France has the monetary or technical capability to develop a nuclear program with such speed. Further, assuming that she did obtain this capability, it might well be in the best interest of the United States and NATO.

7. Mr. Stassen further asserts that this proposal would check on the intentions of the USSR with a minimum of risk by the United States. Eight or ten fixed ground inspection posts in the USSR for verifying the suspension of nuclear tests would provide only minor improvement in the Western intelligence capability to determine Soviet intentions. This slight intelligence gain is more than offset in risk to the United States by the possibility that the Soviets might claim that fixed ground inspection posts, because of their success in supervising the suspension of nuclear tests, would be adequate for inspection in a first phase disarmament agreement. This would jeopardize the Western position that the inspection system in a first phase disarmament agreement must consist of coterminous aerial and ground components, with freedom of access to all objects of control.

---

<sup>6</sup> A Soviet memorandum on partial disarmament measures, including the suspension of atomic and hydrogen weapons testing, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 20 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/793), is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 874-884.

8. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:

- a. Against the adoption of Mr. Stassen's proposal,
- b. Continued adherence to the Four Power Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957, as the U.S. position in any negotiations on disarmament, and
- c. That the above comments form the basis of your reply to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**N.F. Twining<sup>7</sup>**  
Chairman

---

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Twining became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 15.

---

### 301. Editorial Note

On October 1, President Eisenhower sent a personal message to the Prime Minister of Japan, Nobusuke Kishi, in response to Kishi's message to the President, September 24. In his message Kishi had appealed for United States support for a proposal for a one-year suspension of nuclear tests which the Japanese had recently made at the United Nations. Eisenhower in his reply declined to support a suspension of testing in the absence of effective limitations on nuclear weapons production and other conditions. This exchange of messages, released to the press on October 4, is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pages 716-718.

Earlier, on June 20, Kishi had discussed the question of prohibition of nuclear tests as well as other issues with Secretary Dulles. A memorandum of this conversation is scheduled for publication in volume XXIII.

**302. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, October 5, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Disarmament

**PARTICIPANTS**

Secretary Dulles  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Edward L. Freers  
Foreign Minister Gromyko  
Ambassador Zaroubin  
Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky<sup>2</sup>

Secretary Dulles: With regard to disarmament, we are puzzled again about the attitude of the Soviet Union. No progress was made in the Subcommittee on Disarmament. The Soviet attitude at the end, in rejecting the Western proposals, cancelled out the hopes we held earlier in the negotiations. We know you feel that there cannot be progress without what you call "confidence". This cannot be built just out of words. It would be created by a system of inspection. This is of primary importance. The establishment of an accurate system would be a beginning and would be interpreted by the American people as indicating less chance for war and less need for armaments. This is true even though danger could still be lurking, despite such inspection. What else would breed confidence, we do not know. You proposed a system of ground inspection. We proposed aerial photography. Now we have agreed to a combination of both. We do not think ground inspection is adequate, since ground posts can be by-passed. Aerial photography is also needed. That is why we proposed a marriage of the two. We press this because it would give a real ingredient for confidence—a reduction of armaments would quickly result. On the nuclear side, great danger is the fourth power danger. An irresponsible dictator would get a bomb and would throw it wherever he wanted—on New York or Moscow. It is frightening to think of a world where anybody could have a bomb. The cruder they are the more fissionable fallout results. That is why we proposed a cut-off of the use of fissionable material for new weapons. This is not popular with our allies. It would stop the UK with a small amount. It would prevent the accumulation of any at all by other countries such as France. We were able to induce other countries, Great Britain, France and Germany, to accept this although they were very reluctant. Only such a program would

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/10-557. Secret. Drafted by Freers.

<sup>2</sup> Oleg Aleksandrovich Troyanovsky, Adviser to the Soviet Delegation at the U.N. General Assembly; interpreter.

prevent one country after another from using a fissionable material for weapons. This is the only way we know to keep things under control—that is cutting off now—after a certain date never to use fissionable material to make weapons. We are worried about irresponsible countries. There is not much danger that the US and the USSR—and the UK with its smaller amount—would use their stockpiles of weapons irresponsibly. They have too much at stake. A dictator could use the bombs to blackmail the rest of the world. We don't know the basis of your objections to our proposal. Maybe you think we have a larger stockpile. Perhaps so, but yours is large enough to do much damage. And it will be a year or two before the cut-off would be effective. We cannot see why our proposal is so unacceptable to prevent the spread of these weapons to the rest of the world.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Of course, it was not a new idea that Mr. Dulles expressed in talking about the importance of the cessation of production of weapons from new fissionable material. There has been previous discussion on this question. Agreement on the basis of that proposal is impossible. We believe it would not improve the situation but lead to a deterioration of it. The production of weapons from newly produced fissionable material would be stopped, but the stockpiles of weapons would remain untouched, and the weapons themselves would not be prohibited. This would be tantamount to the legalization of nuclear weapons. This would be unacceptable. In our view, there is a possibility of an understanding on disarmament. Experience shows, however, that the problem as a whole is difficult. We should move to a partial agreement. We believe that the point mentioned by Mr. Dulles is no subject for agreement at the present time.

I will refer to other points on which we think agreement can be reached. First, there is the question of the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen tests. We are convinced that this is one of the questions on which agreement can be reached even now. There are no objective obstacles to it providing there is a desire on the part of the US and the Soviet Union to reach an understanding. We think that it would be possible to detect any violation of this understanding by observation. We have proposed installation of control instruments on the territory of the Soviet Union, the US, Great Britain, France and the Pacific Ocean. An agreement on this point would facilitate agreement on more complicated questions—not to mention other positive results. There does exist a real threat to the health of people and not only to their health alone. Test explosions are made to develop weapons of greater explosive force. Cessation of tests would stop this development. The Soviet Union has no more to gain by it than the US. Both the US and the Soviet Union and the common cause of peace stand to gain if the tests are stopped. We are sure that the Soviet Union is not more interested in stopping the tests than is the US. We mention this

point because we believe that a suspension of tests would lead to a better atmosphere between our countries and a better world atmosphere. An agreement here might prove a turning point. It might result in an improvement in the situation and a better atmosphere in which other aspects of disarmament would be settled.

I would like to mention the possibility of agreement on the renunciation of the use of atomic weapons, without for the time-being liquidating stockpiles. This could be for 5 years, say, and we could revert to the matter later on.

The Soviet Union has made other proposals. We have called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, from the NATO countries, and from the Warsaw Pact countries. Has the Government of the US taken everything into consideration in this regard? Would the Government of the United States think it over once again? An agreement would be to the advantage of your country, of our country, and of world peace.

We also made proposals regarding conventional armaments. The figures coincided with certain figures suggested by the US. I won't talk about our proposals regarding the liquidation of military bases. You know them well enough.

I want to talk now about proposals for checking posts and for aerial photography. With regard to the question of inspection of posts—our proposal—we do not put this forward separately from our other proposals for partial disarmament. We do look upon it as our proposal when it is combined with our other proposals. However, when it is detached from our other proposals, we do not look upon it as our proposal. We give consideration to this proposal in relation to other measures of disarmament and with initial measures in the field of nuclear weapons—that is, in connection with the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. When our proposal on inspection posts is thus connected with our other proposals, we consider it our own and a useful one. (In answer to a question from Secretary Dulles, Mr. Gromyko confirmed that he was at this point talking only about ground inspection—although at some future time ground posts could be installed at airports, he was still talking here about ground inspection.)

As far as aerial photography is concerned, the position of the Soviet Government was expressed immediately after the proposal advanced by President Eisenhower in an informal talk with Mr. Khrushchev. We reiterate that we believe it does not solve the question of the prevention of surprise attack—or ground inspection. In the beginning President Eisenhower did not link them at all. Last autumn we did agree to certain aerial photography.<sup>3</sup> We advanced two propos-

---

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the paragraphs of the declaration of the Soviet Government, November 17, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, p. 727.

als for zones, one in Europe and one in the Far East. This was done by Zorin in talks with Stassen in London. Unfortunately the West and the US did not show sufficient interest in those proposals. Two other ideas in the field of aerial photography were advanced—one in the Arctic region, not deserving serious consideration; the other for the whole territory of the US, the USSR and Canada, but it did not refer to other territories where military bases are located. (Secretary Dulles pointed out that this last point had been subsequently dealt with by him.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Gromyko agreed but said he was describing the proposals as they were dealt with at the time.)

Why does one want to photograph the Arctic? All he would get would be pictures of ice, snow and polar bears.

Secretary Dulles: There have been Soviet explosions of nuclear devices in the area. On our part, there is an important base at Thule.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What does this have to do with surprise attack?

Secretary Dulles: Everybody knows that surprise attacks are likely to come from the Arctic area. Air lines are beginning to cross the area with increasing frequency. We did in fact begin by proposing areas which would embrace the centers of military capability—the territory of the US, the Soviet Union and other parts of Europe. You would not agree, so we proposed the Arctic as a beginning. This was an area with no political struggles and few population problems.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: As to aerial photography, the time is not yet ripe for an agreement. There is a lack of confidence between our two countries. We cannot consider it in earnest. Can anyone imagine British and American planes flying over the Soviet Union and Soviet planes flying over the US at the present time?

Secretary Dulles: As far as the US is concerned—yes.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Taking an objective view of the state of affairs, it is hardly possible to do so. At a later stage, when the state of international confidence improves to a necessary degree, the possibility may exist. But, at that time there would be no need for this nor other similar measures.

---

<sup>4</sup> See the Western working paper submitted to the disarmament subcommittee on August 2, and Dulles' statement to the subcommittee on August 2, both printed *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 837–845.



303. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant  
(Stassen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

Report and Recommendations

1. Now that the election in the Federal Republic of Germany has been concluded with a signal success for Chancellor Adenauer; the London disarmament negotiations have been reviewed; and the Soviet Union's progress in missiles has been confirmed;<sup>2</sup> it is desirable that the situation with regard to the disarmament policy of the U.S. be reviewed and that necessary decisions be made.

2. During the pre-election period the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in the NATO Council were opposed to the conclusion of any feasible immediate agreement which included the inspection of the territory of Germany. Mr. Blankenhorn of the Federal Republic of Germany stated in the NATO Council meeting on June 6th<sup>3</sup> that the initial disarmament measures should under no circumstances go beyond

• • • • •

On August 2nd, Mr. Blankenhorn said in the NATO Council that careful reconsideration should be given within the Council before . . .

3. General Norstad recommended to the NATO Council on June 23rd<sup>4</sup> that it would be in the interest of NATO to establish an initial European inspection zone against surprise attack. . . .

• • • • •

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660.0012/10-757. Secret. Stassen addressed his memorandum to the Secretary of State for the President. The President's consideration of this memorandum is noted in the memorandum of conversation, *infra*. A covering note from Stassen to Dulles, October 7, acknowledges Dulles' September 27 memorandum to Stassen, Document 298, and reads in part:

"It would appear that I have not adequately conveyed the nature and significance to the recommendations which I make.

"I have endeavored to make these recommendations more clear and specific in the enclosed supplemental memorandum with annexes." (Department of State, Central Files, 660.0012/10-757)

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet announcement of the successful testing of an ICBM is reported in *The New York Times*, August 27, pp. 1 and 6.

<sup>3</sup> Verbatim text of Blankenhorn's June 6 statement to the NAC was transmitted in Polto 2946 from Paris, June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 030.13/6-657)

<sup>4</sup> No report of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

6. During the London negotiations the U.S. continued to insist upon the requirement that an inspection system must be set up with inspection posts inside the Soviet Union and with appropriate scientific instruments in conjunction with any agreement for the suspension of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union persistently refused to agree to such inspection posts until the informal discussions on the 7th of June, and on that date the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. proposal in this respect.<sup>5</sup> This acceptance was formally confirmed in the Subcommittee on the 14th of June,<sup>6</sup> and was reaffirmed by Mr. Gromyko in his October 5th talk with the Secretary.<sup>7</sup>

7. The U.S. also insisted throughout the London negotiations that it would not agree to an indefinite suspension of tests nor to a permanent cessation of tests under present circumstances. On the 25th of May the President decided to authorize an initial one-year suspension of tests, with appropriate inspection posts to be installed, and linked to other provisions of a first step general agreement.<sup>8</sup>

8. On the 7th of June the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. position for an initial limited period of suspension of tests in a first step agreement but countered with an insistence that the initial period must be longer than the U.S. proposal and counter-proposed a period of two or three years.

9. On the 21st of August the U.S. proposed that the initial period of suspension of testing should be twenty-four months under certain conditions, and under effective inspection.<sup>9</sup>

10. Progress made at the London negotiations now brings within reach a first agreement which would be in the national interest of the U.S. Furthermore, such a first agreement would improve the prospect of additional agreements. It is recommended that this opportunity should now be moved upon affirmatively.

11. Specifically it is recommended that the U.S. should now propose an agreement as follows:

a. The immediate installation, after ratification, of approximately eight to twelve test monitoring inspection stations with appropriate scientific instruments, in the USSR, a like number in the U.S., and suitable numbers of such stations in the Pacific Ocean areas, and at

---

<sup>5</sup> A detailed report of this meeting is contained in telegram 6822 from London, June 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6-857)

<sup>6</sup> See the Soviet proposal introduced in the disarmament subcommittee on June 14 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/60), printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, p. 791.

<sup>7</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>8</sup> The President's decision is noted in the memorandum of conference, Document 206.

<sup>9</sup> The President's August 21 announcement on the suspension of nuclear testing is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, p. 627.

other necessary locations, as agreed by competent scientists. (See attached map Annex A.<sup>10</sup>)

b. A twenty-four month suspension of nuclear testing beginning on September 1, 1958, subject to the satisfactory installation of the inspection stations, and subject to the right to end the test suspension before the expiration of the twenty-four month period upon notice of a violation of the agreement in any important particular.

c. The establishment of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the Security Council of the United Nations to supervise the nuclear test suspension and to prepare to supervise further measures.

d. An undertaking by all signatory states to make a sustained effort, during the twenty-four months of test suspension, to reach agreement upon, and to begin to implement, additional steps of disarmament which would be sound and safeguarded and would improve the prospects of peace. These additional steps should include the U.S. proposal for prompt study of the means of assuring that future use of outer space would be for exclusively scientific and peaceful purposes, the methods and timing of the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and the remaining measures of the Four Power joint proposals of August 29, 1957.

e. If the approval of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the NATO Council can be obtained, the establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack in Central Europe. (See Attached Map Annex B.<sup>11</sup>)

f. If the approval of the U.S. Senators can be obtained, the establishment of an inspection zone of Western Siberia, the Arctic, Northwestern U.S., and Western Canada. (See attached map Annex B.)

12. The agreement for suspension of testing should take effect as soon as ratified by the USSR, UK and U.S., and should be open to the adherence of additional states. It is estimated that public opinion in the respective states, and careful analysis by their governments, will bring about adherence to this agreement of all leading states recognized by the U.S. Government within a relatively short space of time.

13. This agreement would retard and perhaps prevent the spread of nuclear weapons which otherwise will move irreversibly within approximately the next year through the production and testing of nuclear weapons by France and the Federal Republic of Germany individually or in combination. The U.S. intelligence estimate of October 5, 1957 states that France can test a prototype nuclear bomb the later part of 1958, and France and Germany can have a capability of 50 bombs in 1960.<sup>12</sup> Other states in growing numbers would be quite

<sup>10</sup> Annex A is not printed.

<sup>11</sup> Annex B is not printed.

<sup>12</sup> No October 5 national intelligence estimate has been found in Department of State files. Reference may be to NIE 100-6-57, "Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries—Likelihood and Consequences," June 18, which discussed, among other things, the prospects for French and West German production of nuclear weapons. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

certain to follow a French and German decision with decisions on their part to produce and test weapons.

14. In view of the concessions which the USSR made to the U.S. in the informal bilateral negotiations in London from mid April to mid June, 1957, it appears probable that the USSR would agree to a U.S. proposal of inspection posts and the twenty-four months suspension of testing and the other clauses specified in paragraph 11 above.

15. It is estimated that the UK would accept such a provision, and in fact would prefer it to an initial agreement which cut off the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, (unless the latter was accompanied by a firm pledge, made with Congressional approval, for the transfer of a quantity of U.S. materials to the UK).

16. Since the German Bundestag on May 10, 1957 passed an Adenauer-sponsored resolution calling for the suspension of nuclear tests, it is believed that Chancellor Adenauer would agree to such a provision.

17. The establishment of the United Nations machinery for the regulation of armaments would in itself be significant and may well mark an historic turning point in the nuclear age for the better prospects of a durable peace.

18. The opening up to the necessary inspection posts in accordance with the study of the experts of the U.S. units now engaged in test detection, shown in the attached map (Annex A) would also make an important contribution to the evolution toward opening of the Soviet Union and to the lessening of the danger of war.

19. It is reemphasized that if the Federal Republic of Germany and the other NATO countries concerned will agree to an initial inspection zone then the two zones should be added to the U.S. proposal. One would be a reasonable balanced zone in Western Europe subject to the approval of General Norstad and the NATO Council. It is estimated that its dimensions would be from approximately 3° East Longitude to 28° East Longitude and from 45° North Latitude to the Arctic Circle.

20. The zone between the U.S. and the Soviet Union should take advantage of the counter-offer of the Soviet Union on April 30th. In other words it would include all of Siberia east of 108 degrees East Longitude (Lake Baikal to Bering Strait), and the additional Soviet Arctic territory thus including the Murmansk area. In exchange there should be offered the Arctic area of Norway, Greenland and Canada, Alaska, and in addition a sufficient portion of Northwestern U.S. and of Western Canada so as to approximate the same number of square miles as the Soviet territory and to include approximately the same percentage of the territory of the U.S. as the percentage of the territory of the Soviet Union.

21. These two zones would greatly improve the safeguards of the U.S. against surprise attack. U.S. intelligence studies indicate they would constitute an important advance for the security of the U.S. These zones, however, cannot be included in a first treaty unless the Federal Republic of Germany and the other NATO countries concerned are agreeable, and unless the U.S. Senators will concur.

22. It is urged that the opening of Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and the other satellites would improve the prospects of an evolution of these nations to independence and freedom.

23. It may be possible to add other features of the joint proposals in the initial agreement such as the study of means of future control of outer space developments, and the method and timing of a cut-off of nuclear production for weapons purposes. But the other proposals are not as suitable for prompt implementation.

24. Opposition to these recommendations has been expressed within the Administration. The opposing arguments have been taken into account in this net evaluation. It is recommended that these decisions be made in the national interest of the U.S. and that appropriate measures for their implementation be taken.

---

**304. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,  
Washington, October 8, 1957, 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Mr. Stassen

Mr. Stassen gave the President to read his new memorandum of October 7.<sup>2</sup> The President read it. Mr. Stassen then made a strong argument in support of agreeing to the immediate cessation of the testing without agreement on any other aspects of our program. He said this was an "historic moment" to get this opportunity for agreement and that such an agreement was in the best interests of the United States.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The first five paragraphs of this memorandum were forwarded to Elbrick, Smith (who became Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning on October 18, but was already acting in this capacity), Howe, and Farley in a memorandum from David Peacock, Jr., October 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/10-1157)

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

I pointed out that this opinion was not shared by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,<sup>3</sup> the Chairman of the AEC,<sup>4</sup> or by the Secretary of State,<sup>5</sup> and that therefore there was a possibility that it was not in the best interests of the United States.

Mr. Stassen pressed very strongly on the possibility that the inspection to detect testing would “open up” the Soviet Union and that this would be immensely important.

The President concluded that we would adhere to our present program but that it might be of interest to try to ascertain as to whether in fact the Soviets would “open up” and to what degree, this to be done without any implication that we would accept testing without cut-off or inspection against surprise attack or the other features of our program.

Mr. Stassen had with him a small map indicating the stations that were proposed and which he had shown the President.<sup>6</sup> Subsequent to the meeting, I authorized Mr. Stassen, through a reliable intermediary such as Sweden, to try to ascertain whether the Soviets would accept this degree of inspection together with the degree of mobility that our experts had recommended.

[Here follows discussion on other matters in preparation for the President’s forthcoming press conference.]

JFD

---

<sup>3</sup> See Document 300 and its enclosure.

<sup>4</sup> Strauss’ views on Stassen’s September 23 informal memorandum are contained in his memorandum to Dulles, September 28. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Disarmament Talks)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 298.

<sup>6</sup> Not attached to the source text, it is presumably the same map attached as Annex A to Stassen’s memorandum to Dulles, *supra*.

---

### 305. Editorial Note

Following a visit from Admiral Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, on October 9, British Prime Minister Macmillan wrote to Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower on October 10. A copy of his letter to Dulles is in Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Weapons—Test Limitations. His letter to Eisenhower is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.

Macmillan discussed his motivations for writing the letters and quoted from both of them in his memoirs. See *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, page 315.

---

306. **Confidential Report of the United States Delegation to the First Meetings of the General Conference and Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, October 1-23, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY

When the General Conference opened on October 1, 1957, 52 of the original 80 signatory states had ratified. The US was generally relied upon by most of the Delegations present for leadership in this period of development for the Agency, although the statute of the Soviet Delegation was increased by its decision not to oppose the selection of an American Director General<sup>2</sup> and to continue to play an active role in the Agency. Past controversies of the October 1956 Statute Conference<sup>3</sup> were not as heatedly pursued as had been anticipated by the United States Delegation. However, the issues of sovereignty versus safeguards, the composition of the Board of Governors, the relationship between the Board and the General Conference, and the participation of non-member states and other international organizations were all raised directly or reflected in positions taken on other issues, but the tone of the controversies at the Conference on these issues was generally subdued.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: USUN Files, IAEA, June-Dec. 1957. Confidential. A covering page containing an outline of the report is not printed. No drafting information is given on the source text. Letters from Robert McKinney to Richard C. Breithut (S/EA), however, indicate that Harold Vedeler wrote it and that drafting was completed after November 24. (November 19 and 24; Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA-1st Gen. Conf.) The first session of the IAEA General Conference met in Vienna October 1-23. Strauss headed the U.S. Delegation while McKinney, a New Mexico editor and publisher serving as consultant to the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, was Alternate Representative. A longer, unclassified report on the conference is *ibid.*, Inter-Departmental Working Group. Additional documentation is *ibid.*, IAEA-General, and *ibid.*, Central Files, 398.1901 and 398.1901—IAEA.

<sup>2</sup> Representative Sterling Cole.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the conference on the IAEA Statute, see Document 156.

The Soviet Bloc attended the Conference in full strength. The Soviets were in general restrained in their political efforts and gave the impression of serious constructive work. They presented the appearance of a reasonable delegation willing to consider a compromise on certain points at issue.

India took a deep interest in the Agency as revealed by the outstanding character of its delegation and the high-level of its participation. From the point of view of the cooperation with the US, the Canadian and Brazilian Delegations were by far the most outstanding and the most competent. The Netherlands Delegation, one of the most able at the Conference, and some of the other delegations from the smaller European states had the feeling of being left out since they could not attend closed meetings of the Board and were not treated with much consideration by the British and French. Although the British and French Delegations ultimately supported the positions the US was interested in, they often raised unnecessary difficulties and obstacles that frankly gave the impression that they were not wholeheartedly interested in promoting the prospects of the Agency.

The US emerged from the Conference with its major objectives generally obtained, although many delegations felt that the US had been too insistent in pursuit of its own particular objectives. The US must continue to exercise leadership and initiative in the Agency, for example by supplying thorough technical and political staff work and by careful preparation of positions which will generate broad support. There is evidence that any default in leadership by the US will be used to advantage by the Soviet Union in an effort to attain a dominant position in the Agency.

The Delegation recommends, among other things, that the US should be prepared to develop projects in underdeveloped countries friendly to the US, contribute substantial sums to the fellowship program and an operating budget for the development of technical assistance projects, and take the initiative in working out and supporting concrete means to assure that the Agency is "in business" by the 2nd General Conference.<sup>4</sup>

### I. Background

As October 1, the date for the convening of the Conference, approached the ratifications began to flow in. By the opening, 52 out of the original 80 signatories had ratified. A substantial number of Latin American and Arab countries, however, failed to ratify in time. In consequence, from the point of view of the United States the limited

---

<sup>4</sup> The first session of the General Conference agreed that the second session of the General Conference would open on September 22.



participation of the Latin American members was disappointing. Nonetheless, the United States Delegation was able to muster the necessary majority of votes on important political issues.

The Conference itself was well attended, and almost every country which had ratified was represented. The excellent preparations of the Preparatory Commission<sup>5</sup> and the able assistance of a dedicated Secretariat, together with the Austrian efforts, contributed to the good atmosphere in which the Conference set to work. A further factor making for harmony was the general desire of the member Governments to see the Agency established as an effective operating organization with functions of unique importance and to avoid a showdown fight on any issue. However, the stalled disarmament negotiations, the developments in Syria and the anniversary of the Hungarian uprising and the Suez Canal crisis provided a grim backdrop, which was always present in the minds of the Delegates.

Although the United States was recognized throughout the Conference as the government which had conceived and nurtured the Agency, the treatment by the world press of the Little Rock affair,<sup>6</sup> the decline of the American securities market, and the launching of Sputnik<sup>7</sup> somewhat detracted from United States primacy. The immediate potentialities of atomic energy were now being assessed throughout the world and within the United Nations with some skepticism, and the role of the Agency versus other approaches to international cooperation in the atomic field was undefined. Thus, the climate, at the opening of the Conference, was less favorable than that in which President Eisenhower first presented the concept of the Agency in his "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations in December 1953.

There was obvious concern among delegates over the possibility of an uncooperative Soviet attitude toward the Agency as a consequence of the election of an American as Director General. As the Conference opened the Soviets made evident their intention to accept as inevitable the selection of the American candidate and thus gave the appearance, at the outset at least, of preparedness to be more cooperative in the Agency than in other international organizations. The cooperative attitude gave rise to rumors that the Soviets might make a dramatic offer to the Agency which would overshadow the United States offer and leadership in the Agency. However, no such offer materialized.

---

<sup>5</sup> The Preparatory Commission met in Vienna September 9–October 1.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the court-ordered integration of the Little Rock, Arkansas, schools, which led in late September 1957 to Eisenhower's decision to send U.S. Army troops to Little Rock after Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus had blocked the court order.

<sup>7</sup> On October 5, the Russians announced that they had just successfully launched the first man-made Earth satellite, Sputnik I, into outer space.

Irritations arose in the course of the Conference. For example, the Statute was so drafted as to require the convening of a Regular Session, immediately followed by the meeting of the Board of Governors to act on the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission, and then a Special Session. This meant that 36 delegations to the Conference found themselves largely idle and uninformed, while awaiting decisions taken by the Board in closed meetings. This situation was not only costly to governments but frustrating to the delegates who could not follow the proceedings. The selection of an American as Director General resulted in sensitivity on the part of some delegations with regard to other US objectives, particularly where these objectives appeared unduly inflexible from their point of view.

Nevertheless, the inspired concept of the Agency, the record of the Statute negotiations and the record of the Preparatory Commission (in which all decisions had been taken without vote) enlisted the efforts of all delegations to support the Agency and to bring the work of the Conference to a successful conclusion.

## II. Issues which arose

The past controversies of the Statute Conference were not as heatedly pursued as had been anticipated by the United States Delegation. As expected, the issues of sovereignty versus safeguards, the composition of the Board, the powers of the Board versus those of the Conference, and the participation of non-Member States were all raised directly or reflected in positions taken on other issues. But the tone of the controversies of the Conference on these issues was subdued, possibly due to a conclusion that vigorous pressing of these matters in this forum at this time would not succeed and might indeed prejudice the outcome of future discussions.

The issue most strongly pressed was the question of Chinese representation and the participation of non-Member States. The Soviets adhered to an informal undertaking to refrain from making use of the propaganda possibilities of the opening day to parade this issue before the television and radio public of the world. Thereafter, however, the Soviet Bloc raised the issue in the First Session of the General Conference, in the Legal and Administrative Committee, and in the Plenary of the Special Session. They were defeated by overwhelming votes, which were larger than they expected compared to similar votes in other international forums. Their subsequent action, although persistently pursued, appeared largely dictated by a need to make a record.

The sovereignty versus safeguards controversy emerged in comments of the Soviet Bloc and Indian delegates on the work program and brought replies in support of the Statute provisions from the US, Canada, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, Norway, and

others. No effort was made to put any aspect of this question to a vote, however, and the Statute and the PRECO report provisions on this question remained unimpaired.

The question of the powers of the Board of Governors versus those of the Conference did not arise directly. However, the Netherlands Delegation made specific reference to the possible future necessity for clarification of the Statute on this point. The Dutch did, however, raise the question of permitting non-Board members to send observers to Board meetings. They were supported by Austria, Greece, Denmark, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Argentina, and Ceylon, in urging that the Board of Governors give consideration to this problem. The frustrated feeling of non-participation and irritation on the part of the Dutch and other Western Europeans non-Board members was heightened by the behavior of the British and French Delegations. These two delegations did little to keep the Western European Members informed of the action of the Board or of the reasons behind those actions. They expected the Western European Members to take instructions from them on issues which arose in the Conference and tried to channel all contacts with the United States, Canadian, and Latin American Delegations through the United Kingdom and French Members of the Board.

The Scandinavian and Netherlands Delegations rebelled strongly against these maneuvers. Due in part to the good relationship which the United States Delegation had established with them, these delegations looked to the American Delegation for leadership as well as information and advice. This paid dividends, since the Netherlands, Norwegian, and Danish Delegations vigorously defended positions taken by the United States, sometimes spontaneously and almost invariably in response to appeals.

However, this controversy foreshadows a continued latent conflict over the powers of the Board and the General Conference. It may well find expression in future issues which the United States may find difficult to handle. Even though the Board of Governors has agreed that each Member not belonging to the Board may send one observer to Board meetings and may receive agenda of the meetings, final summary records and a monthly report of actions taken, some delegations are continuing to adopt a "wait and see" attitude. The Netherlands Delegation indicated it will pay its assessed contribution but will see how the Agency develops and what the role of Members not on the Board will be before it makes any voluntary contributions.

Many Members would have preferred a Director General from a neutral country and up until the beginning of the Conference they were uneasy over the prospect of an open conflict between the Soviets and the United States on this issue. They expressed anxiety that such a development would interject into the Agency cold war attitudes, or

would result in minimum Soviet participation, or extreme Soviet demands for other key positions. The Soviet decision not to oppose Mr. Cole's election was generally greeted as a statesmanlike act. Many friends of the United States praised the Soviets and the latter gathered considerable credit for themselves. The Soviets indicated that they may seek the appointment of a Soviet national to succeed Cole and they will be in a better position to achieve this end since they accepted an American Director General initially. By giving in to the inevitable they gained a reputation for cooperative effort to maintain the friendly atmosphere which had existed during the Statute Conference and the Preparatory Commission.

On one issue the delegation did not obtain acceptance of the United States position, although it was successful in forestalling a final decision by the Conference. This was with respect to invitations to specific inter-governmental organizations to attend the Conference as observers. The issue arose initially in the Preparatory Commission when the Soviets proposed that the three organizations mentioned in paragraph 28 of the report of the Preparatory Commission be invited to send observers to the First General Conference. The organizations involved were CERN, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in the Soviet Union, of which Communist China is a member, and the Nordic Institute for Theoretical Studies of Nuclear Research. Since the OEEC had requested an invitation, it was also added to the list. In line with instructions from the Department, the United States Delegation to the Preparatory Commission sought the exclusion of the Joint Institute by proposing that none of the organizations in question be invited. There was no sympathy for the United States position, however, even among those customarily considered the United States' staunchest supporters and as defeat was certain and no vote had been taken in the Preparatory Commission on any other matter, the delegation did not press this issue to a vote.

The issue arose again during the General Conference when the Soviets and Czechoslovaks in the Legal and Administrative Commission introduced a resolution granting permanent observer status to the first three organizations mentioned above and inviting them to the Second General Conference. The United States Delegation was able to defeat this proposal on the ground that it was too early to grant a permanent observer status to any organization and this question, as well as that of invitations to the Second General Conference, was left to the Board of Governors to decide. In voting against the invitation to these organizations, such states as Canada, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the Vatican clearly stated that at an appropriate time they would not oppose extending invitations to these organizations as

they had a legitimate interest in the work of the Agency. Time and again reference was made to the fact that these three organizations had been invited to the First General Conference.

Thus the United States Delegation was able to postpone final action on observer status for these organizations, and it will be left to the Board of Governors to draw up rules for the participation of observers of inter-governmental organizations at forthcoming meetings of the General Conferences and to invite appropriate organizations to the Second General Conference. It was clear to the United States Delegation that it would have been counter productive to advance the proposal that organizations may be granted observer status only if they are represented by "nationals, of States members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies". A further opportunity to introduce this qualification will arise when the rules and regulations for participation of inter-governmental organizations are discussed in the Board.

However, in discussions with other friendly delegations it was obvious that, unless a great deal of diplomatic pressure is exerted, it will not be possible to deny observer status to the three organizations mentioned in the Preparatory Commission report. Moreover, the concept of specifying the nationality of a representative of an inter-governmental organization is considered by most delegations as a dangerous and unwise precedent and might not produce the result desired by the US, i.e., the exclusion of the Joint Institute. In the history of international organizations this concept has never before been accepted.

The entire problem of inter-governmental organizations and their relationship to the Agency will have to be carefully evaluated prior to future discussions in the Board. The organizations mentioned in the Preparatory Commission report are legitimate scientific organizations. There will be others. It is generally accepted that the Agency can benefit from the technical information such organizations can supply. A point which merits consideration is whether it is in the best interest of the United States and the Agency to attempt to cut off this source of information. If the United States attempts to keep out only the Joint Institute, it will be considered by many as an introduction of cold war issues into a body which they wish to see have a technical character only. In consequence if the United States decides to press this position in the Board it will probably be necessary to seek support on a straight political basis.

### III. Positions of other countries

The Soviet Bloc attended the Conference in full strength. The USSR and Czechoslovakia were obviously the leaders with none of the other delegations, with the possible exception of Poland, taking

any initiative or deviating from the Party line. Ambassador Winkler,<sup>8</sup> the head of the Czechoslovak Delegation, was one of the more competent representatives attending the Conference due in part to his knowledge of procedural matters and of the work of the Preparatory Commission. As Chairman of the Board of Governors, he conducted its meetings with skill. He sometimes attempted to shape Board conclusions in the interest of the Soviet Bloc. On the other hand, he sometimes passed over opportunities to cause the United States trouble when he could readily have done so without noticeably trespassing the bounds of propriety for the conduct of his office.

In general, the Soviets were restrained in their political efforts and gave the impression of serious constructive work designed to contribute to the creation of a successfully functioning technical body. They presented the appearance of a reasonable delegation willing to consider compromise on many points at issue. They were cooperative from time to time with the United States in working out solutions and supported the original organizational chart for the Agency staff presented by the United States for the Board's consideration.

The Soviet Delegation was headed by Professor Emelyanov<sup>9</sup> whose apparent status in the Soviet hierarchy, faithful attendance, and appearance of earnest intent at the Conference conveyed an impression that the Soviet Union is willing to contribute scientific talent to the success of the Agency. Emelyanov and his deputy Zamyatin,<sup>10</sup> both exhibited the capacity and skill resulting from extensive experience in international negotiation as well as technical background. The Russian Delegation's technical capacities, backed with the evident ability of the Soviet Union to contribute significantly to the success of the Agency should it choose to do so, constitutes a formidable potential basis for seizure of leadership of the Agency.

The Yugoslav Delegation was headed by Franc Kos, who, although supporting the Soviet line on all political issues, took no active part in these debates but merely voted with them. In conversations with Members of the United States Delegation, Mr. Kos was frank and outspokenly critical and distrustful of the Soviets. The Yugoslavs have real hopes for the future of the Agency and desire to get assistance from the Agency. They have made an offer for the training of a limited number of technicians and have offered to undertake a limited amount of nuclear research on behalf of the Agency.

The Egyptian Delegation and particularly Mr. Fahmy<sup>11</sup> in the Board of Governors frequently supported the Soviets against the

---

<sup>8</sup> Pavel Winkler, Chairman, Board of Governors, IAEA.

<sup>9</sup> V.S. Emelyanov, member, Board of Governors, IAEA.

<sup>10</sup> Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin, Soviet representative at the Preparatory Commission and General Conference, IAEA.

<sup>11</sup> I. Fahmy, member, Board of Governors, IAEA.

United States. However, he sometimes departed from the Soviet position and at other times even opposed it or cooperated with the United States Delegation in advancing a common proposal or working out a compromise on a disputed issue. Mr. Fahmy took an active part in the debates and used his position as Chairman of the Administrative and Legal Committee and as a Member of the Board of Governors to interject his own ideas and positions in the debate.

Although the Indonesian Delegation usually followed the Soviet line on political issues, they were not as aggressive about it as the Egyptian Delegation.

India took a deep interest in the Agency as revealed by the outstanding character of its Delegation and the high level of its participation. India's representation was headed by its foremost nuclear scientist, Dr. Bhabha, and included an able member of its Foreign Service, Dr. Rajan.<sup>12</sup> One of these two always sat for India on the Board of Governors. The attitude of India reflected not only expected benefits in the form of technical assistance (the early possibilities of which it appeared to overestimate), but also the force of the Agency as a concept. The positions taken typified those, as might have been expected, of an Asian neutral and underdeveloped country. They were presented with force, brilliance and serious purpose by perhaps the most articulate of all the participants. Having come prepared to give the Agency their country's full support, the Indians experienced frustration when they failed to receive the Presidency of the Conference for Bhabha, or any commitment of support for an Indian candidate for a second-line position on the Agency staff. This frustration, together with their disgruntlement at the drive of the United States to accomplish its objectives, was expressed in polite but tart comment on some of the United States proposals and on the selection of the Director General.

From the point of view of cooperation with the United States Delegation, the Canadian, and Brazilian were by far the most outstanding and the most competent. The Canadian Delegation was led by Ambassador Max Wershof,<sup>13</sup> who never failed to come to the assistance of the United States. The Canadians appear to be one of the delegations most interested in the success of the Agency. They have offered unlimited quantities of uranium. Ambassador Wershof spoke forcefully and effectively on the United States behalf and led the argument against the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia when they tried to open the membership of the Agency to all States whether or not Members of the United Nations or specialized agencies. His out-

---

<sup>12</sup> Balachandra Rajan, Indian representative on the U.N. Commission on International Commodity Trade.

<sup>13</sup> Max H. Wershof, Vice-Chairman, Board of Governors, IAEA.

standing ability and effectiveness, his friendliness, and complete understanding of the United States position made him the staunchest ally of the United States in the Conference and on the Board of Governors.

The Brazilian Delegation was equally as friendly to the United States and supported the US positions. Ambassador Muniz,<sup>14</sup> as always, was an excellent Chairman of the Program and Budget Committee. Mr. Bernardez,<sup>15</sup> who was Chairman of the PRECO, was invaluable in assisting the United States with his knowledge of the proceedings of the PRECO. Although the Brazilian Delegation took the initiative in coordinating the views of the other Latin American Delegations, especially on the subject of slates (selection of officers and election of members to the Board), a well organized regional caucus did not develop.

It should be mentioned that several delegations at the Conference relied heavily on the guidance of the United States Delegation for their positions and, as a matter of fact, in some cases the delegation had only to tell them which way to vote on each item as it came up. Three of the delegations, those of Turkey, Korea and China, asked to be contacted periodically to be kept informed of the forthcoming issues and the position the United States would take. Of these three, the Turkish Delegation proved to be the most articulate and valuable in promoting joint positions. The Delegation of Portugal was also very cooperative and responsive to consultation with the United States Delegation.

The Netherlands Delegation was one of the ablest at the Conference. Because of this they were also one of the most disgruntled when they had to sit and wait for the Board of Governors to take action before the Conference could consider the Preparatory Commission recommendations. Their irritation was increased when told they should not introduce their amendments or proposals because the language presented was a result of compromises reached in the closed meetings of the Board of Governors or the PRECO to which they had not been a party. They were further disturbed when the United Kingdom and France indicated that the Dutch contacts with the United States should be through the United Kingdom or French Members of the Board of Governors. The United States was able to step into this situation and the Dutch were grateful for it. They are not, however, going to recommend that their Government make any contribution to the Agency's fellowship program for the first year until they have a better idea of the way the Agency will develop. They do not have any candidates for top-level positions in the Agency nor are they seeking

---

<sup>14</sup> Joao Carlos Muniz, former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States.

<sup>15</sup> Carlos A. Bernardez, Chairman, Preparatory Commission, IAEA, and member, Board of Governors, IAEA.



to find any. They have put forward the names of some junior officers for administrative and financial positions, but they are not pressing their candidatures.

The majority of other Members supported United States positions along the same lines as is generally followed in the United Nations. Most Members evidenced an interest and a desire for the success of the Agency and the development of a sound, constructive program. The scientific members of all delegations were disappointed over the lack of technical discussions and the tendency to concentrate on procedural and organizational matters. Dr. Randers<sup>16</sup> of Norway particularly deplored this lack and it is possible that his proposal for a scientific committee was prompted as a consequence.

Although the United Kingdom and French Delegations ultimately supported the positions the United States was interested in, they often raised unnecessary difficulties and obstacles. Because of the tactics of the delegations of the United Kingdom and France with respect to the issue of the admission of observers from Member States to the Board of Governors and the undiplomatic method of dealing with the Western European Members, there were times when it appeared that the United Kingdom and France lacked a serious interest in the success of the Conference. They contributed to the Dutch reaction of pressing for the admission of observers to the Board of Governors. They frequently left the impression that they were reluctant to see the Agency embark on any activities which might adversely affect other parts of their atomic energy programs. For example, the French made it clear that their major efforts would be directed towards Euratom rather than the Agency. It appeared that the United Kingdom policy was to keep British technical manpower at home, and instead to seek the appointment of one of their nationals as Deputy Director General for Administration in order to have effective working control of the Agency.

#### IV. The United States negotiating situation and future course of action

The United States emerged from the Conference with its major objectives generally attained. Some delegations considered that the United States pressed too strongly to realize some of its own particular objectives. This created some feelings of disgruntlement which were expressed through thrusts in debate of the Board at the United States Delegation and the American Director General.

However, it is believed that this effect can be remedied in the future by careful efforts to take perceptive account of sensitivities of these countries and to maintain with them an active consultative rela-

---

<sup>16</sup> Gunnar Randers, physicist; Director, Norwegian Atomic Energy Institute; and special adviser on atomic energy matters to the U.N. Secretary-General.

tionship based on a give-and-take exchange of views. Their good will should be cultivated with sympathy and attentiveness both in negotiations and in informal exchanges. It is hoped our task will henceforth be less difficult in that the United States representative will not be called upon again to press for so many major American objectives at one time.

The United States can thus continue to exercise the leadership and initiative it has already shown since 1954 in the genesis of the Agency. Because of the predominant role played by the United States other countries have come to expect this leadership. They often have not had the opportunity to develop carefully prepared positions and have lacked the technical background for doing so. They have had all the more reason, therefore, to follow the guidance of the United States. It is imperative for the United States, both from Washington and Vienna, to fill these needs by supplying the leadership desired through thorough technical and political staff work, and careful preparation of positions which in the future must be largely based on sound analysis of the prospects for effective Agency action in various directions in the atomic energy field.

If there is any default in this leadership, there is evidence that the Soviets will be ready to take it over. They have indicated that their representation to the Agency will consist of a relatively large group of political, economic, scientific and technical officers so that they will be ready to make concrete proposals and to review those of other Missions and of the Agency staff. The Soviet attitude so far revealed suggests that the Soviets desire to see that the Agency operates as a successful technical body in which they can gain influence with other countries by displaying to advantage their own scientific attainments and technological advances. It may be assumed then that they desire to play a dominant part whenever the opportunity presents itself.

From the negotiating situation set forth above the following specific recommendations emerge as to our future course of action.

- 1) The United States should face the possibility that the USSR may help underdeveloped countries prepare projects using Russian reactors and technicians, and fuel from the Agency. These projects might be so well prepared that the Board would find them hard to reject, and, if we are to resist them, we must be able to examine them searchingly and develop a convincing case for alternative projects. Thus, the United States should be prepared to develop projects in the underdeveloped countries friendly to the United States.

- 2) The United States should be prepared to contribute substantial sums to the fellowship program of the Agency and to offer a sizeable number of fellowships for study in the United States under Agency auspices.

- 3) The United States should take the initiative in working out or supporting concrete means to assure that the Agency is "in business" by the Second General Conference. Every effort should be made to see

the Agency undertake as early as possible a limited number of projects which will capture the imagination of the public and of the underdeveloped countries.

4) The United States should maintain close contact with other Member Governments, including those not on the Board of Governors, and should not rely on other delegations to consult on our behalf.

5) The United States should be careful not to appear to be a spokesman for the Director General or an intermediary between him and other Members of the Board of Governors.

6) The United States should confine to a minimum those issues on which support has to be sought on the basis of pressure on the ground that the issue is of political importance to us and should consider modifying its position in those situations in which a convincing case for the United States stand cannot be stated in terms of promoting the objectives of the Agency.

7) The United States Delegation should keep in close touch with the Secretariat at all levels with a view to affording them a full understanding of the problems facing the United States Delegation in seeking United States approval and support of specific types of projects in different fields. In this way it is hoped that proposals which cannot be accepted by the United States may be modified or changed before they are actually presented to the Board.

8) The Department of State should take appropriate steps to stimulate ratification of the Statute by friendly powers before the 2nd General Conference in order to improve the political balance of power. Special attention should be given to increasing the number of Latin American Members in order to maintain the present formula of 4 members on the Board of Governors from this area.

---

### 307. Editorial Note

From October 23 to 25, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and other British officials conferred in Washington with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other American officials on several matters of mutual concern to their two countries. Documentation on these meetings is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII. Among the matters discussed at these meetings was the exchange of information on nuclear weapons.

**308. Diary Entry by the President, October 29, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

I was visited by Professor Rabi, Admiral Strauss, Gordon Gray, and one or two others.<sup>2</sup> The purpose was to bring to me certain conclusions reached by Professor Rabi's Committee, called the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Director of Defense Mobilization.

Briefly, their conclusion was that we now enjoy certain advantages in the nuclear world over the Russians and that the most important of these gaps can be closed only by continuous testing on the part of the Russians. Professor Rabi's Committee has therefore reached the conclusion that we should, as a matter of self-interest, agree to a suspension of all tests subject only to the installation of inspectional systems that would almost surely reveal the occurrence of a test. Scientists differ as to whether certain nuclear tests can be conducted without any knowledge reaching the outside world, but the Rabi Committee believes that with a half dozen or so properly equipped inspectional posts inside of Russia, any significant explosion could be detected.

While the Rabi Committee agreed that certain advantages in our weaponry could be realized by advancement of testing, they say that the expected advantage would be as nothing compared with maintaining the particular scientific gap that exists in the design of the Russian H-bomb as compared to ours.

The nature of this gap is that Russian bombs are unshielded against certain types of radio activity that could be placed around them as they approach. The effect of this would not be to destroy the bomb but to reduce its effect by something like 99%.

Admiral Strauss and his group of scientists do not believe some of the assumption made by the Rabi Committee.<sup>3</sup> They are keenly afraid that should we discontinue our tests, the Russians would, by stealing all of our secrets, equal and eventually surpass us. So Admiral Strauss and his associates believe we should continue all of our experiments and testing out in the open, refusing to be victimized by Russian duplicity. They are quite firm in their belief that we could not protect ourselves adequately against that duplicity.

The outcome was that Gordon Gray, Admiral Strauss and General Cutler are going to try to get (if possible) an agreement of scientific opinion in this whole matter to see what we should do about it.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Others present were Goodpaster and Cutler. Goodpaster's memorandum of this conference is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.

<sup>3</sup> Strauss' views are summarized in the memorandum of conference, *infra*.

Incidentally, I learned that some of the mutual antagonisms among the scientists are so bitter as to make their working together almost an impossibility. I was told that Dr. Rabi and some of his group are so antagonistic to Drs. Lawrence and Teller that communication between them is practically nil.

D.D.E. <sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

---

### 309. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 29, 1957<sup>1</sup>

#### OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Strauss  
General Goodpaster

Admiral Strauss referred to the meeting the President had just had with Dr. Rabi, General Cutler, Gordon Gray and himself.<sup>2</sup> He said that Dr. Rabi is a brilliant scientist and a friend of long standing to whom he is deeply devoted. He thought it necessary, however, to examine very thoroughly the proposals he is making from the standpoint of national risks and international purposes. Sometimes these proposals have not been thought through, and must be modified when mature, experienced judgment in these broader matters is applied to them. The President recalled that he had many times thought that if in fact we are ahead in the types of atomic weapons we have, we should stop testing at once in order to "freeze" our lead. Admiral Strauss reiterated his point about the Russians being able to steal our secrets. He also told the President that Dr. Rabi and Dr. Teller have opposed each other very sharply over many years, for example with respect to the development of the hydrogen weapon.

Admiral Strauss said he hopes that the President had not modified his statement to the British that there are of course some things they cannot have in the atomic field. The President said he had made this point not once, but twice, indicating that there are some things he will not allow anyone to tell him. Admiral Strauss said that Senator Anderson has questioned the security standards of the British, and in

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, AEC Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 30.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

consequence questioned whether we should turn over information to them. The President concluded by saying that the British have a security system which in many ways is superior to our own. . . .

**A. J. Goodpaster<sup>3</sup>**  
*Brigadier General, USA*

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

### **310. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, November 5, 1957—7 p.m.*

Delga 369. Re disarmament. Informal purely social lunch today at which Kuznetsov, Sobolev, Zarubin and Novikov<sup>2</sup> were present on Soviet side and lodge, Wadsworth, Sisco<sup>3</sup> and Pratt<sup>4</sup> for U.S. only item of business discussed was introduced by Kuzetsov, who inquired what U.S. expected as result current disarmament debate.

When replied we expected passage 24-power resolution,<sup>5</sup> Kuznetsov asserted passage of resolution would not mean progress. U.S. should give more attention to Soviet proposal for 82-nation commission which would give all countries chance participate in discussion.<sup>6</sup> He made it clear that his real reason for favoring 82-nation committee was because under its aegis private conversations could be held, as he said looking around and holding out both hands, "like this one"—in other words, bilateral U.S.–Soviet talks. Expense of large body would not be great since permanent representatives always here. Sobolev

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/11–557. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Kirill Vasilevich Novikov, Soviet delegate to the U.N. General Assembly.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph J. Sisco, Officer in Charge, U.N. Political Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> James W. Pratt, adviser, political and security affairs, U.S. Delegation, U.N. General Assembly.

<sup>5</sup> The 24-power draft resolution, first submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on October 11 by several non-Communist nations, including the United States (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.179), and subsequently adopted with amendments as General Assembly Resolution 1148 (XII) on November 14, is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 914–915.

<sup>6</sup> The Soviet draft proposal, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 24 and later revised (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.175 and Rev. 1), was rejected by the First Committee on November 6 by a vote of 45–11.

said expansion of subcommittee by 2 or 3 would do no good. Even if India, Sweden and Mexico were added, subcommittee would be "just as bad".

Lodge

---

311. **Memorandum From David W. K. Peacock, Jr., of the Office of the Secretary of State to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Howe)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, November 6, 1957.*

Ambassador Lodge reported to the Secretary at 5:30 p.m. November 5<sup>2</sup> that he had finished the meeting with the Four Powers on disarmament.<sup>3</sup> Moch had agreed that this is not the time to show weakness. He reported that the Canadians have a draft resolution to enlarge the Committee by 10. The British were reported to side with the Canadians but after discussion had indicated that they have no firm position. Lodge reported that the Secretary's proposal was ingenious but fall between two stools. (The Secretary that morning had discussed with Lodge the possibility of giving the Disarmament Commission authority in its discretion to co-opt other members to serve on a permanent or partial basis whenever they thought it would serve their purposes, the thought being that the Committee or Subcommittee would not be enlarged although there would be the possibility of bringing other countries in, thus enabling us to keep control without showing our hand.)<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary subsequently asked Ambassador Caccia to help assure British support for our position.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660.0012/11-657. Confidential. The source text is a summary of several memoranda of Dulles' telephone conversations, all of November 5. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) Specific citations to these telephone calls are given in all but two of the following footnotes.

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum of telephone call from Lodge to Dulles, 5:32 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> This meeting is summarized in Delga 371 from New York, November 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/11-557)

<sup>4</sup> Dulles' suggestion is contained in a memorandum of telephone call from Lodge to Dulles, 11:48 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

<sup>5</sup> Memorandum of telephone call from Dulles to Caccia, 5:38 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

Thereafter the Secretary discussed this problem with Ambassador Merchant and asked him to approach the Canadians stating that it would be unfortunate if the US and Canada publicly split. Merchant later reported to the Secretary that the Canadians had not advanced a resolution of their own but one which had been developed with the Indians. Merchant further reported that the Canadians were under the impression that they had British support, although he thought they were under a misapprehension.<sup>6</sup>

The Secretary then brought Ambassador Lodge up to date on the foregoing developments, whereupon Ambassador Lodge thanked the Secretary for his efforts and stated that he thought that they would have a very good effect.<sup>7</sup>

D.W.K. Peacock, Jr.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Two memoranda of telephone calls from Dulles to Merchant, 5:45 p.m., and 6:25 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>7</sup> Memorandum of telephone call from Dulles to Lodge, 6:30 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

### 312. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, November 7, 1957—1 p.m.*

Delga 381. Re Disarmament. Department should review carefully voting results on 24-power disarmament resolution<sup>2</sup> as well as Indian and Japanese resolutions on weapons test suspension.<sup>3</sup> Particularly on last two resolutions new elements appeared which have less than favorable implications for continued support in UN for US position. Following are some preliminary GADel observations.

1. Vote on 24-power resolution (57-9-15) slightly stronger than GADel estimated. All in all it constituted impressive show of US

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/11-757. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Approved by the First Committee on November 6 and subsequently adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on November 14, by a vote of 56 to 9 with 15 abstentions, as Resolution 1148 (XII), printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 914-915.

<sup>3</sup> The Indian resolution, submitted on September 21 and later revised (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.176 and Revs. 1, 2, and 4), was rejected by the First Committee on November 6 and later resubmitted and rejected by the General Assembly on November 19 by a vote of 34 to 24 with 20 abstentions. The final version (Rev. 4) of this resolution is *ibid.*, pp. 906-907. The Japanese resolution introduced on September 23 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.174) was rejected by the First Committee on November 6.



strength. GADel estimate in Delga 220,<sup>4</sup> which was deliberately cautious, mainly in error in overestimating "no" votes, which were restricted to Soviet Bloc and even excluded Yugoslavia. Vote might have been even stronger if held a day earlier, since, as GADel informed by British, Nepal and Burma who planned vote in favor, received last minute instructions to abstain. These instructions sent under pressure Indian Foreign Office. Austria, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ireland, Jordan, Libya, Malaya and Sweden indicated they might abstain, all swung to "yes" during course of debate.

2. Indian resolution on test suspension received unexpectedly large vote (22-38-20), although Department estimate of last August (Deptel 171<sup>5</sup>) of 20-45-17 not far wide of mark, given fact estimate based on Soviet rather than Indian resolution. Whereas Department estimated Sudan and Syria would vote in favor, they in fact abstained. On other hand, Finland, Ghana, Mexico, Morocco and Nepal, who Department thought would abstain, supported Indian proposal. Biggest surprise was Iran, who we thought would oppose and which finally voted for. Austria, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Ireland, Sweden and Thailand moved from expected opposition to abstention on separate test issue. Philippines was only one to move to our side from expected abstention.

On whole, outcome on this issue less favorable than we hoped, and presages more acute difficulties on this question next Assembly.

3. GADel estimate (26-48-7) (Delga 220) on outcome vote on Japanese test resolution which was 18-32-31, overestimated support, but also badly overestimated opposition and underestimated number of abstentions. Major unexpected developments were support of Japanese resolution by Ecuador, Iran and Iraq, and abstention by Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal and Venezuela (of particular interest is falling away of three NATO states. Only last-minute contact by GADel prevented Turkish abstention). If Soviets had supported Japanese proposal, resolution would have carried. Department should recognize vote on Japanese resolution was in reality vote on separate test issue.

**Lodge**

---

<sup>4</sup> Delga 220 from New York, November 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/11-757)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 171 to New York, August 26. (*Ibid.*, 330.13/8-2657)

**313. Memorandum of Discussion at the 347th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 5, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

**2. Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1957 (NSC 5720, Part 3<sup>2</sup>)**

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the next item on the agenda was a brief mention of the annual report by the Atomic Energy Commission on the status of its program as of June 30, 1957. He had suggested that Admiral Strauss cover certain topics in this annual report which the NSC Planning Board had found to be of particular interest.

Admiral Strauss stated that he would confine himself to the four topics to which Mr. Cutler had referred, and would conclude with material designed to up-date the report by adding significant developments which had occurred since June 30, 1957. Accordingly, Admiral Strauss read a report covering the following four subjects:

- (1) The program for the development of "clean" weapons;
- (2) The plans for "Operation Hardtack", the weapons test scheduled for the spring of 1958 at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds;
- (3) The aircraft nuclear propulsion program; and
- (4) The program for nuclear propulsion of missiles (the so-called "Rover" program).

Thereafter, Admiral Strauss continued with comments dealing with significant developments in the atomic energy program from June 30, 1957, to the present. He displayed a chart entitled "Weapons in the Stockpile at the End of the Fiscal Year".<sup>3</sup> This chart revealed the extraordinary increases in weapons in the stockpile. Admiral Strauss added that the United States was well ahead of the USSR in both numbers and types of weapons. However, the Soviets have closed the gap between us in the design of weapons. There were perhaps only three or four weapon designs in the possession of the United States which still remained unknown to the Soviet Union.

Admiral Strauss then commented that there appeared to be a concerted effort to convince people that the program of the United States for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, particularly for electric power, was lagging behind. Admiral Strauss insisted that this was not

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on December 6.

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5720, Part 3, "The Atomic Energy Program", has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. Documentation on NSC 5720 is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

the actuality. He recited a number of power plants which were being built in the United States by private industry, and he strongly supported the incentives for building power reactors provided by private resources.

The President commented that in the face of charges that the program was languishing, we should publicize the actual achievements. The President then reverted to Admiral Strauss' earlier statements about "clean" weapons. Specifically, the President inquired as to what was the purpose of "clean" weapons of very high yield as opposed to "clean" weapons of low yield. The President believed that if the USSR used "dirty" weapons against the United States he would be inclined to use "dirty" weapons against the USSR, a statement which he qualified by saying that he meant "the big ones".

Admiral Strauss replied that we had no intention of eliminating "dirty" weapons from the stockpile, but there were certain circumstances in which we would want to be able to make use of a "clean" weapon of high yield. For example, if the United States was preparing to land large forces in some foreign area, we would want to use "clean" weapons of high yield to prepare this area for such a U.S. landing, because if we used "dirty" high-yield weapons the area would be contaminated and could not be entered by our own forces. Moreover, if it came to a situation where we had to use many "dirty" weapons of high yield, the world-wide contamination would be so great that we in the United States would suffer along with our enemies.

. . . . .

With reference to Admiral Strauss' earlier remarks on the program to develop a nuclear-propelled aircraft, the President inquired whether Admiral Strauss had not previously informed him that we could have a nuclear-propelled aircraft flying in two years. Admiral Strauss replied that this was indeed what he had said, but he had also pointed out that such an aircraft would hardly be anything more than a "flying platform", rather than an effective airplane which could have a military use. He added that the AEC and the Department of Defense were preparing recommendations to be submitted shortly to the President with regard to the aircraft nuclear propulsion program. The President indicated his belief that the achievement of such an aircraft was just as important as the Sputnik.

*The National Security Council.*<sup>4</sup>

Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, on the status of the Atomic Energy Program on June 30, 1957, based on Part 3 of NSC 5720.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4.]

5. *Peaceful Uses Of Atomic Energy* (NSC 5507/2; NSC Action No. 1726; NSC 5725; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 4, 1957)<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council, again in great detail, on the contents of NSC 5725. In so doing, he listed a number of changes proposed by Admiral Strauss, most of which were accepted by the Council and which were listed in the Record of Action. With respect to the crucial issue set forth in the split paragraph, 33, on measures to facilitate the construction and use of U.S. power reactors and nuclear technology abroad, Mr. Cutler noted Admiral Strauss' view that a Council decision on this paragraph should be postponed and the matter referred for further study by the Atomic Energy Commission and reconsideration by the NSC Planning Board. Similarly, paragraphs 24 and 34 were suggested for such study and reconsideration.

With respect to subparagraph 41-f, reading as follows:

"f. Explore the feasibility of:

"(1) Placing U.S. non-military atomic energy facilities under the inspection system of the IAEA, on the condition that the USSR and the United Kingdom would do likewise.

"[(2) Offering as an alternative proposal, should the USSR be unwilling to join the United States in such a comprehensive approach, to place several U.S. non-military facilities under the Agency inspection system as a confidence-breeding first step and in order to assure more extensive, world-wide experience in developing a safeguard system.]<sup>6</sup>

"Defense and AEC propose deletion."

Mr. Cutler noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the bracketed portion of subparagraph 41-f be deleted because it did not appear realistic to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to offer unilaterally U.S. non-military atomic facilities for inspection without definite assurance of some progress in international inspection systems. Mr. Cutler went

<sup>4</sup> The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1821, approved by the President on December 9. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

<sup>5</sup> For NSC 5507/2, see Document 14. NSC Action Nos. 1726, May 23, and 5725, November 22, are not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions, and *ibid.*, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725 Series, respectively) The memorandum from the Executive Secretary to NSC, December 4, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5725)

<sup>6</sup> Brackets in the source text.

on to point out, further, that the Atomic Energy Commission wished to delete the entire subparagraph, and he asked Admiral Strauss to explain why the AEC proposed such deletion.

Admiral Strauss explained that the objective of inspection was primarily to prevent the plutonium derived from civilian reactors from being used to make atomic weapons. However, if the United States intended to use such plutonium for weapons purposes, there appeared to Admiral Strauss to be no sense in proposing that we set up an inspection system. Governor Stassen indicated his general agreement with Admiral Strauss' argument. Accordingly, Mr. Cutler suggested that the whole of subparagraph 41-f be deleted.

After dealing briefly with the Financial Appendix to NSC 5725, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council adopt NSC 5725 except for the three paragraphs—24, 33 and 34—which would be reconsidered by the NSC Planning Board and brought to the Council at its meeting of next week.<sup>7</sup>

In conclusion, Admiral Strauss complimented the Planning Board on the excellent job it had done in developing NSC 5725.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>8</sup>

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5725, prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of an initial draft prepared under the direction of the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1726-b; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 4, 1957, and of the views of the Atomic Energy Commission as reported orally at the meeting by the Chairman, AEC.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5725, subject to the following:

(1) The addition, at the end of subparagraph 3-a, of the words, "unless accelerated by a breakthrough."

(2) Substitution, in subparagraph 8-a, line 3, of "1966" for "1965".

(3) Revision of the first sentence of paragraph 9 to read: "Since 1953, and especially since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it has been possible to increase cooperation in the non-weapons field between the United States and the United Kingdom."

(4) Substitution, in subparagraph 11-b, lines 2 and 3, of the words "has just been launched" for "is scheduled to be launched late in 1957".

<sup>7</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>8</sup> Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1824, approved by the President on December 9. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)

(5) Revision of the second sentence of paragraph 21, following the words "conventional plants", to read: "economically competitive nuclear power is not likely to be achieved in the United States at as early a date."

(6) Revision of subparagraph 28–d, following the semicolon, to read: "recognizing that the achievement of this objective requires effective implementation of safeguards under bilateral agreements and under the IAEA, but that national nuclear weapons programs can be controlled only through safeguarded disarmament agreements."

(7) Deletion of subparagraph 41–f and the footnote relating thereto.

(8) Deferral of action on paragraphs 24, 33 and 34 until the next Council meeting, to permit further study of those paragraphs by the Atomic Energy Commission and reconsideration by the NSC Planning Board.

*Note:* The action in b–(8) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate action by the Atomic Energy Commission.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

#### 314. Memorandum of Discussion at the 348th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 12, 1957<sup>1</sup>

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

4. *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* (NSC 5507/2; NSC Action No. 1726; NSC 5725; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 4 and 9, 1957; NSC Action No. 1824)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Cutler pointed out in his briefing note that when the Council considered last week the new policy paper on the peaceful uses of atomic energy (NSC 5725), three paragraphs were postponed for deci-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on December 13.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding NSC 5507/2, NSC Action No. 1726, NSC 5725, and memorandum from the Executive Secretary, December 4, see footnote 5, *supra*. Lay's memorandum to the NSC, December 9, enclosing draft revisions of paragraphs 24, 33, and 34 of NSC 5725, submitted by the Chairman of the AEC, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5725) Regarding NSC Action No. 1824, see footnote 8, *supra*.

sion at the meeting today, in order that the views of the Atomic Energy Commission in regard thereto could be put in writing and circulated to the Council. These views had now been stated and were before the Council. The first of the postponed issues dealt with actions which might be necessary to maintain U.S. pre-eminence in power reactor technology. This issue had been covered in paragraphs 24 and 33 of NSC 5725. Mr. Cutler then read the language for these paragraphs proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission. He noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the language proposed by the AEC for these paragraphs, and then called on Admiral Strauss to explain why the AEC had disagreed with the version of these paragraphs originally offered by the NSC Planning Board, and why the AEC was suggesting this new and more general phraseology.

Admiral Strauss explained that the AEC had objected to the earlier version of these paragraphs because the Commission could not agree that private industry in the United States was not in a position to step in and finance a domestic power reactor program with its own funds. After referring briefly to U.S. power reactors which were in the course of being built or being planned at the present time, Admiral Strauss repeated that the Commission did not yet feel that there was a need for Federal financing of the U.S. power reactor program. He admitted, however, that this could, of course, be a wrong prophecy.

The President also said that he was at a loss to understand the reason for all this pessimism about private financing of the U.S. power reactor program. On the contrary, he felt that the progress under private auspices had been miraculous.

Admiral Strauss said he thought he could undertake to answer the President's question. The answer was that there had been earlier a certain over-optimism among some of the large companies in the United States with respect to the estimated costs of construction of atomic power plants. Since these projects were now in some cases in the red, the companies in question would like nothing better than to have Federal subsidies to bail them out.

Mr. Cutler then inquired whether the Council would accept the phraseology of paragraphs 24 and 33 submitted by Admiral Strauss. There was no dissent.

Mr. Cutler then took up the other disputed paragraph, 34-b, reading as follows:

"b. Develop and submit to the Council measures for the initiation of new large-scale prototype nuclear power projects in the United States of types which appear most promising at this date."

Mr. Cutler explained that Admiral Strauss favored the deletion of sub-paragraph 34-b, and asked Admiral Strauss to state his reasons for favoring deletion. Admiral Strauss replied that his reasons were

based on the view that it was not the function of the National Security Council to concern itself with program matters as opposed to policy matters. Mr. Gordon Gray could not agree with Admiral Strauss, and felt that the Council did have a responsibility in this area, although he said he would not contest Admiral Strauss' recommendation for deletion of sub-paragraph 34-b.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>3</sup>

a. Discussed the draft revisions of paragraphs 24, 33 and 34 of NSC 5725, submitted by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1824-b-(8) and transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 9, 1957; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, as read at the meeting.

b. Adopted the following revisions of paragraphs 24, 33 and 34 of NSC 5725:

(1) *Page 18, paragraph 24:* Revise to read as follows:

"24. World opinion equates pre-eminence in power reactor technology with leadership in the peaceful applications of atomic energy. Accordingly, the development of measures to maintain U.S. pre-eminence in power reactor technology is of continuing concern and paramount importance."

(2) *Page 25, paragraph 33:* Revise to read as follows:

"33. In order to maintain U.S. leadership in the peaceful application of atomic energy, develop additional measures necessary to facilitate the use of U.S. reactor technology and full-scale prototype power reactor plants abroad."

(3) *Page 26, subparagraph 34-b:* Delete the subparagraph.

*Note:* NSC 5725, as amended by NSC Action No. 1824-b and by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5725/1; and referred for implementation to the Secretary of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, advising with the Operations Coordinating Board in order to assure coordination with respect to those matters which relate to the implementation of national security policies for which the OCB is designated as the coordinating agency.

[Here follows discussion regarding the next NSC meeting, scheduled for January 6, 1958.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

---

<sup>3</sup> Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1830, approved by the President on December 13. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)



315. National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>

NSC 5725/1

Washington, December 13, 1957.

PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCES

- a. NSC 5507/2
- b. NSC Action No. 1726
- c. NSC 5725
- d. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 4 and 9, 1957
- e. NSC Actions Nos. 1824 and 1830<sup>2</sup>

The National Security Council, Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr.,<sup>3</sup> for the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 347th and 348th meetings on December 5 and 12, respectively, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5725, subject to the revisions thereof which are set forth in NSC Actions Nos. 1824-b and 1830-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5725, as revised and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5725/1; and refers it for implementation to the Secretary of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, advising with the Operations Coordinating Board in order to assure coordination with respect to those matters which relate to the implementation of national security policies for which the OCB is designated as the coordinating agency.

Also enclosed, for the information of the Council is a Financial Appendix.<sup>4</sup>

NSC 5725/1 supersedes NSC 5507/2.

James S. Lay, Jr.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5725, Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> For NSC 5507/2, see Document 14. NSC Action No. 1726, approved by the President on May 25, authorized the NSC Planning Board to prepare a revision of NSC 5507/2. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) File: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions) NSC 5725, November 22, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725 Series) Memoranda from the Executive Secretary to the NSC, December 4, enclosing the views of the JCS on NSC 5725, and December 9, enclosing draft revisions of paragraphs 24, 33, and 34 of NSC 5725, submitted by the Chairman, AEC, are not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5725) Regarding NSC Actions Nos. 1824 and 1830, see footnote 8, Document 313, and footnote 3, *supra*, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Here follows a Table of Contents.]

**[Enclosure]**

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

General Considerations

*Scope of Policy*

1. This policy statement is addressed primarily to peaceful uses of atomic energy overseas, while recognizing that the success of the overseas program will be dependent to a large extent on the effectiveness of the domestic program.

*Developments Since 1955*

2. Since approval in March 1955 of U.S. policy on the peaceful uses of atomic energy (NSC 5507/2), the United States has developed a broad international program of cooperation and assistance based on many new developments in the United States and abroad. Revision of the existing policy is necessary to reflect the broadening program and to provide flexibility for future action. The most significant new developments are:

a. Conclusion by the United States of bilateral agreements for cooperation<sup>6</sup> with 43 Free World countries.<sup>7</sup>

b. Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the forthcoming ratification of the Euratom Community.

c. Active interest in atomic energy matters by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in Europe, the Organization of American States (OAS) in Latin America, and the Colombo Plan nations in Asia.

d. Initiation of long-term nuclear power programs by the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and other countries.

e. Soviet entry into the field of peaceful application of atomic energy on a scale which will offer an increasing challenge to Western leadership in the field.

f. Greater world-wide understanding of the economic and social potentialities of peaceful applications of atomic energy and of the technical problems which must be resolved to achieve economic nuclear power.

---

<sup>6</sup> Agreements for cooperation are those executive agreements between the United States and other nations or groups of nations which are required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 prior to the exchange of certain information and materials for peaceful uses of atomic energy. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>7</sup> For a list of bilateral agreements for cooperation, in effect and pending by the end of 1957, see 85th Congress, 2d session, *Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1958*, Senate Document No. 72, p. 197.

g. Expansion of activities abroad by U.S. industry in all peaceful uses of atomic energy.

h. Active competition of U.K. industry with U.S. industry in the field of nuclear power.

i. Growing interest among cooperating countries in applying atomic energy in fields other than commercial power, e.g., medicine, agriculture, industry and research.

j. Increased potential for nuclear weapons development and radiation hazard, resulting from development of national and regional programs abroad and the increasing availability of nuclear material and atomic technology.

k. The need for alternate sources of power in Western Europe in view of the heavy and increasing dependence of that area on Middle East oil—a dependence which was demonstrated by the Suez crisis and which has been a strong motivating force in the initiation of EURATOM.

### *Status of Major Atomic Energy Programs for Peaceful Uses*

#### *A. U.S. Domestic Programs*

##### *Power Program*

3. The ultimate objective of the U.S. domestic program is the attainment of economical nuclear power in this country. To attain this objective, the United States has engaged in investigation of many different technical approaches, rather than concentrating on construction of a single type of large-scale power plant known to be uneconomical in the United States in the present state of the art. The U.S. domestic power reactor program is affected by four main considerations:

a. Economically competitive nuclear power in the United States is not likely to be achieved prior to 1970, unless accelerated by a breakthrough.

b. No single type of reactor system will satisfy the variety of our anticipated requirements.

c. It is desirable to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy as a normal function of American business as soon as possible.

d. Because the U.S. domestic program must provide the technical and material basis for implementing U.S. policy concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy abroad, considerable efforts are devoted in the United States to the development of reactors of special interest abroad.

4. On the basis of the source of their financial support, existing U.S. peaceful atomic power projects built or under contract may be divided into three groups. In all three groups private industry finances the conventional portion (including research and development) of the prototype power project.

a. The nuclear portion of the first group of projects is almost entirely government-financed. These projects include 17 reactor experiments specifically aimed at evaluation of the technical feasibility and

economic promise of eight different design concepts and include one large-scale prototype reactor plant and one nuclear-powered merchant ship plant.

b. The nuclear portion of the second group of projects is financed partly by the Government and partly by industry. These projects consist of four large-scale prototype reactor plants to evaluate cost and performance of the most promising designs.

c. The third group consists of two large-scale and one small-scale prototype reactor plants financed wholly by industry.

By 1962 these eight prototype reactor plants will produce approximately 800,000 kilowatts, with two designed to generate approximately 180,000 kilowatts each, five falling within the range of 60,000 kilowatts to 130,000 kilowatts each, and the remaining one generating 5,000 kilowatts.<sup>8</sup>

#### *Research Programs*

5. a. Extensive programs have been established for research in the physical and biological sciences in both public and private institutions, e.g., particle accelerators for research in high energy nuclear physics; radiation effects upon both animate and inanimate material; irradiation of food as a means of preserving it for extended periods without refrigeration; and improved industrial, agricultural, and medical application of isotopes.

b. Extensive research and development programs on controlled thermonuclear reactions, fission reactor materials, chemical processing of fuels, disposal of radioactive wastes, reactor safety and related matters are being pursued in addition to specific military and civilian reactor projects.

#### *Other Programs*<sup>9</sup>

6. Other domestic programs include:

a. Extensive training in the United States to provide U.S. manpower skilled in science and technology.

b. Conferences, missions and foreign information projects.

c. Continuous declassification of all current information on nuclear reactor design other than special military applications.

d. Construction and operation of a nuclear-powered merchant ship by the United States.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix F to NSC 5725. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>9</sup> Not included among "Other Programs" is the present U.S. nuclear-powered military aircraft program. Commercial application of air nuclear power appears to be speculative and a long-range proposition. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix D to NSC 5725. [Footnote in the source text.]

### B. U.S. Overseas Program

7. The essential components of the present U.S. program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy overseas are:

a. Development of agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy with other nations or groups of nations.

b. Aggressive U.S. leadership in establishment and implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States has announced that it is considering donation of a research reactor and laboratory to the Agency. Pursuant to the President's 1956 offer of 5,000 kilograms of U-235<sup>11</sup> plus an amount equal to offers to the International Agency of U-235 through June 30, 1960 by other members,<sup>12</sup> the United States has already allocated for sale to the International Agency:

- (1) 5,000 kilograms of U-235.
- (2) 50 kilograms of U-235 to match the USSR offer.
- (3) 20 kilograms of U-235 to match the U.K. offer.
- (4) 100,000 kilograms of natural uranium to match the Portuguese offer.<sup>13</sup>

c. Designation of amounts of U-235 available for nuclear reactors abroad; reasonable assurances of U-235 supply for periods commensurate with the amortizable life of foreign reactors; and the establishment of U-235 prices for foreign users, which are based on the recovery of full costs (such U.S. costs being apparently lower than the costs of other producer nations).

d. Provision of unclassified atomic energy information, and development of procedures for prompt exchange of such information.

e. Support of training programs for foreign nationals in nuclear science and technology in U.S. universities and national laboratories, and encouragement and support of expanded training of such nationals abroad.

f. Modest financial assistance for research materials and equipment, including grants up to \$350,000 to any cooperating country for research reactor projects.

g. Measures designed to assist in the reduction of reactor operating costs and in estimating the costs of nuclear power: (1) availability of chemical reprocessing services in the United States under longterm arrangements at specified charges; (2) commitments to purchase plutonium produced in foreign reactors fueled with material from the United States; (3) leasing fuel required for research reactors; (4) availability of Export-Import Bank loans, on criteria similar to those for

<sup>11</sup> Enriched uranium is natural uranium enriched by the addition of U-235. The 5,000 kilograms of U-235 offered by the President will be made available for the most part in the form of enriched uranium in varying degrees of enrichment in U-235. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>12</sup> Eisenhower's offer, made on October 26, 1956, is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, p. 274.

<sup>13</sup> The U.S. Delegation at the First IAEA Conference in Vienna, October 1-23, announced that the United States would match these Soviet, British, and Portuguese offers. See *Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, January 1958*, p. 192.

financing conventional plants, to finance fuel inventories for nuclear power projects and to assist in financing capital costs of research and power reactors.

h. Increasing fuel cycle research and development, particularly (1) design and fabrication of fuel elements, (2) improved techniques of chemical reprocessing, and (3) development of a practical and economic method for recycling plutonium, so as to reduce dependence upon U-235.

### *C. U.K. Program*

8. a. The United Kingdom has adopted an expanded program designed to produce 5,000,000-6,000,000 kilowatts of nuclear electrical capacity by 1966 (about three times the goal set in 1955), at an approximate cost of 980 million pounds (\$2,740 million). The 6,000,000-kilowatt capacity is expected to be installed in 16 to 19 stations, most which will have about 300,000 kilowatts capacity each, but some of which may have as high as 500,000 kilowatts capacity.

b. In addition, the United Kingdom now has two power reactors in operation at Calder Hall, producing a net electrical output of about 70,000 kilowatts, and six more such reactors are scheduled for completion in 1958. These reactors are optimized for the production of plutonium for weapons, with electrical power as a byproduct. The total output from the eight reactors is expected to be 280,000-290,000 kilowatts.

c. The United Kingdom also has under way an extensive research and development program on five<sup>14</sup> types of reactors and is working on ship propulsion, research and materials testing reactors, controlled thermonuclear reaction and particle accelerators.

9. Since 1953, and especially since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it has been possible to increase cooperation in the non-weapons field between the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition to technological cooperation, the United Kingdom works jointly with the United States to obtain acceptance of a system of safeguards in the International Atomic Energy Agency and in bilateral atomic energy agreements. The British also are collaborating with a number of other Free World countries.

### *D. The USSR Program*

10. The USSR has an extensive atomic energy program for peaceful purposes both at home and abroad. Its power reactor program is substantial and diversified and its over-all nuclear research is broadly

---

<sup>14</sup> (1) a sodium-cooled graphite moderated reactor, (2) a fast breeder reactor, (3) a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, (4) an aqueous homogenous reactor, and (5) liquid metal fueled reactor systems. [Footnote in the source text.]

based. The USSR is able to, and probably will, challenge increasingly the leadership of the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of nuclear power.

11. The USSR has two ministries directing atomic energy development—one for military uses and one for peaceful uses, the latter being the Main Administration for the Utilization of Atomic Energy. The Soviet Program is in three main fields:

a. *Nuclear power*: The planned goal is 1,400,000 kilowatts generating capacity by 1960 (reduced from the original goal of 2,500,000), through an experimental program of small reactors of advanced design and the construction of three very large power stations.

b. *Nuclear Propulsion*: The hull of a nuclear-powered ice breaker has just been launched; the reactor is scheduled to be installed and operational trials to begin in 1958. Although there is no direct evidence, there is reason to believe that work has begun on a nuclear-powered submarine, and a reactor could be available in late 1957. Numerous statements in open literature indicate that the USSR is at least planning and may have begun work on other nuclear-powered ocean-going vessels. There is no evidence to indicate whether the USSR is working on a nuclear-powered aircraft. If the Soviets do undertake a nuclear-powered aircraft program, it will probably be for psychological and military rather than economic advantages.

c. *Other*: The USSR will continue to make extensive use of radioisotopes in medicine, agriculture, industry and basic research.

12. The Soviet program of atomic energy assistance to the satellites, begun in 1955, consists primarily of the provision of research reactors and training. Soviet-supplied 2000-kilowatt research reactors are in operation in Rumania and Czechoslovakia and will soon be in operation in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Communist China has received a 6,500–10,000 kilowatt reactor which will soon be in operation. The USSR has a large center near Moscow where satellite and other foreign scientists are trained in all phases of nuclear energy. The Soviet aid program is being expanded to include help in constructing nuclear power stations in several satellites. The USSR is attempting to keep close control over satellite atomic energy programs, thus reportedly engendering some antagonism among satellite scientists, by requiring (a) uniform package deals involving all phases of atomic energy development; (b) provisions in the aid agreements assuring Soviet receipt of key natural resources; and (c) satellite scientists to train in the USSR rather than in their own laboratories.

13. Soviet policy toward non-bloc countries is flexible, is designed primarily to achieve political objectives, and is aimed largely toward underdeveloped nations. The most active Soviet programs are with Egypt and Yugoslavia and involve the construction of research reactors. The USSR has offered a number of other countries aid, mostly in the form of scholarships for study in the USSR and of radioisotopes for research. Only a few of these offers have become realities, sometimes

because the recipient country has refused the offer and sometimes because of lack of Soviet follow-through. It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of the Soviet program to non-bloc countries. The appeal of the lack of political or safeguard strings on Soviet offers to Egypt and Yugoslavia may be counter-balanced by Soviet insistence on the presence of Soviet technicians, and slowness of follow-through. However, by late 1959, when the first large-scale Soviet nuclear power plant (210,000 electrical kilowatts) goes into operation, the USSR will probably increase its offers of aid in the construction of nuclear power stations in non-bloc countries.

14. The Soviet Union appears now to be taking a direct interest in the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, after original opposition and procrastination, has cooperated in the work of the Preparatory Commission.

#### *E. Programs of Other Countries*

15. France has constructed five research reactors and has in operation a gas-cooled plutonium-producing reactor, which also yields 5,000 kilowatts of by-product electrical power, all of which is used in the operation of the reactor. Three other full-scale power-plutonium reactors are presently under construction. Funds have been authorized for construction of a plant for production of U-235, either through Euratom or as an independent French national effort if necessary. Canada, Norway, and Sweden have built research reactors and with only limited outside assistance are planning to construct power reactors. Many other countries are establishing or contemplating establishment of atomic energy programs.

#### *F. IAEA and Regional Programs*

16. *The International Atomic Energy Agency Statute* has been signed by more than 80 nations and ratification has been completed by the United States, the USSR and some 55 others. The Statute permits the Agency to engage in any aspect of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Present plans emphasize technical support of national and regional programs. The Agency should have special importance in the enforcement of safeguards against diversion of atomic energy assistance to military purposes.

17. *EURATOM*. The Treaty to establish the European Atomic Energy Community was signed on March 25, 1957, by Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and completion of ratifications is expected very early in 1958. EURATOM, a supra-national organization, will have important operating responsibilities in research and development, in coordination of members' programs, and in supply of nuclear fuel, though actual construction and operation of nuclear power plants will be carried out



on a national basis. A group of three experts recommended that EURATOM adopt as its target the installation of 15 million kilowatts of electric generating equipment in the next ten years, as much as possible being built by European industry.

18. *The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)* has a membership of 17 Western European countries (including the EURATOM countries), with Canada and the United States as associate members. It has a cooperative nuclear energy program, much less closely knit than the EURATOM group. It will sponsor certain joint projects (e.g., a chemical processing plant) and will operate a joint safeguards and accountability system.

19. *The Organization of American States* has established a consultative Atomic Energy Commission for technical matters.

20. While the U.S. proposal for the establishment of an Asian Nuclear Center in the Philippines was supported in principle by the Colombo Plan nations at the Working Group meeting in Washington in July 1957,<sup>15</sup> they indicated that they were not prepared to accept commitments to carry the operating costs of a center on the \$20 million scale originally proposed by the United States. In view of this position, the United States does not propose to proceed with the center as originally envisaged. However, in view of intensified Soviet scientific activity and the need for training facilities in the area, the United States is studying a plan for construction of a less costly center, possibly to be associated with the Colombo Plan and the IAEA.

#### *Economics of Nuclear Power.*

21. Economic nuclear power on a large scale is likely to develop first in England and on the Continent of Europe, although other areas of extensive power networks such as Japan and the USSR may follow closely. Because of adequate supplies of relatively cheap fuel and the availability of large, efficient and low-cost conventional plants, economically competitive nuclear power is not likely to be achieved in the United States at as early a date. Further details are shown in Figures A, B and C,<sup>16</sup> which project the costs of electrical power from conventional and nuclear plants in the United Kingdom, EURATOM, and the United States.

22. The U.K. and Western European political and economic motivations to avoid increased reliance upon conventional fuels from outside sources of supply provide a further incentive, not present in the United States, for the early initiation of nuclear power projects. In both areas, for example, the dependence on Middle East oil and the conse-

---

<sup>15</sup> Documentation on the working group meeting in Washington, July 8-19, including its final report, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 19, 1957, pp. 308-314.

<sup>16</sup> In Appendix E to NSC 5725. [Footnote in the source text.]

quences of interruption of this flow were highlighted by the Suez incident. Figure D<sup>17</sup> portrays the reductions in future imports of conventional fuel expected to be achieved through the nuclear power program recommended for EURATOM.

23. Figure E<sup>17</sup> forecasts and compares anticipated nuclear power programs of the United States, the United Kingdom and EURATOM. It should be particularly noted that the forecast of the U.S. program assumes that reductions in the costs of nuclear power will be achieved during the periods 1960-1965 and 1965-1970 through engineering and technological advances resulting from the construction and operation of sufficient numbers of first and second and perhaps later generation prototype nuclear power plants in these respective periods. See Figure F.<sup>17</sup>

24. World opinion equates pre-eminence in power reactor technology with leadership in the peaceful applications of atomic energy. Accordingly, the development of measures to maintain U.S. pre-eminence in power reactor technology is of continuing concern and paramount importance.

#### *Non-Technical Problems*

25. Some of the more important non-technical problems related to U.S. policy on peaceful uses of atomic energy are:

a. So long as no effective disarmament agreement exists, military needs remain paramount, and military and civilian demands must be reconciled.

b. As other countries develop atomic energy programs they will at the same time develop increasing capabilities for the independent production of nuclear weapons. Provision for the development of a system of safeguards and controls is made in the IAEA Statute, and in U.S., U.K., and Canadian bilateral agreements. The need for safeguards and controls assumes increasing importance as a way of preventing nuclear materials and equipment furnished for peaceful uses from being diverted to military use. Such safeguards and controls might be more acceptable politically on a multilateral than on a unilateral basis. Atomic energy programs based on domestic resources will be free from any external controls. If substantial atomic energy assistance from the USSR, and possibly other countries, becomes available without safeguards, it will be difficult for the United States or the IAEA to obtain safeguards.

c. Widespread use of high-level radiation sources and the need to dispose of radioactive wastes will increase the potential hazard inherent in atomic energy activities and create international health-safety problems and associated legal and financial problems of insurance and liability.

d. In view of the emergence of bilateral, regional and IAEA channels for international cooperation, it will be necessary in undertaking new programs or in responding to foreign overtures for assistance to

---

<sup>17</sup> In Appendix E to NSC 5725. [Footnote in the source text.]

determine which channel would best serve the interests of the United States. These channels need not be competitive but can supplement each other. The United States has a special interest in supporting the IAEA in view of U.S. sponsorship of the IAEA and the special contribution which it can make to acceptance and enforcement of a world-wide system of safeguards. Encouragement of regional groups, where appropriate and politically desirable, as opposed to more costly national efforts, would help develop interdependence in atomic energy matters among military potential more development of national atomic military potential more difficult. Traditional or special relationships, such as those between the United States and Canada and the United States and the United Kingdom, will call for continuance of bilateral arrangements. Such bilateral arrangements may also be necessary to provide the legal framework for cooperation or commercial arrangements not covered by regional organizations or the IAEA.

*Relation of U.S. Policy on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to National Security Objectives*

26. The maintenance of U.S. supremacy in peaceful uses of atomic energy overseas and in nuclear technology, both in fact and in the eyes of the world, is an important element of U.S. national security policy. As long as U.S. activities and capability in peaceful uses of atomic energy overseas and in nuclear technology provide the United States with continued recognition as the Number One country in the field, friendly competition between the United States and other Free World countries would not detract from U.S. pre-eminence and would contribute to Free World leadership. U.S. pre-eminence and influence in peaceful uses of atomic energy overseas and in nuclear technology will enhance general acceptance of effective safeguards to minimize diversion of nuclear material to weapons purposes. Loss of such U.S. pre-eminence would gravely damage the prestige of the United States.

27. Because of the present state of the technology and economics of atomic energy, the highly industrialized countries (Western Europe and Japan) which have scientific and technical capabilities and a need for atomic energy will derive important benefits from atomic energy over the next ten years. U.S. atomic energy cooperation with these industrialized countries can materially assist them in meeting their mounting energy needs. In contrast, over the same period, atomic energy will not contribute significantly to the solution of the economic problem of the underdeveloped areas. However, U.S. assistance and cooperation in the atomic energy field with these underdeveloped areas will be important as a part of the U.S. cold war effort.

Objectives

28. To the extent consistent with "the common defense and security" of the United States:

a. Pre-eminence by the United States and leadership by it and other appropriate Free World countries in peaceful atomic energy development and international cooperation, particularly in the development and application of nuclear power.

b. Use of such pre-eminence and leadership to promote cohesion within the Free World and to forestall successful Soviet exploitation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to attract the allegiance of the uncommitted peoples of the world.

c. International development of atomic energy along lines which provide adequate protection for the health and safety of the individual and the international community.

d. The use only for peaceful purposes of source, special nuclear or other nuclear materials and equipment, and materials derived therefrom, except in the case of the United States and selected allies; recognizing that the achievement of this objective requires effective implementation of safeguards under bilateral agreements and under the IAEA, but that national nuclear weapons programs can be controlled only through safeguarded disarmament agreements.

#### Policy Guidance

29. Vigorously carry out U.S. domestic programs, including those indicated below, in the development and application of all phases of peaceful uses of atomic energy in order to maintain U.S. pre-eminence and Free World leadership in this field.

30. Continue the U.S. program of assistance and cooperation with other nations in the development and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. To this end:

a. Continue to enter into "agreements for cooperation" or "international arrangements", as appropriate, with other nations or groups of nations indicating a desire to cooperate in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

b. Continue, as may be consistent with military requirements, to request further Presidential determinations making special nuclear material available for peaceful uses outside the United States. Except as authorized by the Atomic Energy Commission, enriched uranium distributed for peaceful uses outside the United States shall not be of weapons quality.

c. Continue to assist cooperating nations or groups of nations (such as OEEC and OAS) in the development and use of research and power reactors and in the development and application of atomic energy in the physical and biological sciences, medicine, agriculture, and industry, with special attention to the utilization of radio-isotopes; emphasizing the development of technically and economically sound national programs according to the capacities and needs of the cooperating party.

d. Continue the training and education of eligible nationals of other countries, both in the United States and abroad, in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

e. Continue the dissemination to other countries of information on peaceful uses of atomic energy to the maximum extent authorized by law.

Coordinate such U.S. programs of assistance, and any other new U.S. assistance programs in this field which may hereafter be approved, with other U.S. foreign assistance programs.

31. Continue aggressive research and development in the United States of power reactors of appropriate design for export, including associated fuel cycles.

32. Continue to encourage and facilitate the participation of U.S. individuals, industries and private institutions in atomic activities abroad, including the world market for nuclear equipment, services, and materials.

33. In order to maintain U.S. leadership in the peaceful application of atomic energy, develop additional measures necessary to facilitate the use of U.S. reactor technology and full-scale prototype power reactor plants abroad.

34. In view of the close relation between the early operation of large-scale prototype nuclear power reactors in the United States and leadership in the peaceful applications of atomic energy, accelerate, wherever found feasible, the operational dates of presently-planned nuclear power projects in the United States for which funds have been approved.

35. Continue the peaceful nuclear propulsion program. During the construction period of the first nuclear-propelled merchant ship (a) inform interested Free World nations of both the technology and economics of nuclear ship propulsion; (b) take steps through diplomatic and other appropriate channels to assure that, upon construction, the ship will be able to move freely in foreign waters so that full psychological advantage and operational experience may be gained.

36. Vigorously present a picture of U.S. policies and achievements, stressing the beneficial potential of atomic energy, while making clear the problems associated with the development and conduct of atomic energy programs:

a. Through convocation of and participation in appropriate international conferences and symposia.

b. Through participation in appropriate international exhibitions and trade fairs, with increased attention to exhibits.

c. Through the U.S. information program.

37. Develop opportunities further to support and strengthen the position of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Possibilities include: relating to the Agency U.S. programs now underway; finding ways of encouraging other governments to join the Agency and deal with it; building up the effectiveness and prestige of the Agency; and, to the extent feasible, encouraging Soviet support of the Agency.

38. Develop a plan for construction of a less costly Asian Nuclear Center, possibly to be associated with the Colombo Plan and the IAEA.

39. Develop an active association with EURATOM (when it comes into existence) which would:

a. Furnish the framework for mutually beneficial action on both the governmental and industrial levels.

b. Provide a fruitful two-way exchange of experience and technical development.

c. Assist Euratom in achieving economic nuclear power at an early date.

d. Result in mutual advantage from the proving ground for nuclear power offered by EURATOM.

e. Give recognition and status to EURATOM, thus contributing to the political cohesion and economic strength of its members.

40. Utilize opportunities for limited cooperation in unclassified peaceful uses of atomic energy matters with the USSR and with satellite nations, when such cooperation will serve U.S. national security interests.

41. Continue to press for an international safeguard system to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to other than peaceful uses. To this end:

a. Attempt to persuade other governments that they have a self-interest in an effective system of safeguards and controls.

b. Attempt to reach agreement with other supplier nations with respect to establishing systems of safeguards and controls consistent with those of the United States and the International Agency.

c. Assist in the development of an effective system of safeguards and controls within the International Agency with the ultimate objective of administration by the Agency of existing bilateral controls and safeguards.

d. Implement the safeguard provisions of "agreements for cooperation" by establishing a system of inspection and control based on adequate material accountability and physical security measures, including the stationing of resident inspection teams at the larger and more complex installations.

e. Seek to minimize any adverse effects arising from implementation of safeguard systems.

[Here follows a Financial Appendix.]

**316. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 23, 1957.*

DEAR FOSTER: The report on your background session with the press in Paris on December 19th<sup>2</sup> states that you told the press that the May 31, 1957 informal memorandum to Zorin<sup>3</sup> made proposals that were beyond U.S. authorization.

In fact the May 31st informal memorandum kept meticulously within the decisions which the President had made as reflected in the official minutes prepared by Robert Cutler and initialed by the President.<sup>4</sup> No one in the U.S. Delegation, nor in the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission has ever claimed that any paragraph of the memorandum went beyond U.S. policy.

Sincerely,

**Harold**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/12-2357. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were in Paris to attend the NATO heads of government meetings, December 16-18. For documentation on these meetings, see vol. iv, pp. 218 ff. The report of Dulles' background session with the press has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> Document 214.

<sup>4</sup> Document 206.

---

**317. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant (Stassen)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, December 24, 1957.*

DEAR HAROLD: I have your memorandum of December 23.<sup>2</sup> I am sorry that the matter of your May 31 memorandum to Zorin came up at my background press conference. What I said, however, could have been no surprise to you. You will recall that I cabled you on June 4, "I feel your memorandum to Soviet Delegation of May 31 exceeded your authority both as to substance and procedure";<sup>3</sup> and later the same day I sent you, with the personal approval of the President, the in-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/12-2457. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> See Document 222.

struction to "notify Mr. Zorin at the earliest possible moment that the memorandum you submitted to him was not only informal and unofficial, but had no approval in its submitted form either by the President or the State Department, and that there are some aspects of the memorandum to which this government cannot agree at this moment. Therefore you will request that Mr. Zorin return the memorandum".<sup>4</sup>

Under these circumstances, I could hardly have answered affirmatively the question of "whether this memorandum was representative of the views of the American Government".

I might say that the view that your memorandum exceeded your authority both as to substance and procedure was concurred in at the time by both the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely yours,

**John Foster Dulles**<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> See Document 223.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



# Index

- Abbott, Col. Thomas W., 471
- Acts of Congress:
- Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 115
  - Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 22*n*, 47, 52, 55, 87
  - International Atomic Energy Agency (P.L. 177, 1957), 716
- Adams, Sherman, 62, 725
- Adenauer, Konrad:
- Disarmament negotiations, 359-360, 453, 584, 592, 594, 604-609, 611, 613-615, 626, 658-662, 672-674, 676-680, 686, 735
  - Elections, 636, 719, 735
  - Four-Power Foreign Ministers meeting proposal, 557
  - Nuclear weapons, 449, 475, 738
  - U.N. Disarmament Commission, 359-360
  - U.S. visit, 551
- Agreements for Cooperation, 22*n*, 37*n*, 48, 52, 54, 768
- with Italy, 71
  - with NATO, 371
  - with the Netherlands, 71, 87
  - with the Philippines, 72
  - with Switzerland, 71
  - with Turkey, 71, 87
- Akalovsky, A., 560-563
- Aldrich, Winthrop W., 35, 356, 378-388
- Alphand, Hervé, 587-589
- American Assembly, 61
- American Declaration of Independence, 275
- Amory, Robert, Jr., 248
- Anderson, Clinton P., 755-756
- Anderson, Dillon:
- Disarmament policy:
    - Inspection system, 418-419
- Anderson, Dillon—Continued
- Disarmament policy—Continued
    - Moch plan, 362-363
    - Stassen plan, 144, 154, 250, 290, 294, 319-328
  - Nuclear energy projects, 160, 334-335, 338
  - Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 126
  - Scientific manpower study, 214
- Anderson, Robert B.:
- Disarmament expert, proposal and appointment of, 18-19, 109
  - Disarmament policy:
    - Defense Department plan, 2-3, 16, 18-20
    - Stassen plan, 112-113
- Arctic, 586-587
- Armaments Control Plan, 441
- Armaments Regulation Council, 333
- Armaments Regulation Organization, 624
- Armaments regulation policy (*see also* Disarmament policy; Nuclear weapons testing; United Nations: Disarmament Commission):
- Armed forces limitations, 140-142, 181-183, 276-277, 317, 325, 341-342, 351-355, 358-359, 368, 374, 393, 415, 424, 449-450, 464-466, 623-624
  - Arms race, 93, 148, 152, 163, 320, 327-328, 461
  - Conventional forces/weapons, 34, 256, 258, 266, 269, 289-290, 291-292, 323-325, 332, 374, 464-466
- Disclosure and verification. *See* Disarmament policy: Inspection systems.
- List of armaments, 645-648
- Soviet proposals, 7, 32, 76-78

- Armaments regulation policy—Continued  
 State Department memorandum, 140-142  
 Surprise attack, 206-207, 269, 288-289, 296, 299, 331, 357, 364-365  
 United Kingdom proposals, 440  
 U.S. position, 1-7, 15-20, 28-34, 109-113, 356-359, 368-369, 393-400, 402-408, 422-423, 439-443
- Armed Forces Policy Council, 136
- Asian Nuclear Energy Training and Research Center, 235-236, 259
- Atlee, Clement, 378
- Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 115, 634
- Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 22*n*, 47, 52, 55, 87, 371, 444, 446, 768
- Atomic Energy Commission (*see also* Nuclear weapons):  
 Disarmament plan, 4-5  
 "Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Weapons," 21*n*, 39-40  
 ICA relations with, 259-260  
 International Control of Armed Forces and Armaments, 4*n*  
 Nuclear power plant construction, 65, 114  
 Nuclear weapons effects, 11-15, 20-34, 39-40  
 Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 118-120, 126  
 Programs of, 760-761  
 Radiation effects, international studies of, 89  
 Reactor development, 333-340, 430-432  
 Reactor development abroad, 208-209, 334-336  
 Security procedures review committee, 8
- Atomic energy policy (*see also* Nuclear weapons), 28  
 Atomic weapons ban, 273-275  
 Cyclotrons, 213  
 Fissionable materials, 320, 329, 358, 406, 423-427, 621  
 Information declassification, 156  
 Information exchange, 8, 10-11, 36, 37-38, 371, 755-756  
 International control of atomic energy, 147*n*  
 Nuclear materials production, 340-341  
 Peaceful uses of atomic energy, 41-45, 46-55, 68-70, 430-432, 650, 760-780
- Atomic energy policy—Continued  
 Reactor development, 22-28, 43-45, 47, 49-51, 70, 155-162, 333-340, 430-432, 769-770  
 abroad, 208-209, 259-260, 334-335, 771-772  
 for merchant ships, 65-67, 161, 430  
 for tankers, 431  
 for the U.S. Army, 161  
 Soviet position, 51, 69-70
- Atomic power plants. *See* Nuclear power plants.
- Atomic weapons. *See* Nuclear weapons.
- Atoms for Peace proposal (*see also* International Atomic Energy Agency proposal):  
 Eisenhower address of, 16-17, 25, 1953  
 Information exchange, 27  
 Reactor development, 23-26, 71-72  
 Response to, 430*n*  
 Soviet position, 68-70  
 U.N. exhibit, 8, 25  
 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 68-70  
 "Atoms for Police," 396-398, 416-418
- Baker, Vincent:  
 Disarmament policy, 368-369, 513-525  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 360-361, 463  
 "Ban the Bomb" slogan, 201, 273-275, 324, 394, 436, 449
- Barbour, Walworth:  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 714-715  
 Soviet-U.S. bilaterals on disarmament, 391-392, 705-713
- Baruch, Bernard M., 147 *n*
- Beam, Jacob D., 587-589, 594
- Belgium, 157-159, 336-337, 431, 557
- Berding, Andrew H., 196, 207-208, 482
- Bernades, Carlos A., 750
- Bernau, Phyllis D., 618
- Bevan, Aneurin, 468
- Bevin, Ernest, death of, 633
- Bhabha, Dr. Howi J., 9-10
- Bikini-Enewetok. *See* Pacific Proving Ground *under* Nuclear weapons testing.
- Blankenhorn, Herbert, 605, 658, 662, 735
- Bond, Niles W., 234
- Bonesteel, Brig. Gen. Charles H., III, 63-64
- Bourgès-Maunoury, Maurice, 585, 591*n*
- Bowie, Robert R., 594  
 Defense Department disarmament plan, 2  
 Disarmament expert proposal, 6, 18

- Bowie, Robert R.—Continued  
 Disarmament policy, 20, 247, 249-250, 479, 524, 526, 630-631  
 NATO debriefing, 500  
 Nuclear fuel production, 5-6, 17
- Brazil, power reactor project, 156
- Brentano, Heinrich von, 453, 644
- Bricker, John W., 497, 630, 716
- Bridges, Styles, 497
- British Atomic Scientists Association, 478
- Brown, George, 468
- Brown, Winthrop G., 503-504
- Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 8
- Bruce, David K.E., 594, 658-662
- Brucker, Wilber M., 503
- Brussels World Fair, 157
- Bulganin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich, 157, 186, 202-203, 209-210, 245, 267-269, 303-304  
 Armaments regulation policy, 326  
 Disarmament policy, 433  
 Letter to Eisenhower, 318  
 London visit, 375  
 Open Sky plan, 314-316  
 Stassen-Khrushchev conversation, 378-383  
 U.S.-Soviet relations, 280-283
- Bulganin-Stassen conversation, 378-388
- Bunche, Ralph J., 237, 239
- Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 277-279
- Caccia, Sir Harold Anthony, 455-456, 636-638, 757
- Canada, 569, 688-689, 757-758
- Central Intelligence Agency, nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 64
- "Chance for Peace" speech (Eisenhower), 15
- Childs, Marquis, 303
- China, People's Republic of:  
 Armaments regulation, 112, 133, 135, 247, 289, 332, 365, 407, 415, 426, 441, 446  
 Nuclear weapons, 104-105
- Churchill, Sir Winston:  
 Atomic information exchange, 36, 37-38  
 Thermonuclear explosion effects, 12
- Cisler, Walker, 174
- Civil defense program, 13-14
- Clark, Grenville, 33
- Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 293
- Colclough, Adm. Oswald S., 174
- Cole, W. Sterling, 438, 649, 690-691
- Coleridge, Richard D., 585
- Colombo Plan, 235-236
- Cominterm, 3, 6
- Congress, U.S. (*see also* Acts of Congress):  
 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 334, 649, 716
- Senate:  
 Foreign Relations Committee:  
 International Atomic Energy Agency Treaty, 497, 630  
 Subcommittee on Disarmament, 279-280, 434, 649  
 International Atomic Energy Agency Treaty ratification, 497-498
- Coulson, John E., 573, 588*n*
- Cripps, Sir Stafford, 633
- Cutler, Robert:  
 Atomic energy policy, 41, 762-765  
 Disarmament policy, 19-20, 29-30, 457, 460, 514, 532, 537, 555  
 Disarmament expert proposal, 32  
 First phase of disarmament, 625-626  
 Stassen proposals, 551-555  
 State Department plans, 32-33, 620-625  
 Nuclear weapons, AEC report on, 39  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 63-64, 656-658, 694-695  
 Reactor development, 22, 24-27, 65*n*
- Cyclotrons, 213
- Czechoslovakia, IAEA participant, 176, 177
- Davis, W. Kenneth, 156, 158
- Defense, U.S. Department of (*see also* Joint Chiefs of Staff):  
 Armaments regulation policy, 342  
 Disarmament plan, 2-3, 7, 15-17, 29*n*  
 Disarmament policy, 143  
 International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 310-311  
 Stassen disarmament proposals, 136-139, 726-728
- Denmark, 557
- Diefenbaker, John George, 644
- Disarmament advisory committee, 60-62
- Disarmament expert:  
 Appointment, 58-59  
 Proposal of, 6, 18-19, 29-30, 32-34
- Disarmament policy (*see also* Armaments regulation policy; United Nations):  
 Anglo-French proposals, 362-363, 370, 373, 393, 650-651  
 Baruch plan, 147-148, 151-153  
 Berding suggestion, 196, 207-208

- Disarmament policy—Continued
- British position, 200, 210-211, 217, 293, 630-638, 643-644, 721-722
  - Canadian position, 644, 688-689
  - Defense Department position, 143, 180-181, 510-513
  - Eden plan for test inspection, 364 and European security, 448-449
  - First phase of disarmament:
    - Eisenhower response, 625-626
    - U.S. position, 620-625, 629, 645-647, 695-696, 703-705
  - Four-Power meetings, 555-559, 590-593, 669-672, 682-685
  - French position, 515, 644
  - German position, 359-360, 644, 658-662, 677-678, 686-688, 692, 735
  - Inspection systems, 131, 148-149, 151, 154, 163-164, 166-170, 172-175, 186, 193-194, 217-218, 221-222, 225-227, 227-233, 245, 250-255, 268-273, 291-292, 364-366, 424
  - Bulgarian ground inspection proposal, 257, 357, 407, 415, 454
  - Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange plan ("Open Skies" proposal), 163-164, 169, 172, 184, 186, 194, 196-197, 199-208, 245, 255-257, 278-279, 285-286, 291, 314-316, 330, 357-358, 407, 415, 428, 449-451, 454, 516-517, 537
  - Inspection zones, 622-623, 658-659, 662-663, 669-672, 677-682, 686-689, 692-693, 736-740
  - Soviet position, 3-5, 16, 204, 740
  - Test strips, 293-294, 319, 321-323, 391
  - Joint Chiefs of Staff position, 121-125, 134-136, 144, 183-184, 268-271, 276-279, 283-287, 539-541
  - Moch plan, 362-363
  - Partial agreement/progressive installation of inspections, 449-451, 458, 504-510, 539-541, 542-543
  - Soviet position, 202-203, 204, 209-210, 366-368, 370, 394-395, 449-451, 486-490, 491-496, 499-500, 501-504, 515-516, 613-615, 652-653, 717-718, 731-734
  - Soviet proposals, 655-656, 756-757
  - Soviet-U.S. bilateral negotiations, 391-392, 560-563, 609-611, 653-655, 674-677, 705-713, 756-757
- Disarmament policy—Continued
- Soviet-U.S. negotiations:
    - Bulgarian-Khrushchev conversation, 378-388
    - Bulgarian letter of 1956, 433
  - Special Task Groups, 174, 225-227, 290, 296, 419
  - Stassen informal memorandum, 572, 573-582, 583-584, 613-615
  - British response, 572, 585, 589-591, 596-597
  - Defense Department response, 599-601
  - Eisenhower response, 595-598, 616-617
  - Four-Power meeting discussions, 590-593
  - French response, 572-573, 584-585, 587-589, 591, 606
  - German response, 604-609, 613-614
  - Joint Chiefs of Staff review, 601-604
  - NATO Allies response, 573, 585-587, 591-592, 605-606, 607-608, 613-615
  - Soviet response, 609-611
  - State Department response, 582-583, 593-595, 606, 608-609, 618-619, 781-782
  - Western Powers response, 582-583
  - Stassen proposals, 93-113, 116-117, 121-125, 127-139, 144-145, 240-244, 245-250, 260-268, 319-330, 504-510, 513-526, 529-532, 539-543, 545-550, 551-555, 565-571, 723-725
  - State Department position, 249-250, 620-625
  - Technical Exchange Panels, 167, 169, 191-194, 195-197, 199, 207, 293, 391
  - U.S. position, 144-155, 227-233, 240-244, 250-255, 276-279, 287-290, 290-306, 319-330, 354-355, 355-359, 368-369, 444-446, 474-482, 504-510
  - World disarmament conference proposal, 107
  - World Disarmament Policy, 170
  - Dodge, Joseph M., civil defense budget, 14
  - Donkin, McKay, 108
  - Doolittle, Gen. James H., 174, 572
  - Dulles, Allen W., 545-546, 556
  - Disarmament expert proposal, 18-19

- Dulles, Allen W.—Continued  
 Disarmament policy, Soviet position, 514, 521, 524  
 Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 64*n*  
 Scientific education, 214
- Dulles, John Foster:  
 Agreements for Cooperation, 71-72  
 Asian Nuclear Energy Training and Research Center, 235  
 Atomic energy policy, reactors abroad, 24, 43, 336, 338  
 Atoms for peace program, 23  
 Disarmament expert proposal, 33  
 Disarmament policy, 2, 5-7, 15-17, 19, 30-31, 111, 140-143, 172-173, 191-192, 194-195, 199-202, 218-220, 258, 287-290, 305-306, 322-324, 331-333, 368-369, 452-453, 455-456, 458-461, 474-486, 537-538, 719-720  
 British negotiations, 630-631, 636-638, 668-669  
 Bulganin, correspondence with, 350, 433  
 First phase of disarmament, 629  
 Four-Power meeting, 669-672, 682-685  
 Inspection zones, 662-663, 668-669, 672-674, 679-682, 692-693, 740  
 NATO negotiations, 556-560  
 Senatorial involvement, 649-650  
 Soviet position, 731-734, 740  
 Soviet-U.S. bilateral, 674-677  
 Stassen informal memorandum of *May 31, 1957*, 594-598, 608-609, 618-619, 626, 781-782  
 Stassen informal memorandum of *September 23, 1957*, 723-725  
 Stassen proposals, 111, 145-146, 150-152, 240-241, 294-298, 514-525, 564-565, 725-726, 739-740  
 U.S. position, 663, 721  
 Foreign Ministers meeting, 224  
 German reunification, 375-376, 453  
 IAEA Statute, 170-171, 176-177, 307-311, 436-437  
 International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 177-179  
 London visit, 664-665  
 Nuclear weapons proliferation, 487  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 345-346, 400-402, 463, 664-666  
 Radiation effects, 21, 90-92
- Dulles, John Foster—Continued  
 Speeches, U.N. Disarmament Commission, 721
- Duquesne Power and Light Company, 336
- Durham, Carl T., 649
- Eden, Sir Anthony:  
 Disarmament policy, 222, 251, 261, 306  
 Health of, 633  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 402, 420  
 U.S. visit, 306
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.:  
 Armaments regulation policy, 6, 34, 355-356  
 Atomic Energy Commission, security procedures review committee, 8  
 Atomic energy policy, 42-45  
 Reactors abroad, 25-26, 335-336, 338-339  
 Reactors for ships, 66-67  
 Sharing of information with Soviets, 8  
 "Atoms for Peace" address, 16-17, 25  
 Atoms for Peace exhibit, 8  
 "Atoms for Police" proposal, 398  
 Bermuda meeting with Macmillan, 467  
 "Chance for Peace" speech, 15  
 Disarmament expert appointment, 58-59  
 Disarmament expert proposal, 29-30, 33  
 Disarmament policy, 110-111, 222, 250-255, 296-304, 316-317, 319-328, 460-461, 565-566, 628-629, 739-740  
 Aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal ("Open Skies"), 163-164, 169, 172, 184, 186, 203-208, 314-316, 428, 537  
 British negotiations, 643, 722-723  
 Letter to Bulganin, 340-341, 350, 361  
 Soviet position, 487-488  
 Stassen informal memorandum, 595-597, 609*n*, 616, 618  
 Stassen plan, 145, 148-149  
 U.N. Disarmament Commission, 31
- Dulles' London visit, 665  
 Nuclear weapons, 40, 425, 536-537, 639-640  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 8, 426-427, 434, 641-642, 666-668, 694-703, 754-755  
 Effects of, 11-15, 88-89  
 Moratorium on, 126, 489

- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued  
 “Open Skies” speech (*see also* Aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal *above*), 163-164, 169*n*  
 Technical inspection system, 272-273  
 U.S.-Soviet relations, 152, 280-283  
 U.S.-U.K. relations, 435
- Eisenhower, John S.D., 694-701, 715-716
- Elbrick, C. Burke, 555-558
- Elliott, William Y., 248, 250
- Enewetok. *See* Pacific Proving Ground *under* Nuclear weapons testing.
- European Atomic Energy Community, 308, 317, 320, 768-769, 774-776, 780
- Fairless, Benjamin, 174
- Fall-out. *See* Nuclear weapons testing: Radiation effects of.
- Farley, Philip J., 159, 175-176, 177-179, 307-311
- Farrell, Lt. Gen. Francis W., 247
- Faure, Edgar Jean, 222
- Federal Power Commission, 160
- Federal Republic of Germany. *See* Adenauer, Konrad; German reunification.
- Fedorenko, Nikolai Timofeevich, 378
- Firehock, Col. Raymond B., 108
- Fisk, James B., 174
- Fissionable materials. *See* Atomic energy policy: Fissionable materials.
- Flemming, Arthur S., 214, 431
- Foch, Marshal, 325
- Foreign Ministers meeting (Geneva), 224-225, 376
- Foreign Ministers meeting, proposed, 617
- Foster, Paul F., 89
- Fox, Gen. Alonzo P., 479-481, 522
- France, disarmament policy, 362-363
- Fukuryu Maru* incident, 343
- Fulbright, J. William, 630
- Gaitskill, Hugh T.N., 378
- Gardner, Edward R., 156
- Geneva Scientific Conference, 83
- George, James, 321
- Gerhart, Maj. Gen. John K., 364-365
- German reunification, 3, 6, 360, 367, 373, 375-376, 382-383, 391-392, 393, 407, 450-451, 453, 475, 487, 527, 550-551, 557, 612
- Gilmore, Eddy L.K., 378
- Gladney, Capt. D.W., 108, 276-279
- Gleason, S. Everett:  
 Armaments regulation policy, 109-113, 144-155, 214-221, 250-255, 290-304, 393-400, 457-462, 532-538  
 Atomic energy policy, 41-45, 114-116, 429-432, 760-766  
 Reactor development, 333-341  
 International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 211-214  
 National security programs, 760-764  
 Nuclear energy projects, 160-162  
 Nuclear explosion effects, 11-15, 20-34, 39-40  
 Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 62-64
- Goodby, James E., 471
- Goodpaster, Col. Andrew J.:  
 Atomic energy policy, 7-8, 38*n*, 336  
 Atoms for Peace project, 318  
 Disarmament policy, 428, 453-454, 486-490, 717-718  
 Nuclear weapons effects, 638-640  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 755-756
- Gray, Gordon, 200, 766
- Greece, 557
- Greene, Joseph N., Jr., 525-526, 545-550, 593-594, 598-599
- Grewe, Wilhelm, 605
- Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich, 367, 372-373, 378, 384-388, 391-392, 655-656, 732-734
- Grotewohl, Otto, 676
- Gullion, Edmund A., 108, 185-187, 367, 374
- Hagerty, James C., 281
- Hall, John A., AEC reactor projects, 155-159
- Hall, William O.:  
 IAEA proposal, 81, 83-84  
 Scientific Committee on Radiation, 236-239
- Hammarskjöld, Dag:  
 IAEA proposal, 81-84  
 Scientific Committee on Radiation, 236-237
- Hanlon, Adm. B. Hall, 392
- Hardtack (Operation), 698-701, 760
- Hayter, Sir William G., 378
- Herter, Christian A., 497, 551, 565, 582-583, 664-667, 690, 703-704
- Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 497-498
- Hollister, John B., 208, 259-260
- Holmes, Julius C., 618

- Hoover, Herbert C., Jr.:  
 Disarmament policy:  
   Eisenhower proposal, 205-208, 223, 361-362  
   Soviet proposal, 85-86  
   Technical Exchange Panel, 195-196  
 Nuclear weapons effects, British position, 12-13  
 Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 74-75, 234, 360-361  
 Power reactor development, 432
- Howe, Fisher, 691
- Hughes, Rowland R., 43
- Humphrey, George M.:  
 Armaments regulation policy, 297-298, 323, 461-462  
 Disarmament expert proposal, 32-33  
 Disarmament policy, 152  
 Nuclear weapons for defense, 398  
 Reactor development, 162, 337-338  
 Reactors abroad program, 24-25, 27, 431  
 Thermonuclear explosion effects, 13
- Humphrey, Hubert H., 280
- Iceland, 557
- Iguchi, Sadao, 345
- India, 593  
 Nuclear weapons test moratorium proposal, 18, 420*n*, 75, 758-759  
 Sale of heavy water, 27
- Indonesia, nuclear weapons, 420
- Intercontinental ballistic missiles. *See* Missiles.
- International Armaments Commission, 101-102, 130-121, 137, 173, 226, 244
- International Atomic Energy Agency:  
 Board of Governors Meetings, 741-753  
 Director General, 437-438, 690-691, 741, 743, 745-746, 753  
 Establishment of, 768  
 General conference meeting, 741-753  
 Preparatory Commission, 437, 743-744, 746
- International Atomic Energy Agency proposal (*see also* Atoms for Peace proposal), 18-19, 22*n*, 52, 55  
 Defense Department position, 346-348  
 Fissionable materials, 69, 320, 358  
 Membership proposals, 87  
 Negotiations for, 81-84, 86-88, 176-177, 198-199, 243-244  
 President of, 436-437  
 Reactor development, 70
- International Atomic Energy Agency proposal—Continued  
 Senate support and ratification of, 497, 630, 634, 716  
 Soviet position, 164-165, 188-189  
 Statute of the Agency, 170-171, 175-177, 244, 307, 312-314, 347-350, 377, 388-390, 413, 428-429, 497, 630, 774  
 U.N. resolution re, 69  
 U.S. position, 307-314, 346-348
- International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Geneva), 9-10, 73-74, 165, 171*n*, 177-179, 187-189  
 U.S. Delegation, 179*n*, 211-214
- International Cooperation Administration:  
 Reactor plan, 208, 259-260  
 Relations with AEC, 259-260
- International Council of Scientific Unions, 91
- Italy, 71, 557
- Jackson, William H., 423-427
- Janney, Frederick, 108
- Japan:  
*Fukuryu Maru* incident, 343  
 Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 345-346, 420, 468, 758-759  
 Nuclear weapons testing in Pacific, 343-345
- Jebb, Sir Gladwyn, 585
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 649, 690
- Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
 Armaments regulation policy, 121-125, 134-136, 144, 147-148, 183-184, 268-271, 276-279, 283-287, 299-300, 646-648  
 Armed forces ceiling limitations, 181-183, 325, 351-354, 464-466
- Atomic energy policy:  
 IAEA proposal, 347  
 Information exchange, 10-11  
 Peaceful uses of atomic energy, 762  
 Reactor experiments, 22
- Disarmament policy:  
 Blueprint of military establishments, 184  
 Stassen proposals, 539-542, 726-728, 728-730  
 Nuclear weapons for defense, 397
- Key, David McK., 80

- Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 203, 301, 375  
 Khrushchev-Stassen conversation on disarmament, 378-388  
 Killian Committee. *See* Technological Capabilities Panel.  
 Killian, James R., Jr., 148*n*  
 Kishi, Nobusuke, 730  
 Kitahara, Hideo, 345  
 Knowland, William F., 321, 497-498, 649  
 Korean Armistice Commission, 112, 116, 146, 148-149, 278, 351  
 Kuznetsov, Vasilii Vasilevich, 257, 449-451  
  
 Lall, Arthur S., 389  
 Larson, Arthur, 537  
 Lawrence, Ernest O., 174, 572, 638, 640, 755  
 Lay, James S., Jr., 29, 430, 432, 767  
 Levine, Irvin, 378  
 Libby, Willard F., 89, 118-120, 159  
 Lippmann, John F., 108, 118-120, 245-250  
 Lippmann, Walter, 303  
 Lloyd, John Selwyn, 306, 375, 378, 544, 632-635, 668, 670-671, 681-685  
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.:  
   Atomic information exchange with Britain, 36  
   Atomic weapons ban, 273-275  
   Atoms for Peace proposal, 25  
   Disarmament policy:  
     Disclosure and verification, 151, 168-170  
     Eisenhower plan, 169, 222-224, 314, 454-455  
     Soviet position, 147, 449-451, 755-756  
     Stassen plan, 116-117, 325-326  
     U.N. Disarmament Commission, 192, 209-211, 255-257, 454-455, 755-756  
   IAEA proposal, 86-88  
   Radiation effects, 73-74, 88-89, 91  
   Russian disarmament manifesto, 76-78  
 Loper, Maj. Gen. Herbert B.:  
   Atomic Energy Commission disarmament plan, 5  
   Defense Department disarmament plan, 3, 7, 17  
   Disarmament policy, 32, 479, 556  
   International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 310  
   Loper, Maj. Gen. Herbert B.—Continued  
     Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 64  
     U.S. disarmament policy, 33  
 Luxembourg, 557  
  
 McKillop, David H., 170*n*  
 McMahon Act. *See* Atomic Energy Act of 1946.  
 Macmillan, Harold, 224, 456-457, 467, 475, 485, 543-544, 589-590, 596-598, 616, 628, 636-638, 643, 665, 682, 721-723, 740-741  
 Magsaysay, Ramon, 235  
 Makins, Sir Roger, 400-401  
 Malik, Charles, 79, 209-210  
 Mansfield, Mike, 558  
 Martin, Joseph W., Jr., 690  
 Martin, Paul, 211  
 Matsushita, Masatoshi, 483-486  
 Matteson, Robert E., 108, 365-366  
 Maudling, Reginald, 378  
 Meyers, Howard:  
   Disarmament policy, 1-7, 364-368, 372-374  
   Nuclear weapons tests moratorium, 234  
 Miller, Herbert, nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 64  
 Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr., 60-62  
 Missiles, 490  
   Inspection system, 624  
   Intercontinental, 230  
   Soviet program, 458, 735  
   U.S. "Rover" program, 760  
 Mitchell, William, 159  
 Moch, Jules, 206, 209-211, 372, 449, 469, 475, 477, 482, 515, 564, 585, 588, 591-592, 669-670, 695, 757  
   Disarmament plan, 362-363  
 Mollet, Guy, 375-376  
 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 147, 209-210, 224, 484  
 Moulten, Harold, 174  
 Muniz, Joao Carlos, 429, 437, 750  
 Muralt, Alexander von, 9  
 Murphy, Robert D., 414-416, 447-448, 594  
 Murray, Thomas E., nuclear weapons testing policy, 56-57, 118-120, 408-409, 419-421, 434  
  
 National Academy of Sciences, radiation effects study, 91



National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-5-57, 458

National Security Council:

Actions:

- No. 899, 109
- No. 925, 39-40
- No. 1106, 109
- No. 1162, 109
- No. 1256, 109
- No. 1320, 14, 20-34, 39-40
- No. 1326, 28
- No. 1328, 34, 93-109, 127-133, 190
- No. 1351, 45
- No. 1358-c, 65-67
- No. 1377, 67
- No. 1411, 113, 127-133, 134, 154
- No. 1413, 116
- No. 1419, 154-155, 168, 173, 190, 197, 221, 227-233, 250, 260-268, 279, 284, 285, 290
- No. 1424, 162, 334, 339-340
- No. 1450, 214
- No. 1451, 221
- No. 1496, 254-255, 290
- No. 1510, 304, 319, 329
- No. 1513, 329-330, 351, 358-359, 415, 422, 439, 446
- No. 1516, 339
- No. 1553, 399-400, 402-408, 423, 444-446, 449, 457, 532-533
- No. 1611, 432
- No. 1676, 462
- No. 1722, 538
- No. 1726-b, 763
- No. 1821, 762
- No. 1824, 763, 766
- No. 1830, 766

Documents:

- NSC 112, 1-7, 15-20, 28-34, 109-113
- NSC 5431/1, 21-28
- NSC 5507, 21-28
- NSC 5507/1, 41-45
- NSC 5507/2, 41-45, 46-55, 65-67, 72, 156-162, 313, 333-340, 429-432
- NSC 5720, 762
- NSC 5725, 762-766
- NSC 5725/1, 767-780

Meetings:

- Armaments regulation policy, 109-113, 144-155, 250-255, 290-304, 319-328, 329-330, 393-400, 457-462, 532-538
- Atomic Energy Commission report, 114-116

National Security Council—Continued Meetings—Continued

- Atomic energy policy, 429-432
- National security programs, status of, 760-764
- Nuclear energy projects, 160-162
- Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 62-63
- Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 41-45, 65-67, 211-221, 762-766
- Power reactor development, 333-340
- Thermonuclear explosion effects, 11-15, 20-34, 39-40
- 235th, Feb. 3, 1955, 11-15
- 236th, Feb. 10, 1955, 20-34
- 239th, Mar. 3, 1955, 39-40
- 240th, Mar. 10, 1955, 41-45
- 244th, Apr. 7, 1955, 65-67
- 250th, May 26, 1955, 109-113
- 251st, June 9, 1955, 114-116
- 253d, June 30, 1955, 144-155
- 255th, July 14, 1955, 160-162
- 261st, Oct. 13, 1955, 211-221
- 271st, Dec. 22, 1955, 250-255
- 274th, Jan. 26, 1956, 290-304
- 275th, Feb. 7, 1956, 319-320
- 276th, Feb. 9, 1956, 333-340
- 284th, May 10, 1956, 393-400
- 298th, Sept. 27, 1956, 429-432
- 315th, Mar. 6, 1957, 457-462
- 324th, May 23, 1957, 532-538
- 347th, Dec. 5, 1957, 760-764
- 348th, Dec. 12, 1957, 764-766
- Planning Board, 245-250, 334-335, 338-339, 760, 762, 763-764
- Special Committee, 1-7, 15, 18-19, 29-30

Nehru, Jawaharlal:

- IAEA proposal, 87
- Nuclear weapons testing moratorium proposal, 18n

Nelson, Cmdr. Curtis A.:

- Disarmament policy, 248-249
- Nuclear weapons testing moratorium, 62-63

Netherlands, 71, 557

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 149

Nixon, Richard M., 154, 213, 216, 219-220

Noble, Cmdr. Allan Herbert Percy, 455, 458-469, 463, 469, 482, 499n, 591-593, 631

Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 735

- North Atlantic Council, disarmament discussions, 563-564, 585-586, 605-606, 658, 673, 677-678, 687-689
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization:  
and arms race, 94-95  
Atomic weapons force, 399, 406, 409-412, 414  
Atomic weapons information, 371  
Disarmament discussions, 542, 548, 556-559, 560-561, 585-587, 605, 607-608, 611, 613-615, 659, 661-662, 677-678, 679-680, 686  
French agreement violation, 452  
Nuclear fuel production, 5-6, 17, 288-289, 292  
Nuclear materials production, 8, 17, 358  
Nuclear power plants:  
in the United Kingdom, 114, 430  
in the United States, 65, 760-761, 772  
in West Milton (New York), 114-115, 160-162  
Worldwide, 469
- Nuclear weapons (*see also* "Atoms for Police" program):  
Ban, 449  
British position, 632-635  
Chinese, 104-105  
European program, 573  
French position, 533, 572-573, 629  
German position, 104, 449, 475, 533, 738  
Information exchange, 11  
Japanese position, 104, 483-486  
Numbers of, 8  
Proliferation ("Fourth Powers"), 471, 474-482, 487, 502, 517, 527, 629, 632-635  
Public information re, 40  
Size limitations, 408-409  
Soviet, 6  
Stockpiling, 425, 656-658  
U.S., 425
- Nuclear weapons testing:  
Anglo-French proposal, 79*n*, 85*n*, 96  
Atomic Energy Commission position, 118-120, 126  
British Medical Research Council report, 401, 420  
British position, 12-14, 74-75, 400-402, 420-421, 463, 468-469, 755-756  
Canadian position, 420  
French position, 420, 683-684  
*Fukuryu Maru* incident, 343  
German position, 738  
Nuclear weapons testing—Continued  
Indian proposals, 18, 75, 420, 758-759  
Indonesian Parliament resolution, 420  
Inspection services, 101  
Japanese position, 343-346, 420, 468, 730, 758-759  
Limitations, 415, 434, 463  
Moratorium on, 18, 56-57, 62-64, 74-76, 79*n*, 85*n*, 96-97, 118-120, 126, 234, 343-346, 360-361, 392, 407, 419-420, 426, 434, 436, 468, 486-487, 627-628, 728-730, 758-759  
National Academy of Sciences report, 420  
Nevada Test Site, 35, 447-448  
Operation Plumbbob, 491  
Pacific Proving Ground (Bikini-Eniwetok), 21*n*, 38, 343-345, 403, 408, 484, 694-701  
Operation Hardtack, 698-701, 760  
Operation Redwing, 392-393  
Operation Wigwam, 88  
Publicity re, 11-15, 20-34, 39-40  
Radiation effects of, 35, 73-74, 88-89, 90-92, 234-235, 343-345, 420, 477-478, 484, 491, 638-642  
Soviet position, 653, 715-716  
Soviet proposals, 76, 96-97, 392, 419-420, 486-487, 627*n*  
Suspension, 736-737, 754-755  
in the United States, 8, 410-411, 694-701  
U.S. position, 75, 234, 360-361, 419-422, 426, 426-427, 434, 468-470, 474-482, 549-550, 640-642, 656-658, 664-701, 714-715, 728-730  
Nutting, Sir Harold Anthony, 79, 201, 207, 210, 365, 372-373, 391, 392*n*
- "Open Skies" proposal. *See* Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange plan *under* Disarmament policy: Inspection systems.
- Operations Coordinating Board, 11, 12, 14, 39-40, 766
- Ormsby-Gore, David, 714
- O'Shaughnessy, Elim, 604-608
- Owsley, Charles H., 619
- Pacific Proving Ground. *See under* Nuclear weapons testing.
- Parodi, Alexandre, 585
- Parsons, Howard L., 483-486
- Patterson, Morehead, 81-84, 86-88, 176

- Patterson, Morehead—Continued  
 Resignation of, 349
- Pauling, Linus, 639
- Peacock, D.W.K., Jr., 757-758
- Pearson, Drew, 303
- Pearson, Lester, 321
- Peaslee, Amos J., 201, 414*n*, 458-459, 546, 560
- Perkins, George W., 557-558, 559-560, 563-564, 585-587, 594, 607, 687-689
- Peterson, Val, 13-14
- Philippines:  
 Agreements for Cooperation, 72  
 Asian Nuclear Energy Training and Research Center, 235-236
- Phillips, Christopher, 171
- Pinay, Antoine, 224
- Pineau, Christian, 362-363, 448-449, 585, 589, 682-685
- Plumbbob (Operation), 491
- Plutonium, 310, 763
- Polint, Daniel Alfred, 61
- Portugal, 557
- Power reactor development. *See* Atomic energy policy: Reactor development; Nuclear power plants.
- President's Special Committee on Disarmament Programs, 418
- Protitch, Dragoslav, 378
- Quarles, Donald A., 539-541, 545, 546, 548-550, 556599-601, 658, 726-728
- Quebec Agreement of 1943, 115
- Rabi, Isidor Isaac, 187-189, 198-199, 754-755
- Radford, Adm. Arthur M.:  
 Armaments regulation policy, 121-125, 134-135, 147-150, 181-184, 200, 220-221, 268-271, 276-279, 283-284, 299-300, 326-327, 424, 426, 647-648  
 Atomic energy information, JCS policy on, 10-11  
 "Atoms for Police" proposal, 397-398  
 Disarmament policy, Stassen proposals, 542-543, 545-546  
 North Korean inspections, 32  
 Reactor development, 22-23, 44  
 U.S. press, 303-304
- Radiation effects. *See* Nuclear weapons testing: Effects of.
- Ramsbotham, Peter E., 237-238
- Reactor development. *See* Atomic energy policy: Reactor development; Nuclear power plants.
- Redwing (Operation), 392-393
- Reid, Ralph W. E., 247
- Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 556, 594
- Reston, James B., 589
- Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., 397
- Roberts, Sir Frank, 585-587
- Robertson, Norman A., 364
- Robertson, Reuben B., Jr.:  
 Armed forces reduction, 324-325, 341-342, 351-354  
 Disarmament policy, 180-181  
 International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 310, 312-314
- Robinson, Howard A., 158
- Rockefeller, Nelson A.:  
 Nuclear power development, 27, 115  
 Nuclear weapons research, 217
- Roshchin, Aleksei Alekseevich, 473, 560
- Salisbury, Lord, 544
- Saltonstall, Leverett, 558
- Sandys, Duncan, 585, 613
- Schaetzle, J. Robert, 155-159
- Scientific Advisory Committee to the Director of Defense Mobilization, 754-755
- Scientific Committee on Radiation. *See under* United Nations.
- Scientific education, 213-214
- Scott, Robert, 200
- "Secretary for Peace", 60-61
- Skobeltsyn, D.V., 83
- Smith, Bromley K., 640-642
- Smith, Gerard C., 594  
 Atomic energy policy, 68-70, 155-159  
 Defense Department disarmament plan, 7  
 IAEA proposal, 164-165, 198-199, 307-311  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 63-64, 400-402, 694-695  
 Reactor development abroad, 208-209
- Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell, 174, 225, 293, 572
- Sobolev, Arkady Aleksandrovich, 69*n*, 187, 205, 449
- Soviet Union. *See Soviet subheadings under main headings such as* Armaments regulation policy; Disarmament policy.

- Spaak, Paul-Henri, 560, 573, 586-587, 687-689
- Spiers, Ronald I., 205-207, 474-482, 594, 630-631
- Sprague, Mansfield D., 546
- Sproul, Robert G., 214
- Stassen, Harold E. (*see also* Stassen informal memorandum under Disarmament policy):
- Armaments regulation policy, 393-400, 402-412, 422-423, 424, 532-538, 645-646
  - Atomic energy policy, reactor development abroad, 335, 338-339, 431-432
  - "Atoms for Police" proposal, 396-398
  - Disarmament policy, 80, 93-113, 118-120, 127-133, 144-145, 154, 214-221, 227-233, 258, 260-268, 276-279, 290-304, 321-328, 452-453, 457-461, 474-482, 532-538, 644-645, 723-726
  - Anglo-French proposals, 370
  - Informal memorandum, 572-582, 590-594, 611-615, 618, 626, 781-782
  - Inspection system, 167-168, 173-175, 193-194, 196-197, 200-202, 204, 245-250, 683
  - NATO negotiations, 556-557, 559-564, 611
  - Partial agreement, 504-510, 513-532, 545-550, 565-571
  - Soviet proposals, 449-451, 491-496, 499-500, 501-503, 717-718, 740
  - Soviet-U.S. bilaterals, 560-563, 653-655, 705-713
  - Special Task Groups, 174, 225-227, 290, 323, 457, 486-490, 572
- International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 309
- Nuclear weapons, 471-473, 483-486, 632-635
- Nuclear weapons testing, 436, 467-469, 471-473, 627-628, 650-652, 739
- Scientific education, 213
- Special Assistant to the President on disarmament matters:
- Presidential appointment, 58-59
  - Senate confirmation, 166
- U.N. Disarmament Commission, London meetings, 372-374, 555-558
- Stassen, Harold E.—Continued
- U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, 185-187, 191-194, 719-720
  - Stassen-Khrushchev conversation on disarmament, 378-383
  - State-Defense Military Information Control Committee, 11
  - State, Department of, disarmament plan, 2, 15, 29, 32-33
  - Stein, Eric, IAEA proposal, 81-84
  - Stelle, Charles C., 594
  - Stevenson, Adlai E., 436
  - Strauss, Lewis L., 546
    - AEC relations with ICA, 259-260
    - AEC security procedures review committee, 8
  - Atomic energy policy, 41-45
    - Fissionable materials, 320-321, 328, 459
    - Information exchange with Great Britain, 37-38, 115
    - Information exchange with NATO, 371
    - Nuclear fuel production, 17, 340-341
    - Nuclear materials bank, 143, 153
    - Peaceful uses of atomic energy, 762-763, 765
    - Reactor development, 22, 24, 26, 65-66, 160-162, 208-209, 259-260, 333-340, 430-432
  - "Atoms for Police" program, 397
  - Disarmament policy, 7, 20
    - Armed forces reduction, 317
    - Atomic Energy Commission plan, 4
    - British position, 217, 455-456, 631
    - First phase of disarmament, 625
    - Inspection systems, 424
    - Stassen informal memorandum, 556, 594, 598-599
    - Stassen proposals, 120, 518-519, 524, 526
  - International Atomic Energy Agency proposal, 307-311, 429, 437-438, 497, 690-691
  - International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 9-10, 211-212
  - Nuclear power plant development, 114-116
  - Nuclear weapons, official statements on, 40
  - Nuclear weapons effects, 12-14, 20-21, 90-92, 638-639

- Strauss, Lewis L.—Continued  
 Nuclear weapons proliferation, 481  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 401, 447-448, 477-478, 524, 549, 642, 667-668, 696-701, 740, 755-756  
 Scientific education, 213-214  
 "Soft impeachment of", 334  
 Soviet negotiations, 6, 20
- Streibert, Theodore C.:  
 Atoms for Peace proposal, U.N. exhibit, 25  
 International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 214
- Striganov, Sergei, 185-187
- Summit Conference (Geneva), 147, 162-164, 202, 224
- Switzerland, Agreements for Cooperation, 71
- Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 276-277
- Tchernychev, Ilya S., 237
- Technological Capabilities Panel (Killian Committee), 148*n*
- Teller, Edward, 638-640, 755
- Thermonuclear. *See* Nuclear.
- Thompson, Llewellyn E., 655-656
- Tidwell, William A., 458
- Treaties, conventions, agreements, etc.:  
 Agreements for Cooperation, 22*n*, 37*n*, 48, 52, 54, 71-72, 87, 371, 768  
 International Atomic Energy Agency Treaty, 497  
 Quebec Agreement of 1943, 115  
 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, USSR-U.S., 283, 318, 350
- Troyanovsky, Oleg Aleksandrovich, 378
- Tsuzuki, Masao, 346
- Turkey, 27*n*, 71, 396, 557
- Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 728-730
- Tyler, William R., 448-449
- United Kingdom (*see also* Disarmament policy: Anglo-French proposals)  
 Agreements for Cooperation, 37*n*  
 Armaments regulation policy, nuclear weapons buildup, 395  
 Atomic energy policy:  
 Information exchange, 10-11, 28, 36, 37-38, 115  
 Nuclear power plants, 114, 772  
 Disarmament policy, 152-153, 293, 304, 424  
 Nuclear weapons, 406
- United Kingdom—Continued  
 Nuclear weapons testing, 12-14, 74*n*, 74-75, 400-402, 420-421, 463, 468-469, 755-756  
 Thermonuclear explosion effects, 12-14
- United Nations:  
 Atomic Energy Control Plan, 3  
 Disarmament Commission:  
 Anglo-French proposal, 79*n*, 85*n*, 96, 362-363  
 British position, 74*n*, 77-78  
 Four-Power meetings, 209-211, 214, 757  
 French position, 77  
 Inspection and reporting, 163-164  
 London meetings, 355-356, 359-360, 364-366, 370, 457, 464, 532-538, 555  
 Participants, 36  
 Radiation effects studies, 90-92  
 Soviet proposals, 76-78, 85-86, 652-653, 755-756  
 Subcommittee of Five, 2, 19, 31, 35-37, 74-81, 85-86  
 U.S. position, 19, 74-75, 78-81, 167-168, 172-173, 180-181, 185-187, 191-196, 464, 532-538, 719-720, 757-758
- General Assembly Resolutions:  
 810 (IX), on peaceful uses of atomic energy, 69, 82  
 912 (X), on IAEA Statute, 349  
 913 (X), on radiation effects, 234-235, 484  
 914 (X), on disarmament, 241, 244-245, 255, 258, 261, 285, 289, 325, 345, 361  
 1011 (X), on disarmament, 451, 453-455  
 1148 (X), on disarmament, 758  
 on disarmament, 215, 217, 219, 222-224  
 on nuclear tests, 729  
 on radiation effects, 88-92  
 Uniting for Peace resolution, 274, 305, 333, 406, 417  
 Nuclear defense force, 409, 411-412, 414, 416-418  
 Political Committee, 454  
 Scientific Committee on Radiation, 234-239, 345, 361
- Uranium, 307-308, 358, 431
- Vavilov, V.S. or P.P., 83

- Von Neumann, John, 120
- Wadsworth, James J., 78-81, 311, 349,  
377, 388-390, 413, 429, 437, 497, 691
- Wainhouse, David W., 5, 85-86, 199-202,  
205-207
- Walmsley, Walter N., 546, 589
- Walter Kidde and Company, 156, 158
- Warren, Shields, 237
- Warsaw Pact, 562
- Washington Naval Treaty, 4
- Weiler, Lawrence D., 108
- Western European Union, 332
- Westinghouse Corporation, 336-337
- White House Conference on Education,  
213-214
- Whitman, Ann C., 316-317
- Whitman, Walter G., 9-10
- Whitney, John Hay, 456-457, 469-473,  
491-496, 543-545, 590-593, 596-597,  
609-611, 652-655
- Wigwam (Operation), 88
- Wilcox, Francis O., 573, 587-589
- Willis, Col. Benjamin G., 108, 458
- Wilson, Charles E.:  
  Armaments regulation policy, 438-439,  
  446-447, 461, 464-466  
  Disarmament policy, 153-154, 217  
  Balance of power, 149
- Wilson, Charles E.—Continued  
  Disarmament policy—Continued  
    Defense Department plan, 4, 7, 32  
    Defense Department position, 190-  
    191, 299-301, 303  
  Eisenhower aerial inspection system,  
  425  
  Stassen proposals, 136-139, 146-147,  
  149, 510-526, 645-646  
  IEAE proposal, U.S. position, 346-348,  
  413  
  Nuclear power plants abroad, 23, 26-27,  
  115  
  Nuclear weapons, 397  
  Nuclear weapons testing, 6, 13-14, 701-  
  703  
  Scientific education, 213
- Wolf, Joseph, 375-376
- Yankee Atomic Power Company, 337
- Yost, Charles W., 585
- Zarubin, Georgii Nikolayevich, 280-281,  
389, 437
- Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich, 379
- Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich, 471-482,  
486-490, 491-496, 499, 503-504, 514,  
556, 560-563, 574, 583, 589, 609-611,  
652-655, 674-677, 705-713, 781-782







