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

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
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
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

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c. The employer shall not request the child to stay in the dormitory, factory or in any designated place on a non-working day, holiday, or during non-working hours: *provided, however*, that proper supervision or restriction of behavior, for the sake of all the employees, may be imposed.

SECTION XI. *Physical Examination and Medical Treatment. a.* Irrespective of the nature of the work, the employer shall provide physical examinations at the beginning of the employment and at intervals of three (3) months thereafter by a physician designated by the supervising authority.

b. When physical examination discloses that any sickness or ill health is caused by such employment, the employer shall provide treatment and relief therefor, and shall report the results to the supervising authority.

c. All expenses necessitated by the provisions of this Section shall be borne in full by such employer.

d. The employer shall file in his records the reports of physical examinations.

SECTION XII. *Maternity Leave, Pregnancy, Child-bearing and Nursing. a.* Women employees shall be entitled to not less than two and one-half (2 1/2) days of leave per month on full pay of regular wage, allowance and other pays. Such leave may be accumulated during the employment period. Employees may, in appropriate cases, be required to notify the employer in writing one month before the leave commences where the absence is expected to be for two months or more.

b. Pregnant employees shall be granted sixty (60) days leave without pay for purposes of rest, *provided, however*, that an employer shall be required to grant such pregnancy leave only in case the employee has been in his employ for at least six (6) months.

c. In case of childbearing, a female employee shall be entitled to sixty days leave with regular pay immediately before and after the childbirth.

d. As to nursing required for the infant, appropriate facilities and arrangements shall be provided to such women employees.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

c. Employees may be required to furnish documentary proof in case of any claim of absence due to sickness, pregnancy, or childbearing.

SECTION XIII. *Education, Sports and Recreation for Employees.* *a.* Authorized factories shall provide education, sports and recreation for employees under eighteen (18).

b. At least four (4) hours a week shall be devoted to general educational instruction not connected with the employment. At least two (2) hours a week shall be devoted to sports and recreation.

c. All the expenses and facilities necessitated by the provisions of this Section shall be borne or provided by the employer.

d. The detailed regulations for the education and recreation necessitated by this Section shall be prescribed by the appropriate Director in cooperation with the Director of the Department of Education and the Director of the Department of Public Health and Welfare.

SECTION XIV. *Issuance of Detailed Regulations by the Appropriate Director.* In addition to the special provisions for the detailed regulations in this Act, the appropriate Director shall enact enforcement regulations concerning the following matters:

(*a*) Form of application for employment permit for children (Section VII).
(*b*) Form of employment permit (Section VIII).
(*c*) Form of list to be posted (Section X).
(*d*) Form of working regulations (Section X).
(*e*) Form of report of the result of physical examinations (Section XI).
(*f*) Details of education and recreation in the authorized factories (Section XIII).
(*g*) Forms of report concerning arbitration (Section IX).
(*h*) Forms of report concerning violations (Sections XVII and XVIII).
(*i*) Any other matter requiring detailed regulations.

SECTION XV. *Appointment, Powers, Duties and Reports of the Supervising Authority.* *a.* The supervising authority shall be appointed by the appropriate Director. He shall be supervised primarily by the local administrative officials and secondarily by the appropriate Director. The organisation

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of the supervising authority shall be determined separately by the appropriate Director.

b. The supervising authority shall have the power to issue orders, conduct investigations, and make dispositions necessitated by the provisions of this Act. In addition, he shall have the following duties:

(1) The investigation of local customs concerning the employment of children.

(2) The investigation of the maximum working hours of specific industries and enterprises, or generally:

(3) The investigation of working conditions and maximum and minimum wages.

(4) The inspection of industrial and commercial businesses.

(5) The inspection of facilities for, and practice concerning, education and recreation in authorized factories.

(6) Concerning matters of improvement of working conditions.

(7) Concerning other matters necessary for the enforcement of this Act.

c. The supervising authority shall, before the tenth of each month, report to the appropriate Director on the matters set forth in paragraph *c* of this Section. The supervising authority may, at any time, present his opinion concerning matters pertinent to his duties.

d. The foregoing report and opinions shall be presented through the local administrative officials.

e. Reports shall contain the following information:

(1) Name-list of employees.

(2) Disposition and results of violations.

(3) Results of inspection of businesses, industries, and authorized factories.

(4) Results of physical examinations.

(5) Other comments pertinent to duties of the supervising authority.

f. The supervising authority shall keep whatever records and files are necessary for the performance of his duties, and shall make such records and files available to the local administrative officials and the appropriate Director, upon their request.

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SECTION XVI. *Rights of Recovery.* *a.* Any person injured by the violation of this Act may recover from the offender such damages as he may sustain thereby. In any suit by or on behalf of any child illegally employed hereunder, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or negligence by fellow employees shall not be a defense and may not be pleaded or proved either by way of defense or mitigation, nor shall misrepresentation of age by the person securing the employment or by the person employed be a defense or matter in mitigation.

This shall not apply in case of fraud or tort to gain the benefit of recovery.

b. Any person illegally employed hereunder shall be entitled to recover a sum equivalent to ten times the agreed amount of wages earned or ten times the legal minimum wage, whichever is greater.

c. In case the employer is other than a juridical person, all members of such employer-body shall be liable as employers under the provisions of this Section.

d. None of the provisions of this Section may be waived, and any release of any rights hereunder shall be ineffective to bar any recovery hereunder.

e. No suit may be maintained under this Section for any period of employment which occurred two years prior to the filing of the suit.

SECTION XVII. *Juvenile Delinquency.* *a.* When a child violates any provisions of this Act, or refuses to obey the order or report of, or permit investigation by the supervising authority, or makes any false statements, the supervising authority may take the following steps depending on the nature of the offense:

(*1*) Admonish and exhort the child to repent.
(*2*) Request that the schoolmaster and/or person in parental authority admonish the child and furnish a letter of guarantee.
(*3*) Request a written oath of repentance.
(*4*) Cancel the employment permit or reject the application.

The above steps may be taken either separately or jointly.

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b. In case the steps mentioned above do not correct the behavior of the child, such child shall be conducted forthwith before the juvenile court which has jurisdiction over that district; or, if there is no such court in that place, before any court or judicial officer having jurisdiction over offenses committed by children.

c. In the treatment of offenses committed by children, special care and caution shall be taken and a constant effort made to guide the child.

SECTION XVIII. *General Penalties.* *a.* Any person who permits, procures or suffers the violation of the provisions of Sections III and IV of this Act shall be punished by penal servitude not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of not less than one thousand won (₩ 1,000).

b. Any employer who violates the provisions of Sections V or VI-*b*, or who refuses to permit investigation by, or obey the order or report of the appropriate Director or the supervising authority, or makes any false statements, shall be punished by confinement of less than thirty (30) days or a fine of not less than five hundred won (₩ 500).

c. Any employer who wilfully or continuously violates any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished with penal servitude of not less than one year.

SECTON XIX. *Interim Provisions.* *a.* Any employer employing children in permitted occupations at the effective date of this Act shall, within sixty (60) days, apply for an employment permit, and may continue such permitted employment while the application is pending.

b. Where children over fourteen (14) years are employed in work prohibited or limited in Section III of this Act, on the effective date thereof, the employer or the supervising authority shall within sixty (60) days allocate them to permitted work consistent with the purpose of this Act.

c. If such allocation is impossible because of the nature of the work and the difficulty in providing other work, an application for a permit shall be filed in accordance with Section VII of this Act. The application may be granted on a temporary basis by special action of the appropriate Director, regardless of the provisions of Section III, *provided, however,* that such temporary employment shall not exceed one year.

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SECTION XX. ***Repeal of Inconsistent Laws and Effective Date.*** *a.* Ordinance Number 112 (***Regulation of Child Labor***), dated 18 September 1946, and all other ordinances, regulations or any order having the effect of law, inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions hereof, are hereby repealed.

b. This Act shall be effective thirty (30) days after the date of approval.

Duly enacted by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly:

KIM KIU SIC
Chairman, Korean Interim Legislative Assembly

APPROVED 16 May 1947:

ARCHER L LERCH
Major General United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea.

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 97

23 July 1946

PUBLIC POLICY IN LABOR MATTERS DECLARED;
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ESTABLISHED

SECTION I. *Declaration of Policy.* The public policy of the United States Army Military Government in Korea in labor matters is hereby declared as follows:

a. The development of democratic labor organizations shall be encouraged;

b. Workers shall have the right through self-organization to form and join labor unions, to give aid to and receive assistance from other labor organizations, and to designate representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of their employment contract, without interference from employers, or their agents;

c. Peaceful negotiations between employers and labor organizations resulting in written employment contracts specifying agreed wages, hours of work, and other conditions of employment shall be encouraged.

SECTION II. *Department of Labor Established.* To effectuate the foregoing labor policy and to assist the efficient functioning of the economy of Korea, the Department of Labor is hereby established in the Government of Korea. The Bureau of Labor of the Department of Commerce of the Government of Korea is hereby disestablished. All duties and functions of the Bureau of Labor are hereby transferred to the Department of Labor so as effectuate the carrying out of the purposes herein described. All records, funds, property and Korean personnel of the Bureau of Labor shall be transferred to the Department of Labor, in accordance with orders to be issued by the Director of the Department of Commerce in coordination with the Office of Korea Civil Service and the Budget Bureau of the Department of Finance of the Government of Korea. The purpose of the Department of Labor shall be to aid the efficient functioning of the economy of Korea, to foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of Korea, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.

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SECTION III. *Functions and Duties of the Department of Labor.* The Department of Labor shall have the following functions and duties:

a. To formulate labor policies and programs and to exercise general supervision over conditions of employment, labor relations with employers and with the government, and any other factors affecting the welfare of labor, under the direction of the Military Governor and within the limitations of Ordinance Number 90, dated 28 May 1946, the declared public policy of Military Government in labor matters, and other requirements of law;

b. To supervise and control Labor Mediation Boards and all that pertains to the same so as to effectuate the mediation of labor disputes in accordance with Ordinance Number 34, dated 8 December 1945, the declared public policy of Military Government in labor matters, and other requirements of law;

c. To supervise or administer a national employment service and a labor information service;

d. To recommend to the Military Governor labor laws to effectuate the declared policy of the Military Government in labor matters, to assist the efficient functioning of the economy of Korea, and to promote the welfare of labor;

e. To prepare for issuance in the Official Gazette upon approval by the Military Governor all necessary regulations for the administration of this ordinance and other labor laws which it may be charged with administering, or for carrying into effect the purposes of the Department;

f. To perform all other functions and duties necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Department and the declared public policy of the Military Government in labor matters, under the supervision and direction of the Military Governor and within the scope of existing laws.

SECTION IV. *Penalties.* Any person violating the provisions of any regulation of the Department of Labor issued pursuant to this ordinance, and having the force and effect of law upon publication in the Official Gazette with approval of the Military Governor, shall, upon conviction by a Military Occupation Court, suffer such punishment as the court shall determine.

SECTION V. *Effective Date.* This ordinance shall be effective on the date appearing hereon.

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General United States Army
Military Governor in Korea.

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By NARS, Date

의 有能한 機能을 助長하고 勞働의 福祉를 增進하기 爲하야 勞働法을 軍政長官에게 推擧할 事

(마) 軍政長官의 認可를 得하야 此法令及施行할 其他勞働法의 施行又는 本部의 目的을 遂行하기 爲하야 必要한 모든 規則을 官報에 發布할 準備를 할 事

(바) 本部의 目的及勞働問題에 關하야 軍政廳이 宣布한 公共政策을 軍政長官의 監督指示下及現行法律의 範圍內에서 遂行하기 爲하야 必要한 모든 職能及任務를 實行할 事

第四條 罰 則

此法令에 準하야 發布되고 軍政長官의 認可를 得하야 官報에 發布된 法律의 効力이 有한 勞働部規則條項에 違反한 者는 陸軍占領裁判所의 有罪決定에 依하야 裁判所가 決定한 罰을 受할

第五條 有效期日

本法令은 公布日로부터 有效할

一九四六年七月二十三日

朝鮮軍政長官

美國陸軍少將 아ㅣ취・엘・러ㅣ취

ORDINANCE NO. 97

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

在朝鮮美國陸軍司令部軍政廳

法令第九十七號

勞働問題에關한公共政策公布勞働部設置

第一條　政策宣布

在朝鮮美國陸軍軍政廳은勞働問題에關한公共政策을玆에左와如히宣布함

(가)　民主主義的勞働組合의發展을奬勵할事

(나)　勞働者는自律的勞働組合을通하야勞働聯合會를組織하고加入하며、他勞働組合을援助하고又는援助를受하는權利가잇는同時에雇傭主와其代理人의干涉을受치안코、雇傭契約의期間及條件을協定할目的으로自己가選擧한代表者를指名할權利가有함

(다)　雇傭契約書에잇서雇傭主와勞働組合間의合意된勞賃、勞働時間及其他雇傭條件을明記한平和的協定을奬勵할事

第二條　勞働部設置

右記勞働政策을達成하고　朝鮮經濟의有能한機能을助長하기爲하야　勞働部를玆에朝鮮政府內에設置함、朝鮮政府商務部勞働局은玆에廢止하고其모든任務、職能은여기에列擧한目的을達成하기爲하야勞働部에移管함、勞働局의모든書類、資金、財產及朝鮮人은商務部長과人事行政處及朝鮮政府財務部司計局과의對等한權限으로서發한命令에依하야勞働部에移管함、勞働部는朝鮮經濟의有能한機能을助長하고朝鮮의賃銀勞働者의福祉를助成、增進、發展시키며其勞働條件을改良하고有利한雇傭에對한機會를進捗시킴을目的으로함

第三條　勞働部의任務及職能

勞働部는左記의任務及職能을有함

(가)　勞働政策及計畫을系統的으로記述하고軍政長官의指示下에及一九四六年五月二十八日附法令第九十號及勞働問題에關하야軍政廳이宣布한公共政策及其他法律의要求하는範圍內에서雇傭條件、雇傭主及政府와의勞働關係又는勞働의福祉에影響을및이는其他要素에關하야一般監督을할事

(나)　一九四五年十二月八日附法令第三四號及勞働問題에關하야軍政廳이公布한公共政策及其他法律의要求에依하야勞働爭議의調停을有效히達成키爲하야勞働調停委員會及同委員會에屬하는全員을監督、管理할事

(다)　國家雇傭事務及勞働情報事務를監督又는管理할事

(라)　軍政廳이勞働問題에關하야宣布한政策을遂行하고朝鮮經濟

ORDINANCE NO. 97

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Official Gazette, USAMGIK Ordinance No 121 7 November 1946

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 121

7 November 1946

MAXIMUM WORKING HOURS

SECTION I. *Purpose.* The purpose of this ordinance is to regulate and limit maximum working hours in industry, commerce and governmental work, so as to maintain and protect the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers.

SECTION II. *Maximum Hours.* No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his employees engaged in industry, commerce or governmental work for more than forty-eight (48) working hours in any workweek.

An employee may be employed for not more than sixty (60) working hours in any workweek, *provided*, that in all such cases where employment is in excess of forty-eight (48) hours in any workweek, the employee shall receive compensation for all hours in excess of forty-eight (48) at a rate not less than one and a half times his regular rate of compensation, and *further provided*, that :

a. Employment for such time in excess of 48 hours is pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the employer and a labor union or organization duly authorized to represent the employee, *or*, in the absence of a collective agreement,

b. Employment for such time in excess of 48 hours is pursuant to specific agreement between the employer and the employee.

Each legal holiday, except Sunday or other legal day of rest, shall count as eight hours of the permitted total hours of employment. Every employee subject to the provisions of this ordinance shall be entitled to not less than twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in each workweek.

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SECTION III. *Exemptions.* There shall be exempt from the provisions hereof, to the extent set forth:

a. Employees engaged in industries which are seasonal in nature. Such exemption shall be in whole or in part. The Director of the Department of Labor shall determine which industries are so exempt, and the extent of such exemption;

b. Employees engaged in agriculture, as fishermen or sailors, as domestic servants or in piece work in their own homes;

c. Employees employed in a *bona fide* executive, administrative or professional capacity, as hereinafter defined;

d. Employees employed on the national railway system; but the Director of the Department of Labor shall, after consultation with the Director of the Department of Transportation, formulate and issue published regulations in accordance with the spirit of this ordinance, fixing maximum hours of employment for employees of the national railway system, and providing that all employment in excess of forty-eight (48) hours per workweek shall be compensated at the rate of one and a half times the regular rate of payment;

e. Employment in excess of sixty (60) hours per workweek, where such work is necessary in cases of extreme emergency to protect life or property; *provided*, that the employer shall, before requiring any employment in excess of sixty (60) hours, in each case first secure the consent of the Director of the Department of Labor or his authorized representative. The Director of the Department of Labor shall have the power, by written order, in the event of any emergency caused by fire, famine or flood, or by other extraordinary event or condition creating danger to life or property, to suspend either generally or in stated areas the provisions of this ordinance limiting the maximum number of working hours, for the duration of such emergency. All employment in excess of sixty (60) hours per workweek, where permissible pursuant to this subsection, shall be compensated at the rate of one and a half times the regular rate of payment.

SECTION IV. *"Executive", "Administrative" and "Professional" Defined.*

a. The term "employee employed in a *bona fide* executive *** capacity" means any employee:

(*1*) Whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or a customarily recognized department or

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subdivision thereof, *and*

(*2*) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of other employees therein, *and*

(*3*) Who has the authority to hire or discharge other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring or discharge and as to the advancement and promotion or other change of status of other employees will be given particular weight, *and*

(*4*) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers.

b. The term "employee employed in a *bona fide* **** administrative*** capacity" means any employee:

(*1*) Who regularly and directly assists an employee employed in a *bona fide* executive or administrative capacity (as such terms are defined in this ordinance), where such assistance is non-manual in nature and requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment; *or*

(*2*) Who performs under only general supervision, responsible non-manual office or field work, directly related to management policies or general business operations, along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience or knowledge, and which requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment; *or*

(*3*) Whose work involves the execution under only general supervision of special non-manual assignments and tasks directly related to management policies or general business operations involving the exercise of discretion and independent judgment.

c. The term "employee employed in a ***bona fide*** professional capacity" means any employee who is engaged in work:

(*1*) (*a*) Predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical work, *and*

(*b*) Requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance, *and*

(*c*) Of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time, *and*

(*2*) (*a*) Requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study, as distinguished from a general academic

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education and from an apprenticeship and from training in the performance of routine mental, manual or physical processes, *or*

(*b*) Predominantly original and creative in character in a recognized field of artistic endeavor as opposed to work which can be produced by a person endowed with general manual or intellectual ability and training, and the result of which depends primarily on the invention, imagination or talent of the employee.

SECTION V. *Enforcement, Investigations, Inspection and Records.*

a. Enforcement of the provisions of this ordinance shall be under the supervision of the Department of Labor. The Director of the Department of Labor or his designated representatives may investigate and gather data regarding the hours and other conditions and practices of any employment subject to this ordinance, and may enter and inspect such places and such records (and make transcripts thereof and excerpts therefrom), question such employees, and investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate to determine whether any person has violated any provision of this ordinance, or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this ordinance.

b. Every employer subject to any provision of this ordinance or of any regulation or order issued pursuant to this ordinance shall make, keep and preserve such records of the persons employed by him and of the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment maintained by him, and shall preserve such records for such periods of time, and make such reports to the Director of the Department of Labor as he shall prescribe by regulations published in the *Official Gazette* upon approval of the Military Governor, or by order directed to any specific employer.

SECTION VI. *Regulations.*

a. In addition to the other powers and duties of the Director of the Department of Labor under this ordinance, he shall:

(*1*) Make such regulations or orders as are necessary or appropriate to carry out any of the provisions hereof;

(*2*) Regulate the maximum number of hours any employee may work in any workday;

(*3*) Define such terms not defined herein as may require definition, and amplify or amend any terms, definitions or amended definitions as may be necessary.

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employee is in transit to a place other than his usual place of employment, in order to perform labor or other required duty, and all hours during which the employee is required by an employer to travel to report for work at a place other than his usual place of employment.

SECTION VIII. *Relation to Other Laws.* No provision of this ordinance shall excuse non-compliance with any other law establishing a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under this ordinance or established by collective agreement.

SECTION IX. *Criminal Penalties.* Any person who wilfully violates any of the provisions of this ordinance or of any regulation issued pursuant hereto and having the effect of law shall, upon conviction of a first offense, be subject to a fine of not less than ₩20,000 and not more than ₩100,000, and shall, upon conviction of a second offense, be subject to a fine of not less than ₩20,000 and not more than ₩200,000 or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. Upon conviction of a third or subsequent offense, he shall be subject to such punishment as a Military Occupation Court shall determine, but in no event less than three times the fine or imprisonment, or both, imposed upon his last previous conviction under this ordinance or any regulation issued pursuant hereto and having the effect of law.

SECTION X. *Effective Date.*— This ordinance shall be effective on the tenth day after the date appearing hereon.

SEAL
USAMGIK

ARCHER L LERCH
Major General United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

b. Such regulations shall, when published in the *Official Gazette* upon approval of the Military Governor, have the force and effect of law.

SECTION VII. *Definitions.* As used in this ordinance:

a. Person means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, legal representative, governmental department, bureau or agency, or any organized group of persons.

b. Commerce includes trade, transportation, transmission or communication.

c. Industry includes a trade, handicraft, business, industry or branch thereof, or group of industries, in which individuals are gainfully employed.

d. Agriculture includes farming in all of its branches and, among other things, includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities, the raising of livestock, bees, or poultry, and any practices (including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market.

e. Employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interests of an employer in relation to an employee, including governmental departments, bureaus and agencies, at the national, provincial and local levels.

f. Employee includes any individual suffered or permitted to work by an employer.

g. Employ includes to suffer or permit to work.

h. Wage paid to any employee includes the reasonable cost to the employer of furnishing such employee with board, lodging or other facilities, if such board, lodging or other facilities are customarily furnished by such employer to any of his employees.

i. Workday means any period of twenty-four consecutive hours.

j. Workweek means any period of seven consecutive days.

k. Working hours includes all hours during which the employee is present at his place of employment at the direction of his employer, whether or not work is actually performed (except meal and rest periods), and all hours during which, after reporting to his usual place of employment, the

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在朝鮮美國陸軍司令部軍政廳

法令第百二十一號

最高勞働時間

第一條 目的

本令은勞働者의健康、福祉及一般福利를維持、保護하기爲하야商工業及公務의最高勞働時間을規定制限함을目的함

第二條 最高作業時間

雇傭主는本令에例外로規定한以外에被傭人을每作業週間四十八時間以上、商工業又는公務에從事시키지못함

被傭人은每作業週間六十時間을限度로作業에從事할수있음、但每作業週間의作業이四十八時間을超過하는境遇에는그超過된作業時間에對하야基本給料의十五割以上의比率로計算한手當金을支拂함을要함

가、四十八時間을超過하야被傭人을作業에就케함에는雇傭主와勞働組合又는그勞務者를代表할正當한權限이有한團體와의間에締結된協約에依함

나、前號協約이無한時는雇傭主와被傭人間에締結한個別契約에依함

日曜日其他定休日을除한法定公休日은作業時間에對하야八時間以上、商工業又는公務에從事하는被雇傭人、但除外範圍는前條의規定은左列各號에該當한者에게는適用치않음

第三條 例外

가、性質上季節的인工業에從事하는被雇傭人

全部又는一部로制限할수있음

除外될業務와範圍는勞働部長이此를定함

나、漁夫、船員又는家僕等으로農業、水產業에從事하는被雇傭人又는自家에서하는有給手工業에從事하는被傭人

다、第四條에規定한識實한執行的、管理的又는專門的職掌에從事하는被傭人

라、國有鐵道業務에從事하는從業員、但勞働部長은運輸部長과協議하야本令의精神에卽應한國有鐵道從業員의最高勞働時間을決定하야每作業週間四十八時間을超過하는作業에對하야는基本給料의十五割의比率로計算한手當金支拂의規則을制定發布함

마、非常緊急한天災事變에際하야生命、財產을保護하기爲하야必要한境遇에每作業週間六十時間을超過作業하는被傭人、但雇傭主는그境遇에미리勞働部長又는그代理者의同意를得함을要함

火災、颱風、洪水其他一般의生命、財產에危險이有한非常

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非專門的職業에從事하는被傭人이아닌者

나、職業的專門的職業에從事하는被傭人이아닌者

一、所屬組織內에있어서는部下部組織을管理하는第一次的責任을가진者

二、特別한訓練、知識또는經驗을必要로하는專門的、技術的또는管理的職務에從事하는者

三、人的의施設、物質的設備를利用하여直接關係있는特殊한非肉體的職務에從事하는者

四、植物上又는法規上自由裁量을行使할수있는被傭人이아닌者

第四條 「執行的」「管理的」「專門的」의意義

가、職業的執行的職務에從事하는被傭人이아닌者

一、所屬組織內에있어서는部下部組織을管理하는第一次的責任을가진者

二、植物上又는法規上所屬員의作業을指揮하는

三、人員의雇傭、解雇의權限이있거나또는雇傭、解雇、昇進或은其他人事에關한提案이特別한考慮가拂하여지는

四、植物上又는法規上自由裁量을行使할수있는被傭人이아닌者

나、職業的專門的職業에從事하는被傭人이아닌者

一、(1) 非務本的或은知的이고日常의精神的、手工的、機械的、又는肉體的非務本的性質上相違가하며

(2) 非務遂行에對하여不斷히自由裁量判斷을要하며

(3) 作業結果의完成所與期間을標準으로할수있는性質이있어야하며

二、(1) 特定又는限局된分野에있어一般的學問教育、技術과相當한

必修、又는日常的精神的、肉體的工程에相當한期間의學問的또는技術的教育과經驗을必要로하며

(2) 本質的合理的에있어一般手工的、知的能力又는訓練을必要로하는特定한業務에從事하는者

三、業務에對하여一般的監督下에自由裁量權이있는經營方針又는一般的業務運用에直接關係있는特殊한非肉體的業務에從事하는者

四、植物上又는法規上自由裁量을行使할수있는被傭人이아닌者

第五條 施行、罰則、附則

一、本令의規定은令의施行日로부터施行함

二、本令의規定은令의施行日로부터施行함

三、業務에對하여一般的監督下에自由裁量權이있는經營方針又는一般的業務運用에直接關係있는特殊한非肉體的業務又는野外作業에從事하며一般監督을받는被傭人이아닌

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勞動部長又ニ代理者ト本令ノ規定ヲ作業時間、其他條件又ハ業務ニ關スル報告ヲ蒐集、調査シ本令ノ違反有無及本令施行上必要ナル事項ヲ決定スル所要ノ場所ヘ臨檢シ記錄ヲ調査スル（此ヲ臨檢捜索）ヲ必要ナル程度ニ於テ雇傭主ノ帳簿、作業、業務及其他事項ヲ調査シ得ル權限ヲ有ス

ロ、本令又ハ本令ニ依ル規則、命令ニ適用セラルル雇傭主ハ官報ニ發布セラルル法令又ハ雇傭主ニ對スル命令ニ依リ被雇傭人ノ人員數、賃金額、作業時間其他條件及作業狀況ニ關スル記錄ヲ調製シ一定ノ時間此ヲ保持シ勞働部長ニ對シ之ヲ記錄ヲ提出セラルル事

第六條　規　定

イ、勞働部長ハ前記各條以外ニ

一、本令ヲ實施スルニ必要ナル規則、命令ヲ發布スル事

二、作業日ニ關シ最高勞働時間ヲ規定スル事

三、解釋ヲ必要トセラルル本令ノ規定中句ノ意義ヲ決定スルニ必要ニ依リ字句、意義又ハ規定ノ意義ヲ變更又ハ改訂スル事

ロ、本條ニ依リ制定セラルル規則ハ政廳ノ承認ヲ得テ官報ニ掲載セラルル法律ト同一ノ効力ヲ有ス

第七條　定　義

イ、人ト云ヘルハ個人、組合、團體、會社、法定代理人、法定代表機關、政府ノ部、局又ハ行政機關其他ノ團體ヲ含ム

ロ、商業ト云ヘルハ賣買、運搬又ハ通信ヲ包含ス

ハ、工業ト云ヘルハ手工業、非鑛、工業及ニ部又ハ個人ノ有給ノ爲メニ行フ工業ノ集團ヲ意ス

ニ、農業ト云ヘルハ耕作、特ニ農地ノ耕作、酪農、園藝的圃場的產品ノ生產、採集、栽培及收獲、蒸苗、繁殖及家畜ノ飼育（林業、製材業ヲ包含ス）市場ノ對スル準備、倉庫、市場、市場ノ經營ニ關スル雇傭人ニ對スル行爲ヲ意ス

ホ、雇傭主ト云ヘルハ、地方ノ各部、局又ハ行政機關ノ各部ノ長ヲ含ム

ヘ、被雇傭人ト云ヘルハ雇傭主ト雇傭關係ニ於テ直接ニ又ハ間接ニ雇傭主ヲ爲シ行動スル者ヲ包含ス

ト、勞働ト云ヘルハ雇傭主ノ爲ニスル被雇傭人ノ作業ヲ意味スル事

チ、賃金ト云ヘルハ雇傭ニ依リ又ハ雇傭ニ於テ被雇傭人ニ對シ支拂ヒ又ハ支拂フベキ金錢ヲ包含ス

リ、被雇傭人ニ支拂ヒ又ハ支拂フベキ金錢ト云ヘルハ個々ノ被雇傭人ニ供給セラルル時ニ被雇傭人ニ供給セラルル事實、宿所其他ノ便宜ヲ供給スル時ニ其費用ヲ包含ス

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자、作業日이라함은繼續二十四時間의期間을意味함

라、作業週間이라함은繼續七日間의期間을意味함

라、作業時間이라함은（食事、休憩時間을除外함）作業이實際로實行되는지아니되는지를英論하고雇傭主의指示에依하야雇傭된場所에被傭人이在席한모든時間과一定한作業場所가指定된境遇에勞働其他必要한任務를遂行하기爲하야그作業場所에서外地場所로被傭人을輸送하는時間及그平常의作業場所에서外地場所에作業하기爲하야出頭함에必要한時間을包含함

第八條　他法令과의關係

本令의規定은本令又는協約에依하야制定된作業週間의最高作業時間에比하야作業時間이減少된作業週間을規定한法令의效力에는何等影響을밋치지않이함

第九條　罰　則

故意로本令又는本令에依하야發布된規則에違反한者는初犯인境遇에는金貳萬圓以上拾萬圓以下의罰金에、再犯인境遇에는金貳萬圓以上貳拾萬圓以下의罰金又는六個月以下의懲役에處하고犯情에依하야는罰金과懲役을併科하며三犯以上의累犯인境遇에는本令又는本令에依하야發布된規則에依하야處斷된最終의刑의三倍以上의刑에處함

第十條　施行期日

本令은公布後十日부터效力이生함

一九四六年十一月七日

朝鮮軍政長官

美國陸軍少將　아ㅣ취・엘・러ㅣ취

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Secret

Agric 89

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Agriculture
APO 235 Unit 2

SUBJECT: Joint Commission Decision No. 6

TO : Secretary, Subcommission No. 6
American Delegation US-USSR
Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea

1. In answer to your letter subject as above, dated 26 June 1947, the opinions of this Department are submitted. Added as inclosures are the individual comments of various advisors within the Department.

"2. a. What measures should be taken with respect to the development of agriculture, industry and transportation, in order to increase production and to raise the living standards of the Korean people?"

Considering the world food situation, it is deemed imperative that [illegible] be placed on the production of food crops at the present time. Korea's economy is primarily an agricultural one. With the ever increasing population and the need for exports to eventually balance her import requirements, [illegible] must not only achieve but exceed all past production [illegible]. It is believed that such production can be achieved through emphasis on the following factors:

a. Land utilization.

It is [illegible] that maximum and most efficient utilization of land in Korea has not yet been achieved. Through the development of irrigation facilities and fertilizer production, the area now being double cropped may be increased substantially. Medium and gently rolling lands, foothills, etc., are at present not being completely utilized. With a closely coordinated soil conservation program, a considerable quantity of such land might well be brought under cultivation.

b. Improvement in cultural practices

It is believed that there is room for considerable improvement in cultural methods employed by Korean farmers. Some of the practices presently used are based on customs and beliefs antiquated by modern methods. There is no question but that there exists a need for a well developed extension service whereby modern improvements and methods in agriculture can be brought to the uneducated rural populace.

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BASIC LTR: SWIG, Dept of Agri, Subj: Joint Commission Decision No. 6, dtd

c. Rural Education

The withdrawal of Japanese technicians, police, and their controls of production and distribution has left a void that seriously hampers agricultural development. The Korean farmer has welcomed the removal of restraints on his actions and personal liberties. However, with his lack of education, he has not been made to realize that in exchange for his freedom he must assume certain responsibilities to society. As a result of a democratic ideology, his lack of moral obligation to [illegible] the welfare of the [illegible]. This [illegible] will [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] farm. This [illegible] will be [illegible] of [illegible] service.

d. Development of [illegible] Industries.

[illegible] Fisheries, [illegible] the [illegible]. [illegible] with [illegible], [illegible] must be [illegible]. The [illegible] of [illegible], rabbits, [illegible], [illegible] would [illegible] the [illegible].

[illegible] for [illegible] and flood control which will not only protect the cultivated lands and the productive farms below, but which will also [illegible] forest [illegible] to self-sufficiency. Programs of conservation education and the enforcing of forest protection should be [illegible] of the general plan.

Although Fisheries is not strictly agricultural in nature it enters into the food picture both as a means of [illegible], with protein [illegible] and as an excellent possibility for export trade. Korea is [illegible] with [illegible] and long coastline. With proper facilities for [illegible] and processing the available fish resources Korea could well [illegible] export of aquatic products. The government must develop the fisheries resources and fisheries industry to the maximum.

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SUBJECT: Memo, Dept of Agri, Subj: Joint Commission Decision No. 6, [illegible]

B. Agricultural Land Tenure

a. "What should be the policy with respect to the system of [illegible] land tenure prevailing under the Japanese?"

There exists a definite need to further relieve the Korean farmer from the [illegible] enslavement caused by the excessively high rate of tenancy [illegible] land. While it will probably be impossible and [illegible] to eliminate tenancy 100 per cent, it is considered [illegible] tenancy be reduced to a minimum. It is believed desirable [illegible] that tenancy be controlled by law and that a definite form [illegible] be established to prevent a recurrence of excessive tenancy.

b. "What policies should be followed with respect to land [illegible]?"

The [illegible] Department of Agriculture is [illegible] to become a [illegible] agricultural [illegible] with [illegible] by the [illegible]. This is necessary [illegible], [illegible] efficient, [illegible] and [illegible] production.

It is believed that, since there is [illegible] land to give each household [illegible] size, it will be necessary to sell the land for a [illegible] with restrictions [illegible] until such time [illegible] by law. This, [illegible] general legislation on [illegible] should be [illegible].

It is believed that payment for land should be based on the productivity [illegible] basis of [illegible] form of cash payment would be [illegible] by use of inflation.

c. "What special [illegible] with respect to land [illegible] by Japanese?"

[illegible] of formerly Japanese [illegible] be made through [illegible] representatives of the people. Such sales should be disposed [illegible] sized units and preferably sold to present tenants. The [illegible] of these lands should be closely coordinated with the general [illegible] program as discussed above. These lands should be disposed of as the first part of a general land reform program.

In the case of formerly Japanese owned forest land there should be a consolidation of these lands into public owned forests wherever possible. There now exist various forms of public ownership of forest lands and the Japanese owned forests should be absorbed into one of the above, depending upon the location and type of forest land.

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FROM LTR: SWNCC, Dept of Agri, Sub.: Joint Commission Decision No. 6, (td

. . "If land owned by Korean landlords is to be distributed to tenants, should these landlords be compensated for their land?"

Land owned by absentee landlords, in excess of the amount to be designated [illegible], should be purchased from the landlords at a rate based on productivity of the land and payment should be made, either in kind, in amortized cash payments over a number of annual prices.

. . . "Should land distributed to tenant farmers be sold or disposed of?"

Land distributed to tenant farmers should be sold since there is not enough land to give each Korean an economically sized share.

. . "What should be the policies with respect to irrigation facilities?"

(a) Concerning irrigation facilities which are owned and in operation it is believed that the present Korean organizations are adequate for Korea and that no major shift in policy is necessary. Under present conditions the irrigation associations are self [illegible], with a minimum amount of government control. The government maintains a measure of control, in that the chairman of each organization is appointed by the Governor and certain of its activities in balanced budgets and operating functions must be met, but for all practical purposes the association is controlled by a board of directors elected from and by the land owners within the project area from whom the water fees necessary to construct and maintain the works and to operate the project, are collected. These associations constitute one of the backbone type of agencies in Korean economy and they should be maintained and encouraged.

Centralization of the associations, as has been suggested in some quarters, whereby all controls would be centered in the National Government, would destroy any ambition or aspiration on the part of the local communities for bettering themselves and their projects at their own expense.

(b) Concerning policies regarding construction of new or proposed irrigation facilities, it is believed that some major changes in policy are to be desirable. Chief among these are as follows:

(a) The Korean Land Development Company Ordinances should be abrogated. This was a war time expedient of the Japanese to facilitate construction of irrigation works without due process of law. The abrogation, (This law for particular reasons is still in effect but MG directives have temporarily removed its objectionable features), will return to the landowners, who are ultimately responsible for repayment of construction costs, the privilege of initiating or rejecting the construction of a project.

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BASIC LTR: SKIG, Dept of Agri, Subj: Joint Commission Decision No. 6, ctd

(b) The present highly involved and costly method of financing construction should be changed. Under present conditions 40 to 60 per cent of the cost is furnished by the Government in the form of subsidies while the balance is financed through bank loans which are amortized over a period of years at high interest rates. Other involved financing is necessary before the subsidy is secured.

It is believed that the entire cost of construction should be initially borne by the Government and that, after completion, the amount fixed as the landowners' share of the cost, (be it 40% or 100%) be repaid by the association directly to the Government without interest. This, in effect, is the policy of the US Bureau of Reclamation on projects built by that Bureau and financed from the US Reclamation Fund. Under present methods of financing and with present interest rates in effect, interest costs to landowners over the period of amortization will range from 60% to 120% of the initial funded debt. This money could well be used to reduce government subsidies.

(c) The Government should undertake construction of major tidal land projects which heretofore have been undertaken only by private individuals. After completion land would be sold to farmers on some priority basis.

(3) In all cases, after construction is completed, the operation and maintenance functions should revert to the local association which also would be responsible for repayment of the debt against it. This is merely a reiteration of (1) above, that as far as operating facilities are concerned, no major changes in policy are believed desirable.

C. L. TATUM
Major AC
Advisor

2 Inclosures
Incl 1 - Comments, Lt. Col. Jennings, FAA (4 pages)
Incl 2 - Comments, Mr. Wilson, Forestry (2 pages)
Incl 3 - Comments, Mr. Deshotels, Agric Prod (1 page)

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Secret

KOREA AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION
Seoul, Korea

30 June 1947

Memorandum on Joint US-USSR Commission Decision No. 6

The following are notes on Par B 1 and 2 of above mentioned publication:

B. Economic Policies of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

1. What measures should be taken with respect to the development of agriculture, industry and transportation, in order to increase production and to raise the living standards of the Korean people?

NOTES: The most effective means of developing agriculture and raising the living standards of the Korean people would be the official recognition and development of an extension service. This should be done along practical lines that would be acceptable to the farm families. In past plans and operations, too many decisions have been made at national level by politically minded men or government officials under pressure to get results. Too little consideration has been given to the fact that over 80% of the population of Korea are dependent on agricultural work and constitute the real backbone of Korean economy. The greater part of this large mass of people have had little or nothing to say about policies effecting their own life and work. It is recommended that the Korea Agricultural Association (KAA) be used as a nucleus for this much needed extension service insomuch as:

a. The reorganized KAA is acceptable to the farmers.

b. There are at the present time some 2,000,000 farm families members of KAA.

c. The organization is functioning and is well organized down to the gun level including myun and eup activities supervised through the gun headquarters.

d. KAA has the necessary buildings for office space as well as warehouses, cocoon drying sheds, private dwellings, market sales buildings, cattle sales buildings, school buildings and dormitories etc.

e. The present KAA Education and Training Program being carried out is similar to Extension Service.

f. KAA has 35mm projectors, films and trucks equipped to carry out farm leading or extension work.

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g. The present KAA organization is typically Korean and does not operate on the same principles as when under Japanese domination.

h. All KAA officials on down through the gun and myun level take an active part in rice and summer grains collections, cattle sales, veterinarian work, silk cocoon collections, straw products collections and sales, distribution of and collections for all fertilizers, and all other farm enterprises.

i. KAA owns a school, barns and dormitories, in good repair, at Suwon, near the Agriculture College and Central Experiment Station, that would readily accommodate short course students.

2. Agricultural Land Tenure.

a. What should be the policy with respect to the system of landlordism and tenancy prevailing under the Japanese?

NOTES: Modify same as decided by a representative group of landlords and tenants. The landlord-tenant relations problems in the Orient are peculiar to this part of the world. Past experience has proved that the problems can not be settled by legislation, It has also been proved that when the tenants are questioned personally they are prone to be reticent about giving a direct answer in regards to landlord-tenant relations. A recent survey in Japan on this question reveals many interesting facts that are well worthwhile studying. Many Americans are amazed to find that the majority of tenant farmers in some sections refuse to take the responsibilities incurred in ownership and would rather operate as tenants. The cry "Down with the landlords" is more radical than practical. This is especially true in the Orient. In many cases the tenant farmers could not exist without the landlord to lead and advise them in their work. The requisition and division of landlords' holdings is radically socialistic and it is questionable that this is what the Koreans really want. They do want a division and sale of Japanese lands.

b. What policies should be followed with respect to land tenure?

(1) Private ownership of land with the farmer having a completely free title.

NOTES: A free title should be granted after five (5) years of compliance with stipulations similar to our "Homesteading Laws" in US.

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(2) Private ownership of land but, in the case of land obtained from the government, the right to sell or mortgage would be restricted by the State.

NOTES: All restrictions to end after five (5) years.

(3) Nationalization of land belonging to landlords and its transference to farmers for permanent and free use.

NOTES: Landlords' legitimate rights should be recognized. A transference of lands that are legitimate property of Koreans who are more progressive or better businessmen than others would not be practical. The division of land or wealth would not work out nor be acceptable here any better than it would in the U.S.

(4) Any other methods of solution of the question of land tenure you may suggest.

NOTES: As recommended by a Korean committee as mentioned in Par B 2 a, with fair consideration given to the present landlords.

c. What special policies should be followed with respect to land formerly owned by the Japanese?

NOTES: Priorities set up for disposition for uses as follows:
National Forests
National Parks and Cemeteries
Flood control projects
Experiment Stations
National Institutions:
Prison farms
Reform school farms
Juvenile delinquent farms for boys
Balance to be sold according to plan for sale to private farm families.

d. If land owned by Korean landlords is to be distributed to tenants, should these landlords be compensated for their land?

NOTES: Yes - by all means.

e. Should land distributed to tenant farmers be sold or distributed free?

NOTES: Sold according to a five (5) year plan for payments and improvement with provisions for a 10 or 15 year mortgage.

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Memorandum on Joint US-USSR Commission Decision No. 6

f. What should be the policies with respect to irrigation facilities and their use?

NOTES: Same as now recommended by the Land Reclamation and Irrigation Section in Dept of Agriculture.

JAMES P. JENNINGS
Lt Col AC
Advisor to the President

C

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Sheet Fourteen

30 June 1947

COMMENTS -

B. Economic Policies of the Provision Korean Democratic Government.

1. Wood materials in South Korea are being cut much faster than they can be replaced by growth. From a forestry standpoint, there are two vitally important measures which must be taken in order to increase production and raise the living standards of the Korean people. First, wood material (fuelwood, logs and pulp) must be imported to meet the dire need for wood products and to make possible the protection and survival of the young trees which are needed to control erosion on the mountain slopes and which must be given time to grow big enough to produce a worthwhile harvest. Second, the planned program of reforestation of 50[illegible], 00 acres per year must be financed and carried out.

Improved transportation is also vitally important. Millions of board feet of large logs at Fusan do not get down to the mills at Inchon as fast as they should, and the same thing is true of material at Kwang won ri and other places. Coal at Samchok and Kwasun does not get to the using points, and in consequence wood is used in many places where coal would be more efficient. Tiring out the barrier at 38° will not help much unless resources to the North can be transported to the places where they are needed.

2. Agricultural Land Tenure.

a. Landlordism and tenancy should be modified and abolished as soon as possible.

b. Private ownership of agricultural land with the farmer having a free title should be the ultimate goal, but restrictions on mortgaging and selling of land obtained from the Government is going to be necessary for awhile to keep the land from going right back into the hands of the rich.

c. Forest land formerly owned by the Japanese should be retained in public ownership except, possibly, for small isolated tracts whose administration

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would be too costly. There are now many forms of public ownership -- national forest lands, provincial forest lands, gun lands, myun lands, etc. Where the formerly owned Japanese lands should go would be determined partly by their location with reference to the present ownership pattern. In general, however, stronger central control of forest lands in Korea is desirable, and vested lands should go to the National Government.

d. Korean landlords should be compensated for lands distributed to tenants. Japanese landlords should not.

e. Land should be sold to tenant farmers -- at reasonable or even subsidized cost, however.

f. No comment.

Stanley F. Wilson

STANLEY F. WILSON
Adviser
Bureau of Forestry

L. L./rv

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Comments on "B. Economic Policies of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government".

1. Korea is over populated; that is, there is not enough land for its people. Intensive methods of farming are being used. There can be better utilization in some cases. Crop varieties and cultivation methods can be improved along with disease control and storage and canning facilities. However, the two things which can contribute more to increased production are (1) further development of irrigation projects, and (2) greater use of fertilizer. Farm equipment as we know it in America, has no place in Korean Agriculture.

2. a. Japanese lands should be sold in small lots to Korean farmers. Government will have to have some clause in sales giving some control so that land will not pass to large owner in a few years. For a period of years buyers of Japanese land should be permitted to sell only to the Government.

b. (1) (2) (3) (4) Land reform should be put into effect distributing in small holding to farmers, Japanese lands and that of large Korean land owners.

However, enough land should be permitted to present land owners to permit farming as a business. This is highly desirable from a management, production and financing standpoint. With the control of rents to 1/3 of production, many farmers would be better off as renters than owners. One third would be a cheap price to pay, from a Korean standpoint, for management supervision, financial aid, and security. To permit farming as an enterprize, with a maximum of 1/3 rent, it will be necessary to let a landlord keep 3 times as much land as the amount decided upon for the farmers to receive in the land distribution in order that he will be able to make a business out of farming. The balance of his land could be distributed. Perhaps 5 chungbo permitted to landlords will permit profitable farming to landlords, provide farm and commodity leaders on which the Korean agrarian economy is founded.upon.

(2) Private ownerships of land obtained from government with control for a period of years.

(3) Redistribution of land owned by landlords over a certain amount with payment.

(4) No further suggestions.

c. Distribute to small farmers in small lots, Make payment over a long period of time in cash or products.

d. Yes - Compensated.

e. Sold

f. Irrigation projects should be built by government and controlled by government. This is because it is not felt that private capitol and initiative will develop all potential irrigation on which increased food production depends. This should not prevent private development of irrigation projects.

Isom Deshotels
Bureau of Production
Advisor

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Commerce
Seoul, Korea

30 June 1947

Subcommission #2
American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea

Attn: Capt. Morton S. Jaffe, Secretary

Gentlemen:-

You request my views on recommendations which should be made by the American Delegation in regard to paragraphs B-3 and B-5 of Joint Commission Decision #6. I give you the questions and my answers to the best of my ability in the limited time available.

B-3-a Q. What should be the policy with respect to industrial production and distribution?

A. I refer you to pages 27-28 of "THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF AN INDEPENDENT KOREA" prepared by the Korea Economic Mission, Department of State, in collaboration with the National Economic Board and Departments of the South Korea Interim Government, with particular reference to the first sentence.

B-3-b Q. What kind of ownership (public, private, or cooperative) should be adopted for each of the following?

Large industries (for example, steel and chemicals)
Medium industries (for example, textiles and shoes)
Small industries (for example, furniture and farm tools)
Banks
Wholesalers
Retailers
Mineral resources
Forests
Railroads
Shipping companies
Insurance
Fishing industries
Public utilities (for example, electric power, water, communications)
Household industries

A. There appears to be in the minds of almost all Korean leaders with whom I have consulted, a determination

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that "large industries", what is normally known as "heavy industry", should be the property of the nation. While I do not agree with this conclusion, in my opinion it would not be politically practical for the American Delegation to take any other view.

I would recommend that all banks, major mineral resources, railroads, major public utilities, and the merchant marine be included in this category for practical as well as political reasons.

All other industries, wholesale and retail institutions, insurance companies, fishing industries, household industries, should be left to private enterprise as far as possible.

I observe that your letter omits agricultural enterprise. It is my opinion that the best interests of the Korean people will be served by private ownership with the exception of irrigation projects so large as to require government ownership.

B-5-a Q. Should a program of rationing the necessities of life be continued while commodities are scarce? If so, how should this program be administered?

A. Yes. It should be administered on the general lines of the present policy of the South Korea Interim Government. For details I refer you to the National Food Administration with the South Korea Interim Government.

B-5-b Q. What should be the policy with respect to the collection of essential foodstuffs?

A. Essential foodstuffs must be collected. It is recommended that the policy of the South Korea Interim Government as now embodied in the National Food Administration be continued.

B-5-c Q. What type of program of price stabilization and control, if any, should be undertaken?

A. I recommend that you make a request of the National Price Administration for data on the subject, and discuss it with a subcommittee composed of Mr. Loren, Dr. Sturm, Dr. Johnson and representatives from the National Price Administration and Department of Commerce, South Korea Interim Government.

B-5-d Q. What measures should be taken to cope with speculation and hoarding?

A. No recommendation.

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B-5-e Q. What should be the policy with respect to the foreign trade of Korea?

A. Careful controls must be exercised on exports, imports, and the use of foreign exchange. It is recommended that your Subcommission study pages 34 through 47 inclusive of the "ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF AN INDEPENDENT KOREA".

Sincerely yours,

CALVIN JOYNER
Advisor to the Director
Department of Commerce
South Korea Interim Government

CC: OCA
Gen. Helmick

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SOUTH KOREA INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Education
2 July 1947

SUBJECT: Joint Commission Decision No. 6, Reply to Request for Recommendations

TO: Subcommission No. 2, American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea

FROM: Advisor to Director, Department of Education,
South Korea Interim Government

Following reply is made in reference to request for views on recommendations to be made by American Delegation in subject fields. In other words, it has been prepared with the emphasis on points of view and emphases from American point of view, not merely as a restatement of total needs in given fields. It is presumed that Provisional Government can and will secure from departments concerned basic surveys and information when these are needed. No attempt has been made, therefore, to give a complete picture of educational needs of Korea but merely to point out certain things in each of subject fields which should be emphasized (a) as vital needs, (b) as desiderata from point of view of American Delegation.

Department of Education was asked to consider paragraph C, 1-5.

C, 1 - Education -- "What educational program should be adopted and developed in Korea in the following fields?"

(a) <u>Elimination of illiteracy among adults</u>

Recommend - (1) That present plan be continued whereby:
Initial impetus, training, and some direction is given by National Department of Education through Bureau of Adult Education, and,
Implementation and direct guidance as well as major part of cost is provided by local community.

(2) That similar program now sponsored by Bureau of Culture be combined with program of Bureau of Adult Education.

(3) That every effort be made to prevent content of material used in education and for new literates being given political color. I would suggest that Provinces hold contests to secure best possible manuscripts, modelling form and degree of difficulty on national model, but using such content as they themselves approve.
<u>Note</u>: Localized, semi-voluntary program is less likely to be easily controlled by any political party or group than is highly centralized program. Especially in the matter of the content of literature for new literates it is possible that certain groups may attempt to color such material for their own purposes.

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Paragraph C, 1 - Recommendations (continued)

C, 1 - Education -- "What educational program should be adopted and developed in Korea in the following fields?"

(1) Compulsory Lower School Attendance

Recommend - (a) That Provisional Government be urged to give immediate attention to the desirability of creating school districts with local taxation and local control through school boards, such local support to be assisted by subsidies from national government.

(b) That as soon as possible teacher salaries be raised to such an amount as may be calculated to attract young people of a high type and that other professional treatment be provided for teachers for the same purpose.

(c) That the number of normal schools be increased and that they be provided with needed equipment and staff.

(d) That normal education be raised from secondary to higher school level as rapidly as possible.

[illegible] will be [illegible] the national government [illegible] with a [illegible] burden for education. [illegible] considerable amount of local support is secured to [illegible] through "Parent's Associations". There [illegible] this system and the burden should be spread [illegible] the local communities. Decentralization is also [illegible] possible system of education.

[illegible] must free the teachers from [illegible] very large expenditure of funds is [illegible] to be undertaken in the most [illegible] school buildings are crowded, and the point of efficiency; [illegible] to reduce classes of teachers, and [illegible] extremely low [illegible] now employed. These should be given [illegible] teaching or supervised by better trained teachers as and when [illegible] their turn. It is estimated that of present [illegible] of children in lower school age [illegible] attending [illegible] present facilities, low rates [illegible] to over [illegible] for the current year. It is plain, therefore, that to provide teachers for the remaining 40% would bring the bill for teacher salaries to at least two billion won. It is also improbable that a sufficient number of well-trained teachers could be attracted to the teaching profession at the present salary, even if the facilities for training these teachers were in existence to receive them at once.

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Paragraph 3, 2 - Recommendations (continued)

3, 2 - Education

(c) Middle Schools

Recommend - (1) That the Department of Education of Provisional Government proceed at once to survey the whole middle school situation and program with a view to elimination of poor distribution and consequent overlapping which exists at present. Such a study followed by action could secure a distribution of various types of middle school (Commercial, Technical, Agricultural, regular and, for time being, Normal) according to local and national needs.

(2) That greater diversity and greater opportunity be given for the education of girls.

(3) That in secondary education as in other places of education the largest amount of decentralization consistent with efficiency be made the objective.

(4) That the program and work of the vocational middle schools be more closely related to the needs and conditions of the community in those fields and that practical work in the related fields be made a requirement in the schools.

3, 2 - Education

(d) Higher levels of education

Recommend - (1) That the Provisional Government be advised to
(a) retain and/or secure from abroad a considerable number of foreign advisors and that so far as possible these be given the means and authority to not only advise and teach but to actually carry out such reforms and changes in method as may be approved by the Department of Education.
(b) that large but carefully selected group of mature educators be sent abroad for short term periods of observation.
(c) that a plan be prepared and funds provided to send abroad each year a number of graduate students in various branches of study for periods of from one to three years of study.

(2) That in sending educators for observation and students for graduate study where facilities are equal, the candidates shall be given their choice of country and institution.

(3) That in view of the shortage of institutions of higher learning a plan be worked out for subsidies to such private colleges and universities as shall meet certain standards and requirements to be determined by Department of Education, no discrimination to be based on ideology of the institutions so aided.

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Paragraph C, 1 - Recommendations (continued)

(2) Higher levels of education (continued)

(4) That full provision be made for freedom of thought, speech and teaching in the institutions of higher learning and for as great a degree of democratic control through the faculties of such institutions as is possible.

(5) That the attention of the Provisional Government be called to the need for change and improvement in the following phases of higher education:

(a) Modern techniques and methods of Administration, management and Finance.
(b) Improvement of Library facilities and more liberal library policies.
(c) Training of teaching staff on higher education level.
(d) Translation and preparation of college texts in the Korean language.
(e) Encouragement of professional societies.
(f) Extension of University program to community through varied extension courses and programs.
(g) Emphasis on special need of Korea for scientific and practical education on higher level rather than merely classical and academic type of education.
(h) Reconstruction and re-equipment of most of the physical plants of higher educational institutions.

C, 2 - "What program should be established to train Korean specialists and technicians to fill all necessary positions in economic and governmental positions?"

The recommendations in previous sections on vocational middle schools; on training abroad and on the development of higher training especially in scientific and technical lines will in part answer this question. More specifically -

Recommend - (1) That the government set up schools for the immediate in-service training of government employees.

(2) That short term industrial and technical training programs be set up.

(3) That a system of apprenticeship, supplemented by some formal education be organized.

(4) That existing vocational and technical training programs be strengthened and improved on all levels.

(5) That selected candidates be sent abroad as suggested under C, 1 (d).

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Paragraph C, 3 - Recommendations (continued)

C, 3 - "What measures should be taken to promote the development of national culture, art and also of science?"

The development of any national expression through the various phases of culture in arts and handcrafts, etc., is one where, while encouragement and incentive are desirable, governmental controls must be at the minimum if the result is not to be a highly artificial product and used as a means of party or ideological propaganda.

Recommend - (1) That the utmost care be taken to safeguard pictorial, dramatic and other arts against any form of censorship.

(2) That a system of national awards and other forms of recognition of ability and achievement be set up both in arts and in handcrafts to encourage their development.

(3) That Departments of Commerce and Education cooperate in the selection of such handcrafts as have large promise, and in their encouragement by subsidy, technical advice and in a program of training and education in such handcrafts.

(4) That modern audio-visual aids and methods be employed to bring greater appreciation of national culture to underprivileged groups of the population and to aid in school education on these lines.

(5) That there be no religious or ideological descrimination against any group in the use of any public theater or hall which may be built by government funds for the encouragement of musical, dramatic or other arts.

Horace H. Underwood

HORACE H. UNDERWOOD
Advisor to Director
Department of Education
South Korea Interim Government

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Note:

Studies, Surveys and Reports have been prepared by Department of Education on following subjects bearing on above questions:

School Finances in Korea (Elementary and Secondary) -
Paul Goodman, Administrative Assistant, Bureau of Common Schools

Case Study of Secondary Schools in Inchon (typical of many places in Korea)
Robert E. Gibson, Education Advisor, Kyunggi Do

Study for Proposed Plan of Subsidies to Private Schools (now in preparation)
Edwin L. Miller, Chief Advisor in Higher Education

Survey of Handicrafts in one Province
Warren A. Gilbertson, Advisor, Bureau of Culture

Appendices:

1. Suggested Reply on Higher Education, by Dr. Edwin L. Miller, Chief Advisor in Higher Education
2. Suggested Reply on Training Korean Specialists, by Richard Werth, Advisor, Teacher Training
3. Recommendations regarding Arts and Handcrafts, by Warren A. Gilbertson, Advisor, Bureau of Culture

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SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Education
Bureau of Higher Education

30 June 1947

SUBJECT: Suggested reply to the question: What educational program should be adopted and developed in Korea for the higher levels of Education?

TO : Advisor, Department of Education

FROM : E. L. Miller, Chief Advisor, Higher Education

The following eight principles should be adopted, to guide higher education in Korea along the pathway of maximum service to the country and its people. They emphasize the essential relationship of higher education to democratic development and to the economic rehabilitation and development of the nation:

1. Development of modern techniques and methods, and of democratic organization for the administration of College and University education. This calls especially for a modernization of the business affairs and their management. It must also include elimination of the Japanese concept of complete domination of a College by the president, and a selected few, in the management of a College's internal as well as external affairs. It calls for a democratic faculty organization and for representative student body organization along democratic lines. It also includes clarification of the principle that faculty cannot share with students the determination of scholastic and other matters concerned with basic policy and welfare of the institution. These are all basic weaknesses of the present University and College system of public education in Korea, and will always handicap needed reforms until they are corrected. There are very few Koreans in Korea today capable of and willing to undertake such reforms. It must depend upon either foreigners or Koreans trained abroad.

2. Development of modern libraries and liberal library policies in the Colleges and Universities. At present the setup and functioning of them are educationally unsound. This must be a primary feature of any reform plan for Higher Education in Korea. It can only be accomplished by trained librarians or Koreans trained abroad. Some Koreans trained in library science are in Korea, so that they, with a few good foreigners, could conduct a satisfactory course in library science to give a selected group of Koreans the necessary training.

3. Development of adequately trained teachers for Korean Colleges and Universities. This included the sending of many abroad for study.

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the bringing of a larger number of experts to Korea from abroad, and finally the establishment of a graduate school for such training. It also includes the establishment of many aids for teacher self-improvement in Korea. It also implies the establishment, somehow, of a decent salary scale for teachers if we hope to keep them in this profession, and the establishment of an exchange rate to make this self-improvement possible, through contact with foreign co-workers, foreign societies and foreign books and journals.

4. Development of College textbooks in the Korean Language, without which a complete program of college education in Korea is impossible. This means the establishment of aids, through Korean government channels, to encourage the preparation of such texts by Koreans, and the securing of copyright privileges and translation of many foreign books for College work. This is a vital need of all Colleges and Universities in Korea.

5. Development of societies and associations in Korea of a professional nature, which will facilitate the teaching and research programs of College and University people. It is essential to the promotion of modern scholastic programs, research programs, the public health education and research, and the improvement of standards and the cooperative spirit between individuals and institutions in Korea.

6. Development of a sense of responsibility on the part of Colleges and Universities for community service and adult education, in the form of night classes, extension work, adult education, short courses and vocational education. At present public Universities recognize no particular obligations to the community, the working man, or to occupational interests. Matters vital to the future of Korea itself are involved here. Higher education must do for these interests what it has done so effectively in all modern industrial nations of the world.

7. Development of professional education, and particularly the basic sciences which support and give root to many types of professional education. The purely classical concept of education which has held sway in Korea under the Japanese, must go, if Korea is to develop a healthy economic life. The key to this development is science education. Science education and all that it implies must be developed; this means the laboratory concept of education and the science laboratories, both of which Korean educators feel incompetent to develop, because of lack of experience and training of this kind. It implies the training of more science teachers abroad, and the bringing of more foreign scientists to Korea. Talking about science education and developing programs for it on paper achieve nothing worthwhile, unless there can be a program which will actually give Korea the nucleus of well-trained science teachers which she needs in her Colleges and Universities.

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8. There must be a physical reconstruction of many College and University buildings in Korea. At present the great majority of the public ones are in a sad state of disrepair. This also implies short-term janitorial schools and the embarking on a new policy of janitorial service in Korean Colleges. Without this physical necessity for Korean Colleges, many programs necessary to develop Higher Education are doomed from the start.

EDWIN L. MILLER

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SOUTH KOREA INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Education

SUBJECT: Reply to Question "What Educational Program Should be Established to Train Korean Specialists and Technicians to fill all Necessary Positions in Economic and Government Activities?"

TO: Dr. H. H. Underwood

To answer above question it will be necessary to make at once a distinction between (1) training of specialists which may be accomplished in Korea, (2) training of specialists which must be carried on abroad.

(1) Training to be accomplished in Korea

a. Due to the shortage of training facilities in all fields, the Korean Government should be encouraged and advised to concentrate available Korean teaching talent and machinery from all parts of the country in central schools for each field. For example, if the best existing training facility for chemical engineers is located at a certain college, then all existing chief facilities and equipment in other schools should be pooled to provide training under best possible conditions at one locality.

b. Where a shortage of supplies and machinery exists, the Korean Government should be encouraged and advised to procure items in the world market from such sources as are in accord with the type of supplies and machinery which will in future be available to the country. That is to say that training should if possible be done on the same machinery as that which is in use in industry or may be in use in industry at a future time.

c. Where a shortage of trained teachers exists and where it is possible to have teachers from other countries come to Korea to train technicians, the Korean government should be encouraged and advised to request them wherever available according to their own desires and needs.

The type of programs which can thus be scheduled for training in Korea may be as follows:

a. In-service training of government employees to add to their skill and experience. This to be conducted in special government-sponsored and government-operated schools which would draw their teachers from the staffs of colleges and from all other available sources of industry and business.

b. Short-term industrial and technical training programs conducted by industries in industrial facilities designed to fill immediate needs in readily acquired manual and technical skills.

c. A system of apprenticeship in those industries where skills are not readily acquired in short-term training programs, such apprenticeship to be supplemented by formal training as necessary.

d. A strengthening of existing vocational and technical schools to enable them to provide adequate training for their students, this to apply to both secondary and higher institutions.

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(2) Training of Specialists which may be carried on abroad.

a. A program by which the teachers of Korean teachers may receive advanced training abroad should be installed as quickly as possible to precede all other training programs.

b. Where necessary institutions or facilities are not immediately available in Korea, personnel should be sent abroad for short-term and long-term periods of study in countries and systems which can provide training that can be applied to the Korean situation and economy.

c. Where a system of apprenticeship cannot be immediately installed because of the non-availability or non-functioning of industrial equipment, apprentice-training may be carried on abroad.

d. In fields in which higher institutions in Korea cannot offer instruction of high enough standards, a sufficient number of students should be allowed to enter institutions abroad to enable higher institutions in Korea in future to have fully trained staffs.

RICHARD WERTH
Advisor
Teacher Training

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Education
APO 235 UNIT 2

1 July 1947

SUBJECT: Brief Discussion with Recommendations Regarding Arts and Handcrafts

TO: Dr. Horace H. Underwood

1. National culture may be defined as an agregate of traits which distinguish the ideas, behavior, and technological production of one people with a common historically determined unity. The following are brief discussions with recommendations for constructive development of Korea's national culture only in the field of the arts, including the theater, and the handcrafts.

THEATER

Public entertainment requires a preface. The social order in Korea confines the individual greatly. Recreation is limited and because of the confining pressure of the social order on the individual it is proportionately more necessary. Moreover, it should also be pointed out that since literacy is low the theater is of greater social importance.

Two serious detriments to a healthy constructive development of the Korean theater exist.

1. The police interpretation of their responsibilities regarding public performances. Through last winter numerous examples of obstruction, apparently because of difference of political viewpoint, were brought to my attention. The desire of the police to maintain the identical control exercised by the Japanese is conspicuous in the case of the theater.

2. At the present time all theaters are in the hands of persons whose only concern is money. They feature any motion picture - mostly foreign - that they can obtain knowing two well the public desire for entertainment. This is in general an unhealthy unconstructive approach and in the light of the importance of the theater in this country - particularly in the cities - important. There is one theater in Seoul occasionally available for plays by Korean talent. Except for that theater, the creative talent is being stifled. This grievance is expressed by persons of all political convictions.

3. A constructive recommendation might be the creation of a state owned theater. My concern is that such a theater would become a political tool, create further political antagonism, and would in practice tend to drive the people into more extreme and less democratic political camps. A more practical alternative might be the creation of two smaller theaters,

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one frankly conservative and the other experimental and modern. The healthy conflict of opinion should have a constructive effect. In addition, it will be necessary to have theaters available in the cities through the country for the travelling companies from these theaters.

PAINTING AND SCULPTURE

1. The number of Korean artists in this field are variously estimated at from 50 to 300 depending on interpretation of qualification. There are two general classifications - eastern and western styles. To date since the liberation the artists have been officially neglected. The exhibitions are presented in department stores. The Art Museum was used first as a billet and then as the M.G. Officers Club. The attitude of the artists under the Japanese was at best non-cooperative and it continues to be so in a lesser degree. The natural human thing to do was to form into organizations for mental satisfaction and security. There are four such organizations in Seoul. This negative attitude is not only unhealthy for the artists but in the democratic sense they are not making their proper contribution to society.

2. As an immediate step we are working on the presentation of the first national art exhibition since the liberation of Korea.

3. A basic fault is the maladministration of the Bureau of Culture of the Department of Education. The artists as well as elements of the government continue to think along Japanese lines of authority. The Korean personnel in combination with frequent changes in American counterparts have carried on this concept. On the Korean side the Bureau Head is a politician with no background for his job under whom no constructive thinking Korean desires to work.

4. Broad recommendations are indicated in the summary.

SUMMARY

The fine arts are not making the contribution that they could and should to society. The passive non-cooperative attitude prevails from the Japanese days. Politically and socially many Japanese concepts and grievances still impregnate the people's thinking. For a period, it is my conviction that outside guidance and encouragement - enlightened, forward-looking, and tolerant would be the most constructive approach. That outside guidance would among other things have to insist on the civil liberties within practical limits, aid in the recognition and promotion of Korea's own traditional arts as well as western adaptations, promote the sending of students abroad, and in general aid in creating a constructive hopeful, more democratic attitude as opposed to the feeling now of negative unhealthiness fostered by grievances and frustration.

HANDCRAFTS

1. In the interest of aiding in the re-establishment of Korea's cultural identity, serious consideration must be given to the fact that she is still traditionally a handcraft culture. The products of a craft culture are a profound expression of its civilization. This is readily recognizable

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in the furniture, silver, or textiles of colonial United States. It is equally applicable to present-day Korea. The interest shown by the anthropologist in the handcraft products of any culture demonstrates clearly its importance. Therefore, from the cultural point of view, it is advisable to recognize the importance of this field to Korea as a means of re-establishing her values after so many years of suppression by the Japanese.

2. From the viewpoint of both their cultural and economic welfare, this proposal touches the lives of the major stratum of the population either as producers or consumers. A broad, constructive program in the field of traditional Korean craft culture offers an excellent means of fostering the attention of the people in their own standards and values. It should have a [illegible] stabilizing effect in this critical period of disrupted economic and political adjustment.

3. A test survey of the handicrafts of the province has been made [illegible] which will be used as a basis for [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Chosun Arts Academy which in addition plans courses in theatricals - including the cinema - and the dance. The available talent in a country of this population should be handled adequately by these two institutions. Opportunity for study abroad by students of outstanding ability should also be available.

WARREN A. GILBERTSON
Advisor
Bureau of Culture
Department of Education

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Secret

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Labor
Seoul, Korea

30 June 1947

SUBJECT: Joint Commission Decision No. 6

TO : Sub-Commission No. 2, American Delegation US-USSR Joint Commission, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea.

The following recommendations are submitted:

a. Question: What should be the policy with respect to minimum wages, maximum hours, and working conditions?

Answer: Minimum Wages - Minimum wage legislation, desirable as it may be, is not practicable in Korea until the present crisis of inflation and under production has been overcome. Detailed plans for a minimum wage program can be developed now for introduction and use in the future, when conditions become more favorable for the introduction and successful development of such a program. The following immediate problems prevent the introduction of any minimum wage legislation at the present time:

1. Many plants and businesses are held and operated by USAMGIK, while others are owned and operated by Korean interests.
2. Shortage of consumer goods.
3. Ineffective price controls
4. Shortages of materials.
5. Lack of equipment, machinery and replacement parts.
6. Operating losses in many vested plants and industries due to various shortages, lack of skilled personnel and management, heavy work force.
7. The system of wage payment used in Korea, which includes various allowances, among them being one based on the size of family of the worker regardless of output and skill.

Answer: Maximum Hours - In order to regulate and limit maximum working hours in industry, commerce and governmental work so as to maintain and protect the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers in Korea, Ordinance No. 121 was put into effect 7 November 1946.

Under the provisions of the law, no employer is permitted to work his employees more than 48 hours in any work week unless the employees receive compensation for all hours in excess of 48 at a rate not less than 1½ times the

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Ltr., Sub-Commission #2, American Delegation US-USSR Joint Commission, Re, Joint Commission Decision No. 6, dated 30 June 1947.

regular rate of compensation and provided that employment in excess of 48 hours in any work week is pursuant to a specific agreement between the employer and employee or between the employer and a labor organization authorized to represent the employee. No employee may be employed in excess of 60 working hours in any work week.

Certain exemptions are made in the Law for employees in industries which are seasonal in nature, for employees engaged in agriculture, fishing, merchant marine, domestic servants, persons engaged in piece work in their own homes and employees acting in an executive, administrative or professional capacity.

In order to obtain maximum production from the existing facilities, materials, equipment and labor force, the present 48 hour week is desirable. In the future, when the economic situation becomes more stable, revisions can be made in the work week, 48, 46, 44, 42 or 40 hours depending upon the existing situation. (Attached is a copy of Ordinance No. 121).

Answer: Working Conditions - Appropriate factory laws should be passed establishing safety and sanitation standards.

These laws cannot be passed until the necessary research has been made. The Industrial Health and Safety Section of this Department is establishing medical clinics in factories, encouraging "Good House Keeping" program, and collecting at this time the required data for such legislation.

Any legislation must take into consideration the lack of materials, knowledge and equipment to produce proper safeguards that would be considered elementary in the Western world.

Therefore, original legislation in this field would merely establish low standards, which should be raised as the industrial development of Korea improves.

b. Question: What should be the policy with respect to labor of children?

Answer: In order to regulate child labor and to prohibit, limit, improve and mediate conditions of child labor so as to protect children from harmful or dangerous occupations or heavy labor, guarantee healthy development of life and body as well as just compensation, and thus secure the welfare of society, Ordinance No. 112, the child labor law was put into effect by USAMGIK, 18 September 1946.

On 16 May 1947, the South Korean Interim Government passed Public Act No. 4, which included almost all the provisions of Ordinance No. 112 with certain revisions.

For details of Public Act No. 4 see attached copy.

Answer: Policy for Women - The only legislation covering women employed in industry is Section XII of Public Act No. 4.

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This Section grants 60 days maternity leave without pay prior to birth, and 60 days maternity leave with pay after birth.

This Section further states that appropriate nursing facilities and opportunities shall be afforded.

Additional legislation should be enacted eliminating the employment of women in certain occupations. Also women should be guaranteed equal pay for equal work.

c. Question: What should be the policy with respect to labor organizations?

Answer: The development of democratic labor organizations should be encouraged in Korea. Workers should have the right through self-organization to form and join labor unions, to give aid to and receive assistance from other labor organizations and to designate representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of their employment contracts, without interference from employers or their agents.

Peaceful negotiations between employers and labor organizations resulting in written employment contracts, specifying agreed wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment should be encouraged.

Political interference in the past has hampered labor union organization and development, and a trade union registration act is pending which is concerned primarily with restricting political activities in labor organizations.

Ordinance No. 97, put into effect by USAMGIK, 23 July 1946, established functions of the Department of Labor in respect to labor organizations. For details see inclosed copy of Ordinance No. 97.

d. Question: What should be the policy with respect to social insurance?

Answer: This department considers social insurance to include:

a). Coverage for superannuated workers.

b). Coverage for unemployment.

c). Industrial casualties, (accident and decease).

None of the above can be legislated in Korea at this time due to the fact that the risk in each case is unknown. Our policy should be that of:

(1) Encourage the coverage of these three items in collective bargaining agreements.

(2) A detailed study should be made to gather data in order to determine the risk involved so that it may be assumed either by a state plan or private agencies.

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Ltr., Sub-Commission #2, American Delegation US-USSR Joint Commission, Re, Joint Commission Decision No. 6, dated 30 June 1947.

e. Question: What should be the policy with respect to increasing the efficiency of labor?

Answer: Schools should be established for labor to teach the proper use, and maintenance of existing tools and machinery.

Management training programs should be established to teach proper production and management methods.

The present wage system should be eliminated and for it substitute a single basic wage for various occupations and group incentive plans. This basic wage should be paid on an hourly basis. This should be accomplished through collective bargaining.

The labor organizations should be encouraged to cooperate with management in maintaining the proper discipline among their rank and file members, to secure maximum production with existing machinery and equipment. If the labor organizations would develop the proper spirit among their members this would be the greatest factor in increasing the efficiency of labor in Korea.

L. A. SHAW
Lt Col Inf
Advisor to the Director,
Dept of Labor.

3 Incls.

Incl #1 - Ordinance #97
Incl #2 - Ordinance #121
Incl #3 - Public Act #4

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4. LAW AND JUSTICE

a. What policy should be followed in establishing a Korean code of law?

In order to determine a policy which should be followed in establishing a Korean code of law, the purposes for the codification of any legal system must be first considered. Generally speaking, codes can be grouped in two separate ways. One type of code is a collection of already existing laws arranged and classified into a logical system, or one intended to be such, without the interpolation of new matter. The other type is a declaration of law composed partly of such materials as might be [illegible] from all sources--statutes, adjudications, customs--supplemented by such enactments, alterations, and additions as seem to the codifiers to be required to constitute a complete system and adapt it to the purpose of its adoption or promulgation. This latter type of code of mixed character is essentially the [illegible] of the codes [illegible] by any nation in modern times, and this adding new to the old has entered more or less into the composition of every body of law [illegible]. Probably no subject in the realm of law has been the occasion of more extended and earnest discussion than the relative merits of the code system as it is understood by the jurists and that which is considered its antithesis, a body of law partly written and partly unwritten, finding its beginnings in customs [illegible] into customary law; seeking later expression in statutes and passing through a period of judicial interpretation and modification by being fitted, as it were, into successive cases, with sufficiently varying facts to produce that flexibility which is needed for final crystallization into a body of rules and principles sufficiently well-settled as to have attained the dignity of a well-ordered system. Of the one, the Roman Law is the illustration

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unrivalled in history, as is the English Common Law of the other. That both systems of law tend to eventually reach the same goal is indicated by the fact that no code has ever taken its place as an instrument of legal administration into which there did not enter a substantial part of the existing common law, and that every body of unwritten law on a given subject is tending towards ultimately finding its expression in what is tantamount to a code, whether called by that name or not.

Codes can be defined in four ways:

First. The classification of statutes of force systematically arranged, according to subject matter, without amendment, alteration, or interpolation of new law, the only change being in the correction of errors of expression, repetitions, superfluities and contradictions, which, when done, will leave the laws in letter and spirit just as they were.

Second. The same as the first, but going further and making such amendments as are deemed necessary to harmonize and perfect the existing system.

Third. To take a yet greater latitude, and, without changing the existing laws, to add new laws and to repeal old laws, both in harmony with it, so that the code will meet present exigencies, and, so far as possible, provide for the future.

Fourth. To disregard at will existing laws, and make a system substantially new.

Real codification involves the most intimate and exhaustive knowledge, not only of the statute law to be included, but also of the judicial interpretation and construction of it. There is no species of composition which demands more care and precision than the drafting of a statute. The writer needs not only to make his language intelligible; he must make it incapable of misconstruction. When it has passed to a law, it is no longer

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his intent that is to be considered, but the intent of the words which he has used. The true safeguard is found not in the method of accumulating synonyms and enumeration of particulars, but rather by the concise and complete statement of the full principle in the least possible words and the elimination of description and paraphrase. By confining each section to the single proposition, intricacy and obscurity of statutes can be largely avoided.

As is indicated above, codification of the law of Korean must necessarily be the job for persons learned in law. It is believed that the codification of the laws can best be accomplished by the establishment of a Code drafting Commission headed by the outstanding Korean persons learned in law who can choose other outstanding legal scholars, judges, prosecutors and lawyers to serve on the team, and call upon representative officials of government and experts of industry and commerce, social workers and others deemed proper, for advice and consultation as to the provisions of the new laws for Korea. They could be aided in their work by persons of the United Nations learned in law who would serve only in an advisory capacity. The basis of study should be the Civil Law System, to which the Korean people are accustomed and in which the great body of legal scholars, judges, prosecutors and lawyers are already trained. The primary object should be the elimination of all Japanese innovations in the Civil Law System. Study of the Chinese Code, the Swiss Code, the Philippine Code, the Louisiana Code and the codes of all democratic nations should be carefully made in order to obtain from them the best features of each. Study also should be made of the amendments to the Codes of Japan made since the surrender. Work on codification is already progressing by lawyers, judges, prosecutors and officials in the Department of Justice, with the American attorneys acting as advisers. It is presently contemplated to coordinate all of the work in this line, giving it added impetus, by the creation

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of a Code Drafting Commission to be headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, with the Director of the Department of Justice and Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court as appointed members. This Commission would then choose additional persons learned in law and other outstanding persons to serve with them. A Code Drafting Commission could be established as a subordinate unit of the Joint Commission, if it is intended that the work progress under the leadership of both the Russians and the Americans, or, upon the establishment of the unified Government of North and South Korea, to work under the direction of whatever person or agency forms such unified Government. It is believed, however, that the codification work being done by the Koreans in the Department of Justice at the present time will have been so nearly completed within the next several months that there would already exist a body of law for Korea which could be truly called Korean, having been drafted by Koreans for the peculiar requirements of Korea, which could be presented for immediate promulgation by the proper authorities. Upon the completion of the work of a Code Drafting Commission, the Codes presently in force would be used, with emergency amendments made by the Legislative authority whenever evil results of Japanese innovations in the Civil Law System are discovered.

It is believed that the efforts of codification should not be limited to the first or second types of codes outlined above which are merely classifications and harmonizations of the present law, but that the third type of codification work, at the same time disregarding at will such existing laws as are deemed undesirable, and adding such laws as are deemed desirable, would be most desirable for the establishment of a new law for the new Korean nation. This is the type of work presently being undertaken by the codifiers within the Department of Justice. The presently

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existing laws cannot be disregarded entirely, inasmuch as the creation of a system of laws entirely new is both visionary and wholly impracticable, and would cause great confusion for the new Korean government in foreign relations and in foreign trade and domestic enterprise. There can be no question, though, that many features of the existing law must be removed, and many other features, now missing, must be added. Therefore, in regard to the policy as to how far a code drafting commission should be permitted to revise the existing laws, it is believed that it should have the power [illegible] the adding of new laws [illegible], revision of old laws, both in harmony with the existing laws, so that the code will meet present exigencies and, so far as possible, provide for the future; provided, that it shall have the further power to disregard at will such existing laws as are deemed by the commission as undesirable, and to add such laws as are deemed desirable. With such powers, it is believed that the result of the commission's work will be a democratic system of laws for Korea which laws can depart so far from the presently existing laws, so as to cause confusion. This code could then be adopted or promulgated by the proper authorities as the law of Korea.

There must be a complete set of codes for the new Korean government. On this point there must be no compromise. There is little precedent of court decisions which has built up any body of modern Korean customary (common) law. Furthermore, court decisions rendered under the Civil Law System heretofore followed in Korea do not have the same force in establishing new principles of law as court decisions under the Anglo-American case law system. Therefore, without the existence of a complete set of codes, there would not exist anywhere any Korean law which the courts could enforce and the results would be chaos, inasmuch as it would be necessary for each judge and court to determine what the natural law is in each particular case. Different decisions in different courts in cases involving the

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same facts would be a common occurrence. There would be no uniformity of decisions. But, worse than that, the resulting government would be a government operated and judged by men without the guidance of law, rather than a government of law. A government of law under which the citizens do not live in terror of the arbitrary judgments of a man, even though he holds a judicial office, is one of the most cherished principles of American democracy and cannot be compromised. To prevent this, there must be a code of laws to guide and bind the judges. Another important reason for having a code of laws is that there are insufficient legally trained Koreans to fill initially all the judgeships and judicial offices in North and South Korea. As a result, some of these positions will, of necessity, be filled by persons not legally trained and therefore incapable of legal interpretations, explanations and modifications. They must have a complete code of laws to guide them to eliminate as much as possible the necessity for judicial interpretations. Without a code of laws under these conditions, it would be impossible to preserve a system of law founded on reason, with the multiplicity of courts and jurisdictions, each guessing at what the law should be.

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b. How shall the courts, judiciary and legal procedures in the Korean language be established?

Prior to the Japanese surrender and the American occupation of the southern portion of Korea, and presumably until the Japanese officials were removed from the courts during November and December of 1945, the court records and the verbal proceedings in the courts were conducted in the Japanese language. The codes and various laws were then in the Japanese language, and still are to this date, except as they have been modified since the American occupation began. Immediately after the American occupation and upon staffing of the courts with Korean officials, which took place in the months immediately following November, 1945, the court records and the verbal proceedings before the courts were kept and made in the Korean language. There has been no difficulty whatsoever in making this changeover. It was accomplished smoothly and as a natural result of the staffing of the courts with Koreans. English has never been used either verbally or in writing in a Korean court proceeding. It is presumed that the same natural change to the Korean language took place in the courts in North Korea. In the event that it has not, it is believed that the change in language in the proceedings in those courts could be accomplished just as easily as the natural change of language which took place in the south. Court records which had previously been kept in the Japanese language have not been changed to the Korean language, nor is it deemed necessary to change them. It is interesting to note that both the Korean and the Japanese languages, although pronounced differently, use as their basis the Chinese script, which is the same in both languages. There are slight modifications of the script in both languages, in the Korean by the use of Hangul and in the Japanese by the use of Kanna, to show verb endings, tense, prepositions, and other minor sentence construction. As a result, any person capable of reading one language can determine the sense of a document written in the other language. In reference to the establishment

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of the laws and codes in the Korean language, that would be automatically done by the Code Drafting Commission, outlined in paragraph 4a, whose work would naturally be conducted in the Korean language.

It may be well to point out that the official language of the occupation in the American zone of occupation in Korea has been English until very recently by the terms of Article 7, Proclamation No. 1, of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, dated 7 September 1945. By second indorsement of General Headquarters, Far East Command, dated 10 June 1947, to letter Hq USAMGIK, MGJUS 387.7, dated 16 May 1947, Subject: Proposed Amendment of Proclamation No. 1, the request to make the Korean the official language of the South Korean Interim Government, the governmental agency of the United States Occupation Forces in South Korea, has been approved. Pursuant to such approval, Korean has been designated the official language of the South Korean Interim Government by Executive Order No. 4 of the Military Governor, dated 28 June 1947. It is considered that Korean could be designated as the official language of the government of the whole of Korea either by proclamation of the Joint Commission or by act of the legislative body or the executive of the United Government for Korea.

e. How is the democratization of the judiciary to be exercised?

In speaking of democratization of the courts, we should be very careful to remember that, in every truly democratic nation, the legislative authority expresses the will of the people. The laws governing conduct are made by the legislative authority and the people can look to these laws for a guide. As long as conduct conforms to the law as laid down by the legislative authority, the courts have only limited functions. But when there is allegation that conduct does not conform to the law, the courts must take jurisdiction and interpret the law as applicable to the facts presented. It is fundamental that the courts must protect the people in the exercise of all rights given them by charter, constitution or law against the arbitrary exercise of official power by any officer or agency of the government or by any private person.

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For the judiciary to be able to perform these functions, it must be manned by persons learned in the law. The only possible exception to this would be the judges of the lower county courts, from which appeal could be taken to the District Court or one of its branches. All judges of the District Courts, the Branch Courts, the Appeal Courts and the Supreme Court should be persons learned in the law.

In order to establish a court system in accordance with the concepts of democracy, under which the rights of an individual will be fully respected and protected, and under which justice will be determined, impartially regardless of the position of the persons appearing at bar, the judiciary must be independent, upon an equal basis with the other two branches of government, the executive and the legislative. The judiciary must not be subject to control of the political party in power, for it could then be used as a tool of oppression of the rights of the individual and the perpetuation of that party in power. In order to keep the judiciary independent, the appointment of the judges must not be subject to approval or disapproval by any Civil Service Commission, which would not be in any position to pass upon the qualifications of a judge. In addition, the judges must not be subject to routine inspection and check by an inspection bureau created within the government inasmuch as this would be a tool whereby the judiciary could be intimidated and oppressed, and as a result, the judiciary would become subject to the inspection branch and thereby lose its independence. It is feared that such an inspection branch could very easily develop into a sort of terroristic secret police, an organization repugnant to the concepts of democracy as we know it. Of course, there must be a system of discipline and impeachment to cope with the problem of malfeasance of judicial officials. The system of discipline for minor infractions could be administered within the judiciary. The system of impeachment should be by an agency outside the judiciary. In both cases, provision should be made for impartial trial.

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Courts in themselves are an agency of government to protect the rights of the citizen under a democracy. They in themselves cannot be described as having been "democratized". Procedures before the courts to protect the rights of the citizens of a democracy can be instituted, as the right to trial by jury, right of habeas corpus, warrants of arrest, bail, and preliminary hearings before grand juries. The courts, however, cannot be permitted to become democratic in the sense that the judge is given complete discretion in regard to the standard of penalty to be imposed in a criminal or civil case or to determine (guess) what the applicable natural law is, without any codes of law to guide and bind him. (The danger of this situation was pointed out in paragraph 4a, above). Nor can the courts be permitted, under the term "Democratization" to be staffed by laborers and others not trained in law, when legally trained men are available to staff the judgeships. In short, under the term "democratization", there must never be permitted to be established a system of judiciary operating upon the same principles as the "Peoples' Courts", as they exist in the Soviet Union which enforce the Soviet Socialist law which is always guided by what behavior is most expedient in guaranteeing society's forward movement to communism. It appears from reports of observers in Moscow that the Soviet authorities have done away with not only grand juries but also trial juries in their courts; that there is no direct or cross-examination of witnesses; and that the trial judges openly rely on their intuition, since the evidence presented is seldom conclusive enough to make any other pretense plausible. It is indicative of the temper of the "Peoples' Courts" that the lawyers in cases often ask witnesses whether they are speaking for the masses or for the party organization, or simply as individuals. The courts must follow the pattern of the American courts if democratic rights of the citizens are to be preserved. Upon this point there must be no compromise. This does not mean that a system of administering law, identical with the system

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in the United States, should be adopted. It does mean, however, that there should be included in the constitution for the country and in the codes of law, particularly the codes of procedure, those democratic principles which are perhaps best exemplified in the American system--principles which recognize the superiority of the individual citizen over the state which is only the servant of the people, principles which guarantee basic human rights, such as a fair trial, a prompt trial and restrictions to guard the individual against arbitrary exercise of power by government officials. Such principles as these can be expressed in codes and enforced under a civil law system. Many of them are so expressed and enforced under the modern codes of democracies using the civil law system. Such codes are included in the source material now being studied by Koreans and Americans engaged in revision of the old Japanese codes now in force in this country.

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The Economic Potential of an Independent Korea

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THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF AN INDEPENDENT KOREA

Prepared by

The Korea Economic Mission
Department of State

in collaboration with
The National Economic Board
and Departments of the
South Korean Interim Government

Seoul, Korea
June 1947

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THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF AN INDEPENDENT KOREA

I. Purpose of the Study

This study is submitted in response to a request made by Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner, United States Delegation, United States-Soviet Joint Commission. The request stemmed from a realization that the Joint Commission's task of formulating a Korean Provisional Government could not be performed satisfactorily unless the Commission were apprised of economic factors which must affect the future Korean State and which should be fully weighed before establishing even a temporary administration.

The task undertaken has been to attempt a resume of Korea's economic history under the Japanese, and an evaluation of the country's material prospects during the next four or five years, with most projections centered about the year 1951. What is presented here is in no sense an economic program, but rather a forecast of what appears to be possible in the light of facts now ascertainable. There is no doubt that economic prophecy under the circumstances is beset with so many hazards as to appear presumptuous. Nonetheless, it has been thought indispensable to provide the chart upon which a tentative course may be plotted, subject to whatever amendment later experience may prove necessary.

II. Basic Assumptions

A forecast of the economic configuration of Korea as of about 1951 can be made only on the basis of certain fundamental assumptions. Although it is conceivable that the country may remain divided at that date, the following assumptions have been made here:

1. The country will be politically and economically reunited not later than early 1948.

2. An international program of material and political assistance will have been carried almost, or quite, to a conclusion.

3. The world will be at peace and general economic conditions will be favorable to international trade.

4. Korea will have had the benefit of considerable foreign technical aid, and will have made strenuous efforts to improve the technical competence of its citizens.

5. The Korean Provisional Government, with international cooperation, will have taken all practicable steps to foster agriculture, commerce and industry, and to improve the standard of living of its people.

6. Close control will be exercised over foreign exchange to maintain essential imports and to limit exports to actual surpluses.

None of the conclusions reached in this study can be valid unless at least the first three of the above assumptions are realized. If the country remains disunited, its dismembered halves will be reduced below a national subsistence level, except as they may be sustained by foreign aid. Similarly, the conclusions reached depend upon the degree of accuracy of other assumptions regarding trade, technical training and

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government policy. Even if not all the assumptions prove to have been well grounded, however, the study should still be of value for providing much of the basic data needed to draw new conclusions as conditions may vary.

III. Historical Development of the Korean Economy

Korea is unique among nations liberated by the Allied victory in that its bondage had endured far longer than that of any other conquered country. During forty years of Japanese control it had progressed from a state of handicraft industry and economic feudalism to occupy a position among the more advanced industrial areas of the Orient. Communications and railway services had so far developed as to compare favorably with those of Japan. Fisheries, light and heavy industry, hydroelectric power, mining, and agricultural irrigation were fostered by the Japanese; trade returns grew more and more imposing and Korea's ancient reputation as a hermit nation faded.

Koreans themselves, however, played little part in this apparent progress except as a labor force, and enjoyed small direct economic benefit from it. Japanese-controlled Chosen, indeed, stood as a classic example of colonial exploitation. Japanese from the homeland immigrated in increasing numbers, particularly young unmarried men seeking their fortune, until by 1941 they numbered more than 700,000. After forty years of Japanese occupation, hardly so many as fifteen per cent of the Korean population practiced, or were dependent upon, those callings which admit of a nation's evolving beyond a primitive agricultural state. Resident Japanese monopolized all forms of economic life in Korea save only agriculture, commerce, industry and public service, in fact all the motive forces of a modern economy were in their hands. With rare exceptions, Koreans were not permitted to share in the wealth which the Japanese developed and exploited, or to enjoy an equality of opportunity vis-a-vis the Japanese which might have allowed them to attain a level of existence more nearly commensurate with their native endowment.

In this connection it may very properly be asked how far, and in what direction, Korea had progressed during the many centuries of its existence as an independent nation while subject only to the nominal suzerainty of the Chinese crown. Korea, after having evolved a rich culture in mediaeval times, gradually declined until late in the sixteenth century when, like the tortoise which is a national symbol, it withdrew permanently into its shell after Japanese invasion forces under the command of Hideyoshi had quitted the peninsula. Even during its most vigorous periods, the nation was not noted for exploits abroad. The country was self-sufficient in foodstuffs and productive enough to support an extensive nobility as well as a class of scholars, artists and artisans which ornamented the court and nurtured an artistic tradition notable in Oriental civilization. The national energy turned in upon itself rather than abroad. Struggle for power among factions and among the several kingdoms which shared the peninsula during the first millenium of this era left small room for attempted expansion through conquest beyond its borders.

Korean experience with foreign powers has seldom been happy, but the nation has never warred against another except in its own defense and on its own soil. Even so temperate an

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assertion of the national sovereignty as resistence to Hideyoshi's invasion, left the nation exhausted and desirous only of avoiding any kind of foreign entanglement. For nearly three centuries Korea existed within her shell, paying nominal tribute to China and hoping to avoid international attention by the constancy with which she declined to look abroad.

In the late nineteenth century, however, the opening of Japan to western commerce and the general expansionist movement throughout the Far East could not fail to have their repercussions in Korea. Reluctantly the country signed a treaty of friendship and commerce with Japan in 1876. In 1894 China and Japan went to war over Korea, and as a part of the price of defeat China was forced to renounce its suzerainty over the peninsula. The independence Korea gained in 1895 by the Treaty of Shimonoseki was illusory and short-lived. Within ten years it had become a Japanese protectorate as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. Five years later, in 1910, its status for the next thirty-five years was fixed by annexation to the Japanese Empire.

Korea's wholly passive role in the period 1876 - 1905 provides a key to what its once vigorous civilization had become during the centuries of isolation and cultural in-breeding. Only uncoordinated hands had resistance to offer to the more virile and often brutal aggressor. Both court and government were decadent, corrupt and venal. Economically the country had remained static for many centuries. The bulk of the population consisted of a peasantry held to the soil in a state of serfdom, and only in a few commercial centers such as Kaesong was there a relatively independent merchant class. For the rest, the wealth of the land and the instruments of economic action were in the hands of the court and of the noble, or "yangban," class which had long since lost the capacity for any action more vigorous than that required to maintain their own power and prestige. No stimulus from abroad was admitted to awaken the Korean people from their centuries-old sleep, and so shake the authority of the privileged classes.

Not only was the political atmosphere mediaeval; the physical aspect of the country was equally backward. Lord Curzon, who traveled through Korea in 1892, comments in his Problem of the Far East on the utter deficiency of highways. The east and west coasts of the peninsula were joined by trails impassable except on foot or on the backs of Mongolian ponies. In country districts wheeled carts were seldom used owing to the lack of practicable roads, and farmers hauled their produce on rough sledges. Lacking suitable communications, the country could conduct trade on hardly more than a parochial basis, and its considerable resources were tapped scarcely more than enough to meet the requirements of handicraft industries.

The government itself was not only despotic and unenlightened, but inefficient as well. Appointment to public office was made on the basis of irrelevant examinations, in accord with Confucian tradition. Public finance was traditionally chaotic; tax-farming was the rule, and relatively little profit accrued to the government howevermuch the peasants were gouged. Landlords absorbed the greater part of farm income, after deduction for taxes. The periodic revolutions which overthrew successive dynasties were confined within palace walls, and a change of masters made small difference to the oppressed people.

Such, in brief terms, was the state of Korea at the turn of the twentieth century. Strategically placed between Japan on the east, China on the west and Asiatic Russia on the north,

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it could not fail to attract the greater powers, first as a base of military operations and ultimately as a source of raw materials and cheap labor. That Korea maintained its independence for so long had been due largely to a lack of aggressiveness on the part of its neighbors. Once Japan, in particular, had turned to western ways so obviously desirable a theater of colonial exploitation could not long remain unoccupied. Ease of access, an economic geography complementary in many respects to that of Japan, a source of raw materials, foodstuffs and labor, and a potential outlet for Japanese manufactures: all the attributes of Korea conspired to subject it to the will of Japan.

It is evident, then, that on its own initiative Korea had done little to earn even a modest place among modern nations. Contemporary industrial and economic methods were unknown to it. The vacuum in which it existed had remained inviolate for so many centuries that it found itself no more capable of offering effective resistance to Japan's economic incursion than of repulsing its armies.

Japanese aims in establishing a protectorate over Korea and ultimately annexing the country were assuredly not philanthropic. Benefits deriving from the new order, and they were many, were contrived to favor the Japanese. Inevitably, however, certain advantages adhered to the Koreans. Public health measures proved so effective that no longer were the inhabitants decimated at regular intervals by smallpox, cholera or plague; instead, modern sanitation permitted an explosive birth rate to double the population during the Japanese regime. To be sure, the Japanese acted to protect their own nationals and a subject labor force, but regardless of motives the demographic results were startling.

Generally speaking the advantages of the occupation to the Korean people were peripheral. Not only did few Koreans grow wealthy through collaboration with the Japanese, or in spite of them; equally few participated in any of the higher levels of government, finance, industry, communications, mining or commerce. Exclusion of Koreans as a matter of policy extended down through the managerial ranks as far as positions equivalent to shop foremen. The ordinary well-endowed Korean could hardly aspire to a position higher than that of skilled laborer, with such an individual's limited earnings and powerlessness to influence industrial and economic policy.

The effect of Japanese economic policy was to produce a relatively small Korean labor force of skilled and semi-skilled workmen and a much larger force of unskilled labor. At the same time there developed a Korean commercial and professional class of some importance, while managerial posts were largely reserved for the Japanese. Meanwhile, the country itself, in contradistinction to the indigenous population, was virtually transformed. The most considerable communications system in the Orient, outside the Japanese homeland, permitted easy shipment of Korean produce to ports, quick distribution of imports and transshipment of vast quantities of materials between Japan and Japanese-dominated areas on the Asiatic mainland. An imposing telecommunications network was established, ports were developed, important hydroelectric plants were constructed, the mineral resources of the country were exploited extensively for the first time, heavy and light industries of great variety grew to keep pace with Japanese expansion on the mainland, irrigation and other agricultural projects were fostered, modern banking and financial practices

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were introduced. In a word, all that modern science and Japanese resources and interest could afford, joined to transform the backward country into a model of profitable colonial exploitation.

The Allied victory, paradoxically, so far from proving an unmixed blessing, has thrown Korea into the most acute crisis of its modern history. The country has been divided politically and economically since August 1945 by two separate occupation forces. The ill effects of this division have been responsible for creating and operating the modern Korean state. Disruption of normal commercial flow within the country and between Korea and its former trading areas, and gradual exhaustion of Japanese-created stockpiles have completed the economic dislocation. With American aid, South Korea has thus far been able to avert serious food shortages and partially to restore production of some consumer goods. Admittedly, present aid is in the nature of artificial respiration and no solid economy could be grounded upon it. Only when the country has been reunited will it be possible to undertake those long-range plans for economic rehabilitation which it is hoped will make possible the independent Korea envisioned in this study.

IV. Resources of Korea

A. HUMAN RESOURCES OF KOREA (Population)

1. General

The population of all Korea at the time of the last census, in May 1944, totalled 25,900,142, comprising 25,120,174 Koreans, 708,448 Japanese, and 71,400 other nationals, most of whom were Chinese.

Since the end of the war, there have been large-scale movements of populations in the Far East. In Korea, these movements have involved the repatriation of about 700,000 Japanese civilians and the return to Korea of over 1,600,000 Koreans from Japan, China, and other Far Eastern and Pacific areas. At the same time, there has been a heavy movement of Koreans from north of the 38th parallel to southern Korea. It is estimated that almost one million refugees from northern Korea have crossed the 38th parallel to live in southern Korea since August 1945, and the influx continues at a rate of more than 60,000 per month. Almost all of the more than 1,100,000 Koreans repatriated from Japan, as well as about three-quarters of the estimated 500,000 Korean refugees from China, mainly from Manchuria, have come to southern Korea.

Thus the American-occupation zone now contains almost seventy per cent of the total population of Korea, in comparison with approximately sixty-four per cent in 1944. A census taken under the auspices of the Department of Public Health and Welfare, USAMGIK, in September 1946 showed the population of southern Korea to be 19,369,270. (See Appendix I, Table 23). As of 1 June 1947, it is estimated that the population of southern Korea is close to 20,000,000 as compared with an estimated population in the Soviet-occupied zone of less than 9,000,000. As of the same date, the population of all Korea, counting only Koreans, was estimated at 28,059,000. With a land area of 85,251 square miles, Korea has a population density of about 329 persons per square mile, which is approximately seven times that of the United States and about two-thirds that of Japan.

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2. Projection of Korean Population Trend to 1960

The rate of natural increase of the population of Korea between 1925 and 1944 was approximately 1.7 per cent annually. Available information indicates the Korean population has continued to increase at about the same rate since 1944. If this rate of natural increase continues, the population of Korea in 1950 will total 29,524,000; in 1955. 32,119,000; and in 1960, 34,943,000. (See Appendix I, Table 22).

These projections assume that the inflow of population into Korea will approximately equal the outflow in the period from 1 June 1947 to 1960. It is not expected that the heavy migration of almost two million Koreans from Korea to Japan and Manchuria between 1930 and 1944 will be repeated during the next fifteen years. (See Appendix I, Table 24). However, it is expected that the approximately 1,000,000 Koreans now in Manchuria will remain there, mainly to cultivate the rice fields they have developed. More may migrate to sparsely settled areas in Manchuria, if conditions become settled and Koreans are afforded reasonable security. There may also be a movement of Koreans back to Japan, if the Japanese government permits and if economic conditions are favorable to Koreans residing in that country. It is probable that increasing numbers of Koreans will migrate to Soviet Siberia. Since the end of the war, the Soviets have apparently encouraged the movement of Koreans to replace Japanese fishermen who worked in Sakhalin and Soviet waters and to provide workers for their Maritime Provinces.

It is probable that the Chinese population in the urban centers of Korea, if not discriminated against, will increase over the current estimate of 60,000, of whom only about 10,000 are south of the 38th parallel. It is unlikely that the Koreans will permit the immigration of any substantial number of Japanese during the next ten to fifteen years, even though this development would be almost inevitable if such a movement were not restricted.

3. Composition and Training of the Population

(1) General

Before the end of the war, the 700,000 Japanese who comprised only about three per cent of the population, dominated the government and almost all economic aspects of this primarily agricultural economy. Nearly all the engineers and technicians who operated the industrial plants, the mines, and transportation and communications systems of the peninsula were Japanese. The Japanese pursued policies designed to perpetuate the Japanese in these positions of leadership, and to deny to the Koreans equality of opportunity in almost every phase of political and economic life.

The Korean economy has been, and continues to be, basically agricultural. About two-thirds of the Korean population are now engaged in agriculture. In addition, many Koreans are engaged in simple household industries which have existed in Korea for thousands of years. Koreans have a reputation for being skilled workmen in many household or small-scale industries, such as ceramics and brass-processing.

As the Japanese developed new industries in Korea during the years from 1926 to 1945, Koreans were utilized mainly as unskilled or semi-skilled laborers, while the Japanese population supplied most of the managerial and technical skills necessary to operate the new and larger factories. Reflecting this partial industrialization of the peninsula between 1936 and 1944, Table 25

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indicates that the percentage of the total population dependent upon agriculture declined from 81.2 per cent in 1926 to 69.8 per cent in 1944. The portion of the population dependent upon industry and mining rose from 2.4 per cent in 1926 to 12.4 per cent 1944.

Both Tables 25 and 26, which give the former occupational composition of the population, illustrate that the bulk of the Korean population engaged in farming, fishing, and small-scale commercial enterprises, while the Japanese were predominately engaged in government, commerce, and industry. As indicated in Table 28, of the approximately 188,000 Japanese males between the ages of sixteen and sixty in Korea in 1944, almost 52,000 were managers, professional and technical men, who provided the leadership for the government and economy of the country.

(2) Korean Labor Force

Korea has as large a labor force as it is likely to require, but at least temporarily that force has become seriously deficient in technical skills owing to the repatriation of practically all Japanese technicians and skilled laborers from southern Korea, and of all but a few hundreds from northern Korea. A joint study, made by the National Economic Board and the Departments of Labor and Commerce, USAMGIK, in August 1946 ("Korea's Population and Labor Force"), estimated that the number of Korean individuals either gainfully employed or available for gainful employment within the group from fifteen to fifty-nine years of age was as follows for the years 1940, 1944, 1946 and 1950:

Table 1

LABOR FORCE, KOREA, 1940, 1944, 1946, 1950 *
(in thousands)

	1940	1944	1946	1950
Male	6,153	6,268	7,454	7,812
Female	2,775	2,905	3,225	3,380
Total	8,928	9,173	10,679	11,192

* Source: Korea's Population and Labor Force.

Korea has a Korean labor force adequate both in numbers and in skills for the requirements of its agriculture, the backbone of the country's economy. However, Korea's labor force is seriously deficient in the higher skills necessary for efficient management and operation of most of its industries and many of its mines, public utilities, transport and communications facilities, most of which were built and operated by the Japanese.

(3) Korean Personnel Available for Korea's Industries & Mines

Tables 29 and 30 give employment statistics for Korea's Industries, mines, transport system, and commercial businesses as of 1943. These statistics show that, while more than ninety-five per cent of the industrial laborers and miners in Korea were Koreans, most technicians and engineers were Japanese. For example, Table 29 indicates that in 1943 in all industry laborers were as follows: 512,907 Koreans, 26,966 Japanese, and 9,878 other nationals, chiefly Chinese. On the other hand, there were 7,933 Japanese and only 1,859 Koreans among the 9,852 technicians and engineers in industry. A number of those classed as technicians were actually doctors serving in industrial plants.

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Of the 183,358 laborers employed in 1,239 mines in 1943, 178,881 were Koreans. Of a total of 3,468 mining engineers and technicians in 1943, 1,323 were Koreans. Available information indicates that the bulk of these 1,323 Korean mining engineers and technicians are specialists in coal or gold mining. Hence the Koreans are in a relatively better position with regard to trained personnel, both technicians and miners, to rehabilitate gold and coal mining than almost any other type of industry, with the possible exception of textiles, food processing, lumber, and ceramics. However, most of these Korean technicians are now north of the 38th parallel north latitude, where most of the mines are located.

Japanese workers included 17,231 of the total of 51,267 employed by the railways of Korea. Japanese held almost all the managerial and supervisory positions, as well as a considerable share of the more skilled operating jobs, such as shop foremen, railway engineers, and signalmen.

Part 3 of Table 30 shows the occupational distribution in business offices, shops, and other commercial enterprises, as well as in the professions. In 1943, of a total of 3,934 specialists in these fields, 2,591 were Koreans. Most of these Koreans were doctors, lawyers, or trained businessmen. Consequently, deficiencies in trained Korean personnel are not nearly so acute here as in industry, transportation, and communications. Koreans had relatively greater opportunities in law, medicine, and the smaller commercial enterprises under the Japanese regime than in industry, where the Japanese nationals were given every preference.

(4) Educational Status of the Korean Population

While in 1944 the Japanese comprised only three per cent of the population in Korea, they included fifty per cent of all those who had performed graduate work in a university. Forty-seven per cent of those whose formal education was completed by graduation from a college, normal school, or technical-training institution were Japanese; while forty-four per cent of all whose formal education ended upon graduation from a middle school were Japanese, and seventy-four per cent of those whose education included only two years of middle school were Japanese. (See Appendix I, Table 31).

Approximately ninety per cent of the 22,793,766 Koreans listed in the educational part of the census of 1944 (see Table 31) did not have any formal schooling. This same education census listed 618,103 Japanese distributed as follows: seventy-three per cent were graduates of a primary school; thirty per cent, of a middle school; and five per cent graduated from a college or a similar institution of higher learning. These statistics indicate the relative backwardness of education for Koreans, even though progress was and is being made, and they underscore the urgent need of fostering a training program which may enable Koreans gradually to fill the gaps left by the repatriation to Japan of a relatively small but highly trained segment of the population.

(5) Educational and Training Facilities in Korea

Present educational facilities, as shown in Tables 32 and 33, are entirely inadequate for Korea's urgent needs. Since the end of the war, there has been a substantial expansion in the number of schools and size of educational facilities, both in northern and southern Korea, but this expansion has been mainly in primary education and has probably not been accompanied by any improvement in the quality of instruction. Although there has been

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increased enrollment in the higher schools throughout Korea, the work in these institutions has been seriously disrupted in southern Korea during the present school year by students' strikes.

Technical and vocational education had been developed only slightly in Korea prior to Japan's defeat, and it has so far retrogressed in southern Korea since the end of the war that there is relatively little vocational or technical training being conducted at present in the American-occupied zone. The report of a vocational-education specialist (H. E. Dickerman, Principal of Broadway-Edison Technical High School in Seattle) to the Director of the Department of Education on 21 April 1947 attributes the lack of progress in this urgently needed training to: (a) lack of materials, power and fuel; (b) poor condition of equipment and lack of facilities to recondition it; (3) lack of properly prepared instructors and administrators; and (d) an attitude on the part of school officials that vocational training lessens the prestige of the school. The traditional Confucian attitude which glorifies the scholar and places the industrial or other hand-laborer and craftsman low in the social scale, is a major deterrment to the development of a corps of trained personnel urgently needed to direct the Korean economy. However, the ground-work is now being laid for a comprehensive program of vocational and technical training in southern Korea. This program is designed to include short-term, in-service training in factories, rehabilitation and extension of special vocational and technical schools, and greater emphasis upon science and technical training within the established school system.

In northern Korea, while education in general suffers from the high position of communist propaganda in the curriculum, technical education appears at least to have held its own, or even to have progressed beyond its previous state. Kim Il-Sung University in Pyongyang is reported to emphasize technical studies, and eleven in-service training schools have been opened in large factories and mines. Hundreds of Japanese technicians have been retained in northern Korea to train Korean replacements.

4. Conclusions

(1) The repatriation of almost all the 700,000 Japanese civilians from Korea removed that segment of the population which had provided most of the political and economic leadership and industrial skills during the forty years of Japanese domination.

(2) Korea has the necessary human resources, both in numbers and potential ability, to support an efficient economy. However, Koreans have been denied the opportunity for training and leadership in technical fields during past generations and are therefore seriously deficient in the skills necessary to operate their industries, mines, public utilities, transportation and communications systems.

(3) It is essential that Korea launch a large-scale, well-planned program of vocational and technical training, through in-service training in factories, in special schools, and through regular educational system, if the population is to develop the skills necessary to replace the technically-trained Japanese who have been repatriated.

(4) The Koreans are good farmers and can conduct their own agriculture, the mainstay of their economy, along traditional lines. They also have a nucleus of personnel well trained in

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almost all phases of the economy; around these the new Korea can be built. In addition to agriculture, other occupations in which Korea is relatively well equipped with trained personnel include fisheries, coal and gold mining, ceramics, lumber, food-processing, and textiles. These are facts of prime importance in any consideration of Korea's economic potential during the next five years.

B. PHYSICAL RESOURCES OF KOREA

1. Agriculture

(1) General

Korea is predominantly agricultural, with about two-thirds of the present population of over 28,000,000 engaged in farming. Of Korea's total area of approximately 50,600,000 acres or twenty-one per cent are cultivated. (For details on land utilization in Korea, see Appendix II, Tables 34 and 35). Of the cultivated area, about one-third is normally double-cropped, usually producing rice in the summer and fall, and barley, wheat, or rye in the winter and spring.

About three-fourths of Korea's total planted acreage is utilized for the production of cereals, mainly rice. Cereals comprise over eighty per cent of the caloric intake of the population. Leguminous crops, primarily soya beans, account for about fourteen per cent of the planted acreage, vegetables including potatoes for about six per cent, and non-food crops (mainly cotton and other fibers, and tobacco) about five per cent. Fruits account for somewhat less than one per cent of the planted acreage. Over ninety per cent of the gross value of Korea's agricultural production has consistently come from planted crops, about five or six per cent from livestock, and less than one per cent from sericulture. Korean farms are small, with over three million farms averaging slightly more than three acres per farm. Farm methods are primitive, by Western standards, but cultivation is intensive.

Before the increased industrialization of Korea in the late 1930's, agriculture had always accounted for substantially more than half the gross value of the national production. By 1938, however, agriculture accounted for only 45.8 per cent of the gross value of Korea's total national production, which was valued in that year at slightly over ¥3,000,000,000. In that same year, industry accounted for 37.4 per cent of the gross value of national production, mining for 5.4 per cent, forestry for 5.4 per cent, and fisheries for 6.0 per cent. This trend continued during the war years, with the result that the gross value of industrial production exceeded that of agriculture during the years 1941 to 1945.

Rice is the principal agricultural product, and it has consistently represented more than half the total value of agricultural production. (For details on planted acreage and production of principal crops in Korea, see Appendix II, Tables 36 and 37). During the 1930's, rice production in Korea averaged about 100,000,000 bushels annually. More than forty per cent of Korea's rice production was exported to Japan, and rice usually accounted for about one-third of the total value of Korea's exports during the period of Japanese control of the peninsula.

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(2) Background to the Present Food Situation in Korea

In order to evaluate the possibilities of Korea's again becoming a large exporter of rice, it is essential to understand the reasons behind the former export of a substantial part of the rice crop. Korea's whole agricultural development was geared to enable Japan to ship maximum quantities of Korean rice to Japan. Partly to facilitate collection of rice for export to Japan, the Japanese employed practices which resulted in an increase in farm tenancy from less than forty per cent in 1910 to about seventy-five per cent in 1945. Japanese and Korean landlords usually collected their rentals in rice, which averaged about sixty per cent of the crop. Although the Koreans preferred rice to other grains, their per capita rice consumption thus declined steadily, according to information compiled from official Japanese statistics.

Table 2

PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF RICE IN KOREA, 1915 to 1945

Annual Average	Amount in bushels	Index
1915-1919	3.62	100
1920-1924	3.27	90
1925-1929	2.62	72
1930-1933	2.30	63
1934-1938	2.03	56
1939-1945	2.02	56

Since the comparatively rapid increase in the Korean population was not accompanied by a comparable increase in food production, the heavy exports of rice to Japan were made increasingly at the expense of the dietary standards of the Korean people. Increasing imports of millet and soya beans from Manchuria after Japan seized that part of China in 1931, partially but not entirely made up for this deficiency. Under-consumption became chronic; and millions of farm families annually went through a period of "spring hunger" in the months of April through June when the summer harvests made food available.

With the continued rapid increase in population, together with a decline in production during the war years because of a shortage of commercial fertilizers, the amount of rice available for export to Japan declined. Average exports of rice from Korea for the years 1940 to 1944 were less than 500,000 metric tons, only about one-half the average of the 1930's, while volume of imports of foodstuffs from Manchuria substantially increased.

After the end of the war, the influx of over two million Koreans from Japan, China, and northern Korea into southern Korea, coupled with an almost total absence of commercial fertilizers in southern Korea for 1946 crops and disastrous floods in the summer of 1946, resulted both in a decline of planted acreage and of production. The decline in planted acreage has resulted largely from the farmers' reluctance to double-crop soils which are already depleted because of lack of fertilizer. This decline in planted acreage is accounted for almost entirely by the reduction in the planted acreage of winter and spring crops, since the farmer prefers to conserve his land for rice, his best money crop. To illustrate this trend in production, the following table in which the average planted acreage and production in southern Korea for the years 1935 to 1939 equals 100 shows comparable index figures for the years 1940 to 1944, 1945, and 1946.

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Table 3

PLANTED ACREAGE AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, SOUTH KOREA, 1940-1944, 1945, 1946

Item	1940-1944	1945	1946
Planted acreage	97	86	79
Production, grains & pulses ..	94	74	71

This decline in production and the rapid increase in population in southern Korea have resulted in a serious food shortage. To meet this situation, 329,000 metric tons of cereals were imported by the United States Government between May 1946 and 30 April 1947, and more will be imported in the months to come. In the past, about thirty-six per cent of the population and thirty-six per cent of the food production of Korea was located north of the 38th parallel. However, post-war population movements, plus the availability of more commercial fertilizer in northern Korea (where almost all of Korea's large chemical plants are located), has resulted in a change in this traditional ratio of population to food production. At present only about thirty per cent of Korea's population is north of the 38th parallel, while northern Korea's food production is estimated to be between thirty-six and thirty-eight per cent of the total for Korea. However, the food shortage in northern Korea is currently more acute than in southern Korea, principally because of the different policy toward the food problem adopted by the Soviets. Taken as a whole, Korea is now a food-deficit area, and will probably remain so for at least two more years.

(3) Prospects for Korea's Again Becoming a Food-Surplus Area

To enable Korea to stand on its own feet economically, and to balance its foreign trade, it is essential that Korea not only be self-sufficient in cereals, but that the peninsula again become an exporter of cereals and other foodstuffs. Attainment of such a goal is not only possible, but is very probable, if and when adequate quantities of commercial fertilizer again become available throughout Korea.

The basic cause for the gradual decline in agricultural production of about thirty per cent during the past ten years has been a growing shortage of commercial fertilizers. A comparison of agricultural productivity in Korea, Japan, and the United States, indicates that while the average rice yield per acre in Korea and the United States is approximately the same, the rice yield in Japan is over fifty per cent higher than in either. The Japanese traditionally have used larger amounts of commercial fertilizers than have the Koreans; and widespread experimentation and observation indicates that this is a major factor in the superiority of Japanese yields over Korean yields, areas in which similar intensive cultivation is practiced. A comparison of yields of barley and wheat, the other two most important cereals in Korea and Japan, is even more unfavorable to Korea. Traditionally Koreans have used relatively more commercial fertilizers on rice than on other crops, and this fact is believed to explain in large part this even greater difference in the average yield of barley and wheat in the two countries.

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Table 4

COMPARISON OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY IN KOREA, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.
(annual average yield per acre in bushels)

RICE *	1930-35	1936-37	1937-38	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41
Korea	38.2	45.0	60.7	54.0	43.2	48.7
Japan	70.4	77.9	76.5	75.9	80.2	71.2
U.S.A.	47.1	50.8	49.1	48.8	51.7	50.9

* Years beginning 1 August.

BARLEY	1925-29	1930-34	1939	1940
Korea	17.1	18.3	20.6	20.2
Japan	37.2	37.0	43.6	42.4
U.S.A.	23.3	20.1	21.7	23.0

WHEAT	1925-29	1930-34	1939	1940
Korea	10.5	11.2	14.3	11.9
Japan	26.5	27.1	33.4	32.1
U.S.A.	14.1	13.5	14.1	15.3

Source: K. S. Yum, "Problems in Agriculture in Post-War Korea," Korean Research Bulletin, May 1945. Figures are based on Agricultural Statistics, 1942.

Careful studies by the Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK, demonstrate clearly that Korea's present agricultural production can be increased very substantially by greatly increased utilization of commercial fertilizers, expansion of irrigated areas, and improved cultural methods and insect and plant-disease control. Such programs are now being put into effect. Present plans call for the importation and application of more commercial fertilizers on the farms of southern Korea during the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1947 than in any single previous year, with continued increases in succeeding years. Efforts are being made to secure nitrogen and phosphate fertilizer plants for Korea as reparations from Japan. An outline of estimated present production capacity for commercial fertilizers, plus plans for future expansion of fertilizer production in Korea, are outlined in Appendix II, Table 40. Since almost all of Korea's large commercial fertilizer production facilities are located north of the 38th parallel, unification of Korea is essential for activization of this program. The Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK, has launched a large-scale, three-year irrigation program which is designed to increase the annual production of rice in southern Korea by over 500,000 suk of brown rice. A similar five-year program for all Korea, which would increase the annual yield of brown rice over 1,000,000 suk, has been outlined by the Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK. (See Appendix II, Table 39).

As shown in Tables 41 and 42 of Appendix II, under unusually favorable conditions it is possible to produce enough foodstuffs in Korea by 1951 to make available for human consumption 25,941 billion calories. To feed the estimated 30,000,000 people in Korea in 1951 an average of 2,200 calories per person per day (for the past ten years the average caloric intake was 1950 to 2150), this higher intake would require 24,090 billion calories. This leaves a surplus of 1,851 billion calories, which is equal to 520,000 metric tons of rice or equivalent grains. Granting that production estimates may be optimistic, and that the program for increased use of commerical fertilizer will fall short of expectations, nevertheless it is felt that these figures provide a sound basis for estimating

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that at least 250,000 to 300,000 metric tons of rice-equivalent grains may be available for export from Korea by 1951.

(4) Livestock

The number of domestic farm animals in Korea is relatively small; livestock accounted for only six per cent of the gross value of Korea's agricultural production in 1938 as compared to 47.8 per cent in the United States for the same year. The number of livestock in Korea has declined sharply in recent years, as shown in Appendix II, Table 43. In 1946 there was only about one cow to every three farm families. The average number of other livestock per farm unit in 1946 averaged about as follows: horses, one in 60 farms; pigs, one in 8 farms; sheep, one in 225 farms; poultry, one per farm. There is no significant regional concentration of animal husbandry in Korea. Shortage of animal feeds and lack of land to cultivate them will continue to prevent animal husbandry from becoming an important factor in the Korean economy. During the 1930's, Korea shipped cattle and hides to Japan, but the present shortage of both leather and meat is likely to preclude any significant exports of either commodity during the next few years.

2. Forestry

At the present time, more than two-thirds of the total area classified as forest land is thinly or poorly stocked or actually denuded. As a result of Japan's constantly growing war requirements after the seizure of Manchuria in 1931, the forestry conservation program which had made great strides in Korea between 1910 and 1931 was modified. Increasingly heavy cuts were made to supply timber for various war uses until in 1944, the last year for which data is available, the Japanese were overcutting more than 130 per cent of normal allowable production.

After the end of the war, thousands of Koreans south of the 38th parallel reverted to practices common in the past of unregulated cutting and exploitation of forestry resources. The main causes are: (a) shortages of coal, firewood, charcoal, and lumber, most of which came from north of the 38th parallel in normal times; (b) lack of sufficient transportation facilities for efficient distrubution of available supplies of coal, firewood, charcoal, and lumber; (c) lack of effective enforcement of forestry laws; and (d) high prices of coal and firewood. Korea's past record of unregulated cutting, Japan's war-time cutting of timber resources, plus the post-war surge of hill-stripping has left Korea's forestry resources at an all-time low. Table 5 shows the relationship between Korea's forestry needs and resources.

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Table 5

REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY, LUMBER PRODUCTS IN KOREA, 1946
(in board feet)

Item	South of 38°	North of 38°	ALL KOREA
Charcoal	212,650,000	136,187,200	348,837,200
Firewood	1,028,000,000	1,072,000,000	2,100,000,000
Logs	303,864,300	350,479,900	654,344,200
TOTAL	1,544,514,300	1,558,667,100	3,103,181,400
Allowable Cut in 1946:			
Charcoal	120,000,000	200,000,000	320,000,000
Firewood	540,000,000	970,000,000	1,510,000,000
Logs	43,000,000	557,000,000	600,000,000
TOTAL	703,000,000	1,727,000,000	2,430,000,000

	Charcoal	Firewood	Logs	TOTAL
Southern Korea can produce percentage of her needs:	57%	53%	14%	45%
Northern Korea can produce percentage of her needs:	147%	90%	159%	111%
ALL KOREA can produce percentage of her needs:	91%	72%	92%	78%

About 90,000,000 trees were planted in southern Korea in 1946; and it is expected that 130,000,000 will be planted in 1947. A ten-year planting program calling for the setting out of 550,000,000 trees each year is planned for the decade beginning 1948; but it will be years before Korea's needs can be met from this source. Since 1942, population expansion and the need for food have resulted in the burning and clearing of 117,113 acres for "fire-field" farming in southern Korea and of 1,082,751 acres in the north.

Of the nearly 16,000,000 acres of forest land in southern Korea, only six per cent is stocked with trees over sixty years old. The balance is either denuded or stocked with trees too young to yield high-class wood material. Even this immature material, however, is being cut at the present time to meet the needs of the Koreans and of the American occupation personnel.

If the planting and erosion-control program becomes a reality, further destruction and damage to forest and farm lands can be prevented. By 1951, however, the needs of southern Korea cannot be met. This means imports of wood products must be available not only in 1951, but for many years thereafter.

3. Fisheries

The Korean peninsula, with its 10,000 miles of coastline and innumerable islands, is very favorably situated for the development of the fishing industry. About one-half million people are engaged in fishing, and the average annual catch for the years 1936 through 1938 was 1,847,700 metric tons. However, the greater part of this catch was in sardines, which moved from their former schooling areas off the east coast of Korea in 1939 and are, therefore, no longer available to Korean fishermen.

Other factors hampering the Korean fishing industry at present include a shortage of equipment and boats, since the Japanese commandeered most of the larger fishing craft from Korean waters

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for war purposes. However, with the rehabilitation of the fishing industry, it should be possible by 1951 to restore the annual catch to the 1941-1943 level of an average of about one million tons of marine products. Based on past and present production statistics, this estimated 1,000,000 tons catch in 1951 would include about 800,000 tons of fresh fish, 30,000 tons of shell fish, 70,000 tons of seaweed, and 100,000 tons of whale, seal and miscellaneous products. In 1946 the total catch in southern Korea was 295,711 metric tons. At present there are approximately 35,840 sailing vessels, with a total tonnage of 109,910 or an average of about three tons per boat. There are 2,281 power boats with a tonnage of 28,050 or thirteen tons per craft. The gear at present is in very bad condition and production is very materially affected by lack of equipment.

Of the forty-four canneries in Korea, only a few are now processing marine products because of a lack of equipment and lack of tin for canning purposes. These canneries have an estimated capacity of 16,000,000 cans per year. Of the fifty agar-agar factories, only a few are now operating; these accounted for only 80 tons of production in 1946. There are thirty-four ice and cold storage plants, many of which have antiquated equipment. To rehabilitate the industry, existing net, rope, and tackle manufacturing establishments would have to be reopened and necessary raw materials made available. Domestic production of fishery supplies was limited in 1946 to forty tons of fishing net and fifty tons of twisted thread. Rehabilitation of the fishing industry will not only increase the availability of needed proteins and fats for the Korean diet, but it will also provide an important source of foreign exchange.

4. Minerals

(1) General

Korea's mineral resources were of vital importance to Japan during the war; and their exploitation in many cases was carried well beyond economic limits. Marginal ores were mined with the encouragement of subsidies, and total production assumed proportions far greater than would be possible except under conditions of war-time necessity. The value of minerals mined in Korea increased from $12,389,207 in 1933 to $43,185,000 in 1937, and to $94,600,000 in 1941, an increase of over 700 per cent in eight years. As is illustrated in Table 6, mineral production in Korea reached its peak in 1944. Korea has a relative abundance of iron ore, graphite, magnesite, fluorspar, silica, tungsten, gold, silver, copper, and anthracite coal, but deposits are in general of low grade.

(2) Coal

From 1934 to 1944, production of anthracite coal increased four and one-half times, reaching a peak in 1944 of 4,530,263 metric tons. Although of low quality, Korea's anthracite coal is suitable for industrial and home uses, industrial use being contingent on imports of pitch. Over the five-year period 1936 to 1940, Korea's anthracite mines, most of which are north of the 38th parallel, exported to Japan an average of 1,000,000 metric tons per year. In 1940, these exports totalled 1,423,802 metric tons valued at ¥ 24,577,613.

In 1946, monthly production of anthracite in southern Korea averaged 25,000 metric tons, far short of minimum requirements of the southern zone. Production of anthracite in northern Korea in 1946 was reported to be 830,000 metric tons. Potentially, Korea

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Table 6

PRODUCTION OF MINERALS IN KOREA
(1934, 1936, 1940, 1944, and 1951 estimate)

Mineral	Unit	1934	1936	1940	1944	1951 estimate
Anthracite Coal	MT	982,370	1,051,853	3,153,175	4,530,263	2,500,000
Bituminous Coal	"	none	none	none	none	none
Lignite Coal	"	706,279	1,230,140	2,587,766	2,518,513	2,000,000
Graphite	"	28,862	35,065	73,161	74,879	50,000
Copper	"	1,434	3,627	12,944	5,193	10,000
Tungsten	"	368	1,707	4,525	8,402	6,000
Zinc Ore	"	2,882 2/	2,455 2/	9,028 2/	20,113 2/	10,000
Silica Sand	"	72,279	50,955	173,160	3/	100,000
Iron Ore	"	176,008	234,400	453,718	3,300,402	2,000,000
Lead	"	1,806	2,740	13,045	21,200	6,000
Silver	KG	31,287	58,820	113,885	3/	60,000
Fluorite	MT	12,099	8,740	27,046	75,227	30,000
Gold	KG	12,427	17,489	26,464	6,342	15,000
Alunite	MT	56,330	114,569	37,479	18,951	80,000
Barite	"	5,935	5,113	17,604	5,690	8,000
Kaoline	"	23,421	24,712	48,287	3/	50,000
Pyrophylite	"	9,614	11,645	60,227	50,226	50,000
Limestone	"	3/	3/	3/	384,847	350,000
Magnesite	"	3,136	14,258	73,546	157,745	150,000
Pyrite	"	40,024	78,036	209,791	246,003	240,000
Mica	"	102	70	80	422	100
Molybdenite	"	103 1/	79 1/	190 2/	760	200
Manganese	"	3/	3/	681	33,584	5,000

Source: Bureau of Mining, Department of Commerce, USAMGIK.

1/ Ore
2/ Metal
3/ Figures not available

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should be able to achieve an exportable surplus of anthracite in 1951 of 1,000,000 metric tons provided necessary mining machinery and equipment can be procured.

Korea has no bituminous-coal deposits. In 1940, imports of bituminous coal totalled more than 2,250,000 metric tons. To meet the needs of the railroads and industry in 1951, it is estimated that Korea will need to import about 2,000,000 metric tons.

Lignite-coal deposits, most of which are in northern Korea, are considerable. Production rose three and one-half times from 1934 to 1944, reaching a peak of 2,518,513 metric tons. The quality of this coal is generally poor. Production in northern Korea in 1946 was estimated to be 433,000 metric tons. By 1951, a level of production to 2,000,000 metric tons could be achieved.

Korea is probably better supplied with experienced technicians and miners in the coal industry than in most others. Therefore rehabilitation of this industry should be relatively rapid, if necessary equipment is secured.

(3) Gold

Korea has been one of the leading producers of gold in the Far East; and Korean gold was utilized by Japan as an important source of foreign exchange in the past. Production reached a peak of over twenty-six metric tons in 1940, when heavy subsidies were paid to encourage gold production. Gold should become an important source of foreign exchange for Korea. Since Korea is relatively well supplied with native gold-mining engineers and technicians, lack of qualified personnel should not be as important a limiting factor in this field as in most other phases of industry and mining.

(4) Iron Ore

The production of iron ore increased from an average of 550,000 tons in the years 1934-1936 to a peak of 3,300,402 metric tons in 1944. Expansion of iron-ore production resulted mainly from the discovery and exploitation of the Musan iron mine in northeastern Korea. Although containing only low-grade ore of about thirty-five per cent iron content, this mine is probably the largest iron deposit in the Far East. Its reserves are estimated to be about 1,200,000,000 tons of magnetite ore.

War-time iron and steel capacity was estimated at about 850,000 to 900,000 tons of pig iron, and 350,000 to 400,000 tons of steel. Korea should be able to export significant quantities of iron ore and pig iron in the future.

(5) Lead

Production of lead increased steadily in the decade 1934 to 1944, reaching a peak of 21,200 metric tons in 1944. However, imports have exceeded exports consistently, with a deficit averaging approximately 2,000 metric tons over a six-year period preceding 1940. With the reduced demand for lead in the post-war period, Korea should have a surplus of lead for export.

(6) Graphite

Korea is among the largest graphite producers in the world, and 103,000 metric tons were produced in 1944, including 75,000

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of amorphous graphite and 28,000 of crystalline graphite. In 1940 a total of 80,000 metric tons valued at ¥ 6,000,744 was exported.

Annual production could again reach 1944 levels by 1951, with little difficulty, at an estimated investment of ten to fifteen per cent of the total value of produced graphite. An important factor in limiting exports of graphite, however, is that its large unit volume and comparatively low cost per unit make it difficult to export with profit to distant markets.

(7) Copper

The quality of copper ore in Korea is generally poor, the metal concentrate averaging about 1.5 per cent. Most of the large copper mines are located in northern Korea. Production of copper metal reached its peak in 1940 with 12,944 metric tons. Until 1940, however, imports of refined copper exceeded exports. Korea has exported copper ore to Japan consistently, and these exports reached their peak in 1940 with 9,750 metric tons of copper ore valued at ¥ 68,662,412.

The copper-mining program of Korea in the past has always been an adjunct to the gold-mining program. By far the larger portion of mining overhead was met from the sale of gold found in the copper ores, averaging approximately ten grams of gold per ton of copper ore.

During 1946, in the American-occupied zone of Korea, a total of 2,000 tons of copper ore was produced. Minimum requirements in 1947 for southern Korea alone are estimated to total 6,000 metric tons of pure copper, the bulk of which will be required for the rehabilitation of electrical utilities.

Copper-mill concentrate production, averaging around ten per cent metallic copper, should reach 10,000 metric tons by 1951. The production could be financed from the proceeds of sales of the gold found as a by-product of copper ore. Imports of pure copper must be anticipated for a number of years.

(8) Tungsten

Production of tungsten increased twenty-two fold in the eleven-year period from 1934 to 1944, reaching a peack of 8,402 metric tons of pure tungsten in 1944. Installed refinery capacity is sufficient to absorb mineral production at this peak. About 400 tons of sixty per-cent tungsten (WO_3) was mined in southern Korea in 1946. By 1951 it should be possible to have a production of about 4,000 tons of tungsten (WO_3) annually. To reach this level of production, however, it must be anticipated that at least thirty to forty per cent of the foreign exchange realized from one year's production will have to be set aside to rehabilitate the tungsten mining industry.

(9) Zinc

Before the end of the war, Korea exported part of its zinc ore to Japan and imported pure zinc from Japan. Installed smelter capacity for zinc is approximately 36,000 metric tons of ore annually, or approximately fifty per cent of installed mining capacity.

Korea should be able to meet its domestic requirements, estimated at 6,000 metric tons of pure zinc, by 1951 and achieve a surplus of 4,000 metric tons of zinc ore for export. It is

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estimated that thirty per cent of the foreign exchange realized from one year's production would be required for the rehabilitation of the zinc mining industry.

(10) Silica Sand

Korea has been a consistent exporter of silica sand; her exports have averaged approximately ¥ 600,000 annually over the period from 1934 to 1940. Production could reach 200,000 metric tons by 1951, of which 190,000 metric tons can be anticipated to be surplus for export. To realize a production level of 200,000 metric tons, it is estimated that ten per cent of the value of one year's production must be diverted into buying necessary mining equipment required for the rehabilitation of the industry.

C. INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF KOREA

1. Pre-War Establishment

By 1938 the gross value of Korean manufactures had reached a level where it compared favorably with that of the country's agricultural production: 37.4 per cent to 45.8 per cent of the total national product. Once Japanese economic policy towards Korea had changed, early in the decade, no pains or money were spared to convert it from a granary and source of raw materials to an important industrial producer in its own right. While factories were small, they were very numerous and employed more than 182,000 workers.

Table 7

NUMBER OF FACTORIES AND WORKERS, BY PRODUCT, KOREA, 1938

Type of Factory	Number of Factories	% of Total Factories	Number of Workers Employed	% of Total Workers
Textiles	608	8.7	41,114	22.5
Metal working	295	4.3	9,486	5.2
Machinery & tools ..	613	8.7	17,058	9.3
Ceramics	342	4.9	9,107	5.0
Chemicals	1,618	23.3	47,059	25.7
Lumber & woodworking	360	5.2	6,689	3.7
Printing & binding .	313	4.5	6,608	3.6
Food processing	2,348	33.8	37,929	20.8
Gas & Electricity ..	34	0.5	358	0.2
Miscellaneous	422	6.1	7,363	4.0
TOTALS	6,953	100.0	182,771	100.0

Source: Henning, "Preliminary Economic Survey of Korea, 1943."

The factories listed above are only those normally employing five or more workers. Cottage industry has always been important in Korea, and in 1938 one-quarter of the yen value of manufactures derived from this source. The relative importance of household production in woodworking, ceramics, and foodstuffs is indicated in the following table.

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Table 8

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, FACTORY AND HOUSEHOLD, KOREA, 1938

Industry	Values in millions of Yen			Percentage of Total Production
	Factory	Household	Total	
Textiles	129	36	165	14.5
Metal working	88	4	92	8.1
Machinery & tools	23	4	27	2.3
Ceramics	32	4	35 1/	3.1
Chemicals	320	33	353	30.9
Lumber & woodworking .	7	8	15	1.3
Printing & binding ...	17	--	17	1.5
Foodstuffs	144	133	277	24.3
Gas & Electricity	25	--	25	2.2
Miscellaneous	74	60	134	11.8
TOTALS	858	282	1,040	100.0

Source: Henning, op. cit. 1/ This error in addition appears in the published statistics.

During the decade of the 1930's, the relative importance of food processing, which in 1932 had accounted for 64 per cent of all manufactures, declined in favor of production of chemicals, textiles and metals. Moreover, it should be noted that nearly as much food processing was accomplished by household industry as by factories. As Japan's war effort increased, the value of Korea's industrial output more than doubled. By 1941 it was estimated to have reached ¥ 2,340,000,000; of course this figure represents a greatly augmented cost of production, but the absolute increase in product amounted to at least 50 per cent above the 1932-1936 average.

It has been pointed out many times that while about two-thirds of the foodstuffs in Korea are produced south of the 38° N. Latitude, the country's important industrial production is north of this line. While North Korea is much less populous than the southern sector, by far the greater part of the country's mineral resources and hydroelectric power are concentrated there. As an example of what the Japanese accomplished, it is not amiss to cite the 1937 production of the great industrial and chemical development at Hungnam in South Hamgyong Province, chiefly controlled by the Noguchi interests. This output would be considered imposing in any occidental industrial development. (See p. 22).

The ammonium sulphate plant, whose production is given on the next page in Table 9, was the largest in the Japanese Empire, and its owners claimed it to be the second largest in the world. In any event, its product was of crucial importance to Japanese and Korean agriculture. Other artificial fertilizer plants were stated to have an additional capacity of 60,000 tons of superphosphate of lime, and 30,000 tons of heavy superphosphate.

Non-mineral oil production was an important industry of pre-war Korea. Sardine oil produced in 1940 was estimated at 145,800 tons, rendered principally in small plants lining the eastern coast. Oil hardening was extensively practiced in order to provide soap, glycerine and wax. Total production of hardened oils in 1937 has been given as 43,479 metric tons. Unofficial estimates raised this total in 1940 to 90,000 tons. Cotton-seed oil

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as well was produced at Pusan in a plant having an annual capacity of 10,000 tons. Soya-bean, rice-bran, flaxseed, and castor oils were produced in somewhat lesser quantities.

Potash derived from alunite deposits reached 17,000 tons (K_2O content) in 1937. The entire output was exported to Japan. Cement capacity was estimated at more than 1,500,000 tons; coal shortage, however, prevented attaining this maximum and will continue to hamper production.

Table 9

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, SELECTED ITEMS, HUNGNAM, 1937
(in metric tons)

Item	Quantities	Item	Quantities
Superphosphate	50,000	Nitric acid	10,000
Ammonium phosphate	120,000	Sulphuric acid	450,000
Ammophoska	30,000	Carbide	60,000
Ammonium sulphate	450,000	Copper	300
Cyanamide	50,000	Aluminum	4,000
Caustic soda	15,000	Hardened fish oils	40,000
Liquid chlorine	1,000	Glycerine	2,500
Gold	2.5	Fatty acid	20,000
Silver	25	Soap	20,000
Dynamite	3,000	Oleomargarine	400
Ammonium nitrate	1,000	Magnesium metal	2,000
Black powder	15,000	Ammonium chloride	20,000
Hydrochloric acid	15,000	Sodium fluosilicate	100

Source: Henning, op. cit.

War forced the development of coal liquefaction to provide substitutes for natural petroleum, but because of coal shortage this industry may have little importance in Korea's peace-time economy. A refinery at Wonsan, using natural petroleum, however, was capable of producing 5,000 barrels of crude oil per day and of cracking 1,250 barrels. Established in 1935, it was later expanded to produce lubricating oils as well. This refinery, given adequate technical direction, may eventually play an important role in meeting the peninsula's petroleum needs, possibly with crude oil imported from the Netherlands Indies.

Pulp and paper manufacture in Korea antedates war-time expansion, having been undertaken as early as 1919. In 1936 production of wrapping paper at Sinuiju, in North Pyongan Province near the Manchurian border, was 16,300 metric tons, and of pulp, 17,550 metric tons; nearly all the pulp was exported to Japan. Pulp exports in succeeding years averaged about 25,000 tons. Another Mitsui establishment at Kilchu, in North Hamgyong Province, converted in 1938 to rayon pulp manufacture, was stated to have a capacity of 30,000 tons annually. Other smaller plants brought the pre-war pulp capacity to a total of approximately 63,000 tons per annum.

The textile industry ranked with the chemical and food-processing industries as the most important in Korea. Workers employed made up to 22.5 per cent of all factory workers in the peninsula, and income was 14.5 per cent of the total industrial product. Mills, located principally in the south, were concentrated at Seoul,

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Inchon, and Kwangju. In 1938, 213,112 spindles were operative, as well as 7,803 looms, and plans had been laid to construct many more.

Table 10

PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF TEXTILES, KOREA, 1936
(in thousands of square yards)

Textile	Production	Consumption
Cotton	137,293	282,294
Hemp and ramie	15,850	22,169
Silk	8,018	17,788
Rayon	13,124	89,247
Wool	2,000	8,816
TOTALS	174,287	420,314

Source: Annual Review of Commerce and Industry, 1936, quoted by Henning.

It will be observed that in spite of its relative importance, the Korean textile industry could produce only 41.4 per cent of the local requirement. Peninsular industry was especially deficient in cotton and wool capacity.

Various other industries, producing particularly consumer goods, were concentrated in South Korea. The importance of individual plants was less great than in the north, but collectively they produced a greater variety and quantity of goods for domestic consumption. Some of these smaller plants produced electric bulbs, rubber goods, rope, pottery, matches, foodstuffs, alcoholic beverages, lumber and woodworking products, cork, brick, glassware and printed matter. In the aggregate, it has been estimated that seventy-five per cent of the national industrial product, by value, was produced north of the 38th parallel, while sixty-five per cent of the agricultural production lay in the south.

2. Present Status of Industrial Establishment

(1) North Korea

All major industries in North Korea are now under direct government control, and Korean managers are appointed by the Bureau of Industries of the Interim People's Committee. Although this Bureau is nominally headed by a Korean engineer educated in Japan, it executes the orders of the Russian head of the Industrial Section of the Civil Administration.

Post-war revival of industry in the north, as in the south, has been seriously handicapped by a shortage of trained personnel. However, many Japanese engineers and technicians remain in North Korea and have been used extensively in an effort to restore production and train Korean replacements. These Japanese have been granted special rations and other privileges to insure their collaboration.

Recovery has been hampered by Russian removal of raw materials stockpiles and equipment. Although these removals have been limited as to quantity and selective in nature, they have adversely affected production as well as maintenance and repair. In general they have been confined to machine tools, electrical equipment and certain other items especially needed elsewhere by the Russians.

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Average industrial production is reported to be at ten to twenty per cent of capacity. While some plants are operating above this rate, others are entirely closed down.

Information filtering south of the 38th parallel is too scanty to permit a detailed estimate of the extent to which the war and Russian occupation have reduced North Korea industrial potential, but it appears that electric generating capacity may have suffered considerably and that the war industries have been largely dismantled, while other industrial facilities have suffered relatively little.

(2) South Korea

Unlike the Russians, the American occupation force in South Korea repatriated Japanese industrial personnel, but did not remove stockpiles of raw materials which had been accumulated for war purposes. Although the potential benefits of these stockpiles have been incompletely realized owing to a lack of adequate supervision over their use, it is nevertheless true that as of November, 1946, 5,249 plants employing 122,159 workers were in operation, In addition, twenty government-owned plants employing 10,901 workers were operative.

Although the Military Government was able to reopen many plants, industrial production has been hampered by subsequent exhaustion of raw materials, and by various other factors which have operated from the beginning. Equipment in general is badly worn and in need of repair. Buildings and other industrial properties are neglected and physical working conditions are bad. Equipment is largely of Japanese origin and replacement parts in many cases can no longer be obtained. American supervisors and technicians are lacking, and experienced Korean industrial personnel are totally inadequate to replace Japanese repatriates. Moreover, the division of Korea has made it impossible to secure many raw materials without which production is severely criticized.

General economic conditions also have tended to discourage industrial production. There have been basic uncertainties as to the future ownership of vested properties, and an occasional understandable reluctance on the part of managers to undertake prematurely capital improvements in plants they may one day hope to purchase. Inflation has tended to withdraw many materials from production and cause them to be held for speculative purposes. Finished goods as well have been subject to hoarding, which has intensified the already acute shortages.

The present rate of factory production in South Korea is at approximately twenty per cent of capacity. Of the total output of manufactures, about one-third derives from cottage industry. It is not now possible to give precise, over-all industrial statistics since no complete survey of South Korean industry has been undertaken since the liberation.

In the absence of such a survey, which is critically needed, one must fall back upon the generally excellent "Industrial Labor Force and Wage Survey for South Korea, November, 1946," recently completed by the Census Division, Office of Administration, USAMGIK. At the time of survey, it has been discovered, 5,249 plants and engineering concerns were in operation, employing 122,159 workers. Statistically this represents a decline from 1944 of 43,7 per cent in plants operating, and of 59.4 per cent in workers employed. Actually, the figures may veil considerable hidden unemployment, owing to the traditional oreintal reluctance to discharge employees for purely economic reasons.

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Table 11

INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS OPERATING IN SOUTH KOREA,
BY PRODUCTS, November 1946

Product	Number of Factories	% of Factories Operating	Number of Workers Employed	% of Workers Employed
Metallic 1/	499	9.5	8,966	7.3
Machines & tools ...	878	16.6	17,394	14.2
Chemicals	574	10.9	19,171	15.7
Electric, Gas, Water	78	1.5	2,711	2.2
Ceramics & cement ..	731	13.9	9,693	7.9
Textiles	615	11.7	36,269	29.8
Lumber & woodworking	584	11.1	6,502	5.3
Food processing	726	13.8	8,383	6.9
Printing & binding .	233	4.4	4,540	3.7
Engr. & construction	175	3.3	5,598	4.6
Others	156	3.3	2,932	2.4
TOTALS	5,249	100.0	122,159	100.0

Source: "Industrial Labor Force and Wage Survey for South Korea, November 1946."

1/ Metallic includes smelting, refining, casting, forging, plating and metallic finished products such as chains, springs, nails, utensils.

Machines & tools include motors, electric machines and tools; chemical, textile and farm machinery; railway equipment.

Textiles include thread-making, spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing and finishing.

Chemicals include medical and industrial chemicals; dyes, paints, oils, rubber goods, paper, fertilizer, leather.

Lumber and woodworking includ finished wood furniture, boxes, woodpipes.

Other industires include leather shoes, rope products, lacquer ware, straw products.

In addition to the commercial establishments listed in the above table, the following monopoly and government-owned plants producing exclusively for government use, were in operation: (See Table 12, p. 26).

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Table 12

MONOPOLY AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED PLANTS IN OPERATION, SOUTH KOREA, November 1946

Product	Number of Plants	Number of Workers
Railway rolling stock (new)	1	1,632
Railway rolling stock (repairs)	1	3,244
Measures & scales	4	154
Salt	2	2,280
Ginseng	1	25
Cigarettes	4	3,070
Tobacco drying	1	11
Cigarette paper	1	111
Police uniforms	1	155
Construction	4	219
TOTALS	20	10,901

Source: "Industrial Labor Force and Wage Survey for South Korea, November 1946."

It is instructive to observe how this industrial population of more than 120,000 workers, excluding those employed in government plants, was distributed according to size of industrial enterprise. To be sure, there is nothing surprising in the fact that 91.4 per cent of the plants hire fewer than fifty employees; it may be more revealing, however, to learn that nearly three-quarters of all plants operating engage fewer than twenty workers, and so hardly exceed the scope of cottage industry. The over-all average number of employees per industrial establishment is twenty-three, as compared with thirty-two in 1944.

Table 13

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS BY NUMBER OF WORKERS, SOUTH KOREA, November 1946

Number of Workers	Number of Firms	Cumulative % of Total	Number of Workers	Number of Firms	Cumulative % of Total
1-4 1/	385	7.3	350-399	5	99.5
5-9	2,116	47.6	400-449	1	99.5
10-14	917	65.1	450-499	4	99.6
15-19	485	74.4	500-599	5	99.7
20-24	297	80.0	600-699	2	99.7
25-49	595	91.4	700-799	1	99.7
50-74	186	94.9	800-899	1	99.8
75-99	87	96.6	900-999	1	99.8
100-149	68	97.8	1000-1249	3	99.9
150-199	40	98.6	1250-1499	5	99.9
200-249	20	99.0	1500-1999	1	99.9
300-349	7	99.4	2000 and over	1	100.0
TOTALS				5,249	100.0

Source: "Industrial Labor Force and Wage Survey for South Korea, November 1946."

1/ Including only firms which normally would employ more than five workers.

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3. The Outlook for Korean Industry

Considering the enormous number of indeterminate factors, it would be foolhardy to attempt at this time to forecast in detail the nature and volume of Korean industry within a period of several years after unification of the country. Any considerable industrial output depends primarily upon the hydroelectric power and manufacturing facilities of the north, and our knowledge of the present status of these installations is too fragmentary to permit anything more than a guess as to their future operation. Moreover, it has been established in Part II-A of this study that the human resources of Korea are seriously deficient in the training necessary to support an extensive modern industry, even assuming that facilities were in pre-war condition and that raw materials were plentiful.

It is not improbable that given adequate industrial training programs and foreign assistance, Korea could restore production within five or ten years after unification to a level approximating that of 1934-1938. A single generation, however, is scarcely enough to inculcate in the population all those skills upon which the functioning of an industrial society depends. Those few Koreans who are at present fitted to occupy the highest managerial and engineering posts, will for many years have to be supplemented by foreign technicians.

For the purposes of this study, which is fairly short-range in its scope, it must be presumed that no considerable industrial revival will be feasible within the period under consideration. The country's human and material resources will be taxed to the limit for at least five years to maintain essential communications services and agricultural production, and to manufacture basic consumer goods. Gradually, as the country's economy is stabilized and technical proficiency is increased, it should be possible for Koreans to exploit more fully the peninsula's natural resources, using such Japanese-built facilities as remain and are adaptable to prevailing needs, or constructing new plants as these are required.

It should not be overlooked that much of the industrial plant constructed by the Japanese is already lost. War-time attrition and peace-time abuse, dismantling and neglect have markedly reduced the potential of these facilities. This unfortunate trend may be expected to continue until a Korean government is installed and has undertaken the task of preserving these resources for the nation. Moreover, a good deal of Korea's capital wealth is in the form of specialized equipment designed either for war production or to complement Japanese home industry, and may not be salvageable for peace-time production. It seems hardly too pessimistic to estimate that of the industrial facilities existing in Korea during the period 1940-1944, as much as one-third may be discounted as effectively lost to ultimate use.

In the years immediately following unification, the country may count itself fortunate if it is able to produce sufficient quantities of consumer goods, particularly textiles, shoes, simple hardware and processed foods, to permit stabilization of the domestic economy and provide incentive for the farmer to release his grain for general distribution and for export. Fortunately, to produce these consumer goods will ordinarily not call for skills presently unavailable. Koreans have demonstrated aptitude for this type of manufacture, and it should be possible to effect whatever further training is necessary.

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Maintenance of essential communications, including the railways, will involve manufacturing problems of far greater complexity. In this field and in the production of chemical fertilizers which can be expected to play a vital role in Korea's general recovery, foreign technical aid may be required for many years. Koreans in the south have already voiced their unwillingness to readmit Japanese technicians on any terms, and so have appeared to block the easiest solution of this industrial problem. There is likely to be a surplus of Japanese technicians as Japan finds its new place in the world order; these men by reason of their familiarity with installed equipment and widespread Korean understanding of the Japanese language would seem to be best fitted to enter Korean employ as instructors. It is impossible to say how long the present psychological barrier may continue to exist, but it appears that Korea's industrial recovery would be accelerated if this situation could be resolved. Otherwise, to replace in operation the large plants of the north, for example, may necessitate entering into management contracts with American or European engineering firms.

An equally serious deterrent to industrial recovery is likely to be encountered in a shortage of raw or processed primary materials. In the past Korean minerals were often exported semi-refined, or as ore, processed in Japan, and reimported for further manufacture. Korean raw cotton as well was exported to Japan, spun into yarn, and reimported for weaving. It was to Japan's interest that Korean industry should be dependent in this manner, for the resulting processing charges yielded Japan a credit that was partially liquidated by vast exports of Korean rice. Present export deficiencies, which for various reasons are likely to persist for some time, will not permit a Korean external trade of the sort that prevailed under the Japanese. Although this matter is discussed in detail in Part V, it is perhaps not amiss to state here that in the absence of large foreign credits, Korea cannot expect to buy abroad, and pay for, more than a bare minimum of fuels, fibers, machinery, automotive equipment, metals and basic foodstuffs.

Although too many links are missing from the industrial chain to rely upon its strength until it has been entirely reforged, the long-range prospects for Korean industry need not be as unpromising as those for the immediate future. The country is deficient in bituminous coal, but has abundant water resources which may eventually replace it as a source of power. Mineral resources are varied, and Koreans may in time be able to exploit them even more intensively than did the Japanese. The labor force is unlimited, for all practical purposes, and given sufficient training and incentive need not fall behind the Japanese in the long run. On the other hand, it would be a grave mistake to suppose that Korea now possesses a ready-made industrial plant which is only awaiting the signal to begin full operation. What it has is better characterized as a delapidated Japanese-built structure, which in its best estate was hardly more than a segment of the island industrial system.

Household industry, on the other hand, has been largely immune to the strictures cited above. Using native materials and simple machinery, craftsmen continue to produce textiles, certain chemicals and household wares, and to process foodstuffs in about the usual volume. Their production has been invaluable in offsetting the effects of the breakdown of larger industries, and may be depended upon to continue to contribute much to the economy. The Korean masses had never profited greatly from factory production under the Japanese and so have been spared the worst effects such a breakdown might have entailed under other circumstances.

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D. SERVICE INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC UTILITIES

1. General

The preceding three sections have outlined Korea's human, physical or natural, and industrial resources. This section will sketch the present state and the potential of Korea's service industries, its transportation, electric power, and communications systems. The scope and efficiency of the service industries are vital factors in appraising the potential of any modern economy, for efficient utilization of physical and industrial resources are directly correlated with the status of transportation and communications systems, and with the availability of electric power. In general, Korea's present service industries, if rehabilitated, appear to be more than adequate to meet the country's need for some years to come.

2. Railways

The Korean peninsula provided Japan with a convenient bridge to the Asiatic continent, and the Japanese realized the full benefit of this geographic advantage by developing a well integrated standard-gauge rail network in Korea as well as adequate port and storage facilities. The railway network, consisting of approximately 3,600 miles of standard-gauge track in 1946, forms a predominantly north-south pattern, with branches to main industrial, agricultural, mining and port areas. The backbone of the Korean network is "Y" shaped, with the base at Pusan in southeastern Korea. The main line, running from Pusan northward through Seoul and on to Sinuiju (the Yalu River port city on the Manchurian border), has an excellent road-bed and it is double-tracked throughout. Its total length is 590.2 miles. The eastern branch of the "Y" cuts off at Seoul and runs northeast to the port city of Wonsan, and thence northward via Chongjin to the Manchurian border and to the well-developed Korean port of Najin. Only short stretches of the 674.8 miles of track between Seoul and Najin are double-tracked. The Korean railway network is well integrated with the Manchurian railway system, with which it connects at five points on the border. In addition to these principal rail lines, there are a number of important connecting lines, including a single-track alternate Pusan-Seoul line via Andong; a line from Taejon which connects the southwestern Korean ports of Kunsan, Mokpo and Yosu with the main north-south line; a short line from Seoul to the port of Inchon; a cross-peninsular line connecting Pyongyang and the east-coast port of Wonsan; and two lines connecting the Yalu River towns of Supong and Manpojin with the main Pusan-Sinuiju line. About two-fifths of Korea's rail trackage is located south of the 38th parallel. The railways connect with all principal ports, whose facilities are generally adequate to meet the anticipated future needs of a united peninsula.

Japanese investments in the railways of Korea were relatively heavy as compared to Japan's industrial and agricultural investments. By 1938, total Japanese investments in government railways were approximately ¥ 644,700,000 as compared with corporate investment of only ¥ 244,900,000. Although corporate investments increased rapidly after 1938, total Japanese rail investments still exceeded corporate investments by the end of the war.

During the war years, traffic on the Korean railways increased rapidly, with total freight tonnage increasing from approximately 15,000,000 tons in 1937 to about 30,000,000 tons annually during the 1941 to 1944 period. At the same time, the number of passengers carried increased from almost 44,000,000 in 1937 to well over

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100,000,000 annually during the period 1941 to 1944. In 1933 the government railways had 360 locomotives, 900 passenger coaches, and 3,992 freight cars. That same year, private railways, most of which were narrow-gauge, had an estimated 93 locomotives, 210 passenger coaches, and 834 freight cars. At the time of liberation in 1945, most of the rolling stock on Korean railroads was north of the 38th parallel as shown below.

Table 14

LOCOMOTIVES AND RAILROAD ROLLING STOCK IN KOREA, 1945

Type of Equipment	North Korea	South Korea
Locomotives	400*	474
Coaches, passenger	1,200*	1,352
Box Cars	4,117	1,655
Gondola Cars	5,640	1,291
Flat Cars	685	120
Caboose Cars	416	298

* estimates.

Korea's railway rolling stock is generally old and, during the war years, the equipment was badly worn and not adequately maintained. As a result, more than half of southern Korea's 474 locomotives were not in operating condition, and a considerable proportion of the rails, ties, and other equipment needed replacement when American troops arrived in September 1945. The railways were in a similar state in northern Korea in August 1945 and, according to available information, they have continued to deteriorate during the Soviet occupation. The railways in southern Korea, after a difficult eighteen-month period of readjustment, are gradually restoring their operations to a relatively efficient and financially sound basis. Importation of about 100 American-made locomotives is an important factor in this recent improvement. The railways of southern Korea are now handling about 5,000,000 passengers per month, more than the monthly average carried in all Korea in 1937. Freight tonnage was 408,000 tons for March 1947, about one-third of the total monthly average for all Korea in 1937.

Korea has facilities for assembling locomotives and for the manufacture of other rolling stock. Repair shops are located at Seoul, Pusan, Pyongyang, Wonsan, Songjin, and Chongjin. Although most of the necessary equipment for rehabilitation of the Korean railways can be produced within a united Korea, it will be necessary to import all the bituminous coal needed by the railways, as well as quantities of railway ties and miscellaneous railway equipment.

The present Korean rail network serves the needs of the peninsula adequately and is expected to continue to meet Korea's needs for years to come. One incompleted line whose completion would appear desirable in the not too distant future is the south-coast line from Chinju to Sunchon. Completion of this stretch of approximately thirty-five miles of railway would close the gap in the present south coastline, and would give Pusan and southeastern Korea direct railroad connections with southwestern Korea. At present the only rail connections with these two sections of Korea is by a long and circuitous route via Taejon. Two other lines which the Japanese had started, and then abandoned due to more urgent tasks, are the east-coast line connecting the ports of Wonsan and Pohang, and a direct coastal line between the two northeastern Korean ports of Chongjin and Najin. Completion of either of these lines would necessitate large capital outlays, and do not appear economically justifiable in the predictable future.

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3. Electric Power

Korea has a well developed, inter-connected generation and transmission system of hydroelectric and stem thermal-electric power facilities. The total installed electric-power generation capacity in Korea at the end of the war was about 1,900,000 KW, of which about 1,775,000 KW was hydroelectric. Hydroelectric generation capacity is almost entirely north of the 38th parallel. Hydroelectric generation capacity in northern Korea was 1,775,000 KW in 1945, and in addition plants having a capacity of over 1,000,000 KW were under construction. Of this installed capacity, only about forty per cent can be delivered throughout the year.

The large Yalu River project at Supong, which had a generation capacity of 600,000, was a joint Korean-Manchukuon enterprise, financed almost entirely by Japanese capital. Three of the 100,000 KW generators , which supplied 50-cycle power to Manchuria, have been removed from Supong by the Soviets. Unconfirmed reports of other removals of hydroelectric facilities from northern Korea have been received, and facilities there also are reported to be in poor condition because of inadequate maintenance. The only thermal plant located north of the 38th parallel is at Pyongyang, and it has a generation capacity of 10,000 KW.

South of the 38th parallel, Korea has electric-power facilities with a name-plate rating of 197,200 KW, of which 132,500 is steam-thermal and 64,700 is hydroelectric. However, several of the installations have never reached their name-plate rating, and the maximum attainable capacity is estimated to be 159,000 KW in the summer and 118,500 KW in the winter. (See Table 16).

Table 15

MAJOR ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS IN KOREA, August 1945

NORTH KOREA	Name and Location of Plant	Province	Name-Plate Rating*
Hydroelectric:	Supong on the Yalu River	N. Pyongan	600,000
	Chongjin River (Choshin R.)	S. Hamgyong	371,500
	Hochon River (Kyosen R.)	S. Hamgyong	394,000
	Pujon River (Fusen R.)	S. Hamgyong	223,000
	Buyung (Funei)	N. Hamgyong	35,800
	Hwachon	Kangwon	90,000
Thermal:	Pyongyang	S. Pyongan	10,000
Sub-Totals, North Korea			1,724,300
SOUTH KOREA			
Hydroelectric:	Chong-Pyong (Seihei)	Kyonggi	44,000
	Som Jin River	N. Cholla	12,500
	Posong (Hojo) River	S. Cholla	3,200
	Unam (Umgan)	N. Cholla	5,000
Thermal:	Yongwol (Noiotsu)	Kangwon	100,000
	Pusan	S. Kyongsang	10,000
	Changi-In-Ri (Tojini) near Seoul	Kyonggi	22,500
Sub-Totals, South Korea			197,200
TOTALS, all Korea			1,921,500

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* Actual generation capacity is substantially below name-plate generation rating. Estimated generation capacity for South Korea is given in Table 16. Present hydroelectric generation capacity in northern Korea is estimated to be not more than thirty per cent of the name-plate rating.

Table 16

POWER CAPABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA, June 1947

Plant and Type	Summer Output		Winter Output	
	Maximum	Reasonable Expectation for 1947	Maximum	Reasonable Expectation for 1947-48
Yong Wol (steam)	60,000	0	60,000	22,000
Tojonri (steam)	18,000	0	18,000	12,000
Pusan (steam)	8,000	0	8,000	5,000
Chong Pyong (hydro)	45,000	37,500	16,000	11,000
Som Jin (hydro)	13,000	9,000	9,000	0
Unam (irrigation)	12,000	0	6,000	0
Posong (irrigation)	3,000	3,000	1,500	0
TOTALS	159,000	49,500	118,500	50,000

If and when the Korean peninsula is reunited, present electric power facilities, after rehabilitation, should be more than adequate to meet Korea's needs during the next five to ten years. However, there are several major hydroelectric projects under construction in North Pyongan Province, on the Yalu River and its tributaries, which could be developed to supply an additional capacity of 1,000,000 KW, if necessary. Of these projects, the Kunggye (Nokai) project, designed for a capacity of 340,000 KW, is in an advanced state of construction.

4. Communications

All communications facilities in Korea in the past were government owned and operated except radio broadcasting, which was under close governmental control. The communications system, including telephone, telegraph, radio, and postal services, has proven generally adequate for meeting Korea's needs, although it would be considered inefficient and out-of-date by occidental standards. The postal, telephone, telegraph, and radio systems were all consistent profit-making enterprises until the end of the war, but they all have incurred heavy deficits since the beginning of the Soviet and American occupations. Basic factors in the present adverse financial picture for communications enterprises have been the sharp decline in volume of business and the considerable lag of rates behind sharp increases in operating costs. Main reasons for the decline in volume of business include the repatriation of almost all Japanese, who were the heaviest users of the communications facilities, and disruption of normal flow of communications because of the 38th parallel barrier, and the relative isolation of Korea from the rest of the Far East in this post-war period of readjustment. Most of the technicians operating Korea's communications facilities before the end of the war were Japanese, whose repatriation has left Korea seriously deficient in trained personnel in this field. Although efforts are being made to train Koreans to operate these facilities, their general efficiency of operation is likely to be impaired for some years until competent Korean staffs are developed.

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(1) Postal Services.

There were a total of 1,043 post offices in Korea in 1939, including 100 main post offices and 943 local offices. At present there are 647 post offices in South Korea, and an estimated 400 in North Korea. Volume of postal business in South Korea in 1946 averaged 17,500,000 letters and 65,000 parcels per month, compared to 65,000,000 letters and 735,000 parcels per month for all Korea in 1939.

(2) Telephone.

The commercial telephone system of Korea is not highly developed, but the official telephone network connecting police stations and other government agencies extends throughout the peninsula. In 1940 there were 864 telephone offices and about 55,000 subscribers. A Tokyo-Mukden non-loaded telephone cable, completed in 1939, runs through Korea via Pusan, Seoul, and Sinuiju. Repeater stations are located at Pusan, Seoul, Pyongyang, and Sinuiju. A loaded submarine telephone cable runs between Pusan and Shimonoseki. In Korea, south of the 38th parallel, there were 163 telephone exchanges serving about 42,000 subscribers as of 1 February 1947. As of August 1945, there were 115 telephone exchanges with about 25,000 telephone subscribers north of the 38th parallel. Telephone exchanges are generally located in post office buildings, except in a few major cities. Both telephone and telegraph equipment is in generally poor condition, and needs more adequate maintenance and general rehabilitation. Almost all telephone and telegraph equipment was imported from Japan before the end of the war, and Korea lacks manufacturing facilities to produce most of this type of equipment.

(3) Telegraph.

The Korean telegraph network totalled 5,599 route miles in 1939, and was served by 1,019 offices, which were usually located in post offices. The main trunk telegraph lines, from Pusan to Sinuiju via Seoul, and from Seoul to Najin, are underground; most of the other routes are surface lines that usually follow the railroads and important highways. Japan and Korea are connected by ten submarine cables. In 1939 almost 2,000,000 telegrams were handled monthly in all Korea; in 1946 an average of 442,000 messages were handled monthly in southern Korea.

(4) Radio.

Before the end of the war, radio broadcasting was under the control of the Korea Broadcasting Corporation, a semi-official corporation cooperating closely with the Japan Broadcasting System. At present there are seven radio broadcasting stations presently operating in South Korea, and about the same number in North Korea. In 1945 there were 331,000 radios registered in Korea, of which 208,000 were south of the 38th parallel. In March 1947 180,000 radio owners were paying the radio listening fee in South Korea. South Korea has four ship-to-shore radio stations, as well as sixteen point-to-point radio stations. The equipment in these stations is obsolescent, however, and considerable replacement of equipment is needed.

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Table 17

(A) KOREAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SYSTEMS

	Number of Total Routes			Length of Wire (miles)	Number of Messages Handled 1939
	Year	Offices	(miles)		
Telephone system	1939	858	7,142	174,777	308,301,000
Telegraph system	1939	1,019	5,599	32,080	23,198,000

(B) Volume of Communications Business

Type of Service	1939 Monthly Average (all Korea)	1946 Monthly Average (South Korea only)*
Letters	65,000,000	17,500,000
Parcels	735,000	58,000
Telegrams	1,933,000	442,000
Number of Telephone Subscribers ..	53,000	42,000
Employees in the Department of Communications .	26,000	17,695‡

* Statistics from North Korea for 1946 are not available.

‡ Figure as of 1 February 1947.

V. Trade and Balance of Payments

1. Trade Patterns of the Past

Tables provided in Appendix V give fairly detailed statistics of Korea's external trade under Japanese rule. Here are set forth in summary form certain basic facts concerning this trade, all of which are confirmed by the tables in question.

(1) Korea's external trade from 1910 to 1945 was almost totally absorbed by the Japanese Empire. In 1936, for example, ninety-six per cent of this trade was so accounted for. See Tables 54 and 60.

(2) Korea was subject to an unfavorable balance of trade for all except two years of the period 1910 - 1945. See Tables 52 and 53. However, save for the years 1910 - 1915, and 1934 - 1939, when the Japanese were making heavy investment of capital equipment in Korea, during the first period for the purpose of facilitating their economic exploitation of the peninsula, and during the second to increase the country's war potential, the unfavorable balances were such as might have been eliminated by careful planning and exclusion of luxury items intended primarily for consumption by Japanese residents and wealthy Koreans. Note, for example, the heavy imports of silk and rayon fabrics, Table 55 B.

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(3) The total volume of Korea's external trade grew from approximately ¥ 60,000,000 in 1910 to more than ¥ 2,400,-000,000 in 1939 giving the country a high position among Oriental trade areas, with a foreign trade equal to about one-quarter that of Japan.

(4) Among the larger trade categories of foodstuffs, textiles and fibers, minerals, manufactures, and miscellaneous items, Korea was consistently a net importer except for foodstuffs. However, net foodstuffs balances were seldom so large that they did more than offset imports of textiles and fibers.

(5) The prime factor of Korea's external trade from 1910 to 1945 was export of rice to Japan. The magnitude of this export is reflected in Table 55 A. In 1936, of the 41 Korean products showing a net export balance, rice accounted for 63.9 per cent by value. By 1939 the relative importance of rice exports had declined in favor of minerals and manufactures, but of the 55 products showing a net export balance in that year rice exports still made up one-third of the total money value.

(6) Until the years immediately prior to the war, fish and marine products ranked second to rice in export value and averaged from 7.5 to 9.0 per cent of all commodities showing a net export balance. Other exports individually were of minor significance, and, paradoxically, at times represented a net loss rather than credit to the export balance. For example, ginned cotton appears in Table 58 (1936) as the fifth ranking export of Korea, with a net value of ¥ 10,000,000. What that table does not show is to be found in Table 56 which lists imports of fibers and yarns from Japan to the value of ¥ 42,000,000. Korean spinning facilities did not match loom capacity, with the result that Korean cotton was exported to Japan for spinning and re-imported, together with the supplementary quantities of yarns and fibers. The export figure in this case is purely illusory. The same stricture applies in general to minerals exports. While these exports amounted to ¥ 35,000,000 in 1936, imports of metals and ores, machinery, metal manufactures and iron, reached more than ¥ 170,000,000 in the same year.

(7) Korea's principal imports reflect its dependence on the outside world for fuels (principally bituminous coal and petroleum), heavy manufactures and machinery, automotive equipment, textiles and fibers and specialized products. In the past these needs were met in the main by, or through, Japan. The nature of these major imports and the change in their composition brought about by war-time industrialization, is indicated in Table 18. (See next page).

(8) The volume of Korea's external trade is not to be taken as the index of a healthy economy engaged in exporting its natural surpluses and in importing the ordinary requirements of its industries and consumers. In a country with so large a trade, it is reasonable to seek for a relatively high standard of living. Korea's per capita external trade was nearly as great as Japan's; the standard of living prevalent among the great majority of the people in the respective countries, however, was very unequal. While Korea exported to Japan an annual average of approximately 1,000,000 tons of rice, its population was increasingly rapidly but its production was relatively stable. The inevitable consequence was that per capita consumption of rice in the peninsula declined steadily from 1910 until the war. The deficit was made up in part by cheaper grains, especially millet imported from Manchuria. The magnitude of these imports is indicated in Table 63. It should be noted that apart from millet and perhaps cotton

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Table 18

IMPORTS HAVING NET VALUE OF OVER $5,000,000, KOREA, 1936, 1939
(in $1,000)

Commodity	Value 1936	Value 1939
Metals and ores	15,935	38,534
Machinery	13,288	46,384
Metal manufactures	13,234	26,570
Petroleum	9,176	9,330
Iron	8,208	---
Vehicles and parts	7,827	13,378
Rayon fabrics	7,469	---
Chemicals	7,443	13,380
Cotton fabrics	7,141	---
Millet	6,589	5,309
Silk fabrics	---	11,434
Lumber	---	7,586
Coal	---	6,618
Clothing	---	11,702
Woolen fabrics	---	5,774

Source: Foreign Commerce Yearbook.

fabrics, the principal imports listed were not goods intended for wide distribution among the Korean population, but were rather materials designed to expand and support industry or else luxury items to be consumed by the Japanese and a small group of wealthy Koreans.

(9) Between 1910 and 1939 Korea's cumulative net import balance was approximately ¥ 1,750,000,000. This debt was liquidated by Japanese acquisition of land and capital assets in Korea. Its magnitude in terms of real wealth can be gauged by the size and quality of Japanese corporate and individual holdings in Korea as of 9 August 1945.

2. Present Position of Korea's Foreign Trade

For many months after the Japanese capitulation, Korea may be said to have had no foreign trade. The division of the country into two separate zones between which there is no commercial intercourse save through smuggling, completed the disorganization attendant upon the Japanese defeat. The South, of which we have more knowledge, has become a deficit area in every important respect. Lack of fertilizers, unfavorable weather and a great influx of refugees have at least temporarily made the area incapable of feeding itself. Dislocations due to the war, hurried repatriation of Japanese technical personnel, lack of raw materials and industrial skills, have reduced factory production to about twenty per cent of its previous output. In the spring of 1947, however, there has been a slight revival of foreign trade in the export of certain quantities of government-owned commodities from South Korea, and in the import by China-coast merchants of needed raw materials which they have sought to barter for Korean minerals, ginseng and marine products. Reports from North Korea indicate that exports from that area are tending to exceed imports.

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The United States Military Government has been obliged to import large quantities of grains into South Korea to avert famine, or at the very least, widespread suffering. It is now, through a civilian supply program and a Foreign Liquidation Commission credit, undertaking to provide the country with certain necessary machinery, equipment and raw materials, as well as technical assistance. These measures, while necessary and likely to have lasting effect, are admittedly stop-gap in nature and designed to bridge the period until Korea is once more united.

Heavy imports of chemical fertilizers may eventually produce an exportable surplus of rice in South Korea. Rehabilitation of the fishing industry can result in the availability of considerable quantities of marine products for export. Mine rehabilitation and imported machinery may produce substantial minerals exports. Other agricultural produce, ginseng, fruit and tobacco, could swell the totals somewhat, and native handicrafts, if properly exploited, could provide some foreign exchange. However, there can be no doubt that South Korea's balance of trade will remain seriously unfavorable so long as the country remains divided.

To date (June 1947) apart from smuggling and some small junk trade, all of South Korea's foreign trade has been conducted by the Military Government. Most imports have been financed by U.S. Army appropriations or by the Foreign Liquidation Commission credit, and have originated in the United States or Japan. The U.S. Commercial Corporation has contracted to export such government-owned minerals and other surpluses as the Military Government designates and to dispose of the proceeds so that they may be available to finance further imports into Korea.

Although machinery is being designed to permit a degree of private trade, subject to licensing controls and to strictures as to use of resulting dollar credits, it is highly unlikely that private trade will flourish. The one favorable aspect of Korea's foreign trade at this time is that the country may reasonably expect to be helped over a difficult period by outside aid, principally from the United States, without incurring a crippling foreign debt. When the country has been reunited and fairly extensive measures to rehabilitate its economy have been completed with foreign aid, it may look forward to participating in world trade on a more favorable basis than any it has yet enjoyed.

3. The Objectives of a Re-oriented Korean Foreign Trade

The primary considerations which have dictated the possible future trade pattern which will be set forth later are the following:

(1) The need to free Korea from the threat of renewed Japanese economic domination through the establishment of trade balances persistently unfavorable to Korea.

(2) The necessity of establishing as early as possible a favorable over-all balance of trade, or at least a parity of exports and imports.

(3) The desirability of encouraging Korean participation in multilateral trade in order that the peninsula's products may find their most profitable market, and that Korea's import requirements may be filled most economically.

(4) Recognition of modified consumption patterns in an independent Korea: it is unlikely that rice exports will be as large in the past, unless the price is so favorable that the farmer

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will willingly sell a larger portion of his grain. This would require that sufficient quantities of consumer goods be available to make such sales desirable from the farmer's point of view, and that substitute grains be provided either from expanded local production or imports.

Modern Korea has been dominated by a succession of foreign masters. Since remote and semi-mythological times, it has been nominally or actually a dependent state. The Chinese Empire exercised suzerainty over the peninsula until 1895. Thereafter for ten years Japan and Russia sparred for advantage. Well before the end of the nineteenth century, the Japanese had begun economic infiltration of the peninsula and were already well entrenched in the regions nearest Japan. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia acknowledged Japan's predominant interest in Korea, and a Japanese protectorate was hastily established. In 1910 Japan dissolved the protectorate and annexed Korea. Upon the Japanese capitulation in 1945, Korea was divided into two zones of military occupation, Soviet forces occupying all that portion of the country lying north of the 38° North Latitude, and the United States forces occupying the region south of the parallel. At no other time in its modern history has the economy of Korea been as strangulated as it is now.

It is the position of the United States that Korea should be reunited economically and politically, and assisted to develop into a democratic nation, free from foreign domination, whether political or economic. It must be admitted that this progression will not be easy. Korea lacks democratic experience and a tradition of independent, liberal accomplishment. Moreover there seems to be no widespread realization of the acute economic problems that remain to be solved if Korea's eventual "independence" is to be more than the ear-catching slogan it now represents. Traditionally, Korea has offered a political vacuum into which more powerful surrounding nations have penetrated to the extent that their ascendancy of the moment and their rivals' corresponding weakness permitted.

To prevent the recurrence of such a state of affairs requires a basic reorientation of Korea's internal political structure and of its political and economic relations with the world outside. This is not the place to discuss in detail the government which Korea should evolve, but for our present purposes it must be assumed that the nation, with material aid and counsel from abroad, will establish itself upon a democratic base. Then, for the first time, the government of Korea will begin to represent its people, and eventually progress to a point at which it is as broadly representative as the people's political development allows. Concomitant with political emancipation must be the evolution of a democratic economy in which the land and other sources of wealth are safeguarded from the monopoly control which has existed heretofore.

In the initial stages of development of this new state, the government must be both strong and enlightened. The economy must be protected against marauding by native or foreign elements which have already demonstrated their eagerness to take over from the Japanese and presumably exploit the country in the familiar manner. As it begins its work, this new government may anticipate favorable conditions for its operations. It is the intent of the United States that former Japanese property in Korea shall be ceded to the Korean people. The major production facilities, hence, should be in the government's hands to dispose of, or to operate, as the best interests of the country may dictate.

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Under the most favorable conditions that can reasonably be expected to obtain, Korea's foreign trade position for a number of years to come will be difficult. Given reunion of the country not later than early 1948, it is conceivable that Korea might attain a total, balanced foreign trade of $168,000,000 by 1951. The details of this program will be studied later. However, to achieve this balance will require national discipline and fairly stringent trade controls. Korea has to import fuels, raw materials, machinery, automotive equipment and metal products if she is to continue existing even as a semi-modern state. Exports to pay for these commodities will not be abundant Consequently, foreign exchange will have to be husbanded, and the government will be obliged to limit severely importation of luxury or non-essential items which foreign traders will be anxious to sell and Korean importers, to buy. The alternatives are:

(1) export of more of its produce than the country can afford, to the detriment of its standard of living;

(2) obtaining of foreign credits;

(3) piling up of unfavorable trade balances to be settled by transfer of capital assets;

(4) invitation to foreign investors to pour capital into the country.

The delicate political and economic balance which may be expected to prevail make all these alternatives undesirable to a greater or lesser degree, if not positively dangerous. Short-term foreign credits would probably offer the least peril if it could be demonstrated that early settlement were feasible. However, the earlier Korea achieves a self-sustaining status, even at the cost of temporary sacrifice, the earlier it may expect to stabilize its economy and achieve economic independence.

If Korea directs its trade wisely in the early years of its independence and eschews easy solutions that are apt to prove crippling in the long run, it can prepare for its later participation in world trade on a more liberal, but still rational, basis. To do otherwise is to court the economic enslavement which existed before it was liberated by force of arms.

4. Korea's Geopolitical Relationships

For the reasons given above, Korea's geopolitical relationships in the past have been distorted by abnormal foreign influence. Under Japanese rule, Korea's dealings with the outside world were conducted almost exclusively through Japan, and development of normal foreign relations was never possible. Freed from the yen-bloc and the Japanese Empire, Korea must face the problem of discovering the position it will ultimately occupy in world society and commerce as an independent nation.

While recognizing the political necessity of severing the yoke which has bound Korea to Japan, one must not lose sight of the fact that in many respects the two economies are complementary, and that both must necessarily suffer unless trade between the two countries remains relatively large providing, however, that Korea retains freedom of action in economic matters. It is to be anticipated that rice, even if in reduced quantities, will continue to be Korea's principal export once the economy has been restored more nearly to normal. As Japan must continue to import rice to feed its population, and so can offer Korea an excellent market since the Japanese prefer Korean to other imported rice,

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it would appear unreasonable to set obstacles in the way of this trade. Moreover, Japan is Korea's indicated source of supply for many manufactured goods and bituminous coal, and will in turn require considerable imports of Korean marine products and anthracite coal, as well as ores and minerals. It should not be too difficult to establish with Japan a balance of trade favorable to Korea if care is taken to exclude unnecessary Japanese manufactures. Credits available to Korea in Japan could be utilized to pay for needed imports from other Pacific areas through export of Japanese manufactures.

Although at this time it is not possible to gauge with any precision the level of future Japanese industrial production, public recognition has been given by occupation authorities to the basic economic fact that Japan will be obliged to manufacture and export if she is to live at all. To support her population will require import of all the rice that Korea can spare in the foreseeable future, and desires to export to Japan. The only limitations that should apply to this trade are Japan's capacity to pay in manufactures and coal, or the political expediency of Korea's making other disposition of a part of her grain surplus. It is probable that ultimately Korea's commerce with Japan will account for thrity-five to fifty per cent of the peninsula's total external trade. It is believed that this high level can be reached without prejudice to Korea's political and economic independence.

While no other economy so nearly complements that of Korea as Japan's, it is nevertheless possible for Korea to enjoy a mutually advantageous trade with her other two close neighbors, China and Soviet Asia.

In the past, particularly when Japan dominated both areas, Korea traded extensively with Manchuria. That region's cheaper grains, especially millet, as well as bituminous coal will continue to find a market in the peninsula. In return, Korea should be able to provide China with a variety of marine products, ginseng, electric power in excess of the amount due China as partner in the Supong (Suiho) hydroelectric plant, tobacco, some manufactures and fibers as well as certain quantities of anthracite coal, and perhaps rice. The cultural bond between the two countries has always been strong, and when China is once more at peace, their commercial dealings should occupy a prominent position in the external trade of both nations.

Soviet Asia since 1905 has played an entirely insignificant role in Korean foreign trade. This condition will probably not continue when Korea is independent. Unfortunately, however, while the Soviets could profitably use Korean grain, minerals and light manufactures, their is very little available in Soviet Asia that could find a place in a restrictive Korean import program, except lumber and possibly bituminous coal from Sakhalin. This disparity of available exports will probably cause some difficulty, because of the Russian tendency to engage in controlled bi-lateral trade, and may eventually find a political, rather than an economic, solution.

Korea's relations with the United States were probably closer than with any other non-Oriental country. This was due to the presence in Korea of numerous American religious missions, the large number of Koreans educated in the United States, and considerable imports of American machinery. In the future, Korea will require even greater quantities of American products if Japan's share of her trade is to be limited. For probably many years Korea will need to import cotton, automotive, railway and

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communications equipment, chemicals and various types of machinery. Unfortunately, possible Korean exports to the United States are limited in nature and quantity. Gold will probably prove to be the chief Korean export to the United States, although manufactures and handicraft products may in part replace those formerly imported from Japan. Other Korean minerals, particularly tungsten, may find a market in the United States, but transportation costs are certain to be a limiting factor. Korean silk and marine products as well may serve to offset in part necessary American imports.

The fifth major trading area which is sure to play a large part in Korea's post-war commerce, is Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Korea will require petroleum and rubber, as well as vegetable oils, fibers and phosphate rock from these regions. In return there will be very few native Korean products to counterbalance needed imports. The best hope of striking a balance lies in utilizing Korean credits in Japan to export Japanese manufactures to Southeast Asia. Still unpaid balances might be liquidated by export of Korean gold.

Korea's geographic situation is at once a source of weakness and of strength. Its strategic location has in the past led more than once to invasion. In the future this same location may be of considerable economic advantage if the Japanese practice of using the peninsula as an economic bridgehead to the continent is continued and developed. Japanese and other foreign trade with North China and Siberia can be in large measure channeled through Korean transportation facilities. The good harbors of the south and east coasts, given some railway rehabilitation, can handle as much cargo as peace-time trade requires. The Korean railway system, discounting war-time depreciation, is as good as any in the Orient; in 1936 it handled 600,000,000 ton-miles of freight, and can be made to do so again. Ports of the northeast, especially Najin (Rashin), can serve as alternates for Vladivostok when that port is ice-bound. By establishing free ports and exploiting its transit facilities, Korea can add appreciably to its foreign credits.

It goes without saying that the future relationships suggested here are for the moment entirely hypothetical. Of the countries and areas discussed, only the United States is now in a position to play the role assigned to her here. Korea will have no foreign trade worthy of the name until it has been reunited and rehabilitated. Japan's future is obscure and will remain so until the peace treaty is drawn and the reparations problem has been resolved. China will be in no position to engage in serious trade with Korea, or indeed with any other country, until its internal political problems have been solved and an equilibrium has been established in its economy. All of Southeast Asia, the Philippines and the Pacific Ocean areas face rehabilitation problems of varying degrees of seriousness before they can resume their previous trade activities. Problems of trade with the Netherlands Indies, for example, have been highlighted by the recent seizure by Dutch authorities of an American vessel attempting to clear the Indies with cargo alleged to have originated in Dutch-owned plantations.

While Korea's future obviously contains many unknowns, there are certain unalterable facts regarding its position in the world which are bound to shape its subsequent history. It is an agricultural peninsula, rich in waterpower and reasonably well endowed in mineral resources, well supplied with unskilled and semi-skilled labor, but lacking in managerial and highly-trained technical personnel, deficient in fuels and fibers, and heir to a

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Japanese-built industrial and communications plant beyond its present capacity to maintain or utilize efficiently. It is surrounded by three formidable, or potentially formidable, neighbors all of them will eventually be rivals for political and economic advantage within its borders. If Korea's history is not to repeat itself, with variants appropriate to the new balance of power, the country's economy must be solidly grounded and its government stable. Korea must seek protection from military invasion in the covenants and guarantees of the United Nations, but it must find defense against more insidious economic penetration in a realistic appraisal of its material resources, the erection of safeguards to prevent their dissipation, and the development of commercial skills and procedures which will permit the Korean businessman to deal with his foreign counterpart on an equal footing.

5. Possible Korean Foreign Trade Program, 1951

For the year 1951 there has been prepared in summary form a possible Korean foreign trade program which will be found in Tables 19 and 20. Most of the factors which have played a part in the formulation of the program have been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. However, it would be well to summarize these elements and point up the particular conditions that may be expected to obtain at that time. The assumptions are these:

(1) The country will have been reunited not later than early 1948, and a fairly extensive industrial and agricultural rehabilitation program will have been largely completed before 1951.

(2) Japan, China, Southeast Asia and Indonesia, and Soviet Asia will be able and willing to play the parts assigned to them.

(3) While a wide Korean industrial training program will have been long since initiated, the country will not have progressed to the point of being able to export more than modest quantities of manufactures after meeting restricted domestic consumer requirements. In other words, the contemplated exports will not depend upon skills unlikely to be available.

(4) Agricultural production will have been appreciably increased over present output, but can hardly be expected to exceed levels reached in the 1930's. Moreover, increased domestic consumption will have made a small percentage of the total crop available for export. The grain surplus will probably not exceed 250,000 to 300,000 metric tons.

(5) Fisheries and fish-processing facilities will have been restored to approximately pre-war efficiency.

(6) Among the minerals, gold, iron and anthracite production will have been especially fostered for export purposes, but not to the exclusion of graphite, tungsten and other alloying metals.

(7) An effective import-export licensing system will prevent squandering of foreign exchange and of national resources.

(8) Available exports will limit imports in a balanced trade to about $84,000,000, at current price levels. To maintain the economy will necessitate distributing these imports approximately as follows:

Bituminous coal and petroleum	29.8%
Raw and semi-processed materials ..	29.8%
Manufactures	30.8%
Foodstuffs	4.8%
Miscellaneous	4.8%

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Table 19

PROJECTED IMPORTS, KOREA, 1951
(in $1,000,000)

Commodity	JAPAN	U.S.	S.E.ASIA INDONESIA INDIA,etc.	CHINA	USSR	AUSTRA-LIA	PHILIP-PINES	EUROPE	TOTAL	%
Coal	7.0	---	---	6.0	2.0	---	---	---	15.0	17.9
Petroleum	---	---	10.0	---	---	---	---	---	10.0	11.9
Fibers & textiles ...	---	9.5	3.0	.5	---	1.5	.5	---	15.0	17.9
Foodstuffs	---	---	---	3.5	---	---	.5	---	4.0	4.8
Rubber	---	---	5.0	---	---	---	---	---	5.0	5.9
Machinery & parts ...	3.5	1.5	---	---	---	---	---	---	5.0	5.9
Chemicals	5.0	1.0	2.0	---	---	---	---	---	8.0	9.5
Vehicles & parts	---	5.0	---	---	---	---	---	---	5.0	5.9
Railroad equipment ..	3.0	2.0	---	---	---	---	---	---	5.0	5.9
Communications equip.	1.5	.5	---	---	---	---	---	---	2.0	2.4
Power equipment	.5	.5	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.0	1.2
Lumber	---	.5	---	.5	1.0	---	---	---	2.0	2.4
Metals	2.0	.5	---	---	.5	---	---	---	3.0	3.6
Invisible imports* ..									3.0	3.6
Miscellaneous	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.0	1.0	1.2
TOTALS	22.5	21.0	20.0	10.5	3.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	84.0	100.0
Percentages (less visible imports)	27.8	25.9	24.7	13.0	4.3	1.9	1.2	1.2	100.0	

* not distributed

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Table 20

PROJECTED EXPORTS, KOREA, 1951
(in 1,000,000)

Commodity	JAPAN	U.S.	S.E.ASIA INDONESIA INDIA,etc.	CHINA	USSR	AUSTRA-LIA	PHILIP-PINES	EUROPE	TOTAL	%
Grains	13.0	---	---	.5	1.5	---	---	---	15.0	17.9
Fisheries products ..	6.0	1.0	---	5.0	---	---	---	---	12.0	14.3
Other agric. products	---	---	.5	1.0	.5	---	---	---	2.0	2.4
Anthracite	5.0	---	---	1.0	---	---	---	---	6.0	7.1
Iron ore & pig iron ..	5.0	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	5.0	5.9
Gold	---	13.0	2.5	.5	---	---	---	---	16.0	19.1
Other minerals	3.0	1.0	---	---	1.0	---	---	---	5.0	5.9
Manuf. & handicrafts .	1.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	---	---	10.0	11.9
Textiles & fibers	.5	1.5	.5	.5	---	---	---	---	3.0	3.6
Electric power	---	---	---	2.0	---	---	---	---	2.0	2.4
Invisible exports* ...									6.0	7.1
Miscellaneous	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.4
TOTALS	33.5	19.5	5.5	12.5	4.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	84.0	100.0
Percentages (less visible exports)	43.0	25.0	7.0	16.0	5.1	1.3	1.3	1.3	100.0	

* not distributed

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Table 21

FOREIGN TRADE, KOREA, 1936, 1939, and PROJECTION 1951
(in $1,000)

(A) Summary

Category	Imports			Exports		
	1936	1939	1951	1936	1939	1951
Foodstuffs	23,484	30,412	4,000	87,175	66,582	29,000
Textiles	41,848	51,511	15,000	11,279	22,807	3,000
Minerals	34,409	48,930	18,000	17,306	27,486	32,000
Manufactures	65,503	131,993	26,000	18,380	34,495	10,000
Miscellaneous ...	56,025	96,354	21,000	38,051	110,286	10,000
TOTALS	221,269	359,220	64,000	172,141	261,656	64,000

FOREIGN TRADE, KOREA, 1936, 1939, and PROJECTION 1951
(Categories expressed in percentages of the whole)

(B) Summary

Category	Imports			Exports		
	1936	1939	1951	1936	1939	1951
Foodstuffs	10.4	8.4	4.8	50.7	25.5	34.6
Textiles & fibers	19.0	14.5	17.9	6.5	8.7	3.6
Minerals	15.4	13.6	21.5	10.0	10.5	38.0
Manufactures	29.9	36.8	30.8	10.6	13.2	11.9
Miscellaneous ...	25.3	26.7	25.0	22.2	42.1	11.9
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Foreign Commerce Yearbook, and Tables 19 and 20 of this study.

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This proposed trade program for 1951 is believed not to be too ambitious, if the primary conditions stipulated re fulfilled. It is forty-one per cent of the 1936 trade, on an absolute basis, or approximately twenty-five per cent if allowance is made for depreciation of the dollar. It is twenty-six per cent of the 1939 trade, absolutely, and about nineteen per cent on adjusted basis.

In the matter of imports, it will be noted that the percentages proposed for 1951 are not strikingly different from the actual percentages of 1936 and 1939. Foodstuffs, however, will have less than half their relative importance in 1936. It is suggested that this category should contain little besides salt and sugar, except possibly millet and small quantities of other rice substitutes. Textiles and fibers are limited to raw cotton, wool, hemp and certain industrial fabrics. Minerals include bituminous coal and processed metals for industrial use, such as tin plate. Manufactures include machinery, vehicles and parts, railway, communications and power equipment, and chemicals. Under the heading of miscellaneous are grouped raw rubber, petroleum, lumber and various invisible imports such as insurance charges, freight and services, as well as official expenditures abroad.

Of the proposed exports, rice and other grains will still rank high, but can scarcely be expected to regain their former relative importance as early as 1951. To feed the probable population and meet the other desired uses of rice which were in large part denied the Koreans under the Japanese, and still maintain an exportable surplus, will require very large amounts of chemical fertilizers. To anticipate production of the full requirement in the factories of the north by 1951 is hardly realistic, and to import fertilizers to produce rice for export might be an unwise investment of foreign exchange. On the other hand, it is believed that a vigorous program for rehabilitating and stimulating fisheries promises an early and profitable return. Edible marine products will find a ready market in Japan, China and, to a lesser extent, in the United States. Fish oils and meal will continue in demand throughout the world.

Textiles can hardly be available for export from Korea for a good many years to come, except perhaps in the case of silk fabrics. Cotton mills will be hard pressed to meet domestic demands without considerable expansion. The principal export in this category will be raw silk.

Minerals, it will be noted, occupy a position in the 1951 projection quite out of proportion to their earlier importance. The section of this study which deals with population demonstrates that mining suffered relatively less than other industries by repatriation of the Japanese, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that its recovery may be correspondingly rapid. It may be, however, that too much reliance is placed on availability of gold for export.

Manufactures, except handicraft production, are not likely to bulk large in the export program for a number of years. Too little is known about the present condition of facilities in the north to predict production with any hope of accuracy. Industries in the south produce principally consumer goods for the domestic market, and have never in the past been able to meet local requirements. Export manufactures may be expected to originate chiefly in the northern industrial areas, at Hungnam and elsewhere.

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In the miscellaneous category, invisible exports of labor and services are most important. Foreign missions, tourists and grants by educational and charitable institutions will undoubtedly produce appreciable amounts in foreign exchange.

While this program appears very small in comparison with Korea's 1936 trade, it is actually not as unfavorable as the bare statistics might indicate. No allowance is made for the transshipment of goods which so inflated past trade returns, and the expensive luxury items previously distributed among a tiny segment of the population, have been eliminated. The proposed program, if it is administered with skill, need not represent a lower standard of living for the great mass of the Korean people. On the contrary, it is designed to allow as liberal domestic consumption as is consonant with the complex requirements of the economy as a whole.

Needless to say, Korea's immediate economic prospects are not brilliant. To maintain the country at even the level reflected by this program will require favorable conditions for agricultural production, and concentrated effort to revive the fisheries and mines, not to speak of a governmental and national discipline which the Koreans may be reluctant to accept. The alternatives, however, are only too clear. Unless the basic fuels, manufactures and raw materials can be imported, Korea's chance of reestablishing and expanding its industrial plant will be lost, perhaps permanently. If the country does not begin at an early date to pay as it goes, it will be dangerously mortgaging its future and will run the risk of losing its economic independence.

Although Korea's domestic economy cannot be entirely restored under the best possible circumstances as early as 1951, it is possible that in the eight or nine years following 1951 the relative progress may be very striking. It is hoped that by 1960 the country will have at its service a considerable body of skilled workers. There is no reason why Korea cannot produce large quantities of textiles for export. The people have in the past shown aptitude for textiles manufacture, and their position in this trade could be comparable to that the Japanese previously occupied. Other manufactures, particularly of chemicals, using the waterpower of the north, could be of importance to the economy of the entire Far East. Resumption of large-scale manufacturing, and possible expansion of facilities, may be expected to reduce food exports, but should strengthen the over-all export position of the country. Given world peace and reasonable prosperity, it is not out of the question that by 1960 Korea may attain a gross foreign trade as large as that of 1936. As we have indicated, this would actually reflect a much higher standard of living for the ordinary Korean, with exports representing real surpluses of domestic production.

VI. Summary and Conclusions

It is hoped that the earlier sections of this study have afforded some reasonably accurate indications of what the Korean economy has been in the past, and of what it may be in the future. Although the reasonably well-informed and disinterested Korean, and American as well, may despair if he considers only what he now sees about him, it is still possible by seeking beyond the present to find cause for ultimate optimism. In spite of the fact that the country remains divided and the economy has reached its lowest estate in forty years, the land and people remain, as well as the still serviceable material foundations of a modern economy.

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Once a political equilibrium has been established among the Korean people themselves and in their external relations, the country's prime concern must be to salvage and learn to operate effectively the facilities left by the Japanese. This will be a long-range undertaking. To carry it through will require the most concentrated possible effort on the part of all Koreans. It will be no easy matter under the most favorable circumstances and with foreign aid, to replace the technical and administrative cadre represented by a Japanese population of more than 700,000, who were supported by the wealth, experience and trade relations of the Japanese Empire.

While Korea is schooling itself to manage a modern state, it will have at the same time to find its place in the new trade pattern of the Orient that must evolve as a consequence of the Japanese defeat. If the country is to realize the potential benefits of past Japanese investment and labor within its borders, and still remain free from foreign economic domination, it will have to find the means of developing and broadening its trade relations, while avoiding excessive unfavorable trade balances which might be liquidated by transfer of Korean capital assets to foreign ownership.

The equation, of which the Korean post-war economy is a factor, contains too many x-quantities to permit ready solution. In particular, the future course of Japan, China and the Soviet Union will have enormous bearing upon the alternatives that are open to Korea. However, there seems to be no doubt that if the Koreans themselves are to derive benefits from their resources comparable to those enjoyed by the Japanese, they will have to export on favorable terms.

The economic program which will implement Korea's liberation must take cognizance of the land's particular resources of all types. Economic thinking about Korea must be totally divested of the Japanese character which marked it for forty years. On the other hand, planning should not remain exclusively peninsular, but must look toward Korea's early participation in Oriental and world trade. More especially, those aspects of the economy which may make it possible for Korea to be self-sustaining in most important respects and to produce and export in sufficient volume to pay for basic imports, must have priority in any economic planning undertaken by the Provisional Government. The nation's first concern must be to expand and improve its agriculture by all practicable means. At the same time essential transport and communications must be maintained, basic consumer-goods manufacture must be fostered, preparations must be made for larger-scale manufacture as the economy is stabilized and training programs are completed, and facilities not immediately required must be preserved against further delapidation.

There is no fool-proof means of assuring success. Korea's economic liberation will be won only by years of hard, intelligent, devoted labor in an atmosphere of political stability and liberalism. Should the country fall into bickering factionalism, it may lose forever the opportunity which unification will offer it. All the energy, wisdom and forebearance that Korean leaders can command must be directed toward the creation of a vigorous, progressive state, moulded to the needs and capacities of all its citizens, and to the land's resources. Only in this manner can Korea be saved from reverting to the unenviable position it occupied at the commencement of the twentieth century.

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APPENDIX A - Population

Table 22

POPULATION OF ALL KOREA, 1925 - 1960

1925	19,522,000 1/	1951	30,025,000 2/
1930	21,058,000	1952	30,535,000
1935	22,899,000	1953	31,055,000
1940	24,326,000	1954	31,582,000
1944	25,900,000	1955	32,119,000
1946	27,590,000 2/	1956	32,666,000
1947	28,059,000 3/	1957	33,221,000
1948	28,536,000	1958	33,785,000
1949	29,031,000	1959	34,359,000
1950	29,524,000	1960	34,943,000

1/ Statistics for 1925 to 1944 are taken from the official Government-General of Chosen censuses for the respective years. Koreans, Japanese, and other nationals are included in figures for the period, 1924 - 1944. The period from 1946 to 1960 includes only Koreans. There have been relatively few foreign nationals, other than Japanese, in Korea. The maximum reached during the war was about 75,000, almost all of which were Chinese. These Chinese nationals lived mainly near the Manchurian border; and now the number of Chinese in southern Korea is only about 10,000.

2/ At the time of the census taken in May 1944, there were 708,448 Japanese civilians in Korea. By the end of 1946, almost all the Japanese nationals residing in southern Korea had been repatriated to Japan. By May 1947 only a few thousand Japanese civilians remained in northern Korea.

From the end of the war up to May 1947, over 1,100,000 Koreans have returned to Korea from Japan, over 500,000 have come back from China (including Manchuria, and about 33,000 have returned from other areas. Thus the excess of inflow of Koreans into Korea over the repatriation of Japanese nationals to Japan between August 1945 and May 1947 exceeds one million.

3/ Projected rate of increase between 1947 and 1960 is at the rate of 1.7 per cent per annum. This is approximately the same rate of natural increase as occurred between the years 1925 and 1944 in Korea. This projection assumes the inflow of population into Korea will approximately equal the outflow. The actual number of people living or entering Korea will depend upon many factors, including conditions and economic opportunities in Korea, Japan, and China and particularly in Manchuria.

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Table 23

POPULATION OF SOUTHERN KOREA, BY PROVINCES, May 1944 and September 1946
(and percentage of change)

GEOGRAPHICAL UNIT	TOTALS 1944*	TOTALS 1946	Percentage of increase	MEN 1944	MEN 1946	Percentage of increase	WOMEN 1944	WOMEN 1946	Percentage of increase
All of South Korea TOTALS	15,879,110	19,369,270	22.0	7,847,242	9,791,707	24.8	8,031,868	9,577,563	19.2
By Provinces									
Kyonggi	2,264,336	2,486,369	9.8	1,133,160	1,265,326	11.7	1,131,176	1,221,043	7.9
Seoul City	826,118	1,141,766	38.2	410,015	576,608	40.6	416,103	565,158	35.8
N. Chungchong	970,623	1,112,894	14.7	482,985	566,784	17.4	487,638	546,110	12.0
S. Chungchong	1,647,044	1,909,405	15.9	814,178	967,843	18.9	832,866	941,562	13.1
N. Cholla	1,639,213	2,016,428	23.0	804,299	1,025,041	27.4	834,914	991,387	18.7
S. Cholla	2,486,188	2,944,842	18.4	1,216,646	1,481,009	21.7	1,269,542	1,463,833	15.3
N. Kyongsang	2,561,251	3,178,750	24.1	1,259,638	1,602,361	27.2	1,301,613	1,576,389	21.1
S. Kyongsang	2,318,146	3,185,832	37.4	1,143,126	1,604,885	40.4	1,175,020	1,580,947	34.5
Kangwon	946,643	1,116,836	18.0	481,763	572,171	18.8	464,880	544,665	17.2
Cheju	219,548	276,148	25.8	101,432	129,679	27.8	118,116	146,469	24.0

* 1944 figures for Kyonggi and Kangwon Provinces are corrected to include only territory of these provinces as now constituted. This includes the portion of Hwanghae Province now under the jurisdiction of Kyonggi Province.

Source: Census of South Korea taken by the Department of Public Health and Welfare, USAMGIK, September 1946.

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Table 24

POPULATION OF KOREAN NATIONALS
BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE KOREA, 1925 -1947
(in thousands)*

	1925	1930	1935	1940	1944	1947
Within Korea						
TOTALS	19,020	20,438	22,208	23,547	25,120	28,059
Male	9,726	10,399	11,271	11,839	12,599	14,030
Female	9,294	10,039	10,937	11,708	12,521	14,029
Outside Korea						
TOTALS	720	1,234	1,579	2,326	3,292	1,636 ‡
in Japan	40	419	600	950	1,550	400
" China, mainly Manchuria	500	620	774	1,162	1,500	1,000
" Siberia	160	170	175	180	185	215
elsewhere	20	25	30	34	57	21
TOTAL KOREANS throughout the world ..	19,740	21,672	23,787	25,873	28,412	29,695

* Population statistics for Koreans within Korea, 1925 - 1944, are from official Japanese census reports; 1947 Korean population is estimated. Figures for Koreans abroad are taken from a wide variety of sources, mainly official Japanese and Office of Foreign Affairs, USAMGIK, reports. Estimates for Korean population in Siberia are on the basis of 1939 official Soviet census, which stated that there were 180,412 Koreans in the U.S.S.R. at that time, and from other unofficial reports. There has been a heavy movement of Koreans into Soviet Far Eastern areas since the end of the war, which has exceeded by at least 40,000 the movement of Soviet Koreans into northern Korea.

‡ Between the end of the war and April 1946, Koreans known to have entered southern Korea number: from Japan, 1,103,000; from China (mainly from Manchuria), 375,000; other areas, 33,000. An estimated 125,000 Koreans entered northern Korea from China (mainly from Manchuria), and a few thousands entered from Siberia.

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Table 25

TRENDS IN OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION IN KOREA, 1926 - 1944*
(in thousands)

A. Numbers of the Total Population Dependent Upon Various Occupations

Year	Agriculture		Industry and Mining		Commerce and Communications		Public and Professional Services	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1926	15,513	81.2	468	2.4	1,306	6.8	567	3.0
1930	15,912	78.6	532	2.6	1,432	7.1	706	3.5
1934	16,175	76.6	570	2.7	1 529	7.2	858	4.1
1938	16,660	73.6	972	4.3	1,820	8.0	892	3.9
1944	17,944	69.8	3,230	12.4	2,348	8.6	960	3.8

B. Numbers of Koreans Dependent Upon Various Occupations

1926	15;464	83.1	415	2.2	1,143	6.1	420	2.3
1930	15,853	80.5	449	2.3	1,254	6.4	523	2.6
1934	16,127	78.6	483	2.4	1,340	6.5	629	3.1
1938	16,616	75.6	843	3.9	1,619	7.4	646	2.9
1944	17,917	71.1	3,000	11.7	2,142	8.5	700	2.9

C. Numbers of Japanese Dependent Upon Various Occupations

1926	41	9.2	65	14.5	139	30.6	146	33.5
1930	42	8.4	72	14.4	147	29.4	177	35.2
1934	38	6.8	77	13.7	167	30.0	225	40.1
1938	34	5.4	120	23.0	185	29.1	241	38.0
1944	24	3.4	210	30.0	200	28.0	260	37.0

* These statistics do not include a variety of other miscellaneous occupations or the unemployed with together include from six to twelve per cent of the total. Therefore the percentages for any given year will total less than 100 per cent. Compiled from tables in Chosen Sotokufu (in Japanese, Chosen Sotokufu Tokei Nempo, 1936, pp. 22-23, 32-39), and from Nihon Takumu Daijin Kambo Bunsho-ku (Showa junen) Takuku Tokei, pp. 9-13. Figures for 1944 are compiled from Chosen Government-General Census, 1944.

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Table 26

POPULATION IN KOREA BY OCCUPATIONS, 1938
(in thousands)

Occupation	JAPANESE		KOREANS		OTHERS		TOTAL	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Agriculture	34	5.4	16,616	75.6	10	20.4	16,660	73.6
Fisheries	10	1.6	324	1.5	--	---	334	1.5
Mining	15	2.4	257	1.2	2	4.1	274	1.2
Industry	105	16.6	586	2.7	7	14.3	698	3.1
Commerce	148	23.3	1,422	6.5	15	30.6	1,585	7.0
Transportation ...	37	5.8	197	.9	1	2.0	235	1.0
Public Service and Professions	241	38.0	646	2.9	5	10.2	892	3.9
Others	44	6.9	1,902	8.7	9	18.4	1,955	8.7
TOTALS	634	100.0	21,952	100.0	49	100.0	22,633	100.0

Source: Japan Yearbook, 1940-41, p. 861.

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Table 27

POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS IN KOREA, 1944 (KOREANS)

Age	Managerial		Clerks & White Collar Workers		Professional & Technical		Laborers		Public Servants & Small Businessmen		Unemployed		TOTALS
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
under 12 yrs.	--	--	9	2	--	--	71,688	82,302	46	71	4,555,661	4,412,022	9,121,801
12-15	2	2	1,853	1,393	88	6	450,661	330,485	1,154	469	713,977	756,503	2,256,588
16-20	68	8	30,569	6,221	2,658	51	870,451	519,133	18,132	4,808	170,221	695,837	2,218,151
21-25	371	23	43,495	1,166	6,892	115	741,559	444,552	30,150	1,866	33,607	499,569	1,803,365
26-30	845	44	33,750	564	6,303	77	727,009	417,833	23,668	946	21,508	432,861	1,665,408
31-35	1,248	64	25,013	323	4,763	44	687,177	403,234	18,074	747	17,391	376,078	1,534,156
36-40	1,252	64	17,097	223	3,012	223	591,319	345,823	12,854	546	15,159	299,047	1,284,435
41-45	1,097	42	9,753	124	1,581	124	543,229	305,124	7,355	406	16,153	258,453	1,143,330
46-50	878	53	5,895	58	979	58	498,997	264,537	4,624	336	19,511	242,344	1,038,221
51-55	594	36	2,921	27	623	27	412,062	216,495	2,670	289	27,353	234,210	897,284
56-60	367	8	1,236	23	367	4	294,598	136,737	1,549	228	43,512	216,568	695,202
over 60	429	21	831	42	635	4	403,949	160,653	1,854	561	264,812	626,431	1,460,222
TOTALS	7,151	365	172,422	10,166	27,901	366	6,292,704	3,626,908	122,130	11,273	5,898,865	8,949,923	25,120,174

Source: Results of 1944 Census (written in Japanese), Chosen Government-General, May 1944. Compiled from tables on pp. 2-3.

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Table 28

POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS IN KOREA, 1944 (JAPANESE)

Age	Managerial		Clerks & White Collar Workers		Professional & Technical		Laborers		Public Servants & Small Businessmen		Unemployed		TOTALS
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
under 12 yrs.	---	---	---	2	---	---	28	35	---	4	113,161	110,409	223,639
12-15	---	2	330	564	17	3	4,509	1,410	169	69	23,995	24,720	55,787
16-20	11	4	7,638	8,485	1,449	83	14,617	8,539	1,707	3,074	12,527	14,899	73,033
21-25	14	1	3,795	2,609	1,033	67	4,793	5,472	3,565	1,450	1,550	28,391	52,740
26-30	87	20	6,884	882	2,121	55	7,586	3,274	8,199	663	670	31,107	61,548
31-35	257	24	6,694	504	2,463	44	7,349	3,008	7,066	606	397	27,194	55,606
36-40	380	26	6,461	434	2,373	33	7,083	2,527	5,923	366	282	19,106	44,994
41-45	585	33	7,233	295	2,080	27	7,412	2,839	4,448	231	348	15,223	40,754
46-50	570	37	5,507	206	1,333	13	6,280	2,456	3,056	191	346	10,849	30,844
51-55	566	37	4,304	161	874	11	5,304	2,148	1,975	158	472	8,612	24,622
56-60	477	36	2,670	96	495	10	4,516	1,473	1,198	113	1,060	6,381	18,525
over 60	465	33	1,841	106	248	6	5,087	1,442	935	141	4,308	11,744	26,356
TOTALS	3,412	253	53,357	14,344	14,486	352	74,564	34,623	38,240	7,066	159,116	308,635	708,448

Source: Results of 1944 Census (written in Japanese), Chosen Government-General, May 1944. Compiled from tables on pp. 31-32.

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Table 29

INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS FOR ALL KOREA, 1943

A. All Industry

Category	LABORERS				TECHNICIANS & ENGINEERS		
	TOTAL	Japanese	Koreans	Others	TOTAL	Japanese	Koreans
TOTAL for all Industry	549,751	26,966	512,907	9,878	9,852	7,993	1,859
Male workers	456,925	24,042	423,087	9,796	9,821	7,973	1,848
Female workers	92,826	2,924	89,820	82	31	20	11
Metals (645 concerns)							
Male workers	39,860	4,742	34,682	256	1,422	1,273	149
Female workers	1,824	340	1,479	5	1	1	--
Machine Tools (1,345 concerns)							
Male workers	46,367	3,789	42,399	179	1,572	1,212	360
Female workers	1,454	196	1,258	--	1	1	--
Chemicals (927 concerns)							
Male workers	50,695	7,441	42,879	375	2,316	2,089	227
Female workers	13,023	1,212	11,811	--	16	7	9
Gas, Electric, Water (123 concerns)							
Male workers	6,676	903	5,772	1	1,027	788	239
Female workers	245	146	99	--	1	1	--
Ceramics & Cement (1,818 concerns)							
Male workers	32,775	685	31,070	2	263	215	48
Female workers	4,145	54	4,091	--	1	1	--
Textiles (2,605 concerns)							
Male workers	26,858	759	25,913	186	604	458	146
Female workers	52,905	615	52,227	13	2	1	1
Lumber (2,005 concerns)							
Male workers	26,809	511	25,281	1,017	104	77	27
Female workers	1,608	32	1,560	16	--	--	--
Food Processing (2,202 concerns)							
Male workers	24,247	845	23,202	200	370	263	107
Female workers	7,511	117	7,393	1	--	--	--
Printing (606 concerns)							
Male workers	9,377	175	9,187	15	1	1	--
Female workers	676	30	645	1	--	--	--
Engineering & Construction (1,700 concerns)							
Male workers	183,157	3,954	172,131	7,072	2,036	1,496	540
Female workers	3,641	133	3,507	1	--	--	--
All Others (871 concerns)							
Male workers	10,284	238	9,771	275	105	100	5
Female workers	5,794	49	5,700	45	9	8	1

Source: Report on 1943 Census of Laborers and Technicians in Korea (written in Japanese), Chosen Government-General, 1943. Compilation from tables on pp. 2-276.

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Table 30

INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS FOR ALL KOREA, 1943

B. All Mining (1,239 miles)

Category	LABORERS TOTAL	Japanese	Koreans	Others	TECHNICIANS & ENGINEERS TOTAL	Japanese	Koreans
TOTAL for All Mining	183,358	1,935	178,881	2,542	3,468	2,145	1,323
Male workers	170,075	1,660	165,875	2,540	3,465	2,144	1,321
Female workers	13,283	275	13,006	2	3	1	2
Coal & Metal (1,044 mines)							
Male workers	159,767	1,558	155,782	2,427	3,414	2,001	1,313
Female workers	12,594	271	12,321	2	3	1	2
1) Metal (594 mines)							
Male workers	84,168	1,089	82,320	759	1,818	1,250	568
Female workers	6,473	203	6,270	--	2	--	2
2) Coal (82 mines)							
Male workers	54,902	323	52,915	1,664	1,306	680	626
Female workers	2,394	61	2,331	2	1	1	--
3) Others (368 mines)							
Male workers	20,697	14	20,547	4	291	171	120
Female workers	3,727	7	3,720	--	--	--	--
Sand (28 mines)							
Male workers	2,621	15	2,606	--	26	23	3
Female workers	6	1	5	--	--	--	--
Excavating (167 mines)							
Male workers	7,687	87	7,487	113	25	20	5
Female workers	683	3	680	--	--	--	--

C. Transportation (excluding Government Railroads)

TOTAL	85,589	4,791	80,128	670	1,125	1,003	122
Male workers	79,235	3,405	75,162	668	1,125	1,003	122
Female workers	6,354	1,386	4,966	2	--	--	--

D. Business Offices, Commercial Stores, Other Business Enterprises

TOTAL	24,419	3,675	20,545	199	3,934	1,343	2,591
Male workers	19,565	1,747	17,621	197	3,932	1,342	2,590
Female workers	4,854	1,928	2,924	2	2	1	1

Source: Report on 1943 Census of Laborers and Technicians in Korea (written in Japanese), Chosen Government-General, 1943. Compilation from tables on pp. 302-426.

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Table 31

STATUS OF EDUCATION OF POPULATION IN KOREA, 1944

Educational Status	KOREANS		JAPANESE		ALL KOREA TOTALS*	Japanese Percentage of Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Graduate Students (on university level)	7,272	102	7,147	83	14,604	50.0
Graduates College, Normal and Technical Schools	18,555	3,509	14,921	4,324	41,309	47.0
Graduates Middle School	162,111	37,531	68,366	86,868	354,876	44.0
Preparatory School (equivalent of Jr. High School) at least two yrs. Middle School	40,702	9,240	76,848	65,582	192,372	74.0
Graduates of National Primary Schools	1,281,490	355,552	52,543	75,367	1,764,952	7.0
Attendants of National Primary Schools	190,250	64,555	2,141	5,573	262,519	3.0
"Literate," without a formal education (self-taught)	864,308	115,814	---	---	980,122	.0
Uneducated, no formal schooling or class instruction	8,430,940	11,211,835	75,578	82,762	19,801,115	.8
TOTALS	10,995,628	11,798,138	297,544	320,559	23,411,869	

* Information available only on number of persons listed here.

Source: Results of 1944 Census, Chosen Government-General, May 1944. Compiled from tables on pp. 142-169.

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Table 32

STATISTICS ON SCHOOLS IN KOREA, 1939

A. Primary and Secondary Schools for Japanese (3% of total population in Korea)

Type of School	Number of Schools	Teaching Staff	Enrollment
Primary Schools	513	2,558	92,991
Middle Schools	17	358	8,320
Girls' High Schools	32	489	12,770

B. Primary and Secondary Schools for Koreans (97% of the total population)

Common (primary)	2,607	14,339	1,002,327
Sohtang (private common sch)	5,293	---	172,456
Higher Common Schools	33	689	17,502
Girls' Higher Common Schools	21	342	7,891

C. Higher and Special Schools in Korea

Agricultural Schools	36	428	8,347
Commercial Schools	25	429	10,804
Vocational Schools	9	134	2,359
Technical Schools	180	931	11,657
Fishery Schools	3	34	270
Engineering Schools	1	24	267
Normal Schools	8	257	4,959
Colleges	15	--	4,250
Universities	1	624	501

Source: Statistics from Department of Education, USAMGIK. These are official Japanese statistics on schools in Korea.

Table 33

STATUS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN KOREA, 1946

Type of Schools	SOUTH KOREA[1] Number of Schools	SOUTH KOREA[1] Number of Students*	NORTH KOREA[2] Number of Schools	NORTH KOREA[2] Number of Students*	TOTAL, ALL KOREA Number of Schools	TOTAL, ALL KOREA Number of Students*
Primary	3,140	2,148,000	2,338	1,075,000	5,478	3,223,000
Secondary	266	92,000	299	84,000	565	176,000
Colleges	11	4,500	9	3,300	20	7,800

* Number of students compiled by thousands, hence approximate figures given.

1 Statistics from the Department of Education, USAMGIK. This includes only public schools.

2 From Chosun Sinmun (Pyongyang newspaper) of 21 August 1946. These figures include all government-approved schools, public and private. Reports from north of the 38th parallel indicate that the schools are being utilized largely as agencies for dissemination of communist propaganda.

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Table 34

LAND UTILIZATION, ALL KOREA, 1942, 1946, 1951
(unit: Chongbo = 2.45 acres)

Year	Cultivated Area			Forest Land	Waste Land	Other Land*	TOTALS
	Paddy	Dry	Sub-Totals				
1942	1,724,237	2,695,057	4,419,334	15,803,598	36,448	324,002	20,582,382
1946	1,758,719	2,668,147	4,426,866	15,821,611	35,718	329,715	20,673,910
1951‡	1,850,675	2,665,479	4,516,154	15,789,655	35,004	334,417	20,675,230

* other land includes roads, rivers, building sites, etc.

‡ estimate by Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK.

Source: Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK.

Table 35

PLANTED AREA FOR ALL KOREA, 1930 - 1951

Year	1930, 1934, 1936	1940-1944	1945	1946	1951
Chongbo (2.45 acres)	5,985,000	5,828,021	5,487,110	5,785,902	5,956,721

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Table 36

AREA PLANTED AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS, ALL KOREA, FOR 1930,1934,1936, 1940-44, 1945

CROP	Unit of Measure	1930,1934,1936 Average		1940-44 Average		1945	
		Area Planted (in cho)	Production	Area Planted (in cho)	Production	Area Planted (in cho)	Production
Rice (brown)	suk	1,658,435	18,436,226	1,469,559	19,374,286	1,489,502	18,891,335
Summer grains	"	1,359,273	10,488,321	1,480,310	11,073,703	1,156,839	4,460,091
Other cereals	"	1,308,859	7,791,113	1,196,909	6,389,363	1,171,581	6,339,927
Pulses	"	1,086,100	5,108,914	841,517	3,326,945	819,908	3,344,155
Vegetables	kwan	146,727	352,265,071	190,257	360,217,619	172,032	326,040,885
Potatoes	"	122,695	195,368,021	196,159	267,118,774	272,950	385,647,352
Fruits	"	14,518	25,335,910	39,192	41,727,592	37,233	40,475,851
Cotton	kun	204,992	153,727,002	317,090	235,959,492	276,927	221,541,440
Mulberry (cocoon)	kwan	no data available		no data available		no data available	
Other fibers	kwan	42,031	8,828,218	57,040	14,807,394	53,481	13,335,613
Tobacco	"	15,485	4,597,947	15,204	6,146,720	18,142	8,478,778
Ginseng	kun	210	1,030,597	no data available		no data available	
Pyrethreum	kwan	100	10,573	770	116,878	797	118,213
Peppermint	"	747	614,979	358	255,868	371	253,330
Other indus.crops	suk	25,428	101,184	23,656	70,892	17,347	76,368
TOTALS		5,985,600		5,828,021		5,487,110	

one suk - approx. 5 bushels
one kwan - 8.269 pounds
one kun - 1.323 pounds

Source: Statistics Section, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK.

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Table 37

ESTIMATED LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION, ALL KOREA, FOR THE YEARS 1930,1934,1936, 1940-44, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1951

Animals	1930, 1934, 1936 Average	1940-44 5-yr. Average	1945	1946	1947	1951
Cattle (work)	1,659,997	1,710,191	1,221,425	1,158,336	1,272,612	1,796,395
Cattle (milk)	1,915	3,180	3,196	2,049	2,687	6,350
Horses	53,636	52,362	47,327	47,907	52,610	74,250
Swine	1,514,661	1,012,226	389,814	362,662	445,920	894,218
Sheep	6,392	41,069	20,818	13,133	13,333	14,431
Goats	31,508	47,319	30,906	27,224	31,443	51,266
Rabbits	49,592	129,284	22,444	15,068	29,762	146,691
Poultry	6,814,489	5,586,728	3,221,696	3,032,778	3,629,068	6,570,895

Source: Statistics Section, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK.

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Table 38

ESTIMATED AREA PLANTED AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS, ALL KOREA, FOR 1946, 1947, 1951
(planted acreage in Chongbo = 2.45 acres)

CROP	Unit of Measure	1946 Area Planted (in cho)	1946 Production	1947* Area Planted (in cho)	1947* Production	1951* Area Planted (in cho)	1951* Production
Rice	suk	1,547,218	17,042,948	1,595,377	22,698,812	1,595,377	27,692,551
Summer grains	"	1,047,513	7,378,353	1,190,797	8,799,447	1,234,443	10,559,336
Other cereals	"	1,163,702	6,924,609	1,207,158	7,984,279	1,207,158	9,581,134
Pulses	"	810,289	3,123,366	927,419	4,894,718	972,814	5,873,661
Vegetables	kwan	180,976	334,986,069	197,856	548,391,724	197,856	628,070,057
Potatoes	"	195,416	262,121,305	205,318	442,519,894	205,318	531,023,873
Fruits	"	39,975	39,641,210	41,152	42,562,141	41,152	51,074,567
Cotton	kun	235,388	186,094,810	332,412	265,849,728	332,412	319,019,674
Mulberry (cocoons)	kwan					81,778	6,542,258
Other fibers	kwan	49,314	11,601,640	39,513	9,854,421	39,513	11,825,305
Tobacco	"	20,157	9,420,865	21,165	9,891,908	21,165	11,870,290
Ginseng	kun	no data available		1,389	5,056,268	1,389	6,067,522
Pyrethreum	kwan	693	102,794	672	99,710	672	119,652
Peppermint	"	322	230,281	371	264,823	371	317,788
Other indus.crops	suk	24,244	70,386	25,303	74,141	25,303	88,969
TOTALS		5,315,207		5,785,902		5,956,721	

one suk - approx. 5 bushels
one kwan - 8.269 pounds
one kun - 1.323 pounds

* Department of Agriculture estimates for 1947 and 1951 are considered over-optimistic, but they do indicate the possibilities for substantial increasing production and returning Korea to a food-surplus position.

Source: Statistics Section, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK.

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Table 39

IRRIGATION IN KOREA, 1946 and 1951
(unit is Chongbo = 2.45 acres)

	Area in Organized Associations	Area in Tidal Projects	Other Area under Irrigation	TOTAL AREA
Estimated Base - 1946	356,367	29,997	844,739	1,231,103
Estimated Additional Area 1947-1951	116,134	2,553	83,115	201,802
Estimated Base - 1951	472,501	32,550	927,854	1,432,905

Table 40

IRRIGATION OF PADDY FIELDS, SOUTH KOREA, 1940,
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950
(in 1,000 acres)

Item	1940	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
Organized Districts, with ontrolled rrigation	395	634	696	759	821	880
Partial and Uncontrolled Irrigation Areas	1,128	1,118	1,108	1,100	1,090	1,075
Non-Irrigated Areas	1,745	1,518	1,468	1,414	1,363	1,320
TOTAL RICE LAND	3,268	3,270	3,272	3,273	3,274	3,275

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Table 41

FERTILIZER REQUIREMENTS OF KOREA, NEEDED FOR MAXIMUM PRODUCTION, 1947 and 1951*

	1947 (in Chongbo)	TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	1951 (in Chongbo)	TOTAL REQUIREMENTS
Cultivated Area	5,785,902		5,956,721	
Rate of Application (per Chongbo)				
Nitrogen (N)	.0277 M.T.	160,269 M.T.	.0419 M.T.	249,585 M.T.
Phosphate (P_2O_5)	.01 5 "	72,324 "	.0261 "	155,470 "
Potash (K_5O)	.0039 "	22,565 "	.0127 "	75,640 "

* Given such applications of fertilizer, it is estimated that agricultural production can be very materially increased over current levels to allow for substantial exports of cereals from Korea. It has been estimated that 250,000 to 300,000 metric tons will be available for export in 1951, even though the amounts of fertilizer needed for maximum production are not fully available.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE PROPOSALS TO INCREASE INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION OF FERTILIZERS TO MEET 1951 REQUIREMENTS AS OUTLINED IN Table 41

1. Nitrogen

20% ammonium sulphate annual requirements ..... 1,247,935 metric tons.
estimated annual production, present facilities ..... 512,400 " "

20% calcium cyanimid, present facilities ..... 30,800 " "
Deficit ..... 704,735 " "

Proposed installations for nitrogen requirements:

Kowon (Kogen) South Hamkyung Province	ammonium sulphate	375,000	"	"
Kanggye (Kokai) N. Pyongan Province	ammonium sulphate	300,000	"	"
Kunsan, North Cholla Province	calcium cyanimid	50,000	"	"

2. Phosphoric Acid

It is assumed that 25% of the phosphoric acid requirements will be imported high analysis phosphate rock. This material would produce 250,808 metric tons of superphosphate (16.66%).

Plant at Inchon, Kyonggi Province ..... 36,000 metric ton
Plant at Chinnampo, South Pyongan Province ..... 30,000 " "
Proposed acidulation plant at Pusan, capacity ..... 200,000 " "

The other 75% of the phosphoric acid requirements is to be met by grinding 583,010 metric tons of native raw rock phosphate analyzing 20% P_2O_5 and applied directly to the soil. The grinding plants should be located in relation to phosphate deposits and transportation facilities.

3. Potash

The requirements for 75,640 metric tons of K_2O is to be met by enlarging the Mokpo plant for processing alemite to the extent that 1,100,000 metric tons of the roasted alemite product are produced analyzing about 7% K_2O. This product will be of a low grade and transportation costs per unit of K_2O will be high. However, this is the only way that Korea's potash requirements can be met out of native production.

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Table 42

A. KOREAN FISH CATCH, 1938

Kind of Fish	Quantity (1,000 tons)	Value in Yen
Sardines	975.5	¥ 22,900,000
Other fish	620.5	54,100,000
Shell fish	26.3	2,200,000
Other animals	61.5	5,100,000
Seaweed	75.3	2,800,000
TOTALS	1,759.1	¥ 87,100,000

B. MANUFACTURED SEA PRODUCTS, KOREA, 1938

Food Products	Quantity (in tons)	Value in Yen
Dried, salted and boiled fish	100,300	¥ 27,756,000
Salty fish	12,800	3,217,000
Seaweed	10,200	6,915,000
Other foods	12,600	2,595,000
Sub-totals	135,900	40,483,000
Other Products		
Fertilizer	198,900	28,926,000
Fish oil	116,000	21,979,000
Other products	2,500	1,252,000
Sub-totals	317,400	52,157,000
TOTALS	453,300	¥ 92,640,000

Source: Bureau of Fisheries, Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK.

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Table 43

TOTAL LANDED FISH IN KOREA*
(in metric tons)

Year	ALL KOREA	North Korea	South Korea
1939	1,758,100	1,166,100	592,000
1941	1,318,038	855,125	462,913
1942	845,781	468,433	377,348
1943	776,333	388,192	388,141
1944	690,000	428,368	261,632
1945	420,000	210,448	209,552
1946	496,000	209,033	286,967

* Explanation of the sharp decline in total landed fish between 1939 and the years following 1942 is explained largely by the fact that the sardines catch, which totalled closed to 1,000,000 tons per year, dropped to negligible proportions. The reason for this decline is that the sardine schools left Korean waters.

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APPENDIX C - Industrial Establishment

It is very nearly impossible to provide a precise and detailed history of the industrialization of Korea under the Japanese. Statistics of all sorts published by the Government-General of Chosen, while affording a general impression of the country's economic development, elude analysis. Those relating to industrial output are especially unsatisfactory since much of the establishment was created shortly before and after the Japanese went to war with the Allies. However, for what they are worth, the tables in this appendix are offered as an indication of Korea's industrial capacity as of about 1944, and of certain subsequent developments. The information has been drawn from various sources, particularly the 1944 census of Korea and the Summary Industrial Survey of Korea, issued by the Foreign Economic Administration in 1945.

1. In 1937 the Japanese divided Korea into five industrial districts:

   (1) "Hokusen," in the northeast, containing chiefly chemical, iron, steel, aluminum and magnesium industries, and the cities of Hungnam, Songjin, Kilchu, Chongjin, Aoji and Wonsan.

   (2) "Seisein," in the west, containing the industrial centers of Haeju, Kyomipo, Chinnampo, Pyongyang, and Sinuiju.

   (3) "Keijin," in central Korea, including Seoul, Inchon and Yongdongpo, and important manufacturing centers for chemicals, textiles, iron and steel, light metals, machinery and ordnance.

   (4) "Nansen," in the southeast, containing chemicals, textiles, shipbuilding, iron and machinery industries in the cities of Sam Chok, Pusan and Yong Wal.

   (5) "Konan," in the southwest, containing principally machinery and textile industries in the cities of Kunsan, Chongju, Mokpo and Taejon.

2. The development of Korean industry by 1944 is indicated in the following table, which should be compared with Table 7.

Table 44

FACTORIES AND WORKERS, BY PRODUCT, KOREA, 1944

Type of Factory	Number of Factories	Per Cent of Total Factories	Number of Workers Employed	Per Cent of Total Workers
Textile	2,082	16.9	81,441	19.2
Metal working	619	5.0	61,523	14.7
Machinery & tools	1,226	10.0	64,048	15.2
Ceramics	1,952	15.9	44,192	10.5
Chemical	1,019	8.3	70,338	16.6
Lumber & woodworking	1,799	14.6	30,682	7.4
Printing & binding	586	4.8	10,121	2.4
Food processing	1,990	16.2	36,006	8.6
Gas & electricity	140	1.1	7,725	1.9
Miscellaneous	888	7.2	15,153	3.5
TOTALS	12,301	100.0	421,229	100.0

Source: Census of Chosen, 1944. In addition, there were 1,523 civil engineering and construction firms employing 252,572 workers.

A further breakdown , by type of factory, is given in Table 45.

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Table 45

CENSUS OF MANUFACTURING - NORTH & SOUTH KOREA - 1944

	No. Firms			No. Employees		
	N.K.	S.K.	Total	N.K.	S.K.	Total
TOTAL MANUFACTURING	3,721	8,580	12,301	176,513	244,717	421,239
A - Metallic Industries	199	420	619	43,531	17,992	61,523
1. Metal smelting, refining, processing	32	17	49	38,272	6,630	44,902
Iron	16	7	23	24,445	3,394	27,839
Copper	1	-	1	2,655	-	2,655
Zinc	2	-	2	285	-	285
* Lead	3	1	4	1,549	316	1,865
Magnesium	5	1	6	2,562	551	3,102
Tungsten	-	1	1	-	1,477	1,477
Other refining & process.	1	1	2	434	284	718
Brass manufacture	-	2	2	-	36	36
Other alloy products ...	-	2	2	-	32	32
2. Casting and Forging	60	92	152	2,941	6,114	9,055
Pig iron	56	68	124	2,077	3,121	5,198
Forged pig iron	-	2	2	-	168	168
Copper casting	2	10	12	853	2,561	3,414
Bronze casting	-	3	3	-	39	39
Aluminum casting	-	4	4	-	171	171
Other castings	2	5	7	11	54	65
3. Plating	2	11	13	15	65	80
Zinc	-	6	6	-	33	33
Nickel	1	3	4	6	15	21
Other plating	1	2	3	9	17	26
4. Other Metallic Industries	105	300	405	2,303	5,183	7,486
Chains	-	3	3	-	75	75
Springs	-	4	4	-	243	243
Steel wire	-	2	2	-	445	445
Metallic nets	2	9	11	9	103	112
Bolts,nuts,washers,rivets	15	9	24	274	344	618
Nails	2	10	12	111	190	301
Needles	4	3	7	68	79	147
Metallic plate goods ...	14	33	47	133	337	470
Hardware for bldg.& furn.	3	10	13	28	140	168
Metallic fixt.& furn. ..	1	3	4	7	64	71
Construction material (bridges,buildings)	4	5	9	516	204	720
Metallic utensils	2	6	8	102	94	196
Kitchen utensils	1	6	7	6	92	98
Horseshoes and nails ...	3	6	9	23	251	274
Blacksmithing	20	111	131	326	966	1,292
Metal shearing	-	3	3	-	57	57
Welding	10	26	36	120	225	345
Other industries	24	51	75	580	1,274	1,854
B - Machines and Tools	397	829	1,226	20,673	43,375	64,048
1. Motor Industry	27	51	78	1,221	1,607	2,828
Steam boilers	2	3	5	53	41	94
Steam engines & turbines	-	1	1	-	14	14
Internal combustion engines	12	30	42	368	1,288	1,656
Water mills	3	-	3	16	-	16
Motor parts & accessories	10	17	27	784	264	1,048
2. Electric Machines & Tools	10	41	51	155	2,140	2,295
Machines and tools	9	34	43	151	1,882	2,033
Communication instruments (wireless)	1	7	8	4	258	262
3. Electric Wire and Cable.	-	1	1	-	233	233
4. Electric Batteries	-	4	4	-	271	271
*(insert) Aluminum	4	2	6	6,342	551	6,893

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	No. Firms			No. Employees		
	N.K.	S.K.	Total	N.K.	S.K.	Total
5. Machine Tools	23	29	52	2,080	1,349	3,429
Metallic tools (shearing, grinding)	-	4	4	-	150	150
Other metallic tools ...	2	4	6	66	543	609
Metallic tools,parts,acces.	13	11	24	1,832	219	2,051
Timbering & woodwork mach.	4	3	7	82	46	128
Tools	4	7	11	100	391	491
6. Mining Machinery	28	38	66	1,390	1,629	3,019
7. Chemical Machinery	14	10	24	1,954	288	2,242
Machines, implements for chemical industry	11	9	20	1,899	276	2,175
Machines for Pottery Ind.	3	1	4	55	12	67
8. Spinning & Weaving Machines	4	11	15	33	129	162
9. Other Types of Machines.	5	31	36	31	466	497
Mach.for gas production.	2	4	6	17	171	188
Food machines	2	1	3	12	10	22
Printing machines	-	6	6	-	41	41
Sewing machines	1	14	15	2	171	173
Other machines	-	6	6	-	73	73
10. Railroad Rolling Stock..	4	9	13	2,740	10,393	13,133
11. Automobiles	36	64	100	929	3,642	4,571
Large cars	14	18	32	498	1,531	2,029
Small cars	2	8	10	41	109	150
Motorcycles & tricycles.	1	-	1	5	-	5
Motor car parts & acces.	19	38	57	385	2,002	2,387
12. Bicycles & Other Vehicles	58	132	190	378	875	1,253
Bicycles	7	26	33	22	166	188
Other vehicles	51	106	157	356	709	1,065
13. Ship Building	29	67	96	3,170	6,652	9,822
Steel ships	-	1	1	-	2,148	2,148
Other ships	29	66	95	3,170	4,504	7,674
14. Aircraft and Parts	7	28	35	2,344	2,597	4,941
Airplanes	3	3	6	2,208	171	2,379
Parts & accessories	4	25	29	136	2,426	2,562
15. Transportation Machinery	4	2	6	113	16	129
16. Pumps, Hydraulic Presses, Electric Fans	1	11	12	2	354	356
Pumps & hydraulic press machines	1	8	9	2	323	325
Electric fans and gas compressors	-	3	3	-	31	31
17. Farm & Construction Machy.	48	117	165	601	1,531	2,132
Machines & implements ..	39	97	136	392	1,339	1,731
Bldg.-constr.machines ..	9	20	29	209	192	401
18. Meters & Measuring Instr.	10	23	33	55	778	833
Measures and scales	3	8	11	14	495	509
Gas and water meters ...	-	1	1	-	86	86
Electrometers	-	1	1	-	9	9
Clocks and watches	7	13	20	41	188	229
19. Scientific & Medical Instr.	-	4	4	-	37	37
20. Optical Instruments	1	7	8	7	35	42
21. Illuminating Machines ..	1	14	15	12	698	710
Light bulbs	-	11	11	-	668	668
Other illuminating machs.	1	3	4	12	30	42
22. Musical Instruments and Phonographs	-	1	1	-	4	4
23. Guns, Bullets and Other Ordnance	36	43	79	1,776	6,188	7,964
24. Other Machines & Instr..	15	46	61	670	1,201	1,871
Safes	1	1	2	5	4	9
Valves and cocks	-	2	2	-	53	53
Bearings	-	1	1	-	224	224

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	No. Firms			No. Employees		
	N.K.	S.K.	Total	N.K.	S.K.	Total
24. (cont'd)						
Gears	1	1	2	30	10	40
Ball bearing wheels and shafts	-	5	5	-	62	62
Other parts & accessories	2	10	12	58	130	188
Other machines and tools	11	26	37	577	718	1,295
25. Machine & Equipment Installation	36	45	81	1,012	484	1,496
Installn.of elec.machs.	20	25	45	327	276	603
Installn.other machines	16	20	36	685	208	893
C - Chemical Industries	230	789	1,019	37,100	33,238	70,338
1. Medical drugs & medicines	10	93	103	314	2,904	3,218
2. Industrial chemicals ..	16	7	23	4,105	987	5,092
Industrial soda	-	1	1	-	395	395
Sulphuric Acid	2	-	2	180	-	180
Compressed gas	5	3	8	67	46	107
Carbide	4	1	5	3,307	487	3,694
Other ind.chemicals ...	5	2	7	651	65	716
3. Salt Industry	25	72	97	4,138	3,834	7,972
4. Dyes and Mediums	2	5	7	28	53	81
Natural dyes	1	4	5	13	46	59
Synthetic dyes & mediums	1	1	2	15	7	22
5. Paints and Pigments ...	-	20	20	-	610	610
Paints	-	15	15	-	540	540
Pigments	-	5	5	-	70	70
6. Ignition Articles	8	9	17	3,374	2,040	5,414
Matches	3	8	11	166	1,653	1,819
Other ignit.articles ..	5	1	6	3,208	387	3,595
7. Mineral Oil	5	1	6	6,753	17	6,770
Coal-tar & distillates.	-	1	1	-	17	17
Petroleum refining	2	-	2	848	-	848
Synthetic petroleum ...	3	-	3	5,905	-	5,905
8. Vegetable Oils	15	67	82	519	1,148	1,667
9. Animal Oils and Fats ..	10	7	17	128	66	194
Fish oil	8	6	14	121	57	178
Animal fats	2	1	3	7	9	16
10. Wax and Refined Oil ...	3	7	10	328	196	524
Candles	-	4	4	-	44	44
Finishing oil	3	3	6	328	152	480
11. Rubber Goods Industry .	14	51	65	1,257	6,078	7,335
Rubber goods	14	49	63	1,257	5,765	7,022
Reproduced rubber	-	2	2	-	313	313
12. Pulp Industry	3	3	6	1,673	62	1,735
13. Paper Industry	27	274	301	831	4,443	5,274
14. Celluloid Industry	-	2	2	-	14	14
15. Chemical Fiber Industry	2	1	3	2,994	18	3,012
Rayon thread	1	-	1	1,615	-	1,615
Staple fiber	1	1	2	1,379	18	1,397
16. Fertilizer Industry ...	14	9	23	5,936	457	6,393
Vegetable fertilizer ..	1	-	1	215	-	215
Animal fertilizer	7	4	11	142	211	353
Mineral & compound fert.	6	5	11	5,579	246	5,825
17. Leather Industry	3	16	19	112	3,824	3,936
Leather	3	14	17	112	3,802	3,914
Leather working	-	2	2	-	22	22
18. Soap & Cosmetic Industry	4	22	26	152	611	763
19. Other Chemical Industries	69	123	192	4,458	5,876	10,334
Synthetic resin material and products	-	1	1	-	64	64
Vulcanized fiber	-	1	1	-	6	6
Fireproof cloth and immitation leather	-	4	4	-	58	58
Waterproof building paper and cloth	-	1	1	-	26	26

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	No. firms			No. Employees		
	N.K.	S.K.	Total	N.K.	S.K.	Total
20. (Cont'd)						
Film and dry-plates ...	-	2	2	-	23	23
Tannin	1	2	3	9	377	386
Paste	1	2	3	6	31	37
Insecticides & antiseptics	1	1	2	12	80	92
Grinding & polishing Matls.	1	3	4	97	376	473
Carbon products	4	6	10	817	106	923
Coke	3	4	7	210	353	563
Other chemical goods ..	58	96	154	3,307	4,376	7,683
D - Gas, Electric and Water.	69	71	140	4,849	2,876	7,725
1. Gas industry	3	6	9	46	253	299
2. Electric industry	60	52	112	4,470	2,308	6,778
3. Water	6	13	19	333	315	648
E - Ceramics and Cements ...	597	1,355	1,952	20,356	23,836	44,192
1. Ceramics and patterns for pottery	139	306	445	2,176	4,222	6,398
Pottery	139	305	444	2,176	4,195	6,371
Patterns for pottery ..	-	1	1	-	27	27
2. Glass & glass goods Ind.	6	71	77	187	2,153	2,340
3. Cement Industry	7	1	8	4,408	564	4,972
4. Other Ceramics	377	854	1,231	12,539	14,589	27,128
Bricks & fire-proofed ceramics	118	133	251	8,639	5,954	14,593
Roof tiles	196	615	811	2,211	6,586	8,797
Lime	24	19	43	1,019	589	1,608
Enamel ware	-	4	4	-	205	205
Other ceramic goods ...	39	83	122	670	1,255	1,925
5. Cement & Asbestos Goods	46	78	124	797	1,467	2,264
Cement goods	43	70	113	660	958	1,618
Asbestos goods	3	8	11	137	509	646
6. Stone Products	16	33	49	143	286	429
7. Other stone industries.	6	12	18	106	555	661
F - Textiles	642	1,440	2,082	18,909	62,532	81,441
1. Thread industry	10	40	50	1,987	6,391	8,378
Raw silk	9	40	49	1,967	6,391	8,358
Wild cocoon silk	1	-	1	20	-	20
2. Spinning	19	32	51	1,263	13,143	14,406
Cotton	-	6	6	-	11,287	11,287
Silk	11	11	22	223	264	487
Hemp	4	3	7	688	950	1,638
Wool	1	1	2	12	8	20
Others	3	11	14	340	634	974
3. Thread Twisting	4	18	22	90	737	827
Cotton thread twisting.	-	3	3	-	361	361
Silk thread twisting ..	4	10	14	90	179	269
Other thread twisting .	-	5	5	-	197	197
4. Weaving	108	256	364	3,609	19,125	22,734
Cotton weaving	-	6	6	-	668	668
Cotton mixture weaving.	1	11	12	62	4,192	4,254
Silk	79	98	177	1,729	2,605	4,334
Silk & rayon mixture ..	13	48	61	601	4,694	5,295
Silk & cotton mixture .	1	1	2	21	33	54
Other silk weaving	1	11	12	19	438	457
Grass linen	2	7	9	855	1,716	2,571
Wool	1	5	6	14	99	113
Wool and mixtures	-	2	2	-	409	409
Rayon	6	10	16	230	1,628	1,858
Rayon and mixtures	3	44	47	67	2,363	2,430
Staple-fiber weaving ..	-	1	1	-	20	20
Other weaving	1	12	13	11	260	271

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	No. firms			No. Employees		
	N.K.	S.K.	Total	N.K.	S.K.	Total
5. Knitting	86	92	178	2,826	2,829	5,655
Knitted products	85	68	153	2,819	2,490	5,309
Knitted goods and lace.	1	3	4	7	54	61
Braiding	-	21	21	-	285	285
6. Cotton Industry	23	67	90	703	2,151	2,854
Cotton	23	55	78	703	1,806	2,509
Floss silk	-	12	12	-	345	345
7. Dyeing and Finishing ..	22	109	131	220	1,576	1,796
Machine printing (textile)	-	1	1	-	10	10
Other prints (textile).	2	8	10	7	89	96
Plain & fancy dyeing ..	1	16	17	38	417	455
Thread dyeing,refining, bleaching	1	4	5	6	184	190
Refining, bleaching arrangement	3	5	8	122	300	422
Roughing	-	1	1	-	90	90
Laundering	15	74	89	47	486	533
8. Other Textile Industries	370	826	1,196	8,211	16,580	24,791
Felt	1	-	1	6	-	6
Sewing	352	787	1,139	7,015	13,918	20,933
Embroidery	-	6	6	-	154	154
Napping	-	4	4	-	77	77
Other textile goods ...	17	29	46	1,190	2,431	3,621
G - Lumber and Wood Products	596	1,203	1,799	15,520	15,162	30,682
1. Lumber and plywood	296	405	701	12,053	7,389	19,442
Lumber	291	402	693	11,840	6,941	18,781
Decay-proofing and fire-proofing	3	2	5	59	31	90
Veneer plywood	2	1	3	154	417	571
2. Wood products	300	798	1,098	3,467	7,773	11,240
Wood products & fixtures	186	500	686	1,378	3,628	5,006
Boxes, barrels & coops.	18	70	88	594	850	1,444
Wooden pipes	-	5	5	-	48	48
Cork products	-	12	12	-	833	833
Turnings	11	6	17	123	51	174
Other wooden goods	85	205	290	1,372	2,363	3,735
H - Food Industry	561	1,429	1,990	9,763	26,243	36,006
1. Grain cleaning	146	383	529	2,593	9,644	12,237
2. Flour & starch industry	14	34	48	960	551	1,511
Flour	12	25	37	292	420	712
Starch	2	9	11	668	131	799
3. Brewing Industry	222	587	809	2,466	5,827	8,293
Japanese wine	53	70	123	755	802	1,557
Korean wine	104	395	499	744	2,399	3,143
Beer	6	2	8	49	437	486
Other alcoholic beverages	6	11	17	49	290	339
Soy sauce, bean mash & vinegar	59	109	168	869	1,899	2,768
4. Soft Drinks	7	12	19	77	157	234
5. Bakery & Confectionery.	34	117	151	239	1,540	1,779
6. Canning Industry	8	31	39	516	1,266	1,782
Tin canning	6	29	35	493	1,231	1,724
Glass bottle canning ..	2	2	4	23	35	58
7. Dairy Products	5	7	12	31	379	410
8. Sea-food Industry	65	51	116	1,376	867	2,243
9. Tea Industry	-	3	3	-	41	41
10. Tobacco Industry.....	2	10	12	682	3,735	4,417
11. Ice & Frozen Food Ind.	14	18	32	360	263	623
Ice	11	16	27	209	202	411
Frozen Food	3	2	5	151	61	212

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	No. Firms			No. Employees		
	N.K.	S.K.	Total	N.K.	S.K.	Total
13. Other Food Industries .	44	176	220	463	1,973	2,436
Noodles	29	64	93	250	535	785
Other food stuffs	15	112	127	213	1,438	1,651
I - Printing & Book Binding	172	414	586	2,390	7,731	10,121
1. Printing	169	384	553	2,378	7,341	9,719
2. Book Binding	3	30	33	12	390	402
J - Other Industries	258	630	888	3,421	11,732	15,153
1. Paper goods manufacture	18	89	107	287	1,505	1,792
2. Bamboo, willow & wisteria products	50	84	134	550	1,020	1,570
Bamboo	3	65	68	41	663	704
Willow	8	17	25	105	345	450
Wisteria	-	1	1	-	9	9
Other vine & stalk prods.	39	1	40	404	3	407
3. Japanese mat & straw ind.	59	93	152	887	1,104	1,991
Japanese mats	7	16	23	38	81	119
Japanese technical mats	-	1	1	-	17	17
Straw & palm-hemp prods.	52	74	126	859	987	1,846
Others	-	2	2	-	19	19
4. Twine & Rope Products (cotton,hemp,wool)	17	37	54	297	2,186	2,483
5. Fiber-plates	1	2	3	17	41	58
6. Leather Products	38	103	141	253	1,196	1,449
Leather shoes	38	89	127	253	702	955
Other leather products.	-	14	14	-	494	494
7. Non-metallic Buttons ..	1	16	17	2	272	274
8. Brushes	2	19	21	24	617	641
9. Lacquer Ware	5	17	22	53	134	187
10. Hat Manufacturing	7	27	34	62	391	453
11. Non-metallic Toys	1	6	7	25	162	187
12. Moving Picture Industry	-	1	1	-	50	50
13. Photographic Industry .	4	19	23	9	90	99
14. Painting	9	15	24	55	136	191
15. Miscellaneous Industries	46	102	148	900	2,828	3,728
Bone,horn,ivory products	2	1	3	38	30	68
Medicinal materials ...	-	6	6	-	638	638
Pencils	-	3	3	-	106	106
Japanese umbrellas	-	4	4	-	62	62
Other umbrellas	-	4	4	-	111	111
Japanese shoes &sandals	3	13	16	90	221	311
Fur & feather bleaching	-	4	4	-	161	161
Artificial pearls	-	1	1	-	20	20
Other manufactures	41	66	107	772	1,479	2,251

Source: Bureau of the Census, USAMGIK.

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3. While production figures of certain items by yen value are available, little information on volume of output is to be found in published material or in surviving records. The table below gives estimated capacity of some basic industrial products, divided amongst the various industrial districts when that information is available.

Table 46

ESTIMATED CAPACITY PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIAL ITEMS, KOREA, 1944

A. Iron and Steel (1,000 metric tons)

District	Pig Iron & Sponge Iron	Steel	Rolled Products
Northern	626	316	37
Western	438	261	180
Central	55	74	--
Southeastern	--	14	--
TOTALS	1,119	665	217

B. Non-ferrous Metals (all produced in the northern district)

Metal	Quantity (metric tons)
Aluminum	36,000
Alumina	57,000
Magnesium	6,350
Copper, smelted	12,000
Lead, smelted	13,500
Zinc, smelted	12,000

C. Chemicals (1,000 metric tons)

Chemicals	DISTRICT				TOTALS
	Northern	Western	Central	Others	
Sulphuric acid	525	50	---	--	575
Nitrogen	104	6.3	---	6.3	6.3
Calcium carbide	50	50	---	32	32
Caustic soda	15	--	---	--	15
Soda ash	36	--	---	--	36
Glycerol	2	--	1.2	--	3.2
Industrial explosives	22	10	---	--	32
Superphosphate of lime	--	60	---	--	60
Heavy superphosphates	--	30	---	--	30

D. Oil Industry (in barrels)

Petroleum (Wonsan) Products	Annual Capacity
Crude oil	1,650,000
Cracking	412,500
Iso-octane gasoline	4,745

Synthetic Oils	
Northern District	1,358,000
All other districts	560,000
TOTALS	1,918,000

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E. Pulp and Paper (annual capacity, in 1,000 metric tons)

Paper	20
Pulp (paper and rayon)	56

F. Cement (annual capacity, in 1,000 metric tons)

Northern District	539
Western District	1,166
Other districts	180
TOTALS	1,885

G. Synthetic and Staple Fibers (daily capacity)

TOTAL, for all districts ..... 84 metric tons

Source: Foreign Economic Administration, Summary Industrial Survey of Korea, 1945.

Table 47

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES, SOUTH KOREA
Monthly Average, 1937, and December 1946*

Articles	Unit	Monthly Average 1937	December 1946
Rubber shoes	pair	1,500,000	93,425
Rice rollers	piece	14,000	500
Bicycle tires	piece	3,000	2,000
Leather (cowhide)	square meter	1,653,000	570,616
Soap	metric ton	4,800	5
Fire brick	" "	3,000	600
Carbide	metric ton	no data available	300
Matches	match ton	3,500	173‡
Oxygen	cubic meter	85,000	65,000
Coke	metric ton	6,000	1,700
Gas	cubic meter	1,650,000	675,000
Coal briquettes	metric ton	100,000	25,000

* Produced in Military Government factories under the Department of Commerce.

‡ Match ton = 600 boxes of large matches and 6,000 boxes of small matches.

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Table 48

TEXTILE PRODUCTION, SOUTH KOREA, 1940, 1946, and Projection 1947-1950

Item (annual production)	Unit	1940	1946	Projection 1947	1948	1949	1950
All textiles	yds per capita	14.0	1.6	3.0	7.4	9.4	10.0
Cotton spindles operable	1,000	150.0	90.0	150.0	250.0	275.0	275.0
Cotton cloth	yds per capita	12.0	1.1	2.5	6.2	8.3	9.0
Cotton yarn	1,000,000 lbs.	40.0*	7.0	15.0	40.0	55.0	60.0
Cotton cloth equiv.	" yds.	230.0*	20.0	45.0	120.0	115.0	180.0
Wool spindles operable	1,000	1.3	2.4	2.7	3.3	3.3	3.3
Wool yarn	1,000,000 lbs‡	.5	.5	1.5	2.8	2.8	2.9
Silk cloth	" yds.	37.0	8.0	11.0	22.0	23.0	25.0

* Considerable cotton yarn was imported from Japan and woven into cloth in Korea.

‡ Woolen yarn is to be used mainly with cotton in production of mixed goods.

Source: Department of Commerce, USAMGIK.

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APPENDIX D - Service Industries and Public Utilities

Table 49

FREIGHT AND PASSENGER MOVEMENTS, MONTHLY AVERAGE, 1937, 1946, 1947

	Passengers (1,000,000)	Freight carloadings* (in 1,000)	Tonnage (1,000 M.T.)
ALL KOREA			
Monthly average, 1937	3.9	----	1,166
SOUTH KOREA only, 1946			
March	2.8	5.9	⊥
April	3.5	5.0	⊥
May	5.2	11.5	⊥
June	3.3	10.9	⊥
July	2.8	9.1	191
August	3.7	14.3	248
September	3.7	9.1	152
October	3.9	6.1	171
November	5.6	10.4	251
December	4.8	9.2	291
1947: January	3.6	14.8	347
February	3.7	13.2	330
March	4.9	16.5	408

* During 1946 and 1947, an average of approximately twenty per cent of the freight was military, the remainder was government and civilian.

⊥ Figures are not available.

Source: Department of Transportation, USAMGIK.

Table 50

RAIL INCOME AND EXPENDITURES, 1937 - 1947
(in ¥1,000,000)

Year	Income	Expenditures*	Year	Income	Expenditures*
1937	126.4	94.3	1943	360.9	271.0
1938	158.8	116.1	1944	435.2	286.7
1939	216.5	165.5	1945**	225.3	418.0
1940	272.2	214.3	1946	618.0	1,383.0
1941	229.3	185.0	1947⊥	604.0	564.0
1942	308.6	225.1			

* Expenditures do not include considerable outlay for the expansion of railroad network, 1937 to 1945; nor for coal imported from Japan and used by the railroads since the American occupation.

** Includes all Korea for the first eight months of 1945, but only South Korea for September 1945 to March 1947.

⊥ For first three months only.

Source: Department of Transportation, USAMGIK.

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Table 51

TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH, RADIO AND POSTAL COMMUNICATIONS, KOREA,
1935 - 1941

Fiscal Year beginning 1 April	Number of Employees	TOTAL Revenue	TOTAL Operating Costs
1935	17,529	¥19,412,215	¥14,884,792
1936	19,294	20,936,044	16,008,718
1937	21,979	24,797,160	18,443,309
1938	24,481	27,620,815	21,186,737
1939	26,777	31,800,999	23,756,499
1940	28,810	35,226,044	27,045,990
1941	30,758	37,179,504	32,278,871
Average:	24,233	¥28,138,969	¥21,943,559

Source: Department of Communications, USAMGIK.

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APPENDIX E - External Trade

Balance of Trade

During the forty-year period of Japanese domination, Korea enjoyed an over-all favorable balance of trade in only two years, 1924 and 1925. With Japan itself however, Korea had a favorable balance of trade in thirteen of the years in question: 1918 through 1928, and 1931-1932.

Japanese economic policy with regard to Korea is reflected in these trade returns. Until the decade of the 1930's, Korea was exploited by Japan as a source of foodstuffs and raw materials, and to a lesser degree as an outlet for Japanese manufactures. During the protectorate, 1905-1910, and the first eight years after Korea was incorporated into the Japanese Empire, capital investments by Japan to further its long-range plans for the period, outweighed available exports. Once necessary transportation and other facilities requiring imports had been provided, Japan undertook to extract those benefits from Korea which, together with the peninsula's strategic importance, had inspired it to take over the country. However, even though Korea's balance of trade with Japan was favorable for a number of years, its over-all balance remained unfavorable except in the two years mentioned above.

Table 52

NET BALANCE OF TRADE, KOREA, 1910 -1932
(in ¥1,000)

Year	Amount	Year	Amount		Amount
1910 ...	(-) 19,869	1919 ...	(-) 61,129	1928 ...	(-) 48,012
1911 ...	(-) 35,231	1920 ...	(-) 52,266	1929 ...	(-) 77,429
1912 ...	(-) 46,130	1921 ...	(-) 14,104	1930 ...	(-) 100,501
1913 ...	(-) 40,812	1922 ...	(-) 40,641	1931 ...	(-) 8,668
1914 ...	(-) 28,659	1923 ...	(-) 4,125	1932 ...	(-) 9,002
1915 ...	(-) 9,474	1924 ...	19,438		
1916 ...	(-) 17,316	1925 ...	1,619		
1917 ...	(-) 19,130	1926 ...	(-) 9,215	TOTAL	(-) 650,071
1918 ...	(-) 4,522	1927 ...	(-) 24,893		

Source: Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen, 1936-37.

Throughout the period of twenty-two years represented in Table 52, exports of foodstuffs from Korea to Japan had been mounting. Korea's principal export during the period was rice. This commodity continued to dominate Korean foreign trade until the Japanese defeat in 1945, though its relative importance declined considerably just before and during the war years. To provide substitute grains which would permit export of rice, the Japanese had been obligated to underwrite import of cheaper grains, especially Manchurian millet. Unfavorable trade balances were settled by the Japanese by means of their own manufactures or gold. Credits in Korea reverting to the Japanese by virtue of these transactions were eventually liquidated by Japanese purchase of land and other capital assets in Korea. It will be noted that the cumulative unfavorable balance of trade, from 1910 through 1932, was more than ¥650,000,000.

The particular phase of Japanese expansion which began in 1931, with the taking over of Manchuria, had profound implications for Korea. No longer a mere area of colonial exploitation, the peninsula began to serve as Japan's principal bridgehead on the Asiatic mainland. Moreover, its considerable resources in raw materials and labor attracted the favorable attention of its Japanese rulers

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who were anticipating the need to supplement industrial production in the homeland if the expansionist policies already adopted were to be carried through to a successful conclusion. The decade of the 1930's encompassed a substantial revision in Japanese economic policy toward Korea. Heavy investments in capital equipment to expand industrial production in the peninsula, to exploit its mineral resources, and to enlarge its transportation and communications facilities, are reflected in the gross foreign trade figures and particularly in the increasingly unfavorable balance of trade.

Table 53

NET BALANCE OF TRADE, KOREA, 1933-1939
(in ¥1,000)

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1933	(-) 35,558		
1934	(-) 53,782		
1935	(-) 108,607		
1936	(-) 169,104		
1937	(-) 178,597		
		1938	(-) 176,080
		1939	(-) 375,621
		TOTAL	(-) 730,298

Source: Annual Report of Administration of Tyosen, 1936-37; Foreign Commerce Yearbook.

The total of Tables 52 and 53, representing the cululative unfavorable balance of trade for 1910 through 1939, is ¥1,747,420,000.

Volume of Trade

Before Korea's annexation by Japan, its total annual trade had scarcely reached ¥50,000,000. After 1910, however, trade statistics demonstrated a constant upward curve. Quantitative figures are available for only a relatively few years, and the investigator is thrown back upon the declared money-value of exports and imports and is obliged in most cases to make his own assessment of the element of rising prices and inflation.

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Table 54

FOREIGN TRADE, KOREA, 1910 - 1939
(in ¥1,000)

Year	EXPORT TO		TOTAL	IMPORT FROM		TOTAL	Exports expressed as % of Imports
	Foreign Countries	Japan & Colonies		Foreign Countries	Japan & Colonies		
1910	4,535	15,378	19,913	14,434	25,348	39,782	50.0
1911	5,515	13,341	18,856	20,020	34,058	54,087	35.2
1912	5,616	15,369	20,985	26,359	40,753	67,115	31.3
1913	5,921	15,314	31,235*	31,618	40,429	72,047	43.0
1914	6,448	28,587	35,035	24,647	39,047	63,694	54.7
1915	9,319	40,901	50,220	18,159	41,535	59,694	83.3
1916	14,854	42,964	57,818	22,675	52,459	75,134	77.3
1917	20,236	64,726	84,962	31,396	72,696	104,092	81.7
1918	18,697	137,205	155,902	43,151	117,273	160,424	97.5
1919	22,098	199,849	221,947	98,158	184,918	283,076	78.5
1920	27,639	169,381	197,020	106,174	143,112	249,286	79.1
1921	20,884	197,393	218,277	75,898	156,483	232,381	93.9
1922	17,489	197,915	215,404	95,798	160,247	256,045	83.8
1923	20,403	241,262	261,665	98,338	167,452	265,790	98.5
1924	22,379	306,660	329,031	97,776	211,817	309,593	106.1
1925	24,341	317,288	341,630	105,388	234,623	340,011	100.6
1926	24,779	338,175	362,954	123,933	248,235	372,169	97.6
1927	28,133	330,791	358,524	113,943	269,473	383,417	93.7
1928	32,147	333,829	365,978	118,181	295,839	413,990	88.4
1929	32,773	309,891	345,664	107,767	315,325	423,093	81.8
1930	25,852	240,694	266,547	88,854	278,194	367,048	72.8
1931	12,772	249,026	261,798	52,696	217,770	270,466	95.2
1932	29,210	282,144	311,354	61,686	258,670	320,356	97.2
1933	52,773	315,854	368,627	64,368	339,817	404,185	91.3
1934	57,673	407,693	465,367	79,527	439,622	519,149	89.6
1935	64,902	485,893	550,796	100,589	558,813	659,403	83.6
1936	75,265	518,048	593,313	114,499	647,918	762,417	77.8
1937	----	----	684,343	----	----	862,940	79.5
1938	----	----	878,401	----	----	1,054,481	83.3
1939	----	----	1,007,375	----	----	1,382,997	72.8

* Error in original table.

Source: Annual Report of Administration of Tyosen, 1936-37; Foreign Commerce Yearbook.

For certain selected commodities there exist quantative export and import figures, of small value for detailed analysis, but still serving to convey some idea of the relative magnitude of Korean foreign trade. For what they are worth, the table on the following page offers such figures for the years 1935-1939. It should be noted that the table gives gross, not net, figures.

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Table 55

A. SELECTED EXPORTS OF KOREA, 1935 - 1939

Commodity	Unit	Quantity				
		1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
Cattle	head	66,955	61,953	59,421	81,777	100,546
Fish	1,000 lbs	164,879	123,796	160,164	195,409	423,919
Rice	" bu	44,041	43,369	38,047	49,124	25,238
Soya beans	1,000 bu	5,116	6,414	5,910	5,628	4,001
Fruit and nuts	" lbs	63,172	66,298	68,862	81,334	127,928
Sugar	" lbs	57,399	72,945	71,813	48,758	27,514
Laver	" lbs	1,468	3,822	3,006	3,748	4,630
Cotton, raw	" lbs	29,800	26,802	17,997	18,388	21,937
Silk, raw	" lbs	2,582	2,605	3,065	2,838	2,273
Silk, tussah	" lbs	2,344	1,557	2,574	2,520	1,952
Cotton fabrics	" sq yds	19,592	35,667	103,569	104,809	41,269
Rayon fabrics	" " "	----	----	39,249	23,863	26,072
Staple fabrics	" sq yds	----	----	----	----	22,475
Cowhides	" lbs	5,117	5,576	6,089	6,615	1,292
Leather	" lbs	1,929	2,285	2,613	5,111	2,511
Paper pulp	" lbs	4,808	310	25,477	32,438	22,551
Paper	" lbs	25,313	27,876	29,355	35,956	34,095
Cement	metric ton	149,949	294,219	148,134	243,360	187,901
Graphite	metric ton	44,727	39,166	43,509	50,348	78,501
Coal	" "	638,735	617,940	652,579	982,031	925,953
Iron	" "	264,509	239,429	----	----	----
Copper (with gold and silver)	1,000 lbs	3,782	4,793	6,137	9,053	15,557
Lead	" lbs	3,576	5,368	11,425	12,817	12,790
Iron ore	metric ton	242,407	242,887	1,009,719*	367,157	401,132
Tungsten ore	metric ton	916	916	1,334	1,859	2,396
Gold ore	" "	58,043	64,585	51,447	66,630	76,777
Fish oil	1,000 lbs	84,288	82,531	93,644	91,603	263,646
Hardened oil	" lbs	24,993	20,403	42,817	28,139	34,034
Fertilizer	metric ton	432,890	512,702	446,446	563,153	479,745
Corn starch	" "	28,245	25,911	32,847	30,674	28,246

* Apparent mistakes in original tables.

Source: Foreign Commerce Yearbook.

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Table 55 - continued

B. SELECTED IMPORTS OF KOREA, 1935 - 1939

Commodity	Unit	Quantity				
		1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
Rice	1,000 lbs	84,245	56,862	55,684	18,765	109,009
Millet	" lbs	331,849	406,532	252,795	240,809	258,343
Wheat flour	" lbs	151,393	90,689	58,629	55,526	66,571
Sugar	" lbs	113,226	146,119	146,792	122,503	126,669
Soya beans	" lbs	63,086	114,465	225,900	113,582	188,765
Barley	" lbs	127,142	167,976	77,660	6,796	45,409
Vegetables	" lbs	158,501	182,600	172,614	198,892	263,011
Fruits and nuts	" lbs	87,551	94,965	86,534	105,994	127,663
Salt	metric ton	167,798	159,389	152,736	166,024	1,111,807*
Tobacco, leaf	1,000 lbs	21,536	16,270	10,778	2,000	51
Cotton, raw	" lbs	38,623	58,913	71,484	61,412	34,073
Silk, tussah	" lbs	2,453	1,523	2,455	2,144	1,152
Cotton yarn	" lbs	16,221	9,805	5,394	2,551	324
Rayon yarn	" lbs	5,440	3,640	3,063	7,770	4,078
Cotton	1,000 sq yds	174,593	163,551	135,136	92,979	18,049
Wool	" sq yds	9,104	9,987	7,724	8,493	8,486
Silk	" sq yds	9,825	10,107	8,811	15,743	30,798
Rayon	" sq yds	79,110	94,358	113,721	179,821	64,678
Staple fiber	" sq yds	----	----	----	30,404	58,097
Rubber	1,000 lbs	15,754	9,037	9,446	5,839	1,363
Coal	" tons	1,346	1,544	1,649	1,903	1,975
Cement	metric ton	214,283	356,707	227,331	111,593	213,824
Petroleum:						
Gasoline	1,000 bbls	535	511	----	----	----
Kerosene	" "	294	284	----	----	----
Lubricating	" "	146	132	----	----	----
Others	" "	823	1,742	----	----	----
Iron	metric ton	300,002	305,364	----	----	----
Fertilizers	" ton	380,874	515,809	376,733	434,087	300,891

* Apparent mistakes in original tables.

Source: Foreign Commerce Yearbook.

Korea's Foreign Trade in 1936

The year 1936 has been chosen to represent Korean trade in a peace-time period of relative prosperity. The tables that appear in this section are admittedly imperfect, and without adequate interpretation may even be misleading. Many Korean imports and exports shown in official statistics were actually trans-shipments to other continental areas, originating in the Japanese islands or elsewhere. As an example, reference may be made to sugar statistics. Korea is not a producer of sugar, yet trade returns for 1936 show exports worth more than ¥4,000,000. However, a glance at import figures will reveal that more than ¥9,000,000 worth of sugar was brought into the country. This figure, less exports, leaves ¥5,000,000 worth of sugar imported for domestic consumption.

For this reason exports and imports have been set forth in parallel columns, and the export balance is quickly ascertainable. For convenience, exports and imports have been grouped in the following major categories: foodstuffs,

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textiles and fibers, minerals, manufactures and miscellaneous. Unfortunately the class under miscellaneous entitled "others" is very large, and it grew larger still in the years leading up to the war.

Other inadequacies of the tables include the very incomplete minerals statistics. It would appear that the only minerals imported were coal and phosphate rock, and that the class as a whole showed a favorable balance. Dollar figures given in the Foreign Commerce Yearbook for the same period list imports of iron at $13,474,000, and various metals and ores at $15,935,000; total imports of minerals were $34,409,000; total exports at $17,306,000, leaving an unfavorable balance of $17,103,000. The particular tables used here conceal all minerals and ores imports, except coal and phosphate rock, under the class of "others" referred to above, with the result that a favorable minerals balance of ¥22,523,000 is reported.

Table 56

FOREIGN TRADE, KOREA, 1936
(in ¥1,000)

Commodity	IMPORTS FROM: Foreign Countries	IMPORTS FROM: Japan & Colonies	EXPORTS TO: Foreign Countries	EXPORTS TO: Japan & Colonies	Export Balance
Foodstuffs:					
Rice	4,998	----	249,427	1,528	245,957
Wheat	2,873	----		----	(-) 2,873
Wheat flour	7,829	----		415	(-) 7,414
Sugar	5,825	3,221		4,018	(-) 5,028
Beverages	4,540	----		905	(-) 3,635
Vegetables	4,405	----	294	175	(-) 3,936
Fruits & nuts	5,012	----	2,873	2,033	(-) 106
Fresh fish	----	----	4,174	949	5,123
Dried fish	2,722	----	3,441	488	1,207
Millet	----	22,458	----	----	(-) 22,458
Beans & peas	----	7,752	23,461	----	(-) 15,709
Salt	----	1,971	----	----	(-) 1,971
Cornstarch	----	----	2,271	----	2,271
Salt fish	----	----	669	842	1,511
Dried shrimps & prawns	----	----	3,439	1,004	4,443
Fish roe	----	----	3,908	----	3,908
Laver	----	----	2,829	----	2,829
Corn syrup	----	----	2,457	----	2,457
Canned foods	----	----	1,179	595	1,774
Sub-Totals	38,204	35,402	300,422	12,952	
TOTAL IMPORTS	73,606				
TOTAL EXPORTS			313,374		
TOTAL EXPORT BALANCE					239,768

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Table 56 - continued

Commodity	IMPORTS FROM Foreign Countries	IMPORTS FROM Japan & Colonies	EXPORTS TO Foreign Countries	EXPORTS TO Japan & Colonies	Export Balance
Textiles & Fibers:					
Ginned cotton	----	1,014	11,457		10,443
Cocoons	----	----	1,393		1,393
Raw silk	----	----	15,421		15,421
Tussah silk	----	4,463	4,432		(-) 31
Fibers & yarns	42,140	----	----		(-) 42,140
Cotton	32,118		1,219	6,322	(-) 24,577
Silk	36,564		766		(-) 35,798
Wool	12,601		----		(-) 12,601
Rayon	15,961		----	3,132	(-) 12,829
Silk-rayon	6,403		----		(-) 6,403
Staple fiber	36,565		----		(-) 36,565
Clothing	96,069		2,361	8,668	(-) 85,040
Sub-Totals	278,421	5,477	37,049	18,122	
TOTAL IMPORTS	283,898				
TOTAL EXPORTS				55,171	
TOTAL EXPORT BALANCE					(-) 228,727
Minerals:					
Graphite	----	----	1,999		1,999
Coal	10,120	7,111	6,259		(-) 10,972
Barite	----	----	216		216
Fluorspar			180		180
Gold ore			6,498		6,498
Iron ore			1,104		1,104
Tungsten ore			1,490		1,490
Crude copper			20,499		20,499
Crude lead			2,946		2,946
Phosphate rock		1,437	----		(-) 1,437
Sub-Totals	10,120	8,548	41,191		
TOTAL IMPORTS	18,668				
TOTAL EXPORTS				41,191	
TOTAL EXPORT BALANCE					22,523
Manufactures:					
Cottonseed oil			1,849		1,849
Sardine oil			7,616		7,616
Paraffin			98		98
Hardened oil			3,405		3,405
Fatty acids			3,219		3,219
Soap	2,790		----	494	(-) 2,296
Glycerine	----		2,284	----	2,284
Paper	10,894		----	617	(-) 10,277
Cement	----		4,770	1,145	5,915
Straw bags	----		536	----	536

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Table 56 - continued

Commodity	IMPORTS FROM: Foreign Countries	IMPORTS FROM: Japan & Colonies	EXPORTS TO: Foreign Countries	EXPORTS TO: Japan & Colonies	Export Balance
Manufactures (cont'd)					
Fish meal	----		1,402	502	1,849
Fertilizers	28,256	13,134	38,390	----	(-) 3,000
Books & magazines	----		----	422	422
Pottery	----		----	687	687
Glass & mfrs.	----		----	175	175
Metal mfrs.	45,266	----	----	----	(-) 45,266
Wood mfrs.	5,084	----	----	----	(-) 5,084
Machinery	40,862	4,924	2,329	----	(-) 43,457
Lamps	----	----	----	468	468
Caustic soda	678	----	----	----	(-) 678
Paints & dyes	5,783	----			(-) 5,783
Vehicles	26,748	220			(-) 26,968
Ores & mfrs.	----	14,170			(-) 14,170
Chemicals	----	1,681			(-) 1,681
Mineral oils	----	----	194	850	1,044
Sub-Totals	166,361	34,129	63,763	7,689	
TOTAL IMPORTS	200,490				
TOTAL EXPORTS				71,452	
TOTAL EXPORT BALANCE					(-) 129,038
Miscellaneous:					
Furs	----		372		372
Cowhides	----		1,886		1,886
Leather	3,934		831		(-) 3,103
Timber	12,114	3,457	1,744	5,703	(-) 8,124
Animals		----	----	147	147
Leaf tobacco		2,871	----	572	(-) 2,299
Ginseng		----	----	1,282	1,282
Re-exports	----	----		2,055	2,055
Postal parcels	13,247	----		----	(-) 13,247
Re-imports	----	2,093			(-) 2,093
Others	125,517	22,522	70,789	26,743	(-) 50,507
Sub-Totals	154,812	30,943	75,622	36,502	
TOTAL IMPORTS	185,755				
TOTAL EXPORTS				112,124	
TOTAL EXPORT BALANCE					(-) 73,631

Source: Figures from Henning's "Preliminary Economic Survey of Korea," reanalyzed and reorganized by the author.

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Table 57

SUMMARY: FOREIGN TRADE, KOREA, 1936
(in ¥1,000)

Category	IMPORTS FROM				EXPORTS TO				EXPORT BALANCE
	Japan & Colonies	%	Foreign Countries	%	Japan & Colonies	%	Foreign Countries	%	
Foodstuffs	38,204	5.9	35,402	30.4	300,422	57.8	12,952	17.3	239,768
Textiles & fibers	278,421	43.0	5,477	5.2	37,049	7.2	18,122	24.0	(-) 228,727
Minerals	10,120	1.5	8,548	8.0	41,191	7.9	----	----	22,523
Manufactures	166,361	25.7	34,129	29.5	63,763	12.4	7,689	10.2	(-) 129,038
Miscellaneous ...	154,812	23.9	30,943	26.9	75,622	14.7	36,502	48.5	(-) 73,631
Sub-Totals	647,918	100.0	114,499	100.0	518,047	100.0	75,265	100.0	
TOTAL IMPORTS			762,417						
TOTAL EXPORTS							593,312		
TOTAL EXPORT BALANCE									(-) 169,105

Source: See Table 56.

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Table 58

41 PRODUCTS SHOWING NET EXPORT BALANCE, KOREA, 1936
(in ¥1,000)

Commodity	Net Value	PERCENTAGES OF: Individual Category	PERCENTAGES OF: All Products Showing Net Export Balance	Order of Importance
Foodstuffs:				
Rice	245,957	85.7	63.9	1st
Fresh fish	5,123	1.8	1.3	9th
Dried fish	1,207	.4	.3	
Beans & peas	15,709	5.6	4.1	3rd
Cornstarch	2,271	.8	.6	
Salt fish	1,511	.5	.4	
Dried shrimps and prawns	4,443	1.5	1.2	10th
Fish roe	3,908	1.4	1.0	11th
Laver	2,829	1.0	.7	
Corn syrup	2,457	.7	.6	
Canned foods	1,774	.6	.5	
Sub-Totals	287,189	100.0	74.6	
Manufactures:				
Cottonseed oil	1,849	6.3	.5	
Sardine oil	7,616	25.7	2.0	6th
Paraffin	98	.3	.02	
Hardened oil	3,405	11.5	.9	
Fatty acids	3,219	10.9	.8	
Glycerine	2,284	7.6	.6	
Cement	5,915	20.0	1.5	7th
Straw bags	536	1.8	.1	
Fish meal	1,904	6.4	.6	
Books & magazines	422	1.4	.1	
Pottery	687	2.4	.2	
Glass	175	.6	.04	
Lamps	468	1.6	.1	
Mineral oils	1,044	3.5	.24	
Sub-Totals	29,622	100.0	7.7	
Textiles and fibers:				
Ginned cotton	10,443	28.3	2.7	5th
Cocoons	1,393	5.1	.4	
Raw silk	15,421	56.6	4.0	4th
Sub-Totals	27,257	100.0	7.1	
Minerals:				
Graphite	1,999	5.7	.5	
Barite	216	.6	.06	
Fluorspar	180	.5	.04	
Gold ore	6,498	18.6	1.4	8th
Iron ore	1,104	3.2	.3	
Tungsten ore	1,490	4.3	.45	
Crude copper	20,499	58.7	5.4	2nd
Crude lead	2,946	8.4	.95	
Sub-Totals	34,932	100.0	9.1	

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Table 58 - continued

Commodity	Net Value	PERCENTAGES OF Individual Category	PERCENTAGES OF All Products Showing Net Export Balance	Order of Importance
Miscellaneous:				
Furs	372	6.4	.1	
Cowhides	1,886	32.7	.5	
Animals	147	2.6	.04	
Ginseng	1,282	22.4	.33	
Re-exports	2,055	35.9	.53	
Sub-Totals	5,742	100.0	1.5	
GRAND TOTAL	384,742			

Source: See Table 56.

The table below sets forth in their order of importance the classes of commodities of which net imports into Korea amounted to more than $5,000,000 in 1936. Figures are in dollars and are derived from the Foreign Commerce Yearbook.

Table 59

IMPORTS HAVING NET VALUE OF OVER $5,000,000, KOREA, 1936
(in $1,000)

	Commodity	Value		Commodity	Value
1st	Metals and ores	15,935	6th	Vehicles & parts	7,827
2nd	Machinery	13,288	7th	Rayon fabrics	7,469
3rd	Metal manufactures	13,234	8th	Chemicals	7,443
4th	Petroleum	9,176	9th	Cotton fabrics	7,141
5th	Iron	8,208	10th	Millet	6,589

Source: Foreign Commerce Yearbook.

In 1936 Japan and its colonies provided eighty-five per cent of all Korean imports and received 87.3 per cent of all the peninsula's exports. Korea's direct trade with the rest of the world in indicated in Table 60. (See following page).

This table does not, of course, provide a truly accurate index of Korea's foreign trade. Many products of foreign origin were re-exported from Japan to Korea and, similarly, many Korean products were re-exported from Japan to foreign countries. It is unfortunately impossible at this distance to analyze accurately this element of Korea's commerce. The positive indication is that Japan, its colonies and areas dominated by it, including Manchukuo and Kwantung Province, received 98.3 per cent of all Korean exports and provided 93.7 per cent of all Korean imports. In cases where Japanese exports to Korea were ultimately of foreign origin, the Japanese merchant still made his profit which was passed on to the consumer in Korea in the form of higher prices.

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Table 60

KOREA'S TRADE WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1936
(in ¥1,000)

Country	EXPORTS to	Percentage of Total	IMPORTS from	Percentage of Total
Kwantung Province	9,901	13.2	6,642	5.8
Manchukuo (Manchuria)	55,533	74.0	59,402	51.6
China	3,702	4.9	15,148	13.0
Hongkong	601	.8	6	.005
British India	338	.5	208	.2
Straits Settlement	224	.3	1,313	1.1
Dutch East Indies	265	.4	9,726	8.5
French Indo-China	38	.05	437	.4
Asiatic Russia	34	.05	335	.3
Philippines	384	.5	621	.5
Siam	181	.2	7	.005
Great Britain	197	.3	5,457	4.8
Germany	10	.01	1,042	.9
United States	993	1.3	9,151	7.9
Australia	84	.1	402	.4
Egypt	575	.8	111	.1
Other countries	2,185	2.59	4,491	4.49
TOTALS	75,265	100.00	114,499	100.00

Source: Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen.

Implications of Korea's Foreign Trade, 1936

Incomplete or distorted statistics cannot prevent the drawing of certain basic conclusions in regard to Korea's production and trade in 1936. It is evident even to the casual observer that, of the major categories, Korea produced a net exportable surplus only in foodstuffs. In manufactures, raw materials, fibers and other consumers' goods, the country was notably deficient. Rice accounted for 85.7 per cent of foodstuffs exported, and 63.9 per cent of all products showing a net export balance. Among the eleven leading exports were rice, beans and peas, fresh fish, dried shrimps and prawns, and fish roe. It is to be noted also that the foodstuffs exports were very nearly counterbalanced by textiles and fibers imports.

The 600,000 Japanese residents in Korea were responsible for a high percentage of the imports of many luxury items which weigh heavily in the import balance. Silk textiles, for example, accounted for 4.8 per cent of all imports in 1936, a figure equal to imports of staple fiber fabrics which were much more widely distributed amongst the population. Manufactured clothing and underwear imports undoubtedly intended more for Japanese than for Korean use. However, it is of course not practicable to isolate all, or even many, items of Japanese consumption from the total imports. Still, it seems probable that the elimination of these items would have gone far to reduce the unfavorable balance of trade. On the other hand, it must be conceded that apart from purely agricultural produce, the Japanese were largely responsible for directing production which permitted exports of manufactures and minerals. There are indeed too many unknowns in the equation to attempt an evaluation of what Korean trade might have been, if divested of the Japanese element, and speculation along this line can be of only academic interest.

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More significant than luxury items are imports of the basic fuels and materials needed for the functioning of even a semi-industrialized nation. In the matter of cotton and cotton products, it should be observed that while Korea exported ¥10,443,000 net of ginned cotton, all to Japan and its colonies, it imported from the same source fibers and yarns worth ¥42,140,000, as well as a net figure of ¥24,577,000 in cotton fiber, yarn and textiles, or approximately $25,000,000 at current price levels.

Bituminous coal is an absolutely essential import if Korea is once again to function approximately as it did in the 1930's, or even at the present reduced level. Railways and many industries are wholly dependent on imported coal. In 1936 more than half the imports worth ¥17,000,000 came from Japan, with the balance from Manchuria and China. This coal was paid for in part by exports of anthracite to Japan and its colonies, but the balance due was still nearly ¥11,000,000. In 1939 as Table 55 shows, imports were one-third again as large as in 1936.

In the field of manufactures, it will be observed that the principal net imports were of metal products, machinery and vehicles and parts. Since the major effort to industrialize Korea had hardly got under way by this time, it may be assumed that the figures given indicate at least the order of magnitude of essential manufactures of this type, if an economic level approximating that of 1936 is to be restored.

Among the miscellaneous imports, the most significant are petroleum products, which Table 59 indicates as more than $9,000,000 or approximately $13,000,000 at current prices, and raw rubber, of which imports are likely to approximate $5,000,000 per year at present prices.

Development of Korea's Foreign Trade, 1936-1939

The war-time industrialization of Korea dates from the years 1936-1939. During this period the excess of imports over exports was generally more marked than at any time since the first World War. Relatively large quantities of capital equipment were imported to strengthen the railways and communications and to increase industrial production. The result of these investments appeared in an increase in the list of products showing a net export balance, from forty-one in 1936 to fifty-five in 1939. For purposes of comparison, a portion of Table 58 is incorporated in Table 61.

Table 61

PRODUCTS SHOWING NET EXPORT BALANCE, KOREA, 1936 and 1939
(in ¥1,000)

Commodity	1936 Net Value	1936 PERCENTAGE OF Category	1936 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	1939 Net Value	1939 PERCENTAGE OF Category	1939 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Foodstuffs:						
Rice	245,957	85.7	63.9	161,116	74.5	32.5
Fruits and nuts	----	---	---	4,723	2.2	.9
Fresh fish	5,123	1.8	1.3	7,701	3.6	1.5
Dried fish	1,207	.4	.3	5,794	2.7	1.2
Salt fish	1,511	.5	.4	6,686	3.1	1.3
Dried shrimp & prawns	4,443	1.5	1.2	3,321	1.5	.7
Fish roe	3,908	1.4	1.0	2,357	1.1	.5
Laver	2,829	1.0	.7	9,144	4.2	1.7
Beans & peas	15,709	5.6	4.1	5,287	2.4	1.1
Cornstarch	2,271	.8	.6	3,097	1.4	.6
Corn syrup	2,457	.7	.6	933	.4	.2
Canned foods	1,774	.6	.5	6,311	2.9	1.4
Sub-Totals	287,189	100.0	74.6	216,470	100.0	43.6

(continued, p. 94)

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Table 61 - continued

Commodity	1936 Net Value	1936 PERCENTAGE OF Category	1936 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	1939 Net Value	1939 PERCENTAGE OF Category	1939 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Textiles and Fibers:						
Ginned cotton	10,443	28.3	2.7	1,733	4.1	.4
Cocoons	1,393	5.1	.4	1,521	3.6	.3
Raw silk	15,421	56.6	4.0	24,169	58.5	4.9
Tussah silk	----	---	---	2,170	5.2	.4
Cotton textiles	----	---	---	1,442	3.5	.3
Used gunny bags	----	---	---	1,765	4.2	.4
Rayon pulp	----	---	---	8,557	20.9	1.7
Sub-Totals	27,257	100.0	7.1	41,357	100.0	8.4
Minerals:						
Graphite	1,999	5.7	.5	5,553	5.9	1.1
Barite	216	.6	.06	1,085	1.2	.2
Fluorspar	180	.5	.04	2,598	2.7	.6
Gold ore	6,498	18.6	1.4	6,681	7.0	1.3
Iron ore	1,104	3.2	.3	3,035	3.2	.6
Tungsten ore	1,490	4.3	.45	16,050	17.1	3.2
Crude copper	20,499	58.7	5.4	51,697	54.9	10.4
Crude lead	2,946	8.4	.95	7,607	8.0	1.5
Sub-Totals	34,932	100.0	9.1	94,306	100.0	18.9
Manufactures:						
Cottonseed oil	1,849	6.3	.5	2,047	1.6	.4
Rice bran oil	----	---	---	1,188	.9	.2
Sardine oil	7,616	25.7	2.0	11,337	9.2	2.2
Hardened oils	3,405	11.5	.9	5,820	4.7	1.2
Mineral oils	1,044	3.5	.24	15,059	12.2	3.0
Paraffin	98	.3	.02	1,139	.9	.2
Fatty acids	3,219	10.9	.8	4,021	3.2	.8
Soap	----	---	---	2,285	1.8	.5
Glycerine	2,284	7.6	.6	3,137	2.5	.6
Carbide	----	---	---	4,209	3.4	.9
Explosives	----	---	---	3,587	2.9	.7
Cement	5,915	20.0	1.5	5,015	4.1	1.0
Straw bags	536	1.8	.1	1,421	1.1	.3
Fish meal	1,904	6.4	.6	14,013	11.3	3.0
Fertilizers	----	---	---	36,781	29.8	7.5
Books & magazines	422	1.4	.1	1,351	1.1	.3
Pottery	687	2.4	.2	1,380	1.1	.3
Glass & manufactures	175	.6	.04	1,017	.9	.2
Lamps	468	1.6	.1	1,391	1.1	.3
Medicines & drugs	----	---	---	7,581	6.2	1.5
Sub-Totals	29,622	100.0	7.7	123,779	100.0	25.1
Miscellaneous:						
Furs	372	6.4	.1	838	4.1	.2
Cowhides	1,886	32.7	.5	916	4.6	.2
Bristles & bones	----	---	---	1,843	9.2	.4
Animals	147	2.6	.04	8,294	41.4	1.6
Leaf tobacco	----	---	---	2,283	11.4	.5
Cigarettes	----	---	---	1,009	5.0	.2
Ginseng	1,282	22.4	.33	1,518	7.6	.3
(Re-Exports)	2,055	35.9	.53	3,339	16.7	.6
Sub-Totals	5,742	100.0	1.5	20,040	100.0	4.0
GRAND TOTALS	384,742		100.0	495,952		100.0

Source: See Table 56.

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Table 62

FOREIGN TRADE, KOREA, 1939
(in ¥1,000)

Category	IMPORTS FROM				EXPORTS TO				EXPORT BALANCE
	Japan & Colonies	%	Foreign Countries	%	Japan & Colonies	%	Foreign Countries	%	
Foodstuffs	79,074	6.4	38,242	23.9	213,769	29.1	63,216	23.3	159,669
Textiles & fibers	264,793	21.6	15,914	10.1	76,106	10.3	49,081	18.2	(-) 155,520
Manufactures	349,293	28.4	41,636	26.4	119,313	16.1	72,874	27.0	(-) 198,742
Minerals	28,432	2.3	14,194	8.8	108,564	14.8	----	--	65,938
Miscellaneous	507,825	41.3	49,045	30.8	219,231	29.7	84,740	31.5	(-) 252,899
Sub-Totals	1,229,417	100.0	159,031	100.0	736,983	100.0	269,911	100.0	
TOTAL IMPORTS			1,388,448						
TOTAL EXPORTS							1,006,894		
TOTAL EXPORT BALANCE									(-) 381,554

Source: See Table 56.

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The most striking fact contained in Table 61 is that rice, while it still dominated Korean exports, had lost about half its relative importance in the years between 1936 and 1939. According to the fragmentary statistics available for later years, rice has never again accounted for a larger proportion of total exports than in 1939. Also notable are gains in edible marine products, which together made up 6.9 per cent of all products showing a net export balance. Textiles and fibers as well made considerable advance, particularly raw silk and rayon pulp. All minerals exports increased appreciably, tripling both in money value and relative importance.

Manufactures made striking gains, especially oils. Carbide, explosives and soap appeared as considerable exports for the first time, and exports of nitrogenous fertilizers exceeded imports of other types by a wide margin. However, due to heavy imports of capital equipment, imports exceeded exports by a greater percentage than in 1936.

Table 63

NET PRODUCTS IMPORTED OVER $5,000,000 IN VALUE, KOREA, 1939
(in $1,000)

	Commodity	Value		Commodity	Value
1st	Machinery	46,384	7th	Petroleum	9,330
2nd	Metals and ores	38,534	8th	Lumber	7,586
3rd	Metal manufactures	26,570	9th	Coal	6,618
4th	Chemicals	13,380	10th	Clothing	5,922
5th	Vehicles and parts	13,376	11th	Underwear	5,780
6th	Silk fabrics	11,434	12th	Woolen fabrics	5,774
			13th	Millet	5,309

Source: Foreign Commerce Yearbook.

The factors of inflation, changing economic balance, and the distortions incidental to equipping Korea for war purposes make it unwise to place too much reliance upon trade statistics for 1939, or to attempt to derive from them any norms capable of serving as a guide to Korea's peace-time economic development. Much production supplying exports was subsidized, and many imports were unnecessary to a more nearly peninsular economy. The statistics give historical evidence of what the country was capable of doing under a peculiar set of circumstances which are unlikely to recur.

To attempt an assessment of Korea's foreign trade possibilities as an independent nation, it is advisable to look first to the relatively prosperous peace-time years under Japanese rule, preferably from 1932 to 1936. An evaluation of the changes wrought in Korea's economy by the recent war, the expulsion of the Japanese and the severing of ties that bound Korea so closely to the Japanese Empire will give the necessary supplemental indications upon which to base a reasonable projection of the trade that may be expected to develop in the coming decades.

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Notes on Korean Politics
(1 September 1947)

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POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

15 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN:
(THRU: MR. SARGENT)

SUBJECT: National ~~Liberty~~ Freedom Federation

1. This memorandum is supplemental to the memorandum of 9 October on the same subject.

2. The National Liberty Federation has added twenty new names to its Central Committee, increasing it to a total of fifty. The new members are the following:

KIM YAK SOO (Korean Republic Party) (Offshoot of Minjung Dongmaing: Conservative: Not to be confused with KIM WON BONG's Party)

SIM SOOK (CHUNTO KYO)

SUNG TAI KYUNG (Laboring People's Party)

YOO PYUNG MOOK " " "

PAK TONG CHUL " " "

KANG CHANG CHAI " " "

CHANG KWAN (Socialist Democratic Party)

CHO YONG SI " " "

KIM KI CHUL (Democratic Korean Independence Party) (Kwan Tai Suk's Party)

CHOO HAI " "

KIM HI SUP (New Progressive Party)

PAK EUN SUNG (Woman) (Women's Federation)

WOO PONG WON (Woman) (KONG HYUP) (Council for Joint Commission)

LEE KWANG CHIN (KONG HYUP)

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LEE KYUNG SUK (KONG HYUP)

LEE TONG SAN (KONG HYUP)

JUNG GI YONG (KONG HYUP)

HAN KI CHONG (MINJUNG DONGMA ING)

KIM SUNG KYU (Confucian Society)

KANG SOON (Toiling Masses Party)

3. The most notable weakness in the federation lies in the fact that it is made up only of organizations, which have themselves not been conspicuously successful in the field of mass organization. Unless this is solved, it will not provide a suitable basis for a successful political group.

4. The federation has proceeded with its work of organizing, making the following appointments:

Committee on Politics

Chairman--HONG MYUNG HI
Committee Finance--KIM SI HYUN

General Affairs Section

YUN KI SUP

Organizing Section

LYUH WOON HONG

Propaganda

LEE KEUK NO

Secretarial Bureau

SONG NAM HOON

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
1st Lieutenant, CMP

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NOTES ON KOREAN POLITICS

KIM KOO — National Congress Party (Kook Mi- Ui Hwei)

KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - (Han/Kook Mi- Ju Dang)

SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY (Nan Chosun No Dong Dang)

KIM, KOO - residence - Choong Ching Ro

RHEE, SYNG MAN - residence - RI HUA DONG

DEMOCRATIC PATRIOTIC YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION (MIN JU AI KOOK CHONG NYUN DONG MAING)

SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY (NAM CHOSUN NO DONG DANG)

UNITED YOUNG MEN'S PARTY (DAI DONG CHUNG NYUN DAN)

KOREAN NATIONAL YOUTH CORPS (CHOSUN MIN JOK CHUNG MYUN DANG)

ALL KOREAN STUDENTS LEAGUE (CHUN KOOK HAK SAING CHUNG HONG YON MAING)

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES FRONT (MIN CHU SHUI MIN CHOK CHUN SUN)

SOUTH KOREA WOMEN'S DEMOCRATIC UNION (NAM CHOSUN MIN CHU YUH SONG DONG MAING)

MR. LINCOLN KIM, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE: IS TO BE EXEC. TO CIVIL ADMIN. * MR. AHN

KIM, IL SUNG - CHAIRMAN)
HAN, PYONG OK - SECRETARY) N. KOREA PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

LEE, SHOON SHIN - Korean Admiral who annihilated Jap fleet during Hideipechi invasion.

KYUNG, BI DAI - Constabulary of North Korea

Youth League of National Society for Acceleratio of Korean Independence has changed name to NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR ACCELERATION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE YOUNG MEN'S CORPS.

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NOTES ON KOREAN POLITICS

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The material in this folder has been compiled by the Political Advisory Group, American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission with cooperation of G-2, Hq. XXIV Corps, (Biographic Sketches); Office of Civil Information, Hqs. XXIV Corps, (The Korean Press); and the Office of Foreign Affairs, Hq. USAMGIK, (Note on Sino-Korean Relations)

1 September 1947

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25 August 1947

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF PROMINENT KOREAN POLITICAL LEADERS

AHN, Chai Hong - B. 1895; G. Political Science Department, Waseda University, Japan; editor, Sidai Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo, 1921-32; imprisoned by Japanese, 1942-43; founded (along with Lyuh, Woon Hyung) National Founding Preparatory Committee, 16 August 1945; left Preparatory Committee and formed Nationalist Party, November 1945; chairman, Political Committee, Emergency National Assembly; member, Representative Democratic Council of South Korea, February 1946; editor of new Han Sung Ilbo, February 1946-date; with Nationalist Party joined Kim Koo's Korean Independence Party, March 1946; one of nine executive members, head of Training Department, and member of Central Committee, Korean Independence Party, 1946; one of five right wing members on Coalition Committee, July 1946; Joint Korean-American Conference, October-November 1946; appointed to Interim Legislative Assembly (ILA), December 1946; Chairman, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, ILA, January 1947; member, Internal Affairs and Police and Industry, Labor and Agriculture Committees, ILA, January 1947; at 20 January 1947 session of ILA, cast lone vote of opposition to anti-trusteeship resulution adopted by ILA; appointed civil administrator of MG, February 1947; resigned from ILA, 17 February 1947; withdrew from Korean Independence Party, reformed his Nationalist Party into New Korean Nationalist Party, June 1947; named as representative of New Korean Nationalist Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member of Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

CHANG, Duk Soo - B. 1892; G. Economics and English, Columbia University, New York; professor, Sociology and Political Science, Bo Sung College; leader, Korea Young Men's Party; vice chairman, Diplomatic Officials, Hankook Democratic Party, 1945-46; Political Commissioner, Public Opinion Association, July 1946; elected member of ILA from Seoul, October 1946; when election nullified, defeated in re-election; president, Hwanghai Young Men's Association, 1946; with Kim, Seung Soo worked behind scenes to push through anti-trusteeship resolution in ILA, January 1947; named as representative of the Hwanghai Association to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947. assassinated 02 Dec.

CHANG, Kun Sang - B. about 1882, in Pusan; attended Indiana University; went from U.S. to China, 1916; served as customs official at Hankow until joined Korean Provisional Government, 1919; member of Revolutionary Party and linked with Kim, Won Bong; State Councillor, Provisional Government; chairman of traffic committee, Emergency National Assembly, 1946; joined Democratic People's Front; vice chairman, executive committee, Democratic People's Front; vice chairman, People's Party, 1946; backed Lyuh, Woon Hyung in his efforts in Coalition Committee, summer 1946; became Chief of Propaganda Bureau, People's Party, September 1946, in addition to vice chairmanship; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; quit Party in December 1946; appointed member of ILA, December 1946, but declined appointment; vice chairman, Laboring People's Party 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

CHO, Han Young - B. Unkown, Cholla Namdo; G. Peiping University; member, special diplomatic committee, People's Front, to negotiate with US-USSR Joint Conference, 1946; member, Counter-measure Committee, People's Party, 1946; Tendered resignation as Assistant Secretary, People's Party, August 1946; rejoined People's Party as Chief of Organization Bureau; Secretary, Foreign Affairs Department, Democratic People's Front.

CHO, Man Sik - B. about 1880; G. Law School Meiji University, Japan; resides in Pyongyang; member, Board of Trustees, YMCA, and active in Presbyterian Church; in business as a merchant; famous for refusal to cooperate with Japanese andknown as the "Korean Ghandi"; chairman and founder, Chosun Democratic Party (North Korea), 1945; placed under Russian protective custody for refusing to support trusteeship, 5 January 1946; "voted out" of Chosun Democratic Party, 5 February 1946; still in custody in Pyongyang; named as representative of Chosun Democratic Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission by South Korea branch of party, June 1947.

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CHO (CHOUGH), Pyung Ok - B. about 1894; Ph. D., Economics, Columbia University; active in 1929 student movements and imprisoned by Japanese; assistant professor at Chosun Christian College, about 1934; imprisoned again; prominent member of Hankook Democratic Party; Director of National Police, MG, 1945-date.

CHO, So Ang - B. 1886; G. Waseda University, Japan; joined Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, 1919; membership in Korean Congress; minister, Foreign Affairs, Provisional Government; appointed delegate to UNO meeting in San Francisco but did not attend; chairman, Diplomatic Association; chief of Financial Administration, Korean Independence Party; member Representative Democratic Council of South Korea; one of nine executive members, vice chairman of Central Executive Committee and chairman of Foreign Policy Committee, Korean Independence Party, 1946; lecture tour of provinces, May-June 1946; active in Association for Aiding Korean Representative's Diplomacy, which supported Dr. Rhee's mission to U.S., December 1946; elected to ILA from Seoul, declined position, December 1946; one of the leaders in anti-trusteeship movement, named vice chairman, Anti-Trusteeship Committee, January 1947; elected chairman of Emergency National Assembly (National Congress), February 1947; implicated in 1 March attempt to establish a provisional government, 1947; elected vice chairman and member of the Central Standing Committee, Korean Independence Party, May 1947.

CHO, Wan Ku - B. 1880; G. Law College, Seoul; went to Vladivostok in 1910 where he became director of a newspaper; later went to Shanghai and joined Korean Provisional Government; head, Financial Affairs, Provisional Government; committee member, Kwang Bok Military Committee; chairman, Commerce and Industry, Hankook Democratic Party; one of twelve Secretaries of State, Provisional Government; committee member, Representative Democratic Council; one of nine executive members, and head of "Secret Service Department", Korean Independence Party, 1946; appointed to ILA, declined seat, December 1946; elected chairman, Emergency National Assembly, December 1946; prominent in anti-trusteeship movement, December 1946-January 1947; replaced as chairman, Emergency National Assembly by Cho, So Ang, February 1947; elected member of the Central Standing Committee, Korean Independence Party, May 1947; one of responsible persons for the 23 June Anti-Trusteeship Demonstration, 1947

CHOI - See TCH'EI

HA (HAR), Kyung Duk - B. 1895; G. Harvard University, B. S. 1925, M.A. 1927, Ph. D. 1928; underground leader during war; director, Korean YMCA's survey in Seoul, 1930; taught Sociology and Psychology at Chosun Christian College from 1932 on; editor, Korean Times, 1945; editor, Seoul Shinmun, since 1945; moderate leftist; appointed member of ILA, December 1946; appointed member of following committees of ILA, Education and Welfare, Drafting of Provisional Constitution and Election Laws, Liaison, January 1947; one of four Korean delegates to Pan-Asian Conference, New Delhi, March 1947.

HAM, Sang Hoon - B. about 1896, Hwanghai Do; G. Waseda University; connected with Dong-A-Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo for a number of years, reported to have been a member of the Central Committee, Association for Expediting National Mobilization, a councilor of the Patriotic Assembly of Speech and Press and a councilor of the Corps for Patriotism During War, under the Japanese; one of the founders of All Korea Literary Men's Association, 1946; Vice-President, Emergency National Assembly, 1946; Director of Information Section, Representative Democratic Council; Chairman, Propaganda Section, Hankook Democratic Party.

HAM, To Yong (Tai Yung) - B 1873; G. Law Academy, Seoul; acting director, Bureau of Judicial Affairs, Nationalist Party; advisor of the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; member, Korean Representative Democratic Council, 1946.

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HAN, Bin - B. about 1902, Vladivostok; G. Philosophy, Vladivostok Far Eastern College; student, Lenin University, Moscow; law student, First National University, Moscow; took part in Korean Independence Movement, 1919; helped establish Manchuria Youth League and Manchurian Farmers' League, 1923; returned to Korea, 1925; jailed by Japanese for political activity, 1925-31; escaped to China, 1931; went to Yenan, 1941; joined Korean Independence Alliance, 1942; vice chairman of Alliance, 1943; arrived in Seoul, 28 January 1946; member, Judging Committee and Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front; returned to Pyongyang, March 1946; member, Executive Committee, New Democratic Party (former Yenan Independence Alliance); reported successor to Tch'ei, Yong Kern as head of Police Bureau, Interim People's Committee, November 1946; not mentioned in re-organization of North Korea People's Committee, February 1947.

HONG, Myung Hi - B. about 1889; G. Taese Middle School, Tokyo; wrote Declaration of Independence for Sam Il Movement, 1919; lecturer at Chosun Christian College; was managing editor, Oriental Daily News; was president, Shi Dai Daily News; renowned Korean scholar, versed in Chinese classics; respected, with reputation for personal integrity; chairman of Relief Society, 1945; named by Leftists without his consent to positions in the Chosun Literati League and Anti-Fascistic Cooperative Fighting Committee, 1946; residing in Seoul; appointed to ILA but declined seat on grounds that he had not been consulted beforehand, December 1946; reported organizing the Democratic Unification Party, December 1946; president, Democratic Unification Party, 1947; member, Korean Literary Men's League; named as representative of Korean Literary Men's League to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

HUH, Hun - B. about 1885, Hamgyong Namdo; G. Meiji University Law School, Japan; served as defense attorney in Sam Il Case, 1919; former director, Bo Sawng College; imprisoned for Student Revolt, 1929; freed but barred from practicing law; travelled through Europe and America; arrested twice by Japanese upon return; acting Secretary of Interior and Secretary of Justice, Korean People's Republic, 1945; member, Judging Committee and one of four chairmen, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front, 1946; one of five leftist members of Coalition Council, July 1946; defense attorney at Communist counterfeit trial, September 1946; took charge of Communist Party when Communist leaders, Pak Heun Yung and Lee, Kang Kook went underground to escape arrest, September 1946; maneuvered Communist element of New Democratic Party into Labor Party, November 1946; re-elected one of six chairmen, Democratic People's Front, January 1947; chairman, South Korea Labor Party; advisor to Anti-Japanese Campaign Society, 1947; named as representative of South Korea Labor Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

KANG, Soon - B. 1895; sentenced three years imprisonment by Japanese, 1920; joined Korean Communist Party, 1925; went to China in 1933 and there served the Korean independence Movement; member Shanghai Communist Party (Korean); believed to be a nationalist with Communism as secondary belief; returned to Korea, September 1946; joined Coalition Committee, September 1946; chairman, Industrious Mass (Labor Masses) Party; appointed to ILA, December 1946; appointed member of the following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Industry, Labor and Agriculture, January 1947; named as representative of Industrious Mass Party to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

KIM, Doo Bong - B. March 1889; G. Choongang Middle School, Seoul; served as part time teacher, Seoul Bosawng and Himoon Middle Schools, 1919; executive member, Dai Han Independence Political Party, 1923-28; chief clerk, Society for Study of Revolutionary Theory of Various Parties, 1928-32; a noted Korean scholar; organized Chosun People's Revolutionary Party, 1935-37; principal, Yenan Political School, 1940; first president Yenan Independence Alliance, 1942-46; vice-chairman, N. Korea Interim People's Committee, February 1946; chairman, Korean-Soviet Culture Association, April 1946; chairman, New Democratic Party (former Yenan Independence Alliance), February-August 1946; party merged with North Korea Communist Party as North Korea Labor Party, August 1946; chairman North Korea Labor Party, 1946-to date.

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KIM, Il Sung - B. 1913; G. Japanese Military Academy, Seoul; original name was Kim, Sung Chu (Ke); "General"; guerilla leader on Manchurian border; decorated by Soviets; General Secretary, North Korea Branch, Communist Party; chairman, North Korea Interim People's Committee, 1946; party merged North Korea New Democratic Party (Yenan Independence Alliance), August 1946; vice chairman, North Korea Labor Party, 1946; elected to Interim People's Committee, November 1946; reportedly would be displaced by Kim, Doo Bong were it not for Soviet support; reported to have become a Christian, December 1946; chairman, reorganized North Korean People's Committee, February 1947; representative of North Korea Labor Party for US-USSR Joint Commission meeting in Pyongyang, July 1947.

KIM, Koo - B. 1876; leader, Korean Provisional Government; replaced Dr. Rhee as president, Provisional Government, 1943; came to Korean, November 1945; prominent leader, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; vice-chairman, Representative Democratic Council; chairman, Central Executive Committee, Korean Independence Party, 1946; leading figure in anti-Trusteeship movement from December 1946; chairman Anti-Trusteeship Committee, January 1947; implicated in l[illegible]rch attempt to establish Provisional Government, 1947; re-elected chairman, Central Executive Committee, Korean Independence Party, May 1947; resigned as Chairman, General Labor League for Korean Independence (No Chong) and member, Central Committee, Laborers' and Farmers' Party for Korean Independence, May 1947; one of responsible persons, Anti-Trusteeship Demonstration, 23 June 1947; leader, with Rhee, Syng Man, or Korean People's Representatives, July-August 1947.

KIM, Kyu Sik - B. 29 January 1881; G. with honors, Roanoke College, U.S., 1903; won scholarship for M.A. study, Princeton University; returned to Korea, 1904; engaged in religious and educational work; went to China to work for Korean Independence, 1913; naturalized as Chinese citizen, January 1916; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Education and Minister of Publicity consecutively of Korean Provisional Government; elected vice chairman, Korean Provisional Government, 1944; attended Paris Peace Conference, 1919; organized Korean Commission to Europe and American, Washington, 1920; represented Korea at Far Eastern Revolutionary Congress, Moscow, 1922; in Siberia, 1923-24; returned to China and engaged in educational work; held professorships at Futan University, Chungshan University, Peiyang University (Tientsin), Szechuan University (Chengtu); was President, Williams College (Shanghai); speaks eight languages fluently; returned to Korea, November 1945 from China; resigned presidency, Korean Revolutionary Party, January 1946; vice chairman, Representative Democratic Council, 1946; leader of right-wing members of Coalition Committee from July 1946; appointed to Interim Legislative Assembly, December 1946; elected chairman of Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, December 11, 1946; elected Co-Chairman, with Lyuh, Woon Hyung, of the Counter-Measure Committee for the Present Situation, 3 July 1947; named as representative to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission by seven organizations, June 1947; has been on leave from the Legislative Assembly because of ill health, July-August 1947

KIM, Moo Chung (Tch'ei, Moo Chung) (Moo, Chung) B. 1905; "General"; gave up Seoul Choongan High School, 1919; G. Artillery Department, Northern Army Academy, China, 1926; joined Chinese Communist Party, 1925; commissioned Artillery Lt. Colonel, 1927; appointed Regimental Commander, Chinese Communist Army, 1930; entered Military Staff College, Eighth Army Headquarters, 1936; first Commander-in-Chief, South Korea Volunteer Army, Chindoong, 1941; prominent in Yenan Independence Alliance, 1942; commanded Korean Volunteer Army under Yenan Communist forces, 1942-45; prominent leader of North Korean Communist Party; member, North Korea Interim People's Committee, February 1946; reportedly fell out with Kim, Il Sung and Kim, Doo Bong, November 1946; however, reported chairman of Military Affairs Committee, Interim People's Committee, December 1946; head of Leaders Department, North Korea Branch of Korean Communist Party, 1947; chief of all Security Forces, North Korea, 1947.

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KIM, Seung Soo - B. about 1889; G. Law School, Waseda University, Japan; founder of Dong-A Ilbo, 1919; wealthy; was president of Bo Sawng College, Seoul, 1936-1946; Councillor, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; chairman, Hankook Democratic Party; consultant of Dr. Rhee's GHQ for Korean National Unification, July 1946; reported against coalition with left, July 1946; elected to ILA from Seoul, October 1946; when Seoul election nullified, defeated in re-election by Cho, So Ang; prominent in anti-trusteeship movement of December 1946-January 1947; vice chairman, Anti-Trusteeship Committee, January 1947; named as representative of the Hankook Democratic Party to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947

KIM, Sung Sook - B. 1890; one of twelve Secretaries of State, Korean Provisional Government; vice president, Association for Unification of Political Parties; member, Korean National Emancipation League, was chairman, Production and Economic Committee, Emergency National Assembly; withdrew from Emergency National Assembly and joined Democratic People's Front; one of eight vice chairmen, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front; toured Cholla Pukto with An, Ki Sawng, March 1946; arrested for agitation against MG and violation of Proclamation #2, April 1946; sentenced to 6 months in prison and released 7 September 1946; vice chairman, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; member, Laboring People's Party; 1947; chief, Planning Department, Council of All Political and Social Organizations for US-USSR Joint Commission, May 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

KIM, Wong Bong (KIM, Yak San)- B. 1894; G. Hwangpao Military Academy; founder of "Dare to Die Society", 1926; "General"; State Councillor, Korean Provisional Government; founder of Korean voulnteer corps, 1937; leader, First Detachment, Kwang Bok Army, China; Chief, Military Affairs, Provisional Government; a prominent leader, Korean Revolutionary Party, 1944-46; was a member of Emergency National Assembly but joined Democratic People's Front; one of five left wing members of Coalition Committee under Lyuh, Woon Hyung, July 1946; quite Coalition Committee after it suffered temporary setback, July 1946; named honorary chairman of Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance, December 1946; re-elected to one of six chairmanships, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; chairman, Counter-Strike Committee, Democratic People's Front, March 1947; arrested for connection with March strikes, acquitted, 10 April 1947; reportedly connected with organization of Korean Democratic Patriotic Youth Alliance, successor to disbanded Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance, June 1947.

KWAN, Tai Suk - B. about 1885; jailed by Japanese but accused of collaboration; commuted between Peking and Seoul on business, 1942-45; linked with Lyuh, Woon Hyung in early days of National Founding Preparatory Committee; vice chairman and party financer, New Nationalist Party 1946; with some elements of party joined Korean Independence Party, April 1946, and appointed head of Investigation Department; resigned from Korean Independence Party and formed Democratic Korean Independence Party, May 1947; named as representative of Democratic Korean Independence Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

LEE, Bum Suk - B. 1899; "General"; member, Korean Provisional Government; noted guerilla fighter, commander, Second Detachment, Korean Restoration Army with Headquarters in Sian, China, 1944; came to Shanghai, 1945; arrived in Korea, 5 June 1946; consultant, Dr. Rhee's GHQ for Korean National Unification, June 1946; appointed an advisor to Korean Constabulary, July 1946; quit Constabulary because he claimed it was "pinkish", November 1946; organized and heads the Korean National Youth Corps, sponsored by MG.

LEE, Chung Chun - B. about 1893; "Marshal"; attended Japanese Military Academy, Tokyo; fought against Japanese in Manchuria, 1921-22; Chief of Special Korean Section, Loyang Military Academy; commander, Kwang Bok Army; theoretically, commander-in-chief, Korean Army and Navy; moved from Chungking to Nanking, April 1946; unconfirmed reports mention him loading Chinese Nationalist unit in Manchuria along Korean border, September 1946; listed as member, Reinforced Council established by National Congress, March 1947; returned to Korea with Dr. Rhee, Syng Man, April 1947; elected member of Central Standing Committee, Korean Independence Party, May 1947; currently attempting to unite all right wing youth groups under his control; organized Dai Dong Youth Corps (combining 19 youth groups), 7 August 1947.

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LEE, Kang Kook - B. about 1904; G. Seoul Imperial University; old time Communist Party member; visited and studied in Germany; Secretary, People's Republic, 1945; chief secretary, Central People's Committee, 1945; chairman, Democratic People's Front convention (15-16 February 1946); member of Communist Party Central Executive Committee; was one of five left wing members of Coalition Committee, July 1946; quit Coalition Committee, August 1946; wanted by the police for illegal activities, September 1946; fled to North Korea; appointed chief, Bureau of Foreign Affairs, North Korea People's Committee, February 1947; member, North Korea Labor Party.

LEE, Kap Sung - B. 1888; G. mission school, Taegu; business manager for Severence Drug Company; signer of Korean Declaration of Independence, 1919; one of the organizers of the New Nationalist Party, December 1945; resigned party, 1946; as a rightist active in unification movements; reported at odds with most influential rightists, April 1946; head of Society for Promotion of Korean Industry, August 1946; writer; Director Central YMCA; Director, Central Office of New Korea Company; elected to ILA from Seoul to replace Cho, So Ang, February 1947; named as representative of Yung Woo Association to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947

LEE, Yuh Sung - B. about 1899; attended Waseda University, Japan; G. Political Science and Economics Department, Rikkyo University, Japan; joined Communist Party, 1922; reported Chosun Ilbo; staff member, Dong-A Ilbo; member, Rehabilitation Alliance, June 1945; director, Propaganda Bureau, Rehabilitation Commission, August 1945; member, Election Committee, People's Party; chairman, Magnified Committee and head, General Affairs, People's Party; chairman, General Affairs, Democratic People's Front; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946, quit December 1946; elected one of 13 vice chairmen as independent member, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; leading member of the Laboring People's Party, 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

LEE, Yun Yong - B. about 1881; Presbyterian Minister; was vice chairman, Chosun Democratic Party; chairman, Pyongyang Christian Association; arrived in Seoul, from Pyongyang, January 1946; active head, Seoul "headquarters-in-exile" of Chosun Democratic Party; chairman, Philantrophic Association, 1946; . . elected chairman, Inspection Committee, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, 17 May 1947; member, Standing Committee, Korean People's Representatives, August 1947.

LYOO, Rim - B. about 1885; leader of Korean Anarchist Party; a Secretary of State, Korean Provisional Government; chairman, Agriculture and Labor Committee, Emergency National Assembly; formed and headed Independent Farmer Labor Party, May 1946; active in anti-trusteeship movement, December 1946-January 1947; made statement that from beginning he denounced entirely Moscow Decision and ILA, 16 January 1947; elected vice-chairman, Emergecny National Assembly, February 1947.

LYUH, Woon Hong - B. 1889; educated in Korea and U.S.; attended University of Southern California, Los Angeles; former manager, Singer Sewing Machine Company, Seoul; teacher of English, Posung College, Seoul; brother of Lyuh, Woon Hyung; close advisor to his brother, until he left party; staff member, People's Party, 1945; member, diplomatic committee, Democratic People's Front, 1946; resigned from People's Party, 9 May 1946, charging Communist domination; organized and headed "neutral" Social-Democratic Party, June 1946; backed Coalition Committee, summer 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; appointed member of following ILA committees - Internal Affairs and Police, Qualifications, January 1947; president, Dai Han Dok Lip Shinmun, January 1947; named as representative of Social Democratic Party to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member of the Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

PAIK, Nam Un - B. about 1900; G. Tokyo Imperial University, Japan; former professor, Yawn Hi College; professor, Economics, Chosun Christian College, 1925-40; arrested by Japanese for study of Marxism, about 1940; president, Korean Academy; became chairman of Special Assembly Committee, Yenan Independence Alliance in Seoul, 6 February 1946; head, Law Department, Seoul University until resignation, June 1946; a director, Diplomatic Association;

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• PAIK, Nam Un (Continued)
One of eight vice chairmen, Executive Committee, Democrati· People's Front; made brief trip to Pyongyang for consultation with old friend Kim, Doo Bong; June 1946; one of five leftist members of Coalition Committee, July 1946; withdrew from Coalition Committee when it suffered temporary set-back, August 1946; tendered and then withdrew resignation as head of South Korea New Democratic Party (Yenan Independence Alliance), 5-10 September 1946; merged his New Democratic Party into Lyuh, Woon Hyung's Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; made trip to North Korean to confer with Kim, Doo Bong, October 1946; reportedly dismissed from vice chairmanship, Democratic People's Front, November 1946; retired from politics, December 1946; reported elected to Standing Committee, reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; vice chairman, Laboring People's Party, 1947.

○ PAIK, Sang Kyu - B. about 1885; Seoul; family wealthy and socially prominent; G. Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, about 1910; married, two wives; taught at Chosun Christian College, 1914 - 1923; taught at Posung College; President and General Manager of largest Korean-owned bank under Japanese, Seoul; member of People's Party, 1945; withdrew from People's Party and joined Representative Democratic Council, 1946; considered one of farthest left members of RDC; speaks excellent English.

• PAK, Heun Yung - B. 1889; G. Lening University, Moscow; went to Shanghai, joined Chinese Youngmen's Communist Party, 1920, and became director of organization, 1925; imprisoned in Shanghai by Japanese police for Communist activities, 1925-27; was in Russia, 1927-[illegible]; returned to Shanghai, 1930 and again jailed by Japanese police, 1931-36; came to Korea and organized Communist underground movement, 1936; General Secretary, Korean Communist Party, August 1945; one of 4 chairmen, Executive Committee, Democratic People's Front, February 1946; made brief visit to Pyongyang, July 1946; wanted for violation of Proclamation #2, September 1946; elected vice chairman of South Korea Labor Party in absentia, December 1946; one of six chairmen (in absentia), reorganized Democratic People's Front, January 1947; whereabouts unknown, believed to travel at will between North and South Korea.

• RHEE Syng Man - B. about 1875; G. M.A., Harvard University, PH. D., Princeton University under Woodrow Wilson; published Korea's first daily newspaper, 1897-1904; prominent in revolution, 1 March 1919; first president, Korean Provisional Government, April 1919-1942; in U.S., 1919-1945; peace delegate, Philadelphia, 5 April 1919; Washington representative, Korean Provisional Government, Chungking, 28 October 1942; chairman, Korean Commission in Washington, March 1944; appointed high advisor, San Francisco Conference, March 1945; returned to Korea, November 1945; leader, with Kim, Koo, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; chairman, Representative Democratic Council of Korea; toured provinces, April-May 1946; formed GHQ of National Unification, July 1946; chairman, General Labor League for Korean Independence (No Chong), 1946; left Korea for U.S., 4 December 1946; power behind anti-trusteeship movement in South Korea from December 1946; carrying on international lobby for separate South Korean government, January 1947; returned to Korea from U.S. via China, April 1947; announced full non-cooperation stand on Joint Commission, 10 June 1947; leader of Korean People's Representatives, organizing for a general election, July-August 1947.

• SAW (SHUH), Sang Il - B. 1887; G. Posung College, Seoul, 1910; travelled in China while engaged in Korean independence movement; imprisoned by Japanese in 1919; chairman, Kwang Bok Young Men's Association, 1920; vice chairman of Preparatory Committee for National Party, September 1945; chief of Organization Department, Hankook Democratic Party, Kyongsang Pukto, 1946; vice chief of Agriculture and Forestry Section, Hankook Democratic Party, 1946; elected to ILA from Kyongsang Pukto, October 1946; appointed member of following ILA committees - Legislative and Judicial, Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations, January 1947; one of sponsors of anti-trusteeship resolution passed by ILA on 20 January 1947; named as representative by Same Voice Association to consult with US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947.

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SHIN, Ik Hi - B. 1890; G. English course in Foreign Language School; G. Political and Economic course, Waseda University in Tokyo; head, Home Affairs and Secretary of Interior, Korean Provisional Government; head, Administrative Bureau, Provisional Government; constitutional drafting committee, Emergency National Assembly, 1946; chairman, Legislative Committee, Emergency National Assembly; staff member of Korean Independence Party, 1946; a vice chairman, National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence; dropped from revised officer list by Society's national convention, September 1946; elected chairman of Seoul Branch of NSAKI, October 1946; became publisher of Chanyoo Shinmun, October 1946; with Cho, Soong formed Diplomatic Representative's Association to support Dr. Rhee's mission to U.S., December 1946; elected to ILA from Seoul, December 1946; prominent in anti-trusteeship movement of December 1946-January 1947; appointed member of following ILA committees - chairman of Drafting of Administrative and Organizational Regulations, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Liaison, January 1947; elected one of two vice presidents, Korean Independence Party, May 1947; elected advisor to National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, May 1947; resigned from Korean Independence Party, 18 July 1947; selected co-vice chairman, Korean People's Representatives, August 1947.

TCH'EI (CHOI), Ik Hwan - B. unknown; one of leaders Dai Dong Party, 1919; arrested by Japanese several times; released 15 August 1945; member, New Korean Nationalist Party; committee member, Representative Democratic Council; joined Korean Independence Party, along with some elements of New Nationalist Party, and appointed member of Central Committee, April 1946; President, Patriotic Enterprises Organization, formed May 1947

UEM, Hang Sup - B. 1900; chief of Publicity, Korean Provisional Government; returned to Korea, 23 November 1945; prominent spokesman for Kim, Koo and Provisional Government group; chairman, Propaganda and Information Committee, Emergency National Assembly, chairman of Central Association of Korean Boy Scouts, 1946; one of nine executive members of reactivated Korean Independence Party, March 1946; head of Propaganda Department and member of Central Committee, Korean Independence Party, April 1946; founder and adviser, Philanthropic Fellowship, May 1946; president of new Minchoo Ilbo, Seoul, May 1946; appointed to ILA but declined, December 1946; member, Central Executive Committee, Kim, Koo's Anti-Trusteeship Committee, January 1947; elected member of Central Standing Committee, Korean Independence Party, May 1947; arrested, and acquitted of charges in connection with 23 June Anti-Trusteeship Demonstration, 1947; resigned as chief of Korean Boy Scouts, August 1947.

WHANG (HWANG), Chin Nam - B. about 1894 in U.S.; G. University of California, attended universities of Paris and Berlin; wife is French born; came to Shanghai as English interpreter for noted An, Chang Ho, 191[illegible], where first met Lyuh, Woon Hyung; returned to U.S. about 1922; travelled to France, Germany; worked in Korean Provisional Government, Shanghai; taught, Hamnam Medical College; returned to Korea about 1943 and acquired land holdings near Hamhung; fled to Seoul upon Russian entry, August 1945; staff member, People's Party; close advisor and Secretary to Lyuh, Woon Hyung one of 28 originally appointed to Representative Democratic Council; declined position in RDC, 15 February 1946; member, Investigation Committee of Joint Korean-American conference, October 1946; member, Socialist Labor Party, October 1946; appointed to ILA December 1946; expelled from Socialist Labor Party for joining ILA, December 1946; appointed member of following ILA committees - Foreign Affairs and National Defense, Petitions and Discipline, January 1947; principal leader behind movement to resurrect former People's Party, January 1947; elected chairman, Committee for Foreign Affairs and National Defense, ILA, April 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

WON, Sei Hoon - B. 1887; G. YungHee Middle School, 1905 and Tai Dong Law College, 1909; primary school teacher, Manchuria, later president of Maritime Distirct Primary School, Siberia, 1915; vice chairman and director, Finance Department, Korean National Congress, 1920; organized newspaper for Revolutionist Party, 19[illegible]6; arrested at Peking with Chang Tsu-lin and sent to prison in Korea, 1926-28; vice president, Hankook Democratic Party, 1945-46; member, constitutional drafting committee, Emergency National Assembly; member Representative Democratic Council;

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WON, Sei Hoon (Continued)
One of right wing members of Coalition Committee; withdrew from Hankook Democratic Party due to differences over coalition agreement, October 1946; member, Joint Korean-American Conference to investigate riots in South Korea, October 1946; appointed to ILA, December 1946; appointed member of following ILA committees - chairman of Internal Affairs and Police, Measures for Dealing with Enemy Property, Foreign Affairs and National Defense, January 1947; honorary president, Seoul Branch, and member, People's ~~Popular~~ Alliance; submitted resignation from Coalition Committee, May 1947; organizer of Korean Farmers Party, June 1947; named as representative by People's Alliance, Korean Farmers Party and Han Nam Association to consult with the US-USSR Joint Commission, June 1947; member, Counter-Measure Council for the Present Situation, July 1947.

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BRIEF HISTORIES OF PROMINENT SOUTH KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL FRONT

Chairman - Huh Huhn
Claimed membership 6,180,000

After the Military Government declared the People's Republic illegal, the leftists set up an anti-Fascists Struggle Committee to organize the fight against the rightists. In December 1945 a preparatory committee was established to plan a Democratic People's Front. After the formation of the rightists' Emergency National Assembly and the Representative Democratic Council, the People's Front was inaugurated to organize the Communist controlled leftist groups into a cohesive, effective organization. Since the beginning of 1947, the People's Front has been working on a movement to bring into its orbit some representation of every phase of Korean life, including all the religious groups, industrial, cultural, and social organizations. In line with their expansion plans, the name was officially changed to Democratic National Front in June 1947.

This is not a political party, but a federation of the vast majority of leftist parties, unions, and social groups. The organization wields great political influence over the ignorant masses and echoes the slogans, platforms and policies laid down by the People's Committee of North Korea.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE RAPID REALIZATION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE

Chairman - Rhee, Syngman
Claimed membership 7,000,000

The NARRKI is the most powerful and influential organization in South Korea. It was established on 8 February 1946 through a merger of the Anti-Trusteeship National Mobilization Committee (Ahn Chai Hong), the National Independence Society, and the Central Council for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (Rhee, Syngman). It remained small and inactive until after Dr. Rhee's tour of South Korea about May and June 1946. At that time, Rhee saw the possibilities of a cohesive, over-all rightist "movement." In August 1946, Dr. Rhee assumed leadership from the Chungking exile Provisional Government group which had controlled the NARRKI up to that time, and detailed Shin Ik Hi and Oh Ha Young to organize the NARRKI throughout the provinces. At present, there is a branch in every village and province in South Korea.

In May 1947, Rhee united his Headquarters for National Unification with the NARRKI, thus completing his plan to draw all extreme right groups under his direct control. Next to the Korean Democratic Party, the NARRKI holds the most seats in the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.

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SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY

Chairman - Huh, Huhn
Claimed Membership 800,000

At the time that the Communist Party in all Russian-occupied territories changed their name to Labor Party, the Communist Party in North Korea combined the other leftist parties into one North Korea Labor Party. In September 1946, the movement to merge the Communist Party and New Democratic Party into a South Korea Labor Party was started. However, intra-party strife and rivalry caused delay, and an open rift between Lyuh Woon Hyung and Pahk Heun Young resulted in the establishment in October of the Socialist Labor Party under Lyuh's leadership. Comprised of the anti-Pahk leftists, the Socialist Labor Party was denounced in North Korea, and in November the formal South Korea Labor Party was organized. Because of his connection with the October 1946 riots in South Korea, a warrant was issued by Military Government for the arrest of Pahk Heun Young. Attempting to operate in the open, the SKLP named Huh, Huhn chairman and relegated Pahk to position of vice-chairman.

The March 1st celebrations marked the beginning of a big campaign to open more branches. The sub-committee dealing with politics is actually the most powerful organizing unit of any party in South Korea. With excellent backing from the north, the party has been able to engage in extensive organizational activities. They have branches throughout all of the provinces in South Korea and are the largest and most active political party in the communist-controlled Democratic National Front. They are registered for consultation with the Joint Commission and constantly reflect the views and opinions of the Soviet Delegation.

KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Chairman - Kim Sung Soo
Claimed Membership 850,000

This is the best organized, best financed, and most influential rightist political party in South Korea. It has opposed the efforts of the Coalition Committee due to fear of communist infiltration and has been the most violent enemy of the leftists. This party is composed of the wealthiest Koreans, holds the most seats in the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, and controls the majority of key positions in the departments of Military Government.

Under the leadership of Song Chin Oo, the Hankook (Korean) Democratic Party was formed on 16 September 1945, just after the liberation of Korea. The party was composed of many prominent Koreans who served and prospered under the Japanese; for this reason, they have been continually under attack by those who consider themselves patriots After Song's assassination on 30 December 1945, Kim Sung Soo was elected chairman. Under Kim's guidance, the Democratic Party was successful in combining all rightist organizations registered for consultation with the Joint Commission under a coordinating agency known as the "United Council". Because of their strong influence over the majority of rightist parties and organizations, they have borne the brunt of the communist attacks.

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DEMOCRATIC WOMEN'S ALLIANCE OF SOUTH KOREA

Chairman - Lyuh Young Chin
Claimed membership 857,287

This organization began as the Women's Union for Rehabilitation, but changed its name in December 1945 to Korean Women's General Union. Then in February 1947 at the annual national convention, the name was changed to the present one to correspond to the women's leftist organization in North Korea. It now holds membership in the Democratic People's Front and is one of the five leading Communist "social organizations." Many of the leaders are divorced women who have broken with tradition and seek as much freedom as possible.

The Women's Alliance is strong and well organized, especially on the local levels. It is the leftist counterpart of the rightist Women's Association for the Rapid Realization of Independence.

UNITED COUNCIL

Vice-Chairman - Pahk, Seung Ho
Vice-Chairman - Yi, Yun Yung
Membership 172 rightist parties and organizations.

In an attempt to solidify the rightist organizations registered for consultation with the Joint Commission into a "common front," the leaders of the Korean Democratic Party began negotiations in June 1947 with representatives of the more influential rightist parties. On 19 June 1947, it was publicly announced that the United Council for Studying the Problems of Establishing a Provisional Government had been formed. Within a few weeks, the Council included the representatives of 172 rightist political parties and organizations.

Formed with the aim of cooperating with the Joint Commission, the United Council officially refused to engage in political activities not relative to the Joint Commission. Composed of many varied organizations with independent platforms and policies, the Council was established for the sole purpose of consolidating the rightist elements into a solid bloc to offset the large leftist bloc registered with the Joint Commission. Its activities have been confined to preparing a unified set of answers to accompany the questionnaires submitted to each organization by the Joint Commission.

Important to the rightist cause during the activities of the Joint Commission, the future role of the United Council is undetermined. However, it is known that, in the event the Joint Commission fails a second time, the United Council will attempt to use the general election law passed in the Legislative Assembly as a vehicle for electing a president of South Korea.

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ALL KOREA FARMERS' COMMITTEE UNION

Chairman - Paik Yong Hi
Claimed membership 2,140,505

This organization, commonly known as the Chun Nong, inherited the legacy of the former underground movement against the Japanese occupation which was led by Communists. The organization was originally called All Korea Federation of Farm Guilds, but changed its name in September 1946 to broaden its scope to include small landowners. In February 1947 at the annual convention, the Chun Nong of South Korea became a separate organization from its North Korean counterpart. Considered greatly responsible for the riots of October 1946 all over South Korea, the organization remained quiet and was active underground only until the early part of 1947.

The Chun Nong is very strong amongst the farmers, especially in the southernmost provinces. It would be very helpful in influencing a large percentage of farmers to follow Soviet agrarian customs. This league keeps good contact with the farmers and has well-disciplined and loyal members scattered throughout the provinces.

KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY

Chairman - Kim, Koo
Claimed membership 917,800

This party, formed by Kim Koo in 1931 in China as an independence movement, was the strongest Korean party in China. Upon Kim's return to Korea, five other nationalist parties were absorbed into the Independence Party. Most noteworthy of these were Ahn Chai Hong's Nationalist Party, the New Nationalist Party, and the Self-Reliance Party.

Severe inter-party divisions have cropped up periodically within the organization. These began with the issue of participation in the Military Government and Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. Only Ahn Chai Hong accepted a position, first in the KILA and, later, as Civil Administrator. Another source of inter-party unrest has been the underlying unpleasantness existing between those Koreans who claim to have fought for independence outside of Korea as exiles, and those who remained in Korea and fought as a part of the underground during the Japanese Occupation. The most recent issue has been participation in the Joint Commission. This point caused a definite three-way split in the party: Ahn Chai Hong and 90 members of the central committee participating as individuals; Kwan Tai Suk, representing the liberal faction, participating under the name of the Democratic Korean Independence Party; and Kim Koo's remaining followers abstaining from consultation under the present party name.

This is the organization through which the Chungking exile Provisional Government functions. On March 1st, 1947, when the Provisional Government attempted its "coup d'etat", the leaders of the party supported the move, although the party officially denounced it as extra-legal.

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LABORING PEOPLE'S PARTY

Chairman - Lyuh Woon Hyung
Claimed membership - 250,000

This party was brought about through Lyuh Woon Hyung's attempt to revive his old People's Party. Substantially, it represents the merger of three politically left groups - the anti-Pahk Heun Young members of the Old People's Party, the New Democratic Party, and the Social Labor Party. A preparatory committee started work in April 1947 and carefully laid the groundwork for this new party. Lyuh held great hope for this party in spite of his inability to get Communists and anti-Communists to work together. Although he openly opposed the Communists, Lyuh did represent a decided leftist sentiment; however, his exact political position remained an enigma even after his assassination.

His new party was growing in strength and was feared by both rightists and Communist-controlled leftists. Since his death, the party has floundered. The SKLP has made a determined effort to gain control through Paik Nam Un, one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Party, but the majority of the members appear to favor support of another Vice Chairman, Chang Kun San, who represents the anti-Pahk Heun Young group.

KOREAN REPUBLICAN PARTY

Chairman - Kim Won Bong
Claimed membership 127,500

This organization has its beginning in China in 1935 as the Korean National Revolutionary Party under the guidance of Kimm Kiu Sic. After a quarrel over party principles, leadership passed into the hands of Kim Won Bong, a former member of the Chungking exile government and a well-known general of the Korean Independence Army. Kim had made contacts with the liberal elements of nationalist Koreans all over the world through his association with the exile government, and he formed his organization with these people. He was made War Minister of the exile government in 1942 at the time of the Coalition program, but up to that time he had been branded a "Communist" by that group. Kim returned to Korea and stayed with the Chungking group until after the Emergency National Assembly was established. Then he took his party over to the People's Front. The Los Angeles branch of the organization publishes a red sheet called "Korean Independence" which began a "recall General Hodge" campaign in November 1945. At the 2 June 1947 convention, the party changed its name to Korean Republican Party.

Still a member organization of the Democratic People's Front, the Korean Republican Party is strongly backed by Pahk Heun Young.

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NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY

Chairman - Rev. Pai Un Hi
Membership 230

The Assembly is under the Chairmanship of Rev. Pai Un Hi, a Presbyterian minister. It is completely answerable to the control of Rhee Syngman. It purports to be not a political meeting of partisan character, but a general constituent assembly called for the purpose of creating a government. It now comprises 230 members, who claim to speak for the entire population of Southern and Northern Korea. The manner of the choosing of the delegates is handled with some diffidence by the spokesmen of the Assembly. They are alleged to have been elected by "democratic parties and social organizations, with the assistance of eminent individuals." Actually this organization was the work of the (Rhee) General Headquarters of Korean Racial Unity which was organized by the unilateral act of Dr. Rhee in the summer of 1946. Local units of the Rapid Realization Society were used in some elections. The members of the Representative Democratic Council were invited to become members of the new assembly. This invitation was extended approximately 1 August. Only three of the members have accepted. These are Paik, Young Hi, Chang Myun, Whang Yun Soo.

It may be anticipated that the assembly will operate by quasi-legal methods. It may create a government which would be announced to the people as having full governmental powers, but which at the same time could be justified to the military as being not a government but only a proposed slate.

THE NATIONAL CONGRESS

Chairman - Cho Soo Ang
Membership - In excess of 500

The National Congress at the present time claims membership in excess of 500 members. It claims to be the holder of the moral right to govern by virtue of the "apostolic succession" from the Chungking Government, which in turn derived its power from the consent of the people expressed in the 1919 revolution.

The members of the Chungking Government, returning to Korea in November 1945, came in a non-governmental capacity. The Emergency National Congress was called by the Chungking group in January 1946, for the purpose of creating a Government. In February 1946 it gave its retroactive approval to the creation of the Representative Democratic Council, which thereby became claimant to the "apostolic" tradition. Apparently, in recent months, the Council's place in the succession has been ignored; the Emergency National Assembly has now expanded itself into the National Congress.

The Congress is responsive to the control of Kim Koo. It differs in policy from the National Representative Assembly primarily upon three points. These are:

(1) The question of leadership, i.e. Kim Koo vs Rhee Syngman
(2) Attitude upon the pro-Japanese issue, on which the National Congress follows Kim Koo in a policy of violent opposition to collaborators.

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(3) The National Congress bars from membership all who have accepted seats in the Legislature or positions in the Military Government, designating them as traitors.

(4) The National Congress supports the policy of establishment of a united Provisional Korean Government through general elections held in North and South Korea. However, the National Congress is violently opposed to KHEF's plan of establishment of a separate government in South Korea through the present election law.

COALITION COMMITTEE

Chairman - Kimm Kiusic
Membership 14

The Coalition Committee was organized in May 1946 under the co-chairmanship of Kimm Kiusic and the late Lyuh Woon Hyung. It comprised ten members, five designated by the Representative Democratic Council and concurred in by the Emergency National Assembly, and five designated by the Democratic People's Front. The secession of the four of the five leftist delegates resulted in the later addition of a number of new members representing small organizations Left in orientation but not controlled by the Comintern. The original purposes of the Coalition Committee were the finding of a basis of compromise between the organized Left and Right, the creation of an Interim Legislature, and the establishment of a Korea political organization which would be amenable to the necessities of the situation and to cooperation with the military command.

The first objective was early recognized as unobtainable. The second was achieved, and the third remains uncompleted.

At the present time the Coalition Committee under the leadership of Kimm Kiusic embraces the following members representative of parties and organizations:

Social Democratic Party	LYUN WOON HONG
Po Kuk Party	SIN SUK
People's League	CHANG CHA IL
Democratic Unification Party	HONG MYONG HI
Farmers' Party	WON SE HUN
New Progressive Party	KIM HO AND/OR KIM POONG CHUN
Independence League	CHONG, UI HYONG
Patriotic Women's League	PAK UN SONG
Chong U Party	YI UNG CHIN
New Korean Nationalist Party	AN CHAE HONG
Democratic Independence Party	PAK CHU PYONG
Healthy People's Assn. (Independence Front)	YI KUK NO
Confucian Church	KIM SONG KYU

It may be anticipated that the Coalition Committee will attempt to broaden itself into a framework of political organization capable of holding the support of the presently unorganized majority of the Korean people. At the present time negotiations are under way to bring into the Committee the Council for Current Policies, the Council for Joint Commission Policy, and the Independence Front.

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LESS PROMINENT SOUTH KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS: IMPORTANT FROM STANDPOINT OF INFLUENCE AND POPULAR SUPPORT

NEW KOREA NATIONALIST PARTY

Chairman: Ahn, Chai Hong
Claimed Membership: 291,150

In May 1946 this group joined the Korean Independence Party, but in June 1947 it withdrew from the Independence Party and registered as a separate party under the leadership of Ahn Chai Hong. It represents the former New Nationalist Party and the Korean Nationalist Party. When Kim Koo first returned to Korea, he had only the prestige of the exile Provisional Government, but later, these two parties furnished the organization for his Independence Party. When Ahn withdrew because he favored support of the Moscow Decision, he took his following with him. It is therefore a strong party with significant political influence.

DEMOCRATIC KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY

Chairman: Kwan, Tai Suk
Claimed Membership: 176,590

This organization has a complicated history. The members comprising this party were originally members of the New Nationalist Party. In May 1946 the party split - half of the members joined the Progressive Party, and half the Korean Independence Party. Then in May 1947, those members who had joined the Korean Independence Party were led by Kwan Tai Suk into forming this new organization. Kwan Tai Suk represented the progressive element of the Korean Independence Party that favored support of the Moscow Decision. The party, itself, is small and has little influence but may play a larger role in the coalition efforts of Kimm Kiu Sic.

DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENCE FRONT

Chairman: Cho, Bong Am
Claimed Membership: 498,647

Cho Bong Am, former communist from Inchon, began his plan for unification of all middle-road groups in February 1947. At present, there are 32 small organizations with membership in the Front: most important of which are the Toiling Masses Party, National Independence League, and Vanguard for Fighting for Independence. It has grown stronger and gained a large following through its firm support of the Coalition Committee. It is still in the formative stage and, due to lack of funds and newness, has not organized itself well on the provincial level. This organization is considered non-communist but represents leftist political thought.

SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Chairman: Lyuh, Woon Hong
Claimed Membership: 710,590

This party was begun when Lyuh Woon Hong (brother of Lyuh Woon Hyung) and twenty Central Committee members withdrew from the old Peoples' Party on the issue of trusteeship. At that time, this

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organization was anti-trusteeship, but now supports the Moscow Decision. Although it is usually termed "moderate left", the answers they submitted to the questionnaires were basically the same as the answers submitted by all organizations belonging to the Democratic National Front. The Socialist Democratic Party has little influence as a party, but has helped fight for the coalition movement.

CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Chairman: Cho, Man Sik
Claimed Membership: 432,528

A rightist organization originally formed in Pyongyang, North Korea, under the leadership of Cho Man Sik, this party was the first to be purged by Kim Il Sung and his Soviet superiors. Other party leaders fled to South Korea and started branches in Seoul and in the provinces while Cho Man Sik remained in protective custody of the Red Army. The remaining party officials in North Korea were replaced by communist puppets and the name was changed to North Korean Democratic Party. However, Cho Man Sik is still considered chairman by the organization in South Korea. Although the party is not very strong in South Korea, it has much influence among Koreans coming south from North Korea. Its youth group, the Northwestern Youth Association, is very dynamic and zealous in its determination to destroy the communists.

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List of all Korean political parties and social organizations applying for consultation in South and North Korea: by name, claimed membership, and political orientation. Those twenty-eight parties marked by an asterisk applied for consultation but did not submit answers of the questionnaires.

SOUTH KOREA:

Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
1	Korean Law & Political Institute	2,000	Right
2	General Union of Entire Country Buddhist Assn.	1,585,708	Right
3	People's Republican Party	127,500	People's Fron
4	Humanity Institute	8,000	Right
5	United People's Party	14,000	Mod. Right
6	Sungdong Young Men's League	1,600	People's Fr.
7	Korean Popular Party	23,350	Right
8	North-South Friendship Association	1,840	Right
9	Hq. War Refugee Relief Association	2,500,000	Mod. Right
10	Chosun Renovation Party	20,431	Right
11	New Korea Young Men's Federation	2,400	Right
12	Korea Economic Association	2,756	Right
13 *	Korean Political & Ecohomical Society	125	Right
14	Korean Esperanto Society	5,000	Moderate
15	Association for a Christian Nation	5,000	Right
16	Democratic Independence Front	498,647	Moderate
17	War Refugees Association	20,000	Right
18	New Progressive Racial Association	30,200	Right
19	Korea Civil Engineers & Architects' League	1,220,000	Moderate
20	Shang Hai Christian Friendship Association	567	Right
21	University Club (Global Comrades Society)	2,500	Mod. Right
22	Assn. of People from North Hamgyong Province	1,000	Right
23	Democratic Korean Independence Party	176,590	Mod. Right
24	Relief Assn. for Koreans in China	550	Right
25	Oriental Cultural Promotion Society	13,570	Right
26	Industrial Patriotic Party	13,475	Right
27	Western and Northern Friendship Assn.	1,028	Right
28	Korean Red Cross (charter members:	300)	Mod. Right
29	Society for Making Korea Wealthy & Strong	17,580	Right
30	Committee Promoting Korean Independent Dem.Govt.	22,000	Right
31	Assn. of Descendants of Tan (Founder of Korea)	31,560	Right
32	Whole National Patriotic Assn.	129	Mod. Right
33	Korean Renaissance Political Party	35,000	Mod. Right
34	Alliance for Independence Movement	20,000	Mod. Right
35	Reconstruction Alliance of Korean Druggists	6,029	Right
36 *	Korean Young Men's Esperanto League	300	People's Fr.
37	Young Korean Party	1,889,600	Mod. Right
38	Popular Party of Korea	24,178	Right
39	Institute for China Affairs	1,200	Mod. Right
40	Self-Realization Institute	2,709	Right

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
41	Oriental Idea Association	9,000	Right
42	Korean Civil Engineers Assn.	1,490	People's Front
43	Korean Transportation Society	5,000	Right
44	Korean Civil Engineers & Architects Assn.	195,183	Right
45	Society for the Study of the Korean Language	1,200	Right
46	North Korea Farmers' Union	3,000	Right
47	Korean Electric Engineers' Assn.	1,250	People's Fr.
48	Korean Patriots' Relief Assn.	22	Right
49	Patriotic Association	1,500	Right
50	Korean Manufacturing Chemists' Assn.	1,280	People's Fr.
51	Korean Chamber of Commerce	14,500	Right
52	Seoul Chamber of Commerce	5,553	Right
53 *	Korean Diligence and Saving Fraternity	250	Right
54	Democratic Women's Alliance of South Korea	857,287	People's Fr.
55	Christian Democratic Union	6,740	People's Fr.
56	Kwangju Chamber of Commerce	1,400	Right
57	Korean Fruit Growers Assn.	11,793	Mod. Right
58	Chundokyo Women's Assn.	42,843	Right
59	Central Hq. of Korean Buddhists	4,250,120	Right
60	Feder. of S. Chulla Prov. Commodity Dealers' Union	23,000	Right
61	Idealistic Korean Buddhist Institute	5,512	Right
62	All Korea Confucians' Union	18,635	People's Fr.
63	League of National Free Labor	6,000	Right
64	Korean Metallic Workers' Trade Union	16,596	People's Fr.
65	Korean Communication Labor Union	8,096	People's Fr.
66	Korean Tailor Workers' Union	4,479	People's Fr.
67	Korean Salary Men's Union	40,142	People's Fr.
68	National Congress of Specified Trade Union	8,657	People's Fr.
69	Korean Carpenters' Trade Union	3,752	People's Fr.
70	Korean Food Trade Union	8,384	People's Fr.
71	Korean Industrial Medical Institute	500	People's Fr.
72	Cooperative Association of Korea	554,000	People's Fr.
73	Korean Printing Workers' Trade Union	11,771	People's Fr.
74	Korean Fishery Workers' Trade Union	17,328	People's Fr.
75	Korean Textile Workers' Trade Union	23,252	People's Fr.
76	Chosun Pharmacist Society	560	People's Fr.
77	The Union of Korean Musicians	1,122	People's Fr.
78	Society of Tan Mountain (Tan, founder of Korea)	1,020	Right
79	League of Korean Art	1,624	People's Fr.
80	Great Mutual Society	28,363	Right
81	Toiling Masses Party	47,868	Mod. Left
82	Korean Accountants' Assn.	27	Right
83	Korean Public Opinion Assn.	1,500	Right
84	Chosun Political Economic Study Society	14,100	Mod. Right
85	Korean Wrestlers' Institute	26,531	Mod. Right

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
86	Chosun Healthy People's Society	23,755	Mod. Right
87	1919 Independence Declaration Memorial Assn.	26,400	Right
88	Korean Educators' Association	9,210	People's Front
89	Seoul War Refugees' Street Vendors' Assn.	6,225	Right
90	Dong Hak Party	5,674	Right
91	Korean National Academy	570	People's Fr.
92	Race Culture StudySociety	500	Right
93	Korean Revolutionist Self-Governing Assn.	1,769	Right
94	Korean Mechanical Engineers' Assn.	1,210	People's Fr.
95	Politics and Economics Institute	25	Moderate
96	Korean Modern Garments' Research Assn.	1,300	Right
97	Central Hq. of National Cooperative Assns.	20,000	Right
98	Neighborhood Comrades Assn.	18,372	Right
99 *	Philanthropist Institute	505	Right
100	Chosun Theatre League	2,080	People's Fr.
101	Korean Democratic & Patriotic Young Men's Assn.	781,239	People's Fr.
102	Korean Independence Promoting Assn.	1,500	Right
103	Korean Language Institute	3,392	Mod. Right
104	Drafted (during the war) Union of Workers	11,050	People's Fr.
105	National Music Institute	1,042	People's Fr.
106	Korean Literary Men's Assn.	3,512	People's Fr.
107	Seoul Student Unification Acceleration Society	39,478	People's Fr.
108	Southeastern Section of Korea Club	1,400	Right
109	Korean Mining Technicians' Assn.	1,500	People's Fr.
110	Council of Korean Industry Construction	185,900	Mod. Left
111	Korean Trading Association	1,389	Right
112	Korean Farm Labor Party	58,600	Right
113	Union of Korean Scientists & Technicians	6,820	People's Fr.
114	Korean Agricultural Technicians' Assn.	1,270	People's Fr.
115	Chosun Movie Association	1,560	People's Fr.
116	Council of Committee (located in Korea) of Union of Korean Scientists & Technicians in Japan	1,100	People's Fr.
117	Korean Industrial Technicians Union	11,796	People's Fr.
118	Korean Architecture Assn.	1,475	People's Fr.
119	Chosun Coal Manufacturers' Assn.	3,000	Right
120	Korean Forestry Assn.	3,253	Right
121	Peace and Light Institute	4,160	Right
122	Great Korea Patriotic Society	5,200	Right
123	Korean Farmers' Party	42,159	Mod. Right
124	Suwon Chamber of Commerce	110	Right
125	National Socialist Party	61,552	Right
126	Union of Sacred Korean Construction	72,000	Right
127	Union of New Literature	1,200	People's Fr.
128	Korean People's Relief Society	207,316	People's Fr.
129	Korean Music Reconstruction League	707	People's Fr.
130	Korean Photographers' Union	1,240	People's Fr.

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
131	Union of All Korean Farmers' Committee	2,140,505	People's Front
132 *	Pusan Central Head Office of Korean Young Men's Association in Japan	2,500	People's Fr.
133 *	Pusan Economic Institute	37	Moderate
134	8th February Friendship Assn.	1,637	Right
135	Women's Work Patrons' Assn.	215	Right
136	Self-Supporting Students' Mutual Aid Assn.	21,930	People's Fr.
137	Eugenic Association of Korean Nation	453	Right
138	Korean Industrial Assn.	3,000	Right
139	Women's Scientist Assn.	1,500	People's Fr.
140	Korean Kwangpok Students Ex-Soldiers Assn.	8,470	Right
141	Pusan Chamber of Commerce & Industry	2,341	Right
142	South Kyongsang Province Commodity Assn.	1,231	Right
143	Pusan Property Custodian's Assn.	249	Right
144	Assn. of Korea Federation of Distribution	15,570	Right
145 *	Construction Young Men's Assn.	2,900	Right
146	Korean Opera Union	1,153	People's Fr.
147	Korean-American Assn.	1,300	Right
148	Central Friendly Assn.	3,000	Right
149	Seoul Committee of Residents in Japan Korean Assn.	15,240	People's Fr.
150	South Korea Labor Party	750,900	People's Fr.
151	Great Korea Young Men's Assn.	1,803	Right
152	Young Friends Party of Chon Do Kyo	61,695	Mod. Left
153	Hq. of Chon Do Kyo Religion	4,064,300	Mod. Left
154	Korean Democratic Young Men's League	830,000	People's Fr.
155	Chosun Marine Transportation Assn.	10,670	Moderate
156	Chosun Dancing Art Assn.	1,247	People's Fr.
157	Central People's Committee	20,207	People's Fr.
158	United Labor Committee	58,860	People's Fr.
159	Chosun Chemical Labor Union	18,013	People's Fr.
160	Transit Labor Union	38,311	People's Fr.
161	Union of Korean Civil Engineering Workers	21,025	People's Fr.
162	Korean Barber Workers Trade Union	2,317	People's Fr.
163	Korean Mine Workers Trade Union	15,648	People's Fr.
164	Korean Shoe Workers' Trade Union	2,539	People's Fr.
165	Korean Marine Trade Union	12,579	People's Fr.
166	Korean Electrical Workers' Trade Union Right	11,687	People's Fr.
167	Assn. for Rapid Realization of United Political /	1,500	Right
168	Righteous Friends Assn.	2,000	Right
169	Soviet-Korean Cultural Assn.	1,500	People's Fr.
170	Korean Mutual Relief Assn.	4,000	Right
171	Movement Assn. Anti-Japanese Relief	505,506	People's Fr.
172	Korean Assn. for Liberal Arts & Sciences	5,150	People's Fr.
173	Korean Drug Manufacturing Laborers' Assn.	2,112	Right
174	Korean Inventors' Assn.	963	Moderate
175	Korean War Refugee Unemployed Assn.	25,510	People's Fr.

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
176	Korean Holy Political Society (Confucian)	16,000	Right
177	Korean Student Soldiers League	1,370	People's Front
178	Korean Railway Workers' Trade Union	30,981	People's Fr.
179	Korean Patriotic Women's Union	10,642	Right
180	League of Legal Scholars	1,030	People's Fr.
181	Taichung Music Assn.	1,200	Right
182	Ryesoo Nation Construction Young Men's Assn.	2,100	Right
183	Ryesoo Young Men's Christian Assn.	3,500	Right
184	Kimhai Newspaper Assn.	1,863	Right
185	Diamond Mountain Society	104,583	Right
186 *	Kyongsong (Seoul) Lawyers' Society	120	People's Fr.
187	Student Soldier Refusers' Assn.	2,783	Right
188	Council of Korean Labor Union	354,417	People's Fr.
189	Yongsan Social Work Assn.	1,500	Right
190	Korean General Farmers' Alliance	216,548	Mod. Right
191	Right & Left Unification Promotion Assn.	2,700	Moderate
192	Korean Dentists' Assn.	1,100	Right
193	Yosu Chamber of Commerce	480	Right
194	Korean People's Society	1,800	Right
195	Oriental Youth Assn.	4,900	Right
196	Kum Hung Friends' Society	525	Right
197	Korean Peace-Time Policy Committee	130,000	Right
198	Korean Public Health & Welfare Assn.	1,645	Right
199	Korean Democratic Union	31,600	Moderate
200	Pohang Chamber of Commerce	1,357	Right
201	Anti-Fascist Fighting Committee	25,000	People's Fr.
202	Christian Youth Federation in Soon Chon	1,100	Right
203	State Formation of Women's Society in Soon Chon	6,800	Right
204	Korean Moving Picture Technicians' Assn.	1,101	Right
205	Asiatic Democratic League	12,032	Right
206 *	Similar Righteous Ideas Institute	3,000	Moderate
207	Farmers-Laborers Cooperative Assn.	5,000	People's Fr.
208	Farm Laborers' Assn.	6,000	People's Fr.
209	Korea Welfare Society	20,000	Moderate
210	New Korea Nationalist Party	291,150	Mod. Right
211 *	Chamber of Commerce in Kunsan	1,100	Right
212	Chosun Federation of Youth	651,000	People's Fr.
213	Korean Revolutionary Labor Party	4,350	Mod. Right
214 *	Central Council of Korean Social Problems	27,500	Right
215	Korean-Chinese Cultural Assn.	1,300	Right
216	Central Food Dealers' Union	11,400	Moderate
217	Chun Do Kyo ("Worshipping Heaven," religious sect)	64,360	Moderate
218	Federation of Korean Cultural Assn.	68,493	People's Fr.
219	New Life Society	2,550	Moderate
220	Korean Agricultural Tools Assn.	1,277	Right

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
221	Full Moon Meeting Society	1,430	Right
222	Research Assn. on Problems of Koreans Residing Abroad -/	1,800	Right
223	Righteous Young Men's Assn.	400	Right
224	All Korea Anti-Trusteeship Assn.	3,450	Right
225	Anti-Trusteeship Fellowship Assn.	3,500	Right
226	Anam Revolutionary Young Men's Assn.	1,254	Right
227	Repatriated Koreans from Manchuria Assn.	1,600	Right
228	Great Korean Young Men's League	6,702	Right
229	North Mountain Comrades Assn.	1,185	Right
230	Korean Bamboo Lake Unit	2,763	Right
231	Morning Sun Comrades Assn.	16,613	Right
232	Korean Young Men's Assn.	1,800	Moderate Left
233	General Alliance of Revolutionary Buddhists	1,300	Right
234	Federation of Buddhist Women's Union	20,070	Right
235 *	Great East Gate Market Merchants' Union	270	Right
236	Returned Countrymen's Assn.	37,680	Mod. Right
237	League of Returners from South Sea Islands	3,673	Moderate
238	Great Korean Patriotic Young Men's Assn.	2,000	Right
239 *	Taegu Oriental Herb Business Assn.	158	Right
240	Korea Industrial Assn. in Japan	10,900	People's Front
241	Revolutionary Young Men's Union	12,000	Mod. Right
242 *	Renters' Assn.	20,100	People's Fr.
243	Korean Civil Liberty Union	500	Mod. Left
244	Korean Legal Research	102	Mod. Right
245	White-Clad People's Assn.	200	Right
246	Korea Tailors' Union	3,530	Right
247	Korea Civil Engineers & Architects Assn.	8,200	Right
248	North Kangwon People's Society	100,137	Right
249	Tongchun People's Society	5,080	Right
250	March-1st Establishing Country Assn.	1,200	Mod. Right
251	Mutual Cooperative Original Society	2,600	Moderate
252	National Cultural Assn.	45	Right
253	General League of Young Men of Korea	533,200	Right
254	Korean Scientists Assn.	22,000	Right
255	Political Comrades Assn.	9,546	Right
256	Central Committee for Sea Transportation	2,116	Mod. Left
257	Soon Chun Chamber of Commerce	450	Right
258	Mokpo Chamber of Commerce	1,050	Right
259	March 1st Christian Friendship Assn.	16,736	Right
260	Korean Mining Assn.	37,015	Right
261	Popular Party	90,618	Right
262 *	Chamber of Commerce & Industry in Inchon	1,056	Right
263	People's Alliance	135,702	Mod. Right
264	Chamber of Commerce of Chonju	700	Right
265	Chamber of Commerce of Iri	500	Right

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
266	Kangwon Province Commodity Assn	5,300	Right
267	Kangwon Province Chamber of Commerce & Industry	15,000	Right
268	Federation of Catholic Young Women's Assn.	2,110	Right
269	Federation of Catholic Young Men's Assn.	1,400	Right
270	Roman Catholic Church	198,811	Right
271	Working People's Party	220,520	Mod. Left
272 *	Seoul Midwife's Assn.	300	Moderate
273	Kyonggi Girls' School Alumnae Assn.	3,500	Right
274	Democratic People's Front	6,217,819	People's Front
275	Korean Livelihood Assn.	31,620	People's Fr.
276	Democratic Students' League	73,974	Moderate
277	Elementary Science Assn. of Korea	1,120	Mod. Left
278	Oriental Medical Society	6,800	Right
279	Korean Reporters' Assn.	1,500	People's Fr.
280	Tong Yong Chamber of Commerce & Industry	1,773	Right
281	Seoul Lawyers' Assn.	199	People's Fr.
282	Eastern Country Culture Assn.	42,535	Right
283	Social Democratic Party	71,059	Mod. Left
284	The Korean-China Docotrs' Assn.	1,811	People's Fr.
285	Yong San Truck Business Assn.	1,517	Right
286	Kyonggi Province Steam Engine Assn.	2,150	Right
287	South Korea Farmers' Society	19,679	Mod. Left
288	Kyonggi Province Education Assn.	5,033	Right
289	Korean Young Men's Assn.	102,300	Mod. Right
290	North Kyong Sang Province Chamber of Com. & Ind.	2,600	Right
291	South Cholla Province Chamber of Commerce & Ind.	2,570	Right
292 *	Metropolitan Transportation Cooperative Assn.	3,500	Right
293 *	Kyonggi Province Midwife's Assn.	110	Right
294	Chung Nam Commodity Assn.	1,200	Right
295	South Chung Chong Province Chamber of Commerce	1,200	Right
296	Buddhist Young Men's Party	21,915	Right
297	Inyi Self-Guarding Troop	226	Right
298	Great Law Buddhist Society	200,000	People's Fr.
299	Heung San Laborers Self-Aid Assn.	5,215	Right
300	Korean Renters' Assn.	45,800	People's Fr.
301 *	Merchant Assn. of Great South Gate Market of Seoul	226	Right
302	Sam Ri Self-Strengthening Assn.	10,000	Right
303 *	Great Korean Popular Socialist Party for the Redistribution of the National Land	200	Right
304	National Federation of Confectionary Unions	3,000	Right
305	New Progressive Party	12,332	Mod. Right
306	Dukryang Friendship Assn.	2,300	Right
307	Dukryang Christian Young Men's Mission	1,500	Right
308	Democratic Educational Society	25,581	People's Fr.
309	Korean Legal Clerk's Assn.	1,310	Right
310	War Refugees League	74,326	People's Fr.

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
311	Keunwoo Association	1,300	Right
312	Korea Patriotic Friends Assn.	1,050	Right
313	Hai Yang Gun (County) People's Assn.	3,000	Right
314	Democratic Youth United Front	46,988	Moderate
315	Korean Industrial Club	1,500	People's Front
316	Torch Club	86	Right
317	Sinhomism Korea Society	357	Moderate
318	Korean Patriotic Comrades Assn.	5,800	Right
319	Patriotic Young Men's Assn.	2,611	Right
320	Medical Doctors' Assn.	706	Moderate
321	Korean Medical Doctors' Assn.	2,711	Right
322	Christian Assn. of North Kyongsang Province	3,562	Right
323	Taegu Christian Young Men's Assn.	2,800	Right
324	Street Merchants' Policy Committee	3,495	People's Fr.
325	Coalition Committee	65	Moderate
326	Korean National Reconstruction Youth Assn.	387,000	Mod. Right
327	Korean Textile Assn.	3,380	Right
328	Assn. of Council Against Illegal Actions	2,000	Right
329	Union of Art Assn.	3,080	Right
330 *	Korean Authors' Assn.	730	Right
331	Assn. of People from South Hamgyong Province	125,000	Mod. Right
332 *	Printing Committee of Left-Wing Books	143	People's Fr.
333	Kyongsang Province Natives Friendship Society	5,000	Right
334	North Chungchong Prov. Chamber of Com. & Ind.	3,830	Right
335	North Chungchong Province Commodity Assn.	1,032	Right
336	Christian New People's Assn.	4,462	Mod. Right
337	Korean Horse Assn.	3,000	Right
338	Tongnam Young Men's Assn.	1,050	Right
339 *	Korean Medical Suppliers' Assn.	1,800	Moderate
340	Institute for Nations Program	5,600	Moderate
341	The Legal & Political Assn.	583	Right
342	Kyongsang (N.) Province Medical Doctors' Assn.	309	Mod. Right
343	National Construction Oratory Assn.	1,750	Right
344	Anam Young Men's Assn.	1,100	Right
345	Korea Republican Party	173,500	Mod. Right
346	North Mountain Assn.	300	Right
347	Seoul Nurses' Assn.	250	Right
348	Korean Sericulture Assn.	451,365	Right
349	Hwang Hai Society	5,000	Right
350	Korean Social Education Assn.	15,080	Right
351	Korean Publishers' Cultural Assn.	150	Mod. Left
352	Korean Youth Union	287,500	Mod. Right
353	Federation of Korean Irrigation Assn.	500,000	Right
354	Democratic Party of Korea	865,706	Right
355	Council for Establishing Provisional Government	150	Right

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
356	Union of All Women's Assns. in Korea	4,525,150	Right
357	Independent Laborers Federation of Korea	1,001,790	Right
358	Korean Alphabet Comrades Assn.	1,200	Right
359	National Art Society	1,050	Right
360	Spring and Autumn Assn.	1,800	Right
361	Young Friends' Assn.	1,200	Right
362	Committee for Importation of Korean Property from Japan	20,000	Right
363	Patriotic League	7,164	Right
364	Philanthropical Society	2,800	Right
365	Masan Chamber of Commerce & Industry	3,319	Right
366	Mutual People's Society	1,600	Right
367	Confucian Association	3,000	Right
368	Great Korea Patriotic Assn.	1,800	Mod. Right
369	Light Revival Society	12,550	Right
370	Korean Printing Cultural Assn.	270	People's Front
371	Korean Military Affairs Assn.	300,000	Right
372	Chosun Democratic Party	225,212	Right
373	Korean Public Opinion Society	1,775	People's Fr.
374	Fatherland Culture Society	2,000	Right
375 *	Korean-American Cultural Society	200	Right
376	General Council for National Fishery Industry	105,000	Right
377	Anti-Trusteeship Establishing Country Comrades Assn.	5,300	Right
378	Korean Confucianists Unification Assn.	3,300	People's Fr.
379	Korean Industrial Labor Investigation Institute	2,489	People's Fr.
380	Korean Liberty Party (Korean Free Youth Party)	150,000	Right
381	International Politics & Diplomatic Assn.	230	People's Fr.
382	General Hq. of Self-Guarding Corps	1,200	Moderate
383	Korean Fertilizer Society	7,415	Right
384	Korean Aviation Development Assn.	1,200	Right
385	People's Assn. of Sunchon County (N. Pyongan Prov.)	365	Right
386	Spinners & Weavers Assn. of Korea	30,000	Right
387	Korean Historical Society	2,103	People's Fr.
388	Central Livestock Breeding Assn.	2,462	Right
389	Korean Restoration Youth Assn.	879,050	Right
390	Central Culture Assn.	40	Right
391	Same Voice Association	2,108	Right
392	Korean Medical Supply Industry Assn.	4,700	Right
393	New Life Association	1,500	Right
394	Oriental Politics Institute	1,300	Mod. Right
395	Korean Race Assn.	662,282	Right
396 *	Korean Musicians' Assn.	35	Right
397	Korean Patriots' Union	280	Right
398	Korean Veterinarians' Assn.	925	Moderate
399	Federation of Korean Property Custodians	2,500	Right
400 *	Korea Agricultural Assn.	1,655,650	Right

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Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
401	People's Livelihood Society	1,038	Peoples Front
402	Korean Christian Good-Will Mission Society	3,003	Right
403	General Assn. of Blind in Korea	20,000	Right
404	Chang Dong Church Women's Assn.	110	Right
405 *	Tankoo Fine Art Institute	30	Right
406	Korean Christian Fellowship Missionary Assn.	1,000	Right
407	New Korea Party	5,500	Right
408	Butchers' Union	350,000	People's Fr.
409	Korean Youth Literature Assn. (Youth Writers')	1,350	Right
410	Clean Friends Club	1,500	Right
411	National Club	28,000	Right
412	National Patriotic Party of Chun Do Kyo	1,393,065	Right
413	Women's Assn. for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence	3,281,724	Right
414	Central Union Federation	100,000	Right
415	Korea Laborers' Athletic League	3,710	Right
416	Korean Agricultural Science Assn.	2,253	Right
417	Reformation Comrade Assn.	5,200	Right
418	Republic Club	3,200	Right
419	Evolution Association	2,000	Right
420	Construction League	3,200	Right
421	National Constructing Club	2,500	Right
422	Youth Loving Comrades Assn.	3,451	Right
423	Korea Young Women's Christian Assn. (Y.W.C.A.)	9,280	Right
424	All-Korea Political Parties & Social Organizations' League for U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission	2,125,055	Moderate
425	Seoul City & Town Young Men's Assn.	3,000	People's Fr.

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NORTH KOREA:

Acc. Nos.	Full Name of Party or Social Organization	Declared Number of Members	Classified by Political Orientation
1	North Korea Labor Party	652,077	People's Front
2	North Korea Democratic Party	247,972	" "
3	North Korea Chun Do Kyo Young Friends	414,964	" "
4	North Korea Miners' Union	50,976	" "
5	North Korea Metal Workers' Union	22,250	" "
6	North Korea Construction Workers' Union	16,096	" "
7	North Korea Automobile & Land-Carriage Workers' Union	14,177	" "
8	North Korea Chemical Workers' Union	41,773	" "
9	North Korea Textile Workers' Union	20,190	" "
10	North/Food Industries Workers' Union Korea	11,362	" "
11	North Korea Printers' Union	3,584	" "
12	North Korea Lumber Workers' Union	30,435	" "
13	North Korea Fishing Industries Union	22,681	" "
14	North Korea Communications Employees' Union	5,169	" "
15	North Korea Public Health Employees' Union	4,234	" "
16	North Korea Office Workers' Union	64,249	" "
17	North Korea Teachers' & Cultural Workers' Union	29,461	" "
18	North Korea Municipal Employees' Union	14,177	" "
19	North Korea Railroad Workers' Union	30,319	" "
20	North Korea Electrical Workers' Union	7,163	" "
21	North Korea Peasants' Alliance	2,572,714	" "
22	North Korea Democratic Women's Alliance	1,050,103	" "
23	North Korea Democratic Youth Alliance	1,248,574	" "
24	North Korea Consumers' Cooperative Alliance	2,751,798	" "
25	North Korea Society for Aid to Korean Fighters & Patriots	752,514	" "
26	North Korea Society of Public Health Employees	2,976	" "
27	North Korea Soc. of Engineers & Technical Employees	33,038	" "
28	North Korea Red Cross Society	54,000	" "
29	North Korea Society for the Encouragement of People's Education and Culture	1,569,478	" "
30	North Korea Writers' Society	6,302	" "
31	North Korea Musicians' Society	5,604	" "
32	North Korea Actors' & Singers' Society	6,914	" "
33	North Korea Artists' Society	4,719	" "
34	North Korea Society of Specialists in Agriculture, Forestry & Marine Products' Industries	4,082	" "
35	North Korea United Buddhists' Society	375,762	" "
36	North Korea Society of People's Air Fleet	201,865	" "
37	North Korea Protestant Society	22,084	" "
38	North Korea Chun Do Kyo Religious Society	963,683	" "

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HISTORY OF KOREAN POLITICAL PARTIES 1919 – JUNE 1947

REVISED 24 JULY, 47

COMMUNIST — COALITION EFFORTS — NATIONALISTIC LEFT — THE RIGHT

COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED GROUP

MUTUAL SUPPORT

COMMUNIST-INFILTRATION BUT NOT CONTROL

PREPARED BY – HISTORICAL SECTION OFFICE OF AC OF S, G-2 USAFIK

COMINTERN RECOGNITION (KIM TAN YA)

IR KUTSK COMMUNIST GROUP

SHANGHAI COMMUNIST PARTY

INSTITUTE FOR INVEST NEW IDEAS (HEUN YUNG)

TUESDAY MEETING COMM GROUP

17 APR 1925 KOREAN COMM PARTY (PAK)

LABORER'S ASSOC

YOUNG MENS ASSOC

SEOUL YOUNG MEN'S ASSOC

1919 REVOLUTIONARY GROUP

(SHANGHAI) 1919 PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT — KIM KYU SIK, RHEE SYNG MAN, KIM KOO

KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY (KIM KOO)

1920 | 1924 | 1925 | 1926 | 1930 | 1940

JAP OPPRESSION

JAP OPPRESSION — THE LEFT — THE RIGHT

COMM PARTY LEADS UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST JAPANESE INCLUDES ALL FACTORS

1935 MARX-LENIN COMM GROUP (TCH'OI IK HAN)

KIM WON BONG (KOREAN REVOLUTIONARY PARTY)

DONG-A ILBO GROUP (SONG CHIN OO)

LIBERATION 15 AUGUST

28 AUG REHABILITATION COMM PARTY (PAK)

17 AUG SEOUL COMM PARTY

15 AUG PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR KOREAN REHABILITATION (LYUH WOON HYUNG; AN CHAI HONG)

6 SEPT KOREAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC GOV'T (LYUH)

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE NATL CONGRESS

16 SEPT HAN KOOK DEM PARTY (SONG CHIN OO)

NATIONALIST PARTY

PROVISIONAL GOV'T — KIM WON BONG, KIM KYU SIK, RHEE SYNG MAN, KIM KOO

1 SEPT '45 | 1 OCT '45 | 1 NOV '45 | 1 DEC '45 | 1 JAN '46 | 1 FEB 46 | 1 MARCH 46 | 1 APRIL 46 | 1 MAY '46 | 1 JUNE '46

KOREAN COMM PARTY (PAK)

PAK FACTION — ANTI PAK FACTION (CHANGHAI GROUP)

PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES

LYUH'S GROUP

(HUH HUN)

KOREAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (LYUH) — 12 NOV

NORTH KOREA — YENAN ALLIANCE (KIM DOO BONG)

"GOVT" OUTLAWED 12 DEC

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC FRONT (HUH, HUN) — 15 FEB

KOREAN REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

HAN BIN 6 FEB — YENAN INDEPENDENCE ALLIANCE (PAIK NAM UN)

16 FEB NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY

(31 OCT) 23 OCT CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR THE RAPID REALIZATION OF KOREAN IND

16 OCT RHEE RETURNS FROM U.S.

3 NOV

MOVE TO KOREA — 22 NOV.

14 DEC NEW NATIONALIST PARTY

19 DEC ANTI-TRUSTEESHIP COMM (KIM KOO)

DEATH OF SONG 30 DEC

AMERICAN INITIATIVE

ANTI-TRUSTEESHIP DEMONSTRATIONS (RT WING)

JAN KIM KOO TRIES TO ESTABLISH PROV. GOVT BY A COUP

KIM SEUNG SOO

RHEE SYNG MAN, KIM, KOO 14 FEB REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL OF SOUTH KOREA

KIM WON BONG 7 FEB KOREAN REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

1 FEB EMERGENCY NATIONAL CONGRESS — AN CHAI HONG, KIM KYU SIK, RHEE SYNG MAN, KIM KOO

8 FEB NATL SOCIETY FOR THE ACCELERATION OF KOREAN IND

HONG CHIN TCHEI, DONG O

CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR ACCEL KOREAN IND
CENTRAL COMM OF SOC FOR NATL GENL MOBILIZATION VS. TRUSTEESHIP

NEW PROGRESSIVE PARTY — LYOO DONG YUL

10 APR CONFERENCE RHEE, KIM, KOO KIM, KYU SIK NAMED LDRS.

30 APR CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY — CHAIRMAN LEE, YOON YOUNG

6 MAY J.T COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMUNIST COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY CASE

AMERICAN INITIATIVE
LYUH WOON HYONG-CHAIR. — KIM KYU SIK, CHAIR
HUH HUN — WON SEI HOON

9 MAY

10 JUNE CHO BONG AM

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COALITION TRENDS IN KOREAN POLITICS

With the inception of the modern Korean political complex resulting from the 1919 independence movement and the extension to the Far East of activities subsequent to the Russian Revolution, it was evident by 1920 that future coalition efforts would involve three groups: The Nationalists, who are now known as "Rightists"; the agents, followers, and sympathizers of International Communism, now known as "Leftists"; and a number of leaders, with no particular popular support, usually termed "Moderates."

From 1920 to 15 August 1945, political activity within Korea was largely an undercurrent within the Nationalist camp with the efforts of the International Communism "set" mitigated by factionalism. While there were occasional overt evidences of political activity, they were largely of an anti-Japanese nature, indicative of a community of interest rather than concerted aims of particular groups to assure their political ascendancy. No direct attempt to coalesce the Nationalists and the Communist Party-line adherents was made. As both groups directed their activities against the Japanese regime, there was an implicit element of cooperation.

The establishment of the so-called Korean Provisional Government in China after the abortive 1919 independence movement, included a minor recognition of the coalition principle through the inclusion of Dr. KIMM, Kiusic who was far more moderate in his political orientation than his superiors such as KIM, Koo and Dr. RHEE, Syngman. Until 1933, the Independence Party was the only official party within the Provisional Government. However, in 1933 the establishment of the Korean Revolutionary Party, led by Dr. KIMM, Kiusic and KIM, Won Bong, and its inclusion into the party structure of the Provisional Government, formalized the element of coalition within the Government. During World War II, the Korean Revolutionary Party attempted to effect the inclusion of the Korean Yenan Independence Alliance within the Provisional Government in order to broaden the coalition factor and prepare a representative government which would be available to administer the independent Korea promised at Cairo in 1943. Although they failed, such attempts were the first ones directed at a coalition of all major Korean political factions.

With the end of World War II and the imminent withdrawal of the Japanese regime from Korea, the Preparatory Committee for Establishing Korea, headed by LYUH, Woon Hyung, long known as a moderate Leftist, and AHN, Chai Hong, one of the most prominent Nationalists within Korea, was formed on 15 August 1945. Its founding marked the first real attempt at coalition within Korea.

The Preparatory Committee evolved into the Korean People's Republic which was established on 5 and 6 September 1945. Initially, the People's Republic was an amalgamation of Nationalists, Communist Party-line followers, and moderate leaders. When it soon became apparent that the Moscow-oriented faction was rapidly acquiring dominance, the Nationalist elements seceded.

With the return of Dr. RHEE, Syngman, extreme nationalist representative of the Provisional Government in the United States, to Korea on 16 October 1945, attempts, under his aegis, were made to coalesce the principal factions. However, early indications that RHEE considered any group not in sympathy with his pursuits as "Communist", plus the dictates of the Communist party-line, pre-

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vented the establishing of a coalition movement.

Closely following the announcement of the Moscow Decision on 27 December 1945, attempts were made by leaders of the Provisional Government, who had returned from China, and the People's Republic to unite and present Korean unity to the forthcoming US-USSR Joint Commission. However, the Communist-dominated People's Republic, following its blue-printed strategy, insisted upon support of the "trusteeship" principle of the Moscow Decision, a position utterly unacceptable to the Nationalists. Therefore, political unification was again thwarted.

Failure of the two self-styled "governments" to coalesce was followed by an American effort to create a Representative Democratic Council of South Korea. Although originally willing to participate in the Council, LYUH, Woon Hyung and several of his associates later refused to join, because of disagreement over the composition of the Council. Consequently, the Council was established on 14 February 1946 with an all-Rightist membership, including, however, the outstanding moderate-Rightist, Dr. KIM, Kiusic.

On 15 February 1946, one day after the formal establishment of the Representative Democratic Council, the Communist-dominated groups formed the Democratic People's Front and managed to include a minor group of dissenting members of the Provisional Government and LYUH, Woon Hyung and his followers within the organization's hierachy.

After the adjournment of the US-USSR Joint Commission on 9 May 1946, a Coalition Committee, composed of representatives of the Rightist (with KIM, Koo and Dr. RHEE, Syngman carefully omitted), Leftist and Moderate groups, headed by Dr. KIM, Kiusic and LYUH, Woon Hyung, was formed through American initiative. After approximately two months of negotiations, the majority of the Leftist representatives withdrew. LYUH, Woon Hyung, most popular Leftist leader, remained in the Committee.

In the fall of 1946, the Coalition Committee was revived with representation limited to moderate Rightists and moderate Leftists - the extremes having been purposely excluded in order to isolate them and provide a vehicle for the evolution of a mass-supported directorate composed of Moderates. The Committee failed to acquire commanding popular support but became the nucleus for the appointed slate of representatives to the Interim Legislative Assembly, established 12 December 1946.

The effectiveness of the Coalition Committee was continually vitiated by the vacillation of LYUH, Woon Hyung who, as the member with the greatest popular support, was in a position to increase the Committee's power. The fact that he did not personally accept appointment to the Interim Legislative Assembly hindered control of the Assembly by the Coalition Committee.

Prior to the reconvening of the Joint Commission on 21 May 1947, the Coalition Committee expanded its membership by including more representatives of minor, moderate groups and effected an uneasy liaison with Rightist elements which had become partially disaffected from the leadership of Dr. RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo.

At present, the Coalition Committee remains as the major exponent of the coalition principle. Its continuation, degree of power or replacement will be largely up to American policy following the results of the current sessions of the US-USSR Joint Commission.

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In conclusion the following, based upon past experience, should be noted:

(1) Because of the international party-line, Communist-dominated groups will never be allowed, and would never allow themselves, participation in any coalition effort unless they are able to dominate it.

(2) Extreme Rightists will not participate in any government unless they can dominate it.

(3) It is manifest that the Moderates, who, theoretically, are in a position to hold the balance of power, cannot guide an effective coalition unless they manage to acquire popular support, split the extremes, and mold the largely neutral masses of the Korean people to their cause.

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THE KOREAN PRESS

The press in South Korea following the liberation has not distinguished itself. Leadership, integrity and ingenuity have been lacking. An extremely liberal policy on the part of Military Government in the early days permitted the licensing of any number of dailies and weeklies and monthlies. As a result, Seoul today has over 30 daily licensed newspapers, over 60 weeklies and 106 monthlies. Meanwhile, dwindling stocks of newsprint prevent any worthy news organ from printing as many copies as the public might be willing to buy; and with this enforced curtailing of circulation, no paper can become a national organ or enjoy anything but local attention. The unfortunate consequences of this include an increased tendency of the press to be dependent upon, and subservient to, special interests.

South Korea' daily papers consist of one sheet of American tabloid size, printed on both sides. About 12 papers in Seoul print six days a week, the rest irregularly. Other provincial capitals have from one to five or six dailies. Over half of Seoul's thirty-two papers are leftist, over a third rightist, and a few are usually neutral.

Virtually every daily in Korea is the private organ of some politician or political party. But although these politicians are operating newspapers to increase their political stature and following, they have not, apparently, used the press as a serious means of achieving this end. In relation to political developments in South Korea, the newspapers may mirror events but they never initiate them; they have never been molders of public opinion.

One instance may be cited. In March, 1947, the leftist press, somewhat abetted by all papers, endeavored to fan public indignation against the United States by giving sensational treatment to the trial of four American soldiers charged with rape. They printed only the women's testimony and from the first blatantly declared the men guilty. But the papers failed so completely in arousing the public that even when the Court returned a verdict of not guilty, no disturbances took place at all.

The notion that a Tom Paine could sweep the masses through the printed word has either never occurred to Korean politician-publishers, or the talent has been sadly lacking.

The one exception at the moment is the No Ryok Inmin, official organ of the South Korea Labor Party. This paper prints the Communist line, and there is some indication that the followers of the line faithfully look to the paper as the source of their instruction and inspiration. In contrast to this extreme leftist paper, the right and extreme right organs are dull, often recording tedious accounts of political meetings and speeches initiated by Rhee, Syngman, Kim Koo, Kim Sung Soo, Lee Chung Chun, etc.

In circulation, all papers are pitifully weak. In general, leftist sheets are sold or given away in larger quantities than conservative papers. Leftist strength here is due primarily to sensationalism, secondarily to better party discipline which makes for more effective distribution.

Largest claimed circulation at the moment is 61,000 by Catholic-owned neutral paper (Kyeng Hyang Shinmun). Next comes another neutral paper, the Seoul Shinmun with about 50,000 daily, followed by the No Ryok Inmin (referred to above) with an admitted 45,000 and the rightist Dong-A-Ilbo with about 40,000 copies distributed

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daily. Both leading neutral dailies are occasionally wildly leftist when some clever Communist party member or sympathizer gets control of the editorial and composing room.

Weekly and monthly publications are even less important than the dailies. Magazines devoted to so-called cultural affairs are predominantly Communist or leftist; a few political journals are bitterly anti-Communist.

Recognizing the dangerous character of generalizations, it is still possible to state categorically that the Korean press has failed to make an appreciable contribution to the national development.

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NOTES ON SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS

I. Historical Preface:

By virtue of its geographical location, Korea has been closely related to China from which it has received much of its culture. Korean kings of all three dynasties have paid tribute to the Chinese emperors. Since the two peoples shared a common culture and written language, there naturally existed considerable interchange of ideas. These cultural ties were strengthened by the development of economic and trade relations. For many years, relatively free migration of Chinese and Koreans took place, especially across the Korean-Manchurian border. This migration lead to mingling of the two peoples in areas adjacent to this border, which was not officially established until 1813. Prior to development of the Japanese expansion program, dating from the Russo-Japanese War, relations between China and Korea were generally normal and cordial.

II. Japan's Annexation of Korea, 1910-1945:

a. Immediately following the beginning of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, migration of Koreans into Manchuria increased. This was due primarily to the fact that Koreans resented the annexation and sought freedom abroad. This migration was chiefly of farmers. It was condoned by the Chinese government, since it helped to develop uncultivated agricultural areas in Manchuria. In addition to the large migration of peasants and farmers, a few Koreans who had strongly opposed Japanese annexation policies fled to other areas in China, trying to keep alive the spirit of revolt against Japan.

b. After Japan annexed Manchuria in 1932, the Japanese authorities set up within the Korean Government-General an organization known as the Manchurian Colonization Development Corporation with the sole aim of settling Korean peasants in Manchuria. This organization migrated and colonized between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 members of peasant families. The Japanese military physically evicted thousands of Chinese farmers from their lands to make room for these Korean colonizers. This program was well-organized. Korean colonies were established in units of two to five hundred families per village. The Manchurian Colonization Development Corporation assigned physicians, teachers, agriculture and animal husbandry experts to encourage and assist the newly-arrived Korean peasants in getting started. Although this program provided the Japanese with additional foodstocks for their later Far Eastern expansion, it created bitter resentment of the Chinese who were forced to relinquish their farm lands and means of livelihood.

c. Prior to 1937, some 70,000 Chinese had migrated to Korea. They established permanent residences and worked as merchants, restaurant owners, and farmers. Of these approximately 50,000 lived in Korea south of the 38th parallel. They were successful businessmen in the urban areas where they obtained a substantial monopoly on the food and restaurant business, especially that dealing in imported foods and delicacies. As is customary with most oversees Chinese, they lived peaceably under their own guild system and appeared to get along well with Koreans

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who respected them but were jealous of their business ability. With the invasion of China by the Japanese armies in 1937, it became difficult for the Chinese in Korea to maintain their livelihood in view of the close scruity of the Japanese military, who regarded them as enemy nationals. Many were suspected of spying. Others had their businesses taken away arbitrarily. Consequently, approximately four-fifths of the Chinese community in southern Korea left Korea between 1937 and 1945. Today there are about ten thousand Chinese in the American zone.

III. Korean Support of Japan's Invasion of China:

a. After Japan's annexation of Manchuria in 1932, the Japanese used Koreans operating out of Korea and Manchuria to develop large smuggling operations into China. After Japan's invasion of China in 1937, the Japanese military widely used Koreans to spread vice and narcotics as a part of their program to break China's will to resist. Both Japanese and Korean merchants followed closely behind the Japanese military and established monopolies over every enterprise of which they could gain control.

b. Many Koreans entered the Japanese army as soldiers, although only a few were advanced to positions of authority. Many were assigned to labor battalions and to other less desirable duties.

c. Another wave of Koreans followed the Japanese invasion and served in Japanese businesses and industires that the Japanese developed in China. Many such Koreans acquired Chinese property and established factories, especially in the Tienstsin and Shanghai areas, which produced goods for the Japanese military. They acquired considerable wealth under protection of the Japanese flag. These actions of Koreans in China, from 1937 to 1945, created a bitter hatred of Koreans by the Chinese. The Korean was more despised than the Japanese.

IV. Korean Provisional Government in Chungking:

a. During China's darkest period of resistance to Japan, in 1942-1943, when almost all outside help to China was cut off, the Chinese government sought the good will of all groups that sympathized with its predicament. At this time the "Korean Provisional Government," headed by KIM Koo, found renewed favor among the Chinese government officials in Chungking. The Chinese Government gave KIM Koo and his followers financial support and political backing. This "Provisional Government" was organized as a skeleton government, including its own Kwang Bok Army (Korean Restoration Army). Although this army was small in numbers, it provided guerilla units that worked in conjunction with the Chinese military behind Japanese lines. Their chief contribution to winning the war was one of supplying intelligence information. Most of the Korean leaders of the Kwang Bok Army had held the title of "general" in the Chinese national armies. There is every reason to believe, and considerable evidence to support, the contention that KIM Koo expected, upon the defeat of Japan, to assume leadership in Korea, with full recognition of the Allied Powers and with complete moral, political, and economic backing from the Chinese government.

b. The sudden surrender of Japan found KIM Koo's "Provisional Government" in a good position to control and direct the activites of the many thousands of Koreans who found their way to

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China during the war. A rather complete net of "Provisional Government" representatives was established along the eastern coast of China in area where the largest concentration of Koreans existed. It operated with support of the Chinese government and military.

V. Post War Relations:

a. The decision of the Allied Powers to grant Korea the status of a liberated nation placed in a very peculiar status those Koreans who had actively cooperated with the Japanese in China. Overnight, they ceased to be enemy nations and claimed full rights as a liberated group, even demanding the special consideration accorded those who had supported the Chinese during the war against Japan. They became extremely arrogant. This arrogance was difficult for the Chinese to tolerate, and the pent-up emotions and hatreds of the Chinese for the Koreans expressed themselves in atrocities and acts of violence. At this point, the "Provisional Government" representatives offered assistance and protection to these Koreans in exchange for their support and loyalty. Local Chinese officials and other individuals seized the opportunity to profit from the Koreans in many ways. At the same time, however, the Chinese Government's official attitude was that Korea was a liberated nation and Koreans were entitled to special treatment different from that accorded Japanese nationals. In actual practice, however, Koreans were treated even worse than Japanese prisoners-of-war.

b. This development created need for early and complete repatriation of Koreans from China. This was accomplished by the end of June 1946. Between 50,000 and 60,000 Koreans were repatriated in a mass repatriation movement directly to South Korea. This repatriation was conducted on a voluntary basis, but due to the extreme hardships which Koreans were experiencing, they had little choice. Chinese authorities were delighted to get them out of China. The Chinese retained only those Koreans who were awaiting trial as war criminals. This repatriation included Kwang Bok Army personnel, legitimate merchants and residents of good standing and also camp followers and various other undesirables. The latest survey indicates that today probably less than 2,000 Koreans remain in China (excluding Manchuria).

c. The problem of Koreans in Manchuria has been one of considerable concern since the surrender. In Manchuria, Koreans also suffered oppression by the Chinese. The immediate development of civil strife in Manchuria has prevented gathering a complete picture of actual conditions. It is known, however, that some 300,000 Koreans have returned to South Korea from Manchuria by way of North Korea. All reports from North China and Manchuria indicate that the plight of the remaining Koreans in Manchuria is serious. Many of the former colonizers have been forced off their lands by Chinese peasants. Without any means of livelihood these Korean peasants have been thrown into the confusion of the civil war which has moved back and forth ravaging the countryside. Many Koreans are reported to have affiliated themselves with the Communist armies and to have taken an active party in fighting against the Chinese Nationalist troops. Unconfirmed reports also state that Chinese National forces now also are using Koreans in combating Communists. The complete disruption of economic life in Manchuria and the closing down of

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factories and mines, has thrown out of any means of livelihood those Koreans who formerly worked under Japanese supervision in these industries.

d. Following an urgent plea from Mukden in November, 1946, to repatriate destitute Koreans in the Mukden area, efforts were made by USAMGIK to repatriate about 15,000 Koreans. A repatriation team went to Mukden and attempted to assist Koreans desiring repatriation. Only about 2,500 found their way to the port of Hulatao in time to be repatriated. Disruption of communications in Manchuria, civil war, extreme cold and the unfavorable reports of conditions in South Korea all played a part in discouraging repatriation. Mr. AHN, Chai Hong, Civil Administrator for the South Korea Interim Government, within the past few months, has received several urgent radiograms from representatives of the "Provisional Government" in China requesting relief and assistance for the thousands of destitute Koreans still remaining in Manchuria. Similar requests also have reached USAMGIK from the Korean Residents' Association in Manchuria. All reports indicate that the plight of Koreans in Manchuria is becoming increasingly serious. However, USAMGIK has not been able to establish liaison representation for Koreans in Manchuria, due to lack of funds, the unfavorable exchange rate, and the civil strife. The absence of aid undoubtedly will force many Koreans to the Communists for help.

VI. Trade:

USAMGIK has attempted to steer a "middle-of-the-road" course assisting Koreans in their difficulties following the surrender, and encouraging better relations between China and Korea by playing down past grievances and emphasizing the cultural and economic interrelationships of Korea and China. Both China and Korea can benefit greatly by free trade. USAMGIK efforts to stimulate Sino-Korean trade, however, have been affected seriously by the attitude of the Chinese Government and its efforts to establish monopolistic controls over all foreign trade, with the Central Trust as the sole agent for the Chinese government. Informal negotiations with China aimed at stimulating trade have been unproductive because of the Chinese government's insistence upon trade based upon a controlled government-to-government basis, whereas USAMGIK has attempted to stimulate trade on a merchant-to-merchant basis. The Department of Commerce, USAMGIK, recently has made overtures to other areas in the Pacific in an attempt to establish trade under more favorable conditions than those which the Chinese Government is willing to offer. Although formal trade between China and Korea does not exist, a considerable amount of traffic is carried on by junks between the Shantung Peninsula Peninsula and the western ports of Korea.

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Joint Korean-American Conference
Minutes of Meetings, Nos. 1-27

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Joint - Korean - American Conference
Minutes of Meetings
(Meetings #1 to 27 Incl.)

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MINUTES

OF THE FIRST MEETING
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 0930, 23 OCTOBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS	KOREAN MEMBERS
Maj Gen Albert E. Brown	Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Maj Gen A. L. Lerch	Won, Seh Hoon
Dr. A. C. Bunce	Choi, Tong O
Brig Gen John Weckerling	Kim, Koong Choon
Brig Gen C. G. Helmick	Ahn, Chai Hong
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson	Pahk, Keun Oong
	Chang, Kwon
Interpreter - Dr. Henry Appenzeller	Absent - Lyuh, Woon Hyung

The meeting was called to order at 0930. It was agreed that General Brown would act as chairman of the committee. Introduction was made of all members present.

The purpose of this committee was stated as follows: To investigate conditions leading to the present disturbances in southern Korea.

Arrest of Leftists - Several newspapers published that an order for the arrest of Leftists had been issued by the Military Government. General Lerch denied such an order had been given and that such denial would be made immediately over the radio and in the newspapers. The police were making some mistakes and the Pak Hung Ung group was taking advantage of these errors. For example, the news of the order for the arrest of Communists had reached the district of Puk Chang and unless the police had issued such instructions it would have been difficult for the rumor to have reached so far.

Suggested investigations - Rice collection and distribution, strike settlement, police--personnel problem. It was Pahk, Keun Oong's opinion that the disturbance at Taegu was between the people and the police, and not caused by the rice program. The Chief of Police, Kwang Bum Suh, had bungled the situation by ordering the arrest of thousands of rioters, not properly feeding them, beating and mistreating them. Because of this, animosity against the police is spreading and trouble may break out again in Taegu. Mr. Pahk, Keun Oong further stated that there may be

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some outside agent influence. Sifting of the police force was suggested as the remedy for this situation.

Mr. Yon, Seh Koon stated that under the old Monarchy when a riot occurred in provinces rioters were arrested by order of the central government and officials in that province were dismissed and then the matter investigated.

Mr. Lee, In Soo, speaking for Lyuh, Woon Hyung, said that enmity against the police was not caused solely by food distribution but that the people were disillusioned because they had not obtained what they had expected after a year of American occupation. To rectify this disillusionment, it was suggested that an announcement be made from the committee that something definite was being accomplished.

Mr. Yon, Seh Koon gave the reasons for the uprisings to be that the Japanese collaborators who in former years collected rice for the Japanese were still collecting for the rice program but in a more arbitrary way. Dr. Kimm, Kiusic added that not only are most police officials former collaborators but are members of the Han Min Dong or connected with that party. The people in Seoul are of the opinion that even the judiciary members are associated with this party, as well as Military Government Korean officials. An instance was cited of a farmer being ordered to put up 10 bags of rice when he had not sufficient rice to feed his own family. The people in the village came to his assistance to meet the requirements. Many such cases have occurred.

Statement by General Lerch - From the very beginning the Military Government was pursued by the question of Japanese collaborators. General Arnold set up a court of inquiries to investigate all accusations of Japanese collaborators and whenever it concerned any special person, Military Government was able to supply an answer. However, in recent months no specific complaints have been received. General Lerch hopes this committee will furnish Military Government with names of officials who the committee believes to be collaborators.

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It was decided that an additional meeting should be devoted to general discussion, and that a special attempt be made to have all witnesses present at the next meeting.

The question of press releases was discussed and it was decided that General Brown and Dr. Kimm, Kiusic would prepare a release for immediate publication. Copy of Press Release No. 1 is attached hereto. It was agreed that all sessions would be considered confidential and no publicity would be emitted without agreement of the committee.

The meeting adjourned at 1220 to be resumed at 1330, 24 October.

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23 October 1946

PRESS RELEASE NO. 1

The Committee appointed by the Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in Korea to investigate conditions leading to the present disturbances in Southern Korea held its initial meeting at Duk Soo Palace today. Present were members of the Coalition Committee with Dr. Kim Kiu Sic Chairman, Major General Albert E. Brown Chief Commissioner of the US-USSR Commission, Major General A. L. Lerch Military Governor, Dr. A. C. Bunce State Department Advisor to the Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in Korea with rank of Minister, and other American Officers and civilian experts.

The Committee engaged in a general discussion of the causes and conditions leading to the present disturbances in Southern Korea and decided that after collecting all available facts and any suggestions for solution of the problems the committee will submit recommendations for amelioration of the conditions. The committee adjourned at 1220 to meet at the Duk Soo Palace at 1330 tomorrow.

Albert E. Brown
Major General, USA
Chairman

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MINUTES

OF THE SECOND MEETING
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 24 OCTOBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj Gen Albert E. Brown
Maj Gen A.L. Lerch
Dr. A. C. Bunce
Brig Gen John Weckerling
Brig Gen C.G. Helmick
Dr. E.A.J. Johnson

Interpreter: Dr. Henry Appenzeller

KOREAN MEMBERS

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim. Poong Choon
Ahn Chai Hong
Pahk, Keun Oong
Chang, Kwon
Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung

The Meeting was called to order at 1.30 P.M. All members were present with the exception of Mr. Lyuh who is still ill. Mr. Kim Kuisic introduced Mr. Soon, Ah Koon, one of the secretaries of the Coalition Committee.

General Brown called for the press release which was to be prepared by Ahn, Chai Hong and Won. Seh Hoon. Submitted, translated and read. Chang, Kwon claimed there was the worst kind of agitation clause inserted in this release which must be explained or deleted. Gen Weckerling was appointed to work with Ahn, Chai Hong and Chang Kwon to redraft this release into such language which would be more acceptable to be presented at the next meeting.

Mr. Kim, Kuisic presented a memorandum dated October 23, 1946.addressed to General Hodge bearing the signature of nine political parties who deem themselves responsible for settling present disorders. This memorandum was brought to the meeting by Li Yun Soo, a member of the In Min Dang (Peoples Democratic Party) who was present representing a number of people who had spoken to him. The nine political parties whose signatures appeared on the memorandum were:-

1. Korean Communist Party - Left
2. New Progressive Party - Center
3. Korean Independence Party - Right
4. Korean Peoples Party - Left
5. Independent Laborers and Farmers Party - Center
6. South Korea New Peoples Party -Left
7. Peoples Revolutionary Party -Left
8. Social Democratic Party -Center
9. Young Friends Party -Left

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This memorandum offers the following suggestions:-

1. Because of the indefinite adjournment of the US-USSR Commission and the hopelessness of seeing a unified provisional government. they feel that the future of their fatherland's liberation to be utterly hopeless.
2. The police and the civil administration set up and other productive machinery contain a large number of cruel and harsh collaborators and todies to Military Government. These elements representing the remainder of the imperial Japanese reactionaries are held in the utmost hatred by the people.
3. The food policy seems to have been carried out without informing the people and the method of collection employed has caused discontent.

After some discussion it was decided to take no action re this memorandum until it had been translated into English and both the Coalition Committee and the American Representatives could learn its contents.

Mr. Kim, Kiusic attended a meeting of representatives of the nine political parties immediately following the adjournment of this meeting and informed them of what this committee is doing. He was informed that the committee of nine parties considered this committee at the Duk Soo Palace a committee formed by the Commanding General himself and that if the Commanding General desired to get comprehensive views and opinions of the Korean people at large, such a meeting should be recognized and a representative invited to participate in the discussions. Mr. Kim called attention to the fact that the 9 party committee was formed of half leftists and half rightists. This committee clamoured for postponement of the present elections claiming that most of their men are in jail or in hiding. This is the reason no leftist group of the Coalition Committee has furnished supervisors to canvass the provinces. He suggested that the committee could send

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recommendations direct to General Hodge or General Lerch or through the Coalition Committee if they so desired. No such written statement has as yet been received.

It was further stated that certain leftist parties are officially ready to join the Coalition Committee and if the elections are put through so hurriedly, it would prevent these parties from joining.

Mr. Kim suggested that the Duk Soo Committee invite several representatives of the nine party committee to sit with the Duk Soo Committee.

Name of Committee. A proposal was made by Mr. Kim, Kiusic that if the name of the present Committee is called "Whei Dam" in Korean, meaning "Joint Conference", this may eliminate the misunderstanding that it is a permanent body created by the Military Government. General Lerch suggested "Coalition Committee with invited American Members" and Mr. Bunce "A Conference of the Coalition Committee with American Representatives". Mr. Kim, Kiusic suggested that since retaining the name "Coalition" would preclude any additional members, a decision be reached as to whether we would invite representatives of the nine party group before naming the Committee. General Brown suggested that for the press release we leave the same signature as appended to the original press release - i.e. Albert E. Brown. Major General, USA., Chairman.

General Brown:

At our last meeting we developed certain contributary causes to the present disturbances. In order to progress as rapidly as possible, I am going to suggest that at the next meeting we begin to examine into those causes. I am going to suggest that we do this by asking those who have knowledge of the contributary causes of the disturbances to appear before the Committee and give us their information. I would suggest that we outline those causes now and that each member of the Committee furnish a list of witnesses they wish to have appear before this Committee.

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I am going to ask that the Committee give me additional causes or suggest any change in wording.

Causes of Disturbances:

1 - Enmity against the police
2 - Corruption of some Korean officials
3 - The rice collection program
4.- The rice distribution program
5 - The presence of former Japanese collaborators in Military Government
6 - Non-appearance of a Korean Provisional Government
7 - Wages, prices and inflation.
8 - Refugee and General housing and living problems
9 - Discontent concerning administration of former enemy property
10 - Party influences in government
11 - Government by interpreters
12 - Disappointment of people in failure to achieve economic reforms
13 - How to set up a moral and definitely planned government
14 - Agitators against the best interests of South Korea.

It was suggested that in order to allow sufficient time to call witnesses it now be decided which topics would be discussed at each meeting - also as to whether the fourteen points be discussed by the Committee at large or by separate sub-committees. It was urged by Mr. Kim, Kiusic that as many topics as possible be discussed at each meeting as the problems required urgent solution.

Won, Seh Hoon suggested that the topics be put into three general groupings or categories as follows:-

1 - Personnel connected with the government
2 - Economic Problems
3 - Political Problems

General Lerch concurred.

The chairman moved that tomorrow this Committee discuss:

1 - Press release to be prepared by the Committee.
2 - Enlargement of the Committee as proposed by Kim, Kiusic.
3 - Name of the Committee.
4 - Enmity against the police
5 - Corruption of some Korean officials

The meeting was adjourned at 4.55 PM to meet October 25,1946, at 1.30 P.M.

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MINUTES

OF THE THIRD MEETING
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 25 OCTOBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS	KOREAN MEMBERS
Maj Gen Albert E. Brown	Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Maj Gen A.L. Lerch	Won, Seh Hoon
Dr. A.C. Bunce	Choi, Tong O
Brig Gen John Weckerling	Kim, Poong Choon
Dr. E.A.J. Johnson	Ahn, Chai Hong
Absent: Brig Gen C.G. Helmick	Pack, Keun Oong
	Chang, Kwon
Interpreter: Dr.Henry Appenzeller	Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung

The meeting came to order at 1330.

1 - Press Release: In presenting the press release, General Weckerling explained that the choice of words in the press release were those which contained the best features of both languages. It was moved, seconded and carried that this press release be accepted.

A suggestion was made that the signature to this press release read:

Albert E.Brown, Maj Gen USA,Representing Gen John R.Hodge

Kimm Kuisic, Chairman of the Coalition Committee

Lyuh, Woon Hyung, Chairman of the Coalition Committee.

It was moved and carried that these signatures be appended.

2 - Enlarging Membership: General Brown reported that he had been approached by Chang Yuk Soo and Pak Nam Hoon, Democratic Party, asking for the privilege of joining the conference. Kim, Kuisic suggested that the membership could not be open to all desirous of joining as he had even been approached by church groups. He moved that we invite only the three representatives from the nine party group to join the conference and the other groups could join the 9 party group and thus have representation at the Joint Korean-American Conference. Dr. Bunce seconded the motion providing these representatives did not duplicate the parties already represented. Kim, Kiusic conceded to Dr. Bunce's suggestion. General Lerch also seconded the motion with the suggestion that anyone who would devote the necessary time and

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effort to this group could be admitted.

It was moved, seconded and carried that the representatives of the nine party group select three members to represent them at this conference.

3 - Name of the Committee: The following five names were proposed:-

(1) Conference of the Coalition Committee with Korean and American Representatives.

(2) Special Korean-American Investigating Committee

(3) Joint Coalition Committee, Korean-American Conference.

(4) The Korean-American Committee

(5) Joint Korean-American Conference.

Votes were cast and the name "Joint Korean-American Conference" was adopted by a majority vote for both Korean and American purposes.

General Brown was called out to meet with representatives of the nine party group. He returned and made the following report:

"I was waited on by representatives of the nine political parties. I invited them to come before this Committee now and present their petition. They informed me that they did not have the authority of their group to appear before this Committee and could not do so at this time. They informed me that they have left, with General Hodge, a copy of the document that Dr. Kim, Kiusic presented here yesterday. They asked if I would discuss their requests with General Hodge and get his decisions. They are to meet with me again at 10 o'clock on Monday morning. I will present the Committee's recommendations to General Hodge concerning the enlargement of the Committee and will write a letter to the nine party group extending the invitation of this Committee."

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It was decided to postpone further discussions - i.e. the fourth item on the day's agenda "Enmity against the Police" and "Corruption of some Korean Officials" - until Monday, October 28, 1946, at which time it was hoped the three representatives of the nine party group would be present.

Mr. Kim, Kiusic asked permission to give the gist of a letter received by him and Mr. Lyuh from the nine party group suggesting that this might have a bearing on the matters to be discussed at the next meeting. In this letter the following points were raised:-

(1) The work of the Coalition Committee is illegalizing the establishment and formation of the Legislature.

(2) The election process will help the evil elements, such as profiteers and pro-Japanese elements, practically denying the existence of the working class.

(3) Request that the carrying out of the ordinance be immediately stopped.

(4) To advocate these thoughts to the authorities as leaders of the people and also to make known, clearly, your own thoughts and attitude"

A statement was presented by General Brown classifying the topics to be discussed by the Conference into three categories.

Mr. Johnson suggested and was supported by the Committee in his opinion that in as much as this matter is of such importance to the people of Korea, it is wise to give out what publicity we can - that these topics which we have agreed to discuss be given to the press to indicate that this Committee is seriously approaching the task which has been assigned to it.

The meeting adjourned at 4 P.M.

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TO LT GENERAL HODGE,

We consider it to be an exclusive privilege to submit to you in writing the discussion of the Joint Meeting of the following nine parties, the Korean Communist Party, New Progressive Party, Han Kook Independence Party, People's Democratic Party, Southern Korea New People's Party, Korean People's Revolutionary Party, Social Democratic Party, Independent Laborers' and Farmers' Party and Young Men's Friendly Party (Chung Woo Dang).

The tragic scene of mutual killing of our people which had risen in every place of southern Korea, and the mass upheaval devoid of the past or in the future at this time of harvest, is truly a grave and important problem deciding the existence of the entire people. Party of the responsibility of the inability to eliminate the causes to bring much abhoring situations should be laid upon the shoulders of each of the parties. We, the political parties, representing the thoughts of the people, striving for the benefits of the people, there is no time as urgent as todsy to review ourselves.

Here, every party with the sttitude of absolute sincerity, organized this discussion session to direct the concerted steps toward the cooperation and support of every party for the common good of the people. This, we confirm that we have advanced one step from the rigid political stubborness.

With this spirit of cooperation, for the investigation of this extraordinary condition of southern Korea, and for the solution of this problem, we propose the formation of Joint Investigating Commission of all the parties for the extraordinary situation in southern Korea, and determine the time of sending them out for just investigation and consolation. Before the start of this commission, we want to transfer to you our common thoughts and explanation and at the same time we want to make the following proposition and requests:

The common ideas of all the parties toward this situation:

1. The indefinite interruption of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission together with the loss of hope for the organization of Korean Provisional Government which gives an absolute despair among the people for the future of liberation of fatherland, therefore, the extreme disappointment.

2. Extreme hate toward the police, government organizations and other organizations of production where there are placed many traitors of the people, pro-Japanese and boot polishers of Military Government.

3. Difficult food situation and the revolting attitude which came out from cruel policy of rice collectors and from the misplanned policy of rice distribution.

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Because of the above enumerated reasons, the Korean public has come to thought about the present life worse than the life they had led before the Japanese surrender, and the so-called political freedom is considered to be only in name. We cannot ignore that the multitude have risen in swarms from the deep and wide-spread resentment. Consequently, the objects of attack of this incident, are, first, the police, next, the government officials and then the next are the indecent privileged class and the profiteers. We cannot help but regret about the tragedy of mutual killing among our own people aroused by emotion, losing all kinds of reason and it is difficult to forgive such cruelty. Furthermore, those who were out to suppress the uprising, the Military Government and the police, had resorted to the methods of provocation and revenge; carried out a policy based upon fear stirring up a large scale disturbance and violence. In addition to this, there is a definite rumor that people who are opposed to the crowd were stirred up systematically to wage a war of revenge. If it were true, we consider it to be an unworthy action which will cut off the road to rebirth to Korea. Therefore, we disagree with you, General, when you attribute the cause of this huge uprising purely to the agitation of some people and we absolutely protest against such conclusion.

We, the Korean people, who have had the continued history, culture, and life vitality of 5,000 years, will definitely consider an insult to have been aroused to such an uprising purely by agitation of some worst elements and not aroused by the hopelessness of the living and the political unrest of our fatherland. The uprising of "Dong Hak Dang", March 1st movement in the past, had also considered them to be the results of agitation and dealt with them as such. But they have been the legitimate stages in the path of struggle for freedom of the Korean people.

You should make a clear statement indicating that you suspect a few unlikely Koreans and bad interpreters, who misuse their authorities in order to fulfill their own ambition and make the people against the Military Government for the purpose of covering their own fatal misconducts, probably submitting a report which indicates that the disturbance at the moment has been caused by some agitators. If some agitators were leading the people to cause this cruel, bloody disturbance for their personal ambition as we painted it out for you, the responsibility for such a disturbance should be held by the whole Korean race.

Secondly, we, with the request of the Korean people, request you immediately stop the police's primitive oppression, emotional, big round-up, and reprisal. One who overlooks the continuance of such a primitive oppression and reprisal because of the magnified report of some cruel acts and because of his preconception may not be a clever statesman. Such a terroratic administration will cause a greater disturbance in the future. If such a situation continues, the bloody fight among Koreans will continue or will be repeated. Consequently, an independence of Korea may be prolonged forever.

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We can not predict what would happen next when the people have feat and despair at the time of harvest prior to the collection of rice. Especially when the people in north and south Kyongsang, north and south Cholla, and north and south Chungchong provinces encounter such a situation again; a great difficulty will arise in securing food stuffs for the people in south Korea.

You, considering all aspects mentioned in the above paragraphs and sharing the feeling of working people, farmers and students, are requested to release good workers and farmers in the jail, so they can return to their respective working places. Further, all undersigned political parties pledge to support and cooperate with you in taking such an emergency countermeasure.

In regard with the investigation, consolation, and encouragement, by the YAWN HAB CHO SA DAN (the Combined Investigation Party of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission), your friendly assistance is hereby requested for the purpose of accomplishing our mission.

We always pray for you having cleverness and health.

23 October 1946

The Korean Communist Party
The New Progressive Party
The Korean Independence Party
The Korean People's Party
The Independent Laborers' and Farmers' Party
South Korea New People's Party
Korean National Revolutionary Party
The Social Democratic Party
The TCH'UNG OO DANG

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

TO: General Hodge.

1. To guarantee investigators freedom to investigate in all districts. (In other words, the polices' interference and terroristic acts must be stopped.)

2. To issue an order, which facilitates the investigation mission, to all organizations.

3. To provide three buses and gasoline. (The expense will be paid by all political parties.)

4. To dispatch three men from the Department of Information and three newspaper correspondents together with us. (If possible, to send American correspondents with us, too.)

5. To let the people learn of the mission of the investigation group through radio.

The Korean Communist Party,
The New Progressive Party,
The Korean Independence Party,
The Korean People's Party,
The Independent Laborer's & Farmers Party,
South Korea New People's Party
Korean National Revolutionary Party

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

To the Korean People:

Internal strife wastes the strength of the people and retards the reconstruction of the Fatherland. Futhermore, the recent excesses only serve to discredit the Korean people in the eyes of the nations and obstructs independence. This is a critical moment!

Whatever discontent or dissatisfaction you may have with the Government, do not be deceived by incitement to evil from any political ideological group but have confidence in the legal authorities for the alleviation of your difficulties. Live patiently through these difficult days! Cease these riotous actions among yourselves.

Wanton destruction, murder and arson are terrible crimes and a calamity for any people. Put heart and faith into the gigantic task of uniting under coalition and work for the solution of the grave problems of this hour.

Support the course of coalition as the only road to the solution of the problems of Korea, the realization of the Provisional Government, freedom and independence.

Let this be engraved in your minds: be patient and calm while carrying on the daily tasks.

October 25, 1946

For the Joint Korean - American Conference

ALBERT L. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army
Personal Representative of
General Hodge.

KIM, Kiusic
LYUH, Won Hyung
Chairmen of the Coalition Committee

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED BY CONFERENCE

PERSONNEL

1. Enmity against the police.
2. The presence of former Japanese collaborators in Military Government.
3. Effect of interpreters in Government.
4. Corruption of some Korean officials.
5. Agitators against best interests of southern Korea.

ECONOMIC

6. The rice collection program.
7. The rice distribution program.
8. Wages, prices, and inflation.
9. Refugee housing and living problem.
10. Disappointment of the people in the slowness of economic recovery.

POLITICAL

11. The non-appearance of a Korean Provisional Government.
12. Discontent concerning administration of former enemy property.
13. Party influences.
14. How to set up a moral government.
    a. A government that meets demands of the Koreans.
    b. Government by true patriots.
    c. Definite administrative program.
    d. Elimination of evil doers from government.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
APO 235

26 October 1946

To the Committee representing
the joint meeting of the
nine political parties:

I have carefully considered the requests submitted by you in the petition which you recently presented to me. I appreciate your offer of assistance in inquiring into the causes of the recent disturbances in south Korea. I have recently appointed a Korean-American Conference consisting of members of the Coalition Committee with American officers and civilian experts to inquire into the causes of the disturbances. Since the objective of your group is the same as the Conference appointed by me, I request that you select and submit to me the names of three members from your group for appointment by me as members of the Korean-American Conference. The enlarged Conference will thus have the benefit of the experience, advice and assistance of your group which will make the work of the Conference more effective.

Yours truly,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Lt. General John R. Hodge,
Commanding General of U.S. Army in Korea

Your letter of 26th of this month was read with much gratitude.

As you are well aware of, our Joint Conference of all parties met to seriously study the real nature of the extraordinary incident of Southern Korea and at the same time bring up a political solution from the standpoint of entire people. For this purpose, we had formed a Joint Investigating Committee and had requested you to grant us some conveniences in carrying out these investigations.

To this request, you had answered with your invitation of three representatives from our Joint Conference to participate and jointly assist in the Joint Korean-American Conference now in session [illegible] statement. But because of the following reasons, we regret to say that we can not send our representatives:

1. The formation of Joint Investigating Committee did not come about with the idea of assisting the investigation led by the government. It came into being with the purpose of carrying out an independent investigation solely from the standpoint of Korean people, and requests the military government to accord us with the conveniences for investigation.

2. People representing the government should bear the responsibility of the present reckless movement of this incident of Southern Korea, regardless of the true nature of it therefore, any effort to carry out investigation in conjunction with the military government will not lead us to the true causes of the incident.

3. Joint Korean-American Conference might have been started from good intentions. The result will be that it will be impossible to investigate, discuss and solve, the incident of Southern Korea from the standpoint of freedom-of-Korean people. We maintain that the principal role of investigation of this incident should be given over to the Joint Investigating Committee of all Political Parties.

October 28, 1946

Joint Conference of Nine Political Parties

EXHIBIT 3

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

1. New Progressive Party (Sin Zin Tang)
2. Workers and Farmers Party (Dok Lip No Rong Tang)
3. Korean Democratic Party (Chosen In Min Tang)
4. New Peoples Party of Southern Korea (Nam Chosen Sin Min Tang)
5. Young Peoples Friendly Party of Tun Do Kyo (Tun Do Kyo Chung Woo Tang)
6. Korean Communist Party (Chosen Kong San Tang)
7. Social Democratic Party (Sa Hoi Min Choo Tang)
8. Peoples Revolutionary Party (Min Chok Hyuk Myung Tang)
9. Korean Independence Party (Han Kook Dok Lip Tang)

EXHIBIT 3

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

MEMORANDUM No. 5

24 October 1946

SUBJECT: Submission of a suggestion.

TO : The Korean-American Joint Committee.

FROM : The Liaison Committee of All workers for Korean Independence.

This committee is sincerely extending a whole-heartedly wish for the success of the Korean-American Joint Committee, which has been set up to meet the present emergency situation in South Korea. Further, this committee is submitting a suggestion for an immediate settlement of the current crisis because it is required at the present moment.

This suggestion of this committee is attached herewith.

(Sealed)

YOON, SI SUP

Representative
The Liaison Committee

EXHIBIT 4

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

I. Important Causes for Disturbances in Southern Korea.

1. The hopelessness of immediate organization of Korean Provisinal Government and the severe friction between the Rightists and Leftists.

2. In the midst of insufficiency of food, the rice collection is too cruel, the distribution unjust.

3. Many pro-Japanese personnel in both government organizations and police departments.

4. High price lure of things together with the low scaled salaries and wages which lead people to general doubts, despair and restlessness.

5. Some ambitious politicians, having taken advantage of this opportunity carried on the agitation among the public.

II. Remedies suggested.

1. Hasten the resumption of the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

2. Understand the general attitude of the population, and the rice collection of the new crops should be done only from the enemy property and land owners, and execute just distribution.

3. Carry out an immediate purge of pro-Japanese elements from the government organs and police force and replace them with patriots and others who have the personal history of independence movement behind them.

4. Control the price level of commodities, increase the production of daily necessities so as to safeguard the life of every workman.

5. Those directly responsible for the agitation of the disturbances should be severely dealt with in accordance with the law, and those who had been instigated to the disturbances should be dealt magnanimously.

6. Lend constructive assistance to Coalition Committee and give weighty considerations to the decisions of the committee.

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PROBLEM OF POLICE

1. The persecutors and the traitors of Korean people who used to throw the Korean Independence workers, the patriots working for the Korean culture and civilization and non-cooperators of war into prison and impose upon them all kinds of cruelties under the inhuman suppression of the Japanese Imperialism, are now holding the most important positions in the Police Force. There are not only these traitors of people, the so-called "Fore runner dogs of Japanese Imperialism", but a great many of the same type of these traitors who had escaped from the North of the 38th found their way into these positions. The presence of these people causes the distrust of the general population toward the Police.

2. Such elements do not understand what a Democratic Police System is and also do not have the desire for such a system. Therefore, being acquainted and accustomed to only the worst methods of the Japanese Police System they are repeating exactly the same tactics to arouse the enmity of the people against them. Especially this is so when the highest staff of the Police Force is influenced by the Political Partiality, one Party (Korean Democratic Party), and throw the workers of other political party (Leftists) having different political ideas into prison, treating them as badly as, if not worse than, the former Japanese regime. The genuine hope and understanding of the General Public toward Liberation, Freedom and Democracy had been shattered desperately and they are left with the deepest despair and shiver with fear.

3. Not only the terrorist actions of private organizations and terrorist groups (Rightists) are not definitely put to a stop to but at times, intentionally these actions are overlooked by the police. At times, the police had acted in company with these groups. The actors in terrorist deeds areoverlooked and immediately released while the sufferers were additionally punished by the police. The general public believes that there is a black drama of political intrigue behind the rascals of police. Consequently, the following measures must be carried out immediately in order to correct the mistakes of the Police and build a Democratic Police System.

   a. Clear up all the policies handed over from the Japanese regime.
   b. Stop immediately all the terrorist acts.
   c. Do away with all Political Partiality.
   d. All those who had been arrested and put to prison without any crime should be released immediately.

To carry out all these measures, all those under duty must bear the responsibility of these mistakes and resign from their offices. A new group of people who may definitely carry out these measures shall be put with the highest offices of the Police Force. We propose this to be done immediately.

Chief of National Police
Chief of Police of Seoul
Chief of Police of Every District } should be recommended by the Coalition Committee.

Signed by - LYUH, Woon Hyung

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 118 REPRINTED COPY 24 August 1946

ESTABLISHMENT OF KOREAN INTERIM LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

SECTION I. *Purpose.* The purpose of this ordinance is to increase the participation of democratic elements in the government by the establishment of an interim legislative body and thus to foster the development of the country on democratic principles pending the early establishment of a unified Korean State with a provisional democratic government of all Korea as provided in the Moscow Agreement.

SECTION II. *Purpose of Legislative Body.* It is declared to be the purpose of Military Government to establish through broad electoral processes a legislative body which shall have the duty of formulating and presenting to the Military Governor draft laws to be used as the basis for political, economic and social reforms, pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Initially, the assembly will be composed of members partly selected and partly elected. Eventually all will be elected.

SECTION III. *Establishment.* A Korean legislative body to be known as the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly is hereby established as an organ of government. It shall consist of 90 members, 45 of whom shall be elected. Elective members shall be chosen in each province and in the independent City of Seoul in the manner hereinafter prescribed on the basis of one member for each 550,000 population or major fraction thereof; *provided*, that each province shall be represented by at least one elective member. In addition there shall be elected from each province and the independent City of Seoul a representative at large. The remaining members shall be selected so as to represent equally and fairly major democratic elements of Korean life, economic, political and intellectual.

Ex 7

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECTION IV. *Pay.* Members of the Assembly shall receive the same compensation as judges of the Supreme Court. Payment of compensation of necessary employees shall be subject to Civil Service rules and regulations.

SECTION V. *Duties and Powers of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.* It shall be the duty of the Assembly to enact ordinances on matters affecting general welfare and interest and on such matters as may be referred to it by the Military Governor. It shall also have the power to review all past appointments to the Military Government above the Civil Service Status of Class 4 and to confirm and consent to all such future appointments. Ordinances enacted by the Assembly shall have the force and effect of law when concurred in by the Military Governor, duly signed by him and sealed and published in the *Official Gazette.* In case the Military Governor does not concur in any ordinance, he will return it to the legislature with a written statement of reasons for nonconcurrence.

SECTION VI. *Quorum; Immunity of Members for Utterances.* All action of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly shall be by a majority vote of the quorum, and three-fourths of the members shall constitute a quorum unless otherwise determined by the Assembly. Debates in the Assembly, on the floor thereof, and in committees which may be established, shall be free, and the members shall not be questioned for their utterances during the course of such debate in any other place; but the Assembly shall have power to adopt rules of conduct and measures for punishment of its members for disorderly behavior.

SECTION VII. *Qualification of Members.* No person may be elected as a member of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly unless he or she is a Korean who shall have passed his or her twenty-fifth birthday on the date of assuming office, and unless he or she has been a *bona fide* resident of the province or area represented for at least one year immediately preceding his or her election.

The date of assuming office shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to be the first day of the session of the Assembly following such election.

The following shall not be eligible for membership in the Assembly: persons who occupied positions as central, provincial or municipal councilors, or persons of the rank of *chikimkwan* or above, under the Japanese regime; and all those who collaborated with the Japanese, for gain, to the detriment of the Korean people.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECTION VIII. ***Method of Election of Members of the Assembly.*** Elective members of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly shall be elected by and for the people of each province of Korea south of the 38° parallel and the independent City of Seoul, by universal suffrage regardless of sex, according to rules to be established by an ordinance to be enacted by the Assembly and approved by the Military Governor. Until the enactment of such ordinance elective members shall be chosen by elective procedures established by the Military Governor. Such elective procedures will provide, in substance, that each hamlet, village and district shall elect two representatives, who shall in turn elect two representatives from their respective ***myun***; that these ***myun*** representatives shall elect two representatives for their respective *gun*; that the *gun* representatives shall elect provincial representatives to the Assembly in accordance with provincial population ratios; and that all balloting shall be secret. Until the establishment of an official census, population figures shall be those determined from time to time by the National Economic Board. For the purpose of this ordinance, the part of Hwanghae Province which lies south of the 38° parallel shall be considered a part of Kyonggi Province.

SECTION IX. *Duration of Term.* Original members of the Assembly shall, unless reelected or reappointed for subsequent periods, hold office only until the seating of members elected in the first general election held pursuant to ordinances hereafter enacted.

SECTION X. *Initial Session of the Assembly; Adoption of Rules; Election of Chairman.* The initial session of the Assembly shall be held on the day fixed by the Military Governor at a place in Seoul designated by him. The Assembly shall elect from its number a presiding chairman. Election of the presiding chairman shall be by written secret ballot of a majority of the quorum. He shall hold office until his successor is elected. The Assembly shall adopt rules of procedure which shall include provisions for adjournments, committees and the conduct of members.

SECTION XI. ***Authority of Military Government Unimpaired.*** All duties and powers of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly under this ordinance shall be exercised under the authority of the Military Government in Korea, until the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The Military Governor retains power to dissolve the Assembly, approve new members and require new elections.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECTION XII. *Effective Date.* This ordinance shall be effective on the date appearing hereon.

SEAL
USAMGIK

ARCHER L LERCH
Major General United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

在朝鮮美國陸軍司令部軍政廳

法令第一一八號 (再 版)

朝鮮過渡立法議院의創設

第一條 目 的

本令은모스크바協約에規定된대로朝鮮全體의臨時民主政府를樹立한統一朝鮮國家가速히建設되기를期하며過渡立法機關을建設함으로政府에民主的要素의參加를增加하야民主主義原則下에國家의發展을助成함을目的으로함

第二條 立法機關의目的

臨時朝鮮民主政府의樹立을期하며政治的、經濟的、及社會的改革의基礎로使用될法令草案을作成하야軍政長官에게提出할職務가있는立法機關을廣汎한選擧方法에依하야建設함이軍政廳의目的임을宣言함

最初에同議員은選定된一部의議員과選擧된一部의議員으로써構成될、漸次로는議員全部가選擧됨

第三條 設 置

朝鮮過渡立法議院으로써알려질朝鮮立法機關은玆에政府의한機關으로써設置됨

同議院은九十名議員으로써構成되며其中四十五名議員은選擧되는議員은各道와서울特別市에서左記의規定에依하야各五十五萬名當一名又는各主要端數當一名의單位로選擧됨

但各道는選擧되는議員적어도一名으로代表하게됨

其外에또한各道와서울特別市는全體的代議士各一名을選出할其餘의議員은朝鮮의經濟的、政治的及知的生活의主要한民主的要素를公平正大하게代表하도록選定됨

第四條 俸 給

同議院議員은大法院大法官과同額의報償을받음

必要한履情人의報償支拂은人事行政規程에準함

第五條 朝鮮過渡立法議院의職務及權限

一般福利와利害에關係되는事項及軍政長官이依託한事項에關하야法令을制定함이同議院의職務임

同議院은또한過去의軍政廳에任命한人事行政身分四等級以上의모든官職任命을再調査할權限이있으며또그러한未來의모든任命을追認하고玆에同意하는權限이있음

同議院에서制定한法令은軍政長官이同意하야合法的으로署名

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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同議院의創始議員은次期에再選擧又는再任命되지않는限今後制定되는法令에따라施行될第一次總選擧에被選된議員들이就任할때까지만職務에就함

第十條 同議院의創立總會、規程採用、議長選擧

同議院의創立總會는軍政長官이指定한時日에軍政長官이指定한서울市內場所에서擧行함

同議院은그議員中에서議長을選定함

議長의選擧는定員數過半數의無記名投票에依함

被選議長은後任이被選될때까지職務에就함

同議院은停會、委員會及議員行爲等에關한規定을包含한施行法規를採用함

第十一條 軍政廳의權限은輕減되지아니함

本令에依한朝鮮過渡立法議院의모든職務와權限은臨時朝鮮民主政府가樹立될때까지朝鮮軍政廳의權限下에行使함

軍政長官은同議院을解散하며新議員을任命하며新選擧를要求할權限을保留함

第十二條 施行期日

本令은公布日로부터有效함

一九四六年八月二十四日

朝鮮軍政長官

美國陸軍少將 아ㅣ취·엘·러ㅣ취

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SUBJECT: Discharge of 8 Heads of Police Stations
KIM, Chung Ho to be Police Chief.

Chief of Police Department Cho, Kyung Ok, announced the following changes in personnel of the Police Staff. The announcement was made at the Police Headquarters of Fifth District in the presence of news paper reporters yesterday 22nd, at 3:30 in the afternoon:

DISCHARGED

Public Safety Chief	Park, Ul Soo
Chief of Kern Chun Station	Chung, Hoo Cho
Chief of Sun San Station	Paik, Soo Sang
Chief of General Affairs of Dai Sung Station	Kim, Long Pai
Chief of General Affairs	Kim, Pyung Dai
Chief of San Choo Station	Chun, Kyu Moon
Chief of Sung Choo Station	Yun, Koon Chan
Chief of Ko Ryung Station	Kim, In Choon

APPOINTMENTS

Kim, Chung Ho	To the post of Chief of Police Headquarters of Fifth District (now president of Police School and Head of Department of Education)
Kang, Soo Chang	To the Post of Assistant Chief of Police Headquarters Fifth District (now not working)
Sung, Tai Kyung	To the Post of 3rd District Police (now working in the General Affairs of the Police)
Park, Hai Sik	Head of General Affairs of Police (now working Chief of An Dong Station)
Pai, Young Hon	Head office of Temporary Investigation (now working Investigation office of First District)
Lui, Dan Ha	Chief of Kern Chun Police Station
Chung, Young Dal	Antung Police Station
Kim, Kyu In	Public Safety (acting)
Lee, Mu Ok	Head of General Affairs of Dai Koo Police Station
Chung, Po Soo	Replace Ko Ryung Police Station
Chi, Rong Hai	Sang Choo Police Head (Acting)
Park, Do Dal	Po Sung Choi Police Head

EXHIBIT 8

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PRESS RELEASE NO. 3

The Joint Korean-American Conference, participated in by members of the Coalition Committee and American representatives, meeting daily at Duk Soo Palace has adopted a comprehensive agenda of matters to be discussed by the Conference in determining the causes of the recent disturbances in southern Korea.

To establish a rational approach to the study of these problems, the Conference decided to arrange these questions into three principal groups:

I - Those affecting individuals involved in the reasons for the disturbances,

II - Those involving economic difficulties and

III - Influence of political matters.

In detail the subjects are as follows:

I - [illegible]

1. Enmity against the police.
2. The presence of former Japanese collaborators in military Government.
3. Effect of interpreters in government.
4. Corruption of some Korean officials.
5. Agitators against best interests of southern Korea.

II - ECONOMIC

6. The rice collection program.
7. The rice distribution program.
8. Wages, prices, and inflation.
9. Refugee housing and living problem.
10. Disappointment of the people in the slowness of economic recovery.

III - POLITICAL

11. The non-appearance of a Korean Provisional Government.
12. Discontent concerning administration of former enemy property.
13. Party influences.
14. How to set up a moral government.
    a. A government that meets demands of the Koreans.
    b. Government by true patriots.
    c. Definite administrative program.
    d. Elimination of evil doers from government.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

MINUTES

OF THE FOURTH MEETING
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 28OCTOBER 1946.

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj Gen Albert E. Brown
Maj Gen A.L. Lerch
Dr A.C. Bunce
Brig Gen John Weckerling
Dr E.A.J. Johnson
Absent: Brig Gen C.C. Helmick

KOREAN MEMBERS

Dr Kimm, Kiusic
Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Poong Choon
Ahn, Chai Hong
Pack, Keun Oong
Chang, Kwon
Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung

Interpreter: Dr Henry Appenzeller

The meeting came to order at 1330.

1 - Refusal of the Nine Political Party Group to Join Conference:

General Brown reported that the substance of the reply of the nine party group to our invitation to join the conference was to the effect that they did not feel that they could join with this committee in investigation of the causes of the disturbances as they felt that this committee represented Military Government and they believed that the investigations should be made by Koreans. These three main points were raised:

(1) Because it was a government sponsored committee called by the Commanding General

(2) Had government members on the committee and did not represent the Korean people

(3) Charged that this committee was not in a position to investigate the situation properly

The representatives were informed by General Weckerling that this Conference being the official committee appointed by the Commanding General, it was the only group that he could officially recognize to make these investigations. That any individual or any political party wishing to make an investigation was at perfect liberty to do so. That if their committee conducted any investigation and ascertained any facts of benefit to this committee that we would be glad to have their knowledge.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
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2 - Election for Legislature:

Dr. Kimm Kiusic stated that he was waited on Sunday evening by three persons from the Kang Wan Province who reported that the election was being run by the National Association for Acceleration of Independence (membership around five to seven million) who had apparently taken things out of the hands of the government authorities. A copy of the agenda of the meeting held by the branch heads of the different myun and chung in the whole province to discuss ways and means of conducting the election was presented for translation abd submission at the next meeting. This N.A.I. claimed that only rightists must be elected to the legislature. He further reported that "the leftist people are all crying and howling at this time that the present election will be a unilateral election and that will make the assembly a unilateral assembly. If this election is so branded, and if my information is correct, I think this is also somewhat against the desire of Washington. I understand that this legislature is supposed to be created by a coalition of the rightists and the leftists and the composition of the legislature itself should be rightist, leftist and center. The cry raised by the leftists is that they will not be able to participate in this election. For that reason my game is to call their hand. We have called their hand in inviting them to join this conference, in the naming of this conference and have complied with other whims and fancies they have. They have made the demand that all political prisoners be set free before we begin coalition or legislature or anything else. Mr. Lyuh and I were before General ~~Leroh~~ Hodge this ONE morning and when Mr. Lyuh brought up that question, General Hodge said that they were willing to set the prisoners free the next day if Mr. Lyuh furnished a list. But the question was who are

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actually political prisoners, who were rioters and so on. This was about three weeks ago but that list has never appeared, to my knowledge. They are asking for the postponement of the election. A good beginning will result in a good ending and therefore in order to make a good start and also in consideration of the fact that the Korean people have been under Japanese rule for practically 40 years and they have not in recent years had any experience in election legislature and such things, we might go a little slow as the leftists propose and even postpone the opening of the legislature until December 1st or so. In the meantime in those places where the election has not been conducted properly - that is without leftists participating - we might require them to annul the first election and have another proper election. Another method might be to annul all of the provincial elections and have this first legislature of ninety members elected by nomination by the Coalition Committee since that Committee seems to be the only committee which does include even a fraction of the leftists. These ninety members to be approved by the Commanding General. This is being presented as a probable solution and not as a motion." Won expressed his willingness to agree with a further delay in elections if a more truly representative body could thus be obtained. It was decided that a discussion of the elections be postponed until more complete returns were received.

3 - Enmity Against the Police: The following suggestions were tendered:-

(1) In order to quieten the minds of the people and to avoid recurrences of the troubles it was suggested that leniency be shown those leftists, agitators and their followers who had been arrested by immediately trying them and releasing those found to be followers rather than leaders.

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(2) Because of the comparatively small police force, untrained young men were brought in to assist the police. The actions of these young men were very rough and incurred the enmity of the people at large. (Youth Organization for National Establishment or Kun Kook, having very close relationship with the Korean Democratic Young People's Party composed of 'riff-raff'). This group incited the trouble at the East Gate Police station as recounted by Mr. Cho resulting in the imprisonment of a number of people. Immediate action should be taken to rectify this situation without waiting for the trial date set at December 5th.

(3) Caution the newspapers not to print rumors which would arouse the people but instead articles to pacify them.

** Main Causes of the Enmity Against the Police:

1 - Chang Tac Song, chief of police of Kyung Ki Do Province, appointing this man "Chai" (head of the intelligence department), No Dok Sul and others who did most harm to the Korean people under the Japanese.

2 - Instead of warning the collaborators in the police force who realize their position to leave the police force, bills were posted urging those who served in the police force under the Japanese to join the force as they would get better positions than they had held.

3 - Kim Chung Ho, Captain in the famous Japanese Kwangtung Army of Manchuria (head of the police school) appointed as head of the police for north Kyung Sang Province. He was not only a malicious collaborator but a war criminal. Also the appointment of Kang Soo Chang as vice-chief to Kim Chung Ho and Whang Ok as chief of the second area.

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4 - The Fatherland Defense Battlefront Group (Choguk Panyu Chosun), with its headquarters in the building with the Korean Independence Party, are a terroristic gang supposed to be composed of young men - they seem to be mostly adults some over forty years old. Mr. Cho will report on the activities of this group.

Mr. Cho recounted an incident regarding the attack by the Fatherland Group on a student who tore down one of their posters which resulted in his being beaten up to the point of death, as well as one of Mr. Cho's friends and three other students. He confirmed the above four causes of the disturbances and added

(a) the constabulary and the police are those who care for the social set up. If these officers have the confidence of the people all is at peace, but if they are held in suspicion there is trouble ahead.

(b) the heads of nine or ten out of the twelve police groups are former Japanese employees. The thirty million Koreans cannot believe that once a man has been under the employ of the Japanese he can change his methods and thus do not have confidence in him.

Mr. Cho stated that he himself heard the radio broadcast regarding the recruiting of former Japanese employed policemen to enlarge the present police force. The general public hearing this broadcast will believe that this is the policy of the Military Government.

Mr. Kimm recounted a story of his young help having been beaten up by the police when he asked them for help in repairing his bicycle which had been borrowed and broken by one of the policemen.

It was pointed out that Bark Heun Young used the Taegu incident to further his purposes. It was the spark that set fire to the inflammable material already there. The police

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and the Han Min Dang Group should be investigated.

Upon suggestion of Mr. Kimm the chairman ruled that when non-members, even secretaries, desired to make a statement they are required to do so in writing through one of the members of the committee.

During to-day's meeting pictures of the Taegu incident were passed to the members present.

The meeting adjourned at 1720 to meet again tomorrow, October 29, 1946, at 1330, and continue its discussion regarding item I "Enmity against the Police".

** General Brown in reply to Mr. Won's statement made the following statement:

"Concerning the handling of those arrested for taking part in the Taegu incident, every effort is being made to release those arrested just as rapidly as it can be found that they are guilty of no serious breach of the law. Due to the rather widespread and large number of murders committed, it is necessary to carefully screen those arrested as witnesses. This takes time and is being done as rapidly as the personnel available can make it."

General Lerch added with reference to this strong-arm group that they had been warned to stay out and not take part and some of the leaders have been arrested for taking part. The police have also been warned all over Korea not to use these strong-arm men.

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MINUTES

OF THE FIFTH MEETING HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE AT 1330, 29 OCTOBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS	KOREAN MEMBERS
Maj Gen Albert E. Brown	Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Maj Gen A,L. Lerch	Won, Seh Hoon
Dr. A.C. Bunce	Choi, Tong O
Brig Gen John Weckerling	Kim, Poong Choon
Dr. E.A.J. Johnson	Ahn, Chai Hong
Absent: Brig Gen C.G. Helmick	Pack, Keun Oong
	Chang, Kwon
Interpreter: Dr.Henry Appenzeller	Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung

The meeting came to order at 1330.

Liaison Committee for All Workers of the Korean Independence.

The chairman presented the translation of a communication which was read to the Committee yesterday, in which is submitted a suggestion to the Joint Korean-American Conference from the "Liaison Committee for All Workers of the Korean Independence" signed by Yung Ki Suk who was in China for over 30 years. This is a recently formed group of all persons interested in the independence movement - almost every political organization is represented and is a separate organization from the 9 political party group. Several members of the Coalition Committee had been invited to attend the first meeting of this group but were unable to be present.

1 - Enmity Against the Police: Discussion of this subject was resumed.

No Dok Soo - chief of the detective bureau is reported to have called in Chung Hyun Mook of the Seoul Service (auto.service) and suggested that he break relations with Neu Oon Hyung and make a contribution of one million yen to the Hang Kook Min Ju Dang. He did not comply and some time later his brother and chauffeur were arrested, examined and maltreated and released after a week's imprisonment.

It was suggested that as several persons had brought charges against Chang Taik Sang this would seem to raise the question of his suitability for office. A request was made that

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a list of the more serious of these complaints be submitted in order that the matter may be taken up with the proper authorities.

The chairman suggested that we proceed with a general discussion of all items and return after we have covered all items which it is hoped will be accomplished this week, to a more detailed consideration of each item and at that time we will bring in others who have more knowledge.

Won made the following statements:

(1) dissatisfaction with the police was caused by the behavior of the police in lower positions - police at local police stations and police in charge of local boxes.

(2) Discontent was not against the central government set-up but against former Japanese employed policemen who are now at local boxes. These men in the eyes of the public are the same as those under the old Japanese regime.

(3) Method and selection of personnel last fall (committee of 7) The CIC will be able to supply a complete answer.

(4) Closer investigation of people before employment in government bureaus.

(5) Not a question of patriotism or loyalty with Cho Pyung Ok and Chang Taik Sang, but their choice of subordinates who are 'yes' men to them and proceed to do things which would not be countenanced by their superiors. Koreans are notorious for this characteristic.

Kimm, Kiusic mentioned the disturbances at Yenan and Pak Chung, towns not far from the 38th parallel. The police and their underlings are cooperating with the leftists in the north; Pai Young Keun, chief of police and his men instigated this disturbance and carried away some 300 rifles with ammunition - 11 persons including 8 policemen crossed the border. The Russian border is well guarded and all refugees are well searched, sometimes even being turned back, while our border is less carefully

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guarded. Over 800,000 persons have come through our lines. Some of these are genuine refugees - some agitators. Are the police aware of this or are they just closing their eyes? In South Korea the police and their underlings are cooperating with the rightists. For instance in Keum Cheh (North Chulla Pukto) the police and the National Acceleration of Independence Group are working together in the oppression of leftists. Neutral groups such as the 'Han Chung' are being oppressed because of their unwillingness to take sides. An article appearing in the Han Sung Ilpo supporting the report regarding the Yenan and Kaesong disturbances was submitted for translation.

Won gave the following details:

Pack Chai Soo: Chief of 3rd area. He formerly went around in a Haori coat and boasted that he was a Japanese.

Kim Heun Chin. Chief of the Peace Preservation Section was formerly chief of An Sang police. He married a Japanese girl and was famous for being a Japanese collaborator.

Chai Yong Hi. Adviser to first area. He is a well-known evil doer - oppressed the people.

Lee Ik Heung. Vice-chief of the Seoul Police Station. He was a former Japanese police officer and a collaborator.

Choy Kyung Chin. Vice-chief of National Police and assistant to Cho. Under the Japanese Government General he was a staff officer - the only Korean to hold this position.

Lee Koo Hun. Chief of detective section of Kyungi Do. He was formerly chief of police at Kaesong but was driven out by the people after liberation.

Chai Nyung Chin. Chief of National Detective Bureau. He has been under arrest and served two prison sentences.

Kang Ho Hyung. Chief of police of South Kyungi Do. Even after August 20th he went to the Japanese Shrine to pay homage.

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Chang Cha Kwan. Chief of police in south Kyunsan Do. He was for five years chief of the political police as well as the assistant chief of police in that province. Not only do the citizens dislike him but he is disliked by the police themselves.

Kang Nak Choon. Chief of peace preservation section of south Kyunsan Do. He was formerly the chief of the political police for twelve years.

Pack, Keun Oong stressed that unless the police formerly under the Japanese regime were cleared out we cannot expect to go ahead with progressive work. The collaborators from the north have come down and joined their confreres in the south forming a 'block'. Having been policemen under the Japanese should be sufficient evidence for removal. These points were made:

(1) Removal of Japanese trained head of areas and those immediately under them.

(2) Replacement to be made by patriots.

(3) Coalition Committee have the ability to select such persons.

(4) The above will become the duty and service of this Joint Korean-American Conference.

(5) The removal of former Japanese policemen will give evidence to the police that we are putting patriots in their place, that they can trust their liberators and allies, and it will clear up the whole affair.

(6) Replace those removed by the men who have fought for Korean independence, revolutionaries and patriots liberated by the US Army in the south and the people will then believe in this Coalition effort and will follow peacefully.

(7) Work along these lines.

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Chang added that this boiled down to the question - who has won out in the situation Park Heun Yung or Dr. Kimm and Lyuh in advocating the removal from office of Japanese collaborators and employees? It was suggested that this purge reach as far up as the chief of the peace preservation section and the public health section (Po An Kay and Wee Sang). Won protested stating that men trained under the Japanese regime should not be allowed to hold the position of chief, but should only be allowed to rise to the position of assistant chief.

Party Influence in Government: Ahn brought up the question of party influence in government and suggested that the police be chosen from non-partisan groups. The opinion of the people at large is that non-party members should be used in public offices. Dr. Kimm reported that there is opposition by Korean Military Government employees to the Coalition Movement as well as against legislature. This may be one of the reasons why the Han Min Dang has been opposing the Coalition and the legislature as well as the cause of some of the recommendations to the Coalition Committee. However, the Han Min Dang is very anxious to get into the legislature. The chief of police of Kyungi Do is also opposed to the coalition movement but it is not known whether he is against the legislature. This is one aspect to be looked into. When orders for the arrest of Park Hung Yung are issued, it is usually the other party who is arrested!

The chairman suggested that the Committee consider the development of an issue in each of the other topics and proceed as rapidly as possible.

Dr. Johnson added that it should be made perfectly clear that we are discussing three things and not only that people were in the employ of the Japanese. Our recommendations must cover all three - (1) former employees of the Japanese
(2) because they favored particular parties
(3) because they committed illegal acts

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Dr. Kimm recommended appointment of a committee of three to sift the material on this first item into these three points, also the appointment of sub-committees for each item we discuss or three separate committees, one for personnel, one for economic affairs and one for political affairs. The chairman expressed his willingness to abide by the decision of the Committee but stated that at the first meeting it was decided that the Committee as a whole would first discuss all of the questions entering into the causes and then consider the necessity of appointing committees to consider specific issues. General Lerch stated "This committee is so small that I am of the opinion that no sub-committees are called for. With a committee as small as this I consider sub-committees would merely slow up the procedure. Personally I should like to be present at every discussion of every item of the agenda. I therefore concur with the suggestion made by the chairman earlier that we first define the issues in a general discussion and then call those who can give us the facts. If we had a much larger committee, my opinion would be otherwise."

Won made a motion that General Lerch's proposal to abide by the chairman's decision be accepted. Dr. Johnson seconded the motion and it was accepted by the committee.

Dr. Kimm passed a statement received from Lee Heun Yung and signed by Mr. Lyuh to be read by the Coalition Committee. This was submitted for translation.

The chairman called for unfinished business before closing the meeting.

Pack stated that a Mr. Chim Un Sik of the In Min Party was arrested during the Taegu disturbances and he considers that the release of this man would do much in lifting the tension in Taegu.

The meeting adjourned at 1710 to be called again tomorrow, October 30, 1946, at 1330.

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MINUTES

OF THE SIXTH MEETING HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE AT 1330, 30 OCTOBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS	KOREAN MEMBERS
Maj Gen Albert E. Brown	Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Maj Gen A.L. Lerch	Won, Seh Hoon
Dr. A.C. Bunce	Choi, Tong O
Brig Gen John Weckerling	Kim, Poong Choon
Dr. E.A.J. Johnson	Ahn, Chai Hong
Absent: Brig Gen C.C. Helmick	Pack, Keun Oong
	Chang, Kwon
Interpreter: Dr.Henry Appenzeller	Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung

The meeting came to order at 1330.

Dr. Kimm reported that a group of non-partisan men were ready to go into the provinces to investigate the disturbances and that he would recommend this group to the Conference to carry out their investigations of the disturbances in provinces. General Lerch replied that it is the policy of the Military Government to aid anyone who wishes to make investigations unofficially, and that he would furnish all necessary introductions to governors and other officials so that they are received with courtesy and made as comfortable as possible, but would suggest that the Conference should not adopt the policy of sending out private groups.

The chairman expressed his opinion that the committee should proceed as had been previously decided, to investigate the entire matter including all the subjects before it determined the consequent action of the committee.

Publicity Committee: The following committee was appointed to to compile publications:

Brig Gen John Weckerling- chairman

Lt. L.M. Birtsch

Herbert Kim

George Whang

Mrs. Kim Koh

The chairman instructed this committee that no information will be released to the press until it had been approved by the Chairman and Dr. Kimm.

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Presence of Former Japanese Collaborators in Military Government

General Lerch quoting from a letter received from a Korean who had been imprisoned by the Japanese stated that unless we made a wise decision with reference to the pro-Japanese and got rid of only those who are actually of the worst type of collaborator. we might be making a mistake which we would feel for forty years. He expressed interest in the fact that in Korea the stigma of the father was borne by his family and sons. He further stated that "I want to state that personally I have only the good of Korea in mind. I like to look forward to the day when Korea will be a free, united and independent nation and when Korea will be a broad minded nation as to foreign people and as to her own government the members of which were selected because of their broadminded attitude. I feel that this may be a good time for us to stop, look and listen to see whether the rule of ~~attainment~~ which appears to be one accepted by many people should be continued through the future history of Korea. I have only one other thing, that is, in our country from 1865 on America has suffered by reason of the fact that the old hatreds which were brought out by the civil war has hurt us on every turn. I hope Korea will not make that mistake."

Dr. Kimm said that in order to curb rumours and false statements being published in newspapers, it would be wise to make it very clear as to why we are taking up the matter of Japanese collaborators and the reason why we should eliminate pro-Japanese, collaborators and war criminals from the Military Government as well as elsewhere especially during the construction period of the Korean Government. The Great Powers may not recognize Korea as one of their allies but the Koreans have been with the Allies all through. According to the Moscow Decision "There must be the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese occupation of Korea." Surprise was expressed that the Military Government has done nothing - it was and still is the duty of the American Occupation Forces to

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deal with war criminals as General MacArthur is doing in Japan. What are the Leftists crowing about? What do the Soviet Authorities crow about? They are crowing about the fact that in the north they have got rid of all pro-Japanese and even former Jap policemen. That is a very different picture from the region south of the 38th parallel. They have at least cleared out the pro-Japanese elements and that is why the pro-Japanese elements are coming down here and joining Chang Duk Soo and his group - and yet we say we must be liberal."

Cause of Presence of collaborators in the Military Government was given as the lack of good advisors to the Army when they landed in Korea. Most of these advisors were old missionaries put in by Commander Williams and their political advise was nil. Another factor was that the best elements - the people of ability - felt they should give their services to their fatherland when a government of their own had been established.

Mr. Johnson speaking of his experiences in Norway, Germany and France brought up the fact that the people of those countries after their initial hatred and resentment against collaborators had subsided, learned to differentiate between little and large collaborators. This was necessary in order not to eliminate persons possessing qualities and training necessary to carry on the progress of the country - example: the elimination of doctors as required by the de-nazification program.

Won stated that there were three groups among the Koreans employed by Military Government

(1) the pro-Japanese group

(2) the English speaking group

(3) the newly employed group (this group is unable have much influence because of the old group already employed by the Military Government)

He feels that there are too many pro-Japanese being given privileges under the present government - he is not after long term

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sentences or punishment, but for the suspension of civil rights for say 1. 2 or 3 years during the construction period of the Korean Government.

It was again stressed that these pro-Japanese elements being allowed to hold office made a bad impression on the public. The people feel that the government in employing this pro-Japanese element do not show faith in the anti-Japanese element. This has caused great pain to the public, and the great hope and promise they placed in the American Occupation Forces is being shattered.

Miscellaneous Statements during Meeting:

Chang Chung Dang is a building in which Korean organizations honored their historical heroes and martyrs Since theliberation several Koreans have tried to use this building for making money from the Americans. A Buddist University also tried to obtain permission to use the building. Finally the American Authorities appropriated it for lodging quarters. Dr.Kimm reported to have been 'furious' about it. He was not. Such lies creep in and one cannot depend on subordinates.

Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The former chairman and vice-chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce were arrested for selling material from a certain factory. A sentence of 1 1/2 years of hard labor and 6 mohths was given respectively to the man who had actually done the selling and the chairman who had felt himself responsible, although absent. by the Army. Petition was made to General Hodge through a certain Colonel for shortening the sentence imposed on the offender who was 60 years of age and in poor health. Several days after the submission of this petition, upon enquiry it was stated that the old Chinese was in hospital being guarded by two M.P.s - this was a lie - as he had been visited in prison the previous day. Also it was found that the petition still rested on the Colonel's desk.

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A Korean Saying. If the Americans do not clean-out the pro-Japanese, war criminals and collaborators, the moment they go away there will be a very great civil war among our own people. "If you fellows the Americans - you Soviet fellows - go away then we will clean you up".

General Brown made it known that it was essential that there be free discussion before this Committee. It is also essentialthat no information be given to newspapers except through the chairman of the committee.

Elections.

Dr. Bunce asked the question "how is it that these people have been elected if there is so much detestation of them" Pack answered: "It is very simple. Right now in the Military Government, in the Police Department, Justice Department and every other department, all those people have the main power. These people do not notify the common people regarding the various organizations and the voting procedure. The dictatorship is much worse now than it was under the Japanese."

Dr. Kim upon being reminded that in the Kyungi Province rightists were only represented replied heatedly "the leftists have nothing more to say when they have refused to send their supervisors into the provinces. They have emen openly stated through the papers that they are against the legislature. They have nothing more to day even if only rightists are elected to the legislature."

In closing the meeting General Brown stated:

"I realize the situation that is occurring once again. I am told that when General Arnold first tried to organize the Military Government he tried to get all political parties and

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and interested groups represented. He had to organize a government because there had to be a government. He therefore had to use those available to form the government. An attempt is now being made to form a legislature. A group of patriotic Koreans are attempting to get a coalition in the form of that legislature. Once again certain Koreans are refusing to participate. In spite of all this the government must go on."

It was suggested that the meetings of the Joint Korean-American Conference take place on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays thus enablihg its members to spend some time in their respective offices. Meetings ofcourse to be called every day, even Sundays if the emergency requires.

The meeting adjourned at 5 PM to reconvene on Thursday 31st October 1946 at 1.30 PM.

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MINUTES

OF THE SEVENTH MEETING HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE AT 1330, 31 OCTOBER 1946.

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS	KOREAN MEMBERS
Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown	Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch	Won, Seh Hoon
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling	Choi, Tong O
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson	Kim, Poong Choon
Mr. W. R. Langdon (sitting in the place of Dr. Bunce)	Ahn, Chai Hong
	Pahk, Keun Oong
	Chang, Kwon
Absent: Brig. Gen. C.G. Helmick, Dr. A. C. Bunce	Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung

Interpreter: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Herbert Kim.

The meeting came to order at 1330.

1 - Discussion of Press Release:

The proposed press release was read, approved, and will be given by the Chairman to General Hodge for his approval and then released through regular channels. In the future a Korean translation of press releases will be presented to the Conference together with the English draft.

2 - Election for Legislature:

The Chairman presented a petition which had been submitted by three voters (representatives of the voters) of the city of Seoul protesting the election of certain members to the legislature from the city. As this was a subject not for discussion by this Conference, it was ordered to present the petition to General Hodge without comment.

Dr. Kimm reported on election returns from Quelpart Island in which solely leftists were elected to the Legislature.

3 - Nine Political Party Group:

Dr. Johnson reported that two representatives of the Nine Political Party Group had called on him this morning and raised the question as to whether or not they might visit the provinces to investigate the general situation. Mr. Johnson assured them that they would have the privilege of going as private citizens and making an investigation,

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that they would be provided with letters to the Governors of the various provinces asking that they be afforded every facility.

Dr. Kimm presented information that the Korean Independence Party, the New Progressive Party and the Social Democratic Party have decided to withdraw from the Nine Party Group because of the fact that the original understanding was that the Nine Party Group would support the coalition and the work of the coalition, accepting the same principles and naturally the proposed legislature question. Dr. Kimm also mentioned the fact that on the document presented to General Hodge a few days ago the United Korea Committee of America was included among the nine parties. But this Committee has never joined the group because they are returning to America shortly. Mr. Won pointed out that two other parties listed as members of the Nine Party Group should not be included because one of them had gone to the first meeting only and another had joined with an extreme leftist group. It was therefore thought that in writing the letters of introduction they should be presented as a three party group instead of a nine party group. General Lerch made it clear that in giving letters of introduction it was carefully explained to the Governor that they were down there as individuals and not as a party and there were sufficient instructions to warn the Governor against misrepresentation.

3 - <u>The presence of former Japanese collaborators in Military Government</u>:

The following were designated as Japanese collaborators:

(1) Those who held certain high positions under the Japanese, such as members of Provincial Council, city council, section chiefs and bureau chiefs; and those who voluntarily accepted commissions in the Japanese Army.

(2) Notorious national traitors and their immediate descendents.

(3) Policemen who were active in arresting political offenders.

(4) Judges and those who condemned political offenders.

(5) Those who engaged in the recruiting of soldiers and in drafting forced labor.

(6) Those who were excessive in the grain collection program. This includes all drafting on the populace, including manpower or material.

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(7) Those who promoted the manufacture of war supplies or were large donors to war effort.

(8) Those who, although occupying no official position in government, spied on their people.

Rules permitting exemption:

(1) Technicians and specialists who are not tainted with anti-Korean sentiments.

(2) Those who in the past were not large offenders and since liberation have proven themselves as lovers of their country by their efforts.

(3) Regardless of immediate relatives who are collaborators, if the individual himself is not pro-Japanese in action he can be excused.

After some discussion on the degree of punishment to be meted out to collaborators and traitors, the opinion of the Conference was expressed in General Lerch's statement: "To my mind, the entire problem of punishment is a Korean problem and should be solved just as soon as the Korean Representative Legislature is set up which represents the entire Korean people. I don't believe we want to apply American standards to Korean problems. It is a problem which should be settled by Koreans themselves."

It was brought out that this Conference as an investigation conference should recommend the elimination of certain high police officials and Military Government employees who are collaborators. It will follow that their underlings will want to resign, and this will clean up the whole situation.

Mr. Pahk wanted to add two more groups to those given above as Japanese collaborators:

(1) Those in cultural group (teachers, professors, newspaper writers, church officials, etc. - who influenced ~~large~~ large numbers of people)

(2) Those who since liberation have been profiteers for their own gain.

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Mr. Won cited several adverse rumors concerning the feeling of the Korean people towards American Military Government.

Dr. Kimm pointed out that the Korean people had changed during the rule of the Japanese and had necessarily adopted trickery in order to survive. It is difficult for the Americans to understand the Korean people. He suggested that as each item is discussed in this Conference and action recommended, we should give some evidence of our work in order to retain the confidence of the people.

The Chairman proposed that at the meeting 1 November, 1330, the Conference discuss topics 3 and 4 - Effect of interpreters in Government and corruption of some Korean officials.

The meeting adjourned at 1650.

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PRESS RELEASE NO. 4 1 November 1946.

The Joint Korean-American Conference devoted its session of 29th October to consideration of complaints made against the police.

The Conferees, thoroughly aware of the vital importance of this problem, discussed frankly and freely the general aspects of this question. Before reaching any conclusions, the Conference will go into this matter at some length.

It is to be emphasized that the inquiry will be conducted with the sole objective of determining the facts and making appropriate recommendations. In order that such recommendations shall be fair to all concerned, evidence to be submitted to the Conference should be unbiased and factual.

On this topic, study is continuing and further announcements will be forthcoming.

At the session of 30th October the topic of pro-Japanese collaborators in positions of influence was discussed. The eradication of all lingering vestiges of the Japanese domination of Korea is declared in the Moscow Decision. This objective is expressed also in the statements of the highest official American policy. Needless to say, the desire of the Korean people to rid themselves of all remaining Japanese influence must be borne in mind.

The recent legislative ordinance bars from membership in the legislature all those individuals who collaborated with the Japanese conquerors for gain to the detriment of the Korean people. This enactment is one of the outward signs indicative of the fact that Military Government even now is moving to conform to the wishes of the people.

The problem of collaboration is being approached vigorously but with the recognition that its eventual solution is one largely to be determined by Koreans themselves. In a nation 40 years in bondage, a certain measure of collaboration was in general the necessary price of continued existence. It must be the objective of the Korean people

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to draw a just and reasonable line between enforced collaboration, which may be pardoned, and that greater degree of collaboration, which is culpable. Such a line may be drawn at that point at which it is apparent that the individual has willfully subordinated the good of the community to his own advancement.

In this, as in all other problems that confront the Korean people, it shall be the objective of this Conference not only to act as a sounding board of public opinion, but also to propose solutions to the proper authorities.

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MINUTES

OF THE EIGHTH MEETING
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 1 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson
Mr. W. R. Langdon (sitting in the place of Dr. Bunce a part of the meeting)
Dr. A. C. Bunce

Absent: Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick

KOREAN MEMBERS

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Won, Soh Hoon
Choi, Tong O.
Kim, Poong Choon
Ahn, Chai Hong
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong

Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Herbert Kim.

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Rumors of Border Infiltrations and Disturbances

Mr. Choi reported the following rumors which had just been brought to his ears:

(1) That the Chinese Communist Army had occupied Antung where they had destroyed most of the factories and large organizations. They are reported to be in numbers of tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands, to have an understanding with the Koreans in the North, and to be preparing a general attack when the Yalu River freezes.

(2) That the Red Army from North Korea (in numbers of at least a thousand) has been infiltrating over the line into Kangnung.

(3) That rifle shots have been heard along the 38th line since yesterday.

General Brown made a statement to the effect that he could not confirm these rumors since he had received absolutely no such information, and that he would have received notice had any firing occurred. Mr. Langdon added that he had seen reports from Nanking and that they did not contain any news regarding the Chinese Army coming over the border. He further pointed out that if it were true, the Chinese government would take steps with the Russians to have the soldiers disarmed.

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Dr. Kimm made the following statement: About a month ago, there was a rumor that the 8th Route Army of the Chinese had infiltrated into Korea near Chalwan on the border. This rumor was rectified when it was found that soldiers had come in with Mu-Jung, former Chief of the Korean Independence Army and of the Korean Independence League. Mu-Jung is no longer in a prominent position, being an instructor in a military academy. Since his followers all speak Chinese fluently, they probably were taken for members of the 8th Army. On the other hand, about two weeks ago, a reliable person returning from Pyongyang reported that he had seen with his own eyes 400 Chinese of the 8th Route Army using a certain school building in North Korea as a temporary barracks, and that he had been told that about 40,000 more men would be arriving. He was further informed that these men were supplied with arms.

General Brown advised that he would arrange to have Colonel Robinson, Intelligence Officer on General Hodge's staff, come before the Conference next week to furnish such information as he might have on this situation in Korea.

Ordinance No. 118

A long discussion on this ordinance followed.

Presence of Former Japanese Collaborators in Military Government police st

Mr. Won stated that as a result of the investigation in Seoul (there are ten in all), it was revealed that the head of each station is a pro-Jap and former collaborator with the Japanese. Dr. Kimm reported that he understood that the Yong Dung Po Police Station was sent sixty or more men who had been arrested in the riots in the Ongyong district, and that these arrested men had suffered as a result of the cruel treatment they received. Two died within a week's time. Yi, Kiu Hoon was killed as a result of a blow in the face. He gave this as an example of what the police are doing in attempting to quell riots. He suggested that since the Chairman had suggested that Dr. Chou and Chief Chang be brought before the Conference to explain this situation, that the Conference discuss the manner in which these men would be

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questioned--whether they should be allowed to tell their stories, with the Conference formulating its own opinion from the testimoney given, or whether they should be cross-examined. He felt that it would be embarrassing to cross-examine them as it might result in both sides being humiliated. The Chairman stated: "The Conference wishes all the facts. The Chairman intends to ask any question to bring out the facts and he intends to offer the same opportunity to all members of the Conference." General Lerch concurred but suggested that as a partial solution, each member prepare a list of questions and submit to Chairman so that they could be included in the original questioning. He stated that Colonel Maglin would like to be present when they are questioned. Mr. Fahk stated that there is no reason to question Dr. Chou and Mr. Chang since we already know all about them. He suggested that it would be well to call in common people or other people in office if they have any information to furnish. He added that since Dr. Kimm and Mr. Won are former teachers of these gentlemen and their seniors, it would be embarrassing to all concerned, and that in the Orient "face saving" means more than elsewhere. He suggested some technical manner of questioning to avoid embarrassment. Dr. Kimm felt that our position is one of investigation and not of a tribunal to bring justice to certain individuals. He suggested the following "face saving" method--the removal of these men from office on the pretext of sending them abroad to investigate something else. Mr. Won vehemently stressed the point that we should avoid embarrassing cross-examination so that noone would lose face and so that these men may later be utilized in other positions. General Lerch stated that he had been educated as a lawyer and was admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States, and that his training had been to hear both sides in every case. General Lerch stated further that the other side in this case should be heard and some method should be found so that we can without embarrassing anyone.

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In conclusion, General Brown stated that he hoped that in the future, the Conference would confine its attention to the topics listed on the agenda. He asked that each member think over the above discussed question and talk it over among themselves. He stated that the purpose of asking these individuals to come before the Conference was not to put them on trial, but just to acquaint ourselves with some of the problems which they must solve in executing their responsibilities. He added that he was certain that no member of the Conference desires to do harm to the police force or to any individual in Military Government and that every member of the Conference must realize that any man with responsibility has difficulty in executing it. It is his opinion that these individuals should come before the Conference and tell us what their responsibilities are and how they proceed to meet them."

The meeting adjourned at 1700, to be reconvened again on Monday, 4 November 1946, at 1330 hours.

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MINUTES

OF THE NINTH MEETING OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE

at 1330, 4 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj Gen Albert E. Brown
Maj Gen A.L. Lerch
Brig Gen John Weckerling
Dr E.A.J. Johnson
Dr A.C. Bunce

Absent: Brig Gen C.G. Helmick

Interpreters: Dr Henry Appenzeller
Mr Herbert Kim

KOREAN MEMBERS

Dr Kimm, Kiusic
Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Ahn, Chai Hong
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong

Absent: Kyuh, Woon Hyung
Kim, Poong Choon

Rioting:

Won stated that he had seen in the newspapers that there had been rioting in South Chulla province and enquired whether there was something which should be told about that.

General Lerch advised that the miners in Washin who have been unsettled for some time demanding the same treatment as the miners in Samsook (although they were doing little work and producing hardly any coal) started demonstrations. These demonstrators moving down on K[illegible]u have been stopped on various occasions by Korean police and American M.Ps. - mostly Korean police. Col Champeny was sent down to investigate this last uprising and reported that the demonstrators had once again been turned back with only about 5 casulaties including one policeman killed. Everything is well in hand again.

Ahn, Chai Hong reported that during his lecturing tour early in October he visited the town of Chang Nam - a little mountain village. After his lecture (presumably on elections) the villagers expressed their opinion that if more gentlemen like Mr. Anh would talk to them they would understand better the whole situation. Yesterday Mr Ahn was visited by Suh Pyung Hoon of that village. This man reported that all leftists were being arrested. Since he was not to be found, his father Suh Sang Kil had been arrested. Reports from the town of

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On Jung (Wang Hei Do) indicate that a number of Leftists were arrested in preparatory measures - this seemed to stir up things.

Effect of Interpreters in Government

Ahn, Chai Hong stated that there were two types of interpreters among the Koreans:

1 - Government by interpreters - interpreters just putting the language across for the Americans.

2 - Government by interpreters - cases where the interpreter has a great deal more authority, almost a position of advisor, thereby being able to control affairs.

In the first type of interpreters there are those who willfully deceives the Americans, as well as those who through lack of understanding keeps on talking to cover up his lack of understanding.

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic - gave the qualifications required of interpreters as:

a) Language qualifications to be tested by both Koreans and Americans before employment.

b) Duties and activities should be outlined and he should be told how far his responsibilities go. The trouble is that these interpreters are used sometimes as informers, advisors, liaison officers, etc.

c) Classification:

1. interpreters or translators attached to the higher officials of M.G.

2. those attached to bureau chiefs and governors of provinces

3. those attached to sub-officials such as section chiefs.

The difficulties, Mr. Kimm claims, lie in the lower ranks of interpreters who are picked up here and there and are liable to be anything - pro-Japanese, profiteers - men who are more apt to accept bribes.

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Won, Seh Hoon believes that there are a number of true patriots who have come into the government and acted as interpreters and in various other positions in order to assist their country. These men have been paid salaries which give them little more than tobacco money. These are in the minority. There are others who receive the same salaries and yet are able to live in style. The public attitude towards such men is shown by their saying "very well your day is coming" - "we will settle with you later" In order to prove the existence of this condition, one has only to go to the cafes and entertainment houses in the evenings. There Korean business men, government employees, interpreters are to be seen entertaining and being entertained. An ordinary person cannot afford these things

Kim, Kiusic reported that even prior to the sessions of this Joint Conference and before the disturbances had occurred, he has heard that some of the Korean officials in the M.G., some police officials, business men of shady character, pro-Japanese. Landowners, etc., were striving to form a group against these so-called patriots who may come into legislature and try to oust them from their remunerative positions. He further stated that one of the greatest leaders in south Korea who has the respect of the populace urged that most of those now in the M.G. be retained. The head of the Young People's Organization, Oh Jung Bong's utterances were published in the newspapers. This organization had tried to pick out pro-Japanese and collaborators. If these so-called pro-Japanese and collaborators are all cleaned out, this would leave no one to take part in reestablishment of Korea as a nation. Pak Si Moon, editor of the Tong A Il Po, imprisoned for three years, spoke along the same lines. Still the people are clamoring, even blaming M.G. for the employment of these pro-Japanese.

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Corruption of Some Korean Officials

Ahn, Chai Hong mentioned that there are two kinds of people:

1 - those who themselves are unscrupulous.

2 - those who were not qualified for the positions they fill - such as pastors of the church or men who had had no experience in political or other organizations and since the surrender of the Japanese have been appointed as officials in the U.G.

He also spoke of the difficulties arising from the big discrepancy between salaries paid and the cost of living.

He brought out the short-comings of American Officials, and mentioned:

1. The American soldier was trained to fight and not to take part in politics.
2. The difficulty of one type of people ruling another type of people (Americans ruling Koreans).
3. The American people being composed of so many different races, while the Koreans being one single race, creates more problems.
4. The constant change of American personnel id not condusive to good work - it causes lack of interest in their work and in Korea. They are not well acquainted with American politics nor Korean Politics - their sole idea is to go home. Does not take responsibility in correcting the errors which may have been made by his predecessor.

Kimm, Kiusic mentioned the Property Custodian Office and the New Korea Company as being companies which might bear investigation. Cho Han Bun the present head of the New Korea Company (former vice-minister of foreign affairs in the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking) poses as a P.H.D. of London University, and various other universities.

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This Cho Han Bun is the man to whom Son Chang Sik, the Edison of the Far East, gave one hundred million dollars to hand over to the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking. Cho Han Bun gave only four hundred thousand dollars CNC to the Provisional Government. Cho Han Bun was dismissed from his position of vice-minister on the discovery of this act. He then proceeded to bribe his way back into the favor of the important members of the Korean Provisional Government including Kimm, Kiusic. On his return to Korea he boasted having financed and fed the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking. How such a man got into the Military Government employ cannot be understood. Such men as Cho Han Bun must be weeded out of the M.G. in order not to make it the target of misunderstanding and criticism.

Kimm, Kiusic further commented on the behavior of the G.Is. stating that although he knew that the Military Governor and the senior officers make every effort to have the G.Is. conduct themselves properly, he wanted to cite a couple of cases for the information of the conference.

(1) His son in the company of 2 Koreans and the headmaster of the nautical college in Fusan travelling down south were driven out of the second class car by a bunch of G.Is. and had to stand up all the way down to Fusan. Why does not the M.G. provide cars solely for the use of soldiers so that the Koreans would be left alone?

(2) A Korean woman member of a certain church was travelling from Seoul to the country. All doors were locked and she had to be lifted on to the train through a window.

Transportation conditions are very bad and should be corrected.

General Lerch: There are three groups of Americans and Koreans who spend their whole time investigating matters relating to gifts, favors, entertainments, graft and corruption on the part of American and Korean officials. These are:-

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1 - First of these groups is the inspector general's department which comes under Major Rees who is a regular member of the Inspector General's Department. He devotes his entire time to the investigation of irregularities on the part of American personnel in the American Military establishments.

2 - Special investigators section consisting of nine high ranking American officials and a group of American and Korean accountants.

3 - A permanent detail from General MacArthur's office consisting of a major, who is here on full time, a colonel who he is here on part time and several Korean and American auditors or accountants. The investigators section comes under Col. Duke a regular army officer with 32 years experience. This group devotes its entire time to the investigation of allegations concerning gifts, favors, graft, corruption, etc., in connection with both Korean and American personnel. The group from General MacArthur's office is under Col. Brown who spends part of his time in Tokyo and part in Seoul and his permanent representative is Major McGarity who has an office in the Capitol Building in Seoul. These groups constantly make investigations and inspections whether there are any complaints or not. Major McGarity's group which is the group from General MacArthur's headquarters is constantly making a thorough investigation of the Property Custodians' Office. Col. DuVall working in the special investigators section has been devoting his total time to the investigation of the activities of the New Korea Company. Major McGarity and a warrant officer from Tokyo working under Col.Brown have just completed a thorough inspection of the Materials Control Corporation. Col. Brown from General MacArthur's Office is just making a thorough investigation of the Department of Finance. Col. Duke is the head of the American Special Investigation Division and is starting a study of the Korean Food Administrators Office.

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4. There are also a number of special complaints which are under investigation and these are being handled by Col. Reese, Col. Mitchell and Col. Lamoureau.

Within the last three months I have approved the sentences by general court marshal of two American Majors for three years imprisonment and dismissal from the Army for the improper purchase of Japanese supplies. These cases were developed by Major Rees of the Inspector General's Department. I could also furnish a list of Koreans who have been tried by Korean courts for malfeasance.

In addition to these three groups which are operating in M.G. there is also the Inspector General's Office of the 24th Corps which comes directly under General Hodge. These groups are very anxious to get special reports of alleged misdoings on the part of both Americans and Koreans and while we would especially desire to have specific complaints made, we will also check any general cases submitted.

Won, Seh Hoon: wants to say that "what was done wrong yesterday may be corrected tomorrow" and for this reason is making his comments. If there were no hope for improvement tomorrow, he would not speak.

He held a long conversation with a gentleman who is the head of a department of M.G. This gentleman remarked that General Lerch and those serving under him in M.G. were even more patriotic than Koreans, however, 'things have gotten so settled down and solidified - - even the powers above could do nothing about it'.

The causes for this situation as given by Won, Seh Hoon are:

1 - Decision made by subordinates

2 - Subordinates not willing to make changes because of the risk of losing their position.

3 - Influence of employees on higher officials - trusting persons of 'longer experience' in Korea.

This situation has permeated the whole structure that a major operation is necessary.

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Steps suggested by Wen, Seh Hoon for the correction of "corruption of some Korean Officials" are:-

1 - Cleaning out of the Japanese collaborators - especially men of the type of Chai Neng Jin, No Duk Seol, Pahk Zai Soo and Kim Sen Hoon (Taegu chief of Police). "Why in the world should we lose the support of the people by retaining such individuals who irritate the people constantly"?

2 - The Food Question. The Americans are worried about the future food situation whereas the Koreans are more concerned about what he is going to eat to-day. It is not a question of turning it entirely over to the free market. Let the Enemy Property, the New Korea Company and the Landowners operate, but the other portion be turned over to the free market. If later it is seen that there is going to be a shortage - then put the situation before the people and take measures to correct it. Get the good will of the people by shutting up the cafes and entertainment places where money and time are wasted.

3 - The political set-up for the future should be one in which the responsibility rests on the Koreans and not on the Americans - let the Koreans be blamed if something fails - and if anything turns out well "well we have succeeded with the aid of our American Friends".

Mention was made here of the discrepancies between the factory and market prices on materials and commodities - also the rise in tobacco prices. The taxes were also discussed and dissatisfaction expressed.

Adm. Chai Mong brought up the refugee question and stated that these refugees who have nothing to do swell the crowds in Seoul City when there are demonstrations. It was ruled that this topic was not in order (items 6,7,and 8 on items to be discussed).

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General Brown stated that since there were only a few moments left and time was too short to begin discussion of another topic, he would make a few comments.

He said he had been given the impression that some of the members of the conference had the idea that Cho, Director of the National Police and Chang, Director of Police are reluctant to appear before this conference because of loss of face or possible embarrassment. The chairman understands, however, that both of these gentlemen feel that it is entirely appropriate for such a group as the Joint Korean-American Conference to ask them to come before them and they are willing to come before the conference. The following schedule was given:

1330 - Nov.5.46 - Col. Maglin to explain how the police force is organized and the difficulties experienced by him in organizing and operating the Force.

1415 - Dr. Cho Whan On to explain how he has organized and is conducting the Police Force.

1515 - Mr. Chang Taek Soon to explain how his area is organized and operated.

It was suggested in order to avoid any embarrassment to these witnesses that members of the Conference write out and give the chairman those questions that they would like to have asked. Also, as far as possible questions will be submitted by the chairman, however, any member of the conference may ask questions if he wishes.

Elections: Kimm, Kiusic stated for the information of the Conference that the Coalition Committee had sent a letter to the Commanding General re the postponement and/or annulment of the elections. There was Some discussion was had regarding this matter.

The Conference adjourned at 1705.

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MINUTES

OF THE TENTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT AMERICAN-KOREAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 5 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch
Brog. Gen. John Weckerling
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson
Dr. L. C. Lunce

Absent: Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick

KOREAN MEMBERS

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Poong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong

Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung
Ahn, Chai Hong

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Herbert Kim.

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Enmity Against the Police

Colonel Maglin was introduced by the chairman as a witness to give the Conference information concerning the organization and operation of the National Police. Testimony follows.

Question: Colonel, please inform the Conference as to your full name, etc.

Answer: William H. Maglin, Colonel, CMP, Advisor to the Director of the National Police.

Question: How long have you occupied this office?

Answer: Since November 25th, 1945.

Question: State the strength, organization and distribution of the police force at the present time.

Answer: The actual strength of the National Police at present is 24,964. 20,965 are uniformed policemen. 3245 are detectives. Organization: The police is organized into ten divisions. Jurisdiction of each division is co-extensive with the bounderies of a province. One division is assigned to the city of Seoul - that is called the Metropolitan or M Division. The strength of each division varies with the population of the province or city and the police needs of the province. As an example, the Metropolitan division has 3600 policemen whereas

Division D in North Chungchun has 1348 policemen. The organization

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provides for a national headquarters in Seoul and division headquarters in the capital of each province. The principal on which the National Police functions is central control with decentralized operation. The national headquarters issues general police directives on practices and procedures and concerns itself with the finance, promotions, pay and supply of the National Police. The Detective Bureau has in the national headquarters a central office squad. The central office squad handles such cases not peculiar to one division, such as the counterfeiting and special finance matters. All other detective operations are handled locally by the divisions and districts. The national headquarters has a communications bureau that handles operations of all police communications - radio and telephone. That in general is the organization of the National Police.

Question: What is the organization as regards the command control?

Answer: The command control is entirely within the police organization. The Korean director of the department of National Police commands all the divisions. He deals directly with the ten division chiefs. The division chief takes all his orders for personnel, supply, administration procedure and practice from the Director of the National Police. The chief of a division, which is the police that operates in a province, is responsible to the Governor of that province for the maintenance of law and order. He receives and carries out such instructions from that Governor to enforce the laws and maintain law and order. The Governor has no power over personnel or procedure. He can not make promotions, order transfers or dismissals. The command channel from the division chief is to his district commands who have the rank of captain. We have recently established an assistant director's rank, who is a zone supervisor but he is not in the command channel. He supervises the police activities in two or more divisions. His main function with the staff is to inspect and to conduct investigation of police irregularities. The purpose of this position is to get an accurate investigation of a matter pertaining to a division. He being divorced from any division, we feel that he can obtain for us a more accurate report of the matter being investigated. The assistant

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director, who is responsible for the zone, exercises command only in emergency. The next command is the lieutenants and sergeants assigned to the division. There is one other command channel. That is at the discretion of the division chief - it is what we call an inspection command. The division chief may group four or more districts into an inspection command. He groups them according to road ~~maps~~ Nets and communications for better control. That covers the chain of command - it is wholly within the police for operations and procedure.

Question: Who is the present director of National Police?

Answer: Dr. CHOUCH, Kyong Ok.

Question: What is the responsibility of this Dr. CHOUCH, Kyong Ok for a disturbance which may occur in a province of Korea?

Answer: He has the same responsibility as any commander would have when an element of his command is charged with the preservation of law and order in any area.

Question: You stated that when you took over the police force in November 1945 that the strength of the National Police was 24,964?

Answer: That is the present strength.

Question: What was the strength of the National Police at the time you took it over in November 1945?

Answer: At that time we estimated the strength of the police at about 16,000. The police situation at that time was not established. In each district or gun there was a nucleus of police who had served under the Japanese, reinforced by a number of volunteers who called themselves peace preservation groups. That makes 17,000 that I gave as an estimate. All the Japanese members of the police had been removed, the Korean members of the police were functioning reinforced by volunteers who became members of the local police and they were termed peace preservation units. There was 17,000 persons performing police work in November. A certain proportion of them were men who had served in the police under the Japanese. The remainder were volunteers, citizens who became policemen during the transition period.

Question: What was the number of Japanese policemen employed in Korea that were put out of positions?

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Answer: Our records show that exclusive of the kempeitai, we have never been able to say the size of that, there were about 23,000 police in Korea. Of that number between 13 and 14 thousand were Japanese, about nine thousand were Koreans. All Japanese were immediately dismissed from the police in South Korea. Our records sho that of the police who were in the police under the Japanese -- Koreans that remained, the number was between four and five thousand.

Question: Do you know how many of that four or five thousand remain with the police today?

Answer: I cannot state the number of that four or five thousand. I can state that now in the police we have 17,000 policemen who never saw service in the police under the Japanese and five thousand who did.

Question: How was the police organized in November 1945?

Answer: In November 1945 the police, while bearing semblence to the national organization, were primarily local. They had in operation a provisional police headquarters and district stations. They were unarmed and at that time tactical units of the American army were replacing, some were recruiting other locally, and the police at that time were almost impotent.

Question: Explain to the Conference the main difficulties experienced by you in creating the expanded police force of today.

Answer: The first difficulty we found was to attract the proper personnel to the police. The Military Governor set the goal for the police at 25,000. It was necessary to absorb all those who were performing police duties at the time that we took over. It was necessary to maintain law and order during the period we were trying to establish a police organization. The next problem was to eliminate those undesirables whom we had enrolled in the general absorption of those who had former police duties. We approached that problem by causing every policeman to be finger-printed. Due to communications difficulties, that took some time. All policemen who were found to have had a criminal record other than a political charge were dismissed. The

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next difficulty was the training of new recruits. Initially new recruits were trained at the National Police Academy in Seoul at the rate of 400 per month. The course was for only one month due to the need for police in the various provinces and cities, etc. In the meantime provinces were recruiting locally and we prescribed on-the-job training which was not satisfactory. The next step was to establish an academy in each province, which is now a police division, for the basic training of their recruits. The National Academy was then used for training detectives and police officers with the rank of Lieutenant and above. Another major difficulty was to get out directives concerning democratic practices and procedures and modern police methods down to the main agencies. Another major difficulty during this reorganization was in our efforts to remove from the police uniform any semblance to the Japanese uniform. Cloth for uniforms was limited. Metal for new insignia was hard to get. Eventually all of the police wore uniforms with proper cloths and we replaced the sword as the badge of authority by the police baton. The sword was the Japanese method of showing authority. We were always faced with the difficulty of transportation.

Question: How were the officers of the police force selected?

Answer: When the force that was performing police duties in November was absorbed into the National Police, those acting in the various activities of lieutenants and captains of districts retained their rank.

Question: How were the additional police officers obtained.

Answer: We then put out a ratio of ranks in order to have all sections or divisions uniform. We stated, as I recall, for every six policemen there would be a sergeant, for every six sergeants there would be a lieutenant, for every four lieutenants there would be a captain of a district commander. For every five districts there would be an inspector. Then we have the rank of superintendent for major stations such as Seoul, Pusan, the head of the Academy, etc.

Question: How were these additional officers obtained?

Answer: The selection of these officers was decentralized to the

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provincial chief of police, which is now called division chief under our present program.

Question: How many of the officer rank, that is those serving as heads of stations and above, are new men and how many had former service under the Japanese?

Answer: For captains it shows number of 139 with that rank. 35 never had any experience. 104 had prior experience. However, many of those were not in the police in recent years. Some of them had experience as patrolmen and sergeants as far back as 15 or 20 years ago and had gotten out. At this time I think it would be well to mention instructions that we issued on 14 January about the selection and appointment of police officers above the rank of lieutenant. "Until a syster of examination is instituted, the selection and appointment of police officials above the rank of lieutenant will be governed by the following: all such appointments will be sent to national headquarters for final approval. When the Korean Provincial Chief of Police and the Provincial Public Safety Officer agree on the selection of an individual, the Public Safety Officer will notify the Provincial Military Governor of that fact. When the Korean Provincial Chief of Police and the Provincial Public Safety Officer disagree on the selection of an individual the matter will be referred to the Provincial Military Governor with a request that the Governor's Advisory Council render a decision. The Provincial Public Safety Officers should bear in mind the following: that the National Police organization is being effected for eventual control by Koreans, that arbitrary appointments by US Public Safety Officers may result in a shakeup in the organization when US relinquishes control. That the desire of the US Public Safety Officer to have experienced policemen appointed to superior posts must be balanced by the reputation of those considered. Some Korean policemen accepted advancement under the Japanese because they were ambitious and desired to make the most of their talents, yet were still able to retain the respect of the Koreans. Others accepted advancement and embraced the vicious practices of the Japanese, thereby incurring the hatred of the Koreans. The value of the latter group, even though they are efficient, is made null and void by their reputation and

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standing with the Koreans and other members of the Police. That, by the same token, the selection of superior officers of the police cannot be permitted to develop into a "popularity" contest. That to further the desire that the police be free from any political affiliations they must guard against appointments that are motivated by political convictions." That was the basis on which policemen were selected for the rank of lieutenant and above, which were forwarded to the National Headquarters where an investigation of their past record was made.

Question: How many among the station heads in Seoul are new men and how many had service under the Japanese?

Answer: There are ten stations in the city of Seoul and although I don't have the accurate numbers to that question I believe Chief Chang will. I will say that all the station heads have had experience under the Japanese.

Question: How many of the ten provincial police chiefs had service under the Japanese?

Answer: We have just made changes due to the zone set-up, but I would say that 8 of the 10 had experience under the Japanese. One or two of those eight may not have been with the police in recent years. They were with the police some years ago, got out, became successful businessmen and are now back under the new force. Could I inject one statement along this line? Our experience has shown that new policemen will not respect a superior who has not had experience. A few months ago we selected educated young men, trained them in our National Academy to be lieutenants. Their qualifications were such that they would not come in the police as patrolmen. We trained them at the Academy in the duties of a police officer of the rank of lieutenant. Then we assigned them to divisions. But the experiment was not successful because the sergeants and patrolmen did not respect the ability of those men who had just a brief course of training, they only respect the man who has worked at the police business for over a period of years.

Question: What are the main difficulties now being experienced in the operation of the police force?

Answer: The main difficulties are continuing ones, such as equipment,

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our efforts to keep recruitment even with separations, our endeavor to keep morale of the police up because they are the target for many criticisms, and our continuous efforts to remove any semblance of Japanese practices or procedures or practices of many police here to commit abuse. Another difficulty is to find out what police officials we have that are not embracing our ideas of democratic police. Many of the Korean members of the police who served under the Japanese are fine loyal policemen who are carrying out our ideas whole-heartedly. There are some who are not. And, our main problem now is to find the ones who are not embracing our ideas and remove them without making a general indictment of all of them. We have been asking for help from all sources in order to do this. And we welcome any information about certain individuals who are abusing their authority or are maintaining the practices that existed under the Japanese. We had hoped to eliminate all abuses when we organized the police and took the police out of many activities that they had performed under the Japanese, such as censorship police, health police, etc., which were to our mind the greatest fields for abuse.

Question: Is the salary paid policemen plus living differential reasonable?

Answer: No, not for a policeman. We have just put in a request for an increase for policemen stating the following justifications: At present the policemen's pay is on a par according to his rank with all other employees of the government, even the laborers. Yet a policeman works in all kinds of weather, his hours are irregular, he cannot be paid overtime as other employees are paid because of the abuses that would arise from such a system with police. The next is that his job entails risk that other employees are not confronted with. Finally, if the policemen aren't given adequate pay they are open to temptations to take graft or accept bribes. A survey of the police made by a cross section of all divisions, all ranks, shows that five percent of the unmarried policemen are living within their salary, all others are supplementing their pay by savings or selling property or selling land.

Question: You stated a few minutes ago that one of the main problems faced by you is replacing policemen lost to the police force. Can

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you give the Conference any figures on this matter?

Answer: The turn-over of policemen who resign because of the pay is approximately 15 percent for a month. All these figures are only approximate. That was the estimate we made about three months ago. We have many losses due to dismissals for abuse of their authority. Now we have for Division M, Metropolitan, 54 of all ranks were dismissed for cruelty over a period of six or seven months.

Question: Are there any other causes of loss?

Answer: There are many policemen being killed. 58 were killed in the last month, and I believe in the last year there have been 20 that were killed in the line of duty besides these 58. This is for the entire police in South Korea.

Question: You also stated that one of the problems now was the effort to maintain morale of the police in the face of criticism. Will you please develop that a little?

Answer: We know that there are some police who are abusive when they make arrests after an attack on them. We are trying to corbat a general indictment of all the police for the abuses or delinquencies of the few. We have found that many of the reports of police cruelties are exaggerated. We know that many are instructed to say that they were abused when they were not. I have before me a translation of instructions found on many who have been arrested in recent weeks. One instruction - when being questioned by the police, always avoid the issue. Give false addresses when possible. The police are restricted in the handling of you, so if necessary cry and scream out as if you were being executed. So, our efforts are to find the truth without demoralizing the policemen who are trying to be fair and doing their duty. The police have experienced some fierce attacks and mutilation of their persons by a certain element. The leaders of the police are trying to keep down their human desire to retaliate. We have issued many instructions pointing out the fact that the police in themselves have no punative powers. We have stated regardless of the offense the police have no punative powers, the courts give punishment in all cases. We stated that in a free country even the courts cannot prescribe any form of bodily punishment.

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Therefore, when a member of the police strikes, beats or otherwise tortures the person arrested he is violating the law and is guilty of a grave offense. We state that any police found abusing his authority will be dismissed from the police and charged before a court when circumstances warrant. We also state that police should exhibit no signs of personal interest or satisfaction in making an arrest. That was issued on the 14th of March and has been repeated. It has been used in our National Police College and in all division police schools. It has resulted in the elimination of a great deal of abuse, not entirely though. But, it has succeeded to the extent that it causes this particular group to recognize their responsibility in the handling of arrests.

Question: This Conference has information that among a group of prisoners recently confined to the YongdungPo police station, due to mistreatment two died and one had a broken back. Do you have knowledge of that situation?

Answer: I have had that investigated and Dr. Chough has the answer to it. I am also having an American officer make a further investigation. The initial report to me shows that one person died of a heart attack.

Question: To your knowledge is there much dishonesty in the police force?

Answer: I will say there is dishonesty in the police force. Now as to the use of the term "much". Compared with some of the cases that have come across my desk, there is a great deal of dishonesty in so many activities that I can't say there is much. There is dishonesty I know among members of the police.

Question: What methods are used to combat this dishonesty?

Answer: Whenever there is a report of alleged dishonesty on the part of a policeman or police official, it is investigated and it is immediately investigated with the procurators who are members of the Justice Department. There have been a number of police officials found guilty and convicted of bribery or misuse of funds. The head of the Mounted Police in Seoul is now serving a five-year term for embezzlement.

Question: To what extent does politics influence the organization and operation of the police force?

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Answer: There is some political influence in the police force. That is because recruitment of police is decentralized. There are definite and positive instructions to the police that their politics is personal and has nothing to do with their official action, and whenever they are found using their political beliefs within their official work we dismiss them. I can't help but feel in recruiting a district commander or chief will recruit men who think politically along the same lines as he does, even though he does not exercise his political feeling or hold any office in the political field. In one of our numerous instructions on this particular matter we stated that a policeman is entitled to his individual political beliefs but that he cannot permit his individual political beliefs to influence his official actions. By the same token a group of police cannot, by concerted actions, harrass, intimidate or interfere with the lawful political actions of individuals or groups who may have different political beliefs.

Question: Do you use or allow to be used any corpral punishment or punishment by beating, torture or otherwise in questioning or examining suspects arrested or brought before the police?

Answer: We do not and we have dismissed a number of police for striking prisoners. We have in some aggravated cases suspended them without pay for a number of days, and we have more instructions along those lines. When we find that a police has abused a prisoner we take disciplinary action against him.

Question: Do you have any information other than the YongDungPo claim of police recently killing prisoners under their charge?

Answer: Not recently.

Kimm, Kiusic: In connection with that YongdungPo matter, you have said that it was reported that one of the two men who died died from a heart disease. May I ask whether the autopsy of examination was done by a physician attached to the YongDungPo station, or a physician belonging to the police or an outside physician? Was the man who died from this so-called heart disease the same man who had his face smashed up?

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Answer: The report of the YongDungPo incident reached me Saturday. I referred it to Dr. Chough to investigate so that he would have a report to give when he appeared before this committee. Yesterday I asked him what he had found out about the charges of killing at the YongDungPo station. He said his investigation showed that the preliminary report was not entirely correct, that one man died of a heart attack. He was examined by a reputable physician of the community. We have no police doctors. In all such service reports the initial investigation is through the police channels. When it is a serious case I assign an American officer to make a detailed investigation.

Question: It is said that many former policemen who served under the Japanese are employed on the police force. Were their former records looked into and considered before they were employed?

Answer: We inherited those people, and we stated as a policy that they would be retained. We felt that they were Koreans and would no longer have pressure from the Japanese, they would deal with their own people and they would remain provided they followed our practices and did not maintain the vicious practices of the Japanese. And during the past year we have only removed them for cause, except in some cases where pressure of public opinion about the man's prior record may have been attracting attention.

Question: Recently posters have been put up in Seoul informing that former policemen who had served under the Japanese would be recruited in the police force. This the Chief of the First Area denied that he had done. Then, how can you account for the radio broadcast made from Central Radio Station as speaking for the Police Department which gave similar information?

Answer: I checked that and I read the translation of the broadcast and the publication, and that was put out by the Korean staff of my headquarters. The broadcast and announcement stated when we appealed for recruits that men with prior experience are welcome - no mention of the Japanese. That request was pointed toward those policemen who had been in the police in past years, trained in our schools, but were separated from the police through their own volition.

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Kimm Kiusic stated that he was glad to know that the word "Japanese" had not been inserted. He thought it was misunderstood and that in the future more definite statements should be made.

Answer: In retrospect it might have been better to make a more definite statement, but the people who prepared that poster and broadcast had no reason to believe that the question would be put to them injecting the word "Japanese" when we didn't use it. They would expect you to interpret their statement just as it is put.

Kimm, Kiusic: However, I as a Korean speaking for the Korean intelligence, wish to state that such posters and broadcasts being public announcements to the general public which is comprised of all sorts of people - educated and uneducated and the Korean mentality of certain types - and after 40 years of pressure under the Japanese they are certainly against anything that has a tinge or suggestion of the former regime. For that reason their mentality may be a little bit slanted to the extreme by that condition, and I think it is advisable that the people who are governing the country and particularly the police force which has more direct contacts with the people should bear these things in mind. People who translate these announcements and broadcasts should be very careful so as not to create misunderstanding.

Answer: I agree in part, but the test of any broadcast or poster is the response. 180 young men applied for the police as a result of that broadcast. 30 of them were in the police in the last year. 150 young men had had no experience. Nobody who had ever served under the Japanese responded.

Kimm, Kiusic was glad of the good results to this broadcast, and stressed the fact that it is the aim of this Conference to trace down all causes of disturbances and ill feelings, to determine the grounds for such feeling and to recommend remedial measures. He brought out the fact, as has been done so many times before, that sometimes when English is translated into Korean it means a different thing than what it is intended to mean.

General Lerch, referring to the matter of discourtesy and boorish behavior on the part of GIs which was mentioned in the press release,

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read part of a report showing that the American military personnel in the field are very sensitive in their duty towards the Korean people.

Question: I have a statement that while Military Government is politically neutral, it is to be regretted that the Korean police favor the rightist party. Taking the present disturbance as a pretext, the Korean police has mobilized the rightist youth organizations, both in Seoul and in the provinces, terrorizing everybody whom they consider to be a leftist. Do you care to comment on that statement?

Answer: The policy of the police, not the Americans in the police, is neutrality. It is true that at the present time it appears that the police are not neutral. Our instructions to them right along are that anyone that disturbs the police or breaks the law should be arrested and investigated. When the police are attacked, whatever the reason is, it is proper for a good citizen to go to their aid during that attack, and the police in any country will accept the aid of good citizens who come to their assistance when they are being attacked by a lawless element. Now we have issued very definite instructions to the police that they will not use any citizens to assist them except when they are being attacked. They will not use those citizens or organizations or youths to go out and hunt for those that attacked the police, broke the law, or started the riots. It is true that some of those groups that assisted the police during the attacks did go out and retaliate and go after those who they thought had something to do with the riots, murders, arson, etc. It is also true that the police shut their eyes to that activity initially, but when we were able to impress upon them the illegality of that and the fact that they were responsible for anyone breaking the law and causing terrorism, that activity has stopped to a marked degree. Many of our police, all of our police, are new. They were concerned about their safety. They accepted help. But I believe now you will find the police curtailing the activities of those young people who want to take vengeance or retaliate against their political enemies. I do not think it has been stopped entirely; however, we are exerting every means to stop it and in most cases it has been stopped.

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Question: The next statement is on the occasion of the recent election, these youth organizations arrested everybody belonging to the leftist party and cross-examined them. Do you care to comment on that statement?

Answer: I think the fact that an election was taking place during the time was incidental. Many have been arrested and interrogated in connection with the riots and the posting of hand bills and distributing them, and violation of the Military Government instructions. Whether or not those arrested or picked up for investigation were questioned abou the election, I don't know. If I can have specific instances I will investigate them.

Question: On 30th June 1946 No Duk Soo, Chief of the Detective Bureau in the 1st District, called in Chung Kyung Kook, the owner of the Kyung Sung Garage and told him to cut out all relations with Mr. Lyuh Woon Kyun, particularly not to lend him a car. Furthermore that he should contribute at least one million yen to the Han Kook Min Dang, otherwise suffer dire consequence. Some time later Chung Kyung Koo, brother of Chung Kyung Kook, and Mr. Lyuh's chauffeur were arrested by the Korean police and detained for one week. They were only released through the intervention of Brig. Gen Weckerling. Do you care to comment on that statement?

Answer: This is the first I have heard of the question of the car and the contribution. I have many such allegations. In nearly every case when I investigate the police have some criminal reason, some lawful reason for their action. And, when I confront the police with the complain ant I still have two different stories and the police is always justified by something in the law book, and I can never tell if there is a motive. I do recall the arresting of the two chauffeurs and sent an explanation to General Weckerling. I forget the reason they were held for investigation, but it was based on reasonable suspicion at the time. I do know that the chauffeur and his companion were arrested on reasonable grounds. The police in not releasing them in two or three days were at fault, and the prisoners were ordered released because the suspicion on which they were arrested did not materialize.

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General Weckerling confirmed the witness' statement and added that the reason given Colonel Maglin for the arrest was in connection with the possible hunt for Park Heung Young.

Kimm, Kiusic: If the report is true that this man No Duk Soo asked for a contribution of one million yen for the Han Kook Min Dang and advised this man Chung to sever all his connections with Lyuh, does this have any bearing on the case of the hunt for Park, Heun Young?

Answer: I can't answer that because in the first place I don't know if it is true. In fact, my investigation would show that he denied it. I don't know that it did happen and what connection it would have with Park. I am not familiar enough with the different organizations to say. All I know is that the police would give their right arm to arrest him.

Question: Mr. Kim Yung Kyu, one of Mr. Lyuh's bodyguards, was also arrested by this same No Duk Soo and beaten up. Do you care to comment on that statement?

Answer: I have no knowledge of No Duk Soo ever beating anyone. There have been allegations that I have personally investigated and found to be false. I could cite one instance to show how ridiculous some reprts are. There was an article in one of the papers which stated that the police brutally tortured two boys, 8 and 9 years old, and a young girl, 11 years old. The newspaper article was so alarming that I investigated the case mysif. I made a preliminary investigation by questioning the children involved. I then had the children and their parents, the newspaper reporter and the detectives from the station where the torture was alleged to have taken place, all present in my office. I questioned the boy who was alleged to have stolen a very valuable ring. The boy said that when he did not answer questions and was squirming in the chair that the policeman slapped his face. I asked if it hurt, and he said "no" but he was frightened. He then told what he did with the ring. I then asked the newspaper reporter if it had been his ring that was stolen would he have objected to the policeman having slapped the boy. I then asked what had happened to the little girl. He said that he had seen the girl's parents after the police released her and

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she told them that she was frightened so much that she wet her panties. I then asked him if any steps were taken to torture or frighten that young girl since she came into my office. He said they had not, so I had the little girl stand up and her panties were wet. The reporter admitted that parents would slap a child's face when he was unruly and so would teachers. Yet he had written it up as vicious torture. I mentioned that because many of these cases alleging torture are true, but in most cases they have been exaggerated. And when we investigate we have to give some credence to the policeman's word as well as the complainant. If the report comes soon enough and we can send someone right them to see physical effect of beating, we take immediate action. But, when a report comes long after the incident we are helpless in proving it and we have many evidences of distortion and exaggeration.

Chairman: It is time for the committee to adjourn. We have not yet completed the questions that the chairman has that the committee members wish to ask Colonel Maglin. The chairman will request Colonel Maglin to return at 1:30 Thursday. The chairman requests that any member who has a question to ask Colonel Maglin present it to the chairman before 1:30 Thursday. Dr. Chough will be requested to appear before the conference at 2:15 Thursday.

The proposed press release which had been presented at the beginning of the meeting was approved.

The meeting adjourned at 1710 hours, to reconvene at 1330 hours on Thursday, November 7, 1946.

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PRESS RELEASE #5

5 November 1946

The Joint Korean-American Conference continued its sessions at Duk Soo Palace examining the causes for the recent disturbances in southern Korea.

The Conference on 31 October exhaustively discussed the second topic on its agenda concerning the presence of former pro-Japanese collaborators in Military Government. This was the second of two sessions devoted entirely to this subject.

Members of the Conference, particularly several of the Korean conferees, stressed the fact that the objective of the Conference is to act neither as a court of law nor as a prosecuting agency. Magnanimity in dealing with those of the Korean people who were guilty of collaboration with the Japanese on technical grounds, was urged before the Conference. The Conference recognizes, however, that the final solution of the problem will have to be made by the Korean people themselves including the definition and determination of pro-Japanese collaboration and the punishment of the individuals concerned. With this point generally accepted the Conference may appropriately recommend to the proper authorities action that will correct any improper situations which may be found to require prompt attention.

The Conference on 1 and 4 November discussed the third and fourth topics on its agenda; namely, the "effect of interpreters in government" and the "corruption of some Korean officials".

The conferees examined at some length the question of interpreters in the temporary government that exists at present. It was agreed that one member of the Conference aptly described the situation when he stated that they "were a necessary evil". Although it was recognized that many interpreters and translators were not only competent but honest, it was agreed that considerable opportunity for misrepresentation and fraud was open to the dishonest ones. Incompetent translators particularly added to the confusion and misunderstanding of the Korean people.

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[illegible] of action by military government with respect to corruption of, and bribes, favors, gifts and entertainment improperly accepted by officials, both American and Korean. It was disclosed that three specially organized groups are making confidential investigations, whether direct accusations are made or not. One group, the United States Army Inspector General Group, recently discovered dishonest actions upon the part of American officers, resulting in two being tried by a general court-martial and being sentenced to prison sentences in the United States. Two special investigator sections--one organized by military government and the other by General MacArthur's headquarters, have discovered a considerable number of cases of fraud or attempted fraud on the part of Korean officials. All have been tried in the Korean courts. Currently these groups are making an exhaustive investigation of the Enemy Alien Property Custodian's office and the New Korea Company. The subject of administration of former enemy property will be considered more fully after item no. 12 of the Conference agenda is considered.

It was announced that Colonel William J. Coplin, Adviser to Director of the Korea National Police; Mr. Clough, Kyong Sok, Korean Director; and Mr. Chang, Taik Sang, Director of the First Police Area, will appear before the Conference on November 3, to discuss with the Conference the operation of their departments.

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MINUTES

OF THE ELEVENTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT AMERICAN-KOREAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 7 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Bunce

Absent: Brig. Gen. C. C. Helmick

KOREAN MEMBERS

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Poong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong

Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Herbert Kim.

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Enmity Against the Police:

Chairman: We will continue the questioning of Colonel Maglin which was started at our last meeting. Many of these questions, Colonel, you may not be able to answer because of lack of statistics. If you will simply answer those you are able to, we will appreciate it.

Q. What is the percentage of Korean police who were previously employed as policemen by the Japanese?

A. Approximately 25 percent.

Q. What is the percentage for various officer grades?

A. It varies in the officer grades. I have figures instead of percentages, but there were approximately 20 percent in September 1946 - a total of 24,000.

Q. Give us the numbers if you have them by grade in the various officer grades, taking simply the principal officer grades.

A. There have been some changes since the chart I have was made. This chart was made the latter part of May of this year. At that time there were about 8 division chiefs - 5 had experience in the police, 3 had none. At that time we had 6 deputy chiefs of divisions - 4 had experience, 2 had none. We had one superintendent of police who had experience. We had 30 inspectors - 25 with experience, 5 with none. We had 139 captains - 104 had experience, 35 had no prior experience. We had 969 lieutenants - 806 had prior experience, 163 had none. That

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covers the officer ranks.

Q. It has been stated that the salaries of police are too low. If this is true, how do the police manage to make a living?

A. In May we made a survey of the policemen attending the National Police College. The class of 400 came from all divisions of the police in all provinces. The survey showed that many support themselves by using savings. Many are supported by their relatives. Some are able to live by selling real property and personal property. A very small percentage of the policemen who are single men were able to live on their pay. I do not have the chart with me, but I can very easily furnish a copy of the chart to the committee.

Q. What part do the police play in the rice collection program?

A. The part the police play in the rice collection is this. They are informed of those farmers who are delinquent in meeting their quotas and on orders of the officials charged with the collection, the police make arrests or give notice. The police also patrol and if they detect what they think is illegal disposal of rice that has been harvested they immediately investigate. In some areas where the collecting agencies expected resistance the police would accompany the collectors. The police through a system of road blocks check the illegal transportation of rice. That in general is the police function in the rice collection.

Q. Of the total arrests made in any particular period, do you have data which would show how many are affiliated with the following political parties: Democratic, People's, Communist, no party affiliation?

A. I do not have records that indicate party affiliation for arrests. We have statistical trial reports by census.

Q. Is there any truth in the accusations that the police have devoted most of their effort to the suppressing of leftist activities and very little time to suppress profiteering and black market activities?

A. Our records show that for the past year the majority of arrests by the police are for theft, assault, roudiness, murder. Recently those arrests have dropped off because the police are spending most of their time defending themselves against attacks. Those records show that arrests in recent weeks have resulted in a number of habitual

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criminals and hoodlums being arrested, also some persons who have party affiliations that are more on the left than on the right. That part of the question, General, that deals with black marketing, hoarding and large profiteers has been a problem that we have been constantly working on. We have many reports of hoarders, black marketing and large warehouses of illegal rice. We have not found them and noone has been able to point them out, but where such large operators have been pointed out to the police or to American officials they have tried to find them.

Q. Do you have any figures which show over a period a number of persons arrested for hoarding rice or other grain?

A. I do not have figures. If I did, I think those figures would show the number to be very small. We have reports from various divisions, statistical reports, showing violation of the rice collection, and they will list the number. I do not think the police have been able to detect and arrest many hoarders or profiteers in the rice.

Q. Do you have any figures which would show similar arrests for profiteers?

A. I do not, sir.

Q. Do the police have to have a warrant to arrest a Korean? If not, what protection is there for civil liberties?

A. There is a provision for the use of warrants in making an arrest. The warrant is not used in the general routine operation of the police in Korea. Many actions that are thought to be arrests are merely investigations. The police are required to have reasonable grounds before they arrest or take a person in for investigation. The police will take into custody an individual on information furnished by the procurator (prosecutor?) without a warrant.

Q. Are prisoners held by the police required to pay 50 yen a day or not for their own food?

A. They are not. There may be instances where a district commander or an official may have caused that to be done, but that is not the policy. Food is furnished the prisoners without charge. Such a report may have arisen where some prisoner asked for extra attention or had friends bring food to him or perhaps a corrupt policeman, but the policy and

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the general rule is that they do not pay.

Q. It has been stated that during the present elections in Cholla-Pukto police did not allow leftists to come out to meetings of any kind, but treated the leftists as the Japanese treated the Korean revolutionaries in the past? Do you have anything on that statement?

A. I have heard that statement made before and I have checked with American officers and others who were present, with the police and with other government activities, and found no support or any evidence of that action on the part of the police.

Q. What procedure could be followed to eliminate all policemen previously employed by the Japanese without disorganizing the police force?

A. I have given that matter considerable thought and I know of no way that all those persons could be eliminated without having a complete break-down in the police system for the period of time that it would take to train enough officers and sergeants to carry on the police work. At first the new policemen had antipathy toward the Korean policemen who had been in the service under the Japanese. That is not true today. Whenever we put a new man over a group containing an experienced man, we have trouble. The new policemen want an experienced man who is efficient and who does not have a bad reputation from his service under the Japanese.

Q. What method of selecting recruits should be followed to avoid the accusation that the police force is dominated by the rightist political parties?

A. I don't think under the system we have now that the selection of new policemen is dominated by the so-called rightist influence. Recruiting new policemen is decentralized to divisions and districts. We have numerous minimum standards of education, physical fitness, reputation in the community and he must be free of any criminal record. To answer that question as a solution, but not a practical solution, would be to have all recruiting done in one place, such as Seoul. Most policemen enlist for service in the police initially for their home community. We do not know the political affiliation of our captains and lieutenants. We avoid the political issue in the Police Department.

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Many of our instructions have emphasised the fact that we are not interested in a policeman's individual political ideas as long as he does not use his office to further his political beliefs. We removed the chief of the division in Kyungsang-Pukto in April because he was such an active rightist that nobody could get in the police at that time. He moved all the officers around and he was so politically inclined that he was removed. His name was Cho. Our survey, which was only cursory not in detail, shows that in general the new policeman has no party affiliation or political convictions.

Q. Do you have any figures which show over a period the number of policemen removed from office because of malfeasance?

A. Those figures are now being compiled. I would not wager or attempt an estimate, but in the city of Seoul we have had dismissed and disciplined through forfeiture of pay some 50 or more for brutality. There are other offenses that we have dismissed police officials for - bribery, intimidation or attempts to use their office in the way that would lead to embezzlement. We have dismissed them even before the overt act took place.

Q. How often and how extensively do you personally inspect the police activities?

A. The answer to that question is that I have twice covered the police from here down to Pusan and Taegu. I have made numerous visits to police districts in Division A, which covers Kyonggi-do. I have visited the border stations. When I visit I use my impression of one district as a pattern of other districts. What I learn on these visits to nearby districts I use to disseminate information to other districts. My personal visits to the far distant districts are few. However, I have covered most of Korea since I entered this duty. Also there is always at least one American officer from my office in the field on an investigation or other activities to instruct me.

Q. Are reports made to you of all important happenings?

A. They are. I get a daily radio report from each division headquarters, and throughout the day I get numerous radio reports and telephone reports from American officers who are monitoring the police in the field. I

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would like to read to this committee one that I received just before leaving my office to come over here. (He read a report received from Cholla-Namdo.) I am receiving a average of five or six such messages daily from the southern provinces, particularly right now Cholla-Namdo. Many routine messages from and to my headquarters to the divisions pass out daily over a police radio system and a police telephone system.

Q. It is said, especially in Kyungsang-Pukto and Kyungsang-Namdo, that because of wholesale arrests of the leftist, those not arrested have escaped to the hills. This is seriously affecting harvest and rice collection as well as having excluded leftists in the recent elections. Would you care to comment on that statement?

A. I was in Kyungsang-Pukto about two weeks ago when that report was made. We instructed the police to release those who were just arrested in the so-called dragnet against whom they had no charges except that they were present or suspected of being present at the disorders. We instructed the police to release all farmers so they could harvest the rice. One small group that had been driven into the hills remained in the hills. Dr. Chough made a tour of that entire province shortly after we issued those orders, and he reported that most of the people were back harvesting their crops. There were still a few in the mountains. The police were only holding the known leaders and agitators and those against whom they had definite evidence of committing murders, arson and other crimes during the disorders. Many of those held were habitual criminals and hoodlums who do no work anyway.

Q. What influence, if any, was exerted by habitual criminals and poverty stricken refugees during the recent disorders?

A. Our records of those arrested and those being sought incident to the riots and murders in Taegu show that 3/4 of the number involved are known to the police as habitual criminals, hoodlums, thieves and others who had no party affiliation.

Q. Do you have figures to show how many policemen have been tried either

by the Department of Police or in the courts for brutality, corruption, torture or similar practices since January 1, 1946?

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A. Those figures are being compiled. I believe Dr. Chough will have them. Many of our dismissals where a policeman is tried before a court for abuse of his power or for brutality merely comes from my headquarters in a personnel report showing losses. We have not always succeeded in having the losses broken down. I have personal knowledge of many cases where I reviewed the case and ordered the police official to be tried by court. The ones I have personal knowledge of runs into 30 or more. I would like to state to the committee at this time that although we know that there is some brutality on the part of the police and they do unnecessary beatings, that the situation is not as alarming or as prevalent as reports indicate. I have a report before me which was submitted on the 28th of October by an American officer whom I sent to investigate such reports in and around Taegu. I would like to read a few of his conclusions from this investigation. "It was reported that a certain Korean had been an eye witness to the killing of three prisoners by the police. Upon being interviewed, the man stated that he had only heard a rumor to that effect. It was reported that another Korean knew of the killing of ten prisoners by the police and where they were buried. It was discovered on interviewing him that his son had been shot and wounded in the leg by the police when he attempted to make a prison break. The location of the graves was found and upon checking further it was determined that these graves contained the bodies of the policemen killed during the riots and awaiting community burial service. The number of graves checked with the number of police reported buried there." There is a source of information in Yungchun where many American officers receive reports. While this source is sincere in his desire to help and believes his information to be correct, yet it has been determined upon investigation that these reports are for the most part completely unverified rumors. Due to the position this individual maintains in Yungchun, many American officers and others are inclined to place credence in his statements. I would like to state that we know that there is some abuse on the part of some police, there are beatings. But it is always difficult to prove those things. That is why our dismissals or charges of policemen are never as large as the number of reports that we receive. I

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personally investigated a report that a woman prisoner was tied so tightly that the rope was cutting into her arms. An American officer heard this woman screaming and he discovered that she was tied that way and he reported it to me. I went in there and found that she was tied that way and asked if it was necessary to tie a woman prisoner while questioning her. When I spoke to him I noticed that he had a big patch, a medical dressing on his forehead. He stated that two days before he had a woman prisoner in there whom he did not tie and she hit him in the head with an ink well and he had to have three stitches. So, he though it better to tie even a woman before that happened to him again. I did not like to see the woman tied up but I believe that I would have done the same thing rather than get hit with an ink well or something.

Q. The statement is made that in order to arrest a man there should be a warrant issued by the chief of police or prosecutor, but up to now arrests have been made without a warrant. Isn't it true that in the provinces arrests have been made as a precautionary measure as an aftermath of recent disturbances?

A. Yes, sir, there have been many arrests made as an aftermath of the recent disorders. Most of the arrests are proper. There is an order in this country which states that, "Posters or handbills containing statements that advocate injury or death to any person, that are of an inflammatory nature to arouse people to mob action or public disorder, that are derogatory to military Government, the United States or Soviet Russia or to the military or political leaders of the United States or Soviet Russia are unlawful. Any person or persons found causing such posters or handbills to be made, found posting or distributing such posters or handbills will be arrested and prosecuted under military government ordinance."

Q. It is stated that during the time of Japanese imperialism a detachment of detectives of the highest order was used in suppressing revolutions. Is it true that Chief of the First District, Mr. Chang, has recently used that organization to suppress the leftists?

A. I do not believe it is true because we have no police of that category or any who served in that category under the Japanese. Reports

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have been made that Chief of Detectives, Rowe or No, has a police in the city of Seoul who was in that branch of the police under the Japanese. Our investigation shows that he was in the Judicial Police and his actions were confined only to crime, not any political prosecution. Our records show that he was assigned to the Judicial section of the Police that worked on murder cases, burglaries, thefts, embezzlement, etc. Your question was directed at Chief Chang, and my answer was that I do not think so; However, there has been a tendency in the Detective Bureau to gather information and intelligence other than criminal, and it caused me to issue a directive on the 26th of June showing the abuses of that. I think that directive will show that some individual policemen or detectives think it is necessary to get information of a political nature. We have made reference in this directive to a few districts keeping so-called black lists or other information having no relation to crime or criminal tendency. It states that "Such extra-criminal activities by Criminal Information and Intelligence personnel which have resulted, or might result, in the abuses ennumerated above will be terminated immediately." We believe that that had the desired result; however, there will be individuals in the police occasionally who think they have to go out and collect political information. This subject will be a matter of continuing inspection for all American Public Safety Officers and Chiefs of Divisions. So, I am certain that Chief Chang has no such organization and he did not have any qualified men from the so-called old regime.

Q. Describe briefly the training system in the Department of National Police and any proposed changes for the future.

A. The training system initially at our National Academy was for recruits. There they were given basic instructions in discipline and drill, a course in law, in so far as it affected the policeman in his power and limitation and procedure, a course in first aid, a course in emphasizing that there are so many means by which they can be of service to the people. That includes the method and manner of giving information and furnishing them data and information that they should know in order to be able to give the information and assistance. That course also includes the firing

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and care of weapons. That type of training is now being given at the division academies. At the National Academy we now train investigators and detectives, and we give them the latest methods of crime detection, methods and procedures, practice in our finger-print and identification section and a thorough course in the activities of our crime laboratory. We emphasize, with detectives especially, their relationship to the public. There is a 10 hour course on that subject and it is based on a directive that I happen to have with me. This is basic and emphaizes their special functions and the importance of getting the confidence of the public. We also have a course for superior officers, lieutenants and above. That course is three months. In addition to giving police administration and control of personnel with assistance of patrol and riot control, all subjects that are useful to superior officers are given. We have included many cultural subjects. All literature that originates in the Academy or is furnished to the Academy by their various bureaus or our headquarters is immediately disseminated to all districts for what we call on-the-job training if it has immediate application. Whereever it is practical, in some places it is not because of the lack of transportation and communications and distances between sub-stations and districts, all policemen have two hours a week instruction at their district headquarters. In addition to that we have teams of specially trained policemen who visit all districts and stations to give instructions in special subjects, such as first aid, nomenclature, and care and firing of weapons, so that we will reach those who do not get to the schools. That in general is the training system of the National Police. However, we issue frequent directives on training as we develop the procedure.

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Q. In your opinion, Colonel Maglin, how long does it take before a newly recruited policeman is competently trained to do patrol duty?

A. For ideal results I would say six months schooling with a certain amount of observation training during that period.

Q. What threats or political pressure is being asserted upon the Police Department to dissuade it from its present policy, and from what source, if any, do such threats and pressure come?

A. I am not clear on the meaning of the question. I know of no political pressure on the police causing them to neglect their duties or change the policy we have put out. The police receive many letters. Many of them come through my office threatening them to change their tactics because of retribution, whenever there may be a change. We are now investigating one of our division chiefs who has taken over a new division recently. He is alleged to have made statements to his assembled district commanders that they have to be careful right now to not do things that will cause them to be targets when and if there is another August 15th and someone else takes over the government. His defense is that he was emphasizing fairness. The inference gained by his district commanders was that he wanted them to not enforce the law vigorously for fear of retaliation. It is possible that he may be influenced by some outside source to take that attitude and issue such instructions.

Q. I have here a question concerning a matter of discussion the day before yesterday about Chung, Hyung Mook, the owner of the Seoul Service Station. Is it your opinion that when Mr. No, Duk Soo said "no" on being questioned concerning Chung for the demand for the contribution that he was telling the truth?

A. I believe he was telling the truth for this reason. I questioned both Dr. Chough and Chief Chang about the alleged incident. They were both emphatic in stating how honest this man is. In fact, they state that he is a poor man and he is just able to make ends meet on his salary, yet he has many temptations. Mr. No was instrumental in bringing the charges against the lieutenant who was head of the Mounted Police

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on embezzlement. In that incident, he had an opportunity to take money and not take action. It was a matter wholly within the Police Department, and he used that in his prosecution of the lieutenant. Therefore, I think it is true from all I can learn that Chief of Detectives No said that it did not take place. In attempting to learn the truth of such allegations, I have many times, in different instances, confronted the person making the allegation with the police officer, and the man making the allegation will deny it in the presence of the man charged. Then after he leaves, the report comes back to me that he is afraid to say it in front of the person. In spite of the fact that we guarantee there will be no retaliation and that we want the truth, we do not get anything to support their statements, and we have to accept the statements of the police. We do not say that such things do not happen. I am not speaking of No but in general. The difficulty in proving such charges is tremendous. Usually the reports come in too late or they are greatly exaggerated. Dr. Chough and his staff are more than anxious to guard jealously the reputation of the police, but they are helpless if the information furnished is too meager. They have to be fair to the police who are entitled to their support and loyalty.

Dr. Kimm: May I ask whether in this case against No, Duk Soo whether the two parties were brought together and investigated fully after No Duk Soo denied the fact that he had made any demands? Was that looked into very closely or not? Were they brought face to face?

A. The first information I had of this charge was at the meeting Tuesday. Wednesday I took the matter up with Dr. Chough and Chang to find out what it was all about. That produced no results. This morning I assigned an American officer to go down and question everybody. As the thing crystallizes and I see it, I may have them both in. I have not reached that point yet.

Dr. Kimm: I understand that this matter occurred on June 30th, and to have this matter looked into closely after it was brought up at this conferences yesterday seems rather delinquent. Does not Colonel Maglin himself think so?

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A. I will have to answer that question with a question. Was a report made earlier?

Dr. Kimm: I cannot answer for the Police Department but reports were made either directly or indirectly. This matter was mentioned at certain other quarters which I need not mention here, so certainly indirect report of the matter has been made--perhaps not directly to Colonel Maglin. Furthermore, I hear that this man Chung and chauffeur of Mr. Lyuh were arrested on some charge and detained for a week and released. All these things seem to have some sort of relation, do they not?

A. It is true the question of the arrest of Chung and chauffeur was discussed and investigated as I stated at the last meeting on report from General Weckerling. The matter of the attempt to force the owner of the Seoul Service Station or garage to contribute one million yen was not mentioned at that time nor did I know nor any other member of the National Police know about that until it came up at this meeting. The police are human. They would not originate or investigate a report against them on their own unless it was ordered investigated by some higher authority. You say it was mentioned in some quarters--not my quarters--not Dr. Clough's quarters. The policeman against whom such charges were made would not initiate such an investigation.

Dr. Kimm: I am asking this question because the other day when this matter was mentioned, I think the one million yen was mentioned, and if my memory does not fail me, I think Colonel Maglin at that time replied that when No was asked concerning this question, No's answer was "no". For that reason, I was on the point of asking Colonel Maglin whether in all such cases the summary answer "no" establishes facts.

A. I will answer the latter part of the question first. A mere answer of "no" is not sufficient, and I would like the record checked because I do not think I said Mr. No was questioned on the particular matter of the one million yen and he replied "no". I may have stated that if you merely ask this man if he had done something, he would naturally say "no" and we would require a further investigation. I am sure it was

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my answer because until Tuesday I had no knowledge of any investigation or even report that No asked anybody for one million yen for any contribution.

Dr. Kimm: May I ask for the reading of the stenographic record on that particular case.

(General Brown read that portion of the minutes pertinent to this subject. A long discussion followed during which it was established that no formal complaint was ever made to Chief Chang.)

Col. Maglin: I would like to state and I am sure the Committee will agree that a formal detailed investigation of all allegations against the police would not only interfere with their duties but would affect the morale and efficiency. We make many of these investigations without having the person charged know of it because there are many allegations that are trivial. Some are serious. We have to use our judgment in that. Otherwise we would always have the police out on investigations and the thieves and crooks would be running wild. We do not pass up any complaint. Some we give priority to because they are gravest. There are many others that we take up as the opportunity presents itself. Any negligence in this particular case may be blamed on the delay in making the report. Even George Won stated that the alleged offense on June 30th had not ever been mentioned until Lyuh's abduction in late September or early October. I assure you that the investigation we make now will be thorough even though the case is old.

Dr. Kimm: I think we are taking up valuable time with these questions. If the Chairman will allow me I wish to make a few remarks--not as a question but as a matter of reference for Colonel Maglin to use at his own pleasure. For example, I have heard allegations that maybe some policemen are connected with certain "moonshiners", brewers of liquor, opium dealers, etc. Of course, I have no proof to bring forth and do not have any definite information. If such things are going on, it might be well to keep an eye open. Concerning the matter of police not using brutality or retaliation unless they are attacked, I have heard of cases where certain youth organizations attacked people.

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These youth organizations used by the police were attacking people not at the time when the people were attacking the police but when they were going about their own business. On the matter of face slapping, I think Colonel Maglin gave us the impression that sometimes it may be natural for a policeman to slap a person using his hand, but as Koreans see it, there are face slappings and face slappings. One may slap a person on the face with the palm of the hand and sometimes with a double fist. It all depends on how the face slapping takes place. So, sometimes the interpretion of face slapping by the police themselves and by the public may be a little bit different, just as in the case where we spoke of those children having been dealt with cruelly. I appreciate Colonel Maglin's testimony that this girl was not molested, but she was naturally afraid and wet her pants. That is a case which shows the mentality of the Korean people. The adults have been under the oppression of the Japanese for so long that they are always in fear of the uniformed police as well as plain clothesmen because they have gone through that for forty years. You will have to appreciate their mentality. The little girl has heard things from her parents, and is afraid on being brought into the police station. When she comes before a foreigner, she is even more afraid than ever before. I have one more matter to refer to Colonel Maglin. I have the statement here "Police eat on credit at restaurants and buy goods on credit without even paying for the same." This must be stopped. I think this will serve as a reference concerning policemen's pay. It is certainly not adequate. That I know. We cannot name the policemen who are doing this. Some remedy must be devised. Mr. Chairman, if we are through with taking up so much of Colonel Maglin's time, I would like to voice the sentiment of this conference--that this conference expresses unanimously its appreciation of the valuable information Colonel Maglin has furnished us and the long time he has spent with us.

Colonel Maglin: I would like to make the statement that I appreciate the opportunity to appear here and also the attention and interest. I have one brief remark to make in summary, if I may. What I have to

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say does not apply necessarily to Korea. It would apply in any country, even in America. We know that there are many weaknesses in the police force of Korea. The questions brought out at this conference have further emphasized some of those. We will continue to renew our efforts to eliminate those weaknesses and vicious practices. We are not naive enough to think we can do it overnight, but we will continue to whiddle them down as we have been doing. In operating a police force of over 25,000 men, we cannot put our trust and confidence in everybody. By the same token, we cannot distrust everybody, so we have placed our trust and confidence in Dr. Chough, and we feel that that trust and confidence is well placed. I have never met a man more true and a more true patriot than Dr. Chough. We differ on many things, but we have never differed on the question of fairness or what is good for the Korean people or country in relation to the police.

(The next witness is called in.)

General Brown continues with his questioning.

Q. Please inform the Committee of your full name and the duties which you perform.

A. ~~Chang, Taik Sang~~ Chough, Pyong Ock, Director of the Department of Police.

Q. How long have you occupied this position.

A. Just a little more than a year. I took my office on October 7, 1945 and have continued as such to date.

Q. For your information, the purpose of this Commission is to investigate the causes of recent disorders in South Korea. The Commission is only trying to discover the broad causes of the disorders. One of the causes stated to the Commission is that certain Koreans bear some enmity against the police. It is this phase of the matter that the Commission is now inquiring into. Would you explain to the Commission the primary difficulty which you experienced in the past year in trying to reorganize and create an efficient police force.

A. (Gist of it only) During the past thirty-six years Koreans have witnessed a very peculiar history. Since Koreans in the past have had a lack of training in democratic principles, it is difficult to secure

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suitable personnel. The second difficulty is finding personnel with backgrounds and personal histories of patriots. It is difficult determining a man's past conduct during the past thirty-six years, as there is often nothing to go by but the man's word. Personnel must have patriotic backgrounds to command the respect of the people.

Q. What are the primary difficulties which you are now meeting in operating the police force?

A. (Gist only) The great difficulty is the existing social conditions in Korea today. Certain members of so-called political parties have utilized disturbances, such as the recent riots at Taegu, to realize their own personal ends. In disposing of such cases, of course, our police forces are in a difficult position since it is a principle and golden rule of the police department to protect all political parties working for the interests of Korea within the bounds of law, whatever their number is or whatever their ideas are--they are to be protected, whether they are Rightists or Leftists, it does not matter. The police have no right to arrest any member of any political party without positive proof. One of our greatest difficulties is to protect political parties.

Q. Are there other difficulties such as shortages of personnel, and lack of trained personnel?

A. Due to the high cost of living and the low salaries paid the police, personnel is resigning every day and it is difficult to replace them. Since it takes a certain length of time to train men in police efficiency and democratic principles, it is difficult to build up a good staff with so many resigning.

Q. Are your policemen properly trained?

A. They are not fully trained--just enough to tide us over the emergency. We have been training them for one month and then sending them out in the field. Therefore, there are many defects. We have an ambitious plan to carry out--an educational program through which we can train fully in police administration as well as in democratic ideas. Our National Police Academy has been elevated to college degree. We have established such bureaus that will coordinate formal

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police education throughout South Korea and at the same time carry out activities such as publication of magazines and newspapers, educational movies and lectures, etc. so that the intellectural and spiritual level will be improved and the police force democratized.

Q. Are your principal assistants well trained and competent to perform their duties?

A. In my judgment, most of my assistants, whether they are chiefs or captains in police districts, are competent and loyal and carry out the duties imposed on them--to preserve peace and order in Korea.

General Brown: In order to assist Dr. Chough, the Chairman will furnish him tomorrow before the meeting with the principal questions which it is intended to ask him. The Chairman has previously asked the members of the Commission to give him any questions which they wish to ask.

Dr. Kimm: In order to exp dite matters so that this Conference can get on with its work to the conclusive stage, may I suggest that we should try to confine our questions to ones concerning Dr. Chough himself as Chief of the Police Department and try to avoid duplication of questions already asked Colonel Maglin.

(The Commission adjourned at 1700 hours, to be reconvened tomorrow, 8 November 1946 at 1330 hours.)

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HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR &
CHIEF OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE
SEOUL, KOREA

7th November 1946

SUBJECT: Criticisms of the Police Department.

The Korean Police is still in its cradle but it has made rapid progress toward democratic lines under the able leadership of Colonel Maglin; it started from nothingness. The Japanese destroyed every scrap of paper that might be useful to the Police Force of Korea before their evacuation last fall. People make use of the well-known charge, the Police are employing former Japanese Policemen. At the Communists conference held at Moscow on March 19th 1919, it was decided to employ former Imperial Military Officers for the training of the Red Army.

I remember in the Bible, the story about the return of the prodigal son. Why can we not forgive Korean policemen who were compelled to join the Japanese for sheer want of bread and butter? Must we be hard on them? If so, then we must include a great number of our Government employees scattered in all sections of the civil structure of Korea. I do not think this, a humane answer to the question. We have discharged notorious elements from our service, That step has already been taken long ago by the order of General Hodge and General Lerch. Those that do remain in our service are very capable men. They are an integral part and function of our very fine and democratic Police Department.

Now in reference to the disappearance of Mr. Lyuh, I visited Mr. Lyuh at his home. He made the statement to me that he had been kidnapped. I deny that I made such a statement to the newspapers. As for the remarks regarding Abraham Lincoln, I said in the course of a conversation with some persons in my office that I liked Abraham Lincoln's election address given in Chicago, but this has nothing to do with the kidnapping at all. I am the most misquoted man in Seoul, to-day. What I said was " Somever is elected, be he leftist or rightest, must remember what Abraham Lincoln said, "Quote" You can fool some of the people some of the time, but you can't fool all the people all of the time."Inquote".

ANSWER TO QUESTION No. 6:

I wish to impress to you gentlemen, that the Police have no political affiliations with any parties. The Police are the agents of the people, paid by the people and supported by the people to protect certain individual rights of all the people. We are the agents for keeping peace and order, nothing more and nothing less. The question put to me was why did we arrest so

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many Anti Pak Heun Young Leftists. We have only arrested those men who have imposed upon the individual RIGHTS of the citizens of Seoul. We are only carrying out the duties of the Police. We are searching for and apprehending only lawbreakers. No Antis or Pros for anybody. I continually tell the Police by my past orders that are a matter of record that no Police shall be interested in political parties, and good citizens must be protected and lawbreakers arrested.

I cannot see why you gentlemen are accusing the Police Department of something which they have not done. Some individuals in the Police Department may be bad but the system itself is entirely democratic and Anto-Japanese. Think of the state of Seoul last Winter and early part of last Spring! Fifty or sixty cases of broad daylight robberies occurred in the heart of this city, murders and incendiaries were openly practised without hinderance. Now the record shows that Seoul is one of the most peaceful cities in the world except for certain disturbances caused by misguided individuals.

We are improving as the days go by and I think they deserve more praise than blame. They are sacrificing a lot. They are patriotic and that shows something. Be generous to them. If they need to be blamed, let it be helpful criticism!

T. S. CHANG
Assistant Director,
Chief of the Metropolitan Police.

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MINUTES

OF THE TWELFTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 8 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson
Dr. J. C. Dunce

Absent: Brig. Gen. C. L. Helmick

KOREAN MEMBERS

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Yon, Seh Yoon
Choi, Yong O
Kim, Yoong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Yahk, Keun Oong
Lyuh, Koon Hyung

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Herbert Kim

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

The Chairman advised that the further questioning of Mr. Hough would have to be postponed since it was necessary for him to fly South to be at the scene of some trouble there. The Chairman suggested that the Conference consider instead a review of what it had covered up to date to determine whether there is any concrete action for the Conference to take at this time.

Dr. Kimm Kiusic suggested that it might be best to wait until we have all available testimony so that duplication of work might be avoided.

General Brown then suggested that the question "Who is a pro-Jap?" be discussed. He mentioned that there had been a few attempts made by members of the Conference to define such an individual and that much difficulty had been experienced in attempting to do so. He further stated that the only definition that had been legally announced was the one given in Ordinance #118.

(Mr. Langdon, from the sidelines, asked whether there were any associations in Korea similar to the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" in Japan, membership in which would make anyone ineligible for service in Japan in the new government, that could be used as a method of barring pro-Japs from the government. From the discussion that followed, it appeared that there were none that could be used.)

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General Brown pointed out that the records of the Conference seem to indicate the difficulties of determining a pro-Jap and that such determination would require a hearing in each case. He added that the conducting of such hearings would be an interminable process and that it would therefore seem desirable for the Conference to attempt to define a pro-Jap.

Mr. Chang, Ahon stated that if Ordinance #118, Section VII was used as a basis and also the characteristics of a pro-Jap that Mr. Ahn presented a few days ago, the definition would appear from that.

Mr. Oh Ah Loon made a statement to the following effect: It would be difficult to decide here the line of demarcation as to who and who is not a pro-Jap. The clamor now against pro-Japs has arisen from the fact that former employees in the Japanese government are now working in the government. Psychologically it would be better to stop talking about pro-Jap collaborators and take a positive stand. The legislature should contain patriots only, proven by the fact that they were arrested for independence activities under the Japs or by such similar evidence of patriotism. Such a body or the legislature will later determine the various classes of Japanese collaborators--those who will simply have their civil rights suspended for a time, those who will have their goods and lands confiscated, and those who will receive more severe punishment. There are so many offenders that it would be difficult to make a blanket heading. The present regulation states that only those who have been provisional councilors may not be included, but there are actually others who were not councilors who were worse Japanese collaborators. These cases bring forth greater comment and criticism. Therefore, the legislative body which is the representative organ of the country should contain only members who are proven patriots.

General Brown stated that he was not thinking so much of the legislature as he was of the police force and that he understands that the main difficulty of the police force now is the lack of competent senior police officers. "Men who learned police duties under the Japanese have been eliminated from the police force until out of a

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force of 25,000, only 21% remains. The elimination is continuing. What standard is this Conference going to use to recommend further elimination of this type from the police?"

Mr. Yon, Seh Koon made a statement to the following effect: 21% is really proportionately very low of Japanese former employees. This includes all grades. In the upper grades of officers, the figure would be nearer 50%. The problem would be solved if men in the following positions who have a taint of pro-Jap experience were eliminated: chiefs, District chiefs, political chiefs of kuns, governors, and heads of police areas. Anyone who has graduated from a middle school and is over thirty years of age could with a little experience assume the duties of a chief in a country district. He could even have an experienced man as an adviser for a few months until he got started. Dr. Chough and Mr. Chang did not have experience before assuming their jobs and they seem to have done a good job. The people will approve of a new man and will help him. They will take orders from him whereas they resent men with Japanese experience and refuse to cooperate. If you cut off such individuals from the top, in a period of about three months, everything will come around.

Dr. Kim, Hiusic agreed with Mr. Yon but felt some of his remarks too sweeping and not quite correct. He believes that Korean police must not be looked upon as a remnant or vestige of the former Japanese police which suppressed and persecuted them. He does not wish the Korean police to become a GPU as in Soviet Russia or a Gestapo as in Germany and feels that the Korean police should be considered as a friend and protector of the people--it should guide the people in law abiding. He further stated that the object of the police should be the keeping of law and order. He is not yet prepared to speak of the plan he has in mind in regard to this.

(The Chairman suggested that the topic "Agitators against the Best Interests of Southern Korea" be discussed.)

Mr. Yon, Seh Koon made a statement to the following effect: There are several classes of agitators--those who agitate against the country and those who agitate for the political interests of the country. In general these agitators appear under the name of "Communists". It is not a question of opposing Communism as a theory

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but of opposing those who have sworn allegiance to and work for the interests of another country. These people are deceiving the masses by making false statements. They circulate misinterpreted statements that are often believed by the ignorant masses. These things lead to rioting. Then there are those who wish to play up to the Americans to the extent of making the situation awkward for the American government. Instead of using the words "Allied Nations", they use the word "American" to further their aspersions. Some say that the occupying forces in the North and the South should be neutral and that those above the 38th line are not and those in the South are. Such statements are awkward rather than helpful. Statements such as these have been made by a person who calls himself the "Father of the Country". This individual has made the representation that when the Joint Commission meets, that everyone should just trust the United States and everything will be fine rather than to follow the Moscow Decision. This is extremely awkward when General Brown has been working for the reopening of the Joint Commission and the working out of independence following the lines of the Moscow Decision. What can you do when an individual in the RDC disclaims any usefulness for the Moscow Decision in the Joint Commission? This same person proposed that the RDC send a telegram to the State Department advocating that it is not necessary to reopen the Joint Commission and to "Just vote for me and we will have independence." All this promotes uncertainty and unrest. Another concern is that the police are deceiving the people. They cause excitement and unrest by activities such as stopping cars and bicycles as they did the other night with traffic going from the East to the West gate. The people fear that it means something is going to happen. This is along the line of agitation.

Dr. Johnson brought up the question of the difference between public debate and agitation. He asked whether there were not some point at which public debate becomes agitation so that criminal action might be taken against people who engage in malicious misrepresentations.

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Mr. Lee, Yeh Yeon asked whether Military Government had made an investigation of the causes of the present uprisings and whether it would be possible to be informed of it.

General Brown and General Lerch advised that Colonel Robinson, Intelligence Officer on General Hodge's staff, is scheduled to appear before the Conference.

Mr. Lyuh, Woon Hyung made a statement to the following effect: There is a great lack of responsible individuals to take the responsibility in government. Korea lacks a "master in her own house". Even during the last year of liberation, the lack of the feeling of "master in our own house" has been felt. The country is going "to pot" because of this lack of responsible individuals. As a result, everything in Korea--roads, buildings, hospitals, etc.--need attention and repair. Korea is grateful to General Hodge for his efforts toward establishment of the country, but if one person had come forth to represent the people and joined with the Americans in their labors, the efforts would have been more productive. However, we do not see to have such a representative leader to come forth. There should be one individual who should be the responsible leader, with the American forces remaining in an advisory capacity. This person should assume the responsibility for a certain length of time, following the pattern of American presidents. Until a Korean government is established, a "master in his own house" would be the only solution for the problems of the Korean people. He has more detailed ideas along this line which he will present at the proper time.

Mr. Kim, Koong Choon stated that the shortage of food in Seoul was one of the primary causes of the uprisings in South Korea. He read a report of a private investigation made by the Representative Democratic Council on the situation in Taegu from the period October 7 - 11, 1946. In brief, this report stated: When the reports of the food shortage in Seoul were received in Taegu in the latter part of September, KWAN, Yong Suk, Police Chief of the Province, and YUN, Chong Hyuk, leftist representative of the Chunpyung Labor Union, made an agreement

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that they would not allow meetings of more than three people, would forbid the distribution of handbills and posters, and would not allow parades. Rumors were spread that rice was being collected and being sent to Japan and America, and the people were instructed to gather and go to the rice collection stations to get their rice. On October 1st, the Chu Pyung people gathered in tens of thousands. Yun took 30 policemen and went to disperse the crowd. He reminded him of the agreement that they had made, and demanded that the crowd disperse. Yun said they would disperse only after the police had dispersed. Yun said they would disperse only after the police had dispersed. When the police did, however, the crowd, instead of dispersing, surrounded the police and beat them with sticks and stones, and scattered only after the policemen started to shoot. On October 2nd, the Chunpyung people formed three brigades of agitators. They dressed the corpse of a person who was killed the day before in clothes of a boy student and went to a boys' school and started agitation by saying that this boy student had been killed by the police. They dressed a corpse, used by medical students in their laboratory work, in the clothing of a girl and took it to a girls' school and said that the police had killed innocent girl students. Another group agitated the crowd by asking the people not to live in to the rice collection and to ask for more rice from the government. Thus, students, laborers, and common citizens were agitated and gathered in the number of 30,000. They surrounded the police and threatened them. The police could do nothing else so started to shoot. This riot resulted in the wounding and killing of thirty policemen. A crowd of students went to the houses of policemen and to the police stations and started destruction. The wounded police were taken to the hospital in the province for treatment, but the hospital refused to take care of them. On October 2nd, the American Commander declared marshal law in Taegu. The people then withdrew to other places and agitated the crowds as to the lawlessness existing in town. The crowds, answering the call, came out to attack the branch offices of the police and other official places. Houses of rich landowners were

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to be torn down, and government officials and police officers and their families were to be killed. The following report was made on 12 October: 36 killed, 67 wounded, 38 missing. Agitators arrested on 9 October totalled 1,500. An examination of the people arrested revealed posters giving instructions to kill all government officials, destroy all the houses of those officials, attack all government buildings and destroy them, destroy the rightist organizations, kill all important men, kill all rich people and destroy all their property.

F. Mr. Music reported that Choi, Hyung Pin, Vice Director of the Central Police Department, (the man immediately under Mr. Hough) had been having Saturday night meetings at his home to deal with the present situation. At the last meeting all the well known pro-Japanese collaborators were present, including Gen. Yang Kyung (thought to be a member of the old emperor but known to be a very prominent pro-Japanese collaborator). This information had been given him by Mr. Kang, Kai Won of the Independence Farm Labor Party.

Mr. Allen reported on the situation of the recent disturbances as follows: It seems that Park, Hoon Young of the left is the arch fiend. In the early part of September, it was reported that Park said he would institute an October revolution in Korea. Of course, that October revolution may mean November because of the difference in the Russian calendar and our calendar. The October revolution that took place in Russia actually started, according to our calendar, on 7 November. The October revolution in Korea might even mean both the months of October and November. It was also stated that he based this great project on the allegation that he had received secret orders from the North to the following effect: (1) The Coalition Committee shall be broken up; (2) the proposed convening of the legislature shall be blocked; and (3) a general uprising shall be instituted in the whole of South Korea with the object of making the U. S. Commanding General, Lt. General Hodge, untenable, so that he may be recalled and to demonstrate to the world that the American Military Government in South Korea has been a failure and

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is unable to keep peace and order. That was announced to all the people of the left. Both adherents of Park and antagonists believed in total that such secret orders had come. Such whisperings were also heard by the Rightists. However, when Mr. Lyuh, Woon Hyung took his trip to Pyongyang, he came in contact with Mr. Kim, Il Sung and Mr. Kim, Doo Bong, leaders of the leftists in the North. Both Mr. Kim, Doo Bong and Kim, Il Sung told Mr. Lyuh that they believed that coalition was absolutely necessary, but that they were against the legislature project because it was the child of Syngman Rhee and should die. They advised Mr. Lyuh to keep his hands off this legislature project. However Mr. Lyuh tried to explain that this was not the order of Rhee, they told him not to be misdirected. Mr. Lyuh reported that Park was planning a general uprising in South Korea during October and November, they were very much surprised. They said that even if one North Korean was found to have committed any outrage similar to shooting or hurting anyone in South Korea, it would only make their position untenable and it would make the Soviet Russian position untenable with the rest of the world. Such report was made to Gen in the presence of General Hodge and Mr. Lyuh himself. I also understand that Mr. Lyuh reported a statement to the same effect at the meeting of the People's Party, of which Mr. Lyuh is the head. This proves the fact that the so-called orders from the North which Park claimed he had were just made up. It shows that Park not only caused this uprising in South Korea but also deceived his own followers. The only possibility that Park can claim he has connection with the North is because of the following facts: In the latter part of last year, 1945, Park himself wanted to become the head of the All Korean Communist Party, but Kim, Il Sung did not want him to become this leader. Therefore, Kim, Il Sung announced himself as the head of the North Korea Communist Party, thereby blocking Park's plan to become head of the Communist Party of both North and South. For that reason Park did not have the confidence of either Kim, Il Sung or Kim, Doo Bong or any of the leaders--either

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Korean or Russians in North Korea. For that reason it was perhaps natural that this Lucifer planned to work up something in South Korea by which he could establish his prestige and credit in the eyes of the northern leaders and Soviet Russia. And it so happened that there was a man by the name of Moo Chung who was the Commander of the Volunteer Corps of the Korean Independence League, of which Kim, Doo Bong was head, and he had come in to North Korea with Kim, Doo Bong from Yenan. For a time Moo Chung and Kim, Il Sung got along quite well, but Moo Chung somewhat looked down on Kim, Il Sung as he had only been a captain in the Soviet Army, and had only remained in Russia a short time getting training in guerilla warfare, going from there to Manchuria where he organized the Korean and Chinese guerillas. Moo Chung compared Kim, Il Sung to himself. He, himself, was a major general in the 8th route army. So, when the Korean Communist Party in the North (it took a new name when it came into Korea) was changed to the North Korea Labor Party, Moo Chung was left out in the cold, not even getting a seat in the Central Executive Committee. So, Moo himself having become a purse without strings, joined hands with Park, the other purse without strings. Therefore, the so-called secret orders from the North may have originated from Park with the aid of Moo from the North or may have originated from Moo. I don't know. However, Moo was able to send a few official followers down South to help Park in his grand scheme and probably sent some arms. It boils down to the point that Park was the arch fiend in this uprising in the South. I think the CIC or G-2 got wind of some of these facts and I understand Park's arrest was ordered. I still wonder why Park has not yet been arrested in spite of Chief Chang and Dr. Clough's wonderful and most efficient police force."

General Lerch "General Hodge instructed me to say that he had personally directed Chang not to make the arrest of Park and that it would be made by G-2. At the time set by General Hodge for the arrest of Park, when the G-2 operators went after him, he was not there."

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General Brown: "The reason why his arrest was delayed was because there were others to be arrested at the same time and had he been arrested too early, the others would have escaped. As a result, he escaped."

Mr. Kim, Kiusic "I am very glad to hear that, and all I have to say is that Park is a lucky boy. The only reason why I have asked why the Korean police with all its efficiency failed to arrest Park when the arrest was ordered is from the fact that Mr. Chang came to see me one afternoon at my house and said that he had received orders to arrest Park three days after the CIC had these orders. Of course, not being aware of General Lolce's later policy, I was still laboring under the idea that Park's warrant for arrest was still alive. What I wanted to state was that it was easy enough to find out where Park was and perhaps is. I asked a certain friend whether he could find out where Park was and he came two days later and told me that Park had been living somewhere outside the East Gate at a certain place, but he had gone up North. Then someone said a few days ago that Park had been living at a certain place on the east side of the city, inside the city. But the report about Park having gone to the North still remains unverified. I understand that Mr. Lee, Han Yoon, head of the Shin Hin Dang, had been up North quite recently. He came back and said that he had not seen Park in Pyongyang nor was it that he was in Pyongyang. So this wonderful Park is a very evasive character."

Mr. Kang, Kwon made a statement to the following effect: When we heard about the warrant for Park having been issued, had we used all our efforts to arrest him immediately, it might have been accomplished. All the people in town say that Military Government did not really want to arrest him. They wanted to spread news that they were going after him so he would have a chance to escape. It shows how easy it is to mislead people. That is the rumor going around town.

Mr. Kim, Kiusic "Instead of arresting Park and his immediate followers, the Korean police were too busy arresting people in the Shin Hin Dang

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and other people of the Leftist camp who were getting ready to come into the Coalition. That was one of the reasons why the Coalition Committee could not start off for a long while. It even delayed the starting of the legislature campaign."

Mr. Hon, Seh Hoon added that while the police were looking for Park, newspapers were publishing articles that he had contributed. "He was some place in town contributing articles to newspapers and yet he was not arrested. During the time of the Japs that kind of thing never happened."

General Lerch stated that the Japanese had "thought police", and that we have done away with that.

Mr. Hon, Seh Hoon "We agree that Park should be arrested, but instead of arresting him, those people against Park were arrested."

The meeting was adjourned at 1700 hours, to be reconvened on November 12, 1946, at 1330 hours.

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MINUTES

OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE AT 1330, 12 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Bunce

Absent: Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling

KOREAN MEMBERS

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Yoong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong
Lyuh, Woon Hyung

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Herbert Kim

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Dr. Kimm asked the Chairman for a ten day or two week leave of absence since he "has been sentenced to imprisonment in the 29th General Hospital". He stated that it is too early to summarize and make final recommendation on the first four topics on the agenda, but wished to express his personal views, which are chiefly supported by members of the Coalition Committee, on these subjects. These are in effect as follows:

Work of the Conference has been confined to hearing witnesses of one side only, although suggestion (which was outruled) was made in early part of Conference to dispatch persons to the provinces to investigate causes of disturbances and report. Charges have been brought forth from one side and answered by witnesses of other side. Before recommendations are formulated, it would be well to have those making the charges bring in their witnesses to be heard.

Concerning the first two topics on the agenda, from the information given by Colonel Maglin and partially from Dr. Clough, there is no question about there being a certain number of Japanese collaborators in the police force and among Korean personnel in Military Government. Also, the remarks made by General Lerch that certain special investigation groups and committees have been created in connection with Military Government and XXIV Corps indicate the fact that certain undesirable personnel exist among the interpreters in government and

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that there is probably some corruption among the Korean officials. It is the unanimous opinion of Korean members of the Conference and the general opinion of the Korean populace that these elements have been both directly and indirectly responsible for the present disturbances.

We recommend the following remedies for settling disturbances: The Conference should recommend that Military Government with the approval of the Commanding General at least make a gesture to show the Korean public that both the Commanding General and Military Government are working for the benefit of Korean people and are attempting to make improvements and readjustments wherever necessary. (Some Korean members of the Conference advocate a general housecleaning from top to bottom, but most members wish to be tolerant and broad-minded and therefore recommend just a few changes at this time. The police force cannot be improved in one stroke just as "Rome was not built in one day". Before the Conference started, it was his idea that both the head of the National Police and the Metropolitan Police should be replaced since they had the highest responsibility in the police force. However, after due consideration, it is now his opinion that they should not be replaced since they are patriots, and although they may have made mistakes, it does not make them less patriots and they should be treated as such. Their fault lies in the fact that they used and are using some notorious pro-Japanese collaborators in important positions immediately under them.) One of these gestures might be to ask the two top men to remove at least one, two, or three of the most obnoxious and notorious Japanese collaborators immediately under them. Also, a few of the ten chiefs of police stations in Seoul could be replaced, a few out of the 80% of the police chiefs in the nine provinces, and some of the Korean personnel in Military Government could be changed as examples of exemplary replacements. Just a few of these exemplary replacements would be a sufficient gesture to show the Korean people that Military Government as well as the Commanding General sincerely desires a military government which is actually attempting to assist the Korean people. It is the minimum demand

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that the Korean people can make, and it is also the minimum that Military Government and the Commanding General can do if they wish the support of the general Korean populace. It will go a long way to quiet the disturbances and to unmask Park, Heun Young's schemes to create disturbances.

Another gesture could be improvement in the rice program. (He calls the attention of the Conference to Confucius' proverb "Fools advice may also be taken", and stated that while the American officials have promulgated a wise program, the advice of Korean fools might be considered.) The rice collection could be suspended for the time being. The reason could be that it is harvest time, harvesting has been delayed, especially in the southern provinces, and the people in the country are busy putting away provisions such as kim-chi for the winter. "For the time being" could mean an indefinite period. Then since there could be no reason for farmers to leave their harvesting, provincial disturbances could quiet down. In the meantime, the rice rationing system could be improved. This improvement together with the suspension of rice collection would remove the causes utilized by agitators in creating disturbances. Also, it would weaken the black market and bring down the cost of rice. An effort should also be made to improve free transportation, if possible. All these things would go a long way in winning the hearty support and confidence of the Korean people. While the rice collection is suspended, Military Government could take the time to train the rice collection staff. Military Government has used good radio broadcasts requesting the people to support the rice collection program. Along with this, they should train collectors to collect in a legitimate and proper manner. He cited the cases of farmers who have been browbeaten in attempts to make them produce bags of grain which they do not have, and suggested that incidents such as these be investigated.

General Brown announced that Chang, Taik Sang was ready to appear before the Conference. He added that Dr. Chough will be available on Thursday and Colonel Robinson will be prepared to come before the Conference on Friday to discuss the fifth topic. He further stated that if any person wished to call any person before the Conference to let

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he know.

Mr. Lyuh stated it was evident he had missed a great deal of the discussion concerning the police and the feeling of the people toward them. He concurred with Dr. Kim's suggestion to make a gesture in regard to the police, but does not feel we should say which of the police should be dismissed. He feels it is important that pro-Japanese elements in the police force be eliminated, but he thinks we need to go further into the attitude of the police. He has the feeling that the police are not the neutral protectors of the people, but are the organ of one party and one individual. If the attitude of the police is not changed from partisanship to that of neutral protectors of the public, the removal of a few individuals would not remedy the trouble. The police and the workers of the Department of Justice in any country are not forbidden to belong to a political party, but it is forbidden that they use their official position for political objectives. Dr. Clough was one of the founders of the Han Kook Min Ju Dang (Korean Democratic Party) in September 1945, and was very active in that organization until he became Director of National Police and at that time severed his connections with the party. When the Han Kook Min Ju Dang was organized, one of their objectives was the attack of and elimination of Lyuh, Woon Hyung. He believes that Dr. Clough as Director of the police has used this office to further the objective of his political party - to eliminate the influence of Lyuh, and Lyuh has had no freedom of mind. Whenever he leaves his home, the police discover where he has stayed and search each place. His bodyguards have been questioned and mistreated by the police, until now his bodyguards consist of members of his family. The police have searched his house a number of times and have mistreated his wife. One time when he was not at home three policemen spent the entire day at his house ostensibly to protect him and his home, but Lyuh does not believe that was the purpose. The homes of other Leftists were similarly taken care of by the police at the time of the celebration of the Leftist Day of Commemoration.

Lyuh recalled the time when Syngman Rhee went on a speaking tour and the police were out in force to protect him. Lyuh and his bodyguards had been stopped by the police on that occasion and examined. He said

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it was a bit awkward to make representation of personal matters, but he would go on oath that No Duk Sool had restrained his chauffeur and told him not to associate with Lyuh and had also asked the chauffeur to make a donation to the Han Kook Min Ju Dang. Members of the Department of Justice have said that if facts could be shown that Lyuh had associations with the Japanese, they would certainly sentence him. Lyuh would welcome such an investigation of himself.

Mr. Lyuh also feels that the police should be cognizant of those who are the leaders of the disturbances in their provinces, and if they do not know they are deficient in their duties as policemen. He thinks they let the leaders go free and apprehend the leftists.

Regarding rice collection, Mr. Lyuh does not feel that the police should be used in this collection - that any rice collection program that envisages the use of the police cannot help but result in disorder on the part of the people. He has heard that the police demand a certain quota from farmers, if they cannot meet this quota they are arrested and charged ¥100 a day for board; consequently, they borrow from their neighbors in order to meet the quota. He had also heard that those who could not fill their barley quota last summer had their rice quota increased to make up for this shortage.

Freedom from fear was one of the things that the Korean people had looked forward to with liberation, but now most of the people are fearful of the police and avoid them. Some of the policemen were notorious in the time of the Japanese and still are; they are abusing their powers.

Mr. Chang, Taik Sang was introduced to the Conference as a witness and questioned by the Chairman. Testimony follows:

Chairman: Would you like to make a statement before I ask you questions? I want to say in the beginning that the purpose of this Conference is to try to find out what has caused and is causing the disturbances in South Korea. The Conference is not investigating any individual, nor is it attempting to place blame on any individual. The Conference is trying to find the broad causes in order to try and find remedies. Will you please inform the Conference of the position you occupy in the police force.

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A. I am the Assistant Director for the First Police Area and also Chief of the Metropolitan Police.

Q. How long have you been a member of the Korean police force?

A. Since the 12th of January, this year.

Dr. Kim. Who is Director of the First Area?

A. Dr. Chough is the Director of the Police Department for all South Korean police.

Q. To your knowledge is there much dishonesty in the police force?

A. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Q. What methods are utilized to combat dishonesty in the police force?

A. There are several ways of treating dishonesty in our police force. These are the dismissal, reduction of salary and suspension from duty. Such punishments are meted out to those who are discovered dealing dishonestly in the police force.

Q. This Conference has been informed that many Koreans who served as policemen under the Japanese have been taken in as members of the police force. To what extent is this correct?

A. As far as I know the percentage of Japanese servicemen in the police force is about 15 percent - that is to say in the officer classes. But as far as patrolmen are concerned, they occupy most of the places. They are employed for their technical training, etc., but we are training new men for service for the future.

Q. Do you know to what extent the officers and non-commissioned officers of the police force of your area are persons who had previous service in the Japanese police force?

A. There are about 4,000 policemen under my direction at the present time, and the former Japanese police officers are not more than 85 at the most at the present time.

Q. How many officers serve under you in Area A?

A. Including lieutenants and above, about 600 officers - excluding sergeants.

Q. Of these approximately 600 officers, how many had service in the police force under the Japanese?

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A. The 85 officers that I spoke of a few minutes ago are in the classes of captains and section chiefs, but when it comes to including lieutenants I think a total of over 400 officers served under the Japanese regime.

Q. Of those 600 officers, about how many hold the class of captain and higher?

A. I have 10 captains under my control and 6 section chiefs under my control at the present time.

Q. Of those 10 captains and 6 section chiefs, how many had prior experience under the Japanese?

A. Eight of them are former experienced officers.

Q. What efforts have been made to eliminate Japanese police practices from the Korean police force?

A. This is the list of police officers under my control at the present time - new members of the police. These men came to the police force since I came in last January, and I am training them as future members of the staff. By March next year I think these men will take the places of present men. This is my program at the present time. This will show that I am trying my best to change the staff members of our police force. This is confidential material in the police records and it would result in dissatisfaction if it were prematurely disclosed. I ask that the members of the Conference observe that this list of a confidential nature.

Chairman: I would like again to caution the Conference that everything said in this room is confidential.

Mr. Chang. This list of police officers is strictly secret because if this list is known to present officers, there would be much uneasiness among the police officers. This is the first time I have exposed this to any person at all, and I ask that you keep this list strictly secret.

Q. In your two provinces, how many police stations are there in your area?

A. I have ten stations under my control at the present time, that is in the city of Seoul. I used to have the whole province under my direct control, but Division A is divided from Division M and is going

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to the Division A chief.

Q. You do not control the provinces of Kyonggi-do and Kangwon-Do?

A. No, I supervise them.

Q. How many police stations in the two provinces of Kyonggi-do and Kangwon-Do?

A. There are about 35 police stations in Kyonggi-do province, including the ten stations in the city of Seoul. But I cannot tell the exact number in Kangwon-Do.

Q. Of these 35, do you know how many chiefs have had prior experience under the Japanese police force?

A. I think most of them are of former experience under the Japanese except the one at Inch'on.

Q. What is the method of appointment of chiefs of these police stations and who appoints them?

A. The method of appointment is generally that we hold a conference in our office and I gather the opinions of the different section chiefs, and if a man is recommended by a section chief then I recommend him to the Director of the Police Department. They generally accept that recommendation.

Q. What part do the police play in the rice collection and distribution program?

A. Generally speaking, the police have no business in rice collection, but for the purpose of cooperating with the Governor of Kyonggi-do Province instructions were issued to the different captains to cooperate with the Governor for the rice collection and collection of other grain.

Q. The police then are used in any manner in which the Governor wishes to use them?

A. I do not think so. The Governor makes a request for the cooperation in the rice collection and I use my own discretion in doing so. As an example, in the collection of summer grains the request was made for the apprehension of certain individuals. The matter was taken up with General Lerch, and in general it was not felt to be a good policy. We arrest those who incite the people not to turn over the rice. On things like that we do not hesitate in making arrests because they are in strict opposition to the policy of Military Government.

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Q. Did any case come to your attention in the summer grain collection where the police acted without authority in arresting persons for failing to turn over their grain?

A. We had more trouble with the people who incited the peasants not to turn over their rice, but we never had any illegal arrests as far as the police in Kyunggi Do province.

Q. Is it true that most of the leaders of the police force belong to the Rightist parties?

A. I have heard that said for a long time. We have no affiliation with any political party. The police are the agents of the people and do not have time to mix with the political situation at all.

Q. Is it true that the police have recently attempted to destroy the strength of the Leftist party by arresting Leftists without cause?

A. I have some more concrete evidence for these charges. We are not arresting Leftists or Rightists. We are rounding up criminals, lawbreakers, disturbers of the peace. We do not know one from the other. There is so much agitation in the city, we do not have time to find out who are Leftists and who are Rightists.

Q. Does the Korean National Police under your control utilize Rightist youth organizations in enforcing the law?

A. That is a thing which is strictly prohibited by express order of General Hodge and Colonel Maglin. Any policeman, whenever he is discovered taking the side of Rightist or Leftist organizations, is immediately dismissed from the service. We received orders from General Lerch and Colonel Maglin that if anyone takes sides with a political organization, the man, whether he is a captain or patrolman, is immediately dismissed from the service.

Q. This Conference has been informed that during the recent disturbances, certain youth organizations were used by the police in putting down the disturbances--that these organizations were not police. Is that true?

A. That needs more conclusive evidence. Whenever a disturbance happens in this city, some members of young men's organizations run around like rats after a flood. We do not know who is who. The police

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never took them for their supporters or anything of the kind, to my knowledge. They may run after the police, but the police never have anything to do with them at all.

Q. Do you use or allow to be used any corporal punishment or intimidation such as torture, beating or otherwise in connection with arrests?

A. This list will show you gentlemen what method I use for the punishment of the policemen who use violence against peaceful citizens without reason. Since I came into the police force last January, I have had dismissed and reduced salaries and suspended from duty 53 policemen from lieutenants to patrolmen. This will show you what steps we take against any policeman using such methods on peaceful citizens.

Q. Is the Yung Dong Po Police Station within your area?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It has been stated before this Conference that of certain persons recently confined to the police station there, two were killed and a third injured by mistreatment. Can you comment on that?

A. I have heard the story before, and I investigated the whole thing from top to bottom. I found that nothing, as far as this statement, was co firmed. If any gentlemen wish to establish the facts, I want you to send a committee for the full investigation of this matter and verify it from beginning to end.

Q. To your knowlege, has there been any failure on the police force's part to serve a warrant for the arrest of Park, Heun Young?

A. We never received any order to arrest Mr. Park at all, but after a while we received an order from Colonel Nist of the C.I.C. to look for Park, but there was an order from General Hodge not to interfere with Colonel Nist at all. When the order came for the arrest of Park, General Hodge set the time. When that time came, I understand Mr. Park was already gone. General Lerch, General Hodge, and Colonel Maglin will verify that fact.

Q. Do you have any statements you wish to make to this Conference.

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Exhibit 10

A. I have no particular statement I wish to make, but I have drawn up a paper which might be used as a reference.

Q. Will you present it.

(Mr. Chang presents paper to General Brown)

Q. Will you translate it into Korean?

(Mr. Chang translates same orally into Korean)

This paper is attached hereto as an exhibit.

Q. There are reports that the Han Kook Chung Hun Dai (National Reconstruction Youth Organization) helped the police to quell the disturbances and riots in the Seoul area. Do you know whether or not this is correct?

A. I am looking for the chairman of the Han Kook Chung Hun Dai. How can I ask their support as far as the police is concerned. I can ot catch him yet. I am looking for Mr. Dai, the chairman of the Han Kook Chung Hun Dai. How can I ask for the support of that organization whose chairman I am looking for?

Q. How about the Chai Kook Tang Ee Chun Hun (Motherland Defense Front) who attacked members of youth organizations and seriously beat them?

A. I never heard of the name of that association and I do not know of any beating case. No report came into my hands. It is the first time I ever heard of the Chai Kook Tang Ee Chun Hun or anything of the kind. There are so many I do not remember them all. As far as the beating, we have received no report to that effect yet. The trouble with some of these people is that instead of reporting the case to the police, they take the case to General Hodge and General Lerch directly, and we do not know anything about it until an order comes from the top to investigate the whole case. We have many instances of those things.

General Brown: Does any member of the Conference have any questions to ask Chief Chang?

Dr. Bunce: Why do people not report to the police?

Mr. Chang: As far as my experience is concerned, the Leftist do not

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report cases because from the beginning to the end, they do not intend to cooperate with Military Government. As far as my knowledge is concerned, they generally take the case up direct to General Hodge or General Lerch. That is my experience. I do not know what the real nature of that is.

Mr. Yon: The public has the general impression that Mr. Chang is a member of the Han Kook Min Ju Dang (Democratic Party). Is that true? Mr. Chai, Ryong for his actions against some people has gotten to the place where these people are griting their teeth in hatred of him. Can Mr. Chang rest in peace with such an officer in his employ?

Mr. Chang: There is no use for me to say I am not a member of the Democratic Party. I want you gentlemen to go to that party and examine the records. I do not belong to any political party at all. As the chairman of that party. He must know I do not belong to the Democratic Party. As for Mr. Chai, he was dismissed a month ago.

Mr. Yon: If he was dismissed, how come he has been seen riding around in a police car as an adviser?

Mr. Chang: As far as Mr. Chai was concerned, he was deputy chief in the police forces before I came in. I do not know his personal record because he was not a police officer in Korea proper, as far as I know. He had done something in North Korea. When I came in, he was already a high officer in the Police Department. I found him very experienced, and he was a capable man so I used him as one of my important officers, but when people began to talk about his former service, he was dismissed from the service a month ago. He had done lots of good things in our department and for that he was given the title of supervisor for a length of time--that is only a question of time. He will be gone before long.

Mr. Choi made the statement that it must be a mistake on the part of one of the police stations if the report did not come to him (Mr. Chang) of his personal experience the other night--one which he explained in a previous meeting.

Mr. Chang stated that he would investigate it at once.

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Mr. Kon stated that he had a list of names of people who he had heard had been pro-Japanese collaborators, telling what they did under the Japanese, and that he was giving this list to Mr. Chang for what it was worth to him, and that the list indicates how these men are signboards to the people of the policy of the police force. General Brown asked that this list be turned over to Lieutenant Wilkinson to be copied into the record and to have translated.

Exhibit A

I. Chang: Wait until March and we can get this whole thing cleaned up. In March all the difficulties of these pro-Japanese will be cleared up.

Dr. Kimm reminded Mr. Chang that the Joint Conference is not meeting to find fault with the Korean police force or Korean officials in Military Government but to assist them, and that it is solely attempting to investigate the causes of the present disturbances in South Korea and to make recommendations as to how to quiet or prevent these disturbances. He further stated that we cannot wait until next March, as Mr. Chang suggested, to make our recommendations since these disturbances are still occurring.

General Brown concurred in Dr. Kimm's statement, and General Hodge also concurred and added that his statement represented the attitude of the Conference.

Mr. Lyuh stated that he would either speak personally with Mr. Chang or write him expressing his complaints--search without warrant, molesting, etc.

General Brown asked that he be furnished with a copy of the statement so that it may be transmitted to Military Government for investigation.

The meeting adjourned at 15/0 hours to be reconvened again on Thursday 14 November 1946.

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MINUTES

OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 14 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch
Dr. A. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. L. Bunce

Absent: Brig. Gen. C. S. Helmick
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Teuk Syung

KOREAN MEMBERS

Lee, Seh Loon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Poong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong
Lyuh, Yoon Hyung

Absent: Dr. Kimm, Klusic

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

The Chairman proceeded with the further questioning of Mr. Clough.

Q. In your knowledge is there much dishonesty in the police force?

A. Inasmuch as the police itself is a human organization, I imagine there must be some degree of dishonesty within our force, and since some disciplinary measures have been taken, I must admit that there is some degree of dishonesty in our force. The figure at the end of September 1946 was about 1,100 persons dismissed or punished by these measures. This figure includes all serious cases of misconduct. I believe that 30% of this number were reprimanded for dishonesty in the force.

Q. What measures are used to combat dishonesty?

A. We have primarily two measures to deal with this. Negatively, we punish any and all members of the police force who abuse their official power by dishonesty and misconduct. Positively, since most of these dishonest cases perhaps may be caused by environment and high cost of living, we have submitted a plan by which we are going to improve their living conditions. Those plans are in the hands of Military Government at the present time.

Q. Statements have been made to the Conference that many Koreans who served as policemen under the Japanese have been taken in as members of the police force. To what extent is this statement correct?

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A. I want to submit these figures first. According to the figures obtained 30 April 1946, about 23% are those who served under the Japanese regime and 77% of those men were newly recruited. However, the ratio that exists in the commissioned officer ranks is somewhat different. I do not think these figures are totally correct, but I think about 60% of the officers are those men who served under the Japanese regime and 40% are those that have been newly recruited. I have to admit that it is a fact that we have many persons who served under the Japanese regime. Further, we are using these men of experience on a certain conviction that we have in our mind. As you know, the Director of National Police--perhaps the Vice of the Division-- can be a civilian who has had no experience at all in the affairs of the police. However, captains of stations or chiefs of sections must have a certain amount of experience in order to discharge their duties as police. This is true about other nations too. The Anglo-Saxon race highly values experience highly. I personally appreciate and highly value the Anglo-Saxon opinion of experience because the trouble with us Koreans is we minimize the value of experience too much. I am in favor of employing elementary experience. However, we have two limitations in recruiting men. First, we do not use the element consisting of those who for the sake of promoting their personal interests are abusing their official power or hampering national duties so that they cause notoriety and enmity of the people and the value of their service is made null and void. Second, as you know, under the Japanese police system, in the central bureau of the police, there is a section of public safety. That section is the political police. I have in the provincial level two sections--the high police and the crime section. The high police deal with political crimes, and the crime section deals with ordinary social crimes. In the local police stations, there are two sub-sections--high police stations and ordinary crime sections. It is our policy not to use any men connected with the police section of the national bureau because those men were dealing with political crimes, or any men who were connected with high provincial scale or high police of local scale, because those

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sections were chiefly in charge of dealing with political criminals from a Japanese standpoint. Most nationals were persecuted and thrown into jail by members of that section. These are two limitations we have in dealing with these men. However, even now, there are among our ranks some men who were connected with the high police because of lack of information and not being able to find out about the exact status of their personal histories. However, there is a plan to weed them out entirely from our police force. As a practical program, as you know, we have what we call zone directors and assistant directors in charge of police zones. The chief function of that office is to investigate personnel problems of different divisions. We have ordered the directors and assistant directors to investigate immediately and carefully the present status of all these officers in our police, especially whether or not they were connected with the high police under the Japanese regime. As soon as the reports come into our hands, we will begin to take measures in those cases to realize our set policy. On the remaining question of this. Are you intending to use these men in connection with the highest police in the future? It is my personal judgment that we are going to use them because we value their services very highly. As you remember, even the Russians themselves after the revolution decided to use experienced men in organizing the police and the regular army. That can be verified by the minutes of the Communist Party Conference held in 1923, and furthermore I believe most of these men who served under the Japanese police are good, lonely men. Personally I do not like to class a man pro-Japanese. Thirty-six years is a long time. In order to maintain family affairs and daily existence, they were obliged to serve in that particular field they were thrown in. That is the way I look at it. If you want to push this so-called pro-Japanese problem to a logical conclusion, I do not see how we can organize a police force in Korea. How can we come to a logical conclusion if we have to throw them all out. There is some social consideration to it. Even patriots like Dr. Rhee are considered as pro-Japanese today.

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Q. What efforts have been made to eliminate Japanese police practices in the police force?

A. We are striving now with all our powers to drive out these bad elements of the Japanese police system in our Korean police in order to establish a real democratic police in Korea. We have punished 260 men because of misconduct--practicing Japanese methods such as torture, maltreatment, etc. Of those tried by the provost court or civil court in Korea, 12 of them are serving now in prison; 128 were discharged from duty because of misconduct. We have more detailed figures according to divisions, etc. which will be supplied at your request.

Q. In yo r opinion, will it be practical to get the Korean people to respect the police force with these former Japanese employees as officers?

A. Yes, sir. With the limitations I have set, we are contented that the National Police, including the former Japanese ex-servicemen, will be highly honored and respected by the whole Korean people. It has been claimed by some elements of society that our present rice situation was created because of common enmity against the police. It is far from the fact. I inspected 15 guns in one province and 11 guns in another, and although I do not want to say this, I must tell the facts. I was highly respected, not as an individual, but as Director of the National Police. Therefore, I am contented that our Korean National Police is well respected and honored by all the people.

Q. What part do the police play in the rice collection and distribution program?

A. As law enforcing agent of the government, the police has only the right to deal with those men who disrupt the rice collection law. There are duty ends and are powers are limited. However, in some isolated cases, some of the police, over zealous and concerned with the rice program, I believe, went beyond their power and duty prescribed by national law. Thereby they got a certain degree of criticism from the public.

Q. Is the police force large enough to perform their duties in connection with the rice collection and enforcing laws?

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A. As a whole, the number of police is sufficient to enforce rice collection. However, until and when an efficient Coast Guard is established to protect coastlines in Korea, it is my opinion that we should increase the number of police so that they can protect coastlines in order to check the smuggling of rice. That plan is in the hands of the Military Governor at the present time for his consideration.

Q. Do the police have any responsibility for enforcing price ceiling laws?

A. When an inspector of the Rice Administration Office turns certain cases over to us, it is our business to make further investigation and send them to the civil court.

Q. Do you have any figures which show how much rice has been confiscated from hoarders so far this year?

A. I am sorry I am not prepared to answer that question by figures. However, I will have those figures ready for you within a reasonable time.

Q. It is not necessary to furnish those figures. I thought you might have them. Do you have any figures showing how many persons have been prosecuted for hoarding rice this year?

A. I am not ready to answer that question.

Q. Do poverty-stricken refugees play much part in causing difficulty in enforcing the law at this time.

A. This problem is a serious one. Unless we solve this problem carefully, it will be very difficult, and these people will create criminal, social, and political difficulties in South Korea.

Q. In what way are these people causing difficulty to the police?

A. Many of them are engaged in criminal acts such as thefts and robberies, and also because of difficulties in living, most of these men are engaged in all kinds of illegal acts such as the recent riots in South Korea.

Q. What part do habitual criminals play in the difficulties experienced by you in enforcing law and order?

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A. These ex-convicts and habitual criminals are really the ones who are making much of the criminal trouble in Korea today. Under the Japanese regime, the police had the right to check up on the population every three or six months, according to law. Thereby, they could check on the floating population, but at the present time, our police are not allowed to carry on those activities. It is difficult to check up on habitual criminals, and there are some with criminals tendencies among the war refugee population.

Q. In your opinion, should there be some system devised for permitting a check-up on such persons?

A. Yes, sir. I believe that we must have two systems of checking them. One plan is to establish some kind of identification card showing that a person is a citizen of South Korea because there are many scoundrels coming from North of the 38th, etc. At present there is no way of checking up on them. The second plan is to have the power of investigating households every so often--say every period of three months, to check up on the population.

Q. Is it true that most of the leaders of the police force belong to the Rightist political party?

A. I believe some of them may belong to some political parties, but most of them are not party members.

Q. Is it true that the police force has recently attempted to destroy the strength of the Leftist party by arresting leftists without cause?

A. No, that is very wrong. We have not arrested any more from the Leftists without cause. All those arrested have committed actual crimes. There may be some isolated cases that have not come to my knowledge. To my knowledge, there has been no instances where members of the Leftist parties are arrested without cause.

Q. To what extent do politics influence the organization and operation of the police force?

A. Politics have no business at all in our National Police. As far as the National Police is concerned, we are putting all political parties on the same level. This is; we have them on the same footing

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as long as those organizations carry on activities within the bounds of law. If they go beyond the bounds of law, we deal with them sternly, whether Rightist, Leftists, Red, or White.

Q. Does the Korean National Police discriminate in favor of Rightist parties in any way?

A. In my judgement, an overwhelming majority of the Korean people are Rightist in thinking and acts. Therefore, in my judgment, the great majority of the Korean National Police as individuals are partial to ideas characterized by Rightists. Therefore, as human beings, unconsciously they may exercise their official power in favor of Rightists, but this is not legally allowed by our National Police. We are discussing this problem as persons engaged in serving a common cause utterly and sincerely. This is my story. In accordance my official powers, I have traditional convictions. I exercise of that power may base on my personal convictions. My convictions are that in the first place, no dictatorship shall be allowed in South Korea. Only a genuine, true democracy shall be allowed. In the second place, no revolutionary or destructive methods may be allowed in building a new Korea. Third, nobody should be allowed to hurt our friendly relations with our Allies, especially those Allies who are sincere and who are able to assist our Korean people in realizing our aims and endeavors.

Q. Have the Korean National Police utilized Rightist organizations, particularly against leftists, during the present disturbances and regardless of the participants in the riots or not.

A. It is the policy of the National Department of Police to try not to use so-called Rightist youth organizations to deal with leftist organizations. However, in connection with the situation in Kyongsang Pukto, there are some youth organization who cooperated with our police in defending our police stations and government organizations. However, so far as the police are concerned, we do not regard them as Rightist organizations. We only regard them as youthful citizens of that community who are cooperating with the police in defending our public institutions. In that respect our Department approved it.

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Q. To your knowledge, during the recent elections have any unauthorized organizations arrested Leftists and cross-examined them?

A. I have no knowledge of such facts.

Q. Do the National Police, on their own initiative, make political arrests, exercise surveillance over political activity, investigate political plotting, and perform functions which might be called national security measures, or do they do these things only on orders from the American Army authorities?

A. Our National Police does not exercise at all the power of national civil law. It is not our practice to check on political movements of leftist or rightist parties, nor have we received any orders from the American Army to check on movements of political parties, especially leftist parties. If any arrests or investigations were made, they were based on the judgment of police chiefs or commanders of divisions based on information that some kind of criminal action was going on.

Q. Do you have any knowledge that in Sangju, although there were no disturbances, leftists have been arrested and four of them were beaten to death.

A. In answer to this question, I inspected Sangju about the end of last month myself, and I heard the report from the chief of that province that about forty or fifty men got together and conspired to attack Sangju station. That is the reason they held some prominent members of political organizations in that region. They were in the cells at the time. The leader, Kang Hoon, escaped and was being sought then. I have not heard the fact that four men were killed.

Q. It was stated that in Sangju, Cho, Yong Kern and his son were arrested and detained for fifteen days, that he was made to pay ¥50,000, and that the police did this on the pretext that Cho Yong Kern contributed money to Kang Hoon of the People's Committee. Do you have any knowledge of that accusation?

A. I have no knowledge of this fact and will investigate it immediately and thoroughly.

Q. Do you know whether or not it is true that Kang, Soo Chang was

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Q. Is it true that Kang, Soo Chang has been restored to the position of vice chief of the police force of Kyongsang-Pukto Province? If so, do you know why this action was taken.

A. It is a fact that I as Director of National Police removed, in consultation with Major Slaghtery and another major down there, Mr. Kang from the office of deputy chief and reinstated him because, although he has no police experience, he is a man with strong will power and patriotism and is well respected by the many people of Kyongsang-Pukto, where he was born. My firm conviction is that of all these new men with no service he will be a competent police officer in the region.

Q. It has been reported to this Conference that on the 30th of June 1946, No, Duk Sool, Chief of the Detective Bureau of the First District, called on Chung, Hyung Mook, the owner of the Kyung Sung garage, and told him to cease all relations with Mr. Lyuh, Woon Hyung and in particular not to lend him a car. It is also reported that Chief No demanded that Mr. Chung contribute at least one million yen to the Han Kook Min Ju Dang or suffer due consequences. It is further reported that sometime later Mr. Chung, Hyung Moo, the brother of Chung, Hyung Mook, and Mr. Lyuh's chauffeur were arrested by the Korean National Police and detained for one week. It is also reported that Mr. Kim, Yong Ki, one of Mr. Lyuh's body guards, was also arrested by Chief No, Duk Sool and beaten up. If you have knowledge of these facts, can you make a statement concerning the allegation?

A. As regards this order not to give or lend any car to Mr. Lyuh, I checked that up with both Mr. Chung, Hyung Mook and Mr. No this morning. I found that Detective No was investigating the case of one Lyuh Soon, chief of a section of Division A, with the charge that he was exposing secrets of a police organization to outside parties, and our police found out that he was closely connected with Chung, Hyung Mook. Inasmuch as this Chung had known Lyuh for four or five years he made some kind of statement in a mood of a plea that because he lent a car to Mr. Lyuh he had been classifiedby outside people as "red" or "left". I think in that conversation Mr. No made some kind of a remark about

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why should he lend his car to Mr. Lyuh. That is the gist of the statement received from Mr. Yo and verified by Mr. Chung, Hyung Mook. A written report will be made and in your hands before long. The second case about asking for one million yen is entirely wrong, according to both Mr. Yo and Mr. Chung, Hyung Mook in my office this morning. These two men were arrested in connection with the arrest of Park, Hyung Young. According to the reports, this particular chauffeur had used Park's car many times. On that information, our police were obliged to take this man in to find out as to where Mr. Park was. As this man Chung, Hyung Moo and Park's chauffeur were invited by the Russian Consulate and given a party - on the basis of that information these men were arrested and also to find out where Park was. This man Lim, Yong Mi was held by our police in the Central Station in Seoul on August 12th on the information that he was hiding a great deal of dynamite in his house. The police investigated his house but could not find any amount of dynamite at all. However, they discovered a great quantity of hand bills, and one of the statements on the bills was that all the officers of Military Government should quit their jobs. That is the reason our police held him and he was being investigated. Mr. Lyuh made a personal request to Chief Chang and also to Colonel Naglin. He asked our police to place him on probation. He was investigated and turned over to the Provo Court and then set free. Those are the facts I have. According to investigation, this man is not a body guard of Mr. Lyuh.

Q. Do you use or allow to be used any corporal punishment or intimidation by beating, torture or otherwise in questioning or examining those suspects arrested or brought before the police?

A. We of the Korean National Police are doing everything possible to build up democratic methods and practices. Any members of the Korean National Police found abusing their power by inhuman methods are severely punished. Many cases are turned over to the Provo Court, and a great many of those are discharged or punished by such disciplinary measures as suspension from duty, demotion or reduction in salary. Up

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to the end of October, 266 were punished either by legal measures or disciplinary measures. The Korean National Police is only one year old in tradition. I am conscious of the fact that the police must be polished and for the most part improved. We are now carrying out an ambitious program to democraticize our police through educational measures. The National Police have an independent bureau for police education, whose function it is to formulate education and to carry on extra-educational enterprises such as publication of magazines, moving pictures, etc. At the present time there are some isolated cases where the Korean Police abuse their power, but please remember that changes cannot be made overnight. A police system like all other social organizations is largely determined by social history and social tradition. Even the advanced nations such as Spain and Italy have not completed a democratic police system as yet because of their social background. The general public must also know and appreciate the true meaning of democracy. In my judgment it is unfortunate that the general public loses the balance of thought in mixing up the main issue and the side issues. There seems to be a great tendency to emphasize the abuse of power on the part of the police.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of two men being recently beaten to death in the YongDung-Po prison?

A. I have tried very hard to find out this fact. I have not been able to find out that there were two men killed at YongDung-Po prison. I have made a thorough investigation into the matter and have found that there never was such a case as referred to just now. There was no such person by the name of _____ who died of torture or natural causes. At present there is held in YongDung-Po station a suspect named _____, a name somewhat similar, but he is strong and healthy now. In recent months we have on record two cases of loss of life in that station. One is the murder case, the other death caused by physiological disorder. On 29 September 1946 a rightist, Lee Chei Sun, was beaten up by a leftist, Chuoo Kyu Sun, and he died on 30 September 1946. Kwan Kil Choi was held on the request of the Angyang

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Police Station on 22 October 1946 and he died on 23 October 1946. A doctor in Seoul certified that the man died of heart trouble.

In response to personal reprimands by Mr. Won in regard to pro-Japanese elements within the police, Dr. Chough read statements to the following effect: About the month of December of last year we had two difficulties with out police - one was internal and the other external. Within the rank of the police there was a tendency on the part of new men not to be willing to obey the old hands - that was internal. Externally we were receiving severe criticism from the public regarding so-called bad elements within our police. At the first conference of police chiefs held in the middle of December I made a statement and released it to the press. Statements were also made in March and April. This was also reiterated at the conference of police chiefs held July 17th. Except for the element of ex-servicemen, all members of the police were to be equally treated - whether they were old or new. They are expected to be honorable and loyal members of the police. But the bad elements - those ex-servicemen who for the sake of promoting their personal interest and personal advancement abused their official power, hampered our national movement and crucified those patriots engaged in national movement to such a degree that they received public notoriety and condemnation. It is for their own benefit and for the honor of the police that they should withdraw or be made to withdraw from the service. That is about the statement I made and released to the press conference to emphasize this point. After the arrival of General Lerch and Colonel Maglin our police, as well as Military Government, was able to centralize our investigations. This was sent out from Colonel Maglin on January 14, 1946: It is the desire of the office of Public Safety to have experienced policemen - those considered reputable. Some Korean police accepted advancement under the Japanese regime because of ambition and desire to make the most of their talents, yet were able to retain the respect of the Korean people. Others accepted advancement and used vicious practices under the Japanese, thereby incurring the hatred

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of the Koreans. The value of the latter, even though they are efficient, is made null and void by their reputation and standing with the Koreans and other members of the police. Military Government has no intention of retaining the services of those whose services are harmful to us in spite of their efficiency and experience.

Chairman: Dr. Clough, you have read a directive dated in January 1946 which indicates that the Military Government was anxious to remove those police who had served under the Japanese and who were not exercising their police duties in an democratic manner. What progress has been made in carrying that directive into force?

A. I have tried my best to weed out these so-called malignent elements from our service. Perhaps there is a complaint that we are in slow motion; however, the slowness in carrying out this policy has been due to three facts: First, time is required to carefully and fairly investigate all personnel and their personal worth. Second, we are always confronted with the serious problems of preserving peace, so our major effort and time has been given to that practical problem. Third, I could not be in the service half a year or a year without due consideration of the careful investigation of myself. Due to these factors, the carrying out of this policy has been somewhat slow. However, some time ago my assistant director was charged with making a careful and prompt investigation in connection with this problem and I expect a report in a very short time.

Q. There is before this Conference certain figures showing the number of former Japanese policemen in the police force. These figures are not of great value. I am going to ask that you send to this Conference not later than Monday the following information:

(1) The total strength of the police force.

(2) The total number of those who have had experience under the Japanese as policemen.

(3) The number of area chiefs.

(4) The number of area chiefs who had service under the Japanese.

(5) The same information for provincial chiefs.

(6) The same information for district chiefs.

(7) The same information for police captains not included in the above category.

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(8) The same information for lieutenants.

(9) The same information for sergeants.

(10) The same information forall other grades.

This information is to be furnished as of the latest available date. Also give any additional information you have that will cast a light on this problem - for instance, the number discharged or separated since you came into office.

Mr. Yon made following statements as reference and did not want any replies. He pointed out that of the Japanese practices covered in the period of 36 years the one that received the greatest enmity on the part of the populace was the police. The police under the Japanese could be divided into three groups:

(1) The thought police or internal security police - experienced in espionage affairs.

(2) The high police or political police.

(3) The criminal police.

The matter of the thought police was cleared up in the newspaper statements referred to by Mr. Clough. The second group were the fellows who feathered their nests and action should be taken in regard to them. He has the greatest sympathy for the third group, and believes that experienced men for the police should be chosen from this group. He understands that it is difficult for Mr. Cho to dismiss men who have worked for him for six or seven months without thorough investigation. He submitted the following names of those in high positions who should be further investigated:

(1) Chang, Chai Kwan of South Kyongsang Province - he was for five years reported in this higher political section of the Japanese police.

(2) Kang, Nak Choong of the same province, reported to have been for 12 years in this higher political police.

(3) Ha, Pan Hak - he was for 11 years also in this higher thought police.

(4) Kim, Kwang Ho - for 8 years also in the thought police.

(5) Lee Koo Bum - he was in the higher grade of political police.

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Heard he was up at Kaesong but was driven out and came to Seoul - he is presently in Seoul.

(6) Choy, Oon Ha - now in the Detective Section. Was formerly also in the higher detective section of the political police.

(7) Hong, Tack Hee - similarly placed in the Detective Section.

(8) Park, Choi Soo - the man in charge of Chun-la Northern and Southern Province. He was a captain in the time of the Japanese in the internal safety police. Reports have it that that fellow strutted around the city in a Japanese hoare coat.

Dr. Chough reported that Mr. Ha has been taken care of, that Mr. Kang, Mr. Choy and Mr. Hong are on his black list, he does not know about Mr. Chang. As for Mr. Park, he is assistant director of the second zone, also head of a gun and head of a public safety section. He has nothing to do with the higher police, and is respected by all. He was one of the four candidates submitted by the advisory council of Kyonggi-do when they decided upon Chief Chang. He had not heard about him being seen wearing a Japanese costume but said he will check that more carefully and assured the Conference that both Colonel Maglin and he would be very faithful to carry out the original policy set a long time ago.

Mr. Kon stated that he felt very stongly that until the chiefs of police in South Korea have been changed, the people will not be content and a solution will not be attained.

General Brown stated that we are cognizant of the problems which Dr. Chough as the Commissioner of Police has to deal with. He also thought that it was not the desire of the Conference to weaken the police force in any way.

Mr. Ahn said that in general the public opinion seems to be that our Conference here has settled upon the police question as being the chief cause of the disturbance in South Korea, whereas we know that that is only one contributory factor.

Mr. Won brought up the question of Dr. Chough's affiliation with the Han Kook Min Ju Dang.

Dr. Chough explained that before accepting his office as officer of the police he spent most of his time and effort in organizing this

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political party, and then came to the conclusion that we needed peace and order in Korea. When General Sheetz asked him to come into office, he resigned many important offices in the political party and offered to resign his membership but was told that it was necessary. If his membership in this party is now hurting the prestige and honor of the police and General Lerch should request him to resign this membership, he will be glad to do so because he wants only to carry out his police position to help Korea. He said he was not influenced by that party at all, though he did have something to do with the organization of it.

Mr. Won felt that the relationship of Dr. Chough to the Han Kook Min Ju Dang is a cause of misunderstanding to the police and to the people and also the the party. Formerly when the director sent people to the country, people remarked, "Well, these are all former Japanese. That must be the work of the Han Kook Min Ju Dang." Some things being done in the name of Dr. Chough is believed to be the work of the Han Kook Min Ju Dang.

Mr. Chang feels that those in the upper grades previously mentioned, such as the chiefs of provinces and stations, known to be former Japanese employees, who prosecuted patriots and nationalistically minded Koreans, have incurred the enmity of the people at large. Therefore, unless this root trouble in the police is cleared up there will continue to be this festering point in the minds of the people and they will not be calmed down.

General Lerch announced to the Conference that it was necessary that he confined in the hospital for about four weeks. He said he was sorry not to be able to be present for the remainder of the discussion, particularly the discussion on the last five topics suggested by Mr. Won which look to the furture rather than to the past. He said he was proud of the honest, straight-forward statements made by the representatives of Military Government who have appeared before the Conference. Whether we agree with them or not we cannot doubt their earnestness, courage and their patriotism. General Helmick will be back in a few days, and he and Dr. Johnson are familiar with the views of General Lerch and will

be able to represent him without prejudice to their own views.

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MR. MOA expressed the regrets of the Conference members at the coming absence of General Lerch from the meetings, hoped his confinement wouldn't be as long as four weeks, and assured General Lerch that we would do nothing along destructive lines during his absence.

The Chairman thanked Dr. Clough for his assistance by appearing before the Conference, and advised that Colonel Robinson will appear at the next meeting as a witness on the police matter. He stated that only one member had given him the name of a witness to be called on this matter. He asked that any member who wishes any additional persons to be called on the police question should give him the names not later than 10 O'clock tomorrow morning. He hoped that Monday or Tuesday the Conference would be able to submit conclusions and recommendations on the first five topics - all topics concerned with the personnel questions.

The meeting adjourned at 1700 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on 15 November 1946.

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MINUTES

OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 15 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Dr. H. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Bunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch
Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Teuk Syung

KOREAN MEMBERS

Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Poong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong
Lyuh, Woon Hyung

Absent: Dr. Kimm, Kiusic

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

The Chairman called in Mr. Choy, Mung Chin, who had been requested by two members of the Conference to appear for questioning, and questioned him as follows:

Q. Will you please state to the Conference your name and the office you occupy.

A. My name is Choy, Mung Chin, and I am head of the Detective Bureau of Military Government.

Q. This Conference is formed not to investigate any individual but to try and determine the causes of the recent disturbances in South Korea. One of the causes which certain individuals have stated has contributed to the disturbance is the enmity borne by certain persons against the police force. This Conference will be glad to hear from you your views in this matter.

A. The causes of the Kyongsang Pukto riots are many, but the main reason is that the Communist Party sent an order to some organizations to riot against Military Government. Another cause is the rice collection. I have gone around to the farmers and have been informed by them that during the summer, policemen went out to the farms blindly, without knowing what the quota assignment was and attempted to force the farmers to turn over their rice. If they did not, the police handcuffed them and took them to the police station where they were held all day, sometimes without any food at all. Sometimes they were locked in jail and charged

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₩35 for each meal. Some farmers could not pay this and were forced to sell their cows, oxen, or whatever cattle they had in order to pay this amount. These policemen were worse than those under the Japanese regime because in the Japanese regime, ordinary policemen were afraid to do these things. Now these ordinary policemen have no respect for their superior officers since they do not have enough supervision. One farmer told me that 150 farmers were brought to the police station every day because they could not meet their assigned grain quota. Therefore the farmers are against the police. Another cause of the riots is the low wages received by the police which causes them to obtain their living commodities through the police force--that means "black marketing". They even confiscated rice coming into Taegu and kept the rice themselves. When the homes of policemen and government officials were raided, at least one or two bags of rice were found in each place. The people therefore believed that the control of this grain collection is only for the privilege of the police--not for common people. All the blame seems to go to the police. It should be on Military Government officials, not only upon our police force.

Q. You stated that the homes of policemen and government officials were raided and one or two bags of rice were found. Who raided those homes?

A. When that riot was taking place in Taegu, there was no Left and Right. All the young people mixed with the rioters. A young man leader of a Rightist organization of about 2,000 told me a story he had seen himself--the young people of Taegu demanded that the governor of Kyongsang Pukto resign because of the fact that privileged persons and government officials had rice although it was not rationed to anyone in the Taegu area. The police personnel is the main trouble, not only to people in Taegu but all over Korea. Korea was liberated by the Americans. The American Military Government rules Korea, but it is still as if we were under Japanese control since the same personnel remains. We do not want to be directed by the same police who directed police stations under the Japs. We find very few patriots in the police force. The hearts of the police are not with us Koreans. Personnel in the

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police force should be changed. Cho, Eil Hang, leader of the Young Men's Rightist Party in Taegu, told me that the Right party young men were against the police and were publishing statements to that effect in the newspapers. They object to former Japanese trained men being in the police. In Taegu, both the Chief of Police and the Chief Detective were former Japanese trained policemen and army men and do not understand the hearts of Kyongsang Pukto people. As far as I see it, the causes of the Taegu riots are as follows: The police force in Taegu acted as a military army marching into a defeated area. They should instead have sent a detective force in first to find out what was wrong. Police raided the homes of farmers without first investigating. It will take a generation for the people to forget these actions of the police. Military Government should send an investigation party to villages to check on persons killed, arrested, etc. CIC has too many people on their hands to make a general investigation. A committee from the Public Information Department--internal security section--went down there and sleg one or two nights and then returned.

(The Chairman then explained to the witness the meaning of "marshal law" and the necessity of putting Taegu under it.)

Q. Do you have anything further to add.

A. Had marshal law been announced sooner, it would have entirely stopped the rioting. When American officers appear, even without shooting or arresting, the people disperse. The crowd was only against Korean personnel in Kyongsang Pukto headquarters. These headquarters were not taken by the mob because a major, a captain and twelve Koreans defended it. I think that as long as American personnel are in Korea, Korean people will not have large mob actions. Even in Taegu, if American officers had gone down and helped the police force, the riots would not have occurred. Of course, some of these rioters were sent down from Seoul. The majority of the people respect American personnel and are also afraid of them.

Q. Why did the good people of Taegu resort to rioting instead of using peaceful means in order to establish a change in police.

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A. They rioted because of orders from the Communist Party in Seoul that came to the leader of the Communists in Taegu. The order was sent out to all farmers and to employees of all organizations. They also told the war refugees (they number at least 40,000) to come to the station where they would be given rice. When they heard the rifle shots, they knew it was some kind of mob action and many went back to their homes. Then this so-called Leftist flying party started demanding the police to disarm. The police were afraid of them and took off their coats and hats and started to run away. Those running away were killed. Those remaining were not. Those who killed police were not the good people of Taegu. They represented three types--the butcher class, loafers, and those who have been beaten by the police or have had such experience. A man told me he had seen forty persons riding in a truck that he had never seen before--probably had come from Seoul or somewhere. They were agitators. They killed, burned homes, and then ran into the mountains and were not seen again. According to my investigation, Taegu did not intend such mob action. Another thing--Chin, Moon Hok, a medical student, originated the riot in Taegu on 1 October, when he took a body from the Taegu Hospital, dressed it as a student, and told the students that the corpse had been killed by the police. The students wanted revenge against the police--they did not know the true story. They followed this leader and carried the body to other students who joined them. Then they took the body to the Taegu Station singing "Policemen killed our students". This mob, seeing this, were on the side of the students. Then the killing started. We arrested that man.

Q. Has he been tried as yet?

A. Not yet.

Q. You stated that the police in Taegu were accused of taking rice from the farms. Is this condition known to you to exist elsewhere in Korea.

A. It was practiced during the Japanese regime. The same personnel in the police force practice it.

Q. Do you believe that it is practiced now because it was practiced

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during the Japanese regime, or do you know that it is practiced now?

A. I cannot prove that it is practiced, but I have heard rumors.

Q. Does the Police Department try to prevent such things happening throughout Korea?

A. My adviser, Colonel Flynn, has always told me to stop this practice even if it was carried on under the Japs. We also send out orders to the police chiefs throughout the country in this regard.

Q. Do you know of any policeman who has been arrested for taking rice illegally from Koreans.

A. I have no knowledge of any.

General Brown: Do any of the Conference members wish to ask further questions.

Mr. Won stated that he had heard that prisoners were charged ¥100 rather than the ¥35 which Mr. Choy mentioned, and that he had heard that the police had confiscated rice that was being brought in by farmers and asked whether this was a fact. He further remarked that the witness should be aware that some policemen have taken rice from people since he is associated with the Detective Bureau of Military Government.

A. I do not know about that confiscated rice --whether it was taken to policemens' homes. I did not raid policemens' homes. I do believe policemen have a better chance than ordinary persons.

Mr. Ahn stated that he had heard a story about policemen stealing and killing fatted calves and feating on them. Who should be responsible for the acts committed by the police such as that?

A. That is a difficult thing. In the first place, I do not know if all these things happen. I have heard from farmers that they do. I am not the responsible person for the various departments and cannot answer all these questions.

Mr. Ahn: Is it true that as many killings were committed in the provinces as the figures seem to convey?

A. In our police force, the numbers are correct because we have the names of the policemen in headquarters. As far as civilians are concerned, we do not know the definite number. We cannot find out unless

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we have a thorough investigation. In some areas, some of the people either ran away or are missing. We have not reached out into the mountain areas as yet.

Mr. Ahn: I asked this question because it is a fact that under the Japanese regime, in cases such as this, the real facts and numbers were never exposed, and figures were always exaggerated. It would be well to give the public the actual figures of dead persons so that they may know the real facts.

Mr. Won stated that he felt that all the people employed in the Police Department should be out and out patriots. These cases occur because carelessness is characteristic of the employment of police personnel and also because pro-Japanese trained police are used.

A. That is correct. I have recommended many times to the Police Department that we employ patriotic men. Those who worked with the Japanese in Korea should be removed from the police force. Since this has/been not done, rumors have been spread to the effect that Americans love the Japanese and do not like Koreans and intend to use Japanese people in Korea and that rice is being taken to Japan because Americans do not like Koreans. I suggest that about 30% of bad former Japanese employees be removed from high offices. Our people will never obey the police force unless the personnel is changed.

General Brown: Could you retain an efficient police force without retaining some experienced men?

A. I would say "yes". Commissioner Valentine in his speech in Tokyo stated that it is impossible to have a democratic police with old personnel and that a new uniform will not democratize a police force. Our American friends can teach us how to organize and how to handle cases. I learned my detective work from an American officer in a month and a half. New personnel trained by the Americans would be superior to any Japanese trained police. With American help in training, we could have a better police force in six months.

Mr. Kim: I have heard that the police force in Kyongsang Pukto collected 350 million yen to remodel and repair public buildings. Is that correct?

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A. I have heard that at Taegu there was a committee organized to raise funds for our policemen who were killed, for their families, and for repairs to buildings. I, myself, encouraged the people there to do something for the police force. The collections were discontinued when a former Japanese trained policeman was put in as deputy chief of that province.

Mr. Kim: Don't you think it rather ridiculous in view of the fact that we have so many war refugees t ere that people were willing to contribute to such a cause?

A. The police department headquarters did not ask anyone to organize such an organization. The people of Taegu themselves decided on it. They did not collect money from the farmers--only from the rich people in Taegu. The rich people voluntarily contributed.

General Brown: It has been said that the lower rank police do not respect their superiors who have had no experience. What do you say about this?

A. It is true, sir. We do not respect each other or cooperate very much in our police department. We emphasize experience and do not stress spirit at all. Therefore, many persons do not respect the high officers who have had no experience in the police force.

Q. How many cases of rice collection abuses have been reported to detective headquarters and investigated by you?

A. We are national not the local police and do not have that particular work. We just supervise police instead of actually going out into the field. We from time to time go out and investigate and have found many wrong things. Rice has come in from the Hang River and has been stopped by the Coast Guard or police because they are not well trained. We go out and release this rice to the city of Seoul.

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The Chairman presented Lt. Col. Hugh H. Bledsoe as a witness. Testimony follows:

Q. Will you please state your name, rank and the position which you occupy.

A. Hugh H. Bledsoe, Lt. Col, Adviser to the Director, Korea Civil Service.

Q. By what system are Korean Military Government officials chosen in the beginning?

A. First, when a need for certain types of officials or employees is presented to Korea Civil Service, announcements are made through the press, radio and other mediums to secure persons who might be interested in this type of work. Persons interested in the announced position vacancies then apply for positions with the Recruitment and Examination Division of Korea Civil Service, and they are given preliminary examinations to determine their qualifications for the position. An investigation is conducted by the Investigation Division of Korea Civil Service to determine their educational qualifications, also their character qualifications, loyalty, etc. Those applicants who are considered by Korea Civil Service as qualified in every respect for the position vacancies are referred to the Department in which the vacancies occur for their selection of those who are qualified to fill the position. When the department concerned agrees on the selection of certain individuals to fill their vacant positions, Korea Civil Service then places them on permanent rolls of government service.

Q. How long have you been in the office of the Director of Korea Civil Service?

A. I was the first American official assigned to the what was then known as Secretary of Personnel, which is the same thing as the present Office of Korea Civil Service, in September 1945.

Q. How were the original personnel requirements of Military Government obtained in Korean personnel?

A. When we entered Korea on 9th September 1945 we had a few American

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advisers to assist us in making initial selection of Korean officials. Those American advisers that I remember were Commander Williams, Mr. Erie and a Mr. Wilhaven. Both Mr. Erie and Mr. Wilhaven were former mining officials in North Korea and Commander Williams is the son of a former missionary in Korea. In addition to these gentlemen, I believe there were other American citizens in the Army of the U.S. of Korean ancestory who were connected with CIC and other U.S. agencies. The first Koreans selected for positions in Military Government in Korea were taken in upon the advice of these gentlemen that I have mentioned. It is entirely possible that General Arnold, at that time Military Governor of Korea, also had other sources of information about which I am not familiar.

Q. Were Koreans selected because of their belonging to any particular political party?

A. No, sir, they were not.

Q. What was the basis of their selection?

A. They were selected on a basis of the determination by American officials in charge of their qualifications, those being most suitable for the jobs for which they were being considered.

Q. Do you recall when the method of obtaining such personnel by advertisement was initiated?

A. It was used to my knowledge as early as October 1945.

Q. What was the response to the request for personnel you advertised?

A. At first we had so many people to apply for positions in the government that we were unable to see them for days at a time. As time went on naturally the numbers of people who came as a result of our requests were decreased.

Q. How was the selection of the personnel required made?

A. In the early days it was absolutely necessary for us to use temporary measures for selection of officials. By temporary measures I mean a very hurried and very incomplete investigation and accepting the statements of department heads and other U.S. military personnel in regard to their suitability to fill the positions. All appointments

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in the Military Government of Koreans were temporary. It was very carefully explained to all Korean officials who were selected in the earlier stages that their appointments were temporary and were subject to later investigation and that they might be removed at any time.

Q. On what basis is promotion of Korean officials made?

A. There is no policy yet established for promotion of Korean officials.

Q. All offices now are filled by selection?

A. Either by the selection of officials who have not been employed by Military Government before or by reassignment of some officials who had been temporarily appointed in other positions in the government.

Q. In the appointments of high officials was previous service under the Japanese regime or pro-Japanese zeal taken into consideration?

A. It was. It was the most important consideration.

Q. In what way?

A. If it were possible to determine that a Korean had in the past cooperated with the Japanese to an extent greater than that considered necessary to protect his life and the lives of members of his family from death or torture, he was considered to be pro-Japanese.

Q. Were pro-Japanese employed by the Military Government?

A. Not to our knowledge.

Q. Can you give us any instances where political party influence has entered into government appointments or promotions?

A. I cannot insofar as American control could prevent such entry.

Q. Is it true that Military Government is a Han Kook Min Ju Dang club?

A. I am not familiar with the terms you mentioned particularly. However it is my opinion, and my opinion only, that it is not such a club.

Q. Was it necessary to employ a large number of interpreters in order to carry on the business of the government?

A. Yes sir, absolutely necessary.

Q. Can you state approximately how many interpreters are now utilized in Military Government?

A. Our records in Korea Civil Service include only the national government exclusive of the Department of Transportation at the present time.

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In the national government, excluding the Department of Transportation, there are at present 40 interpreters and 35 translators who are Korean citizens not U.S. War Department employees.

Q. In addition to the Korean interpreters and translators, does Military Government employ other interpreters and translators?

A. Yes. Military Government, through the Office of Civilian Personnel, has in its employ a number of U. S. War Department civilian interpreters. These gentlemen may or may not be U.S. citizens.

Q. Are any of these personnel Korean, to your knowledge?

A. I can't say that I know.

Q. Have you experienced difficulty in obtaining competent interpreters and translators?

A. Yes sir. I would consider that second in the most difficult problems experienced here in Military Government.

Q. Will you explain in greater detail what difficulties enter into this problem?

A. First, the obvious fact that the spoken and written Korean language is entirely different from the spoken and written English language. There was an attempt made in the earlier stages and all along to select Korean officials who were representative of the Korean citizenry. Since only a relatively few Koreans are able to speak English, then less than ten percent of the higher officials in Military Government have any understanding whatever of English. Less than one-half of the number who do understand English are able to speak it effectively. It is absolutely necessary for Americans to be able to talk and to get over ideas to Korean officials. This can be done only through interpreters.

Q. I think we might add that practically no Americans can speak Korean. Can you add any further difficulties in obtaining satisfactory interpreters and translators?

A. I might make a few statements in that regard. In Korea it is not customary, I have found, for higher officials to talk to a person on a lower social strata. Regardless of what we may think about it as Americans, an interpreter to most Korean officials is a person on a lower social ground. It is therefore difficult to persuade a Korean official to say exactly what is on his mind when he must make such

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statement through an interpreter. We as Americans, not knowing anything about the Korean language, are therefore unable to find out what the man thinks or what he is saying. On the other hand, we never know whether our actual remarks are transmitted to the official to whom we are talking and, more important than just our remarks, our meaning. I have personally on many occasions attempted to reprimand a Korean that we were about to relieve and I have found rather than being reprimanded that the man had been congratulated by the interpreter. I think those examples are sufficient to illustrate the point.

Q. To your knowledge is there much dishonesty amongst the interpreters employed by Military Government?

A. I have no way of knowing. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Are interpreters well paid?

A. Comparatively speaking, interpreters are paid higher than chief clerks and considerably higher than their position called for under the former government of Korea - under the Japanese. Their exact pay at present ranges from Civil Service grade 7 at the rop to 10 at the bottom. The total monthly pay for the top grade at present, including the cost of living differential, is 1870 ¥. The total monthly pay for the lowest paid interpreter at present is 1670 ¥.

Q. Is there much opportunity for interpreters to be dishonest or to graft?

A. In my opinion they are in a very desirable place to be dishonest.

Q. Can you explain that a little?

A. If an interpreter is used in a conversation between a Korean who speaks no English and an American who speaks no Korean, then it is quite obvious that neither the American nor the Korean can know whether or not he is interpreting what either of them says correctly. He could therefore very easily distort the remarks of either of these two officials deliberately if he had any reason to do so. If, therefore, he receives something from an outside source in order that he might cause this outside source to be in a relatively favorable position with the government, it is possible that he might accept such payment.

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Q. Do you, of your own knowledge, know of any situation such as you have described which has arisen in Military Government?

A. Not of my own knowledge. I have heard of many such cases; however, no specific names were given and it was not called to my attention officially.

Q. Does Military Government now have all the interpreters it needs?

A. No sir, it does not.

Q. Are additional interpreters obtainable?

A. They are certainly not obtainable in sufficient quantities. Occasionally we get a few in response to our requests, but only a very few. Also, we have dismissed a number of interpreters for various reasons.

Q. Any other comments?

A. No sir, other than I would like to emphasize one statement - that in my opinion this interpreter matter, due to the language difficulty, is of paramount importance.

Q. Does any member have a question?

Bunce: I would like to know if the police come under the Civil Service system.

A. The civilian officials in the police department are under Korea Civil Service, but the actual uniformed police have been removed from Korea Civil Service.

Mr. Won mentioned that he knew of some head men appointed to adminster counties - 12 were definitely men who had collaborated with the Japanese, 2 had not collaborated with the Japanese, and 6 others he was not sure about. But, he mentioned one man in particular - Mr. So, Sung Kyoo - who was formerly connected with the Japanese administrative force who urged Korean young men to go into the Japanese Army during the war. The people whose sons were to be drafted into the Japanese Army offered this man money and other valuable gifts if he would keep their sons out of the service. This man is now filling one of the highest positions in Military Government and is doing a lot of boasting. He was arrested by the Japanese and after liberation he was employed in Military Government. He is rather respected by the people because of his high position in Military Government.

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There was some discussion on the definition of a pro-Japanese collaborator, and the Chairman said that next week when the Committee begins to write conclusions and recommendations on the first five topics he will again try to get a definition of what constitutes a pro-Japanese. Mr. Won believes that because of the Koreans experience under Japanese oppression for 36 years, it is the Koreans who know what constitutes a pro-Japanese. He also made the statement that while experience is highly valued, a man's thinking and research in the administration of a people or a nation is to be more valued than that of experience. Dr. Johnson said that the word "experience" in our language has two quite distinct meanings. In one sense it means an apprenticeship or serving a period of time in a certain occupation. In the other sense it means technical capacity or qualification. When the American Army has emphasized "experience" they have meant this latter meaning, but Dr. Johnson fears that when this is translated into Korean it has meant the former.

The chairman said this matter would be discussed a greater length next week. He announced that Colonel Robinson of G-2, XXIV Corps, will be present as a witness at the next meeting and will inform the Conference as to the causes of the disturbances in South Korea.

The meeting adjourned at 1710 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on 18 November 1946.

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MINUTES

OF THE SIXTEENTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 18 NOVEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Dunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. [illegible] Lerch
Brig. Gen. John [illegible] ackerling

KOREAN MEMBERS

[illegible]on, Deh Koon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Koong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Koun Gong
Lyuh, [illegible]oon Hyung

Absent: [illegible]. Kim, Hiusic

The meeting was called to order at 1330 hours.

The Chairman introduced Colonel John E. Robinson, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Division, XXIV Corps, and stated that he would give out information to the Conference on the situation in South Korea. All members of the Conference were directed by the Chairman to treat the information as confidential since Colonel Robinson was to present secret information. He further directed that no stenographic notes be taken on this material.

Colonel Robinson made an introductory statement explaining what he proposed to present and the source of his information. He then read the checked portions of the report that is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "1".

The Chairman then asked if any member of the Conference wished to ask Colonel Robinson any questions.

Mr. [illegible]on made a statement to the following effect: Both Russia and America came here to work for the independence of Korea. It is a fact we know. When we fight among ourselves as Koreans, it is proper that those under the Russian command should obey what they are told not to do by the Russians, and likewise for those under the American command. In fact, we should not fight among ourselves. The report indicates that there is instigation of civil fighting that should not exist at present. It boils down to the fact that some individuals feel that [illegible] is the benefactor of Korea and the only country capable of ruling,

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while, on the other hand, others feel that only America should rule. I do not wish to reveal my true feelings but will say that we are grateful to Russia and to America. However, in assisting, "Help us and please move on as quickly as possible". The Coalition Committee has the problem of the pulling from both sides. Those Americans and Russians who try to criticize us do not have the solution either. As imperfect as we are, we are working for the best interests of Korea itself.

Mr. Ide made a statement, the substance of which is as follows: For centuries, the average Korean has been a man without pretense or artifice. He has a habit of believing his leaders. Not having had a long political existence or life under present conditions, they do not now know their real leaders or what they want. However, they do want relief from their present difficulties and are most likely to believe the person who offers such assistance. They have been misled by propaganda. Base it upon the following facts: If they have enough to eat, they do not care about and will have nothing to do with politics. They will be coerced or looked down on. They are concerned first with their existence--their food. If you leave enough for them to eat and take the rest away, they will not care, but if you take or threaten to take it all away, they will fight to death for it. Second, they are concerned with that which prevents their freedom of movement--that is the police. When their freedom is disturbed by the police in the taking away of their rice, they will strike for that freedom. Therefore, the material used in propaganda consisted of threats to take away their food and civil liberties. These two factors became the timber of the fire which was lighted by the instigators. Therefore, it is appropriate that we consider the causes of the uprisings to be the result of propaganda. We must consider these problems and find some solution to them.

General Brown then asked that each member of the Commission be prepared by Thursday to present their conclusions and recommendations on the first five topics covered and suggested that these be presented to General Hodge so that concrete action may be taken.

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Mr. Lobk read a report on the killing of Kwun Kil Chai at the Yong Dung Po police station as follows: Kwun Kil Chai was a student of Seoul University, age 37. Two policemen arrested him at his home at No. 170, Tohall Surun, Sinheung Koon, on 22 October 1946. About 10 policemen surrounded the area. At first he was taken to Anyang Police Station. That night at 7 o'clock, he was transferred to the Yong Dung Po station house. His survivors are his wife and others, including a baby 40 days old. The relatives were not informed of his death until 3 days later when they were asked to come to the Sei Dun (?) Police Station. One relative went to the police station, accompanied by a policeman. Instead of being told immediately about the death, the relative was asked about the conditions of the family. Shortly after that a policeman came from Anyang Police Station and told this relative to accompany him on a truck to the Yongdung-Po Police Station. When they arrived at this police station, the relative was informed of the death of Kwun Kil Chai. The story of the death was this: On 22 October at about 12 o'clock they dragged in all these captives to Yongdung-Po Police Station, the man in charge of the captives asked the police chief at Yongdung-Po to let him use the place only for a little while to keep these captives, and two hours later one of the guards discovered that Kwun Kil Chai was dead. The police chief at Yongdung-Po insisted that he had no responsibility in connection with the death that took place at his station, he had only granted the request to let the captives he kept there for a little while. He was only too glad to lend a truck and other facilities to move the dead body. On 23 October at 9 o'clock the body was removed from Yongdung-Po to this man's house, and on 27th October it was cremated there. About 3rd November, contrary to what the police chief said at Yongdung-Po that he was lending the truck and other facilities at no cost to remove the dead body, a certain funeral undertaker came with a bill for one thousand yen for the funeral services. The relatives paid the undertaker ¥850 on 7th November. On 24th October in the afternoon a man by the name of Sung Cho accompanied the dead man's sister, who is a doctor, to investigate the body, and the doctor discovered that he had been killed from being beaten on his shoulders, arms and legs.

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The Chairman said he was very glad to have that statement because that was the kind of statement he had been trying to get ever since the Conference started. He asked that the statement be turned over to him and he would have it translated, the matter would be investigated and the Conference would be informed as to the results.

Mr. Ahn remarked that Koreans don't like cremation except in extraordinary cases and wondered who had demanded the cremation.

The Chairman said he had the same suspicion in his mind, and he intended to find out the facts.

Mr. Choi said that perhaps this interval of five days may be according to Korean custom, but during that time he wondered why no public doctor was appointed to come and examine the body. There should have been a doctor appointed by the government to examine the body and give testimony. The Chairman turned the report over to General Helmick for a thorough investigation and said the Conference would be informed of all facts when the investigation is completed.

The meeting adjourned at 1650 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on 19 November 1946.

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MINUTES

OF THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 19 NOVEMBER 1946.

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
Brig. Gen. C. C. Helmick
Dr. L. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Bunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling

KOREAN MEMBERS

Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Poong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong

Absent: Dr. Kim, Kiusic
Lyuh, Woon Hyung

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Beuk Syung

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Mr. Pahk: Sometime ago in the conference a case was stated relating to a young man by the name of Cho, Sung Chik, whose father was terribly beaten by the police force down in Seng-Ju. He is up here to testify and with him also a man by the name of Ko, Chei Hong, Director of the YMCA of that city. He is believed to be a rightist.

The first witness was brought before the Conference. Testimony follows:

Q. Please give us your name.

A. Cho, Sung Chik.

Q. Where do you live?

A. Sang-Ju of Kyongsang North.

Q. Do you have some information to give this Conference?

A. Yes, I have a great deal. On 11 October in the city of Sang-Ju I suffered a great deal at the hands of the firemen. The reason for that was that our house is regarded as one of the richest ones in the city. The accusation was that my father, who had no relation with either the right or the left parties, had made a contribution to the Communist Party. So, he was incarcerated for 11 days and suffered greatly. My father is Cho, Yong Yun.

Q. Who arrested him?

A. The Independence Promotion League and the police joined in the arrest.

Q. Can you name any of the policemen who arrested your father?

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A. I can give them all. Lee, Myung Nok - Chief of Detectives, and Pak, Young Pai, also a detective chief. The charge was that he had made a contribution to the Communist Party and the fact of the matter is that he had paid nothing at all. They urged a contribution of 500,000 ¥ to their own organization, which was the Emergency Committee of Sang-Ju. I myself saw them intimidate him and threaten him that if he didn't pay this amount it would be bad for him. So, seeing my father in such a plight, and the continuing urging that he pay 500,000 ¥, I promised to pay 150,000 ¥, and put my fingerprint on it. Because of their insistence and ugliness, I paid in cash the amount of 52,000 ¥. A few days after having paid the 52,000 ¥, my father was released.

Q. Who did you pay this money to?

A. Pak, Nam Heui. He is the organization chairman of this Emergency Committee of the city of Sang-Ju. It is not a regular party but an emergency committee.

Q. Is that connected with the Committee for Rapid Realization of Independence.

A. This Pak, Nam Heu is concurrently of this committee and the Rapid Realization Committee. Choy, Sang is the vice chairman of the Emergency Committee and an official member of the Rapid Realization Committee.

Q. What did he have to do with it?

A. I paid it to the committee - about 10 of them - these two were the ones who received it. The others were being witnesses.

Q. Do you know the names of any of the others?

A. Pak, In Ok and Lee, Pyung Ok. Those are the only two names I remember.

Q. Was any member of the police force present when you made the payment?

A. There were no uniformed policemen present, but they knew about it and were in cooperation with this group.

Q. How do you know that?

A. They established and organized this Emergency Committee within the bounds of the police station itself. The money was paid in the upstairs room of the police station. The request and demand was not made by the police themselves but by these people I have mentioned. The Chief of

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Police of Sang-Ju gathered together between 50 and 60 of the people who had money in Sang-Ju and at 1 o'clock on 12 October they exhorted them in view of the uprisings in the province that money was entirely essential to the police, and therefore they should pay up the half or third or what they could to this Emergency Committee, and it was collected by the committee members and by the firemen.

Q. Where was your father at the time you paid this money?

A. He was in the detention part of the police station.

Q. How long after you paid the money was your father released?

A. The actual cash transaction was effected after my father was released, but I signed the paper and put my fingerprint on it and it was the third day after this promise to pay that my father was released.

Q. What happened to the paper you signed?

A. They kept pressing their demand for 500,000 ₩. I had seen them beating people up before my eyes. I said I could not pay that, so they said to do what I could. On compulsion I wrote 150,000 ₩ and put my fingerprint on it. When I paid 52,000 ₩, they said "How come", but didn't make any complaints. That paper is now in the possession of this committee.

Q. Where did you get such a large sum of money?

A. From my father after he came out. He had that much money.

Q. You didn't have to get it from the bank?

A. He had this money in his home, he did not get it at the bank. I paid 52,000 ₩ with the excuse that I would pay the balance later on.

Q. Have they molested your father or any member of his family since that payment?

A. No. After that the Emergency Committee for North Kyongsang came to being with a capital of 300 million yen, 15 million for Sang-Ju. The Committee, therefore, had made my father put his name down as one of the officers of this Emergency Committee and, because our house is one of the richest or the richest in the gun, they made him a member and planned to try and get five million yen out of him. The payment of funds like these should be a matter of one's freedom, not one of compulsion. It is not subscribed when you are compelled to make a contribution, so I urged my father to move up to Seoul. Because of the disturbed conditions down

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there I brought him up to Seoul. Because my father has come to Seoul, the Emergency Committee in Sang-Ju is greatly set back. Because of his coming to Seoul and the set back to the comittee down there and because the forced contribution wouldn't work, they used another plan and got out a warrant for his arrest on the charge that he made a contribution to the Communist Party, and had sent up to Seoul for his apprehension. They asked for his transferrence back to Kyongsang in order that they might apprehend him on the charge of having made contribution to the Communist Party. If I were to summarize the reason for this, it is because they are evil minded police from the Japanese regime who are in charge. I don't know whether there was any definite plan for Sang-Ju or not, but there was no riot in Sang-Ju itself. Whether it was their plan for prevention or whatever, they summoned all the leftists of that section and gave them a working over and any who were unfriendly to them were called in and given threats, and that was what happened. Of the leftists who had not done anything, I know that three of them have died as results of their beatings. One was killed by gunshot wounds and two by beating. If you were to go and investigate the detention room at Sang-Ju you would find that there were men with broken legs and broken arms and the wounds full of pus. They, all of the people of Sang-Ju, their condition is such that they cannot openly protest but they are secretly saying that their situation is worse than under the Japanese, they are not able to live, and they hate the police with a bitter hatred.

Q. Can you tell us the names of those killed?

A. Oo, Chang Chin - killed by the police. The second son of Whang, Pok Choo - I don't know his name, but everybody in Sang-Ju knows who he is. He was a student in Tokyo and returned as a student volunteer in the army. The other man, I don't know his whole name, but he is a Mr. Sung. Everyone knows who that is. The condition is very bad in that section because the police have used the services of the firemen and given them weapons and they have used these to bully people with. The police not being able themselves to beat the people they turn them over to the firemen and the firemen work on them. The police know me and my family and

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wouldn't dare put hand to me, so they turned me over to the firemen, and a man by the name of Kwon, Myung Keum beat me around for about two hours. The persons who were active in the independence activities were set upon by both the police and the firemen. When I was misused it was for the reason given, that I was active in independence work and they said, "What do you want with that sort of thing." Therefore, it is proof to me that there are many former Japanese policemen who are carrying on in the old ways of oppressing the people. Having made their demands for this money, supposedly for the emergency, the actual fact of the matter is if you were to go and look at the drinking places and cafes and Kaesang houses, you will find that they are filled each day with policemen and firemen who are using these funds in this dissolute manner. There are two requests that I desire to ask of the Joint Korean-American Conference. The first is that these former Japanese police be cleaned out, and the second is that the organizations, such as the firemen, who are not committed with the carrying out of the laws of the country, that they be forbidden to be used by the police in carrying out of the things that the police themselves do not do. My final urgent request is that organizations such as the police, this Rapid Realization youth group, the firemen who are given free rein to enforce contributions to the extent that landowners and merchants of that section are now driven to desperation, that this sort of action be forbidden. There is a policeman in the Sang-Ju station, as I recall, who has been there for 15 years. He was a former Japanese police official and has incurred the deep hatred of the people of that section. That is why they have this deep seated enmity against the police.

Q. Can you give us the name of this former Japanese police official?

A. Lee , Myung Nok - he was in the Japanese police for 15 years. Pak, Young Pai was in the Japanese police for about 7 years. Of the police officials down there about 50 percent of them are former Japanese employed police. I will finish with a short presentation of the public opinion in Sang-Ju. I believe that if I report the public opinion of Sang-Ju it would be similar in the surrounding country, but I know only what I have heard and that is what I will make representation on. From the 15th of August last year on the Koreans thought of the Americans as their liberator:

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and were very grateful for having destroyed the power of the Japanese and brought to them this new found liberation, and their feelings were the most cordial and of the deepest gratitude. From the time of the uprisings there has been a sudden reversal in which people, because of the trials which they have gone through, are now generally saying that the American Government has been deceiving them worse than the Japanese in that they are employing these police as their tools. Therefore, the feeling toward the Americans has suffered a decided reversal and the people wonder what can be done about it, and the feeling toward the Americans is anything but cordial.

Chairman: Has any member of the Conference a question to ask?

Dr. Bunce: I understand that under the Japanese they had a fire warden group of young men. If he referring to that group or the actual employed firemen in the fire hall of the city?

A. There was this terminology of firemen in the time of the Japanese. After liberation it didn't amount to much, but recently there has been appointed by the Chief of Police of the area this group of firemen which is a group of people appointed by the police to aid them. Of course they do work when there is a fire, but it is an organization appointed by the police.

Dr. Bunce: Who pays them?

A. They do receive pay.

Mr. Ahn: A while ago you mentioned a man who was shot by the police. Do you know his name?

A. No, I do not.

Mr. Won: I have listened with interest to what you have said, and I understand the representation you have made. However, there is one point on which I am in doubt. It concerns your statement that the police shot a man. It is very unlikely that a policeman in any country would draw his gun and shoot a man without a reason.

A. It was a criminal accusation. The charge was worthy of shooting.

The enmity and misunderstanding and hatred aroused by our people is due to the fact that without due course of law, without sentencing and trial, the police said it was a charge worthy of shooting, on the urgency of the moment, and shot the man. It is this that has aroused the ire of the people

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Mr. Won: You know that under marshal law they can shoot people. How about that?

A. There was no marshal law in Sang-Ju.

Mr. Ahn: It is very different if we were seeking to arrest a man and he ran away and he was shot at, and if he were shot in some other way. Please explain that.

A. There were no riots in Sang-Ju, no marshal law. It was reported that a couple of fellows brought some explosives from a village about 60 li from Sang-Ju. This was discovered by the police and they shot one of them.

Mr. Won: Therefore, if they had weapons and explosives, was it not proper for the police to shoot him?

A. They were not opposing the police, but they buried these things beside the river, the police found this out and shot them.

Mr. Won: We too have heard about this collection of three hundred million yen for Kyongsang and we have regarded it as a wrong move. But I have something to say to you rich men. From the 15th of August a year ago it is common knowledge that everybody said it was necessary now to work for liberation of our country and those with wealth should give up some of this wealth. From your own testimony you say you are one of the richest families in your section and you did not pay to the right or to the left. Is this not a condemnation on you and is the feeling of hatred for you not justified?

A. You have not understood what I have said. We did not pay to the right or to t e left political parties, but to public works such as schools and civic enterprises we did make contribution.

Mr. Won: If that is true, we appreciate what you have done.

A. If you look into the inside of this Emergency Committee there are a lot of deficiencies within that group. In regard to the receiving of contributions, they put our name on the list as officials of the organization and asked that we pay about three thousand yen and demanded about ten times that from others. It is this inequality of demand for contribution which has caused a lot of dissatisfaction down there. The real

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trouble is that those who are close to members of the police or firemen brigade are excused if they don't give so much, but those who are not friendly to this group - to this group the demands are greatest, and this brought the resistence on the part of the people and brought this trouble.

Chairman: It is difficult for the chairman to understand why contributions are demanded by any group. The right of contribution under a democratic government rests with the individual. In a democratic system of government no one can demand a contribution of any individual. Certainly no member of the government can demand a contribution of an individual unless it is in payment of taxes. If any political party or organization attempts to, by force or unlawful means, exact a contribution from a person it is illegal and that individual or group is punished under the law.

A. It is alright to say that here in the center where there is government, but out there there is no government, it is the law of force, and that is all that is to it.

Chairman: We hope that the Koreans will join us in establishing a democratic government in Korea. Any other questions?

Dr. Johnson: I should like to know if this gentleman was arrested by the police. He said he was detained by the firemen and beaten up for two hours by the firemen.

A. It covered one hour of questioning and one hour of beating.

Dr. Johnson: What was the purpose of questioning him? Did they try to make him admit he was a leftist?

A. Because my father didn't make contribution to the right and was at that time detained by the police. "Like father, like son", they said, and beat him.

Q. Do you have any scars or marks as a result of that beating?

A. I was unable to get medical aid there. After being released I went to the hospital and the doctors were afraid of me. They said if they treated me they would be afraid to live here. They recommended that I go to Taegu or some other place and get treatment. There are no scars or marks now.

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Mr. Kim: The 10th Day Emergency Committee - is it called that as well as the Sang-Ju Emergency Committee?

A. It seems that it was also called that.

Mr. Kim: I have heard two different figures - 300 million and 350 million. Which is it?

A. I am not certain, but I have heard only 300 million.

Mr. Cho was thanked for his testimony and left the meeting.

The next witness was presented. His testimony is as follows:

Q. Please inform the Conference as to your name and place of residence.

A. My name is Ko, Chei Bong.

Q. Do you have certain information to give this Conference?

A. I am going to tell you about the incident at Sang-Ju. Since the day of liberation of Korea in Sang-Ju there was no right party but there were leftists, and the other group is the pro-Japanese group. The true patriots there have not been able to work for the realization of the complete independence of Korea because of the interference by these groups. However, the city was privileged by Dr. Syngman Rhee's visit this summer, and a man by the name of Han Kan Suk had the privilege of meeting Dr. Rhee and talking with him. Since that time it has been possible for the people down in Sang-Ju to be able to establish a Korean Independence Rapid Realization group, but the public did not welcome such an organization, thinking that it was composed primarily of pro-Japanese and profiteers. This man Han, Kan Suk was forced by the people to tender his resignation as the chairman of this Independence Acceleration Committee. With such an event the Sang-Ju Young Men's Association urged the people to withdraw their demand but they did not take such advice and at the same time they were against this young men's group because of such exaltation. Thus, no colder relation has been maintained between the Sang-Ju Young Men's Association and that Korean Independence Acceleration Committee. Being active with this Sang-Ju Young Men's Association, the group that was against these two organizations urged or rather caused the firemen to assist them in executing their plans. At the time of the strike, the Sang-Ju postoffice employees were on strike. On the

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pretext of maintaining peace and order, in view of this strike, these firemen carried out their plottings. Admitting that their own power in the way of maintaining peace and order was rather meaningless, the police there urged the firemen to supplement what they lacked in the putting down of all the upheavals down there. Just at the time of the strikes down at Sang-Ju Gun on 4th October the firemen brigade got into action in putting down the riots. In that way there was no particular danger in that gun, and the riot was prevented. The chief of this riot, Kan Hoon, escaped but about 15 accomplices were captured. Because of the inability of these three graps - the polic department, the firemen and the Sang-Ju Young Men's Association - in maintaining peace and order, this so-called Sang-Ju Emergency Committee was organized. First about a two million yen budget was made. This two million yen was to be contributed by the different men down there according to their ability to pay. Some of the men were financially able to meet this demand or his share. In case a man who is to pay or contribute states that he is not able to do so, he is immediately arrested and prosecuted and beaten, and because of such action on the part of these firemen and police people are complaining tremendously. Following that the question of electing legislative members came up. With this program going, we, the Sang-Ju Young Men's Association, thought Han, Kan Suk was the most appropriate candidate for the legislative assembly. So the Young Men's Association nominated him. Because of the recommendation by the Young Men's Association and because of his qualifications with all such opposition on the part of the pro-Japanese and profiteers, he was elected by a majority vote to sit in the legislative assembly. Although this man Han Kan Suk was elected by a majority, because of the propaganda for evil purposes on the part of these pro-Japanese and profiteers telling the people that Han Kan Suk is not qualified for the position and is a traitor and also a pro-Japanese, therefore, he is not fit to sit or represent that section in the legislative assembly.

Mr. Chang: What we are primarily interested in is the question or problem in regard to the police force, not in the election. So, please confine your statements on this police problem.

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Mr. Pahk: I think we should hear what he is going to say about pro-Japanesee. Regardless of a party division, whether right or left, I hate to see a patriot being prosecuted by the pro-Japanese, so I should like to hear as much as possible about the patriots down there.

A. The election was to be conducted on the basis of at first eight votes and then for some reason it dropped down to five and then down to three. Now this first nominee Han, Kan Suk in our estimation is the best qualified for the legislative assembly but because of the propeganda against him by the pro-Japanese and profiteers - the whole five areas were supposed to elect one representative but there the opinion was divided because of this propaganda, and the other party - the pro-Japanese and the profiteers, nominated another man much older than this man - a man by the name of Han, Il Chung. These two men were nominated and the people down there proceeded to vote for one or the other and the vote came out even - three to three, but on the score that Chung was older than Han, Kan Suk, the people swung toward this older man. Thus, Han Kan Suk was eliminated. In this busy hour, permit me to say this thing - before you lies my desire to request you members of this committee to place if possible the best type of patriot who will stand for the country, elect such a man. That is my request for the election side. My final request is that if such a movement as raising two million yen over these people for some selfish interest, such a thing should be prohibited by the central government and then all these unlawful things that are being carried on by these profiteers and pro-Japanese against the innocent people would be stopped. That is my request.

Chairman: Thank you very much. Thursday the Conference will meet to consider further evidence. If any member of the Conference desires any additional person to appear before the Conference on the first five topics discussed and will give the Chairman those names he will summon them for Thursday. The Chairman is going to request each member of the Conference to bring to the meeting Thursday their conclusions and recommendations on the first five topics discussed. If any member wishes to give his conclusions and recommendations to the Chairman without disclosing who he is, the Chairman will present them without their names being known.

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Mr. Won: Having heard the report of Colonel Robinson in regard to the evil activities of these groups of agitators - is that all we are going to hear or does the Chairman expect to carry that on?

Chairman: Not unless the members have some other person they wish to call before the Conference.

Mr. Won: I looked for an opportunity today to make some sort of statement in regard to the misconception that is going around that this is the coalition group, that agitators coming down into South Korea pillaged, burned and stole are called leftists - that this coalition group is termed leftist. We know where the line is and know that it is a coalition. I wanted to make some statement in regard to that, but there is no opportunity today.

Chairman: Thursday you can do that. The Chairman is particularly anxious that this committee can make some specific recommendation on the police question. The Chairman, however, does not wish to hurry any member of the Conference.

The meeting adjourned at 1530 hours, to reconvene at 1330 hours on November 21, 1946.

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INUTES

OF THE EIGHTEENTH MEETING
JOINT KOR AN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
LD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 21 NOVEMBER 1946.

PRESENT

AMERICAN DELEGATION

Maj. Gen. Albert L. Brown (Chairman)
Lt. Gen. John Hodge
Lt. Gen. C. [illegible]
[illegible]

KOREAN DELEGATION

[illegible]
Chol, [illegible]
[illegible], Room [illegible]
[illegible], Kwon
[illegible], Ken [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Party of KaPyung.

[illegible] information to furnish [illegible]

[illegible] last covered [illegible]

[illegible] three art theye [illegible]

[illegible] Farmers Uni[illegible], [illegible]

[illegible] decided on [illegible]

[illegible] to be present [illegible]

[illegible] action of the Farmers [illegible]

[illegible] chairman of this youth section of the [illegible]; [illegible] - I have had no connection with them particularly [illegible]. About 22 October, during the middle of the night I was [illegible] by someone at the gate, I went out to see who it was and it was the police. There were two policemen, and they said they had come to summon me to the police station. So, I arose from sleeping and followed them. When I got to the police station there were a lot of them sitting around and after some talk one of the [illegible] said to a certain

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"All right, we will take him off", and I was taken off by a policeman, to the detention room. They said they had received communications from higher up that that they were to ask him to come and wait for a few days, and would he be good enough to remain there. "It is the order from higher up and we don't know just what it is." So they took down my name, age and address and then took me to the detention room. They took me to the guard of the detention room and turned me over to him. Having gone into the room, I looked around and found that there were a number of my fellow village mates there whom I recognized. So, I was left for the rest of the night. About 11 o'clock the next morning they called me in for questioning and asked if I was a member of the People's Party and of this Farmers League. Having had my name placed on the roll as chairman, I said I was a member of the Farmers League. So they put down my name, address and age and all the rest. That day passed and it was the next day. That day they took my picture. On the 3rd day they called me out again and took my finger prints. They took my identification marks and my height. Another night passed and about 10 o'clock the next day they called me out again. Having taken away my belt when I went in, they gave it back to me and said, "This is a small place. We will take you to a place where the Japanese were", and I was moved to the judo room. Another night passed sleeping in the judo room, and the next noon after lunch they called me out again. They said, "After having looked you over and questioned you, we have found that you are not an evil doer. There is nothing the matter with you, so we are going to release you." There were twelve of us there at the time and we were called in before the Chief of the station. The chief said, "Well, you have been in here a long time and we find nothing the matter with you. We will send you out." My reply was, "well, it was a command of the higher ups. So we, without any crime, have been detained a long time." They said, "When you go back to your home don't be worried, we will make sufficient investigation and you need not be worried about anything." So I went out and nothing happened.

Q. Did you have to pay board while in jail?

A. No, I did not pay board.

Q. Had there been disorders in the area in which you lived before they

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arrested you?

A. There was none whatsoever.

Q. Why were you arrested?

A. I have no idea whatsoever. They just came in the middle of the night and said it was the order of the higher ups, and I had no idea what it was about.

Q. Who is the Chief of police in the town or koon where you live?

A. I don't know his whole name, but it is Mr. Um or Om. He was Chief Detective there in the time of the Japanese.

Q. Is he still there?

A. Yes, he is the Chief down there now.

Q. Who is the higher up you refer to?

A. I don't know that - just that the orders were from higher up.

Q. How many people were arrested at the same time? He mentioned about 12. Was that the total from that one village arrested?

A. From my town of KaPyung there were 37.

Q. Have they all been released?

A. Yes, they have released all of them. When I was released there were 12 released. The remainder were released afterwards.

Q. You were arrested when?

A. October 22nd.

Q. While you were detained were you mistreated?

A. No, they did not beat me.

Q. Which province is KaPyung in?

A. Kyonggi-do.

Q. How long did the arrest last?

A. Five days in jail.

Mr. Chang said that another witness was to have come today and was unable to do so, but had written down what he intended to say. Mr. Chang then read the report of Mr. Kim, Kwan Ho , which is attached hereto as Exhibit 13.

Mr. Choi then read and submitted for the records a report made b an investigation made of
Kim, Don of/the elections in Kwang-do. This report is attached Exhibit 14.

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The Chairman said he had several papers he had been saving to present to the Conference at this time. One was a table submitted by Dr. Chough, Director of Korean Police, which shows the number of policemen in various grades who had prior service under the Japanese. This report was submitted for the records, and is attached as Exhibit 15.

He then presented a report on items questioned by Dr. Kimm, Kiusic. These items had been investigated by Major Peyton Rackley, Adviser of Uniform Bureau, and are as follows:

1. The Korean police chief is making wholesale arrests of Leftists.

A. There is no evidence anywhere to support the contention that the police are making wholesale arrests of Leftists without cause. In fact, strict orders have gone out to the Police that strict impartiality will be the rule in every case. American officers in the field are supervising this.

2. Kim, Chul-Soo and two sons were arrested October 23, and released October 24. They were badly beaten up at Yong Pong-Po police station.

A. Kim, Chu-Soo and two sons were picked up on 23 October with several other suspects, at the home of Kim, Ki Shool, on suspicion of murder, rioting and personal attack on police. They were released 24 October.

3. In regard to the statement that they were badly beaten up at Yong Pong-Po police station.

A. No evidence could be found to prove brutality. They were subjected to a severe and intensive investigation on the night of the 23rd.

4. Huh-Hurn was arrested October 19, released October 20.

A. Huh-Hurn was picked up and released two hours later.

5. He was badly beaten up at West Gate police station.

A. He was not beaten up as he was picked up at the request of American Public Safety officers and questioned by them.

6. Police Chief Chang (he questions the identity of the individual) has been asking different groups for contributions to reward the police for their efficient work in quelling the recent strikes.

A. No information could be secured on this point as no testimony could be taken directly without publicity. This question has come

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up in the past, however, and no basis could be found for it. Some towns and police divisions have contributed money for death benefits to help support widows and children of policemen killed in riots and to reimburse others for loss of homes, etc.

7. On October 24, a poster appeared in Seoul signed by the Chief of Police requesting all former servicemen of the police force (meaning former Japanese police force members) to enlist.

A. A poster did appear in Seoul and radio announcement was made for recruits to join the police; former experienced policemen were asked for in these appeals, but no mention was made nor any intent indicated for former Japanese police. In the past year of the police existence many policemen have quit their jobs because of the long irregular hours, dangerous work, and low pay. These are the men appealed to. It has been a constant struggle to keep the police force up to strength with properly trained police and to perform the expected duties a t the same time.

8. Y. T. Kim, employed with the Finance Department, Military Government, as interpreter, has been posing as director of the Department. Recently Yuh Ho-Byung has been appointed director, Finance Department. Both Y.T. Kim and Yuh Ho-Byung are persona non grata to the Korean people. Yuh as a collaborator, Kim as an imposter. Chang Hong-Sik is recommended for appointment as director, Finance Department. He is considered eminently suited. It is understood that his name is now being considered.

A. This has been answered by the Department of Finance direct to the M.G.

This report is attached as Exhibit (15d.)

The Chairman then read a letter (unsigned) he had received from a Korean citizen in regard to the legislature. This letter is attached as Exhibit 16.

The Chairman had received this afternoon a letter from Lyuh, Woon Hyung regarding his views on the police department. This was read, and is attached as Exhibit 17.

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Mr. Ahn: I was a teacher under the Japanese, and for ten years was editor and manager of a paper. Because I worked for the independence of Korea, I suffered imprisonment a number of times. At that time those who worked with the Japanese had to be pro-Japanese to get along, and they gave the impression that Koreans in general appreciated and liked the government of the Japanese. Therefore, the Japanese rulers felt that any antagonism was on the part of a few isolated people who they called "misguided Koreans" and that if they arrested and beat up a few of them and got them out of the way, they could do what they pleased in Korea. Before the 1919 uprising they asked me to be dean of one of the schools. At that time there was a general disturbance and movement among the people for an uprising, and one of the teachers working with the Japanese Educational Minister was asked by this Minister about the public feeling on the part of the Koreans. When this teacher told him the public was exceedingly disturbed and ready to burst, the Minister said, "What are you talking about? All the other people say Koreans are perfectly satisfied and everything is going on fine. That must be your own thought." That was the general impression given to the Japanese. They were thus not warned and prepared for the thing that burst in their face. In regard to the newspapers then, there was an Article No. 20 which stated that retractions would be given upon demand. For instance, if some newspaper had stated that someone had been beaten by the police, the Chief of Police would give out the retraction and say that the statement had been published without fact. No matter how we fought against the government, they could cover it up with Article 20. Their government could do no wrong. They had an ordained policy that was decided on. If anything came under that heading, no matter what protest was made, it was never considered if it conflicted with the decided policy. If in a province or kun of a Chief of Police nothing occurred during his term, nothing was done. If the Governor General could make suitable explanation to the Diet for anything that occurred, that was all that was to it. Take the incident of the Kwangju school strife in 1929 where 122 schools were involved and 50,000 students protested against government schools. In brief the reason for that

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incident was that the Japanese students at Kwangju attacked Korean students. They said the Korean students outnumbered them and in revenge turned the police on them. The whole student populace throughout the country was aroused. In general Koreans are peaceful and obedient and suffer small things without protest, but when they multiply the result is an explosion as in 1919 or 1929. This Kwangju incident was definitely one between Japanese and Koreans, but, in order to cover up, the Governor General blamed the incident upon the Communists of the Moscow Third International. Had he reported it as it actually happened, he would have been responsible and would have been blamed. However, he reported it as an international incident involving the Soviets so the Japanese would rally to him and regard it as something to be fought by the country at large. I speak thus today because you gentlemen consider this not as responsible officials who need to look after their own position but in general as to the position and feeling of the Korean people. What is the reason and cause for the underlying motive of it all? Take for instance this reply that there was preventative arrest of Leftists. I went to Pohang on 21 October to make a political speech. The Police Chief there, Kun Sun Yu (?) had been a police chief for about 20 years and had been dropped for some reason. He took his present office in May and received the support of the people. This man said that orders had come from headquarters to apprehend the Leftists in Chun Pyung, all farmers' leagues, all those connected with the People's Front. This police chief said he did not believe the people in his section were evil-minded and did not arrest them. He has heard nothing in that connection since, but definitely heard that at the time. I also found evidence of this in the town of Cho Dong Ha in Kyunggi-Do province. I learned that a large number of leftists in these leftist groups were arrested as a result of these orders from high up. Mr. _____ reported that no malcontents were among those arrested and felt that their retention in the police station too long would work as a counter-irritant. On 3 October I went to ChungYung to make another coalition speech. An elderly gentlemen of 70 was apprehended because when this general order

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for preventative detention of Leftists came out, they were after his son and took him instead. In regard to the general statement of denial about Leftist preventative detention, it is not so. There is evidence that there was. If Leftists have done something wrong they should be arrested, but a blanket order draws in innocent persons also. It does not seem to be good sense. Dr. Kimm is trying to establish the point of one individual by making a general statement which he believes is so, and to deny that does not get us anywhere. If we follow and revert to the procedure followed by the Governor General and as under Article 20 --that the government can do no wrong and there is no evidence for anything, we will not be able to get anywhere. It is our responsibility to make accurate reports when there are facts to make.

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Chairman: I would like to make one or two suggestions. The paper was presented by the Chairman because it had come to him. He did not accept it. The Chairman is of the opinion that there has been sufficient evidence produced before the Commission to show that certain action is necessary. It is desired that today and tomorrow, the Conference prepare and present to General Hodge recommendations on these questions. The Chairman is going to suggest that the Conference consider recommending that a letter be written to Dr. Hough directing him to see that police cease all political activity and to discontinue practices which have been brought to the attention of this Conference, that Chief Chang, Taik Sang be removed from office and transferred elsewhere, that other police officials who are defintely pro-Japanese or who have committed practices which justify their removal be immediately removed from the police force. The Chairman is going to present certain conclusions and recommendations. The Chairman has not studied it himself. It is requested that the members of the Conference make notes and suggestions on each item. The Chairman asks that the whole paper be read through, and then slowly one part at a time for any discussions members may care to have.

(Conclusions and recommendations are read by Chairman and then translated into Korean. This paper is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "18".)

Mr. Won: If you make Park, Heun Young the object of your search, it is well and good, but to make the general statement that the whole Leftist party is invelved in the agitation will give rise to difficulties. He is not being punished because he is a member of the Communist Party. It should be presented to the people very clearly that the agitator, Park, Heun Young, who deceived the people is the one who is being prosecuted and that those who believe in the Communist Party are not to be prosecuted. In our history it has been a custom to seek out responsible individuals and leaders of any movement against the government and prosecute them. The great mass who followed along are overlooked and disciplined by the action taken against their leaders. We must make the point of difference distinctly clear. People may believe in Communism as they have the right to believe in what they

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please. However, the ones who killed and committed brutalities are the ones to be punished.

Chairman: I think all members of the Conference will agree with you.

Mr. Won: It has been the custom in this country to put the responsibility on those who are responsible for what happened in their province. If something occurs in a province or district where an official is in charge that disturbs the peace of the district, that official, as responsible agent, should assume responsibility by resigning or somehow. In order to preserve his political integrity, it is necessary for him to assume the responsibility or he will be regarded as an individual without responsibility. If he waits until he is accused, he has lost his opportunity to keep his record clear. The responsible official in practically all of the eight provinces of South Korea should resign for this reason. When an official resigns, the people realize that he is blameless and feel that he is sacrificing himself in the interest of the people and will rally to his support. However, if a person is accused and found responsible and guilty, he appears more guilty in my eyes and the eyes of the people. There is, of course, the apprehension that if these responsible individuals left, the police force would be weakened, but if responsibility is assumed by them, public peace will be preserved and the problem of lack of replacement will find some solution. If a few in the top positions are removed, the men in lower positions may be forgiven and allowed to remain. It is a matter of record in our history that the King himself assumed the responsibility and took the blame when there were disturbances. It is very difficult for me to say this, but I must--While we are talking about responsibility, is not the responsibility on Military Government as well?

Mr. Ahn: I concur with the statement of Mr. Won but wish to make a further statement. Chang, Taik Sang was a fellow student of mine. I worked with Dr. Chough in the independence movement of 1929. He suffered imprisonment and for some reason I was not incarcerated. When you talk about the riots in the eight provinces, Dr. Chough's

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responsibility is even greater. I regard Dr. Chough as a friend, and realize that for years he suffered material difficulties such as having to resign from his position as teacher at Chosun Christian College for financial reasons and his economic condition was bad. However, this matter of political responsibility is something else again. Chang, Taik Sang and Dr. Chough should bear similar responsibility and should be removed. Because of circumstances, it would be difficult to remove them both at one time, but Chang could be removed first, and then in about ten days, Dr. Chough could bear his responsibility in the matter. They would have to be protected from attacks when they are released as both have been attacked recently. In their present positions they are amply protected. We would fear for their safety if they were dismissed. This situation could be taken care of by sending them to America to investigate police procedure. In this way these citizens who will be useful in the future would be guarded and protected. If it is necessary to remove Chang, I feel there is a greater need to remove his superior Dr. Chough.

Mr. Won: As a supplementary suggestion to Chairman, I feel it would not do to disgrace these two men by dismissal. Let them resign voluntarily. If they do, their names will be clear and they will be useful citizens to their country.

Mr. Pahk: I support the views expressed by Mr. Won and Mr. Ahn, but add the following: In making our analysis and during our discussion, it seemed to proceed along three lines--First, enmity to the police--This came out of the fact that they were pro-Japs. The second was that they were partial politically in their views. The third idea developed was a matter of dishonest and illegal measures. We have touched upon the real weakness of the police and also the weakness of Military Government. The success of the agitators has been due to the fact that they used these points. The difficulties of the Coalition Committee have resulted from the use of these weaknesses by agitators. Both Right and Left and Military Government have felt the results of this agitation. The Leftists have felt that they could not come into the coalition for this reason. The patriots have been blocked in their efforts at coalition. The purpose of our Con-

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fermnce is to get at these weakenesses and bring about corrective measures. Dr. Chough is a member of the Han Kook Min Ju Dang and has retained former Japanese police. Therefore he has the responsibility of this situation that has arisen. He did not remove the causes and should bear responsibility for the failure to remove them. The responsibility of the police has been overlooked and the actions of Park, Heun Young, the agitator, have been brought to life. By allowing the heads to remain in responsible positions would leave the roots of discontent among the people and would not serve the purpose of this Conference. We must remove the big cause first. Further, we should do all in our power in the future to see that former Japanese collaborators are not used in Military Government. They should be replaced with patriots who worked for the independence of the country. It should be a principle that in the future only patriots should be used in government.

Chairman: It is requested that each member of the Conference bring recommendations for modification of the document, and it is also suggested that they bring their criticism in the form of concrete suggestions.

The meeting adjourned at 1710 hours to be reconvened tomorrow, November 22, 1946, at 1330 hours.

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Specific Accusations and Derogatory Information Concerning Mr. Chang, Taik Sang, Director of Area "A" of the National Police Force and Chief of the Metropolitan Area of Seoul.

I - Miscellaneous

1. Fourth Meeting, 28 Oct: Dr. Kimm, Kiusic reported an incident in which a young man attached to his household was beaten up by police in Seoul (under Chang, Taik Sang) when he asked for aid in repairing his bicycle which had been borrowed and broken by a policeman.

2. Eleventh Meeting, 7 Nov (Alleged Abuse of Authority by Police Under Chang, Taik Sang)

Vague accusation made by Dr. Kimm (authority not stated) that Seoul police (and others) "eat on credit at restaurants and buy goods on credit without paying".

II - Alleged Political Activities of No, Duk Soo, one of the chief assistants of Chang, Taik Sang.

1. Fifth Meeting, 29 Oct: No, Duk Soo, Chief of the Detective Bureau (Seoul area), one of Chang, Taik Sang's principal assistants, is reported to have called on Chung, Hyung Mook of the Seoul Auto Service (where Mr. Lyuh, Woon Hyung keeps his automobile) and suggested that he break relations with Mr. Lyuh and make a contribution of one million yen to the Han Kook Min Ju Dan (Korean Democratic Party). Mr. Chung did not comply and later Mr. Lyuh's chauffeur and Mr. Chung's brother were reported to have been arrested and maltreated by the police and held for one week in jail.

2. Tenth Meeting, 5 Nov: Substantially the same charge against No, Duk Soo was repeated by Dr. Kimm, Kiusic who added a charge that No, Duk Soo had warned Mr. Chung against lending Mr. Lyuh a car. Colonel Maglin stated that this was the first time that he had heard of the question of the car and the contribution. Colonel Maglin denied knowledge of the case except that he stated that he investigated the arrests of Mr. Chung's brother and Mr. Lyuh's chauffeur and that they were released after a short detention.

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3. Eleventh Meeting, 7 Nov: Colonel Maglin (Page 11) stated that he had questioned both Dr. Chough and Chief Chang regarding No, Duk Soo's alleged connection with the Chung affair. He stated his belief that No was telling the truth when he said that he had made no demand on Mr. Chung for one million yen to the Han Kook Party. (A long discussion only brought out the fact that the investigation of the No, Duk Soo accusations had not been completed. Colonel Maglin had not spoken to No personally. No formal complaint had ever been made to Chief Chang).

4. Thirteenth Meeting, 12 Nov: Mr. Lyuh stated that he could declare "under oath" that No, Duk Soo had "restrained his chauffeur" and told him not to associate with him (Lyuh). Mr. Lyuh also believes that No, Duk Soo had asked "the chauffeur to make a donation to the Han Kook Min Ju Dan".

5. Fourteenth Meeting, 14 Nov: Dr. Chough, Pyung Ock admitted tacitly that No, Duk Soo had asked Chung, Hyung Kook why "he loened his car to Mr. Lyuh" but stated that the reported demand for one million yen was "entirely wrong," according to both No and Chung. Dr. Chough stated that Chung's brother and Mr. Lyuh's chauffeur were arrested because they "were invited by the Russian Consulate and given a party - - - - also to find out where Park was". Mr. Lyuh's chauffeur was also held on suspicion of concealing a quantity of dynamite which was never found. Handbills - one stating that all M.G. officers should resign - were found at his house.

6. Statement of Choy, Neung (Daniel) Chin, Head of Detective Bureau (not included in Joint Korean-American Conference)

Choy accused No, Duk Soo of pro-Japanese activities, including reluctance to change his former Japanese name (Matsuda). Choy was certain that No used money to obtain his present post.

III - Alleged Mistreatment of Suspects at Yong Dung Po

1. Eighth Meeting, 1 Nov: "He understood" Dr. Kimm stated

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that the Yong Dung Po Police Station (under Chang, Taik Sang) had received 60 or more suspects arrested in the Ongyong District and that these men "had suffered as a result of the cruel treatment they received. Two died within a week's time. Yi, Kiu Hoon was killed as a result of a blow in the face".

2. Tenth Meeting, 5 Nov: Colonel Maglin (Page 10) stated that he had had the matter investigated and that "Dr. Chough has the answer". The initial report made to Colonel Maglin showed that "one person died of a heart attack". Dr. Kimm (page 11) asked whether the autopsy was made by a physician attached to the Yong Dung Po station or other physician. He also wanted to know if the man who died from "this so-called heart disease" was the same man who had his face "smashed up". Colonel Maglin stated that the examination was made by a "reputable physician of the community". (The first question was not answered by Colonel Maglin).

3. Thirteenth Meeting, 12 Nov: Chief Chang denied categorically report that two persons were killed and a third injured at Yong Dung Po station.

4. Fourteenth Meeting, 14 Nov: Dr. Chough stated that he had thoroughly investigated the alleged killing of two persons at Yong Dung Po prison. He stated that there was two cases of death at this station in recent months.

a. A rightist (Lee, Chei Sun) was beaten up by a Leftist on 29 September 1946 and died the next day.

b. Kwan, Kil Choi was held at the request of the Angyang Station on 22 October 1946. He died the next day of heart trouble. (This is the case referred to in the tenth meeting page 10, Testimony of Colonel Maglin).

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5. Sixteenth Meeting, 18 Nov: Mr. Pahk, Keun Oong (member of Conference) gave a detailed statement of the reported "killing" of Kwan, Kil Choi (see tenth and fourteenth meetings) at Yong Dung Po Police Station. He stated that relatives were not notified of the death of Mr. Kwan until two days later (25 Oct) when they were asked to come to Sei Bun Police Station. Mr. Pahk stated that the police explanation was that Mr. Kwan's death at Yong Dung Po was entirely natural. On 24 Oct Mr. Kwan's sister who is a doctor examined the body and concluded "that he had been killed from being beaten on his shoulders, arms and legs". On 27 October the body was cremated at Mr. Kwan's house. Contrary to police statement that a truck and other facilities were being loaned the family a bill for yen 1,000.00 was presented by a certain funeral director to the family.

B - Alleged recruiting Campaign to enlist Former Policemen who served Under the Japanese.

1. Tenth Meeting, 5 Nov. Colonel Haslin was asked about posters put up in Seoul, (allegedly at Chang, Taik Sang's orders) recruiting former policemen who had served under the Japanese. A Korean member also asked about radio broadcasts which gave similar information. Colonel Haslin stated that the posters and broadcasts were sponsored by the Director of National Police (and not Mr. Chang, Taik Sang). Further the campaign envisaged recruitment of "men with prior experience"(no mention of service under the Japanese) The campaign was pointed toward men who had served with the Korean Police during the past year, trained in the present schools and separated by their own volition. 1^0 young men submitted applications as a result of the campaign - none of whom had previous service under the Japanese.

2. Eighteenth Meeting, 21 Nov: Major Reckley, Adviser of the Uniform Bureau of the National Police, admitted that a radio and poster campaign for police recruits had been inaugurated

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but "that no mention was made nor any intent indicated for former Japanese police".

V - Alleged Maintenance of Special Squad of Detectives for Political Purposes by Chang, Taik Sang.

1. Eleventh Meeting, 7 Nov: Colonel Maglin was asked whether Chang, Taik Sang had utilized "a detachment of detectives of the highest order (political police)" to suppress leftists. Colonel Maglin stated his belief that the report was untrue as the Korean National Police had no detectives of that category. He denied that , Duk Soo was a member of such a branch. He admitted, however, that there "has been a tendency in the Detective Bureau to gather other than criminal information and intelligence" which caused him to issue a directive against this practice in June 1946. He admitted that a "few districts had kept so-called black lists or other information having no relation to crime".

VI - Alleged Failure of Chief Chang to Arrest Park, Heun Yung.

1. Twelfth Meeting, 7 Nov: Dr. Kimm, Music asked sarcastically why the police had not arrested Park, Heun Yung. Gen. Lerch stated that Chang had been personally instructed by Gen. Hodge not to arrest Park as the arrest would be made by the CIC. (Later orders were given to the police to arrest Park). Dr. Kimm further stated that instead of arresting Park, the Korean police "were too busy arresting people (of the leftist groups) who were getting ready to come into the Coalition". Mr. Won stated that while the police were looking for Park, the newspapers were publishing articles that he contributed. Mr. Won further stated that instead of arresting Park, "those people against Park were being arrested".

2. Thirteenth Meeting, 12 Nov: Chang stated substantially what has been said above regarding ordered arrest of Park, Heun Yung.

VII - Alleged Police Mistreatment of Mr. Lyuh and People Around Him.

Thirteenth Meeting, 12 Nov: Mr. Lyuh, Woon Hyung discussing

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the unneutral attitude of the police, charged Dr. Chough (and, inferentially, Chief Chang) with using his office to further political objectives, particularly the elimination of the influence of Mr. Lyuh himself. Mr. Lyuh stated that his bodyguards have been mistreated by the police. The police discover and search each new place to which he moves and have "mistreated his wife". On one occasion three policemen spent the entire day at his home ostensibly "to protect him" although Mr. Lyuh believes that other motives were present. He stated that he would declare under oath that No, Duk Soo had "restrained his chauffeur" and told him not to associate with him (Lyuh) and had "also asked the chauffeur to make a donation to the Han Kook Min Ju Dan".

VIII - Alleged Mistreatment of Kim, Chul Soo and Hu Hun.

1. Eighteenth Meeting, 21 Nov: Dr. Kim, Music presented a list of questions involving arrests and mistreatment of Koreans by the police.

a. One report stated that Kim, Chul Soo (well-known Communist) and his two sons were arrested 23 October and "badly beaten" at Yong Dung Po Station. Major Rackley, Adviser of the Uniform Bureau, stated that these three persons were arrested on "suspicion of murder, rioting, and personal attack on police". They were released on 24 October. Major Rackley stated that there was no evidence found to prove brutality.

b. Another report stated that Hu Hun was arrested on 19 October and released 20 October. Major Rackley stated he was held for two hours only and "was not beaten up as he was picked up at the request of American public safety officers and questioned by them".

IX - Alleged Attempt by Chang, Taik Sang to Threaten Park, In Soo (Jeweler) and to Extort a Valuable Camera.

1. Testimony of Park, In Soo (Not yet introduced at proceedings of Joint Korean-American Conference)

a. On 9 September 1946 Chang, Taik Sang was accused by

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Park, In Soo, owner of a jewelry, watch and camera shop in Seoul, of attempted extortion of two valuable "Exakta" and "Prima Rex" cameras (said to have been admired previously by a United States Army officer). Chang is reported by Park to have said, "Cameras are needed by the country, as such should be turned over to U.S. If not, your life will be in danger. Furthermore you should not talk about this to anybody else. Tomorrow is a holiday. Therefore, we will be back for these cameras at 10 o'clock the day after tomorrow morning. At that hour you must have these two cameras and all the accessories with these ready".

b. Chang ordered the eldest son of Park held at a Police station when he refused to turn over the cameras to Chang. He stated he was beaten by Chang several times and turned over to the Chief of Detective's office.

c. Later on the same day a plain clothesman called at Park's store and again demanded the cameras. Park again refused and was forced to accompany the plainclothesman to Chang's office. Chang again demanded the cameras as "needed by the country and lent to the police". Chief Chang then said , according to Park, that he would take the cameras "just the same whether he agreed or not." Then Chang had Park handcuffed and beaten according to Park. Chang also threatened to confiscate all Park's merchandise and had the Chief of Detectives telephone the Pon Chung Police Station (in Park's presence) to "confiscate all the merchandise and close up the store".

d. The eldest son was handcuffed and taken back to the store where he got the "Prima Rex" camera and brought it to the Chief of Detectives, but still held in custody. Ten uniformed policemen confiscated "goods, the key to the safe, and finally (closed) up the store". Park and son still handcuffed were again brought to the Chief of Detectives office and asked why they "did not follow the wishes of the Police Chief. If we were to commit such crime again, we will not be kept here any longer but will

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be driven over to northern Korea and if ever this incident will leak out, - - - - our lives will be in danger". Both father and son then wrote apologies to Chang for their "crimes" by order of the Chief of the Pon Chung Police Station.

2. Statement of Choy, Nueng (Daniel) Chin, Head of Detective Bureau:

In a statement made to Maj General A. E. Brown about 19 November 1946, Choy, Nueng (Daniel) Chin, Head of the Detective Bureau, confirmed the essential facts of Park, In Soo's above statement. Choy further stated that Park reported the matter to Major Clarence Weems of Military Government. Choy said he inquired into the matter and that "they tried to throw me out of my job because I brought this case up".

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MINUTES

OF THE NINETEENTH MEETING OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE AT 1330, 22 NOVEMBER 1946.

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown (Chairman)
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling
Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick
Dr. F. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Bunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Teuk Syung

KOREAN MEMBERS

Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Koong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Paik, Keun Oong

Absent: Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Lyuh, Woon Hyung

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

The Chairman presented to the Conference a report which had been sent to him from Dr. Kiusic Kimm regarding an investigation made in the provinces on the riot situation. This was read to the members, and is attached as Exhibit 19.

Chairman: As there is no new business, the Commission will proceed to consideration of the conclusions and recommendations of the Conference as presented yesterday. The Chairman wants to again caution the Conference and those present in the Conference room that everything discussed here is confidential. The Chairman understands that there has been some discussion of what occurred before the Conference yesterday. That is unfortunate. Until a release is issued on the conclusions and recommendations of the Conference, they must not be discussed outside this room. Does any member of the Conference have any recommendations to submit?

Mr. Chang: I had prepared something in regard to suggestions, but did not have time to present it yesterday. What was read yesterday duplicates part of this, but I would like to read what I have: According to the evidence brought out by members of the Conference, the testimony of the higher police officials and testimony of witnesses brought in from Sang-Ju, Yongdung-Po and KaPyung - all of this shows that there is evidence against the police. We can affirm that there were quite a number of former Japanese officials used. We can affirm that there has been dishonesty on the part of certain of the police. We can also affirm

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that there has not been a neutral attitude on the part of policemen in regard to political affairs. We can also affirm that the rightist youth groups have used powers which are detrimental to the police powers. Another fact we can affirm is that police have used beatings and tortures. We also can affirm that in regard to the grain collection program there has been malfeasance and misuse of power. Also we can affirm that there has been on the part of the police retaliation and revenge for the attacks upon them. The charge of preparatory or preventative arrests has been denied but the evidence which we have heard would indicate that the charge is sustained. The testimony of the medical doctor in regard to the murder case at Yongdung-Po is uncertain but it raises suspicion. The maligning of the leftist groups, the mistreatment of certain men can also be affirmed. Any one of these items of itself would not be enough to cause any great concern, but the sum total of them in the eyes of the people is such as to bring the police into ill repute. I would like to speak of my personal experience in regard to those who were collaborators of the Japanese type of person. We cannot decide this problem of collaboration merely on the intellectual basis. The only ones who can really have a full understanding are those who went through it in the time of the Japanese occupation and suffered under it. It is embarrassing to make the statement, but even of the members present here in the room those who have lived abroad are unable to understand experientially to the degree that their bones ached from the type of persecution that went out under the Japanese. The attitude of those who are of the wealthy class and were able to buy themselves off, those who had nothing to do with the government or the very ignorant - their attitude would be that it was not so bad. Those who are able to understand it most fully and accurately are the type of people who did not have money enough or means enough to escape to the country because livlihood was dependent on them and at the same time to urge the young people to continue their strife for independence and freedom - they are the ones who bore the brunt of persecution. Dr. Chough and Mr. Chang, Taik Sang, before the time of liberation, during the Japanese, were those who had fallen away from the activities of the patriots.

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Under the Japanese regime there was a government in which the profiteers and those who were having illicit traffic were covered up by the police. Because the police protected those who were persecuting the patriots and because they protected the profiteers, the hatred of the people against the police was the greater. The charge is now going around in certain areas that the American Government is supporting the police even to the extent of their having been former Japanese collaborators because if this present opportunity is not taken to set straight the feeling in this regard by removing Dr. Chough and Mr. Chang and those connected closely with them, if the sincerity of action is not revealed to the people, they will not settle down. If action is not taken it will weaken the stand of the Coalition Committee and give material to those who seek to continue their propaganda against the government.

Dr. Johnson: I am a little bit confused about some of the things said here yesterday and today. I wonder if some of my Korean friends could enlighten me. The last day our very wise counsellor Dr. Kimm, Kiusic was here, he made certain recommendations about the police problem. He said he had thought the matter over carefully, that he was at one time of the opinion that Dr. Chough and Mr. Chang would have to be removed, but he said that when he had given that much deeper consideration he had come to the conclusion that they should be retained, that they were in his judgment both patriots and very valuable to Korea. I have checked the minutes to make sure that my memory did not fail me. When he made this statement there was no further discussion and there seemed to be agreement on the part of my Korean friends in this recommendation. From what has been said yesterday and today, there seems to be a complete change of sentiment. It is difficult for me as a foreigner to understand all the implications, but I only wanted to record the fact that I am somewhat confused.

Mr. Chang: When we first organized and had our meeting here we went over the procedure of each one giving his own personal ideas. I interpreted what Dr. Kimm said not to be a pronouncement of the coalition group but his own ideas, therefore I listened to what he said without any comment. If, however, that had been given for the passing of a motion as representing the total of the whole conference, both I and other members would have made comments. ~~Confidential~~

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Mr. Yon: In regard to the question asked by Dr. Johnson, he is right. Dr. Kimm not only said that at that time, but I confirmed it. e both agreed to the fact that Dr. Chough and Chang, Taik Sang are patriots and that it would not do to charge them as being Japanese carry-overs and so remove them. You will recall that when Mr. Chang was sitting here and we made the charge that there were a great many Japanese carry-overs in the government, he admitted the charge and said, " ait until March and we will get this thing ironed out.". In reply to that same statement, Dr. Choug said he found it difficult to disband police after having employed them for six or seven months. Therefore, we don't want them to bear their responsibility for having used former Japanese police. What I said yesterday was along another line. Because the peace of the country has been broken and because Dr. Chough and these others are charged with maintaining peace in the country, they should bear the responsibility for the riots and breaking of the peace. Our history records that at such times as these, inevitably the responsible ones were removed. I do not advocate the doing away with them; I advocate the removal of them for their present position. Let them resign voluntarily, realizing that public opinion demands that they do so. I am very embarrassed about the leak that the Chairman mentioned and feel that it must have been the fault of one of the Korean members. Of course you can't believe everything that goes around, but I heard that after Dr. Chough had been called here, he gathered his former Japanese carry-over officers and talked to them and did not speak lightly to the gathering. I am regretful that Dr. Chough has put a personal interpretion on this because our sole desire here is not to bring up personal matters but to carry on for the good of the country. Whatever we write down, I would repeat one hundred times that Dr. Chough must himself realize the responsibility for his actions. One great factor which will have to be changed is the police thinking they are above criticism. The central police agency shall not regard itself as an independent

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gency. The Director of Police must be under the central organ. The police stations in the provinces must be under the provincial head. This would prevent police from being despotic. This is a matter that must be considered by the legislative body. When it meets the most important thing will be the reconstruction of the whole setup of the

Chairman: It is the opinion of the Chairman that all members of the Conference have the same views except as to one point. There are many different ways to state in words the same thought. It is believed that the words now before us express the thoughts of all members of this Conference except as to one point. That one point is the question as to whether Dr. Chough and Chang, Taik Sang should both be dismissed. The recommendation now before the Conference suggests that only Chang, Taik Sang be removed from the police force. It is the opinion of the Chairman that Dr. Chough should not be removed from his position as Commissioner of Police. There are many reasons why the Chairman has this opinion. In reply to the primary reason advanced by certain of our Korean friends for removing Dr. Chough--that is, that he must be held responsible for the disturbances at Taegu and other places, the testimony before this Conference shows that provincial governors are responsible for the maintenance of law and order in their area. If the Chairman accepts the theory that the Commissioner of Police is responsible for these disturbances, he would have to remove the Commissioner every time a murder was committed. The man committing those murders has many ways of expressing his disapproval of government rather than going out and killing policemen wholesale. As far as this record now before this Conference goes, there is no evidence that there was any complaint against any police, against any government, until the mob proceeded to kill police. To hold Dr. Chough responsible for that condition does not seem just. It is natural that in a group of able men there should be many different opinions. It is the unfortunate duty of the Chairman to try to reconcile those opinions in order to get unanimity. In order to attempt that, the Chairman will take up one at a time the recommendations that have been proposed. The Chairman is going to ask for a discussion of these

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recommendations and then for a vote as to whether recommendation will be adopted. In voting, the Chairman will start with Mr. Choi and proceed clockwise around the table. He will ask Lieutenant Wilkinson to record the vote on each recommendation. First recommendation-la. (A long discussion followed on how the recommendations should be presented and the translation of same into Korean. A committee was formed to translate recommendation into Korean.)

H. Ahn: It has been stated that Mr. Chough should resign. Now I will say something I had not planned on saying. Today we are at the place where under the direction of General Hodge, General Lerch and General Brown and the Coalition Committee, we are working along broader lines. Therefore we must receive the thoughts of these Generals and follow up lead. However, the question is that Mr. Chough who is a member of the same government on his own is opendently supports Kim Sang Soo (?) and Kan Duk Kool (?) and other elements opposed to coalition. There are two representatives of the public who are opposing coalition. One is Park, Heun Yung and the Communist group he represents, and the second is a certain illustrious individual I will not name. Mr. Chough has allied himself with the opponents of coalition. I heard that when Chough came in, he came in with the idea of fighting it out. Mr. Chough is an official under the jurisdiction of General Hodge and General Lerch and is following a policy which is opposed to the policy of the two Generals. So, how can we support the policy of these generals with a man who is opposing this policy. It looks as if we see things differently. I made this statement to clarify this. We hope you will consider it deeply as it concerns the policy of General Hodge, General Lerch and Military Government.

(The Conference proceeded to the discussion of paragraphs 1a, 1b and 1c of the recommendations.)

Chairman: It has been suggested that paragraph 1c be amended to read as follows: "That Dr. Chough, the Director of the Korean National Police be directed to control the police force so that it is not used for political purposes and that individual policemen do not use their official position for political purposes."

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Mr. Yon: I have an additional statement concerning the police in the light of something that has just come in. It is a report that has reference to Dr. Chough. (Report is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "20". It states that in Kimpo the police forbid the organization of the Y.M.C.A. When it was inquired as to why it was forbidden, it was stated that it could not be allowed since it is now a time of riots. The Y.M.C.A. is a group that support coalition. On the following day in the very same village, they allowed the Rapid Realization group to organize. That is the group which opposed coalition. Not only did they give them permission to organize, but the Chief of Police went there and made congratulatory remarks. The Chief of Detective Section made this startling remark: "This Y.M.C.A.,-- a Christian organization -- is now forwarding the aggressive ideas of American desire to seize land." The police at Kimpo confiscated rice and helped themselves. That was brought to light by a man from that district who found out about it and told the newspaper. This man is now being sought by the Kimpo police. He is hiding here from them. These things can be proven. People get slapped in the face for just walking by and looking at the police station. Another thing you have not heard is the remark being circulated throughout Seoul--that rice merchants and cattle thieves have to live before we can live. In inquiring into the meaning of that, I found that the rice merchants are the Americans and the cattle thieves are the Russians. So, among the Koreans it is felt that we have to get rid of rice merchants and cattle thieves in order to live.

Chairman: Many of these things which have been brought up before this Conference are causing improvements to be made which it is hoped will eventually correct most of the errors. The latest action is the bringing from the United States of a group of trained American policemen. These men have been especially selected and are being sent throughout all provinces. It is hoped that they will be able to aid in getting rid of some of the practices which have been brought before this Commission.

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(The Conference then proceeded to the discussion of the other items in the recommendations, and a few minor changes were suggested.)

Chairman: Are the recommendation acceptable to all members of the Conference?

Mr. Kim: In regard to the question of Dr. Chough, I have a statement to make. As the recommendation now stands, it does not go beyond that which is namely an admonishment to Dr. Chough. This being the situation, a coalition and legislative procedure and other matters will stand the disapproval of the public. It will eventually incur a disbelief in these organizations. That is my personal point of view. I am willing to follow the unanimous opinion of this Committee.

Chairman: The legislature will have the authority to remove Dr. Chough as if the legislature thinks his removal is necessary.

Mr. Kim: That may be so. If the legislative assemble will be composed of real patriots as we hope, such steps could be taken but the question is whether the legislative assembly will be composed of real patriots.

Chairman: Dr. Chough can be removed by the Military Governor when his services become unsatisfactory. When this Conference started, it was stated that it was not the purpose of the Conference to investigate individuals but to try to find the broad reasons which caused the disturbances in South Korea. The evidence before this Conference does not in any way show that Dr. Chough is responsible for this disturbance. That is the opinion of the Chairman as an individual member of the Conference only. Each member of the Conference is entitled to his own opinion and to submit any recommendation he may desire.

Mr. Chang: I understand that when the Conference was opened, it was understood that it was not the purpose of the Conference to reveal any conclusions that may be reached by this Conference to the public. At that time the Leftist and Rightist parties were so split that nothing could be reached on the basis of an economic agreement. The public is anxious to see a coalition function as they had hoped. When coalition came into existence on the 7th of October, the people had great hopes. Shortly after that their hopes were reinforced by the fact

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that the coalition was working in conjunction with Military Government. After that the Coalition Committee published in the newspaper that it was working on personnel problems of the police. The newspapers published the fact that the police chiefs attended this conference. The public has been hoping that the coalition might do something to satisfy their expectations. Although we have no specific agreement with the public, we can do no less than to satisfy them. To satisfy the desire of the people in relation to persons like the police--pro-Japanese police--would be to keep the minds of the people in peace. I have heard that since the issuance of Directive 118, certain policemen are not enthusiastic about their work. We are dubious about the public feeling when we retain Dr. Chough in office while we dismiss Chang, Taik Sang. My opinion is that both should be discharged at the same time. If one is retained and one is discharged, it would cause a disturbance.

Mr. Won: I express my gratitude to the Chairman because he has been so mindful of our suggestions. So far all these recommendations have been very fair to us, but in regard to Dr. Chough's dismissal, one serious consideration should be made. If Dr. Chough is allowed to remain in office the legislative assembly or coalition would not function as they should, simply because of this one man remaining in office.

Chairman: If the legislative assembly is depending upon the removal of Dr. Chough, it will not be much of an assembly. If Koreans are not patriotic enough to serve their country with Dr. Chough in office and have to demand his removal, we won't have much of an assembly.

Mr. Won: What I meant to say is that the success of the legislative body would be greatly influenced by the removal of this man.

Chairman: If people are going to be influenced by that little thing, they will not be very valuable.

Dr. Bunce: One further point--this is my personal opinion. In these recommendation we have a strong recommendation to the Chief of Police and Military Government that the police shall not be active in a political way. It is my belief that Dr. Chough will follow his instruction The belief of the people who want his removal at any cost is based on the assumption that Dr. Chough will not obey his instructions. I think

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it is essential that we believe whether or not Dr. Chough will obey his instructions and if he has been false in the past will mend his ways. My personal opinion is that Dr. Chough can take a different path and can perform work that will be acceptable to everybody.

The meeting was adjourned at 1710 hours to be reconvened on Monday, 25 November 1946, at 1330 hours.

Exhibit 20. Attached original.

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GIST OF ATTACHED (KOREAN) REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF RIOT SITUATION IN THE PROVINCES - sent to General Brown by Dr. Kiusic Kimm and presented at 19th meeting of Conference on 22 November 1946.

From November 7 to 14, in Taegu, Yongsan, Mason and Pusan, they conducted an investigation, calling upon the outstanding citizens in those areas and also those arrested and detained in detention houses for plotting these riots. This report is considered to be impartial.

According to the investigation, one outstanding fact in relation to those riots is the conviction on the part of the public that the riots were caused primarily by the coalition between the leftists and the plotters. Whereas the rightists gave their support and cooperation to the public. Judging from the fact that during this riot, the police force was not properly prepared with weapons indicates that the plotters organized their forces and put it over in such a way that the police force was helpless. (3rd) The fact that in these riots there were so many medical students together with practioneers indicates the special consideration on the part of the medical educationists in the way of spreading their education among medical students. The need of re-educating the medical student is great.

The reason for this upheaval is:

The proverty stricken condition among the people. Despite the liberation of Korea, the food situation has become very accute and this is one of the main causes.

The rebellious action on the part of the people from the time of the Lee regime down to the Japanese regime. People in Kyongsang-Pukto have been in such a tendency as to hate or to harbor phobia against officials, and the same thing is almost unanimously applicable to the present administration by the Military Government. That is, they are in an attitude of disliking the officials of Military Government. The primary reason why these people have a rebellious attitude towards the officials of any kind lies in the fact that they have for the past 30 or 40 years not been trained along democratic principals of government. Then these officials who serve in the Military Government

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are also accused of being negligent in matters of democratic principals applied in their daily duties. That is another reason why the people down there are against the officials of the Military Government.

The particular enmity against the police. The particular enmity of the populace against the police who have been carrying on Japanese practices from their training under the Japanese Government on into the new regime, particularly in the hate against them for the matter of collection of grain.

The enmity against the Taegu Chief of Police. During the former months because of the cholera inoculations given out by the Public Health and Welfare Bureau, there is some irritation on the part of the people toward the police and the Public Welfare people.

The deficiency in ability of the police.

The low calibre of the mentality of the police and the lack of schooling - having been turned over to an ignorant type of person who plays upon the emotions of the people.

The sending of auxilliary forces from Seoul. The indiscriminate arrangements with the justice because of some 4,000 odd citizens at Taegu on the part of the police has aroused opposition and enmity and will continue for some time. Because about two-thirds of those apprehended were proven to be innocent shows the inefficiency on the part of the police in making their arrests. Because they use methods used by the Japanese without any proof of guilt, it is likely that the dissatisfaction with the police will continue on in the future. There is no sympathy for the families of the police who have been suspended because of their actions during their term of office to oppress the people. The Chief of Police in Taegu, Kim by name, is concurrently head of a youth band in Seoul in which there are a great many rowdy persons.

The opposition to the grain collection program. Because of the inefficient way of collecting grain from July on and the lack of proper information in regard to the collecting of it, the people have

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a great deal of dissatisfaction in regard to it. The knowledge of the distribution of grain has also been lacking. Because of the unjust allottments which were placed upon the poor type of farmers rather than the wealthy having heavy burdens, their enmity against the police in the rice collection has been increased.

Because of the strict measures exerted by Colonel Herlz, the pressure on the police, who in turn passed it on to the people, thus arousing hostility.

Enmity against American soldiers. The lack of authority and power on the part of Koreans in Military Government. If the Americans had been dispatched immediately to put down the trouble, there probably would have been less. We cannot understand why the American Army personnel were indifferent to the action of the manslaughters by the medical college.

The enmity against Colonel Herlz on the part of the people of Taegu.

Extreme action on the part of certain part of the American forces in stopping and breaking the windows of cars, etc.

Impressions of investigations. Americans should understand the fact that in Korean agricultural economy a great many more people are used than machines and people have an affection for the soil.

The importance of propaganda in regard to the collection of grains. Magnanimity on the part of quotas for the people. Announcements should be made from time to time of allottments and collections, etc., in regard to the grain collection program.

Recognizing the disability of those who are trained under the Japanese program to carry out the American democratic program, it is important that a democratic instruction be given to these people, and the schools should be organized. Change the organization of the Japanese type of school. Recognizing the inability of all those instructed under the Japanese regime to change over to the democratic type, that all those employed under the Japanese regime should all be dismissed.

To fill up the police force with less of the ignorant type of person and more of the educated type, making this possible by granting them better wages.

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MINUTES

OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 25 NOVEMBER 1946

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Auth: DOD Instr. 12 Apr and 8 July 1976
By FWB/Bkm NARS, Date APR 02 1977

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert L. Brown (Chairman)
Brig. Gen. John Beckerling
Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick
Dr. L. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Bunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Teuk Syung

KOREAN MEMBERS

Won, Heh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Kim, Poong Choon
Chang, Kwon
Pah, Keun Oong

Absent: Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Lyuh, Woon Hyung

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Mr. Won made the following report: At a labor meeting which opened in Seoul the day before yesterday it was reported that General Hodge's representative made a congratulatory speech. The chairman made the following remarks: Victory has been gained in the conflict of the people against the government in South Korea. The implication is that the labor group itself had won the victory. Mr. Won stated that he was making the report only, and would leave the interpretation of it up to the chairman and members of the Conference. However, his personal interpretation is that there are many causes of the disturbances in South Korea and one of them is the agitators. The labor group's interpretation is that the people are fighting an evil government and they are celebrating a victory in that strife. Is this not a contradiction when on one hand General Hodge's representative offers congratulations to one group and we sit here with other representatives of his discussing the matter of the disturbances. Which one of the groups will the people believe. The Russians would not permit such an announcement in North Korea. Those who instigated the disturbances, whether right or left, should be punished. I am unable to excuse the Korean Labor Party for making such a pronouncement and admitting their guilt in instigating such a riot as this.

In answer to questions from members, Mr. Won stated that this group is not the Socialist Labor Party, but is a labor party which includes four or five groups - the Chunpyung, the Socialist group, the Park Heun

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Young group, etc. He stated that he, Mr. Ahn and Mr. Kim attended the meeting yesterday; that there were about 500 representatives from all the various guilds; that the total membership is estimated at 70,000; that it is his estimation that they will swing to the extreme left. He stated that in his speech he advocated that they not go to the extreme right or left but that they have a coalition. They are professing to follow that course now.

The Conference proceeded to a consideration of the findings and recommendations which were discussed at the last meeting.

General Weckerling proposed an amendment to Paragraph 2, Section 5, Recommendations, which would eliminate the responsibility of Military Government and General Hodge in defining "former Japanese collaborators".

Mr. Chang suggested that the word "chikimkwan" be changed to "chuimkwan" in the third paragraph of Section VII, Ordinance 118, and further suggested that we follow the precedent set in Japan whereby 211,000 were removed from office. He felt that it would be contradictory not to do something similar here. He feels that if the word "chikimkwan" were left in, no one would be removed.

Mr. Won agreed that no one would be removed if this word were left in, and also feels that it should be done as it was in Japan. In China, Japan and elsewhere the matter of Japanese collaborators has been solved to the satisfaction of the world, but in Korea it has not been solved to the satisfaction of anyone - not only Japanese collaborators, but war-time criminals. Many who worked in war industries are occupying positions of prominence now. If we put out a regulation that does not hit anyone, the regulation would be useless.

Chairman: It is the opinion of the Chairman that the discussion is rather academic. The Legislature will meet within a period of two weeks. One of the first tasks will be to determine the eligibility of those elected to the Legislature under the provisions of Ordinance 118. In determining that the legislature will of necessity set a standard for the handling of collaborators. The Legislature also having the power to refuse all the appointments in government will naturally enforce that standard upon government. The government would have no opportunity

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to examine individual cases and act before the Legislature would act. The only law which now exists under which the government could act is Ordinance 118.

Mr. Won stated that public opinion looks at it this way - that those up to the grade of "chikimkwan" are disbarred because they lack enough qualification for membership, and those above that grade are at present in the government. He feels that this is a contradiction, a paradox.

General Weckerling stated that the purpose of this amendment is not to lower the sta ndard, but merely to postpone the determination from Military Government to the Legislature.

Chairman: The Chairman will propose an amendment which may satisfy both points of view. In the first line of page 5 of the recommendations as now written in lieu of the words "at once" substitute the words "as rapdily as possible". This was agreed to by all members.

Mr. Won brought up the matter of the selection of Korean officials. He feels that there should be some systematic plan. At present a small group makes the selection. He suggested a plan similar to the civil service plan in China.

Chairman proposed an additional conclusion and recommendation to cover what Mr. Won had recommended. He suggested the addition of the following paragraph to Section II - Personnel: "6. That the present method utilized in selecting Military Government personnel to fill the higher positions is not in all cases producing the best available individuals." He suggested also the addition of the following paragraph under Section V - Recommendations to take the place of the present paragraph 5 which will become paragraph 6: "5. That Military Government devise a more efficient method of screening applicants for important positions and in employing such personnel follow the principles of selection by civil service methods as far as practicable."

General Helmick and Dr. Johnson assured the members that increasing care is taken every day in the appointment of Korean civil service to insure that there are no Japanese collaborators hired. Dr. Johnson further stated that civil service classification experts from Washington have been brought to Korea and are attempting to set up standards for each job.

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Mr. Won referred to the method used in China where a preparatory examining group chooses a group of names that is published in the newspapers. The qualifications are made public, and individuals are selected from this list.

Chairman suggested that Dr. Johnson and Mr. Won prepare a recommendation draft for a similar selection system.

The Conference approved the Conclusions, and went on to a discussion of 1 (a) under Recommendations.

Mr. Won suggested that those who served as Lieutenants or Captains under the Japanese be demoted and after a year promoted.

Mr. Pahk suggested that steps be taken to eliminate present police who were Lieutenants or above under the Japanese and whose records do not meet the democratic requirements.

Chairman suggested that the meeting be adjourned and that voting on Recommendations be completed by 1530 at the next meeting and that the Conference then proceed to a discussion of the rice collection program.

The Conference adjourned at 1700 hours to be reconvened on Tuesday, 26 November at 1330 hours.

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UNITED

...TY-FIR... MEETING
JOINT KORLAN-AMERIC N CONFER NC
... IL DUK ...OO PALACE
1330, 26 NOV...BER 1946

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...ICAN ...E...

...aj. Gen. ...lbert ... rown (Chairman)
...rig. Gen. John ...eckerling
...rig. Gen. C. ... elmick
...r. ... ... J. Johnson
...r. A. C. ...unce

Absent: ...aj. ...er... ... ...ercl

Interpreters: ...r. ...arry ...oenzeller
...r. ...o, Yeub ...yung

KOREAN ...EMBER

...on, Seh Yoon
Choi, Yong O
Chang, Kwon
...ohk, Keun Yong

...bsent ...r. Kim, Kiusic
...yub, O n Kyung
...im, Yoong Choon

...e meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

...e conference proceeded with a discussion of 1 (b), Section V of ...ecommendations since 1 (a) was not completely translated. This 1 (b) was approved by all members of the Conference. The Conference ...on proceeded to paragraph 1 (c).

Chairman stated that it was the unanimous opinion of the Korean members of ...nference that they could not accept this paragraph, and read a ...ter or signed by all the Korean members to that effect. This is attached ...reto and marked Exhibit "21". He put this letter and the following paragraph up before the Conference for discussion: "That ...r. Chough be directed to control the police force so that it is not used for political purposes and that individual police do not use their official position for political purposes."

Gen. Helmick: As acting Military Governor, I am responsible for the police force and the enforcement of peace and order. Mr. Chough is the head of the Department of Police. He joined the police in September 1945 as Chief of Police Affairs which combined at that time both operations and policy making. In the first part of 1946, he was appointed head of the Department of Police. He is a man of great efficiency and diligence. He has done everything in his power to carry out the policies directed by Military Government in eliminating abuse of autho-

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rity, brutality, and political partisanship. He has made many trips into the provinces to speak on democratic principles and to build up a police force which would meet with the approval under democratic principles. Every suggestion which has been given to Mr. Chough on personnel and organization has been received by him in a cooperative manner and carried out. Under Mr. Chough the police have never waivered in carrying out their duty to combat rioting and disturbances. At Taegu the disturbances reached the proportion they did because of a weak police chief. Mr. Chough himself went there as soon as the disturbance reached a serious phase. He dismissed the police chief who was weak and that man has not be redeployed elsewhere. I feel that Mr. Chough has given to the government faithful, loyal, and efficient service. There are many things in the police that neither Mr. Chough nor I wish to see, but he is working constantly to eliminate the activities which do not conform to our directives. To remove Mr. Chough at this time would remove a man who has done his best for Korea, and it would make every policeman who has truly tried to do his duty feel that he also is liable for removal.

Chairman: The Chairman would like to state that he personally cannot support the recommendation of the Korean members of the Conference for the reason that the Chairman has searched the records of this Conference and can find no cause in the record to justify the release of Mr. Chough. It is not believed that the accusation that the Commissioner of Police, Mr. Chough, Yung Sek, bears responsibility for the disturbances at Taegu and elsewhere in Korea is a proper cause for his release. The record clearly shows that the responsibility for maintaining law and order is a responsibility of the provincial governor. The principal assistant of the provincial governor in maintaining law and order is the provisional chief of police. The Chairman can understand how a provincial chief of police might be properly charged with failure, and in the Taegu case, the chief of police was removed by the Commissioner of Police for such failure. The Chairman cannot see by what line of reasoning the Commissioner of Police could be removed for a failure of

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one of his provincial chiefs. To follow this line of reasoning to a natural conclusion would mean that every time a lawless individual committed a murder, the Commissioner of Police would have to be relieved. Speaking confidentially and within the Conference, it is the opinion of the Chairman that if the political support of any loyal Korean will be lost if this Conference fails to recommend the release of Mr. Chough that then we had better lose the support of such Korean because he could not be classed as a loyal Korean. If Korea is to be properly developed to the greatness which we all hope, then the type of Korean who would leave his sinking ship or would leave the government because of the failure to remove an individual under the slight charge brought against Chough, Yung Tek would not be the type to engage in the government.

Mr. Johnson: I consider it a great privilege to be a member of this Conference and I have been pleased with the objective and impartial way all members have been addressing themselves to the problems. The interest has been the future of Korea, not partisan, political interest. We have agreed that we would address ourselves toward these problems in terms of certain principles. We have gone on record that it is a principle we are following in addressing ourselves to the police problems. The recommendations this panel made is that those members of the police force who cannot adapt themselves to a democratic procedure are to be progressively dropped from the police force. If we test the issue before us for discussion now in terms of those principles, it will be incumbent upon Mr. Chough's critics to prove that he has adapted himself to a democratic way of conduct. That surely he has not demonstrated. In fact, several members have themselves attested that he is a true patriot who is following the democratic course. The charges brought against Dr. Chough this afternoon, I regret to say, are political. I think the issue is too great to consider in terms of narrow sectarian lines. We must think of this problem in terms of what Korea must do.

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Mr. Chang made a statement to the following effect: The Korean members have also spoken of the matter of principle. There have been frequent demands for specific charges against individuals which have often embarrassed us. Therefore to speak more on the personal matter of Mr. Choi is a matter of personal inconvenience and regret. When Mr. Choi testified here, he said that the organization of the police was along democratic lines and that he sought to form its membership from those who followed democratic procedures. However, the practical and actual results show, according to Colonel Millard's figures, that all of the ordinary patrolmen type of police are what he terms of the officers were former Japanese employed police. Another witness, Mr. Choi, stated that it was impossible to bring Mr. Choi Tokyo who had studied under the Japanese police and expect him to understand and act in a democratic manner. I agree with this statement of Mr. Choi. If you are fishing, you must have a net or hook. You can't catch fish with a club." If the Mr. Choi organization of police is to be based upon patriotic Koreans rather than former Japanese employed men, the people could not understand why former Japanese employed police are what they are. Any of those who served under the Japanese police were practically dragged into the police department when it was being organized last fall. Now those policemen are gradually becoming bolder and bolder, and the Taegu incident was the result. The disturbances were not only in one province, but there were minor affairs in the other eight. According to all practices of the Orient and what the Koreans understand themselves, Mr. Hugh as head of the National Police should bear the responsibility. I don't understand how this could be a political action when I represent the Center, Mr. Hank represents the left, and the rest of the members are largely right. The leftist would concur. The people would not consider this a political action but a necessary move. The charge that this is a political action has no foundation. Mr. Hahk is Left, but the people outside would consider that he is Right because he came from China from the interim government there. I also have a personal statement I would

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like to make. From the time I was a student in middle school, I realized that Korea was indebted to America for many cultural things. I therefore regarded Dr. Appenzeller Sr. and Dr. Underwood as great benefactors of Korea, also Dr. Anderson. During the war, I spoke my mind to the Japanese on this subject. I realize it was a lack of information on the part of the Koreans to misrepresent them to the Japanese. In addition, I feel that our American friends in Korea cannot fully understand the Korean position. This was what Dr. Rhee publicized and misunderstood. It is the responsibility of the Koreans here to correct this trend. We know that now [illegible] Koreans here, we can talk with members of the [illegible] like current times. However, it is a value [illegible] responsibility lies in this regard. If we fail to [illegible] Koreans in decision, it is the responsibility of [illegible]. Action of the Korean members of the conference in [illegible] is not to take partial action on Dr. Rhee or [illegible] action to further political party aims, but to further the interests of Korea as an [illegible] people understand. It is for the interest of Korea [illegible] to represent that we [illegible] and the people desire--to bring [illegible] in the attitude of the Korean people--that we resent this.

R. on: It is a matter of [illegible] difficulty to speak of Dr. Rhee because of our close personal relations. However, personal affairs are personal affairs, but affairs of the nation are something else again. There are three contradictions in regard to Dr. Rhee. Personally, he is without a doubt a sincere patriot, but from the time he assumed the position of Director of Police, he began employing former Japanese employees. The reason he does not receive praise from the public is because of this. Had he only employed one-half Japanese employees, he would not be in the fix he is in now. Personally I feel sure he is a democrat, but his subordinates are former Japanese employees and not democratic. He states that the peace of the country is being maintained very well, but peace is not being maintained because the people are not receiving the commands of the

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police. The commands have to be enforced and that is where the difficulty comes in. Mr. Chough boasts about peace being maintained, but the people are dissatisfied. With these three contradictions, it is difficult for Mr. Chough to remain as head of the police. If people listen well to the commands of the police, the government will be made much easier. However, since the people have now decided not to listen to the commands of the police, what can you do? If it were just for the incident of Taegu, it could be understood, but since the people in general have been aroused and are antagonistic toward the police, it is something else. In the history of our country it has been a precedent that people understand that the top man bear the responsibility. You can get confirmation of this by reading our history. If Mr. Chough does not bear his responsibility, it will set a new precedent. In the future when things get to a bad state and the whole country is aroused, the top man will say that Chough stayed on and only he should be removed. If we decide this erroneously today, it will establish a precedent which will allow in the future any officials to stick it out stubbornly in opposition. However, I realize that there are not many men like Chough in our country. From my point of view, he is a very valuable person, but to insist that he remain as Director is inimical to his own interests and his further usefulness in the country. The idea in removing him is not that he shall be discarded but that he will be reserved for future use. Finally, in regard to Chief Chang, why ask him to resign? If you remove Chang for what happened, then you would have to remove all the provincial chiefs. Law must be just and impartial. It would not be right to punish one and reward another.

Gen. Helmick: Mr. Kon has given us a very clear exposition of Korean feelings and customs. I would like to give the feelings of the Americans--that is the customs of the Americans in such a case. To an American, if Dr. Chough should resign because there has been trouble, his commander would feel that Dr. Chough had deserted him in time of need. Also, if I as Military Governor should remove Dr. Chough when I feel that he has given good honest work, I would not be loyal to

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those who served under me. I would feel that all those under me would say: "Why should I work for that man. He would not support me in time of trouble." The difference in the American feeling probably seems as strange to my Korean friends as their feelings seem to me. It is the same difference as our languages, but I want them to feel that each has those feelings in the best interest of Korea.

Dr. Bunce: Why is it felt necessary to remove Dr. Chough at this [illegible] time in order, as they state in the letter, to save the coalition. As I understand it, one of the privileges of the assembly will be the review of appointments.

Mr. Clark: As far as the left is concerned, there is no point in talking about them. Even the rightists find it difficult to work along with the government. In spite of the fact that we realize our great debt to the Americans for liberation and culture, we ask that is causing this difficulty. It is a misunderstanding. One of the big misunderstandings is this: Why are they using former Japanese collaborators? Until that is changed, there will be no desire on the part of patriots who are either right or left to work for the government. In regard to our investigation, I feel that the greatest mistake of the government has been in the use of former Japanese employees. In the police, in the government and even in the Property Custodian Office, you will find collaborators and profiteers. One illustration is that those patriots who lived abroad and worked for their country have come back to their native land and can't get a room to live in. The profiteers have grabbed them all. As a result of the war and liberation, people are commencing to realize the advantages of democracy and America's gift to us. Of course, the number is not large, but the intelligentsia and those who know history realize that America intends to carry through democratic ideas. These are ideals that have perished here. We too prize them. Contrary to Hitler, Mussolini and Japanese claims, we understand and believe that America intends to give little nations their liberty. Having little acquaintance with the people of the country when they arrived, it is understandable that the Americans used some pro-Japanese, but we believe and expect that

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this factor will be changed. What evidence will the people have of our intentions if nothing is done? If nothing is done now, it will be done another time. In regard to the Coalition Committee, we dislike Japanese collaborators. If our recommendations are disregarded, the regard of the public for this Committee will be lessened. If these Japanese collaborators are allowed to remain in office, it makes the sincere attempts of patriots like us very difficult. I believe that all patriots feel as I have represented.

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Mr. Won: Replying briefly to what Dr. Bunce has asked. Mr. Lyuh has come at great risk here to attend these meetings, but the leftists are saying to him that he is being deceived by the Americans. Mr. Lyuh himself has made up his mind, but it is difficult for him to carry out things because the leftists are claiming that he is being deceived by the Americans. The evidence is that Dr. Chough and Mr. Chang could have come and conferred on the matter and asked what to do, but they did not. When I heard the evidence of Mr. Chang, he was quite forthright, "If you wait until March we will get it fixed up." When I put my direct direct question to Dr. Chough, he said "How can I dismiss people whom I have employed for six or seven months." When I accused him of being a party member and that that influence was bad for him as Chief of Police and asked why he didn't give it up, his reply was that "if the Military Government asks me to give it up I will do it." That is the point at which I was completely discouraged. If I were in Dr. Chough's place, of course on one hand I would feel my responsibility to General Hodge and Military Government. In order to carry out the desire of that very Military Government I would if I were Dr. Chough look up people like Mr. Lyuh and Dr. Kimm and find out what should be done about this. If he is such a true patriot, instead of running around in the evening with pro-Japanese friends why doesn't he come to us and confer with those who represent coalition with Military Covernment. He has never once come. What he wants to do is gain favor with the American side and look down on the Korean side. That is not right. Therefore, from the time he became Director, the distance between him and patriots has become greater. You will find from the time he became Director he has had no fraternization or relation with the patriots who were his former friends. If he is acting that way toward those who were formerly his friends, what will the leftists say. The thing I can't understand is why after the testimony, after being accused, didn't he come to Dr. Kimm or Mr. Lyuh and ask what he could do to clear these errors, but on the contrary he is on the winning side and is playing the game that way.

Mr. Ahn: In regard to the feeling of the people that Dr. Chough has

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not represented their feeling and has misunderstood it, Mr. Won has clearly portrayed the situation. The reason for asking the removal of Dr. Chough is the lesser of two evils. It is unfortunate to ask for his removal, but his remaining would be a greater misfortune for the country. Whether Dr. Chough is a patriot or not, we will not say, but his record for over a year is that he is not one. If by removing Dr. Chough we can restore the confidence of the people in the government, we will accomplish something good. If our American friends have not been able to understand this point of view, we will say that it is a difference in the social structure and leave it at that. The facts are there. If in a time like this you gentlemen will understand and follow the desires of us who act in the interest of the country and value our patriotism, the results will be better. A while ago mention was made that the provincial governor was responsible for the peace and order in his province. In regard to that, in America the responsibility for various states would not be the responsibility of the Federal Government but here in a small country the responsibility is in a central place. If it is necessary to remove Mr. Chang, it is also necessary to remove Dr. Chough.

Mr. Won submitted a report of a youth group at Andong, written by the chairman of the group. This report is attached as Exhibit 22.

Chairman said there were two proposals as to Section V, paragraph 1 (c) of the recommendations. The first proposal was as above stated, and the second proposal was the letter submitted by the Korean members of the Conference. He said he would present both proposals and each member would vote yes or no on each proposal.

Mr. Choi did not feel that a vote would be the right action to take in this matter because the letter which had been submitted was signed by all the Korean members of the Conference and represented their unanimous approval for the removal of both Dr. Chough and Chief Chang. It seemed undesirable for this group which had gotten along so well thus far to come to a disagreement on this one point, and he thought it would be better if they could talk it out and come to some conclusion that would be agreeable to all the members. He asked how the proposals would be presented to General Hodge if a vote were taken.

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Chairman: The Chairman would present the recommendation of the majority members as the recommendation, with a report of the minority members as a minority recommendation. I feel that the only thing we can do is to put both proposals before the Commanding General and let him make a decision.

Mr. Yon suggested that if Dr. Chough's name were left out of the recommendation as presented, it might then be agreeable to all the members.

The Chairman then presented the recommendation as given in Exhibit 23, and it was accepted by all members.

Chairman: It is the understanding that the Conference accepts this recommendation as amended. I will also present to the Commanding General the recommendations of the Korean members.

Mr. Yon expressed the desire that these two recommendations be presented to General Hodge separately.

Chairman said that would be done - that he would present them separately. "In view of the action taken on this recommendation, I would like to ask the Korean members of the Conference as to who should be appointed Commissioner of Police if Dr. Chough is removed."

Mr. Ahn said they would have to think that over, that there were many who were suitable.

Chairman: I would like that recommendation submitted at the next meeting. The Chairman does not want to give the impression that the recommendation of the Korean members will be accepted by the Commanding General, because the Chairman does not know the Commanding General's mind.

Paragraph 1 (a) as amended, of Section V - Recommendations (Exhibit 23), was presented by the Chairman and agreed to by all members.

Paragraph 1 (d) of Section V (Exhibit 23) was presented.

General Helmick: As Military Governor I would like to say that Chief Chang has raised the morale and the efficiency of the police from a very low ebb to a state where they are now an efficient police force. He is a leader and a man of unquestioned bravery. He has tried loyally to carry out the instructions of the government. Some things which he has done have been embarrassing, but they were done because he was trying to carry out what he thought was desired. When this was pointed out to him, he did not do it again. ~~He is a leader and a~~ brave man who would be

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very hard to replace. He also is a man who has done his best to serve loyally, and I would feel disloyal in taking him out. I know of no one who can lead and maintain the police of Seoul as well as he.

Dr. Johnson: I think it is a little unfortunate that particular names are brought into this recommendation. Our problem is to recommend the course of action. Our only disagreement in this committee has arisen when it comes to specific recommendations of particular persons. I think that is beyond the scope of this committee's work. The next task is to lay out a course of action that can be followed consistently for the improvement of the general situation. I feel, therefore, that it would be very unfortunate to vote on this and find an unhappy division. I should like to move the deletion of this paragraph.

Chairman: The Chairman then has before him a substitute paragraph - that is, that paragraph 1 (d) of the recommendations of the Conference be deleted.

Mr. Ahn: said that he realized the truth of what General Helmich had stated in regard to Chief Chang, and he believed that most Koreans did.

Mr. Won: concurred with what Dr. Johnson had said in regard to naming of principles, but thought that if Dr. Chough is removed then Chief Chang should be removed also. Chief Chang surrounded himself with former cronies and pro-Japanese and his actions made the people hate the police. If we delete this paragraph and have nothing to show for our action after talking so long about these two men, then where are we. He said he was in favor of deleting this name and the stating of principles upon which the deletion should be made.

Chairman: The Chairman has to present to the Commanding General the judgment of this Conference as to action which should be taken to quell these disturbances. The Conference has divided as to whether or not the relief of Dr. Chough should be recommended. It is the opinion of the Chairman that the Conference must express its views on Chang. The only way the Chairman knows of getting those views is by a vote. The Chairman suggests that each member vote secretly and pass it to the Chairman, and that the vote consist of "remove" or "leave in office".

Dr. Johnson: The Conference has already taken action on the police situation in paragraph 1 (a). It is merely circumstantial that attention

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was centered on Chief Chang. There are probably other police chiefs whose actions have been criticized. I contend that it is a very partial attitude to center out one individual. I repeat that we ought to lay out a course of action that could be followed little by little.

A secret vote was taken, with results as follows:

"Remove" - 8 votes

"Not remove" - 2 votes

Chairman: Therefore, the recommendation as submitted stands. Paragraph 1 (d) reads as follows: (read from Exhibit 23). The Chairman again cautions the members of this Conference and those in the room that the action of the Conference in this room is regarded as confidential until and as announced by the Commanding General. The Chairman also asks the Korean members who they will recommend to take the place of Chief Chang if he is removed.

Mr. Ahn: That also will need thought.

Paragraph 1 (e) of the recommendations in Exhibit 23 was presented and approved, as were the balance of the recommendations.

Chairman: Any further recommendation to be submitted on this matter?

Dr. Johnson: I recommend the addition of paragraph 4 (b) to read as follows: "In the selection of officials for governmental positions, Military Government extend and improve its examination system, publish the names of eligible candidates prior to official appointment and use all efforts to see that the examination system is not abused to make political appointments." This was approved by the members.

Mr. Won said there are five separate divisions by which an independent country is governed, we have three of them here already and he suggested the fourth which is an independent civil service system outside of government for preparation and putting aside of names of those who are candidates for government. He said the five independent divisions are: legislature, justice, administration, civil service and inspector section.

General Eckerling agreed with Mr. Won, but said he thought this would come under Item 14 of the agenda, "How to set up a morale government."

Chairman announced that Friday would be the next meeting of the Conference. At that meeting he proposed to start discussion of the economic

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topics. The first topic is the rice collection program. The Chairman has the following persons to come before the Conference to give information: Choi, Yong Oon; Mr. Carol Hill; Lee, Han Koo; Hwa, Kwan Soo. If any member has additional persons he would like to have called, the Chairman would like their names.

Mr. Won: On Friday we will submit the names.

Chairman: On Friday the Chairman proposes to devote two hours to discussion by this Conference and then to call the first individial, Mr. Choi, at 1530.

The Chairman said that after the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference (Exhibit 23) have been prepared for presentation to the Commanding General he would take them to Dr. Kimm and ask that he sign them with the Chairman.

The meeting adjourned at 1700 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on 29 November 1946.

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MINUTES

OF THE THIRTY-SECOND MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 29 November 1946.

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By EWB Bohn NARS, Date APR 0 2 1977

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert L. Brown (Chairman)
Brig. Gen. John Eckerling
Brig. Gen. C. I. Helmick
Mr. L. A. J. Johnson
Mr. L. C. Lunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. E. Lerch

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Seuk Kyung
Mr. Choy, Bisong

KOREAN MEMBERS

Lyuh, Woon Hyung
Choi, Yong O
Chang, Kyu Sik
Kim, Koong Choon
Kang, Youn Gong

Absent: Kyuh, Gon Kyung
Dr. Kim, Kiusic

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Mr. Lyuh wanted to relate some things, especially for the benefit of General Helmick, as to what the Koreans are saying. They are waiting for some good news from this Conference. Now that cold weather has come, there are many people without homes who are freezing to death. Koreans are not supposed to be on the streets after 10 o'clock at night, but after that hour there are many "K" cars around which reputedly contain Korean officials and Kaesong girls. The restaurants and eating places are filled with those officials, while those people without homes cannot find a place to sleep. From General Hodge on down, there has been a feeling among the Americans that when the legislative assembly convenes they will take care of everything. But even though the legislature should convene at once, its action would not become effective for a month or so. This difficulty of the people must be taken care of at once. If the "A" and "B" grades of eating places could be closed and the rooms made available to those without homes, it would be greatly appreciated by the people. This would not only keep people out from the cold and save food, but would also stop the entertaining of business prospects. The general talk is that if you want to get something from the government, the first thing you do is entertain the officials and then you get anything you want.

Mr. Lyuh spoke of the city of Chungju where the power of the leftists is very strong. In October when there were disturbances in the other prov-

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inces, it was slated that this Chungju would also have disturbances, but it was prevented by measures taken by the Rapid Realization Society. Mr. Ahn stated that he had received a report from a Mr. Hong Sung Koh, member of the Independence Party, that under the leadership of the Korean National Party the homes of these leftists have been demolished - 630 houses were demolished and about 4,000 people have been made homeless. The people in the town treat the leftists as murderers and are very rough on them. Something must be done about these homeless people. The people in general have heard of the plans of the government in regard to refugee housing and approve of it, but that is not sufficient. During the war when the Japanese made plans to care for the people in event of bombing, it was planned that all eating places and prostitution houses would be closed and made available to the people and people with extra rooms would loan these extra rooms. Since the order came out abolishing houses of prostitution, those who had ten of these houses still have five and these could be made available for housing refugees. These refugees are the spearhead of any revolt and if they are not taken care of there will be a lot of trouble. He suggested that a committee of citizens be constituted to requisition all available housing for the refugees.

Dr. Johnson: I am sure General Helmick will agree with me when I say that Military Government is grateful for these suggestions made by Mr. Ahn and Mr. Hon. I understand that this sudden advent of cold weather has brought attention to this matter of refugees, but this item appears on our agenda and will be discussed. At that time Col. Wilson and Col. Cullen will report on what is being done. I gave instructions more than two weeks ago to Col. Wilson and Col. Cullen to investigate eating places, houses of prostitution, etc., to see if they could not be used for refugees, and I shall investigate at once to see whether or not anything is being done. I do want to make one point, I want to assure Mr. Hon that the advent of the legislative assembly is not causing any American officers in Military Government to relax their efforts one bit, and I shall make inquiries to see that everything that can possibly be done will be done.

Chairman: The topic facing the Conference for discussion today is the first topic under the economic group, topic 6, Rice Collection Program.

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The Chairman proposes that the Conference consider approaching this topic as the other topics - that is, by each member of the Conference expressing his views on the subject.

Mr. Lon recommended that Lee, Son Taik, a professor at Chosen Christian College, who is specialized in the rice program, be called as a witness.

Mr. Kim recommended that Ko, Pil Kwan be called as a witness.

Chairman said these men would be contacted and asked to appear before the Conference.

Mr. Lon presented a report of a survey of the rice collection program which a certain group had spent more than a month making and which had been presented to Military Government. This report will be translated into English and presented at a later meeting.

Mr. Ahn said that formerly the grinding mills and places where the grain was processed was under the direct control of the government, but now this machinery is on the free list and there is free competition; consequently rice is processed in all localities. In the biggest and best mills in Korea it takes 315 pounds of rough rice to produce one suk of polished rice, in the small mills it takes 346 pounds of rough rice for one suk of polished rice, and in the poorest mills it takes 360 pounds to make a suk. He estimates that because of the inefficiency in the mills there is a waste of about two million suk in South Korea.

Mr. Kim said that three main grains are used in Korea - rice, millet and barley. The others are mixed grain such as beans, peas, etc. The people who eat only white rice are largely the city people. In the country the only people who eat white rice are the very wealthy and the very old. The great bulk of people mix rice with either millet or beans. Barley is only eaten from May to July, after July it doesn't taste good. Therefore, when you consider Korea there is grain enough for everybody because the Koreans eat a mixture of grains. The person who sits at his desk and talks about the deficiency in the food supply because of the lack of rice doesn't know what he is talking about. According to Mr. Kim's estimate in round figures, there is about 30 million suk of rice in Korea, ten million suk of millet and barley, 10 million pounds of potatoes, and a plentiful supply of other grains. In general a person can live easily on one suk of rice a year. Therefore, estimating thirty

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illion people in South Korea and thirty million suk of rice, there is one suk apiece. In the past the Japanese have taken away a large portion of it, and millet was shipped in from Manchuria. Therefore, since the millet has stopped coming in from Manchuria and the rice has presumably stopped going out of Korea, there is enough of grain and rice for Koreans. Military Government has set up a food administration agency and is having a lot of trouble - that is because there is opportunity for all sorts of cannivery and misdealings. Mr. Kim does not believe it is necessary to have such an organization. There is no need to have rationing. Turn over to the people their own living and they will get along all right. But for unusual cases such as extreme drought or the advent of some unforeseen emergency, there should be certain preparation such as: making a cordon on the part of the Coast Guard to prevent smuggling of rice to Japan and China, and strengthening the border at the 38th parallel so that rice can't get into North Korea, also stopping the manufacture of alcoholic beverages. One-fifth of South Korea's lands belong to the New Korea Company. The grain from this land and from other former Japanese owned land should be gathered and set aside by the Government. The big land owners could be allowed 100 suk for their needs and the balance collected by the government. Receipts from these three above sources would be roughly four million suk. That rice could be stored in warehouses and given out in case of emergency. If the price of rice should be forced to rise, then this rice could be turned on the market to bring it down. If the price should drop, then the government could buy in some of this rice. So this becomes a reserve fund for the government which could be used for raising or lowering the price of rice. If this process is folbwed there will be enough rice for everybody and immediately upon the enactment of this sort of policy the price of rice will drop to 250 a suk. He believes that a price of 250 per suk is a fair figure in comparison with other commodities on the market. He believes that if this procedure were followed the price of rice would drop to this figure and the price of other materials will be correspondingly lessened, and the whole situation will be improved. He feels that in general if the broad plans he has outlined could be followed it would not be necessary to go into the minor details of the provinces and areas

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because this overall picture would serve to foresee the needs of the areas and the whole situation in regard to the rice problem would work itself out. Without waiting for any legislature, which may or may not take action, this is a question which does not need to be postponed for any future date but may be acted on now. He realizes the feeling of responsibility of Military Government that there be no starvation or difficulty in regard to food in Korea, but a program such as outlined would eliminate the necessity of bring grains from abroad into Korea because Korea has enough to supply its needs and such a program would meet the needs completely. If there is any doubt of this, he suggests storing the grain that is coming from abroad and wait and see if there is a need for it. One of the reasons for the riots was the matter of food. If an announcement were made by the government that the rationing was over with and there would be a free market, the people would rejoice and the agitators would have no material upon which to work.

Dr. Johnson: We agreed to speak very frankly here, and I want to speak frankly about the rice collection program. The most frequent criticism against Military Government is that it constantly changes its plans. The rice collection program was announced long in advance, and it has been one program in which Military Government has been consistent. Yet now we are being criticized for being too consistent. In spite of the fact that the plan was laid long in advance and publicized, yet when the program is about to be launched Military Government is subjected to a terrific barrage of criticism. We have reason to believe that this has been inspired by land lord opposition and that it was not entirely a criticism which sprang from the deep and profound love of Korea. It is extremely difficult for the people in Military Government to know what the inspiration behind the criticism may be. It comes in from all sides - it is very difficult to sort out. There are one or two things we should make clear at the outset. The United States is attempting to supply certain emergency needs for Korea. These things must be requisitioned from the War Department. But the demands come into the War Department from other countries, and the War Department must therefore have proof that Korea has need for these various goods we are requisitioning.

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The foremost proof that Military Government must supply is that it is properly using the indigenous resources in Korea, and it is this which the rice system is intended to provide. I do want to say this, that Military Government has not made a snap judgment aboutthis matter. It has examined with great care all the evidence that is available. It has taken production figures for a five-year period and compared those with crop estimates in the Departrent of Agriculture and compared them with crop estimates of each of the several provinces. The figures show the production of thirteen million suk. If thirty million suk were produced, as Mr. Kim suggests, it would be a happy event for Korea. It would mean that Military Government would have to collect only 1 suk out of seven instead of one out of three.. If the production were as large as Mr. Kim suggests, the problem of collecting four million suk of rice would be a very easy one. It is my opinion that the rice collection program is going forward. In the last week I have talked to five governors of provinces and they tell me the program is going forward well, that it is not the farmers who are objecting to this program - they find it reasonable. The matter of the New Korea Company is being carefully investigated. The matter that Mr. Ahn brought up about threshing mills and polishing mills, I can state that in two provinces at least ordinances have been prepared for the licensing and inspection of all mills It is difficult to build up machinery for a government in a period of a year, but it is going forward.

Mr. Kim: I agree with you that if you set up a plan and follow it through consistently for a number of years it will gain headway and be workable. But when it comes to paying out, the individual when he estimates how much he is able to pay takes off about ten percent. The same thing is done in the Kun and Myun and province; therefore, when you make your estimates there is one great big hunk that is unestimatable. The Japanese collected the rice for, say, five years. What they collected they did not give to the people but they gave it to the Japanese army. But, isn't it a fact that the Koreans have eaten and have existed. No matter what we say, there is black market rice and this rice is not in estimates. This is the rice which commands high prices. I believe that there is left over from last year among the people somewhere one million suk of rice.

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Mr. Vance: In relation to the business of falsifying reports of rice production, we were able to obtain when we came here the secret estimates of the Japanese. The Japanese had various percentages, and they would increase the reports that came from each province. Their estimates of production were based not on reported figures but on inflated figures--no relation to the free market. We established a program right in line with getting a free market for rice. Every argument presented was today was presented at that time. We followed the advice of Korean leaders at that time and opened up a free market. The result was that overnight the quantity of rice was used for all kinds of purposes, such as candy and candy and that the people ate more rice than ever before. This is the only year in which the Korean farmers have eaten rice since I have been working with the farmers of Korea--for six years. When I was with the farmers, we did not eat rice. We had millet and not rice with beans. The farmers were forced to sell almost all of their rice in order to buy enough millet in order to get enough calories to live. Out of all the millet and beans imported from America this year, for two months there was a period of spring suffering on the farms and people in the country were short of food and ate roots and barley. In response to the pressure from various groups, several price issued an order prohibiting small quantities of rice to be brought into the cities. After this order was issued, we estimated how much of the rice that came into Seoul was new rice and how much was old rice. Of all the rice that came in as a result of it, only approximately was old rice, and why people should hold one million suk of old rice when price was going down because of the new rice crop is more than I can understand. As far as I know, every farmer expects the price to drop when the new crop comes in and they do not hoard rice. If the picture were as optimistic as painted and we had 30 million suks, the program as outlined would be welcome. Our estimates show that last year the total rice crop was about 15 million suk, and the estimate for this year is 30 million suk. Actually, there are six and one half million in South Korea who are non-producers and have to be rationed rice. We believe that the minimum amount that we need to have is about four to

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one-half million suk of rice. In looking at this picture, it seems to me we have to remember certain things. First, the population of the eight provinces in South Korea has increased by approximately two million persons in one year. If they eat a suk a piece in a year, that is two million suks of rice needed. Last year because the imports of Koreas from Manchuria were cut off, we imported from the United States approximately one-half million suk of grain. The dangers of making over-estimates of the grain situation is this: Next spring and early summer when the grain runs out, we may face riots of such violence that thousands of Koreans may have to be shot. We face that responsibility and we cannot go as much as we would like accept an over-optimistic picture at the present time. Take our estimates we have to make regarding our collection program which is designed to meet the minimum needs of a non-producing population. These are all in terms of suk. From the Japanese for now taken over by the New Korea Company, we expect 800,000 suks. From the landlords' land--the collection of the rental rice going to landlords--we expect 1,500,000 suk. That gives you a total of 3,300,000 suks of rice. In addition to that, we need at least 1,000,000 more suk which will be purchased from the farmers. You add that to the 3,000,000 and you get a total of 4,300,000 suk which is a minimum. In addition to that, we are planning to import from the United States about 2,000,000 suk of various grains. There is nothing that would please military government more than to be able to reduce that estimate of food imports in order to use the funds that must be spent on food to import things we need to get our factories running, such as cotton, rubber, gasoline, coal oil and fertilizer. We have to make the choice as to what goods we will import and we do not like having to import this food. If the picture were as optimistic as painted here, the first thing we would want to do would be to change our import program. One or two more things I would like to stress--First, the price for rice we are getting both from landlords and farmers is a very fair price. We are giving them ¥600 for a small bag of unpolished rice. As far as we can find out, there is no resistance on the part of farmers to sell their rice at that price. Almost all the opposition to our rice collection program has come from rice dealers and landlords. In terms of riots, they were caused by people who did

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not have enough rice because we did not collect it last year. To my mind, if we threw open a free market for rice, we would jeopardize the whole economy of the country. I think this Conference must face these facts very seriously. Personally, I would like nothing better than to have these gentlemen persuade me that there is lots of rice and that we do not need to ration or collect it.

Mr. Ahn made a statement to the effect that a free market would be best since it will be impossible to collect all quotas from the farmers.

Mr. Bunce: The United States belongs to a world organization on food and agriculture, and there is a special committee to allocate scarce food items from surplus countries to countries that need food. All these countries have signed an agreement which states they will not allocate food to any country which removes its system of collecting and rationing of food. If we declare a free market in this country, we must face the reality that we may not be permitted to import any food. If we can ration each person between two and one-half and three hop a day, it will be equivalent to one submarine per year.

Mr. Oni: Can you guarantee this program?

Mr. Johnson: If every person is back of it. We have reached a critical point. If every person will put himself behind this program, it will succeed. I am sure in my own mind that if a person wants to be a patriot today, he should support the rice collection program.

Mr. Bunce: One thing will insure the failure of the program--to accept the suggestions of Mr. Kim who said we should call it off. I think that would be fatal.

Mr. Oni: Does the government have confidence in the ability to realize this program? It must have confidence.

Mr. Bunce: The Food Administrator will give us more details on the program.

Mr. Oni: If you have confidence in the collection of 6,300,000, then you should have confidence in the distribution of it.

Mr. Bunce: If the program is successful, we can ration to the people of Korea--non producers--between two and one-half and three hop of grain per day and will be able to sell it at a price that will reduce the cost of living to about a third of what it is today.

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Mr. Johnson: This rice program is the key to not only the food problem but to the problem of wages and prices.

Mr. [illegible]on: If you have so much confidence in collecting the rice and in this program, there is no further need for discussing it here. As you said, you need our cooperation. It is easy to cooperate, but the farmers must cooperate and the landlords. 2,500,000 suk of rice from landlords is a deduction. How do you figure that?

Mr. [illegible]unce: That includes the rice for rental pay. The farmers will be given their supply of rice.

Mr. [illegible]on: The landlords should retain that they want for their own use first and not have it collected. It would save time and avoid duplication that would occur if he were to pay his whole share to the government and then buy from the government.

Mr. Johnson: The object was to take the landlords out of the rice collection business so that the farmers will pay their rental directly into the provincial food offices.

Mr. [illegible]on: Landlords are those who receive three, ten and a thousand suk. The government shall not recognize persons and personalities. The contest now is not over landlords and tenants but over the big landlords. It is only the middle fellows who have just enough to get along on who are protesting. Everybody hears this. It is a common thing. The easiest and best way is to let each man have his own whether he gets it from the ration board or his own. What is the difference? It is easier to let him keep it. Do you have confidence that you will be able to give what has been promised. From April until now, there have been announcements that so much is to be given, but it has never been given.

Mr. Johnson: There were 65 trucks out yesterday. We have mobilized every available truck to get this ration requirement. 756 suk of rice were brought in yesterday afternoon.

Mr. Kim: If you start to get the rice, it must be continued. If you can continue the ration of rice on that basis, who would be such a fool as to buy black market rice. If you just keep up this two and one half hop, neither Dr. Kimm nor Dr. Rhee will talk about a free market. If you have confidence that you can continue as planned, why should we

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waste our time here. It is all settled. The government has made promises, but when the time came they were not able to meet them. It is a matter of confidence. If you have confidence that Military Government can carry out this plan, we will support it wholeheartedly and believe there will be no trouble. To have a free market on other goods and to have only rice controlled does not make sense. The principle of rationing is basically to estimate needs and resources, and after gathering resources making the corresponding distribution. You must compare the price of rice with other goods. In general, the price of one-half suk of rice and a bolt of cotton were the same. Now the price of one-half suk of rice is ¥600 and the ration price of a bolt of cotton is ¥900 and something. So, your bolt of cotton is ¥300 more expensive than your rice. That is the government price. The price of rice is very much cheaper than all the other goods. The people in the country know better than we the value of rice and cotton. When they recognize this disparity, they start criticizing the government. You have the same situation in rubber and soap. If you make the price of rice as low as that and ask farmers to be patriotic and sell their rice, it will not do.

Dr. Johnson: There is a fundamental mistake in this analysis. There is a subsidy to the consumer of rice. Against my protest, General Lerch insisted that the price of rice be kept low for the benefit of the consumer. The farmer is not being penalized by this low price. The farmer is being paid ¥1700 a suk which will cover his cost of production.

Dr. Bunce: The farmer is getting ¥2,200 for the amount of raw rice which will make one suk of polished rice.

General Brown: Military Government goes out to a farmer and pays ¥2,200 for what will produce a suk of ~~un~~polished rice. That will produce a suk of polished rice which (govt) they sell at ¥1700. The difference is a subsidy in the interest of the consumer.

Dr. Ohn: Why get involved like this. One-half suk of raw rice is ¥600; one bolt of cotton is ¥900. That is all there is to it.

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Gen. Helmick: No, the ceiling price of rice is one-half suk for ¥600 and the bolt of cotton is ¥900, but the farmer gets ¥1100 for his half a suk of rice and can buy a bolt of cloth for ¥900 and have ¥200 l ft over. The government pays farmers ¥2200 for the amount of rice which will make one suk of polished rice. Half of that is ¥1100--what he gets for it. For a half a suk of rice, he can get a bolt of cotton and have ¥200 left over.

Dr. Bunce: Instead of sitting in Seoul and estimating it, we should consider how the farmers feel. They figure they lose ¥500. The steadiness of the price of rice dependson the government. It is that going back and forth which causes the price of rice to waiver. I intend to support the policy of Military Government in regard to rice to the very end.

We have got to make an accurate estimate of what is coming in. We can't have confidence that your figures are accurate any more than you have confidence that ours are accurate. You have not had a census of the population of Seoul and don't know how many people there are here. Profiteers will report incorrect figures of people living in their homes. They will report that they have 20 in their houses rather than 5. If you are going to ration it, you must have definite knowledge of the number to whom you are rationing. Let the landowner take his own portion from his own land first and then pay the rest. Let the tenants take their rice and let them barter for goods they need. From now on make the ration distribution continuous without failure. If you do that, the price of rice will drop right down. If it goes down, the government should go out and buy. Don't make one announcement and stop. Announce also the ration for the various areas. Acquaint the people with the actions of the government. You can't lie to the people for riots will result. If you let the landlord have his portion of his own rent and give the people two and one-half hop, the whole problem will be solved. There has only been propaganda to bring in rice--not to give it out.

Dr. Bunce: Before giving it out, you have to collect it.

Mr. Lehk: The professionals will be able to talk about the technical end. The three basic principles are these: First, the control of the

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people. I support Mr. Bunce's idea for the bringing in of two million from the outside. The second problem is personnel engaged in the collection and distribution. The third is the support of patriotic people of the country in that food program. The first principle is carried out because the American government is determined to carry out the ration program. Our big problem is the question of personnel after things get started. It is a fact that profiteers are buying it at high figures and selling it outside Korea. The Coast Guard and other agencies are doing their best to stop this sort of thing, but it is going on. The police, profiteers and the Coast Guard are all in cahoots. The governor of Cholla Namdo has had much difficulty in collecting rice because of the pressure of profiteers who buy at such large prices. He is no leftist. The patriots must get in on this rice program. I support the program of Mr. Bunce and feel that it must be carried on. It has failed in the past. There are a great many others who realize the necessity for the program outlined by Mr. Bunce, and are seriously concerned over it. We must solve this problem of personnel. The heads of the departments of agriculture, food administration, etc. must be patriots. Chiefs of police of various areas, those in command of the Coast Guard must be patriots. They are not. If the fundamental personnel problem is not solved, there will be no results. If Military Government does not have the courage to face this, there is no point in discussing it because we are heartily supporing Mr. Bunce's program. The technical experts can handle the food administration better than we can. Therefore, the success and failure in this rice collection program depends entirely on success or failure in handling the personnel question.

Mr. Johnson: I am extremely happy that Mr. Pahk has made these remarks. I have been waiting a long time to hear a leader of Korean people make an outright statement that he is supporting the rice collection program. I think Mr. Bunce will be the first to agree with me. It is not his program. It has been worked out with infinite pains with a great number of people. I often hear Koreans make reference to

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some saying or proverb. Ours is "Hell is paved with good intentions". If there is any program in Military Government that is based upon good intentions, it is the rice collection program. It is based upon the assumption that all shall be fed. It is based on theother side on the fact that all shall contribute over and above what they need, what the farmers need, that adequate reserve shall be left in the hands of the farmers so that they shall have enough, and that they shall deliver what is over and above that surplus, that they shall be paid a fair price that will cover the cost of production. The question has been raised again and again, will Military Government promise that it has a certain amount? This, Dr. Bunce has answered by saying that we must collect it first. Every successful rationing program calls for discipline. A certain amount must be collected and a certain amount must be distributed. A part of that discipline can be imposed by authorities, the greater part is self-discipline imposed by all the members of society. Here is where the element of faith comes into the picture. It has been brought up again and again that it is a matter of faith. What has happened is that people are consistently confused in this country. I frankly believe that if a dozen or more responsible Korean leaders had gotten behind this program we would be rationing two hop of rice right now. This program is going forward. The rice is being collected, it is being brought into the warehouses and into the cities. I think that if everyone would appoint himself a committee of one to make the rice collection program a success, it will be a success. There are many myuns who have already collected 100 percent. There are provincial governors who assure us that there is no doubt in their minds that they will collect 100 percent. I am extremely grateful for Mr. Mahk's statement that he is behind this program. That is what is going to make it succeed.

Mr. Chang: We of the Social Democratic Party believe an estimate of 4,500,000 suk, but Dr. Bunce said 4,300,000 suk. The difference is 200,000 suk. We hope you will have success in that. We have some information from different localities that I would like to give.

Chairman suggested that Mr. Chang present this information at the next meeting as it was time for the meeting to adjourn.

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The Chairman said the following persons had been requested to appear before this Conference as witnesses in regard to the rice collection program:

Mr. Chee, Yong Eun
Mr. Lee, Hong Keun
Mr. Lee, Son Tak
Mr. Koo, Kul Kwan
Mr. Ha, Kyun Suk
Mr. Carol Hill

He asked which of these witnesses the members wished to call for the next meeting.

Mr. Johnson suggested that Mr. Hill be called quite early because he can give a picture of the technical problems obstructing our analysis of the problem.

Mr. Bunce suggested that Mr. Chee and Mr. Hill be presented together, and this was agreed to by the other members.

The Chairman said we would leave one hour to complete the general discussion at the next meeting, and would request that Mr. Chee and Mr. Hill be present at 1430 hours.

The meeting adjourned at 1710 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on Monday, 2 December 1946.

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MINUTES

OF THE TWENTY-THIRD MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SU PALACE
AT 1330, 2 DECEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown (Chairman)
Brig. Gen. John Beckerlin
Brig. Gen. D. C. Helmick
Dr. A. W. J. Johnson
Mr. G. T. Bunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch

KOREAN MEMBERS

Kon, Seh Koon
Choi, Tong O
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Kein Yong
Kim, Koong Choon

Absent: Mr. Kim, Kiusic
Yuh, Yoon Kyung

Interpreters: Mr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Teuk Kyung
Mr. Choy, Hisong

The meeting came to order at 1330 hour.

Since General Brown was absent for the first part of meeting, General Beckerling acted as Chairman.

Mr. Kon made a statement to the effect that there must be a quicker manner in which we could discuss various items on the agenda and suggested that we might include all the economic subjects in the discussion of the rice collection program.

Acting Chairman: The Acting Chairman is of the opinion that there is much to what Mr. Kon has said, and it might be wise to reconsider our general program--the order of discussion of various items on the agenda. However, today we have already asked Dr. Chee, the National Food Administrator, and Mr. Carol Hill of Military Government to appear before the Conference at 1430 hours. It is now 1400. Also several members wish to continue the general discussion of the rice collection program. If there is no objection, I would like to continue discussion of the rice collection program, and then hear Mr. Chee and Mr. Hill who are waiting to be heard. I then think we should discuss Mr. Kon's proposal further.

Mr. Chang made a statement to the following effect: In Kyongsang Namdo province, there is a certain section of land which is fairly productive and which has been allotted a quota varying from five to twenty-five hop per pyung. Another section nearby, only slightly less productive has been given a quota of five hop per pyung. The marked disparity between these two quotas is the cause of great dissatisfaction among

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the landowners and farmers in this region. Also, a man from that region reported that the summer grains were stored in that district. People saw it rot and felt that if they continued to pay up on their quotas, the rice would only spoil. Another difficulty is the fact that landowners would select tenants and then change them. There should be some ruling whereby a landlord should not be allowed to change his tenants on his own whim so that farmers might have peace of mind. After the summer grains were gathered, many farmers heard that their lands were to be sold and they would not be able to farm them. This causes for uncertainty as far as living is concerned. Another form of intimidation on the part of landlords is the threatening of tenants that they will be dispossessed and not allowed to farm land if they do not pay their rental in kind to landlords.

Mr. Johnson: I am sure the committee is grateful for suggestions. The proposals that have been made are technical administrative matters that should properly be brought to the attention of National Food Administration.

Acting Chairman: I suggest that in the general discussion we limit ourselves to matters of general interest. However, I feel that the matters brought up by Mr. Chang were specific reports made to him by certain individuals and as such would have a double value as a report made by an individual farmer or farmers to the Conference and also would give Mr. Cheng or any other member of Conference an opportunity or reminder to use this material in the questioning of Mr. Chee. Are there any further comments to be added.

Mr. Kim made a statement to the following effect: The question we are discussing concerns the riots. The general questions of administration can be properly considered by the authorities concerned. In general, there are two plans to be considered--whether we will have a free market or a ration market. There will be considerations in regard to either of those plans. Our primary and central purpose is the relation of riots to the rice distribution problem. The whole thing centers around these two plans. In regard to feeding next year and the 2,000,000 suks of grain from abroad, the relation of that to the whole problem is a general matter. My feeling is that the general

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reaction to the words "ration" and "collection and distribution of grains" is one of revulsion and hatred. The people do not want to hear about it. They hate worse than anything these days the question of rice restriction. The whole question hinges on this 2,000,000 suk of grain which is to come from abroad. In my opinion, if you take this 2,000,000 suk and put it against the 17 or 18 million population of South Korea, per capita, it is not a very terrific amount. If it is properly presented, it seems to me that the people by using measures of personal restriction, etc. could solve this problem satisfactorily. The people feel that if this 2,000,000 is the crux of the matter as to whether or not there is to be a ration program or a free market, there is no necessity for them to pull in their belts since this 2,000,000 suk is coming from abroad. The people will say that they don't want to be rationed so they won't turn in their quota. I feel that if this question is put to the people, they patriotically will prefer restricting themselves in the use of grain in order to avoid a rationed market. Either way it would be experimental. If you take this question of collection in order to carry out the ration program, it is necessary to collect in order to distribute. If the rice collection is unsuccessful, Military Government loses face, so of the Conference who have advocated this procedure will lose face, and the people will be the ones to suffer the consequences. If we continue as we are, we will be burying the cause of riots within the problem itself--covering it up. If you explain to the people that you will give them what they are clamoring for--liberation from rationing and allow them to restrict themselves, I feel that they will patriotically accept the situation and will use enough restraint so that the 2,000,000 will not be a burden on anyone. My estimate as to the rice collection program is that it is doubtful whether more than about one-half of the estimate will be actually collected because it is in the stage of experiment. Getting back to my original statement that there are two general questions, a free market or a rationed market, if we decide to back or then suitable procedures for that type of action would be necessary. It is up to the Conference to decide what method we will have. It the purpose of this Conference to find some means of solving the

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which arose during the riots, and it is incumbent upon us to decide here which plan we will adopt and follow it through.

Mr. Chang: I feel that it would be more profitable to study here the shortcomings and failures in the present system and then to take immediate measures along those lines. Whatever the general picture may be, I feel that the country people--farmers in general--understand that the plan is to go ahead with rice collection, and if we can iron out some irregularities and expedite that program, it would be helpful. There are two questions involved in this. First, the people must be made to believe in the justice of those who are in the rice collection program--that they are faithful servants of the government. Second, the confidence of the people must be restored in regard to basic quotas given to them. Give the farmer the confidence that he will be given the privilege of farming his land next year so he can make plans for spring and summer. Also, it would be helpful if we could devise some means of relieving small landlords who find themselves economically embarrassed in their receipts because of this new method of 73.[illegible] I believe that herein lie certain methods of solving the problem.

Acting Chairman: I suggest that we ask the witnesses to come in and that we let Mr. Chee give us a general picture of the food situation with particular emphasis on rice and grain collection programs, and let him go as far as he wishes subject to any interruptions that a member of the Conference feels must be brought out at that time, and then to open meeting to a more detailed questioning by all members of Conference. It was suggested at the last meeting that we call both witnesses in together. Does that meet with everybody's approval?

It was decided that both witnesses should appear together and Mr. CHEE, Yong Sun and Mr. Carol Hill were introduced to members of the Conference.

Acting Chairman: The Conference has called both Dr. Chee and Mr. Hill to hear from you and discuss with you the rice collection program. This Conference is not a court. We are not trying to find anyone guilty on any count or charge and not asking anybody to take an oath. We

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would like to hear a general statement from both of you. He would like to have Mr. Chee give in as much detail as possible and as he desires a general picture of the Korean food situation, particularly rice and other grains, the past record as to statistics of production, the prospects for this year, imports from the United States, and the necessity for continuing the present grain collection program. If you feel to collaborate together in replying, it will be perfectly all right.

Mr. Chee: I would go back very further than last year. According to an announcement made by the Department of Agriculture last year, the crop estimate was somewhere around 11,000,000 suk unpolished. Out of that the government tried to collect rice, but it proved difficult beginning on account of transportation and other hindrances mostly; inundation of standing crops, labor emancipation. I am sorry to say we are not able to collect more than 700,000 suk unpolished rice. As to this failure in collection enough rice, we are facing the present critical shortage of food in South Korea. In order to meet the food shortage, we had to ask the interim government to give us our difficult situation. By the good will of the interim government, two ships returning American grains. One arrived, in the latter part of May, a second ship in the latter part of June, two ships in July, and we are to get at least four more ships of grain from America totalling 32,000 metric tons. (*See Meeting 24. These figures changed to 172,000 metric tons, 1,205,000 suk(So far, we have received 150,000 metric tons in terms of suk 1,050,000. * suk. Aside from that, we have been supplementing our regular ration. With the 750,000 suk of rice we collected from last year's crop plus America's loans, we began a general rationing on April 5th. Mr. Chee read the figures of this rationing from April 5th to the present, and this report is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "A".

Mr. Noni Are these figures for the city of Seoul only.

Mr. Chee: Yes.

Mr. Noni: Since it has been presented that there were 750,000 suk of rice, what was done with that. That could have been distributed in the provinces. In what provinces? I would like to hear about that. How was the distribution made from ships that came in--not only in Seoul but other provinces. What are the figures of expectation and dis-

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ribution for the whole of South Korea. We would like the presentation of future figures. How many are there in Seoul who need to receive ration. What is the population in Taegu, Pusan and other large centers which must receive a share in ration. How many are there in the various mining and factory sections who need rice since they do not raise it. How many fishermen are there who do not raise rice themselves and who would normally be on the ration. When set aside the large districts and what is the population of small centers which will need rations--when the total figures for the whole country. What we the city collection or summer grain--the total. What was done with that if there any left. What are the general figures for the 750,000 suk or rice. How was that distributed in general What about the grain that originally came from abroad. How were they distributed in general After any left. You must give figures for the whole of the country rather than for Seoul if you are to solve the problem.

Mr. Chee: We turned to the disposal of the 750,000 suk of land rice, mostly we rationed it to Seoul people. Some of the other districts, like cities and provinces collected rice and gave out one to the hop according to their own plan. Of the 750,000 suk collected and mentioned, Seoul with a population of 1,200,000 did not get much as the figures show. Most of the collected rice was consumed in provinces. Some provinces gave out more rice to their own people than we rationed in Seoul. That is how this collected rice was consumed.

Mr. Jon: In regard to exact figures, we appreciate that, but we want to know in particular about the 750,000 suk. How much Seoul got. We want general figures. How many people are there who received the ration? If you say in Seoul, there are roughly 1,200,000 people, that is not a good answer--not a complete answer. What did you do with the summer grain?

Mr. Chee read a report on summer grain collection which is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "25".

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Mr. Won thought these figures should be mimeographed and passed around. In general the people are saying you (Food Administration) collected the grain and didn't give it out. What did you do with it? We feel the necessity of the Food Administration making public these figures on the distribution of grains, not only here but to the papers, and the 150,000 tons of grain and flour which came from abroad should be publicized as to where it went in the various provinces. In regard to this flour from America, Mr. on had heard that some of it had become wet and was inedible. Under that excuse the flour was being sold and the fellows who bought it up had made a tidy sum of money. The sending of this grain was to feed the hungry and was not for profiteers. It is that sort of thing which the people are criticizing Military Government for. It is, therefore, very important and urgent that the Food Administration make public these figures on where this grain went.

Mr.
Colonel Hill: In response to the inquiry of Mr. on, there was a small quantity of flour damaged enroute and perhaps this was used for allocation for industrial purposes, but to my knowledge none of the flour was sold to private operators or dealers except those who were authorized to receive this flour by a governmental agency. The general suggestion that more publicity be given to the distribution of American grain is a good one and we probably should publicize just what we are doing with these grains. For example, we did publicize just recently what we collected in grains and just how much shipped to Seoul - about the same sort of figures you just had presented to you.

Mr. Won: Since you report the collection of summer grains as 628,094 and 25,330 suk came into Seoul, then there must be a balance of roughly 600,000 suk of summer grain still left.

Mr. Hill: This has been consumed in the provinces or remains in their present inventory.

Mr. Won: If you take 600,000 suk of barley, it is roughly 400,000 suk of rice in value. If, therefore, you have about 400,000 suk in value of grain left for the new year, you should carry that over as a balance. If you say that it is not done, you must estimate that as a deficit. What is the status of that grain? Please give us a complete answer on that question.

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Chairman (General Brown); I would like to extend that question a little. The report submitted shows approximately 600,000 suk of grain without stating where that grain is - that is, whether it has been consumed, whether it is in storage and if so how much has been obligated and when it will be consumed. In other words, how much is being carried over into the fall grain season?

Mr. Hill: We cannot supply specific figures to answer that question, but we can say that most of that 628,000 suk has been consumed, there is some carry-over that remains on the respective inventories of the several provinces. How much that inventory amounts to I cannot say, but we can supply those figures.

Mr. Mon: In regard to your collections, is that which was collected used by the several provinces according to their own desires? The reason for asking that question is that we had understood that under this rationing unless permission was received from the national office it was not in the authority of the provincial offices to make distribution on their own; however, what we have heard here would lead us to believe that the provinces have consumed this grain on their own. If this is a national rationing, then in the provinces they should not be allowed to consume one suk of that without permission from the national headquarters. If this is not so/in each province they are allowed leeway to do what they please more or less, then it seems that there is no central national food administration. Please clarify this matter.

Mr. Hill: The summer grain collection program was set up so as to provide for the collection of summer grain to take care of the non-suppliers of summer grain with proper consideration being given to the estimate for the harvest. The estimate of grain that should be allowed to the producers was also calculated and the balance was considered as the amount of grain that would remain for distribution. That figure is adjusted to the requirements of the non-suppliers depending on the period selected for the rationing period of summer grains. We worked it out on a four-month period. That is, the farmer would require so much of that grain. The balance would be left over for distribution to the non-producers of that grain. The amount left for distribution to the non-suppliers was considerably smaller per person than that left to the

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producer. Then, taking the ground that [illegible] for the non-producer, we divided it by areas the provinces in accordance with their own figures of crop estimates compared with national estimates and established a quota of each province and a proportionate share of that amount was to be contributed to the non-producing area.

General Helmick: As I understand it, all of the [illegible] over and above that needed to be retained by the farmer was to be the allocation to all non-producers.

Mr. Hill: That is right. What is now available for allocation to non-producers.

General Helmick: And the allocation of that [illegible] to the localities based upon the number of non-suppliers in those localities, such as cities and provinces?

Mr. Hill: [illegible] to be had this balance. [illegible] to the several provinces as their quota for self-[illegible] of that amount was determined by the provinces' [illegible]. The total amount was set up as the amount to be collected and distributed to the non-suppliers, and that was apportioned; 1,[illegible] - that appears in the table referred to previously - and [illegible] that we collected only 40 percent of that amount.

Chairman: What we want to know is what happened to the [illegible] amount.

Mr. Hill: That 1,289,000 was the estimate. If that were true we would have been alright, and could have [illegible], but the estimate fell short and only 40 percent came in therefore, each province was short and that which was to serve to [illegible] that would be the shorter.

Mr. Won: Did the provinces give out on their own if they did without authority from the central office, then that is a non-authoritative office and could just as well not be.

Chairman: If your central office had control, you could tell immediately where the grain went to. Can you answer that?

Mr. Chee: If we take Cholla-Namdo, there is an estimate of a certain amount. If that were all collected then it would be distributed to the province and the balance forwarded to the central office; however, since

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they did not receive their full quota - did not collect what they expected to on the estimate - then they were short and they did give on their own authority to their own people first out of what they collected - we would have nothing to say about that. So the central office was short.

Chairman: I don't think that answers the question. Do you know what happened to the 628,000 suk of grain or don't you?

General Helmick: Is the province authorized to take its full allotment before shipping any?

Mr. Hill: The pattern for the distribution of food in a broad sense is determined at the national level. In order to decide on a equitable distribution it is necessary to plan that from a national standpoint. That was done for the summer grain. But when certain factors accounted for the collection of only approximately one-half of the total quota set up for South Korea, obviously the plan for distribution had to be changed radically. Under the plan each province had certain latitudes of control. With the carrying out of the plan as laid down, the province had the right to distribute in its province in accordance with the national pattern for distribution as long as it complied with the national plan for the distribution of surplus grain in the various provinces. If it could meet its shipping quota then it would be assumed that the province would distribute its grain in accordance with the national policy on rationing. In the case of Cholla-Namdo, for example, it failed to collect its quota, it missed it by a large margin. The amount of grain collected by that province was considered by the National Food Administration and we arrived as to what percentage of the amount collected it should ship as surplus grain. Since the province failed to collect a substantial amount of its quota, it was felt it should make greater sacrifice and ship a larger amount of what it did collect to the other provinces. That is being done by the province of Cholla-Namdo. We treated other provinces in the same way. We reviewed the amount of the grain collected, the ratio of their established quota and the expected shipment, and readjusted their shipping quota. During the collection

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of the grain the provinces had to ration to their own non-suppliers. They continued that as the grain was being collected. Since the collections were considerably less than what had been expected, the grain that was collected in the provinces disappeared quite rapidly in the rationing channels. The amounts of grain rationed in the provinces in many cases was considerably below what was considered as the proper amount by the national office. So, I think you will see from what I have said that practically all of the grain collected in the provinces was or has been consumed except for a very small amount which remains in their warehouses and is now being distributed along with the new rice.

Mr. Kinney: I have inquired into the situation and I might give the essence of the situation following what Mr. Hill has said. During the last four months there have been five million people who have been rationed daily at a rate of about two hops per day of summer grains and imported grains. Out in the provinces, taking three million of these people and at two hops per day over a period of 100 days you use 600,000 suk. That left no summer grains for the two million people in Seoul, Inch'on and Pusan - they were fed from the imported grains shipped from America.

Mr. Yon: Now I understand it. From the standpoint of the Food Administration there should be figures which say of each province - your allotment is so much, you may give so much to your own people and send us so much. We desire these figures for these various provinces. I am not asking this question to ascertain what happened to the summer grain. I am more interested in what is going to happen to the next allotment. Please realize the difference between the provinces in Korea and the states in America. Remember that in America each state has a certain amount of independence and in Korea the provinces do not act that way. There are a lot of mistakes or difficulties that arise from the fact that the Americans interpret the provinces as states - that does not apply here In regard to the summer grains, there are provinces which have come up pretty well and some have fallen down badly. What is the plan in regard to those which have fallen down? According to some rumors I have heard

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what they haven't paid in summer grain they will have to pay in rice. Is that so or not?

Mr. Hill: No, not just that way. Certain provincial governors, both Korean and military, have felt in those cases where they failed rather severely in the collection of summer grains that their rice collection quota should be increased accordingly. In other words, they volunteered to try and collect more rice than their normal quota because they failed to collect their proper quota in summer grain. Cholla-Namdo, for example, we increased the quota 150, 000 suk.

Mr. Ahn spoke of a village by the name of Najo in the province of Cholla-Namdo. A kunsoo by the name of Nam, Kay Ryong, because of the failure of the summer grain collection, felt it necessary to increase the rice quota in the fall. The quota was raised to the tune of 200 pyung, 1.8 suk. The people are complaining that that quota is too high.

Mr. Kim: I do not want to ask about the past. The Food Administration should have correct figures on this - what is the population of South Korea?

Mr. Hill: We are using 18,800,000 as our basis in setting up our rice collection and distribution program.

Mr. Kim: Of this figure, how many are farmers and how many are non-producers?

Mr. Hill: There are 6,910,000 non-farmers or non-producers.

Mr. Kim: Do you know the distribution of this for provinces?

Mr. Hill: We can furnish that information if you wish.

Mr. Kim: Make that report next time, please. What was the total collected since this spring.

Mr. Hill: 1,750,000.

Mr. Kim: How many are there in the city of Seoul that do receive rations?

Mr. Hill: 1,200,000.

Mr. Kim: To this 1,200,000 how much food has been rationed from April up to the present?

Mr. Hill: We can supply a tabulation showing just the amount that has been rationed to the people in Seoul for each period.

Mr. Kim: What I wanted to know was the amount rationed from April 8th to November 8th. If you are to give each person three hop a day for 180 days it would be 540 for one person.

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Mr. Kinney: Three hop per person per day would be 648,000 suk for 180 days. At 2½ hop for 1,200,000 people it would run to 90,000 suk a month.

Mr. Kim: I can judge in general from there. Since the people of Seoul at the rate of three hop a day would use 648,000 suk, and since only 25,330 came in, that is where the discrepancy is. How can the people live on a deficiency like that?

Mr. Kinney: During the last three months in addition to the 25,330 suk of summer grains, approximately 280,000 suk of imported grains have been rationed in Seoul.

Mr. Hill: Back in April the ration was but one hop, the balance of the food consumed by the people came from the open market and from the purchase of other food. As we gradually increased our rationing, there was less food purchased by the families on the open market and more received in the daily ration.

Mr. Kim: I understand it now. Because of the fact that the people could not starve they went out into the country and got grain and this grain was taken from them, so much so that what grain was in the city of Seoul was sold at outrageous prices. The hungry and discontented person is the cause of riots. Since I am one of these persons on the ration and have been unable to get in my ration enough to live on, I have bought in the market and I have broken the law. What is in the ration is not enough to live on for ten days. Therefore, I buy enough to live on. But what about those people who don't have money to buy it. If we disregard that which is hanging on our eyelids and ration all the time, where are we going to come out on this thing. There must be collection before there can be rationing. Therefore, what I said a while ago as to my estimate that there won't be collected more than half enough - if that is so, what are the people living in cities going to do to live? Therefore, I repeat that of the two plans - we should decide which we are going to use and work it through to the end.

Chairman: It is now time to adjourn. I will ask that Mr. Hill and Mr. Chee come back tomorrow. We will also ask that Mr. Lee, Hong Koo be ready to appear as a witness tomorrow. He is with the Department

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of Agriculture.

The meeting adjourned at 1700 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on Tuesday, 3 December 1946.

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RATIONING IN CITY OF SEOUL FROM 8 APRIL 1946 TO DATE

April 8 - July 6	1 hop rice
July 7 - 16	180 grammes flour (1-1/2 hops)
July 17 - 26	120 grammes flour (1 hop)
July 27 - Aug 5	100 grammes flour 1/2 hop rice
Aug 6 - 15	1/2 hop corn
Aug 16 - 25	60 grammes flour 1 hop corn
Aug 26 - Sept 4	1 hop corn 1 hop wheat
Sept 5 - 14	1 hop wheat 120 grammes flour
Sept 15 - 24	120 grammes flour 1/2 hop wheat 1/2 hop corn
Sept 25 - Oct 4	1/2 hop barley 120 grammes flour 1/2 hop wheat
Oct 6 - 15	120 grammes flour 1 hop wheat
Oct 16 - 25	120 grammes flour 1 hop wheat .3 barley
Oct 26 - Nov 5	120 grammes flour 1 hop wheat .3 barley or rice
Nov 6 - 15	60 grammes flour 1-1/2 hops wheat .3 hop barley
Nov 16 - 25	1.8 hop wheat .5 noodles or rice

Exhibit "24"

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SUMMER GRAIN DATA
AS OF Nov 4, 1946

UNIT-SUK

PROVINCE	Collected	Quota	% of Quota Collected	Rec'd in Seoul	Remaining in Province	% of Collection Shipped to Seoul
Chung Chong Pukto	69,573	98,000	71	4,160	65,413	6.0
Chung Chong Namdo	40,962	97,000	42		All	
Cholla Pukto	84,520	122,000	69	5,000	79,520	6.0
Cholla Namdo	39,978	363,000	11	10,690	29,288	34.2
Kyong Sang Pukto	210,756	282,000	75	5,480	205,272	2.6
Kyong Sang Namdo	95,069	217,000	44		All	
Kyonggi Do	60,799	96,000	63		All	
Kangwon Do	26,447	14,000	189		All	
Total	628,104	1,289,000	49	25,330		

Entire shipments to Seoul in Suk---------- 25,330

Entire summer grain collection in Suk----------628,094

Seoul-Inchon received 4% of total collection

Seoul-Inchon has 8% of total population of Southern Korea

Exhibit 25

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MINUTES

OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 3 DECEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown (Chairman)
Brig. Gen. John H. Beckerling
Brig. Gen. S. C. Helmick
Dr. L. E. J. Johnson
Dr. A. G. Bunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch

Interpreters: Mr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Teuk Syung

KOREAN MEMBERS

Hon, Seh Koon
Choi, Tong O
Chang, Kwon
Park, Keun Dong
Kim, Koong Choon

Absent: Mr. Kimm, Kiusic
Lyuh, Koon Hyung
Kim, Chai Dong

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

General Beckerling acted as Acting Chairman for the first part of meeting since General Brown was not present.

Acting Chairman: I have a number of statistics here, some of which will answer Mr. Hon's questions of yesterday. One is a complete list of ships and cargoes of grain which were carried from the United States and received in Korea through 27 November 1946. This report is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "26". The other is a list of statistics entitled "Determination of Shipping Quota of Rice (Current Plan)". This report is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "27". The Acting Chairman would also like to introduce "Status of Rice Collection Program as of 1 December 1946". This is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "28".

The two witnesses from the previous meeting, Mr. Chee and Mr. Hill, were present, and the Acting Chairman suggested that Mr. Hill continue with the explanation of the distribution of summer grain. The witnesses first corrected a part of the testimony given yesterday. They stated that the total tonnage received in Korea to 27 November was 172,000 metric tons, rather than the 150,000 metric tons which was given at the previous meeting. (Page 5, Minutes of 23rd Meeting)

Each member had before him a Summer Grain Table.

Mr. Hill: You will observe in the tabulation for the summer grain that a total of 628,000 suk were collected, and that out of that total 28,830 suk were shipped to Seoul. The difference between the total collected

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and the amount shipped to Seoul was retained in the provinces other than Kyonggi Do. That amounts to approximately 600,000 suk. Of that 600,000 suk, there remains in the inventories of the provinces a total of approximately 62,000 suk of summer grain. That means that a total of approximately 538,000 suk of summer grain was distributed in the provinces in accordance with the province rationing plan. That is as far as we are able to go at the present time with the figures to show what has happened to summer grain. With further work, we can produce figures for each province, if desired.

Acting Chairman: It is the opinion of the Acting Chairman that those figures should be worked up in as great detail as possible and furnished to the Conference in written form as early as possible. We will now proceed with the remainder of the questions by Mr. Won.

Mr. Won: Now that it has been explained, I understand it. We have not yet been able to discuss the plans for the future. Is this the plan of distribution we have here.

Mr. Hill: The larger sheet shows the consumption of rice and the collection and distribution. The first sheet shows the number of non-producers and what the plan is in the way of rice distribution to non-producers, and then the amount of rice that will be consumed by the farmers and also the amount of rice we would like to have available as a supplementary ration to workers in certain categories such as special industrial workers, etc. to encourage production.

Mr. Won: Is Cholla a less producer than Kyonggi Do?

Mr. Chee: It is a greater producer than Cholla.

Mr. Won: If anyone glances at this and sees the figures are larger than Cholla, they will assume that it is.

Mr. Hill: The answer in a way to that question is that in those provinces where there exists a deficit in rice, there is an incentive to collect more. You will find in surplus provinces, for example Kangwon Do, that some provinces collect an excess of the normal quota. You will find greater cooperation in a collection program in deficit provinces than a surplus one. We naturally take advantage of collecting grain in a deficit province.

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Mr. Won: The other day Dr. Bunce gave the figures of rice collected from government lands as being 850,000 suk, from Korean landlords as 2,500,000 and from America, 2,000,000. Are those figures correct?

Mr. Hill: Generally, yes.

Mr. Won: Will then this rice as estimated here be collected without fail. That is what I want to hear--from the New Korea and from the Japanese lands.

Mr. Hill: We have every indication now that all the rental rice from the New Korea lands will be collected in all provinces with the possible exception of Cholla Pukto where we are now experiencing some difficulty.

Mr. Won: You estimate 2,500,000 from landlords. How much has been collected and what is the prospect in that regard?

Mr. Hill: I am not able to say at the present time. We have not attempted to ask that the provinces submit their figures in accordance with these different categories of origin such as New Korea land, former Japanese land, and land owned by Koreans. We can probably obtain from the provinces some indication as to how the rental rice is being collected from lands owned by Koreans. We can probably ask that that information be submitted, but it will only be a general indication, and it would be a great a task to get it correctly. At the close of the collection program, it will be possible to arrive at a fairly correct figure by auditing the receipts of rental rice turned in from land owned by Koreans, but that will, of course, not be possible until towards the end of the collection program.

Mr. Won: I inquire because the New Korea lands and the Japanese owned lands would come in without question. We don't need to ask much about them. From what I have heard in reports from the country, the landlords' portions will probably come in as estimated. If that is so, there would be roughly 3,300,000 suk that we could just about count on, but it will be very difficult to affirm as to the landowner and tenants. If you gentlemen can affirm that this extra million which is coming in from here which is the basis of question, making a total of 4,300,000, if you have confidence that this can be collected, there is no need to argue further here. That would be enough to distribute to the people and our question

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Mr. Hill: We have indications now of the response on the part of owner operating farmers and tenant farmers with excess rice over their rental requirements as is expected of those tenants who are operating lands owned by Koreans. We feel that there are indications in provinces such as Kangwon Do, Chung Chong Pukto and Chung Chong Namdo that clearly indicate that the individual farmers are responding to the collection program in a very satisfactory way. We are not able to say clearly or decisively that the tenants with excess rice are going to respond in the same manner but we have reason to believe they will.

General Brown arrived at meeting and assumed the role of Chairman.

Chairman: I don't understand that expectation because this chart before me shows Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namdo 2.6 and 2.9 and Kyongsang Namdo and Kyonggi Do around 17%. With four provinces lacking, how can this program be successful.

Mr. Hill: I would like to add to what I have said. The rice is first harvested in provinces like Kangwon Do, Kyonggi Do, Chung Chong Pukto and Chung Chong Namdo, also in the northern part of Kyongsang Pukto. The extent of large holdings is not so great in provinces like Kangwon Do or Chung Chong Pukto. There are a large number of individual owners in those two provinces and about one-tenth small landowners. The figures shows a very good start in the rice collection. In provinces like Cholla Namdo and Cholla Pukto and Kyongsang Namdo, there are extensive land holdings. As I have said, the rice when last harvested in these provinces was collected satisfactorily. It is very satisfactory in Kyongsang Namdo and very satisfactory in Cholla Namdo. The rice collection in Cholla Pukto is obviously last. There are some difficulties that must be straightened out there, but we do not know the whole picture as to that situation yet. However, we are studying it very carefully. Furthermore, these figures represent mainly the purchase of rice by the Provincial Food Service in the respective provinces. These figures represent what has come up through the myun, kun and up to koo so that with these figures flowing in and the rice collected, there is that which has not been reported yet, so the conditions are more favorable than here. These represent rice purchased by the Pro-

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vincial Food Service. We know right here in Kyonggi Do there are large quantities of rice at the collection stations which have not yet been picked up by the Provincial Food Service. There have been as high as four or five thousand bags a day. It is physical impossibility for them to keep up. I think these figures also show the need for everybody in South Korea, particularly the leaders, to lend all possible support to this collection program. I think we have sufficient indication now that the program promises to be successful. We should feel that all Korean leaders in South Korea are lending their shoulders to the wheel and pushing this program to success.

Mr. Yon: If the rice collection program is not successful this year, not only will it be difficult for Military Government, but we who are working for Korea's independence will also experience great difficulty. Since I am working for the independence of Korea, I feel that this problem is one that contributes to that cause. Personally I realized the importance of this program three or four months ago and have from time to time gathered friends and groups together and urged them to realize the importance of the program. I desire to make one further remark here in the presence of the Chairman, Military Governor, Dr. Bunce, and the Civil Administrator. If you want to have a successful rice collection, it simply will not do to use only those of you in the National Food Administration. We, the people, are taken for granted. We should assist in the program--not only Food Administration but the Military Governor, Civil Administrator and various department of government. If you want to go and ask for rice from whose who have produced it, you must give them what they need. Since the children of farmers are crying for cloth to make their clothes, it is no enough to just go and demand rice. The farmer also needs kerosene in order to have light at night for his children to study and for them to be able to weave straw mats in which rice is to go. The harvest this year has been very good, but if you go into the next year without planning and successfully giving ammonia for fertilizer, it won't do. If you expect to collect the rice which is produced in the farming districts

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for use in the cities, then the goods produced in cities must be taken to farmers in their own districts. If you do not follow this policy but simply stress the work of the Food Administration, you are going to be in hot water. I have had experience from 1919 and saw the grain taken away from Russian peasants with the promise of shoes and clothes. The farmers were fooled the first and second year, but when they found that they were not given clothes and shoes, they sat down on their jobs and would not farm. Adding to that, in 1920, there was an extreme drought. Because the farmers refused to farm in the Ukraine, a strange situation resulted, and thirteen million persons died. Therefore Lenin awoke to the situation and in 1921 wrote the book about the farmers political situation--plan for the farmers. In Korea during the last five or six years, the Japanese made vain promises and continued to take away the food of the farmers. Therefore, the women in the country who were supposed to get up and go to work were unable to do so because of their cordition. I repeat the example I gave the other day of half a bag of unhulled rice being ¥600 and a bolt of cloth ¥1000. These formerly were on the same level in value. Gasoline may be ¥130 in the city, but in the country it is as high as ¥1000. How in the world can the farmers be expected to purchase kerosene for the purposes he needs at such a price. He must sell his rice in order to get it. I would like to make a substitute motion that rather than have this be Food Administration's responsibility that we all together hereby declare that this rice collection program is our program and must be put over. For example, if you were to take ammonia from America and offer to exchange it for rice, there would be plenty of rice come in. This is the solution of next year's problem in preview. In South Korea there are as many as 2,000,000 houses that produce rice and each house used one tin of kerosene, so you need to bring 200,000 drums of kerosene out here. Never mind 200,000, make it 100,000. If you brought that in, you could get one million kimoni of rice easily. What I have heard is that materials that came from Japan were landed in Pusan, and that if they could get permission from Military Government, they would sell them in different

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localities. From America there has come kerosene and textiles and other articles which the farmers want very much, but when you go out into the country, the farmers do not have it. They have gone into the warehouses of the middlemen. One farmer made a complaint to me that ¥130,000 of candy was sent to Kyontaik and that the farmers there are saying, "Why bring this candy when you can't light our houses. What in the world is the good of all this candy. Do the Americans have come out here to be candy merchants." I don't know whether this is to be laughed over or cried over. I am sorry for you two gentlemen from Food Administration. If we leave it up to you, it just can't be done. It is a bigger job than that. In order to set up a proper procedure to bring in rice, you must take kerosene, matches, rubber shoes, and tools for farming. These are the things which people need and want. Then the rice will come in. My hope is that we will all unite in supporting the Food Administration in the rice collection program. As for these two gentlemen themselves, be not content with getting a few figures and instructions, that is not enough to put the thing over. What I advocate is the collection of rice and then its distribution. Therefore, before you make distribution, be sure you have that which you can continue to distribute consecutively from the time you start, and then the price will fall. As far as the question of a free market is concerned, since we are supporting the rice collection program, if you give the farmers the things they need, your rice will come in. How you should get the things the farmers need to them is a question we won't go into now.

Mr. Bloom: Is this plan for one year ahead.

Mr. Hill: For the period between December 1st of this year and December 1st of next year.

Mr. Yun: Whether you get the rice or not, you have to give the farmers what they need.

Mr. Kimm: When you look at these figures on paper, how much grain came to Seoul. It is not enough for one-half a month. I don't need to look at them. There is not enough in Seoul to feed people for more than a few days. They make promises to give out food and then don't keep them.

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They promise potatoes and when we get them they appear rotten. In regard to riots, the main subject on which the conference is meeting, they come from hunger. You brag about fine results. They were only 50 %. People did not bring their quotas in and the police went out to get it and were beaten up. People here do not have rice. It means hunger and trouble. If you follow the same methods, what will you do? Will you force them to bring it when they don't.

Mr. Moni In regard to soap, it is difficult to buy even on the black market. Then it is announced that it will be rationed. Then you buy the product, it is filled with sand. There is no speaking of it. The year before last, the Japs said they were going to ration turnips and cabbage about this time for kim-chi. So, they left them all in the fields and did not collect it. All of a sudden it got cold, and the whole business froze up so they couldn't transport it into town. Then in January, they rationed this frozen stuff. They said, "If you don't take these turnips now, you won't get any rice later." So, unable to do anything about it and in tears, they gave up their money and bought rotten turnips in fear that they would not get rice. I hope you will consider that rationing is an exact thing. You must know how many people there are and you must have this material to be rationed in hand. If you go on an experimental basis, it will not work. There is enough here for us all to eat if it is all distributed according to the estimate. The experts say there is a shortage of 2,000,000 suk. Of course, we are unfamiliar with politics and in handling this, so we are obliged to believe this. What I said a while ago still goes. If you musttake, you must give. It is not a question of just taking rice. Since it will be necessary to bring clothing, ammonia, and kerosene in in any event, if you can bring it right now, it will push this rice collection over.

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Chairman: The purpose of this Commission is to investigate the causes of the disturbances in South Korea. The time remaining to this Conference is drawing short. The legislature will shortly meet and most of the Korean members of this conference will undoubtedly become members of the legislature. The detailed solution of these problems will become the problem of the legislature. The Chairman is going to suggest that the Conference take the entire economic block of subjects and discuss those in order to develop the principles involved in relation to the disturbances in South Korea. We have had these two gentlemen with us now for two days. Dr. Lee, Director of the Department of Agriculture, is now waiting to come before us. I am going to suggest that we endeavor to finish with these two gentlemen and let them go.

Choi: Do you know what the acreage is of the New Korea Company?

Mr. Kinney: About 700,000 acres or 275,000 chumbo. This includes the Japanese owned land. The New Korea Company administers all Japanese land.

Mr. Chang related the experience of his own family in the rationing. The ration they get which is for 10 days only lasts six days. In order to get this ration, it is necessary for his wife to wait in line for five or six hours. He presented samples of the wheat and rice they have received from the rationing store to illustrate the poor quality. His wife has found that it must be swelled in water and cracked before being eaten, and this process takes two days. Therefore, the general public has waited anxiously for the appearance of rice. A while back they heard there would be no rice and then a short time later the newspapers announced there was rice; however, this rice did appear in the district where his office is located but not in the district of his home. You can see what the feelings of the public would be in regard to this whole matter - they are told they are going to get rice on a certain day, but have to wait four or five days after that. Now that the weather is cold, it is a hardship for the women to stand in line for hours to wait for rice, and Mr. Chang hoped that careful consideration would be given to this matter.

Mr. Won (after examining the grain and rice submitted as a sample):

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There is something mixed in with this rice. I hope you will realize that this is the type of ration they are giving out. You of the Food Administration are the curators of the lives of the people, so please consider this carefully. If in Japanese times it was done that way, we would have taken them out and bumped them off. If I had power I would not let a fellow like that live. Consider it carefully, please.

Chairman: Can you add anything, Mr. Hill, to what you have given us that will help this Conference to understand the rice collection or rice distribution program?

Mr. Hill: I might add something to answer in part the questions of the last Korean gentleman. The rationing distribution in Seoul is not what we would like to see it. We too are quite disturbed when we see long lines of people waiting for their ration. Late last spring when we observed the same conditions, the matter was brought to the attention of the local authorities in charge of the distribution and additional ration points were set up. However, the stores that were available to the distribution authorities were too small, and at the present time we are investigating the possibility of establishing fewer and larger stores. We are considering the possibility of enlisting the aid of Korean businessmen to help us solve this problem. We are hoping that it will be possible in the very near future to set up some of these new distribution points and enter into arrangements with Koreans for their management. In that way we believe that the problem of transporting the grain will be eased. The larger stores will permit the handling of greater numbers of people in a very much shorter time. We hope to be able to have something positive to say about this before the end of December. At the present time the representatives of the city of Seoul, the Kyonggi-do Food Service, the Office of the Controller of Commodities and the National Food Administration are conferring on this matter.

Chairman: Who is the person we should bring before us to tell us about the handling distribution of grain?

Mr. Hill: At present it is handled by the Kyonggi-do Provincial Food Service which, of course, operates under the administration of the Provincial Governor and also under our general administration.

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Mr. Chang: I suggest that it is not necessary to have bigger places, that if notice were sent to each rationee of the time when he may be expected to get rations, and if there were greater quantities of grain to be distributed, that will expedite the matter.

Mr. Yon: In regard to the collection, I would suggest that the landlord be allowed to take his out of the amount first. In regard to distribution, don't be hurried in your census of the population - don't make a quick estimate as to how many there are. Rather than 1,200,000, it seems to me there is nearer two million. In your distribution program please do not use the merchants. They are not brilliant in promoting the welfare of the people, they are very bright in means of feathering their own nests. Formerly the rice collection and distribution, the OCC, was regarded as the gathering point of the great big crooks, and the Material Control Corporation similarly just a bunch of thieves. My very urgent request is that in the distribution and collection of rice you do not use these merchant people because of their former connections.

Chairman: Please inform us as to the present method of distributing rice in the city of Seoul.

Mr. Chen: It was determined that the proper amounts to be distributed throughout these different sections would have to be based on the reserve. If we know the amount of reserve, then we can estimate how much is to be distributed to these distribution centers. In order to decide on the quota system of distribution we, the parties concerned in this matter, the Food Administration section of the national level and the city level, and the OCC representatives from these respective centers, come and meet on a certain day to decide on the amount to be distributed and following that procedure, distribution is made. We meet preferably on Monday. Then we decide just which to distribute - rice or wheat or corn or potatoes. After this amount is fully decided on by this committee of representatives from these centers, OCC is called to handle that in such a way as to call in the city representative and the city representatives in turn take their amount out to different centers. That has been the method we have been following.

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The amount taken out to the centers of course is determined by the number of people in that area. The chung, or streets, are divided or rather each distribution center has under it so many chung from one to three or four, according to the decided area in which the district or section is located. If the area is a large one, the distribution center is assigned to handle more chung than any other distribution center. The process of getting this work done is this. The head man of a chung is assigned to collect all these distribution (ration) cards showing the number in the family, etc., and when these ration cards are collected the officer of the chung takes them to the distribution center to be counted. According to the number, the ration man sets aside so much rice or flour or whatever there appears to be and gives it to the chung man and he takes it to his own chung and distributes there. That is one way of distribution. Another way is to announce that the distribution is to be made at a certain chung so that all those people belonging to that chung should come on a certain day to receive their ration.

Chairman: How is the food distributed in the city of Seoul? What is your responsibility to see that the household gets the food?

Mr. Hill: My responsibility is primarily concerned with the administration of the distribution of food, and in so far as Seoul is concerned we are interested in how the Provincial Food Service collects and distributes grain to these ration stores, also the manner inwhich the city authorities, including the chung head, administer the issuance of these rations books or certificates. The chung head and the block head must verify the numbers of persons who are eligible for rations. After those lists are verified, then the names of the persons who are to be served by a particular ration store are grouped together and are assigned to that particular ration store. Those persons then go the the ration store once every ten days to receive the ration that has been decided upon. The Provincial Food Service has the responsibility of suppaying these ration stres with the required amount of food. At the present time the city authorities are revising the ration certificate system. They have now printed new ration books to be distributed on a person basis rather than on a family basis. With this new arrangement whereby each person carries his own ration book, it is

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believed that a more accurate check on the number of persons eligible for rationing can be determined. These new books will be distributed to the eligible persons in the next two or three weeks. We hope by the issuance of these books to eliminate the number of ghost people now receiving rations. When a person goes to the ration store he must, of course, stand in line. The method of measuring out the grain or flour is, in our judgment, too slow. It is difficult to change the ways of doing things but nevertheless we hope that we can speed up the process by which the food is measured out for these persons. The small stores that we are now using can only hold a very limited amount of grain. They are difficult to police and as a consequence we are losing a certain amount of food through theft; therefore, the necessity of this investigation that I previously commented upon whereby certain improvements in the rationing system may be worked out for the best interests of all concerned.

Chairman: Well, now come back to the question I asked. What is the responsibility of the National Food Administration for the distribution of rice in the city of Seoul? Let me help you answer that. I think the answer is none. I think the responsibility of the National Food Administration is to see that the city is provided with a certain bulk of food and the city has responsibility for seeing that it is distributed correctly. The National Food Administration has the sole responsibility of providing the city administration with the amount of food necessary to feed those in the city of Seoul who must be fed. It is the responsibility of the city administration to distribute that food and to see that it is furnished to those supplied with ration books which entitle them to a certain amount of food.

Mr. Hill: No, not quite that. The present organization is that the National Food Administration work is concerned with the overall plan for the collection and allocation to deficit areas. In Seoul the Provincial Food Service, a provincial organization, is responsible for the distribution of food to the rationing stores and also accounts for the persons in these stores.

Chairman: Who heads the Provincial Food Service for the city of Seoul?

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Mr. Hill: The Provincial Food Service for the province.

Chairman: I want to get somebody in here who can tell us how the city of Seoul stands. Who could I get in here?

Mr. Hill: We have tried to explain how it is done.

Chairman: It is not your responsibility. We want the man who is responsible.

Mr. Hill: The trouble is that the city of Seoul has been just recently separated from the province. Up to that time everything concerned with food was on a provincial basis and so it was a part of Kyonggi-do. The Provincial Food Service received the food from the surplus provinces, made the distribution to the ration points and staffs the ration stores.

Chairman: Who is providing the city of Seoul with food?

Mr. Hill: The Provincial Food Service of Kyonggi-do is still in that capacity.

Chairman: Who is the head of that?

Mr. Hill: For the Americans - Captain Cushmeyer. I can't remember the name of the Korean.

Chairman: The National Food Administration bears a simi ar responsibility in all provinces. Is that correct?

Mr. Hill: Yes, it is.

Dr. Bunce: Does the National Food Administration have any responsibility for seeing that the distribution carried out for provincial food distribution is satisfactory or not?

Mr. Hill: In the language of the ordinance as set up for the National Food Administration, the National Food Administration is concerned with the policy and overall administration of the distribution of food in all parts of South Korea.

Chairman: How does the National Food Administration exercise that responsibility?

Mr. Hill: Through the respective head of the Provincial Food Service and the City of Seoul.

Mr. Wop: As I hear of the whole plan, I have nothing but regret - that the fact that these two gentlemen do not come to our expectations in regard to the information, they have not thoroughly prepared their reports and thereby they hesitate to answer our questions - is a thing

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to be regretted. However, in this great project all the governmental organizations must cooperate. As I understood about the matter, Dr. Bunce proposed an overall plan for this rice collection and distribution, but we know too well that in making this program successful the transportation section of the government, the police and the food administration department all have to pull together.

General Helmick: I think Mr. Won has put his finger on a very important point - the whole government is taking part in this program. Commerce is getting incentive goods through importation, Agriculture is making the allocations of fertilizer, transportation is furnishing cars and seeing that the rice flows to the places that need it. The whole government, both provincial and national, feels that this is the main objective of the government at this time and the governors in all provinces have been told that their objective is not just to go out and get the rice and ship it but to see that the goods go out to the farmers so that the farmers can buy the goods they need. The national government is watching this very carefully. If a province appears to be slow in getting in its rice, we send to those provinces those who can take the necessary steps to see that the incentive goods go out, that we make all arrangements not only to get in the rice but to see that the whole operation is carried out. It is a big operation, a complicated operation, and the whole effort of the government is bent toward making that operation a success.

Dr. Bunce: I would like to add a few comments on the remarks made by Mr. Won. In the first place, the plan for the rice collection and distribution was not made by me, it was made by the National Economic Board in consultation with all agencies - The National Economic Board is an organ of Military Government. As a matter of fact, I was in America when the plan was developed. But I want to emphasize that in developing this collection and distribution program, the Economic Board considered certain basic plans. The first thing was the absolute necessity of controlling inflation in this country. In order to prevent wages constantly rising because the cost of rice was constantly rising, we had to determine the price of rice paid to the farmers that would be related to a price level which we hoped to attain as a stable price level in the future. The second thing, the price paid to the farmers

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had to be related to the price o the consumer goods that we were importing from the United States for the farmers and the goods to be manufactured in Korea by many of the large establishments owned by Military Government. The other thing was that there was no answer to this problem in raising the price of rice and in raising wages - you have to stabilize somewhere, and we selected this price of rice and related it to all these factors in economy. The price landlords and farmers receive for their rice will be, I believe, a very fair price as goods increase in output. This talk about distributing all these goods to everyone - we don't have time. At present we are trying to increase production and stabilize the price of rice so that the cost of goods will be a fair price in relation to the price of rice. Finally, I don't think that the criticism of the figures that are being presented are quite fair. We didn't give these gentlemen a list of questions so that they could prepare these figures in advance, and it is not easy to carry all these figures in your head or even in a portfolio. Personally, I have had a good deal of information presented to me that I did not have before, and I am quite sure that Mr. Hill and Mr. Chee would prepare detailed statements of the information that has been requested at this meeting.

Chairman: The Chairman was endeavoring to remove any criticism from Mr. Hill and Mr. Chee by endeavoring to show that they had fully explained to the Conference their responsibility of administration and control. It is the opinion of the Chairman that the Conference has accepted the principles of the present rice collection and distribution program. This being the case, it appears to the Chairman that the time remaining to this Conference might better be spent in examining more vital issues - one of the vital issues facing consideration of this Conference is whether or not the individual and farmers are getting sufficient food. To examine this question further, it is necessary that the Conference get other persons. The Chairman intends to propose to the Conference that Captain Cushmeyer and his assistants who have the responsibility for feeding the city of Seoul be called before the Conference, and that the Conference discontinue inquiry into the broad

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question of the rice collection and distribution program.

Mr. Won: Is wheat included in the anticipated import of American grains?

Mr. Hill: Yes.

Mr. Won: In regard to wheat. I should like to say that if whole wheat is imported , that should be given to flour mills and then distribute flour instead of whole wheat because the value in the good received is just the same whether it is flour or rice. If they are given this whole wheat they have a grat burden of preparing that to food substance. If possible the Military Government should appoint a certain flour grinder who can do the job successfully. The surprising fact is that since people when they receive this whole wheat are not inclined to use it for food, they barter with a small quantity of rice from a certain farmer who in turn will use this wheat for making wine. Generally one mal of wheat is equivalent to one mal of flour when it is ground. But now only six percent of flour is obtained from whole wheat, and the rest has gone to the hogs. This suggestion of mine - that is making flour and distributing it to all rationees is an absolute request. Then, too, I should like to suggest at this point th t in case any flour grinder takes such a job on contract they may not set aside so much for their own and then the amount of flour would not be wasted or be robbed, so it is necessary that Military Government should appoint a flour grinder and see that the whole amount is distributed. During the Japanese administration, flour g inders when they were given the contract to grind the flour they would grind only a half. Then the rest was dumped out into a certain place and used for feeding hogs, etc., and they derived a great sum of income. That also should be given careful consider tion. That is the only thing the Korean people remembered from the Japanese administration or Japanese policy, is just how to cheat the other fellow.

Mr. Hill: Just a brief comment on converting wheat to flour. We are at the present time using all flour mills - they are working 24 hours daily and can't begin to meet the requirements. We lost one mill by fire last winter, but the milling facilities in South Korea are totally inadequate to take care of the wheat coming into Korea at the present time. I would venture a guess that only about 20 percent has been able

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to be milled.

Mr. Hill and Mr. Chee were excused and thanked for the information they had given.

Chairman: I suggest that Captain Cushmeyer and his assistants be called as witnesses for the next meeting in order to explain how the city of Seoul is fed. In addition to these, we have the following witnesses named by not yet called: The Chairman would like to know if you wish any of these witnesses on Thursday.

Mr. Lee, Hong Keun
Mr. Lee, Son Tak
Mr. Ko, Pil Kwan.

Mr. Kim said that Mr. Ko, Pil Kwan would appear as a witness on Thursday, also.

The meeting adjourned at 1700 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on Thursday, December 5, 1946.

NOTE: Exhibits 26 and 27 attached to original only,
Exhibits 28 and 29 attached to all copies of the minutes.

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STATUS OF RICE COLLECTION PROGRAM AS OF 1 Dec 46

PROVINCE	QUOTA	COLLECTED	PER CENT OF QUOTA
Chungchong Pukto	180,000	76,782	42.65
Chungchong Namdo	470,000	177,190	37.70
Cholla Pukto	798,000	23,640	2.96
Cholla Namdo	750,000	74,997	9.99
Kyongsang Pukto	720,000	220,769	30.60
Kyongsang Namdo	600,000	101,000	16.83
Kyonggi-Do	775,000	134,668	17.37
Kangwon-Do	60,000	57,000	95.00
TOTAL	4,358,000	866,046	19.87

Unit-Polished suk
National Food Administration
1 December 1946

Exhibit 28

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INVENTORY OF FOOD STUFFS
(SOUTH KOREA)

Unit-Suk

Grains (Korean)

Rice	866,538
Barley	48,464
Wheat	3,915
Rye	8,720
Buckwheat	5
Flour	1,172
Corn	912
Brans	619
Total	930,245

Grains (American)

Wheat	198,189
Corn	13,728
Flour	56,680
Total	268,587

Canned Goods (American)

Assorted can goods	17,123	cases
Bran cakes	1,000	cases (Korean)
Lunch meat	3,180	cases
10-1 Rations	594	cases
Total	21,897	cases

Sugar 95 suk

Total grains

Korean	930,245	Suk
American	268,587	Suk
Total	1,198,832	suk

Exhibit 29

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MINUTES
OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 3 DECEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown (Chairman)
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling
Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Bunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Teuk Syung

KOREAN MEMBERS

Won, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Chang, Kwon
Pahk, Keun Oong
Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Kang, Shoon
Ahn, Chai Hong

Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung
Kim, Toong Choon

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Two witnesses, Lt. Col. James E. Wilson and Captain J. T. Kusmierz, were introduced to the Conference.

Chairman: Will you please inform the Conference as to your duty assignments and responsibilities, Col. Wilson.

Col. Wilson: I am Military Adviser to the Mayor of the City of Seoul. As far as rice distribution is concerned, it is my responsibility to designate the rationing of food in the City of Seoul, and it is presumed to be my sole duty to see that all the people in the City of Seoul are fed properly and that the food is distributed. The actual physical distribution of the City of Seoul, however, is under the control of the Kyonggi Do Food Service. Kyunggi Do Food Service maintains warehouses, food distribution facilities and the necessary stores through which the food is actually given out to the individuals. On the actual details of physical distribution of food, Captain Kusmierz is completely responsible and knows all the details of that.

Chairman: Will you explain to the Conference how the machinery for distributing food is organized and how it operates?

Col. Wilson: I think Captain Kusmierz can answer that better.

Capt. Kusmierz: It is the direct responsibility of the Kyonggi Do Food Service of which I am military director to Mr. La, Chul Ha, the Korean Director of Kyonggi Food Service, to procure all warehouses, mill and

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distribute food in the province of Kyonggi Do under the direction of the home office of the Korea Commodity Company which is in turn under National Food Administration.

Chairman: How does an individual get his food? Where do you get the food?

Capt. Kusmierz: Take the subject of basic food. Now we are most concerned with rice. National Food sends down the quotas that various provinces will ship to Kyonggi Do due to the fact that Kyonggi Do is unsufficient in itself in food to last the 240 day period of rationing between rice harvest seasons. Col. Wilson would like to have me give a larger picture although I think it really should come from National Food who actually set it up through the Agricultural Department throughout all of South Korea. Briefly, the provincial agricultural department on instructions from National Food Administration sends out inspecting teams to determine what the rice or summer grain crop will be. The agricultural people determine how much will be anticipated, produced, and what the quota for each farmer in province will be to turn into government controlled agency like the Korea Commodity Company. Agriculture people set up quotas and actually collect rice from farmers and bring to collection point where our job starts. The agriculture department within the provinces on a national level and the national level agricultural people determine where food is to be distributed in accordance with population of non-producers and farmers. When the food is brought to collection station, it is then turned over and placed in the hands of the Korea Commodity Company. We take this food at collection point, pay farmer for it, warehouse it, mill and make it ready for consumption, and then ship on orders of provincial governor and on orders of Kunsoo who is direct representative of the Agriculture Department of the provincial government. We ship food on instructions of the agriculture people. For purpose of illustration as to how food actually gets to individual civilians, take Suwan, Inchon, or Seoul, preferably Seoul. The population of the City of Seoul at the present time is about 1,200,000. Most of the food that is going to be used to feed City of Seoul will come from outside provinces. Within the City of Seoul, a rationing system is set up approved

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by National Food Administration, set up by the Mayor of Seoul, and the individual or family ration book is now in the possession of all heads of families within City of Seoul. We have ration cycles of ten day periods. The periods are from the sixth of the month to fifteenth of month, from sixteenth to twenty-fifth, and 26th to fifth. The ration is determined at a meeting held by Mr. Hill of National Food Administration at least three or four days prior to a new ration beginning. At that meeting, National Food by getting figures from the Kyonggi Food Service and the home office of the Korea Commodity Company as to how much grain is available and what types will be avilable for next ten day period, determines what and how much the ration is for that ten day period. For example, the ration beginning tomorrow morning will be as follows: Out of the total of nine districts, six will be given one-half of rice and 1-3/10 hop of flour or wheat. Three districts will receive 1½ hop of flour, 1 hop of wheat, barley or noodles depending upon which we have available most in our stocks. Now we have 184 retail stores that are handled by the Kyonggi Food Service for the purpose of putting out this ration. These stores are then filled from shipments arriving from the United States. For example, wheat and flour usually comes in from Inchon. The rice and a very low percentage of summer grains are shipped via truck and horse cart from Kyonggi Province and some of the rice is now coming in from southern provinces. This stuff is transported during a day's operation using 30 trucks and approximately 100 horse carts. We keep the 184 stores filled up for the ten day period to get it out to the people. The amount to be put into each store is determined by the district manager by determining the amount of population of the particular district of which there are nine. It takes approximately 1,000 employees to run these 184 stores. It is all controlled by the present ration book. One member of the family brings in his ration book. In that ration book, it tells how many people are living in the household which may be anywhere from five to fifteen per family. The individual brings his own containers and presents his ration book. He is given 2½ hop or 3-1/3 hop of food for each member of family. He pays for it at the store at

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government prices. These prices are set at national level. In addition to the 2½ hop that the population receives on the ration card, the majority of the working classes in Seoul receive an additional supplementary ration that is issued right from warehouses of the Kyonggi Food Service here in Seoul. I don't know what the percentage of the population would be, but some organizations having large numbers of employees as Transportation, Seoul Electric, the Constabulary, Police Department, and school teacher, are given supplementary rations in addition to the regular ration.

Chairman: When can these people get their ration? What hours are the stores open? Are they opened every day? Do the people have to stand in long lines and how is the service?

Capt. Kusmierz: It is a fact that in some of the districts and stores there are long lines for this reason. Some of these 184 stores are nothing but cigar boxes and are very small and absolutely inadequate to handle the population of particular district that that store is feeding.

Dr. Kimm interrupted to introduce Mr. Kang, Shoon, newly added member of the Coalition Committee and to this Conference. Mr. Kang is a representative of the Toiling Masses Party.

Capt. Kusmierz: Inasmuch as the City of Seoul has the largest population in South Korea, I would like to confine the discussion to the 184 stores here since I think the other people within the provinces are being adequately handled as in the smaller cities such as Inchon, Suwan, etc. In view of the critical shortage of horse carts and trucks, I would like to bring up a point here now regarding the stores in the City of Seoul. For example, one ten-day ration period in this city at the present ration takes approximately 160 box cars of grain or approximately 32,000 suk of grain. This problem of feeding city of Seoul alone occupies a good 75% of the Kyonggi Food Service operations. The 184 stores were placed in the lap of Kyonggi Food Service some time last May. The Kyonggi Food Service by its laws and regulations should not have anything to do with the retailing of foodstuffs in Korea. Therefore, I would recommend that an organi-

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zation be contacted in Seoul with the thought in mind of turning the 184 stores and the job of feeding the City of Seoul by ration system over to it. If a private or government organization took over these 184 stores, the Kyonggi Food Service within this province could more efficiently handle the transportation and distribution of grains within province. Aside from the fact that it would alleviate operations of Kyonggi Food Service, the primary reasons for this recommendation are as follows: (1) The Korean people of the City of Seoul could be more efficiently served; (2) With the introduction of a new ration system which Colonel Wilson now has in production--an individual ration book, and a large organization handling the rationing in large stores, it would be more effective than at the present time.

Chairman: What are the hours of these stores and what days are they opened for the individual Korean to procure his food?

Capt. Kusmierz: There are nine districts in City of Seoul. Now break that down to one district and break district down into sub-districts. In the smallest community, one individual member of that community notifies the people on that street when the store will be open and when people can come and get food so as to prevent any long standing in line. For example, if there is one store feeding an area of ten blocks square, people living probably in two streets would come and get their food say on Monday or Tuesday. Then it is repeated in the other streets. It has to be done that way because of the fact that the stores are so small and with three or four employees weighing the food, taking it out of bags and marking ration cards, there is not enough room to handle any larger amount of people than that. They are open from 7 A.M. to 6 P.M.

Chairman: If one fails to get his ration when his street comes in for rations, when does he get his?

Capt. Kusmierz: He may get it after the particular district has finished with the ration or pick it up at the next ration.

Chairman: Do the people have any opportunity to complain of the condition of the food issued?

Capt. Kusmierz: We do not put any kind of spoiled food into any

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store. All food put out for the people on the ration is in absolutely A-1 condition.

Chairman: At the last meeting of this Conference, one of the members produced a sample of rice, two-thirds of which was shaff, which he stated was issued at one of the ration distribution stores.

Capt. Kusmierz: No spoiled food to my knowledge has ever been sold in the ration stores.

Chairman: This food was not spoiled. It was only one-third rice and two-thirds dirt and shaff.

Capt. Kusmierz: Although this is the first complaint that has ever come to my attention, I will try to explain. I know it to be a fact that some of the rice that is passed by some of the agricultural experts is not the standard it is supposed to be before it is passed to pay the government prices for it. The agricultural inspectors determine what grade it is, and we of the Kyonggi Food Service have to pay government prices for it. We have never received any complaint about the food distributed.

Chairman: Is the opportunity offered for purchaser to complain?

Capt. Kusmierz: I believe so. The Korean people have various ways of expressing likes, dislikes, and complaints. I might add that anybody is welcome to come up and see the Director or myself with complaints and to bring the facts with the case.

Mr. Chang: People were promised rice a long time ago and when they received it, it turned out to be old rice. They had thought the old rice was all gone and were expecting new rice. Where did the old rice come from? Furthermore, if some explanation is not given as to where the old rice came from, the people will misunderstand and will wonder where it came from when they were told that there was none. Some explanation would avoid further difficulty.

Col. Wilson: Where did you get the information that old rice was given out?

Mr. Chang: It was my office boy who went to get the ration about two weeks ago.

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Capt. Kusmierz: Before I answer question, I would like to ask gentleman how much was the amount and does he know of any cases so we can base it on some amount, in suk or bags.

Mr. Chang: They said they had received rice. I looked at it. It was what I brought here the other day. For ten days, it would be three hop.

Capt. Kusmierz: In answer to the question of where the old rice came from, In the first place up until three weeks ago there was no rice issued to the people of Seoul. Therefore, what old rice was in the stores was carried on the inventory remaining in the stores from the last time rice was given on the ration. Naturally when Food Administration determined stocks of rice from my inventory, they said they would issue rice. We gave out all the old rice in storage in the warehouse along with the new rice.

Chairman: Is there much of the old rice left?

Capt. Kusmierz: We still have a little bit left. Since the rice has been coming in, National Food has prescribed that we give out as much as we possible can. In the last ration we told National Food we could afford to give three of the districts one hop of rice each. As determined in National Food this morning for the ration beginning tomorrow, the six districts that did not get rice will get one hop of rice. Without a doubt, those stores in those six districts will have some old rice and there will be old rice given out.

Mr. Chang: The time consumed in obtaining one's ration is very long in many instances. Could not some means be devised for a person to go at his convenience to buy rice?

Capt. Kusmierz: Under the present system of running these 184 cigar box stores, it cannot be done since most people would like to get their ration on the very first day of a ration period and that is physically impossible. Furthermore, by using horse carts and thirty trucks, we can't hope to keep these stores so stocked so we could sell it all in one day. I want to emphasize again

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that it takes 160 box cars of food to distribute to 184 stores every ten days, and if the people can't wait another day or organize themselves to come when told, I don't see how the situation could be remedied.

Mr. Chang: I suggest that we increase the 184 stores to further outlets in order to supply needs. The difficulties of transportation should be cut because supplying people with food is one of the primary factors in civic life. It is important that people procure food at specific times. If it is difficult with Hyongsi food service handling this, why not change over to some concern or company who can expedite it and more easily distribute food to the people.

Col. Wilson: That is exactly our plan. We recognize the shortcomings of our present inadequate system and are planning to enlarge scope and type of distribution. I plan to put a great deal, if not all, of this distribution in the hands of a reputable retail store to distribute food.

Mr. Choi: Reports were appeared in the papers saying that there would be rice on 24 November and then on 1 December. Do these reports have any basis?

Col. Wilson: Those announcements did not come out of the City Hall. They might have come from National Food.

Mr. Choi: When will the city give out rice for sure?

Col. Wilson: As soon as National Food tells me they have sufficient rice to issue.

Capt. Kusmierz: I would like to add something very indirect. I had a conversation this morning with Mr. Choe about the next ration. According to estimates based on production of rice in South Korea, National Food has anticipated larger shipments into Seoul than have been coming in. Perhaps they make announcements that rice will be rationed at a future date anticipating shipments that are to come in, but which up to now have not been coming in on schedule.

Mr. Choi: You have no plan now as to definitely when you will be able to give rice?

Capt. Kusmierz: It can't be stated definitely. We have on hand now

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2,413 suk of ice that we are ready to start issuing tomorrow in the stores.

Mr. Choi: You haven't decided when you will give out rice?

Capt. Kusmierz: It has been decided as given to Conference before. I want to bring out the point of promises to people of Seoul of what they will get before the food is actually here. For example, we will give six district one hop of rice although we do not have the rice actually in Seoul as yet. Mr. Lee, the Director, and I know we can make the 8,400 suk that it will take to feed the six districts one hop of rice.

Mr. Lee: There are nine districts in the City of Seoul. On the 26th an announcement was made that rice was started, but they didn't have rice for more than three district. Three will receive from tomorrow on. It takes 8,400 suk and we do not have all that now. This is anticipated, and the decision was made this morning on the strength that this will be available for ration purposes.

Mr. Choi: What about the other three?

Mr. Lee: They will have the ration mentioned a while ago.

Capt. Kusmierz: I think that National Food has been making promises based probably on their anticipation of shipments coming in. I would like to further go on record that at meetings of National Food once a week, I have discouraged verbally the promising of anybody any rice until we actually have rice in the City of Seoul.

Dr. Johnson: The root of this problem is the resistance of the rice surplus areas to release their available supplies for the deficit areas. I don't want to give excuses for the National Food Administration, but again and again National Food has had what it thought was a definite promise from surplus areas to ship food to Seoul. It probably was ill advised in announcing that rations would be met without having the grain in hand. I would like to cite for information of Conference one recent episode. In that case National Food Administration had what they thought was absolutely certain information that 64 carloads would be coming from certain areas in Cholla

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ukto and Cholla Namdo. The whole operation was apparently all tooled up and ready to go. The cars were at the right places at the described moments, but when a representative from the Department of Transportation made rounds to insure that box cars were in right places, he found the rice was not there because of terrific resistance that I have spoken of. When the operation was completed, instead of having 44 carloads to bring to Seoul, they had 29 carloads. It must be admitted that the whole operation was not completely coordinated. I do want to point out that there is this terrific resistance to meet at all times when rice is to be loaded to go out of a province, and it is terrific resistance to overcome. Here again I would like to point out if it could be emphasized to all the people of Korea that it is an operation for the benefit of all the people of Korea, it would be more helpful.

Mr. La: In regard to the charge that there was inferior rice sold at our outlets, as the Governor has explained, there were sort in accounts of old rice carried over in the stores themselves. There is a regulation which says that in the polishing of new rice 94% must be retained. Therefore, the rice which is polished on the free market is very different.

Mr. Chang: You must remember that the people wonder why there is old rice retained and why it was not given out when there was this great shortage. Why was it retained? It must have been because of personal reasons of merchants. Also the comparison made by Mr. La of that is a matter known by the public, and it is not wise to bring it up because government rice suffers in comparison.

Mr. Johnson: With regard to the old rice, it is my opinion and I think it is a correct one that it was brought up from Cholla Namdo. Those were supplies discovered there and they were again being withheld by the provincial authorities. I, myself, went to a myun meeting in Cholla Namdo last September with the Food Administrator, and while there we learned there was a large quantity of rice in warehouses which was being withheld. It had been ordered to be distributed by the Provincial Food Service, but the railroad workers refused to load rice. It is

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just a sample of the problems that have to be overcome. If I remember correctly, some 38 carloads of old rice were made available in the two Cholla for the City of Seoul. I may be wrong in the figures, but it is a sizeable amount. Personally I am unable to see any objection to the old rice. It is food and it has been found and made available for a deficit areas.

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Capt. Kusmierz: I would like to make a statement in regard to things preventing the rice from coming in here. I talked with the other provincial food controllers, and we are all trying for the same thing - that is, trucks, truck tires and truck parts. In some of the gun in Kyonggi-do we have to haul as far as 75 miles to get it to a railway. Right now the Kyonggi-do Food Service has 20 trucks that we received through KCC, and half of those have been loaned out to the sub-branch managers to get the rice loaded. I would like to qualify a statement that I made earlier and again mention the 184 stores. I made a statement that the mission of the Provincial Food Service or the Korean Commodities Corpany was to procure, transport, polish and distribute food. I don't want you to be misconstrued that we are not responsible for distribution. I want to make a distinction between retailing it through stores and distributing in on instructions from higher authorities, either from the Agricultural Department or from National Food. Therefore, if we could get rid of the 184 stores and let a private organization or a government controlled organization take over the stores or part of our stores and other food stores, then we could concentrate more on the important job which is the distribution of the grain.

General Melrick: How much storage have you for rice in the Seoul area, for how many days' ration?

Kusmierz: About 400 car loads or about 80,000 suk - approximately enough for one month's supply.

Mr. Choi: This is not a criticism, but a statement I would like to make. I know of one private concern that has a fleet of 50 trucks. Evidently there is a lack of planning, because 1,200,000 people need about 90,000 suk a month, and there is a fleet of only 20 trucks. Even if the rice is available we can not bring it in. While having the plans for the collection of rice, you must have plans for the distribution of that rice to the center where it is used. The collection of rice is one question, but this simple question of the transportation of rice after collected with only 20 trucks - how can you expect to meet that problem? If this were the beginning of the rationing and

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controlled market in which there had been a month or two of prepar tory work toward one thing it would be one thing, but now after year of controlled market to admit that you have only a fleet of 20 trucks is quite remarkable. I am not one who wants to criticize the controlled market situation, but upon the facts as presented it does not give one confidence to believe in the ability to carry it forward. To eat three times a day is a common expectation, but rather than to starve one reverts to thievery. Since the arrival of new rice there has been a period of three months. The individuals have had to bear the responsibility of getting their own rice and transporting it during this period so that they might live. If after three months preparation it is admitted that for a city that needs 30,000 suk there is in sight only 2400 suk, how can you expect the people to have confidence in such a situation. If within a month or so it is possible to make effective the plan whereby the people of South Korea can be fed that is the desirable end, but if it cannot whatever explanations are offered the American plan as at present presented to the people will prove a failure. If here in the central city of Seoul where the National Food Administration has its headquarters the situation has reached such a state, what must be the condition in the other cities? The situation is not a pleasant one to look at.

Capt. Kusmierz: Personally I don't think that any Korean is entitled to anticipate a failure of anything that we are trying to do. I know that every effort is being made in Kyonggi-do as well as in other provinces to get the rice into Seoul at all costs and as soon as possible. Plans have been made to coordinate the shipments into Seoul so that the Kyonggi-do Food Service can take it off the box cars and place it in the stores. I admit that if the incoming rice is in such great quantities that we can't handle it it will have to be stock-piled at the stations and in open warehouses next to the station so that it can be distributed to the stores. I earlier stated that the Kyonggi-do Food Service had twenty trucks of its own. That is supplemented daily with 30 trucks from other sources. It is also supplemented with whatever trucks or horse carts the Kyonggi-do Food Service is able to get, and we

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have tried to contact some private organizations like I mentioned before. But, for example, we pay the horse cart at ¥7 per bag for every bag they haul for us from the platform to the store. Private organizations pay as high as ¥25 per bag for hauling individual items like wood, coal or anything else. Not only that, if we meet their price of ¥25 per bag they will double that and knock us out of business by doubling the price. There are plenty of horse carts that we would like to have but we can't fight private organizations that double the price. The same thing applies to private trucking organizations.

Col. Wilson: The gentleman's remarks may not have been criticism, but they had many edges. We have tried to retain a sense of fairness in trying to reach a solution without quarreling or criticizing. Since he has introduced that aspect into the problem, I might ask him why we don't get full 100 percent cooperation from the Koreans in order to answer some of these problems.

Chairman: We do not want this meeting to degenerate into an accusation. We want the facts and all the facts.

Col. Wilson: We have promises of many private owned trucks in the city - one fleet with five trucks. I was surprised to hear about the fleet of 50 trucks. When we issue gasoline to these operators they make promises to allow us to call on them when we have emergency needs for their trucking. Now, this is purely a gentlemen's agreement. We make no conditions on the issuance of the gasoline; however, when we call on them for cooperation we rarely can get more than 18 or 20 trucks out of the whole group. These problems cannot be completely solved without the full cooperation of all. Captain Kusmierz has said that people with horse carts and trucks can earn more money by hauling other loads, and we cannot expect them to sacrifice.

Mr. Choi said that apparently his remarks had driven home rather deeply. It was not his intention to arouse anyone's feelings, but merely to try and reach a solution to this common problem.

Chairman: I would like to say to Col. Wilson and Capt. Kusmierz that this Conference is endeavoring to get facts without trying to find criticism, only to try to find remedies for the conditions which can be

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remedied. The future work of the Conference will proceed along this line. We will endeavor to eliminate all criticism from the discussion.

Mr. Ko, Pil Kwan was presented as a witness, and was asked to give his testimony.

Mr. Ko said he came as a member of no party, but as a citizen of Seoul and is representing himself individually. He said that on the 7th of July a number of friends met at his home to go over the food situation. There were three questions they wanted to present which seemed to be uppermost in their minds, and they asked Mr. Ko to present them since he had no political connections and would have no difficulty in making the presentation. The first of these questions was in regard to the food problem, the second was in regard to the refugees and the third was the housing problem. This petition was presented to General Hodge and General Lerch and they waited for something to happen, some news in the paper or something, but up to the end of September we had heard nothing. They waited until the 20th of September when there was an ordinance in regard to food. After studying Ordinance No. 2, as a citizen interested in the welfare of the country he realized that much of it would not do. He made two visits to Mr. Chee, of the National Food Administration, asking whether it was not possible to make some change in this ordinance but his reply was that an ordinance after having been published could not be changed and nothing could be done about the situation. By this time it was about the 24th of September and the railroad strike broke out. Realizing that this would be the beginning of further trouble, a petition was prepared on 30th September and was presented to General Hodge, General Lerch and the EDC. In this petition two ways were listed to meet the rice problem - a free market or a controlled market. During the Japanese regime because of an emergency in the case of war, they had a controlled market. But now that the war was over, after an examination of the situation it seemed that a free market would be the best course for the government to take. If you declare a free market, you have the danger of its failure. The dangers in the failure of a free market are the hoarding of rice on the part of the farmers themselves and the danger in regard to the profiteers. If these farmers, therefore, start to hoard the rice the

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government will not have the source of rice with which to meet the needs of the people and the situation becomes aggravated. For these reasons it seemed to him that the free market was not an acceptable solution to the situation, and in the petition the setting up of a controlled market is recommended. What would be the most acceptable and easiest way of rice collection? He felt that the responsibility on the part of the landlord was the solution. If there were 100 landlords there would be about one thousand tenants; therefore, from the standpoint of office force in the handling of the matter this method would be the best. This power should be given the landlords because in the last ten years the tenants have not recognized the position of the landlords, have not surrendered their grain, and have not treated the landlords properly. That also is the reason for this decrease in the inflow of rice. If the landlord had this responsibility he could go into the field and count the bags of rice himself. He would know the yield of rice and how much the tenant is to deliver. It is because the landlord and the tenant work together. If this responsibility is not given to the landlords, then they will advise the tenants that they need not give up their portion of the rice or to do it slowly. As far as the landlord is concerned, the price of rice has gone from 300 to 700 up and down, and they have not had the opportunity to eat rice in their own homes. That is because of the spread of the railroad strike. If this trouble had been anticipated two months ago according to the petition which we presented, and the situation would have been avoided but at that time there was no organization such as the Joint Korean-American Conference. This has all been contained in the petition which was presented to General Hodge and General Lerch, but apparently this petition has not been looked at yet. It is not intended as a criticism of Ordinance 2, but rather as an aid in the handling of the situation. He mentioned also that it would be necessary to have a complete correct census in order to have the rice distribution program succeed.

Chairman asked that a copy of the petition be left with the Conference, but Mr. Ko did not have an extra copy. He said he had given a copy of it to Mr. Kim, Koong Choon for presentation to the Conference previously.

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It has never been presented to the Conference, and the Chairman said he would check with Mr. Kim. Mr. Ko was excused from the meeting.

Col. Wilson, Captain Kusmierz and Mr. La were again called as witnesses.

Dr. Kimm had been absent during all previous discussions on the rice collection and distribution progress, and asked some questions which had already been answered. He mentioned the fact that during the Japanese administration the Koreans had become expert at cheating, and the Japanese had never been able to get true figures as to the actual yield of rice nor were they able to determine the exact number in a family. For instance, a family of five members would be represented as having 15 members and though the policemen would come early in the morning to count the members the never would find out the truth. They may still be doing the same thing. He asked if those handling the rationing have not felt that there is something wrong somewhere.

Dr. Johnson said that the collection and distribution had to be co-ordinated. We could build up stock reserves, but this would involve twice the transportation - from the box cars to the warehouses and from the warehouses to the distribution centers.

General Helmick: The reports of the allotments we have taken from the farmers have been studied very carefully from the national level, from the provincial level, to the gun and then down to the smallest areas. I am sure that the overall amounts taken from the farmers are not excessive. I am also sure that excessive allotments are very seldom found. In any extensive machinery such as this there will be human failings somewhere along the line, and it is possible that in a few cases there are unfair allocations. But I am sure that on the whole the farmer has enough for him, enough for his own family and enough for seed. Captain Kusmierz is in the position of receiving grains allocated to him from the National Food Administration. That administration made its plans and had what it considered firm allocations of grain. They were extremely anxious to announce the beginning of rationing and were entirely optimistic upon many of the conditions which would allow grain to be delivered at Seoul. Such plans are necessary for an operation like this. I have given instructions that the

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National Food Administration will not announce rationing plans unless they have the rice in hand available to issue. At the same time, not only the National Food Administrator but the whole national government is expending every effort to carry out its plans - not only all the means available to Military Government but all the powers of requisitioning transportation and labor to carry that out will be used to make this program work. You ask how Captain Rushmore feels on being promised grain and not receiving it. He feels just as I do - that we have undertaken something and we have not accomplished it. He is the one who has the criticism of the citizens of Seoul, but it is the national government which has not supported him in the task that we have given him to do. I can assure you that all of the Military Government is working to support Captain Rushmore in carrying out his mission of feeding the citizens of Seoul.

Mr. Linn: In spite of transportation difficulties, Mr. Linn showed us a document showing some of the things going on in this so-called New Korea Company. This New Korea Company was very much in the limelight on this rice collection matter. In this document there were one or two items concerning the selling of some 40 trucks to the vice-president of the New Kor a Company and they were sold to him in two lots of 20 each. I suppose they were for some factory, but if those things were looked into probably this transportation difficulty could also be a little bit alleviated.

Mr. Johnson: I assure Mr. Linn that this matter has been very carefully investigated and appropriate recommendations have been made to the Military Governor. I would like to say that the New Korea Company is being observed constantly to see if it fulfills its functions in the rice collection program. Its records are spotted. In Kyongsang-Namdo 100 percent has been collected. In Cholla-Pukto its record is poor. That matter is being investigated right now. The Commission has gone down there to see what is wrong and see why it is not functioning properly.

Mr. Yon: In the New Korea Company there is an official who is in charge of certain lands. It is reported that this superintendent of land goes down to the tenants and gets in cahoots with them. If there were 20

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suk from this land, then six suk should come in. They write it up as 15 suk. This balance is divided between the superintendent and the tenants themselves. So, the report is that of the people in the New Korea Company none will go hungry, they are fixed.

Mr. Kang made some remarks as to the difficulty in changing from a war time program to a peace time program. The reason for rationing in war time was because those in industry and producing munitions of war could not work unless they were fed. In peaceful times if the laborers in factories, etc., do not get a large enough ration that is their excuse for not working hard. It is necessary that we use a certain amount of control, and that all the various departments of the government must work together.

Chairman announced that there would be no meeting of the Confe ence tomorrow because of a meeting of the Coalition Committee. The next meeting will be on December 9th, and the discussion will continue on the rice distribution program. Mr. Lee, San Teik will appear as a witness at that meeting.

The meeting adjourned at 1700 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on 9 December 1946.

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MINUTES
OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 9 DECEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS	KOREAN MEMBERS
Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown (Chairman)	Won, Seh Hoon
Brig. Gen. John Beckerling	Choi, Tong O
Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick	Pahk, Keun Oong
Dr. L. A. J. Johnson	Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Dr. A. C. Bunce	Kang, Shoon
	Ahn, Chai Hong
Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch	Kim, Joong Choon
	Lyuh, Woon Hong (substituting for Chang, Kwon)
Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller	
Mr. Cho, Teuk Syung	Absent: Lyuh, Woon Byung
	Chang, Kwon

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

Dr. Kimm introduced Mr. Lyuh, Woon Hong, head of the Social Democratic Party, who is representing Mr. Chang, Kon on the Coalition Committee and substituting for him on this Conference.

Mr. Kim: Mr. Choy, Nueng Chin, Chief of the Detective Bureau of Military Government has been dismissed and this has caused undesirable results. The public apparently feels that this Conference instead of remaining on the line of seeking to find out and to allay the sources of the riots has instead created an internal disturbance in the police bureau, picking on one man only. This has appeared in the newspapers, and the results personally and for the Conference are unfortunate. If our freedom of expression and ability to fully express our ideas here is misinterpreted and it is felt that we are seeking to check upon certain individuals, then the whole objective of the Conference is distorted and it leaves our position open to criticism.

Chairman: The Chairman regrets that any opinion of that sort is prevalent among the people. As far as the Chairman knows, this Conference had nothing to do with the relief of this individual. Certainly this Conference did not recommend his relief or in any way suggest it.

Gen. Helmick: That is correct. The action which led to the dismissal of the detective chief had nothing to do with this Conference. It is

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an action of comparatively long standing. It is something which was recommended I would say six or eight months ago, and it is a culmination of a long series of actions which had nothing to do with this Conference.

Mr. Yon: That is correct as we understand it, but the world believes that Mr. Choy was removed by his superiors because he spoke out forthright. The unfortunate thing is that the differences of these two men and all that they are alleged to have said to each other appeared in the newspapers with the result that the public now regards the whole police situation as hopeless and disgraceful. When Military Government is criticized, we feel that we hear the same criticism, and when it is praised we are happy about it. Since there are mutual accusations among police officials of having received bribes, etc., what must the opinion of the public be in regard to that arm of the government. Therefore, when we first met, I said a man like Dr. Chough should voluntarily resign from his position if he knew what was good for him and if he wished to be used in the future. The papers now have taken over the discussion of the whole affairs, and it is reported that Dr. Chough has three Americans who will vindicate his case. Therefore the public is saying, "Why in the world three Americans. Why not put some Koreans in there. Put the press in there. Don't cover up a thing like that." My criticism is not that a man like Dr. Chough is used in Military Government, but that when a man is used, everything should be known about him and his position should be clear. The belief in the police has deteriorated. For illustration, take our Coalition Committee. We met yesterday in preparation for a meeting tomorrow of the forty-five selected for the legislative assembly, and it was stated that we would probably need police guards. The whole feeling was that we can't believe in the police and were afraid to call on them. If we as a Coalition Committee are unable to tell the public that we want the police to protect us, what sort of situation do we find ourselves in?

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Dr. Kimm: On the question of the change in the police staff, I think members of this Conference as well as those in responsible positions in Military Government and particularly in the police force realize that this is now a very criticial moment. This being the case, words spoken or opinions expressed in this Conference as well as actions taken through the efforts and recommendations made by this Conference portend a great deal of meaning. I am in full agreement with what General Brown and General Helmick have said that it is to be regretted that the public so judge since they judge wrongly, but that does not stop those in responsible positions from misleading the public. We have a saying in Korea that "If the crow flies over the tree, the rear ends." We have been informed through the goodness of General Helmick this matter concerning Mr. Choy was of some seven or eight months standing, but I think both Dr. Clough as well as Military Government should have considered what the public might think of this dismissal coming at this moment. As a matter of policy or as a tactful way of doing things, the dismissal of Mr. Choy could have been left in abeyance for at least a few days until after the adjournment of this Conference. In the first place, I personally feel somewhat indirectly responsible for Mr. Choy's dismissal because when I heard that Mr. Choy had something to report on the matter that might give some light to the Conference, I requested the Chairman to have him called in. I took that step with all good intentions without knowing what there was actually between Dr. Clough and Mr. Choy or in the police force itself. Furthermore, in my faithful belief in the integrity of Dr. Clough as well as the good intentions of Military Government in all its departmental affairs, I did say to Mr. Choy that his appearing at the Conference would not affect him personally in any way. I might have said more than I should have said, but believed that according to the general way of doing things in democratic institutions, his appearance at the Conference would not bring any personal consequences to Mr. Choy. Since the public does not know

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what is going on in the Police Department and then hears that Choy appeared at this Conference to testify and a few days later is dismissed by Dr. Chough, it comes to one conclusion. We cannot blame the public very much for that. On the other hand, the recommendation that we already made to General Hodge has not yet been acted upon, or if it has been acted upon, it has not been announced to the public. If the public is misinformed, I think it would be well for us to devise ways and means of informing the public properly on this particular question. As things are now, the public only sees a pear dropping as a crow flies over the tree.

Gen. Helmick: I regret that I did not have sufficient acumen to realize that the dismissal of Detective Choy would have this interpretation. When I took over my office in the temporary absence of General Lerch, the personnel of the Police Department was explained and set out to me. At that time it was reported to me that the Chief of Detectives and Dr. Chough had a long history of differences and that in the opinion of the American officer at the head of the police, Dr. Choy should be let go because he was not loyal to Dr. Chough nor in carrying out the policies of the Police Department. The officer who was in charge of the police before Colonel Maglin told me that he had felt that Mr. Choy should have been released many months ago, that he so recommended it, but that it was desired to keep him on in order to see if he could not do his duty--give him another chance. This was sometime before the police appeared before this Conference. The actions of Mr. Choy extending that far is the reason for his discharge. Since his appearing before the Conference, he did a number of things which were not in accord with police policies or discipline. It was a culmination extending from many months before his appearance before the Conference which caused his dismissal.

Chairman: I would like to interpose a comment here. The Conference has now been in session for about 84 hours. Approximately 75 of those were given to discussing the police question. The Chairman has a witness waiting outside, Mr. Lee, Sang Taik, who is to come in at three

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o'clock. We are going to talk about the rice distribution program. Tomorrow will be the last meeting of this Conference. Tomorrow the Chairman has asked Mr. Allan Loren to come before the Conference to discuss wages, prices and inflation. The Chairman asks for the mercy of the Conference and that he be permitted to proceed.

Mr. Yon: Mr. Lee was not able to come today.

Mr. Kim: In spite of the fact that we must hurry through all these things I would like to make one more remark especially since I understand that tomorrow will be the last day of this Conference. This Conference was set for the purpose of looking into the causes of the recent and present disturbances in South Korea and to make recommendations for the solution of some of the problems. The question of this Conference carrying on its own independent investigation was ruled out, and the only investigation we have done was mainly hearing representatives from the military government side--Koreans and Americans--telling how well they are doing their work. If our work in the future is carried on in such a way and in such a spirit, I am afraid even the new legislature which is opening in a few days will also be able to do very little. Although this is not the place to make such a remark, ever in the setting up of this legislature we have not been able to exactly coordinate our work. I am sure of one thing--if we had coordinated our efforts more faithfully, we would have had a still better legislature opening in a few days. I would suggest that either General Helmick in his weekly press conference or General Brown, speaking for this Conference, make it known to the public that the dismissal of Mr. Choy had nothing to do with his appearance at this Conference. That is the least we can do--to inform the public properly.

Gen. Helmick: That point was brought up at the press conference last Thursday, and it was pointed out there was no connection between the two. Colonel Maglin was brought in to state the general reasons for his dismissal.

Mr. Won: The public is saying that the man who talks frankly is kicked out. They say that Mr. Choy was not only dismissed for talking frankly,

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but arrested a few days after his dismissal. In the past history of Korea, many were similarly arrested after having talked frankly. Because of that experience, the public is concerned over the future under such conditions. For the information of General Helmick and the Civil Administrator, I am bringing this up as public opinion.

Chairman: The Chairman would like to reply briefly to Dr. Kimm who has seemed to criticize the Chairman and Conference of which he is Co-Chairman. The Chairman would like to remind Dr. Kimm of a fact well known to him; namely, that the Chairman on many occasions asked members of this Conference to give him a list of witnesses whom they desired to appear before the Conference, and that the Chairman summoned before this Conference all the witnesses requested by Koreans as well as Americans, save the last witness so summoned, Mr. Lee, and Paik, who was summoned at the request of one of our Korean friends, and failed to appear before the Conference.

The witness, Mr. Lee, Tong Je was called in before the Conference, and the Chairman proceeded to question him.

Chairman: Would you please inform the Conference of your name and the capacity which you now perform.

Mr. Rhee: Mr. Lee, Tong Je, Director in charge of the Korea Commodity Company.

Chairman: What are the duties of the Korea Commodity Company with reference to the rice collection and distribution program?

Mr. Lee: It is an organization for the control of food products.

Chairman: What does your organization do with reference to controllin the rice?

Mr. Lee: According to an official ordinance of Military Government, the free buying and selling of rice is forbidden. Therefore, under government order, rice is brought to our company and it is distributed.

Chairman: How does your company get the rice which it distributes?

Mr. Lee: Each year the total amount of that which is to be collected is estimated. That total is allotted to the various provinces. Each province further divides it into each gun. When the total allotment is made, then an allotment is made for each province.

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Dr. Kimm: What is the exact relationship of this company of which Mr. Ree is managing director? Is it a company organized by Military Government or organized under the supervision of Military Government, or what?

Mr. Ree: This organization was in existence during the time of the Japanese Governor General, and when the Americans came in, they took over the organization as it was a government agency.

Chairman: Does your company supervise the allotments that are made by the provinces?

Dr. Johnson: I suggest for clarity that the word "quota" rather than "allotment" be used.

Mr. Ree: The quota is determined by the National Food Administration. The handling of this quota is the province of our company.

Chairman: In what way does your company handle that quota?

Mr. Ree: This is a supplementary remark. The general quota is determined by National Food Administration, but we also in our office may to a certain degree control that quota through the agencies which are established in the provinces and guns.

Chairman: To what degree do you control the quota?

Mr. Ree: The quota of the provincial office in the guns is not within our sphere. Our connection is with the province governor only.

Chairman: Do you have any responsibility for supervising collection of grain?

Mr. Ree: We do not have any direct responsibility of supervision, but that is delegated to the agricultural association which collects the grain and our representatives go and pay for it. Ours is a forwarding responsibility--transportation.

Chairman: When does your organization take over the grain?

Mr. Ree: It starts in October. A date is decided upon between our company and the provincial office as a matter of convenience, and at the agreed upon time, our representatives go and receive it.

Chairman: Where do you receive the grain?

Mr. Ree: The gun determines the collection point in the myun, and our representatives go to the collection point and receive the grain.

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Chairman: What do you do with it after receiving it?

Mr. Ree: In each collection point, there are warehouses. It is put in them.

Chairman: What maintains the records of the amount of grain stored in the warehouses?

Mr. Kee: The record of that is kept by our office. This is a qualifying remark. During this summer by mutual agreement, part of the grain to be collected was alloted for collection to the agricultural association. Therefore, there are two agencies receiving the grain and the records of it. The discrepancy during the summer of disbursement of grain is due to the dual relationship whereby there are warehouses under this grain control company for which an order is necessary before disbursement is made--a portion is also kept in the warehouses of the agricultural association the chairman of that association may write the order for the grains to be disbursed, and it is there that the difference in the amount of grains as recorded appears. The chairman of the agricultural association is the kunsoo and governor of the province. Therefore, they under their authority are allotted to disburse grain.

Mr. Johnson: The agricultural association has a very precise meaning. If I may say so, I think this is the agricultural branch of the provincial governor not the agricultural association. It is the agricultural branch of the provincial government.

Chairman: Do you have any statistics which will show how much summer grain came under the control of your company?

Mr. Ree: I have brought them here. As of November 30th, 615,175 suk--47.73% of the national quota.

Chairman: Do you know how much in addition to that was controlled by the agricultural sections of the provincial government.

Mr. Ree: We do not know. There were no figures given to us.

Chairman: I think it was testified before this Conference that there was 615,000 suk of summer grain collected all together. Now that would indicate that only 2% was controlled by the provinces. That could hardly be correct.

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Mr. Ree: In regard to the fall collection this would be true. The provinces also make a quota of their own above the national one.

Chairman: Does the company control the entire national quota?

Mr. Ree: Yes, sir, all of it.

Dr. Johnson: I think the said regulations were made by the agricultural company, and the Korea Commodity Company will control the larger proportion, practically all.

Chairman: It isn't a question of larger. Mr. Hill of National Food Administration gave us a figure of 62[illegible],104 suk as of November 4, 1946 summer grain collected.

Mr. Ree: That report is only which we may money for and buy and have control of--receive.

Chairman: The difference is only 13,000 suk which according to Dr. Johnson would probably be seed grain.

Mr. Johnson: It isn't enough for seed.

Dr. Bunce: In collecting the summer grains, would the agricultural departments of the provincial government collect summer grain which they themselves distributed within the provinces for their own use?

Mr. Ree: As far as that goes, I do not have definite information myself, but there was a report which we received from Chung Chong Pukto that grain which was collected for national purposes was stored in the agricultural association warehouse over which we do not have jurisdiction. It was sold at a price ¥10 under the national figure. We received that report, and verbally we have heard that there was a similar instance in Kyongsang Pando.

Chairman: That raises the question is there any way of collecting up the exact quota of rice to be collected in provinces as determined by National Food Administration together with the quota of each gun in that particular province.

Mr. Ree: Unless there is centralization of control which was broken up last Spring in the initial stage due to inflation and decentralization, the whole program will meet with difficulties.

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Chairman: In your opinion then there was no centralized control of quota assignments for summer grain collection?

Mr. Ree: There was central quotas, but the collection of that was rendered difficulty for the following reasons: They did not follow according to our central instructions, claiming provincial circumstances. Therefore they did not meet the quotas as assigned to them.

Chairman: What do you do with the grain which comes under your control?

Mr. Ree: The quota is made for each province. Take, for example, a province like Kangwon Do. More grain must come in than is collected. Therefore the quotas are made from other provinces.

Chairman: Your company then ships grain in accordance with quotas given you by National Food Administration?

Mr. Ree: According to the directions of the Food Administration.

Chairman: Where do you keep your grain prior to shipment?

Mr. Ree: We put it in our own administration warehouses and also in the warehouses of the agricultural guild groups.

Chairman: Is your company responsible for the shipment of that grain to the final destination in each province?

Mr. Ree: The general responsibility rests with our company. However, without the cooperation of local transportation agencies, we are in difficulty.

Chairman: When does your company lose control of the grain?

Mr. Ree: When the grain is delivered to the local centers for distribution, the associations, guilds and stores where it is bought by the people, then our responsibility ends.

Chairman: Do you have the responsibility for supplying Seoul with grain?

Mr. Ree: Even during the Japanese times, it involved the transaction of a three or four million yen subsidy. To that amount they were unable to carry forward, so the company maintains direct control of the rationing in Seoul.

Chairman: How much grain did your company ship into Seoul between April 1st and November 1st of this year?

Mr. Ree: The rationing of Seoul is under the direction of the provincial

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branch of our office so those figures are there and I do not have them with me. I have figures for the whole of South Korea.

Mr. Johnson: Do you mean the Provincial Food Service?

Mr. Kee: Yes.

Chairman: What is the quota assigned to your company for collection of rice under the present program?

Mr. Kee: The figure is 4,358,000 suk.

Chairman: Will there be rice in addition to this collected by the provinces?

Mr. Kee: There must be considerable. For instance in Kangwon Do, our quota is 60,000 suk, and we heard that they had a collection of 100,000 suk. When I went down to Kangwon Do province, the governor explained that the announcement of the 60,000 program would be a burden upon the province and that it would be better if the announcement were not made.

Mr. Johnson: On that point, the quota is a fixed amount--a minimum amount. There is no reason why more grain cannot be sold at legal price. In Kangwon Do the governor takes pride in that he not only collects the quota but voluntarily collects more than quota. He expects to collect 180 of the amount. That shouldn't be construed as a double quota system. It merely means that farmers have responded patriotically and brought in more.

Dr. Bunce: Is it because in that province, we do not have a large amount of people buying grain at black market prices? In other words do they have control of the black market in that province.

Mr. Kee: Rather than that, I feel that because Kangwon Do needs more than they produce themselves, it must be brought in so they feel a patriotic responsibility togo over the top with their quota.

Mr. Won: Is your company a company for profit or non-profit.

Mr. Kee: Definitely a non-profit organization.

Mr. Won: How much profit then do you realize?

Mr. Kee: We have no profit. Our expenses are met by the government.

Mr. Won: Do you people receive a bonus?

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Mr. Ree: That is forbidden by the government. Therefore, there is no such thing.

Mr. Hon: Do you receive travelling expenses?

Mr. Ree: The travelling expenses are determined by Military Government. ecause of the present situation, a certain plan was formulated to send a group out to help in the collection. Assistance is received for this.

Mr. Hon: hat is the total number of employees in your company?

Mr. Ree: In general, there are about 4,000. Because of the bringing in of extra persons in the Fall collection, it is difficult to say what the exact figure is. The difficulty in making a definite reply is that we are short in personnel. One man in harvest time must take three or four places. In order to expedite the work, temporary employees are used in certain places.

Mr. Hon: Are you concerned with grains coming from abroad?

Mr. Ree: Only that which concerns food. e are not concerned with any other things. Both domestic and foreign foods are handled by our company.

Mr. Hon: Then, how much came in from abroad up to the end of November?

Mr. Ree: I can't answer that right now.

Mr. Hon: You said a while ago, that there was extra collection over and above the quota from the various provinces. Who does that and how much is it?

Mr. Ree: Our plan concerns only the quota as set up by Food Administration and we have no cognizance of anything over and above that.

Mr. Hon: You misunderstand what I am saying. You say there is the quota from the central organization and Food Administration and then there is an extra quota made by the provinces. What handles that extra quota and where does it go?

Mr. Ree: If you want to know about that, you must inquire from the Food Administration since it is not our responsibility.

Chairman: I have asked Mr. Fill and Dr. Chee to come back to the Conference at 3:30 today in order to get the answer to that question.

Mr. Hon: Since you said the grain is stored in the national warehouses and I think agricultural warehouses, how much do you receive as rental on these warehouses?

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Mr. Ree: There is a lot of trouble and bother about this whole matter. We are receiving in the national warehouses ¥1.50 per suk per fortnight; ¥3.00 a month. The agricultural people are demanding more, and that is where our trouble is. We have a fee for loading in the warehouse--¥2 per suk, but the agricultural people are insisting that they have to get ¥5.17 per suk for that service--cartage to the storage.

Mr. Hon: When you have stored this grain in warehouses, is the amount stored the same as taken out or is there an allowance for that consumed by rats and other rodents?

Mr. Ree: The responsibility is borne by the warehouse people. We have refused, however, to take out fire insurance on this as it would run into several million yen a year, and even if there are a few fires, it would not run into that amount. We have therefore refused fire insurance.

Mr. Hon: You have said that that which goes into the agricultural groups warehouses is outside of your responsibility. What am I to assume when the National Food Administration people come here? Are they going to answer as you that claim?

Mr. Ree: The fact is the report is made to us and National Food Administration, and I can say nothing further than reports which I receive.

Mr. Hon: You receive the unhulled rice and give it out as polished rice. Please give us some statement as to how much you pay for the milling of the rice.

Mr. Ree: During the Japanese administration, they had about 500 places designated as milling centers. The present plan is that a certain number have been designated as official agencies for milling, and then there are a lot of individual ones. The contention now lies between these two types of milling agencies.

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Mr. Kon: If it is said that there is any discrepancy or malfeasance in the whole rice situation, I would say that it is probably in this rice milling--polishing situation.

Mr. Kee: This is a very difficult operation - the whole business. There are inspectors sent from our office and from the other places.

Mr. Won: Since you recognize and we all recognize the difficulty of this situation, we will stop with that interrogation because it leads to further things which we are not discussing today.

Mr. Kee: If you will present me with any items which you want investigated I will be happy to make such investigation.

Mr. Won: Remember that when the rice is fresh, you have the straw which is made into bags. That also is a source of income - this is something that you as Director know. The rice milling people all the time are saying that the rice is very poor and it is very lacking, and make that sort of excuse.

Mr. Kee: There is a great deficiency and cry for the straw sacks and rope that we don't have to stock up what comes from America. The inspection of milling is under the Military Government and there should be inspectors who go out. Because they have not performed their duty sufficiently we have on our own instigated so far as possible vigorous inspection.

Dr. Kimm: It is alleged that the provincial authorities may allot in that province more rice for the provincial quota than actually determined by the National Food Administration, and it is the general allegation that the scale goes downward while the quota goes upward. That is, if the National Food Administration gives the quota of 30 suk in one province, the provincial authorities increase that to 60 suk, down in the gun it is increased to 90 and in the myun increased to 180, etc. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. Kee: I do not know other than the experience in Kangwon-do.

Mr. Won: Is there no fee for inspection?

Mr. Kee: That is done directly by the Military Government. There is no fee for that.

Mr. Won: How much rice will there be from one suk of raw rice?

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Mr. Ree: We figure that in order to get one suk of polished rice we must have 3.7 kamani of raw rice.

Mr. Won: Do you, therefore, put the responsibility on the miller and say "give us one suk of polished rice for each 3.7 kamani of unhulled rice."

Mr. Ree: We do not give it with rice, but in money.

Mr. Won: According to your experience when they mill this, is there more or less suk out of 3.7 kamani?

Mr. Ree: There is a variation there.

Mr. Won: Therefore, when you inspect, what do you inspect? If it does not come up to standards, what do you do?

Mr. Ree: That is not our responsibility. That is the responsibility of the province.

Dr. Kimm: What do you mean by saying you pay out money? Do you give out 3.7 kamani unhulled rice in money value?

Mr. Ree: There is a price for milling of about ¥23 per kamani. That is what I am talking about. There is a contention about that price - a great deal of trouble over that.

Mr. Won: In regard to the prevalent practice during the Japanese time, the milling process goes through seven times - that is turning over the unhulled rice seven times. Thus it increases the amount of hulled rice. If we should go beyond that number anywhere around nine or ten times the amount of polished rice would be much less. How about that? Are you going to have a seven times turn-over or a nine and ten times turn-over? There is a big difference.

Mr. Ree: Make an inquiry from the Food Administration in regard to that.

Mr. Won: As Mr. Ahn said the other day, our desire is to produce as much rice as possible from any given amount of unhulled rice, that in advocating that procedure it would be desirable to forbid the private milling places and put it all in the big ones in order that a better result might be obtained. Our whole idea is to produce more rice for the people of Korea. Since this whole question would involve a long discussion, I am only going to make one inquiry. Of course this may not be so, but I have heard that there is this sort of thing going on.

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This may be rumor, but what I have heard is reports that at some places you give your grain and take your money later. In regard to the summer grain collection, this was weighed and after the transportation and the warehouse charges were taken out it looked as though they have to pay something rather than to receive something. Is that so? Do you know how many warehouses are under the jurisdiction of the Agricultural Section and how many employees they have?

Mr. Ree: I do not know. If it is collected by the Agricultural Association they pay those charges and the Korean Commodities Company pays them. There are two methods of payment. That received from the tenant farmers is paid for directly at the collection point. In regard to landlords and certain big tenants who have larger amounts the payment is made through the Agricultural Bank - the Financial Corporation. There is a great deal of trouble over inflation because there is so much they try to get those people to take a certain amount in money and take the balance in credit in the bank, but in order to beat this there would appear to be those who use the names of tenants in order to get the money.

Mr. Yon: Since you have said that your company is responsible for the rationing in Seoul, how many people are there to be fed in Seoul?

Mr. Ree: In general I would say 1,260,000. That isn't a definite figure but it is around that.

Mr. Yon: What was the ration of yesterday and the day before - that is, recently?

Mr. Ree: The provincial office has rationing in Seoul so I cannot speak definitely on that.

Dr. Kim: Does that 1,260,000 include all those that are being rationed at the present time or does it mean that that is the present population of the city of Seoul?

Mr. Ree: Our relation is only to those who receive rations in Seoul; therefore, any figures over and above that we don't know.

Dr. Kim: 1,260,000 means those now actually being rationed?

Mr. Ree: Yes.

(Mr. Hill and Mr. Chee of the National Food Administration were again presented as witnesses)

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Chairman: Mr. Hill, Mr. Ree in his testimony said that the quota assigned to the various provinces for the summer grain collection program and the rice collection program is assigned by the National Food Administration. Is that correct?

Mr. Hill: Yes.

Chairman: He further stated that the Korean Commodity Company of which he is head is responsible for collecting and storing that grain. Is that correct?

Mr. Hill: The Korean Commodity Company does pick up the rice at the collection points, warehouses it and distributes it in accordance with directions received from the National Food Administration and also the provincial government.

Chairman: Mr. Ree gave us figures for the national collection for summer grain which approximate the figures given by you the other day. He further gave us figures for the collection of rice in the fall program which are similar to the figures given by you the other day. But he states that in addition to these quotas, provincial governors place additional quotas for collection in their provinces. Is that correct?

Mr. Ree: May I interrupt to say that I reported for Kangwan-do. I do not know for the others.

Mr. Hill: I have to answer yes, that is true. There is one province where we know that that happened, but of the other provinces we do not have specific knowledge.

Chairman: Do you know to what extent provincial governors are authorized to raise the quota set by the National Food Administration?

Mr. Hill: The provincial governors are responsible for the collection and distribution of food in their provinces, and I suppose under that responsibility in their own minds they determine that it is to the best interests to adjust upward their assigned quotas.

Chairman: Does this authority to increase the quotas extend below the governor to the myun or gun head or other agencies?

Mr. Hill: No.

Chairman: Who then determines the quota that each individual farmer has to pay?

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Mr. Hill: The farmers in a meeting with village heads decide among themselves what each individual farmer's quota should be - they decide among themselves the quota that is assigned to them from authorities above.

Chairman: But some of those quotas may be considerable in excess of the quotas fixed by the National Food Administration. Is that correct?

Mr. Hill: That might be so.

Chairman: Does the National Food Administration have any information as to what extent that is true for the summer grain program?

Mr. Hill: I can only recall information concerning the province of Kangwan-do where that was done.

Chairman: Does the National Food Administration have any information as to what extent that is true for the fall rice collection program?

Mr. Hill: Yes. All the provinces except Kangwan-do have either assigned quotas equivalent to the over-all total assigned in the province by the National Food Administration or an amount somewhat less than the assigned over-all total.

Chairman: You stated the other day that the National Food quota assigned was 4,300,000 suk. Is that correct?

Mr. Hill: 4,358,000 suk.

Chairman: What is the total quota which has been assigned by all provincial governors or others within South Korea?

Mr. Hill: I do not have that figure with me and I would not be able to give an accurate figure.

Chairman: Should it be a material increase over the 4,358,000 suk?

Mr. Hill: On the contrary, it would be a decrease.

Chairman: Why would it be a decrease?

Mr. Hill: Because some of the provinces did not assign their full quotas.

Chairman: Why was that?

Mr. Hill: That was due to administration difficulties in relaying the information and the anticipated action on the part of certain officials prior to receiving the official quotas. Certain provinces tried to jump the gun and tried to make their quotas in accordance with what they thought was right. They assigned those figures before the official

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figures came through, and these figures in some cases were larger but they decided it would be unwise to make any change in those quotas assigned down to the myun and gun.

Dr. Johnson: I have a statement here under date of December 5th from the governor of Kangwan-do, and it states that this province has collected to date approximately 180 percent of its quota. I had been under the misapprehension that quotas were assigned and persuasion was not used to convince farmers to give more than their quota, and therefore though the collection exceeded the quota there was no imposition or any larger quota other than that assigned. Am I wrong?

Mr. Hill: Yes. This should be kept within this room because those who administer the program in Kangwan-do have of themselves decided that they were within their own right as to their best interests to take the quota assigned by us and up it to what they thought was the proper amount to turn in. They did it in a quiet way - just assigned larger quotas to guns. It is to their interest, I believe, to do that.

Dr. Bunce: I would like to ask Mr. Ree two questions and then ask Mr. Hill if he has any comments on them. What does Mr. Ree think is the most difficult problem they face in handling this grain collection program this fall?

Mr. Ree: To answer that briefly I would say that the central organization must show more power, more authority, and the individuals who are delegated to carry out the program must have greater authority, - the district officers.

Dr. Bunce: Have you had any special problems, for instance - in transportation and in moving grain, etc.?

Mr. Ree: There are many difficulties inherent in a program of this size which might be mentioned, but since we are receiving the fine cooperation of all concerned there is nothing specific I want to mention now.

Dr. Bunce: What do you think of our chances of succeeding in collecting this grain this year?

Mr. Ree: In conference this morning with our people from long standing experience the general concensus was that it will be successful to a degree of 80 percent.

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Mr. Hill: I might comment on his answer to the first question. There has been considerable feeling on the part of the Korea Commodity Company that they do not have the national control that they feel the job requires. The authority has been delegated to the provincial governors. They are primarily responsible for the collection and distribution of food in their provinces. Where the difficulty comes in is the request for shipments of grain from surplus provinces for deficit areas. As their own agency does not have authority, they feel handicapped. Actually, this responsibility rests with the National Food Administration, and any violation or failure of the provincial governor to provide is a matter between Military Government and their own office. The Korea Commodity Company is the operating arm of Military Government in handling any transportation of grain to and from surplus areas to deficit areas. If I were to point out the single difficulty that the Korea Commodity Company is faced with in the collection and distribution of rice under our current program, it would be the matter of transportation. I refer primarily to the transportation of grain from the collection point to the warehouses and from the warehouses to the railroad, and to a lesser extent railroad shipments. As to the second question, inside this room, we feel that under present conditions with the difficulties we are faced with, we ought to collect between 75 and 80 percent of our quota. Of course we hope to achieve the entire quota, but for calculations of our present food situation and preparing ourselves for the future we feel that something in the neighborhood of 75 or 80 percent should be the assumption for collection.

Dr. Johnson:
Chairman: Is the Food Administrator prepared to say how many suk has been collected to this day?

Chairman: The Chairman has a report handed him by Mr. Hill as of December 7th. The total quota is 4,358,000 suk, collected is 1,251,398, percent collected - 28.71. In Kangwan-do - 130.14 percent collected, and in Cholla-Pukto - 5.45 percent collected. The other provinces are between these extremes. (This report is attached hereto as Exhibit 30.)

Mr. Won: I have received a great deal of information from what Mr. Ree has said. We have heard a report here, Mr. Hill, that the farmers who store their grains in the Agricultural warehouses dispose of that grain at their own pleasure. What about that?

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Mr. Hill: I do not quite understand the question.

Mr. Ree: In Chungchong-Pukto where the grain is stored in the warehouses of the Agricultural Association - it is given out under the authority of the governor and the president of the guild. It is not reported to the central office.

Mr. Hill: I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. Won: I would like to ask Mr. Ree a question. The report you presented was that 615,175 suk was collected. How much did you distribute?

Mr. Ree: I haven't the figures with me here. I will bring them tomorrow if you desire.

Mr. Won: The reason for asking this question was because we heard the other day that there was a certain amount of grain collected in the summer collection and not reported to the central food administration. I have said this before and repeat it again that in Korea the provinces must not be mistaken by our American friends for states - as being synonymous with the states of the United States. If you regard this little country of Korea as being comparable to America, you will run into a lot of difficulties. In the presence of these food administrators, I would like to present a question. How much grain has been set aside for the manufacture of alcoholic beverages? Is there a quota for that?

Mr. Hill: There is no quota for that.

Mr. Won: If so, since there is no quota for the manufacture of alcoholic beverages and at present it is being manufactured, where does that come from? I am asking that because you gentlemen are here who can answer that. How much grain was used in Japanese times for the manufacture of liquor?

Mr. Chee: The lowest was 300,000 suk.

Mr. Won: There was a time when there was a million suk - not only rice but all grains. I bring this out for the refernce of the Chairman and the Military Governor and the Civil Administrator. I bring this out because of the fact that in the difficult times of Japanese administration when they were stringent on the rice program, it was recognized that from 300,000 to one million suk of grain went into this liquor program. Since

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the manufacture of alcoholic beverages is forbidden by Military Government and the grain program - the collection program - is under difficulties, how is it that this is ignored and allowed to continue? I believe that severe penalties should be made for breaking of this law. That is one hope that I have.

Dr. Kimm: Have you any means of checking or do you intend to check up actual quotas assigned by the National Food Administration and those by the provinces and guns and myuns, etc. The reason I ask this is because there is a belief among the Korean public, or rather reports coming from the provinces, that the actual quota assigned by the National Food Administration is increased by the provincial governor or provincial authorities, and then that is again increased by the gun authorities, so that the increase actually goes up something like this: 30, 60, 90, 180, etc. That is why the people are crying that they are dissatisfied - that there is something wrong somewhere.

Mr. Hill: In anticipation of that, each provincial governor was instructed to have certain persons designated to do that particular duty. The Military Governor was asked to send the assigned officer to tour his particular province to look for this particular thing and report back to him as to whether or not there was any discrepancy in regard to his assignment of quotas, unfair quotas, etc. The Korean Governor was asked to do the same thing and assign the number of people he thought necessary to make sure that the quotas assigned to the farmers were fair and in accordance with instructions issued by the provincial governor. We have only a few reports on those check-ups and they do not indicate anything very wrong. Of course, there were some cases of local jealousy or local maladministration where some farmers were assigned unfair quotas. Those cases are supposed to be dealt with immediately.

A witness was presented to the Conference, and his testimony follows:

Chairman: Give your name and residence.

A. Han, In Suk. I live in Nak Dong Myun, Sangchu Gun, in KyongsangPukto.

Chairman: What is your business?

A. I am a farmer.

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Chairman: Give the Conference such information as you have come to give us.

A. I am very much embarrassed to be giving evidence at such an illustrious gathering, but on the other hand it is an honor. I want to give an example of what happened in my village in regard to the collection of rice. There were 769 suk of polished rice as the assigned quota for the village. There was an order to investigate from the gun to the myun, and a lot of people went out to investigate. The total of polished rice was found to be 925.4. There were 21 suk of other grains, such as beans, etc. Therefore, taking this quota of 769 there was a balance of 177.4 left. There is a population of 104,000 there. That is the food for these people until next spring. Dividing that among the population results in 1.7 mal. There was an order from Military Government to give six mal for each person for that period. Therefore the deficiency for our village population will be 425 suk. But the myun insisted that unless we pay 769 suk it won't do. We went in three or four times to petition to the Military Government and the gun. The reply was that "you are just agitators, you fellows - you have to give as we have requested, otherwise we will arrest you." With such an instruction or order the people cannot live. What are we to do about it? I went around collecting a petition. The farmers being ignorant people can't represent their cause, and when they try to they just get frightened. So, from the gun they said they were going to arrest the agitators and kill them off. I don't know whether you gentlemen in the central office would consider so small a case as ours, but I came with the purpose of presenting this for your consideration. There was a similar instruction like this in the Japanese time and the Japanese said we had to pay and we could eat the bark of trees or anything. With that demand what we couldn't pay we had to cover up on our figures and misrepresent the thing. So, for saying what was not was ours and for falsifying figures all that we had was taken from us. The population through starvation became swollen. When the time of liberation came the people were overjoyed. It is not more than a year. Therefore, in regard to collection this time our feelings are greatly disturbed. The police came out and took

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the young men and the young women and bound their hands together and led them around the villages. Therefore, the people are afraid that in the fall collection the same process will be repeated. If you gentlemen here in the central office are unable to help us our village is in a hopeless plight.

Dr. Kimm: What is the name of the kunsoon?

A. Pak, Chung Hyung. Lee, Chong Ha is the Chief of the Agricultural Section and Han, Pil Chan is the Director.

Chairman: The Conference appreciates what you have told us. The matter will be investigated and if the facts are found as reported proper action will be taken. Please leave the papers with us. (The petition was left with the Chairman, and is attached hereto as Exhibit 31) Witness left.

Mr. Lyuh: A while ago you said if you had more authority you could carry on your work better. What do you mean?

Mr. Ree: Rather than to ask for authority for our company, we are asking for greater authority in the districts where they are collecting the rice in order that they may carry forward their duties - a greater centralization.

Mr. Lyuh: Since we have heard the evidence of this individual, apparently the local people have a terrific amount of authority. What do you mean by more authority?

Mr. Ree: There may be some cases such as this, but if you compare the collections with that of Japanese times there is a great decrease over that.

Mr. Lyuh: To say that they are unable to collect such a greater small allotment than in the Japanese times does not make sense.

Mr. Won: In that district there are 103 chumbo of land. In general you get 20 suk out of one chumbo of rice, and there should be 2,000 suk of rice. There are ten chumbo of fields. There should be 100 suk there... This man reported that he was to submit polished rice - that leaves a question.

Dr. Kimm: I think the discrepancy in this man's report can be assigned

to Mr. Kang, Shoon who has introduced this man to find out exactly whether that 769 suk was polished rice and if so how it was that they

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were asked to produce that much polished rice when they usually ask for unpolished rice.

Chairman asked that Mr. Kang make this report.

The meeting adjourned at 1710 hours, to be reconvened at 1330 hours on 10 December 1946.

(NOTE: Exhibit 31 attached to original only.)

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STATUS OF RICE COLLECTION PROGRAM
AS OF 7 Dec 1946

PROVINCE	QUOTA	COLLECTED	PERCENT OF QUOTA
Chungchong Namdo	470,000	229,657	48.9
Chungchong Pukto	180,000	101,753	56.52
Cholla Pukto	798,000	43,550	5.45
Cholla Namdo	750,000	97,000	12.93
Kyongsang Pukto	720,000	220,759	30.66
Kyongsang Namdo	600,000	169,872	28.31
Kyongi Do	775,000	310,723	40.09
Kangwon-Do	60,000	79,086	130.14
Cheju-Do	5,000	No report	
Total	4,358,000	1,251,398	28.71

NFA
7 Dec 46

EXHIBIT 30.

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Gen Brown's Copy

MINUTES
OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING
OF THE JOINT KOREAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
HELD AT THE DUK SOO PALACE
AT 1330, 10 DECEMBER 1946

PRESENT

AMERICAN MEMBERS

Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown (Chairman)
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling
Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick
Dr. E. A. J. Johnson
Dr. A. C. Dunce

Absent: Maj. Gen. A. L. Lerch

Interpreters: Dr. Henry Appenzeller
Mr. Cho, Teuk Kyung

KOREAN MEMBERS

Hon, Seh Hoon
Choi, Tong O
Pahk, Keun Oong
Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
Kang, Shoon
Ahn, Chai Hong
Kim, Poong Choon
Lyuh, Woon Hong (substituting for Chang Kwon)

Absent: Lyuh, Woon Hyung
Chang, Kwon

The meeting came to order at 1330 hours.

General Weckerling acted as Acting Chairman for the first part of the meeting in the absence of the Chairman.

Mr. Johnson: I had hoped before the termination of this Conference we would be able to discuss the refugee problem, but since this is the last day it seems unlikely that we will. I would like to leave before the Conference a testimonial of refugees who have been housed in refugee camps. This is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "32".

Acting Chairman: I am sure every member of the Conference will welcome this confidential report. The Acting Chairman would like to introduce Mr. Allan Loren who is Fiscal Adviser to Military Government to give us a picture on wages, prices and inflation. Mr. Loren, this Conference is meeting to determine the causes of the recent disturbances in South Korea. It is not a court nor is it an investigative body to try to determine the guilt of any one individual. We would like to have you sit with us and give a general picture of wages, prices and inflation phases. I think all members of the Conference will agree that it would be best to give a broad picture and then to have questions from the various members of the Conference.

Mr. Loren: With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like first to read a brief summary which I have prepared of the situation with regard to wages, prices and inflation. (Permission was granted.)

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During August 1945 there was a sudden and violent inflation of prices. A short time after the arrival of the American forces there was a slight decline in some prices, but from December 1945 to date there has been an almost unbroken increase in commodity prices. Complete price and wage statistics are not available, but in Seoul it is estimated that the unweighted average of commodity prices as of the end of October 1946 were about 290 times prices for the same commodities in the pre-war year of 1937. If the importance of the commodities is taken into consideration, the cost of living has risen much less.

Wages have lagged behind commodity prices constantly and as of October 1946 were only about 110 times the 1937 level. Some wages have risen even less and are no more than 40 or 50 times the 1937 wages for similar work. This wide disparity between wages and prices is based on commodity prices in the free market. The official price for rice is only 76 times the 1937 price. Rice normally made up almost half of the cost of living of unskilled workers. Much of the hardship of wage-earners results from the fact that the Government has previously not been able to issue a living ration of rice at the official price. The official price for cloth is also reasonable in relation to wages, but insufficient quantitites of textiles have been available for distribution at controlled prices. When the wage-earner has to buy food, cloth and other necessities at free market prices, the cost is exhorbitant in relation to his wages. The Government recognizes this hardship. It also realizes that a general increase in wages would put more and more money in circulation and force prices higher, offering no solution to the workers problem. Accordingly, the Government instead of taking the popular but economically dangerous step of constantly raising wages in an attempt to catch up with prices, has made every effort to increase the supply of goods available at controlled prices. The most vital of all these measures is the rice collection program. If rice cannot be issued at fixed prices there is little hope of stabilizing prices and wages. In Korea there is a scarcity of rice and other basic commodities in relation to demand. There is not a sufficient supply of goods to go around. It would be quite impossible to raise wages and bring them in line with

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prices, because each wage raise would put more money in circulation and cause a further increase in prices.

Inflation is caused by an increase of money in relation to the supply of goods available for sale in the markets. One way to overcome the condition of inflation is to increase the supply of goods. This requires an increase in local production and an increase in importation of essential goods from abroad. At the same time the problem must be attacked from the other side by limiting the increase in purchasing power. The increase of money is caused primarily by the Government's deficit spending and by the expansion of bank credit.

During the first half of the current fiscal year the Government borrowed approximately 3,379,727,000 won from the Bank of Chosen to cover expenditures in excess of revenues. If present trends continue, borrowing during the last half of the fiscal year will be even greater. This deficit is caused by a number of reasons: Neither the Department of Transportation nor the Department of Communications is collecting enough revenue to cover its payroll alone. Prior to 1945 the operations of these government owned facilities resulted in considerable net profit to the Government. Their operation at a loss deprives the Government of a large source of revenue. Another big loss of revenue in relation to the increase in the price level is involved in the operation of the Monopoly Bureau, the Korean Government's largest source of net income. There are several reasons: The anti-social production of opium has been abolished; ginseng, formerly distributed by the Japanese Zaibatsu at a great profit, has been held as a source of future income while direct contacts between Korea and the Chinese market are being developed; and net profits of the salt and tobacco monopolies have not increased as much as the general rise in prices, because of the rise in costs of raw materials and labor.

In addition to the large income producing agencies of Transportation, Communications and the Monopoly Bureau, the only important source of income for the Government is taxation. Taxes are completely inadequate to support the Government. Income from taxation has constituted only 10,20 or 25 percent of the Government's income in the past. With the loss of net profits from the income-producing agencies, the tax revenues are not

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able to bear the burden of the administrative expenses of the Government.

All bank loans of 10,000 wun and over must be passed on by the government. The general policy is not to approve credit except for purposes essential to the Korean economy. Credit extended to essential activities may not always be economically used. The success of an operation cannot be assured simply by making funds available. If experienced personnel and equipment are not available also, very little benefit is derived from the expenditure of funds on an inefficient operation. The release of additional purchasing power merely causes greater inflation. Credit should be extended only when there is reasonable assurance of its efficient use.

To help solve the fiscal problems of the government and combat the growing inflation several steps have been taken or are contemplated.

A. Taxation.--Existing taxes have been revised by increasing the rates. However, these emergency changes add only millions of wun to the revenues when billions are required. The total tax income will not exceed 2 billion wun this fiscal year despite the upward revision of almost all tax rates. A complete reform of the tax structure is required and it is planned to introduce such a program before the beginning of the new fiscal year on 1 April. Taxes will have to be devised to provide the Korean Government with a continuing source of income.

B. Income from Government owned utilities and monopolies.--Tobacco and salt prices have been increased from time to time. Railway fares and postal rates have also been increased. Transportation, communication and monopoly prices are still below the price level of most commodities, and even below the level of wages. In my opinion, transportation and communication rates should be raised further until these activities at least cover operating costs and cease to be a drain on the public treasury.

C. Reduction in expenditures.--At the same time revenues are increased by every possible means, expenditures must be held down. The Korean people should not be burdened with a more costly governmental structure than they can afford. The number of government employees and the scope of governmental activities must stay within the bounds of available resources.

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A reduction in the Government's deficit spending and a limitation of bank credit will tend to hold down the rise in purchasing power. However, stability of the price level cannot be attained until there is a revival of industrial production. Finance is only one part of the problem of inflation. Increased production, restoration of foreign trade, wage adjustments, and, eventually, when the economy has regained its balance, a currency conversion, are other factors which are necessary for the establishment of a sound Korean economy.

Mr. Won: Is there any plan as to the reconversion of currency?

Dr. Kimm: A certain person of high authority recently told me that there is some sort of plan for a currency adjustment that is to be put into effect as soon as possible.

Mr. Loren: The conversion has long been considered by Military Government but it has not deemed it advisable to institute conversion until the price level is more stable than at the present time. Conversion cannot be put into effect with any result unless the program for reducing the deficit spending of the government and for balancing the economy and relation between prices and wages can be carried into a successful conclusion.

Mr. Won: We realize that inflation is caused by an over-abundance of currency and a scarcity of commodities. However, is it not true that the Bank of Chosen notes have been inflated to such a degree that no one knows how many there are. From what I understand, during the time of the Japanese occupation, the Bank of Chosen notes went up to from 80,000,000 to 100,000,000. Now I understand there is 12,000,000,000 in circulation.

Mr. Loren: The figures 80,000,000 to 100,000,000 must refer to pre-war years. During the war, the currency was greatly expanded under the Japanese. In July of 1945, there was about four and one half billion.

Mr. Won: That figure of twelve billion or whatever it is is a figure that cannot be relied upon. If you ask why, it is because when the Japs left, they spread out a lot of money which was unannounced. Then there is a lot of money which is counterfeit. I have heard that in one place there

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...ore piles of ¥100 notes lying like a hill. ...e do not know how ...many hundreds of yen are stored in the houses of people who have not put it on the market yet. I would not be surprised if it were close to a couple of billion. Is it not difficult therefore to say that the conditions are if you do not know how much money there is?

Mr. Lorenz: The amount of total Bank of Chosen notes outstanding is known. The Japanese in August and September in the days of confusion let out about three and one half or four billion yen and increased circulation to ...,000,000,000 at the end of September 1945. The rest in addition was both North and South of the 38th so there are two elements of uncertainty with respect to the total circulation in South Korea. One is the fact that no one knows how much currency that went North of the 38th has come into the South. The second factor is that it is known that notes have been counterfeited and that amount is uncertain and noone knows how much is in circulation today.

Mr. Jones: How much then are the bank deposits now?

Mr. Lorenz: The total bank deposit in Korea south of the 38th degree is now ...,000,000,000. Because of the delay in getting reports in from the branches in rural areas, this figure is the total only through August 31st.

Mr. Jones: There must be about five billion then if you subtract this probably circulating among the people.

Mr. Lorenz: The total Bank of Chosen notes outstanding as of last week was 14,300,000,000. That, of course, includes the amount outstanding in North Korea, in North China and elsewhere at the end of the war. We do not know how much of this is now in Korea.

(Mr. Johnson interposed with the statement that he thought "adding" was meant rather than "subtract".) The total purchasing power would include the amount of bank deposits which can be drawn against plus the bank notes outstanding with the exception of small amounts of cash on hand held in the tills of the bank. It is more logical to add than subtract. This is currency released by the Bank of Chosen. It does not count currency held by the bank in the hands of the public.

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Mr. Kim: Is it not possible to collect all the Bank of Chosen notes and replace them? Is there no such plan? Isn't there a need to issue some sort of ordinance whereby anything above ¥10,000 must be accounted for in cash for one individual to hold.

Mr. Loren: I think a law of that nature would not be possible to enforce unless at the same time you had a currency conversion that required the surrender of all notes to the bank. Otherwise people could conceal notes in excess of 1[illegible],000 and it would almost be impossible to enforce such a regulation.

Mr. Kim: [illegible]merica controls the financial destiny of the world now. Russia can't get along without American assistance, either can Europe or Korea. We must trust you completely to advise and help us in our financial destiny.

Mr. Loren: The success of any program for the reform of the currency and the price policies in Korea will depend upon the ability of the Korean people. and we are relying on the legislature itself to help us in working out a tax program. That will solve the financial problems of the Korean government.

Mr. Kim: I realize the matter of taxation will come before the legislative assembly, but the general complaint now is taxes are so high that people can't live under the present situation.

Mr. Loren: Some of the taxes may have to be readjusted and new sources of revenue found, but the income of the government must be increased to cover expenses more adequately or there will be no solution to the problem of inflation.

The Chairman, General Brown, arrives at the meeting.

Mr. Kim: The Bank of Chosen notes were originally based upon the value of the Japanese yen, were they not?

Mr. Loren: Yes, they were converted into Bank of Japan notes.

Mr. Kim: I feel that since the Korean Bank of Chosen money was based on Japanese money and Japanese money does not exist, then it is based upon a false valuation. It has been increased to the degree that it has no backing, and this currency is now spread out over to Manchuria

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and China. Is not the inflation based upon the fact that it purports to represent something that does not exist. Therefore is there not some plan on the part of the government to alter this?

Mr. Loreni The inflation is due in part, of course, to the lack of confidence in the currency to the extent that people do prefer to buy up goods rather than to hold their money. That factor I think is not so important in the inflation as the tremendous expenditures of the government in excess of its revenues which results in billions of yen being added to circulation each fiscal year. It is true that the for an currency when it is established and must support itself should have foreign exchange reserves. Korea at the present time does not have adequate foreign exchange reserves to support a stable currency.

Mr. Kimi Is it not so that since a government that formerly paid 100 and now has to pay 1,000--if the government should convert the money on some sort of basis and bring it all down again, would not that be the solution?

Mr. Loreni As I indicated before, I think a currency conversion is necessary and desirable. However, the conversion itself will not solve the problem. The government revenues are completely inadequate and even with the conversion and deflation, it will not be possible to solve the problem by conversion.

Mr. Kimi Rumor has it that because of the estimated deficit of government, another billion or so will be issued. Is that so?

Mr. Loreni: The government has had to issue additional currency regularly. Bank of Chosen notes in circulation have been increasing weekly.

Mr. Kimi When will we be able to catch up with this thing unless we make some start. Wouldn't it be possible to take a ¥100 bill and say it is ¥1. Issue a new currency somehow and bring this thing down. Can't some means be devised?

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Mr. Loren: Call ¥100 note a ¥1 note and this would still not make prices stable. Military Government has already started on its stabilization program. A most important factor in program is rice collection plan in order to issue rice at a fixed price so that it would be possible to make prices and wages bear some reasonable relationship to each other. When stabilization is obtained, then if you issue new currency, it might be possible to keep prices down. Under the present situation, the new currency would go up in circulation as it did in Japan where they did that.

Mr. Yoon: You can't compare Japan with Korea. In Japan the cities were bombed and obliterated. In order to rebuild, the government issued tremendous amounts of money. That situation does not exist in Korea.

Mr. Loren: On the contrary, Military Government here is required to expend large sums of money in trying to rehabilitate Korean economy.

Mr. Kim: I feel that the situation is not the same in Japan. In Korea nothing is going out. We may have to bring something in. That will cause a need for money to be sent out. Since we have enough to get along here, it is the increase in currency which is causing the trouble. Everything is in inflated value. Production can be increased. When it comes to purchasing from abroad, we will need funds. If we reduced from 10 billion to one billion by some change in currency, everything would follow along. Price would follow that.

Mr. Loren: A violent deflation in price level would, of course, cause maladjustments as well as increase in inflation. However, it is desirable that we have conversion as soon as conditions permit. Korea is in a very enviable position in relation to other countries because it has no external debt and there is no significant internal indebtedness in the Korean government.

Mr. Kim: You have to start the process of deflation. Therefore take a figure of 50 to 1, if 100 to 1 is too great. It is necessary to have some sort of movement to check this inflation.

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Mr. Loren: The distinction should be made between conversion; call currency in, limit amount people should have, eliminate counterfeits and eliminate currency held outside Korea, and a conversion that would be 100 to 1 or 50 to 1 would cause a violent adjustment and would make all wages and prices out of line. I would be in favor of conversion, of calling money in. I do not think it would be desirable to have conversion of 100 to 1 or even 10 to 1.

Mr. Kimm: Is it not the same to issue new currency as to stamp the old currency?

Mr. Loren: It is the same except with the stamp it is more easily accomplished.

Mr. Kimm: I was not able to get a clear-cut answer to my question. My question was that I had heard from a very authoritative source that there was a plan on foot to stabilize or reform the present currency, and after hearing Mr. Loren's statement that currency reform cannot be effected without this and that, etc., I consider this theory is correct, but whatever the theory or practice may be, I am only asking since I have heard this information. I want to ask Mr. Loren if there is such a plan. If so, what in a general way, can he tell us of the plan.

Mr. Loren: The plan for conversion of the currency has been discussed for quite a long time. I think that the plan you have heard of is unquestionable the general discussion we have had. There has been no decision as to any particular time for conversion or details as to how any conversion would be undertaken. The concentration at the present time has been on obtaining stabilization.

Mr. Kimm: In regard to Mr. Loren's remarks that the government should plan an increase in revenue and decrease in expenditure in order to make ends meet, that is correct of course. However, may I ask what specific plans has Military Government concerning the increase of revenue, particularly the present so-called income taxes, etc. There are people who are required to pay as much as 80 to 90% in taxes, including income and other taxes. In extreme

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cases, people are paying more than their actual income. Can you give us any light on this point?

Mr. Loren: The land tax is planned to increase be raising the valuation--the existing valuation of the property by ten times. The present assessed value is based on the 1943 assessments. Present income from property and from the sale of farm products is, of course, much higher now than in 1943. As a temporary measure, it has been decided to increase the assessed value arbitrarily by ten times until the law can be worked out. The provincial household income taxes have also been increased. It is true that in income over ¥4 [illegible],000 per year, the total of the household income tax paid by members of the household may be as much as 90% of the total income. However, there is a provision in the law which states that in no case shall the total of the household income tax paid by the head of the household and the national income taxes paid by individual members exceed 90% of the total income of the household.

Chairman: Are you speaking of laws that actually exist now?

Mr. Loren: Yes, it has already gone into effect.

Mr. Kim: It seems that Mr. Loren affirms the fact that income, land, and property taxes, especially in regard to persons having an income of more than ¥400,000 is core to 90%, that it will not in any case exceed 90%. In regard to that, how are you going to arbitrarily increase taxation by ten times.

Mr. Loren: That is the land tax, not the income tax.

Mr. Kim: If the income and other taxes remain as they are already existing and you change the land tax suddenly by ten times, will that not make the actual amount of taxes to be paid by that individual over and above the 90%. As long as we are under American Military Government, and it is, of course, their duty and they must have a way of doing this, I will not press this any further.

Mr. Loren: The Korean tax officials inform me that in figuring income taxes when they send out notices that allowance is made for expenses of the landlord in operating property, and they figure so much for his expenses in maintaining land, and they also figure a certain amount for the amount of tax as assessed.

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Chairman: There is a plan of government which Military Government follows that nothing is concealed by the government. That is particularly true in regard to taxes levied on individuals. Any individual is entitled to know the taxes levied on him and to take up with the government the question of whether that levy is just or not.

Dr. Kimm: For that reason, I do not wish to press that question any further. The whole problem that is causing trouble to Military Government is misunderstanding by the people through rumors, reports, etc. I just asked these questions so that I would be in a position to answer any landlord who might ask such questions of me. Mr. Loren says in fixing rates of taxes, particularly the land tax, the department in Military Government is guided by Korean officials in charge of respective areas and they in turn take it up with the landlords and investigate as to actual income, etc. That may be the best way of doing it. However, I am sorry to say that because of the level of Korean officials in such localities and even in the central government itself, our American friends in Military Government are liable to be misled and misguided.

Mr. Loren: One thing should be emphasized to these people who make inquiries of Dr. Kimm. That is the tax program at the present time is an emergency measure which increases rates of existing taxes in order to get a little bit more income for the present fiscal year. The intention and plan of Military Government is to submit proposals for more permanent tax reforms to the legislature so that there can be public comment and advice from Koreans as to an appropriate tax structure. These emergency measures should not this year work too much hardship on people if properly administered because income taxes collected this Fall is the tax on last years income. Incomes last year were of course less than the present inflated prices. So, the combination of income and land tax should not be a great burden on the people at the present time.

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Dr. Kimm: The legislature will be open in a few days and all these questions will come up. However, in the meantime, Military Government is holding the reins and there is criticism, both favorable and unfavorable. Therefore, those who have the best intentions wish to have the actual facts. Furthermore this Conference has met for the purpose of investigating causes of the recent disturbances in South Korea and to recommend measures to relieve the situation. I ask these questions for my own information since I may use some of these facts when the legislature sits as I understand that I am being honored with a seat in this legislature. What has been done regarding the Bank of Japan notes that have been collected from the people in Korea (with or without adequate compensation.)

Mr. Loren: The Bank of Japan notes that were recalled from circulation here in Korea have not been converted. There has been no payment for the deposits of the Bank of Japan notes that were made under the Military Government ordinance. It is doubtful that payment for those notes can be made any sooner than there is a general settlement of the claims against the Japanese.

Dr. Kimm: I am not very conversant on that point, but I believe Mr. Edwin Pauley said Korea should have a share in indemnity. If no provision is there, I think some provisions should be made when the indemnity question is being settled if the indemnity question has anything to do with settlement of the Bank of Japan notes.

Mr. Loren: The Bank of Japan notes will unquestionably be considered along with other claims of Korea against Japan. Until settlement is made with Japan, it will probably not be wise for the Korean government to take money from its own public treasury to compensate claimants who happen to hold Japanese notes.

Dr. Kimm: What is the plan regarding stabilization of currency either by reconversion or the issuing of new currency backed by some credit or reserve or replacing Bank of Japan notes now non-existing, which we have as a backing for the present Bank of Chosen notes. What is the general plan of Military Government regarding Bank of Chosen notes which were backed up by Bank of Japan notes. At the present time, we have in Korea no national currency. We are using just slips

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of paper with no backing whatsoever.

Mr. Loren: As previously discussed, I think everyone has agreed that there must be a conversion as soon as conditions here will permit. Until there is a Korean government, the currency can only be another issue that is issued by the Bank of Chosen without adequate foreign exchange assets.

Dr. Kim: I think, Mr. Loren, that I am clear on several points now. If Mr. Loren had said no economic adjustment can really be made until the appearance of an actual Korean government at first I would not have taken so much time asking all these questions.

Mr. Loren: I would like to make one thing perfectly clear. It is entirely possible to have conversion prior to the time that there is a Korean government established. The conversion can be conducted to reduce amount of excess currency outstanding and to give Korea economically the benefit of a smaller amount of money in circulation. I thought your question was about currency backed by foreign exchange assets and so-called free currency on international exchange. I do not think it is reasonable to expect that a large loan could be granted to the Korean government until that government is established. At that time a permanent currency with adequate foreign backing can be planned on. That should not prevent us from establishing a sound economic system in South Korea until such time as a provisional government is established.

Dr. Kim: Everybody fully realizes that no definite international credit can be established until there is a Korean government and now everything is a temporary measure. This interim legislature is also a temporary measure until such time as a Korean government is established. However, during this period of temporary measures, people have to live. We are therefore devising ways and means for this temporary period. I wonder whether Military Government was thinking of temporary measures on some of these issues, impossible as some of them may seem.

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Mr. Jon: I have heard that people are going to restaurants and for every ¥10 that they eat, pay ¥1 in tax. They do not know why they have to pay it. If the people felt that it were for the support of the country, they would support it, but they are saying "The restaurant operators and the police are in cahoots and work us for this". In large restaurants where large amounts are spent, there is a considerable amount in taxes. The tax collectors are of the previous Japanese type and are not trusted or liked by the people. They have the skill of milking the people which they learned from the Japanese.

Mr. Loren: I have no knowledge of individual tax collectors. The law itself, however, is one that has been on the books for some time. There is a tax on restaurants and places of amusement. It is required to be collected by restaurant owners, and he must settle with the tax collector before the tenth day of the following month for taxes he has collected from people attending his restaurant.

Mr. Jon: I understand that that is where the trouble is. In the old days, restaurant operators were required to put revenue stamps on receipts. The people knew where the money went. There is no such regulation now. It is just a sort of agreement between the tax gatherer and restaurant owner. People have no confidence in it whatsoever.

Mr. Loren: If the tax was formerly payable in revenue stamps and stamps are no longer being placed on receipts, I would be glad to report that to the Treasury Bureau. The tax itself on places of amusement is a desirable one as it takes money from people who can afford to give parties and spend money on luxuries.

Mr. Jon: Not only in big restaurants, but even in the tiniest ones, you have to pay a sizeable tax.

Mr. Loren: Isn't it true that the tax at restaurants with kaesang girls is much higher than at smaller eating places.

Mr. Jon: That is right, but all these hole in the wall places where they collect taxes as well, do not pay their taxes after collecting from the people.

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Mr. Jourson: The purpose of this conference is to make recommendations to the Commanding General. I think it is of the utmost importance for the Conference to go on record that this Conference recommends the curtailment of government spending and an increase in governmental revenues. It is too often assumed that there is some simple way to solve this problem of wages, prices and inflation. A very common feeling has been expressed this afternoon--that all we need to do is convert the currency. I want to make this matter very very simple so noone can misunderstand it. A man is chasing a horse. He is running as fast as he can. The horse is running as fast as he can. The horse is getting farther away. It won't help matters to tell the horse and the man to run half as fast. It won't help to tell the man and the horse to run one-fiftieth as fast. Yet that is all you could do if you converted your currency now for the horse is governmental expenditures and the man is revenues. In other words, the horse is prices. The solution is much more fundamental than that. I want to assure members of this Conference that Military Government has a plan, and that we are working on that plan night and day. It contemplates reducing expenditures and contemplates increasing revenues, and above all it contemplates an increase in the quantity of goods. I won't ask for a vote of confidence as to what Military Government is doing, but I do think it imperative that we go on record as recommending drastic curtailment of governmental expenditures and an increase in governmental revenues.

Chairman: This is the last meeting of this Conference due to the opening of the legislature. We do not have sufficient time left to do very much more this afternoon. The object of the Chairman in asking Mr. Loren to come before the Conference was not to get all the information available but to get a brief picture of the present situation. Mr. Loren has done that, and the Chairman expresses the appreciation of the Conference to him.

Mr. Kimm: In behalf of the Korean members of this Conference, I would like to state that not all the questions and statements we

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Mr. Kimm: In behalf of the Korean members of this Conference, I would like to state that not all the questions and statements we

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have made were made with the object of criticizing Military Government or the Korean and American workers on the staff, nor were we criticizing measures taken by Military Government. We realize fully that no government in the world is foolproof. Furthermore, even the efficient United States government and the government the Japs bragged about are not altogether foolproof. In Korea at the present time we have the American Military Government in South Korea and the so-called People's Committees under the Russian Military Government in North Korea. In both of these and even in our own Korean government, it is not expected that they should be foolproof. The spirit of this Conference is to make recommendations that will help Military Government as long as it exists to be as foolproof as possible. Sometimes the persons who testified here had the feeling we were trying to dig in and find fault. Sometimes our statements were made very frankly. Yesterday, even the Chairman himself after a few remarks from me felt that I was sort of criticizing, but if I conveyed that impression, it was not my intention. It was with the spirit of helping the work rather than one of criticism.

Mr. Loren: I can't speak for the other witnesses, but I, myself, fully appreciate the intent of the questions that were asked. My only purpose in pressing some of the points was that members of the Conference might understand the plan and intentions of Military Government.

Chairman: The Chairman wants to thank the Korean and American members of the Conference for the work done. He feels that much has been accomplished by this Conference. There remains to the Conference the consideration of conclusions and recommendations on the economic question discussed. There has been circulated in Korean a brief summary of a proposed introduction to those conclusions and recommendation. The Chairman has certain conclusions and recommendations drafted. These have to be translated into Korean. The Chairman will have them translated and will give them to Dr. Kimm and ask that he get the concurrence of the other members of

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the Conference on these and that he give them back with any comments or without.

Dr. Kimm: I have not yet read this Korean translation which Chairman has mentioned. Furthermore, I have not yet had time to go over general outline of recommendations to be made nor have the Korean members of this Conference had a chance to go over this. It will have to be translated in the good offices of our English secretary, I presume that we will have to see when we can have it in. I am afraid I might not be able to give a definite answer in a very quick time. It might be delayed a few days. I have one remark to make with reference to Dr. Johnson's suggestion that we recommend a curtailment of government expenditures and increase in revenue. I think it would be well for this Conference to remember that the curtailment of government expenditure must be done rather cautiously and very carefully. It has been pointed out at this Conference that American office force as well as the Korean staff of Military Government because of present economic situation are not being paid adequate wages for a living. Therefore, the curtailment might be by decreasing personnel rather than decreasing the already inadequate wages. Here we would strike another snag--when you decrease personnel, you are liable to decrease efficiency of that particular organ. It is not a simple or arbitrary matter. If we are to make the present American Military Government, as long as it exists, as foolproof as possible so that the Korean staff at least shall not be pushed into corruptive methods and ways, we shall have to be very careful in curtailment of expenditures. For the same reason, the increase in revenue is perhaps necessary, but we must think of the people who are paying taxes and not make it more difficult for them than under the Japanese rule. I understand the United States government is now planning to curtail expenditures--cut down the budget--so that taxes may be decreased. I understand the new Republican Congress has an end in view of reducing taxes twenty-five percent. Korea is not a parallel one with America. The Korean people have no government of their own as yet. Therefore, whatever taxes they

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pay they compare with what they paid during the Japanese regime. At the same time, they are ignorant of by what means the national expenditure will be decreased. I therefore recommend that the increase in revenue, in order to avoid further corruption or to eliminate existing corruption, if there is any, should be planned on an equivocal basis.

Chairman: The Chairman agrees with Dr. Kimm, but this Conference is not in a position to make any recommendations concerning discontinuance or decrease in spending or increase in revenue. The Conference has not carefully enough examined factors entering into that problem. The papers which have been prepared on conclusions and recommendations cover only the rice collection and distribution program. The Chairman is going to ask that these papers be regarded as confidential and no publicity be given them until furnished to the Commanding General and released by him for publication. They will not be transmitted to General Hodge until signed by Dr. Kimm, representing with the Chairman this Conference.

The Chairman thanked the various members of the Conference and assistants for their assistance, and the last meeting of this Conference was adjourned at 1700 hours.

(NOTE: Exhibit 32 attached to original only.)

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POLICY ORIGINATING IN USAFIK (MISCELL.)

1. Ordinance 118, Establishment of Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.

2. Statement of Gen. Hodge upon opening of Legislative Assembly, 12 December 1946.

3. Letter from Gen. Hodge, 13 Dec., on Liaison with the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.

4. Development of a Political Program - by Joint Commission. 4 Feb. 1947. Also letter from C.G. of 10 Feb. approving this program.

5. Mission of American Delegation, US - USSR Joint Commission, 28 Apr 1947.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE
NUMBER 118 REPRINTED COPY 24 August 1946

ESTABLISHMENT OF KOREAN INTERIM LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

SECTION I. *Purpose.* The purpose of this ordinance is to increase the participation of democratic elements in the government by the establishment of an interim legislative body and thus to foster the development of the country on democratic principles pending the early establishment of a unified Korean State with a provisional democratic government of all Korea as provided in the Moscow Agreement.

SECTION II. *Purpose of Legislative Body.* It is declared to be the purpose of Military Government to establish through broad electoral processes a legislative body which shall have the duty of formulating and presenting to the Military Governor draft laws to be used as the basis for political, economic and social reforms, pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Initially, the assembly will be composed of members partly selected and partly elected. Eventually all will be elected.

SECTION III. *Establishment.* A Korean legislative body to be known as the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly is hereby established as an organ of government. It shall consist of 90 members, 45 of whom shall be elected. Elective members shall be chosen in each province and in the independent City of Seoul in the manner hereinafter prescribed on the basis of one member for each 550,000 population or major fraction thereof ; *provided*, that each province shall be represented by at least one elective member. In addition there shall be elected from each province and the independent City of Seoul a representative at large. The remaining members shall be selected so as to represent equally and fairly major democratic elements of Korean life, economic, political and intellectual.

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SECTION IV. *Pay.* Members of the Assembly shall receive the same compensation as judges of the Supreme Court. Payment of compensation of necessary employees shall be subject to Civil Service rules and regulations.

SECTION V. *Duties and Powers of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.* It shall be the duty of the Assembly to enact ordinances on matters affecting general welfare and interest and on such matters as may be referred to it by the Military Governor. It shall also have the power to review all past appointments to the Military Government above the Civil Service Status of Class 4 and to confirm and consent to all such future appointments. Ordinances enacted by the Assembly shall have the force and effect of law when concurred in by the Military Governor, duly signed by him and sealed and published in the *Official Gazette.* In case the Military Governor does not concur in any ordinance, he will return it to the legislature with a written statement of reasons for nonconcurrence.

SECTION VI. *Quorum; Immunity of Members for Utterances.* All action of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly shall be by a majority vote of the quorum, and three-fourths of the members shall constitute a quorum unless otherwise determined by the Assembly. Debates in the Assembly, on the floor thereof, and in committees which may be established, shall be free, and the members shall not be questioned for their utterances during the course of such debate in any other place; but the Assembly shall have power to adopt rules of conduct and measures for punishment of its members for disorderly behavior.

SECTION VII. *Qualification of Members.* No person may be elected as a member of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly unless he or she is a Korean who shall have passed his or her twenty-fifth birthday on the date of assuming office, and unless he or she has been a *bona fide* resident of the province or area represented for at least one year immediately preceding his or her election.

The date of assuming office shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to be the first day of the session of the Assembly following such election.

The following shall not be eligible for membership in the Assembly: persons who occupied positions as central, provincial or municipal councilors, or persons of the rank of *chikimkwan* or above, under the Japanese regime; and all those who collaborated with the Japanese, for gain, to the detriment of the Korean people.

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SECTION VIII. *Method of Election of Members of the Assembly.* Elective members of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly shall be elected by and for the people of each province of Korea south of the 38° parallel and the independent City of Seoul, by universal suffrage regardless of sex, according to rules to be established by an ordinance to be enacted by the Assembly and approved by the Military Governor. Until the enactment of such ordinance elective members shall be chosen by elective procedures established by the Military Governor. Such elective procedures will provide, in substance, that each hamlet, village and district shall elect two representatives, who shall in turn elect two representatives from their respective *myun*; that these *myun* representatives shall elect two representatives for their respective *gun*; that the *gun* representatives shall elect provincial representatives to the Assembly in accordance with provincial population ratios; and that all balloting shall be secret. Until the establishment of an official census, population figures shall be those determined from time to time by the National Economic Board. For the purpose of this ordinance, the part of Hwanghae Province which lies south of the 38° parallel shall be considered a part of Kyonggi Province.

SECTION IX. *Duration of Term.* Original members of the Assembly shall, unless reelected or reappointed for subsequent periods, hold office only until the seating of members elected in the first general election held pursuant to ordinances hereafter enacted.

SECTION X. *Initial Session of the Assembly; Adoption of Rules; Election of Chairman.* The initial session of the Assembly shall be held on the day fixed by the Military Governor at a place in Seoul designated by him. The Assembly shall elect from its number a presiding chairman. Election of the presiding chairman shall be by written secret ballot of a majority of the quorum. He shall hold office until his successor is elected. The Assembly shall adopt rules of procedure which shall include provisions for adjournments, committees and the conduct of members.

SECTION XI. *Authority of Military Government Unimpaired.* All duties and powers of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly under this ordinance shall be exercised under the authority of the Military Government in Korea, until the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The Military Government retains power to dissolve the Assembly, approve new members and require new elections.

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SECTION XII. *Effective Date.* This ordinance shall be effective on the date appearing hereon.

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ARCHER L LERCH
Major General United States Army
Military Governor in Korea

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在朝鮮美國陸軍司令部軍政廳

法令第一一八號 (再 版)

朝鮮過渡立法議院의創設

第一條 目 的

本令은모스코바協約에規定된대로朝鮮全體의臨時民主政府를樹立하고統一朝鮮國家가速히建設되기를期하며過渡立法機關을建設함으로政府에民主的要素의參加를增加하야民主主義原則우에國家의發展을助成함을目的으로함

第二條 立法機關의目的

臨時朝鮮民主政府의樹立을期하며政治的、經濟的、及社會的改革의基礎로使用될法令草案을作成하야軍政長官에게提出할職務가있는立法機關을廣汎한選擧方途에依하야建設함이軍政廳의目的임을宣言함

最初에兩議院은選定된一部의議員과選擧된一部의議員으로써構成됨、漸次로는議員全部가選擧됨

第三條 設 置

朝鮮過渡立法議院으로써設置됨

同議院은九十名議員으로써構成되며其中四十五名議員은選擧됨

選擧되는議員은各道와서울特別市에서左記의規定에依하야各五十五萬名當一名又는各主要端數當一名의單位로選擧됨

但各道는選擧되는議員적어도一名으로代表하게됨

其外에또한各道와서울特別市는全體的代議士各一名을選出함

其餘의議員은朝鮮의經濟的、政治的及知的的生活의主要한民主的要素를公平正大하게代表하도록選定됨

第四條 俸 給

同議院議員은大法院大法官과同額의報償을받음

必要한雇傭人의報償支拂은人事行政規程에準함

第五條 朝鮮過渡立法議院의職務及權限

一般福利와利害에關係되는事項及軍政長官이依託한事項에關하야法令을制定함이同議院의職務임

同議院은또한過去의軍政廳에任命한人事行政身分四等級以上의모든官職任命을再調査할權限이있으며또그러한未來의모든任命을追認하고玆에同意하는權限이있음

同議院에서制定한法令은軍政長官이同意하야合法的으로署名

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下の中議院議員、道会議員、又は市会議員の地位を兼ね、又は勅任官級及其以上の地位を兼ね、自己の利益を図り、又は人民の不利益を与えた時、日人は協力者とす

第八条　四選禁止

国務総理、閣僚、中央行政機関の長又は三十人以上国会議員が連署して憲法改正の動議を提出する場合、国会議員の過半数の賛成で改正の動議を決定し、国会議員の三分之二以上の賛成で改正を決定する時は改正案を国民投票に附して国民の過半数

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同議院의創始議員은次期에再選擧又는再任命되지않는限今後制定되는法令에따라施行될第一次總選擧에被選된議員들이就任할때까지만職務에就함

第十條 同議院의創立總會、規程採用、議長選擧

同議院의創立總會는軍政長官이指定한時日에軍政長官이指定한서울市內場所에서擧行함

同議院은그議員中에서議長을選定함

議長의選擧는定員數過半數의無記名投票에依함

被選議長은後任이被選될때까지職務에就함

同議院은停會、委員會及議員行爲等에關한規定을包含한施行法規를採用함

第十一條 軍政廳의權限은輕減되지아니함

本令에依한朝鮮過渡立法議院의모든職務와權限은臨時朝鮮民主政府가樹立될때까지朝鮮軍政廳의權限下에行使함

軍政長官은同議院을解散하며新議員을任命하며新選擧를要求할權限을保留함

第十二條 施行期日

本令은公布日로부터有效함

一九四六年八月二十四日

朝鮮軍政長官

美國陸軍少將 아ㅣ취·엘·려ㅣ취

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PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

12 December 1946

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE
UPON OPENING OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Members of the Interim Legislative Assembly and good people of South Korea:

I consider that this initial meeting of the Legislative Assembly marks the most important step forward in the development of Democratic processes as well as the greatest single step in the progress of Korean self-government in South Korea.

The Legislative Assembly is the public servant only of the people of South Korea, and through its establishment the American Command has high confidence of furthering the self-governing program for, by and of the South Korean people. With sincere service by the members of the Assembly itself, and the full support of the people of South Korea, the tempo of democratic progress in government will be greatly increased, pending the establishment of the Provisional Government of united Korea by the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission.

With the opening of this great assembly, the people have for the first time a law making body, a body free to discuss and study the many Korean problems and devise ways and means according to the wishes and psychology of the people to make for better social and economic life. In addition to its legislative status, this body will be an open forum for free discussion of Korean affairs through which the Korean people can make known their wishes. As elected and selected representatives of the people, this Assembly takes on great reponsibility which I have full confidence that it will faithfully discharge.

Discharge of our sacred duties here will not be easy. In study of all problems, we will have to seek facts as opposed to rumors and propaganda. We will have to study carefully and think through proposed reforms clearly to determine their final effect on the future welfare of the nation. We will have to (MORE)

Gen. Hodge's 12 Dec. Statement

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hear all sides of every question in order to insure sound judgement in final action. We will have to set aside any purely political ideas where they conflict with the welfare of the country, and units behind those reforms for the general good. We must rise above party politics and avoid action tied strictly to party lines, concentrating on the national welfare.

Progress in truly democratic practices and true representation of the people in government must go on unimpeded. Therefore, I charge this Legislative Assembly as one of its first duties to provide laws and machinery whereby all adult Southern Koreans will, at an early date, be able to exercise direct universal suffrage in the election of an all-elected national legislative body as well as in election of key officials on all levels. Through this process I foresee progress in representative democracy beyond the highest hope of most of those who hear my voice.

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File

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

4 February 1947.

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

SUBJECT: Development of a Political Program.

The Problem Presented: To develop a political program for South Korea.

I. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

1. The Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in Korea, as agent of the United States Government, is responsible for governing Southern Korea under policies prescribed by the United States Government.

2. The United States Government has prescribed the following policy guide for the Government of Southern Korea:

a. Broaden the basis and extent of Korean participation in the government by using qualified Koreans in responsible governmental positions on all levels. Where possible, selection is to be made by broad electoral processes. Where selections are appointive, these will be made from all political groups.

b. Apply liberal policies as regards individual Koreans in the government and in influential positions outside the government, including:

(1) Freedom of expression by members of all parties and groups.

(2) Preferred use of leaders who remained in Korea throughout the Japanese rule.

(3) Solicitation of cooperation of all groups and the use in the government of individuals from all political groups.

c. Establishment of a Southern Korea Legislature by election participated in by all major political groups. It is envisioned as the lawmaking body for South Korea and will initiate all major reforms, and review appointments to the government. Laws enacted by the Legislature shall be put into effect unless they are inconsistent with basic United States objectives.

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en.o. to CG, XXIV Corps 4 Feb. 1947.
AHJ: Development of a Political Program.

3. During the 40 years of Japanese control, Koreans lost all sense of political responsibility and knowledge. They are at present totally unschooled in the art of politics and government.

4. The so-called political parties which exist in Southern Korea are, in fact, small groups of leaders who attempt to control the people by offering them ideas which appeal to them. These ideas have no consistency, quickly lose their appeal and result in constant shifting of political support by the people from one so-called party to another.

5. Political leadership follows the usual pattern of right, center and left. The dominant group which presently holds the thought of and directs the right are men of considerable wealth, or those who acquired positions and prestige under the Japanese, reenforced by certain so-called patriots who have returned to Korea. The center is largely without organized political leadership. The dominant leadership of the left is the radical Communist group led by PAK, Heun Yung which operates largely on instructions issued from Russia.

6. The most powerful of the rightist political parties is the Korean Democratic Party. This party is joined in major issues of common interest by reenforcements from the Independence Party and in national issues by reenforcements from the Rapid Realization of Independence Party. The strategy of political action on national issues is dictated by the General Headquarters controlled by Syngman RHEE. It is believed that a sizeable group of the Independence Party and a lesser number of the Korean Democratic Party are not entirely amenable to leadership of Korean Democratic Party heads on domestic issues nor of General Headquarters on national issues. It is believed that this group furnishes a fertile field in which to seek reenforcements for a real center party under able leadership.

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7. The extreme leftists or Communists consist of a small group of able leaders supported by a variable number of followers dependent on the appeal of the program which they advocate at the moment.

8. Many leftists are not amenable to the leadership of the extreme left or Communist faction, although they are, to a large extent, classified as Communists. This group, more conservative in their views and in general loyal to the interests of Korea, are believed a fertile field in which to recruit adherence for the center party if such party has able leadership.

9. The most powerful group in Korea today is the rightist group. Their power derives from the fact that they control most of the wealth of Korea. They occupy strategic positions in government both at Headquarters and in the field, as well as in police. To a large extent they have the power to dictate policy for the control of Korea. Until recently this group has not been coordinated in action because of lack of able leadership. General Headquarters, under Syngman RHEE, attempted to lead it on national issues. The Korean Democratic Party has recently taken the leadership on the issue of anti-trusteeship and appears to have consolidated the strength of the majority of the rightists on this issue and may at present be able to control the political situation of Korea.

10. There has been constant friction between the leaders of the various political factions. This friction became particularly strong between the leaders of the Korean Democratic Party and the leaders of the so-called Coalition Committee, caused by the fact that the Korean Democratic Party visualized their power and prestige as being cut into by the action of the Coalition Committee. The Coalition Committee leaders, likewise, bitterly contested the power and prestige of the Korean Democratic Party

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leaders, as they could only gain political stature at the expense of this party. The extreme leftist group similarly opposed the Korean Democratic Party and for the same reasons. They also opposed all other political parties in order to impose their Communist views on Korea. Those rightists who are not in sympathy with the leadership of their chiefs, as well as the leftists not in sympathy with the leadership of the extreme wing of the Communist Party, are at present drifting with the political tides. No leader of sufficient stature has yet appeared who can consolidate this element into a real political movement.

11. The extreme rightist group has recently demonstrated that it will remain loyal to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in Korea, and to Military Government only so long as it is permitted to maintain its position and prestige in Korea.

12. The attempt to organize a "middle of the road" party through the creation of a so-called Coalition Committee has met with little success. It has, however, accomplished the following:

a. Resulted in a legislature much more representative than might otherwise have been secured.

b. To some extent, educated the people politically to the idea that cooperation for a common interest is possible.

c. Challenged the power of the Korean Democratic Party and the KRRI and demonstrated that the tenure of office of that party and the KRRI is, to some extent at least, dependent on public support.

d. Provided the beginning of a political movement which may, with proper nurture, be developed into a worthwhile political result.

13. The Korean Democratic Party has recently regained considerable prestige by leading the anti-trusteeship movement in the legislature and throughout Southern Korea. However, the

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results at this moment, potentially great, may not reach the full intent of proponents for the following reasons:

a. There seems to be a definite rivalry for leadership between Dr. RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo.

b. Certain groups have considerable political power and are opposed to the methods being taken by the Korean Democratic Party and ARRI leaders to bring the trusteeship issue to the front. These groups include:

(1) The Coalition Committee.

(2) A sizeable portion of the Independence Party.

(3) Certain members of the Korean Democratic Party itself.

(4) And it is believed the majority of conservative thinkers amongst the non-political element in Southern Korea.

14. The radical Communist group led by PAK, Heun Yung which lost much prestige as a result of the October riots has made a shrewd move and regained considerable prestige and following through the organization of the South Korea Labor Party.

15. The formation of the South Korea Labor Party has left without present political leadership a large number of the former People's Party and dissident Communistic groups. The attempt made to weld these individuals into the Socialist Labor Party has thus far failed.

16. Dr. KIM, Kiusic and his adherents were considerably disheartened and confused by the passage of the trusteeship resolution. Although Dr. KIM will continue as chairman of the legislature and will press for a constructive legislation program, his efforts will not be wholly successful for two reasons:

a. Attempt by extreme rightist bloc to continue practical nullification of Assembly and enhancement of own prestige by sponsoring political legislation appealing to the public and embarrassing the Military Command.

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b. Resultant defensive tactics by Dr. KIMM and his followers, including sponsoring of similar legislation on their part.

II. Conclusions.

1. In order to execute the mission assigned him by his governmen , it is essential that the Commanding General, USAFIK, continue his efforts to develop representative democratic government in Southern Korea.

2. It is extremely desirable, if not essential, that the Interim Legislative Assembly be continued in being. The following appear to be the means of keeping the Assembly in being:

a. Assist the present chairman in any practicable way to maintain his leadership over that body.

b. Contact the majority group in the Legislative Assembly (extreme rightist bloc) and suggest a revolt against the leadership of the present chairman to take over the leadership in the Legislative Assembly.

c. Dissolve the Legislative Assembly as unable to function effectively. Call new elections to bring into being an all-elected legislature.

3. It is contrary to the assigned mission that the Commanding General, USAFIK, lend his support to assuring control by either of the extreme political parties. Should the extreme rightist bloc secure control of the Assembly it will, in fact, govern Southern Korea under a system comparable to that employed by the war lords of China. It is believed the ultimate result would be revolution against its arbitrary and ruthless methods. Regardless of improbable ultimate success, it is believed that the only logical course to follow is the continued support of the coalition movement under KIMM, Kiusic's leadership.

4. The intensive organized efforts of the extreme rightist bloc together with the much publicized activities of Dr. RHEE,

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Syngman in the United States, has brought the trusteeship issue so sharply into focus in Southern Korea that it eclipses and probably will overshadow for some time all other political issues. Certain political leaders will continue to keep anti-trusteeship and allied political matters to the forefront as a sure-fire issue with powerful, even potentially explosive, political appeal. The return of Dr. RHEE will intensify this campaign.

III. Action Recommended.

1. That efforts be continued to develop representative democratic government in Southern Korea.

2. That the Interim Legislative Assembly be encouraged to reconvene under the leadership of Dr. KIM, Kiusic as chairman and that the legislature be guided and persuaded into consideration of a constructive legislative program in order to convince the people of its usefulness.

3. That effort be made to strengthen and extend the prestige of the Coalition Committee in order to encourage, to the maximum extent, the formation of a real "middle of the road" political party.

4. That the power in government of the extreme rightist bloc be gradually reduced by replacement of the members of the bloc.

5. That the Coalition Committee be persuaded to enlarge and revise its "seven principles" to secure more general acceptance of its program for political unification.

6. That a vigorous educational campaign be instituted at once to inculcate among Koreans more realistic consideration and acceptance of the Moscow Agreement.

7. That in the furtherance of political objectives economic assistance from the United States, such as locomotives, fertilizer, food, etc., be given wider publicity.

8. That "Koreanization" of the government be played up in

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Memo to CG, XXIV Corps. 4 Feb. 1947.
SUBJ: Development of a Political Program.

such a way as to reflect more of the "credit" for its consummation on the Assembly.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief Commissioner.

copies to:
Orig & 1 - CG, XXIV Corps
1 - Military Government
1 - Dr. Bunce
1 - Mr. Langdon

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235

10 February 1947

SUBJECT: Approval of Study

TO: Chief, American Delegation of Joint Commission
APO 235.

1. The recommendations contained in Section III of Memorandum dated 4 February 1947 from Joint Commission to CG XXIV Corps, Subject: Development of a Political Program, are approved as a statement of policy of this headquarters for political development.

2. Paragraph 4 of approved recommendations is not construed as intending that replacements will be made from leftists whose aims are inimical to American and Korean interests.

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235

MEMORANDUM

4 April 1947

SUBJECT: Reorganization Staff Headquarters XXIV Corps on Handling Political and Economic Matters.

TO : Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED

To create staff control and preservation of records which will assure proper organization, supervision and coordination in political and economic matters, and proper maintenance of records.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The General Staff divisions, XXIV Corps, are now organized into the four normal divisions.
2. FM 101-5 par 4 states, "The organization of the staff is based upon the duties of the commander."
3. The Commanding General, XXIV Corps and USAFIK, is faced with the solution of many problems of political and economic import.
4. The Commanding General, XXIV Corps, has been furnished a political advisor (Mr. Langdon, State Department); an economic advisor (Dr. Bunce, State Department); a Joint Commission (for the implementation of the Moscow Agreement only) and a Military Governor, who is primarily a deputy for administration of government.
5. Political and economic records of great importance are now scattered in many offices of the command. There is at present no existing office of record for such files.

Only a draft

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6. The political load carried by the Commanding General personally is so excessive as to require time which should be available to him for supervision of military activities.
7. Each political and economic problem as it arises is taken in hand by one of the agencies or individuals mentioned in par 4 above. There is no staff coordination in handling such matters, and at times they are not properly coordinated with all interested agencies before submission to the Commanding General.
8. The Commanding General has utilized the Joint Commission to assist him in political matters. Should this Commission reconvene to consider the Moscow Agreement, all personnel would be required for this mission.

III. ACTION RECOMMENDED

1. The Chief Commissioner, Joint Commission, be charged with responsibility for handling policy concerning political and economic matters.
2. Mr. Langdon, the Political Advisor, and Dr. Bunce, the Economic Advisor, be subordinated to the Chief Commissioner, Joint Commission, for the purpose stated in #1 above.
3. The Chief Commissioner, Joint Commission, be directed to divide the Joint Commission into three sub-sections:
   a. Joint Commission (Moscow Decision);
   b. Political;
   c. Economic.
4. The Chief Commissioner, Joint Commission, prepare plan for perpetuating the political and economic sections during the period that the Joint Commission is reconvened.

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5. The Adjutant General be directed to establish at the Duk Soo Palace a political and economic record section of his office.

6. The political and economic record section of the Adjutant General's office established at the Duk Soo Palace become the office of record for all international, political and economic records.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
APO 235

TFGCG 092.3 28 April 1947

SUBJECT: Mission of the American Delegation, U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission.

TO: Chief Commissioner, American Delegation, U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission.

1. The basic mission of the American Delegation, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, is the implementation of paragraphs 2 and 3, Section III-(Korea) of the Moscow Agreement.

2. Pending reconvening of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission and in preparation therefor, the American Delegation will:

a. Exercise staff supervision and coordination of all matters affecting political and economic development in so far as these developments affect its basic mission.

b. Maintain close contact with the Korean political and economic situation with the view:

(1) To fulfillment of the basic mission of the American Delegation defined in par 1 above;

(2) Advising the Commanding General concerning important political or economic developments which threaten the security of U. S. forces or domestic stability.

c. Maintain a skeleton organization consistent with current duties and capable of rapid expansion.

d. Continue the training and indoctrination of its personnel.

e. Prepare and maintain up-to-date material essential to the work of Commissioners and members of subcommittees when the Commission reconvenes

/s/ John R. Hodge
/t/ JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding

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MISCELLANEOUS
WASHINGTON POLICY
FOR USAFIK

1. Atlantic Charter.

2. Extract from UN Charter.

3. Extract from Moscow Decision (Korea Section).

4. "Policy for Korea" - War Dept. General Staff, Plans and Operations Division, 13 June 1946.

5. SVC 6983, 290306/ June 1947 advising that Dept. telegram 92, May 21, may be used as basis for assurances Gen. Hodge carrying out policy of this government.

6. WAR-X 82886, 291630 July 1947 from Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Interim Directive for Military Government of Korea."

7. State Ser. 168, 152200 Aug. - Statement that Gen. Hodge following US Government policy in Korea.

8. Public Information Program on Korea, 5 November 1947, from Washington.

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THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea.

They have been accompanied by officials of their two governments, including high ranking officers of their military, naval and air services.

The whole problem of the supply of munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the United States and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression has been further examined.

Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of the United States Government. These conferences will also cover the supply problems of the Soviet Union.

The President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite government of Germany and other governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in the face of these dangers.

They have agreed upon the following joint declaration:

> The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government, in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.
>
> FIRST, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
>
> SECOND, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
>
> THIRD, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
>
> FOURTH, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;
>
> FIFTH, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic adjustment and social security;
>
> SIXTH, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

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SEVENTH, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

EIGHTH, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

(World Almanac 1946 - pg 121)

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Chapter XII: International Trusteeship System — Ref Charter

1. Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

2. Article 76

The basic objective of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;

b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

3. Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be place thereunder by means of trusteeship agreement:

a. territories now held under mandate;

b. territories which may be ~~detached from~~ enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

4. Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

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5. Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

6. Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be contrued in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

7. Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

8. Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

9. Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security consideration, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship

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Council to perform those functions the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

11. Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

11. Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

Chapter XIII: The Trusteeship Council
Composition

12. Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following members of the United Nations:

a. Those Members administering trust territories;

b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and

c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

13. Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority.

b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority: and

d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms

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of the trusteeship agreements.

14. Article 88

1. The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

VOTING

15. Article 89

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

PROCEDURE

16. Article 90

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

17. Article 91

1. The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

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SUBJECT: Moscow Conference (Korea Section)

"Section III - Korea Section

"1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations. The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks."

Reproduced 22 April 1946
by U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION.

RBH

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SECRET

[redacted]
(24 July 46)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

APO 500
3 July 1946

[redacted]

AG 091 (3 Jul 46)CS

SUBJECT: Policy for Korea

TO : Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235.

1. Attached hereto, for your information and guidance, is letter, War Department General Staff, OPD 091 Korea (7 Jun 46), subject as above, dated 13 June 1946, with proper enclosures.

2. Copies of enclosures have been withdrawn by this headquarters for necessary information.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

/s/ J. R. Martz
/t/ J. R. MARTZ
Lt. Col. AGD,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

3 Incls:
1. Copy ltr, WDGS, OPD 091 Korea (7 Jun 46)
2. Copy Memo, Dept of State, dtd 6 June 46
3. Copy, mimeographed notes on Policy for Korea

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Plans & Operations Division
Washington 25, DC

OPD 091 Korea (7 Jun 46) 13 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ARMED FORCES, PACIFIC,
TOKYO, JAPAN

SUBJECT: Policy for Korea.

1. On June 6, 1946, the Assistant Secretary of State for occupied areas forwarded to the War Department copies of the inclosed paper, "Policy for Korea", with the request that the conclusions be transmitted to you by radio and that copies of the entire paper be forwarded to you at an early date, for your guidance and information.

2. The conclusions were transmitted to you in WAR 90716.

3. The inclosures are herewith forwarded to you for information.

J. E. HULL
Lieutenant General, GSC
Director of Plans & Operations

K. R. HILDALL
Major, GSC
Asst Executive Officer
Plans & Policy Group

2 Incls
7 copies of mimeographed notes on Policy for Korea.

Ltr from Mr. Hilldring to OPD - copy.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: Operations Division
War Department

FROM: Assistant Secretary of State for
Occupied Areas

It is recommended that the following message together with the conclusions of the attached paper be transmitted to SCAP as soon as possible and that the entire paper be forwarded at an early date.

> Following are conclusions of a State Department political policy paper on Korea, concurred in by War and Navy Departments and transmitted to you for information and guidance. Entire paper is being forwarded by courier. In implementing any of the below listed provisions you are cautioned not to exceed your current budget. Steps have been taken to prepare a new JCS directive for Korea based on political principles outlined below and including expanded cultural and economic measures which are considered necessary in order effectively to implement a revised policy.

/s/ J. H. HILLDRING
Assistant Secretary

Attachment:
Paper on "Policy for Korea."

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POLICY FOR KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. The problem is to determine the basic objectives of the United States with regard to Korea and how best to achieve these objectives through further negotiations in the Joint Commission and through unilateral action in southern Korea, pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. The basic objectives of the United States with regard to Korea as a whole are:

(1) To establish a self-governing Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations;

(2) To insure that the national government so established shall be a democratic government fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and

(3) To assist the Koreans in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system necessary for an independent democratic state.

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local and provincial administrations and in the administration of the United States zone as a whole;

(b) For all appointive posts, selecting Koreans insofar as possible from all political groups; and

(2) Establish through broad electoral processes an advisory legislative body which shall supersede the present Representative Democratic Council of Southern Korea and shall have the duty of formulating and presenting to the United States Commander draft laws to be used at his discretion as a basis for political, economic and social reforms in the southern zone, pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government. The Commander of the United States Forces in Korea shall put into effect such draft laws except when they are inconsistent with basic United States objectives or the Moscow Agreement.

KOREAN LEGISLATURE

In the implementation of paragraphs (1)(a) and (2) above, the United States Commander shall make every effort to insure that all major political groups participate in all elections.

c. As a further measure to win popular Korean support for United States policies and thus strengthen the United States position in future negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Commander of United States Forces in Korea shall take steps to institute a broad program of constructive economic and educational

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g. The public information program shall be utilized to the fullest to further Korean understanding of and support for United States policies in Korea.

h. While implementing paragraphs d and e above, the Commander of United States Forces in Korea should not lose sight of the intention of this government to establish, as soon as possible, a nation-wide Provisional Korean Government, in accordance with the terms of the Moscow Agreement. To this end, the United States Commander, while standing firm on the principle that freedom of expression must be safeguarded throughout Korea, shall be prepared to instruct the United States representatives on the Joint Commission to resume negotiations with the Soviet representatives at any time and shall propose the resumption of negotiations whenever there is reason to believe that there may be a basis for agreement within the Commission without compromising United States principles. In particular, he shall be ready to exploit any favorable reaction on the part of the Korean people or the Soviet representatives on the Joint Commission to conditions resulting from the implementation of paragraphs d and e above as the basis for agreement regarding the establishment of a nation-wide Provisional Korean Government. When negotiations are resumed, the United States representatives shall look to SWNCC 176/18 for guidance and shall also consider the present impasse in the Joint Commission:

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provide acceptable living accommodations for the families of United States personnel. In addition to providing living accommodations by utilizing and remodeling former Japanese owned property, new construction should be undertaken. Other facilities, such as schools, hospitals, and household supplies shall be made available to all United States personnel and their families. Accommodations shall also be provided for personnel on specialized duty requiring only brief visits.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The United States, the United Kingdom, and China stated in the Cairo Declaration on December 1, 1943, that they

> "Mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

In the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 the same Powers declared that:

> "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine."

2. In oral statements to Mr. Hopkins at Yalta in February 1945 and at Moscow on November 12, 1945, Stalin agreed with the United States suggestion that a Four-Power trusteeship involving the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, and China would be a desirable solution to the problem of the immediate future of Korea.

3. SWNCC 176/8 (October 13, 1945) was the basic initial directive to the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, for the administration of civil affairs in those areas of Korea occupied by United States Forces. It defined the authority which CINCAFPAC possessed and the policies which were to guide CINCAFPAC in the administration of civil affairs in Korea in the initial period after Japanese surrender prior to the establishment of a trusteeship. The political section outlined in basic objectives of the military occupation of Korea, the establishment

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Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

"The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultations with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks."

5. Mr. Byrnes in his radio address on 30 December 1945 commented on the Korean Section of the Moscow Agreement as follows:

"The administration of Korea has been a trying problem since the surrender of Japan. For the purposes of military operations the occupation of Korea was divided north and south of Latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas. The continuation of this division after surrender has been unsatisfactory. The movement of persons and goods and the functioning of public services on a nationwide scale has been hampered.

"Under

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Because of fundamental differences in points of view, no decision could be reached on the supply of electric power, exchange of commodities, mutual payments for goods, repatriation of Japanese in northern Korea, telecommunication between zones, and partial or local changes in the boundary between zones. The United States delegation based its discussions on the desirability of removing the barrier of the 38th parallel and considering the country as an economic and administrative unit. The Soviets, on the other hand, viewed the problem as one of exchange and coordination between two adjoining but separate zones of military responsibility.

7. The objective of SWNCC 176/18 (January 28, 1946) was to determine the policy for the guidance of General MacArthur in conducting negotiations with the Soviet Command in northern Korea regarding the initial powers and functions of the Joint Commission provided for in paragraph 2 of Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Agreement and regarding the formulation of plans for the creation of a Provisional Korean Government.

CINCAFPAC was directed to make arrangements for an early meeting of the Joint Commission at which the United States members were to regard the creation of a Provisional Korean Government as the first and most pressing political task. To facilitate such an end the United States Commander in Korea was to encourage the various political parties to reach fundamental agreement on political, social and economic policies.

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so that in the future it will not become a base for attack on the Soviet Union."

From the beginning the Soviet position was that the Provisional Korean Government would be formed after consultation with those political parties and social organizations fully in favor of the Moscow Agreement. A month of negotiations resulted in a public statemenw on the part of the Joint Commission to the effect that those Korean parties and organizations would be consulted which supported the aims of the Moscow Agreement expressed in Paragraph (1) thereof, abided by decisions of the Joint Commission and Four Powers under paragraph (2), and cooperated with reference to paragraph (3).

In discussions with reference to the procedure for consulting parties, the Soviets insisted that should individuals selected by the parties be those who had expressed opposition to the Moscow decision or had attacked any of the Allied powers, they would be declared incligible for consultation with the Joint Commission. The United States delegation did not agree with this proposal since such exclusion would in effect have barred from consultation those Koreans who had participated in the "Representative Democratic Council of South Korea," a majority of whom had voiced opposition to trusteeship. The formation of the "Democratic Council" had been encouraged by the United States Command. The Soviet delegation adopted the position that because the United States delegation did not agree without

qualification

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of negotiations and fully concurs in position General Hodge has taken, Mr. Acheson said.

10. Representative Democratic Council

In order to create an advisory body representative of the various political parties in southern Korea, the United States Command set up the Representative Democratic Council which held its first meeting on February 14, 1946. The twenty-eight members of the Council signed a statement pledging themselves to assist General Hodge in his efforts to create a provisional government. Syngman Rhee became Chairman of the Council, Kim Kiuosik--Vice Chairman, and Kim Koo--Secretary General.

The leader of the Peoples' Party, Lyuh Woon Hyung, did not attend, although he signed the agreement and his name appeared on the list of members. Lyuh's absence stemmed first from the fact that the "Propaganda Minister" of the defunct "Provisional Government," in a face-saving statement, had conveyed the impression that the new organization was an offshoot of the former "Provisional Government" and that Lyuh had merely been invited to participate rather than that he had been included from the outset as an original member; and secondly, from Communist opposition within Lyuh's party to the Council.

Thus, the Representative Democratic Council did not succeed in unifying the political parties; rather it stimulated their alignment into two camps. The Right and Center parties united behind the Representative Democratic Council under the leadership of Syngman

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The major current statements of United States policy with regard to Korea are SWNCC 176/8 and SWNCC 176/18. These two documents no longer fully meet the needs of the situation in Korea. The former was designed as guidance for the initial stages of the occupation of southern Korea prior to the assumed early unification of the United States and Soviet zones and the creation of a Korean Government or a Trusteeship. The latter document was designed as guidance in the negotiations with the Soviet authorities over the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government as a preliminary step in the unification of Korea and the creation of a Trusteeship or an independent Korean Government, as called for in the Moscow Agreement.

When the Joint Commission adjourned sine die on 8 May 1946, negotiations looking toward the creation of a Provisional Korean Government came to a halt. It obviously will be extremely difficult to reopen these negotiations and push them to a successful conclusion. Thus, the United States authorities in southern Korea are faced with the prospect of an indefinite prolongation of the present unnatural division of Korea and the postponement of all plans for the creation of a Trusteeship or independent Korean Government. It is necessary, therefore, at this time to reexamine United States policy with regard to Korea in order

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occupation of northern Korea is continued. The United States occupation of southern Korea, therefore, should be maintained as long as it contributes to the attainment of basic United States objectives with regard to Korea.

4. As a result of the joint occupation of Korea by United States and Soviet forces, basic United States objectives with regard to Korea can only be attained through agreement with the Soviet Union. In fact, the policy problems raised by Korea assume added significance because they entail the necessity of agreement with the Soviet Union and thus become part of the much more vital problem of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the United States should hold firm to its basic objectives with regard to Korea, it should be recognized that an amicable agreement with the Soviet Union over Korea is to be desired not only as a means of achieving our objectives there but also as a factor facilitating a Far Eastern and general understanding with the Soviet Union.

5. If an agreement over Korea is to be reached with the Soviet Union, it is imperative that the United States strictly observe the Moscow Agreement. The United States Government, therefore, in attempting to achieve its objectives in Korea should work within the framework of the Moscow Agreement and to this end should do all in its power to achieve the fulfillment of the terms of the Agreement and in particular the attainment of Korea independence within a maximum period of five years.

6. A satisfactory

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creation of conditions favorable to the development of a strong and lasting democratic system in Korea.

These measures, while helping to prepare Koreans for the duties and responsibilities envisaged in the Moscow Agreement and in basic United States objectives, whould prove to be extremely popular with the Koreans and should do much to strengthen democratic tendencies within the country. Popular elections should be used wherever possible for the selections of Koreans to occupy key posts in local, provincial and zone administrations and also to select an advisory legislative body. For non-elective posts, it would be advisable to choose Koreans insofar as possible from all political groups, with a view to giving Korean leaders of all shades of political opinion a vested interest in the administration of southern Korea and thus winning their support for United States policies. In holding elections, it may prove to be advisable to try local elections before attempting provincial elections and to postpone elections for the zone administration until after successful provincial elections have been held.

Since elections are to be held primarily to educate Koreans in the ways of democracy, it would be advisable to insure that all major political groups participate in all elections. Such a policy might at times make it desirable to postpone elections temporarily, but it is felt that in some cases this might be preferable to holding elections under conditions which would only serve to widen political cleavages within southern Korea and

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have the maximum effect in winning public support for the United States position and United States policies as opposed to the Soviet position and policies.

9. While winning Korean support for United States policies, it should not be forgotten that the creation of a broader basis for agreement with the Soviet Union is equally important. The measures outlined in paragraph 7 above should prove to be equally valuable for this purpose. A broad program for constructive economic and educational reforms would probably contain many features which would be acceptable to the Soviet authorities and might help to create greater confidence among them in our aims and methods. The inclusion of Koreans from all political groups in our administrations in sourthern Korea and the holding of popular elections also should afford new ground for agreement. In particular, the holding of elections to choose an advisory legislative body should enable us to create a Korean leadership in the south which is more truly representative of all Korean political opinion than is the leadership of the present Representative Democratic Council of sourthern Korea, which includes no leftists of any kind. Such a new leadership should prove to be not only stronger but also more acceptable to the Soviet Union than the present Council and, therefore, a factor strengthening rather than weakening the possibility of agreement with the Soviet Union. For these reasons the United States Commander should seek the cooperation of representatives of all political groups

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The holding of elections referred to in the preceding paragraph would probably either force these returned Korean leaders to share their leadership with more liberal Koreans or else make them a minority opposition group in the southern Korea regime. It would, however, be still better if these men were to retire altogether and permit other less controversial figures to replace them as the representatives of rightist and centrist opinion in southern Korea. Such a step would probably greatly facilitate the achievement of a satisfactory agreement with the Soviet Union without weakening the United States position in the slightest. The United States Commander, therefore, would as a general policy encourage the selection for important posts of leaders who remained in Korea throughout the period of Japanese rule and should in no way oppose the voluntary retirement from politics of Korean leaders who have returned to Korea since the Japanese capitulation.

11. The various measures outlined above are not ends in themselves but are means of achieving basic United States objectives in Korea through agreement with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Moscow Agreement. These measures are meant to facilitate but not to delay such an agreement. The Commander of United States Forces in Korea, therefore, while initiating these various measures, should not lose sight of the intention of this government to bring the negotiations of the Joint Commission to a successful conclusion as soon as possible through

the creation

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(2) To hold nation-wide elections of a type consistent with United States concepts of democracy in order to select the key members of a nation-wide Provisional Korean Government

(3) To accept for consultative purposes the advisory legislative body mentioned in paragraph 7 above as representative of all democratic parties and social organizations in southern Korea; or

(4) To use members of such an advisory legislative body for key positions in a nation-wide Provisional Korean Government.

13. The civilian recruitment program now being operated by the War Department to furnish Military Government in Korea with civilian personnel has had limited success. Notwithstanding the attractive salaries offered for positions in Korea, well qualified United States civilian personnel hesitate to accept employment. Chief among the drawbacks are said to be the present prohibition against families accompanying the employees to Korea and lack of adequate facilities there for the families, including housing, schooling, medical care and limitations on supplies ordinarily required by an American household.

In the face of demobilization affecting the strenght of military government personnel, it is feld that every means should be taken to strengthen the civilian recruitment program. Since the positions for which personnel are required demand experience and technical knowledge not now ordinarily found among Koreans,

and since

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C O P Y

SECRET

R 6729

~~1 June 1947~~

SVC 6983 290306K June

FROM: War

TO : EKRP (Political Adviser) CG USAFIK

Your assurances ~~aim relative~~ to AHN relative agreement between State and War on U.S. policy toward Korea well founded (your telegram 163 June 28).

Appropriate portions of Department telegram 92, May 21 may be used in whatever manner you see best as a basis for assurances to Koreans that General Hodge is carrying out policy of this government and as repudiation of statements to effect Command's operation on basis of policy at variance with that of Department (your telegram 162 June 20).

It should be made clear to Koreans that U.S. policy toward Korea will not change so long as there is evidence U.S.S.R. adheres to principles Moscow Agreement and is taking constructive steps with us in accomplishing its purposes and aims of Moscow Agreements.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Date-Time Recd	Msg Cen No.	How Received
291630/1 July 47	H-1313	RTT
Classification	**Precedence**	**Cite**
Secret	**Routine**	WAR X 82886

(2902507)
True Too 26 Jul

From: WAR

To: CINCFE, CG USAFIK

"PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS SECRET CORRESPONDENCE PER PARS 51 1 AND 60 A (4), AR 380-5"

TO MACARTHUR AND HODGE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE FOLLOWING INTERIM DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE MILITARY GOVT OF KOREA, RECEIVED FROM THE STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS IS TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR GUIDANCE:

"INTERIM DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, USAFEC
AND
COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. ARMY FORCES IN KOREA,
FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THOSE AREAS OF KOREA
OCCUPIED BY U. S. FORCES

1. The purpose and scope of this directive.

a. This directive, which supersedes the basic initial directive under which you have been operating, defines the authority which you will possess and the policies which will guide you in your conduct of Military Government in those Areas of Korea occupied by U. S. Forces during the period prior to the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government as envisaged in the Moscow Agreement.

b. This directive is divided into, part 1: GENERAL AND POLITICAL; part 2: CULTURAL; part 3: ECONOMIC AND CIVILIAN SUPPLY; and part 4: FINANCIAL.

c. This directive is based upon policies agreed upon by the State, War and Navy Departments and approved by The President. It is recognized that the financial requirements of this directive may be greater than under preceding directives and that U. S. funds may not now be allocated or otherwise made available to you in

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sufficient amounts to implement certain features of the directive. To the extent that essential imports and other necessary expenditures contemplated by this directive exceed your budgetary limitations, you will, as soon as practicable, report fully on the nature and extent to which additional U. S. funds will be required, including complete justification for such additional funds so that the War Department may request additional appropriations by Congress: Pending such appropriations or arrangements you will expend funds in implementing this directive only to the extent and for the purposes for which currently such funds are available.

PART 1

"GENERAL AND POLITICAL"

2. The Basis and Scope of Military Authority.

a. By virtue of your Military Occupation of Southern Korea, you are vested with the Conventional Powers of a Military Occupant of Former Enemy Territory. In addition, and in order to effectuate the surrender instrument executed by Command of the Emperor of Japan, the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Moscow Agreement, you are authorized to exercise all power necessary to give effect to those instruments.

b. While reporting to the Commander in Chief, Far East, for all Military matters, you will report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (The War Dept. acting as the Executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for all non-military aspects of the occupation, including political, economic, cultural, social, and non-military operational matters.

c. Your administration of Mil Govt will be based upon the treatment of Korea as a Liberated Country. In all your activities you will bear in mind the policy of the United States in regard to Korea which, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, contemplates a progressive development involving the following successive steps:

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(1) The present period of zonal administration by the United States and the USSR;

(2) The establishment of a Provisional Korean Govt which will assist the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission in preparing Korea for self-government;

(3) The creation of some form of Trusteeship for Korea under the United States, The United Kingdom, China, and the USSR for a period of up to five (5) years, unless there is general agreement among the Four Powers that conditions made it unnecessary;

(4) The complete independence of Korea at the earliest possible date, with subsequent membership in The United Nations.

3. Basic Objectives of Military Occupation.

a. The basic objectives of the United States with regard to Korea are:

(1) To establish an Independent and Sovereign Korea, free from all foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United Nations;

(2) To insure that the National Govt so established shall be a Democratic Govt fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and

(3) To assist the Koreans in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system necessary for an independent, democratic state.

b. It is the intention of the United States Govt to achieve its objectives in Korea within the framework of the Moscow Agreement and to this end to do all in its power to achieve the fulfillment of the terms of the Agreement and in particular the attainment of Korean independence at the earliest possible date.

c. The United States occupation of Southern Korea is for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of basic United States objectives in Korea and shall continue as long as it contributes to this end.

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d. You will continue to replace military personnel in Mil Govt with Korean personnel and U.S. civilian personnel with a view to the complete elimination of U.S. Mil personnel as soon as practicable.

e. A Political Adviser of Ambassadorial status will be appointed to advise you on matters concerning the administration of civilian affairs in Southern Korea and relations with representatives in Korea of the Soviet Union. At such time as you and the Political Adviser agree that civilian personnel have effectively replaced Mil personnel in the administration of civilian affairs and so report to the Joint Chiefs, you will be relieved of your responsibilities for civilian administration and the Political Adviser will assume them. At such time as this transfer of responsibility takes place, the term 'military government' will be abolished and a term such as 'United States Political Mission in Korea' will be substituted therefor. Until such time as this transfer of authority takes place, and a new directive is issued, you will retain final responsibility for all but non-Mil aspects of the occupation. You will, however, normally delegate to the Political Adviser the operational exercise of the political authority and functions now exercised by you or by the Mil Governor, both with respect to internal civil administration and with respect to relations with the Soviets. The Political Adviser will report to you, and his reports will be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs through you as prescribed in par 2 b above. You will assure that there will be appropriate distribution of all communications to and from the Political Adviser.

4. General Administrative Measures.

a. You will continue to take all actions necessary to assure the maintenance of law and order.

b. You will continue to utilize local, regional and national agencies of governmental administration subject to the necessary changes implicit in this directive. You will continue to give these agencies maximum responsibility for the administration of Government and will, in so far as practicable, charge them with the execution

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of your policies and directives. At all times, however, and in all circumstances you are empowered yourself to take direct action where required to carry out the objectives of the Occupation.

c. Pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Govt, you will continue to strive for the coordination of economic and administrative matters between the U.S. Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, insofar as this can be done without prejudicing the attainment of basic U.S. objectives.

5. Political Reorganization.

a. You will broaden the basis for Korean participation in the administration of Southern Korea, pending the establishment of a nation-wide Provisional Korean Govt. Insofar as the following can be accomplished without impairing the maintenance of the necessary civil control, you will:

(1) Utilize qualified Koreans in as many posts of responsibility as possible in the local and provincial administration and in the administration of the U.S. Zone as a whole by:

(a) Using popular electorial processes where ever appropriate for the selection of Koreans to occupy key posts, and

(b) For all appointive posts, selecting Koreans insofar as possible from all Political Groups, having due regard to their proportionate strength; and

(2) You will continue to utilize the Interim Legislative Assembly which shall have the duty of formulating and presenting to you draft laws to be used as a basis for political, economic and social reforms in the Southern Zone, pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government. You shall put into effect such draft laws except when they are inconsistent with basic United States objective or the Moscow Agreement.

In the implementation of paras (1) (a) and (2) above, you will make every effort to insure that all major political groups participate in elections.

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b. You will take steps to institute a broad program of constructiv economic and educational reforms for Southern Korea looking towards the creation of conditions favorable to the development of a strong and lasting democratic system in Korea. The Interim Legislative Assembly shall be encouraged to assist in formulating this program and to take the lead in initiating draft legislation for its implementation. All major reforms shall, if practicable, be initiated by the advisory legislative body, and normally no major reform should be undertaken without consultation with this body and, preferably, and obtaining its support.

c. In implementing paragraph b above, you will, insofar as consistent with para 7 d below, continue to permit full freedom of expression to all political groups and shall seek the cooperation of representatives of all groups in the administration of Southern Korea. No Korean shall be barred from participation or elective office because of his political affiliations, except as hereinafter provided. However, as a general policy, you should encourage the selection of leaders who remained in Korea throughout the period of Japanese rule and should in no way oppose the voluntary retirement from politics of Korean leaders who have returned to Korea since the Japanese capitulation.

d. While implementing paras a and b above, you should not lose sight of the intention of this govt to establish, as soon as possible, a Nationwide Provisional Korean Govt, in accordance with the terms of the Moscow Agreement. To this end, while standing firm on the principle that freedom of expression are to be safeguarded throughout Korea, you will be prepared to instruct the U.S. representatives on the Joint Commission to resume negotiations with the Soviet representatives at any time and will propose the resumption of negotiations whenever there is reason to believe that there may be a

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basis for agreement within the Commission without compromising United States principles. In particular, you will be ready to exploit any favorable reaction on the part of the Korean people or the Soviet representatives on the Joint Commission to conditions resulting from the implementation of paras a and b above as the basis for agreement regarding the establishment of a Nationwide Provisional Korean Govt. When negotiations are resumed the United States representatives will look to SWNCC 176/16 for guidance and should also consider the following suggestions as possible means of resolving the present impasse in the Joint Commission:

(1) To hold nationwide elections of a type consistent with United States concepts of democracy in order to select the group of representative democratic Korean leaders called for in para 4 d (1) of SWNCC 176/18;

(2) To hold nationwide elections of a type consistent with U.S. concepts of democracy in order to select the key members of a Nationwide Provisional Korean Govt;

(3) To accept for consultative purposes the Advisory Legislative Body called for in para 4 (2) above as representative of all democratic parties and social organizations in Southern Korea; and

(4) To use members of such an advisory legislative body for key positions in a Nationwide Provisional Korean Govt.

6. Legal and Police Organization.

a. You will continue the substantive and procedural law now existing in Korea only insofar as it is consistent with the objectives of the occupation. You will encourage the Interim Legislative Assembly to initiate and pass laws, subject to your veto, and you will impose laws by decree or ordinance only insofar as other legislation is necessary to achieve the objectives of the occupation. You will take action necessary to annul any laws and practices promulgated or followed by the Japanese authorities which discriminate for or against any person because of race, nationality, creed or political opinion.

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. Ordinary criminal and civil courts in Korea will be permitted to continue to function subject to such regulations, supervision and control as you, or the Legislative Body with your approval, may provide. Personnel of the courts who are found to be unacceptable or objectionable because of Japanese influence will be removed and will be replaced with acceptable and qualified successors. Full power of review will be retained by you over all courts which are allowed to function but will be ordinarily used only to set aside decisions which are inconsistent with the purposes of your mission. You will continue to take all necessary measures to cause the release of personnel unjustly held in custody.

c. You will continue to appoint such Military courts as may be necessary with jurisdiction over offenses involving U.S. personnel or property and over such other acts as you may declare to be offenses against your military occupation. You will, however, except as otherwise deemed necessary by you, assure that Korean courts exercise an effective jurisdiction over cases not of direct or predominant concern to your Military occupation.

d. You will retain appropriate existing police agencies and establish such others as may be necessary. All police agencies will be kept free of undependable and undesirable elements.

e. Existing policies will be retained relative to:

(1) Arrest and internment of war criminals,

(2) Prisoners of war, United Nations Nationals, neutral, and displaced persons, and

(3) Personnel objectionable because of Japanese influence.

7. Political Activity.

a. The dissemination of Japanese propaganda in any form will be prohibited and completely suppressed, and no revival of Japanese or pro-Japanese Nationalistic Societies will be allowed.

b. Subject to the necessity of maintaining security of the Occupying Forces, the formation and activities of democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion will be

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encouraged. You will continue your supervision over all political parties and those organizations and societies which participate in political activities.

c. Encouragement will be given to the development of democratic labor organizations, commerce, industry, and agriculture.

d. To the extent that the security of your military occupation and the attainment of its objectives are not clearly prejudiced, you will continue to insure freedom of opinion, speech, press and assembly.

e. Freedom of religious worship shall be maintained.

f. You will not extend official recognition to, nor utilize for political purposes, any self-styled 'Korean Provisional Govt' or similar political organizations.

4. Other Administrative Measures.

a. United States Mil and Civ personnel in Korea should make special efforts to treat the Korean population in such a manner as to develop confidence in the increased prestige of the U.S. and the United Nations. You will continue to provide your forces with information concerning the customs of the Korean people in order to contribute a better understanding between your forces and the Korean people and to avoid friction and undesirable incidents.

b. You will continue, with appropriate publicity, your efforts to ensure the recruiting and training of suitable Koreans to replace at the earliest possible moment Japanese or non-desirable Koreans who have been retained in positions of responsibility by reason of their technical qualification.

c. You will continue such minimum control and censorship of civilian communications including the mails, wireless, radio, telephone, telegraph and cables, films and press as may be necessary in the interests of Mil security and the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation.

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d. You will assist and cooperate with civilian agencies of the U.S. Govt. or of other United Nations Govts functioning in Southern Korea in accordance with decisions communicated to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The activities of such agencies will be subject to your control and authority.

e. For the purpose of attracting the well qualified civilian personnel essential to the effective operation of the U.S. occupation of Southern Korea, and for properly maintaining the occupation forces, you will initiate a program to provide acceptable living accommodations for U.S. personnel and their families. While immediately taking all practicable steps to provide living accommodations by utilization and remodeling former Japanese and foreign-owned property, you will initiate plans to undertake such new construction as is necessary, submitting estimated requirements to finance such new construction in accordance with the provisions of para 1 c above.

f. In view of the limited facilities and services existing in Korea, the provisions of War Dept policy contained in WD 80429 (12 Mar46) will not apply to War Dept civilian employees or to other civilian personnel, employed by other agencies of the U.S. Govt, who are operating under your Command in connection with Mil Govt in Korea. While not committing U.S. funds beyond budgetary limitations, you will take all practicable steps to make available to U.S. personnel and their families facilities such as schools, hospitals, and household supplies and to assist them in maintaining a suitable community.

PART II

"CULTURAL"

9. Objectives.

The basic cultural objectives of the U.S. in regard to Korea are:

a. To further the attainment of the over-all objectives of the

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occupation,

b. To encourage and assist the Koreans in freeing their cultural institutions, and the educational system in particular, from all Japanese Nationalistic influences which have been forced upon the Country in the past, in establishing a free and revitalized educational system and media of information, and in preserving and developing their own traditional National Culture along liberal and democratic lines, and

c. To encourage and assist the Korean people through an education and information program to rehabilitate their economy, and develop scientific research and technological skills,

d. To encourage and assist the Koreans to prepare for and, to the extent the conditions permit, to participate in international cultural organizations and in international cultural exchange, so long as these are consistent with the purposes and objectives of the United Nations.

e. To foster among the Korean people a knowledge and understanding of the history, institutions, culture and accomplishments of the U.S. to the end that U.S. occupation policy may achieve its objective.

10. Education.

a. You will permit all bona fide educational institutions including libraries, museums and art galleries, to remain open or to reopen as soon as possible. In order that the education processes may continue with the least possible interruption, you will undertake to preserve the use of these institutions for educational purposes. Where temporary use for other purposes is deemed imperative, they shall be returned to their normal uses as soon as possible and in nearly their original condition as practicable.

b. In order that Koreans may eventually achieve the level of literacy and educational standards necessary for the people of a Democratic and Independent State, you will permit and encourage, and assist in:

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(1) The expansion of existing educational facilities, including facilities for technical and in-plant training,

(2) The opening of appropriate new educational institutions, and

(3) The expansion of existing adult education program, making use of schools, lectures, displays and mobile educational units. To the extent that such assistance involves the expenditure of U.S. funds, you will be limited by the amounts of U.S. funds available to you.

c. You will continue to insure that all teachers who have been exponents of Japanese Militant Nationalism and Migression and those who actively oppose the purposes of the Mil Occupation are removed, and, wherever subjects, replaced by acceptable and qualified successors.

d. Proper training will be provided to insure that qualified Koreans are available for governmental, educational, and other essential positions.

e. You will permit, encourage, and within the means at your disposal assist the Koreans in programs for:

(1) The organization and administration of a democratic educational system;

(2) The general training of an adequate number of teachers at all levels;

(3) Service training of teachers for an educational system consistent with democratic, independent statehood;

(4) The reorientation and retraining of teachers who have been deprived of an adequate knowledge of their own culture, language and institutions;

(5) Development of the vocational and technical training of the Koreans through in-plant training and adult education techniques;

(6) The training of farmers through an agriculture extension system.

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f. You will continue to remove and prohibit the use of text books and curricula containing Japanese Nationalistic propaganda and see that new text books and curricula of a liberal and democratic character suitable to the Korean people are provided as soon as practicable.

g. So far as consistent with the purposes and objectives of the occupation and the security of the occupying forces:

(1) You will permit and wherever feasible assist suitable Koreans to travel abroad for purposes of study and observation in all fields of knowledge and in all skills;

(2) You will permit and encourage suitable citizens of allied countries to teach and aid in educational, scientific, technical and related institutions; to carry out activities of a philanthropic and missionary character; and to engage in religious instructions;

(3) You will permit and, within the means at your disposal, assist the flow into Korea of suitable educational material including books and other publications, aural and visual aids, technical and scientific supplies, specimens and other educational aids essential to the development of education and training; and, wherever conditions permit, you will also make available other suitable material from local sources at your disposal, including confiscated Japanese material.

h. In order that the progress of the Korean people in matters relating to the appreciation, protection and development of their traditional and historical National Culture may proceed in an orderly fashion, you will permit and encourage the Koreans in the creation of societies and organizations for these purposes and for the general advancement of learning.

i. You should encourage the Koreans to make appropriate use of the museums, libraries, monuments, and related institutions for

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educational purposes.

j. You may request the services of competent educational, scientific and technical advisers whenever desirable.

k. In the event that funds and other collective resources at your disposal or at the disposal of the Koreans are not adequate to insure the carrying out of programs based upon the above paragraphs, you should, under the provisions of para 16 below, submit such requests and justifications for additional resources as you deem necessary for their fulfillment.

11. Media of Information.

a. You will encourage the Korean people to develop all media of information and to enjoy freedom of speech and of the press, subject to the necessity of such minimum control and censorship as may be necessary for military security.

b. All available media of public information will be utilized in the guidance of the Korean people in the attainment of the objectives set forth in para 3 a through the dissemination of democratic ideals and principles of Democracy.

c. You will develop and maintain organizations and facilities for the operation of media of information designed to further the objectives of your Govt.

12. Arts and Archives.

a. You will continue to take adequate measures for the protection and preservation of all historical, cultural and religious monuments and objects, and archeological sites against deterioration and depredation.

b. You will maintain jurisdiction over designated national treasures, monuments and archeological antiquities and prohibit their sale and export.

c. You will prohibit archeological excavations and the undertaking of any extensive restoration, repairs or remodeling of monuments or other cultural objects except as may be necessary for

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their preservation, and then only under the guidance of competent experts.

d. You will take such measures as appear appropriate to encourage and, within the means at your disposal, to assist the training of competent Korean scholars and experts so that they may be prepared to assume full responsibility for the administration, technical care, and utilization of their historical and cultural property.

e. You will cause to be preserved the records and reports prepared during the period of Japanese control, (including those of the Government General, Government Departments and bureaus and all government-administered institutions and organizations), the records of important Japanese or Japanese-controlled private, financial, industrial, manufacturing, and business concerns, the archives of the former kingdom of Korea and all other historical archives.

f. You will prepare reports, as necessary, on the over-all status of Korean art collections, museums, historic monuments and archeological sites.

PART III

ECONOMIC

1. Objectives.

The basic economic objectives of the United States with regard to Korea are:

a. To further the attainment of the over-all objectives of the occupation.

b. To establish a strong independent Korea economy free from domination by Japan by any Foreign Power as a necessary foundation for political independence.

c. To assist the Koreans in developing an economy which will provide them with as high a standard of living and as great economic security as their resources and technological development will permit.

d. To assist the Koreans in initiating a broad program of

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domestic economic reforms which will encourage stable democratic institutions.

c. To assist the Koreans in encouraging and developing scientific research and technology adaptable to their country.

14. General policy for attainment of objectives.

While at all times and in all circumstances you are empowered to take such direct action as necessary, insofar as possible, you will accomplish these objectives as follows:

a. By encouraging maximum local production and equitable distribution of needed goods.

b. By encouraging Korean participation in world trade particularly with a view to stimulating exports, procuring imports essential to the attainment of the objectives of the occupation and keeping to a minimum the quantity of imports which must be financed by the U...

c. By encouraging in the United States some Korean responsibility, initiative and participation in economic activities in all ways which are not inconsistent with the maintenance of necessary military control, by

(1) Utilizing for this purpose the advisory legislative body as provided for in paragraph 5 d (2) above, and

(2) Encouraging Koreans to assume responsibility insofar as possible for administration of economic programs, with participation of U.S. personnel directed primarily to high level advice, guidance, technical assistance and training in fields where skilled Korean personnel is limited.

d. U.S. occupation costs in Korea, including both won and non-won expenditures for purposes of the occupation, will be covered by separate directive.

15. Reintegration of Economy of Northern Korea with that of Southern Korea.

Early reintegration of the economy of Northern Korea with that of Southern Korea continues to be an important aim of U.S. policy.

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You will be prepared to instruct the U.S. representatives on the Joint Commission to resume negotiations with the Soviet representatives to effect economic reintegration at any time. Meanwhile, you will continue your efforts to arrange with the Soviet Commander of Northern Korea for the exchange of goods between the Northern and southern zones.

1. Domestic Economic Program.

a. In order to control inflation, maximum production of needed goods, ensure equitable distribution of such supplies as are available, and introduce greater stability on the economy of Southern Korea, you will establish such measures for rationing, price control, allocation of materials, production control, and such other appropriate fiscal and administrative measures as you deem necessary. You will encourage Korean participation in the formation and administration of these measures. You will guide the establishment of such controls so that, insofar as possible, they will be developed only as temporary measures. Revive the economy following a period of disruption caused by war and will be administered to bring about such balance and stability as should permit their elimination as soon as possible.

b. Safeguards should be taken to assure to the Koreans adequate opportunity to determine for themselves the ultimate character of economic institutions and activities within Korea. You will assist them in every way possible to develop an economy so organized as to facilitate the growth of peaceful and democratic, political, social and economic institutions. Such an economy in Korea might well be on the 'mixed' type including various arrangements for industrial organization such as public, private and cooperative ownership, and an agriculture based firmly on a large number of small farmer proprietors. You will encourage popular discussion of economic reforms such as redistribution of land ownership or development of credit

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cooperatives and promote active Korean participation in the formulation and administration of measures to accomplish these reforms along the lines indicated in paragraph 14 c.

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17. Foreign Trade.

Subject to your control, participation of Koreans in world trade will be encoureged. You will establish measures to stimulate exports from Korea, to limit imports and other expenditures requiring foreign exchange to items essential for the achievement of all the objectives of the occupation, and to establish control over all Korean foreign exchange in order to pay for a maximum proportion of such necessary imports and reduce U.S. commitments for this purpose to a minimum. As in the case of domestic economic controls, such measures should be of temporary duration for the purpose of dealing with the present-day normal situation.

18. Civilian Supply.

a. You will assure that all practicable measures are taken to achieve the maximum utilization of Korean resources in order to limit U.S. responsibility for imports into Korea. Such measures will include the controls discussed in paragraph 16 a. above.

b. Insofar as essential goods necessary to accomplish the objectives set forth in paragraph 13 cannot be furnished through local Korean production or through imports financed by relief and charitable agencies such as UNRRA, it is the policy of the United States Government to provide such imports, subject to the following procedures and to budgetary limitations:

(1) You will submit periodically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff statements of over-all import requirements essential to attain these objectives, setting forth specific justifications of items and quantities.

(2) You will indicate proposed sources of supply and methods of financing for these import programs according to the following categories:

(a) Surplus or Excess U.S. Government stocks in Asia and the Pacific.

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As high a proportion of your import requirements as possible should be obtained from excess U.S. Government stocks. Additional goods, suitable in type and cost to Korea's economy and available in surplus property stocks, should be obtained within the limits of foreign liquidation commission credits made available to you.

(b) Imports from Japan.

Such essential imports as Korea can most easily and economically obtain from Japan should, during the period of rehabilitation, be supplied from that country to the extent that they are available. Imports into Korea from Japan will provisionally be considered as deductions from Japanese obligations to the United States for repayment of Japanese imports.

(c) Imports financed by Korean Foreign Exchange and exports. Other essential imports should be financed to the maximum extent through Korean foreign exchange or exports.

(d) Imports financed by U.S.

All other sources should be fully exploited before establishing import requirements which must be financed by the U. S. Government.

19. Resumption of foreign business operations.

U. S. policy calls for the resumption of normal foreign business operations in Korea as soon as possible. You may, subject to the controls established in implementing para 17 above, authorize travel of businessmen to Southern Korea and of Korean businessmen to allied countries when you consider such travel desirable. When authorizing such travel you will consider the needs of the Korean economy for industrial development and technical assistance, the necessity of preventing foreign enterprises from obtaining control over any part of the Korean economy, the availability of living facilities and any other relevant considerations. Opportunities for such travel will be open on equal terms to businessmen of all allied countries which practice no discrimination against U.S. interests. The detailed terms and limitations under which allied businessmen will be permitted to enter

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Southern Korea will be determined by the United States Government upon receiving your recommendations. To the extent that such a program will improve the Korean economy, you will enlist the aid of U.S. and other allied technicians and experts in training Koreans to carry out necessary economic activities.

PART IV

"FINANCIAL"

20. In the administration of financial matters you will continue to use Korean personnel and existing agencies and financial institutions in Korea to the maximum extent consistent with the objectives of the occupation. You should establish new agencies, or reorganize existing ones, to the extent necessary to assure the effective execution of the policies and programs of this directive. You will continue to remove and exclude from positions of responsibility or influence all personnel objectionable because of Japanese influence. You may establish administrative machinery not dependent upon Korean Authorities and Agencies to the extent necessary to execute or assume the effective execution of the policies and programs in this directive. Such machinery will be integrated with other Korean agencies as early as practicable to insure maximum, efficient and economical administration of Korean financial affairs.

21. You will continue to take all steps necessary to terminate Japanese influence over financial institutions in Korea. You will not permit communication or other contact involving business, commercial, or financial matters between Japanese Nationals in Japan and persons within Korea.

22. The legal tender in Korea will be Bank of Chosen notes. Until further directed you will not permit any other currency to circulate except as follows:

a. United States Mil Payment Certificates will be a medium of exchange for authorized personnel under regulations approved by you.

b. As a temporary measure, Japanese currency now in circulation of less than one yen domination may be continued in use. You will not announce, establish or permit the use or publication of ~~any~~ general

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rate of exchange between Bank of Chosen notes and the US dollar and/or other currencies, except for a Mil conversion rate to be governed by separate directives.

23.

a. The Bank of Chosen will continue to perform central banking functions under your direction. The central banking functions of the institution will, for the purposes of accounting and the training of specialized personnel, be conducted [illegible] special banking activities and handled by a separate department of the bank. You may if you deem appropriate change the English translation of the name of the Bank to "BANK OF KOREA."

b. Adequate funds in Korean legal tender may be made available to financial and business institutions in Korea to finance activities which you consider essential to the Korean economy. You will receive a separate directive dealing with revised procedures regarding the financing of local currency expenditures (see par. 14 g.).

c. You will hold in force either directly or through the Central Banking Dept of the Bank of Chosen, should retain strict control of bank credit in Korea, prescribe rates of interest, conduct periodic bank examinations, require bank to maintain reserves against deposits, and take such other measures as may be required to assure adequate supervision and control of the Korean financial and credit structure.

24. You will continue to maintain such accounts and records as may be necessary to reflect the financial operations of your Mil Occupation and you will provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with such information as they may require. Separate accounts will be kept of all receipts and expenditures in US dollars and all receipts and expenditures in Korean legal tender currency arising from:

(1) The normal functions of Govt in Korea and

(2) The Mil Occupation of Korea.

25. You will continue to take action necessary to insure that all laws and practices promulgated by the Japanese authorities relating to

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taxation or other fields of finance in Korea which descriminate for or against any person because of race, nationality, creed or political opinion, will be amended, suspended or abrogated to the extent necessary to eliminate such discriminations. The Mil Govt in Korea should take all steps necessary to revise the tax structure and to take such other measures as may be required to assure adequate inflow of revenues, and should exercise control and supervision over the expenditures of public funds to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of the occupation. Funds in excess of normal Govt revenues necessary to finance essential Govt activities and programs necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation may be borrowed by the Mil Govt from the Bank of Chosen in accordance with the provision of par 7 of this directive; however, such expenditures in excess of revenues shall be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, you will advise on the question that any such loans or expenditures authorized by Mil Govt will be honored by the Provisional Korean Govt or other Korean Govt then established. You will take no commitment beyond the purview of Congressional appropriations for approved war dept civil affairs/mil govt operations that might be construed as an obligation of the dollar funds of the US Govt.

26. No transaction with respect to any impounded or blocked assets will be effected except pursuant to licenses or other authorizations issued by your Mil Govt in Korea. You will impound or block all gold, silver, platinum, currencies, securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers, and all other property falling within the following categories:

a. Property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part by any of the following:

(1) The Governments, Nationals or residents of Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary;

(2) Any persons specified by Mil Govt by inclusion in lists or otherwise.

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b. Property in Korea which is, or has been since 6 Dec 1941, owned or controlled directly or indirectly, in whole or in part by any person outside Korea or Japan.

c. Identifiable looted property.

Identifiable looted property in Korea and property of called Nationals which was vested by the Japanese Govt should be restored as promptly as possible.

27. All transactions in foreign exchange and foreign exchange assets, including those arising out of exports and imports, shall be controlled for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the occupation. To effectuate such objectives you will:

a. Prohibit, except as specifically authorized by your HQ Govt in Korea, all dealings in foreign exchange assets and all foreign exchange transactions.

b. Establish effective controls over the import and export of

(1) Gold, silver, whether in coin or bullion form, platinum and other precious metals;

(2) Currency;

(3) Securities;

(4) Checks, drafts, bills of exchange, promissory notes, payment instructions, transfer orders and other financial instruments;

(5) Powers of attorney or other authorizations or instructions to effect financial or property transactions; and

(6) Other evidences of indebtedness or ownership of property.

c. Make available any foreign exchange only for the payment of imports necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation. No other outlay of foreign exchange assets will be made without specific approval by your Govt through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. As used herein, the term "FOREIGN EXCHANGE ASSET" shall include, but not by way of limitation, gold, silver, whether in coin or bullion form, platinum; any foreign currency, property physically situated outside of Korea; claims, demands, bank deposits, credits, securities, checks, drafts, insurance policies, or other evidences of ownership or indebtedness

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issued by or which are obligations of any person outside of Korea; copyrights, patents or trade-marks, issued by any country other than Japan, and any contracts or licenses relating thereto.

c. As used herein the term "TRANSACTIONS IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE" will include, but not be limited to, any transaction involving any foreign currency, any payment or transfer to or from any foreign country, any deposit or credit, or payment or transfer between residents, wherever located, of foreign currency, any purchase, sale, transfer or other dealing in any foreign currency, any commercial or mercantile transaction between a person in Korea and a person outside Korea, which is to be settled in foreign currency, and any transaction involving an obligation owed by any person in Korea to any person outside of Korea or owed by any person outside of Korea to any person in Korea.

d. The term "vested property" means property interests which have been or shall hereafter be vested in the Custodian of Korea by its Ordinance Number 33 or any subsequent ordinance. In case of any juridical person chartered in Korea, shares may be voted so as to make the term applicable only to the Japanese interests of such juridical person. Any juridical person in Korea will hold vested property for ultimate disposition in accordance with instructions to be forwarded to you.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

URGENT
INCOMING MESSAGE

DATE-TIME RECD	MSG CEN NO.	HOW RECD
161419 AUG 47	R-4684	RTT
CLASSIFICATION	**PRECEDENCE**	**CIT**
NONE	URGENT	66 GRNC 45 152200/Z

FROM: WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT

TO: KPNCFE ADVANCE PASS TO CG XXIV CORPS (FOR POLAD)

INFO:

FOLLOWING STATEMENT BEING ISSUED TO PRESS BY DEPT TODAY "REPORTS HAVE REACHED THE DEPT OF STATE FROM KOREA ALLERGING THAT THE AMERICAN COMMENDER THERE GENERAL HODGE HAS BEEN FOLLOWING A POLICY IN KOREA CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS LAID DOWN IN WASHINGTON THE PROJECTED VISIT TO KOREA OF GENERAL WEDEMEYER AND THE RECENT LETTER ADDRESSED BY SECRETARY MARSHALL TO MR MOLOTOV ARE CITED AS EVIDENCE OF A COMING CHANGE IN UNITED STATES POLICY AS IT HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT IN KOREA BY GENERAL HODGE SUCH ALLEGATIONS HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO FOUNDATION IN FACT "THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TOWARDS KOREA HAS BEEN AND STILL IS TO ASSURE THAT KOREA SHALL BECOME A FREE UNITED AND SOVEREIGN NATION WITH A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WILL OF ITS PEOPLE IN ADDITION TO THE FUNDS FOR KOREA APPROPRIATED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT BY THE CONGRESS GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH GENERAL HODGE ARE COMPLETING STUDIES ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE KOREA PEOPLE FOR FURTHER AID THESE STUDIES WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED BY THE REPORT OF GENERAL WEDEMEYER WHO HEADS A FACT FINDING MISSION OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS TO

[redacted]

ACTION DISTRIBUTION

G-1	AES	PM	IG	CPS	POSTAL
G-2	AIR O	SIG O	JA	DBS	JT COMM
G-3	CML O	SURG	QM	I & E	USAMGIK
G-4	ENGR	CHAP	SSO	PIO	KBC
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URGENT

8-8-39

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INCOMING MESSAGE

DATE-TIME RECD	MSG CEN NO. R-4084	HOW RECD
CLASSIFICATION	PRECEDENCE	CITE

FROM: _____

TO: _____

INFO: _____ PAGE 2

KOREA AND CHINA ANY PROGRAM OF FURTHER AID DEVELOPED FROM THESE STUDIES WILL BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH THE COMMANDING GENERAL US ARMY FORCES IN KOREA AS EXISTING PROGRAMS AND POLICIES HAVE BEEN "THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THEREFORE WISHES TO STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE IS BUT 1 AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD KOREA AND THAT GENERAL HODGE HAS FAITHFULLY ANDCONSISTENTLY ACTED IN CONFORMANCE THEREWITH UNDER DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX CIRCUMSTANCES.

AC-5848-A-TYPED BY SLADON

RECEIVED: 161425/1

ACTION DISTRIBUTION

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G-4 _____	ENGR _____	CHAP _____	SSO_____	PIO _____	KBC _____
AG _____	ORD O_____	FIS O_____	SBS_____	ARC _____	POLAD_____

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Policy file

Restricted

RESTRICTED

5 November 1947

PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM ON KOREA

1. This paper is classified Restricted as it is not for release or publication, but the information contained in it may be used for domestic information purposes.

2. Additional information in regard to the attached paper may be obtained from Gen. W. H. Arnold, P&O, WDX 3310.

[redacted]

Note last par

Restricted

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INFORMATION THEMES

1. US objectives in Korea are:

a) To assist in the establishment, as soon as practicable, of a self-governing sovereign Korea independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations;

b) To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely-expressed will of the Korean people;

c) and to aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state.

2. The US carries out its international commitments.

The US is committed with the USSR, UK and China to provide for the establishment of a free and independent Korea, under the terms of the Moscow Declaration of December 27, 1945. These commitments will not be met unless we carry out our objectives in Korea. These objectives, further, are consistent with the principles of the Charter of the UN, to which each of the four powers is a party. By submitting the problem of Korea to the United Nations, the United States is recognizing its obligations to that international body while at the same time supporting its commitment for an independent Korea.

3. Every possible effort to expedite independence of a united Korea has been and is being made by the U.S.

Within the framework of our commitments, US policy is designed to pursue every avenue of solution in accomplishing its objectives. New steps taken in the development of this policy, as they become public, should be case in this light, with the reasons fully explained. To keep the record clear, every occasion should be taken to review the efforts that this Government has made and, when these have been unsuccessful, to point out the reasons why.

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4. A united, independent Korea is essential to stability and peace in East Asia.

Korea is an historic "weak spot" that has twice within the past half century been a cause of international friction. Our efforts to eliminate this "weak spot" constitute an investment in peace.

5. Secondary theme, to be kept alive to US audience only.

Attainment of this objective will contribute to the political and economic stability of East Asia, which vitally affects the economic and political welfare of the US. Further, early independence of a united Korea within the framework of our commitments, will hasten the withdrawal of US troops and the reduction of occupation costs.

INFORMATION CAUTIONS

1. Avoid use of "trusteeship". The Four Powers are committed through the Moscow Agreement to the creation of some form of trusteeship over Korea, for a period of up to five years. However, by general agreement among them that conditions make this unnecessary or through agreements reached as a result of United Nations consideration of the problem, "trusteeship" as envisaged in the Moscow Agreement may not be realized. Under the circumstances therefore, and because of Korean hatred for this term which was used by the Japanese as a euphemism for their early rule over Korea, emphasis should not be placed upon this term in discussing the Korean problem.

2. Avoid speculation and comment on establishment of an independent south Korea.

Treatment of the Korean problem should emphasize the objective of a united, independent Korea. The suggestion that the US should support an independent south Korea is contrary to that objective and should be treated accordingly.

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b. It is the intention of the United States Government to achieve its objectives in Korea within the framework of the Moscow Agreement and to this end to do all in its power to achieve the fulfillment of the terms of the Agreement and in particular the attainment of Korean independence at the earliest possible date.

c. The military occupation of Southern Korea is for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of basic United States objectives in Korea and shall continue as long as it contributes to this end.

d. With a view to preparing Koreans for early independence and winning popular Korean support for United States policies and thus strengthening the United States position in future negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Commander of United States Forces in Korea, pending the establishment of a nation-wide Provisional Korean Government, shall broaden the basis for Korean participation in the administration of Southern Korea. Insofar as the following can be accomplished without impairing the maintenance of the necessary military control, he shall:

(1) Utilize qualified Koreans in as many posts of responsibility as possible in the local and provincial administrations and in the administration of the United States zone as a whole:

(a) Using popular electoral processes for the selection of Koreans to occupy key posts in

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reforms for Southern Korea looking toward the creation of conditions favorable to the development of a strong and lasting democratic system in Korea. The advisory legislative body, when constituted, shall be encouraged to assist in formulating this program and to take the lead in initiating draft legislation for its implementation. All major reforms shall, if possible, be initiated by the advisory legislative body, and no major reform shall be undertaken without consultation with this body and, preferably after obtaining its support. Further instructions regarding specific features of such an economic and educational reform program will be provided by the United States Government for the guidance of the United States Commander.

f. In implementing paragraphs d and e above, the Commander of the United States Forces in Korea shall continue to permit full freedom of expression to all political groups and shall seek the cooperation of representatives of all groups in the administration of southern Korea. No Korean shall be barred from an appointive or elective post because of his political affiliations. As a general policy, however, the United States Commander shall encourage the selection of leaders who remained in Korea throughout the period of Japanese rule and shall in no way oppose the voluntary retirement from politics of Korean leaders who have returned to Korea since the Japanese capitulation.

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(1) To hold nation-wide elections of a type consistent with United States concepts of democracy in order to select the group of representative democratic Korean leaders called for in paragraph 4 d (1) of SWNCC 176/18;

(2) To hold nation-wide elections of a type consistent with United States concepts of democracy in order to select the key members of a nation-wide Provisional Korean Government;

(3) To accept for consultative purposes the advisory legislative body called for in paragraph d (2) above as representative of all democratic parties and social organizations in southern Korea; and

(4) To use members of such an advisory legislative body for key positions in a nation-wide Provisional Korean Government.

i. Pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government, the United States Commander in Korea shall continue to strive for the coordination of economic and administrative matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea, insofar as this can be done without prejudicing the attainment of basic United States objectives.

j. For the purpose of attracting the well-qualified personnel essential to the effective operation of the United States occupation in southern Korea, a substantial program shall be initiated to provide

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establishment of the Civil Affairs Administartion and the political and administrative reorganization; the procedures to be followed in regard to demilitarization, arrest and internment, prisoners of war, United Nations Nationals, Neutrals and other persons; and the actions of the Command relative to political activity, education, arts and archives.

The section on economics defined the objectives and methods of economic control; procedures regarding armament production, agriculture, industry and internal commerce, public health, international economic transactions and restitution of property; and the methods of achieving adequate civilian supply and relief. The financial section defined the action to be taken regarding the control of banks, issuance of money, payment of pensions, freezing of certain assets, and foreign exchange transactions.

4. Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, reads as follows:

"III. Korea. 1. With a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a joint commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern

Korea.

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"Under our agreement at Moscow, the two military commands are to form a Joint Soviet-American Commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems. They will make recommendations to the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China for the formulation of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. They will also make proposals to these Governments regarding a four-power trusteeship to prepare Korea for its independence within five years.

"The Joint Soviet-American Commission, working with the Korean Provisional Democratic Government, may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the Society of Nations."

6. The United States-Soviet Joint Conference, which met from January 16 to February 5, 1946, was convened in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, which provided for consideration of urgent problems affecting both occupation areas and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the two occupation commands. Of the fifteen points on the official agenda, agreement was achieved on only seven items. These agreements provided for: rail, motor and water-borne transportation on a limited basis; uniform regulation of ports in both zones; establishment of joint control posts along the 38th parallel; limited movement of Korean citizens from one zone to the other; limited exchange of first-class mail; allocation of radio frequencies; and measures for future coordination between the two commands. Implementation of the agreements made has not been complete; in fact the only agreement known to have been carried out in full is that concerning exchange of first-class mails.

Because

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The United States members were to suggest that the Joint Commission should select a group of representative democratic Korean leaders for the purpose of consultation with the Joint Commission in its preparation of proposals for the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government. Such leaders were to be chosen after full consultation with all democratic parties or through electoral processes. If the Joint Commission could not agree on such a position, the United States and Soviet Commanders in Korea separately were to choose the members of the group from their respective zones—the number from each zone to be proportionate to the population or at least to the number of provinces in each zone. The group of Korean leaders were to be called on to formulate plans for a Provisional Korean Government, subject to modification by the Joint Commission. Such proposals were then to be forwarded to the four Powers. If it were impossible for the Joint Commission to reach agreement on the creation of an advisory group of Korean leaders, the United States Commander in Korea was independently to form such a group to act in an advisory capacity to the United States members of the Joint Commission in matters relating to the creation of a Provisional Korean Government.

8. Representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea began sessions of the Joint Commission on March 20, 1946. In the opening session, the Soviet Delegate, General Shtikov, stated that "the Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union.

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qualification that the Moscow Agreement makes a five-year trusteeship for Korea mandatory, and because the United States Command did not prohibit further discussion of the subject by Koreans, the United States was not living up to the Moscow decision.

It became evident that no progress could be made, and the United States delegation moved for consideration of measures for the elimination of the 38th parallel. The Soviet delegation responded to the effect that the problems involved there would be solved with the creation of a Provisional Government. The United States delegation, on May 8, moved for adjournment sine die; the Soviet delegation agreed.

9. In a press conference on May 17, Acting Secretary Acheson stated when asked if any communication had passed between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the deadlock of the Joint Commission in Korea, that no such communication had passed on government level and that the Commission had simply adjourned and had not dissolved since it had no authority to dissolve, He added that the United States representatives on the Joint Commission are ready at any time to resume negotiations for fulfillment of the Moscow decision as soon as the Soviet delegation to the Commission is ready to acknowledge that freedom of expression will be safeguarded throughout Korea in implementation of the Moscow decision. The State Department has been kept fully informed by General John R. Hodge of all phases of

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SWNCC Directives, 1945-47

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SWNCC DIRECTIVES

1945

79 – 176/12

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COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE

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COPY NO. 51

SWNCC 176/12

17 December 1945

Pages 76 - 77, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DISPLACED PERSONS IN KOREA
Reference: a. SWNCC 176/8

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report on the above subject by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East proposing amendments and additions to reference a, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

ALEXANDER D. REID
B. L. AUSTIN
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: J.C.S. regarding memo M-71
Name and title of person making the change:
MOG
Date 4/24/73

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ENCLOSURE

DISPLACED PERSONS IN KOREA

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To propose additions to SWNCC 176/8 (JCS 1483/5), paragraph 8, with respect to displaced persons in Korea.

DISCUSSION

2. Paragraph 8 of SWNCC 176/8 (JCS 1483/5) contains directive to CINCAFPAC as to displaced persons in Korea. In order to provide further guidance to CINCAFPAC, certain additional provisions are appropriate.

CONCLUSIONS

3. Paragraph 8 f of SWNCC 176/8 (JCS 1483/5) should be cancelled and the following should be added to paragraph 8:

"f. All Korean displaced persons, including those formerly resident in Korea north of 38° North Latitude, found outside Korea should be permitted to return to Korea. You will make necessary arrangements to carry out any agreements made on a governmental level by the United States and the U.S.S.R. for exchange of displaced persons within Korea.

g. You should organize adequate reception facilities for Korean displaced persons to be repatriated from outside Korea or returned from Korea north of 38° North Latitude.

h. All Korean displaced persons formerly resident in Korea **south** of 38° North Latitude should be permitted to return to their homes.

i. The care and return to their homes or other disposition of internally displaced Koreans should be the responsibility of the local authorities subject to your supervision and control.

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By NARS Date

j. (1)All Japanese nationals whose place of origin was the main Japanese home islands should be repatriated to Japan with such exceptions as you may deem appropriate, such as those whose presence is temporarily required on grounds of professional or technical abilities.

(2) All repatriations of Japanese should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

(3) You should determine the rate of repatriation from Korea on the basis of arrangements for reception to be made by the Japanese Government at your direction and subject to your approval.

(4) The movement of Japanese from Korea to Japan should be coordinated with repatriation of Koreans from Japan wherever practicable.

(5) You should take steps to protect the Japanese nationals awaiting transportation from disorders resulting from any anti-Japanese feeling on the part of the Korean people, and if necessary effect the segregation of the Japanese.

k. All expenses incurred by United States authorities in connection with displaced persons operations covered by this Directive shall be considered a part of occupation costs which may be included in the United States claims against Japan.

l. UNRRA and private relief agencies may be used at your discretion wherever available in the care and repatriation of United Nations nationals and those assimilated to them in treatment."

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that, upon approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the "Conclusions" in paragraph 3 above be transmitted to CINCAFPAC.

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SWNCC 176/11

15 December 1945

Page 75

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES INITIAL POLICY WITH RESPECT TO KOREA
Reference: a. SWNCC 176/10

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum on the above subject from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated to the Committee for consideration in connection with reference a.

ALEXANDER D. REID
B. L. AUSTIN
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

ENCLOSURE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SM-4468
14 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: United States Policy with respect to Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered a memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, circulated as SWNCC 176/10, which contains a statement, proposed for publication, dealing with United States policy with respect to Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no military objection to the release by the State Department to our Allies and the press of this statement subsequent to its receipt by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, providing that it is not released until the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has had sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements to be prepared to counteract the expected unfavorable reception by the Koreans of this official announcement of the trusteeship plan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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SWNCC 176/10

23 November 1945

Pages 69 - 74, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES INITIAL POLICY WITH RESPECT TO KOREA
Reference: a. SWNCC 176/9/D

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East on the above reference, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this report has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comment from a military point of view. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ALEXANDER D. REID
B. L. AUSTIN
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: JCS regrading memo 17-71
Name and title of person making the change:
MOG
Date 4/24/73

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E N C L O S U R E

UNITED STATES INITIAL POLICY WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

Memorandum by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

1. SWNCC 176/9/D directed the Subcommittee to prepare a statement giving the general outline of United States policy with respect to Korea for release to our Allies and to the press.

2. Such a policy statement, based on and in consonance with SWNCC 176/8, "Basic Initial Directive for Civil Affairs in Korea", is contained at the Appendix.

3. It is recommended that:

a. This report be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view; and

b. Upon approval by the SWNCC of the policy statement at the Appendix, the Appendix be forwarded to the State, War and Navy Departments and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guidance and information, and to the State Department for release to our Allies and to the press at its discretion, subsequent to its receipt by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

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A P P E N D I X

UNITED STATES INITIAL POLICY WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

The Atlantic Charter sets forth the general principles that all people have the right to choose the form of government under which they will live and that sovereign rights and self-government should be restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, subscribed to by the heads of state of the United States, China and the United Kingdom, states:

> "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

The Potsdam Declaration, to which the four Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union, have subscribed, provides that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out. Consequently, the four major Allies are committed to Korean independence "in due course".

President Truman emphasized, in a statement issued on September 18, 1945, that the surrender of Japanese forces in Seoul, the capital of Korea, heralded "the liberation of a freedom-loving and heroic people" and that the United States, China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, who are agreed that Korea shall become free and independent, will assist Korea in the building of a great nation.

For purposes of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, the country was divided into two zones. These zones have continued to be used as the areas of military government of the Soviet and United States forces. Negotiations with the Soviet Government have been initiated by the United States to further United States aims (1) to establish liaison between

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the two forces as rapidly as possible to reduce to a minimum the effects of such division on Korean unity and (2) to eliminate the two zones as quickly as possible. It is the position of the United States that the present period of military governments, under the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in their respective zones of responsibility, should be succeeded as soon as possible by a period of temporary, international trusteeship over all Korea so that Korea may become independent at an early date and will be prepared to take its place as one of the United Nations.

II. POLICIES OF MILITARY OCCUPATION IN THE UNITED STATES ZONE

Military Government in the United States zone is governed by the following:

A. Purposes:

(1) to insure compliance with the surrender by Japanese forces in Korea;

(2) to effect complete political and administrative separation of Korea from Japanese social, economic and financial control;

(3) to facilitate the development of a sound Korean economy;

(4) to foster the establishment of self-government leading towards restoration of a free, independent and responsible Korea.

B. Implementation of Purposes:

The purposes as outlined above fall under the general headings of political, economic and financial. With relation to them, the following basic policies are set forth as working principles:

(1) Political.

a. In accordance with the terms of the Japanese surrender all Japanese armed forces in the American zone have been disarmed and are now being repatriated.

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Similarly, Japanese and pro-Japanese officials in the Government of Korea are being removed from office. As such personnel are removed, they will be replaced, to the greatest extent possible, by capable and responsible Koreans. United States occupation authorities have initiated a program of recruitment and training of Koreans for administrative positions which is designed to overcome the lack of experienced personnel for responsible offices which resulted from the Japanese policy of suppressing Korean participation in government.

b. The expression of the will of the people, through organizations and societies whose activities do not jeopardize peace and order, is being encouraged.

c. Freedom of religious worship, the encouragement of enlightened education and the preservation of Korean culture, as opposed to continuation of Japanese influence, is being facilitiated.

(2) Economic.

a. During the present period of occupation, every effort is being made to establish liaison with Soviet occupational forces in order to maintain to the maximum extent possible normal distribution of goods, services and communications between the two zones of occupation.

b. Within a framework of orderly development, a program providing for the elimination of all vestiges of Japanese control over Korean economic life and the separation of Korea from economic dependence upon Japan is being pursued by United States authorities. Recruitment and training of Koreans for managerial and technical positions to replace Japanese personnel will be undertaken.

c. Measures designed to permit a wide distribution of income and local ownership of the means of production and trade will be given force. Encouragement will be

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given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry and agriculture, formulated on a democratic basis, and dedicated to orderly integration into a national Korean economy.

d. A program will be followed designed to maximize the local production of all foodstuffs and goods important to the Korean economy. When any surpluses in such items appear, they will be made available for interzonal exchange and for international trade.

e. Encouragement will be given to a program designed to strengthen the Korean economy and raise the living standards of the Korean people by fostering industrial development and maximum utilization of local resources. Orderly integration of an independent Korean economy into the Far Eastern and world systems of international trade will be supported.

(3) Financial.

a. The United States occupation authorities will endeavor to utilize central banking operations in Korea and to adopt control measures designed to provide for the development of industry and commerce through a stable currency related to the resources of the country.

b. Korean agencies and personnel will be used in the administration of financial transactions under occupation personnel, and Japanese influence in all public and private financial institutions will be removed.

c. To cover expenditures by the Military Government in the administration of the area under control, such taxes will be levied and collected as are found expedient and necessary to assure adequate revenue for the administration.

d. Assets, real or personal, owned or controlled in part by the governments, nationals or residents of

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powers or dependencies, except Korea, recently engaged in hostilities with members of the United Nations will be impounded or blocked. Resources controlled by absentee owners, including those of the United Nations or neutrals, by persons furthering subversive enterprises, by persons subject to arrest or by associations and organizations dissolved by Military Government, will also be blocked or impounded. The release of such assets will be under license or instructions issued by military government authority.

e. All foreign exchange transactions, including those arising out of exports and imports, will be controlled in conformity with the purposes of the occupation.

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SWNCC 176/9/D

15 October 1945

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DIRECTIVE

BASIC INITIAL DIRECTIVE FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS IN KOREA
Reference: a. Item 6, Minutes of 27th Meeting.

Note by the Secretaries

As was agreed upon by the Committee at its twenty-seventh meeting, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East will prepare a statement giving the general outline of the U.S. policy on Korea for issue by the State Department to our Allies and then to the press.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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13 October 1945

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

BASIC INITIAL DIRECTIVE FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS IN KOREA

References: a. SWNCC 176/3.
b. SWNCC 176/6.
c. JCS 1483/5.

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a revision and consolidation of references a and b as approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at their twenty-seventh meeting and agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated for information and guidance.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been requested to forward this directive to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, for guidance.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: JCS regarding memo 17-71
Name and title of person making the change:
MDG
Date 4/24/73

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ENCLOSURE

BASIC INITIAL DIRECTIVE TO THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC,
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN
THOSE AREAS OF KOREA OCCUPIED BY U.S. FORCES

1. The Purpose and Scope of This Directive.

a. This directive defines the authority which you will possess and the policies which will guide you in the administration of civil affairs in Korea in the initial period after Japanese surrender prior to the establishment of a trusteeship.

b. Korea, as used in this directive, is defined as those areas of Korea occupied by U.S. forces.

c. This directive is divided into Part I: General and Political; Part II: Economic and Civilian Supply; and Part III: Financial.

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PART I

GENERAL AND POLITICAL

2. The Basis and Scope of Military Authority.

a. By virtue of your military occupation of Korea, you are vested with the conventional powers of a military occupant of enemy territory. In addition, and in order to effectuate the Surrender Instrument executed by command of the Emperor of Japan, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration you are authorized to exercise all power necessary to give effect to those instruments.

b. In conformity with the provisions of the Cairo Declaration your administration of civil affairs will be based upon the treatment of Korea as a liberated country to the maximum extent consistent with the security of your forces. In order to effect the greatest possible economy of military personnel you will utilize Koreans in governmental positions as far as possible. You may also utilize Japanese in accordance with paragraph 5 f below. You will also take such steps as are necessary on a military level to effectuate liaison with the Russians. In all your activities you will bear in mind the policy of the United States in regard to Korea, which contemplates a progressive development from this initial interim period of civil affairs administration by the United States and the U.S.S.R., to a period of trusteeship under the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the U.S.S.R., and finally to the eventual independence of Korea with membership in the United Nations organization. In the exercise of your powers you will be guided by the following general principles.

3. Basic Objectives of Military Occupation of Korea.

a. The ultimate objective of the United States with respect to Korea is to foster conditions which will bring

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about the establishment of a free and independent nation capable of taking her place as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of nations. The achievement of this objective will require the progressive elimination of all vestiges of Japanese control over Korean economic and political life and the eventual substitution of independent Korean governmental, economic and social institutions.

b. As Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, you are charged with responsibility for assuring that the Japanese surrender terms are vigorously enforced in Korea and for initiating appropriate action to achieve the objectives of the United States.

c. You will make it clear to the Korean population that your administration of civil affairs in Korea is intended principally:

(1) To insure compliance with the surrender by the Japanese armed forces in Korea;

(2) To effect a complete political and administrative separation of Korea from Japan and to free Korea from Japanese social, economic and financial control;

(3) To facilitate the development of a sound Korean economy devoted to peaceful pursuits; and

(4) To foster the establishment of local self-government and the restoration of a free and independent nation which will conform with the principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations.

4. The Establishment of Civil Affairs Administration in Korea.

a. Upon occupation you will take prompt action to assure the restoration and maintenance of law and order.

b. You will insure immediate compliance with all orders for carrying out the surrender issued by the Emperor and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to the Japanese armed forces and to the armed forces under Japanese

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control in Korea. In this connection you will issue such further orders as may be required.

c. Local, regional and national agencies of governmental administration will be fully utilized after elimination of those whose functions and responsibilities are inconsistent with the purposes of the occupation and after the removal of all Japanese officials, subject to exceptions permitted in paragraph 5 f below. The remining agencies and their personnel will be given maximum responsibility for the administration of government and will be charged with the execution of your policies and directives. At all times, however, and in all circumstances you are empowered yourself to take direct action where required to carry out your objectives.

d. You will establish liaison with the Russians and seek through that liaison to achieve the maximum uniformity of procedures and policies in the control of Korea, consistent with the purposes of this directive.

5. Political and Administative Reorganization.

a. So far as practicable, you will continue the substantive and procedural law existing in Korea at the commencement of your occupation. You will abrogate all laws, ordinances, decrees and regulations which would jeopardize the achievement of the objectives set forth in this directive. You will, in particular, assure the abrogation of all laws, orders and regulations which established and maintained restrictions on political and civil liberties on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion. Agencies charged specifically with the execution of legislation abrogated or to be abrogated shall be abolished.

b. Ordinary criminal and civil courts in Korea will be permitted to continue to function subject to such regulations, supervision and control as you may determine. As

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rapidly as possible, Japanese judges, other Japanese court personnel and Koreans who collaborated with the former, will be removed. Such officials will be replaced with acceptable and qualified successors. Full power of review will be retained by you over all courts which are allowed to function. You will veto all decisions which are inconsistent with the purposes of your mission. You will take all practicable measures to cause the release of persons held in custody solely under laws or regulations of the type to be abrogated under paragraph 5 a above.

c. You will establish such military courts as may be necessary with jurisdiction over offenses against the forces under your command and over such other acts as you may declare to be offenses against your military occupation and the implementation of the surrender. You will, however, except as otherwise deemed necessary by you, assure that Korean courts exercise an effective jurisdiction over cases not of direct or predominant concern to your military occupation.

d. Criminal and ordinary police agencies, and such others as you may consider proper to be retained under appropriate supervision, will be progressively purged of undependable and undesirable elements, and in particular, of Japanese and Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese.

e. Throughout Korea you will assure the dissolution of all elements of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Taisei Seijikai), their branches, affiliates and agencies or any successor organizations, and all Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies and their branches, agencies and affiliates.

f. Only in exceptional circumstances as determined by you will any Japanese be allowed to hold any position of

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responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise, nor will any Korean who has been an exponent of militant Japanese nationalism and aggression, who has been an influential member of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies, their branches, agencies or affiliates, who has been influential in the activities of the other organizations enumerated in paragraph 5 e above, or who manifests hostility to the objectives of the military occupation, be permitted to hold any office as above. Providing security factors permit, and to the extent that qualified Koreans or other suitable personnel are not available, you may temporarily make use of such Japanese and Koreans who have collaborated with the Japanese as are deemed essential by reason of their technical qualifications. You will make every effort to ensure the recruiting and training of suitable Korean replacements for such last-named personnel at the earliest possible moment. Should use be made of Japanese or non-desirable Koreans as above, care will be taken that the Korean population are informed that such use is temporary.

g. You will provide your forces with information concerning the customs of the Korean people and you will enforce such control over the association of your forces with the Koreans and Japanese as you deem necessary to avoid friction, misunderstanding and undesirable incidents. Your officers and troops should so treat the Korean population as to develop confidence in the United States and the United Nations and their representatives.

h. Representatives of civilian agencies of the U.S. Government or of other United Nations Governments shall not participate or function within Korea except upon your approval, and subject as to purpose, time and extent, to decisions communicated to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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6. Demilitarization.

a. You will assure that all units of the Japanese armed forces in Korea, including the Gendarmerie (Kempei) (but not the civil police), civilian volunteer corps and para-military organizations, are promptly disarmed. Personnel of such units will not be treated as prisoners-of-war, but as disarmed units under their own officers being held for demobilization in accordance with directives issued or to be issued to you.

b. All elements of military and para-military organizations of Japanese origin found in Korea together with all associations which might serve to keep alive the military tradition of Japan in Korea will be permanently dissolved. You may, however, for a brief period of time, utilize military and naval agencies for the limited purpose of giving effect to the surrender.

c. In accordance with Section IV, SWNCC 58/5 (Annex to Appendix "B" to J.C.S. 1328 as amended by J.C.S. 1328/1), you will seize or destroy all arms, ammunition, naval vessels and implements of war, including military aircraft and aircraft designed for civil use, and stop the production thereof, except that naval combatant and auxiliary vessels and craft of all kinds, both surface and submarine, including those under repair, alteration or construction will not be destroyed or scrapped pending further instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. Arrest and Internment.

a. Any of the following found in Korea will be arrested and held as suspected war criminals pending further instructions concerning their disposition:

(1) All members of the Japanese Supreme Military Council, the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, the Imperial General Headquarters, and the Army and Navy General Staffs;

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(2) All commissioned officers of the Gendarmerie (Kempei) and all officers of the Japanese Army and Navy who have been important exponents of militant nationalism and aggression;

(3) All key members of Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, and secret patriotic societies; and

(4) All persons who you have reason to believe are war criminals or whose names or descriptions are contained in lists of suspected war criminals which have been or may be furnished to you.

b. All persons, regardless of nationality, who have played an active and dominant governmental, economic, financial or other significant part in the formulation or execution of Japan's program of aggression and all high officials of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and their agencies and affiliates or successor organizations will be interned pending further disposition. You may intern other civilians as necessary for the achievement of your mission.

c. You may, however, for a brief period of time utilize the closely supervised services of the Japanese arrested or interned as above who are absolutely required by you to expedite the demobilization of the Japanese armed forces.

d. You will receive further instructions concerning your responsibility with relation to war criminals, including those who have committed crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.

e. No differentiation shall be made or special consideration be accorded to civilian or military personnel arrested as war criminals either as to manner of arrest or conditions of detention, upon the basis of wealth of political, industrial, or other rank or position.

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f. All nationals of countries except Japan with which any of the United Nations are or have been at war in World War II (Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Roumania and Thailand) will be identified and registered and may be interned or their activities curtailed as may be necessary under the circumstances. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be taken into protective custody and held for further disposition.

g. Property, real and personal, owned or controlled by persons who have been detained or arrested under the provisions of paragraph 7 will be taken under your control pending directions as to its eventual disposition.

8. Prisoners of War, United Nations Nationals, Neutrals, and Other Persons.

a. You will insure that prisoners of war of the United Nations are cared for and repatriated.

b. Nationals of neutral countries will be required to register with the appropriate military authorities. They may be repatriated under such regulations as you may establish. However, all nationals of neutral nations who have actively participated in any way in the war against one of the United Nations will be arrested for disposition in conformity with later instructions. Neutral nationals will be accorded no special privileges of communications or business relationships with their home countries or people resident outside Korea. The persons, archives and property of consular officials of neutrals will be accorded full protection.

c. All civilians who are nationals of the United Nations, resident or interned in Korea will be identified, examined closely, and, if you deem it advisable, may be placed in custody or restricted residence. All such nationals who fall within the provisions of paragraph 7 b above shall be arrested and held as suspected war criminals. All other

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United Nations nationals who have actively participated in any way in the war against one or more of the United Nations will be arrested and held for later disposition. Thereafter, they will be dealt with in accordance with instructions to be furnished you. In general, practical measures will be taken to insure the health and welfare of United Nations nationals and to facilitate their prompt repatriation if they so desire.

d. Within such limits as are imposed by the military situation, you should take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve and protect the property of the United Nations and their nationals.

e. Formosan-Chinese technically may be considered Japanese subjects and may, if necessary, be treated by you as enemy nationals. However, they are not included in the term "Japanese" as used in this directive. In so far as military security permits, you will treat them as liberated people. Formosan-Chinese may be repatriated if they so desire under such regulations as you may establish. However, priority will be given to the repatriation of nationals of the United Nations.

f. Civilian Japanese may be allowed to continue their normal activities consistent with the objectives of the military occupation. Steps will be taken to prevent disorders due to any anti-Japanese feeling of the Korean people. If necessary, you may segregate Japanese for their protection.

9. Political Activity.

a. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic, National Shintoistic and ultra-nationalistic Japanese ideology and propaganda in any form, especially that which urges continued Japanese control of Korea, will be prohibited and completely suppressed.

b. You will establish such minimum control and censorship of civilian communications including the mails, wireless,

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radio, telephone, telegraph and cables, films and press as may be necessary in the interests of military security and the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in this directive. Subject to such controls you will facilitate and encourage the distribution of news and information, both domestic and foreign through all channels and media. All available media of public information will be utilized for the guidance of the Korean people in the attainment of the objectives set forth in paragraph 3 a through the dissemination of democratic ideals and principles.

c. You will immediately place under control all existing political parties, organizations and societies. Those whose activities are consistent with the requirements of the military occupation and its objectives should be encouraged. Those whose activities are inconsistent with such requirements and objectives should be abolished. Subject to the necessity of maintaining the security of the occupying forces, the formation and activities of democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion will be encouraged.

d. Encouragement will be given to the development of democratic organizations in labor, industry and agriculture.

e. Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly.

f. To the extent that the security of your military occupation and the attainment of its objectives are not prejudiced and, subject to subparagraphs a, b and c above, you will insure freedom of opinion, speech, press, and assembly.

g. You will not extend official recognition to, nor utilize for political purposes, any self-styled Korean provisional government or similar political organizations, although you will permit the existence, organization and activity of such groups subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 c above. You will utilize the services of members

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of such organizations as individuals when desirable without commitment as to the organizations.

10. Education, Arts and Archives.

a. Educational institutions will be permitted to continue or to reopen as soon as possible. As rapidly as possible, all teachers who have been exponents of Japanese militant nationalism and aggression and those who continue actively to oppose the purposes of the military occupation will be removed and replaced by acceptable and qualified Korean successors. To the extent practicable in view of the limited period covered by this directive, you will assure that curricula acceptable to you are employed in all schools and that Japanese influences are eliminated therefrom.

b. You should cause to be preserved for information and use the records of all governmental and quasi-governmental, important Japanese or Japanese controlled, private, financial, industrial, manufacturing and business concerns, and the Japanese organizations referred to in paragraph 5 e above.

c. You will, so far as practicable, cause to be protected and preserved, all historical, cultural and religious objects, against depredations by the occupational forces, or others.

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PART II

ECONOMIC AND CIVILIAN SUPPLY

A. ECONOMIC

11. Objectives and Methods of Control.

a. Such controls will be imposed with respect to Korean economic activities including essential public services, financial, banking, exports, imports, and production and distribution of essential commodities, as may be necessary for the following purposes:

(1) To meet the needs of the occupying forces;

(2) To maximize production of all normal surplus items of foods and of goods important to the Korean economy.

(3) To eliminate all vestiges of Japanese control over Korean economic life;

(4) To foster conditions that will separate Korea from economic dependence upon Japan.

b. Subject to your control, participation of Korea in world trade relations will be encouraged.

12. You will utilize local, regional, and national agencies of governmental administration after elimination of those whose functions and responsibilities are inconsistent with the purposes of the occupation and after the removal of all Japanese officials subject to exceptions permitted in Part I, paragraph 5 f above, for the execution of the economic measures required by your directive. At all times, however, and in all circumstances you are empowered yourself to take direct action where required to carry out your objectives.

13. Reports and Surveys.

a. You will institute or assure the maintenance of such statistical records and reports as may be necessary in the

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carrying out of your objectives or meeting the needs of your military government.

b. You will undertake appropriate surveys as may assist you to achieve the objectives of paragraph 14 a and 20 of this directive. Reports based on these surveys will specify condition and capacity of plant and equipment, and the extent of stocks of raw materials, finished goods and goods in process. You will communicate to this government through the Joint Chiefs of Staff the results of such surveys.

14. Armament Production.

Pending receipt of a further directive you will

a. Suspend the production, acquisition, development, maintenance or use of all arms, ammunitions and other implements of war, naval vessels, and all types of aircraft, including those designed for civilian use, and all parts, components, and materials especially designed for incorporation therein.

b. Seize and safeguard all facilities used or intended for use in the production of any items covered in this paragraph, pending receipt of further instructions.

c. Permit the production of items enumerated in this paragraph to the minimum extent necessary to meet the requirements of the occupying forces.

15. In order to accomplish the objective specified in paragraph 11 a (2), you will encourage the conversion of facilities mentioned in paragraph 14 a, for the production of consumer goods.

16. Agriculture, Industry and Internal Commerce.

You will immediately establish liaison with the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East, in order to maintain to the maximum extent the normal flow of goods and the normal operation of transportation and communications between the United States and Russian-occupied zones of Korea.

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17. You will use all means at your disposal to maximize the production of foodstuffs (including reactivation of the fishing industry), fuel and other essential goods and to continue or establish as rapidly as possible effective rationing and other machinery for the collection and distribution thereof. You will insure to the maximum possible extent the equitable distribution of goods and services throughout the area of your occupation.

18. You will accomplish emergency repair and construction for the restoration of transportation, communications services, and public utilities essential to meet the objectives and needs of the occupying forces.

19. You will exercise such controls as may be practicable to prevent or restrain inflation of a character or dimension which would endanger the accomplishment of the objectives of your occupation as outlined in paragraph 11 a. You will, in particular, maintain or establish controls of prices and wages and take the fiscal and financial and other measures appropriate to this end.

20. You will protect and maintain for such disposition as is determined by this and other directives, all plants, equipment, patents, books and records, and other significant property of large Japanese industrial and financial companies and trade and research associations, making report of action taken to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

21. a. You will insure that all laboratories, research institutes, and similar technological organizations are closed immediately except those you deem necessary to the purposes of the occupation. You will provide for the maintenance and security of physical facilities thereof when deemed necessary, and for the detention of such personnel as are of interest to your technological or counter-intelligence investigations. You will at once

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investigate the character of the study and research conducted in such closed organizations and as rapidly as possible permit the resumption of those forms of study and research that have an obviously peaceful purpose under appropriate regulations which (1) define the specific type of research permitted, (2) provide for frequent inspection, (3) require free disclosure to you of the results of the research, and (4) impose severe penalties, including permanent closure of the offending institution whenever the regulations are violated.

b. All facilities for research on atomic energy or related matters shall be seized and all persons engaged in such research taken into custody. Prompt report will be made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with full information regarding the action taken and the results thereof. No research activities on atomic energy or related matters shall be permitted in Korea.

22. Public Health.

You will encourage the Koreans to develop as high a level of public health as is possible within means at their disposal. To this end you will furnish such technical advice and other assistance as is available consistent with the provisions of paragraph 25 c below.

23. International Economic Transactions.

Using the existing governmental machinery to the maximum extent consistent with paragraph 12 above, you will establish control over all Korean trade in goods and services with foreign countries and will take steps to insure that:

a. Persons, corporations and organizations in Korea will be permitted to acquire foreign assets only by ~~our~~ your specific approval.

b. No firm in Korea will participate in international cartels or other restrictive international contracts or

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arrangements and all existing Korean participation in such cartels, contracts or arrangements will be promptly terminated.

24. Restitution.

You will take all steps practicable to require full and prompt restitution of all identifiable looted property.

B. CIVILIAN SUPPLY AND RELIEF

25. Civilian Supply Policy and Standard of Provision.

a. You will assure that all practicable economic and police measures are taken to achieve the maximum utilization of essential Korean resources in order to limit U.S. responsibility for imports into Korea. Such measures will include production and price controls, rationing, control of black markets, fiscal and financial controls and other measures directed toward full employment of resources, facilities and means available in Korea.

b. To the extent that goods may be available in areas occupied by you in quantities surplus to the needs of the whole of Korea, such surpluses will be made available in the first instance, to meet United States military requirements in Pacific Ocean and Asiatic areas.

c. You will initially be responsible for providing imported supplies only to supplement local resources and only to the extent that supplementation is needed to prevent such serious disease and widespread unrest as would endanger the occupying forces or interfere with military operations. Such imports will be confined to minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies and other essential items, including those which will enable local production of such supplies which you would otherwise have to import.

d. If importation of supplies for which you are responsible is necessary, you will utilize to the fullest extent possible

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surpluses from other areas. To the extent that such surpluses are available in areas under the jurisdiction of other United States commanders, arrangements may be made by you directly with such other commanders. To the extent that such surpluses are available in areas under the jurisdiction of governments other than the United States, or the military commanders of such governments, negotiations necessary to obtain such surpluses will be conducted by or with approval of local United States diplomatic representatives in the areas in question. In the event such diplomatic representatives are not available, you will report the situation, with your recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. If you deem that, in order to prevent serious disease or widespread unrest or to attain the objectives of your occupation, you should assume responsibility for additional imports, you will submit your recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanied by statements of requirements.

26. Methods and Conditions of Distribution.

You will take all practicable steps to assure the fair and equitable distribution of supplies under uniform ration scales.

27. Imported supplies for the civilian population should, in so far as practicable and desirable and consistent with military expediency, be delivered to such Korean public supply agencies or other consignees as are acceptable to you and under your direct supervision or control. Whenever possible, such deliveries will be at ports of entry, but if necessary, deliveries may take place at appropriate inland centers of distribution.

28. You may make sales directly to wholesalers or other commercial dealers in the event that no satisfactory public supply agency exists or that operational or other reasons render

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distribution of civilian supplies through such an agency impracticable. In order to limit direct provision and distribution of supplies by you to the civilian population, you will involve the occupying forces in such responsibility to the minimum extent possible. Such direct sales by you as are necesssry will be paid for by the purchaser in local currency at prices determined by you to be consistent with the internal economy.

29. Supplies delivered to supply agencies or other consignees will be sold by them through distribution channels and in accordance with distribution policies satisfactory to you and at prices determined by you to be consistent with the internal economy. When military necessity requires, civilian supplies may be made the subject of direct relief issue by you or by supply agencies under your supervision or control.

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PART III

FINANCIAL

30. In the administration of financial matters, you will follow the principle that, to the maximum extent possible, without jeopardizing the successful execution of measures required to implement the objectives of the occupation, Korean personnel, authorities and agencies should be used, and if necessary, new Korean agencies should be established, subject to such supervision as is necessary to insure that they carry out their task. For this purpose appropriate authority should be given to Korean agencies and administrative services, subject to strict observance of the provisions of this directive regarding the removal and exclusion from positions of responsibility or influence of all Japanese, pro-Japanese Koreans and other pro-Japanese elements. You may establish administrative machinery not dependent upon the Korean authorities and agencies to the extent necessary to execute or assure the effective execution of the policies and programs in this directive.

31. a. You should, in cooperation with your military government administration in Japan, take steps necessary to sever all managerial and other organizational connections of banks, including postal banking offices, and all other financial institutions located in Korea with banks and business enterprises or persons located in Japan.

b. You should remove and exclude from positions of responsibility or influence in all public and private financial institutions, agencies or organizations all Japanese, pro-Japanese Koreans and other pro-Japanese elements and all persons who have actively participated in the organizations enumerated in paragraph 38 b (1) below. It may be generally assumed in absence of evidence to the contrary that any persons who have held key positions in any such institutions, agencies or organizations are pro-Japanese.

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32. a. You will use in Korea supplemental military yen currency (Type "A") issued pursuant to military proclamation hereinafter referred to as supplemental yen (Type "A") and Bank of Chosen notes. Supplemental yen (Type "A") will be declared legal tender in Korea and will circulated therein interchangeably at par without distinction with Bank of Chosen notes. Records will be kept of amounts of currencies used by your forces.

b. Supplemental military yen currency notes (Type "B") Bank of Japan notes, Bank of Taiwan notes and Japanese military yen issued for circulation in territories formerly occupied by Japan will not be legal tender in Korea. The importation of any type of currency into Korea, except for your use, should be prevented by border and other control measures. As soon as practicable, Bank of Japan and Bank of Taiwan notes should be exchanged for Bank of Chosen or supplemental yen (Type "A") on a one for one basis.

c. No Korean governmental or private bank or agency will be permitted to issue banknotes or currency without your authorization.

33. You will not announce, establish or permit the use or publication until receipt of further instructions, of any general rate of exchange between Bank of Chosen notes and supplemental yen (Type "A") on the one hand and the U.S. dollar and other currencies on the other. However, a rate of conversion to be used exclusively for pay of military and naval personnel and for military and naval accounting purposes, i.e., 15 Bank of Chosen and/or supplemental yen (Type "A") equal one U.S. dollar, has already been communicated to you.

34. a. A Financial Division should be established within your Military Government Administration which should include in its functions the control of supplemental yen to be used by your forces within the area including receipt, storage,

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issue, exchange, and shipment of such currency. It should maintain all the accounts and records necessary to indicate the supply, control, and movement of such currency, as well as financial data which may be useful in the determination of occupation costs and other expenditures arising out of operations or activities involving participation of your forces.

b. In so far as operations relate to the provision of supplemental yen for the pay and other cash requirements of military formations of your forces, the Financial Division should draw the necessary resources from its currency reserve and should record the debit against the U.S. forces concerned.

c. In so far as operations relate to the provision of supplemental yen for civil administration, the Financial Division should draw on its currency reserve and should record the debit against your Military Government Administration.

35. a. You will designate the Bank of Chosen, to perform under your direction central banking functions. Simultaneously, all connections between the Bank of Chosen and institutions or persons in Japan should be severed in accordance with paragraph 31 a above. When satisfied that this bank is under adequate control, you may make credits available in legal tender currency of Korea, if necessary, to place such bank in a position to finance approved business either directly or through other banks or other financial institutions.

b. In an emergency you are also authorized to make direct advances, only in Korean legal tender currency, to other Korean financial and business institutions.

c. You may designate the head office of the Bank of Chosen under your direction, control and supervision as agent for the Financial Division of your Military Government Administration.

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36. You will close and not allow to reopen banks and other financial institutions whose paramount purpose has been the financing of war production or the mobilization or control of financial resources in colonial or other Japanese-occupied territories for the benefit of Japan. These include such offices as may be found in Korea of the

a. Bank of Taiwan,

b. Southern Development Company,

c. Southern Development Bank,

d. Central Bank of Mancheu,

e. Bank of Mongolia,

f. Federal Reserve Bank of China,

g. Central Reserve Bank of China,

h. War Time Finance Bank, and

i. National Financial Control Association and its member control associations.

You will take custody of all the books and records of these banks or institutions and you should take measures to ensure in so far as practicable the preservation of books and records of all public and private banks and other financial institutions.

37. You are authorized to take the following steps:

a. To prohibit, or regulate transfers or other dealings in private or public securities or real estate or other property;

b. To close banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions other than those indicated in paragraph 36 above, only where clearly necessary for the purpose of introducing satisfactory control, removing objectionable personnel and taking measures to effectuate the program for the blocking of certain accounts and transfers or the determination of accounts to be blocked. You should reopen any closed banks or financial institutions, except those indicated in paragraph 36 above, as promptly as is consistent with the accomplishment of the foregoing purposes.

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38. With the exception of non-Japanese who served in the armed forces of any of the United Nations or in any other direct way aided the United Nations' victory, you will prohibit

a. The payment of all military pensions, or other emoluments or benefits, except compensation for physical disability limiting the recipient's ability to work, at rates which are no higher than the lowest of those for comparable physical disability arising from non-military causes;

b. The payments of all public or private pensions or other emoluments or benefits granted or conferred

(1) by reason of membership in or services to the Political Association of Greater Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Taisei Soijikai), their affiliates and agencies or any successor or similar organizations, and all Japanese nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies and their agencies and affiliates, or by reason of any other assistance rendered to Pan-Japanism or Japanese imperialism,

(2) to any person who has been removed or excluded from an office or position in accordance with paragraphs 30 and 31 above, and

(3) to any person arrested and detained in accordance with paragraph 7 of the political directive during the term of his arrest, or permanently, in the case of his subsequent conviction.

39. a. You will take such action as may be necessary to insure that all laws and practices promulgated by the Japanese authorities relating to taxation or other fields of finance, which discriminate for or against any persons because of race, nationality, creed or political opinion, will be amended,

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suspended or abrogated to the extent necessary to eliminate such discrimination. Consistent with the foregoing purposes, the Korean authorities should be required to take such action in the field of taxation as is necessary to assure an adequate inflow of revenues. Any public revenue in Korea collected by the Japanese Government prior to occupation may be used for approved public expenditures.

b. You should exercise general control and supervision over the expenditures of public funds to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of the occupation and to insure that public expenditures are consistent with the objectives stated elsewhere in this directive.

c. You will promptly institute a survey for the purposes of ascertaining

(1) the amount of the Japanese Government debt held in Korea,

(2) the fiscal position of Korea.

40. You will impound or block all gold, silver, platinum, currencies, securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers, and all other assets falling within the following categories:

a. Property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by any of the following:

(1) the governments, nationals, or residents of Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, including those of territories formerly occupied by them and by Japan;

(2) absentee owners, including United Nations and neutral governments;

(3) any institutions dedicated to public worship, charity, education, or the arts and sciences, which have been used by Pan-Japanese nationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic societies to further their interests or to cloak their activities; and

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(4) any persons subject to arrest under the provisions of paragraph 7 of the political directive and all other persons specified by military government by inclusion in lists or otherwise;

(5) all organizations, clubs or other associations prohibited or dissolved by Military Government.

b. Property which has been the subject of transfer under duress, or wrongful acts of confiscation, disposition or spoliation, whether pursuant to legislation or by procedure purporting to follow forms of law or otherwise; and

c. Works of art or cultural material of value or importance, regardless of the ownership thereof.

You will take such action as will insure that any impounded or blocked assets will be dealt with only as permitted under licenses or other instructions which you may issue. Property in Korea taken from non-Japanese under the conditions stated in b above should be restored as promptly as possible, subject to appropriate safeguards to prevent the cloaking of Japanese, pro-Japanese, or militaristic influence.

41. All foreign exchange transactions, including those arising out of exports and imports, shall be controlled for the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth in this directive. To effectuate such objectives you should

a. prohibit, except as authorized by regulation or license, all dealings in gold, silver, platinum, foreign exchange and all foreign exchange transactions of any kind;

b. make available any foreign exchange proceeds of exports for payment of imports necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives set forth in this directive and authorize no other outlay of foreign exchange assets without specific approval of your government through the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

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c. establish effective controls with respect to all foreign exchange transactions, including:

(1) transactions as to property between persons inside Korea and persons outside Korea;

(2) transactions involving obligations owed by or to become due from any person in Korea to any person outside Korea; and

(3) transactions involving the importation into or exportation from Korea of any currency foreign exchange assets or other form of property.

42. You should seek out and take title to all Japanese public and private property interests of any type and description located in Korea. You will provide full reports to your Government, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on such property interests which will be held for ultimate disposition in accordance with detailed instructions to be forwarded to you.

43. You will maintain such accounts and records as may be necessary to reflect the financial operations of your military occupation and you will provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with such information as they may require, including financial data referred to in paragraphs 32 a and 34 above, for intergovernmental settlement and other necessary purposes.

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29 November 1945

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM

TO

SWNCC 176/8

BASIC INITIAL DIRECTIVE FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS IN KOREA

Note by the Secretaries

Holders of SWNCC 176/8 are requested to change so much of paragraph 23 a (page 57) as reads"only by our specific approval" to read "only by your specific approval".

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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COPY NO. 43

SWNCC 176/1

24 August 1945

Pages 4 - 6, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AS TO OCCUPATION OF KOREA
Reference: a. SWNCC 176.

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War on reference a, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: J.C.S. Segrading memo 17-71
Name and title of person making the change:
MOG
Date 4/24/73

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E N C L O S U R E

MEMORANDUM BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR

The Enclosure to SWNCC 176 (Memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff) is not believed to be an answer to General MacArthur's message (Appendix to Enclosure), which appears to pertain only to the operational aspects of the occupation of Korea.

General MacArthur evidently anticipates the early arrival of British and Chinese forces to participate in occupation of Korea. It is believed that the answer to General MacArthur should indicate that initial occupation of Korea will be by Soviet and U.S. forces only, and that the provisions of paragraphs b and e, Section I, of General Order No. 1, apply so far as the immediate problems of contact with Soviet forces are concerned.

An immediate pressing problem facing General MacArthur is what he should do politically and economically about southern Korea once he enters. Just as pressing a problem will be his relations with the Russians concerning Korean matters. It is understood that Korean administration is probably highly centralized. The dividing line of 38° north is not a natural geographical, economic or political subdivision. It is obvious that General MacArthur should receive, in the near future, a directive as to how he is to proceed politically and economically and it appears that aspects of this directive will need to be coordinated with and agreed to by U.S.S.R.

From the information available, it appears that General MacArthur can be given no guidance at the present time except on immediate matters pertaining to occupation troops and securing Japanese surrender. It is believed that the attached message will give all needed clarification on these points.

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In light of the above comments, I recommend that the inclosed draft message to the Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter or urgency. I further recommend that the additional matters mentioned above be given urgent consideration by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

(Sgd) JOHN J. McCLOY
Assistant Secretary of War

*1 Incl
Draft Message
to CINCAFPAC

- - -

*Appendix hereto.

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APPENDIX

DRAFT

Message to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Pacific

Initial occupation of Korea will be by U.S. and Soviet forces only under the provisions of paragraphs b and e, Section I, General Order No. 1. An oral understanding with respect to a future temporary multi-partite trusteeship over Korea was reached at Yalta. This understanding does not affect initial occupation and does not necessarily lead to eventual multi-partite occupation. The matter of international arrangements with regard to Korea is under urgent consideration by the State Department.

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COPY NO. 43

25 August 1945

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DECISION AMENDING SWNCC 176/1

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AS TO OCCUPATION OF KOREA

Note by the Secretaries

1. By informal action on 24 August 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 176/1 after amending the appendix as follows:

Inserted the words

"In the absence of declared intentions by the United Kingdom, China or other United Nation"

in front of the opening sentence of the draft message to Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Pacific.

2. The draft message, as amended, was forwarded to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending transmittal to Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Pacific, in answer to his message contained in the Appendix to Enclosure of SWNCC 176.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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SWNCC 176

22 August 1945

Pages 1 - 5, Incl.

COPY NO. 43

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AS TO OCCUPATION OF KOREA

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a proposed reply by the Assistant Secretary of State to a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Appendix to Enclosure), is circulated for the consideration of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: JCS signing memo 17-71
Name and title of person making the change:
MOG
Date 4/24/73

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ENCLOSURE

DRAFT MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Reference is made to SM-3005, dated August 22, 1945 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicating a message from the Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, with regard to international agreements relating to the occupation of Korea.

The initial clause of the message from the Commander in Chief reading "in as much as the occupation of Korea is to be on a quadri-partite basis", is not understood to be correct. An oral understanding was reached at the Conference of the Three Major Allies at Yalta that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China should establish a temporary international trusteeship over Korea. So far as can be ascertained the understanding referred to above is the only international agreement which relates to Korea, and that agreement would relate to a period and to a condition subsequent to the period of occupation of Korea.

The following is for the information of the JCS only:

Although there is no agreed United States view as to the character of administration of civil affairs in Korea, the Department of State believes that it would be politically advisable that, as soon as practicable after the surrender of the Japanese forces is completed, up to which time the administration of civil affairs will be the responsibility of the respective Commanders of the two zones in Korea, the administration of civil affairs should be combined, so that the whole of Korea would constitute a centralized administrative area. The civil administration might be placed under the control of a council made up of the Commanding Officers of the United States, Soviet, and other forces participating in the occupation of Korea.

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Present provisional plans for the setting-up, in accordance with the oral understanding above mentioned reached at Yalta of an international authority in Korea, would provide for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship for Korea by the Four Major Allies, under the supervision of the General Assembly of the United Nations, such trusteeship to become effective as soon as possible.

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

SM-3005
22 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: International Agreements as to Occupation of Korea.

The following message from the Commander in Chief Army Forces, Pacific, has been received by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"22 August 1945

"Inasmuch as the occupation of Korea is to be on a quadri-partite basis, it is requested that this headquarters be furnished at earliest with agreements reached with Allied Powers, especially with Russia, regarding direct contact between commanders of occupational forces in contiguous and overlapping areas, together with any pertinent instructions thereon pertaining to Korea. Information is urgently required for incorporation in letter of instructions to Commanding General United States Army Forces in Korea (Commanding General XXIV Corps)."

It is requested that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee furnish the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the information necessary for the basis of a reply as a matter of urgency.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, USA,
Secretary.

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SWNCC 101/4

24 October 1945

Pages 18 - 32, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY IN KOREA

References: a. SWNCC 101/1
b. SWNCC 101/2
c. Item 3, Minutes 28th SWNCC Mtg.

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a revision of SWNCC 101/1, as amended by SWNCC 101/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee at the 28th meeting and agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated for information and guidance.

ALEXANDER D. REID
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: JCS regrading memo 1-7-71
Name and title of person making the change:
MOG
Date 4/24/73

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ENCLOSURE

Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine whether there should be an international trusteeship for Korea pending full Korean independence and, if so, the form of such trusteeship and the policies to be followed in connection therewith.

2. To determine the functions and relationships of such a trusteeship with military government in Korea and with the United Nations Organization.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

4. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

5. Following the termination of Japanese sovereignty and of military government, Korea should be established, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to an International Trusteeship System, as a trust territory, no part of this territory should be designated as a strategic area.

6. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Republic of China are the nations which should be regarded as "the states directly concerned" with Korea within the meaning of Article 79 of the Charter of the United Nations. As soon as practicable, these four powers should enter into a trusteeship agreement containing the terms under which Korea will be administered and designating themselves jointly as the "administrative authority" in accordance with Articles 79, 81 and other appropriate articles of the Charter of the United Nations.

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7. Appendix "C" should be approved as a statement of United States policy with respect to an international trusteeship for Korea.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. This report be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from the military point of view; and

b. Upon approval by the SWNCC of the "Conclusions" in paragraphs 5 and 6 above and of the policy statement contained at Appendix "C";

(1) The report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the War and Navy Departments for their information, and to the Department of State for its guidance and appropriate implementation.

(2) A statement substantially the same as that shown at Appendix "D" be released to the press when considered appropriate by the Department of State.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Cairo Declaration states:

"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.

"They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

****

"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

2. The Soviet Union in its declaration of war on Japan on 9 August 1945 stated that:

"Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied powers of July 26."

With reference to the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China stated that:

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

3. President Roosevelt proposed to Generalissimo Stalin at Yalta that an international trusteeship should be established for Korea, to be administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China. On 28 May 1945, Generalissimo Stalin agreed to this proposal in his conversation with Mr. Hopkins.

4. The Charter of the United Nations provides for an International Trusteeship System in Articles 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, and 87. (See Annex "A" to Appendix "A").

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ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Charter of the United Nations provides for an International Trusteeship System as follows:

"Article 75. The United Nations shall establish under its authority an International Trusteeship System for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

"Article 76. The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter shall be:

a. To further international peace and security;

b. To promote the political economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.

"Article 77.

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. Territories now held under mandate;

b. Territories which may be detached from enemy status as a result of the Second World War; and

c. Territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

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"Article 78. The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

"Article 79. The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

****

"Article 81. The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

****

"Article 84. It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territority shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

"Article 85.

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

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2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

****

"Article 87. The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. Consider reports submitted by the administering authority;

b. Accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. Provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and

d. Take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements."

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China have stated in the Cairo Declaration that they "are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent". The Soviet Union indicated its support of the Cairo Declaration when it declared war on Japan.

2. No time has been set as to when Korea should become independent, but this should, of course, be accomplished as quickly as possible after liberation. The question arises as to whether or not military government in Korea should be extended beyond the period necessary to disarm the Japanese to continue until Korea becomes free and independent. Considerations which militate against such an extension are (a) that military government is not specifically designed to cope with the difficult and complex problems that will inevitably arise in transforming a former colonial territory such as Korea into an independent state, and (b) that the American people will probably not desire an extended military occupation of Korea beyond the time designated by military necessity. It would therefore seem advisable to terminate military occupation as early as practicable.

3. The United States, by its acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations, favors an international trusteeship system for certain types of territories such as Korea. Both the internal and external factors connected with the liberation of Korea and the establishment of Korean independence are so complex that some form of international trusteeship would seem necessary following military government. It is the policy of the United States, as indicated by the plan suggested by President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Stalin at Yalta, that an international trusteeship should be established for Korea and that such a trusteeship should be administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China. This plan was

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later agreed to by Generalissimo Stalin in his conversations with Mr. Hopkins on 28 May 1945.

4. It remains to be determined, therefore, whether or not all of the four states concerned agree to such a proposal and whether such a four-power trusteeship should be independent of the United Nations Organization or part of it. The strategic position of Korea between China, the Soviet Union and Japan, and the instability of the Korean Government prior to its annexation by Japan made it the scene of rivalry between China and Japan and later between Japan and Russia. Unless prompt agreement is reached among the four major Allies on the form of trusteeship for Korea, rivalry for the control of Korea may again develop.

5. Korea is a territory to which the proposed International Trusteeship System, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable. It is a territory detached from an enemy state as a result of this war and one in which a progressive development toward independence should be promoted. Korea is not one of the United Nations.

6. There would be several advantages to the Koreans in placing Korea under the International Trusteeship System as a trust territory, no part of which is designated as strategic:

a. The Charter provided that the terms of the trusteeship for all areas not designated as strategic shall be approved by the General Assembly. Hence, any trusteeship agreement for Korea made by the powers concerned would be subject to the approval of all the United Nations, thereby increasing the responsibility of all the powers for carrying out the agreement.

b. The Charter further provides that the administering authority shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust area. Consequently, the Korean people would have the benefit of the

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influence the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council will be able to exert upon the administering authority.

c. The Charter also stipulates that the Trusteeship Council may accept petitions from any trust area, so that the Korean people would have adequate opportunity to express their criticisms of the administering authority.

d. Furthermore, the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council may provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories.

7. The principal advantage to the administering powers lies in achieving stability through joint action in Korea as an alternative to rivalry among the great powers in an area of special danger. Furthermore, the difficulties inherent in the establishment of an international supervisory authority for Korea independent of the Trusteeship System of the United Nations would be avoided, and the duplication that would result from the formation of international machinery charged with the responsibilities similar to those of an organ of the United Nations would be eliminated.

8. The administering authority in Korea should, in accord with Article 84 of the Charter, recruit police forces from the territory for local defense and the maintenance of law and order.

9. It is probable, however, that foreign military forces will be necessary in Korea, especially during the early period of trusteeship before sufficient local forces have been organized. The four administering powers should arrange for such forces.

10. The success of the temporary administration of Korea under the trusteeship would also depend on whether or not the terms of the trusteeship agreement were acceptable to the Koreans. Many of the possible objections of the Koreans to a trusteeship system could be met, and the pledge in the Cairo Declaration that Korea shall become free and independent in due course, could be implemented most effectively by the inclusion in the trusteeship agreement for Korea of provisions substantially as follows:

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a. The independence of Korea is recognized subject to the condition that the exercise of the powers of independent government are suspended during the period of trusteeship.

b. The states directly concerned, parties to the agreement, pledge themselves actively to support in the Security Council and in the General Assembly the admission of Korea to full membership in the United Nations as soon as conditions indicate that Korea can accept the responsibilities of independence.

c. The primary purpose of the administering authority for Korea will be to make it possible for the Koreans to undertake the responsibilities of independence and for Korea to become a member of the United Nations at an early date. The Trustee Powers will make every effort to bring about as early as possible the necessary internal conditions in Korea and international arrangements assuring Korea's security to justify the termination of the trusteeship administration and Korea's admission to the United Nations.

d. To these ends the administering authority will:

(1) Utilize Korean personnel to the fullest possible extent;

(2) Provide necessary facilities to train the Koreans to assume the responsibilities of an independent state;

(3) Provide necessary facilities by which the Koreans can determine the form of government under which they will live and to which the administering authority can transfer its powers and responsibilities in such a way as to disturb least the security of the region. Such facilities might include the establishment of a Korean representative assembly and, when the appropriate time arrives, the formulation of a constitutional assembly for the formulation of a national

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constitution in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people.

e. Exercise such executive, legislative and judicial authority as is necessary for the efficient administration of Korea until a free and independent Korean government is established.

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APPENDIX "C"

UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO AN INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP FOR KOREA

1. The primary purpose of the administering authority for Korea should be to make it possible for the Koreans to accept the responsibilities of independence and for Korea ultimately to become a member of the United Nations. The independence of Korea should be recognized in the trusteeship agreement subject to the condition that the exercise of the powers of independent government will be suspended during the period of trusteeship. The administering authority should make every effort to bring about as early as possible the necessary internal conditions in Korea and international arrangements assuring Korea's security, to justify the termination of the trusteeship administration and Korea's admission as a responsible member of the United Nations.

2. Following the termination of Japanese sovereignty and of military government, Korea should be established, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to an International Trusteeship System, as a trust territory, no part of this territory should be designated as a strategic area.

3. There would be several advantages to the Koreans in placing Korea under the International Trusteeship System as a trust territory, no part of which is designated as strategic:

a. The Charter provided that the terms of the trusteeship for all areas not designated as strategic shall be approved by the General Assembly. Hence, any trusteeship agreement for Korea made by the powers concerned would be subject to the approval of all the United Nations, thereby increasing the responsibility of all the powers for carrying out the agreement.

b. The Charter further provides that the administering authority shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the political, economic, social and educational

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advancement of the inhabitants of the trust area. Consequently, the Korean people would have the benefit of the influence the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council will be able to exert upon the administering authority.

c. The Charter also stipulates that the Trusteeship Council may accept petitions from any trust area, so that the Korean people would have adequate opportunity to express their criticisms of the administering authority.

d. Furthermore, the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council may provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories.

4. Military government in Korea should terminate as soon as practicable in accord with a joint agreement by the trustee powers, and should be superseded by the administering authority for Korea. The administering authority itself should be terminated, consistent with the trusteeship agreement, when Korea is capable of assuming the responsibilities of independence.

5. The administering authority for Korea should exercise such executive, legislative, and judicial powers as are necessary. It should make arrangements to maintain in Korea forces adequate for the maintenance of law, order and security.

6. The trusteeship agreement for Korea should include, in addition to the provisions necessary to implement the policies listed above, the following stipulations:

a. Korea shall be administered as a single political and economic unit by a central administering authority, which shall be responsible for the promulgation and implementation of political, economic and financial policy throughout the country.

b. Korean personnel to be used to the fullest possible extent in the administration of Korean affairs, and their responsibility to be progressively increased.

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c. As far as possible, Koreans returning from outside Korea not to be appointed or retained in official positions by the administering authority if these persons are clearly unacceptable to the Korean people.

d. Adequate facilities to be provided to train the Koreans to assume the responsibilities of an independent state.

e. Adequate facilities to be provided by which the Koreans can determine the form of government under which they will live, these facilities to include a Korean representative assembly to advise the administering authority and, when the appropriate time arrives, a constitutional assembly for the formulation of a national constitution in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

f. Provisions to be made for the termination of the trusteeship and for the transfer to a Korean government of the rights and responsibilities of the administering authority.

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APPENDIX "D"

STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS

"As indicated by the Cairo Declaration, it is the policy of the United States that Korea in due course shall become free and independent. In order to assist the Korean people in the development of a responsible democratic government that will enable Korea to assume its proper position as a member of the United Nations as quickly as possible, a trusteeship for Korea should be established as soon as adequate agreement can be concluded. Furthermore, since the United States has subscribed to the principles of the United Nations Organization and has ratified the Charter, the Government of the United States believes that such trusteeship for Korea should be brought within the framework of the United Nations Organization. The United States has invited China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom to enter into a joint agreement for such trusteeship."

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COPY NO. 60

SWNCC 101/3

18 October 1945

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY IN KOREA

References: a. SWNCC 101/1
b. SWNCC 101/2

Note by the Secretaries

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the report of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East concerning Temporary International Authority in Korea (SWNCC 101/1) and the amendments proposed thereto in SWNCC 101/2.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the strictly military point of view, perceive no objection to the amended report.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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COPY NO. 63

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SWNCC 101/2

27 September 1945

Pages 18 - 20, Incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY IN KOREA

References: a. SWNCC 101/1.
b. J.C.S. 1483/6.

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, is circulated to the Committee in connection with their consideration of reference a.

2. A copy of this report has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment in connection with their consideration of SWNCC 101/1. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SWNCC 101/1 and SWNCC 101/2 will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: J.C.S. regrading memo 17-71
Name and title of person making the change:
NNDG
Date 4/24/73

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE

A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY IN KOREA

Memorandum by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

1. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in J.C.S. 1483/6, have recommended certain changes in SWNCC 101/1.

2. Action on J.C.S. 1483/6 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was deferred on 21 September 1945, pending receipt of amendments by the Subcommittee for the Far East.

3. It is recommended that:

a. The amendments to SWNCC 101/1 proposed by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, ANNEX TO APPENDIX be approved; and

b. The additional amendments proposed at the "Appendix" be approved.

4. It is further recommended that this report be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from the military point of view.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

A P P E N D I X

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SWNCC 101/1

1. In paragraph 5 of the "Conclusions", strike out the word "Allied" before "Military Government" and lower-case "Military Government".

2. Amend paragraph 8 of the "Recommendations" as follows:

"8. It is recommended that:

a. This report be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from the military point of view; and

b. Upon approval by the SWNCC of the "Conclusions" in paragraph 5 and 6 above and of the policy statement contained at Appendix "C":

(1) The report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the War and Navy Departments for their information, and to the Department of State for its guidance and appropriate implementation;

(2) A statement substantially the same as that shown at Appendix "D" be released to the press at once by the Department of State."

3. In paragraph 2 of Appendix "C", strike out the word "Allied" before "Military Government" and lower-case "Military Government".

4. Add a new Appendix "D" as follows:

STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS

"As indicated by the Cairo Declaration, it is the policy of the United States that Korea in due course shall become free and independent. In order to assist the Korean people in the development of a responsible democratic government that will enable Korea to assume its proper position as a member of the United Nations as quickly as possible, a trusteeship for Korea should be established as soon as adequate agreement

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can be concluded. Furthermore, since the United States has subscribed to the principles of the United Nations Organization and has ratified the Charter, the Government of the United States believes that such trusteeship for Korea should be brought within the framework of the United Nations Organization."

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX

(Enclosure to JCS 1483/6)

MEMORANDUM TO THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the report of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East concerning "Temporary International Authority in Korea" (S.W.N.C.C. 101/1) and perceive no objection from the military point of view to the conclusions therein, subject to the following amendments:

a. Amend paragraph 5 of the conclusions of the report as follows:

"5. Following the termination of Japanese sovereignty and of Allied Military Government, Korea should be ~~placed under an international trusteeship to be~~ established, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to an international trusteeship system~~.~~ , as a trust territory. No part of this territory should be designated as a strategic area."

b. Amend the first sentence of paragraph 6 of the discussion of the report (Appendix "B") as follows:

"6. There would be several advantages to the Koreans in placing Korea under the international trusteeship system as a trust territory, no part of which is designated as strategic."

c. Insert paragraph 5, as amended, and paragraph 6 of the conclusions of the report as paragraphs 2 and 3 of Appendix "C", "United States Policy with Respect to an International Trusteeship for Korea" and renumber the paragraphs which follow the insertion.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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COPY NO. 63

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19 October 1945

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM AND ADDENDUM

TO

SWNCC 101/2

A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY IN KOREA

Note by the Secretaries

1. Holders of SWNCC 101/2 are requested to attach the enclosed Annex to Appendix to their copies.

2. Holders are further requested to amend SWNCC 101/2 as follows:

Page 18, paragraph 3 a, insert the words "(Annex to Appendix)" between the words "Strategic Survey Committee" and "be approved;".

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY NO. 5

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SWNCC 101/1

11 September 1945

Pages 5 - 17, Incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY IN KOREA

Reference: a. SWNCC 101

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East on reference a, is circulated for the consideration of the Committee.

2. A copy of this paper has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. These comments will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: J.C.S. regarding memo 12-21
Name and title of person making the change:
MDG
Date 4/24/73

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ENCLOSURE

Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine whether there should be an international trusteeship for Korea pending full Korean independence and, if so, the form of such trusteeship and the policies to be followed in connection therewith.

2. To determine the functions and relationships of such a trusteeship with military government in Korea and with the United Nations Organization.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

4. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

5. Following the termination of Japanese sovereignty and of Allied Military Government, Korea should be placed under an international trusteeship to be established in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to an International Trusteeship System.

6. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Republic of China are the nations which should be regarded as "the states directly concerned" with Korea within the meaning of Article 79 of the Charter of the United Nations. As soon as practicable, these four powers should enter into a trusteeship agreement containing the terms under which Korea will be administered and designating themselves jointly as the "administrative authority" in accordance with Articles 79, 81 and other appropriate articles of the Charter of the United Nations.

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7. Appendix "C" should be approved as a statement of United States policy with respect to an international trusteeship for Korea.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. This report be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from the military point of view; and

b. Upon approval by the SWNCC of the "Conclusions" in paragraph 5 and 6 above and of the policy statement contained at Appendix "C", the report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the War and Navy Departments for their information, and to the Department of State for its guidance and appropriate implementation.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Cairo Declaration states:

"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.

"They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

****

"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

2. The Soviet Union in its declaration of war on Japan on 9 August 1945 stated that:

"Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied powers of July 26."

With reference to the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China stated that:

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

3. President Roosevelt proposed to Generalissimo Stalin at Yalta that an international trusteeship should be established for Korea, to be administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China. On 28 May 1945, Generalissimo Stalin agreed to this proposal in his conversation with Mr. Hopkins.

4. The Charter of the United Nations provides for an International Trusteeship System in Articles 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, and 87. (See Annex "A" to Appendix "A").

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ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Charter of the United Nations provides for an International Trusteeship System as follows:

"Article 75. The United Nations shall establish under its authority an International Trusteeship System for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

"Article 76. The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter shall be:

a. To further international peace and security;

b. To promote the political economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.

"Article 77.

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. Territories now held under mandate;

b. Territories which may be detached from enemy status as a result of the Second World War; and

c. Territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

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"Article 78. The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

"Article 79. The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

****

"Article 81. The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

****

"Article 84. It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territority shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

"Article 85.

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

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2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

****

"Article 87. The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. Consider reports submitted by the administering authority;

b. Accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. Provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and

d. Take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements."

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China have stated in the Cairo Declaration that they "are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent". The Soviet Union indicated its support of the Cairo Declaration when it declared war on Japan.

2. No time has been set as to when Korea should become independent, but this should, of course, be accomplished as quickly as possible after liberation. The question arises as to whether or not military government in Korea should be extended beyond the period necessary to disarm the Japanese to continue until Korea becomes free and independent. Considerations which militate against such an extension are (a) that military government is not specifically designed to cope with the difficult and complex problems that will inevitably arise in transforming a former colonial territory such as Korea into an independent state, and (b) that the American people will probably not desire an extended military occupation of Korea beyond the time designated by military necessity. It would therefore seem advisable to terminate military occupation as early as practicable.

3. The United States, by its acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations, favors an international trusteeship system for certain types of territories such as Korea. Both the internal and external factors connected with the liberation of Korea and the establishment of Korean independence are so complex that some form of international trusteeship would seem necessary following military government. It is the policy of the United States, as indicated by the plan suggested by President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Stalin at Yalta, that an international trusteeship should be established for Korea and that such a trusteeship should be administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China. This plan was

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later agreed to by Generalissimo Stalin in his conversations with Mr. Hopkins on 28 May 1945.

4. It remains to be determined, therefore, whether or not all of the four states concerned agree to such a proposal and whether such a four-power trusteeship should be independent of the United Nations organization or part of it. The strategic position of Korea between China, the Soviet Union and Japan, and the instability of the Korean Government prior to its annexation by Japan made it the scene of rivalry between China and Japan and later between Japan and Russia. Unless prompt agreement is reached among the four major Allies on the form of trusteeship for Korea, rivalry for the control of Korea may again develop.

5. Korea is a territory to which the proposed International Trusteeship System, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable. It is a territory detached from an enemy state as a result of this war and one in which a progressive development toward independence should be promoted. Korea is not one of the United Nations.

6. There would be several advantages to the Koreans in placing Korea under the International Trusteeship System:

a. The Charter provided that the terms of the trusteeship for all areas not designated as strategic shall be approved by the General Assembly. Hence, any trusteeship agreement for Korea made by the powers concerned would be subject to the approval of all the United Nations, thereby increasing the responsibility of all the powers for carrying out the agreement.

b. The Charter further provides that the administering authority shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust area. Consequently, the Korean people would have the benefit of the

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By NARS, Date

influence the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council will be able to exert upon the administering authority.

c. The Charter also stipulates that the Trusteeship Council may accept petitions from any trust area, so that the Korean people would have adequate opportunity to express their criticisms of the administering authority.

d. Furthermore, the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council may provide for periodic visits to the respective trust ~~agreement~~ Territories.

7. The principal advantage to the administering powers lies in achieving stability through joint action in Korea as an alternative to rivalry among the great powers in an area of special danger. Furthermore, the difficulties inherent in the establishment of an international supervisory authority for Korea independent of the Trusteeship System of the United Nations would be avoided, and the duplication that would result from the formation of international machinery charged with the responsibilities similar to those of an organ of the United Nations would be eliminated.

8. The administering authority in Korea should, in accord with Article 84 of the Charter, recruit police forces from the territory for local defense and the maintenance of law and order.

9. It is probable, however, that foreign military forces will be necessary in Korea, especially during the early period of trusteeship before sufficient local forces have been organized. The four administering powers should arrange for such forces.

10. The success of the temporary administration of Korea under the trusteeship would also depend on whether or not the terms of the trusteeship agreement were acceptable to the Koreans. Many of the possible objections of the Koreans to a trusteeship system could be met, and the pledge in the Cairo Declaration that Korea shall become free and independent in due course, could be implemented most effectively by the inclusion in the trusteeship agreement for Korea of provisions substantially as follows:

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a. The independence of Korea is recognized subject to the condition that the exercise of the powers of independent government are suspended during the period of trusteeship.

b. The states directly concerned, parties to the agreement, pledge themselves actively to support in the Security Council and in the General Assembly the admission of Korea to full membership in the United Nations as soon as conditions indicate that Korea can accept the responsibilities of independence.

c. The primary purpose of the administering authority for Korea will be to make it possible for the Koreans to undertake the responsibilities of independence and for Korea to become a member of the United Nations at an early date. The Trustee Powers will make every effort to bring about as early as possible the necessary internal conditions in Korea and international arrangements assuring Korea's security to justify the termination of the trusteeship administration and Korea's admission to the United Nations.

d. To these ends the administering authority will:

(1) Utilize Korean personnel to the fullest possible extent;

(2) Provide necessary facilities to train the Koreans to assume the responsibilities of an independent state;

(3) Provide necessary facilities by which the Koreans can determine the form of government under which they will live and to which the administering authority can transfer its powers and responsibilities in such a way as to disturb least the security of the region. Such facilities might include the establishment of a Korean representative assembly and, when the appropriate time arrives, the formulation of a constitutional assembly for the formulation of a national

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constitution in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people.

e. Exercise such executive, legislative and judicial authority as is necessary for the efficient administration of Korea until a free and independent Korean government is established.

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APPENDIX "C"

UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO AN INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP FOR KOREA

1. The primary purpose of the administering authority for Korea should be to make it possible for the Koreans to accept the responsibilities of independence and for Korea ultimately to become a member of the United Nations. The independence of Korea should be recognized in the trusteeship agreement subject to the condition that the exercise of the powers of independent government will be suspended during the period of trusteeship. The administering authority should make every effort to bring about as early as possible the necessary internal conditions in Korea and international arrangements assuring Korea's security, to justify the termination of the trusteeship administration and Korea's admission as a responsible member of the United Nations.

2. Allied military government in Korea should terminate as soon as practicable in accord with a joint agreement by the trustee powers, and should be superseded by the administering authority for Korea. The administering authority itself should be terminated, consistent with the trusteeship agreement, when Korea is capable of assuming the responsibilities of independence.

3. The administering authority for Korea should exercise such executive, legislative, and judicial powers as are necessary. It should make arrangements to maintain in Korea forces adequate for the maintenance of law, order and security.

4. The trusteeship agreement for Korea should include, in addition to the provisions necessary to implement the policies listed above, the following stipulations:

a. Korea shall be administered as a single political and economic unit by a central administering authority, which shall be responsible for the promulgation and implementation of political economic and financial policy throughout the country.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

b. Korean personnel to be used to the fullest possible extent in the administration of Korean affairs, and their responsibility to be progressively increased.

c. As far as possible, Koreans returning from outside Korea not to be appointed or retained in official positions by the administering authority if these persons are clearly unacceptable to the Korean people.

d. Adequate facilities to be provided to train the Koreans to assume the responsibilities of an independent state.

e. Adequate facilities to be provided by which the Koreans can determine the form of government under which they will live, these facilities to include a Korean representative assembly to advise the administering authority and, when the appropriate time arrives, a constitutional assembly for the formulation of a national constitution in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

f. Provisions to be made for the termination of the trusteeship and for the transfer to a Korean government of the rights and responsibilities of the administering authority.

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14 September 1945

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM

TO

SWNCC 101/1

A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY IN KOREA

Note by the Secretaries

All holders of SWNCC 101/1 are requested to make the following changes therein:

Page 13, paragraph 6, subparagraph d:

Delete the last word "agreement" and insert "territories".

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

S E C R E T

COPY NO. 46

SWNCC 101

7 April 1945

Pages 1 to 4, Incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY IN KOREA: RELATIONSHIP WITH MILITARY GOVERNMENT

References: a. SWNCC 16/2
b. SWNCC 16/4

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by the Far East Subcommittee, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE

POLITICO MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST: A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY IN KOREA: RELATIONSHIP WITH MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of statements of policy to be incorporated in a paper on the subject: "A Temporary International Supervisory Authority in Korea: Relationship with Military Government."

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. The subject, "Special Problems Concerning Korea: Consideration of the Establishment of a Temporary International Supervisory Authority Pending Korean Independence and the Relationship of the Military Government therewith," appears as Item X-4 of SWNCC 16/4.

4. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b of SWNCC 16/2.

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By NARS, Date

CONCLUSIONS

5. It is concluded that:

a. In general, the scope of the paper should include a discussion of: (1) the desirability of setting up a temporary international supervisory authority pending Korean independence; (2) the probable functions and membership of any such supervisory authority and its relationship both to a military government and to a world organization; and (3) the approximate time and manner of transfer of the powers of government in Korea from the military government to the international authority.

b. The Department of State should be requested by SWNCC through its Secretary to prepare a draft paper on the above subject.

c. The draft of the paper prepared by the Department of State should be submitted to the SWNCC Secretary who will issue a numbered SWNCC paper on the subject.

d. The SWNCC Secretary should then simultaneously:

(1) Request the JCS through its Secretary to designate the appropriate JCS agency to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate JCS agency designated to consider the subject.

(3) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to secure appropriate views of the State, War and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate JCS agency and the Coordinating Subcommittee has resulted in tentative agreement.)

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

e. The appropriate JCS agency should then report to the JCS. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

f. Upon receipt of a report from the JCS, SWNCC should consider the report with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

g. The final paper as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Approve the above conclusions.

b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

APPENDIX

DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO MR. EUGENE H. DOOMAN SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. D[illegible]

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC _____*, approved on _____**. Your attention is invited to The Problem (paragraph 1) and the Conclusions (paragraph 5).

It would be appreciated if you would inform this Committee as to the date by which you would be prepared to submit a draft paper on the subject of SWNCC _____*.

The initial draft of this paper will, of course, deal primarily with the political aspects of the problem.

* Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is an Appendix.

** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves the paper of which this letter is an Appendix.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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COPY NO. 60

SWNCC 79/2

15 October 1945

Pages 10 - 11, Incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION OF KOREA

References: a. SWNCC 79
b. SWNCC 79/1

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated to the Committee in connection with their consideration of SWNCC 79/1.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ENCLOSURE

SM-3763
13 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Structure and Composition of Civil Affairs Administration of Korea

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the report of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East dealing with the structure and composition of civil affairs administration in Korea (SWNCC 79/1).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection from the military point of view to the conclusions set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the report.

They do not concur, however, in the last two sentences of the conclusion set forth in paragraph 6 since, in their opinion, the matter of centralizing military occupation in Korea can only be resolved by negotiations between the Soviet and United States Governments. In view of the unsettled conditions in Korea at present, it would appear undesirable to place restrictions upon military government in southern Korea without full knowledge of the situation in that area.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that paragraph 6 of the report be amended as follows:

"6. Pending the completion of such negotiations, immediate measures should be taken by the United States and the Soviet ~~Union~~ Governments to abolish the artificially established line between the two military forces and to centralize military occupation in order to lay the ground-work for a trusteeship. ~~Such measures should be accomplished so far as possible by liaison on a military level and should also be directly related to the negotiations for a trusteeship.~~ In addition to and supplementing these governmental measures, efforts should be made by the Commanding General of United

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States forces in Korea to attain the maximum possible co-ordination with the Soviet Commander through liaison on a military level. In organizing the administration of southern Korea under the directive previously issued to him, the commanding general should ~~seek to arrange~~ be advised of the desirability of arranging its structure so as to make it capable of ~~having its authority~~ being extended to the whole of Korea in agreement with the Russians."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Secretary.

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COPY NO. 90

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SWNCC 79/1

27 September 1945

Pages 5 - 9, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION IN KOREA

References: a. SWNCC 79
b. SWNCC 101/1
c. JCS 1483/6

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. A copy of this paper has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: JCS regrading memo 17-71
Name and title of person making the change:
MoG
Date 4/24/73

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ENCLOSURE

STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION IN KOREA

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the policy of this Government regarding the structure and composition of a civil affairs administration in Korea prior to the establishment of an international trusteeship for Korea.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. The present zonal military occupation of Korea by United States and Soviet Forces should be superseded at the earliest possible date by a trusteeship for Korea, as described in SWNCC 101/1.

5. Negotiations for a trusteeship should be initiated at once.

6. Pending the completion of such negotiations, immediate measures should be taken by the United States and the Soviet Governments to abolish the artificially established line between the two military forces and to centralize military occupation in order to lay the ground-work for a trusteeship. In addition to and supplementing these governmental measures, efforts should be made by the Commanding General of United States forces in Korea to attain the maximum possible coordination with the Soviet Commander through liaison on a military level. In

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organizing the administration of southern Korea under the directive previously issued to him, the commanding general should be advised of the desirability of arranging its structure so as to make it capable of being extended to the whole of Korea in agreement with the Russians.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that:

a. This report be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from the military point of view; and

b. Upon approval by the SWNCC of the "Conclusions" in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 above:

(1) the report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the State, War and Navy Departments for their guidance and, where appropriate, for implementation; and

(2) the report not be communicated to our Allies nor released to the press.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. General Order No. 1 (SWNCC 21/8), issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, states:

"The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38° north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East."

"The Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38° north latitude, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific."

2. The Cairo Declaration states in part:

"The aforesaid three great powers, (United States, United Kingdom, China) mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

3. The Soviet Union in its declaration of war on Japan on 9 August 1945 states that:

"Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied Powers of July 26." (Potsdam Declaration).

With reference to the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration states:

"(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out....."

4. In May, 1945, Generalissimo Stalin in conversation with Mr. Hopkins agreed to a four-power trusteeship. In June, 1945, it is understood that Dr. Soong, upon being informed by the

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President of our plan for a four-power trusteeship, gave his agreement. In September, 1945, an officer of the Department of State informed the British Embassy orally of our plans for a four-power trusteeship. No indication of the British Government's attitude in this matter is on record.

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. SWNCC 101/1 recommends that an international trusteeship for Korea should be established as soon as practicable.

2. The existing division of Korea into two zones north and south of 38 degrees north latitude under control respectively of the Soviet Union and the United States, is the result of a decision reached between the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff in regard to operational zones of their respective forces. This division was adopted as an emergency measure for the limited purposes of receiving Japanese surrenders and of disarming and demoblizing enemy forces. Its continuance would severely handicap the establishment of an effective centralized trusteeship having as its objective an independent Korea based on the freely-expressed will of the Korean people.

3. In order to terminate the present division of Korea into two zones and to facilitate the inauguration of a centralized trusteeship for Korea, negotiations for such a trusteeship should be pressed at once. In the event of the unwillingness of any of the powers to participate in such agreement, the agreement should be concluded among the remaining interested powers. Immediate measures should be taken by the United States and the Soviet Union to abolish the artificially-established line between the two forces and to centralize military occupation in order to lay the groundwork for a trusteeship. Such measures should be accomplished so far as possible by liaison on a military level and should also be directly related to the negotiations for a trusteeship. In organizing the administration of southern Korea under the directive previously issued to him, the commanding general should seek so to arrange its structure as to make it capable of having its authority extended to the whole of Korea in agreement with the Russians.

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S E C R E T

COPY NO. 44

SWNCC 79

19 March 1945

Pages 1 to 4, Incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
COMPOSITION OF FORCES TO OCCUPY KOREA
Reference: a. SWNCC 16/2

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by the Far East Subcommittee, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE

POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST:
COMPOSITION OF FORCES TO OCCUPY KOREA
Reference: a. SWNCC 16/2

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To recommend the procedure to be followed in the preparation and processing of statements of policy to be incorporated in a paper on the subject: "The Extent of United States and Allied Participation, and the National Composition of Forces to Occupy Korea".

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 16/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 23 February 1945, directs that the Subcommittee for the Far East maintain as a general guide for its activities a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in approximate order of priority, and that prior to initiating action on any one of such problems the Subcommittee submit in each case to SWNCC a detailed recommendation showing (1) a statement of the problem, (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including recommendations for ultimate implementation.

3. The subject, "The Military Occupation of the Japanese Empire and Other Areas: The Extent of United States and Allied Participation, and the National Composition of Forces", appears as Item IV-2 on the initial list (SWNCC 16/2, Appendix "A").

4. The conclusions and recommendations which follow are submitted in compliance with paragraph 6 b. of SWNCC 16/2.

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CONCLUSIONS

5. It is concluded that:

a. In general, the scope of the paper should include a discussion of (1) the effect on military government of the pledge in the Cairo Declaration that in due course Korea shall become free and independent; (2) the relative merits of Allied or United States Military Government; (3) the national composition of the forces to be represented in such a military government; and (4) the extent to which the United States and other countries would participate in the forces to occupy Korea.

b. The Department of State should be requested by SWNCC through its Secretary to prepare a draft paper on the above subject.

c. The draft of the paper prepared by the Department of State should be submitted to the SWNCC Secretary who will issue a numbered SWNCC paper on the subject.

d. The SWNCC Secretary should then simultaneously:

(1) Request the J.C.S. through its Secretary to designate the appropriate J.C.S. agency to consider the subject.

(2) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to collaborate with the appropriate J.C.S. agency designated to consider the subject.

(3) Direct the Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East to secure appropriate views within the State, War and Navy Departments, and coordination with other civilian agencies as may be appropriate. (Such views and coordination should generally be secured after collaboration by the appropriate J.C.S. agency and the Coordinating Subcommittee has resulted in tentative agreement.)

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e. The appropriate J.C.S. agency should then report to the J.C.S. This report should reflect the results of the collaboration and coordination outlined above.

f. Upon receipt of a report from the J.C.S., SWNCC should consider the report with such further advice as may be necessary from the appropriate officials within the three Departments.

g. In the event that there are any divergences between the views of SWNCC and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such divergences should be reconciled with the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to final approval by SWNCC.

h. The final paper as approved by SWNCC should be transmitted to the interested governmental departments and agencies as approved governmental policy for their guidance and, where appropriate, for proper implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Approve the above conclusions.

b. Dispatch the letter in the Appendix to the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn.

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APPENDIX

DRAFT LETTER FROM SWNCC TO THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. DUNN

There is enclosed a copy of SWNCC ____*, approved on ____**. Your attention is invited to The Problem (paragraph 1) and the Conclusions (paragraph 5).

It would be appreciated if you would inform this Committee as to the date by which you would be prepared to submit a draft paper on the subject of SWNCC ____*.

The initial draft of this paper will, of course, deal primarily with the political aspect of the problem.

---

* Here will be inserted the number given by SWNCC to the paper of which this letter is an appendix.
** Here will be inserted the date on which SWNCC approves the paper of which this letter is an appendix.

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SWNCC DIRECTIVES

1946 - 1947

(176/13 —)

(Commissioners' Office)

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By NARS Date

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Jan Brown.
103

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General Staff, United States Army
Plans & Operations Division
Washington, D. C.

PAC 091 Korea (27 Sept 47) 30 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA:

SUBJECT: Treatment of Korean Workers Organizations

The inclosure is forwarded for information.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

/s/ WESLEY R. EDWARDS
WESLEY R. EDWARDS
Lt Colonel, GSC
Executive Officer
Plans & Policy Group

1 Incl
JCS Memo (SM-6984) w/1 Incl
(Cy No. 73, SWNCC 376), plus
additional cys 86, 87 & 88
of SWNCC 376

Copies furnished:
CG, USAFIK, w/cy of SM-6984, w/incl (Cy No. 74, SWNCC 376)
D/Pers, w/cy no. 89 of SWNCC 376
D/I, w/cy no. 90 of SWNCC 376
PID (thru: Chief of Info), w/cy No. 91 of SWNCC 376
L&LD, w/cy no. 92 of SWNCC 376
Manpower Bd. w/cy No. 93 of SWNCC 376
CAD, w/cy No. 94 of SWNCC 376
C/S, USAF, w/cy no. 95 of SWNCC 376
Sec. JCS, w/o incl
Sec. SWNCC, w/o incl
Chief, Opr Gp, P&O, w/cy no. 96 of SWNCC 376
Chief, Pac Br (Thru: Chief, Opr Gp, P&O), w/cy No. 97 of SWNCC 376

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

SM-6984
26 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander in Chief, Far East
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea

Subject: Treatment of Korean Workers Organizations.

Reference: WARX 87117 (25 Sep 47).

Enclosure: SWNCC 376 (Copy No. 74).

At the request of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee the Enclosure is forwarded for information.

/s/ W. G. LALOR
W. G. LALOR
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Secretary.

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SWNCC 376

27 June 1947

Pages 1 - 13, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

TREATMENT OF KOREAN WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a study by the Department of State, presented by the State Member, SWNCC, is circulated for consideration by the Committee as a matter of PRIORITY. The State Member requested that this paper not be referred to a subcommittee.

2. A copy of this paper has been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view. These comments will be circulated to the Committee on receipt thereof from the Secretary, JCS.

H. W. MOSELEY
A. A. SCHULGEN
V. L. LOWRANCE
Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE

TREATMENT OF KOREAN WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS

A Study presented by the State Member, SWNCC

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the policy to be followed by the Military Government in dealing with the labor problems and labor organizations in Korea.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

[illegible] policy with [illegible] in Korea [illegible] Appendix "C".

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that:

a. This report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment from a military point of view.

b. [illegible] approval of the report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the War Department telegraph the conclusions incorporated in Appendix "C" to the theatre for implementation and transmit the full report to the theatre for information.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The "Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Korea" (SWNCC 176/6), Part I, paragraph 9 d) states:

"Encouragement will be given to the development of democratic organizations in labor, industry and agriculture."

2. The Acting Secretary of State in a statement issued on August 20, 1946 announced that "the development of democratic labor organizations and improvement of labor conditions" were major objectives of military government in Korea.

3. Section II of Ordinance number 19 issued by the Office of the Military Governor in Seoul, Korea on October 30, 1945 stated that "the right of any individuals to organize and to work uncontested shall be respected and protected. Any interference with this right is unlawful."

Section II of Ordinance 19 also calls for compulsory arbitration of all labor disputes in industries that are in the opinion of military government essential to the people's livelihood.

4. Ordinance number 68, issued December 6, 1946, supplemented Ordinance number 19 by establishing national and provincial labor arbitration boards.

5. Ordinance number 97 of July 22, 1946 entitled "Labor Policy in Labor Matters Declared; Department of Labor Established" stated that "the development of democratic labor organizations shall be encouraged" and "workers shall have the right to form self-governing labor unions, to give aid to and receive aid from other labor organizations, and to elect representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of establishing terms and conditions of their employment without interference from employers or their agents." The

Appendix "A"

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policy declaration also calls for the encouragement of "peaceful negotiations between employers and labor organizations" regarding wages, hours and other conditions of employment. No mention is made of the right of unions to strike or engage in other activities incidental to labor disputes.

Ordinance Number 97 also establishes a Department of Labor for the effectuation of this labor policy and lays down its functions and duties. Section IV of this Ordinance reads as follows:

> "Section IV. Penalties. Any person violating the provisions of any regulation of the Department of Labor issued pursuant to this Ordinance, and having the force and effect of law upon publication in the Official Gazette with approval of the Military Governor, shall, upon conviction by a Military Occupation Court, suffer such punishment as the court shall determine."

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Introduction

The encouragement of democratically organized workers' organizations has been one of the fundamental tenets of American occupation policy in both Europe and the Far East. This policy is based on the belief that genuine trade unions and peasants organizations are vital factors in the establishment and preservation of democratic forms of government. It also stems from an awareness that [illegible] provide and maintain a satisfactory framework within which workers' organizations can thrive will inevitably result in the development of "underground" organizations whose policies of sabotage and violence will disrupt and curtail output and so sow or later bring them into conflict with constituted authority.

No labor policy on the part of occupation authorities, especially in the unstable economy typical of countries under occupation, can be expected to prevent the development of some amount of labor unrest. The choice thus narrows down to the selection of a set of principles which will not only carry out the basic policy directive of promoting the development of democratic forces within the occupied area, but will at the same time tend to minimize labor unrest and promote production efficiency on the part of both labor and management.

As stated above, American policy calls for the encouragement of democratically organized workers' organizations. In practice this necessitates the establishment of a proper legal and administrative framework within which genuine workers organizations can flourish. Without such a framework "encouragement" becomes a hollow mockery. Without such a framework unions are apt to go underground and to grow increasingly politically minded. American experience also demonstrates that an adequate legal and administrative framework assists in the promotion of sound collective bargaining procedures, reduces labor unrest, and stimulates productive efficiency.

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Labor Movement in Korea

[illegible] labor movement has had a relatively short and [illegible] an All-Korea Council of Trade Unions (Chosun [illegible] known locally by the Col Hwoy), generally called [illegible] Confederation. Before this there was a [illegible] local basis, farmers as well as workers [illegible] the organization but in 1947 [illegible] organization of industrial wage earners only. In view [illegible] limited degree of industrialization as well as the [illegible] political conditions, membership remained quite [illegible], 500,000 being the maximum figure claimed. During the late [illegible] number of strikes or threats were successfully con- [illegible] by Communist unions of the Chosun Kyung, and some strikes [illegible] reports of the labor movement to have been [illegible] and around the Japanese labor [illegible] in 1945, there was much anti-Japanese [illegible] Communist [illegible] to establish [illegible] vern- [illegible] under. This attempt accomplished little, and [illegible] of army units by Japan in 1931 labor organi- [illegible] have been outlawed. The Chosun Kyung went underground, [illegible] 1946 and 1948 were on a limited political rather than economic nature. A few strikes [illegible] limited gains were secured, but several notable [illegible] resulted in a purge [illegible] of the Chosun Kyung of labor, and undoubtedly [illegible] under Communist control. Independence [illegible] [illegible] organizations. The essential viability of these [illegible], however, is attested by the rapid and [illegible] several workers' political committees immediately after the [illegible] August 15.

[illegible] of labor's underground exploits in [illegible] orientation when compared with similar organi- [illegible] in the United States. During their years under Japanese

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control Korean workers were schooled in sabotage and other practices designed to hamper production. This makes the securing and maintaining of the cooperation of the workers' organizations doubly important in order that the economic objectives of the occupation be not similarly interfered with.

3. Labor Organization Activities Since the Surrender

The period immediately following the surrender was one of great confusion. Nearly eighty percent of Korean industry was owned and operated by Japanese big business interests. In this management personnel was Japanese. Workers' committees, which developed almost immediately after V-J Day in most plants, either deposed the old managers or took over following their voluntary departure. The main function of the committees at that time appeared to be to prevent looting and the widescale destruction of equipment. In some cases attempts to continue production under labor control were made. The general holiday spirit and confusion, however, were not conducive to much success along this line. Even some Korean employers found themselves unable to cope with their employees, though their plants were not seized. Others were successful in being able to work out their problems with employees and get their plants back into production in a relatively short time. In view of the lack of experience in collective bargaining procedure on both sides, the past record of worker exploitation, sharply rising prices and general economic disequilibrium, difficulties in establishing sound employee-employer relationships is quite understandable. This early period, nevertheless, built up a wall of distrust between the organization of workers on the one hand, and employers on the other. It also created a troublesome situation for Military Government whose responsibility it was to take over and operate the plants formerly owned by Japanese.

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In November a conference of the Workers' Committee was held in Seoul and the Chun Pyung was reestablished as a national labor federation. It has been reported that this Conference concerned itself more with political issues than with trade union problems. Nevertheless considerable progress along the latter line was also reported to have been accomplished including the reorganizing of the Chun Pyung, the dispatching of 700 labor organizers to secure new members and arrange for the affiliating of unions into it, the setting up of district councils as well as a subordinate office in North Korea, and the laying out of a general policy for the protection of labor and the strengthening of labor bodies. Local unions, in theory at least, are affiliated with the Council through their membership in the district councils or in one of approximately fifteen national industrial councils. In practice, however, the Chun Pyung does not as yet appear to be the highly centralized body called for in its organization chart, records of labor incidents involving its affiliates outside the Seoul area failing to show any close relationship between them and national headquarters. There is strong Communist influence in Chun Pyung and Communist domination of the organization is probable. In no sense can it be said to be a democratic workers' organization today. Membership figures for the South Korea Council in May 1946 were given by the organization itself as 467,000. A recent Military Government estimate, however, places the number as around 60,000 only.

The connection between South and North Korea was written into the Chun Pyung regulations in the following terms: "A general bureau of Chun Pyung in North Korea is to be temporarily stationed in Pyongyang and is to be given autonomy for the Korean trade union movement in Northern Korea; it is nevertheless obliged to obey the instructions of the Chun Pyung." Although direct evidence is lacking, it is probable that the Northern branch

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sever[illegible] its relations with southern headquarters early in 1946. The name, Chon Pyong, is however still used by this North Korea organization which is the sole labor union federation in the area. It is believed that labor is nearly 100 per cent unionized there and that control from the "top down" is the order of the day. In fact, to say the affiliated unions as well as the North Korea Chun Pyong are Communist-controlled and far from being democratic organizations. Total membership appears to be in the neighborhood of [illegible],000.

A second national "labor" organization, the General League for Korean Independence (Tai Han Dok Lib Tongmang Yeh'hwe) or "Tai Dok" was organized early in 1946. This body was supported by wealthy Koreans and manufacturers and up to present date collected membership fees or membership dues. Its [illegible] and organizers were frequently drawn from the ranks of [illegible] supervisors or [illegible] serving in a confidential capacity with employers. [illegible] of currently [illegible] for the improvement of labor [illegible] and [illegible] have appeared to be to [illegible] satisfactorily, to promote support for Rightist [illegible], not to cause disturbances. As strikes have as yet been [illegible] in the area, though of late it has become somewhat more active on labor's behalf. A recent estimate by Military Government lists this organization as approximately 90,000 members, which is thought to be [illegible] and as half a million. Labor [illegible] officials from Korea believe that many Korean workers [illegible] members of both Chun Pyong and Tai Dok, the latter as a sort of [illegible] in any cases being in the nature of "job insurance."

4. Political preoccupation of Korean labor

The [illegible] of political preoccupation by Korean [illegible] organizations, especially by the national bodies, is a [illegible] that must be examined as far as possible reversed, [illegible] view of Korean labor's historical background and the [illegible] international political situation that has developed [illegible] among these people, this orientation is not too surprising. Korean political preoccupation has not only been

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a hindrance to the workers' organization is proper considering their primary functions of an economic nature but are also also a fundamental source of the friction that has grown up between the military government and its effect are difficult to distinguish here, but as suggested earlier in this paper, there have been a number of developments, or lack of developments, since the occupation that have contributed to the suspicion given to politics workers by the labor bodies. Much has been the nature of some of the early ordinances promulgated after occupation, the way in which these were interpreted and enforced, the hardness with which an ordinance to implement the policy of encouraging development of democratic unions was promulgated, and the lack of adequate administrative machinery to implement the ordinances when promulgated.

Appendix "A", paragraph 3, a, and b, "Labor Problem," relate to some of the early ordinances. Ordinance 19, as interpreted in an opinion of the Department of Justice dated of May 5, 1946, included a statement that section 15 of this Ordinance "prohibits by penalties any interference with the labor relation between individual employers and employees". This opinion gave rise to fears that many normal activities of both unions and employer associations would be prohibited. Ordinance 57, by stating that the development of democratic labor organizations and peaceful collective bargaining should be encouraged, and that workers should have organizational rights subsequently erased some of these fears. However the wide scope of the "penalty" clause of this Ordinance could not but cause apprehension regarding the essential freedom of individuals in organizing unions and of the unions in carrying out their activities. Fear that Ordinance 34, which implemented the mediation provisions of Ordinance 19, would result in compulsory arbitration of all labor disputes also contributed to labor's apprehension since they lacked faith in the impartiality of the

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labor mediation board (upon which labor was not represented), and believed that they could obtain more for themselves by normal collective bargaining processes.

Basic cause of most of the aforementioned difficulties was lack of sufficient trained personnel, both American and Korean, to implement labor ordinances and prevent many of the abuses that have developed. In Japan a functioning Japanese Government relieved our occupation forces of much of the difficulties of this kind. In Korea not only did no government exist when we came in, but Korean personnel trained in such work was almost non-existent. Moreover, we were forced to rely to a considerable extent upon a limited number of Koreans who knew English, many of whom were either unsympathetic to or mistrusted by labor.

c. What labor is by?

There is universal agreement on only one aspect of the labor picture in Korea today, that an exceedingly deplorable and possibly dangerous situation exists. Deplorable because no real progress has been made in the development of democratic workers' organizations. Dangerous because both the Korean workers and the existing workers' organizations are suspicious of American intentions, and are resentful of the economic status in which they find themselves and of the repression they have experienced. More than mere reference from the field speak of the existence of an underlying "explosive" situation, one that might break out into riots of a more serious and widespread nature than those experienced in connection with the railway strike of last Fall.

While it is recognized that conditions in Korea are very different from those in Japan it is believed possible, nevertheless, that if approximately the same labor policies and activities that have been successful in Japan are applied to Korea, [illegible] ve-

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ment in the labor relations field in the latter country can be secured. Obviously this policy will be no "royal road" to satisfactory labor relations. There is none such for Korea. Those wishing to give political emphasis to the labor movement, both the communist and extreme rightist forces will undoubtedly seek to take advantage of the freedoms offered. Although these dangers exist, it is most important to prevent abuses of power and arbitrary arrests of workers for union activities by the Korean police on the one hand, and anti-union activities by employers on the other. In connection with the former, attention is called to the special instructions of the Japanese Home Ministry to the Prefectural Governors concerning the functions of police in regard to labor organizations and labor disputes.

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APPENDIX "C"

1. Encouragement will be given to the development of democratic labor organizations in all fields of economic activity.

(a) The right of workers to organize and join labor unions or similar organizations of their own choosing will be recognized and labor unions and workers will be safeguarded in their efforts to improve wages, hours and working conditions, and to promote basic mutual protection and economic status generally. You will not permit employers to interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate against employees or prospective employees because of union membership or activities. You will protect the right of union organizations to bargain collectively through orderly means. Persons chosen to represent properly their members in matters affecting their economic or social status. Administrative machinery adequate to safeguard these rights and safeguards, based upon appropriate legislation, will be established.

(b) In the adjustment of labor relations and labor disputes, the practice of collective bargaining will be encouraged, assisted, where necessary, by agencies of conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration.

(c) Strikes or other work stoppages should be prohibited only when the military governor considers that such stoppage is harmful to the objectives or security of the occupation.

(d) The military security forces and the constabulary, or police forces will not participate in labor disputes except to prevent public disorder and to safeguard life and property.

(e) You will facilitate and protect the right of labor officials and workers to hold meetings, print and distribute pamphlets, posters and newspapers, engage in peaceful picketing and to utilize peaceful means in recruiting members or obtaining public support for their activities.

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(f) Workers should be free to choose the form of organization of their unions, whether on a craft, plant, industry or territorial basis. Unions should be allowed to form federations or similar groupings.

(g) You will encourage the use of secret balloting and democratic methods in the election of trade union officials and standing committees.

7. Encouragement will be given to the improvement of working conditions and the development of protective legislation.

(a) You will develop legislation to eliminate abuses in working conditions and to promote industrial health and safety and will establish agencies competent to enforce and administer such legislation.

(b) You will pursue employment policies designed to relieve unemployment and make maximum use of the manpower resources of Korea.

(c) You will encourage the establishment of a wage and salary structure designed to promote industrial efficiency and stable labor relations.

(d) You will encourage the development of appropriate social insurance and public assistance legislation and the establishment of agencies competent to implement such legislation.

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2 July 1947

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM

TO

SWNCC 376

TREATMENT OF KOREAN WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS

Note by the Secretaries

Holders of SWNCC 376 are requested to substitute the attached revised page 13 for the one contained therein and destroy the superseded page by burning.

J. P. GARDINER

W. A. SCHULGEN

V. L. LOWRANCE

Secretariat

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2 ... 1

... October 1947

...-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DECISION RECORD SWNCC 376

...MENT OF JOINT ACTION OF ...

...ote by the Secretaries

1. By informal action on 22 September 1947 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 376. In approving SWNCC 376 the Committee agreed to amend the "Facts Bearing on the Problem" and "Discussion" as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in SWNCC 376/1.

2. Holders of SWNCC 376 are therefore requested to make the following changes therein:

a. Substitute the attached revised pages 2, 3, 6, 7, ... and 9 for the pages contained therein and destroy the superseded pages.

b. Page 6, line 16, change to read "Appendix 'A', ... and b, c, and d," instead of "Appendix 'A', Sections b, c, d, and e."

R. A. ROBERTS
... A. SCHULGEN
V. L. LOVELACE
Secretariat

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file in office
Safe: Not to leave
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JMB

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PAO 091 Korea (7 Aug 47) 13 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500,
c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA:

SUBJECT: United States Policy in Korea

The inclosure is forwarded for information.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

James L Cantrell

JAMES L. CANTRELL
Lt Colonel, GSC
Executive Officer
Plans & Policy Group

1 Incl
SWNCC 176/30 w/dec on. Cys
No. 89 thru 96

Copies furnished:
CG, USAFIK, w/cys No. 87 & 88 of incl
Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Nanking, w/cy No. 97 of incl
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7 August 1947

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DECISION ON SWNCC 176/30

UNITED STATES POLICY IN KOREA

Note by the Secretaries

1. By informal action on 6 August 1947 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 176/30.

2. In approving SWNCC 176/30 the War Member made the following comment:

"I note, however, that although the Conclusions of the paper indicate that the proposed course of action is not rigid and may have to be modified by developments, that is not made completely clear in the Recommendations. While proposed course of action appears to be sound, the War Department wishes to make clear its understanding that the State Department may have to make necessary modifications in the light of developments."

H. W. MOSELEY
W. A. SCHULGEN
V. L. LOWRANCE
Secretariat

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COPY NO. 88

S E C R E T

SWNCC 176/30

4 August 1947

Pages 207 -227, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES POLICY IN KOREA
References: a. SWNCC 176/27
b. SWN-5601

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by an ad hoc Committee in response to the above references, is circulated for consideration by the Committee as a matter of URGENCY.

H. W. MOSELEY

W. A. SCHULGEN

V. L. LOWRANCE

Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES POLICY IN KOREA

Report by ad hoc Committee on Korea

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate as a matter of urgency a proposed course of action to be adopted by the United States Government to prevent further serious deterioration of the unsettled political situation in Korea.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. The U.S. cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under circumstances which would inevitably lead to Communist domination of the entire country. The resulting political repercussions would seriously damage U.S. prestige in the Far East and throughout the world, and would discourage those small nations now relying upon the U.S. to support them in resisting internal or external Communist pressure. Every effort should be made, however, to liquidate or reduce the U.S. commitment of men and money in Korea as soon as possible without abandoning Korea to Soviet domination.

b. The present unsatisfactory state of affairs in south Korea will not improve until definite action is taken giving the Koreans reassurance that the United States is doing and will continue to do its utmost to carry out its commitment to bring independence to Korea.

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c. In the event of early failure of Joint Commission negotiations there is the possibility that the Korean people, discouraged by lack of progress toward their independence, will be led by extremists of either Right or Left, into such serious internal disorders that U.S. public opinion might require the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea under such circumstances would almost certainly result in the complete domination of Korea by the Soviet Union, with grave consequences to U.S. prestige and world-wide political objectives.

d. The United States must immediately adopt a course of action to expedite a satisfactory solution to the Korean problem. This course of action must be designed (1) to prove to the discouraged and explosive Korean people that the U.S. Government is making every possible effort to speed their independence, and (2) to prove to American and world public opinion that the U.S. Government is acting in accordance with its international commitments, particularly the Moscow Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations.

e. In the event that the present impasse in the Joint Commission continues until August 7, a letter (Appendix "C") should be dispatched to the Foreign Minister of the USSR informing him of the desire of the U.S. Government to receive from the Joint Commission a report by August 17 of such progress as it has made so that immediate consideration can be given as to what further steps should be taken to expedite the establishment of a united, independent Korea. If the Joint Commission is unable to agree on a joint report, the U.S. delegation should be instructed to submit its unilateral report to the U.S. Government. On August 18, after receipt of a report either from the Joint Commission or the U.S. delegation, the U.S. Government should forward a note (Appendix "D") to the other three powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement, informing them of the lack of progress by

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the Joint Commission, and proposing definite steps for early achievement of the aims of the Moscow Agreement. These proposals should provide (1) for the establishment of a Provisional Government by the Koreans themselves through recognized democratic procedures, (2) for United Nations observation of elections and the other procedures involved in establishing the Provisional Government, and (3) for such aid and assistance, (not termed "trusteeship") as is agreed between the Provisional Government and the Four Powers. This letter to the other three powers should request the early comments and views of the other three powers, and invite informal consultation in Washington through their Ambassadors. It should be made clear at the beginning of these consultations that if no agreement is reached regarding these or substitute proposals, the United States feels that, in view of the already untoward delay in achieving Korean independence, it must submit the matter to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The letters in Appendices "C" and "D" should be made public upon receipt of notification of their delivery.

f. In the event that the Soviet Delegation on the Joint Commission should precipitate a breakdown in the negotiations prior to August 7, the U.S. Government should immediately dispatch to the other three Powers concerned the note contained in Appendix "D" with appropriate modification of the first paragraph. Under such circumstances the United States should follow the courses outlined above with reference to publicity.

g. Should the Soviet Government refuse to consider the U.S. proposals, the United States Government should inform the other adherents to Moscow Agreement on Korea that it is submitting the whole problem of Korea to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and that in the meantime it proposes to take the initial steps outlined in the Annex to Appendix "D", welcoming at the same time

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United Nations observers. Immediate steps should then be taken to place the case on the agenda of the General Assembly.

h. Should the Soviet Government propose the immediate simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces, the U.S. Government should agree in principle subject to the limitations set forth in Section IV, B, 4 of the Interdepartmental Committee Report on Korea which are designed to safeguard Korean political freedom and national independence.

i. In the unlikely event that the Soviet delegation begins to cooperate on the Joint Commission, reference to the United Nations must be delayed at least temporarily. The United States should still make a public announcement of the actions being taken in the southern zone to expedite Korean self-government and full independence. A new impasse in negotiations should be met by immediate initiation of the course outlined in subparagraph e above.

j. A State Department working group should immediately be formed to prepare the Korean case for submission to the United Nations. This working group should consult as appropriate with representatives of the War and Navy Departments.

k. In view of the possibility of failure of solution in the United Nations, the U.S. Government must be prepared for the possible necessity of granting independence to south Korea, and must make a continuing study of the political and economic considerations involved in taking such a step.

l. There is a continuing need for a Grant-in-Aid to Korea by the U.S. Government, whether or not it becomes necessary to submit the Korean problem to the United Nations. Plans should be made therefore to submit Grant-in-Aid legislation to the next session of Congress.

m. Immediate steps should be taken by the Foreign Policy Information Subcommittee of SWNCC to revise appropriately the public information policy on Korea.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that:

a. In the event that present impasse in the Joint Commission continues until 7 August, the letter in Appendix "C" be dispatched to the Foreign Minister of the USSR, and on 18 August the letter in Appendix "D" be dispatched to the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, United Kingdom, and China; these letters to be made public upon notification of their delivery.

b. In the event of breakdown in Joint Commission negotiations in Korea prior to 7 August, that the letter in Appendix "D" be immediately dispatched with appropriate publicity, to the governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China.

c. If no agreement can be reached between the four powers regarding the propcsals contained in the Annex to Appendix "D", on 10 September the United States publicly announce its intention of submitting the whole Korean problem to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations beginning 16 September.

d. In the event the Soviet Union refuses to consider the U.S. proposals on Korea, or otherwise delays progress, the United States inform with appropriate publicity, the other three powers of its intention to submit the whole problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

e. A State Department working group immediately be formed to prepare the Korean case for submission to the United Nations, consulting as appropriate with representatives of the War and Navy Departments.

f. The Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC, after the receipt of General Wedemeyer's report, prepare a study of the political and economic considerations which will be involved should it become desirable or necessary to grant independence to South Korea.

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g. Grant-in-Aid legislation for South Korea be prepared for submission to the next session of Congress.

h. The information policy on Korea be appropriately revised by the Foreign Policy Information Subcommittee of SWNCC.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. On 27 March 1947 the Special Interdepartmental Committee for Korea submitted to the Secretaries of State and War a report (SWNCC Memorandum for Information No. 75) containing recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Korea. In brief, the Committee recommended that (a) An immediate approach be made by the U.S. Government to the Soviet Government for the purpose of resuming negotiations leading to the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement; and (b) immediate steps be taken to obtain Congressional approval of a substantial Grant-in-Aid for the purpose of rehabilitating south Korea. The Interdepartmental Committee pointed out that both actions were required to break the intolerable impasse and to reassure the Korean people of our intentions regarding their independence.

2. After an exchange of letters between Secretary of State Marshall and Prime Minister Molotov, the U.S. and Soviet Governments agreed to reconvene the Joint Commission on 20 May, and to review the work of the Commission in July or August. The Commission reconvened and, after some initial progress, became deadlocked regarding the manner of consultation with Korean political parties under the terms of the Moscow Agreement. This deadlock is over the identical issue which caused the failure of the first session of the Joint Commission in May of 1946. It is the U.S. view that the Joint Commission should consult with all Korean parties of consequence, so long as these parties agreed to cooperate with the Joint Commission. The U.S. delegations contend that on the basis of the Marshall-Molotov Agreements no such party can be excluded from consultation save by agreement of both delegations. The Soviets have insisted that they would not consult with any party which has expressed opposition to any part of the Moscow Agreement, particularly the provisions regarding "trusteeship," so hated by Koreans. The U.S. feels that to

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agree to the Soviet position would be to abridge the right of freedom of speech in Korea and would bar from consultation all parties save the Communists and their fellow travelers.

3. Although detailed plans for a Grant-in-Aid program for south Korea were prepared, and draft legislation agreed between the War and State Departments, it was determined, after consultation with Congressional leaders, that a request for funds in addition to those incorporated for Korea in the War Department budget for occupied areas would not be made at this session of Congress. It was felt that favorable Congressional consideration could not be anticipated due to the large sums being requested for other areas and the possibility of progress in Joint Commission negotiations. In addition, it was felt that should the legislation have been introduced and not favorably considered, the effect on the U.S. position in Korea and the Far East in general would have been unfortunate.

4. General Hodge and his Political Advisor, Minister Jacobs, are of the opinion that the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission has been stalling negotiations to delay U.S. plans for the rehabilitation of south Korea until the U.S. Congress adjourns, after which the Soviets may be expected to allow the negotiations to come to a close. This view is in agreement with a recent War Department intelligence analysis, portions of which are quoted herewith:

> "...It has become apparent to General John R. Hodge and his advisors that (a) a complete break with the Soviets in the Joint Commission must be faced with a probable denouncing of the Moscow Agreement, and (b) that the United States administration must be prepared to announce some definite program for south Korea, and/or be prepared for uprisings sponsored by either the Left or the Right or both."

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"[The Koreans are] an unusually volatile, venal, and politically infantile people.... [They] fanatically desire independence, but are woefully lacking in the attributes which make such independence, in the Western democratic sense, possible."

".... If and when it becomes apparent that the ends desired by the Soviet cannot be attained through quasi-legal processes, and especially if negotiations are broken off, and the United States denounces the Moscow Agreement, communist efforts to embroil the situation may immediately be expected, gradually rising in crescendo until the peninsula becomes untenable for the US occupation.

"On the Rightist side, the increasing disillusionment of the people because of the delay of independence, or any efforts on the part of the United States to placate the USSR and yield to their advancing demands, may set off riots, violence and even the attempt to declare an independent government. The Communists can be counted upon to realize this situation, and to do everything in their power to aggravate it.... A firm refusal on the part of the United States delegation to yield to Soviet demands, and especially an open break with the Soviets because of their recalcitrant attitude, will probably serve to reassure the more moderate Koreans. However, Rhee and his party, fearing loss of prestige through such a reassurance, may be led to seize that opportunity to arouse the volatile populace against the United States occupation and Military Government, by a declaration of independence and the precipitation of open revolt. Rightist uprisings must therefore be prepared for at any time within the near future, the exact moment depending upon the development of events.

"There is little doubt that such a Rightist venture would play into the hands of the Communists, enabling them within a short time to foment trouble within the populace, and opening the way for the infinitely better trained and ordered Communist workers and troops to destroy the Rightist move-

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5. Reports from Korea indicate that there is considerable possibility of civil disorder on 15 August, the second anniversary of "Liberation Day". There is some apprehension in Korea that such disorders might be the spark to ignite widespread violence and perhaps revolt.

6. In addition to the United States and Soviet Governments, the Governments of the United Kingdom and China are adherents to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. It is provided in paragraph 2 of the Moscow Agreement that the recommendations of the Joint Commission shall be presented for the consideration of those four powers. Since the Joint Commission has not yet agreed on any recommendation there have been no formal communications regarding its work to either China or the United Kingdom.

7. The President has charged General Wedemeyer with the mission of making an appraisal of the situation in Korea with particular reference to an economic aid program and its relation to general political and economic conditions throughout the country. General Wedemeyer and his group are currently in China, and are expected to reach Korea late in August.

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The immediate problem facing the U.S. Government in Korea is to determine what course of action should be taken by the U.S. when, as appears almost certain, current Joint Commission negotiations fail. This failure may result either from an immediate breakdown of negotiations precipitated by the Soviet delegation, or may develop gradually as a result of Soviet procrastination. In either case any action taken by the U.S. must be designed (a) to prove to the discouraged and explosive Korean people that every possible effort is being made to speed their independence and (b) to prove to American and world public opinion that the U.S. Government is acting in accordance with its international commitments, particularly under the Moscow Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations. Should factor (a) be ignored, the U.S. Government might find itself faced in Korea with internal disorders of a serious magnitude. Although forces available to General Hodge are capable of dealing with any foreseeable internal disorders in south Korea, widespread repressive action involving bloodshed might result in the American public forcing the precipitate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, leading inevitably to Soviet domination over south Korea with severe and far-reaching political repercussions. Ignoring factor (b) might also lead to loss of international prestige and good-will. In addition, critics in the United States who are quick to detect any alleged by-passing of the UN, might so confuse the issue as greatly to hamper the ability of the U.S. Government to take effective action.

2. Complicating the problems in the American zone in Korea are the numerous confusing and sometimes contradictory statements issued in Washington regarding the possibilities of (a) a Grant-in-Aid program for economic rehabilitation in south Korea and (b) the taking over of civil administration in south Korea by the State Department. Both of these matters have been referred to by General Hodge in his message forwarded by SCAP to the JCS and

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3. Among the courses of action open to the U.S. are those which were considered by the Special Interdepartmental Committee in preparing its 27 March report to the Secretaries of State and War, namely:

a. The recognition of an independent nation in south Korea.

b. Reference of the Korean problem to the United Nations.

c. Reference of the problem to the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., USSR, U.K., and China.

d. A Grant-in-Aid to south Korea in order to institute a positive program of economic, political, and cultural rehabilitation in south Korea.

e. Negotiations with the USSR leading to a solution.

4. Concerning these courses of action, we have already attempted to reach a solution to the Korean problem through negotiations with the Soviet Union both on the local level in Korea and through governmental negotiations. It appears doubtful that the continuation of bilateral negotiations will prove constructive. More routine continuation of our thus far fruitless attempts to solve the problem with the Russians is likely to drive the discouraged Koreans to terrorism and violence in their struggle for independence.

5. While experience has shown that discussion of problems by the foreign ministers has made but little progress, nevertheless the U.K. and China are associated with the U.S. and the USSR in the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Any course of action deviating from the procedures laid down by that Agreement must be discussed with the other powers concerned in order to preclude any justified accusation that the U.S. is unilaterally abrogating the Moscow Agreement.

6. There is a continuing urgent need for the positive program recommended by the Special Interdepartmental Committee in its report. Such elements of this program as can be undertaken

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without the Grant-in-Aid to Korea recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee, particularly in the political field, have already been started and should be continued with vigor. Strenuous efforts should be made by the Administration to obtain Congressional approval of such a Grant-in-Aid at the next session of Congress. Congressional leaders will look much more favorably upon this program when it can be proved that every possible step has been taken to unify Korea through bilateral negotiations with the Soviets, by discussion with all the adherents to the Moscow Agreement, and, if necessary, through reference to the United Nations. No action, however, on a Grant-in-Aid can be taken before Congress next meets, which will be during the fall of 1947 at the earliest. It is quite obvious, therefore, that the Grant-in-Aid program can have no effect on the immediate problem of preventing a dangerous deterioration of the political situation in south Korea.

7. The Special Interdepartmental Committee recognized that it might be necessary to refer the problem of Korea to the United Nations if bilateral attempts to reach a solution were to fail. It now appears that all such attempts have failed. The report of the Special Interdepartmental Committee proves quite conclusively that recognition at this time of the independence of south Korea will not solve the problem. (Section IV A 2 of SWNCC Memorandum for Information No. 75). It may eventually become necessary to take this step. It is not believed however that the U.S. public is yet prepared to support the cost of underwriting an economically unsound and politically unstable south Korea, and will not be prepared to do so unless or until failure of solution in the United Nations convinces the American people that the only other alternative is to abandon south Korea to the Soviets.

8. It would appear, therefore, that the U.S. must be prepared to announce at once its future course of action upon failure of Joint Commission negotiations. Our course of action

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should have the following objectives: (a) to calm the Korean people through concrete actions which will provide them acceptable political objectives, toward which to work and which will constitute tangible evidence of our intentions to expedite Korean independence, (b) to protect the U.S. political position in Korea, the Far East, and the rest of the world, (c) to assure that the onus for any failure or delay in providing Korea its promised independence will fall squarely and publicly on the Soviets, and (d) to expedite the maximum accomplishment of U.S. objectives in Korea and thus hasten the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

9. Should the Joint Commission negotiations be protracted beyond August 7 without making any substantial progress it is believed that the U.S. Government should take definite steps to expedite matters by immediately referring the problem to the four powers associated in the Moscow Agreement on Korea, followed if necessary, by reference to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Immediate steps are necessary because of the possibility of civil disturbances in Korea on or about August 15 as pointed out in paragraph 5 of Appendix "A". Furthermore the United States cannot allow present negotiations in the Joint Commission to continue beyond the 7th of August as the next meeting of the General Assembly begins September 16, and as pointed out above the United States must first discuss this problem with the Four Powers involved. It is realized that this requires political action by the United States Government before General Wedemeyer has an opportunity to prepare his report on Korea. General Wedemeyer's mission in Korea, however, is primarily economic, and it is believed that regardless of the immediate political action taken by the U.S. Government the long-range economic aspects of the Korean problem will remain unchanged.

10. In case the Soviets should break off negotiations in the Joint Commission prior to August 7, the U.S. Government should immediately and publicly refer the problem to a conference of the four powers concerned.

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11. Should the Soviet Government refuse to meet as requested or endeavor to postpone the meeting unreasonably the U.S. Government should inform the other adherents to the Moscow Agreement on Korea that in justice to the Korean people it cannot admit of further delay and is submitting the whole problem of Korea to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

12. If, as appears extremely unlikely, the Soviet delegation on the Joint Commission becomes cooperative in the near future, reference to the United Nations must be delayed at least temporarily, even though we may feel that such cooperation is not sincere. While current political considerations will affect our immediate course of action under such circumstances, the U.S. should proceed with the positive program recommended by the Special Interdepartmental Committee, including a Grant-in-Aid for south Korea. Only through definite action leading towards the political and economic rehabilitation of south Korea can we retain the support of the people of south Korea and create a realistic basis for successful negotiations with the Soviets looking toward the creation of a unified, economically and politically stable Korea. Should the Soviets once more bring negotiations to an impasse, we should not delay in proceeding with our plans to submit the problem to the United Nations.

13. It is quite likely that United Nations consideration of the Korean problem may be inconclusive as a result of Soviet intransigence. In this event the U.S. may be confronted with the necessity of establishing an independent government in south Korea. The U.S. Government should therefore give continuing consideration to the arrangements which would be required to assure the economic and political stability of an independent south Korea.

14. No matter which of the tactical steps discussed above are taken, there is required, in order to eliminate the existing

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confusion in the field as mentioned in paragraph 2 above, an immediate decision as to the time and manner of implementing the decision that civil functions in the U.S. zone of Korea should be taken over by the State Department. Implicit in this is the urgency of designating a Civil Commissioner who can begin at once preparations for this takeover.

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APPENDIX "C"

August 7, 1947

Dear Mr. Molotov:

In your letter of April 19, 1947, you suggested that the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea resume its work on May 20 in Seoul "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea" and that the Commission should present the result of its work for the consideration of the Soviet and United States Governments in July and August, 1947. According to all reports received from the American delegation to the Joint Commission, it has been impossible for the two delegations to agree on the issue of broad consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations. This situation has continued without material change for more than one month and is a matter of great concern to the government of the United States.

You will recall that in my letter to you of May 2, I referred to your statement that the work of the Commission should be "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement" and that in order to avoid future misunderstanding I made clear my interpretation of that phrase. I pointed out that it had been the consistent and well-known position of the United States Government that "Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." In your reply of May 7 you did not take exception to this position. You accepted as a basis for reconvening the Commission the suggestion outlined by General Hodge in his letter to General Chiatiakov of December 24, 1946, which was in accordance with the United States position described above.

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In furtherance of this policy the American delegation to the Joint Commission has maintained that there should be the widest possible participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and that in such participation there shall be no restriction cn freedon of expression and opinion by all Koreans. In an effort to expedite matters the U.S. delegation has several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet delegation.

The United States Government believes that, in justice to the Korean people whose hopes of independence have been so long postponed, there cannot be further delay. It is the desire therefore of this Government that by August 24, 1947, the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations so that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations.

Changed by letter dtd 8 Aug 47 (12800) Arty

I am providing copies of this message to the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.

I have the honor to be, etc .....

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SWNCC

DATE-TIME RECD	MSG CEN NO.	HOW RECD
281115/I AUG 47	A-6116	RATT
CLASSIFICATION	**PRECEDENCE**	**CITE**
RESTRICTED	URGENT	WARSVC 360 (272320/Z)

FROM: STATE DEPT. TRUE TOO (270350/Z)
ST SER 181 AUG 26, 5 PM

TO: SCAP, CG USAFIK (FOR POLAD)

INFO:

"PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS RESTRICTED CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAGRAPHS 51 I AND 60 A (4), AR 380-5."

FOLLOWING IS TEXT LETTER BEING SENT MOLOTOV TODAY. THIS CONTAINS REVISION OF APPENDIX D TO SWNCC 176/39.

"DEAR MR. MOLOTOV:

IN YOUR LETTER OF AUG 23, 1947 TO SECY MARSHALL THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE JOINT COMMISSION HAS BEEN SET FORTH IN TERMS WHICH CONROBORATE A RECENT REPORT RECEIVED BY THIS GOVT FROM THE US DELEGATION TO THE JOINT COMMISSION. THE REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE DESIRE OF SECY MARSHALL AS SET FORTH IN HIS LETTER TO YOU OF AUG 12 THAT A REPORT FROM THE JOINT COMMISSION SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY AUG 21 IN ORDER THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS MIGHT IMMEDIATELY CONSIDER WHAT FURTHER STEPS MAY BE USEFUL TO ACHIEVE THE LONG-DELAYED UNIFICATION AND INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA. THE REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE JOINT COMMISSION HAS BEEN UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT REGARDING THE BASIS ON WHICH REPRESENTATIVES OF DEMOCRATIC KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS SHALL BE CONSULTED BY THE

ACTION DISTRIBUTION

G-1	AES	PM	IG	CPS	POSTAL	
G-2 Info	AIR O	SIG O	JA	DBS	JT COMM	
G-3	CML O	SURG	QM	I & E	USAMGIK Info	
G-4	ENGR	CHAP	SSO	PIO	KEC	
AG	ORD O	FIS O	SBS	ARC	POLAD Info	

C/A Info

REPORT OF ACTION NOT REQUIRED

REPRODUCED BY 69TH ENGR. TOPO. CO. - XXIV CORPS

24

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JOINT RESOLUTION, THE US DELEGATION ALSO REQUESTS THAT IN ORDER
[illegible] TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO ANY
ALTERNATIVE [illegible] OF COMPLETING THE TASK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION
AS DEFINED [illegible] IN YOUR LETTER IT WAS AGREED BY THE UNDERSTANDING
[illegible] OF MAY OF THIS YEAR THAT THE JOINT COMMISSION
SHOULD CONSULT WITH THOSE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
[illegible] WHICH SUPPORT THE MOSCOW DECISIONS ON KOREA. YOU
[illegible] RECALL THAT IN YOUR LETTER OF MAY 7 YOU EXPRESSLY REFERRED
TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABOVE AGREEMENT AS PROPOSED BY THE US
DELEGATION IN WHICH [illegible] NOTING THE DECLARATION IN CONFORMITY
WITH [illegible] WILL BE ACCEPTED AS DECLARATION OF GOOD FAITH WITH A VIEW
TO [illegible] FULLY THE MOSCOW DECISION AND WILL TAKE THE CONSULTATIVE
PARTY OR ORGANIZATION ELIGIBLE FOR INITIAL CONSULTATION. THE ACTIVITY
[illegible] ACTIONS ENUMERATED BY YOU AS BELONGING TO THE ANTI-TRUSTEE-
[illegible] [illegible] IN SIGN COMMUNIQUE NO. 5 AND [illegible], IN THE OPINION
OF THE US DELEGATION, ELIGIBLE FOR INITIAL CONSULTATIONS. YOUR
LETTER OF MAY 7 ALSO PROVIDED THAT ANY DECISION EXCLUDING INDIVI-
DUALS, PARTIES OR SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO
THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION SHALL BE BY AGREEMENT OF THE
JOINT COMMISSION. ACCORDINGLY, THE US DELEGATION/AGREEMENT HAS REPEATEDLY, BUT
WITHOUT SUCCESS, ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION
CONSULTATION WITH KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS APPLYING FOR SUCH CONSULTATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
TERMS PROVIDED IN YOUR LETTER. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS INSISTED
ON THE UNILATERAL RIGHT TO EXCLUDE PARTIES WHICH HAVE EXPRESSED
DISTASTE FOR TRUSTEESHIP, EVEN THOUGH SUCH PARTIES HAVE DE-

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TO THE SOVIET AND THE JOINT COMMISSION FURNISH AN AGREED

REPORT TO BE THE GOVERNMENTS. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION

WASHINGTON HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REACH

AGREEMENT ON A JOINT REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE DELIBERATIONS

OF THE JOINT COMMISSION. IN VIEW OF THE POSITION SET FORTH IN

THE PLENARY MEETING THE REPORT ALREADY RENDERED BY THE UNITED STATES

DELEGATION, HOWEVER, IT IS APPARENT THAT A JOINT REPORT CAN

ACCOMPLISH LITTLE OTHER THAN A FORMAL DELINEATION OF THE ISSUES

WHICH HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT.

FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS

DEVOTED ITS UTMOST EFFORTS TO CARRYING OUT THE TERMS OF THE

MOSCOW AGREEMENT ON KOREA. THE PRESENT STALEMATE IN THE JOINT

COMMISSION NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FAILURE OF THAT COMMISSION TO

ACCOMPLISH ITS FIRST TASK OF ITS OWN CHOICE MAKE IT

ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO ALL THAT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS

OF CONSULTATION WITH KOREAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

WILL ONLY SERVE TO DELAY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR AGREEMENT AND

DEFEAT ITS ANNOUNCED PURPOSES OF BRINGING ABOUT EARLY INDEPENDENCE

FOR KOREA. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CANNOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE

BE A PARTY TO ANY SUCH DELAY IN THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS OBLIGATIONS

TO THE KOREAN INDEPENDENCE AND PROPOSES THAT THE FOUR POWERS

ADHERING TO THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT MEET TO CONSIDER HOW THAT AGREE-

MENT MAY BE SPEEDILY CARRIED OUT. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THEREFORE SUBMITS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT THE ENCLOSED OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THE AIMS OF THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT ON KOREA. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT

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[illegible]

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SWNCC

EXCERPT from St. Serial 178, Aug. 24, WAR SVC 8264 (250830/Z)

(First part of radio re joint report of Commission)

....In meantime we are considering proceeding with implementation SWNCC 176/30 modified to take cognizance Soviet note. You will be informed soon as decision reached. For possible use in this connection your immediate comments requested re Soviet desire consult only organizations of more than 10,000 membership. Also any further comments you may wish to make re recent arrests US zone.

LOVETT

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APPENDIX "D"

Revised by Radio St. Serial 181, Aug. 26.

August 18, 1947

Sir:

The Government of the United States has considered the work of the Joint US-USSR Commission set up under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on Korea of December, 1945. It has noted with extreme regret that the Joint Commission has been unable to reach agreement regarding the basis on which representatives of democratic Korean parties and social organizations shall be consulted by the Commission.

For almost two years the Government of the United States has devoted its utmost efforts to carrying out the terms of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The present stalemate in the Joint Commission negotiations and the failure of that Commission to accomplish even the first task of its mission have made it abundantly clear to all that to allow further delay in the implementation of this agreement will serve only to defeat its announced purpose of bringing about early independence for Korea. The United States Government cannot in good conscience be a party to such a betrayal of the Korean people.

The United States Government therefore submits for the consideration of your Government the enclosed outline of a proposal designed to achieve the above objectives. The United States Government is anxious to receive the comments of your government regarding these proposals at an early date. It is therefore requested that the British /Soviet, Chinese/ Ambassador be authorized to participate in consultations on this problem in Washington beginning on August 25.

I am addressing similar notes to the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and China.

I have the honor to be, etc .....

The Foreign Minister of China
The Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom
The Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX "D"

United States Proposals Regarding Korea

The following is an outline of the proposals which will be made by the Government of the United States in an effort to bring about the early independence of a united Korea.

1. In both the USSR and U.S. zones of Korea there should be held early elections to choose representative provisional legislatures for each zone. These elections should be by secret, multi-party ballot and on a basis of universal suffrage in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone.

2. These provisional legislatures shall choose representatives to meet, at a place agreed upon between the two legislatures, to establish a provisional government for a united Korea on a basis which bears in mind the proportional population in each zone.

3. The resulting Provisional Government of a united Korea shall meet with representatives of the four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea to discuss with them, on a basis of equality, what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

4. It is the belief of the Government of the United States that during all the above stages the United Nations should be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken.

5. The Korean Provisional Government and the Four Powers concerned will agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.

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6. It is the opinion of the Government of the United States that the provisional legislatures in each zone should be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption of a constitution for all of Korea.

7. It is also the opinion of the Government of the United States that until such time as a united, independent Korea is established public and private Korean agencies in each zone should be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and that the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences should be encouraged.

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COPY

P&O 091 Korea (12 Feb 47) 12 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, FAR EAST, TOKYO, JAPAN:

SUBJECT: Public Information Program on Korean Occupation Policy

1. On 24 January 1947 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Sub-committee on Foreign Policy Information approved SWNCC-FPX 2/2.

2. In approving this paper, the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information agreed that under the terms of its charter, it is within the competence of the Subcommittee to direct the implementation of this program without further reference to the State, War and Navy Departments. It is to be implemented by the Department of State in collaboration with proper agencies in the other Departments or as otherwise specified in the body of the paper.

3. The inclosure is forwarded for information.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

/t/ JAMES L CANTRELL
Lieutenant Colonel.CSC
Executive Officer
Plans and Policy Group

1 Incl
SWNCC-FPI 2/2, Cys No. 37 thru 52

COPY
(562) 579
(423)

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COPY NO. 43

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SWNCC-FPI 2/2

5 February 1947

Pages 1 - 10, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

SWNC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM ON KOREAN OCCUPATION POLICY

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, FPI 2/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information at its 10th Meeting on 24 January 1947, is circulated for information and guidance and, where appropriate, implementation.

2. In approving this paper, the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information agreed that under the terms of its charter, it is within the competence of the Subcommittee to direct the implementation of this program without further reference to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. It is to be implemented by the Department of State in collaboration with proper agencies in the other Departments or as otherwise specified in the body of the paper.

H. W. MOSELEY
W. A. SCHULGEN
V. L. LOWRANCE
Secretariat

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S E C R E T

E N C L O S U R E

S E C R E T

FPI 2/2

23 January 1947

SWNC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM ON
KOREAN OCCUPATION POLICY

SITUATION

1. U.S. policy towards Korea is based on the following basic objectives: (1) To establish a self-governing sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations; (2) To insure that the national government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and (3) To assist the Koreans in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system necessary for an independent, democratic state.

2. Korea is at present divided into two zones of military occupation, the United States occupying that part south of 38°, and the USSR occupying the northern part of the country. However, through the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the United States, United Kingdom, and China are committed to the eventual independence of all of Korea. In its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, the USSR joined in the Potsdam Declaration.

3. In the early days of the occupation the U.S. commander, General Hodge, was unable to establish satisfactory liaison with the Soviet commander in the north. Political and economic problems created by the artificial division of the country into two zones became acute. In December 1945, at the Moscow Conference, these serious consequences of the bizonal occupation were discussed and a portion of the Moscow Agreement between the U.S., USSR and Great Britain was devoted to Korea. This portion of the agreement, to which China subsequently subscribed, provided that:

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a. There would be an immediate conference between representatives of the U.S. and Soviet Commands in Korea for the purpose of settling acute economic and administrative matters. (This conference, held in early 1946, achieved no substantial results.)

b. The U.S. and Soviet Commanders in Korea would establish a Joint Commission which, in consultation with local democratic parties and social organizations, would prepare plans for the formation of a provisional Korean government.

c. The Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean government (when established) and Korean democratic organizations, would work out measures leading to the independence of Korea. These measures, including proposals regarding a five year trusteeship over Korea, would be submitted to the four trust powers, the U.S., U.K., USSR and China, for approval.

4. On March 20, 1947, the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission provided for in the Moscow Agreement met for the first time. It was the U.S. view that the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean Government was the first and most pressing task before the Commission.

From the beginning the Soviet position was that the provisional Korean Government would be formed after consultation with only those political parties and social organizations fully in favor of the Moscow Agreement including its provisions for a trusteeship for Korea. The Soviet position would have had the effect of excluding from consultation all parties save the Communist party and its fellow travelers, even though, until indoctrinated with the "party line", Communists in south Korea, like those in the north, initially opposed trusteeship. The Joint Commission finally agreed that it would consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which were truly democratic in their aims and methods and which would cooperate with the Joint Commission in carrying out the aims of the Moscow Agreement.

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The Soviet delegation then insisted that if any of these Korean parties were represented by any individuals who had expressed opposition to the Moscow Agreement, and particularly to the provision for trusteeship, these individuals should be declared ineligible for consultation with the Joint Commission. The United States delegation did not accept this proposal on the ground that such an exclusion would constitute a violation of the principle of the freedom of speech. As it became evident that no progress could be made, the Commission adjourned sine die on May 8th.

The U.S. Command has taken the initiative and on several occasions pressed the Soviet Command for resumption of negotiations on a basis not inimical to essential individual rights.

5. Divergent policies pursued by the occupying forces of the United States and the USSR have served to create in Korea an intensification of the division of that country during the past 17 months.

a. In the Soviet occupied zone of Korea, "people's committees" have been formed under the supervision of the "interim people's committee of north Korea". These committees have subordinated to themselves all other political parties or organizations insofar as their influence is felt in the administration of the area. Soviet direction of the committees is complete, and "elections" held in the north during September, 1946 reveal an unreal unanimity of opinion by Koreans residing in the Soviet zone. The Soviet political pattern as developed in other countries has been followed in the north. The best available information indicates that this regime is not popular with the Koreans.

b. In the American zone U.S. military government under a military governor, who is an officer on the Staff of the U.S. Commander, was established at the beginning of the occupation. This government is operated by U.S. military and civilian personnel, as well as Koreans who have been given a

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large number of responsible positions. Emphasis is being placed upon the treatment of Koreans as a liberated people, and measures are being adopted which provide for Korean participation in forward looking programs in political, economic and cultural affairs. There is considerable unrest in south Korea because of the Koreans' desire for immediate independence and a growing belief that there will never be any results from U.S.-Soviet negotiations. This unrest is aggravated by the serious economic situation, which cannot improve until considerable material assistance is received from the U.S. The right wing elements are increasing their vocal opposition to trusteeship. The Communists are using tactics typical of those employed in other areas under their control to gain strength and are pointing out that it is to the advantage of individual Koreans to support Communist objectives now. Complicating the confused political picture is the political inexperience of the Koreans after 40 years of foreign domination. An interim legislative assembly for south Korea was convened December 12, 1946 which is designed to further political maturity and to give expression to Korean views and aspirations. Encouragement is being given to moderate elements, and it is hoped that these will become dominant in the Interim Legislative Assembly. General Hodge has made it clear that, while encouraging legitimate Korean aspirations for their own government, he does not intend to transfer his executive power to this legislature or any other agency until a provisional government of unified Korea is formed.

6. Unless the U.S. people, and consequently Congress, support present U.S. policy and programs for Korea, it will not be possible to obtain the funds on which the programs depend. The success or failure of U.S. policy toward Korea thus appears to depend, in large part, on informing the U.S. people of the issues involved.

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PROBLEM

7. To inform the American people of the problems, issues and U.S. commitments involved in Korea, and their relationship to overall U.S. foreign policy in order to obtain the popular support required to achieve our objectives in Korea.

INFORMATION THEMES

8. Background on Korea as Basis for U.S. Policy. The effect on Korean people, and the country, of 40 years of Japanese domination should be presented factually. Korean sensibilities must be taken into account by recognizing the fact that they have an extensive cultural and historical background that is their own. It should be stressed at all times that Koreans are a liberated people. They should not be thought of in the same terms as Japan, as a defeated enemy. By living up to our commitments in Korea through the steadfast pursuit of our policy, the United States will be furthering its prestige in the Far East gained by our record in the war and the fact that we have implemented our promise to give the Filipinos their own independent government. It should also be stressed that by living up to our commitments and thus creating an effectively independent Korea, we are contributing to the stability and peace of East Asia which so vitally affects the economic and political welfare of the U.S. In this connection, it may be pointed out that a weak Korea has twice within the past half century been a cause of international conflict.

9. Liberals. Emphasis should be placed on the encouragement now being given to liberals in South Korea (see paragraph 5 b).

10. Korea as a Direct Point of Contact Between the U.S. and the USSR. The U.S. public has a limited interest for Korea as such, although as a phase of U.S.-USSR relations, it attracts attention. The fact that the U.S. intends to carry out its commitments without sacrificing the essential human rights for which it stands should be stressed. Such unilateral action as is being

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taken by the U.S. in its zone can be presented as constructive steps designed to fulfill Korean desires for a united, independent country. The success of these steps, and the effect of the constant pressure exerted by reason of our presence in Korea, may serve to convince the USSR that they should cooperate with us. It may be shown that our activities in south Korea and ultimate objectives for a unified, democratic Korea will in no way be a danger to the legitimate interests of the USSR in Korea or elsewhere. On the other hand, it may also be shown that vacillation on the part of the U.S. in this respect would have its effect not only in Korea, but in other areas of the Far East, and the rest of the world. Successful negotiations to accomplish the simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops would not in itself assure the unification of the country. In view of the sharply divergent political views in Korea, civil war might result. It is questionable whether Korea could automatically become a democratic and effectively independent nation subsequent to such withdrawal, particularly in view of obvious communist aims in north and south Korea. In addition to being a united nation, Korea must not only retain its political integrity, it must be healthy economically and socially before it is really free.

11. Soviet Obstructive Tactics. To offset anti-American propaganda and Soviet obstructive tactics, point up positive factors in U.S. occupation policies designed to fulfill our commitments for a unified, independent Korea. Anti-American propaganda and other obstructive tactics (See Appendix) should be treated by making factual and timely statements, exercising due care not to jeopardize further negotiations. The reasons for the breakdown of negotiations in pursuance to the Moscow Agreement (paragraph 4 above) may be made clear.

12. Trusteeship. The U.S. is committed to the creation of some form of trusteeship over Korea under the U.S., the U.K., the USSR and China for a period of up to five years, unless there

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is general agreement among the four powers that conditions make this unnecessary. The word "trusteeship" should be avoided as much as possible, because of the hatred of the Koreans for this word, which was used by the Japanese as a euphemism for their early rule over Korea.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

(Supplementing Existing Programs)

13. Timing. Flow of information should be stepped up immediately in view of Congressional appropriations hearings.

14. Background Conferences (off the record) for media representatives. Suggested participants: Top officers of the three departments assisted by specialists in political, economic and cultural fields. In these conferences, care should be taken to give possible USSR views and actions (see paragraph 11 and the Appendix) perspective by relating them to facts, and to interpret these facts in the light of U.S. objectives and policy.

15. Prepared Press Conferences in which top officers of the three departments, assisted by specialists, present material on specific developments affecting Korea. Transcripts could be worked into background summaries and given wider circulation to editors, writers, and commentators.

16. Possible Speech by General MacArthur. General MacArthur's public statements have had a profound influence on U.S. public opinion. A speech by him, perhaps in connection with a visit to Korea, would draw U.S. attention to Korea and bring popular support to current U.S. policies and objectives in Korea.

17. Speeches by Top Policy Officers and Specialists. Appropriate times and places should be selected when top officers of the three departments (State, War, Navy) and U.S. officials returning from Korea might cover current developments in Korea. Discussion and community groups should be encouraged to discuss Korea, and specialists should be provided by the departments, upon request, to contribute material on their particular fields.

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18. Background Summary. War Department to furnish writer. Summary should include information on historical and cultural background of Korea. (See paragraph 10 above.)

19. Documentary Film: War Department has requested the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, to have filmed a minimum of 5000 feet of documentary motion pictures on the occupation of Korea. It is understood that upon receipt, this film will be reviewed and releasable footage will be offered to civilian motion picture agencies and private discussion groups.

20. Exclusive Interviews. Series of exclusive interviews on different aspects of Korean problem arranged for influential columnists with selected officials returning from Korea, as soon as they arrive.

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APPENDIX

EXPECTED COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1. The project of educating the U.S. people on the necessity of achieving U.S. objectives in Korea will encounter considerable opposition from Communist, and directly or indirectly Communist-inspired, propaganda. This propaganda, already active, may be expected to devote maximum attention to efforts to curtail Congressional appropriations for Korea. It will exploit, magnify or create the following and other considerations in an effort to confuse American thinking with regard to Korea:

a. The proximity of Korea to the Soviet Maritime Provinces proves that the security of the U.S.S.R. is more directly involved in Korea than is that of the U.S.;

b. The direct clash of interests of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Korea is of such a nature as to create incidents and tension which may eventually generate a new world war;

c. No progress towards real independence for Korea can be expected until both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. withdraw from Korea;

d. The U.S. occupation of Korea is an imperialist venture supported by self-seeking U.S. capitalists;

e. The cost of U.S. occupations throughout the world is a vast and unwarranted burden on the U.S. taxpayer, the reduction of which should immediately be initiated in Korea, the least important area occupied by U.S. forces;

f. Unless the current stupendous military budget of the U.S. is cut drastically other nations may doubt our peaceful intentions; cutting occupation costs, particularly in Korea, will help reduce the size of that budget and consequently reassure the other nations of the world;

g. The U.S. occupation of southern Korea has failed, particularly in comparison with the successful results of Soviet occupation of northern Korea; proof is contained in such factors as:

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(1) Inability to obtain the high-caliber personnel necessary to carry out our occupation policies,

(2) Poor handling of riots in south Korea,

(3) Preferential treatment of Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans,

(4) Lack of social reform in south Korea,

(5) Occupation personnel, and policies instituted by them, favor the wealthy classes and discriminate against the poor,

(6) U.S. occupation authorities have, for selfish reasons, backed expatriate reactionaries against progressive native liberals in the struggle for political power,

(7) Lack of results in negotiations with the U.S.S.R.,

(8) Instances of misbehavior of U.S. troops,

(9) Lack of progress in economic affairs in south Korea, resulting in greater hardship than at any time under Japanese rule,

(10) Poor handling of "trusteeship" question.

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 88

27 February 1946

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DECISION AMENDING SWNCC 176/21

GUIDANCE FOR INITIAL MEETING OF JOINT COMMISSION
References: a. SWNCC 176/20
b. SWNCC 176/21

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a revision of reference b as amended and approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 26 February 1946, is circulated for information and guidance.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been requested to transmit the message in the enclosure to General MacArthur.

ALEXANDER D. REID
B. L. AUSTIN
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

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COPY NO. ____

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

GUIDANCE FOR INITIAL MEETING OF JOINT COMMISSION
Reference: SWNCC 176/20

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a message to General Hodge, furnishing the guidance requested in the above reference, presented by the Acting State Member, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

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ENCLOSURE

DRAFT MESSAGE

Reference CA 57792.

Decision of General Hodge to instruct the American delegation to press for agreement on freedom of speech, press and travel within Korea of Koreans at the beginning of the forthcoming proceedings of the Joint Commission approved here. Should Soviets not agree initially to such action, rather than forcing an adjournment of the Commission, Hodge should (1) reserve his position in respect to freedom of speech, press and travel for final decision prior to the time the interim government begins to function, (2) press for initial agreement on travel by members of Commission and their staff throughout Korea to consult with "Korean democratic parties and social organizations", and (3) then proceed with consideration of the structure of an interim government.

Ambassador Harriman has recommended here, and the State Department concurs, that nothing would be gained by taking up such matters as the question of freedom of speech, press and travel on a governmental level prior to the discussion of these topics in the Commission.

It is suggested that in order not to prejudice the effectiveness of the work of the Joint Commission, and at the same time to accomplish Hodge's purpose should the Soviet representatives in the Commission prove obstructionist and refuse to agree to his demands under (1) or (2) above, you may wish to consider the desirability of requesting your government to make public a statement citing your attempts to encourage freedom of speech, press and travel. In such a public statement, reference would be made to paragraph 2, Article I of the Charter of the United Nations which reads: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."

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COPY NO. 54

SWNCC 176/20

14 February 1946

Pages 123 - 125, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

GUIDANCE FOR INITIAL MEETINGS OF JOINT COMMISSION
Reference: SWNCC 176/18

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to a message from General Hodge, is circulated for consideration by the Committee with a view to forwarding to the Department of State for the guidance requested.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

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E N C L O S U R E

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-5010
14 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Guidance for Initial Meetings of Joint Commission.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the enclosed copy (Appendix) of CA 57792 (CM-IN-2528) be transmitted to the Department of State and that the Department be informed as follows:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in general with the course of action outlined by General Hodge and invite the attention of the State Department to General Hodge's recommendation concerning a governmental approach to the U.S.S.R.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be furnished, for transmittal to General Hodge in the near future, the guidance requested in the attached message.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

Enclosure (Appendix)

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APPENDIX

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific

To: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Nr: CA 57792

12 February 1946

I have just received the following message from General Hodge:

"Although SWNCC 176/18 states that the most pressing task of the forthcoming meeting of the Joint Commission should be the creation of an interim Korean Government, I feel that before that problem can be faced it will be necessary to open up the country and break down the Soviet 'blackout'. The arrangement in this regard reached by the recent conference was most unsatisfactory from the United States standpoint. Soviet delegation refused to consider free circulation of newspapers, combined radio network for benefit all parties on equal basis, and travel Koreans between zones except under strict permit system. I accordingly propose to instruct American delegation to begin proceedings of Joint Commission with a strong demand for complete freedom of speech, press and movement within Korea of Koreans, on grounds that until that is accomplished Joint Commission will be unable freely to consult Korean parties and leaders and to learn desires Korean people regarding their government, a prerequisite stipulated in Moscow communique.

I am prepared to press this point with considerable vigor and to postpone joint consideration by the Commission of structure of interim government until solution satisfactory to U.S. is reached. If this viewpoint is approved, I suggest asking State Department to inform USSR that despite considerable progress achieved by recent economic

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conference, United States Government feels that Koreans are still so restricted in freedom of speech and movement that Joint Commission will have difficulty in asking proper evaluation of the desires and aspirations of all classes Korean people.

The Soviet Government might not respond to such approach but at least it would put the United States Government in addition to the U.S. Army Forces in Korea on record, and would prepare Soviet delegation in Joint Commission of our viewpoint.

If my position outlined above has backing of United States Government and if Soviet delegation in Joint Commission displays reluctance to come to agreement, I could discreetly make known to Korean people through their consultative group in South Korea that United States has from beginning tried to break down barrier of 38 parallel but that USSR has failed to follow out lead. Such disclosure should strengthen our hand and might cause USSR delegation to accede to our desires. I am convinced that the more we open up the country and convince the people of our real aims, the greater will be the chances of achieving truly democratic rather than a Soviet directed communistic Korean Government. Benninghoff concurs."

I am in agreement with Hodge's suggestion and request the government view for guidance.

End.

Note: 176/18 not identified in WDCMC.

CM-IN-2528 (12 Feb 46)

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Gen. Arnold

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SWNCC 176/18

28 January 1946

Pages 104 - 122, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

POLITICAL POLICY FOR KOREA

References: a. SWNCC 176/15
b. SWNCC 176/16
c. SWNCC 176/17

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a revision of SWNCC 176/15 in light of the message in SWNCC 176/16 and the amendments proposed by the Army and Navy members in SWNCC 176/17 as approved by the Committee on 28 January 1946, is circulated for information and guidance.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

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ENCLOSURE

POLITICAL POLICY FOR KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine a policy for the guidance of General MacArthur in conducting negotiations with the Soviet command in northern Korea regarding the initial powers and functions of the Joint Commission provided for in paragraph 2 of Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Communique and regarding the formulation of plans for the creation of a Provisional Korean Government.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. Arrangements for an early meeting of the Joint Commission, specified in paragraph 2 of the Korean Section of the Moscow Communique, will be made with the Soviet Government by the State Department. It is the view of the United States Government that the Joint Commission, in accordance with the Moscow Communique, is to be given the following functions:

(1) To formulate plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government, in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations and with a view to the presentation of these plans for the consideration of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., China, the United Kingdom and the United States, prior to

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final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission, as provided for in paragraph 2 of the section on Korea of the Moscow Communique.

(2) To work out measures, with the participation of the provisional Korean Government, for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, with a view to the submittance of these measures for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and China, as provided for in paragraph 3 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique. These measures should include plans for a system of government to eliminate zonal arrangements in northern and southern Korea. These plans, depending upon such factors as the ability of the Koreans to organize and operate an efficient centralized administration, may or may not take the form of a trusteeship for a period not to exceed five years from the time of the issuance of the Moscow Communique.

(3) To take those steps which it considers desirable and which may not have been taken by the conference provided for in paragraph 4 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique for establishing permanent coordination of economic-administrative matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea. It is expected that these steps will lead to the integration of the civil administration of the northern and southern sectors as rapidly as possible under the centralized control of the Joint Commission, which should ultimately be "civilianized".

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b. The United States members of the Joint Commission are to regard the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government as their first and most pressing political task. Pending further instructions, they are not to discuss matters coming under paragraph 4 a (2) above. This, however, is not to be construed as limiting in any way the discussion of matters affecting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people and the development of democratic self-government in so far as they pertain to the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean democratic government.

c. With a view to facilitating the creation and smooth functioning of a provisional Korean government, the United States Commander in Korea should, without delay, encourage the various Korean political factions to reach fundamental agreements on the political, economic and social policies to be applied by the new government, including essential democratic reforms.

d. The United States members of the Joint Commission are to be given wide latitude in their negotiations with the Soviet representatives regarding the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government, but the following points are submitted as an indication of the position favored by the United States Government:

(1) The Joint Commission should select a group of representative democratic Korean leaders for the purpose of consultation with the Joint Commission in its preparation of proposals for the establishment of a provisional Korean government. Such leaders, who should as far as practicable represent the will of the Korean people, should be selected after full consultation with all democratic parties and social organizations throughout Korea. If it is considered feasible and advisable, electoral processes may be utilized in their selection. The persons chosen should be the leaders of all the democratic political

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parties and social organizations which have sufficient political strength and popular backing to warrant representation and also any individual Koreans without party affiliations who have sufficient national prestige to justify their inclusion in the membership of the group. The larger and stronger parties and organizations should have representation proportionate to their political strength and popular support. Special efforts should be made to find and select a definite majority of strong competent leaders who are not extremists of either right or left. Care should be taken that the Korean leaders chosen are true Koreans and not puppets of foreign powers.

(2) If it is not possible for the Joint Commission to reach agreement on the above methods of selecti n or on the composition of this group of leaders, it should e proposed that the United States and Soviet Commanders in Korea should separately choose the members of the group from their respective zones. In making their choice they should follow the same general principles of selection as are outlined above. In the event of separate selection of the members of the group by the United States and Soviet Commanders, the number of members to be chosen from the two zones should be roughly proportionate to the relative populations of the t o zones or at least proportionate to the number of provinces in the two zones.

(3) The Joint Commission should provide a meeting place and quarters for this group of Korean leaders at a place conveniently located with respect to the meeting place of the Joint Commission and should arrange for defrayment of the expenses of the group from funds within Korea.

(4) After the selection of the group of Korean leaders has been completed, the Joint Commission should call upon it to formulate plans, in consultation with

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the Joint Commission, for a provisional Korean government. These plans should be submitted within a reasonable time for the consideration of the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission should then propose these plans, with such modifications as the Commission deems desirable, to the four powers.

(5) The plans for the provisional Korean government proposed by the Joint Commission should be in accord with the following points and principles:

(a) The name should indicate the provisional nature of the government.

(b) The organization of the provisional government should be simple and consonant with its provisional character.

(c) There should be provisions whereby changes can be made in the organization of the provisional government to meet changing needs and new functions and whereby there can be a gradual increase in the use of popular electoral processes for the selection of key officials.

(d) The members of the group of Korean leaders, provided for in 4 d (1) above, or specific individuals in the group, should if possible be used to form the nucleus of the provisional government.

(e) There should be concrete proposals for the initial membership of the provisional government, including the names of the individuals who are to fill the key offices provided for in the plans. The distribution of portfolios in the provisional government should be made in general in conformity with the principles for selecting the group of leaders outlined in 4 d (1) above.

(f) The duties of the provisional government should be:

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(1) Progressively to assume, under the supervision and control of the Joint Commission, responsibility for administering and developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people, as provided for in paragraph 1 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique.

(ii) To perform such other administrative duties as are assigned to it by the Joint Commission.

(iii) To participate with the Joint Commission and under its supervision in working out measures for the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, as provided for in paragraph 3 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique.

e. If it is impossible for the Joint Commission to reach agreement on the creation of an advisory group of Korean leaders, as provided for in paragraph 4 d (1) or (2) above, the United States Commander in Korea should independently form such a group to act in an advisory capacity to the United States members of the Joint Commission in matters relating to the creation of a provisional Korean government.

f. In view of the possible delays between the completion by the Joint Commission of proposals for a provisional Korean government and the final decision by the United States and the U.S.S.R. on these proposals, the United States members of the Joint Commission should take the position that, subsequent to the submission of the proposals to the four powers and pending the final decision of the United States and the U.S.S.R., the Joint Commission has the power, under paragraph 4 a (3) above, to take whatever preliminary steps it deems

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desirable to facilitate the transfer of administrative duties and functions to Koreans. Such a transfer should be in accordance with the proposals for the provisional government which will have been submitted to the four powers.

f. This government should be kept fully and promptly informed of the progress of the negotiations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that:

a. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approve the paper and that on approval it be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for transmission to General MacArthur subject to their comments from the military point of view.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmit the conclusions immediately by radio to General MacArthur for his information and guidance, calling attention to the fact that paragraph 3 of SWNCC 176/13 is superseded by paragraph 4 a of the above conclusions.

c. That the State Department take immediate steps to arrange for an early meeting of the Joint Commission provided for in paragraph 2 of the Korean Section of the Moscow Communique.

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ANNEX "A"

APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Communique reads as follows:

"III. Korea. 1. With a view to the restoration of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary measures for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a joint commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to the conclusion by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the Provisional Korean democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-

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overment and the establishment of the national in de-

endence of Korea.

"The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be su-

mitted, following consultations with the provisional Korean

Government for the joint consideration of the Governments

of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agree-

ment concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a

period of up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting

both southern and northern Korea and for the preparation

of measures establishing permanent coordination in ad-

ministrative-economic matters between the United Commands

in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in

northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of

the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be

convened within a period of two weeks."

Mr. Byrnes in his radio address on 30 December

stated on the Korean section of the Moscow Communique:

as follows:

"The administration of Korea has been a tough problem

since the surrender of Japan. For the purpose of mili-

tary operations the occupation of Korea was divided north

and south latitude 38 into Soviet and American

zones. The continuation of this division after surrender

has been unsatisfactory. The movement of persons

and the functioning of public services on both sides of

the line has been hampered.

"Under our agreement at Moscow, the two military com-

manders are to form a Joint Soviet-American commission to

solve immediate economic and administrative problems. They

will make recommendations to the Governments of the United

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tates, the oviet Union, Great Brit in nd Uni he
ulation of a Korean rovisional Democr tic v nt.
ey ill also ake proposals to these Goverm t rd-
e four-power trusteeshi to prepare Kore
e endence ithin five ye rs.

"The Joint oviet-Americ n commission, o th
e Korean rovisional Democratic overnment, it
ssible to di ense ith a trusteeship. It i l
hasten the day hen Kore will becom n i t
ber of the ociety of Nations."

. The irective to eneral ac rthur, iven
y "A" of C 176/1 and a roved on 6 J ,
i s for n otiations ith the oviet comm n i rn
economic- inistrative matters but nor
ion of olitical matters pending further i
es as follows:

"3. In connection ith aragraphs and of
reen section of the oscow Communique, you ill -
e for an early meeti of the Joint Briti -
oviet Commis ion. You will eceive from , th
the Joint Chiefs of taff, early political uidance for
eetings of the Joint Commission."

. Message (C -IN 4001, 22 Jan) as been receive from
eneral odge, pertinent section of which is quote below:

"Finally, I suggest that the olitical eeti be
convened as a result of inter-governmental co unications
rather than on my own initiative. uch appro ch would,
I feel, give the proceedings greater dignity and demon-
strate to the Russians the importance we attach to our
orean and other Far Eastern Commitments."

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[redacted]

3. An interim reply (CM-OUT 94266, 28 Jan) was sent to General Hodge as follows:

"Message has been submitted to SWNCC by J[illegible]. Since State, War and Navy Departments already concur [illegible]ally in your recommendations, you may defer action on paragraph 3 of WARX 91640 (SWNCC 176/13). State Department this date referred to SWNCC for approval complete draft political directive for US members Joint Commission."

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APPENDIX "B"

CONCLUSION

2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the section on Foreign Relations make clear what the political planning objectives of the Commission are to be. It is assumed from the [illegible] Joint Commission will also continue the [illegible] ce, referred to in paragraph 4, looking toward [illegible] ment of permanent coalition in Korea between [illegible] ers, but even the United States Command in [illegible] Soviet Command in northern Korea. It would [illegible] to have this permanent coalition take [illegible] of [illegible] tion as rapidly as possible of the [illegible] tion of the northern and southern sectors of [illegible] the [illegible] control of the Joint Commission. It is [illegible] ing conditions will eventually make the "[illegible]" [illegible] int Commission advisable.

3. The early creation of a provisional Korean [illegible] is highly desirable, because under the terms of the [illegible] great progress toward the complete elimination of [illegible] ment in Korea and the permanent solution of Korea's [illegible] problems can be made until a provisional Korean government has been created and has had a chance to participate in the formulation of plans for the future of Korea. The early establishment of such a government is also desirable in order to lead political activity away from destructive channels into more constructive channels, in order to give Korean leaders practical experience in the problems of government, and in order to facilitate and hasten the growth of a truly responsible and representative democratic government in Korea which can eventually take full responsibility for the administration of the country.

4. For these reasons it is clear that the Joint Commission should regard the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government as its first and most pressing political task.

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c. The creation and subsequent smooth functioning of a pro-visional Korean government would be greatly facilitated if there were unity and agreement among the various Korean political factions. In particular, discussions between the United States and Soviet members of the Joint Commission would be considerably easier if the attitude of the Korean people toward the problems were to be clarified by agreement among the Korean political parties. It would, therefore, be desirable for the United States Commander in Korea without delay to encourage the various Korean political factions to adopt a uniform program for political, economic and social policies to be followed by the provisional government, including essential democratic reforms.

Paragraph 2 of the section on Korea in the Moscow communique provides for consultation with the Korean democratic political and social organizations regarding proposals for the creation of a provisional Korean government. It is believed that this could be done most effectively through a group of Korean leaders which will be fully representative of all Korean democratic parties and political organizations. This group should include the leaders of democratic parties and factions which have sufficient political strength and popular support to warrant representation. Larger and stronger parties should have representation proportionate to their political strength and popular backing. In order to be fully representative of the Korean people as possible, the group should also include any individual democratic Koreans without party affiliations who have sufficient national prestige to justify their inclusion. If it is considered feasible and desirable, electoral processes might be utilized in selecting the members of the group, but elections should be undertaken only if there is good reason to believe that they will result in the selection of politically competent and representative group. Such elections might be held within individual parties and organizations or within appropriate localities or provinces.

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c. Since there is not always agreement as to the meaning of the word democratic, it would be best to adopt the principle that any political party, organization or individual regarded as democratic by either the United States or Soviet members of the Joint Commission should be accepted by both sides as being democratic and any political parties, organizations and individuals considered to be undemocratic by both the United States and Soviet members should be excluded on that score from participation in the election of leaders.

d. The group of Korean leaders should be both representative of the views and aspirations of the Korean people as a whole and of such political composition as to be acceptable to both the United States and the U.S.S.R. It is felt that no group limited to extreme rightist or leftist elements, such as the Communists, or exclusively rightist elements, representative of capitalistic and land-lord interests, would be representative of the Korean people as a whole and successfully cooperate with the United States and the U.S.S.R. The above provisions would best be met by a group in which center and left elements would have a definite majority, and it is therefore felt that efforts should be made to find and select for the group a definite majority of leaders who are not extremists of either right or left. In this connection, great care should be taken to insure that the leaders chosen are not only strong in their own right but also are true Koreans and not merely puppets of foreign powers. They should not be men little known within Korea ~~but~~ BUT should be generally regarded by the Koreans themselves to the extent possible as representative of the Koreans living within Korea.

7. The most satisfactory method of choice of the members of the Korean leaders would be by the Joint Commission as a whole. If it is not possible for the Joint Commission to reach agreement on the composition of the group, it is felt that the best solution would be for the United States and Soviet Commanders in Korea to choose separately the members of the group from their respective zones.

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If this method of selection is used, it would be desirable to have the number of members selected by each Commander proportionate to the relative populations of the two zones. However, this might meet with strong objections from the Soviet members of the Commission, for it would permit the United States Commander to choose at least two-thirds of the total membership. An alternative formula might be that the number of members to be selected by each Commander should be proportionate to the number of provinces in each zone. There are 7-1/2 provinces in the United States zone and 5-1/2 in the Soviet zone.

8. It would be advisable for the Joint Commission to call upon the group of Korean leaders to draw up the initial draft of the proposals for a provisional Korean government. This would give the Korean leaders the realization that they are having an important voice in the creation of their provisional government and would greatly increase the probabilities of wholehearted acceptance of and support for the proposals on the part of the Korean people as well as their leaders. It would also relieve the Joint Commission of responsibility for the elaboration of many minor details of organization, nomenclature and procedure, which are, for the most part, matters of indifference to the United States, and would place the responsibility for drawing up these details on the Koreans themselves. Since the proposals must meet with the approval of the United States and Soviet Governments, it would be advisable for the group of Korean leaders to keep in constant consultation with the Joint Commission on all major problems. This should facilitate consideration and amendation of the proposals by the Joint Commission before it submits them to the four powers. If the group of Korean leaders cannot within a reasonable period of time agree upon their proposals for a provisional Korean government, the Joint Commission may be forced to proceed with the formulation of its proposals independently of the group of Korean leaders.

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9. Since the initial draft of the proposal for a provisional Korean government by the group of Korean leaders should be completed as soon as possible, the group should be given no other duties by the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission naturally should provide the group with a meeting place and quarters at a place conveniently located with respect to the meeting place of the Joint Commission and should arrange for defrayment of the expenses of the groups from funds within Korea, but, since the group is not specifically provided for in the Moscow Communique and will be merely an advisory body created by the Joint Commission, it should be given no other official recognition.

10. The provisional Korean government should be, as the name implies, only a provisional government and should exist only during a transitional period. It is believed, therefore, that it will not require a complex constitution or an elaborate organization. Its organization should be as simple as possible and so constituted as to be fully ~~in~~ consonant with its actual duties and its provisional character. In other words, the proposals for the provisional Korean government should not include detailed plans for offices and organs of government which, because of the limited duties and powers of the government, would be without actual functions, or would be difficult to organize and operate during the transitional period.

11. The possibility is [illegible], during the life of the provisional government, there will be a steady expansion of its functions and powers. Consequently, there should be provisions whereby changes can be made in the organization of the provisional government to meet changing needs and new functions. Since the provisional Korean government as originally constituted will probably be made up of men who have not been selected for their posts by any system of popular elections, special care should be taken to include provisions whereby there can if conditions permit, a gradual increase in the use of popular electoral processes for the selection of key officials.

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12. The selection of key officers of the provisional Korean government by national elections is desirable in principle, but it is felt that the lack of adequate machinery for national elections and the desirability of wide representation in the new government in the initial period make the inclusion of provisions for immediate national elections of key officers inadvisable. Since the group of Korean leaders discussed in previous paragraphs will be made up of strong, competent and truly representative Korean leaders and will be so constituted as to be politically acceptable to both the United States and the U.S.S.R., the best practical means of selecting the principal key officers of the new government would seem to be for this group of Korean leaders to select them, subject to the approval of the Joint Commission. It is envisaged that members of this group, or specific individuals from the group, will probably form the nucleus of the provisional government. In this case, it would greatly facilitate the organization of the new government, for it would eliminate the necessity for long negotiations between the United States and Soviet members of the Commission and other consultations with the Koreans to arrive at a new panel of Koreans who are acceptable to both the United States and the U.S.S.R. and who are truly representative of the Koreans.

13. It is felt that proposals for the provisional Korean government should include the names of the individuals who are initially to fill the key offices provided for in the proposals. This would permit the four powers to see clearly the true nature of the proposed government and would help insure the formation of a government which is not dominated by some minority faction. In this connection, care should be taken to insure that the portfolios in the provisional government are in general assigned in conformity with the principles for the selection of the group of Korean leaders, as outlined in paragraph 6 above. This would give a preponderant voice in the new government to those elements, defined in paragraph 6 as not being extremists of either right or left, which are felt to be not only the most acceptable to both the United States and the U.S.S.R. but also most representative of the Korean people as a whole.

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14. The proposed administrative and political planning duties of the provisional Korean government are clearly stated in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique. In order to give flexibility to the plan and to provide for growth in the functions and powers of the provisional government, it would be desirable to have it specified that the provisional Korean government may also perform any other administrative duty assigned it by the Joint Commission. It would also be advisable to have it clearly stated that the provisional Korean government performs all its functions and duties either under the supervision or else under the direct control of the Joint Commission.

15. It is possible that the Soviet members of the Joint Commission will not be willing to create an advisory group of Korean leaders. In that case, it would be desirable for the United States Commander in Korea independently to select such a group to act in an advisory capacity to the United States members of the joint commission in matters relating to the creation of a provisional Korean government. Great care should be taken to insure that such a group is preponderantly liberal and is not open to the charge of being reactionary or fascistic. Constant consultation with such a group of competent and truly representative Korean leaders would strengthen the position of the United States members of the Commission in their negotiations with their Soviet colleagues and would greatly aid them in their planning by giving them a clearer idea of the real views and aspirations of the Korean people.

16. In view of the possible delays between the completion by the Joint Commission of proposals for a provisional Korean government and the final decision by the United States and the U.S.S.R. on these proposals, it would be desirable for the Joint Commission, subsequent to the submission of the proposals to the four powers and pending the final decision of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to take whatever preliminary steps it deems desirable to facilitate the transfer of administrative duties and functions to Koreans, as

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provided for in the proposals. It is felt that these steps would not prejudice the final decision on the proposals, for they could be justified as measures for establishing permanent coordination of administrative-economic matters in Korea, as provided for in paragraph 4 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique. It is assumed that the final plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government will not differ greatly from the original proposals of the Joint Commission, and consequently, whatever preliminary steps the Joint Commission takes in order to facilitate the transfer of administrative duties and functions to Koreans, as provided for in the proposals, will directly aid in the early creation of an efficiently operating provisional Korean government.

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SECRET ROUTINE

FROM: WASHINGTON (STATE DEPT) WARSVC 3830

TO : SCAP, POL ADV, CG XXIV CORPS, 311845/Z 010200/Z APR

(STATE SERIAL 45 29 MAR)

SWNCC 176/18 INDICATES THAT 1 FUNCTION OF JOINT COMMISSION IS TO WORK OUT PLANS FOR A SYSTEM OF PERMANENT GOVT AND ELIMINATE ZONAL ARRANGEMENTS, BUT US MEMBERS, PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, WERE NOT TO DISCUSS THIS. SINCE PLANS FOR SUCH SYSTEM OF PERMANENT GOVT MUST BE BASED ON LOCAL CONDITIONS DEPT WOULD WELCOME INFO AND ADVICE AS TO TYPE OF GOVT MOST FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE. PRESUMABLY NO CLEAR LINES CAN BE LAID OUT UNTIL JOINT COMMISSION IS UNDERWAY EFFECTIVELY AND KOREAN PROVISIONAL GOVT ESTABLISHED, ALTHOUGH SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE FROM TIME TO TIME COMBINING VIEWS OF YOUR ASSOCIATES THERE WILL BE WELCOMED AS GUIDE TO DEPT IN REVISING PARAGRAPH 4 B OF SWNCC 176/18. REF W-96200, FEB 6.

Received
American Consultate General
Apr 2 1946.
Seoul, Korea.

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COPY NO. 37

SWNCC 176/17

28 January 1946

Pages 99 - 103, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

POLITICAL POLICY FOR KOREA

References: a. SWNCC 176/15
b. SWNCC 176/16

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosures, memoranda by the Army and Navy Members, are circulated to the Committee in connection with their consideration of reference a.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE "A"

Memorandum by the Army Member, SWNCC

In view of the message from General Hodge contained in SWNCC 176/16, I believe that paragraph 4 a of SWNCC 176/15 should be amended so as to conform with the recommendation of General Hodge. Furthermore, there are certain phrases in the paper which might be clarified by minor amendment, as indicated below in each such case. I also note that SWNCC 176/15 contains no "Recommendations". I therefore approve SWNCC 176/15, subject to the following amendments.

a. Paragraph 4 a. page 79, amend the first sentence as follows:

"a. Arrangements for an early meeting ~~General MacArthur is to arrange with the Commander of the Soviet forces in northern Korea for the organization and initial meeting at the earliest possible date~~ of the Joint Commission, specified in paragraph 2 of the Korean Section of the Moscow Communique, will be made with the Soviet Government by the State Department."

b. Paragraph 4 a. (2), page 80, second sentence, delete words "supersede present", and substitute the word "eliminate". (This amendment is recommended since it is to be expected that the present zonal arrangements will have been modified, at least in part, by the economic-administrative conference now taking place, and by the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government prior to the period contemplated by the paragraph in question.)

c. Paragraph 4 b. page 81, add the following sentence: "This, however, is not to be construed as limiting in any way the discussion of matters affecting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people and the development of democratic self-government in so far as they pertain to the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean democratic government." (This will warn the members of the

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Commission not to interpret the previous sentence so strictly as to prevent discussion of the political, economic and social matters which must be considered in connection with the formulation of the Korean provisional government.)

d. Paragraph 4 d. (1), amend the sixth sentence on page 82 as follows:

"Special efforts should be made to find and select a definite majority of strong competent leaders who are not extremists of either right or left ~~rightist-or preponderedly-leftist-but-represent-center-and-left-of center-parties.~~"

(It is believed that the sentence as originally written might render the U.S. government liable to charges of pro-communism by those unacquainted with the true significance of the expression "left of center".)

e. Paragraph 4 d. (5) (d), page 83, third line, delete the word "may" and substitute the words "should if possible". (Since this is part of an expression of the position of the U.S., it is believed that this subparagraph should be worded more positively.)

f. Paragraph 4 f. page 84, third line, delete the word "an" and substitute the word "the". (This appears to have been a typographical error.)

g. Paragraph 4 f. page 85, second line, delete the words "as provided for in the proposals." Add the following final sentence to the paragraph: "Such a transfer should be in accordance with the proposals for the provisional government which will have been submitted to the four powers." (It is believed that this amendment clarifies the intent of the paragraph.)

h. Add a section as follows on page 85:

"RECOMMENDATIONS

"5. It is recommended that:

"a. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

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approve the paper and that on approval it be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for transmission to General MacArthur subject to their comments from the military point of view.

"b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmit the conclusions immediately by radio to General MacArthur for his information and guidance, calling attention to the fact that paragraph 3 of SWNCC 176/13 is superseded by paragraph 4 a. of the above conclusions.

"c. That the State Department take immediate steps to arrange for an early meeting of the Joint Commission provided for in paragraph 2 of the Korean Section of the Moscow Communique."

i. Page 88, add two paragraphs to "Facts Bearing on the Problem", as follows:

"4. Message (CM-IN 4881, 22 Jan) has been received from General Hodge, pertinent section of which is quoted below:

'Finally, I suggest that the political meeting be convened as a result of inter-governmental communications rather than on my own initiative. Such approach would, I feel, give the proceedings greater dignity and demonstrate to the Russians the importance we attach to our Korean and other Far Eastern commitments.'

"5. An interim reply (CM-OUT 94286, 23 Jan) was sent to General Hodge as follows:

'Message has been submitted to SWNCC by JCS. Since State, War and Navy Departments already concur informally in your recommendations, you may defer action on paragraph 3 of WARX 91640 (SWNCC 176/13). State Department this date referred to SWNCC for approval complete draft political directive for US members of Joint Commission.'"

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j. Paragraph 6, page 91, amend the third sentence as follows:

"These two provisions would be best met by a group in which center and left of center parties had a definite majority, and it is therefore felt that special efforts should be made to find and select for the group a definite majority of leaders who are not extremists of either right or left ~~rightist-or-preponderedly-leftist-but represent-center-and-left-of-center-parties.~~"

(Amendment suggested for same reason as in Par d. above.)

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ENCLOSURE "B"

Memorandum by the Acting Navy Member, SWNCC

January 28, 1946

I approve SWNCC 176/15 after incorporation of the amendments proposed by Mr. Petersen in his undated memorandum to you received by me on January 26, 1946.

I suggest, however, that the third sentence of paragraph 13 of the Discussion, page 94, be revised to make it consistent with Mr. Petersen's suggested amendment of paragraph 6 on page 91. It should read:

> "This would give a preponderant voice in the new government to those elements, defined in paragraph 6 as ~~being neither rightist or pronouncedly leftist but representative of center and left of center~~ not being extremists of either right or left, which are felt to be not only the most acceptable to both the United States and U.S.S.R. but also most representative of the Korean people as a whole."

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COPY NO. 38

SWNCC 176/15

24 January 1946

Pages 79 - 96, Incl.

Revised by SWNCC 176/18

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

POLITICAL POLICY FOR KOREA
Reference: a. SWNCC 176/13

Note by the Secretaries

1. SWNCC 176/13, approved by the Coordinating Committee on 3 January 1946, provides that

> "In connection with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Korean section of the Moscow Communique, you will arrange for an early meeting of the Joint United States-Soviet Commission. You will receive from SWNCC, through the JCS, early political guidance for meetings of the Joint Commission." * (SCAP)

2. In this connection, the Acting State Member recommends that the Committee consider, as a matter of priority, the enclosed report on the problem of political guidance for the meetings of the Joint Commission.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: JCS regrading memo 25-73
Name and title of person making the change:
MOS
Date 4/24/73

ALEXANDER D. REID
B. L. AUSTIN
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

Revised by SWNCC 176/18

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E N C L O S U R E

POLITICAL POLICY FOR KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine a policy for the guidance of General MacArthur in conducting negotiations with the Soviet command in northern Korea regarding the initial powers and functions of the Joint Commission provided for in paragraph 2 of Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Communique and regarding the formulation of plans for the creation of a Provisional Korean Government.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. General MacArthur is to arrange with the Commander of the Soviet forces in northern Korea for the organization and initial meeting at the earliest possible date of the Joint Commission specified in paragraph 2 of the Korean Section of the Moscow Communique. It is the view of the United States Government that the Joint Commission, in accordance with the Moscow Communique, is to be given the following functions:

(1) To formulate plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government, in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations and with a view to the presentation of these plans for the consideration of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., China, the United Kingdom and the United States, prior to

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final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission, as provided for in paragraph 2 of the section on Korea of the Moscow Communique.

(2) To work out measures, with the participation of the provisional Korean Government, for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, with a view to the submittance of these measures for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and China, as provided for in paragraph 3 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique. These measures should include plans for a system of government to supersede present zonal arrangements in northern and southern Korea. These plans, depending upon such factors as the ability of the Koreans to organize and operate an efficient centralized administration, may or may not take the form of a trusteeship for a period not to exceed five years from the time of the issuance of the Moscow Communique.

(3) To take those steps which it considers desirable and which may not have been taken by the conference provided for in paragraph 4 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique for establishing permanent coordination of economic-administrative matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea. It is expected that these steps will lead to the integration of the civil administration of the northern and southern sectors as rapidly as possible under the centralized control of the Joint Commission, which should ultimately be "civilianized".

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b. The United States members of the Joint Commission are to regard the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government as their first and most pressing political task. Pending further instructions, they are not to discuss matters coming under paragraph 4 a (2) above.

c. With a view to facilitating the creation and smooth functioning of a provisional Korean government, the United States Commander in Korea should, without delay, encourage the various Korean political factions to reach fundamental agreements on the political, economic and social policies to be applied by the new government, including essential democratic reforms.

d. The United States members of the Joint Commission are to be given wide latitude in their negotiations with the Soviet representatives regarding the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government, but the following points are submitted as an indication of the position favored by the United States Government:

(1) The Joint Commission should select a group of representative democratic Korean leaders for the purpose of consultation with the Joint Commission in its preparation of proposals for the establishment of a provisional Korean government. Such leaders, who should as far as practicable represent the will of the Korean people, should be selected after full consultation with all democratic parties and social organizations throughout Korea. If it is considered feasible and advisable, electoral processes may be utilized in their selection. The persons chosen should be the leaders of all the democratic political parties and social organizations which have sufficient political strength and popular backing to warrant representation and also

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any individual Koreans without party affiliations who have sufficient national prestige to justify their inclusion in the membership of the group. The larger and stronger parties and organizations should have representation proportionate to their political strength and popular support. Special efforts should be made to find and select a definite majority of strong competent leaders who are not rightist or pronouncedly leftist but represent center and left of center parties. Care should be taken that the Korean leaders chosen, are true Koreans and not puppets of foreign powers.

(2) If it is not possible for the Joint Commission to reach agreement on the above methods of selection or on the composition of this group of leaders, it should be proposed that the United States and Soviet Commanders in Korea should separately choose the members of the group from their respective zones. In making their choice they should follow the same general principles of selection as are outlined above. In the event of separate selection of the members of the group by the United States and Soviet Commanders, the number of members to be chosen from the two zones should be roughly proportionate to the relative populations of the two zones or at least proportionate to the number of provinces in the two zones.

(3) The Joint Commission should provide a meeting place and quarters for this group of Korean leaders at a place conveniently located with respect to the meeting place of the Joint Commission and should arrange for defrayment of the expenses of the group from funds within Korea.

(4) After the selection of the group of Korean leaders has been completed, the Joint Commission should call upon it to formulate plans, in consultation with

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the Joint Commission, for a provisional Korean government. These plans should be submitted within a reasonable time for the consideration of the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission should then propose these plans, with such modifications as the Commission deems desirable, to the four powers.

(5) The plans for the provisional Korean government proposed by the Joint Commission should be in accord with the following points and principles:

(a) The name should indicate the provisional nature of the government.

(b) The organization of the provisional government should be simple and consonant with its provisional character.

(c) There should be provisions whereby changes can be made in the organization of the provisional government to meet changing needs and new functions and whereby there can be a gradual increase in the use of popular electoral processes for the selection of key officials.

(d) The members of the group of Korean leaders, provided for in 4 d (1) above, or specific individuals in the group, may be used to form the nucleus of the provisional government.

(e) There should be concrete proposals for the initial membership of the provisional government, including the names of the individuals who are to fill the key offices provided for in the plans. The distribution of portfolios in the provisional government should be made in general in conformity with the principles for selecting the group of leaders outlined in 4 d (1) above.

(f) The duties of the provisional government should be:

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(i) Progressively to assume, under the supervision and control of the Joint Commission, responsibility for administering and developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people, as provided for in paragraph 1 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique.

(ii) To perform such other administrative duties as are assigned to it by the Joint Commission.

(iii) To participate with the Joint Commission and under its supervision in working out measures for the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, as provided for in paragraph 3 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique.

e. If it is impossible for the Joint Commission to reach agreement on the creation of an advisory group of Korean leaders, as provided for in paragraph 4 d (1) or (2) above, the United States Commander in Korea should independently form such a group to act in an advisory capacity to the United States members of the Joint Commission in matters relating to the creation of a provisional Korean government.

f. In view of the possible delays between the completion by the Joint Commission of proposals for a provisional Korean government and in final decision by the United States and the U.S.S.R. on these proposals, the United States members of the Joint Commission should take the position that, subsequent to the submission of the proposals to the four powers and pending the final decision of the United States and the U.S.S.R., the Joint Commission has the power, under paragraph 4 a (3) above, to take whatever preliminary steps it deems

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desirable to facilitate the transfer of administrative duties and functions to Koreans, as provided for in the proposals.

g. This government should be kept fully and promptly informed of the progress of the negotiations.

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APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Communique reads as follows:

"III. Korea. 1. With a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a joint commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

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The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultations with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

"4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks."

2. Mr. Byrnes in his radio address on 30 December 1945 commented on the Korean Section of the Moscow Communique as follows:

"The administration of Korea has been a trying problem since the surrender of Japan. For the purposes of military operations the occupation of Korea was divided north and south of Latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas. The continuation of this division after surrender has been unsatisfactory. The movement of persons and goods and the functioning of public services on a nationwide scale has been hampered.

"Under our agreement at Moscow, the two military commands are to form a Joint Soviet-American commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems. They will make recommendations to the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China for the formulation of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. They will

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also make proposals to these Governments regarding a four-power trusteeship to prepare Korea for its independence within five years.

"The Joint Soviet-American commission, working with the Korean Provisional Democratic Government, may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the Society of Nations."

3. The Directive to General MacArthur, given as Appendix "A" of SWNCC 176/13 and approved on 3 January 1946, provides for negotiations with the Soviet command in northern Korea on economic-administrative matters but postpones the discussion of political matters pending further instructions. It concludes as follows:

"3. In connection with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Korean section of the Moscow Communique, you will arrange for an early meeting of the Joint United States-Soviet Commission. You will receive from SWNCC, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, early political guidance for meetings of the Joint Commission."

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique make clear what the political planning duties of the Joint Commission are to be. It is assumed from the Communique that the Joint Commission will also continue the work of the conference, referred to in paragraph 4, looking toward the establishment of permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea. It would be highly desirable to have this permanent coordination take the form of complete integration as rapidly as possible of the civil administration of the northern and southern sectors of Korea under the centralized control of the Joint Commission. It is envisaged that changing conditions will eventually make the "civilianizing" of the Joint Commission advisable.

2. The early creation of a provisional Korean government is extremely desirable, because under the terms of the Moscow Communique, no great progress toward the complete elimination of military government in Korea and the permanent solution of Korea's political problems can be made until a provisional Korean government has been created and has had a chance to participate in the formulation of plans for the future of Korea. The early establishment of such a government is also desirable in order to lead Korean political activity away from destructive criticism and into more constructive channels, in order to give Korean leaders practical experience in the problems of government, and in order to facilitate and hasten the growth of a truly responsible and representative democratic government in Korea which can eventually take full responsibility for the administration of the country. For these reasons it is clear that the Joint Commission should regard the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government as its first and most pressing political task.

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3. The creation and subsequent smocth functioning of a provisional Korean government would be greatly facilitated if there were more unity and agreement among the various Korean political parties and factions. In particular, discussions between the United States and Soviet members of the Joint Commission would be made considerably easier if the attitude of the Koreans toward many basic problems were to be clarified by agreement among the leading political parties. It would, therefore, be desirable for the United States Commander in Korea without delay to encourage the various Korean political factions to adopt a uniform program for the political, economic and social policies to be applied by the new government, including essential democratic reforms.

4. Paragraph 2 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique provides for consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations regarding proposals for the creation of a provisional Korean government. It is believed that this can be done most effectively through a group of Korean leaders which will be fully representative of all Korean democratic parties and social organizations. This group should include the leaders of all democratic parties and factions which have sufficient political strength and popular support to warrant representation. The larger and stronger parties should have representation proportionate to their political strength and popular backing. In order to be fully representative of the Korean people as a whole, the group should also include any individual democratic Koreans without party affiliations who have sufficient national prestige to justify their inclusion. If it is considered feasible and desirable, electoral processes might be utilized in selecting the members of the group, but elections should be undertaken only if there is good reason to believe that they will result in the selection of a truly competent and representative group. Such elections might be held within individual parties and organizations or within separate localities or provinces.

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5. Since there is not always agreement as to the meaning of the word democratic, it would be best to adopt the principle that any Korean party, organization or individual regarded as democratic by either the United States or Soviet members of the Joint Commission should be accepted by both sides as being democratic and only those parties, organizations and individuals considered to be non-democratic by both the United States and Soviet members should be excluded on that score from participation in the group of Korean leaders.

6. The group of Korean leaders should be both representative of the views and aspirations of the Korean people as a whole and also of such political composition as to be acceptable to both the United States and the U.S.S.R. It is felt that no group dominated by totalitarian leftists, such as the Communists, or by rightist elements, representative of capitalistic and land-lord interests, would be representative of the Korean people as a whole or mutually acceptable to the United States and the U.S.S.R. These two provisions would be best met by a group in which center and left of center parties had a definite majority, and it is therefore felt that special efforts should be made to find and select for the group a definite majority of leaders who are not rightist or pronouncedly leftist but represent center and left of center parties. In this connection, great care should be taken to insure that the leaders chosen are not only strong and competent men but also are true Koreans and not merely puppets of foreign powers. They should not be men little known within Korea but should be men generally regarded by the Koreans themselves as competent and representative of the Koreans living within Korea.

7. The most satisfactory method of choice of this group of Korean leaders would be by the Joint Commission as a whole. If it is not possible for the Joint Commission to reach agreement on the composition of the group, it is felt that the best solution would be for the United States and Soviet Commanders in Korea to choose separately the members of the group from their respective zones.

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If this method of selection is used, it would be desirable to have the number of members selected by each Commander proportionate to the relative populations of the two zones. However, this might meet with strong objections from the Soviet members of the Commission, for it would permit the United States Commander to choose at least two-thirds of the total membership. An alternative formula might be that the number of members to be selected by each Commander should be proportionate to the number of provinces in each zone. There are 7-1/2 provinces in the United States zone and 5-1/2 in the Soviet zone.

8. It would be advisable for the Joint Commission to call upon the group of Korean leaders to draw up the initial draft of the proposals for a provisional Korean government. This would give the Korean leaders the realization that they are having an important voice in the creation of their provisional government and would greatly increase the probabilities of wholehearted acceptance of and support for the proposals on the part of the Korean people as well as their leaders. It would also relieve the Joint Commission of responsibility for the elaboration of many minor details of organization, nomenclature and procedure, which are, for the most part, matters of indifference to the United States, and would place the responsibility for drawing up these details on the Koreans themselves. Since the proposals must meet with the approval of the United States and Soviet Governments, it would be advisable for the group of Korean leaders to keep in constant consultation with the Joint Commission on all major problems. This should facilitate consideration and emendation of the proposals by the Joint Commission before it submits them to the four powers. If the group of Korean leaders cannot within a reasonable period of time agree upon their proposals for a provisional Korean government, the Joint Commission may be forced to proceed with the formulation of its proposals independently of the group of Korean leaders.

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9. Since the initial draft of the proposal for a provisional Korean government by the group of Korean leaders should be completed as soon as possible, the group should be given no other duties by the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission naturally should provide the group with a meeting place and quarters at a place conveniently located with respect to the meeting place of the Joint Commission and should arrange for defrayment of the expenses of the groups from funds within Korea, but, since the group is not specifically provided for in the Moscow Communique and will be merely an advisory body created by the Joint Commission, it should be given no other official recognition.

10. The provisional Korean government should be, as the name implies, only a provisional government and should exist only during a transitional period. It is believed, therefore, that it will not require a complex constitution or an elaborate organization. Its organization should be as simple as possible and so constituted as to be fully consonant with its actual duties and its provisional character. In other words, the proposals for the provisional Korean government should not include detailed plans for offices and organs of government which, because of the limited duties and powers of the government, would be without actual functions, or would be difficult to organize and operate during the transitional period.

11. The possibility is envisaged that, during the life of the provisional government, there will be a steady expansion of its functions and powers. Consequently, there should be provisions whereby changes can be made in the organization of the provisional government to meet changing needs and new functions. Since the provisional Korean government as originally constituted will probably be made up of men who have not been selected for their posts by any system of popular elections, special care should be taken to include provisions whereby there can be, if conditions permit, a gradual increase in the use of popular electoral processes for the selection of key officials.

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12. The selection of key officers of the provisional Korean government by national elections is desirable in principle, but it is felt that the lack of adequate machinery for national elections and the desirability of wide representation in the new government in the initial period make the inclusion of provisions for immediate national elections of key officers inadvisable. Since the group of Korean leaders discussed in previous paragraphs will be made up of strong, competent and truly representative Korean leaders and will be so constituted as to be politically acceptable to both the United States and the U.S.S.R., the best and most practical means of selecting the original key officers of the new government would seem to be for this group of Korean leaders to choose them, subject to the approval of the Joint Commission. It is envisaged that members of the group, or specific individuals from the group, will probably form the nucleus of the provisional government. If this were the case, it would greatly facilitate the creation of the new government, for it would eliminate the necessity for long negotiations between the United States and Soviet members of the Commission and protracted consultations with the Koreans to arrive at a new panel of leaders who are acceptable to both the United States and the U.S.S.R. and who are truly representative of the Koreans.

13. It is felt that proposals for the provisional Korean government should include the names of the individuals who are initially to fill the key offices provided for in the proposals. This would permit the four powers to see clearly the true nature of the proposed government and would help insure the formation of a government which is not dominated by some minority faction. In this connection, care should be taken to insure that the portfolios in the provisional government are in general assigned in conformity with the principles for the selection of the group of Koreans leaders, as outlined in paragraph 6 above. This would give a preponderant voice in the new government to those elements, defined in paragraph 6 as being neither rightist or pronouncedly leftist but representative of center and left of center parties, which are felt to be

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not only most acceptable to both the United States and the U.S.S.R. but also most representative of the Korean people as a whole.

14. The proposed administrative and political planning duties of the provisional Korean government are clearly stated in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique. In order to give flexibility to the plan and to provide for growth in the functions and powers of the provisional government, it would be desirable to have it specified that the provisional Korean government may also perform any other administrative duty assigned it by the Joint Commission. It would also be advisable to have it clearly stated that the provisional Korean government performs all its functions and duties either under the supervision or else under the direct control of the Joint Commission.

15. It is possible that the Soviet members of the Joint Commission will not be willing to create an advisory group of Korean leaders. In that case, it would be desirable for the United States Commander in Korea independently to select such a group to act in an advisory capacity to the United States members of the Joint Commission in matters relating to the creation of a provisional Korean government. Great care should be taken to insure that such a group is preponderantly liberal and is not open to the charge of being reactionary or fascistic. Constant consultation with such a group of competent and truly representative Korean leaders would strengthen the position of the United States members of the Commission in their negotiations with their Soviet colleagues and would greatly aid them in their planning by giving them a clearer idea of the real views and aspirations of the Korean people.

16. In view of the possible delays between the completion by the Joint Commission of proposals for a provisional Korean government and the final decision by the United States and the U.S.S.R. on these proposals, it would be desirable for the Joint Commission, subsequent to the submission of the proposals to the four powers and pending the final decision of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

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to take whatever preliminary steps it deems desirable to facilitate the transfer of administrative duties and functions to Koreans, as provided for in the proposals. It is felt that these steps would not prejudice the final decision on the proposals, for they could be justified as measures for establishing permanent coordination of administrative-economic matters in Korea, as provided for in paragraph 4 of the section on Korea in the Moscow Communique. It is assumed that the final plans for the creation of a provisional Korean government will not differ greatly from the original proposals of the Joint Commission, and, consequently, whatever preliminary steps the Joint Commission takes in order to facilitate the transfer of administrative duties and functions to Koreans, as provided for in the proposals, will directly aid in the early creation of an efficiently operating provisional Korean government.

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COPY NO. ~~28~~

3 January 1946

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DECISION AMENDING SWNCC 176/13

DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL MacARTHUR FOR
U.S.-SOVIET CONFERENCE ON KOREA

Note by the Secretaries

1. By informal action on 3 January 1946, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 176/13, after amending.

2. Holders of SWNCC 176/13 are requested to substitute the attached revised page 79 for the one contained therein and destroy the latter by burning.

ALEXANDER D. REID
B. L. AUSTIN
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: Ltr requesting memo 25-73
Name and title of person making the change:
M.D.H.
Date 4/24/73

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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COPY NO. 28

SWNCC 176/13

1 January 1946

Pages 78 - 82, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL MacARTHUR FOR U.S.-SOVIET CONFERENCE ON KOREA

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

ALEXANDER D. REID
B. L. AUSTIN
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
By authority of: JCS regrading memo 25-73
Name and title of person making the change:
WNOS
Date 4/24/73

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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ENCLOSURE

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 January 1946.

MEMORANDUM BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR:

SUBJECT: Directive to General MacArthur for U.S.-Soviet Conference on Korea.

Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Communique (Appendix B of the Enclosure) provides for meetings of a joint United States-Soviet Commission on political, economic and social Korean problems. It provides further for a meeting of representatives of the United States and Soviet commanders in Korea to be held within two weeks (i.e., prior to January 10, 1946) for the purpose of considering the urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States and Soviet zones.

I recommend that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee consider the enclosed draft directive (Appendix "A") to General MacArthur as a matter of priority, and that on approval of the directive by the Committee, it be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for transmission to General MacArthur, subject to their comments from the military point of view.

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APPENDIX "A"

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL MacARTHUR

1. You are hereby charged with the responsibility for carrying out for the United States the provisions of Section III (Korea) of the Moscow Communique.

2. In connection with paragraph 4 of the Korean section of the Moscow Communique you will arrange for the conference specified therein. The following general points are furnished you for the guidance of the U.S. representatives at the conference:

a. Pending further JCS instructions, you will retain full responsibility for the administration of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude, subject to boundary changes of the sort suggested in your CA 53789 of 24 Oct and WARX 81584 of 7 Nov.

b. Pending further JCS instructions, political matters will not be discussed, the U.S. representatives limiting their discussion to economic-administrative matters.

c. It is believed that you should seek, so far as possible, Soviet concurrence with the economic and administrative matters outlined in your CA 53789 and such other economic or administrative matters as you desire. In this connection you are authorized to reach all necessary agreements to achieve these ends, so long as they are in consonance with the basic objectives expressed in SWNCC 176/8, the basic directive with regard to Korea.

d. You are further authorized to make such agreements for exchange of liaison personnel and such other movement of U.S. and Soviet military personnel between the two zones as you believe desirable and advantageous.

3. In connection with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Korean section of the Moscow Communique, you will arrange for an early meeting of the Joint United States-Soviet Commission. You will receive from SWNCC, through the JCS, early political guidance for meetings of the Joint Commission.

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4. You will keep the JCS fully informed of the results of all conferences between your representatives and those of the Soviet Commander in Korea.

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APPENDIX "B"

III

KOREA

1. With a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a joint commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

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The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.

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Target 7

Subcommission No. I
Minutes of Meetings, Nos. 1-16 (May 26-Aug. 30, 1947)
Transcripts of Meetings, Nos. 2-21

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

65 A

Subcomission # I
Minutes of Meetings
(Meetings # 1 to 16 Incl.)
(26 May 47 - 30 Aug 47)

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By NARS, Date

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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Subcommission I
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

Minutes of the

1st Meeting

Duk Soo Palace

26 May 1947

Present

American Delegation	Russian Delegation
Dr. Arthur C. Bunce	Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. Robert A. Kinney	Mr. V. I. Petuhov
Mr. Eugene V. Prostov	Lt.Col. I. V. Kravtsov
Mr. Benjamin B. Weems	
Mr. Philip C. Rowe	

Secretariat

Capt. Margaret Johnson	Mr. I. I. Valenko
Lt. Betty Coleman	Miss I. D. Mesiatz

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1. Soviet Proposed Plan of Work of Subcommission I.

   a. "Elaboration of proposals on the order of consultation with Korean Democratic parties and social organizations.

   b. Compilation of a list of Korean Democratic parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission shall consult.

   c. Compilation of a list of representatives nominated by the Korean Democratic parties and social organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission."

2. Review of Joint Commission Decision Number 4.

During the discussion, the members of Subcommission I agreed that further discussion of Steps 2 and 3 in the "Conditions for and Order of Consultation with Democratic Parties and Social Organizations" would be postponed and the work of Subcommission I will begin with Step I.

After discussion:

a. The Soviet delegation submitted to the American delegation its proposal for the method of consultation with Korean Democratic parties and social organizations.

b. The American delegation submitted to the Soviet delegation its proposal for the method of consultation with Korean Democratic parties and social organizations.

c. It was agreed to defer further consideration until each delegation had opportunity for study of proposals submitted.

d. It was agreed to reconvene at 1330, 27 May 1947.

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Subcommission I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes

2nd Meeting

27 May 1947

1330 hours

Duk Soo Palace

Present

American Delegation

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Robert A. Kinney
Mr. Eugene V. Prostov
Mr. Benjamin B. Weems
Mr. Philip C. Rowe

Russian Delegation

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. V. I. Petuhov
Lt. Col. I. V. Kravstov

Secretariat

Capt. Margaret B. Johnson

Mr. I. I. Valenko
Miss I. D. Mesiatz

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S E C R E T

1. Discussion of the merits of the two proposals submitted at 1st meeting.

a. Soviet Delegation stated the Soviet proposal on comparison with American proposal seemed clearer and more specific, and should therefore be accepted as the document to be presented to the Joint Commission.

b. The American Delegation pointed out that the additions and omissions in the Soviet proposal distorted the intent and failed to carry out the ideas agreed upon by Mr. Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall in their correspondence of the past year.

c. The Soviet Delegation stated the changes and omissions in their proposal was merely a difference in wording in order to make a new document. There was no intent to change basic idea. Asked for the specific objections.

d. The American Delegation named three specific objections:

(1) Limitation of parties to be consulted to 30.

(2) No statement in Par 1 saying, "no persons will be excluded for opinions", etc.

(3) Further extracts of the correspondence between Mr. Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall should be included, and the suggestion that the correspondence should be reproduced in full and attached to the final document as an appendix. Furthermore, that copies in full of this correspondence be sent to all parties and organizations whose representatives would consult with the Commission.

e. The American Delegation stated that approximately 100 parties in South Korea could be consulted in a period of three weeks. By consulting all the parties, conflict concerning selection would be eliminated. Last year six weeks were wasted in argument over selection of parties

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to be consulted. In that time 200 parties of North and South Korea could have been heard. That the American Delegation had no intention of repeating this situation. If it appeared that conflict on this point was inevitable, the Subcommission should ask the Joint Commission to convene on Thursday to settle the problem.

f. The American Delegation has instructions to follow a broad and all-inclusive program of consultation of Korean people. We cannot accept the Soviet proposal on the basis of restriction to 30 parties.

g. The Soviet Delegation asked if the basis of the Commission work would be the three American proposals agreed upon in the Molotov-Marshall correspondence.

h. The American Delegation agreed with the stipulation that this correspondence be published in full and disseminated to parties and organizations to be consulted.

2. The Soviet Delegation announced today's meeting successful in that the views of both delegations had become clearer. Suggested that the Chairman of each delegation consult in the morning with his respective commissioner for further instructions. That Dr. Bunce and Mr. Tounkin meet at 1100 28 May to discuss. If after this discussion it is felt the Subcommission I can continue in its work, the Commission will reconvene at 1330 the same day.

3. The American Delegation agreed. The meeting was closed at 1710 hours.

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Subcommission I
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes
3rd Meeting
30 May 1947
1330 hours
Duk Soo Palace

PRESENT

AMERICAN DELEGATION

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Robert A. Kinney
Mr. Eugene Prostov
Mr. Philip C. Rowe
Mr. Benjamin B. Weems

SOVIET DELEGATION

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. V. I. Petuhov

SECRETARIAT

Capt. Margaret B. Johnson

Mr. I .I. Valenko
Miss I. D. Mesiatz

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1. Short discussion of proposed work of the Commission for 30 May. Mr. Tounkin asked for the list of parties to be consulted. Dr. Bunce stated there might be confusion on the day's work, as he understood the mission for today was the composition of the Communique to present to the Press for the parties and organizations who wished to consult with the Joint Commission. Mr. Tounkin agreed this was correct.

2. The American Delegation then presented paragraph by paragraph the draft of the U.S. proposal regarding announcement on consultation. (See transcript of meeting -- the Soviet Delegation had no draft.)

3. Discussion of American Delegation's draft.

a. Mr. Tounkin objected on two points.

(1) This draft included all of the American proposal's points.

(2) That it stipulated the added condition -- expression of freedom of opinion. He contended that if the American Delegation insisted on a new condition before accepting the basis of the three points agreed upon in the foreign ministers' correspondence, that the American Delegation was violating the basis upon which the Joint Commission had reconvened.

b. Dr. Bunce pointed out that:

(1) The American proposal fulfilled the Soviet proposal of Thursday that the Communique and Questionnaire be published for Korean consultation.

(2) The correspondence between the foreign ministers was broad and comprehensive and in no way binding. The basis for reconvening the Joint Commission was <u>not</u> based on exclusion and that

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the American policy accepted by Mr. Molotov ~~included no exclusion on the basis of~~ opinion.

(3) Mr. Tounkin stated that he could not accept the American draft and that he supposed they must present this problem to the Joint Commission on the 31st.

(4) Dr. Bunce pointed out that the draft met the basic requirements of the Soviet Delegation in that the Communique and questionnaire be published for the Korean people immediately. The only difference being that we have added that there be one general meeting in order to enable the Korean representatives meet the Commission and be told of the Commission's desire to have their participation in the establishment of their government. In regard to Mr. Tounkin's statement that only American proposal points were included, Dr. Bunce drew attention to paragraph 8 which leaves the area of disagreement wide open.

4. Summary of discussion.

a. Soviet Delegation:

(1) In stipulating new condition, the Americans are violating the basis upon which the Joint Commission reconvened.

(2) That both groups agree on the immediate publication of the Communique and Questionnaire.

(3) That we shall be forced to let the Joint Commission handle the problem.

(4) That only the 3 points agreed upon in the foreign ministers' correspondence should be included in the document to be presented.

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b. American Delegation:

(1) Agreed that the problem must be presented to the Joint Commission.

(2) The American draft fulfills the Soviet requirements and adds a general meeting which is also indicated in the Soviet concept of participation.

(3) Since the conditions in correspondence between the two foreign ministers and the U.S. and Soviet commanders have been published and the Korean people are fully aware, see no reason for not including complete correspondence as an appendix to the document to be presented to the Joint Commission.

(4) The American Delegation has no desire to modify or change the 3 points agreed upon by the foreign ministers.

(5) For the sake of expediency a standard or criteria of consultation must be set to avoid many expressions of small isolated groups that do not express the will of the people.

(6) The American Delegation desires to establish a government that is compatible to the Korean people and that will not be antagonistic to either of the Allies.

(7) That freedom of expression of opinion is an inherent right of Democratic peoples and is therefore an all-important point to be included. This was expressed fully by the American Delegation in the last meeting of the Joint Commission.

5. Mr. Tounkin moved the meeting adjourn. Dr. Bunce agreed. Meeting adjourned at 1700 hours.

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SUBCOMMISSION I
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
SEOUL, KOREA

MINUTES
4th MEETING
2 June 1947
1000 hours
Duk Soo Palace

PRESENT

AMERICAN DELEGATION

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Robert A. Kinney
Mr. Eugene Prostov
Mr. Philip C. Rowe
Mr. Benjamin B. Weems

SOVIET DELEGATION

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Lt. Col. Kravstov
Mr. V. I. Petuhov

SECRETARIAT

Capt Margaret B. Johnson

Mr. I.I. Valenko
Miss I. D. Mesiatz

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Minutes of 4th Meeting of Subcommission I 2 June 1947, 1000 hours.

1. American Delegation presented draft of communique based on desires of Soviet Delegation. Includes relevant quotations from the letters and enables all groups to answer questionaire. presented also a draft of a tentative basis for selection of parties and organizations to be consulted orally. Soviet Delegation was asked if they wished to discuss the document first, or if they had a proposal to present.

2. The Soviet Delegation requested that the commission discuss the 2 press communiques presented by the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission, and requested immediate publication.

3. American Delegation agreed that immediate publication is desirable but that it had been made clear by General Brown at the meeting of the Joint Commission that it would be misleading to publish the communique on consultationwithout at the same time including the definition of the parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission would consult orally, and that he would refuse to consider a joint communique on this matter until this detail was cleared up. The American document can be used as a press communique as it does two jobs in one. It also eliminates one whole step in asking the parties to send in the name of their delegate at the time of application for consultation. We need to reach agreement on only one question - that of the parties and organizations to be consulted orally. Paragraph 6 of the American document is open for modification. As soon as this technical question is agreed upon the communique can be published. The Soviet Delegation was then asked for recommendations on paragraph 6, or specific alternate criteria.

4. Soviet Delegation refused to discuss criteria for selection of parties and organizations to be consulted orally. Insisted on immediate publication of the 2 Soviet proposed communiques.

5. Then followed a discussion on the standard to be used as a basis for oral consultation, with the American view that no specific number of parties be set but a standard for selection instead, and the Soviet view that it was a blind discussion unless the list of parties was available. American Delegation again asked for agreement or specific recommendations from the Soviet Delegation on what would be a better criteria. Also pointed out that paragraph 8 of the American proposal was identical with paragraph 14 of the Soviet propcsal. The Soviet Delegation stated that they wished to discuss principles of the representation and estimated values of the parties and social organizations to be consulted.

6. As it was then noon, the American Delegation proposed that the meeting adjourn and reconvene for discussion of this question at 1030, 3 June. The meeting was adjourned at 1215 hours.

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SUBCOMMISSION I

US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

Seoul, Korea

Minutes

5th Meeting

3 June 1947

1030 Hours

PRESENT

American Delegation	Soviet Delegation
Dr. Arthur C. Bunce	Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. Robert A. Kinney	Mr. V. I. Petuhov
Mr. Eugene Prostov	Lt.Col. Kravtsov
Mr. Philip C. Rowe	
Mr. Benjamin B. Weems	

SECRETARIAT

Capt. Margaret B. Johnson	Mr. I. I. Valenko
Miss Dorothy Cascioni	Miss Klepikova
Miss Helen Helser	

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1. Discussion of proposed work for meeting.

Chairman, Dr. Bunce, proposed the day's work of the Commission start with working out paragraph by paragraph the American proposal in order to expedite the business of arriving at a final joint document. The Soviet Delegation presented a draft document for discussion. Discussion was deferred until Soviet document could be translated.

2. Discussion of correspondence to be included in joint draft document:

a. Soviet Delegation:

(1) Insist on including 3 conditions in General Hodge's letter.

(2) Insists on omission of text of General Chistiakov's letter.

(3) Refuses to include Molotov and Marshall's texts in full.

(4) Only reasons given for above is expediency and that American Delegation is retreating from 3 points agreed upon by the two foreign ministers and raising new questions by insisting on addition.

b. American Delegation:

(1) Insists on including complete correspondence, if Soviet Delegation insists on using General Hodge's letter for 3 points.

(2) To include full text as an appendix to final draft document.

(3) Reasons for above:

(a) General Hodge's letter is only an amendment to General Chistiakov's proposal,

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and without full text the document can be misinterpreted.

(b) If Molotov quoted General Chistiakov's letter and the amendment by General Hodge he must have had the same reason - i.e. that of avoiding any misunderstanding caused by not quoting texts in full.

(c) The Joint Commission failed last year on this question of consultation. Therefore it is necessary to make quite clear in final document, the basis for reconvening and present a document to the Korean people that cannot be misinterpreted.

(d) The document must be a safeguard against misunderstanding in the Joint Commission at a later stage of the mission.

3. The Chairman, Dr. Bunce, suggested adjournment and to reconvene for further discussion at 1400. The Soviet Delegation agreed to adjourn and added that:

a. The American Delegation's remarks re amendments were incorrect, as General Hodge's letter was final correspondence and the basis for reconvention of Joint Commission.

b. That it seemed to be the American Delegation's tendency to raise new questions and to discuss points already agreed upon by the foreign ministers, instead of working out present and past disagreements.

4. The meeting was adjourned at 1220.

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5. Meeting reconvened at 1415 hours.

Discussion of Soviet draft presented in morning session:

Dr. Bunce suggested starting with paragraph 6 of Soviet draft.

a. Soviet Delegation:

(1) Proposal in Paragraph 6 is to compile list of parties and organizations from signed declarations (Communique No. 5) and decide on number of representatives from each party and organization to consult with the Joint Commission.

(2) That a fair representation would be based in a ratio -- larger number of representatives from large parties and organizations than from small parties and organizations.

(3) This establishes a fair ratio of representation for future permanent consultants, for voting purposes.

(4) A further basis for establishing ratio is estimated value of influence of each party and organization desiring to consult.

b. American Delegation:

(1) Establishment of a permanent and specific group to consult is a new concept and must be considered carefully.

(2) American Delegation wishes only a broad consultation with Korean people.

(3) Rather than a permanent group for consultation on the various and diversified problems in establishing Korean Democratic Government, it would be better to have first a general con-

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sultation with all parties, then in the stage of construction of government call in specific groups qualified to give advice in specific problems such as; education, agriculture and industry, rights of women, etc. Individual experts in various lines could be included in these consultations.

(4) For general consultation why should there be any objection to one representative for each party?

6. Dr. Bunce suggested adjournment for thought on following points:

a. Can we draft an agreement retaining concept of broad participation?

b. Ar initial broad consultation with large group from all parties and organizations as suggested in American proposal.

c. How to specify more accurately proposal in Paragraph 6 of Soviet proposal, i.e. number of representatives and how to measure influence value.

7. Soviet Delegation agreed and meeting adjourned at 1630, to reconvene at 1000 4 June.

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SUBCOMMISSION I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes of the
6th Meeting
4 June 1947
1000 Hours
Duk Soo Palace
Seoul, Korea

Present

American Delegation

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Robert A. Kinney
Mr. Eugene Prostov
Mr. Philip Rowe
Mr. Benjamin Weems

Soviet Delegation

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. V. I. Petuhov
Lt. Col. Kravstov

Secretariat

Capt. Margaret B. Johnson
Miss Dorothy Cascioni
Miss Helen Helser

Mr. I. I. Valenko

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Minutes of 6th Meeting of Subcommission I
4 June at 1000 hours.

1. Meeting opened with an attempt of the American Delegation to get a specific wording or outline of par #6 of the Soviet proposal, i.e., a mathematical basis for selection of parties and organizations for consultation or a specific standard for selection.

a. Soviet Delegation:

(1) Number of representatives from each party and organization would depend on total membership.

(2) Number and ratio to be decided after lists are compiled from applications for consultation.

b. American Delegation:

(1) A general principle such as above could be used in such a way as to disenfranchise a large number of people belonging to small groups. This is not democratic.

(2) Suggest representation on population basis for initial group.

(3) A detailed plan or standard of selection or ratio should be set up early to avoid misunderstandings later as to which and how many for oral consultation.

(4) Call in specialist groups for special problems in construction of government.

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2. Discussion of draft-proposals and rewording.

a. American Delegation:

(1) Insert in blank in par 6 of American proposal, "5000."

(2) In par 8, before "representatives", insert "a group of", and add to par 8, from par 6 of Soviet proposal, "This group shall be formed in conformity with the membership of those parties and organizations and taking into consideration as much as possible their influence."

(3) Can remove par 7, and add to Soviet proposal the general meeting in Seoul and Pyongyang.

b. Soviet Delegation:

(1) Before agreeing on pars 6 and 8 it would be well to outline specifically par 6 - Show exactly the 2d stage of consultation and go over other paragraphs. Par 2, inclusion of correspondence.

3. Discussion of Relevant Correspondence in final document:

a. American Delegation:

(1) Take out all of par 2 and reword to say, "The letters stating conditions of consultation are attached in appendix A."

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b. Soviet Delegation:

(1) Disagree - necessary to include 3 conditions as stated in Gen. Hodge's letter.

(2) Inexpedient to give history of correspondence.

(3) No objection to publishing letters of Molotov or all correspondence between two foreign ministers and distributing to certain number of parties and organizations.

c. American Delegation put in form of a question - would you agree to publish Marshal and Molotov's letters as an Appendix if the body of the document contained the 3 conditions in Hodge's letter? Soviet Delegation agreed.

A 15 minute recess was called to ascertain the acceptability of this proposal by the American Delegation. Recess at 1145.

Meeting resumed at 1200.

d. American Delegation unable to accept suggestion on par 2, re 3 conditions.

e. Soviet Delegation proposed adjournment for American Delegation to formulate proposal re 3 stages for Soviet Delegation to study, and to report problem to Joint Commission at 1330 session this date.

Meeting adjourned 1220.

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COPY NO. 5

SUBCOMMISSION I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes of 7th Meeting

5 June 1947

1100 hours

Duk Soo Palace

PRESENT

AMERICAN DELEGATION

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Robert A. Kinney
Mr. Eugene V. Prostov
Mr. Philip Rowe
Mr. Benjamin B. Weems

SOVIET DELEGATION

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. V. I. Petuhov
Lt. Col. Kravstov

SECRETARIAT

Capt. Margaret B. Johnson
Miss Virginia Quigley

Mr. I. I. Valenko

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MINUTES OF 7TH MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION I

5 JUNE 1947 1100 HOURS

1. Meeting opened with outline of work for today, presented by Dr. Bunce.

   a. No new proposal on Paragraph 2 of original document.

   b. Have rewritten complete proposal in conformity with Soviet paper, in paragraphs 4 to 12 inclusive, making 3 steps of consultation clear.

   c. Must endeavor to reach a compromise on Paragraph 2.

2. Soviet Delegation presented a new proposal.

   Rewritten Paragraph 2:

   "The Commission in its work on consultation with democratic parties and social organizations shall be guided by the following three conditions brought out in the course of the correspondence between the Soviet and American Commanding Generals in Korea and agreed to between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, (letter of 7 May 1947) and the State Secretary G. Marshall (letter of 13 May 1947), namely the following:

   (paragraph a, b and c representing the three conditions stated in the previous Soviet proposal - 2, 3 and 4 of 3 June.)"

   If American Delegation does not agree to inclusion of three conditions in document they must propose definite statement.

3. American Delegation makes specific statement to the effect:

   a. To have the exact conditions stated in full.

   b. Willing to include 3 conditions in full.

   c. Soviet Delegation's objections to inclusion of full statement seems to be an attempt to modify agreement made by Molotov.

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d. Under these circumstances no point in continuing meeting.

e. Outlined the several alternatives and proposals presented by American Delegation.

f. American Delegation wants full statement to avoid future misunderstanding and to make it clear to Korean people.

4. Soviet Delegation insisted on stand as to Paragraph 2.

Dr. Bunce suggested adjournment for study of Soviet proposal and rewritten American proposal.

Meeting adjourned at 1210 to resume at 2000 this date.

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MINUTES OF 7TH MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION I (cont'd) - 5 June 1947 -2000

5. American Delegation opened meeting by stating:

(a) Work of the meeting to discuss paragraph 2.

(b) Presented summary of four (4) American proposals on the matter which has been refused by Soviet Delegation.

(c) As delay has become serious, if no compromise is reached in this meeting, General Brown will request of General Shtikov that:

1. Korean people and rest of world be made fully aware of reason for delay.

2. That tomorrow's meeting be open to the press.

(d) Request Soviet Delegation to summarize the difference between the Soviet paper and the American paper. Then we will be able to continue the discussion of those points for clear understanding.

6. Soviet Delegation stated that if three conditions in General Hodge's letter were not included there would be no guiding point for the Commission's work. Suggested the American Delegation present in written form a satisfactory explanation of an alternate guiding point.

7. American Delegation repeated position:

(a) Both original proposal of General Chistiakov and amendments by General Hodge must be included. Unless the original proposals and amendments are stated in full. The amendments alone can be misinterpreted inthe future.

(b) Suggest rewording of paragraph 1 to express more exactly the basic reasons for reconvention of Joint Commission.

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8. Results of Discussion:

(a) Soviet Delegation agreed to include in the document General Chistiakov's proposals and General Hodge's amendments. Not yet decided whether these will be printed in the form of Mr. Molotov's letter or excerpts from General Chistiakov's letter of 26 November 1946 and General Hodge's letter of 24 December 1946.

(b) The rewording or question of paragraph 1 is still to be decided.

(c) American Delegation tostudy rewritten draft of Soviet proposal presented at this meeting.

(d) American Delegation suggested both Commissions prepare a written statement interpreting the issues involving the reconvening of the Joint Commission.

(e) Next meeting to be 1000 hours 6 June.

9. Meeting adjourned at 2200.

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SUBCOMMISSION I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes of 8th Meeting

6 June 1947

1000 hours

Duk Soo Palace

PRESENT

AMERICAN DELEGATION

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Robert A. Kinney
Mr. Eugene V. Prostov
Mr. Philip Rowe
Mr. Benjamin Weems

SOVIET DELEGATION

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. V. I. Petuhov
Lt. Col. Kravstov

SECRETARIAT

Capt. Margaret B. Johnson
Miss Dorothy Cascioni
Miss Helen K. Helser

Mr. I. I. Valenko

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1. By request of American Delegation the Soviet Delegation submitted draft of quotations of correspondence to be included in document. Also submitted rewritten draft of document with new Paragraph 1 and 2. All other paragraphs reproduced as in original document.
2. Commission worked in both drafts and arrived at an agreement on paragraphs 1 through 7, but disagreed on question of broad consultation, i.e., paragraph 9 of American Delegation proposal of 5 June.
3. Agreed to adjourn and present disagreement to Joint Commission.

Meeting adjourned at 1445 hours.

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SUBCOMMISSION I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

COPY NO. 5

Minutes of 9th Meeting

6 June 1947

2100 hours

Duk Soo Palace

PRESENT

AMERICAN DELEGATION

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Robert A. Kinney
Mr. Eugene V. Prostov
Mr. Philip Rowe
Mr. Benjamin Weems

SOVIET DELEGATION

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. V. I. Petuhov
Lt. Col. Kravstov

SECRETARIAT

Captain Margaret B. Johnson
Miss Evelyn Van Note

Mr. I. I. Valenko

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Minutes of Meeting of Subcommission I, 6 June 1947

9th Meeting 2100 hours

1. Meeting opened with an informal check of American and Soviet texts of draft of final document.
2. Followed a detailed discussion of document by paragraphs, and rewording of draft. With a few minor revisions the final draft document was completed for presentation to Joint Commission and publication.
3. The following dates were agreed upon:
   a. Publication of document - 9 June 1947.
   b. Applications to be submitted by - 20 June 1947
   c. Questionnaires to be submitted by - 25 June 1947
   d. Initial general meeting in Seoul - 25 June 1947
   e. Initial general meeting in Pyengyang - 30 June 1947.

Meeting adjourned at 2240 hours.

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Dr. Bunce

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SUBCOMMISSION I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes of 10th Meeting

23 June 1947

1100 hours

Duk Soo Palace

Present

American Delegation	Soviet Delegation
Dr. Arthur C. Bunce	Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. Robert A. Kinney	
Mr. Eugene V. Prostov	
Mr. Philip Rowe	

Secretariat

Capt. Margaret B. Johnson	Mr. I. I. Valenko
Miss Virginia Quigley	

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MINUTES OF MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION I

11 hours
23 June 1947

1. Mr. Tounkin opened meeting by stating the business of the morning would be a discussion of the completed party lists of North and South Korea.

2. Proposal by the Soviet Delegation:

   a. To eliminate parties of South Korea that have testified falsely as to branches and membership totals.

   b. To eliminate organizations that would not be classified as a social or political organization.

   c. To eliminate all parties that do not have a central organ or headquarters.

3. Discussion by American Delegation:

   a. Request for definition of "social organization."

   b. By Joint Decision #12, we are now committed to consultation with all parties and social organizations.

   c. Refusal to exclude parties and organizations that have no central organ, on the basis of the fundamental difference between North and South Korea party organization; i.e., In the North all parties tightly organized; in the South many do not have central organ--no way for them to be represented.

   d. Explanation of discrepancy in population of South Korea and total membership of parties--caused by duplication by branches of parties registered by central organ.

   e. Agreed that some must be eliminated.

   f. Proposal that a method be evolved that will give small amount of time in consultation to small, local parties and a longer time to larger, and more important parties.

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4. Both delegations agreed to study the problem of elimination and meet 24 June with definite proposals for solution.

5. Meeting adjourned at 1220 hours.

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Subcommission No. I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes of The

11th Meeting

1400 Hours

26 June 1947

Duk Soo Palace

Present

American Delegation

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Eugene E. Prostov
Mr. Robert A. Kinney
Mr. Philip C. Rowe

Soviet Delegation

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. Shabshin

Secretariat

Capt. Margaret B. Johnson
Miss Dorothy Cascioni

Mr. I. I. Valenko

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1. American Delegation submitted proposals for solution of elimination problem:
   a. Form 2 groups by membership -- 5,000 dividing line.
   b. Form groups of parties and social organizations on basis of mutual interests.
   c. Consult smaller and local organizations in groups of 5 or more.
   d. Eliminate only those deliberately fraudulent or illegal.
2. Soviet Delegation wishes to exclude all parties and social organizations that have no central or zonal organ.
3. Discussion of various parties and organizations on list.
4. Conclusions and Recommendations:
   a. Soviet Delegation tentatively accepted American proposals.
   b. Both delegations to make further study of lists.
   c. American Delegation to assemble lists per proposal and make further check for fraudulent parties and organizations.
5. Meeting adjourned 1630.

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Subcommission I
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes of 12th Meeting

1330 hours

27 June 1947

Duk Soo Palace

Present

American Delegation

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Robert Kinney
Mr. Eugene Prostov
Mr. Philip Rowe

Soviet Delegation

Mr. Tounkin
Mr. Petuhov
Mr. Shabshin

Secretariat

Captain M. B. Johnson
Miss Virginia Quigley

Mr. I. I. Valenko

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Minutes of 12th Meeting of Subcommission I
27 June, 1330 hours

1. American Delegation presented proposals for grouping parties by membership and interest, to be consulted at the rate of 5 groups a day. The consultation period can be completed in 11 days.

2. Soviet Delegation withheld final acceptance of American proposals and insisted on elimination of all parties who have indicated objections to the Moscow Decision or whose members belong to parties and organizations constituted for the purpose of opposing the Moscow Decision. A list of parties was then presented with the demand they be excluded.

3. The American Delegation refused to continue the discussion on the basis of exclusion and pointed out that the Soviet Delegation was taking the exact same position on exclusion that the Soviet Delegation took last year, which broke up the Joint Commission; suggested adjournment and presentation of the deadlock to the Joint Commission.

4. The meeting was adjourned at 1415.

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SUBCOMMISSION I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes of 13th Meeting

28 June 1947

1100 Hours

Duk Soo Palace

Present

American Delegation

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Eugene Prostov
Mr. Robert Kinney
Mr. Philip Rowe

Soviet Delegation

Mr. Tounkin
Mr. Petuhov

Secretariat

Capt. M. B. Johnson
Miss Virginia Quigley

Mr. I. I. Valenko

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Minutes of 13th Meeting of Subcommission I - 1100 hours.

28 June 1947

1. Purpose of meeting to receive answer from Soviet Delegation on the American proposals for method and schedule of consultation. Mr. Tounkin stated the answer would be given Monday in Pyengyang.

2. American Delegation proposed a joint report for the Joint Commission setting forth reasons for lack of agreement in Subcommission I on list of Parties and Organizations to be consulted in South Korea. Soviet Delegation refused stating such a report not necessary.

3. Soviet Delegation stated objections to a number of Parties and Organizations that had members in the Anti-Trusteeship League, basing objections on the technical point of validity of signatures on the Declaration supporting the Moscow Decision, when the same signatures appear in parties set up to oppose the Moscow Decision. Demanded such parties be excluded from list unless the representatives of such parties made an official statement as to which signature they wanted to be valid.

4. American Delegation pointed out that the signing of the Declaration was to be accepted as a sign of good faith, support of the Moscow Decision and assistance to the Joint Commission. That to inject new requirements at this time would be retreating from joint committments made to the Korean people. That any exclusion must be made, not by Subcommission I, but by the Joint Commission as previously agreed.

5. No agreement on the list was achieved, nor was the decision on the American proposals of method and schedule of consultation given by the Soviet Delegation.

6. Meeting adjourned at 1410.

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Subcommission I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

Minutes of 15th Meeting

26 August 1947

1030 Hours

Duk Soo Palace

Present

American Delegation

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Eugene Prostov
Mr. Robert Kinney
Mr. Philip Rowe

Soviet Delegation

Mr. Tounkin
Mr. Petukov

Secretariat

Miss Evelyn Van Note
Captain M. B. Johnson

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I. Subcommission I was charged with the draft of a Joint Commission report covering work of the Joint Commission.

II. Dr. Bunce presented the American draft of an outline of material to be included in the report.

III. After a short discussion a final draft of an outline was agreed upon by both delegations, for presentation to the Joint Commission (Draft attached).

IV. The meeting adjourned at 1115 hours.

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US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Subcommission I
Seoul, Korea

Minutes

16th Meeting

1030 Hours

30 August 1947

Duk Soo Palace

Present

American Delegation

Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Mr. Eugene Prostov
Mr. Robert Kinney
Mr. Philip Rowe

Soviet Delegation

Mr. G. I. Tounkin
Mr. Petuhov

Colonel Watlington was also present.

Secretariat

Captain M. B. Johnson
Miss H. K. Helser

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Minutes of the 16th Meeting of Subcommission I
1030 Hours, 30 August 1947

1. Drafts of the Joint report of the Joint Commission were exchanged by the two delegations.

2. A short discussion of the form and inclusions in the reports followed.

3. <u>Decision</u>

Each delegation would study the submitted reports for basic differences and methods for reconciling such differences.

The subcommission will meet on Monday, 1 September 1947 at 1030 hours.

4. The meeting adjourned at 1100 hours.

Subcommission #I
TRANSCRIPT of Meetings
(Meetings # to 21 Incl.)

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TRANSCRIPT OF 2ND MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION NO. 1, 27 MAY 1947
1300 HOURS

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to express the following view on the American proposal. Last year there was a long discussion on the question of consultation with political parties and social organizations. As a result of this discussion, both sides came to an agreement which was adopted by the Commission, with the exception of paragraph 2. However, this point was agreed on in the process of the exchange of letters between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall. Now we have the situation where, on one side, we have a proposal that was agreed upon last year and also a proposal that was not agreed on at that time. Our Subcommission should take that part that was not agreed upon and discuss it in detail. Such an approach would speed up the operation of the order of consultation. The draft which I handed Mr. Bunce yesterday has this in mind. I would like to propose that the Soviet draft be used as a basis for the elaboration of the order of consultation with political parties and social organization, that it be studied carefully and if necessary discussed.

~~DR. BUNCE~~: "The American Delegation studied very carefully the proposals of the Russian Delegation ~~yesterday~~, and we all felt that in the proposal submitted by the Russian Delegation that the essential spirit of the agreement between Foreign S~~ecretary~~ ~~Marshall~~ and Secretary of State Marshall was distorted because in the quotations from the letters presented in the Soviet proposals, certain quotations were omitted and some of them had words added to them. (I would like to review briefly the basic correspondence upon which this Joint Commission is reconvening and bring in the parts of the correspondence which were omitted in the statement by the Soviet Delegation.) In the letter of April 19th, Mr. Molotov states: omit

"The establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of a wide scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in order to expedite the political and economic unification of Korea as a self-supporting state independent

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of foreign interference which would do away with the division of the country into two zones". Then I would also like to quote from Mr. Marshall's letter of May 2 in reply to Mr. Molotov. In paragraph 2, he stated: "In order to avoid any future misunderstanding with respect to the phrase 'exact execution', I wish to make clear my interpretation of the phrase. In my letter to you of April 8, I stated that the Joint Commission should be charged with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on the basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of expression. In making this statement, I have in mind the well known position of the government of the United States that Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission". In Mr. Marshall's letter to Foreign Secretary Molotov, when he accepted the conditions stated by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Marshall made this statement: "These proposals authorized by this government are identical in purpose to the statements contained in the second paragraph of my letter of May 2, 1947". I further point out that when Foreign Minister Molotov accepted Mr. Marshall's letter that he made no references or criticizm of this statement and accepted it. "Further points which I consider extremely important are brought out in Mr. Molotov's letter of May 7 which Secretary Marshall accepted. Under a is this statement: "Proposal #1 is to be interpreted as follows: Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory parties and organizations eligible for initial consultation". In quoting this, the Soviet Delegation has added certain words which I consider superfluous. Proposal #2 reads as follows: "I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the

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implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to either the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied powers, the Joint Commission may after mutual agreement require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman". I would like to point out that the Soviet Delegation's proposal for some reason or other omits the first part of this paragraph, and I would further mention that this agreement means that there will be no unilateral exclusion from consultation, and exclusion can only take place after mutual agreement in the Joint Commission that a person may be excluded." Proposal #3 states--"it is suggested that it be reworded as follows: "Individual parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which, after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision to exclude such individuals,parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission." I would like to point out that this agreement completely eliminates exclusion on the basis of statements of opinion and allows exclusion only on the basis of fomenting or inciting active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or either Allied power. It also excludes any unilateral exclusion. When you take this in conjunction with the agreement between Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary Marshall, it seems that the concept of free opinion is soundly established as the basis on which we work. I would further point out that Foreign Minister Molotov, in his first reply to Secretary Marshall's letter, accused the United States of excluding political parties and social organizations from consultation. He also made a strong plea for a

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very broad method of consultation, and it is for that reason that the paper presented by the American Delegation, while following in general the broad outlines of the previous agreements, broadens the whole method and whole basis of consultation. I would also like to point out that the last session of the Joint Commission broke up over the attempt to establish a basis for excluding people from consultation and selecting a very small group. That was the fundamental cause of the breakdown. There appears to be no hope of finding agreement on the basis of exclusion, and any attempt to do so will lead to interminable bickering and waste of the Commission's time which might be well used for consultation with parties and organizations. Furthermore, I believe that such a procedure violates the basic principles upon which Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall came to an agreement. I therefore propose that because the United States proposal is based on the widest possible consultation that it be accepted as a basis for our work. I might say that we broadened the whole method of consultation in order to avoid the completely unnecessary delay which always happens when we try to exclude certain parties and organizations. I believe that the position of the American Delegation is completely in harmony with the suggestion of Foreign Minister Molotov.

MR. TOUNKIN: I can't agree with the opinion of the American Delegation that the Soviet proposal distorts the main sense of the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall on the question of consultation. I feel that Dr. Bunce, who advanced this, did not have any substantial argument. The Soviet Delegation has no intention of retreating from the agreement reached by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation does not retreat from this agreement. Mr. Bunce referred to the letter of Mr. Molotov of April 19, in which were laid down the primary tasks, or tasks which the Soviet Delegation considers primary, regarding the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government on the basis of wide participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations. I think that the Soviet proposal in no way contradicts this paragraph 1. On the contrary, it is based on this paragraph. I would like to

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mention that in the letter of Mr. Molotov, the general principles of policy are stated. When we prepared our proposal, it was not necessary to improve the principles laid down in this correspondence. We have in mind one question--the order of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and we put down in our proposals the order which was agreed upon by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It is the same as the question of freedom of expressing opinion which it is not necessary to discuss here because such a discussion would lead us too far away. The Soviet Delegation considers that in the correspondence between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, complete provision for consultation was decided in the letter of Mr. Molotov to Mr. Marshall of May 7. The Soviet delega- includes this in its proposals. In regard to the remarks which Mr. Bunce made regarding paragraph 1 of the proposal which was cited in the letter of Mr. Molotov of May 7--that we partly omitted some words and partly added some--I would like to state once more that all these changes were made not with the aim of changing the sense of the agreement achieved between the two Foreign Ministers, but only for the purpose of forming a new document. Regarding the addition of some words, there are no real addition. We could even have a new paragraph about the beginning of paragraph 2 of our proposal. Our proposal is logical and clear and is based on the sense of the letters between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall. Regarding paragraph 2 of the proposal, I would like to say that it is contained in the letter of Mr. Molotov. Mr. Bunce objected to our omitting the first part of this proposal in which it is said that any party or organization has the right to appoint such a spokesman who will represent the opinion of an organization or party who can best express the view on fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. That is contained in the first part of paragraph 3, and I will not object to including this part as it is stated in the exchange of letter. Mr. Bunce mentioned unilateral exclusion from consultation of parties and organization. I do not understand exactly what Mr. Bunce has in mind because in the Soviet proposal, there are no words about exclusion. This proposal cites provisions from the letter of Mr. Molotov of May 7 in which it is said that any

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spokesman may be excluded from consultation after mutual agreement by the Commission. Paragraph 2 completely contains paragraph 4 which I submitted to Mr. Bunce yesterday in the Soviet proposal. There are some very small changes. Instead of the words "individuals,parties and social organization," we put down "democratic parties, social organizations and their representatives". I think that our terminology is more clear, and it is in accordance with the Moscow Decision that we should consult with parties and social organizations. Our proposal does not lead to any misunderstanding. I would like to know the concrete objections of the American Delegation to the Soviet proposal. I would like to stress once more that in the letter of Mr. Molotov, there is on one side accusation or statement that the American Delegation last year excluded some parties and social organizations from consultation, and in our proposal we are in favor of broad consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. I would like to state that in question 1, in the letter of Mr. Molotov, there are cited concrete facts that the American Delegation has excluded some democratic organizations from consultation. Regarding the broad consultation with democratic parties and social organizations, I consider that the Soviet proposal has this as a basis. We would like to know first of all the opinion of the Korean people. That is the first purpose of our consultation. In regard to the statement of Mr. Bunce that the American Delegation is trying to avoid any unnecessary conflicts about the order of consultation, the opinion of the Soviet Delegation is the same. Because of this, the Soviet Delegation proposes that we not discuss the questions which were agreed upon last year by the Joint Commission and the questions which were not agreed upon and later were agreed on in the exchange of letters between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

MR. BUNCE: The specific objections that the Americans have to the proposals of the Russian Delegation are, first of all, that in paragraph 1, there is no statement made regarding freedom of expression and that no person can be excluded for holding opinions or expressing opinions. That, I think, is one of the fundamental grievances.

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Second, the Soviet proposal again limits the number of parties to approximately 30 and therefore narrows very clearly the field of consultation. Inevitably, such a proposal will lead to very difficult debates as to what parties and organizations shall be included. The third objection includes the suggestion of the Russian Delegation that we include further extracts from the letters of Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov. That means we are going to have in a working document which will be published in the press, a long series of quotations from letters. I would like to make this as a specific suggestion--that we insert in the American proposal a paragraph which will state that the Joint Commission has reconvened on the basis of an understanding reached between Foreign Secretary Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall, and that copies of this correspondence will be made available to all parties and social organizations. It seems to me that if we include in our documents the conditions and order of consultation and all extracts that we are wasting a lot of time. If we include any, we should include the whole letters, and we could have those translated into Korean, mimeographed, and we could send those later as a basis for reconvening, to all parties and organizations when we tell them what time we are planning to meet and consult with them. That could be put into a very short paragraph. Now in regard to the American proposal compared to the Russian proposal, I think that our method of consultation is simpler, it will cover more parties, and we will be able to get on with the work much more rapidly. Again I believe that in some ways the American proposals are very close to those previously worked out. For example, paragraph 1 is identical to the original proposal, and paragraph 3 is essentially identical to the old paragraph 2. I think that the fundamental reason I prefer the American proposal is that it is broader and will be more expeditious. Under no circumstances, in the light of the letters that have passed, can we accept a proposal such as the one suggested by the Soviet Delegation that we only consult 30 parties. After listening to the arguments of the Soviet Delegation, I think that we can work out together an acceptable

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paper. I think our basic objectives are the same. If we can decide today on two things, I think we can go ahead very rapidly with the work. I would like to see us finish this week so it can be announced in the press and we can go forward rapidly. I think the things to be decided on are: (1) Whether we are going to limit the parties to 30 or not; (2) Whether we will insert the paragraph referring to the correspondence of the Secretaries; (3) Agree on the broadest and most rapid method of consultation.

MR. TOUNKIN: The question was as follows in the exchange of letters about consultation--in Mr. Molotov's letter of May 7: The Soviet Commander in his letter of November 26 suggested several proposals for the renewal of work of the Joint Commission. I will not enumerate all these proposals because they are well known to the American Delegation. The American Commander, in his letter of December 26, 1946, agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander as the basis of the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission with some changes--so these proposals have been accepted for the work of the Joint Commission in the exchange of letters between Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov. That is why I don't understand why the American Delegation objects to excluding from the Soviet proposal those concrete paragraphs about consultation which in the process of the exchange of letters between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall were accepted as the basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. It is necessary to say that the proposals adopted by the two Foreign Ministers are the basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. They are contained in the letter of Mr. Molotov of May 7 and completely cited in Mr. Marshall's letter in which he agreed with Mr. Molotov that these proposals should be accepted as the basis for the renewal of the Joint Commission. Mr. Marshall, in his letter of May 30, remarked that those proposals were sanctioned by the government of the United States. The Soviet Delegation does not wish and does not consider that it is necessary to retreat from that which was achieved during last year.

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We consider that the agreed points last year should be used and that we should not have a new discussion on these points. Regarding the question of broad consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations and some limitations in this consultation, we suggest that as a starting point that we accept now the points which were agreed upon last year. Moreoever, it is necessary to remember that in a sense we are not divided in principle. The American Delegation also submitted some limitations which are contained in paragraph 2 of the proposal of the American Delegation. Consequently, we should agree on a practical way of deciding what number of organizations we should invite for consultation--30, more than 30, or less than 30. It is not a question of principle; it is a question of practical expediency. It is necessary to state that 30 parties and social organizations were agreed upon last year on the suggestion of the American Delegation. I don't remember a country where 30 parties or more take part in the political life of the country. Therefore, this figure is not too small. We should also take into account the circumstances that would be involved in the consultation with small groups. It may give the Commission bad results. Any small organization very often reflects just the opinion of its members. In order to split up our work, it would be better not to discuss the questions which were agreed upon, and I suggest that we retain those paragraphs about the order of consulation which were agreed upon last year and which were mutually agreed upon by the two Foreign Ministers as the basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. Paragraph 5 of the Soviet proposal which was agreed upon last year gives the possibility to Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are not included in the list of parties and organizations for the consultation--that is more than thirty--those parties and organizations which are fulfilling the provisions regarding the consultation. That will broaden the terms for consultation with Korean organizations.

MR. BUNCE: I would like to point out that the Soviet proposals which were sent to General Hodge were completely reworded in General Hodge's

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reply, and they were not accepted by the Soviet Commander who sent a reply which was quite unacceptable to the American Delegation. It was the result of that refusal of the Soviet Commander to accept the American proposals that the issue was taken up by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister. I further point out that we have no objection to including the relevant parts of the correspondence between Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov, but we insist that all points be included, and we have suggested that if this is done, it will be necessary to prepare a separate document, giving the text of the correspondence in full. This I have suggested to be done by means of a paragraph which would state something like this: "The conditions of reconvening the Joint Commission and the basis of consultation are fully stated in the correspondence between Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall. The full text of these letters will be forwarded to the central organs of all democratic parties and social organizations who desire to consult with the Joint Commission." I also wish to point out that the proposals enumerated in General Hodge's letter have been published in all the Korean newspapers, and the Korean people are fully aware of the contents of the letters and proposals. I don't see that we need to include all these details in a document regarding the conditions and order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. I would also like to make it quite clear that there was no formal approval of any part of this document prepared last year because each paragraph was approved subject only to the approval of the document as a whole. Such approval was never achieved, and, therefore, there is no agreement on any of the paragraphs. The American Delegation will not accept the decision regarding the limitations for consultation to 30 parties which was discussed at the last conference. If the Soviet Delegation feels that it must hold to that agreement, I see no point in the Subcommission continuing its work, and recommend that the matter be referred to the Joint Commission and a meeting called for next Thursday at 1:30 . I might say that we have been instructed to consult with democratic

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parties and social organizatins on a broad basis. There will be no departure from that decision.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to ask Mr. Bunce one question. As I have mentioned before, it is not a question of principle but one of practical approach. The American Delegation also proposed some limitations in consulting parties and organizations. It is hardly possible to consult with all parties and organizations. Consequently we are divided as to the level on which we should stop and what limitation we should accept. Say, for instance, we take 30 parties and organizations. That was accepted last year. I would like to ask Mr. Bunce how many parties, in his opinion, it would be possible to invite for consultation as an American proposal.

DR. BUNCE: In preparing the American proposal, we discussed in great detail the number of parties which would fall into classification according to the suggested standards we set. We believe that there will not be more than 100 parties and social organizations in South Korea. We do not quite know how many there would be in North Korea. We also estimated the length of time it would take for three subcommittees to meet with the representatives of those parties, and we could cover the consultation within a period of three weeks by appointing the necessary number of subcommissions. We believe that this would give us a broad section of Korean opinion, and it will avoid all argument as to which parties will be included. Then our proposal was that we would go to Pyongyang and carry forward the work according to the overall plan which seemed sound. My understanding of the Chairman of the Soviet Subcommission is that you wish to consult with only 30 parties--stay with the old suggestion made at the last meeting of the Subcommission. That is a position we cannot move from a step. I might add that I went through the last Joint Commission meeting, and we wasted six weeks of time arguing about who to consult with. We could have consulted with 200 parties while arguing. That is something I don't want to see repeated.

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MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to ask one more question. Does the American Delegation agree that the three American proposals mentioned in the letter of Mr. Molotov of May 7 should be accepted as the basis for our work.

DR. BUNCE Yes, I agree with the three proposals that must be accepted as the basis of the work of the Joint Commission. That is well known. It is perfectly well known to the Koreans. All the Korean parties have read that correspondence and agree with it. I, for one, am completely in agreement with them and will see that they are carried out.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to point out the following: First, on the question of those three paragraphs, these three paragraphs were discussed for a long time--approximately a year. The result of this discussion was that they were accepted as definite provisions for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission--provisions for consultation with parties and organizations. Therefore, it is quite logical that this final result should be adopted by our Commission, if you want to have these proposals as a basis for our work and not start from the beginning. One more important point is in regard to that document about the order of consultation with organizations. I don't object to the fact that this document was not adopted formally, but it excluded paragraph 2. Since it was agreed upon later, therefore this document should have some meaning and some weight. As to the proposal of the American Delegation about the order of our future work, I consider that today's meeting was very useful as a first step. We have detailed views of both sides. I would like to propose the following: to report the results of our discussion to the respective Chief Commissioners, and after that to decide whether we should have a meeting again or submit these questions to the Chairmen of the Commission.

DR. BUNCE: That is quite agreeable. There is one thing that has caused confusion--that is the Soviet Delegation is confusing the conditions of consultation with the conditions under which consulta-

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tion will be withdrawn. As I understand it, there is only one condition for consultation which is agreed upon, and that is signing Communique No. 5. That is the basic condition of consultation. Then there are certain conditions under which we have agreed further consultation will be refused. Those are conditions for withdrawing consultation. I would again like to emphasize that the basic objective of the American Delegation is to have a wide participation in the process of consultation in order that the Joint Commission may be informed on the aspirations and suggestions of the Korean people. I would suggest that we discuss this with the Chief Commissioners and that we get in contact with each other some time tomorrow--say tomorrow morning at 10 or 11 o'clock.

MR. TOUNKIN: 11 o'clock is o.k.

DR. BUNCE: Then, if we feel there is a chance of continuing, we can work out a broad basis in the Subcommission. I suggest we meet again at 1:30 P.M. tomorrow; if that is not acceptable, that we meet on Thursday.

MR. TOUNKIN: I accept your proposal, but in connection with that which was mentioned by Mr. Bunce, in my point of view, the American Delegation confuses two things--the right to be invited for consultation and the eligibility for the actual invitation for the consultation. In accordance with the agreement between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, democratic parties and social organizations who signed the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 have the right to be appointed for the preliminary consultation, but it does not mean that the Commission is obliged to consult with all organizations. Last year it was understood that from the number of organizations who would sign the declaration, the Commission would select a certain number of democratic parties and social organizations with which it would consult. The rest of the organizations would have the possibility of submitting for consultation their suggestions.

DR. BUNCE: I think the basic issues which we need to clarify and which will be our basis of work will be the restrictive number--

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large or small. There has been considerable reorganizstion of parties among Left, Center, and Right. The American position is that the Soviet proposal is far too restrictive. The other point is that the references regarding consultation in the correspondence between the two Minister should be, I think, presented in full or left out, and they could be added as an appendix to the document. The Russian proposal is, as I understand it, to restrict the number of parties to 30, and also that certain segments of the correspondence be published. That is the basis of our disagreement.

The meeting adjourned at 1700 hours.

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Transcript of
3rd Meeting of
Subcommission No. 1
Duk Soo Palace
Seoul, Korea
1330 hours, 30 May 1947

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to know whether you think that we should exchange the lists of your parties and organizations.

DR. BUNCE. I thing that before we present a list of parties and organizations that it is necessary to establish the criteria which would be used in making a list of parties and organizations. For example, if we just ask for parties and organizations without any criterian at all we would have all the subpparties scattered all through the country listed and it would run into thousands of small organizations. I think the first thing is to discuss the criterian. I understood yesterday that we were given the job of drafting a communique to initiate consultation on a broad scale. I think there was some confustion as to what we were to to.

MR. TOUNKIN: You are right. I mentioned that as the first question. We were instructed to prepare a communique. I have no objections.

DR. BUNCE. Which shall we do first?

MR. TOUNKIN: As I understand it you are not ready to exchange now the list of parties and organizations. I should like to mention that it is a matter of lists of parties and organizations; but on the other hand, if the American side has some difficulty in defining party and party organizations, that is another question. It seems to me that such parties and organizations should be known from the point of view of their organizations. So I have no objections to discuss now the second question that is about the draft of a communique.

DR. BUNCE: Before we discuss the criteria we wish to use in establishing which parties and organizations we will consult with, as you know in our proposal, we established two very simple

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criterian. One is that they have a membership of over 1,000 and another that they be national organizations that have branches in two or more provinces. If you change that criteria you get a different list of parties. If you change the criteria to membership of only 200 then you get a different list; if you change it to provincial organizations you get a different list. It seems to me we have to get a meeting of minds on the criteria we are going to use in making a list of parties. We could go on and discuss the communique regarding the consultation. I think it would be well if we agree on some general principles which would be embodied in the communique. I have a draft here. It is a very rough draft of such a communique, following more or less the suggestions contained in our paper regarding consultation.

I wonder if Mr. Tounkin has a proposal draft for us to consider.

MR. TOUNKIN: We have such a proposal but we haven't prepared a concrete communique. That proposal was announced yesterday during the session of the Commission. In the spirit of this proposal, I suggest to draft a proposal of communique for publication in the press and our proposal is well known to the American side. That is why I would like to know more about the American proposal in order that now or in the near future, maybe tomorrow morning, we could discuss in detail this proposal and prepare a complete draft of the communique for the press for presentation to the Joint Commission tomorrow.

DR. BUNCE: This proposal that we have is a rough draft--not finished, and we have followed in it essentially the proceedure outlined in our paper. We found it hard to make a general proposal without having some form of proceedure. We might go over this paragraph by paragraph. The first paragraph reads:

1. In accordance with the recent correspondence between Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall, agreeing to wide scale Korean participation and respect for freedom of expression, the Joint Commission has reconvened to prepare for

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for presentation to the four signatory powers to the Moscow Decision on Korea, recommendations regarding the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

2. The Joint Commission has agreed that all democratic parties and social organizations which have a membership of over 1,000, branches in two or more provinces, and which will subscribe to the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, shall be invited for consultation regarding the organization, structure and political platform of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government.

3. All political parties and social organizations meeting the above requirements and wishing to present their suggestions to the Joint Commission are hereby invited to sign the declaration and submit it together with the following information to the Joint Commission not later than 10 June 1947:

1. The full name of the party or organization, together with the address of its central organ, the date of establishment, and the estimated number of members.

2. The full names of a designated representative and an alternate given in Chinese characters and English or Russian transliteration, the place and date of birth, positions held in the party or social organization, and their home addresses.

4. In order to expedite the work of the Joint Commission, questionnaires regarding the charter and platform of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government will be distributed simultaneously with the distribution of applications for consultation."
Now, we should have a sentence that's not in here as follows, "These forms will be available at the Joint Commission Headquarters, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, and Headquarters in Pyongyang." That will be the fourth paragraph.

"5. All parties fulfilling the stipulated conditions for consultation with the Joint Commission are requested to submit their answers to these questionnaires to the Joint Commission,

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Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea, or to the office of the Joint Commission, _____, Pyongyang Korea, on or before 15 June 1947.

6. Following the approval of the application for consultation and of the representative of such parties and social organizations by the Joint Commission, a meeting of all the representatives of the parties and social organizations of South Korea will be called in Seoul on 16 June.

7. A similar meeting for the representatives of the parties and social organizations of North Korea will be held in Pyongyang on June 19.

8. Following this initial consultation, parties and social organizations will be invited to send their representatives to consult with the Joint Commission or its designated representatives where further elucidation of their views is deemed desirable."

MR. TOUNKIN: I shall note more carefully this proposal, but as a preliminary consideration I would like to mention the following: I think that you have included all the American proposals and have not made any exceptions for our side. That is why we can hardly elaborate at this meeting on a communique for the press. The Soviet Delegation, in presenting its proposal, was striving to speak of our work and to give it possibly to the Korean people now, at present, to start deliberation of the proposals. With this aim, the Soviet Delegation presented its proposal on the question of the order of consultation. But on this proposal we did not agree. We have proposed to continue the discussion, but in order not to delay our work, and in order that the Korean people could know the questions which the Joint Commission will submit to them. I suppose that this question should be presented to the Joint Commission at the meeting tomorrow because our discussion apparently would not give any result. I propose, if the American Delegation insists upon its proposal, to submit this question for discussion at the

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Joint Commission tomorrow.

DR. BUNCE: That is quite agreeable, but I would like to point out that the American proposal meets the basic requirements of the Soviet proposal completely in certain respects. One, that we publish immediately Communique No. 5 and the questionnaire and get it to the parties right away--immediately and get them working on the answers to the questionnaire. The only difference between this and the Soviet proposal is that we have put in one general meeting at which all the representatives of the political parties and social organizations have an opportunity to meet with the Joint Commission face to face; shake their hand and express to them the desire of this Commission to help them to establish their government and their desire to have their assistance. I think it is very important that such a meeting be held so that the Koreans may feel that they are participating more directly in the work of the Joint Commission than if they just submit a questionnaire. Now, regarding Mr. Tounkin's remarks that I haven't budged an inch, I think this proposal is wide open. It does not determine the method of consultation after this initial meeting. Paragraph 8 says, "Following this initial consultation, parties and social organizations will be invited to send their representative to consult with the Joint Commission or its designated representatives where further elucidation of their views is deemed desirable". I left it wide open because that is the area where we haven't reached agreement.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think I am right.

DR. BUNCE: As I understand it, also the Soviet proposal had the concept of an open meeting mentioned so I don't think that this is so very far from the proposal of the Soviet Delegation. I think in the proposal of the Soviet Delegation there is this one weakness and that is, nowhere in the statement did they state which parties and organizations we would consult with. If you

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took the Soviet proposal, every little "sewing session" in Cholla Namdo could send in a questionnaire and we'd be flooded with them. We have to set some standard. There could even be clubs of little villages. If you have any specific suggestions on this proposal, I would very much like to have them because we could be considering them.

MR. TOUNKIN: It seems to me that you don't budge any. At least the American Delegation is ready to publish Communique No. 5 and the questionnaire. This proposal has in mind the following: Because there are some questions on the consultation which are not agreed upon, it is the Soviet proposal to publish in the press the text contained in Communique No. 5 together with the questionnaire and announcement, or communique of the Commission that all the Korean democratic parties and social organizations which would sign the declaration could present their situations to the Commission in written form on all the questions which are enumerated in this questionnaire. Dr. Bunce, you expressed caution that there would be too many suggestions, but that was the desire of the American Delegation to take as many suggestions as possible. Why do you object to that now? So we are proposing to have more suggestions and then the Commission will receive all these suggestions and recommendations. It will then, in accordance with the order which would be established by the Commission review or look through all these recommendations and it is, strictly speaking, more or less, technical questions. That is why the Soviet Dedegation is for a very wide scale consultation.

DR. BUNCE: I agree completely with that desire for broad consultation, but I would like to ask you specifically this question. Would you include in consultation, the branches of national organizations? That has not been made clear. Or would you only have the national organizations included?

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MR. TOUNKIN: I think that is a very important question. It seems to me that the Commission would be forced to handle all these suggest ons presented. The Commission will be able to decide in what degree to take into consideration these suggestions of different kinds. It is important now for us that the Koreans take part in this work. This question is not contr~~overtional~~oversial and it seems to us that the rest can be discussed later and agreed upon. Regarding this concrete question of parties and organizations, I think that it is expedient that the central organs of the parties present their situations or recommendations because a party is a party and when a party expresses interest by its suggestions, we understand these suggestions are the opinion of part~~y~~ies as a whole but not just the opinion of several persons.

DR. BUNCE: I agree completely with that point of view and we could strike out the words, "which have a membership of over 1,000, and branches in two or more provinces", and insert at the end of paragraph two something like this, "Each party and organization should submit only one application on behalf of its zonal headquarters and and provincial branches."

MR. TOUNKIN: I think, of course, that changes the rethod. I would like to ask Dr. Bunce one question. There is nothing said about the three conditions about which the Foreign Ministers agreed upon. It is not clear to me the position of the American Delegation on this question. I have carefully read General Brown's statement made by him yesterday at the meeting of the Joint Commission and I could not understand the American Delegation on this question from this statement. I would like to ask you to clarify the position of the American Delegation. Does it intend to include all these conditions into the text of the conditions for consultation?

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DR. BUNCE: I think I can express General Brown's statement made yesterday quite clearly. It is this, that in one of the proposals in General Chistiakov's letter was that the parties and organizations be informed before hand that they should not appoint as their representative any person who had voiced opposition to the Moscow Decision and that proposal was not accepted by the United States Commander. My own feeling is that since the conditions in General Hodge's letter and in the letter of General Marshall and the letter of Foreign Minister Molotov, having been made public, are well known, there is little point in including them in a document that you want to make as short as possible. I would further say that if one part of the understanding upon which the Joint Commission reconvened is published then other parts should also be published at the same time. That was the position that I discussed I think the first day this Sub-commission met. I would like to ask you, what is the specific value of publishing those conditions in a statement regarding the order of consultation?

MR. TOUNKIN: I did not propose what way those three conditions should be included in this announcement, but those three conditions should be included in the document about the order of consultation. I don't want to have any misunderstanding. The American Delegation omits those questions and in my mind it is not right. You asked me about the value of including these conditions in the order of consultation. I would answer that it is for the purpose that it would be clear on which conditions we are going to conduct the consultation. These conditions are of great importance in my opinion and they are of great importance since two Ministers of Foreign Affairs have agreed upon them. The American Delegation's objections regarding the inclusion of these three conditions is only in order not to have a very large document. I don't believe this is of any importance because all these three conditions

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would take no more than a bond sheet of paper. If the American Delegation doesn't agree with those conditions that is another question. I would like to know, is the American Delegation now objecting to the inclusion of those three conditions as they were presented by General Hodge in his letter of December 24, 1946 and were cited by Mr. Molotov? We would like to have these conditions included into the communique for consultation as a whole in the same wording--verbatum.

DR. BUNCE: I would like to make it quite clear to the Soviet Delegation that the United States has no desire whatever to modify those conditions in any respect. The point of view that I take is this, there is one basis of consultation--initial consultation and that is signing Communique No. 5. It is an expression of good faith and willingness to cooperate with this Joint Commission. I believe that the implications and statements explicitly made in General Hodge's letter are desirable and should be carried out. I do not believe that this Joint Commission should tolerate any active attempts to foment or instigate opposition to the work of this Commission and that people and parties which do that should be excluded from further consultation. I believe that very sincerely. Now we have no desire whatever to protect people who wish to sabotage the work of this Joint Commission. I would like to make that very, very clear. Now, regarding the question of whether we include those three points in the document, which I think should be published regarding the order of consultation. I think it a part from the fact that this letter of General Hodge's has been widely published already. I personally feel that we have another agreement which is equally binding on the American Delegation and that is the statement regarding the freedom of expression and the meaning of the term, "exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision", that was presented in General Marshall's letter in paragraph 2. My personal feeling

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is that if we publish the three statements regarding the basis on which we will exclude from further consultation, we should also publish in that statement either the paragraph from General Marshall's letter or a brief summary stating the conditions agreed to regarding the freedom of expression. I think that if the Soviet Delegation would agree to that suggestion which I made in the first Subcommission meeting, that without any doubt the American Delegation would agree to include those conditions in the document regarding consultation. My personal preference in including that statement would be that it be attached as an appendix at the end of the document rather than inserted in the body of the document. It is essentially a somewhat seperate matter which could be and should be attached, I believe as an appendix and I do not want the Soviet Delegation to feel that the United States in any way does not believe that it is bound by that letter--it is. I think that we have to develop mutual confidence between the United States and the Soviet Delegation at an understanding that we are both trying to establish a provisional Korean government. I think it is essential that we should understand and believe that the United States has no desire and would oppose putting into power any provisional government which was antagonistic to our allies--the Soviet Union. I would also like to emphasize that the United States has no desire in any way to dominate the provisional government. It is my belief that by working together with mutual confidence that we can achieve a provisional government which will meet the wishes of the Korean people and which will be friendly to both of the allies. We are bound to have differences of opinion and some confliction of ideas, but I hope that these conflicts can be resolved on the basis of cooperation and understanding.

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MR. TOUNKIN: I am glad to know the statement of Dr. Bunce that the American Delegation has no intention of creating such Korean Government which would be antagonistic toward the Soviet Union and that the United States of America has no intention of dominating the Korean Government which would be established. I should like also to note this statement, that the American Delegation wishes to create such a Korean Government which would correspond to the wishes of the Korean people and that the American Delegation believes that those differences in opinions which are existing between us could be solved on the basis of mutual understanding and confidence, so I would like to join this statement Dr. Bunce. The Soviet Delegation desires, as soon as possible, to establish a Korean Democratic Government which would respond to the wishes of the Korean people and would be in accordance with the Moscow Decision of creation of a democratic government, in accordance with which Korea would be able to join with the world family of peace loving nations. Regarding the concrete questions which we are discussing, I would like to know your position. It seems to me it is contradictory. The statement made by you could be formulated as such. The American side agrees to accept the three points of which the two Foreign Ministers had agreed, but on this certain condition. That is, to accept these three agreed points proposed for consultation and also a new condition. You said that the American Delegation would agree to including those three points only on the condition of simultaneous inclusion of a new point besides that, regardless of which condition is presented for inclusion. That is not right. If you would present conditions for acceptance of points which were agreed by the two Foreign Ministers, we would first of all violate the agreement between the two Foreign Ministers and second, conducting in this way our work, we would never finish our discussion. It would be similar to the Russian fable, "The Three Blind Mice." I would like to

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say that in the letter of the Soviet Commander of November 26 there were presented three points for consultation as a condition for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission. The American Commander, in his letter of December 24, gave his interpretation of these points. There were no other conditions--no new conditions in the American or in the Soviet Commander's letters. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs--Mr. Molotov, in his letter of May 7, in order to speed up the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and the integration of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, agreed to accept the three points. They were laid down in the letter of General Hodge of December 24 and proposed on this basis to renew the work of the Joint Commission. State Secretary Marshall, in his letter of May 13, agreed with the proposal made by Mr. Molotov and did not present any new conditions for that, so it is completely clear that the three points which were accepted in the process of correspondence in the form as it was fixed in the letter of General Hodge of December 24 and as they were repeated in the letter of Mr. Molotov of May 7th. No other conditions were accepted. Therefore, if we are speaking about conditions accepted in the correspondence between the two Foreign Ministers, we must not have any misunderstanding. There are three points. They are included in this correspondence and there is no other points about this additional point. There was no previous discussion. The Soviet proposal thus, is that we should follow those three points and include them into the document for the consultation.

DR. BUNCE: The American Delegation looks upon those three points as they are in the general framework of understanding reached between the two Foreign Ministers and it was certainly the understanding of General Marshall that his paragraph 2, regarding freedom of expression was included in the proposal. I think the American position can be made quite clear when you compare the

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proposals submitted by General Chistiakov to General Hodge and the proposals reworded by General Hodge. General Chistiakov proposed to exclude from consultation those who voiced opinion against the Moscow decision. The American position has always been, and still is, that the freedom of expression is an inherent right of democracy and that to exclude people for an expression of opinion is not consistent with democratic principles. It was for that reason that General Marshall included in his letter to Foreign Minister Molotov that very precise statement regarding freedom of speech. I might point out that in Mr. Marshall's acceptance of Mr. Molotov's letter, he makes this statement, "These proposals authorized by this government are identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of May 2, 1947." I see no reason why the Soviet Delegation should object to a statement that the Joint Commission is convening on the basic democratic principle of respect for freedom of opinion and expression. It seems to me it is something that the Soviet Delegation would wish to have expressed in that document. An alternative way of expressing the same proposal would be to enumerate the proposals of General Chistiakov in his letter which excludes people from consultation on the basis of voicing an opinion and compare with that the American proposal and rewording of those proposals. That also could be done to make it quite clear that this Commission is not meeting on the basis of a policy of exclusion of persons because of expressing of opinion. That is all that I wish to see done in this document. I would like to suggest that this is probably one of the most difficult problems which will have to be threshed out by the Joint Commission itself. The American point of view was expressed very fully in the last session of the Joint Commission and I expect that the Russian point of view will be presented fully tommrrow. I think only after that has

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been discussed will there be the full understanding which I think is essential for the rapid progress of our work.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to say that there are two questions. Of course, the American Delegation has every right to present any proposal. It may propose to insert into the document a point about the free expression of opinion, then we would discuss this proposal. That is question number one. The second question is that whether we are going to accept or not to accept the three points in the form which was agreed by the two Foreign Ministers. The American Delegation refuses to accept those three points and proposes new conditions, but these three points were decided in the correspondence between the two Foreign Ministers, so we have two different questions before us.

The freedom of expression is only a general conception. About this freedom of expression, the Commanders of zones expressed their views in their correspondence and the Soviet side never objected against the freedom of expression, but in the second correspondence there was an agreement about the three points regarding the consultation and it is my opinion that these three points are not contradictory to the expression of opinion.

I think that the discussion of freedom of expression would lead us too far away and it is hardly necessary to develop discussion on the general problems. After today's discussion, I have such an opinion that the American Delegation is expressing its objections regarding the inclusion of the three paragraphs in the information of consultation. I feel that our further discussion here expedient on this question, therefore, I propose to adjourn our today's meeting. Tomorrow this question will be discussed by the Joint Commission, so I believe that we could not discuss the question number two--that is about the project of the announcement of the communique for the press because still we have nothing for the press, we have not agreed in principle on this question.

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DR. BUNCE: I would like to make two specific suggestions that we can consider both for the communique and for the general document on the order of consultation. First of all, in paragraph 1, of our proposal, I would suggest we insert these words after the words, "In accordance with", insert right in the communique, "the three points in the letter of General Hodge to General Chistiakov on the 24th of December 1946 and the recent correspondence, etc." Just insert those words. That is my first suggestion as a change in this wording.

Secondly, I would propose that at the first meeting of the Subcommission to discuss the order and method of consultation, that paragraph 1 be worded to give the basis on which the Joint Commission reconvened and that it include therein a statement regarding the freedom of expression and also contains the text of Communique No. 5. I do not think that it would be difficult to get an agreement on that first paragraph of the document on consultation. I think that after tomorrow's discussion that we will be able to progress more rapidly with our work in the Subcommission.

MR. TOUNKIN: I hope so.

DR. BUNCE: I agree that we adjourn.

Meeting adjourned at 1615.

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE 4TH MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION NUMBER I, 2 JUNE 1947
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DR. BUNCE: At the last meeting of the subcommission I suggested that we consider the preparation of the document on the conditions for and order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations, and that we consider putting in the first paragraph the reference to the basis on which the Joint Commission has reconvened and on the order of the consultation. We prepared a draft of a new document in which we have tried to meet the basic desires of the Soviet Delegation. We have included in this document the relevant quotations from the letters. We have made consultation through the questionnaire completely wide open so that all groups can answer the questionnaire. We have worded this in such a way that there will be no need for separate press communique. This will go out in all the details. We have also drafted tentatively a basis on which we would select the parties and social organizations with whom we would consult orally, that is to replace the small group of 30. Our original proposal was 1,000 membership. We have left that blank. It is one of the items that will be discussed in detail. I have some copies of this document, and I would like to present it to you. I don't have any documents in Russian because we didn't have time to prepare them. I don't know whether the Soviet Delegation would like to take up this document first, or whether they have a proposal which they would like to present.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to propose to start now the discussion on the two press communiques which were presented by the Soviet Delegation in the last meeting of the Joint Commission. I believe that after the meeting of the Commission on Saturday there is no ground not to publish this press communique. We have reached an agreement that we will not limit the number of democratic parties and social organizations which would meet for consultation with the Joint Commission, particularly because of the American Delegation's decision

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to put off its criteria regarding the limitation of the membership of parties and organizations -- that is about 5,000 members, and at least two provinces. It was, I suppose, the main difference, and this difference now doesn't exist, and I believe that the American Delegation would not object to publication of the press communique and the declaration which should be signed by democratic parties and social organizations who are desirous of taking part in the consultation, and the American Delegation would not object to publication of the questionnaire. To date that work was stated by General Shtikov and laid down at the last meeting of the Joint Commission, about the basis on which the Soviet Delegation wishes the press communique to be published immediately. The Soviet Delegation wishes to speed up the work of the Joint Commission, and believes that there are good reasons for the publication of those two communiques. It will greatly expedite the work, and until we receive the applications from parties and organizations about their wish to consult with the Joint Commission with these applications duly signed, we could not make a draft or list of parties and organizations. The American Delegation, I believe, is in agreement with this, at least in their proposal about the order of consultation. The American Delegation also has as a starting point that first the parties and social organizations should submit or present to the Joint Commission the signed declaration, and after that the Joint Commission will draft the list of these parties and social organizations. Before all this procedure of signing and submission of the declaration we should give some definite time -- that is, several days -- and during this time we in this subcommission may talk over and discuss the details of the questions connected with the order of consultation. Regarding the application of the questionnaire, we feel that this may be of greater importance for the speeding up of the work of the Joint Commission. The immediate application of the questionnaire will give the possibility to the Korean democratic parties and social organizations at once to start

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the preparation of the proposals which would be presented to the Joint Commission. I think that we are very interested in receiving these letters and proposals as soon as possible, because the Joint Commission will have a lot of technical work with these letters and recommendations. The main work will be that of translation of the proposals, and time for study of these proposals. All this work will take a certain amount of time, probably a long time, and that is why it is very important that we should start receiving the letters and recommendations from the parties and organizations as soon as possible in order that our secretariat at the earliest possible date could start the translation of these proposals and recommendations, and submission of the recommendations to certain subcommissions for their study. That is why the Soviet Delegation attaches such great importance to the publication of these two press communiques.

DR. BUNCE: The U.S. Delegation is just as anxious as the Soviet Delegation to get ahead with the work of consulting with the parties. However, General Brown made it quite clear at the last meeting of the Joint Commission that he felt it would be very misleading to publish the communique on consultation without at the same time including the definition of the parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission would consult orally, and that he would refuse to consider a joint communique on this matter until this detail was cleared up. As I remember General Shtikov's remark to Mr. Tounkin and myself, we were to do both jobs. We were to get an agreement on a general document such as I have presented, and also work on a press communique, and I feel very strongly that this document can be used as a press communique, and we can accomplish the two jobs in one. The second thing, about the proposal that we have suggested, is this -- that at the same time the parties and social organizations send in their application for membership, they also send in the name of the delegate. It eliminates a whole step

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of writing back and asking them for the name. It is much quicker to do it this way, and the only thing we have to do now is to reach an agreement fundamentally on one question. The U.S. Delegation has agreed to the Russian suggestion that we include the text of the correspondence on which the Joint Commission was reconvened, and we have agreed that there will be no limit whatever put on consultation through the questionnaire. Those points have been agreed upon. There is only one point on which we need to find agreement, and that is the question of which parties will be consulted with orally. We have made a suggestion in paragraph 6 which fundamentally is very similar to our original proposal, but which is, I say again, open to modification. This is a technical question and not a matter of policy, and I would say that if we can get agreement on that one point in this subcommission now, then I believe we could prepare the whole thing and have it released. I would like very much to have Mr. Tounkin's specific suggestions. The area of disagreement is very small. It is a matter of getting a definition of those parties and social organizations with which we will consult orally and ask their representatives to meet with us. Once that problem is solved the whole thing can go ahead very rapidly. I would like to have the Soviet Delegation's recommendations on paragraph 6, or what they would like to suggest as a criteria for establishing the basis for consultation orally with the parties and social organizations. It would be a waste of time to discuss a press communique further because General Brown simply will not consider it, and I think he has not changed his point of view on that at all.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think we should discuss two documents first -- first, the two press communiques, and then discuss the procedure of consultation. Just now I gave the reasons why the Soviet Delegation is interested in the immediate publication of these two press communiques. I can't agree with the opinion of the American Delegation

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that the publication of these two press communiques may lead to some misunderstanding, because both sides agreed that all the democratic parties and social organizations which would sign the declaration and submit it to the Joint Commission with their recommendations on the questions which are contained in the questionnaire, in which event there would be no misunderstanding. I think we could submit to the Joint Commission for its approval today the two press communiques, in order that tomorrow they will be published in the press. In order to speed up the work of the Joint Commission I ask the American Delegation once more to consider its view on this question, because there is no ground for delay of recommendation of these two press communiques. The discussion of the whole document about the procedure of consultation would take some time. It is necessary to think over the details, and it would take several days, which would be delaying the publication of these two press communiques, and the Joint Commission would delay its work for at least several days. I thought over the general plan of the point of view of the time for this Joint Commission and I think that/those deadlines which were set forth by the two foreign ministers in order to fulfill our task we should plan out our work, or they would not be able to deal with all the technical questions which we would prepare by July or August. It is very important, and I state once more by publication of these two press communiques, it would invite Koreans to work on these questions with the Joint Commission.

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DR. BUNCE: The only thing I can say is this -- I am not authorized to repudiate the statement made by General Brown in the Joint Commission meeting last Saturday, which represented the American point of view regarding the issuance of a press communique. If the Soviet Delegation wishes to bring the matter up at the next Joint Commission meeting, it is perfectly all right to do so, but the issuance of that press communique cannot be authorized by this subcommission. I think that a further discussion is just wasting time.

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I do not agree that the order of consultation, preparation of the basic document ~~will take long to complete. I think we should do~~ it very rapidly, and the whole thing could be published. As I said before, we have a basic agreement on almost the whole procedure except for this one point. The U. S. Delegation has submitted one suggestion, and I would still like to get the suggestions of the Soviet Delegation on that particular point.

MR. TOUNKIN: Since the American Delegation doesn't agree to discuss at present the two press communiques which were proposed by the Soviet Delegation, I agree that we should exchange views on the second question -- about the document on the procedure, but I would like to stress once more that it would simplify and speed up the work of the Joint Commission if the commission would agree to the Soviet proposals, but because the American Delegation definitely refuses to publish press communiques, I can't do anything. Regarding the proposal of the American Delegation, I suppose that first we should carefully study it, and now I would like to see the blank spot on this proposal of the American Delegation filled out, because the Soviet Delegation proposes to discuss this question and it will be necessary to see the complete proposal which we could discuss.

DR. BUNCE: The proposal of the American Delegation is simply to establish a simple standard which will determine the parties and social organizations with which we will be able to consult orally. Our desire is to establish that standard so that it will leave a fairly large number of parties with which we will consult, and I would suggest that in the blank we could consider the original American proposal which was membership of 1,000, or we could consider either 2,500 or a figure of 5,000. It is a matter of arriving at a figure which is acceptable to the Soviet Delegation. We made our original proposal of 1,000, and I think that is the figure that we would still prefer, but it is not something that is definite in

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our minds. I would like to point out that there is one great advantage in establishing such a definite figure in that it gives us a hallmark, and from that we can find out after the applications come in how many parties and social organizations would be included. I would like to know if the Soviet Delegation has any figure in mind, if it accepts this general standard, or if it has other proposals which it would like to suggest as a standard which could be used to determine the number of parties and social organizations with which we will consult. (Dr. Bunce then explained the meaning of the term "hallmark").....We have already established one standard which will eliminate some parties -- that is, they must sign the declaration and agree to cooperate with the Joint Commission in its work. What we wish to do now is to establish a standard which will determine the number of parties with which we can consult orally. The Americans have felt all the time that a fixed number like 30 is not a good procedure, that it is too small a group, too narrow, and it leads to the question of arguments as to who should be included in that fixed number. If you establish a standard, you can eliminate a great deal of that argument.

MR. TOUNKIN: Mr. Bunce proposed three definitions -- membership of 1,000; 2,500; and membership of 5,000. The trouble is that we don't know now the number of political parties and social organizations which would like to consult with the Joint Commission, and we are having a blind discussion. If you take the first proposal of 1,000 and the third one of 5,000 membership there is a very big difference -- five times as much . It is very difficult to say anything on this question because we haven't before us a list of the parties and organizations which would like to consult with the Joint Commission.

I would like to know your opinion on this question.

DR. BUNCE: I agree that we would not know how many parties we would have to consult with orally exactly by means of this definition, but we would have a better idea. The exact number would only be determined after we have all their applications in and saw how many

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fitted into this particular classification. There is an advantage, in that it leaves it wide open, but does not set any other limit. The previous Soviet proposal that we consult with only 30 parties also assumes that you are going to have some criteria of which parties would be in that 30. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation essentially is that we limit it to the very big parties. The American proposal is that we broaden that so as to include a broader segment of parties and organizations. That is fundamentally the difference in our proposals, and even if you set a fixed number of parties, for example, with whom you would consult orally and said, "We will consult only with 100 parties", then you would have to establish the criteria which would select those parties. It does not avoid the difficulty of establishing some simple criteria by means of which you can find which parties would be included in this 100. There is no way of avoiding the problem as I see it, and our proposition is to make the thing as broad as possible, and also as simple as possible.

MR. TOUNKIN: Speaking on the just-made American proposal I cannot imagine that this proposal was interpreted very clearly by Mr. Bunce. If you wish to have as many invitations as possible of parties and social organizations for the consultation, it would be logical to say that you would not limit this number at all. If the American Delegation proposes certain limits of parties and organizations, we have to deal with a certain limited number. The American Delegation always states that it would not limit the number of political parties and social organizations, but it is necessary to deal with this question practically. The American Delegation proposes not to limit the fixed number of parties. We have agreed to this, but it is clear that this number would depend on the criteria which we would adopt, whether membership of 5,000, 20,000 or 100. I stress the fact that we discuss this practical side of the question now, but it is very difficult to do so because we have no list of these parties and

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organizations, and we do not know with what to deal. The following question is ~~necessary to assure a fair representation of democratic~~ parties and social organizations -- how the American Delegation thinks in this respect a party of 1,000 membership should be equal with a party of 400 membership.

DR. BUNCE: The problem that Mr. Tounkin raised in that last point as to the evaluation of the remarks and suggestions of the various political parties will be there no matter how many parties we consult with. If we only have a very small group, there will be differences, very large differences in membership, and as I discussed before I think that the answer to that lies in the Joint Commission using its judgment in weighing up the point of view expressed. I would like to point out that the proposals that we have made would provide consultation on a personal basis on a very broad basis, that it would include all major parties that wish to be consulted and meet the conditions of consultation, that it would enable the Joint Commission to obtain a broad cross section of all Korean opinion, and it would eliminate from personal consultation all the small parties which really do not carry a great deal of weight, and in our paper there is provided a paragraph which permits the Joint Commission to bring in groups of representatives as they mutually agree upon. I believe that some such broad basis is essential. I would like to ask Mr. Tounkin very specifically what alternative method could be used? We have racked our brains, and the one that we have proposed seemed to the American Delegation to be the simplest and most reasonable, and if Mr. Tounkin has other suggestions to make, I would be very glad to consider them. We can exchange our ideas on this problem very frankly.

MR. TOUNKIN: Regarding the remarks made by Mr. Bunce that it is necessary to know the opinion as wide as possible of the Korean people, I think that just the same aim is in the Soviet proposal which was submitted at the meeting of the Joint Commission on Saturday. This

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proposal was the same from the very beginning -- to give a possibility to all the democratic parties and social organizations to present to the Joint Commission their recommendations, and not to put limits on the number of the membership of the parties and organizations. The American Delegation has agreed to this purpose. There is another question, and that is the invitation of representatives to the parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission will consult. That is where the Joint Commission will have to conduct elimination of recommendations and proposals. These representatives apparently will have deliberation of recommendations by the Joint Commission, and in this event it is important to assure fair representation of democratic parties and social organizations. How to assure fair representation is a question which we should discuss, and as a criteria for that the number of membership of parties and social organizations, and consideration for their influence in the country. That is my point of view.

DR. BUNCE: The American proposal in this last paper essentially has three stages of consultation. First of all there are the written questionnaires which will be available to all political parties and social organizations who signed communique No. 5 and wish to consult with the Joint Commission. They can fill in the questionnaire and send in their written answers. I agree with that proposal fully. The second point, we provide for all the major political parties and social organizations to take part in consultation, and third, we provide a paragraph which allows for a detailed oral consultation for working out the details of a democratic government, and that group is not specified. It would be established after we have had initial oral consultation with this broad group. I still feel that we have to establish a criteria. I am making no claim that ours are perfect, and I would like to get again, if possible, specific recommendations of what would be a better criteria.

MR. TOUNKIN: As I understand this document, the same representatives would be present for consultation at the second and third stages. Is this a correct understanding?

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DR. BUNCE: In general, paragraph 8 would draw the leaders from the group included in paragraph 6, but we left that open so that we could include all of them, or if there were too many, we might want to have a smaller group, depending on whether we have a very large number under 6 or not too large a number. Paragraph 7 allows the Joint Commission on the approval of the two chief commissioners to invite other representatives that we might want -- parties or organizations that might not be included in 6, some particular group that we might want to invite in. We might mutually agree to bring that person in. 8 is really broad, and is not definite. It is not fixed, not specific. It is left very broad and very wide open so that the Joint Commission at such times as it sees fit may convene one or several joint sessions with representatives of..... It doesn't say all of them, but that would be by agreement of democratic parties and social organizations of both North and South Korea, and it would offer for discussion questions regarding the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. I think that is identical with paragraph 14 in your proposal. As a matter of fact, we drew this up with your proposal in mind.

Since it is now noon, and we have to meet with the full Commission at 1:30, I would suggest that we adjourn, and that the Soviet Delegation consider our proposal and the discussion, also that we will determine the date of the next meeting of the subcommission after the Joint Commission meeting of this afternoon.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to say some words. I have heard the explanation of the American Delegation regarding paragraph 6 and paragraph 8. Maybe this is what the American Delegation has in mind, but I cannot see the text of paragraph 6 and paragraph 8. Both paragraphs say the same about representation. The Soviet Delegation in order to assure a fair representation of democratic parties and social organizations proposes to discuss the question about the principles of the representation, and to take in membership of parties and social organizations and their estimated value, as much as possible.

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DR. BUNCE: In view of the Joint Commission meeting this afternoon, I suggest that we meet tomorrow morning at 10:30 for further discussion of this question.

MR. TOUNKIN: Agreed.

The meeting adjourned at 1215 hours.

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TRANSCRIPT OF THE 5TH MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION NUMBER 1
3 JUNE 1947 - 1030 HOURS

MR. BUNCE: I suggest that the quickest way to do this job which we have had put on our shoulders is to take up this proposal paragraph by paragraph, find out where we can agree and where we can make changes and where we have to disagree.

MR. TOUNKIN: Yesterday I talked to Mr. Bunce about the essential points of our proposal. Now we have the draft in written form which was drafted in accordance with my discussion with him yesterday. I would like to point out the difference between the American and our proposal. First of all, the Soviet Delegation proposed paragraph 6 in our draft which laid down that Subcommission No. 1 compile a general list of parties and social organizations and the number of representatives for consultation from democratic parties and social organizations who signed the declaration in accordance with the number of members of those parties and organizations, taking into consideration as much as possible their influence. That is the main difference between the Soviet and the American draft. The second is that we insert completely or fully the three conditions agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers which was fixed in the letters of Mr. Molotov. I think the American project is not infelicitious. In this project, there are too many quotations from the correspondence instead of giving the results of this correspondence. We are preparing a document in which it is necessary to fix the agreement but not to give the history of this correspondence. If you would like to give the history of this question, it is quite possible to print all the correspondence between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall and distribute it for general knowledge. These are the main questions which I propose that we discuss now. I think that if we achieve an agreement today on these two questions, the rest of the questions which are before the Subcommission will be agreed to very soon.

DR. BUNCE: I think that Mr. Tounkin has stated two fundamental differences. I might take up one of the quotations in the document

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first which I think is a simple one to settle. The American position has been that all these documents have already been published and that there is little reason to include any of them in this particular document, but if the Soviet Delegation wishes to include them, the American Delegation feels that it is essential to include a fairly full statement. We cut it down as much as we could, and the reason we feel that we ought to include the points in General Chistiakov's letter is that essentially General Hodge's reply is in the form of an amendment to three propositions, and in order to understand the amendment, you have to have the original proposition as well, and it is necessary to understand General Hodge's reply to have these quotations. I might point out that this was essentially the position taken by Foreign Minister Molotov who quotes at the beginning of his letter the three points in full presented by the Soviet Commander in his letter of November 26, 1946, and that this is a part of Mr. Molotov's document: "With a view to expediting the work of the Joint Commission and the creation of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander". We cannot accept the amendments without accepting the original proposition, and I feel that we cannot publish the three points alone. They don't make a complete statement. I accept Mr. Molotiv's position and feel that we have to publish the three points as they are in his letter. The whole thing would not take more than a page and a half or two. The thing is so important that to try to save paper on an issue as important as this is hardly justifiable.

MR. TOUNKIN: In regard to the amendments that could not be decided on without the initial text, I may take as an example the American Constitution in which there are many amendments and in which there are no references to the initial text. That is why this remark in general is not correct. If the American Delegation thinks that the three conditions which were fixed in the letter of General Hodge and accepted later do not cover the agreement between the two Foreign Ministers, then we will discuss it here. We consider that

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the three conditions Mr. Molotov set in the wording proposed by General Hodge and the attempt to add to these conditions something from the correspondence unwillingly leads to a question. Is there not an attempt to retreat from these three conditions which were clearly and exactly fixed in the correspondence? I would like to state once more that we are insisting upon the inclusion of these three conditions as they were laid down in the wording of General Hodge's letter and accepted by the two Foreign Ministers. I may add that it is the American proposal, and it seems that we are insisting on the inclusion of the American proposal. The American Delegation does not want to include it.

DR. BUNCE: I think there is no question that the American Delegation is willing to publish the statements of the three proposals as they have been presented and worded by Mr. Molotov, and I would ask Mr. Tounkin whether he is disagreeing with Mr. Molotov.

MR. TOUNKIN: No, I am not.

DR. BUNCE: I think there is a fundamental necessity for quoting both General Chistiakov's letter and General Hodge's letter to have a complete understanding, and I suggest that in order to save time, we just make our first agreement, which is that the Subcommission could not agree on the quotations to be included, with the American Delegation insisting that the quotations be included as stated by Mr. Molotov in his letter and with the Soviet Delegation insisting that the three points in General Chistiakov's letter be omitted, and present that to the Joint Commission.

MR. TOUNKIN: I see that Mr. Bunce is not willing to work all day. We are here to clear up some questions, and we should work hard today. Mr. Bunce did not correctly formulate the position of the Soviet Delegation in this Subcommission. Our position is that it is necessary to include the three conditions which were fixed in the letter of General Hodge and were accepted and which clearly defined the conditions for consultation. Let us discuss the suggestions of the American Delegation on everyone of those three conditions as they were cited in the letter of General Hodge and, in the

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opinion of the Soviet Delegation, were accepted. Paragraph 1 of General Hodge's letter of December 24th, proposal #1 can be interpreted as follows: "Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation". The proposal of General Chistiakov, which was interpreted, reads as follows: "The Joint Commission must consult with those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea." To make it clear that we have prepared a document and not prepared a history of this question, I would like to know if the American Delegation is willing to combine those two points in one point. That is my remark.

DR. BUNCE: I think that paragraph 1 presents very clearly the reason why the American Delegation wishes to include both of these statements. General Chistiakov's letter, stating that the Joint Commission must consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, repeats the concept of exclusion because of freedom of speech which led to the breakdown of the last meeting of the Joint Commission. The American Delegation has never accepted and will not accept the exclusion of parties and organizations because of opinions they have expressed in the past. General Chistiakov's letter is quoted in the past tense, and there is a proposal which could be used to exclude every single political party in South Korea, including all political complexions. As Mr. Thayer pointed out to Mr. Tsarapkin during the discussions last year, all parties in South Korea came out with statements opposing the concept of trusteeship. Many parties have since then changed their minds and wish to work with the Joint Commission including paragraph 3, and have come to recognize that aid and assistance will be necessary and that it will be developed by the Joint Commission in consultation with Korean Provisional Democratic Government. The reason we wish to insist that

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General Chistiakov's letter be included is to make perfectly clear that this Joint Commission is meeting not on the basis of excluding any parties and social organizations because of opinions upheld or expressed in the past. The quotation of General Hodge's letter alone does not make the issue clear and could be misinterpreted. With the quotation of General Chistiakov and refusal of the United States to accept that position, the whole issue is made perfectly clear. I can see no good reason why the Soviet Delegation would wish not to publish that statement of General Chistiakov when it is included in the letter of Foreign Minister Molotov. The question of space cannot be an issue on a point as important as this. I would like to understand why the Soviet Delegation is attempting to insist that we exclude from this document paragraphs which were in Foreign Minister Molotov's letter.

MR. TOUNKIN: It is more clear for me now to see the American position on this question, and I feel that we can come to an agreement on this question. I did not know why the American Delegation wanted to add some additional quotations to the three principal conditions. First, the Soviet Delegation insisted on the inclusion of the three fixed conditions as they were laid down in the letter of General Hodge and accepted by Mr. Molotov. Mr. Bunce twice repeated about space and paper. It could not be the reason in this very important question. I repeat once more that the three conditions that were accepted in the wording of General Hodge are the main points of disagreement. That is why the Soviet Delegation considers that it is necessary to accept the final results of the correspondence, but not all the correspondence. There were some instances when the American Delegation referred to the letters of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall. We consider it inexpedient to include into our document quotations from the letter of General Chistiakov. It is considered that this document is cited in the letter of Mr. Molotov. It is hardly an argument because in the letter of Mr. Molotov there are many quotations, but those have no reference to our document and to this question. We should include

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in our document the results of the correspondence as the basis on which the Joint Commission renewed its work. I should like to mention that in this document, there is a very great mistake in the translation. Mr. Bunce stated that the letter of General Chistiakov is in the past tense. In our Russian text it is in the present tense. It seems to me that there is no ground for Mr. Bunce to say that paragraph 1 will be misinterpreted as it was worded by General Hodge in his letter. I don't know whether Mr. Bunce took part in the wording of this paragraph, but I would like to say that it was worded nicely, very clearly and precisely, and leads to no misinterpretation. If you take paragraph 1 from the letter of General Hodge, it reads: "Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation." It is quite clear, and the Soviet proposal has as a starting point this quotation--that all parties should participate in the consultation. Also, our press communique reads: "Korean democratic parties and social organizations who sign the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 may submit to this Joint Commission their considerations on the above mentioned questions." The Soviet Delegation takes this as a starting point. Paragraph 1 from the letter of General Chistiakov does not have limitations about which Mr. Bunce has stated. It is not of importance because we take paragraph 1 from General Hodge's letter. In the letter of General Hodge, it is said exactly that the signing of the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation. I see no misinterpretation. If Dr. Bunce states that he could not agree with paragraph 1 of the letter of General Chistiakov, then what is the purpose of inserting this quotation into our document? There are many things on which the American Delegation did

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not agree with the Soviet Delegation and the Soviet Delegation did not agree with the American Delegation during more than a year of the discussions of these questions. We would like to include into our document not those on which we have differences but parts on which we have agreements.

DR. BUNCE: I can't agree with any of the references. I would like to go back to the basic issue. The United States Delegation has agreed and desires to include the three points. It also desires to include certain other statements which we believe give a clearer understanding. From my experience at the last meeting of the Joint Commission, I believe that those statements expressed fully in the document will avoid misunderstanding and lead to a more rapid fulfillment of our work--of making recommendations to the four powers regarding the Provisional Government for Korea. In regard to the tense, the wording is in the present tense. During the last meeting of the Joint Commission, if you read the discussions that went on, the Soviet Delegation attempted to exclude individuals and parties which had at any time expressed opposition to the Moscow Decision. I think that that should be avoided. I still do not have a good reason from the Soviet Delegation as to why these other quotations which we think are extremely important should be excluded. I will offer a compromise to the Soviet Delegation--that we reword paragraph 2 and state that the detailed basis of consultation and the reconvening of the Joint Commission are expressed fully in the letters of Secretary of State Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov and both of these letters are attached, as appendix "A", and that both letters be given in full. The only reason that Mr. Tounkin has given to me for excluding certain things that we wish to put in is that it is inexpedient. We cannot agree with that statement.

MR. TOUNKIN: I gave every reason why we presented such a proposal and not only that I considered it inexpedient. The American Delegation really gives no reasons and just states that it is not expedient.

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Mr. Bunce did not answer my arguments. I think that in all negotiations, if both sides are really desirous of coming to an agreement, arguments are always given to justify their position and to try to convince the other side--not just to say it is expedient or inexpedient. I repeat once more that we are insisting on the inclusion of the three conditions in the wording accepted by the Foreign Ministers. The American Delegation could not answer what is clear--what is not clear and why it is necessary to have some additions. I have come to the conclusion that the American Delegation has a tendency to discuss again all the questions agreed upon in the past. This, of course, will not be useful for our work and will not facilitate or speed up the work of our Commission. Mr. Bunce is always misrepresenting the position of the Soviet Delegation. I want to say once more that we don't want to add anything or exclude anything from the conditions agreed upon by the two Foreign Ministers. That is the position of the Soviet Delegation. Meanwhile, the American Delegation proposes to include those things it wants from the correspondence of the Secetary of State, Mr. Molotov.

DR. BUNCE: I should like to summarize again my reasons for desiring to include full statements from the correspondence. First of all, I believe that including the full statements will avoid any misunderstanding because the letter of General Hodge is a reply and a qualification of propositions presented by General Chistiakov, and General Hodge's letter alone is an amendment only. The second point I make is this--that Foreign Minister Molotov quoted these points made by General Chistiakov and the three amendments offered by General Hodge. I cannot understand why he did that if the points of General Chistiakov are not needed to have a complete understanding of the amendments offered by General Hodge. Third, I cannot understand the Soviet position of not wanting all the correspondence. The United States Delegation believes that full quotations from this correspondence are desirable in order that the Korean people

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will fully understand the basis on which we are working. I believe it is essential that this be done. Fourth, the reason that the Joint Commission adjourned a year ago was largely on the question of consultation. I believe that we should make it perfectly clear in this document the basis on which the consultation is to take place in order that disagreements later may be avoided. I believe that the letters of Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall make this perfectly clear. It is for this reason that I believe the correspondence should be quoted as we have suggested in our paper, or, as an alternative, that the letters be attached in full as an appendix. I might suggest now that the Subcommission adjourn and that we meet again at 1400 hours.

MR. TOUNKIN: In regard to the amendments, I have stated this morning at the beginning of the meeting that the remarks of Mr. Bunce about the amendments are not correct. In this correspondence, we have letters of General Hodge and General Chistiakov, and Mr. Molotov cited these letters, particularly the letter of General Chistiakov because it was in a letter of Mr. Molotov. That is the history of the question. In the letter of Mr. Molotov, it is stated: "Your proposal, as I understand, is that before the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission, it is necessary to come to an agreement about the consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. This question was the subject of the correspondence between Soviet and American Commanders in Korea, as a result of which, as I have stated in my previous letter, the points of view of both sides are considerably narrowed". I would like to clear up once more the only desire of the Soviet Delegation in this question is to speed up the work of the Joint Commission and to strictly adhere to the conditions on which the two Ministers have agreed, and not to discuss questions which were previously agreed upon. The Soviet Delegation proposes that we take the final results of all this long correspondence as a basis, but the tendency of the American Delegation is not to take as a starting point that which was agreed

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by the Foreign Ministers, but rather to discuss again questions agreed upon. It is not necessary to discuss the questions which were agreed upon previously. The American Delegation wants to include some quotations and does not answer all questions. I agree to have our meeting adjourned and to meet as was proposed by Mr. Bunce, and after the interval to discuss another--the other question.

The Subcommission adjourned at 1230 hours.

The Subcommission resumed at 1415 hours.

DR. BUNCE: I suggest we start discussion on paragraph 6.

MR. TOUNKIN: To explain exactly what is meant in the Soviet Proposal on this question, as a starting point, it is to establish a fair representation of Korean parties and organizations and to give the right to all the democratic parties and social organizations who sign the Declaration to participate in the consultation and clearly submit their considerations on the questionnaire. The Soviet Delegation proposes to make this in such a way that small parties and organizations and big parties and organizations would not be in the same position. That small parties and organizations and big parties and organizations should not send the same number of representatives. To send one prepresentative from small and big parties, we have not the just expression of views. Opinions and views could be expressed by all the democratic parties and social organizations presented to the Commission for consideration. In this proposal we have in mind the appointment of representatives from the democratic parties and organizations with which the Joint Commission will permanently consult and which in accordance with the proceedure which will be made, these representatives would assist the Joint Commission in elaboration of recommendations. The concrete proposal is to establish principle on which we can accept the number of representatives from different democratic parties and organizations

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in accordance with the membership of these parties and organizations and take into consideration too, the influence in the country as far as possible of these parties and organizations.

DR. BUNCE: The proposal of the Russian Delegation essentially corresponds to part 3 in the American proposal of consultation--that is the group consultation, which I think is included in paragraph 8 of the American proposal and I quite agree with Mr. Tounkin. This may sound strange that I agree with him that we should have such a group, that it should represent a fair proportion of all the parties and organizations and that we could use it to consult with us continuously in solving the problems of determining the structure and platform of the Korean Provisional Government. The thing that I felt, from the brief statement of paragraph 6, was this: that there is nothing in paragraph 6 which states explicitly what the standards are which will determine the parties and organizations which will be included in this group and that there is nothing which states specifically how large this group should be. I would like Mr. Tounkin to elaborate to the American Delegation the specific basis on which the membership and size of that group would be determined and also I would like to know how he would measure, specifically, this factor that he refers to as "influence".

MR. TOUNKIN: The question put by Mr. Bunce is quite logical. The matter, however, is like the Russian proverb, "Every plant has its season". If we accept the general principle as it is fixed in paragraph 6 of the Soviet proposal, we will be bound by this principle in our phase of work and today, not having the list of parties and organizations and not knowing what parties and organizations would like to participate in the consultation and what the membership of these parties are, it is very difficult now to propose any concrete number. Mr. Bunce is right that we would

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deal later with the establishment of a general number of the representatives in the first point. We should set the number of representatives and proportional ratio. It is inevitable, but it seems to me to decide this question now, before we have the list of the parties and organizations would be premature. I would like to point out that it seems to me if we will have agreement in principle about the general number--agreement in principle and of the fixing of the ratio, then the establishment of the number and ratio of representation would be achieved by us without any difficulty, but first we should have the list of parties and organizations withwhom we will consult.

DR. [illegible]: I think that I ought to follow Mr. Tounkin's efforts and quote an old English proverb which says "Hou should never buy a pig in a poke", and I think the more clearly we can determine the composition of this group now, the less will be the problem of debating its composition later on. In other words, there will not be any arguments as to whether the pig was 150 pounds or 200 pounds. It seems to me that already there are certain specific issues that we should settle as early as possible if we are going to have a consultative group which will be a combined group of North Korean parties and social organizations and South Korean parties and social organizations. We must reach an agreement of what proportion of North and South Korean political parties and organizations should be in the total and I would suggest that the best basis of such representation in this group, in order to represent the will of the Korean people, is to put it on a population basis. I think that was agreed to in principle at the last Joint Commission meeting. I think that would be one thing which should be agreed on. Second, I think we ought to agree regarding the size of this group and if possible, upon some objective means of measuring the qualifications of parties and social organizations that would be included. I think one of the basic problems that we faced at the last meeting of the

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Joint Commission, was the failure of Subcommission No. 1 to establish any such standards and the result was that it became a matter of personal argument as to whether this party should be included or that party should be included and there was no basis for judgement except personal opinion. Now, I believe that if we can establish general standards, that a lot of that argumentation and discussion can be avoided and that the work would go ahead very much more rapidly. I would like to mention how this proposal that the Russian Delegation made fits into the proposal presented by the United States. As I mentioned before, we had essentially three stages. (1) All political parties and social organizations signing Communique 5 can express their opinions through the questionnaire. (2) We established a broad basis for all consultation which we suggested should be determined by the fact that the organizations would be national or zonal in scope and would have a certified number of members. (3) For detailed consultation, parties and organizations could be invited as a group to meet with the Joint Commission at such times and places that the Joint Commission wished to invite them, and I left that paragraph 8 wide open. As I look over this proposal again I still wonder whether that is wise and whether it would not be better to agree that we would have a certain sized group and that we would include parties and social organizations which meet certain specifications. I do not think that postponing this decision will help us in our work. Frankly, I think that it would hinder it, and would lead to further argument as to which parties and social organizations would be included.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to ask Mr. Bunce one question. I have little knowledge of Korea I will have to confess. Would Mr. Bunce tell us what is the meaning in this population basis and the relation between the North and South Korea? What is the proportion of this group?

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DR. BUNCE: The best estimate that we have of the relative population of North and South Korea today would indicate that North Korea has approximately 30 per cent of the total population and South Korea has 70 percent. This ratio gives a larger percentage to South Korea than was true during pre-war years. This fact is largely the result of two things, (1) almost all the Korean repatriates from Japan and China and the South Seas moved back into South Korea with the result that the population of South Korea has increased by over 2,000,000 during the last 14 months, (2) there has been a large number of Koreans who have moved down to South Korea from North Korea and that is estimated at around a million between the end of the war and the present time. The present rate is between 60,000 and 90,000 a month moving over the border from North Korea into South Korea. This has reached such proportions that it is actually creating a serious problem of feeding these people who are moving down from North Korea. We have had to establish special repatriation camps for them and special feeding centers. Those are the main factors which have changed the population from the pre-war ratio which was about 64 percent in South Korea to 36 percent in North Korea in the last census of 1944 taken by the Japanese. The change is not a very large percentage change, but it is quite large in terms of the number of people that we have had to feed. There are almost 20,000,000 in South Korea now and in North Korea we can arrive at the figure by taking the 1944 census and the increase that we have had plus influx from outside, plus influx from North Korea to South Korea. That is a question which needs a detailed review, but this is just a broad basis.

MR. TOUNKIN: My estimation is that if you take 20,000,000 from South Korea, 70 percent, it will be about 10,000,000 for North Korea. To make it more clearly I would like to ask some questions.

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Mr. Bunce proposed a proposal about the establishment of three stages for consultation. The three stages, that is, detailed consultation with the representatives as was stated by Mr. Bunce. Is my understanding correct that the Soviet proposal contained in paragraph 6 Mr. Bunce's proposal to apply to this third stage of consultation? Is my understanding of Mr. Bunce's proposal right? The second question is about the second stage of consultation, namely, oral consultation. Consultation on a wide basis and it is proposed to establish a definite limit on the basis of total membership of the party or organization. What number of members does Mr. Bunce propose to establish as a minimum for inviting to consultation of parties and organizations on this stage of consultation?

DR. BUNCE: The third stage in our proposal is almost identical with the Soviet proposal in that it is very broad and leaves the Joint Commission free to consult with groups once or several times, as it sees fit, or even with individuals. It is wide open. In regard to the second stage, I would put no limit on the number that we would consult with except the standard that we apply and if we applied, for example, a limit of 1,000 membership, I believe that there would not be more than about a total of 100 parties and social organizations. If you make the limit 5,000, it would reduce that number somewhat but it does not set a definite number or limit on the people.

MR. TOUNKIN: The Soviet proposal, based on the Moscow Decision on the consultation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations regarding the number of representatives of parties and organizations, will be proposed to apply to principle of representation. It is based on the total membership of each party and organization. Regarding the statement of Mr. Bunce, that if now we will have established a total number of representatives and a ratio of representatives, that would delay the work

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of the Commission. I can't agree with this. Of course, it is our wishes to elaborate now those questions which we can elaborate now, but it is logical that we should have such a proceedure. First, parties and organizations declare to the Commission of their desire to take part in the consultation, then they sign the declaration and give the total number of membership and other particulars if we would see that these particulars would be necessary for us and after that Subcommission No. 1 will make a list of these parties and organizations. After that we will establish the total number of the ratio of these representatives of these parties and organizations. If we deal with this question now, we may have made a mistake. It is possible, for instance, to set such a ratio on the basis of which the total number of representatives would be too big or too small. For instance, if we set such a ratio on the basis of which we will have a list of 10,000 representatives, or contrary, we will have a very small list of representatives. The Soviet proposal based on this, that in order to speed up the work of the Commission, we should not go to far away--run ahead of ourselves. We should decide what we can decide now and what we cannot decide now we should lay aside for awhile in order not to delay the work of the Commission.

DR. BUNCE: The question of what can be decided now is one that we will have to get mutual agreement. For example, Mr. Tounkin says that we would prepare lists of these parties and social organizations in South Korea. He does not say how many would be included in the list or what basis should be used to include anybody in the list. I think we can decide that question now just as easily as we can decide it later. In regard to the point of view that we should have different numbers of representatives for different numbers of members in parties, I think it is quite true that one representative can present the views of the party probably better and more quickly than 10 representatives could present the views of a party and that the real problem is

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evaluating and weighing up how much weight to give to the views expressed on behalf of a particular party or organization. That seems to me to be the problem of the latest stage when we are evaluating the views of the parties and organizations and tabulating the results. If this were followed out how many members would you allow for each representative? If we followed the plan that the United States representatives presented, we would not have an exorbitant number of people with whom we would consult initially, nor would we have too few. I believe that we could take a standard of a membership of 1,000 or 5,000 and have a group of representatives which we could handle very easily in less than two weeks time, and we could also bring that same group in together for consultation, or if we agree, we could decide we would reduce it somewhat. Even so, we would then have to agree on what basis that reduction in the number of representatives would be made. It seems to me we could make that agreement now. We could limit that at 5,000 members. If we wanted a smaller group we could eliminate smaller parties by setting the membership at 7,500. In other words I cannot agree that these decisions need to be postponed and I think that if we make the decisions now that we can avoid uncertainty and conflicts later on.

MR. TOUNKIN: Mr. Bunce wanted to know on which basis we proposed to include parties and organizations into the list for consultation. It is very clear from the Soviet proposal. We have clarified it several times. We have in mind a list of parties and social organizations who signed the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 as parties which are admitted for consultation. Mr. Bunce stated about the previous American proposal, that it is necessary to establish a minum number of membership of parties and organizations. That those parties and organizations which has less total membership were excluded and those parties and organizations which

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which have more membership would be admitted for the consultation and that every party and organization which would be admitted for oral consultation--consultation in general, should appoint one representative from each party. In connection with this, I would like to have a concrete answer on such question. Does the American Delegation accept the proposal by the Soviet Delegation in principle in accordance that each different party and social organization which would be admitted for the consultation, will appoint a number of representatives and this number would depend upon the total membership of parties and organizations? This, strictly speaking, this proportional representation, does the American Delegation agree with such a principle or doesn't it? If the American Delegation agrees with that principle, we may discuss details and if not, then I would like to know that.

Dr. BUNCE: As I understand the Russian proposal more clearly as a result of this discussion, it seems to me that they are proposing to establish a representative body with the idea that people have large number of representatives if they have a very large number of members in order that the party will have more votes in deciding specific issues. This concept of a legislative assembly with apparently having members with the right to vote is a new concept which the American Delegation has not considered in terms of consultation. Our concept of consultation was based on the Moscow Decision. It is essentially a means of obtaining the opinions of the Koreans and evaluating them, with the Joint Commission making decisions on the basis of an understanding of the point of view expressed by the Korean people. I would like to know before answering Mr. Tounkin's question specifically, what is the reason for more than one representative to present the views of even a very large organization, and to inform me if I am mistaken, in interpreting that as meaning that they are to have some kind of a vote.

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DR. BUNCE: I move that we have a recess for coffee.

MR. TOUNKIN: I agree.

The Subcommission recessed at 1555 hours.

Meeting resumed at 1605 hours.

MR. TOUNKIN: That is right. We propose that the bigger parties and organizations should have more representatives than small parties and organizations. Mr. Bunce understood my explanation quite right. Regarding the voting, we do not foresee voting in our draft. Mr. Bunce points out that to represent or to submit views of parties or organizations, it is quite enough to have one representative from the party or organization. Our Soviet proposal makes the doors wide open for all representatives of parties and organizations to present their views and the Soviet proposal has in mind those representatives with which the Commission would consult, more or less permanently and which would assist the Commission in the elaboration of the recommendations, and for that it is very important to know how many representatives would send one or another party or organization. We can also not take into consideration those circumstances that are accepted by the U. S. principle. They should be fair and acceptable for the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. If it would have equal rights, big parties with small parties and organizations or groups which would represent no one but the views of these small groups, then such a decision would not be fair and not only would not be fair, but would be harmful because the voices of these small groups would silence the voices of the big parties and organizations.

DR. BUNCE: The concept of the permanent group of representatives who would work out recommendations to the Joint Commission was one thing we should consider carefully. I do not see, however, that the problem of voting would be avoided, because if there

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were a difference of opinion between different parties and we wanted the opinion of the group as a whole, we could only obtain it by having the party's vote on a particular issue.

The major difficulty that I see in this proposal, as it is presently presented to us, lies in the determination of the parties to be represented in this group of people with whom we consult. My feeling is that rather than have a permanent group of this nature, it would be much better to have special groups called in when special problems occur. For example, if we were discussing the problem of labor organizations, we might ask one specific group to come in and present their point of view on this problem. In another case, we might want the representatives of women's organizations to discuss the problems effecting the rights of women. We might want another specific group to advise us on problems of education and we would certainly need specific groups to advise us on problems of agriculture and industry. For that reason, it might be more desirable to have special groups called in on special topics, and we could include in those groups specialists in the various fields. I would suggest that we adjourn for today and that we consider this proposal. Can we draft an agreement which will retain:

(1) The broad consultation with all political parties and social organizations through the questionnaire.

(2) Initial broad consultation with a large group of political parties and social organizations such as suggested in our paper.

(3) How can we specify more accurately the proposal presented in paragraph 6 of the Soviet paper.

We have not had time to study all the Soviet proposals in detail and I think we could do that this evening and meet again tomorrow morning. I would suggest fairly early, 9:30, and see if we can work out an agreement.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think it is a good proposal made by Mr. Bunce, that it is necessary for us now to think over the question which was discussed for a long time today and to adjourn the meeting to meet tomorrow at 10 o'clock instead of 9:30.

MR. BUNCE: I agree.
Meeting adjourned at 1615.

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Dr. Bunce

6th Meeting

Transcript of
Minutes of Meeting
of
Subcommission No. 1
Duk Soo Palace
~~1000 hours, 4 June 1947~~

DR. BUNCE: I studied this paper and particularly the wording of paragraph 6 and what I would like to do would be to have outlined to me specifically, how you obtain proportional representation and I will put it in this way: Suppose you have three parties with 1,000,000 membership each, and say five parties with 500,000 membership, and eighty small parties with say an average of 50,000 membership, and you have a consultative body, which say you limit to a hundred persons, how would you have those persons selected? It's a specific question in mathmatics.

MR. [illegible]: The principles presented by the Soviet delegation is as follows. That the number of representatives from each party and organization should depend upon the total number of membership of these parties and organizations. This principle I think is well known to everyone who lives in a country where there is an electoral organ and that is why, if we follow this principle, we will have such a picture. Those parties, for instance, that have twice as much total membership than another one, then this first party should send more representatives for the consultation than the second party. That is the principle. Regarding the mathmatical question, I think that we may deal with this question only when we will have the list of the parties and organizations. Then it will be possible to decide what figure or what number we may take for the general consultation of those representatives and of what number of total membership should be the ratio of each party and organization for sending one representative. How many members should a party or organization have to send one representative? I repeat that the matter is not only about the expression of opinion of all parties and organizations who will sign the declaration. We should not

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forget this. It seems to me that the proposal by the Soviet Delegation has a quite fair and democratic principle.

DR. BUNCE: Whether such a principle would be democratic in application would depend entirely on the standards that were set for the selection of the representatives and the number of representatives to be included in the group. For example, the illustration that I will use could, through this process, disinfranchise the largest number of people by making this very simple rule: that you would have one representative for parties with 100,000 or more members with an additional representative for each 1,000 members. That would mean that your five parties of 500,000 would have 25 representatives. Three parties what a million members would have 30 representatives and that would give you a consultative group of 55 representatives and the 4,000,000 million people in the large number of small parties would have no representation at all. That principle is not democratic unless it could be worked out in detail to see that the large number of people represented in small parties also have a representation. Now, what I was hoping that Mr. Tounkin could do this morning would be to give me a specific proposal to see that the general principle would be democratic in its operation and would not exclude the very large number of people which are in the small parties.

Mr. TOUNKIN: I would like to say the following. Any fair and correct principle could be presented in such a way as to show it as a monster. Mr. Bunce is trying to discuss this question not in the real form. He wants to say to prove that the principle can be not democratic. This example which was cited by Mr. Bunce is not real. It is invented. A principle can be invented by an example and that is not right. I would like to repeat once more. I would like to repeat that now we cannot establish concrete total number of representatives and a ratio of representatives from parties and organizations because in this question we should take as a starting point not invented examples but we should have real facts. We will have the facts

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only after we publish the declaration and receive applications from the parties and organizations, then we will lay down on the table ~~the list of these parties and organizations and will~~ discuss it in concrete form. The American Delegation would be able then to define any total number of representatives and any ratio of representation. I may assure you that the Soviet Delegation is not intending in any way to insist on such a proposal which would deny representation of big groups of membership of any party or organization. I could add that if we would try to establish this number of representatives now, it would be like the proverb we discussed yesterday, "... buy a pig in a poke", because we do not know the facts.

DR. BUNCE: I am not going to quibble over this but we have place the fact that sometime or another we would need a detailed plan as to how we are going to select these parties and organizations in order to give fair representation. Unless we establish such a plan now, there is grave danger that in trying to establish this plan by preparing lists that we will reach the stage of trying to include some parties and exclude other parties because we have no standard to use. I am really asking these questions and using examples in order to try and get from the Soviet Delegation a clear idea of the procedure we could use and agree on. At present all we have is the general principle. I would like to point out that my example was not entirely facetious. We faced an almost identical problem in the United States of American when it was being first established as an independent country. We had at that time in the United States several very heavily populated states in the East. We also had certain states in the West. Any assembly which was established purely on a population basis meant that three Eastern states would completely dominate the whole national policy and it was because of that problem that the United States established a

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a second House, known as the Senate, where proportional representation is not followed. Each state has the same number of senators, regardless of population. Now that is one way of solving this extremely difficult problem. It is not a matter of quibbling, it's a very serious problem. It is my belief that in order to have this broad representation, that we desire in consultation orally with the parties and social organizations, the American proposal is much simpler because in stage two, we establish a process for broad consultation orally with a large number of democratic parties and social organizations. We further have a third stage of consultation wherein we bring in groups together either one group or if we decided, smaller groups, on special problems, and I am perfectly willing to write into the American proposal number three, a statement that, "in the group or groups consulted, consideration shall be given to establishing a system of proportional representation." I think that would overcome my main fear, that unless we could agree on a very definite procedure of representation in the group to be consulted, all the smaller parties might find themselves actually disinfranchised. I might add one thing and it is this: I believe that we should have wide oral consultation in order that we do not give the Korean parties and organizations the idea that we are only consulting with them through asking them to fill out a questionnaire. In the United States it is considered much more important to appear publicly before a body than to fill out a questionnaire and I would not like the Korean people to feel that consultation was just a matter of filling out answers to a few questions when it is concerning the establishment of a provisional government for them.

MR. TOUNKIN: Mr. Bunce made reference to the American Constitution and particularly why the Senate was created. In the Soviet Union we also have such a principle, that the Supreme Soviet has two chambers. Both chambers have members which are elected by

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election. The first chamber consists of deputies or members elected on a population basis and the second chamber has equal representation from every part of the Soviet Republic, so this principle is combined in the United States as well as in the U.S.S.R. This example has no analogy to the circumstances here, because we have quite different conditions here and those are my general remarks. Now I would like to specify the proposal made by Mr. Bunce. I would like to know whether I heard him correctly or not. I understood him thus: First stage of the consultation is that parties and organizations submit their recommendations to the Joint Commission in written form, after the questionnaire. The second stage is that the parties and organizations who would sign the declaration and who will have no less than a certain number of membership would appoint one representative in order to present the view of the party and organization in the Joint Commission or in the Subcommission or in any subcommittee which would be created by the Joint Commission and it would depend upon decision of the Joint Commission. A representative would be sent to the Joint Commission to express the point of views of parties and organizations, in addition to those views which were expressed in written form. The third stage is that creation of a group or meeting based on the principle fixed in paragraph 6 of the Soviet proposal. Is such an understanding of the American proposal right?

DR. BUNCE: I think that Mr. Tounkin has expressed the American proposal much more clearly than I did. I would make this very specific suggestion which I think would solve all our problems if it would be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation. That we take paragraph 6 of the American proposal and insert in it the word "five", making that, "membership 5,000". That will still leave a large number of parties. Then change the wording of paragraph 8 so that it places the wording of the Soviet

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proposal in this way, "The Joint Commission at such time as it may see fit may convene one or several joint sessions with a group of", enter the words, "with a group of representatives of parties and social organizations of both south and north Korea.....", then add, "this group shall be formed in conformity with the membership of the parties and social organications and taking into consideration as much as possible their influence", which is the exact wording of paragraph 6 of the Russian proposal.

MR. TOUNKIN: I have one I would like to propose to the American Delegation is to write down paragraph 8 as it was proposed by Mr. Bunce and paragraph 6 of the American proposal. That is, does Mr. Bunce propose to establish now the total number of organizations and the ratio of the representation for the consultation or will we limit ourselves just with what is fixed in the paragraph 8. What is the American proposal?

DR. BUNCE: The original proposal came from Mr. Tounkin and I have been asking him for two days to give me the definition of the standard and number of the group. If he has a specific suggestion now, I should like to discuss it, otherwise, we can leave it until we have all the representatives of parties and organizations then we can come to it later when we have all the information for it. My personal opinion is to establish standards as early as possible on the basis that it will eliminate misunderstanding and discussion later. I would like to know what Mr. Tounkin thinks about it.

MR. TOUNKIN: My point of view is well known. The Soviet Delegation considers that now it would be premature to discuss and to establish ratio of representatives before we have lists of parties and organizations, it may be we can't do this.

DR. BUNCE: Well, I agree with Mr. Tounkin to this general proposal with this addition: There is one paragraph in there that I would like to have his opinion on. It is paragraph 7 which

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we put in to be in conformity with our agreement. I think in Joint Decision No. 1 where it says, "The Joint Commission may invite persons in for specific consultation", I am thinking there specifically of Korean specialists we may want to bring in to discuss specific problems. Again, they have to be mutually agreed upon by the two Chief Commissioners.

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MR. TOUNKIN: As I remember, when decision No. 1 was accepted, General Shtikov especially provided that the invitation of persons does not refer to the consultation. With this condition, this decision was accepted.

DR. BUNCE: If the Soviet Delegation wishes, we will remove paragraph 7, and I would make a further proposal--that in addition to removing paragraph 7, we add in the proposal, the Russian proposal for joint meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang. We included those in this group meeting, but I don't think we made it specific--and for the general meeting under paragraph 6, in both Seoul and Pyongyang, according to the Soviet proposal 8.

MR. TOUNKIN: We have not agreed on paragraphs 6 and 8. It would not be useful to discuss other questions, so we should have agreements on these two questions. In this connection, I would like the American Delegation to specify paragraph 6 in order to specify more exactly the second stage of consultation.

DR. BUNCE: In order to get agreement on this statement, I will suggest that we take out all these duplicating statements in the American proposal where we quote General Chistiakov's letter, and change the wording of paragraph 2, to state: "The letters stating the conditions of consultation are attached as Appendix 'A'", and leave out the rest.

MR. TOUNKIN: Mr. Bunce previously made such a proposal, and I stated that the Soviet Delegation could not agree with that.

DR. BUNCE: Can the Soviet Delegation offer any other possible suggestion or possibility of compromise? If you have a suggestion, I would like to hear it.

MR. TOUNKIN: The Soviet proposal is that it is necessary to include fully the three conditions on which there is an agreement between the two Foreign Ministers.

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DR. BUNCE: We agreed on that. The only question is the definition of "fully". I believe that General Chistiakov's original proposals and General Hodge's amendments are both desirable in that statement. Would the Soviet Delegation accept the publication in the appendix of only Mr. Molotov's letter in full?

MR. TOUNKIN: In regard to publishing all the correspondence between the two Foreign Ministers, the answer on this question has been given by me previously. The Soviet Delegation insists that the document which we are preparing should be clear about the method of consultation, and it is necessary to include the three conditions as they were finally accepted by the two Foreign Ministers. The questions in connection with this are--why is the American Delegation including the quotation from the letter of Secretary of State Marshall, and does the American Delegation agree to exclude this quotation from Mr. Marshall's letter before we reach an agreement on this question.

DR. BUNCE: The American Delegation believes that both letters are important and have a direct bearing on the question of consultation, and we wish to include what we consider the important portions of both letters. We would prefer to have the statement of Mr. Marshall included, and if the Soviet Delegation is not willing to agree to the publication of Mr. Molotov's letter in full in the document, I suggest that we refer the full question to the Joint Commission.

MR. TOUNKIN: We agreed on that yesterday.

DR. BUNCE: I had hoped that we would be able to find an acceptable compromise.

MR. TOUNKIN: Yesterday I said that it would be expedient to submit this question to the Joint Commission, and today I have not changed. I would like only to specify the Soviet point of view which is all the time misinterpreted. The Soviet proposal is to include the three conditions in their final wording and

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not to give the history of this correspondence between the two Foreign Ministers. The Soviet Delegation does not object to publishing one letter of Mr. Molotov or to publish all the correspondence between the two Foreign Ministers and to distribute this publication in a separate document to a certain number of parties. That is why I suggest that we stop the discussion of this question and submit to the Joint Commission this question, as proposed by Mr. Bunce.

DR. BUNCE: I would like to ask one question. Would the Soviet Delegation agree to publish Mr. Marshall's letter and Mr. Molotov's letter as an appendix to this document if the body of the document contained the three points in General Hodge's letter.

MR. TOUNKIN: We agree.

DR. BUNCE: I would like to call a fifteen minute recess and discuss this with the American Delegation. I did not understand from the previous remarks that that was an acceptable compromise. I would like to discuss that with the American Delegation and see if they are willing to accept that suggestion.

The Subcommission recessed at 1140 hours.
Meeting was resumed at 1155 hours.

DR. BUNCE: The American Delegation discussed the suggestion that Mr. Tounkin presented and feels it cannot accept that suggestion as a compromise, and as a result is calling the Joint Commission meeting for 1:30 P.M. in order to thrash the question out--that is in regard to the publication of the three points.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to point out that it was the proposal of the American side today to include the three points laid down in the letter of General Hodge and to add the correspondence as an appendix--the correspondence between the two Foreign Ministers.

DR. BUNCE: I asked the Soviet Delegation whether they would agree to publishing the letters of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall as an appendix and attach to the document, if the three points were included in the document. I asked a question. I did not make a proposal. The position of the American Delegation

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remains unchanged; that is, if the Soviet Delegation insists on including the three points in General Hodge's letter, we believe it is necessary to include the three points in General Chistiakov's letter, as originally presented by the American Delegation. I suggest that I present the report to the Joint Commission this afternoon which in general will cover the area on which we have agreement on consultation, and that after the question of paragraph 2 in the American proposal is settled, we can then draft together a final wording for the whole proposal.

MR. TOUNKIN: I regret very much that we must report to the Commission that we cannot agree on question 1 and 2 which we have discussed. I would like to ask Mr. Bunce how the American Delegation suggests paragraph 6 be formulated. Mr. Bunce does not answer this question, and it is my opinion that it is necessary to change the wording of paragraph 6 in some way, speaking tentatively about the three stages of consultation. I would also like to have an answer on the second question--that is the American proposal including the suggestion about the three stages, particularly about the third stage, to fix the total number of representatives and the ratio of representation for participation before we get a declaration and before we draw a list of parties and social organizations for consultation.

DR. BUNCE: I don't quite understand the question on the third stage. I understood Mr. Tounkin to state that he preferred not to establish a standard or fix a number before we had the replies and applications submitted. Do I understand that he would like to establish those standards now?

MR. TOUNKIN: When the Soviet Delegation submitted a concrete proposal yesterday, it pointed out that at present it is necessary to establish a principle, and then after the list of parties and organizations is ready, to establish the total number of representatives and the ratio of representation for the parties

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and organizations. Such was and is the proposal of the Soviet Delegation. ~~Now the American Delegation~~ suggests a new proposal concerning the three stages of consultation. I would like to ask the American Delegation to make clear how it understands its proposal. Does it propose to discuss the question about the total number of representatives and the ratio--I mean particularly stage number 3, or does it propose to discuss these questions when we receive the declarations and when we make the lists of parties and organizations.

DR. BUNCE: I answered that question earlier this morning when I stated that I preferred to establish standards before the lists were in if we could do so, but that I would agree to postpone that until we had all the names of the parties, their membership, and the names of their representatives, if the Soviet Delegation wished to do so. Mr. Tounkin assured me when we were discussing this question earlier that no large party would be deprived or denied the opportunity to be represented.

MR. TOUNKIN: I have a suggestion that in order not to starve the American Delegation that we adjourn this meeting today, and I would like to ask the American Delegation to formulate its proposal regarding the three stages of consultation in order that we can study it.

The meeting adjourned at 1215 hours.

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Dr. Bunce

TRANSCRIPT OF THE 7TH MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION NO. 1

5 JUNE 1947 - 1100 Hours

DR. BUNCE: Yesterday in the Joint Commission meeting we were given another job. That is we were told to find an agreement. I have not prepared any proposals on paragraph 2 of our original document but we have rewritten completely our proposals in conformity with the Soviet paper so that we have paragraph 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. Several of those paragraphs are taken out of the Soviet paper and included and I think that this now makes the three steps of consultation quite clear. We have not yet had this translated into Russian but they are working on that and we should have a typed copy in about 15 or 20 minutes, so I suggest we postpone the discussion of this until we have the translated document and discuss the question of how we can get a compromised settlement on paragraph 2.

MR. TOUNKIN: I agree with this proposal. I make a new proposal on this question which it is possible will move from the deadlock this question. I transmit to Mr. Bunce our new proposal, paragraph 2 of our proposal, which includes the previous paragraph 2, 3 and 4 of this proposal. I would like to know the opinion of Mr. Bunce. And the correspondence, if the American Delegation will desire so, between Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall may be included into the appendix.

DR. BUNCE: That is the question which I discussed yesterday morning with the American Delegation and it is not acceptable as I informed Mr. Tounkin yesterday.

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MR. TOUNKIN: The aim of the Soviet Delegation is that it is necessary to put down in the document about the method of consultation such wording by which we could be guided in our work. I think that the American Delegation can't object to this. The document should be clear and should not contain any historical references. If the American Delegation does not agree to be guided by these three conditions--we consider that we should be guided by these three conditions--we consider that the American Delegation then should suggest the text. A history of the proposals might be interpreted in any way. Let the American Delegation formulate what we should be guided by in our work. We are wasting days because the American Delegation does not want to give its proposal to be guided by in our work and does not want to accept the three conditions agreed upon by the two Foreign Ministers. At the same time, it proposes to lay down the history of the question, from which it would not be clear by what we would be guided. The Soviet Delegation insists that the document should be very clear, and proposes to write down the three conditions. If the American Delegation does not agree with this proposal, then let it word this proposal in such a way that would definitely state the agreement reached by the Ministers in their correspondence. The Soviet Delegation cannot understand what the American Delegation proposes as a guidance for our work. Until the American Delegation will state definitely on this question, we cannot move from this point.

DR. BUNCE: I want to make very clear the position of the American Delegation. First, we wish to have the exact conditions stated in full. Second, the American Delegation is willing and desirous of including the three points stated in full. Third, the Soviet Delegation is the delegation which is objecting to the inclusion of the full statement, and, it seems to me, definitely attempting to modify the agreement made by

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Foreign Minister Molotov. Fourth, I see no point in spending further time on this discussion. The American position has been made perfectly clear, and I suggest that the minutes of the last Joint Commission meeting be studied carefully. We have offered several alternative solutions, including the publication of Mr. Molotov's letter and Mr. Marshall's letter in the appendix with a reference to them, or the publication of the three points of the agreement in full with the original proposal and amendments stated in full and with the paragraph of Mr. Marshall defining the concept of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. We have no further proposals to suggest.

MR. TOUNKIN: I have heard the advice of Mr. Bunce to study the minutes of yesterday's session, but I have a good memory. The trouble is that the American Delegation tries to make references--suggestions that we include different quotations from the letters of Mr. Marshall and Mr. Molotov, in order that later on there will be grounds for retreating from conditions which were agreed to by the Foreign Ministers. The Soviet Delegation wants to have a document by which we would be exactly guided, and the American Delegation wants to make such a document in which there would be different interpretations. My question is on what ground is the American Delegation proposing to include into the document about consultation, the quotation from the letter of Mr. Marshall on 2 May. Where is the proposal in the letter of Mr. Molotov or the work of the Commission about that--the conditions of Mr. Marshall's letter are accepted as a condition for the work of the Commission. There is no such reference. That is why we cannot understand clearly why the quotation from the letter of Mr. Marshall was included. The American Delegation makes the reference that the three conditions as laid down in the letter of General Hodge of December 24th are identical in aim with the suggestions made by Mr. Marshall in his letter of May 2nd--what he said in his letter of May 13. It is already a conclusion of Mr. Marshall which is quite natural. We can discuss the ex-

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pressions of Mr. Marshall in his letter of May 2nd and we should include in our document those conditions which were agreed to by the two Foreign Ministers. The American Delegation does not want to deal with the question directly and gets away by making it a general discussion. The American Delegation proposed to include paragraph 2 of General Chistiakov's letter and paragraph 2 of General Hodge's letter. If the American Delegation considers that between those two paragraphs there is no difference, let it say about that. If the American Delegation likes paragraph 2 of General Chistiakov's letter more than paragraph 2 of General Hodge's letter, let it so say. If the American Delegation considers that paragraph 2 of General Hodge's letter is not specific enough and wants to add something from paragraph 2 of General Chistiakov's letter, then let the American Delegation say it. We cannot get away from this matter by a general discussion. We should decide, and the Korean people are awaiting our message. The general discussion is frequently argument in order to cover the essence of the question. Without such interpretation, the position of the American Delegation is not clear and may lead to suspicion.

DR. BUNCE: In answer to the specific question, the United States Delegation included the statement from Mr. Marshall's letter because it makes quite clear the American position on freedom of expression. Second, the approval of the proposals made by General Chistiakov and amended by General Hodge and approved by Foreign Minister Molotov is the basis for the reconvening of this Joint Commission. I would like to point out again that it is the Soviet Delegation through its refusal to publish this statement in full, so that the points are clear and explicit and not subject to misinterpretation, that the work of the Joint Commission is being held up. We want to publish that statement in full. It is the Soviet Delegation that is refusing to accept this for no valid reason. It is my personal opinion

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that the statement as given in Mr. Molotov's letter is full and clear from any misunderstanding. I cannot understand why the Soviet Delegation is insisting on deleting certain parts of that agreement which the American Delegation believes is essential to a full understanding of the work of the Joint Commission. I have here the Russian translation of the other part of the revised document. I suggest that we adjourn now and meet again at 2 P.M.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to point out that the accusation that the Soviet Delegation is delaying the work is a very strange one. When it becomes possible to speak in such terms, accept our proposal, and if you do not accept, that means you are delaying the work of the Commission. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation clearly shows that it is anxious to speed up the work of the Joint Commission. For that purpose, it proposed not to delay those matters that were agreed on, particularly the publication of the declaration contained in Communique No. 5. This declaration is adopted and cannot be changed. Such adoption would speed up the work of the Joint Commission and give the possibility to Korean democratic parties and social organizations to s tart their work. I think that the Soviet Delegation has shown enough that it is anxious to speed up the work of the Joint Commission. Second, Mr. Bunce did not give the answers to my questions, and I reserve the right to put these questions before Mr. Bunce later. Third, I accept the proposal to adjourn now and to meet at three o'clock--not two o'clock-- to consider these matters.

The meeting was adjourned at 1205 hours.

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RESUMPTION OF 7TH MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION #1

2000 Hours-5 June 1947

DR. BUNCE: We have not had time to have the Soviet Document translated, and have not had time to study it in any detail. I thought we might start our meeting with a summary of the problem concerning Paragraph 2. I want to make the American position very clear. The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly impugned the motives of the U. S. Delegation and has accused us of being responsible for the delay in reaching agreement on the methods of consultation. I want to make it quite clear that the U. S. Delegation feels that this delay is due to the fact that the Soviet Delegation refuses to publish exactly the basis on which the Joint Commission has reconvened, and the basis on which consultation is to be conducted. Secondly, I want to summarize all the proposals that the U. S. has made to the Soviet Delegation. Our first proposal was that we could admit all quotations on the basis that the correspondence has all been published in the press and that it is well known. This proposal the Soviet Delegation refused. Secondly, we proposed the inclusion of the text of the letter of Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall, either in the body of the document on consultation, or as an appendix. Thirdly, I asked the Soviet Delegation whether they would consider the publication of only Mr. Molotov's letter, either in the body of the document, or as an appendix. This also was refused. Fourth we offered the parallel statements of General Chistiakov's three points and General Hodge's amendments, with paragraph 2 of General Marshall's letter. This also has been refused by the Soviet Delegation. I discussed this with the American Commission, and in light of the fact that the delay is becoming serious, we believe that the Korean people and the rest of the world should become fully acquainted as to the cause of this delay, and General Brown has asked me to present to you his request so you will present it to General Shtikov for his consideration that tomorrow's meeting be made an open meeting and that the press be invited.

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I think that if Mr. Tounkin would summarize for us the differences between the Soviet paper and the American paper, we might be able to continue our discussion with those points and get a closer understanding.

MR. TOUNKIN: I will transmit to General Shtikov the proposal of General Brown about the invitation to the correspondents for tomorrow's meeting of the Joint Commission. However, it is not up to them to agree or not to agree upon this question, and I would like to mention that regarding correspondents, we are not in equal positions. The American correspondents are here, but here there are no Soviet correspondents. Our correspondent is up in Pyengyang and could not receive the permission of the American administration to come to Seoul right away.

Now, regarding the three points -- Mr. Bunce said that one of the proposals of the American Delegation is the proposal about the inclusion into the text of the document about the method of consultation -- the letter of Mr. Molotov of May 7th. Probably the American Delegation has in mind the extracts or quotations from the letter from Mr. Molotov in which are stated the three conditions of General Chistiakov and General Hodge. The Soviet Delegation tried to clear up all this in order that later there would be no misunderstanding regarding the question of what would be our guiding point. So far it is not clear what is the guiding point of the American Delegation in this connection. Because of the insistence of the American Delegation on the inclusion into the document the letter or the quotations from the letter of Mr. Molotov of May 7th, I agree on such inclusion. That is, I mean that I agree on the inclusion of the letter of Mr. Molotov of May 7th, or appropriate quotations from this letter, which I mentioned, on the condition that the American Delegation in written form will give a satisfactory explanation of by what we should be guided -- that is, the conditions in General Hodge's wording, or in General Chistiakov's wording, because this question is not clear enough for the Soviet Delegation.

DR BUNCE: I might also remark en passant that the letter clearing the TASS correspondent was sent by General Hodge about a week ago, and it

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cleared the TASS correspondent for immediate entry into South Korea, providing that when the Joint Commission went to Pyengyang the U.S. correspondent and other foreign correspondents would be permitted to accompany him. I regret that the Soviet Delegation has refused apparently to permit the American press to go into their territory.

I have explained the U. S. position -- that both the original proposals of General Chistiakov and the amendments by General Hodge must be taken together. The U. S. Delegation takes the full text of Foreign Minister Molotov's letter, with no exclusions, no eliminations, and no amendments as the basic principle upon which we operate. I would like to further point out again that there are not two versions, but only one. There is an original proposal with its amendment stating in the exact terms of Foreign Minister Molotov's letter and the American position is that unless the original proposals are included with the amendments, the amendments themselves can be misinterpreted to provide a basis for misunderstanding at a later date.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to mention once more, en passant, that the American commander made as a condition of the admission of the Soviet correspondent, reciprocity. The Soviet commander agreed with that, and he answered that on the basis of reciprocity he would not object to the entry in Pyengyang of American correspondent. It is clear that the Soviet commander replied on the basis of reciprocity, if the entry of the Soviet correspondent was the entry of the American correspondent in North Korea, but the American commander wanted more than reciprocity on the entry of the correspondent to South Korea. He wanted the entry of an unlimited number of correspondents to Pyengyang.

Now on the matter under discussion, our position, as I have said, is that we are agreed on both conditions, to include the quotations from the letter of Mr. Molotov into the document in such form as the American Delegation insists on, but because the American Delegation did not explain how it understands this combination, then not for publication, but for our word in the future, the Soviet Delegation would like to have the American explanation on this proposal. I ask you to

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think over this proposal. This proposal is a very practical one, and I think it may move the matter from the deadlock.

DR. BUNCE: Also en passant, we have in Seoul correspondents representing three nations, British, French, and about ten from the United States. It would be extremely difficult for General Hodge to select one without getting his throat cut. The Soviet commander should have offered at least one per country. The press occasionally gets in our hair, and it might be nice to have them get into the Soviet Commander's hair occasionally.

The proposal that Mr. Tounkin suggests, if I understand it correctly, is that we include in the text of the document on consultation the three proposals of General Chistiakov, with the amendments made by General Hodge attached to them. That is essentially the suggestion we had, with the exclusion of General Marshall's quotation, and I would be willing to accept that as a compromise solution, if we can also include that general introductory paragraph, paragraph 1, with the references to the letters of the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State: in the first paragraph a simple statement. Further, I think that in wording this statement we should put in the exact words of General Hodge. You will notice that I X'd out at the top the words "I consider" in the second proposal and in the first one. We left them out, but I think that would be acceptable, and then I would agree to delete the paragraph from General Marshall's letter. I think if the proposals are stated in this way that there is no need to include that paragraph. I would like to know if that is acceptable to the Soviet Delegation?

MR. TOUNKIN: It is acceptable if the American Delegation will explain by what we shall be guided. To explain this officially it should be fixed. It is not clear enough, because we are including in the document both conditions, and there is a distinct difference between them. I would suggest that we not waste time now for discussion. I will submit tomorrow morning a draft of the quotations from Mr. Molotov's letter for inclusion into the document, and the American Delegation will submit an appropriate statement regarding how we should understand

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passage in the document -- how to formulate this document -- what form would be better. This statement would not be for publication together with the document, but only for the Commission in order to avoid any misunderstanding in our work.

DR. BUNCE: I will suggest a rephrasing of paragraph 1 which might make more clear in the document itself the concept of the U. S. Delegation on the basis of the work of the Joint Commission. I find it difficult to understand why the American position is not clear to the Soviet Delegation. In my mind the concept of an original proposal amended provides a perfectly clear working basis, and I think we could make it clear in paragraph 1, quoting more exactly this relationship in these words. The first few lines would not be changed. The fourth line would not be changed, and then you would insert after the fourth line the letters of General Chistiakov.....perhaps I had better read the whole thing....."In accordance with the recent correspondence between Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall we agree to reconvene the Joint Commission on the basis of freedom of expression, and the acceptance of the three conditions stipulated in the letter of General Chistiakov on 26 November 1946, as amended by General Hodge on 24 December 1946.....The Korean Democratic parties and social organizations are invited to consult with the Joint Commission regarding formation of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government." It is just making it clear that the points proposed by General Chistiakov, as amended by General Hodge's letter, are the basis on which the Joint Commission was reconvened. As General Brown stated in the Joint Commission meeting, the American Delegation believes it is bound by the letter of Mr. Molotov making a specific proposal, and the reply of Secretary of State Marshall accepting that proposal. Those in a sense are the two basic documents. I would like to ask Mr. Tounkin whether that would be a satisfactory statement, or whether he would prefer to leave paragraph 1 as it is now stated. Secondly, if he considers it necessary to reword these quotations which we have? I can't quite see why there is any need for rewording

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these. I would like to get more of an idea of what you mean by re-wording the proposal.

MR. TOUNKIN: The American Delegation insisted on the inclusion of the letter of Mr. Molotov, or some quotation from his letter, including three quotations. I have already said that I agree with this. I agreed to include fully the letter of Mr. Molotov, or quotation including the quotations of General Chistiakov, and the conditions of General Hodge, provided the American Delegation would give us a statement by which we should be guided. It is not necessary to include anything else into the document, and the American Delegation did not propose to include anything in this document when it stated that for a clearer understanding it was necessary to include the conditions as presented by General Chistiakov and the conditions as presented by General Hodge, and what is included in the letter of Mr. Molotov. I propose to include in the document quotation from the letter of Mr. Molotov, but it would be better to state by what we should be guided in our work for consultation. It is not necessary to include anything else.

MR. BUNCE: I understood that the Soviet Delegation accepted the inclusion of paragraph 1 of our proposal, with the references to the correspondence as an introduction, and that the quotations were satisfactory. Do I understand Mr. Tounkin now to state that he does not want to include paragraph 1?

MR. TOUNKIN: There was no talk about paragraphs. From the very beginning of this conversation I talked only about Mr. Molotov's letter, and had in mind only the insistent proposal of the American Delegation to include the letter of Mr. Molotov, and I agree with that on the condition which I have previously stated.

DR. BUNCE: Apparently the Soviet Delegation did not understand my original proposal. (Dr. Bunce then directed the recorder to read back that section of his discussion pg 4 of these minutes, starting with "......The proposal that Mr. Tounkin suggests....." down to and including ".....with the references to the letters of the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State.") The reason I wanted to quote

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this again is that we have to have an introductory paragraph stating the basis for the inclusion of the quotations, and I would like to know why paragraph 1 as written, or as we suggested, an amendment to make it clear as the basis of understanding, is not acceptable, if it is not acceptable.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think that if we desire to move from the deadlock we should not rephrase the proposal on the basis which the American Delegation insists on, and because of which we are wasting much time here. I would like to check the minutes, but as I remember it General Brown yesterday made such a proposal and insisted upon it. Today, Mr. Bunce reviewing the American proposals also said the American Delegation proposed including in the document only one letter of Mr. Molotov, the letter of May 7th, but when I said "yes", there was another condition advanced by Mr. Bunce -- a new condition -- and it seems to me that if I say now "yes" again, there will be still a third condition. I don't agree to continuing our discussion on such conditions. I think that such a discussion may be continued for a very long time and would still not lead us to any agreement. Now the time is late and I propose to stop our discussion on this question. I would like to ask the American Delegation to think over my proposal, and to accept it. Regarding the proposal which was submitted by the Soviet Delegation in written form, I think that it will be necessary to give the American Delegation time to study it. Until they have studied it, our discussion will not be effective, and I propose that we adjourn now to call a meeting tomorrow at 10:00 o'clock, if it suits the American Delegation.

DR. BUNCE: I agree to adjourn the meeting now and meet at 10:00 o'clock, and we will examine the draft of the quotations which will be prepared by the Soviet Delegation and presented at 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning. We will study this in the meantime and see what the differences are, if there are any. I don't think that the question of paragraph 1 is an issue, because I think we'll have to have an introductory paragraph. I will also suggest to the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation that he and General Shtikov prepare a statement on the basis of interpreting the issues involved in reconvening the Joint Commission.

Meeting adjourned at 2140.

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Dr Bunce

TRANSCRIPT OF THE 8TH MEETING OF SUBCOMMISSION NO. 1
6 JUNE 1947 - 1000 hours

DR. BUNCE: I would like to ask Mr. Tounkin if he has prepared a draft of quotations.

MR. TOUNKIN: Yes, I have prepared it and it is typed. We have prepared the whole draft of the document. In the first paragraph of the document, there is a quotation from Mr. Molotov's letter. Then the first paragraph and three, four, and the others were transmitted yesterday afternoon to Mr. Bunce. Now we have reproduced it all into one document.

DR. BUNCE: Now the question of paragraph three on--the proposals submitted by the Soviet Delegation have been studied by the American Delegation and are not acceptable in the present form. The reason they are not acceptable is that broad consultation is not made mandatory, and I think that the wording of the American proposal is much clearer and much more specific. I would like to ask the Soviet Delegation whether they would prefer to accept the American proposal to have oral consultation with all political parties signing Communique No. 5 and submit their applications, that have a membership of 5,000 or more--that is paragraph 6 and paragraph 9--or whether they would prefer to have oral consultation with all parties and social organizations which signed the communique and submitted their applications. The American position is that broad consultation--oral consultation is essential under the terms of the Moscow Decision and under the recommendations of Foreign Minister Molotov in his correspondence.

MR. TOUNKIN: If Mr. Bunce carefully read our draft, he would see that the proposal of the Soviet Delegation foresees consultation on a broader basis than the draft of the American proposal. So, such a conversation is not very clear to me. The Soviet proposal in paragraph 6 states that any representatives designated by

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democratic parties and social organizations which have signed the declaration can attend the oral examination and express the view of their party or organization, and that the Joint Commission or its subcommissions or subcommittees can in the process of their work call such representatives to submit their considerations. So it foresees the broadest consultation with all democratic parties and social organizations who sign the declaration. It seems to me that it is not necessary to limit the circle of parties by certain membership in parties and organizations.

DR. BUNCE: I accept the proposal and suggest that we reword the proposal explicitly stated in the American document in paragraph 6, striking out the words "have a membership of over 5,000 or more", and insert the words "in North and South Korea". Then in paragraph 9, again strike out the words "and have a membership of 5,000 or more". That makes the proposal very clear-cut and specific. I will accept that suggestion. I would also suggest that paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 9 are much more clear in terms of process than the Soviet Delegation's redraft of these proposals. I think that with those changes we can have a complete agreement on this broad consultation which is essentially the first and second stage of the consultation process.

MR. TOUNKIN: How about paragraph 8 of the Soviet propbsal?

DR. BUNCE: That paragraph 8 is similar to our paragraph 10, and I think there is one mistake in it which is not clear. I do not know why Mr. Tounkin moves from one question to another so fast. I would like to get his idea of my previous suggestions, but in regard to paragraph 8, it is almost identical with paragraph 10 of the American proposal, and I think the only change which we can make is the insertion of "by mutual agreement of the Chief Commissioners" after the words "social organizations shall be invited".

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MR. TOUNKIN: I think that all these paragraphs are mutually connected. We should discuss them together. That is why I brought up the question of paragraph 8 because it is connected with the other paragraphs. Regarding the amendment made by Mr. Bunce, I think this amendment is not necessary and would only confuse the matter. Paragraph 8 provides that the number of representatives from different parties and organizations would be established in accordance with the total number of members in these parties and organizations and takes into consideration as much as it would be possible their influence. That means that the number of representatives would be established by the Joint Commission. So, the heads of the delegations would decide this question. In this draft it is said that the joint meetings with such representatives would be called on the decision of the Chiefs of the delegations. It does not seem clear, and I cannot accept the amendment made by Mr. Bunce. It would make confusion in a very clear paragraph.

DR. BUNCE: I would like Mr. Tounkin to point out where it states in that paragraph that the number of representatives shall be established by the Chief Commissioners of the Joint Commission. I think that should be inserted specifically as I suggested before--in paragraph 2 there should be stated "the number of representatives of parties and organizations shall be determined by the Chief Commissioners in accordance with". It does not state that specifically anywhere in that paragraph.

MR. TOUNKIN: I accept this amendment of Mr. Bunce, but I think that such questions should be decided by the Joint Commission unless it is necessary to write down "It would be established by the Joint Commission in accordance, etc.", but not by the Chief Commissioners, because this question is not a technical one.

DR. BUNCE: I agree to that suggestion. I would suggest the following as a solution to this whole paper in order to speed up the work--that we take paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 and 9 of the American

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paper which are in many cases almost identical with the Russian paper, and then we take from there on paragraph 8 as amended, paragraph 9 and paragraph 10 of the Russian text, and I would suggest as we did in our paper, that we delete paragraph 11 of the Russian text simply on the basis that that is included in the program of work and does not belong in consultation. That statement is specifically made in the program of work and is not necessary in this document. I think that putting it in here is not necessary as it is out of place, and it infringes on the work of the other subcommissions.

MR. TOUNKIN: Let us take it paragraph by paragraph.

DR. BUNCE: One question which is of a technical nature--I agree with Mr. Tounkin that the broadest possible consultation is desirable, but from the point of view of the length of time it will take, I still think that we would get ahead faster if we would limit the oral consultation to parties with over 5,000. I think that it would expedite the work of the Joint Commission. By all principles, broad consultation is desirable, but I think we have to consider somewhat the work of the Joint Commission and the rapidity with which we can do it. I think that if we leave out the limitation of 5,000 membership that it will mean an added burden of work and may actually mean another week or ten days in that second stage of consultation. While I agree that we remove that limitation if the Soviet Delegation wishes, I still believe that it will be more practicable if that limitation were left. I would like Mr. Tounkin to consider that aspect.

MR. TOUNKIN: At present, I am not authorized to change this Soviet proposal about the limit of consultation with all the parties and organizations who will sign the declaration. I will report the considerations of the American Delegation to the Soviet Delegation and later on will give the answer on this

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question, but now I would suggest that we examine our document paragraph by paragraph.

DR. BUNCE: I agree to that, and in discussing it with your delegation, state that we have no objection to the broadest consultation, but is is purely a matter of saving time of the Joint Commission. The technical consideration of time is important.

MR. TOUNKIN: Your remarks on paragraph 2?

DR. BUNCE: I have not studied that yet.

MR. TOUNKIN: There is nothing to study. It is just a quotation.

DR. BUNCE: I think we ought to have this translated--this first paragraph in the exact wording.

DR. BUNCE: I suggest that we have a break of five minutes.

The Subcommission recessed at 1100 hours.

The Subcommission reconvened at 1105 hours.

DR. BUNCE: In order to speed up the work, since we have only one hour left, I suggest that we go over the whole document paragraph by paragraph and withhold approvals of specific paragraphs until we think we can approve it as a whole to get a complete understanding. The first paragraph reads:

> "In consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Joint Commission shall be guided by conditions stated in the letter of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Molotov, of 7 May 1947, and accepted by Secretary of State of the U.S.A., Marshall, in his letter of 13 May 1947. The appropriate quotation from the letter of Foreign Minister Molotov if given below:"

Also as to the American matter of wording I think we should put the initials of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall--V. M. Molotov and George C. Marshall. I have only one comment on that paragraph

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and that I noticed the words, "for freedom of expression", which we had in our paragraph has been omitted. Following the introductary paragraph is a full quotation from Mr. Molotov's letter stating the three points in General Chistiakov's letter and the 3 points in General Hodge's letter.

MR. TOUNKIN: I should like to say that we have taken not the American proposal but our own text and we need not exclude anything from the American proposal.

DR. BUNCE: My remark was in the nature of a side remark. The second part which was paragraph 3 of the American proposal, I notice, omitted completely from the Russian proposal--that is, we included the text of the decision in Communique No. 5 and I still think that it is a desirable thing to have the text of that Communique right in this document, although it has been published so often that it may not be necessary. It is not very long. I would suggest that the Soviet Delegation consider the insertion in paragraph 3 of the American proposal, which simply states the text of the decision in Communique No. 5 as follows and then gives the exact wording of the statement to be signed.

MR. TOUNKIN: I don't understand exactly whether we have accepted paragraph 1.

DR. BUNCE: We were to examine each paragraph by paragraph then we would approve the whole document.

MR. TOUNKIN: We should accept it paragraph by paragraph, otherwise, I do not know the American view.

DR. BUNCE: I would approve paragraph 1 as submitted by the Russian Delegation, subject to approval of the document as a whole; that no paragraph be binding unless the whole document is approved.

MR. TOUNKIN: That is between us. We will consider that the paragraph 1 has no objections and is accepted.

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DR. BUNCE: Yes. In paragraph 2 I recommend that we insert in this document, so that we have the complete text from Communique No. 5.

MR. TOUNKIN: I have in mind that my yesterday's conditions will remain in force--that is, that the text of the American Delegation would clear up this by which we shall be guided.

DR. BUNCE: General Brown said that he would be glad to do so. I would like Mr. Tounkin's opinion here regarding the inclusion in paragraph 2, of the text of the decision in Communique No. 5, or it could be in a separate paragraph.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think that if you will have agreement of the document as a whole, the Soviet Delegation would not object inclusion into this document, thetext of the declaration. The Soviet Delegation had in mind, when it prepared this document that it would like to publish the declaration as soon as possible and such a proposal was made last Saturday, to publish this document. Since the matter is going well now, and if agreement on the document is reached, I think that there would not be any objection from the Soviet Delegation against the inclusion of this text of the declaration into the document. I want to add that the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 be separate because there is nothing changed, it is accepted, so you know our position was made clear last Saturday. I think that it would be better to insert thetext of the declaration into paragraph 2 of the Soviet proposal. What is the opinion of Mr. Bunce?

DR. BUNCE: I agree. There is one point here, the text says "The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations.....". We don't need that, it is in the communique. I suggest that we just put that in exactly as it is in the communique without any introductory paragraph.

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MR. TOUNKIN: That is alright.

DR. BUNCE: That takes the place of paragraph 2. Then, following my general proposal that we take the old paragraphs 4 to 9 of the American proposal, which we reworded according to a previous Soviet proposal, and which included essentially two paragraphs of the Soviet proposal, and go over that point by point. Paragraph 4 will now become paragraph 3. There is one difference of the Soviet proposal from the American proposal on information required. The Soviet proposal omitted the membership of each branch and the total membership. We put this in so that we would get a general picture of the spread of the organization.

(There followed a detailed discussion and rewording of paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposal.)

DR. BUNCE: I will read the final form of paragraph 3 as follows:

3. Democratic parties and social organizations of Northern and Southern Korea are hereby invited to submit their applications for participation in consultation with the Joint Commission. Every party and organization must submit only one application through its central zonal organ. The application should be accompanied by a copy of the declaration given in paragraph 2 above, duly signed and sealed and which shall also be signed by the designated representative. The application shall contain the following information.

a. The full name of the party or organization, the address of its central office, the date of establishment, the number and location of branches, [membership of each branch] and total membership.

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b. The full name of a designated representative given in Chinese characters and, where possible, in English and Russian transliteration, the place and date of birth, position held in the party or organization, and home address."

Paragraph 5 will now be paragraph 4 which reads as follows:

"Questionnaires regarding the charter and platform of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government will be ~~distributed~~ published simultaneously with the distribution of applications for consultation. These forms will be available at the Joint Commission Headquarters, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, and _____ Pyongyang. All parties accepting the stipulated conditions for consultation with the Joint Commission are requested to submit their applications and answers to the questionnaire to the Joint Commission, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea, or to the Office of the Joint Commission, _____ Pyongyang, Korea on or before _____ 1947.

(There followed a detailed discussion and rewording of paragraph 4.)

DR. BUNCE: The final form of paragraph 4 is as follows:

4 "Questionnaires regarding the charter and political platform of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government will be published simultaneously with this document. Democratic parties and social organizations which sign the declaration in paragraph 2 may submit to the Joint Commission in written form, their views regarding the questions enumerated in the questionnaire. The application and answers to this questionnaire should be submitted to the Joint Commission, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea,

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or to the Office of the Joint Commission, Pyongyang, Korea on or before ___ June 1947. ~~(The date of receipt of the application and the questionnaire not decided.)~~"

Paragraph 6 is now paragraph 5.

(There followed a detailed discussion and rewording of paragraph 5.)

DR. BUNCE: The final wording of paragraph 5 is as follows:

5. "Subcommission No. 1, upon receiving the applications for consultation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration in paragraph 2, ~~(and which have a membership of 5,000 or more)~~.

Paragraph 7 will become paragraph 6.

(There followed a detailed discussion and rewording of paragraph 6.)

DR. BUNCE: The final wording of paragraph 6 is as follows:

6. "Following the approval by the Joint Commission of the list of democratic parties and social organizations and their representatives, mentioned in paragraph 5, the Joint Commission shall convene in Seoul on _____ June 1947 a joint meeting to which it shall invite the above mentioned representatives of parties and social organizations in South Korea. A similar meeting of representatives of parties and social organizations in North Korea shall take place in Pyongyang on _____ June, 1947. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation shall preside over the meeting in Seoul, and the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation shall preside at the meeting in Pyongyang. At such meetings the chief of the delegation in whose zone the assembly is being held will present a statement elaborated by the Joint Commission.

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the Chief Commissioner of the Delegation in whose zone the meeting is taking place, shall present a statement elaborated by the Joint Commission."

Paragraph 8 is now paragraph 7. Paragraph 7 reads as follows:

"The Joint Commission will present the considerations and proposals received from the Korean democratic parties and social organizations of North as well as South Korea for study and elaboration of coordinated proposals to the corresponding subcommissions which will create, for this purpose, the necessary number of subcommittees, advisors, experts and technical personnel for the work in the Joint Subcommissions and subcommittees will be appointed by the heads of the corresponding delegations.

In the process of suggesting the proposals of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and elaboration of coordinated proposals for the Commission, the subcommissions or subcommittees may, upon mutual agreement of the chairmen of the appropriate subcommissions, invite the representatives of parties and social organizations of both North and South Korea with whom they may deem it necessary to elucidate or discuss some problem or other."

Paragraph 8 will read:

"Representatives of parties and social organizations of both North and South Korea (which have a membership of 5,000 or more) will be invited for individual oral consultation regarding the formation and platform of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government. These consultations will be held beginning on _____ June, 1947 in Seoul or Pyongyang as the Joint Commission considers expedient."

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MR. TOUNKIN: Regarding U.S. paragraph 9, this is not acceptable in this wording. It is not quite logical. The Joint Commission gives to all parties and social organizations signing the declaration, the opportunity to present their written considerations. Afterwards, the Soviet Delegation proposes to give opportunity to these parties and organizations, through their representatives, to present to the Joint Commission any oral explanation, amendments, etc., on any question in the questionnaire. Then give the Joint Commission and the subcommissions the right to call on such representatives once more to get their opinions. I think this is a broad, yet sufficiently flexible procedure. If the Joint Commission decides that it is obligated to call in all such representatives, this would be completely ....." We do not desire that all parties and organizations are obligated to participate in consultation. We invite them only if they wish. We cannot force them. For instance, the following situation may arise. That neither does a party wish to add anything to its written considerations nor does the Joint Commission wish to spend half a day to listen to a representative of some party. Why, then should we state that we must call them anyhow? This is not necessary. I feel that the Soviet proposal is completely reasonable. The Joint Commission does not refuse anybody the right to be heard by the Joint Commission or the subcommissions. I feel that the Soviet proposal is better.

DR. BUNCE: The Soviet proposal is definitely aimed at the elimination of broad oral consultation and it is completely unacceptable to the American Delegation. We insist that there should be included in the document a statement permitting very broad oral consultation with representatives of parties and organizations. Our paragraph is explicit and it must be a part of the document. I understand that yesterday Mr. Tounkin

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agreed to the second stage of consultation, the broad oral consultation. In addition he wished to include a consultative group of representatives. I told Mr. Tounkin that I would accept the Russian proposal regarding the consultative group providing the Soviet Delegation would accept the American proposal. The American proposal is broad. The position taken by the Soviet Delegation on this point essentially negates our previous agreement. Unless the American proposal for broad consultation is accepted, I cannot see any possibility of agreement on the document. I wish to state further that the wording of the U.S. proposal states that the representatives are <u>invited</u>--not forced. The forcing is merely a figment of Mr. Tounkin's imagination. There can be no retreat from this position by the American Delegation. If Mr. Tounkin feels that after the broad initial consultation, it is unnecessary to have further consultation, I suggest that to omit the added paragraph which we have attached to the new paragraph 8 (old paragraph 9). Unless we reach an agreement regarding the explicit statement concerning consultation on broad basis, I see no hope of getting an agreement. We must present our disagreement to the Joint Commission.

MR. TOUNKIN: First of all, I did not agree yesterday on the paragraph 9 of the paragraph proposal. Here we should make everything clear in order that we could elaborate such conditions which would be acceptable and logical. Mr. Bunce spoke about the invitation, but what does it mean to invite a party if that party doesn't want to be invited. If the Commission would consider it is necessary to invite one or another party, it is hardly believable that any party would refuse to accept this invitation, especially if the party is interested in the work of the Commission. I don't see the

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reason why the American Delegation doesn't like the Soviet proposal which is explained quite clearly. If the American Delegation would make more exact its position, it would be much easier to understand what the American Delegation wishes.

DR. BUNCE: The weakness of the Soviet proposal is that consultation depends upon the mutual agreement of the heads of the subcommission, and as Mr. Balasanov and I used to tease each other, "it is often too easy to say 'no'", and the representative of the Soviet Delegation should just say, "No" and there would be no oral consultation. The American Delegation will not accept any such proposal. Regarding our proposal, it very specifically states that we will invite these representatives, and they will come to the Joint Commission in Pyongyang or in Seoul, whichever we decide, and will meet with representatives of the Commission and discuss the Provisional Government and its charter orally. I believe it would be insulting to the Korean people if the Joint Commission asked them to give their views only by a q written questionnaire. I urge the Soviet Delegation to accept paragrap 7, which was the old paragraph 8 which we have reworded, putting the words "which have a membership of 5,000 or more" in brackets in order that we may present an agreement to the Joint Commission this afternoon. I feel that the American proposal is directly in light with the intent of the Moscow Decision and the American Delegation feels that we must uphold that position. I would not like to see us enter into another long argument in the Joint Commission regarding consultation on a broad basis if it can be avoided.

MR. TOMKIN: I should point out that Mr. Bunce has distorted the Soviet proposal and distorting can be done without having special intention to distort it. In the Soviet proposal, it is the following: "If the heads of the Subcommission do not agree

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as to the admission of this representative to the consultation there will be no oral consultation." It is not correct, because the Soviet proposal provides much wider than the American proposal. The Soviet proposal provides that any party or organization which signed the declaration can send its representative to the Commission for consultation orally and to submit or present the views of this party or organization, thus the Soviet proposal provides wide possibilities for presenting before the Commission, views of parties and organizations. Then it is necessary to take into consideration that the paragraph of the Soviet proposal above in which it is said that, "to assist in the work of the Joint Commission during the elaboration of the recommendation, would be invited representatives from parties and organizations, etc." These representatives are designated on fair and unquestionable principles. This principle is in accordance to the total number of parties and organizations, thus the Soviet proposal provides the possibility for all parties and social organizations unlimited possibility to present their views before the Commission. Second, the invitation of special representatives and these representatives will assist the Commission to elaborate its recommendations. I consider that the Soviet proposal is expedient. I ask the American Delegation to accept the Soviet proposal in order that we may submit this whole agreed document in today's session of the Joint Commission.

DR. BUNCH. The Soviet Delegation believes in wide consultation. There must be machinery set up and invitations issued for the parties to meet with the Commission. I move that we adjourn this meeting and present this basic difference to the full Commission at 3 o'clock.

The Subcommission adjourned at 1445 hours.

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SUBCOMMISSION I

TRANSCRIPT OF 10TH MEETING, 1100 HOURS

25 JUNE 1947

MR. TOUNKIN: I propose to discuss the list of political parties and social organizations.

DR. BUNCE: No objection.

MR. TOUNKIN: I have not yet studied carefully the list submitted by the American Delegation of the democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea because it was not translated fully. However, I have made a brief review of this list, and it seems to me that if we adopt such a list we would put ourselves in an awkward position. I would rather say that we would put in an awkward position the Moscow Decision. That is why I would like to know the suggestion of the American Delegation about this list which was submitted by the delegation.

DR. BUNCE: This list submitted by the American Delegation is the result of an agreed program of work which was subscribed to by the Soviet Delegation at the time this was discussed in the Joint Commission, and also during the meetings of Subcommission I the American Delegation attempted to obtain from the Soviet Delegation a definition of what a social organization was and what parties would be consulted with, in order that a certain limitation could be placed on the number who would apply for oral consultation. The American proposals were not accepted by the Soviet Delegation. This list is a direct result of the position insisted upon by the Soviet Delegation. The American position is that we must in good faith follow out the commitments made in Joint Decision #4. If Mr. Tounkin feels there are certain objectionable and dangerous features in the list of the South Korea parties, I would like him to explicitly state what the objections are and what the Soviet Delegation proposes as a solution to any of the problems that they may raise. Mr. Tounkin stated that this list might even put the Joint Commission in an awkward position, and the Moscow Decision itself. I would like a full explanation of the meaning of that statement.

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MR. TOUNKIN: First, I remember that when we discussed this question in the Subcommission I suggested to exchange for orientation the lists of parties and organizations in North and South Korea. Second, the Soviet Delegation proposed earlier to publish the declaration, and only then to look through this list to see what parties and organizations would apply for consultation with the Joint Commission. Neither the first nor the second Soviet proposal was accepted. Looking at this list I am sure that if we had accepted the American proposal to limit the parties and organizations to 5,000 membership and at least 2 branches in the provinces there would not be much change in the list. It would have had no real effect on this list. I did not count -- maybe the American Delegation has counted it -- the total membership of the parties and organizations of South Korea submitted for consultation, but probably the total membership is about seventy or eighty million members. If we had accepted the limitation of a 5,000 membership, it seems to me that we would have a total membership of one hundred twenty or maybe one hundred fifty million. I don't think that it would help us in our practical work, and it would not let us have the limitation of the number of these parties and organizations. I have no objections to the fulfillment of Decision #12 of the Joint Commission, and I feel certain that we should fulfill this decision, but I think that by accepting this decision, and being guided by the Moscow Decision on Korea, the Commission has not in mind and it does not follow from the Joint Decision that the Commission has in mind consulting with, for instance, the following organizations mentioned in the list: #14, Society of Esperanto; #15, Society of Fighters for Christianity; #21, Society of Students Studying in America and in Europe; #39, Society of Chinese Signs; #85, Society of Fencing, and so on to many other such organizations which have narrowly specialized and local character. In Decision #12 it is said that the Joint Commission will consult with the democratic parties and social organizations of South and North Korea, and that the organizations who would like to participate in the consultation should submit only one copy of

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application, in the name of their central zonal organization. It seems to me that we have agreed that we would consult with the central zonal organizations, but not with the local provincial and city organizations. I think it would be better to exclude the provincial, city and local organizations from the list. What suggestion has the American Delegation on this question? Americans know best which ones are local and provincial.

DR. BUNCE: I think the fundamental difference between the South Korea list and the North Korea list lies in the fact that in South Korea we do not have the central organizations which take into their organization all the smaller associated organizations. As you go over the North Korea list you find you have a Musicians' Society, with a central committee; an Actors and Singers Society, with a central committee; a North Korea Artists Society, with a central committee. In the South we do not have, and have not built up, any of these central organizations, so that if you exclude all these social organizations and parties which are not associated with a central committee or organization, they would have no way whatever of making their views known. I think the difficulty and difference between these two lists lies in that fundamental difference of the organization of the parties and social organizations in North and South Korea. In South Korea no effort has been made to get them all tied in and associated with any central committee or organization.

MR. TOUNKIN: I cannot agree with such an interpretation. Such an interpretation does not coincide with the real situation. In the South there are parties and organizations which have local provincial branches. Such organizations as well are in the North of Korea. In the South there are central parties and organizations, and in North Korea there are also central parties and organizations. In the South there are local organizations with no central organizations, and in the same way in North Korea there are very many local organizations which have no

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central organs. There are many organizations, such as musical, physical culture, and so forth, and that is why if we would accept the way of the South, in the North, there might be twice as big a list of parties and organizations in the North as there are in the South. If we approach this question so that every local organization would have the right to send its representative to the Joint Commission for consultation, then -- I don't know how it is in the South -- but in the North we have very, very many such organizations, and it is probable that every village would send its representative to the Joint Commission for consultation. If we are not intending to delay the work of the Joint Commission we cannot consult with the local organizations, and we should not consult with those organizations which are not social organizations in the meaning which the Joint Commission has for consultation with the organizations. My proposal to exclude the local organizations and the organizations which are not under the meaning of the Moscow Decision from the list completely corresponds to Decision #12 of the Joint Commission. I think that Mr. Bunce would agree that our position would not be very solid if we would consult with an organization such as Fencing Society, or an organization such as Society of Chinese Signs, and many, many other organizations of such a type. We are confronted with a serious task, the task of the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and we should fulfill this task in such a way that neither the Korean people nor the world could form the opinion that we are engaged here with fencing and so on, and not with the serious work of the fulfillment of this task.

DR. LUNCL: I agree with Mr. Tounkin that we do face a very serious problem. If Mr. Tounkin will recall, the American Delegation attempted to state specifically in Joint Decision #12 that social organizations with branches in two or more provinces be included, but that phrase was not acceptable to the Soviet Delegation. We are now in the position of having stated to the Korean people, in Decision #12, that we would consult with these social organizations and political parties. Mr.

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Tounkin now proposes that the Joint Commission essentially go back on its word to the Korean people and say that now we will not consult with them. I agree that probably in North Korea there are many independent organizations which might have sent in their applications for consultation, and I am somewhat surprised that none of them did so. In terms of interpreting the meaning of social organizations in the Moscow Decision it is very difficult to state explicitly what social organizations should be included and which ones should be excluded. For example, No. 36 in the North Korea list is the "North Korea Society of People's Air Fleet". I don't know whether there is much difference between flying a plane or using a foil. They are both examples of manual dexterity and skill. I cannot see very much basis for reaching a definition as to what parties we should exclude at this time after we have publicly announced and committed the Joint Commission to consultation. There is one other problem involved in Mr. Tounkin's suggestion which I cannot see how to solve, and that is excluding all parties and organizations which have only one branch and no sub-branches. We may exclude some parties and organizations with a large membership, while we would at the same time include some parties and organizations which may have two or three branches but a very much smaller membership, and essentially it would weight consultation in favor of all parties and organizations that list branches. I should think that the number of members should also be considered as an important factor.

MR. TOUNKIN: I agree that the membership is an important factor, but in the South this looked very strange. There are about 62 million members of parties and organizations. From this figure it is seen that everything is not in order with the membership. Having a population of 16 million, there are more than 60 million members of parties and organizations. It means that one adult person is a member of at least eight organizations. I can mention one very believable example -- there is a Union of Building Workers and Repair Workers of South Korea with

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a membership of 1,200,000 members, or the Korean Society of Red Cross with a membership of 5,000,000. Mr. Bunce, I think, should help us out on how we should deal with such membership, because such membership is false, and for such false statements to an official organ there are penalties. We have only one way -- to exclude such an organization from the list -- we have no other means of imposing a penalty. I would like to ask Mr. Bunce if he has any concrete suggestion about the list submitted by the American Delegation, and does the American Delegation suggest to exclude any parties and organizations from the list, or does it believe that all these parties and organizations should be retained in this list?

DR. BUNCE: In reply to Mr. Tounkin I might mention that the population figure for South Korea is considerably too low. Our statistics indicate that we have approximately 20 million people in South Korea. I would point out that one reason there is such a large number of people counted in this total list is that central associations have filed applications giving their total membership, and also the associated parties or organizations have listed themselves separately. I will give one example -- "The People's Front" has listed itself with a membership of six million, and all the associated parties with The People's Front have also listed themselves, so we have a complete duplication of six million people. The Chung Pyung has listed itself with 364,000, and all the unions associated with the Chung Pyung are also listed. The Farmers' Union, for example, lists over two million members, and The Cooperative Union, which essentially represents the same people, has over half a million, so there is no question about Mr. Tounkin's statement that there is a good deal of duplication in this list. Now in regard to the proposal, the American position is that we wish to exclude as few parties and individuals as possible. Where we have outright cases of fraud and deception then I believe that we have a perfectly just cause for excluding a party or organization. What I would like to see us do would be to try and work out some method whereby we could maintain our commitments to the Korean people and

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organize some form of consultation with a lot of these small parties and minor groups that could be done very rapidly, and give a longer time to the more important groups with the larger numbers of members. I would suggest that since we have to meet at the Capitol at 1:30, and do not want to be late, the Subcommission meet tomorrow at 9:30, and that both the Soviet and American representatives consider further this problem, and see if we can get any more ideas by tomorrow. I assure Mr. Tounkin that we have no desire whatever to delay the work of the Joint Commission and that the American Delegation is just as interested as the Soviet Delegation in finding a solution to this problem.

LR. TOUNKIN: First of all I should mention that the 20 million population in South Korea is an imaginary figure. Second, such a big membership could not be explained by duplication. I mentioned two examples where there is no duplication. In the whole of Korea there is no 1,200,000 workers, and only in one trade union of building and repair workers there are listed 1,200,000 workers; or if you take the South Korean Red Cross with five million members, it means that almost all the adult population are members of this organization. That is not the case. I think that the duplications should be eliminated, because some parties and organizations are submitting their views to the Joint Commission, and we should exclude such parties and federal organizations which are submitting to you on behalf of these organizations. I agree to adjourn now and to meet again tomorrow, and later on I will phone Mr. Bunce about the time of our meeting tomorrow.

Meeting was adjourned at 1215 hours, 25 June 1947.

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SECRET

TRANSCRIPT OF 11TH MEETING, JOINT SUBCOMMISSION NO. 1, ON
26 JUNE 1947 - DUK SOO PLACE
1400 HOURS

MR. TOUNKIN: Today we are going to discuss the lists of parties and organizations. Mr. Bunce has said that he has a good suggestion. I would like to listen to it.

DR. BUNCE: The suggestion I have is one which, I think, will avoid the difficulty of putting the Joint Commission in a rather embarrassing position by excluding a large number of parties from consultation. The Joint Commission, in its Decision No. 12, made certain statements. If we now reverse those statement and standards, it will appear as if the Joint Commission was not acting in good faith. I think at all costs we should avoid that, so I suggest that in order to make it possible to speed up this matter of consultation, that we take all parties with a membership of under 5,000 and group them into groups according to their different interests, and that we interview them as groups of five people representing similar interests rather than interview them as individuals. In rough terms, this is what that would mean. It would eliminate, according to our estimates, 240 parties from individual consultation, and it would leave 185 parties. The 240 parties could be grouped into groups of five persons, and I would suggest that we not have that as a fixed figure but have it from 5 to 10, according to interests. We could then have 185 plus 40 to 50 groups, possibly nearer 40. That would give you a total of 225 consultation periods. We can easily cover that number with our Subcommittees in 12 days--5 Subcommittees, 25 a day. We could do it in probably 10 or 12 days, with one committee in Pyongyang and five committees working in Seoul.

MR. TOUNKIN: As I understand it, there will be two lists--one which would include parties and organizations with a total membership of 5,000 or above, and one which would include parties and organizations with a membership under 5,000.

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DR. BUNCE: I had not thought of two separate lists. I just thought of one list with different classifications of consultation just to speed up the work.

MR. TOUNKIN: It seems to me we should have two lists.

DR. BUNCE: In practice, what we would do would mean a lot of work for the American staff. We would have to classify all parties with membership less than 5,000 and then put them into groups. For example, the Chamber of Commerce has, I think, 16 groups registered. We would lump them into two groups of 8, and we would give them one consultation with each of the 8 and ask them what questions they have on elaboration of the questionnaire--in terms of questions we develop. It avoids the business of having told these people we would consult with them and then not. I think it is a reasonable solution. Frankly, the thing that I wish to avoid today is getting into the question of eliminating parties and social organizations in the manner that occurred during the last Joint Commission meeting. The Russian Delegation attempted to eliminate parties and organizations not associated with the People's Front. The Americans, in retaliation, were trying to eliminate people associated with the People's Front. That sort of elimination is bad. We have to work these people in together. I agree with Mr. Tounkin that where there are deliberate false statements and falsification of applications, we should eliminate those groups. I think there will be very few. I might point out in this connection what we picked up yesterday in the application of the Red Cross. The Red Cross application states that it has 300 charter members but that it had a potential membership of 5,000,000. It is just a mistake. All the people of Korea were potential members, but they list only 300 as charter members. I looked at that immediately simply to check on the Red Cross as it is a fairly responsible group in South Korea. I did not think they would make any silly statement as it is completely unjustified. We may find others that are worse as we go on. It is just a simple case of mis-statement. Another

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thing that I wanted to avoid is getting into this question of duplicating membership. We have without any question overlapping claims of membership. If we are to eliminate duplication of membership, it will be extremely difficult. An example is an individual who is a member of a trade union. He is registered in the Printers' Union, Application #73. He is also registered as a member of the master organization of the Chun Pyun Association of Trade Unions in #138. He registered in #274 as a member of the Democratic People's Front which includes the Chun Pyun. Chances are he is also a member of the Cooperative Association of Korea, which is #72; probably he is a member of the Labor Party, Application #150. He may be a member of several youth organizations or women's organizations, Applications 212, etc., plus various relief organizations. I can see no end to the constant struggle if we try to avoid the duplication. I don't see any way of doing it. I have one other correction I want to give at this time. This is #283. The Social Democratic Party listed 710,590 members. We are checking back now very carefully the membership of these organizations. We checked that one early as we know the organization fairly well. We knew it did not have that many members. When you add up the branches, the total is 71,000, not 710,000. They just put in an extra zero. The actual membership of #283, the Social Democratic Party, is 71,000, and it is stated in the application. That was a result of the extremely rapid interpretation and listing. We wanted to get it finished so you could have the list as early as possible. It is just an error in the application. We are now checking very carefully all the applications against these figures to eliminate that sort of an error. I would like to ask Mr. Tounkin what he thinks of the general approach that I proposed of grouping these people and having them in as small groups.

MR. TOUNKIN: It is necessary to think over this suggestion very carefully. This suggestion came unexpectedly, but irrespective of

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how we decide or to what decision we will come on this suggestion of Mr. Bunce, we should carefully look over the list of parties and organizations in order to exclude those parties and organizations which do not fall under Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission. To consult with such parties would minimize the importance of this very important task with which we are dealing. Then there are local organizations, and it seems to me that these organizations should be excluded--for instance, such organizations as #6, Youth Union from the district of Sungduk. It is purely a district organization. It is unthinkable to consult with all the district organizations. It would be also unthinkable to have such a task for the Commission. In Decision No. 12, it is agreed that we shall consult with zonal organizations--organizations consulting with the Joint Commission through their central zonal organs. These two points we should consider very carefully. Then about the overlapping, of course we cannot check on these parties and organizations and people who are members of different parties and organizations. It is natural that one person can be a member of several organizations, but yesterday we had a discussion not about that. We discussed that it would not be correct if parties and organizations would submit their own applications and also applications would be submitted by the union of this organization. It would be unwise to have such overlapping.

DR. BUNCE: I would like to point out several things to Mr. Tounkin. First of all, this list of parties and organizations came in spontaneously from the parties and organizations of South Korea. We did nothing in the way of screening them or saying they could not apply as we believed we were following the exact wording of Joint Decision No. 12. I might read what it says in paragraph 2: "The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declaration."

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Paragraph 3 is the statement: "Democratic parties and social organizations of Northern and Southern Korea are hereby invited to submit their applications for participation in consultation with the Joint Commission. Every party and organization must submit only one application through its central zonal organ." That in no way excludes parties which do not have branches. It says that if a party has branches, it must only submit one application. Again in paragraph 5, it states: "Subcommission 1, upon receiving the applications for consultation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration in paragraph 2." I would further point out that the American Delegation asked that it be made perfectly clear that zonal organizations having branches in two or more provinces only could apply for consultation. That was refused by the Soviet Delegation. They are now trying to say that that is what they meant when they refused to put it in writing. I will never accept that position.

MR. TOUNKIN: The matter is not in such position as Mr. Bunce described. The Soviet Delegation has as its starting point that we should carefully approach the question of parties and organizations with which the Joint Commission is intending to consult. The question is a very serious one because we are dealing with a very important problem--the creation of the first democratic Korean government. If we are intended to approach this problem seriously, then we would hardly use such words. For instance, this Youth Union of Sungduk submitted its application. If we should consult with that one, we should also consult with the organization called Union of Cultural Garments. The reference of Mr. Bunce in regard to the decision that all parties and organizations are included in the list does not prove the solution of this question. We should discuss this list through and through to see what we have in this list. I consider that purely local organizations should be excluded from the list.

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In this list there are not a few local organizations. The question is not whether an organization or party has branches or not. The matter is that there are purely local organizations, and we should be just to the Korean people too. If this organization has submitted its application, then there are many other district organizations, maybe several hundred of them. Why should we not consult with those other district or local organizations then? They are no worse than this one. If you take the Chamber of Commerce--why should we consult with all Chambers of Commerce? There is a central Chamber of Commerce and all the provinces have one. Why should we consult with all the provincial Chambers of Commerce. I consider that we should accept two conditions. First, it is necessary to exclude all the local organizations from the list; second, exclude all federation organizations or unions because all the organizations or parties which are affiliated with this federation are themselves submitting applications and will be consulted by the Joint Commission. It is also necessary to exclude such organizations which in any way could not be consulted as social organizations in the spirit of the Moscow Decision. To my regret, I have not enough time for carefuly study of this list which was submitted by the American Delegation, but my first study leads me to such conclusions.

DR. DUNCH: I cannot see why Mr. Tounkin is now insisting on excluding these local organizations because I remember, and I am quite sure if he looks up the minutes of the subcommission meetings, he will find that under the decision we drafted there was nothing which would prevent a local organization from applying for membership. I have outlined a plan to Mr. Tounkin which will make it possible for us to meet the representatives of these various agencies without in any way going back on the word of the Joint Commission which has been announced in public and which represents a solemn commitment that we made to the people of both North and

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South Korea. In the case of the Chamber of Commerce, it is the national organization of the Chamber of Commerce. There is a Seoul Chamber of Commerce, and the other branches consider that they are completely independent and in no way attached to the Seoul Chamber of Commerce. There is no direct affiliation between any of the provincial Chambers of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce in Seoul. They are quite independent. We asked them about that. The thing that is not clear to me is why Mr. Tounkin wishes to exclude what would amount to a very large number of organizations and their representatives who have presented their applications in good faith and who would, I believe, feel that the Joint Commission had gone back on its public announcement if we at this time now state that we will not consult with them. I think it is very very serious, and I think that the impact of that would have a very serious effect on the Korean people. If Mr. Tounkin had wished to exclude these people, he should have done it in Joint Decision No. 12, not now, and I repeat again that I warned Mr. Tounkin what might take place under that Decision as it was finally drafted, approved, and published by the Joint Commission. I think that it is useless to go along discussing this basis of broad exclusion on the basis of local organizations. The other point that we exclude organizations which we consider frivolous raises some very difficult questions. It would mean that we would have to have a detailed investigation of each of these organizations to find out its objectives--whether we would consider it frivolous or not. That in itself would consume infinitely more time than having them come in with a group of 5 or 6 other people and present their views to a subcommittee. I have no objection whatever to hearing the opinion of any single group that wishes to consult with the Commission and has signed its application unless they have been guilty of outright fraud and distortion. I would like to point out that if we spend three days arguing over this point, during that time we could have consulted

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individually with 75 parties with our 5 subcommittees, and if we had 5 representatives, we could consult with 375 parties. I see no reason for wasting time in finding a basis to exclude these people. I would suggest that the Soviet Delegation accept my proposal and that we than go over the list and examine it for cases of fraud and deceit, overlapping, and duplication of central organizations, and that the American Delegation prepare a grouping of parties with less than 5,000 members into groups with which we could consult, ranging anywhere from 5 to 10. If we do that, we can get on with our work and save a lot of time.

MR. TOMKIN: I agree with Mr. Bunce that it is better not to argue. I don't want to argue or to waste time. The suggestion made by Mr. Bunce is a very serious one and should be carefully studied. Maybe during that time the American Delegation will concretize the suggestion--maybe the list of parties and organizations for grouping will be made. I have one more question about the list. It is hardly understandable what some organizations are engaged in, such as the Society of the Full Moon or the Society of the Diamond Mountains, and many others. Nobody has ever heard about such organizations, and they are not seen in the political or social life. How will we deal with such organizations? We should have our eyes open when we include or exclude from the list parties and organizations. I will have more of such questions for the American Delegation when I study this list more carefully.

DR. BUNCE: I would like to reply to that point. This organization, The Full Moon Meeting Society, was founded on 15 August 1945, which was probably a full moon. It may be a small political organization that was founded at that time and has maintained itself. We have no information whatsoever on that organization. We don't know what its activities are or what it is doing. We will have to make inquiry and find out. That is the only way we can get information. There are many parties on the list which we have not heard of before.

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These social organizations are not under law required to register. I feel that it is much easier to have these small insigificant groups come in with a group of other people than to spend days and days investigating all these parties as we have absolutely no information on some of them. In some cases, it would take considerably more time on the investigation than on the actual consultation. It would be saving the time of the Joint Commission. There is one question that I would like to raise with Mr. Tounkin now that Mr. Shadshin is here as I think he may know the organization quite well--that is regarding the youth groups that were registered in the list. There are three of them registered. That raises a question which I think we should investigate. The Chosun Federation of Youth or the Korean Young Men's General Union, Succession #212, was established on 25 December 1945, and it created a series of terroristic activities and got a lot of unfavorable public opinion. Its leaders then realized it was necessary to create a new organization, called the Korean Democratic Young Men's League or Union, in order to avoid a bad name of the old association, commonly known as the Min Jung.

MR. TOUNKIN: Registered?

DR. BUNCE: The old one was registered under the law. On 25 March, the Chosun Federation of Youth informed Military Government that it was merging with the Min Jung but did not wish to withdraw its registration with Military Government until the merger was completed. It did not, however, withdraw its registration although it did merge completely with the Min Jung. From March 1946 to June 1947, this federation, Accession #212, did not have an office. It made no public statement, and it did not engage in any organizational activity. It submitted no financial report as required by Military Government and was no longer in existence. The organization was revived in June of this year and re-registered with Military Govern-

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ment. It is known definitely that the federation re-registered in an attempt to officially establish its existence so that the same youth group under different names and organizations could be consulted with three leaders. Now, Accession #154, the Democratic Young Men's League or Union (Min Jung), which absorbed the Chosun Federation of Youth, was disbanded by Military Government on 16 May 1947, and we have a copy of that order here. It was disbanded for terroristic activities. We also disbanded an extreme Right organization at the same time which has not applied for consultation. The Min Jung cannot longer exist. The Korean Democratic and Patriotic Young Men's Association, Accession #101, was organized on 5 June 1947 and essentially is a reorganization of the old Min Jung and essentially a duplicate of the same group of people. We are perfectly willing to recognize the existence of Accession #101, the Korean Democratic and Patriotic Young Men's Association and its representative. It is legally registered and has absorbed these other young men's organizations. However, we cannot recognize the existence of the other two organizations which were absorbed by it and one of which was legally disbanded because of its terroristic activities. Again, in going over this list, there will be certain of these things that we will have to check carefully. As a result of a remark made by General Shtikov and by Mr. Tounkin about this Association of Architects and Builders, Accession #19, we have had a partial investigation made of that organization, and it appears to me that it is not a legitimate organization. It claims a membership of over 1,000,000. I think that #212, #154, and #19 should be excluded. General Shtikov was particularly angry about that. He said there were not that many architects in all Korea. We want to investigate that a little further. I think it is purely a front that somebody has put up in order to get in for consultation. It is a fraudulent application.

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MR. TOUMKIN: You say the membership is not correct?

DR. BUNCE: There is no such active functioning organization. We are not sure, but it appears that that is true. I think that we are going to have to scrutinize this list carefully, and if we can accept my general proposal of how to handle these things without any exclusion clauses coming in, we can get ahead with our work pretty fast.

MR. TOUMKIN: Another problem is I thought Mr. Bunce said yesterday or the day before that there may be quite a number of organizations that are non-existent just as #19. There may be some other organizations which do not exist in reality also.

DR. BUNCE: There are about 100 organization which we knew nothing about. We must protect the Joint Commission and eliminate them. We arehaving every single one checked. We have a whole staff of people working on it to see if they are bona fide organizations or not. So far, we have reduced it down to only 65 that we have not checked.

MR. TOUMKIN: What is the result of the check?

DR. BUNCE: They all appeared to be legitimate and honest except #19 and the two youth groups. There may be some others that are not sound. As soon as we find that out, I shall inform you of that fact. All of them are very small organizations--the ones about which we do not know.

MR. TOUMKIN: How about federal organizations? How many of them do you have on the list?

DR. BUNCE: #16, Democratic Independence Front, #188, the Council of Korean Labor, #274, the Democratic People's Front, and #424, the All Korean People's Party and Organization League to Assist the Joint Commission, whose leader is Kimm, Kiu Sic. I would like to have the representative of the Democratic People's Front appear before us and also Kimm, Kiu Sic. He is one man who has worked tremendously hard to support the Joint Commission. His association

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brings in a large number of parties and organizations. We might gain by including them. I thought the Democratic People's Front would be represented by Ho, Hun, but he is appearing for the Labor Party, I raised that point yesterday to indicate why it was we would have such a large duplication of names, and my preference would be to keep them in.

MR. TOUNKIN: How about #2, the Korean Union of Buddhists? Is that a federation organization?

DR. BUNCE: It is a social organization within the Buddhist Church. The Buddhists are as bad as the Christians, and various sects do not cooperate too well. There is another one--a women's organization.

MR. TOUNKIN: #16, isn't that a federated organization?

DR. BUNCE: It is the Democratic Independence Front. We mentioned that.

MR. TOUNKIN: #13?

MR. KINNEY: It was organized more than a year ago. To say whether they are individual or federations is difficult. They are often both.

DR. BUNCE: There has been a series of groups that have worked in order to assist and cooperate with the Joint Commission simply because there have been some antagonistic groups. It would be very bad taste not to consult with them after they have worked so hard for the Joint Commission.

MR. TOUNKIN: Our opinion is that northern groups should be excluded. #22 should be excluded. I think that the people of North Korea will be represented by the parties in North Korea.

DR. BUNCE: You picked on a branch of my friends. I come from Hamchung. I know a lot of those people from that province, and many were here long before the end of the war. They are not, for example, an association of people who have come down fairly recently. There are many very good economists in the group. There are some top-notch

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men in there. I noticed on looking over the list of labor leaders in this central organization that about half of them were from Hamhung.

MR. TOUMKIN: #20 is another organization of the same kind. I don't think it would be good for the people of North Korea to have them represented by those organizations here.

DR. BUNCE: These are people who are living in South Korea, whose birthplace was in Yung Kong Namdo (?). They don't represent the people of North Korea.

MR. TOUMKIN: There are many people, I was told, who have come from South Korea to North Korea who have their own groups there, but I do not think it is necessary to consult with groups of such kind.

MR. KINNEY: This list came from the Korean people. We set standards and they applied. Similarly in North Korea, if those groups applied, we would have no objection.

DR. BUNCE: We would have no objection to talking to them. If they are in small groups, bring them in together.

MR. TOUMKIN: I suggest that we adjourn today and meet tomorrow at 1:30 P.M.

DR. BUNCE: We will draft a list of groups under 5,000 and how we can group them for consultation. I think that is the simplest solution.

MR. TOUMKIN: It is an interesting suggestion anyhow.

(The meeting adjourned at 1600 hours.)

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SECRET

Subcommission No. I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Duk Soo Palace

TRANSCRIPT OF 12TH MEETING, 27 JUNE 1947, 1330 HOURS

DR. BUNCE: We have grouped all parties and social organizations and have made a time schedule for consultation. This schedule is based on an analysis and tabulation of all the parties with a membership of less than 5,000, which are then put into groups for consultation as shown on the larger sheet. The individual accession numbers of each group are indicated. I will start off with a suggestion -- we have to consult individually with 185, or a few less which we may exclude because of fraud and mis-statement; and in groups, 240 organizations. I would suggest that the first week in Seoul we have 5 subcommittees operating, and that they consult with 5 persons per day. That will make a total of 25 persons per day, or 150 in the first week, on a six-day week basis. Then in the second week we have 4 subcommittees working in Seoul and one subcommittee goes to Pyengyang. The 7th and 8th day of consultation will continue with individuals taking 20 per day, with a total of 40, which will more than cover the 35 left. It will mean that those two days won't be quite so full. Then on the 9th, 10th and 11th day -- three days -- will be given to consultation with these groups in this association. In making these groupings we attempted to bring together groups with similar interests, and by and large they will probably have a similar point of view so that you won't have within the group people with strongly opposed ideas, because in that case you wouldn't have as much chance to talk freely with them than if ~~XXX~~ they had the same ideas. It is just a matter of classification according to our judgment. We used 11 classifications of different types of groups. This means that we would complete all consultation both in North and South Korea in the 11 days, which does not seem too long a period in the light of the problem we face.

MR. TOUNKIN: We shall study this proposal and the final answer I will give later on, probably tomorrow, but this studying will not interfere

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with our working on other questions. En passant I have seen in the newspapers a list of parties and organizations which have submitted their applications, and I would like to know whether the American Delegation has given such a list to the newspapers.

DR. BUNCE: I have certainly not given any list to the press, nor have I discussed it with the press.

MR. TOUNKIN: I ask Mr. Bunce to check on this question. Now I would like to outline the position of the Soviet Delegation on one question which I consider is of great importance. The Soviet Delegation ~~sees~~ insists on the elimination from the list of those parties and organizations which are specifically created for the purpose of fighting against the Moscow Decision or which are members of other organizations created for the same purpose. The signing of the declaration by the above-named parties and organizations cannot be accepted as an expression of good faith to uphold fully the Moscow Decision, because the aims of the above-mentioned parties and organizations are incompatible with the obligation contained in the declaration to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea. The Soviet Delegation insists in particular on elimination from the list of parties and organizations those parties and organizations which are members of the so-called committee against trusteeship -- I understand that this is the name -- Anti Trusteeship. It is well known that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee was organized with the specific purpose of fighting against the Moscow Decision, and that this committee was carrying on and is carrying on active opposition against this decision. The committee declares at present that it will continue to fight against the Moscow Decision and the parties and organizations, members of the committee, which have signed the declaration have made it for the specific purpose of continuing this fight against the Moscow Decision in the process of consultation with the Joint Commission. The committee also is actively opposed to the work of the Joint ~~XXX~~ Commission. Taking this into consideration, I insist on the elimination from the list of those parties and organizations which are members of the said committee. I insist, for instance,

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on the elimination from the list of the following parties and organizations. ~~No. 12, Society for Korean Economy;~~ No. 13, Society for Study of Korean Politics and Economics; No. 37, Korean Youth Party; No. 38, Korean Popular Party; No. 224, All Korean Anti-Trusteeship Society; No. 326, New Society for Building of Korean State; No. 330, All Korean Society of Writers; No. 354, Korean Democratic Party. I should also say that some of the above-mentioned parties, for instance the Democratic Party, have recently made specific declaration on their own behalf against the Moscow Decision, after having signed the declaration. I reserve the right to demand elimination from the list of other parties and organizations created for the purpose of fighting against the Moscow Decision, or members of organizations created for fighting against the Moscow Decision, if such parties and organizations will be found in the list later on.

LT. HUGH: I regret very much that the Soviet Delegation has found it necessary to take exactly the same position that was taken by the Soviet Delegation a year ago and which led to the breakdown of the Joint Commission. I believe the position taken by the Soviet Delegation is contrary to the agreement written and signed by General Shtikov and General Brown. It is contrary to the agreement reached between the two Foreign Ministers, and will not be accepted by the American Delegation. If Mr. Tounkin is expressing the determined position of the Soviet Delegation, I suggest we adjourn and leave this for the next meeting of the Joint Commission. The position taken by the Soviet Delegation will not be accepted by the American Delegation. I move that the Subcommission adjourn.

MR. TOUNKIN: I consider that the view which I have expressed is completely in accordance with Decision No. 12, and with the agreement of the two Foreign Ministers. I would like to refer to Paragraph 1 of the Decision No. 12, in which it is said, "Signing the ~~XX~~ declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

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So a party or organization on one hand is signing the declaration and saying that it completely upholds the Moscow Decision, and at the same time retaining its signature under the program which says that this organization or party opposes and will fight against the Moscow Decision. It is clear that such a signature under the declaration cannot be accepted as a bona fide signature. That is my viewpoint. My second point is in Paragraph 3 of the same Decision it is said, "Proposal Number 3. It is suggested that it be reworded as follows: Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission." We have facts where some parties and organizations which are included in this preliminary list are opposing the Moscow Decision after they have signed the declaration, so the expressed view is based on Paragraph 1 of the Decision No. 12 in which is fixed the agreement between the two Foreign Ministers.

DR. DUNCL: In replying I would like to make this clear -- that Proposal Number 1 states signing the declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith, and that proposal Number 3 in the last paragraph states, "The decision to exclude such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission", and/the Subcommission will not accept, and I feel quite sure the American Delegation will not accept any exclusion on the basis outlined by Mr. Tounkin. I feel that there is no use in meeting as a Subcommission any further.

MR. TOUNKIN: All right -- we will adjourn now.

Meeting adjourned at 1410 hours, 27 June 1947.

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Subcommission No. I
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

TRANSCRIPT OF MINUTES OF 13TH MEETING

28 June 1947
1100 Hours

DR. BUNCE: We have made a tabulation of the consultation of parties through the 8th day, which completes this first sheet, which you will remember is just an outline. This is how the parties could be grouped to be covered. I wondered whether we could reach agreement on this general method of consultation with individuals and with groups. Mr. Tounkin said yesterday he would consider it and let us know today.

MR. TOUNKIN: I am not yet prepared to give a final answer concerning the suggestion you made yesterday concerning the groups. As to this, it is a different matter, and we shall see whether we have remarks on this schedule. The first thing is to agree on the list.

DR. BUNCE: I thought possibly we could agree on the general over-all method so that when we report to General Shtikov we won't have complete disagreement, but at least have agreement on the method of consultation.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think I will be able to give you a reply on Monday.

DR. BUNCE: The other point I thought we might be able to work out would be a statement as to why we have been unable to agree on the list. I discussed Mr. Tounkin's statement with the American Delegation and they were all very surprised at the position taken by the Soviet Delegation, and they agreed with me that they felt it was a violation of our basic agreement. I may point out to Mr. Tounkin the reasons we take this position. In Joint Decision Number 12 General Shtikov in Proposal 1 stated, "The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and social organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea, and General Hodge's letter, which was accepted by Foreign Minister Molotov, stated, "Proposal Number 1 to be interpreted as follows: signing the declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision, and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation." Proposal Number 3 which Mr. Tounkin quoted yesterday states,

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"Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission, or to either of the Allied Powers, or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission". (I want to underline the word "further".) "The decision to exclude such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission." In earlier meetings when we discussed this with Mr. Tounkin I emphasized the fact that the United States intended to live up to that agreement. If I understand the written statement of Mr. Tounkin, he proposes to exclude from the list, and therefore from initial consultation, all those parties and organizations associated with a certain committee, regardless of the fact that they have signed the declaration contained in Communique Number 5, and that that should be taken on good faith of their willingness to cooperate. It seems to me that we ought to make the issue quite clear in order that we can present a report to the Joint Commission wher we meet in Pyengyang. I was wondering whether we could not draft together a statement of the Soviet position and the American position which I can present at Pyengyang as a report of Subcommission I, and make the issue quite clear as to why we were unable to obtain any agreement or the list.

MR. TOUNKIN: Of course I have no objections against such a report, but I see no reason why we should have such a report. It is probable there is no necessity for such a report. Practically we did not discuss my suggestion made yesterday. Today Mr. Bunce also, it seems, did not state the position of the American Delegation on this question. At any rate this position is not clear to me. Mr. Bunce said that according to my suggestion made yesterday it is proposed not to admit for consultation organizations which belong to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, though they have signed the declaration. Generally speaking, that is true. I would like to make more clear my suggestion made yesterday. Yesterday

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I said that affiliation with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is inconsistent with the obligation which parties and organizations undertake by signing the declaration in Communique Number 5. That is why the parties and organizations which belong to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee may be admitted for consultation only after they will state through the central organs that they officially withdraw from this Anti-Trusteeship Committee. According to all rules it is impossible to sign with the right hand the declaration about upholding the Moscow Decision and with the left hand to sign the program of opposition to the Moscow Decision. Regarding the report, I should say that there is no necessity for this report. It will take some time to make such a report, and so far we have not made such reports. It seems to me that we do right from our side. If we submit this question for the discussion of the Joint Commission it will be quite sufficient to state to the Commission that we have not reached an agreement, and Mr. Bunce and myself accordingly will state to the American and Soviet Delegations the essence of our disagreement. It seems to me that would be much simpler.

DR. BUNCE: Do I understand Mr. Tounkin's position clearly as being this: that signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 will not be accepted as an act of good faith and will not permit a party to be eligible for initial consultation -- that is, to be included in the list?

M. TOUNKIN: Signing the declaration in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Decision Number 12 is accepted by us as an expression of good faith to uphold fully the Moscow Decision, and it gives the right for the inclusion into the list for taking part in the consultation. My theory is that the signature should be valid -- that is, there should not be such circumstances which would make such a signature not a bona fide signature. We are not blind here, and if we see that a party signed the declaration about the upholding of the Moscow Decision, and at the same time retains its valid signature under the program of the organization to which this party is affiliated and in the program of which the basic task is to wage an active struggle against the Moscow Decision, we not

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only have the right, but we can ask them which of these two signatures is valid. Let these parties themselves say which signature is valid. We do not force these parties and organizations to state which one. If a party or organization will withdraw its signature from the program of Anti-Trusteeship and will withdraw from this committee, we will accept the signing of the declaration as an expression of good faith to uphold fully the Moscow Decision. In this case there would be no contradictory statements from the same organization. I might also add that in case an organization which has signed the declaration continues or starts to instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, we should according to Paragraph 1 of Decision Number 12 exclude this organization from the list. The word further will apply in case the consultation has already started, but if consultation has not started, it does not prevent us from excluding that organization from the list, inasmuch as condition Number 3 said that "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not, after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5....." it expressed the words, "after signing the declaration..... instigate active opposition," and so on.

GEN. HUICH: I would like to make quite clear the United States position again. I thought I had made it clear before. The American position is this: that any party or social organization signing the declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision, and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation. As far as the American Delegation is concerned, there are no other requirements called for. To introduce a requirement that certain other actions be taken by a party or social organization before it is admitted for consultation seems to me to be an attempt to add in another requirement to that one which we have agreed to here in the Joint Commission, and which was agreed to by Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall. The Americans believe that no additional requirements of any

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kind should be made for inclusion of the party or social organization in the list which makes it eligible for initial consultation. The suggestion Mr. Tounkin makes denies the very spirit of proposal Number 1 which says that signing the declaration will be accepted as a declaration of good faith. Mr. Tounkin is stating, in fact, that signing such a declaration will not be accepted as an indication of good faith and is demanding that other actions be taken before we accept that party or social organization and place its name on the list. The second point that I would make is that if any individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision they shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission, and that the decision to exclude such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission. Either delegation, the United States Delegation or the Soviet Delegation, may challenge any party or social organization after it has been admitted for initial consultation, if it does instigate or foment active opposition, as stated above. I might point out that if Mr. Tounkin wishes to uphold the position he has taken, he has to show clearly that certain parties and organizations are officially members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Second, Mr. Tounkin must prove that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is opposed to the Joint Commission and to the Moscow Decision. In many cases the concept of Anti-Trusteeship is based on a misconception of the meaning of trusteeship, and what these people are opposed to is not the Moscow Decision, but to a concept of imperialism. These facts, I believe, should be placed before the Joint Commission any time the Soviet Delegation wishes to challenge a party, but I do not believe according to the wording of the agreement that we have signed that any such investigation or study should be made before parties and organizations are placed on the list and accepted for initial consultation. I would further like to point out

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the position taken by the American Delegation is consistent with Paragraph 5 of Joint Decision Number 12 which states, "Subcommission Number I upon receiving the applications for consultation shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration in Paragraph 2." If we follow the system that Mr. Tounkin is proposing it would mean not only an investigation of all these parties and their associations that belong to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, it would also mean investigating those parties and individuals who have at one time or another spoken against either of the Allies, who have attacked both Russia and the United States, and it would mean that we would have to demand from them a retraction of their statements. The American Delegation feels there is only one solution to this problem in the preparation of the list, and that is to accept the signing of the declaration that was contained in Communique Number 5 in good faith; that all actions previous to that time are wiped out, and by that act, parties and organizations and individuals have declared their intention of cooperating with the Joint Commission. If we follow the suggestion of Mr. Tounkin it seems to me that the whole of Subcommission I would be bogged down in a long series of investigations, charges and counter-charges, of definitions and interpretations, and that the work of the Joint Commission would be retarded immeasurably, and the goal which I believe we both desire, that is, the establishment of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, would be postponed for a considerable period of time. I would suggest that the Subcommission accept the list as compiled, subject only to the exclusion of such parties and social organizations that we mutually agree upon have been guilty of fraud in presenting their application, and that this list be presented to the Joint Commission when we meet in Pyengyang, and that it be understood that all parties and social organizations included in the list are subject to challenge by either delegation if, after being admitted to consultation, they do foment and instigate active opposition to the Joint Commission. I believe that if we could accept that position

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that we can go ahead with our work rapidly and avoid considerable delay. I also would suggest that if that were done that the proposal of the American Delegation regarding group consultation be accepted, and that we go ahead and prepare appointments according to the suggested schedule that we presented to Mr. Tounkin.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think that the suggestion Mr. Bunce has just outlined is in clear contradiction of Joint Decision Number 12. I will answer Mr. Bunce point by point. First, we do not advance any additional conditions to that fixed in Decision Number 12, and specifically in paragraph 1 of this Decision. We do accept the signing of the declaration as an expression of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision, but in case we are presented with two documents, with two contradictory documents signed by the same party or organization, we should investigate. I think every law will tell us that in case the same person presents two contradictory documents signed by him we should ask this person which of the documents presented is valid. So in this case when a party or organization, a member of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, presents a signed declaration, and at the same timewe have at our disposal the program of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the committee specifically created for the purpose of fighting against the Moscow Decision, we should ask this individual, party or organization which of those two documents is legally valid. If the party says that the declaration in which an obligation is contained to uphold fully the Moscow Decision, after the signing of this declaration, is valid, we will accept it. If the party states that its former signature under the program of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is being withdrawn, or has been withdrawn by this party, I stress that it is a completely logical procedure. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the same organization publicly presents two documents -- one document containing the obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision, and the other document containing the obligation to fight against this Decision. Those two documents are inconsistent, and we should take either one or the other as a valid document. I repeat that the suggestion I mentioned does not add any new condition to condition Number 1 as stated in paragraph 1 of Joint

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Decision Number 12. Mr. Bunce further stated that in this case the Soviet Delegation will have to prove that an organization or party is a member of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. I think that is very easy -- we might call upon the representative of a party or organization in question and ask him whether his organization is at present, I stress at present, not before, after signing the declaration, considers itself a member of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. If he says no, and presents on behalf of the central organ of this party or organization an official statement to this effect, we will say, "All right, now we have no doubts whatsoever." Then Mr. Bunce said in this case we should also consider whether the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee are directed against the Moscow Decision. In my opinion there is no question at all, and I would like to know the opinion of the American Delegation, and whether the American Delegation considers that the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee are not directed against the Moscow Decision. Referring to condition Number 3 as fixed in paragraph 1 of Joint Decision Number 12, Mr. Bunce said that the exclusion of parties and organizations to consultation may take place only after the list has been compiled and approved by the Joint Commission. He also referred to paragraph 5 of Joint Decision Number 12. Paragraph 5 says, "Subcommission Number I shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration Number 2", and it states that "following the approval of the Joint Commission of the list", so the list is to be approved by the Joint Commission, and it means that Subcommission I -- I think that is logical -- should present certain recommendations to the Joint Commission as to which parties and organizations should be retained in the list and which parties and organizations should be eliminated from that list. In this, Subcommission I should be guided by the conditions as outlined in paragraph 1 of Joint Decision Number 12. It would be ridiculous that Subcommission I having at its disposal information according to which certain parties and organizations are not

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eligible for consultation, would not present to the Joint Commission recommendation to eliminate or strike out those parties and organizations from the list. I think condition Number 3 in paragraph 1 states very clearly that "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not, after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5, foment or instigate active opposition" and so on. It means that if a party or organization foments or instigates active opposition after signing the declaration it should be excluded from the list, and, as I said, it would be ridiculous to put this party or organization on the list if we have information concerning fomenting or instigating by this party or organization of active opposition, as stated in condition Number 3, after signing the declaration, of course. I agree with Mr. Bunce that as far as the parties and organizations are concerned we do not take now into consideration their activities before signing the declaration, and I think I made it quite clear in my suggestion that we would not object to including into the list those parties and organizations which had previously been members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee but which have withdrawn from this committee. I think we might greatly expedite the work of the Joint Commission if we follow strictly the conditions of consultation as fixed in Joint Decision Number 12. I think we should accept the suggestion I made yesterday that parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, or parties and organizations specifically created to fight against the Moscow Decision may be admitted to consultation only after they make through their central organ a statement that they withdraw from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Second, I think we ought to go through the preliminary list compiled by us and see which parties and organizations may be admitted and which should be eliminated. Then of course we should also discuss the order of consultation. I have made some suggestions on this point, and I think it won't take us very long. It won't be difficult to agree on this order of consultation.

DR. BUNCE: I would like to ask Mr. Tounkin what specific documents he is referring to that these parties and organizations have signed which invalidates their signature to the Joint Communique Number 5. I have not

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seen any such documents. Second, I would like to know explicitly what actions of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee he calls instigating and fomenting active opposition to the Moscow Decision. Third, I cannot quite see the logic of Mr. Tounkin's position when he states that signing the declaration will be accepted in good faith and yet at the same time states that it cannot be accepted in good faith without some other statement or action to prove that it is in good faith.

Mr. TOUNKIN: Answering first to the questions, I may say that in my opinion the membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee created specifically for the purpose of fighting against the Moscow Decision is inconsistent with the obligation contained in the declaration. When I spoke of the document I meant the program and aims of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, whether the signature is here physically or not it is understood that I spoke categorically. If a party or organization is a member of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee it supports and upholds the aims and the program of work of this committee. Mr. Bunce said that it was not clear how we could accept the signing of the declaration as an expression of good faith and at the same time doubt it. I say that we do accept signing the declaration as an expression of good faith, inasmuch as there are no other circumstances which raise certain doubts. I think every lawyer will tell you that this is true -- if Mr. Bunce, for instance, promised me, gave me an obligation, that he would give me a certain house at a certain street number, but two days before he made it public that he would give that same house to Mr. Kinney, shouldn't I ask Mr. Bunce which declaration is true? Whether he gives that house to Mr. Kinney or to me? It is the same thing here. A party or organization declares that it will support to fight against the Moscow Decision, and today by signing the declaration it declares that it will uphold the Moscow Decision. Which one of the declarations are we to believe? Isn't it a justifiable question? Let the parties and organizations tell us if they withdraw from the committee, and that is all right, but I stress once more that membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee contradicts the obligation contained in the declaration.

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MR. BUNCE: I would make another legal simile and point out that whenever a person signs a new will which postdates an old will, the old will is always invalidated. Further, I would say that in the case of the house which I promised Mr. Tounkin that he would be much wiser if he got me to sign the contract and then sued me for breach of contract at a later date. I take it from Mr. Tounkin's remarks that he does not have any document showing the signatures of these parties or organizations as members of this Anti-Trusteeship Committee. I have not seen any such document, and that is why I raised the question. I would like Mr. Tounkin if he has such a document to present it to the American Delegation. I would also like to know the date on that, because it is a matter of when they signed it, legally. I would feel that the Joint Commission should not be worrying about these people that we should accept them for consultation. If there is such a document, which has not been proved, then the people who ought to be worried are the Anti-Trusteeship Committee leaders. I would like to also mention that Mr. Tounkin did not specifically answer the question I asked before as to what activities of this Anti-Trusteeship Committee constitute instigating and fomenting active opposition to the Moscow Decision.

MR. TOUNKIN: First, there is such a document. It was published January 17, 1947, and it is called "Text of the Joint Declaration of 35 Representatives of Parties and Organizations included Into the Anti-Trusteeship Committee." Second, Mr. Bunce is right when he said that the signature of a new will wipes out the previous will. Let me in this connection ask you -- do you consider that the signature of the declaration by the parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee wipes out their signatures under the document which I just mentioned? Third, regarding the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, directed against the Moscow Decision, I think that this question could hardly be considered an appropriate one. These actions or activities are well known to everyone, and if Mr. Bunce wants to prove that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee does not act against the Moscow Decision and that it is not a committee against Trusteeship, let Mr.

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Bunce prove it. I might add that the doubts regarding the validity of these signatures is founded regarding some parties and organizations which in 1946 signed the declaration, then withdrew their signature, and now again sign the same declaration.

DR. BUNCE: I would say in reply to Mr. Tounkin's specific question that I would accept the signing of the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 as an act of good faith, and would admit the party for initial consultation. If they later are associated with any organization or group which deliberately instigates and foments active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission, either of the Allies, or the Moscow Decision, I should then immediately challenge their eligibility for further consultation. There is a well-known and widely accepted concept that a man is innocent until he is proven guilty. The burden of proof both as regards membership and the activities lies with the prosecution. The United States Delegation is not prosecuting anybody. We are accepting their statements in good faith.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think that if the American side will accept the position that the parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee which will not declare their withdrawel from this committee, those parties are excluded from the consultation, then we will not have any difficulty in establishing which parties are members of this committee. We may call on the representatives of parties and organizations about which we have some information that they are members of this committee, or which have been members of this committee, and ask these representatives if they are now members of this committee or not. If the representatives of parties and organizations would state that those organizations had withdrawn from this committee, it would be quite sufficient for us to know about this, and if a party or organization states officially it is no more a member of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, that would be enough.

DR. BUNCE: It seems to me much simpler to accept the American position that by signing the Joint Communique offering to uphold the work of the Joint Commission that they have repudiated any intention that they may

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have had, and that would have to be proved, to foment and instigate active opposition to either of the Allies, to the Joint Commission or to the Moscow Decision. There have been other groups which have violently attacked the United States. Would Mr. Tounkin have us call in all those representatives and ask them if they repudiate their previous statements? I can see no solution to the problem of compiling a list on the basis presented by the Soviet Delegation.

MR. TOUNKIN: The proposal which I made is based on condition Number 1, first of all, in which it is said that the signing of the declaration is accepted as an expression of good faith about fully upholding the Moscow Decision. In the declaration is really an obligation that is about the upholding of the Moscow Decision. I have stated that the signing of this declaration, in which there is an obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision, is inconsistent with membership in the Anti-Trusteeship committee. I repeat once more that we are not speaking of the organizations that previously have been members of this committee. If at present this organization takes an obligation to fully uphold the Moscow Decision and will declare that this organization has withdrawn from this committee, we can admit this organization for consultation. That is the first point which is based on condition Number 1. The second fully unquestionable point is fixed in condition Number 3, that if persons or parties or organizations after signing the declaration will instigate or foment active opposition against the Joint Commission, one of the Allies, or against the Moscow Decision, then this organization should be excluded from the consultation. If the Soviet or American side has such a proof, then of course this question should be considered. This proposal Number 3 says only activities after signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5.

DR. BUNCH: I agree with Mr. Tounkin one hundred percent for once in that paragraph 3 applies only after they have signed the decision to support the Joint Commission. I would like to point out that Mr. Tounkin's position has recently been expressed quite differently from the position which he took yesterday, and I quote from his statement, "Taking this

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into account, I insist on the elimination from the list of those parties and organizations which are members of the said committee. I insist, for instance, on the elimination from the list of the following parties and organizations....." Then he went ahead and listed a large number of parties and organizations. Further, he went on to state, "I reserve the right to demand elimination from the list of other parties and organizations created for the purpose of fighting against the Moscow Decision, if such parties and organizations will be found in the list later on." Mr. Tounkin now is stating that he is not demanding the elimination of these parties from the list, but that they be tried by Subcommission I before being accepted for inclusion in the list. Mr. Tounkin in fact is stating, "I do not believe that you have signed the declaration in good faith. I do not believe that you intend to cooperate with the Joint Commission, unless you give me additional proof." I think that is against the spirit and the meaning of paragraph 1 in Joint Decision Number 12 taken from the letter of General Hodge. I think that it would be much simpler to accept this signature, as it has been publicly announced, as an act of good faith. In some ways I think Mr. Tounkin reflects some of the early concepts of the Catholic Church when a person had to go out and do pennance before they were considered acceptable. The Association to which Mr. Tounkin has been referring made its statement last January. I do not know exactly the status of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee today, whether it is active, or how many organizations are associated with it. I do not even know whether the Anti-Trusteeship Committee itself would be unwilling to cooperate with the Joint Commission in helping to establish a Korean Provisional Government today. I do feel, however, that all those problems would have to be thrashed out if any procedure such as that suggested by Mr. Tounkin were followed. I cannot see why signing a statement last January, if such a statement could be interpreted as fomenting and instigating active opposition, why that act also should not be forgotten as Mr. Tounkin has stated other statements and other actions should be forgotten, and that the concept of exclusion should not be retroactive. I cannot see why individuals, parties or

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organizations which have made inflammatory and derrogatory statements against either of the Allies should be forgiven and forgotten, whereas meeting with this committee is apparently something in a different category. I cannot quite see the distinction between these positions outlined by Mr. Tounkin. The American position is clear -- that signing Communique Number 5 eliminates all past actions and makes any party or individual eligible for initial consultation. Any later opposition is taken care of in paragraph 3 when either delegation may bring before the Joint Commission for its consideration any actions which foment and incite active opposition to either of the Allies, to the work of the Joint Commission or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea. I might say that this discussion to my mind has greatly clarified the position of the Soviet Delegation, and I think it has been well worth while from that point of view. I only wish that we could go one step further and reach agreement to accept signing of the declaration in Communique Number 5 as an act of good faith and let it go at that. I believe that our work would progress rapidly and that we could very soon come to an agreement on the methods of consultation.

MR. TOUNKIN: I also consider that today's discussion was useful because it clarified the position of both sides. As the French proverb says, "The clash of opinions leads to truth". Yesterday I said that we should carefully discuss this question, and that this question is a very serious one. I may agree with Mr. Bunce also that the signing of the declaration wipes out the past, but such a signing of the declaration assumes for parties and organizations certain obligations in the future. When we have some information which gives us a possibility to accept the signing of the declaration as an expression of good faith, then we should clarify. When the information does not permit us to accept and leads to some doubts, I don't propose any trial, but association with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is inconsistent with the obligation contained in the declaration. Parties and organizations associated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee could be admitted for consultation if they officially declared that they have withdrawn from

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this committee. In order to make a step ahead I would like to know the answer -- whether Mr. Bunce is agreed with the proposal that membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is inconsistent with the obligation contained in the declaration -- that is, the obligation to fully uphold the Moscow Decision? If Mr. Bunce agrees with that, but if in his opinion the signing of the declaration in itself means ipso facto that such an organization by doing so is withdrawn from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, then in such an event it would be much better that certain parties and organizations would declare publicly about their withdrawing or non-association with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

DR. BUNCE: I could not answer Mr. Tounkin's question regarding the Anti-Trusteeship Committee at the present time because I do not know enough about its programs and policies to state whether it could be accused of inciting and fomenting active opposition to the Moscow Decision. Second, I believe that any party that has signed the declaration in the Communique has publicly declared its intention to cooperate with the Joint Commission, and that if it does not do so, but goes back on its word, then that party or organization should be excluded by mutual agreement of the Joint Commission under paragraph 3. In addition to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee there have been some organizations in South Korea that have been violently opposed to both of the Allies. Those organizations are still existing, and many parties and social organizations in the list belong to such organizations. The position of the American Delegation is that by signing Communique Number 5 all these parties and organizations have eliminated the past and that they are acceptable for consultation. If we followed Mr. Tounkin's proposal of investigating the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and its membership, we would logically be forced to investigate many other organizations and their membership. That is why I say I think that the scheme is unworkable and would result in an interminable delay in achievement of the task that we have before us. I suggest that on the basis of our discussions yesterday and today I prepare a brief report for the Joint Commission, and that after presenting my report I shall ask Mr. Tounkin to express his opinion on any corrections and distortions or errors that he may feel I have made so

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that we have both points of view fully and correctly presented to the Joint Commission. I had hoped when we met in Pyengyang we could say to General Shtikov that we have had an agreement in Subcommission I.

M. ROUNKIN: Regarding the report, I believe that there is no necessity to make such a report, and if it would be necessary to have such a report it should be my task because I was the chairman during this week. I propose another way -- not to waste time on making such a report and discussing it again, but to both think over all the questions which were raised and discuss in the Subcommission this question once more. Maybe after the weekend when we have a rest we will gather in Pyengyang and try to get once more an agreement. It is better to present an agreement to our chiefs than a report on disagreement. Second, Mr. Bunce confused two quite different questions. I have mentioned this because these two questions should not be confused, and it will lead to a misunderstanding. Mr. Bunce says that there are some organizations which were opposed to the Allies. It is probable there are such organizations, and it is probable that they have signed the declaration. Let us follow the decision which was reached by us. In this decision it is said that if after the signing of the declaration there will be active opposition on the side of parties and organizations, such parties and organizations should be discussed in the Joint Commission about their exclusion from the list for consultation. Quite another question is regarding the organizations associated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. If any organizations have signed the declaration and continue to be a member of this committee, then it is inconsistent one with the other. But if they after signing the declaration have withdrawn from the committee, then they should publicly announce that. We should have clarity on this question. It is very important that Mr. Bunce give a concrete answer to our proposal. I propose to adjourn now and to think over all the questions which were raised on the consultation, and to gather in Pyengyang and discuss this question once more in the Subcommission before this question will be submitted to the Joint Commission.

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DR. BUNCE: I agree to meet Mr. Tounkin personally in Pyengyang, but we cannot meet as a Subcommission because the members of the Subcommission are not going to Pyengyang. ~~I think I should make it quite~~ clear that these two cases which Mr. Tounkin suggests I have mixed are not mixed or confused. They are identical. These organizations which have opposed the allies have made no statement that they do not so do at the present time. We are perfectly willing to take parties and social organizations on faith when they have signed the declaration. I think that I have made the American position clear, and I hope that after Sunday's rest we may be able to meet in Pyengyang and find an agreement before meeting with the Joint Commission. There is nothing I would like better than to meet such an agreement.

MR. TOUNKIN: May we add to that that those are two different questions. One question is that such and such an organization voices opposition to this Ally or that Ally before signing the declaration. It is clearly stated here that we do not take into consideration activities which took place before signing the declaration. It is clear, I think. But if an organization continues to be a member of the organization specifically created to fight against the Moscow Decision, it raises doubt, or rather invalidates the signature under the declaration, therefore we should clarify whether this organization is a member or not. We have some information that those organizations still cooperate with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, so we as a Joint Commission should say then definitely that if they want to be admitted to consultation they should withdraw from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. That is the position, and that is why I ask Mr. Bunce to give a complete answer, because it all depends on his answer if we accept the position that Anti-Trusteeship Committee membership is compatible with the decision to uphold the Moscow Decision contained in the declaration, and it is quite obvious that parties and organizations which up to now have not publicly announced their withdrawing from the Committee should do so.

DR. BUNCE: The difference in point of view is that we accept the declaration as a statement to cooperate, a public statement, and that if, as you claim, the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is aiming to destroy the

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work of the Joint Commission, then we accept the declaration as meaning that those people have withdrawn from that activity and that if they continue it, or engage in any other activity fomenting or inciting active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission, then we exclude them under paragraph 3. There is no question about that.

Meeting adjourned at 1415 hours, 28 June 1947.

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SECRET

TRANSCRIPT OF 14TH MEETING OF JOINT SUBCOMMISSION NO. 1
1000 HOURS 2 JULY 1947 PYONGYANG, KOREA

MR. BUNCE - Chairman

MR. BUNCE: I think the best thing that we can do is to prepare a joint list and present it to the Joint Commission; and if the Soviet Delegation has reservations, they can present those to the Joint Commission, and if we have reservations, we can present those to the Joint Commission. As a Subcommission, I believe it is our job to simply make an inclusive list. I might quote from your own statement, "Subcommittee No. 1 shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration in No. 2." That was paragraph 5. Then you went on, and it states, "following the approval of the Joint Commission of the list." So, the list is to be approved by the Joint Commission. I think this is the logical order of recommendations to the Joint Commission as to which parties and organizations should be retained in the list and which parties and organizations should be eliminated from that list. My proposal is that we present the joint list together, all inclusive, and that the Russian Delegation then present to the Joint Commission the parties and social organizations that it wishes to question in the Joint Commission, and we will do the same thing. If this procedure were followed and we could adopt the American proposal on the order of consultation, it would mean that we could go ahead and start our consultation immediately on the 7th of July as we have already announced publicly.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think on 7 July the consultation should begin. The proposal of Mr. Bunce is that we should submit these questions to the Commission. I would like to compile the list of parties and organizations who signed the applications, and after we have submitted the recommendations, we would be able to discuss the list. We should make recommendations first in order that the Commission

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may be able to approve what we have done and compile the list of parties and organizations which, according to the conditions adopted by the Commission, should participate in the oral consultation. That is why we have not yet agreed as to which parties should be left on the list. We having nothing to submit to the Joint Commission. I think it is not the right thing to do. As we have not completed our work in this respect, the Joint Commission would charge us with it again. In order not to delay the beginning of consultation, I would like us to do as I proposed previously--say tomorrow we will present to the Joint Commission the list of parties and organizations we agreed upon and the list of parties on which we have no discrepancies--on which we have already agreed. Last time we discussed my proposal of not using parties and organizations which are members of anti-trusteeship committees. Dr. Bunce did not give a final answer on this matter last time. I would like Dr. Bunce to tell the position of the American Delegation on this matter. I also propose not to include into the list of parties and organizations of local character such parties and organizations, for instance, as #6, the Union of Young Men of some districts, #20, Christian Association of some provinces, and #138, the League of Young Men, and others. It does not matter whether they have branches in provinces or not. I propose that we exclude those which are regional or provincial organizations but not zonal organizations. I propose that we not include into the list organizations which are not social ones--for instance, #43, the Korean Transport Society. As far as we know, this organization is a commercial one; it is not a social one. The Chambers of Commerce are also commercial ones, I think. I am not quite sure of that. The Korean Industry and Medical Institute is another, and there are others. We may be obliged to find out whether there are in reality such organizations because nobody had ever heard about them. What about the list of parties and organi-

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zations of North Korea? I would like Dr. Bunce to make some comments on this matter.

DR. BUNCE: I have very little to say regarding the North list of parties and social organizations except that it appears to me to be rather narrow in its representation and, of course, all parties and organizations appear to be associated with the People's Front. I have stated quite clearly the United States position in regard to exclusion in Subcommission No. 1. It is this: We will not accept any additional clauses in Joint Decision No. 12, but will accept that Decision as it is written and as it has been agreed to. Mr. Tounkin is continually trying to write into that agreement additional words and additional basis of exclusion. There is no basis of exclusion in that decision by the Subcommission. I have stated that any exclusion in the Subcommission would have to be on some sort of a broad basis such as membership. For example I suggested that we might limit the membership to 5,000. That has never been given any consideration. I also suggested that we would exclude from consultation those parties and organizations which have been guilty of fraud. We mentioned three organizations on that basis. That is the United States position. These are the suggestions that Mr. Tounkin has made in this Subcommission: (1) That we exclude all parties which have no branches.

MR. TOUNKIN: I stated that?

DR. BUNCE: You stated that as one of your proposals. I can quote your very words.

MR. TOUNKIN: Your interpretation. I never said that.

DR. BUNCE: You pointed out that the exclusion of all these agencies which did not have branches and therefore did not have central organizations. This would be unfair because it would eliminate some very large groups which did not have branches and would leave in some small groups which had a very small group.

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My reply to your suggestion was exactly along those lines. That was your suggestion and I answered it in those terms. The second point you have repeated is that we exclude all local organizations. The third suggestion was that we exclude all or anizations associated with anti-trusteeship. Then you said we should have these people make a public declaration that they have left the anti-trusteeship committee and that we would not accept as good-faith their Communique No. 5, and finally, you have suggested that we exclude what you classify as not being social organizations. You suggested, for example, the Chamber of Commerce as being commercial organizations but left in the trade unions which are just as much commercial but represents a different group of people. There is one thing that you have in common in every one of your suggestions. Every one of them would eliminate groups which are not associated with the People's Front in South Korea. It leaves to one inevitable conclusion--that the Soviet Delegation is using the Joint Commission to interfere in Korean internal political matters on a partisan basis. I believe that this position is most undesirable and is unworthy of the work of the Joint Commission. Mr. Tounkin suggested that we present a partial list. It is completely unacceptable to the U.S. Delegation, because according to all the documents we have signed exclusion can only come after signing Joint Decision No. 5 and exclusion can only be made by agreement of the Joint Commission. Mr. Tounkin is obviously trying to institute a method of unilateral exclusion by saying that, "I will not agree to these people being on the list, therefore we cannot have a list, therefore, we cannot consult." I think that this is a complete misinterpretation of all agreements we have had. It ~~converts~~ reverses completely the agreement made between Mr. Molotov

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and Mr. Marshall. It is completely against the very intentions of Joint Decision No. 12 and I would ask Mr. Tounkin one question and I would like a very direct answer. Why is it that he has spent weeks and weeks attempting to find a basis of excluding certain parties and organizations? What is the motive? What is the necessity and why should we continue it? I might add that the American Delegation has presented in Subcommission No. 1 a complete proposal which would enable us to meet all these people and consult with them in a period of 12 days. There is no basis for excluding these parties and social organizations on the excuse that we have not time to meet with them and their delegates. The American Delegation feels that we have made a public committment in North and South Korea and that the Joint Commission should live up to the public committment. I believe that we can do this and go ahead rapidly with our work if Mr. Tounkin will agree to accept the list and the methods of consultation presented by the American Delegation. If he cannot accept this position then I would like an explicit definite statement as to the motives of the Soviet Delegation in pursuing exclusion.

MR. TOUNKIN: Mr. Bunce stated wrong that the Soviet Delegation is trying to make use of the Joint Commission to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea on a partial basis. I consider that such an implication of Mr. Bunce is taken from the arsenal of the American reactionary press, and is harmful and improper. I reject it. As well with the same right I could implicate that the American Delegation is trying to draw into the list some kinds of organizations which would contradict Joint Decision Number 12 of the Joint Commission and which contradicts the Moscow Decision in order to interfere with the internal affairs of Korea on a partial basis. I think that an implication like that not only cannot expedite our common work, but it may be very harmful. The Soviet Delegation is willing to fulfill exactly the Moscow Decision. The Moscow Decision

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states that the Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. It is not stated there that the Joint Commission will consult with different commercial associations, and it is natural that into the list compiled for consultation we should include only the social organizations and not the commercial associations. I have a draft of a listing of organizations which may be considered social ones. In this listing there may be some mistakes. If such mistakes are there, we should discuss them here, but I consider the question by me here is quite justified and corresponding fully to the Moscow Decision. What about the local organizations? How can it be that Mr. Bunce thinks that when the three ministers of Foreign Affairs signed the Moscow Decision they had in mind that the Joint Commission would consult for instance with the Youth Union of some district, or with the Association of Business Men of a District, Dong Dar Mun, or the Association of Friends of the District of Pogot (?). I think we shouldn't vulgarize the Moscow Decision. What about parties and organizations associated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee: I have already outlined the position of the Soviet Delegation Friday and Saturday, but I don't know the position of the American Delegation on this matter. I believe that the fulfillment of such a serious task should be carried out seriously and not mechanically. Such are the motives. I think it would be better and more expedient that instead of implications which have been made here by Mr. Bunce, we would try to tentatively discuss this matter in order that we could proceed to the fulfillment and final agreement of the matter. Now I would like to make some separate remarks. I didn't propose any new conditions. We should abide by the decisions which have been approved already. I have never proposed inclusion in the list of parties and organizations which have no branches in the provinces. I proposed to exclude the local organizations. It is not the same. A great number of organizations having no branches in provinces should be left in the list for they are of zonal character. For instance, organization number one, "Organization of Studying the Korean

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Legislative and Political Science", this organization has no branches, but the activity of this organization is of zonal character, as we may see from its title. I don't understand what Mr. Bunce had in mind by saying about the one-sided exclusions from the list. First of all, the list has not yet been submitted. There is a decision of the Joint Commission that Subcommission Number 1 should submit an agreed list of parties and organizations after discussion. Now we have to deal with the discussion of this list. The matter is not of exclusion, but of inclusion of parties and organizations for submitting them to the Joint Commission. I may remind you of the Joint Decision Number 16 which says, "On the basis of the aforementioned information there shall be compiled a complete list of parties and organizations which have applied for consultation, and a separate list of their designated representatives. A list of parties and organizations, as well as a list of their representatives shall be discussed in Subcommission Number 1, and following agreement will be submitted for approval to the Joint Commission." That is what we are doing now -- discussing this preliminary list of parties and organizations.

DR. HUNCH: I want to make it quite clear to the Soviet Delegation that the U.S. Delegation did not in any way pull any parties and social organizations into the list. The applications that came in in South Korea represented a spontaneous action of the Korean people in response to the conditions that were published by the Joint Commission in Decision Number 12. We did not in South Korea refuse any applications from parties and organizations that signed the declaration which was contained in Communique Number 5. I have repeatedly stated that the Soviet Delegation refused to accept a definition of a social organization or to establish any limitation regarding the parties and organizations which might apply for consultation. I cannot understand why the Soviet Delegation would not accept a definition earlier and would not accept our suggestions for limiting the number of parties and organizations before issuing Joint Decision

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Number 12, but want to reintroduce them now after the parties and social organizations in good faith have applied for consultation. I would also point out that Mr. Tounkin has not made it clear to me what is the difference between a so-called commercial organization and a trade union. Finally, Mr. Tounkin has not to my satisfaction explained why these small organizations should be excluded now. The Joint Commission has publicly promised to consult with them on the basis of Joint Decision Number 12. Why should we exclude any of them? Is it not much simpler to accept them rather than to give the people of Korea the impression that the Joint Decision Number 12, which was published and signed by the two chief delegates, is not actually the basis on which we will consult with these people? It seems to me that if we do that we are forcing the Joint Commission to go back on its expressed word and promise to the Korean people. We have made a public announcement that the Joint Commission will consult all parties and social organizations who signed the declaration and applied for consultation. In that decision we did not put in any definition of what we would call a social organization. We did not put in any limitation as to area to be represented by a party or organization, and it seems to me that we should have a very good reason before we should exclude any of these small local groups. They applied in good faith. For us to exclude them now might be taken as bad faith on the part of the Joint Commission. I think it is a very serious consideration. I do not see that Mr. Tounkin has given us a really valid reason for not including them in the list. The time that it would take to consult them in the small groups that we have established is a very minor problem. The only thing that he has suggested is that it would be undignified for the Joint Commission to consult with these local groups, but would it not be more undignified for the Joint Commission to put itself in the position where it might be accused of bad faith and going back on an earlier decision which was publicly announced? In regard to the specific question that Mr. Tounkin raised on parties which were associated with

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the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, I think I have made it perfectly clear what the American position is. I will repeat it again. The American Delegation will accept any party and social organization which has signed the declaration, because our agreement states that signing that declaration shall be accepted as an act of good faith and make a party or social organization eligible for consultation. We do not believe that any additional action should be required of any party or organization. I might point out that earlier when we were discussing this question of exclusion I told Mr. Tounkin that the labor involved in determining and examining all small parties and organizations which he would wish to exclude would take a long time and that in three days we could complete consultation with these small groups, to the number of 240 parties and organizations. It seems to me that the expedient and logical thing for us to do is to present the list complete to the Joint Commission with the program of consultation that we have worked out and then we can go ahead with the job very, very rapidly. If we do not do that, I can see days of delay during which we work out a definition of what a social organization is. That is not going to be easy, as I said before, and I can see no more reason for excluding a Chamber of Commerce than for excluding a trade union. Personally I would like to consult with both groups. Mr. Tounkin is perfectly right. We have a very serious obligation. I also believe that we have a very serious public commitment to the Korean people which was made and published in Joint Decision Number 12. I do not believe that the Subcommission should do anything which could ever be interpreted as repudiating that solemn declaration that we made to the Korean people. I believe most sincerely that if the Soviet Delegation wishes to define social organizations it should have been done before Joint Decision 12 was published in its present form. That is now water under the dam.

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We cannot go back and change that decision without appearing to act in bad faith. I think that the danger of harming the work of the Joint Commission is much greater if we attempt to reduce this list very considerably, as Mr. Tounkin has suggested, than if we go ahead and consult rapidly with all those who have applied in good faith. I suggest that we adjourn, as we have to have lunch. I understand the full Commission meeting is at 1:30. I will ask Mr. Tounkin to present a report on the meeting of Sub-commission 1 and I will add comments that are necessary, after he has presented his.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would like to say a few words. I regret that Mr. Bunce is not willing to accept my proposal to present to the Joint Commission a list of parties and organizations which raise no objection on either side so that we might start oral consultation on July 7th. I think that suggestion might expedite considerably the work of the Joint Commission. Then I would like to ask Mr. Bunce whether he agrees on membership in Anti-Trusteeship organizations as consistent with the obligation contained in the declaration. This question has not been answered. As for the definition as to what is a social and a commercial organization, I don't think that we have to elaborate in any way such a definition. We can go through the list and we may see which organizations may be called commercial ones. The difference between social enterprise and commercial enterprise is more or less clear. I would like to say this: I might present Mr. Bunce in a few hours with our complete suggestions as to what organizations are purely local and which are considered as non-social organizations. We might go through that list and discuss it. That may put us a step forward.

DR. BUNCE: The thing I would like from Mr. Tounkin would be a basis that would justify exclusion from the list after the public statement of the Joint Commission. Why should we exclude them?

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Social organizations should not be excluded. The Joint Commission may consult Korean democratic parties and social organizations, ~~therefore those commercial enterprises should not be~~ excluded. That is clear. We will be very glad to consider at any time the proposals of the Soviet Delegation.

MR. TOUNKIN: We can discuss it in a pratical way.

Meeting was adjourned at 1210 hours, 2 July 1947.

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TRANSCRIPT OF 15TH MEETING
SUBCOMMISSION NO. 1
U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
26 August 1947
1030 Hours

Chairman - Dr. Bunce

[illegible]: As was suggested yesterday when Mr. Tounkin and I met briefly, it was agreed we would both prepare an outline for a joint report. I have prepared one in English which I think we can condense into a fairly short concise report. Did you draft an outline?

[illegible]: Just in my head.

[illegible]: From what General Shtikov indicated yesterday, I think he would like us to get this report out in a hurry.

[illegible]: Of course the sooner the better. My opinion was that this report should be fairly complete and at the same time not so long.

[illegible]: Yes.

[illegible]: In looking at your suggestion, I am doubtful as to whether it would be necessary to say anything of the session of 1946. It might take considerable space if you take this matter up. I didn't think of that - I thought we would start with this session and go ahead that way - give a very short outline of decisions reached by the Joint Commission and, probably attach those decisions to the report. Then I think we should state the differences on the compilation of the list, the Soviet position and the American position, and then probably we should give the recent suggestions of both delegations. That would be a fairly complete report I think of what we have done and where we stand.

[illegible]: Yes, if we can use this as a basis and draw up an outline. I would like to present an outline of this report to the Joint Commission this afternoon so they can agree on it and then have Mr. Tounkin draft the Russian report and I will draft an American report and we can exchange them and see if we can fit them in together.

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[illegible]: It would be very good to present it this afternoon. [illegible] have to do a more thorough study - that is to say, you might have a few questions and after thinking it over more thoroughly we might decide it would be too long or not complete and of course we might change it later on.

[illegible]: The main thing is to get an outline we can both follow in keeping the report so we don't approach it from entirely different points of view. The first session in 1946 for example can be very brief.

[illegible]: Let's mention the introduction first.

[illegible]: It could be included in the introduction, but the [illegible] differences in the last session could be brought out [illegible].

[illegible]: All right. Let's leave it as it is.

[illegible]: Then section 2, Tokyo Tribunal, that can be very brief. I don't want to go all the way into it, only the [illegible] that would be done very briefly - giving references [illegible] giving the text, just references - the three basic [illegible] to consult briefly, [illegible] of Japan and later - by way of introduction - the letters they will be written up very shortly.

[illegible]: Why not just make on those three points - that is [illegible] an introduction.

[illegible]: Then under that sub 1, sub 2 in separate paragraphs and you would [illegible] sub 1 in the introduction and mention the declaration, the confirmation of Potsdam and the setting of the Tokyo Tribunal. Those are the three introductory factors.

[illegible]: Yes, but they are well [illegible].

[illegible]: They could be just mentioned as introductory background.

[illegible]: We will see what the introduction will be after thinking it over. What do you mean, to state the essence of the decision?

[illegible]: Yes and the basic discussion about it.

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. TURKEY: That would be the position, Soviet and American position.

t do you mean registration?

. TURKEY: We should give the total number of parties and organi-

zations making application - the people that signed Communique No. 5.

.. TURKEY: Then it should say application instead of registration.

... I have told you after this I think we should state the

... the compilation of the list, or we may say compilation

of list of parties and organizations, Soviet position; ... union

position. Just before that, Point 2, we mention only Joint Commu-

nique section No. 12, what about the questionnaires too.

. ... : That would come in the formal agreement.

. TURKEY: The questionnaires and location 12.

. ... : I was thinking the formal agreement and the

... that could come in 1.

... I: I understand, but we must take decision in order

... questionnaires.

. ... : The reason I brought it is that in the questionnaire

... is because there may be not, in the agreement to be made

tion - the two parties, the first two parties, the joint

Joint location 12 - it depends; Joint location ... Commu-

nication, there may be not ... in the questionnaire

... with the Joint Communique ...

.. ITALY: Yes so I think we should put Joint Communique

as Joint location 12 will be point 2.

.. ITALY: What was Joint location No. 10 or 12. What we could do

is state that would be ... now 5 and now 6 - we can include what I

have listed here as 6 and 7 in the discussion of the two positions

toward the question of the exclusion or inclusion.

.. TURKEY: So that will be Point 2 questionnaires, 3 Joint

Communique Decision 12, 4 applications, and 5 I think will be

compilation of list of parties for that was a question on the agenda.

Dr. ITALY: I think for that we should use, Order and Method of

Consultation.

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[illegible]: On the Agenda we used for almost a month one heading, [illegible]ation of List of Parties and Organizations. I think we may [illegible] - that was the question discussed - then Soviet position, [illegible]erican position.

[illegible]: The title, I think, comes under Program of Work.

[illegible]: My opinion is that we can joint 1, joint 2.

[illegible]: Condition for the order of consultation with democratic [illegible] political organizations, that is Consultation Question No. 3 [illegible] and Question No. 4, Extent of Consultation, the Concept of [illegible] and Question No. 5, Nature of Consultation, [illegible].

[illegible]: The Joint Communique [illegible].

[illegible]: Order of consultation is Joint Resolution Question No. 12. I do not understand the Question was [illegible] and I [illegible] be given [illegible] Consultation, [illegible] Consultation, for instance, as simply Consultation, [illegible] American position.

[illegible]: I was just thinking of using this for a heading, Conditions for and order of Consultation with Democratic Parties and Social Organizations. It comes down to a question of interpretation - we thought we had all those problems solved in Joint Decision No. 12 and then it was interpreted one way by the Soviet Delegation and another way by the American Delegation.

MR. TOLMAN: That is why we have not come to any agreement.

DR. BUNCH: Why not just call it Disagreement over Consultation. That is what it is - and then have the Soviet position and the American position.

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M. TOUMIN: Well, of course it is very broad.

D. BUNCH: What about this - Differences on the Implementation of Joint Decision 12.

M. TOUMIN: I suggest we stick close to the question we have been discussing for two months - to stick to the agenda and to put in the drafting compilation of the list of Parties and Organizations for consideration. That would be a useful heading.

D. BUNCH: But differences would come out in the discussion in relation to the position there was no list and a list which is compiled on the decisions but the position the list was prepared by both Soviet and Germans.

M. TOUMIN: Well, my oral compilation simply.

D. BUNCH - Oral compilation. Do not call it [illegible] Soviet position, Western position.

M. TOUMIN: Because my oral compilation, it would be arrangements which would be the new point 5 or the elements that we would have (a) Soviet position, (b) U.S. position. If you do that we can eliminate point 6 and 7. So what about this summary of the Basic Differences and Conclusions.

D. BUNCH: Before this I suggest to add a new point which may be entitled Recent Suggestions of Both Delegations, your suggestion of August 12, for instance, it can hardly be put into Oral Consultation. Further Proposals, new Point 6.

M. BUNCH: All right. Further Proposals. Or Proposals of Both Delegations which have not been Resolved. What would you include from the Russian Delegation?

M. TOUMIN: I think it can be put under one heading, Oral Consultation, your proposal for instance of August 12 and our reply.

D. BUNCH: Put in there Further Proposals, then Basic Differences and Conclusions.

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M. TOUMLIN: Should we say Basic Differences Already Had Before? That would be all differences outlined under heading 5 and 6.

M. BUNDY: We will leave it out?

M. TOUMLIN: We could and see if we are able to have conclusions. What about recommendations?

M. BUNDY: We are not asked for recommendations in this report.

M. TOUMLIN: Probably we better strike it out - we will see later on.

M. BUNDY: All right we leave 6 Further Proposals.

M. TOUMLIN: Maybe we should make the last one Summary.

M. BUNDY: I was thinking of that - a summary - but this will be a condensed report. I think we should leave it out at the present. Under Introduction, Sub 1; Background; Sub 2 Interim Correspondence, Sub 3; Current Session - which will all be dealt with very briefly Sub 4; Introduction, otherwise we may both write introductions which we files apart. I think with that [illegible] we could write a report that would be acceptable to both.

M. TOUMLIN: Interim Correspondence - wouldn't we say just Correspondence Between Marshall and Molotov? That is what we are interested in.

M. BUNDY: Yes, except they quoted the letters of General Hodge and Chistiakov. Following the break in both correspondence was started between Commanding Generals of North and South Korea several letters were exchanged, two of which were finally accepted by Marshall and Molotov, and then we can give a reference to the two letters - rather four letters - that is all I was thinking of - a very brief statement.

M. TOUMLIN: Just start with the current session - we started on May 21.

M. BUNDY: No. We were asked for a report on the Joint Commission which includes last year. The letter does not exclude the first session - it just says the Joint Commission - but I think that can be done in a fairly brief statement.

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M. TOUMIN: All right I suggest this, that the first three points be left out while I consult with my delegation and point 4 be accepted tentatively and before the beginning of the Joint Commission meeting that we meet for ten minutes and see what we have to exchange.

M. NIKOL: Why don't you get yours typed up. I will have this typed up in the way we agreed on and you can have yours typed up and then we can see what the differences are. From the letter I think we ought to have a brief report on the 1946 session.

M. KULIK: OK.

M. NIKOL: Obviously what they sent in the basic differences and I think that should be involved. Did your instructions say just that session?

M. KULIK: We received instructions to present a report.

M. NIKOL: I think it will have to include a brief report on the session of last June.

M. KULIK: All right.

Meeting adjourned at 1145 hours.

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TRANSCRIPT OF 16th MEETING OF
SUBCOMMISSION No. 1
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
30 August 1947, 1030 hours

DR. PUNCE: Did you get your home work finished?

MR. TOUNKIN: Certainly. Is yours ready?

DR. PUNCE: We finished it this morning.

MR. TOUNKIN: How long is yours?

DR. PUNCE: Eighteen pages. How long is yours?

MR. TOUNKIN: Twenty-one pages, but I think your pages are bigger than ours.

DR. PUNCE: I think the best thing to do would be for us to have this translated and you can have ours translated and then I will meet with the American Delegation here in Subcommission No. 1 and we will go over the Soviet proposal and you can go over our proposal and then we should meet just as soon as possible in order to see what the differences are and see if we can reconcile. I followed the outline very closely. I didn't put any headings in here -- I just numbered all the paragraphs.

MR. TOUNKIN: I didn't put any headings in either. We will study ours and each of us will prepare a new draft and we will reconcile those.

DR. PUNCE: I don't know about preparing the new draft. I think we should study the two proposals and see where they differ and then meet and see if we can get an agreement on changes which should be made. You want to change ours and we want to change yours, then we can work together and try and make up a new draft -- or would you rather we make a new draft and you make a new draft. The thing is we want to do this as quickly as possible and I think cut down the size.

MR. TOUNKIN: If we meet and discuss it before compiling a new draft that would be alright too. We could do that probably quicker than writing out a new draft.

DR. PUNCE: I think we should compare them and make detailed suggestions as to how they can be integrated.

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MR. TOUNKIN: How can we make suggestions without drafting?

DR. BUNCE: Just on the basis of an outline without writing a new one.

MR. TOUNKIN: I have no objections. When shall we meet?

DR. BUNCE: Just as soon as we can. I think if we don't meet tomorrow we ought to meet Monday at 10:30.

MR. TOUNKIN: Have you a copy of Marshall's letter?

DR. BUNCE: We got one but it is not offical and we can't release it until we receive official word. Just as soon as we have word I will send you a copy. It asks for a joint report on the 5th. We have not included in our report quotations from the record. We thought that it might be a good idea to send in a list of all the Joint Decisions and the press releases. Those could be sent by mail and the report could be given in a cable. You government and my government both have all those reports.

MR. TOUNKIN: We have included some quotations -- the latest proposals mostly.

DR. BUNCE: Yes, we have those quoted in full.

MR. ROWE: Are the proposals taken from our transcripts?

MR. TOUNKIN: We took it according to the minutes.

DR. BUNCE: Suppose we go ahead and meet on Monday at 10:30.

MR. TOUNKIN: Agreed.

Meeting adjourned at 1100 hours.

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Exec. File

[illegible] OF 17TH MEETING, SUBCOMMISSION NUMBER 1, 9-1-46
1030 HOURS

[illegible]: I have here a copy of a letter to Mr. Marshall which has been formally released. I don't know whether or not you have a copy.

[illegible]: It has been published already.

[illegible]: Yes, it has been released in the press.

[illegible]: What are the suggestions of the American Delegation as to the preparation of the joint report? You have studied our proposal?

[illegible]: We have studied your proposal of the report very carefully and it is not acceptable as a joint report to the American Delegation. I would suggest that you accept the American draft.

[illegible]: And I would suggest that you accept the Soviet draft, as a basis at least.

[illegible]: We feel that the American draft would not be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation.

[illegible]: Yes, I feel it is not acceptable. There are many objections to it which we must discuss before we decide.

[illegible]: My feeling is that if we get into a discussion of all the differences of opinion it is going to take an interminably long time to actually get a report presenting both delegations' point of view, satisfactory to each delegation. I have been through this and have used my red pencil on it, and I think if we just go through it that way it will delete a lot of delay. I would suggest the best thing to do would be to prepare a joint letter and submit both of these reports just as they are. In that letter you state that the U. S. report is not acceptable to the Soviet Delegation and that the Soviet Delegation's report is not acceptable to the American Delegation, and that both reports are included. Then I would further suggest that in that letter you include a paragraph stating that the crucial issue faced by the Joint Commission at this last meeting was the question of the method of consultation, and that if the Soviet Delegation would accept the American statement, in our papers of the American position we would accept the Soviet statement of its position and essentially put in that agreement with references to the paragraphs and the pages.

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MR. COLLIN: That is not quite clear.

MR. MUNOZ: This would be a letter from the Joint Commission signed by General Shtikov and General Brown. It would be a joint letter.

MR. COLLIN: To both governments?

MR. MUNOZ: Yes, to both governments -- which would state first of all that the two reports are included; the one prepared by the American Delegation, and the one prepared by the Soviet Delegation, and that the American report is not acceptable to the Soviet Delegation, and the Soviet report is not acceptable to the American Delegation. Then it would have a further paragraph stating that the basic issue facing the Joint Commission is the question of consultation with political parties and social organizations, which involves the interpretation of point 1 and point 3 of the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers. Then say that the Soviet Delegation's position as stated on page so-and-so is accepted by both delegations/as stated in its report, and that the American position as stated in its report on page so-and-so is also accepted by both delegations and represents the fundamental disagreement in the Joint Commission. If you wished you could expand that letter to include in part 3 the actual quotations and transmit it by cable.

MR. COLLIN: Quotations of the statement of both positions?

MR. MUNOZ: Yes, of the American Delegation and the Soviet Delegation. It is the position of the Soviet Delegation which started on page 11 going thru page 12 and page 13. Then the American position as given in our report, which starts on page 9 of the American report in English, paragraph 30. It starts at the bottom of page 9 and goes through 10, 11, and half of page 12.

MR. COLLIN: I cannot accept this proposal because I think we were charged with elaborating a Joint report. With this view the Soviet Delegation prepared its draft, and I suggest that we try to make a joint report. Your suggestion is practically to refuse the preparation of a joint report and submit two reports. I am not so pessimistic as to the possibility of elaborating a joint report because both sides will exercise their best efforts to make it. I would like to come back to my original suggestion, namely that a joint report should be submitted which deals only with the current session, starting from

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21 [illegible]. Following approximately such a plan, first we might give a very short review of the decisions passed by the Joint Commission; next would be a statement of the positions of the two delegations on the compilation of the lists of parties and organizations; and the third item would be the further proposals. I may say that this second part would be very easy -- that is, the third part -- because the further proposals are very close and are simply suggestions made by both delegations. If we accept this plan, I think we might draft a report -- a joint report. I would suggest that we prepare such a report.

MR. DULLES: The heart of the report as I see it would be the statement about the issue of consultation, and there we will have to have the position of the Americans and the Soviet position. I would suggest that you include the statement in your report of the Russian position and the American position statement. That would largely solve the second part, which would be the body of the report. You have this report divided into three parts -- first of all the joint decisions; second the question of consultation; and third further proposals. The further proposal part is very close in both reports. The question in part 2, the Soviet position, will be stated clearly in your report; and the American position will be stated clearly in our report. If you take the Soviet position from your report and the American position from our report and put the two together you have part 2 of this report. That was the part I was going to include essentially as a joint report.

MR. TOMLIN: That would be about the same. That is the way to do it, and that is what I meant. Of course I have to see once more the exposition of the American position -- the statement of the American position -- but our statement is a lot more objective. I meant that each delegation might state its position and then discuss it, because it will be a joint report signed by both delegations. We wouldn't sign what we considered not quite acceptable, nor would you.

MR. DUNN: We could sign a statement that we did not agree to the statement of the Russian position. We wouldn't have to agree with the Russian position.

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MR. FOUNTAIN: No, just a statement of position. We will state it differently of course.

MR. MUNCH: I think we can accept that general principle, with each delegation having the right to state its own position. I think we would have to accept that.

MR. POTAKIN: It is a joint report and cannot be accepted in principle.

MR. BUNCH: I would accept the Russian statement of its position if you would accept the American statement.

MR. FOUNTAIN: We have to get a joint report and there might be some changes probably acceptable to the American delegation in the joint report as a statement of position.

MR. MUNCH: I doubt it. I would then want to change some points in the Russian position (?)

MR. FOUNTAIN: If we accept your principle I'm afraid that each delegation will go too far.

MR. MUNCH: Well, you have our statement and you say you will not accept the American statement of the American position.

MR. FOUNTAIN: I have to read it once again. It is not necessary, I think, to accept this principle at all -- at least at present, but just to serve the principle that each delegation states its own position. Of course the other delegation may take exception to some parts of that statement because it is going to be included in the joint report. Otherwise your principle will be just mechanical -- the inclusion of the position. We may say the Soviet position as stated by the Soviet Delegation, and the American position as stated by the American Delegation. That is also of course possible. That will be just the mechanics.

MR. MUNCH: Yes, because otherwise you would be trying to get the American Delegation to accept your statement of the Russian position, and that would be very difficult. You express your position and our statement of the American position completely disagrees with it, so how are you going to get us to accept your position. We have two completely opposing positions.

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[illegible]: No, not the position -- the statement of the position. If you accept our proposal as to the elaboration of the joint report, according to this principle, we may try to state our position then. We will see.

[illegible]: We have stated ours and you have it now.

[illegible]: I don't know whether we can accept it.

[illegible]: You can't say now?

[illegible]: No.

[illegible]: Can you make any comments.

[illegible]: There is no need to make any comments. In this respect I suggest that if we accept the principle of composition of the joint report that we might this afternoon meet again and see what we have. Then we have enough time to make new drafts of the joint report.

[illegible]: I would have to decide certain other things. In regard to this report, I have studied it carefully and I can make comments at the very beginning here.....

[illegible]: I would like to decide in principle because you [illegible] shall have comments on the reports, and it will probably take a few hours. I would suggest not to do that. Just agree on the principle of the joint report that I suggested. It is better to start our work and meet this afternoon to prepare a draft of such a joint report.

[illegible]: Then in the first part of your suggestion we agree to discussion of all these joint decisions.

[illegible]: No discussion. Just enumeration -- does the Joint Commission accept such and such decision, and so forth.

[illegible]: That would avoid a great deal of debate over your report and over our report. As about the position regarding the 1946 meeting, should be leave that completely out.

[illegible]: Yes.

[illegible]: Now about the correspondence between Molotov and Marshall?

[illegible]: Just what concerns the present session. I think we may just refer to the correspondence regarding the reconvening of the Joint Commission on the basis of the agreement reached between the

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[illegible] ministers and arrive [illegible]. Molotov's letter of May 7th.

[illegible]: Just make a statement that the Joint Commission reconvened on the basis of that letter.

[illegible]: We might accept the two paragraphs -- the whole [illegible] presentation.

[illegible]: You might just state the first paragraph.

[illegible]: The first and the second.

[illegible]: That's serious at the end of Nig-2's. They could [illegible] right -- and we start out then just like the Joint Decisions reached, Minus discussion at all.

[illegible]: Why, not raise the issue.

[illegible] that the first part, the [illegible] portion of [illegible] paragraph. The second part [illegible] the Soviet position.

[illegible]: The statement of position of the two delegations -- the Soviet position and the American position.

[illegible]: The first part would be quite proper. There would there would have to be a considerable revision of the Soviet portion. There is also the question of the complaint about the Greeks. It is not a proposal, but a statement of fact. And we would have to put in the answer of the American Chief Commissioner.

[illegible]: Of course, we can't leave it out.

[illegible] regarding part 2.....

[illegible]: I think we will have to prepare a new draft according to this plan.

[illegible]: I doubt if there is any point in preparing a new draft regarding those positions. You have drafted your statement just as we have drafted ours. I don't see any point in making a new draft.

[illegible]: I am going to think it over before I do anything.

[illegible]: I think if we can reach an agreement on a joint report, my feeling was that the present Soviet report was so badly biased

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that it would be impossible to get an agreement, and I thought we would want to maintain many of the remarks you made in your report, but if you are willing to draft all that out of the report I think we can reach agreement. You have two opposing concepts now.

[illegible]: You suggested another way?

[illegible]: I think that is better because you can't get the U. S. delegation to agree with the Soviet position because we disagree with it fundamentally and we hardly expect you to agree to our position. We have those two statements of position and all you would need would be an introductory paragraph stating that the basic issue of consultation is so and so.

[illegible]: Only I think we had better think it over and discuss it this afternoon -- reach agreement on the second part and re-draft joint report.

[illegible]: I think that will be all right. What time shall we meet?

[illegible]: 3:00 o'clock?

[illegible]: All right. We will meet at 3:00. It will mean the report will be much shorter.

[illegible]: Yes, of course, much shorter.

[illegible]: I think we want to break the bad reputation of subcommission on not reaching agreement.

Meeting adjourned at 1110 hours.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] September 1947
1500 Hours

[illegible]: I propose that statements of both positions be charged.

[illegible]: It was the Soviet delegation who [illegible] in the [illegible].

[illegible]: [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]: I [illegible].

[illegible]: [illegible]

[illegible]: [illegible].

[illegible]: The Soviet proposal [illegible].

[illegible]: That is not so. I question the [illegible] statement that the Soviet delegation is the only delegation willing to give [illegible] agreement as soon as possible. My suggestion, which is acceptable to the American delegation, is that the only way to submit a joint report is to make a joint report.

[illegible]: Your statement does not state the American position. Your last two days are nothing but arguments. We represent two entirely different views and will not reach agreement.

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[illegible] permits one statement.

[illegible] to include two pages of argumentation based on

[illegible]: Can you rewrite your statement?

[illegible] but until I see your rewrite, I'm not [illegible] your

[illegible] statement; I might possibly [illegible] statement.

hat [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] and other related parties and organizations.

[illegible]. TOLKIN: Just registration - but when [illegible] agreement from the [illegible] - [illegible] in any list in existence, but that is relevant - that is the

[illegible]: Yes, that is the issue.

[illegible]. TOLKIN: [illegible] we cannot agree to say what is provided - it would say you refer to that paragraph.

[illegible]: This is the American position and we believe it is provided for in paragraph 5.

[illegible]. TOLKIN: Any body should understand it - it may be understood in Joint Commission Decision 12 - it says that all the parties are

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the [illegible] of the Joint Commission - [illegible] exist,
[illegible] responsible Joint Action is regarding which
parties [illegible] organizations should participate in consultation - that
was the [illegible] paragraph; that certain elements in the
position as follows - the U.S. delegation sees its position as
follows.

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DR. BUNCH: We discussed it in Joint Commission and in Subcommission No. 1.

MR. TOUNKIN: ~~I am sure we have not discussed it. We discussed your~~ suggestion of 1000, 5000 membership and two branches - that is not a definition of a social organization.

MR. KINNEY: Various criteria do make a definition for eligibility for consultation.

MR. TOUNKIN: There is no sense in that. I think if we reconsider our statements in view of these remarks we may make new statements which may be accepted as far as a joint report and I am sure the only way to state two positions in a joint report.

MR. KING: I am perfectly convinced it is a true statement and I can remember perfectly well General Brown at one time asking General Shtikov "What is a social organization?" What standard could be set as to what would be a social organization" and General Shtikov refused to give any definition or any qualifications of any kind.

MR. TOUNKIN: The Soviet Delegation defined - stated its position to the American Delegation as stated.

DR. BUNCH: That was after Joint Decision 12 was signed.

MR. TOUNKIN: Not social -

MR. KINNEY: I think both delegations agreed the heart of the issue was General Hodge's letter of December 24, the 1st and third points - ~~possibly the statement which would be mutually agreeable on both~~ points.

DR. BUNCH: I doubt it.

MR. TOUNKIN: Well we cannot agree on this point. I think we should refer the matter back to the Joint Commission.

MR. KINNEY: You have no objection to our paragraph 30 a?

MR. TOUNKIN: No objection.

DR. BUNCH: But the point is, if Mr. Tounkin accuses this of being a false statement and states that there was no such statement made, then

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I say the best thing to do is to present the two reports as written with the statement and a covering letter that the American Delegation will not approve the Soviet report and the Soviet Delegation will not approve the American report but the positions of the two delegations are stated therein.

MR. TOUMKIN: I will not accept this proposal because we have Joint Commission instructions to prepare a joint report.

MR. BUKO: If we have a disagreement we cannot prepare a joint report. I certainly am not going to have the Soviet Delegation write the American position. You want to amend all the statements in it in order to make less clear the American position. I will let you write your report. I will accept your statement if you accept ours.

MR. [illegible]: I was taking it the way you had it - our statement as a whole.

MR. BUKO: You have here three pages under the heading "The position of the Soviet Delegation". Now you say that is not the position of the Soviet Delegation - you want to add more pages.

MR. [illegible]: The Soviet position and the summary to it.

MR. BUKO: This again does not follow the agreed outline - the agreed outline was, the Soviet Delegation would state its position, and the American Delegation would state its position - and now you are saying the statement you have given as the position of the Soviet Delegation is not the position of the Soviet Delegation - you have to add a great deal more to it.

MR. TOUMKIN: I understand and I was right because the American draft just was my impression that you intended to outline a discussion - not only outline but state the American position very clearly and you did. I suggest again not to waste our time - suggest again that we reconsider our statements so that we make them acceptable.

MR. BUKO: If your statement as presented here is to be retained you will have to reconsider it.

MR. TOUMKIN: I mean both statements - not only the Soviet statement. If you do not suggest this statement, I suggest referring the matter back to the Joint Commission and not to waste time.

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GEN. BUNCE: And you will not accept the suggestion that both reports be sent forward with a covering letter stating the Soviet report represents the Soviet position and the American report the American position and that neither delegation would approve of the presentation of the other delegation?

GEN. DUNN: I think this suggestion is not in line with the instructions received from the Joint Commission.

GEN. BUNCE: And you also refuse to have the American Delegation prepare its position?

GEN. DUNN: That is what I suggested.

GEN. BUNCE: We have presented it to you and you will not accept it.

GEN. DUNN: I won't accept it in such form.

GEN. BUNCE: I told you I would accept your statement as that if you would accept ours and you refused to accept the American statement.

GEN. DUNN: You said you won't accept the Soviet statement - you won't accept only part of the statement of the position.

GEN. BUNCE: It is all here together as it was in the document - "The Position of the Soviet Delegation" - 2 pages - now you say you want to change that.

GEN. DUNN: No I don't want to change it. If you read our draft you will see that the position of the Soviet Delegation stated in two places --

GEN. BUNCE: That was not according to the outline we agreed on.

GEN. DUNN: It is according to the actual facts from the American Delegation make the same thing.

GEN. BUNCE: No, we have our position all in one place here. I suggest if you refuse to accept the American statement of its position that we turn it back to the Joint Commission.

GEN. DUNN: I suggested if you don't want to both reconsider our statements - as I understand you don't want to reconsider - in this case I think we must refer the matter back to the Joint Commission.

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Dr. SUC: Let's get this straight - I was willing to accept the Soviet statement of its position as included in their report if the Soviet Delegation would accept our statement as included in the American report.

Mr. SMITH: I understand - but you have not read carefully our draft complete - if you had done it you would have seen -----

Dr. SUC: What you have done in your draft is add a new section which is not included in the outline and you have not drawn up a report according to the outline we agreed on.

Mr. SMITH: It is according to the outline. It just starts for the proposals - it does not change anything.

Dr. SUC: There is no place in the outline for a refutation of the Soviet or American position - that was left out. You have put in the Soviet position and then added a new section which is a refutation of the American position - that was not included in the outline.

Mr. SOKOLIN: I suggest if you don't want to accept the Soviet position as it is outlined in the present report - you may have reasons for that - and I can't accept the American position as it is outlined in the American draft - I think we should both rewrite those statements so they may be included in a joint report and do just a mere statement of facts and refrain from adding - otherwise I think we cannot come to ~~a satisfactory~~ agreement.

Dr. SUC: The only statement you can make is the Soviet and American Delegation differed as to who should participate in consultations - the rest is all argumentation.

Mr. SOKOLIN: Why do you say that the American Delegation, for instance is of this opinion on this point and this point and refers in this respect to this document and so on - and the Soviet Delegation insists on this point - facts which have taken place in the Joint Commission.

Dr. SUC: If you want to draft a new statement of the Soviet position we would consider it certainly, but it has to be in one section - the statement of the Soviet position - and then after we have reviewed that we can see whether we have to revise the American position - we probably would not.

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[illegible]. MCCLOY: My suggestion is to revise both statements because in my opinion the American statement also should be revised.

[illegible]. BURT: If you want to prepare a new statement of the Soviet position and present it to us we can examine it and it may be possible that in the light of that statement it would be possible to revise the American statement.

[illegible]. MCCLOY: I suggest once again to revise both statements.

[illegible]. BURT: But in the light of your remarks, I say we would get no where.

[illegible]. MCCLOY: I would suggest we revise both and make acceptable is the only way to prepare a joint report.

[illegible]. BURT: I suggest we throw it back to the Joint Commission and I will suggest the two reports be forwarded.

[illegible]. MCCLOY: I will suggest to the Joint Commission - - General Shtikov will call the next meeting?

[illegible]. BURT: He is chairman.

[illegible]. MCCLOY: Once more we do not get in agreement.

Meeting adjourned 1545 hours

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19th

Bunce

TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING OF
SUBCOMMISSION NO. 1
1030 Hours, 3 September 1947

MR. TOUMKIN: Have you prepared a redraft of your position?

DR. BUNCE: We have run off a new report very much shorter than the old one which omits all the argumentation in the first part. It lists the Joint Decisions upon which agreement was reached and then it leaves a blank space for the Soviet Delegation's position, and then the statement of the American Delegation follows and that is essentially the same as the other.

MR. TOUMKIN: We have redrafted the statement of the Soviet position.

DR. BUNCE: How about the other -- the listing of the Decisions?

MR. TOUMKIN: I'm sorry but we have not prepared them completely. I hav the first part but I have not the second.

DR. BUNCE: Suppose we exchange these documents then you can see the introduction. We used the first two paragraphs of the Soviet proposal and added one paragraph from our proposal so the first page is a joint page. We left a blank space for your proposal.

MR. TOUMKIN: My redraft I have left out the argumentation. If you haven't changed the American statement, I may give you some remarks about what I consider.

DR. BUNCE: Suppose we go over the American statement point y point and see where you object and what you specifically suggest for change. It starts on page 4.

MR. TOUMKIN: Point "A" no remarks. Point "B" -- when we compare the it with our wording, we tried to underline that it is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation so that it wouldn't be absolute, as for instance you say "As provided in para. 5, Joint Commission Decision No. 12." Now I told you yesterday about automatic inclusion into the list, that it is the opinion of the American Delegation -- you stated that.

DR. BUNCE: Let me mention one thing, we had a list and the American Delegation stated its position as follows -- this is all the statement of the American Delegation you see, and the American Delegation, if

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you put that sort of a heading, takes the responsibility for this statement all the way through.

MR. TOUKIN: Yes, but as I told you yesterday, that wouldn't be exactly right. It would be two different proposals -- two separate papers. I would like to have really a joint report so that the statement of positions could be factual statements.

DR. PENCE: Well, lets go through this and see. The thing in "B" you want to have stricken out reads "in the opinion of the U.S. Delegation.

MR. TOUKIN: (Reads proposal) I told you yesterday, we have discussed the question of eligibility. While discussing the point concerning the list of parties and social organizations the first point was that which states that the position of the Soviet Delegation nullifies the agreement between Marshall and Molotov. In my opinion, such expressions should be left out. We do not use such conclusions in our report. It is factual statements. About the veto power, also we may leave it out. I may say that there is practically no question of veto power. The word was used by the American Delegation probably because it is on the front pages of the leading American newspapers. You leave this characteristic. It may be needed a little slight change in the statement of the Soviet Delegation's position. Now "C". (Reads proposal) Now as I told you yesterday, the American Delegation has not suggested any definition of social organization, of course, you may leave here that it is the opinion of the American Delegation that Joint Commission Decision No. 12 does not contain a definition of social. That is the statement of the American Delegation. Point "D". (Reads proposal) Well, I may remind you that we asked for this proposal many times. The American Delegation's proposal was very bad and she didn't want to present a list which might be discussed. I don't know how to draft it but this is not quite correct in this wording.

DR. PENCE: I think that it has reference to the suggestion we made that we eliminate small organizations -- I think all under 1,000 members.

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MR. TOUNKIN: On July 31 you made a suggestion that certain groups might be discussed for removal from the list. It was not very clear. We asked for specific suggestions and the American Delegation refused to give them. Point "E" - no remarks. Point "F" (reads proposal). It is not a fact -- it is the opinion of the American Delegation -- "failure of the Soviet Delegation to bring charges."

DR. BUNCE: Well, this was all written as the opinion of the American Delegation.

MR. TOUNKIN: We agreed that we will give factual statements and not just a statement of position by each Delegation seperately. Point "G" (reads proposal). I think the whole wording of this paragraph is not acceptable. There is nothing practical in the way of factual statements and the rest -- those figures -- in my mind we should leave them out. At least, I did not include in the Soviet Delegation's statement any figures. It is a very controversial matter. These are all the remarks I have at present. When I study the new draft of the American position I will probably have some other remarks, I don't know. In most instances the wording should be changed. Of course, we cannot stick to the wording we use in our unilateral statements.

DR. BUNCE: I think the comments you have made really show the statement of the American position as presented as not acceptable to the Soviet Delegation and yet, if we modify the statement along the lines that you suggested you would not have a statement of the American position. You have this problem of having two distinctly opposing positions -- the US taking one position and the Soviet Delegation taking another position and I don't see how you can have a joint report that would mean anything unless these two opposing positions are clearly and explicitly stated. I wonder if we could take the statement of the Soviet Delegation's position and read that paragraph by paragraph now.

MR. TOUNKIN: The first three paragraphs are the same.

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DR. FUNCE: We won't translate the first three paragraphs -- just start with point 4.

(not translated):

Below are stated the positions of both Delegations regarding the question of compilation of a list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission:

THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

1. Among the parties and organizations of Southern Korea which had filed applications for participation in consultation, there were organizations which are not social -- mercantile and industrial companies, administrative institutions, schools, etc., whereas the Moscow Decision on Korea stipulated consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include into the list for consultation those organizations which are not social.

2. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that among those filing applications for participation in consultation from South Korea there were branches of central organizations, narrowly local insignificant organizations, of non-social character. The Soviet Delegation proposed not to include these organizations into the list for consultation, declaring that in its opinion, the Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission stipulates consultation with democratic parties and social organizations of zonal scale. At the same time the Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations of both Northern and Southern Korea is very great and that if the Joint Commission would consult with all local insignificant organizations, its work would be greatly delayed and confused.

3. The Soviet Delegation declared that in accordance with the Agreement reached between the Foreign Minister of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the U.S., George C. Marshall, during April - May 1947, the Joint Commission must consult with democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the

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Moscow Decision on Korea and which after signing the declaration do not incite active opposition against the work of the Joint Commission or against one of the Allied Powers or against the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

On the basis of this, the Soviet Delegation introduced a proposal stating that parties and social organizations which had filed applications for participation in consultation which are affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee may be admitted to consultation only provided they withdraw from that Committee and cease struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission. (translated for record):

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that after the reconvention of the Commission and even following the publication of the decisions of the Joint Commission on the order of consultation, the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had not only failed to discontinue, but as is shown by numerous and widely known facts presented by the Soviet Delegation at the sessions of the Joint Commission that actually intensified its struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, striving to frustrate its work on the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Until and unless the parties and organizations are affiliated with that Committee, that they withdraw from that Committee, they continue to bear responsibility for its activities. The Soviet Delegation further indicated that parties and organizations affiliated with Anti-Trusteeship Committee, having signed the declaration, thus undertook the obligation to fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea. At the same time, while continuing their membership in that Committee, the aforementioned parties and organizations retained their signature under the program of the Committee which contains the obligation to struggle against the Moscow Decision and they continue actually to participate in the struggle against the Moscow Decision. The one is not compatible with the other.

4. The Soviet Delegation has frequently proposed to summon to

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the sessions of Subcommission No. 1 or to sessions of the Joint Commission the representatives of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee in order to more fully define their position regarding the Moscow Decision and the work of Joint Commission. The American Delegation declined these proposals.

5. The Soviet Delegation declined the assertion of the American Delegation claiming that the inclusion of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee into the list for the consultation is indispensible in order to preserve the definite and alegedly firmly established correlation in the political life of Korea between the parties of the rightist and leftist orientation in proportion of three to two. Pointing out that it is impossible to conduct the work of the Joint Commission upon party basis, the Soviet Delegation declared this Joint Commission must be predicated, as regards the question of consultation with Korean parties and organizations, upon the attitude of those latter toward the Moscow Decision and not upon their belonging to this or that political orientation.

6. And listing the preliminary list of parties and organizations of Southern Korea submitted to Subcommission No. 1 by the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation noted the total membership of these parties and organizations expressed by figures of 70,000,000 individuals while the entire population of Southern Korea [illegible] of approximately 18,000,000 people. This signifies that every adult Korean whether a man or a woman maintains membership in 3 organizations which is remote from the actuality. Such a contention could not fail to arouse doubts regarding the correctness of the information submitted by some of the parties and organizations especially so since soon thereafter the facts of submission of false information had been established in Subcommission No. 1. Furthermore, even in the course of the preliminary study of the South Korea list, nonexistent organizations has been disclosed. In this connection, the Soviet Delegation proposed to check the organizations whose existence or whose membership arouses doubts.

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7. Whereas the discussion regarding the list was delaying the beginning of the oral consultation, the Soviet Delegation in order to expedite the work of the Commission, had many times proposed to begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations regarding consultation with which there were no objections on either the Soviet or the American Delegation without awaiting for the compilation of the final list. This proposal was declined.

8. The Soviet Delegation is likewise frequently proposed to charge Subcommission No. 1 with examining specifically the objections or remarks regarding each organization separately but the American Delegation declined these proposals.

9. As regards the question of compilation of the list the Soviet Delegation declared that whereas Subcommission No. 1 had not submitted an agreed list of parties and organizations, it revolves upon the Joint Commission to decide which parties and organizations which had filed application must be included into a list for i itial oral consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision and Joint Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission. It will be possible to exclude from the list only when there will be available a list approved by the Commission. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that the position of the American Delegation regarding this question tends to make the Joint Commission consult with all parties and organizations which had filed application which the American Delegation deems it necessary to invite for consultation.

MR. TOUNKIN: What are your remarks Mr. Bunce?

DR. BUNCE: I think we face exactly the same problem of going over the Soviet Delegation's position that you faced when you went over the American Delegation's position, for example, you make the flat statement that it was proved that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee was intensifying its struggle against the Joint Commission and the Moscow Decision. General Brown upholds that that has not been proved and that if any party did struggle, foment, incite active

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opposition against the Moscow Decision, either of the Allies, or the Joint Commission, then they could be brought before the Joint Commission as provided in para. 3 and he claims that no such proof has ever been presented and now you say that it has.

MR. TOUMKIN: It is our contention. Your contention is in your statement. The Soviet Delegation states -- etc.

DR. BUNCE: I will have to read the translation carefully, but we could go down each point and we would find disagreement as to the statements of fact and as to interpretation and again it leads me to believe that the only way we could get an acceptable joint report would be to have the Soviet Delegation state its position and put at the top that it is the statement by the Soviet Delegation regarding its position and have the American Delegation state its position without any attempt to try and reconcile these very divergent statements into one statement because obviously any statement of the American Delegation's position that would be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation would modify the American Delegation's position so greatly that it wouldn't be acceptable to the American Delegation. Similarly, any statement of the Soviet Delegation acceptable to the American Delegation probably would not be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation. I am thinking the only way we can get agreement is to have the Delegations each make their own statement and put the heading at this is made by the Soviet Delegation and the other is made by the American Delegation.

MR. TOUMKIN: That won't be a joint report because it would leave the main question -- we have two reports in a joint report. I may also say that even in this case the statement of the Delegation's position wasn't so easy because the Soviet Delegation uses this or that strong wording and the other would also like to use not less strong expressions, but if we confine ourselves to mere statements of position it would not, first of all, obscure the real issue. I don't see why we cannot compile such statements,

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moreover, in both instences, whether we will try to compile factual statements or just statements, either Delegation will see what the other Delegation says. Anyhow that would be inserted in a joint report, but if we present factual statements that would be because we agree to what we disagree. I haven't made many remarks on the American position. These remarks and certain changes are made in the American statement but they won't distort the American position I am sure and I am ready to consider the American remarks on our statement.

As you say that the Soviet Delegation has veto power. I can see why it is a wrong statement. There is nothing about veto power. What is a veto power? Where does it come from? It comes from an old Roman law. Ancient Rome had two Chief Magistrates and if one magistrate gave a certain order the other might exercise a so-called veto power. He might say --"I prohibit, I defend", and he will stop the order or decision of the other. There is no decision to stop. There are only two Delegations -- one delegation suggests and the other delegation suggests. Practically nothing you could call a veto power. When there are four or five partieipants and in spite of a majority for anything one may stop the position. That may have some sense. There is practically nothing to say about the veto power. That is your statement of your position. The statement of our position is that each council has a right to give orders and if his orders were valued and should be complied with unless the other council would not interfere. There is no delegation here who can decide anything unilaterally -- it may only suggest for consideration in the Joint Commission.

DR. BUNCE: The position of the American Delegation was that in Joint Decision No. 12 we would establish the basis upon which people would come in for consultation and we thought that Decision was written in harmony with the letters of Marshall and Molotov and also with the Moscow Decision. The American Delegation felt that if limitations on consultation were to be applied those limitations

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must be stated in that Decision and after you publish Joint Decision which promised consultation on a wide basis to all who signed the declaration, that to introduce conditions afterwards is not fair to the Korean people. We made a public declaration and in the case of the veto power, we saw in the American position that all the people who had applied had the right to be included in the consultation, unless the two Delegations by mutual agreement decided that they would exclude certain of those powers for fraud or too small, etc, and it is the question as to whether the parties will be excluded by the acts of one Delegation or whether it must be by the joint action of the two Delegations is really a crucial issue. In fact the position taken by the Soviet Delegation has given them the right to exclude any parties and social organizations for what they thought were good reasons and consultation has not gone on because of the use of that veto power. I was just wondering what you would like to do, the time is getting on and we are meeting this afternoon at 1:30 and I would suggest that you report as Chairman to the Joint Commission and state the differences of opinion and the difficulties that we have met in attempting to get a statement that would be agreeable to both delegations and also I think you might report the proposal that I made at the beginning that both reports be sent forward with a covering letter, as a possible solution to this problem, to take the original report and state that we could not get agreement that was mutually acceptable to both delegations of the statement of the American and Soviet positions. If necessary, I could make some comments afterwards and then the Chief Commissioners of the Joint Commission could discuss the basic issue.

MR. TOUNKIN: The American Delegation's position is well known to me and what you just said is stated in your statement. That is all right. That is your position. Of course, you know the Soviet position which is that there was no limitation as to filing the declarations by parties and organizations. Then, of course, even before studying

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the applications, we might say that there might be some organizations which are not suitable to admit to consultation. We have certain decisions to be guided by -- the Moscow Decision, the Agreement of the two Ministers and Joint Commission Decision No. 12. The Soviet Delegation was that we take those applications, put them against those decisions and see which of those applications should be admitted according to those agreements. For instance, according to the Moscow Decision social organizations should be consulted with, therefore, we should see which of them are not socially. There is no reason to discuss those positions now -- it is not our task. Our task is just to state adequately those positions. So I agree with your proposal that we make a short report stating what we have done and where we stand and what is the position of the two representatives. We may adjourn.

DR. HUNCH: And we will try and get a full translation of your proposal.

Meeting adjourned at 11:30 hours.

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TRANSCRIPT OF ~~19TH~~ 20TH MEETING - SUBCOMMISSION NUMBER 1 - 4 SEPTEMBER 1947
1030 HOURS

MR. TOUNKIN: What are the American Delegation's suggestions?

DR. BUNCE: We have rewritten the statement of the American Delegation of its position. The last 3-1/2 pages are not yet here, but they will be very shortly. I haven't proof read it and there might be some typographical errors. We worked on it last night and revised the statement.

MR. TOUNKIN: Well, I will have to consider it when it is complete. Have you any remarks on the statement of the Soviet position?

DR. BUNCE: In par 2 you state "Decision 12 of the Joint Commission stipulates consultation with democratic parties and social organizations of zonal scale." That is your interpretation of that statement. The U.S. Delegation did not stipulate that. If you will remember, we tried to get the Soviet Delegation to agree that parties must have branches in two or more provinces to be eligible for consultation, and that proposal was thrown out by the Soviet Delegation. Therefore the statement that this stipulation was in Joint Commission Decision 12 is completely false. It is not factual. Actually we tried to make that stipulation in the joint decision.

Then, further on in the same paragraph you state, "At the same time the Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations in both South and South Korea....." Actually the U.S. Delegation in Subcommission 1 presented a plan with which we could have consulted with all applicants for consultation in a period of 12 days, breaking them into groups. The small organizations would have been taken in groups of 5 at the time, and there would have been no delay. The fact that no applications came in from North Korea is irrelevant. If they wanted to apply they should have applied. The same conditions were published in North Korea.

MR. TOUNKIN: What do you suggest?

DR. BUNCE: I think you should delete the statement, or if you want to put it in say that the American Delegation attempted to introduce -- but we put that in our statement, so I don't think you need to put it

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here. We could have completely finished consultation a month ago if we had gone ahead with that plan.

In par 3 you state "The Soviet Delegation declared that..... the Joint Commission must have consultation with democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the Moscow Decision on Korea." That is not an accurate statement of the correspondence. In the correspondence it states that signing the declaration contained in Communique Number 5 will be accepted in good faith.

MR. TOUNKIN: You think it does not correspond to the Marshall-Molotov agreement -- we think it does.

DR. HUNT: Again that will be brought out in our statement. The interpretations are different all the way through.

MR. TOUNKIN: Our positions are different.

DR. HUNT: Again, in par 3, the second part, you state.....In the American statement we have quoted the paragraph in full, point A of our position. If the Soviet Delegation.....

MR. TOUNKIN: Your statement does not consist only of quotations. We might quote also, because those agreements are well known.

DR. HUNT: That happens when you go through the Russian statement and our criticism of the Russian statement is simply that it presents your point of view and we disagree with it. I am perfectly certain that you will disagree with our statement when you get it. For example, take this second part -- "On the basis of this the Soviet Delegation refused.....and cease struggling against, and so on, it was never to our mind proven that these parties that had signed up were struggling against the Moscow Decision. As a matter of fact they came out and disagreed with the Anti-Trusteeship people. They said they disagreed and were going to cooperate with the Joint Commission. That point again comes up in the next paragraph of Point 3 -- "The Soviet Delegation pointed out that after reconvention.....actually intensified its struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, striving to frustrate its work on the creation of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government." Now that is a statement of your position, but we can't agree to it jointly. We disagree with that completely.

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Again further down it comes to the same problem. "The Soviet Delegation further indicated that parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee," and so on. What they undertook were the three statements in Communique No. 5 which states that they will cooperate with the Joint Commission, with measures as foreseen in par 3 of the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation has used the words "fully uphold" as a means of excluding people that wish to oppose aid and assistance in a form which will greatly limit the sovereignty of their government. It is again a matter of interpretation. As a statement of your position I think that is exactly what you intended and what you meant, but we cannot agree that that is a correct statement of the facts.

Then, further on you say "The aforementioned parties and organizations retaining their signature.....in the struggle against the Moscow Decision." That again has never been proven. As a matter of fact I think the facts are completely to the contrary. Since they signed those applications and declarations they have never taken any action whatever to struggle against the Moscow Decision or the work of the Joint Commission. Again that is the position that has been taken by the Soviet Delegation. I think that as a statement of the position of the Soviet Delegation that it is perfectly clear.

Again, in Point 4 -- "The reason why the American Delegation declined these proposals is not given" -- and of course we gave them in the American statement.

Paragraph 6 in there, the membership figures you used are according to our tabulations incorrect. The total membership is in par 6. The figure we got -- for instance, you remember the Red Cross was 5 million instead of 5 thousand. I think that is a statement that you make, and I think it presents your point of view, and as I said before, I think each delegation must present its point of view and its own position, stated in the way you feel is adequate. I said at the very first meeting that the American Delegation will accept the Soviet position if the Soviets will accept the American position. I don't agree with your position and I'm sure you won't agree with yours, however.

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MR. TOUNKIN: We need not agree on the positions, we need only agree on the statements of the positions.

DR. BUNCE: The membership figure that we have for all parties and social organizations of all of South Korea is 56 million, not 70 million. You have included all the duplicating figures. Then, the population of Southern Korea is probably nearer 20 million than 18 million. There has been a tremendous increase in the population in South Korea. The census of last fall gave (?) There has been a large influx of people since that time and it has brought the population up to approximately 20 million. Apart from that, par 6 is all right, but we could make the same claim regarding the membership of parties and social organizations of North Korea. They considerably exceed the total population of North Korea.

Again, in par 7 I think it is a correct statement of the Soviet position. The reasons for declining the proposal were not given because it is obvious that if the Soviet proposal had been accepted we would never have had agreement on the list. Therefore they would have been excluded by the Soviet proposal. That could be pointed out, though I'm quite sure you would say that you didn't intend that.

Paragraph 8 I think is a very serious misstatement of fact. "The Soviet Delegation likewise frequently proposed to charge Subcommission Number 1.....The American Delegation declined these proposals. Actually, if you study the record of the minutes, the U.S. Delegation made many proposals of that nature -- that we examine the list one by one and determine the positon of the Soviet Delegation and the American Delegation regarding each organization, in order to clarify the position being taken by both delegations. We made that proposal at least three times I think.

MR. TOUNKIN: But you never agreed to start the work.

DR. BUNCE: I think that is a false statement. You can learn from the record of the minutes that the American proposal essentially made that proposal. The only proposal made by the Russian Delegation was that we compile a list mutually agreeable to both delegations, and examine

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each one separately to draft an agreed list. It was never a complete list. I think that if you study the minutes of the record that that is very clear.

MR. TOUNKIN: I would suggest that you not use in the future such words as "false statements". There are no false statements in the Soviet statement.

DR. BUNCE: From the American point of view they are false. From the Soviet point of view they are not.

MR. TOUNKIN: I wouldn't want to use such strong words. I don't think that is the way to deal with the task we are charged with. I think you are completely wrong. This is a completely true statement and presents the facts as true and as they are. From the very beginning in Subcommission No. 1 it was the Soviet representative who desired to go along the list and investigate some of the organizations which, as they saw it, presented fraudulent information. You categorically rejected that proposal and insisted on bringing this matter to the Joint Commission. I never suggested to stop the work of Subcommission No. 1. I remember now that it was on Friday -- I don't remember the exact date -- but it was on Friday that you said categorically that there was nothing more to do in Subcommission No. 1 and that you thought the matter should be referred to the Joint Commission.

DR. BUNCE: That is correct. I did make that statement, and I will ask you to recall the reason. You presented a written document, which we have in our record, in which you categorically excluded from consultation all organizations affiliated or associated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, and because of that categorical statement you refused to consult with them. You did not say you would examine them one by one. That is the reason Subcommission turned it back to the Joint Commission.

MR. TOUNKIN: We had first to examine the organizations. There might be left a group of organizations and parties on which we might disagree.

DR. BUNCE: We started on that basis in the beginning, then you introduced several propositions, each one of which would have excluded a large group of organizations. If you remember, in regard to small local organizations I proposed we eliminate all those with membership of

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less than 1,000. That you refused and instead said we should eliminate all those without zonal headquarters. It just happens that those without zonal headquarters were largely Rightist, and it would have eliminated a large Rightist group.

MR. TOUNKIN: We never came to a discussion of eliminating certain groups because the American Delegation did not want to discuss it unless agreement on general principles was reached. We suggested to leave it for a while so as to make the issue clear. Discussion in Subcommission 1 was our constant suggestion on July 7th, repeated I don't know how many times. It is completely true.

DR. BUNCE: The thing you started out to do at the very beginning was to examine these parties with the list in front of us. We informed the Soviet Delegation that there were somewhere about 70 parties that had registered for consultation, about which we had no information and that we were investigating them and would continue that investigation. It was during the process of the investigation when we found three organizations which had submitted fraudulent applications, and we generally agreed not to include them. We were going through the others to challenge them, then you brought up the suggestion for excluding large groups.

MR. TOUNKIN: We never came to an agreementon these groups because of the divergent opinions and positions. The position of the U. S. Delegation was that they did not want to discuss applications one by one until the Soviet Delegation accepted their position; whereas the Soviet Delegation suggested that the two delegations, having their positions as they are, examine the list and find out what in reality were the differences as regarding so many parties they agreed to include, so many parties they disagreed to include, and so on. The American Delegation did not want to do that.

DR. BUNCE: Not on the basis of the broad exclusion that you introduced in Subcommission 1. The proposals you made were not acceptable as a basis of exclusion. I constantly tried to get you to examine each party separately.

MR. TOUNKIN: You suggested to examine, if the Soviet Delegation agreed to accept the position of the American Delegation.

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DR. BUNCE: Let's go on to par 9. I think that is a very good statement. There are only certain changes which I think should be made, and that is in the last two lines, where you should say, "To make the Joint Commission consult with all parties and organizations which had filed applications and signed the declaration which either delegation deemed it necessary to invite for consultation." It would give both delegations the right, not just the Americans. The Soviet Delegation has the same right to insist on consultation.

MR. TOUNKIN: Your position was that all applicants should be included into the list, and then excluded from that list only by mutual agreement, therefore the American Delegation was not willing to exclude such and such parties. The American Delegation had, as you probably would say in case that was the position of the Soviet Delegation, the veto power.

DR. BUNCE: On exclusion -- but the American Delegation had exactly the same right to insist on the inclusion on that list of all parties and social organizations it wanted to see included. I think that was a sound principle.

MR. TOUNKIN: The Soviet Delegation had the same right to oppose the inclusion, because there was no list yet approved by the Joint Commission of organizations, of organizations which did not exist and which were fraudulent and so on, because those organizations did not correspond to the conditions stated in the Moscow Decision, the Marshall-Molotov agreement and Joint Commission Decision 12. That is the position of the Soviet Delegation.

DR. BUNCE: Now I suggest we look over the American statement.

MR. TOUNKIN: There are not so many changes in it I don't think.

DR. BUNCE: We have broken up the long paragraphs which were not clear and have rewritten them, trying to make them as you suggested factual statements of our position. You must remember this is a factual statement of the American position, and not the Soviet position. You will disagree with the position, I am quite sure.

MR. TOUNKIN: I think I had better consider it completely. I see there are added some remarks, but I don't see many changes in it. I think the statement of the Soviet position is much more objective than this

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statement of the American position.

DR. BUNCE: That again is a matter of opinion. We always think that we are objective.

MR. TOUNKIN: I may give you the first part of the Soviet Delegation's report.

DR. BUNCE: And how about the last part -- part three?

MR. TOUNKIN: And the last part, part three.

DR. BUNCE: These pages you have are numbered Pages 4-5-6-7. The original document we presented to you probably had different page numbering.

MR. TOUNKIN: It doesn't matter.

DR. BUNCE: Up to Page 3 is the first part. I gave you that copy, and I don't have another one. I gave you that at the last meeting.

MR. TOUNKIN: I have it.

DR. BUNCE: When you insert this in the one I gave you yesterday, this is a little longer and it would make Page 7 of that document Page 8-9-10 and so on.

When shall we meet again? We want the Joint Commission to meet at 3:30, wasn't that it?

MR. TOUNKIN: I suggest that we meet at 1:30.

DR. BUNCE: That is satisfactory.

Meeting adjourned at 1110 hours.

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TRANSCRIPT OF 21ST MEETING
SUBCOMMISSION NO. 1
4 September 1947
1330 Hours

I. TOUPKIN: Have you any comments on the Soviet draft presented this morning?

Dr. BUNCHE: I haven't read the translation yet - it has not been translated and typed.

I. TOUPKIN: I have studied the American draft presented this morning and I may say that there was very little change in the direction of making this statement acceptable for inclusion into a joint report. There are, I think, some new points included which add to those objections which have been made by me the other day. It was my impression that the American Delegation redraft a statement aiming at compiling a statement acceptable for inclusion in a joint report and as it seems is not agreeable in the compilation of a joint report. As I stated yesterday, the joint report may be compiled only in the case that both delegations will confine their statements to a statement of facts in stating their positions and use expressions which may be acceptable for inclusion in a joint report. My opinion is that unilateral statement is one thing and a joint report has got to show a different thing.

Take paragraph 2 of the American statement, there is a new word included - "political parties and social organizations signing the declaration" - "social" is a new word which does not reflect the state of things as it was in Joint Commission because the position of the American Delegation was that all organizations, whatever they are, which have signed the declaration are eligible for consultation. Then the new words in the same paragraph, "They may be removed from this list and excluded from consultation only for just cause and by mutual agreement of the two Delegations." "For just cause" are new words and I don't think they are proper in this paragraph.

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DR. BUNCE: The word "organizations" of course was simply used as a plural word to save repetition of "political parties and social organizations" all the way through. We thought it would be more explicit.

MR. BOUNKIN: It does not in this word correspond to the position of the American Delegation as stated in the Joint Commission.

DR. BUNCE: Why?

MR. BOUNKIN: Because the position of the American Delegation was that all organizations, whether social or not, should sign the declaration and were eligible for consultation.

MR. BUNCE: We said they were all eligible and all included on the list and could be removed by mutual agreement. We said that all the way through and have made several proposals which would remove organizations which could be classified non-social in the general interpretation of that word - but only by mutual agreement. Remember, we prepared one time in Subcommission No. 1, the American Delegation, a list of parties and social organizations which we were willing to consider for exclusion if you would take the parties one by one - the Soviet Delegation refused that offer. We gave you the exact number of parties we had classified and the various categories and we did a great deal of work in order to prepare that list so the Soviet Delegation might meet with us and discuss in detail those parties and social organizations which might be excluded for a just cause, not just an organization which is essentially non-social in the general accepted meaning of the term, and we had also listed in that small organizations purely of local character. We also had a list of those who were not residents of Korea, that is foreign applicants. We also had a group that we considered should be questioned on the basis of fraud - fraudulent statements - and that was turned down by the Soviet Delegation. I never could quite understand why.

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MR. TOUNKIN: The Soviet Delegation requested many times to specify that proposal. The American Delegation refused to say what parties and organizations they meant and the American proposal was left hanging in the air.

DR. BUNCH: We would have presented a discussion of that in Subcommission No. 1. We had all of the documents - we still have - all tabulated with names of parties - we had copies for the Soviet Delegation. We also made a further proposal in which we suggested that Subcommission No. 1 meet and that it examine all of the parties and social organizations that had applied for consultation and they prepared a detailed statement giving the Soviet statement regarding them and the United States position regarding them - that was refused. It didn't commit the Soviet Delegation to anything and yet that proposal was also refused.

MR. TOUNKIN: That was refused because the American Delegation was willing to do that job only on the condition that the Soviet Delegation accept the American position concerning this and the Soviet Delegation could not accept. It suggested many times to do this job without accepting any definite position - just every delegation consider things upon those obligations from its own position. The American Delegation though did not intend to change its position in any way and refused to do that.

DR. BUNCH: But this proposal did not aim at compromising the American or Soviet position - it was simply to get a complete statement of both delegations in respect to every party that applied - it was just designed to bring in a complete report to the Joint Commission.

MR. TOUNKIN: What I am talking about now is that this Point 2 does not reflect clearly the position of the American Delegation as stated in the Joint Commission because the position of the American Delegation was that all organizations signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 are automatically eligible for consultation - that is what was said in the first draft of the American Delegation.

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DR. BUNC': Yes, and we use the term "organizations" to include the political parties and social organizations.

MR. TOURKIN: Non-social are also included according to your position.

DR. BUNC': They are automatically included in the list and then could be excluded by mutual agreement.

MR. TOURKIN: You also include non-social.

DR. BUNC': You are suggesting regarding 2 that we change political parties and social organizations to state "all organizations signing the declaration"?

MR. TOURKIN: Yes, all.

MR. KIRK: We have always said we will review and those which we mutually agree on will be excluded from the list.

MR. TOURKIN: Yes, that is later they may be removed from the list and so on. In Point 3 - eligibility or admission for consultation - I may say again this question was not discussed in the Joint Commission during discussion on the compilation of the list of parties and organizations.

DR. BUNC': That again is a question of fact. I will read from the transcript of the 2nd meeting of Subcommission 1 when we were discussing a broad basis for consultation.

MR. TOURKIN: No one can say there is no difference between eligibility and admission, but there was no question of it during the discussion of the compilation of a list. We state the positions on the compilation of the list but not the list regarding the document on the order of consultation.

DR. BUNC': Let me read. I said, "There is one thing that has caused confusion - that is the Soviet Delegation is confusing the conditions of consultation with the conditions under which consultation will be withdrawn. As I understand it, there is only one condition for consultation which is agreed upon, and that is signing Communique No. 5. That is the basic condition of consultation. Then there are certain conditions under which we have agreed further consultation will be refused." You said, "... in

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my point of view, the American Delegation confuses two things -- the right to be invited for consultation and the eligibility for the actual invitation for the consultation. In accordance with the agreement between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, democratic parties and social organizations who signed the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 have the right to be appointed for the preliminary consultation, but it does not mean that the Commission is obliged to consult with all organizations. Last year it was understood that from the number of organizations who would sign the declaration, the Commission would select a certain number of democratic parties and social organizations with which it would consult. The rest of the organizations would have the possibility of submitting for consultation their suggestions."

It was in that same meeting I pointed out there would be, under the agreement, no unilateral exclusion and you remarked you didn't know what unilateral was. That was introduced into the Joint Commission meeting according to the record and General Brown stated, "The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation regrets the necessity to leave the issue under discussion to acquaint the Soviet Delegation with certain passages from the meeting of Subcommission No. 1 on 28 May 1947. Dr. Bunce asked Mr. Tounkin a question. "Do you believe that an individual shall be excluded because of the opinion he holds and because of expressing his opinion?" Mr. Tounkin replied, 'The question is not correctly stated. You confuse two problems, one, freedom of opinion, eligibility for consultation, two, admission to consultation.' Mr. Tounkin further stated, 'If a party has opposed the Moscow Decision saying it is not correct, opposing it vehemently, and urging all Koreans to oppose it, this, in my opinion, would constitute active opposition. Opinions privately held or expressed are not active opposition. Opinions expressed in public are active opposition.' Mr. Tounkin further stated, 'They may express their opinions as much as they wish, but if what they say opposes any

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paragraphs of the Moscow Decision, we won't consult with them because we want to consult with those who wish to take part in its fulfillment, not those who wish to oppose it.' That is Mr. Tounkin speaking for the Soviet Delegation."

Then our proposal was presented. In reply General Shtikov said, "The Soviet Delegation feels that it is useful to go over the documents and transcripts of the previous work. The Soviet Delegation remembers well the proposals which it presented to Subcommission No. 1 during the discussions concerning the working out of Document No. 12. The statement of Mr. Tounkin has nothing contradictory to the Moscow Decision, nor to the agreement of the two Ministers."

In other words, General Shtikov supported you directly.

GEN. HODGE: I may again repeat that this question was raised in connection with discussion of the document, Decision No. 12, but there was no discussion on this subject in Joint Commission when the compilation of a list was discussed. It is a fact.

GEN. DEAN: The same position was brought up in the discussions regarding the parties and organizations with which we would consult and the Soviet Delegation took exactly the same position and stated that there was no list, that no such list had been prepared. The American Delegation stated we had the list -- we gave you a list of parties from South Korea and you gave us a list from North Korea - then we had to go over party by party and representative by representative and exclude those we felt should not be approved for consultation and that would be by mutual agreement. That is the American position - you may not agree with it but that is our position.

MR. TOUNKIN: The Soviet Delegation during the discussion of the question of compilation of list of parties and organizations did not raise this question and did not discuss it. There was no discussion in the Joint Commission.

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DR. BUNCH: I think you will find pages and pages of the transcript of the Joint Commission meetings making distinctions between compiling and application.

M. LOUNKIN: The Soviet position was that all would be invited - according to the Moscow Decision, the Marshall-Molotov correspondence and the Joint Commission - we have conditions, we have to see which of them applying for consultation meet those conditions, we can not start with a negative word first we have to start that each of them are meeting those conditions.

DR. BUNCH: Mr. Lounkin, at the very beginning of our session in Subcommission 1 I pointed out that the first session of the Joint Commission broke down because of the failure to establish standards of criteria for eligibility and that we must establish standards before any applications were signed - not after they came in - after they came in the Soviet Delegation attempted to establish standards of criteria. We have never accepted that position and we never will.

M. LOUNKIN: That is not the case. We couldn't - at least the American Delegation did not desire it - it was impossible to limit the number of applications or anything like that and applications came in - there was no limitation and no control and so everybody, even those organizations which are non-existent, anybody could file an application. Therefore, the Joint Commission should take those applications and have some conditions, even the Moscow Decision sets forth the condition of the Joint Commission will consult with democratic parties and social conditions - democratic parties and social organizations - it does not say the Joint Commission should consult with any non-social organizations - the word is different - one is social, the other is not. We should have discussed that but there is a condition set forth in this. There are other conditions so it was quite logical. But again we go over the same ground - since July 2nd.

DR. BUNCH: In other words, you would want paragraph 3 removed?

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M. TOUMKIN: I say there was no question of eligibility and admission. Point 4 -"the American Delegation repeatedly tried to obtain agreement on the definition of political parties and social organizations". I told you my opinion of this yesterday. I believe it is not a factual statement - rather not correct - "Due to the opposition of the Soviet Delegation . . . . ."

Dr. BUNCH: I can quote from the minutes to show that from our point of view that is a factual statement.

M. TOUMKIN: General Brown said that - it is not a correct statement. His statement was also not correct. The American Delegation left in such expressions as "unilateral exercise of veto power".

Dr. BUNCH: That is our position.

M. TOUMKIN: If you like to state your position in such terms, the Soviet Delegation will consider it necessary to state its position in likewise terms. I don't know whether that would be acceptable for a joint report - if we both go this way. In your new paragraph 9, "The Soviet Delegation has challenged no political party or social organization under Point 3 . . . . " - that is not a correct statement.

Dr. BUNCH: You have not challenged under Point 3.

M. TOUMKIN: We did.

Dr. BUNCH: No. We repeatedly asked you to do that.

M. TOUMKIN: That is the same paragraph - you continuously state we excluded from our list 24 parties - there were 20 parties excluded - or rather not included. Your new paragraph 10 is not correctly stated. "While the Soviet Delegation stated that the parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee would be considered for consultation with the Joint Commission if they publicly withdrew from that organization.." The position of the Soviet Delegation was that those organizations might be admitted for consultation in case they publicly withdrew from that Committee - it is not the same thing.

Dr. BUNCH: I do not get the distinction.

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M. KOVRIN: "would be considered", we could say "might be considered" or "could be".

DR. BUNCH: The meaning to me is the same.

M. KOVRIN: "Would be" does not mean the Soviet Delegation agreed to admit them for consultation.

DR. BUNCH: They "could be" or "would be" considered in either case. I understood if they publicly withdrew you would consider them. It binds you to consult them - as I understand you were bound to consult them.

M. KOVRIN: We said they would be admitted if they withdrew.

DR. BUNCH: Let me read to you these statements regarding this definition of social. In the 20th Meeting of the Joint Commission, General Brown said, "It is necessary to agree on a definition which will determine which parties and social organizations shall be consulted. In order to reach such a definition, the American Delegation proposes that any party or social organization having more than 1000 members and which has branches in two or more provinces should, for the purpose of consultation, be considered a political party or social organization."

Further he says, "If the Soviet Delegation desires to remove all limitations, the American Delegation is willing to discuss this with the Soviet Delegation. It is essential to future progress that the Soviet Delegation and the American Delegation agree on what definition a political party or social organization must meet to be regarded as such under the terms of the Moscow Decision."

And then again on the next page in the same meeting, General Shtikov said, "The Soviet Delegation does not make any proposals concerning the limitation of the number of parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission will consult, and it also does not represent itself as an authority on the disputed number of thirty parties and social organizations to be eligible for consultation. This number was proposed by the American Delegation last year, since the American Delegation objects to the

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number thirty at the present time, the Soviet Delegation also agrees not to limit the number of parties and social organizations which will be invited for consultation."

And again in the 28th Meeting on page 20, General Shtikov stated, "The Soviet Delegation doesn't make any proposals of limitation of the number of parties and social organizations - just the opposite - the publication of the Communique will give us the chance of finding out which parties and social organizations wish to participate in consultation with the Joint Commission, because such a list of parties will be drawn up and when drawing up such a list of parties the signed declaration will be taken into consideration. That is why the only wish of the Soviet Delegation is to have the Communique published which states the decision of the Joint Commission on April 17th."

And then in the 28th Meeting on Page 23, General Brown asked the following question, "Will the Soviet Delegation agree to consult all democratic parties and social organizations which sign Communique No. 5?" General Shtikov replied to that question and said, "We should be guided by a strict decision which was reached during the correspondence of our Ministers of Foreign Affairs and as stated in the three conditions which we have accepted and upon which a decision has been reached. Is there any necessity to have these three conditions repeated once more?"

Again in the 28th Meeting General Shtikov repeated the statement above, he said, "The number thirty does not belong to the Soviet Delegation. The Soviet Delegation is not the author of this number thirty. This was the proposal made by the American Delegation. The Soviet Delegation agreed to this proposal, but now in consideration of the American Delegation's objection to such a stated number, the Soviet Delegation agrees not to limit the number of parties and social organizations."

It goes on all through here - the question of consultation.

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M. TOUMAIN: What the American Delegation suggested was not a definition of "social organization" but the limitation as to the number of members and the number of branches. The definition of "social organization" has never been suggested by the American Delegation.

DR. BUNCH: It is what we would call "criteria" of those parties and social organizations which were to apply and we desired it in order to cut down applications.

M. TOUMAIN: Neither the membership nor number of branches in the provinces is any characteristic for the type of organization, whether social or non-social. A social organization may be a big one, a small one, may have branches in the provinces, and may not.

DR. BUNCH: That is true but we would have liked you to make a definition as to what a social organization was and without the definition we have to use the accepted term as it is accepted in the dictionaries.

M. TOUMAIN: Well that is different. Then the American Delegation included in its statement a letter, or rather speech, about a letter that 9 organizations which as it states were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The American Delegation is not willing to say whether they are at present members or whether they are not. That is leaving this question in obscurity. But that is not the point. The point is the question is included and if we include that we may also include petitions presented in Joint Commission demanding to exclude those organizations, or rather not to admit for consultation.

DR. BUNCH: That letter is quoted in there because of the fact that these parties that you said were under suspicion did come out and publish a statement of cooperation with the work of the Joint Commission and had only one reservation, which we quoted, and that was the right to express an honest opinion of aid and assistance

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in a form which would greatly limit the sovereignty of the Korean government, and the declaration in paragraph 3 states that they will cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out of measures in no sense binds them to approve of any interpretation of para raph 3 which might be put on it by the Joint Commission. They are free to express their opinions, but they will still cooperate. They are also bound not to oppose the work of the Joint Commission and if a decision is made they do not approve of they will cooperate, but at the same time they can express their own views. Unless the party or organization has that right, there is no sense in consultation. The very word implies that right.

[illegible]. TOMMII: That is well known to me. I have been listening to statements of the American Delegation for some time on their position. I don't agree. When you left in paragraph 11 the words, "...acceptance of this proposal would in fact give parties and organizations affiliated with the Democratic People's Front an overwhelming majority in consultation."

DR. BUNCH: That, we believe, is a very relevant fact which should certainly be included in any report, either by the Soviet Delegation or by the United States Delegation.

[illegible]. TOMMII: If you make this statement, we should add another to the Soviet statement, something which would be our opinion of where the American Delegation was going - what would be the factual practical results of the American Delegation's suggested proposals in the Joint Commission. We didn't do that in our statement so far. And all of those figures are left in.

DR. BUNCH: Yes. As General Brown stated very clearly in the Joint Commission meeting yesterday, any statement of the American Delegation's position must be clear-cut and the implications that the American's feel result from the Soviet Delegation's position regarding consultation. I am quite sure the American Delegation would not agree to removing that factual analysis - that statistical

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analysis.

MR. TOUMLIN: Well, it seems to have been a continued position of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission that whether the Soviet Delegation accepts their position or does not accept their position - this fact may show once again that the American Delegation is not willing to cooperate - is not willing to work with the Soviet Delegation - just arguments, one after another. It is of course hardly possible to achieve the aims of the Joint Commission in this case - impossible to compile a joint report if one of the delegations is of the opinion it could not agree to a report or could not try to write a report which should be acceptable to both delegations. If it is a joint report it should be acceptable to both delegations. There is no other way to compile a joint report.

MR. BUNCH: Well, as I said when we first met on the issue, it is going to be very difficult to get a statement of the Soviet position by the Soviet Delegation which would be acceptable to the United States Delegation and vice versa. It will be very difficult for the American Delegation to prepare a statement of its position which the Soviet Delegation will accept. We face very fundamental basic differences of opinion - both regarding interpretation of the Moscow Decision and the Marshall-Molotov correspondence and Joint Commission Decision No. 12. I see no way in which the differences can be hidden or glossed over in a joint report. I think it would be unfair to draft a report which would obscure those basic issues. I think the joint report should bring them out very clearly and the differences very clearly. As I stated at the very beginning, the American Delegation was willing to accept the Soviet report as written and forward with a covering letter provided the Soviet Delegation would accept the American report with a covering letter stating that neither delegation approved the statement prepared by the other delegation. I think that is a perfectly sound method of presenting a joint report.

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that it is essentially is a compilation of two minority reports and it is standard practice to have a minority, or disagreeing report, in any reports submitted.

M. TOUMKIN: There is no minority, there is no majority, there is only two.

DR. BUNCH: I would like to read one passage from the very beginning when we discussed this question. "I am not going to quibble over this but we have to place the fact that sometime or another we would need a detailed plan as to how we are going to select these parties and organizations in order to give fair representation. Unless we establish such a plan now, there is grave danger that in trying to establish this plan by preparing lists that we will reach the stage of trying to include some parties and exclude other parties because we have no standard to use."

I saw the last Joint Commission meeting break up over the same issue and when I was working with you I did everything I could to try and avoid the difference of opinion which has occurred again in this Joint Commission.

M. TOUMKIN: That was my aim also, but it seems we didn't work well enough.

DR. BUNCH: You feel there is no chance of drafting a joint report?

M. TOUMKIN: If the American Delegation states what it had written before and add new controversial items to statement, it will be impossible.

DR. BUNCH: What do you propose that we do?

M. TOUMKIN: It is almost time to have a meeting - in an hour.

DR. BUNCH: When we came in General Shtikov had not called a meeting.

M. TOUMKIN: I would like to know your opinion on the two drafts presented this morning.

DR. BUNCH: I haven't read those. What about the American report.

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M. TOUMKIN: Shall we postpone until tomorrow?

DR. BUNCH: No. Do you have any comments on Part 1 and 3 of the American draft that was handed you?

M. TOUMKIN: Part 1, yes, the difference between the draft we presented this morning and your draft is not very big.

DR. BUNCH: What about Part 3 - the proposals?

M. TOUMKIN: I included part of our statement regarding arrests.

DR. BUNCH: In that case we would have to include part of General Brown's answer. I had hoped that could be summarized in one statement - the Soviet Delegation proposed that the Leftists were being investigated and a brief statement of the reply, but if you want to put it in more fully we would have to put in the reply.

M. TOUMKIN: I didn't put it in - just left it for you.

M. MAY: Would it be possible to agree on 1 and 3 and submit that as a joint report and add the other as an appendix.

DR. BUNCH: No. The other things don't amount to a hill of beans in a report. I think we ought to try and follow the three proposals we were instructed to. The first, to try and get a joint report; if that is impossible, then to agree to send in the first reports that were drafted and prepare a covering letter.

M. TOUMKIN: That was not agreed to yesterday - we accepted only one proposal and that is the compilation of a joint report.

DR. BUNCH: Your interpretation was that General Shtikov would not accept Point 2 and 3.

M. TOUMKIN: Yes, that is definite.

DR. BUNCH: Then the third point of drafting a brief report - stating the difference of opinion between the American and Soviet Delegation was not accepted either - each doing their own without any criticism or amendment from the other delegations?

M. TOUMKIN: The third point, I understood, was to include in the joint report two statements.

DR. BUNCH: Two completely separate statements without any attempt to modify it with the other delegation.

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L. TSUKIN: That was not accepted - he accepted only one proposal.

D. BURCH: Then the other thing is to get General Brown and Shtikov together today - that was General Brown's suggestion.

L. TSUKIN: If they want to, they may meet again. What shall we do, advise them to postpone the meeting till tomorrow and continue our work?

D. BURCH: I would like to make it quite clear that the American Delegation is not willing to prepare a joint report which does not fully state their position as they see it.

L. TSUKIN: The opinion of the Soviet Delegation is that a joint report should state differences fully and objectively. That is how we can do that.

D. BURCH: We had better get a definition of the word objective.

L. TSUKIN: What other suggestions do you have?

D. BURCH: I was going to suggest to draft a letter and send two reports or include your statement and ours with Part 1 as agreed to and Part 3 as agreed to, which I think are close together, but if you say that was not accepted by General Shtikov there is no good trying to do it.

L. TSUKIN: It was not accepted yesterday.

D. BURCH: I don't see how I can amend the American Delegation's report to meet the many criticisms that you have made and I imagine you would have difficulty accepting some of the criticisms I made of the Soviet report. Why don't we just draft a very brief letter which could take part of the joint report in which we state the basis of the disagreements of certain issues and that neither delegation will accept the report of its position as prepared for the report. In other words, just draft a letter stating that it is impossible to agree on a statement of position.

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DR. ZOBKIN: Write a report that we have not been able to compile a joint report? We have been instructed to present a joint report. Do you suggest a report saying we cannot make a joint report? I suggest we report to our Chief Commissioners and see what they can do.

DR. BUNCE: All right.

Meeting adjourned at 1440.

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