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UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

NMWR, MP 62-9

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Washington: 1962

REEL NO. 4

SUBDELAGATION ON AGENDA ITEM 3

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

PAN MUN JOM MEETINGS

SESSION 1 (4 DECEMBER 1951)

THROUGH

SESSION 71 (19 APRIL 1952)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND ADVANCE
APO 72

UNCA/A8-6
Serial: 266
27 July 1953

From: Secretary to the Delegate, United Nations Command (Advance)
To: Distribution List

Subj: Downgrading of classified matter; notification of

1. All classified transcripts of proceedings of meeting held between this command and the Communists in connection with the Armistice negotiations, are hereby downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

2. No report of downgrading is desired by this command.

/s/ J. E. SHEW
/t/ Commander, USN
Secretary

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PAUL B. COOKE
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Reports Division

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

4 December 1951

SUBJECT: Summary of Proceedings, First Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, delegates; RADM R E Libby, USN, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL J J Kinney, USAF, and CDR G R Muse, USN, Staff Officers; 1st LT R Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Lee San Jo, NKA, and MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, Delegates; RADM Kim Won Mu, NK Navy, COL Chang Chun San, NKA, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Tsai Cheng-Wen and Chiu Ke-An, Staff Officers; interpreters and stenographers.

Meeting convened at 1400 hours, 4 December 1951.

1400
GEN LEE — Let us now begin the talks. At the plenary session you raised questions, now do you want answers to them?

1400
GEN TURNER — Yes.

1401
GEN LEE — 1. Rotation of replacements is impermissible in the entire duration of the armistice. Individuals rejoining their units can be permitted to return periodically to Korea within the scope to be prescribed by the armistice commission and subject to examination by the supervisory organ of the neutral nations.

2. By "military forces" is meant all units and personnel, regular and irregular, of ground, naval and air forces.

3. By "weapons" is meant all military equipment including aircraft.

4. Neither side has the right to interfere with or inspect reconstruction of any facilities within Korea.

5. Replenishments and exchange of weapons and ammunition are impermissible.

[redacted]

[redacted]

GEN LEE:
(cont'd)

6. The supervisory organ composed of representatives of neutral nations shall send to the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides the same kind of representatives for conducting the same kind of inspection. The scope of inspection is limited to that prescribed by paragraph 6 of our proposal.

7. It would be appropriate that neutral nations be three to five in number and that they be invited by both sides.

8. Whether the supervisory organ of neutral nations shall be stationed at ports of entry at the rear of both sides or proceed there regularly is to be decided by the supervisory organ itself, and the method of inspection is to be decided in the same way.

9. Regarding the list of netural nations, our side will submit our specific proposal after this measure is agreed to by both sides.

This is the synthetic answer to the questions you raised yesterday. This is a general answer to the questions on the proposal we submitted.

1405
GEN TURNER — Is that all you have?

1405
GEN LEE — Yes.

1406
GEN TURNER — We would like to have your answers in writing.

1406
GEN LEE — Very well.

1408
GEN TURNER — We would like a thirty minute recess in order to go over your answers to compare them with the questions we asked yesterday.

1409
GEN LEE — Agreed.

<u>Meeting recessed at 1409 hours</u>

[redacted]

[redacted]

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours.

1436
GEN TURNER — We have noted your answers. There are two questions which we gave you yesterday that you didn't answer. I would like to ask them again and perhaps you can give me an answer to them.

Does your principle 6 preclude the return to Korean ports of naval vessels sent elsewhere for periodic overhaul?

1436
GEN LEE — Is that all?

1436
GEN TURNER — Will you answer this question now?

1436
GEN LEE — You said that there are two questions which are not answered. You have one more. Will you please say it?

1437
GEN TURNER — I have several more.

1437
GEN LEE — Please go ahead. We will give you a synthetic answer.

1437
GEN TURNER — Well, we would like an answer to this question to determine whether more questions on the same line are needed.

1438
GEN LEE — I said that I will give you a synthetic answer, generalizing the same questions raised together. As to the question of the warship, it is essential because of the need of the replacement and replenishment, so the answer to that question is included in the first point of our answer.

1440
GEN TURNER — Then your answer is yes. Is that correct?

1440
GEN LEE — That is it.

1440
GEN TURNER — Next question. In "necessary inspections beyond the demilitarized zone", do you include aerial reconnaissance and photographic reconnaissance?

[redacted]

[redacted]

1441
GEN LEE: Is that all?

1441
GEN TURNER: Yes.

1441
GEN LEE: That answer is included in point 8 of our answer. We said the method of inspection is to be decided by the supervisory organ itself. The question of aerial inspection, or whether they will be inspected on the ground, can be decided by the supervisory organ itself. What we are here discussing is about the principle, and so in the discussion we must discuss principles first, and then concrete questions can be discussed later.

1445
GEN TURNER: Your principle number 5 would hold the armistice commission responsible for "The concrete arrangement and the supervision of the implementation of the whole armistice agreement, except for the scope of supervision specified in paragraph (6) of this proposal".

What is the exact meaning of the term "scope of supervision specified in paragraph 6"? Does it mean supervision to insure only that neither side introduce into Korea during the armistice any military forces, weapons and ammunition under any pretext?

1447
GEN LEE: That is it. That is so.

1447
GEN TURNER: The answer is yes?

1448
GEN LEE: Yes.

1448
GEN TURNER: Your principle 7 provides that the neutral-nations supervisory organ will report its findings to the armistice commission. This we take to mean that the armistice commission would be responsible for supervising the enforcement of your sixth principle. If this is correct, do you intend that the military armistice

[redacted]

[redacted]

GEN TURNER (cont'd) commission have the authority to direct the neutral-nations organ to make whatever inspections the military armistice commission considers necessary? In other words, will the military armistice commission determine what constitutes "necessary inspection beyond the demilitarized zone"?

1452
GEN LEE: Firstly, your side and our side are parties of the belligerents. Therefore, it is a fact that we cannot inspect your rear and you cannot inspect our rear, so our seventh principle provides that neutral nations which are not belligerents should do the inspecting. So, it is a matter of course that the supervisory organ, which is composed of neutral nations should report to the armistice commission. So, in case your side has violated our rear, or vice versa, if our side has violated your side, the supervisory organ, which is composed of neutral nations, should make a report to the armistice commission, and then the armistice commission will deal with the reported cases.

1456
GEN HODES: I would like to go just one step beyond that. Does the military armistice commission have authority to direct this neutral-nations organization to make inspections which the military armistice commission considers necessary to be made?

1458
GEN LEE: The scope of activity of the supervisory organ, composed of the neutral nations, is very clear. The seventh principle of our proposal provides that the supervisory organ, composed of the neutral nations, should inspect what is provided in principle 6 of our proposal.

1459
GEN HODES: I have a question. Do you intend that the military armistice commission have authority to direct the neutral-

[redacted]

[redacted]

GEN HODES: (cont'd) nations organization to make whatever inspections the military armistice commission considers necessary to be made?

1500 GEN LEE The supervisory organ of the neutral nations as provided in paragraph 7 is for the inspection of what is provided in paragraph 6. Accordingly, they can confine their activities within the scope as provided in paragraph 6. So the answer to that is given there. Whether the supervisory organ, composed of the neutral-nations, is to be stationed at ports of entry in the rear of both sides or proceed there regularly is to be decided by the supervisory organ itself, and the method of inspection is to be decided in the same way.

1502 GEN HODES: What supervisory organ do you mean? You have got two supervisory organs now.

1502 GEN LEE: I mean the supervisory organ composed of neutral nations. In our answer in principle 6, it says the scope of inspection is limited to that prescribed by paragraph 6 of our proposal.

1503 GEN HODES: Now, let us see if I understand this correctly. What you mean is that the neutral-nations organization itself determines <u>when</u>, and <u>where</u>, and <u>what</u> it inspects. It is not, then, under the control of the military armistice commission. Is that correct?

1506 GEN LEE: You ask when, where, and how the supervisory organization, composed of neutral nations, should do the inspections. Now the supervisory organ is to inspect the execution of what is said in paragraph 6. In other words, the

[redacted]

[redacted]

GEN LEE: (cont'd) supervisory organ should be composed of neutral nations, and this organ itself should study and decide when and where, and how to inspect.

1508
GEN HODES: All right, it decides itself.

In other words, what you are telling me -- I am a little confused about what organ you are talking about. One minute you say "supervisory organ", then "neutral nations." Which do you mean? It is important for me to know just what you are talking about. I will give you an example. Suppose that Pusan or Sinuiju are to be inspected as a port of entry for incoming troops, incoming ammunition, incoming equipment, who decides whether they go to Siniuju or Pusan? This neutral-nations organ itself? That is my first question.

1510
GEN LEE: According to the seventh principle of our proposal, "the supervisory organ is to be responsible for conducting necessary inspection beyond the demilitarized zone of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides." In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will make it clear. Who then decides the ports of entry? It must be decided here at this meeting.

1512
GEN HODES: Now, who is the boss of this neutral-nations organization? Who is the boss? Anybody? No one?

1515
GEN LEE: As to that question, we will give you our answer tomorrow.

1515
GEN HODES: All right, I've got one more question you can answer tomorrow on the same subject. Does the neutral-nations organization undertake to make these inspections on their own initiative, or do they do it by direction of the military armistice commission?

[redacted]

[redacted]

1517
GEN LEE: Judging from the content of your question you just put forth, it is related to your previous question.

1517
GEN HODES: That is right. I would like to have an answer to both of them, please.

1518
GEN LEE: You read two questions, but it can be answered by one answer because they are of the same nature.

1518
GEN TURNER: Since only representatives of neutral nations can conduct inspections beyond the demilitarized zone, and since their inspection would be limited to the items in your principle 6, how can the military armistice commission obtain enough information to enable it to supervise the carrying out of the other terms of the armistice?

1520
GEN LEE: In accordance with paragraph 7 of our proposal, as for the inspection of the ports of entry by both sides there can be many ports of entry and there can be less ports. The inspection within the demilitarized zone will be conducted by the military armistice commission.

1521
GEN TURNER: I ask, how can the military armistice commission obtain enough information to enable it to supervise the carrying out of the other terms of the armistice such as the withdrawal of troops in the rear areas?

1523
GEN LEE: As to the withdrawal from the rear, that must be done by a definite route through definite ports of entry. Therefore, if any troops of either side should withdraw they can be inspected by the neutral-nations supervisory organ at specified ports of entry.

1525
GEN TURNER: But your principles do not permit the neutral-nations organization to supervise this.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1525
GEN LEE: Why should they not supervise?

1526
GEN TURNER: Your principle 5 covers all except what is contained in principle 6.

1527
GEN LEE: The items outside of the 6th paragraph will be supervised by the military armistice commission. The withdrawal of our troops from the rear is an internal affair of ours, and, vice versa, the withdrawal of your troops from your rear is also an internal affair of yours, and therefore, that withdrawal need not be supervised.

1528
GEN TURNER: What is your conception of the specific duties of the military armistice commission?

1529
GEN LEE: The duties of the military armistice commission are to supervise the execution of the paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of our proposal and to supervise the execution of the matters provided in the armistice agreement. That question, our proposal has clearly explained in written form. Paragraph 5 of our proposal provides that "both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form an armistice commission to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangements and supervision of implementation of the whole armistice agreement, except for the scope of supervision specified in paragraph 6 of this proposal." In other words, it provides how to form the military armistice commission and what it is to supervise. Therefore, the military armistice commission can know whether you withdraw your troops from our rear or, vice versa, whether we withdraw our troops from your rear. For instance, the withdrawal of our troops from your rear you can know, and that area you can then control. Vice versa, the withdrawal of your troops from the islands in the rear of our side we

[redacted]

[redacted]

GEN LEE: (Cont'd) will know, and then that area will be controlled by us.

1534
GEN TURNER: Suppose shells began to fall in the demilitarized zone from without the zone, how will the military armistice commission investigate this matter?

1537
GEN LEE: Taking your example, for instance, in that case the armistice commission can inspect on that spot as to the kind of shell or bullets, damage, where it came from, and with what weapon the shell was fired. As to that question, that is a temporary case, an unexpected case, so such a case can be provisionally inspected and can be dealt with as a provisional case and can be provisionally settled by the military armistice commission. Then the military armistice commission can, by agreement, deal with that case as a provisional case and can make a provisional settlement.

1540
GEN TURNER: What you really mean then by your proposal is that the military armistice commission is restricted in its authority and movement strictly to the demilitarized zone.

1541
GEN LEE: In general, it is so. In other words, it is to carry out and supervise cases outside of the provisions of paragraph 6.

1542
GEN HODES: Actually, as long as it is a <u>joint</u> military armistice commission it cannot move <u>as a joint body</u> outside the demilitarized zone, is that correct?

1543
GEN LEE: We do not yet know what items will be agreed upon in the armistice agreement. That is, the armistice commission is to carry out and supervise the agreed items, except paragraph 6.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1544
GEN HODES: Here is the reason it is important to us. In your principle 5 you say that the military armistice commission is responsible for enforcing all the terms of the armistice. On the other hand you indicated to me today that the military armistice commission, as a joint body, cannot move outside of the demilitarized zone. Therefore my question is: "How in the world can the military armistice commission be made responsible for enforcing all the terms of the armistice when it must remain inside the demilitarized zone?"

1546
GEN LEE: As to this question, you don't seem to understand yet that both your side and our side are parties of the belligerents. Therefore, we, as a party of the belligerents, cannot go to your rear and you, as a party of the belligerents, cannot come to our rear. Under such circumstances the answer is a supervisory organ of neutral nations, and what is possible after the armistice is the possibility provided in our sixth paragraph. In order to prevent such things from heppening, in order to supervise it, we need a supervisory organ composed of neutral nations. After the armistice there is a possibility that many things can happen outside the cases provided in paragraph 6; that is, several possible cases which may be provided in the armistice agreement agreed upon by both sides. For instance, they can ask questions whether the troops are withdrawn to the demiliatrized zone as agreed by both sides and it should be inspected as to whether they are withdrawn on the day agreed upon or not and it is a matter for the military armistice commission to see whether that is carried out or not. There is the necessity of observing whether there is any violation after the execution of the withdrawal. All these are things for the military

[redacted]

000013

[redacted]

GEN LEE: (cont'd) armistice commission to do in the future. Therefore, strictly speaking, the military armistice commission is to supervise the execution of the agreement within the demiliatrized zone and within their own troops and then it should observe the execution. It should supervise whether each side observes the agreement within its own troops or not, and therefore we can inspect within our rear and you can inspect within your rear. So you should inspect internally whether the agreement is being carried out in your rear, and we too should inspect whether the agreement is being carried out in our rear.

1553
GEN HODES: You see General Lee, I had an entirely different idea of your fifth principle than that which you just told me. It would have been much better for you to have put it this way: by principle 5 then we are to mean that the term "military armistice commission" has only one function and that is the supervision of the demilitarized zone. Is that correct?

1555
GEN LEE: It seems that General Hodes has not fully understood our paragraph 5 and not carefully surveyed the wording of it.

1556
GEN HODES: I have carefully surveyed the wording of it. That is the reason I am sure it means what I have just said.

1557
GEN LEE: You haven't fully studied the paragraph. We have the question of releasing the prisoners of war before us. Is this a case within the demilitarized zone? No. The question of releasing how many, at what time, that lies before the military armistice commission.

1558
GEN HODES: I don't agree at all. I think it lies in Item 4 of the agenda. I don't agree with your example.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1558
GEN LEE: It is true that the question of the prisoners of war is included in Item 4 of the agenda, but who is to carry it out?

1559
GEN HODES: Your side and our side are going to carry it out.

1559
GEN LEE: The military armistice commission is to carry it out.

1559
GEN HODES: The military armistice commission doesn't have any prisoners.

1559
GEN LEE: Then as to the question of releasing the prisoners of war, how are they to be released? Through what organ?

1559
GEN HODES: I don't know. That will be taken up in the next item of the agenda.

1600
GEN LEE: The military armistice commission is to supervise all the items provided in the agreed agreement. Therefore it ihcludes the prisoner of war question.

1600
GEN HODES: I have the answer. I know what you are saying.

1600
GEN LEE: If you have any other questions to raise, raise them.

1600
GEN HODES: We have more.

1602
GEN TURNER: With reference to inspection beyond the demilitarized zone by representatives of neutral nations: Is it your intention that each side will select an equal number of representatives from neutral nations of its own choosing and that these representatives then form teams composed of equal membership on each side, to be stationed at such ports as Sinuiju, Wonsan, Pusan or Inchon? In other words, at any of the ports just mentioned, would there be a team composed of representatives designated by both your side and our side? Or do you intend that neutrals of your choosing only will inspect and report on matters north of the demilitarized zone?

[redacted]

000015

[redacted]

1604
GEN LEE: Have you any other questions?

1604
GEN TURNER: Yes.

1604
GEN LEE: You should go ahead with them and I will answer them together.

1604
GEN TURNER: We would like the answer to this before we proceed on to our other questions.

1606
GEN LEE: In case the representative should go to your rear they will not only be the neutral nations of our choosing but of your choosing together, and visa versa, in case of coming to our rear the representatives of the neutral nations which are agreed upon by both sides should come. In other words, it should be inspected jointly.

1607
GEN HODES: Well, we just want to get this straight. I think I understand what you do in principle 6. Under your principle 6, as implemented by your principle 7, you mean that there will be joint inspections behind both sides by teams of neutrals who are selected jointly. Is that correct?

1608
GEN LEE: Yes.

1610
GEN TURNER: Now I have a number of questions with reference to selection of the representatives of neutral nations: When are the neutral nations to be selected? By whom? Who will issue the requisite invitations to the selected neutral governments? How do you propose to insure that the supervisory organ can be ready to function when the armistice is signed? If it is not ready, how will the necessary inspections be made in the interim? And further, how are the representatives of the neutral nations to be selected?

[redacted]

[redacted]

1612
GEN LEE: Have you any other questions?

1612
GEN TURNER: Not on that subject at the moment.

1613
GEN LEE: If you have any further questions please raise them and I will answer them all together.

1613
GEN TURNER: We would like to have an answer to that group of questions.

1614
GEN LEE: We want you to present all your questions together. For instance, yesterday you presented several questions, but we answered them together by studying their interrelation. So instead of presenting questions one by one you should present them all together and we would study their interrelation, and then later let you have the answer at one time. We hope you will present it in writing.

1616
GEN TURNER: Very well. I have two questions then to ask on your proposal 6 of your principles: Does your principle 6 preclude visits or inspections of a temporary nature from outside Korea by military personnel from those United Nations whose troops are part of the United Nations Command? Does your principle 6 preclude the flight to that part of Korea south of the demilitarized zone of those United Nations Command administrative and cargo aircraft regularly operating in Korea but based elsewhere? These are all the questions I have at the moment on proposal 6. Are you prepared to answer them now?

1620
GEN LEE: What else have you on other principles?

1620
GEN TURNER: I have questions on other principles but they are unrelated to these.

[redacted]

1620
GEN LEE: We expect you to raise all the questions that will lead to the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda.

1620
GEN HODES: For what reason do you refuse to answer?

1620
GEN LEE: Who has refused to answer?

1620
GEN HODES: Why do you want them all at one time? These are unrelated questions.

1621
GEN LEE: We said if you have any questions necessary for the solution of Item 3 we are ready to answer them. Who said that we wouldn't give you any answer and when did they say it? I said if you presented the questions in writing we will make a full study of it and then answer it. In what phrase of that expression was it said that no answer would be given? Based upon what do you raise that question?

1622
GEN HODES: Are you trying to tell me that you prefer to answer them tomorrow instead of this afternoon?

1622
GEN LEE: If you present your questions we will give you a synthetic answer. What we can answer today we will, and what we cannot answer today we will answer tomorrow.

1623
GEN HODES: I have another question. In your paragraph 3 I note that you have again proposed us out of the islands. Now my question is: What is meant by the word "Coastal" in your third principle?

1624
GEN LEE: What other questions do you have?

1625
GEN TURNER: The answer to the question we have already asked will determine whether we have more questions.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

1625
GEN LEE: As to the questions you have raised, we will give you our answer tomorrow. What other questions do you have? Won't you submit the questions in writing?

1625
GEN TURNER: That will take about 30 minutes.

1625
GEN LEE: Good.

1631
GEN TURNER: Could you give us your written answer through the Liaison Officers at 9 o'clock in the morning to the questions that we asked today that were unanswered?

1631
GEN LEE: You mean we are not going to have a meeting tomorrow?

1632
GEN TURNER: I didn't make any comment about that.

1632
GEN LEE: At 11 o'clock tomorrow, at a meeting, we will give you the answers.

1632
GEN TURNER: We shall need time to study the answers you have given us today and would like to study the answers that you propose to give us at 9 o'clock in the morning. We suggest that we meet tomorrow afternoon at 1300.

1632
GEN LEE: As to the questions you have raised we will give you our answer at 11 o'clock tomorrow in writing through the Liaison Officer.

1632
GEN HODES: Do you mean we meet at 1300? Is that correct?

1632
GEN LEE: Yes that is correct.

Meeting recessed at 1635.

OFFICIAL

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

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Date: 27 JUL 1953

AUTHENTICATED:
Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, JR.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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[redacted]

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

[redacted]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

5 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Second Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS: MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; RADM R E Libby, USN, Col D O Darrow, USAF, Col J J Kinney, USAF, LTCol J W Thames, USA, LtCol H S Levie, USA, CDR G R Muse, USN, and ChSClk G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st Lt R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Lee Sang Jo, NKA, and MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, Delegates; RADM Kim Won Mu, NK Navy, Col Chang Chun San, NKA, Col Tsai Cheng-Wen, Capt Chu Mun Soon, NKA, and Chiu Ke-An, CCF, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1300 hours, 5 December 1951

1300
GEN TURNER: Do you have an opinion regarding the proposal which our side made yesterday in the plenary session for the establishment of a sub-committee on Item 4?

1301
GEN LEE: I am not entrusted by our senior delegate to say anything definite about it.

1301
GEN TURNER: We have looked over the answers you gave us to the questions propounded yesterday. (See Enclosure 1) We find that there are several points that you have not made clear and we have some questions to ask with reference to those points.

We cannot determine whether or not your proposal for neutral observation teams would be satisfactory until we know your ideas concerning what constitutes a nation "neutral in the Korean war." What nations do you consider qualified to act?

1302
GEN LEE: I will answer that question. Before specifying the neutral nations I will say first what we mean by the neutral nations. In strict accordance with the definition of neutrality, all the nations which support and participate in the United Nations intervention in Korea cannot be considered as neutral

[redacted]

[redacted]

GEN LEE: (cont'd) nations. However, in order to meet the wish of the soldiers at the front and the people of the world for a speedy realization of peace we would agree to invite representatives of those nations not directly taking part in the fighting to participate in forming a supervisory organ to share the responsibilities of the supervising functions as stipulated in paragraph 6 of our proposal.

1304
GEN TURNER: Can you give us some examples of the nations you consider neutral?

1304
GEN LEE: For instance, those nations which, though having joined the United Nations, support the peace, and did not send troops to Korea - such as Czechoslovakia or Poland.

1304
GEN TURNER: Any other examples?

1305
GEN LEE: Many examples of such nations could be found, these are just examples.

1305
GEN TURNER: Would you consider Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark as neutral nations?

1305
GEN LEE: Nations which haven't dispatched their troops to Korea, such as Switzerland, can be considered neutral nations. Is that clear?

1306
GEN TURNER: You would consider Switzerland acceptable to your side?

1306
GEN LEE: I do not mean that we would accept any such nation as the neutral nation, but that is just in accordance with the definition of neutral nations used for an example.

1308
GEN TURNER: Then am I to understand that you would not consider Sweden and Denmark?

[redacted]

[redacted]

1308
GEN LEE: Our discussion hasn't yet developed so far as to recommend specific neutral nations. We are simply discussing what nations could be considered as neutral nations. If the understanding of that is clear, then we can go over to talking about the specific neutral nations.

1309
GEN HODES: Let me ask a question along that line to see if I understand you. Let's assume that you decide that you select Poland to get neutral representatives from. Then am I entitled to select Switzerland? And then, in that case, the nation's representatives that you select and the nation's representatives that I select serve jointly in this organization? Is that correct?

1311
GEN LEE: I just used Switzerland and Czechoslovakia as an example. And then, of course, the neutral nations of your choosing and the neutral nations of our choosing can work jointly. If this is the question you are asking, the answer is "Yes."

1311
GEN TURNER: Do you exclude nations such as Sweden, Denmark and other nations because they contributed hospitals during the war in Korea?

1313
GEN LEE: If you consider the definition we have given as to neutral nations, it will be clear to you. We said that we could invite the nations which are not directly taking part in the Korean war. We can invite those nations which have not directly taken part in the Korean fighting.

1314
GEN TURNER: Fighting?

1314
GEN LEE: Fighting. I think it's clear to you as to the specific selection of the neutral nations, it can be discussed when we go over to the discussion of the selection of these neutral nations.

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1315
GEN TURNER: Yes, we understand, but we wanted to know some specific examples, and so we asked about Sweden and Denmark. We judge from your answer that they are acceptable since they are not fighting in Korea.

1315
GEN LEE: We can consider such countries as Denmark and Sweden, which you talk about, to be neutral nations.

1316
GEN TURNER: Would the neutral-nations supervisory organ be under the authority of and responsible to the armistice commission? If not, to whom would it be responsible? In other words who would be in charge of this organization?

1317
GEN LEE: As to that question, we have given you our answer already in paragraph 3 of our written answer. It says, "after agreement is reached on Item 3 of the agenda, both sides can immediately work out through negotiations a list of neutral nations agreed upon by both sides, and proceed to invite them jointly, and after obtaining their consent, ask them to send an equal number of representatives respectively to be responsible for forming the supervisory organ, to be prepared, after the signing of the armistice agreement and in accordance with the scope specified in the armistice agreement, to dispatch inspection teams composed of equal numbers of members to carry out inspections at the ports of entry in the rear of both sides mutually agreed upon, and to be responsible to the armistice commission for reporting the result to the armistice commission." In other words, the armistice commission does not direct it. It is a parallel organ. (Drawing a diagram and explaining) Here are two commands - two headquarters, yours and ours - and the headquarters are now carrying on the armistice negotiations, and as a result

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GEN LEE: (cont'd) of it here on the one side the armistice commission is formed and here the neutral-nations supervisory organ. Under the neutral-nations supervisory organ there are observer teams 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., and here under the armistice commission, too, there are observer teams which are composed of your representatives and our representatives. And then what happens in the rear areas? They would be inspected by the neutral supervisory organ and the neutral supervisory organ would make a report to the armistice commission. Then after the reports, the armistice commission will have a conference with your side and our side and settle the cases.

1320
GEN TURNER: What does the supervisory organ supervise?

1320
GEN LEE: The supervisory organ supervises our principle 6. And as a result of the negotiations, two independent organs are born. Here, out of this armistice conference, we have the terms of agreement. The terms which correspond to principle 6 of our proposal will be supervised by the neutral supervisory organ, and the terms outside of principle 6 will be supervised by the armistice commission. Is that clear?

You asked the question: "Who is the boss of this supervisory organ?" It is to supervise and inspect the terms of agreement.

1321
GEN TURNER: Terms of agreement that we lay down?

1326
GEN LEE: Correction. The supervisory organ is an organ for supervising the terms of the agreement which have to do with the cases which take place in the rear. In other words it does not belong to any boss but it is an organ unto itself.

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1326
GEN TURNER: Who can issue instructions to the neutral-nations organization?

1327
GEN LEE: There is nothing to instruct. We will have the terms of the agreement. The representatives will be the representatives of the nations which we have invited. That means they are fair representatives - fair referees.

1328
GEN TURNER: Then you expect the armistice delegation here to spell out all the functions, all the authority of this neutral organization?

1330
GEN LEE: Yes, here we can discuss and decide the scope and details of the work of the supervisory organ.

1331
GEN TURNER: I think I understand that. I have a question I would like to ask. To cite an example: I for the moment will be the United Nations Command, and I feel that certain matters should be refereed. Do I have the authority as United Nations Commander to direct this neutral organ to inspect and report to both commanders on what they find?

1333
GEN LEE: Firstly, within the scope of the armistice agreement your commander can transfer the case to the armistice commission, then the armistice commission will reach an agreement and then entrust it to the supervisory organ and have it investigated. That cannot happen constantly, that is provisional, but an accidental case within the scope of the terms of the agreement. The case can be settled in that way.

1336
GEN TURNER: You have me confused. A minute ago you said this neutral organ was not under the control of the military armistice commission, and would receive no instruction or direction from them. Now you tell me that they do get, or may get, instructions through the military armistice commission.

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GEN TURNER: (cont'd) Which is correct?

1338
GEN LEE: In our statement we didn't say anything about instructions on the objection, we only say that we can "ask" that organ or "entrust it to" that organ.

1339
GEN TURNER: I understand. In the first paragraph of your answer today, you used the term "the contents of the armistice terms in general are all limited to the demilitarized zone". We do not understand what you mean by that.

1340
GEN LEE: It is a fact that the major task of the armistice commission is to supervise the cases within the demilitarized zone. But it doesn't mean that the tasks are limited to that alone. As we have mentioned in our statement at yesterday's conference, it has many things to deal with, such as the treatment of the prisoners of war or the treatment of the inspections and reports of the neutral-nations organization.

1343
GEN TURNER: You mean, then, that the armistice commission is limited in general to the demilitarized zone in terms of the armistice agreement?

1345
GEN LEE: The agreement we reached concerning the armistice will mainly be concerned with the arrangement of the demilitarized zone which will separate the troops of both sides; the accidents that might occur will mostly occur along the demilitarized zone and those incidents will be handled by the military armistice commission. The other terms of the armistice agreement concerning the rear, as specified in our paragraph 6, will be inspected by the supervisory organ of the neutral nations and their reports will come to the

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GEN LEE: (cont'd) armistice commission. So these matters will also be settled by the armistice commission.

1350
GEN TURNER: Once the neutral nations are agreed on, how would the individual representatives be selected? By the neutral nations themselves?

1352
GEN LEE: That would be of the concern of the neutral nations, they will select all representatives.

1352
GEN TURNER: Would they be military or civilian representatives?

1353
GEN HSIEH: It depends upon the decision of the government concerned as to whether they will be military persons or administrative persons. We think that when the governments concerned select the representatives, they will certainly send us people who will take good care of the things specified in paragraph 6.

1354
GEN TURNER: Within what period of time would you expect agreement to be reached on this?

1355
GEN LEE: As to the question of the time, it depends upon how quickly we both reach agreement. It depends upon whether we reach an agreement quickly or delay. If we should agree to the principles today, we could invite them tomorrow. That means we can settle the problem as quickly as that.

1357
GEN TURNER: Well, if we reach an agreement on armistice before the neutral organs are ready to operate, how do you propose to handle inspections in the interim?

1358
GEN LEE: The answer is given clearly in paragraph 3 of our answer this morning and it says, "after agreement is reached.....

1358
GEN TURNER: You don't have to repeat it.

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1358
GEN HSIEH: If you read it, you can get a clear answer.

1358
GEN TURNER: We cannot find the answer in the question in your paragraph 3.

1359
GEN HSIEH: Then I have a question to ask. You mean that the armistice agreement is finished, and then, at that moment, the representatives of the neutral nations have not yet arrived?

1359
GEN TURNER: Yes, that is right.

1400
GEN HSIEH: The question can easily be settled when we finish the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda. If we invite the representatives then, they will have time to get out here. Do you understand?

1400
GEN HODES: Simply as an example: suppose they take 60 days to get here - I don't mean 60 days to finish Items 4 and 5, I mean 60 days to get these people over here after the armistice is agreed upon - who acts?

1400
GEN LEE: The neutral nations which we are going to invite certainly will be nations which hope for an armistice in Korea and which hope for the realization of peace in Korea. Now, judging from the advanced traffic system of today, it is not considered that any one will take 60 days to reach here. We don't need to suppose it will take 60 days and we can suppose that they can arrive soon after the armistice. In fact they can come by the time of the armistice. This is not conjecture but it can be a reality.

1403
GEN HODES: Then the answer to my question is: "No one acts until they are established." Is that correct?

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1403
GEN LEE: We think that as soon as we are through with Item 3 of the agenda we can immediately invite them, so it is not conceivable that such a thing can happen.

1404
GEN TURNER: But it is understood by your concept that the armistice would not come into effect until the representatives of the neutral nations are here and ready to function?

1404
GEN LEE: What we mean is that we will let them come by the time of the signing of the agreement because having discussed Item 3 of the Agenda, if we decide the number of ports in your rear and the number of ports in our rear, then the number of the personnel required will be known. If we invite the necessary persons from the neutral nations then, they will get ready. As to a tehnical settlement of the question, we can do this before signing the armistice agreement - we can let representatives of the neutral nations come to countries near to Korea. If we do so, any such thing as taking 30 to 60 days for the trip will not happen.

1407
GEN TURNER: In paragraph 1 of your answers today, who would request the supervisory organ to make the inspections mentioned in that paragraph? Could anybody direct it to make them? If so, who?

1408
GEN LEE: We are not going to make any direction. The armistice commission can ask the supervisory organ and the supervisory organ can carry out their activities in accordance with the request of the armistice commission. That is asking or requesting, not direction. As to who is to ask the supervisory organ, the military armistice commission is to ask it.

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1410
GEN TURNER: Who assigns the representatives of the neutral nations at to who goes to any particular port of entry?

1410
GEN LEE: That can be decided by the neutral-nations organization itself, after the agreement. Suppose that here we have the port of Sinuiju and here the port of Pusan, representatives of all the neutral nations both of us have invited - A, B & C - will inspect Pusan, and representatives of A, B and C will inspect Sinuiju.

1411
GEN TURNER: Do these ports of entry include airports as well as such ports as Sinuiju and Pusan?

1411
GEN LEE: What we are discussing here, now, is whether we will accept the principle or not. As to the specific points, they can be decided when we discuss the specific question. Now, we are not discussing specifically Pusan or Sinuiju, but we are discussing the adoption of this principle.

1413
GEN TURNER: In order for us to understand your principle, it is necessary that we ask certain questions and get specific answers. So I ask, what about airports? Pyongyang, for example?

1413
GEN LEE: We will decide through which ports the armed forces will be introduced into Korea. We will discuss about inspection of ports through which the armed forces will be introduced into Korea. In other words, we will discuss the places which are necessary for any increases of armed forces from outside.

1415
GEN TURNER: Does it apply only to armed forces and not to supplies and material?

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1415
GEN LEE: I request you inspect principles specified in our principle 6 - that is: "the inspection of and introduction of military forces, weapons, and ammunition."

1417
GEN TURNER: Now, I am asking if it applies to airfields as well as seaports? I am not asking for any specific place. I mentioned Pyongyang only as an example of an airfield.

1418
GEN LEE: In other words, inspect and supervise the spots where the introduction of armed forces, weapons and ammunition can be prevented.

1419
GEN TURNER: Airports of entry as well as seaports of entry?

1419
GEN LEE Let us discuss that question when we come to discussing the concrete questions. I think that answer is sufficient. Do you have any other questions to raise? We better go ahead with the discussion of the principle.

1420
GEN TURNER: When can we expect an answer to that question?

1420
GEN LEE: At the time of discussion of concrete questions we can exchange our opinions as to that question. As to the answer in principle, we have already given you the answer in principle.

1421
GEN HODES: The answer is not understood. Now you asked us to consider a number of principles in your proposal. One of them speaks of ports. Now, before we can consider seriously any proposal containing a word you cannot define, we've got to get the definition of it. It should be very simple to answer the question. What do you mean by "ports"? Are you speaking of only seaports, or do you include airports, of entry?

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1423
GEN LEE: We have clearly said that we are to inspect the ports at which the introduction of armed forces, weapons and ammunition can be prevented.

1424
GEN HODES: Well then I understand that you mean all types of ports. That is the way I have to understand your answer unless you tell me otherwise. All types of ports.

1424
GEN LEE: We have given you a clear answer already, and that question can be settled when we come to discussing specific ports.

1424
GEN HODES: I am talking about which type. I am not talking about any one port. Does it include all types?

1425
GEN LEE: After we have decided the principle and when we come to decide whether Pusan or Sinuiju, or when we come to discuss that, that question can be settled.

1426
GEN TURNER: You haven't answered our question. What types of ports? Do your types of ports include airports of entry?

1426
GEN LEE: I think there is no need to waste time with this type question because we have given you a clear answer. We can say it this way: on equal footing we will inspect a place which is necessary for inspection or which is required for inspection.

1428
GEN TURNER: Who considers it necessary?

1430
GEN LEE: That we can decide here, in accordance with the sixth principle.

1430
GEN TURNER: That is a part of the principle that you propose, and we do not understand it. We would like to know specifically if that includes airports of entry.

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1431
GEN LEE: We can decide concrete questions when it comes time to discuss concrete questions. For instance, where can we prevent introducing military forces, weapons, and ammunition? For instance, we can insist on Pusan and you can say that Pusan is not used for that purpose. Then we will discuss it, and then reach an agreement. Then the ports which are agreed upon can be supervised, can be inspected, by the neutral nations. I think so far the question has become very clear.

1433
GEN TURNER: Well, we understand that. It includes airports. Is that your understanding?

1433
GEN LEE: Now, we are not talking about airports, but later we can talk of specific ports.

1433
GEN HODES: Well, by refusing to answer that question, all you've done is to prevent us from considering any further your principle 7. It cannot be considered until we get an answer to that question.

1434
GEN LEE: We have given a clear answer to it, and it depends upon you whether the conference will be delayed. And the one who is responsible for delaying the conference is General Hodes.

1434
GEN HODES: All right, let's keep on the subject. You are getting off the subject. You either mean that you include airports or you exclude airports. Now, will you answer which? Do you include or exclude them?

1435
GEN LEE: As specific ports, they will be decided when we decide to discuss specific ports; if you propose specific ports, we'll

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) consider them and if they are proper then we will accept them and if some of them are not we will refute their applicability; vice versa, we will propose ports and if they are acceptable then you will agree to them and if some are not, you will refute them. As to that question, we've given you a very clear answer; yet in spite of this you're going to delay the conference. It depends whether you want to delay the conference or not, it depends on whether General Hodes wants to delay the conference or not.

1436
GEN HODES: I am going to delay the conference until I get an answer to my question. I have not got an answer to it yet.

1437
GEN LEE: If General Hodes wants to take over the responsibility before the opinion of the world public, we can not prevent him from doing so. But we can add that it would be a sinful action.

1437
GEN HODES: Now, briefly then, you're telling me that you refuse to answer the question. Is that right?

1437
GEN LEE: We never refused.

1438
GEN HODES: You haven't answered it.

1438
GEN LEE: The attitude of taking a clear answer not to be clear, cannot expedite the progress of the conference. Again we say clearly, both sides have the right to propose, to ask to see what ports and if some of them are not proper, both sides have the right to refute them for this or that specific reason, by saying why they are not proper. How can it be clearer than that? You said you would delay the conference. Now, are you going to continue the conference or not?

1439
GEN TURNER: At the time we are discussing specific ports we can consider all types of ports including airports. Is that correct?

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1439
GEN LEE: Well, we have given you clear answers. These ports which are necessary for preventing the introduction of armed forces, weapons, and ammunition - they will be inspected and selected.

1439
GEN TURNER: You say that you have given us a clear answer, but we still do not understand. You can make it clear very easily by saying that you <u>include</u> airports or you <u>exclude</u> airports.

1440
GEN LEE: Airfields and airports are specific ports, and you can propose them as ports which you find it necessary to inspect to prevent the introduction of armed forces and weapons and ammunition, and we, too, can propose such ports.

1443
GEN TURNER: We understand then that you include airports in your "ports of entry". Is that correct?

1443
GEN LEE: In our answer, we said "ports." In other words, we said in paragraph 7, "as ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides."

1444
GEN TURNER: In our questions yesterday, we asked you what you meant by the word "coastal" in your third principle where you refer to "coastal waters and coastal islands." What is meant by "coastal"?

1445
GEN LEE: We mean, by that, the waters within the vicinity of our territory. That means the islands and waters around the islands in the near sea north of the military demarcation line - north of the demarcation line as well as south of it.

1445
GEN TURNER: You use the term "in the vicinity" of the islands of the territory. How far do you mean?

1446
GEN LEE: As we are talking about the armies and talking about withdrawal of troops, we mean the distance which is outside of threatening range.

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1446
GEN TURNER: Do you mean four kilometers?

1447
GEN LEE: We did not mention any specific kilometers.

1447
GEN TURNER: How far then?

1447
GEN LEE: How far it should be - that we did not decide here. After the armistice your naval forces should not be in the vicinity of our sea.

1448
GEN TURNER: We're discussing principles here and in one of your principles, the third principle, you used the term "coastal waters and coastal islands." We now ask: What do you mean by "coastal"? How far does that extend from the mainland or from the islands?

1449
GEN LEE: What we are discussing here is not how far from the islands is coastal, and I don't find it necessary either to define how many kilometers.

1449
GEN TURNER: How can you expect us to consider your principle when we don't know definitely what you mean by coastal? We must have an answer as to the exact distance.

1450
GEN LEE: For instance, after the armistice, there is no necessity for your war vessels to be around here.

1450
GEN TURNER: International law calls territorial waters anything within three miles. Is that what you mean?

1451
GEN LEE: The territorial waters in the international law you are talking about, has nothing to do with this discussion of ours.

1452
GEN TURNER: We get back, then, to the question: What is meant by "coastal waters"?

1452
GEN LEE: It is not necessary for us to tell how far is "coastal".

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1453
GEN TURNER: I want to make one thing clear before we recess: We cannot further consider your principle 7 until you give us a clear, unequivocal, frank answer to our question about airports. We cannot further consider your principle 3 until you have given us a clear, unequivocal, frank answer as to what you mean by "coastal". We would like an answer to this tomorrow.

1454
GEN LEE: General answers in principle we have given today, already, and it is your choice to discuss it or not. It is also your choice to delay the meeting or not. What are you going to do about the meeting tomorrow? The meetings of yesterday and today had nothing but questions. Are you going to continue the meeting tomorrow in this way?

1456
GEN TURNER: Are you going to refuse to answer our questions when they pertain to the terms that you have used in your general principles?

1456
GEN LEE: We have not refused anything, and we've answered the questions clearly; and you cannot say that the questions were not clearly answered.

1458
GEN HODES: In your answer, paragraph 2, that you gave us at 11 o'clock this morning, you said that flight of civil transport aircraft is not prohibited. Civil transport aircraft? Now, do you mean the word "civil" or do you mean "transport" aircraft? In other words do you mean non-combatant aircraft? Is that what you mean?

1500
GEN LEE: Yes.

1500
GEN HODES: You mean non-combatant? All right. That answers that question.

1500
GEN LEE: Not only that question, but all other questions are answered.

1501
GEN TURNER: Would it be possible for the representatives of neutral nations to be located at agreed upon ports of entry at the time the armistice is signed?

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1501
GEN LEE: That is possible. That can be.

1501
GEN TURNER: You are aware of the proposal submitted by the United Nations Command delegation on Item 3, and we are aware of your proposals in this regard. On some points our two proposals seem to be in agreement and on others they differ. Therefore, I suggest that we first make up points upon which we can agree. To this end, let us take up each matter individually to reach each point successively. Perhaps that which is not precisely the wording of either side's proposal will be found satisfactory to both sides. Therefore, let us begin with this, as point 1, Do you agree with the following words? "Cease fire by air, ground, and sea forces under the control of each side 24 hours after the armistice has become effective." Do you agree with this wording?

1510
GEN LEE: Read them all, the whole thing.

1510
GEN TURNER: No, just one by one.

1510
GEN LEE: All the items are interrelated to each other; so when you speak of them all, we can consider them and give you our clear answer. If you can submit it in writing we can study it.

1511
GEN HODES: Now look, you've got a proposal and you have our proposal, and we are not in agreement on these two proposals. If we start with these things on which we agree, or on which we can agree here, then we have some chance of breaking this stalemate or deadlock. If we take each one as a whole, we cannot make any progress. What we are trying to do is to find a way of making progress by taking broad principles only, and seeing if we will agree on these broad principles. Later, if we can get agreement on some of the broad principles, then we can later on work out other details necessary to take care of and describe these principles fully. Any agreements that we make here are of course always dependent on, and subject to, the final agreement when we

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) get them all put together. This is the only way we know of to attempt to break this deadlock.

1515
GEN LEE: We agree to what you just said.

1515
GEN TURNER: All right.

1515
GEN LEE: For that, it is necessary to see all the difference you had in mind. In yesterday's meeting as well as in the meeting of today you only asked what you required as explanations; so therefore, now if you present your questions about principles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 together - present them in writing or orally - then we will ask you about your general opinions about principles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Present it in writing or orally because each item is interrelated with the others; so therefore we want to know your general opinion about them all.

1517
GEN HODES: Is that all? Now first we have asked a lot of questions. We asked those questions so we could attempt to understand what you intend by your proposal. We think now with two exceptions - which we have stated many times today - with two exceptions, we understand most of the intent of your proposal. Now, what I have in mind is an attempt to build a framework, upon which we can develop all of the principles necessary to satisfy the conditions of Item 3. That is what I am endeavoring to do. Now in order to build this framework that I am suggesting, we should attempt to do what is essential for that building, beginning with what we are in agreement on. That is what I am attempting to start this afternoon. After we get this initial framework built there will undoubtedly be additions, additional principles, that each side will probably want to include. But let us get into those after we have gotten the framework upon which we can agree. Now for the purpose of this framework, then let us take principle 1 to be "Cease-fire by air, ground and sea forces under the control of

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) each side within 24 hours after the armistice becomes effective."

That is number one. Now can we get agreement on that question?

1522
GEN LEE: Please say further.

1522
GEN HODES: What is that?

1522
GEN LEE: Please say further.

1523
GEN HODES: No, let's get this straight! Let's go down these one at a time and see if we can get agreement as we go along. If you do not agree, just say: "I don't agree."

1523
GEN LEE: What is the difference between principle 1 which you are talking about and our principle 1? What is the difference between them?

1524
GEN HODES: Call this principle 6, 7 or 9, I don't care what number you give them. I am not trying to run these down in the same order which you have or which we have, but in the order in which it is necessary for us to make decisions.

1525
GEN LEE: You must know this one thing. You must understand this one thing. We cannot say that translation is exactly the same and this is an important question. Therefore you should submit these in writing, and you cannot submit principles separately because all the principles are related with each other.

1528 (General Hodes hands written principle to General Lee)

1528
GEN HODES: Here it is in writing.

1528
GEN LEE: Our way of solving the question is this: We do not want to discuss it point by point, all your opinions about all the principles 1, 2, 3, etc., and what is different .... on what points they are different and on what points they are the same. We must understand them as a whole then we can also express our opinions.

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1530
GEN HODES: You understand what I said was that we expect that on these principles there may be some additional points that will come up later, but the part that is in here as far as I know is agreeable to both sides, both sides have agreed to it.

1530
GEN LEE: I now want to say to General Turner that at the plenary session we said that on principles 1, 2, 6, and 7, we are in agreement. What we want is to hear your opinion on principles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 together.

1530
GEN HODES: You have prevented us from thoroughly considering your proposal since you have not completed the answers to the questions we have asked in some cases and in other cases you have evaded an answer, so that we do not understand what your intent is on certain points. Now then, I have made a proposal to attempt to get this thing on its feet. If you do not want to accept this method of getting this Item 3 solved, then we would like to know what method you suggest for solving it.

1531
GEN LEE: We never refused your questions, and we always answered all your questions. As to your 21 questions of the day before yesterday and the 19 questions of yesterday, we seriously studied them and we gave you our serious answer in writing. Throughout today's session, with all our sincerity, we have given you explanations to your questions. Therefore, as to your way of solving the question, we ask you to tell us all your opinions about all the principles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. But what is your attitude? You tell us your brief opinion about one principle, the first principle. We are not trying to force you to give us an opinion you do not have prepared. Therefore, the shortest way of solving the question is to tell your opinion, as a whole, on the seven principles.

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1536
GEN TURNER: General Hodes has told you exactly what he meant, and even though you agreed to the individual principle 1, if you do not like the way they fit together when we are done, you are free to reject the whole.

Since we do not seem to be making any progress this afternoon on this discussion, I suggest that we recess until tomorrow at 11 o'clock. At that time we will expect answers to the questions we have proposed.

1537
GEN LEE: It is not that we did not answer--it is not at all that we did not answer to anything. We agree to your proposal of recessing until 11 o'clock tomorrow. There is nothing that we do not answer, but we agree.

Meeting recessed at 1538 hours

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

Enclosure 1 - Communist answers to United Nations Command questions of 4 December 1951.

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COMMUNIST ANSWERS TO UNITED NATIONS COMMAND QUESTIONS OF 4 DECEMBER 1951

TRANSLATED COPY

(1) The function of the armistice commission is to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangement and the supervision of the implementation of the whole armistice agreement, except for the scope of supervision specified in paragraph 6 of our proposal. If any armed forces of either side are found to have violated the armistice agreement by entering the demilitarized zone or carrying out any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone, the armistice commission shall dispatch an inspection team composed of an equal number of personnel of both sides to the demilitarized zone to carry out inspection. The armistice commission has no right to operate behind the battle-line of either side, beyond the demilitarized zone, because that would be an interference in the internal affairs of both sides, while the contents of the armistice terms are in general all limited to the demilitarized zone. Regarding the deliberate bombardment, aerial bombing and coastal attack on the rear of one side by the other side, such as the case you posed in your question 17, we consider that if both sides are sincerely for an armistice, such incidents should not occur, and that, if they should occur, the supervisory organ of neutral nations must be requested to send there its inspection team to make an investigation and to report the result of the investigation to the armistice commission.

(2) During the armistice, no military forces, weapons or ammunition shall be introduced into Korea under any pretext, including, of course, military aircraft and naval vessels. The purpose of this is to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level. As to flight of civil transport aircraft and navigation of merchant vessels, they are not prohibited.

(3) After agreement is reached on Item 3 of the agenda, both sides can immediately work out through negotiations a list of neutral nations agreed upon by both sides, and proceed to invite them jointly, and after obtaining their consent, ask them to send an equal number of representatives respectively

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to be responsible for forming the supervisory organ, to be prepared, after the signing of the armistice agreement and in accordance with the scope specified in the armistice agreement, to dispatch inspection teams composed of equal number of members to carry out inspection at ports in the rear of both sides mutually agreed upon, and to be responsible to the armistice commission for reporting the result to the armistice commission.

(Received 1100, 5 December 1951)



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

6 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Third Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS: - MGEN H M TURNER, USAF, and MGEN H I HODES, USA, Delegates; RADM R E Libby, USN, MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Col D O Darrow, USAF, Col A J Kinney, USAF, Lt Col A P Hurr, USAF, Lt Col H S Levie, USA, CDR B W Spore, USN, and CHSCLK C G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st Lt R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS: - - - MGEN Lee Sang Jo, NKA, and MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, Delegates; RADM Kim Won Mu, NK Navy, Col Chang Chun San, NKA, Col Tsai Chong Won, CCF, Capt Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Chiu Ko An, CCF, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

1100
GEN LEE: If you have anything to say, we would like to hear it.

1100
GEN TURNER: During the past three days we have asked you a number of questions in order that we may clearly understand your proposals. There are two questions which are still unanswered. We cannot give you an opinion on your third and seventh principles until we have a specific answer to each of these questions. The two questions are as follows: First, do the "ports of entry" you referred to in your principle 7 include airports? Second, what do you mean by "coastal" in your third principle?

1101
GEN LEE: You have asked these questions already. As for your 40 written questions and your oral questions during the past three days, we have given you clear answers. The answers are serious answers, after our serious consideration and study of your questions.

1102
GEN TURNER: These terms in question are terms that you used in your proposed principles. You say that you made them clear, but we don't understand them.

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1103
GEN LEE: As to that question, I will explain it again. I will now answer the questions that you are not quite clear on, about the ports of entry. I will give you my answer again. We said that we would select points which are necessary for preventing the introduction into Korea of military forces, weapons, and ammunition as provided in paragraph 6 of our proposal. As for the selection of the specified spots, we said we could select them when we come to discuss the concrete questions after we have discussed the principles. This is our clear answer we gave you the day before yesterday and yesterday. To that question we can give you clear answers by discussing the principles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, point by point. By clarifying our agreement and the differences on each point, we can also give you a clear answer to the question of the ports of entry.

1108
GEN TURNER: Then you mean that the word "ports", as used by you, includes air, sea, and ground ports where it is possible to introduce military personnel, supplies, and equipment into Korea. This is the way we will interpret your meaning.

1110
GEN LEE: I want to tell you again that as for the "ports of entry" in our proposal, we are talking about ports of entry in general.

As to the question of "coastal", it is as it is described in our written proposal. According to that wording, the content of it is very clear. It seems to be your intention to find out and determine how many kilometers can be within the scope of the territorial waters, but here we are not discussing the question of determining the scope of the territorial waters, whether it is 3 miles or 12 miles. That is not what we are discussing here.

By "coastal", our discussion hinges upon how to keep apart the forces of the belligerents. Now, we are discussing the question of how we can separate the combatant forces of both

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) sides on the south and north of the military demarcation line and how to withdraw them, how to make it possible that no hostilities be resumed again. We are not going to clarify the legal explanation of whether it is outside territorial waters, whether the many naval vessels should be anchored or go around there - that is not what we are discussing here. (Drawing a diagram and pointing) This is Korea, and this is the coast, and this is the military demarcation line here, and then after the armistice, your forces need not be around here (North) and our forces need not be around here (South). (Pointing to coast of Korea.) What we are discussing here is the question of withdrawing our forces from south of this line to the north. Our stand is that your forces, though they may be outside the territorial water, need not be here (North). Your naval forces need not be here, because you must remember that your side and our side are not in the amicable relationship of peace time. That you must remember. In other words, your side and our side are two belligerents. Therefore, we've got to say that it's different from your forces navigating on the high seas; we've got to say that your naval forces are not navigating on the high seas; therefore, in our principle, we said "coastal". What I say time and again is that we are not talking about three miles or 12 miles, but saying that your naval forces need not be north of this military demarcation line.

1119
GEN TURNER: We have noted your long explanation, but you still have not answered our question as to the meaning of the term "coastal". We will interpret "coastal", as used by you, to mean "territorial", as defined in international law. Now I want to go right on with a statement about your principles 6 and 7.

In attempting to arrive at a clear understanding of the full intent of your principles 6 and 7, we have analyzed carefully your answers to our various questions. Certain aspects

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd)

require further clarification. This much, however, is clear: Your sixth principle, which would deny rotation of units and individuals and would prohibit replenishment of ammunition expended in training or replacement of unserviceable weapons, is designed to effect reduction in the strength and effectiveness of the United Nations Command's forces through the process of attrition. What I want to state, without qualification, is that the United Nations Command rejects categorically any such prohibitions against replacement and exchange of units and personnel on a man-for-man basis, and of equipment on a piece-for-piece basis within the level existing at the time the armistice becomes effective.

We will again attempt to explain the step-by-step proposal we presented yesterday. It is designed to reduce the area of disagreement. You said yesterday that the two delegations were in agreement on the United Nations Command's proposed principles 1, 2, 6, and 7. You are aware, I presume, that your wording of principle 1 differs from our wording of principle 1. That difference must be resolved. We must achieve agreed wording on all principles we adopt. In the case of some principles, though basic differences exist in substance as well as in wording, some parts of the two differing versions are identical. We can reach agreement on these similar parts. Thus, by adhering to the practice of setting down what we can agree to, we can mark out and perhaps narrow the area of disagreement.

In the case of principle 1, we both agree that hostilities shall cease within 24 hours after the armistice is signed. At least that much is agreed about principle 1. Why not put that down as agreed? We can come back to it later, adding qualifying words as necessary. If we follow the procedure now recommended by us, at least something will be agreed. Such agreement in no way prejudices the right of either sub-delegation to refuse to

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) accept the whole product even though made up of agreed parts. As an example, if we agree on revised principles 1, 2, and 3, it does not mean that we agree on the three collectively. Instead, it only indicates that each is satisfactory individually. Upon tentative agreement by both sides on each principle considered, we can then discuss them in toto as the basis for the concrete arrangements under Agenda Item 3. If at that time either side wishes to amend a previously agreed principle, it shall have the right to do so. At least we would have an agreed skeleton upon which we could hang the details of each principle as we worked them out.

For example, suppose we agree upon the wording of principle 1 as follows: "A cease-fire by all forces, ground, naval, and air controlled by each side within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement." That much is agreed. Now perhaps you would wish to add the words "regular or irregular" after the word "forces". We can discuss that later after we have agreed to the basic idea. Perhaps we would wish to add the words "armed" before the word "forces". We can discuss that later after we have agreed to the basic idea. We would be working on an agreed skeleton, molding the flesh we added to produce the agreed final product. We are only suggesting this procedure in order to achieve agreements. To do so is the task charged to these sub-delegations. We recommend we get on with it.

1147
GEN LEE: In your statement you said that you oppose the restriction of entry into Korea from the outside, of military forces, weapons, and ammunition because it would mean the reduction of your armed forces. But this principle cannot be applied to one side alone but to both sides. I have said this principle would be applied to both sides.

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) Then we agree in principle to the procedure of discussion. As we have already said in the plenary session as well as in yesterday's sub-committee meeting, we agree in principle on principles 1, 2, 6, and 7. Accordingly the paragraph 1 you proposed yesterday does not differ in principle from ours. So, we have no opposition to point-by-point discussion.

1152
GEN TURNER: Then you agree to the first revised principle: "There shall be a cease-fire effective within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice agreement and adhered to by all forces of any type under the control of both sides."

1154
GEN LEE: I say that paragraph 1 you proposed yesterday does not differ in principle from ours. Accordingly we can agree <u>in principle</u>, but of course this does not mean that the wording of the terms of it are agreed.

1155
GEN TURNER: The second revised principle: "There shall be established a supervisory organ equally and jointly manned by both sides for carrying out the terms of the armistice agreement."

1157
GEN LEE: Your second paragraph corresponds to our paragraph 5 but there are partial differences.

1157
GEN HODES: I realize that this basic principle which we have just read to you is not exactly the same as any of those we have proposed previously. I have to go back to the explanation of this morning. We are now trying to find how far each side can come to agreement in this particular one. I believe that both sides are in agreement this far. As we said earlier this morning, this does not mean that when we come back to these, to determine what we want to add to them, we may not want to add something, as you have added in your paragraph or principle on the armistice commission. I believe that basically we were in agreement that there will be an armistice commission; that it will be of mixed

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) membership; that each side will have equal membership, and that this armistice commission is responsible for the supervision of the armistice agreement terms. I believe that those points are what both sides have so far agreed to. There are other points of the armistice agreement on which we are not in agreement. The purpose is to get this framework, on which we are agreed, and build on it to the extent necessary, after we get this basic framework.

1203
GEN LEE: Is that all?

1203
GEN HODES: That is all on principle 2.

1203
GEN LEE: From what General Hodes said, that there should be an armistice commission, that there should be members equally from both sides - as to that, yours is the same as ours. Thirdly, that it should be jointly composed and that it should jointly observe the armistice terms, so far we agree. But as to our paragraph 6, the supervision in the rear, that is different from yours. According to our proposal, the supervisory organ composed of neutral nations should inspect in the rear. On that point your proposal is not clear; there it differs from ours and therefore we cannot agree to it.

1204
GEN HODES: I understand what is in your principle 6. I purposely left the word "inspection" out of this because I knew what you had in mind for "inspection". It may be that we will disagree with your idea of "inspection". Therefore, we left it out of this skeleton principle so that we can later discuss inspection. This says that the military armistice commission is responsible for the supervision of the adherence to the terms of the armistice agreement. It says nothing about inspection and purposely so. That is the reason I felt you could accept this as part of the skeleton.

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd)

I want to add one more statement to that. In your principle which speaks of the military armistice commission, you have referred to a neutral organ for the carrying out of this inspection behind the lines. In our original proposal, we had a condition for utilizing teams from the military armistice commission to do this inspection or observation behind the lines. We are in disagreement on those two points at the moment, therefore we did not include inspection in this skeleton principle.

Perhaps I should again try to make one point clear: that is, that what we are doing is <u>not</u>, repeat <u>not</u>, offering a new proposal; we are attempting to pick out or select from both proposals - your proposal and our proposal - those points that we are in agreement on, for the purpose of building a complete set of principles. This is not a new proposal.

1208
GEN LEE: Between your proposal, paragraph 2, and our paragraph 5 there are agreed points. The establishment of the military armistice commission, that it should be composed of equal numbers, that it should supervise the armistice terms, and that the armistice commission be jointly composed - these are similar. But there is a difference, in that we said "except for the scope of provisions specified in paragraph 6 of this proposal" -- on that point your paragraph 2 differs from our paragraph 5. We have said, therefore, that there are points of agreement and points of difference in the paragraph you read, and I think our paragraph 5 is clearer; but I say that we should put aside the differences and go over to the discussion of other principles.

1210
GEN HODES: Before we do that, let us see if we can reword paragraph 2, so that it is in agreement on both sides at the moment without getting into the specific disagreements. Let us see if we can do this, add the following to principle 2 that we are talking

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) about: "Except as modified by mutual agreement during discussion of Item 3 of the agenda." Will that satisfy paragraph 2 for the moment?

1213
GEN LEE: As to the points of difference, we can put them aside. You can submit your opinion for the revision of it, and we too can present our opinion for the revision of it. So we should put it aside and go over to discussion of the other principles without getting into specific wording.

1215
GEN HODES: I am perfectly willing to go on to the next one. However, I believe it would be desirable if you would attempt to find some way to write paragraph 2 - that we have been talking about - as a skeleton principle satisfactory to both sides, since I have offered two possible solutions to that paragraph.

I will now go to paragraph 3: "All armed forces . . . .

1217
GEN LEE: Before you read your paragraph 3, if you would submit it in writing, we would have it translated and think of it first.

1218
GEN HODES: All right (Handing paper to General Lee) Paragraph 3: "All armed forces withdraw from and remain outside the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the armistice becomes effective."

1218
GEN LEE: As it is not yet translated, I have not read the full wording of it. As to the withdrawal within 3 days, we can agree to it.

1218
GEN HODES: Now as it stands, we are tentatively in agreement on paragraphs 1 and 3, while we are not in agreement on paragraph 2 for the moment. Is that correct?

1220
GEN LEE: We can say that as to your paragraphs 1 and 3, we agree in principle. As to paragraph 2, there are agreed points, and there are differences.

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1221
GEN HODES: Paragraph 4: "There shall be effective inspection responsible to the military armistice commission beyond the demilitarized zone and in the rear of both sides within Korea." While that is being translated, so there can be no misunderstanding of what is meant, I would like to call attention to the fact that in this principle we have not, I repeat not, said who actually does the inspecting anywhere.

1223
GEN LEE: In your proposal, you said "effective inspection". What do you mean by "effective"?

1223
GEN HODES: By "effective", we mean inspection that will determine whether or not the terms of the armistice are being carried out as intended by the armistice agreement.

1225
GEN LEE: Your fourth paragraph corresponds to our paragraphs 5 and 7, but it does not provide who supervises ("inspects" according to United Nations Command Interpreter) and because of this we can hardly think that your proposal is perfect.

1227
GEN HODES: We don't expect it to be perfect or complete either. We said that in the beginning. If I understand what you just said, you would prefer to substitute "supervised by" for the words "responsible to". Is that correct? If so, I will change my wording.

1230
GEN LEE: We are not talking about what you say as to "responsible to" whom. On this point we have differences: it does not provide who supervises it. According to our paragraph 7, it is very clear. Therefore, as to that question, we should put it aside and go over to the discussion of other principles.

1231
GEN HODES: Well now, we can do that; but let's see if we can't straighten this one out. That is what we're here for, I think, to see if we can't get an agreement. Suppose that instead of

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) "responsible to" we said "reporting to"?

1232
GEN LEE: We do not oppose insertion of that phrase, but we only mean that it does not provide who supervises - who inspects. Therefore, we say that we should put it aside and go over to the discussion of other principles.

1233
GEN HODES: What you're doing is preventing any progress in trying to get ahead here on basic principles. We don't go as far in here as to say who is to do the inspecting. We don't intend to. We purposely left it out.

All right, paragraph 5: "There shall be no increase in the level of units, personnel, war equipment, facilities, or material existing in Korea at the time the armistice agreement goes into effect." Now, in connection with this paragraph 5, I want to call attention to the fact that all I am trying to do at this moment is put a ceiling on this structure. I'm not trying to put the floor in it. I'm only trying to put the ceiling in. We're all agreed I'm sure that there will be no increases.

1238
GEN LEE: Your paragraph 5 corresponds to our paragraph 6. The basic spirit of our paragraph 6 is that after the armistice there shall be only the outgoing of the military forces, weapons, and ammunition, but no introduction of them.

1239
GEN HODES: I know what your paragraph 6 means. I understand it very well. But I do not agree with your paragraph. Now then, what I'm trying to do here, I repeat, is to get some points on which we can get agreement. You say that the forces shall be reduced. That's the effect of your paragraph: to be reduced. We say they shall not be increased. Now, if you say that the forces are to be reduced, then certainly you can say that the forces shall not be increased.

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1241
GEN LEE: What General Hodes just said is exactly the point on which we differ from each other. Our basic stand is that there shall be only reduction and no increase, and that the military personnel can go out but not come in. It is, of course, more positive than saying "No increase." Therefore, we can say that on this paragraph our differences are rather big and we both mutually understand that point fully. We should put this aside and go over to other principles.

1245
GEN HODES: You still misunderstand the purpose of what we are trying to do. You want to reduce. Eventually everybody will want to reduce. The time for reduction is not yet ready to be decided. If you agree or propose that there be reduction, then certainly you should be able to agree that there be no increase. In other words, both of us have agreed that there be no increase; therefore, why can you not say that you agree that there be no increase?

1246
GEN LEE: Of course we do not oppose your stand that there should be no increase of armed forces, but we insist that there be only going out but no coming in. We say that after the armistice there should be only going out and should be no coming in, and that must be so. And, according to our principle, it is not a requirement to your side alone, but it is also a requirement to our side.

1247
GEN HODES: I understand all that, but what you are doing is trying to discuss your sixth or seventh principles here. Now, you know that we object to your principle which says that no troops, replacements, rotation, or anything else can come into Korea under any pretexts. Now from what you have just said - that you have no objection to "no increase" - I assume that you accept this paragraph 5. Is that correct?

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1250
GEN LEE: We have spent a long time on this, and both your side and ourside know very well that we do not agree on this point. The difference between us on this point is bigger than anything else so we should put this aside and go over to other principles. We cannot settle this now, so now we should go over to the discussion of other principles.

1252
GEN HODES: I'm afraid that you still do not understand, or will not understand, what we are trying to do here this morning.

Paragraph 6: "Each side will withdraw its forces, air, sea, and ground from the areas controlled by the other side." I don't see how you can object to that.

1252
GEN LEE: Your paragraph 6 and our paragraph 3 treat the same question. Do you agree to our proposal? If there is any differences, on what points do you differ from us? There should be wording that the withdrawal be from the "rear of the other side" but it isn't clear in your paragraph from where to withdraw.

1254
GEN HODES: Well, how would you write it?

1254
GEN LEE: Our paragraph 3 is very clear and your paragraph 6 deals with the same question in nature. What difference is there between them? Does this mean you agree to our paragraph 3?

1255
GEN HODES: Do you agree or disagree with our paragraph 6? Agree or disagree?

1255
GEN LEE: I said your paragraph 6 isn't clear. It deals with the same principle as our paragraph 3 and as long as it doesn't become clear we cannot agree to it. Accordingly, what we want you to answer is this: On what point in our paragraph 3 do you not agree?

1257
GEN HODES: At the moment I do not agree on "coastal islands".

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1257
GEN LEE: That's what I say on this point - there is a big difference between us, so let us go over to the other principles.

1258
GEN HODES: I have spent considerable time and patience this morning attempting to find a way in which we could arrive at a reasonable solution. You have failed completely to cooperate. I therefore drop this method.

1259
GEN LEE: We have tried to find out on what points both sides agree and we have given you all explanations necessary for you to solve the questions; and, up to paragraph 6, we said on what points we agree and on which points we do not agree. We must say that for the settlement of the questions, both sides now know fully on what points we are closely together and on what points we are further away from each other. We recognize that this was very necessary for expediting the progress of the meeting. But so far, your side has not made your attitude clear as to our paragraphs 6 and 7. For the speedy progress of the meeting, we continuously asked you to express your attitude as to our paragraphs 6 and 7.

1302
GEN TURNER: You apparently do not, or will not, understand the purpose we are trying to serve by this. It is therefore useless to attempt to continue. Here is the complete proposal of the United Nations Command on our principles:

"1. All armed forces, ground, sea and air under the control of either side, shall cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the armistice agreement enters into effect.

"2. All armed forces under control of either side shall be withdrawn from and remain outside of the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the armistice agreement enters into effect, except such armed forces of a police nature as may be specifically and mutually agreed to by both sides.

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GEN TURNER:
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"3. There shall be established a military armistice commission of mixed membership on an equal basis designated by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and the Commander in Chief of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers to be responsible for supervision over the execution of and adherence to the terms of the armistice agreement.

"4. (a) The Military armistice commission, and its joint observer teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations, together with freedom of movement for the above teams over principal lines of communications throughout all of Korea.

(b) The military armistice commission shall have the right of joint aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance over all of Korea.

(c) The military armistice commission shall have the right of complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone.

"5. Neither side shall increase the level of units, personnel, war equipment, military facilities, or materiel existing in Korea, at the time the armistice becomes effective.

"6. Within 72 hours of the entering into effect of the armistice agreement, each side shall withdraw the armed forces under its control, ground, sea, and air, from the territory controlled by the other side.

"7. Each side will administer that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the median line and in accordance with the terms of the military armistice agreement.

"8. The armistice agreement shall not enter into effect until the military armistice commission has been organized, is staffed, and is ready to begin the exercise of its assigned functions."

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) Now, before we recess, I would like to ask you if you have an opinion regarding the proposal made the day before yesterday in the plenary session relating to the establishment of a sub-committee for Agenda Item 4? After you have answered that question, I recommend that we recess until tomorrow at 11 o'clock.

1315
GEN LEE: Your new proposal has been duly noted. Having heard your proposal, I would like to say first that during the three days of our sub-committee meetings we have made no progress at all. We cannot find anything new other than that your proposal means to interfere in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We tell your side that your proposal cannot be accepted and it cannot be realized.

If you have any sincerity for the progress of the meeting for reaching the peace, we hope that you will develop the discussion on the basis of our seven-principle proposal. Our seven-principle proposal is the most reasonable proposal for a cease-fire in Korea. Only such a proposal alone can bring forth a fair and reasonable armistice. You have expressed no concrete opinion as to our proposal and you could not refute this just stand of ours.

As to paragraphs 6 and 7, you haven't expressed any opinion at all. As to that, we requested you to express your opinions but your side refuses to do so. We think this is no attitude for the settlement of the question. You must remember that as long as such an attitude continues to exist, the meetings cannot make the slightest progress. At the moment, when there is no evidence of progress of the meeting, our Senior Delegate will not give you any answer as to the prisoners of war question, because in discussing Item 3 of the Agenda you should show your sincerity. Only when there exists such

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) sincerity can we give you an answer as to Item 4. If you should show your sincerity, I think the sub-committee for the discussion of Item 4 could soon be opened.

1322
GEN TURNER: As long as you define "progress" as the process of doing only what you want us to do, we shall make no progress. If and when you are willing to negotiate, we shall make progress. Are you willing to recess until tomorrow at 11 o'clock?

1323
GEN LEE: We have never refused to discuss with you. As to your proposal for the question of the prisoners of war, our Senior Delegate will consider it and then give you the answer.

1324
GEN HSIEH: General Lee just requested your side to give a formal answer to our proposal. I would like you to express your opinion about our proposal. You may remember well that our proposal was raised three days ago with all sincerity, and we have been answering all the questions you have raised. This proves sufficiently that we are perfectly willing to negotiate and try to solve our questions. On the contrary, during these three days you have put forth questions, some of which may actually be points which are not quite clear to you, but some others have apparently been raised to delay the discussions, and up to today we have not heard any formal opinions of yours regarding our proposal. This is entirely unsatisfactory to us.

I must point out that although you say your proposal is a new one, yet there is nothing novel in it at all. On the contrary, it only reveals that you have no sincerity toward the negotiations and that you are trying to resort to coercion. We entirely reject such a proposal of yours.

Perhaps you remember that these sub-delegations have been entrusted by the plenary session to do what? It was because there was no result after six days discussions in the plenary session and because we would like to break the stalemate, that

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) our side proposed our fair and reasonable principles; and it was when your side expressed the thought, or gave the impression that you thought these principles of ours are likely to settle the problem that we have transferred this business to the sub-committee. But after three days of sessions of the sub-committee, you have now made this proposal of yours, which you call formal but in reality there is nothing new in it at all, and you have not said one sentence expressing your opinion regarding our fair and reasonable proposal, thus making the three days of discussions in the sub-committee entirely futile.

You know that time is precious for the sake of the wishes of the peace loving peoples of the world, of the welfare of the troops at the front, and of the welfare of the Korean people; but your attitude has been wasting the time. For this we feel very regretful. I now await your formal opinion regarding our proposal.

1335
GEN TURNER: I have nothing more to say at this time. I suggest we recess until tomorrow at 11 o'clock.

1336
GEN HSIEH: I hope that you will give your formal opinion tomorrow.

1336
GEN LEE: We agree to recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Meeting recessed at 1336 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

Enclosure 1 - Meeting of Staff Officers to Determine Contact Line, Held at Pan Mun Jom, 6 December 1951

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

6 December 1951

SUBJECT: Meeting of Staff Officers to Determine Contact Line, Held at Pan Mun Jom, 6 December 1951

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS: LTCOL N Edwards, USA, LTCOL A M Butler, USA, and LT C W Brickle, USNR, Staff Officers; C H Lee, DAC, and C K Lin, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographer

COMMUNISTS: - - COL Chang Chun San, NKA, SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NK Navy, and COL Tsai Cheng-Wen, CCF, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1000 hours

LTCOL EDWARDS: I am taking Colonel Murray's place today. We have our maps here with your version of the northern boundary of the demilitarized zone, and our version of the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone, as we agreed the day before yesterday. We have also described all three lines -- line of demarcation, northern and southern boundaries of demilitarized zone — in the longitude and latitude in writing, using the same points that we agreed to yesterday. We have a copy of the map together with the description of the three lines in longitude and latitude for you. The first thing we would like to do today is to straighten out the discrepancies that were noted in the drawing of the demilitarized zone, discrepancies which were due to differences in our maps. Is this all right for a start?

COL CHANG: Yes, this is all right.

LTCOL EDWARDS: Our map has been corrected by aerial photography in 1950.

(Note: The Communists accepted the principle to follow the main channel of the Nam River.)

LTCOL EDWARDS: We agreed to follow the stream from here. (Referring to a point of discrepancy southwest of Kumsong)

COL TSAI: We agree to follow the stream line and to follow the railroad downward following the stream.

(Note: West of the Kumsong area the Communists agree to correct the demarcation line to follow the stream.)

Enclosure (1)

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(Note: In the Nangon-ni area LTCOL Edwards agreed to correct the demarcation line according to the Communist version.)

(Note: In the Hagonnyong area the Communists agreed to correct their demarcation line according to the UNC version.)

LTCOL EDWARDS: I propose that we proceed to the job of comparing the latitude and longitude of the three lines to which we have agreed.

(Note: Made a note that neither side would disagree on points which were within two to three seconds of each other in latitude and longitude.)

COL TSAI: We agree to your first step. Also we think that in the descriptions there will be differences in some things.

LTCOL EDWARDS: You can make changes as you go along. We agree, and unless you have nothing else we will proceed to do this.

COL TSAI: Captain Kim will be in charge, as I and Colonel Chang are going to be in the other meeting this morning.

LTCOL EDWARDS: We wish, and we would like, to complete everything today. Will you and Colonel Chang come back after the other meeting?

COL TSAI: Yes, we will come back to check on this after the other meeting.

(At 1030, Colonel Tsai and Colonel Chang left for the sub-committee meeting, leaving Captain Kim in charge.)

LTCOL EDWARDS: Captain Kim, we would like for Colonel Butler and you to check the corrections on the map while at the same time another team begins checking longitude and latitude.

CAPT KIM: I and Colonel Butler will work out this today, so that we can finish today and also have everyone's approval on it.

(At 1035, proceeded to work on maps in teams.)

(Note: East of the Kumsong area the Communists agree to correct their demarcation line according to our version.)

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LTCOL EDWARDS: I suggest that we start with the demarcation line and check it all the way across. I also suggest that one team do this and check it against the longitude and latitude. When that team finishes a sheet of the map it should be passed to another group to begin checking the northern and southern boundaries. This method will speed up checking.

CAPT KIM: I will check and take care of the line of contact.

(Teams continued to work on maps until 1240 hours, then recessed for lunch. Meeting reconvened at 1400 hours. Continued to work in three teams. Spent rest of the afternoon checking the exact points on the line of contact and the northern and southern boundaries to make a complete description of these lines in longitude and latitude.)

Meeting recessed at 1700 hours to be reconvened at 1000 hours tomorrow morning, 7 December 1951.

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

7 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fourth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL DO Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, LCOL L J Hill, USAF, and CDR B W Spore, USN, Staff Officers; 1st Lt R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Lee Sang Jo, NKA, and MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, Delegates; RADM Kim Won Mu, NK Navy, COL Chang Chun San, NKA, COL Tsai Cheng Wen, CCF, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Chiu Ko An, CCF, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

1100
GEN TURNER: At the end of yesterday's meeting, your side delivered a statement accusing the United Nations Command delegation of stalling the conference, of coercion, of asking questions for the purpose of delay, of lacking concern for the welfare of the troops, and of failing to comment on your side's proposal. We will let the world be the judge of who is guilty of these things. Here are the facts:

As to stalling the conference: The United Nations Command delegation has many times recommended simultaneous work in separate sub-committees on Items 3 and 4 of the agenda. Your delegation has so far refused this procedure, even though the over-all time of the armistice negotiations would be obviously shortened thereby.

As to coercion: Yesterday you told the United Nations Command delegation that until we were ready to agree with your proposals on Agenda Item 3, you would not consider proceeding with the work on Agenda Item 4 simultaneously, even though the substance of Item 4 is unrelated to that of Item 3.

As to asking questions for purposes of delay: For two days the United Nations Command delegation asked, repeated, and

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) repeated again, a fundamental question regarding airports of entry which could be answered "Yes" or "No". Your side has dodged, evaded, and made lengthy statements regarding this question without once giving a clear answer, a short "Yes" or "No". You have refused to clarify the meaning of your phrase "coastal waters and islands". You have forced the United Nations Command delegation to pose these easily-answered questions in many different ways, in our effort to obtain a clear answer. But you persistently refused to answer.

As to lacking concern for the welfare of the troops: More than a week ago the United Nations Command delegation suggested that both sides gather and exchange information regarding prisoners of war -- to relieve the anguish of many who await word of their loved ones, and to expedite the work on Item 4 of the agenda and thereby speed the day when hostilities end. But you have not responded to this suggestion. Indeed, you have resorted to coercion by indicating your refusal to take up the question of prisoners of war until we agree to your vague proposals regarding Item 3 of the agenda.

A word more on stalling: Yesterday we spent a great length of time attempting to work out with you a procedure which was designed to produce progress in our negotiations. You failed to cooperate. You made a travesty of a sincere effort to resolve our differences by inflexibly insisting on acceptance of your version of every point in dispute. It is clear that your delegation is guilty of stalling, of delaying, of refusal to negotiate, of insincerity, and of a callousness toward the men who fight and suffer.

And finally you accused the United Nations Command delegation of failing to comment on your proposal. In a moment I will tell you in clear terms what we think of it insofar as we are able to understand it. But before doing so I would like to say that such statements as you made yesterday, on which I

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) have just commented, are not helpful in attempting to reach agreement on a subject as serious as the one before us.

Your proposal of 3 December has interested us. It is definitely a step forward. That has been the reason we have spent so much time in attempting to understand your proposal. It is also the reason we suggested that Item 3 be discussed in sub-delegation meetings. We believed there was reasonable chance of arriving at a mutually agreed set of principles earlier than would be possible in plenary session.

There are, however, a number of points where we are not in agreement at this time. I shall now give you our formal opinion of your proposal.

Your sixth principle is completely unacceptable to us. It denies rotation of units and individuals, and prohibits the replacement of material that becomes unserviceable. It is designed to effect, by attrition, a substantial reduction in strength and effectiveness of United Nations Command forces.

I again state that the United Nations Command categorically rejects any prohibition against replacement and exchange of units and personnel on a man-for-man basis, and of equipment on a piece-for-piece basis, within the level existing at the time the armistice becomes effective.

Yesterday we suggested a reasonable substitute for your sixth principle. I'll repeat it again: "There shall be no increase in the level of units, personnel, war equipment, facilities, or materiel existing in Korea at the time the armistice agreement comes into effect." If there is sincerity for an effective armistice, both sides should agree with the proposition that the belligerents must not increase their war-making capabilities during the period of the armistice.

Now with respect to the general question of airfields and air transport. You propose:

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GEN TURNER:
(Cont'd)

(a) no limit on construction or rehabilitation of airfields;

(b) no restriction on the operation of civil air transport; and

(c) you evade the question about observation at airports.

Surely you must see that we read into your position a definite intention to build up your capabilities to introduce large quantities of men, materials, and airplanes into Korea in a very short time, and thereby to increase greatly your military potential during the armistice. We hold this to be evidence of intent to directly violate our cardinal principle that there shall be no increase in military potential during the armistice. It is inconceivable to me how you could expect our side, during a military armistice, to agree that our forces should be gradually weakened by your principle of attrition, while at the same time, allow your side to build up an offensive air capability. This certainly is not in accord with your expressed desire, "to ensure the stability of the military armistice".

The major difference between <u>your</u> principle 3 and <u>our</u> principle 6 concerns your requirement that we must withdraw from coastal islands and waters north of the demilitarized zone. We agree by your principle 6 to withdraw from the territory which you control. We have stated repeatedly, however, that we will not withdraw our forces from certain islands we control just to satisfy a unilateral desire of yours.

This is only <u>part</u> of the major difference. The other part concerns your use of the word "coastal". In order that we may fully discuss your principle 3, we must have a clear definition of the word "coastal". We cannot accept your explanation of yesterday. I can assure you we will never accept any prohibition on our right to sail the high seas north of the military demarcation line. We expect to withdraw our naval vessels from territorial waters contiguous to the area controlled by you.

GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) We will not, however, accept any limitation on our rights under international law to sail the high seas.

We consider our sixth principle is completely adequate as a basic principle. Your principle 5 and our principle 3 are similar. We are still in doubt as to what you mean by the words "responsible for the concrete arrangement". We thought that it was the purpose of the delegations in discussing Item 3 to be responsible for the concrete arrangement of the whole armistice agreement.

In this connection, we maintain that the armistice commission should be responsible for the supervision over the execution of, and adherance to, the terms of the armistice agreement. Therefore, we cannot agree to any division of responsibility between two supervising organs in respect to the armistice agreement as provided in the last sentence of your principle 5.

We consider that our principle 3 is clearly stated and should be acceptable as one of the basic principles. It is not ambiguous, as is your principle 5, and it does not limit or restrict the responsibility of the armistice commission for supervising the execution of, and adherance to, the terms of the whole armistice agreement.

Your principles 1, 2, and 4 are generally the same as our corresponding principles. Although the United Nations Command delegation does not agree with your exact wording of these three principles, we can say that we agree to them in principle. Yesterday we tried to reach agreement with you on the wording of these principles. You said it was not necessary. Therefore, we have reached no firm agreement on any of the principles.

Now, your principle 7: The United Nations Command delegation has consistently maintained that the armistice agreement must include safeguards such as observation against violation

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd)

and evasion of the terms of the armistice. Our fourth principle provides for such observation by joint teams at ground, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea, together with freedom of movement by these teams over principal lines of communications.

The observation you propose in your seventh principle is tied directly to your sixth principle, which we have already categorically rejected. Despite this, we are encouraged by your acknowledgement that some observation is necessary outside the demilitarized zone.

At the same time, we cannot agree that any observation or any method of observation can be limited solely to ports of entry as you propose. Likewise, we cannot agree that other points of the area under your control can be unilateraly observed by your own forces.

If the carrying out of the armistice terms is to be effectively observed, such observation must not be unilateral, and must not be limited only to ports of entry. Effective observation must be provided at communication centers throughout Korea, and teams involved in such observation must have freedom of movement over principal lines of communication. Similarly, there must be joint aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea.

These are measures which will insure adequate observation. They are measures which are not included in your principle 7. These measures must be included in one of the basic principles for Item 3.

With respect to the neutral organ proposed in your principle 7, we listened carefully to your explanation of the relationship between this organ and the armistice commission. It is difficult for us to visualize how these two organizations can function separately. It is more difficult for us to

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) understand why they should be expected to function separately. We maintain that a single supervisory organ should be responsible for supervising the execution of, and adherance to, all of the terms of the armistice agreement. We maintain the single supervisory organ should exercise direct authority over all observation teams.

We should like you to explain why the neutral organ should be completely independent of the supervisory body. I should like you to explain again what is to be gained by such separation.

We have given you our opinion of your principles. We consider that there are considerable areas of agreement between your proposal and our proposal. We are closer to agreement on certain points than we were four days ago. Certain of the remaining differences can be resolved without too much discussion. Other differences may be more difficult to resolve. For instance, we can not and will not accept your principle 6.

We request that you carefully study our comments on your proposal, and that you give careful consideration as to how the differences between your proposal and our proposal can be resolved. We are receptive to any changes which you consider will resolve our differences and upon which we can mutually agree. I would like to hear your opinion.

1207
GEN LEE: Your long statement this morning has been duly noted. Your statement can be divided mainly in two parts. One part is delaying the conference; the other part is your comment on our proposal.

Your statement on responsibility for delaying the meeting does not coincide with the facts at all, and therefore we cannot accept it. Your statement on delaying the conference is nothing but procuring material for certain parts of your propaganda. Who has delayed the meeting? At the conference

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd)

your side openly said that your delegation would delay the meeting. You must remember that your statement of delaying the meeting clearly states-to us and to the people of the world--that it was precisely your delegation who has challenged to delay the conference. That responsibility cannot be shifted on our shoulders but you must take it over yourself.

In spite of such an attitude on your side, we have carefully considered and given you answers to your 40 written questions and to your oral questions during the last 3 days because we thought that it was necessary for the settlement of the question to do so. You say that we refused the proposal on discussing Item 4. We never said that we would not discuss Item 4 before we settle Item 3. In spite of your attitude of trying to delay the conference, we sincerely transmitted your opinion to our Senior Delegate. We cannot but point out that such an attitude of yours can contribute nothing to expedite the progress of the meeting. You must know that your attitude will be judged by all the peace-loving people of the world, the soldiers at the front, and their parents as the final opinion of the world.

Your opinion of our proposal of this morning is not satisfactory. In your statement we can see points which are close to our proposal and points on which you differ from us. Judging from your statement, you openly reveal that you are going to interfere in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That is, you expressed that you want to go around freely throughout Korea and want to interfere in our internal affairs. That is what we have been persistantly opposing in the plenary session as well as the sub-committee session. At the same time, you have not made your attitude clear as to the withdrawal of the forces from behind the demilitarized zone. You are trying to maintain the balance of the forces, as you said, by exchanging and replacing military forces

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd)

and weapons. Why should there be a necessity of introducing units, and replacing weapons and units, after the armistice? We don't consider that there is any such necessity, because what both sides should do after the armistice is to gradually reduce the state of war. For that, our proposal that units and weapons should only go out and should not come in is fair and necessary.

As to the question of withdrawal of armed forces and weapons from the islands in our rear, you have not yet showed any clear attitude of your side. After the armistice, both sides should withdraw all military forces from the rear of the other side. Our paragraph 3 of our proposal clearly provides for the realization of this purpose. We think that the balance of military forces is not necessary after the armistice. In other words, it must be clearly provided that military forces, weapons, and ammunition should go out but should not come in. So our paragraph 6 clearly, fairly, and reasonably provides such necessary things for the guarantee of the supervision of the rear. But for that supervision, as your side and our side are belligerents, it is absolutely necessary to have an organization composed of neutral nations. Therefore, we propose the formation of a supervising organization by inviting neutral nations. This is a necessary thing and it must be done so. But in your proposal, you try to interfere in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by using such ambiguous terms as "armistice becomes effective", or "aerial observation or photographic reconnaissance of all of Korea", or "shall withdraw its armed forces under its control from the territory controlled by the other side", and so forth. By such terms you are trying to have your forces in the rear of the other side even after the armistice is realized.

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) Not only that, we can find that in your proposal, by using such terms as "armistice agreement becomes effective", you are going to delay the armistice as specified in the first paragraph. Therefore, your proposal is not clear and we cannot consider it appropriate for realizing a cease-fire in Korea. Compared with that, our proposal is very clear. Our first paragraph provides for the armistice, and our second provides for the withdrawal after the armistice. Our third paragraph provides that both sides cannot have forces in the rear of the other side. Our fourth paragraph provides that hostilities cannot occur in the demilitarized zone after withdrawing from the military demarcation line. Our paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 provide for the execution of the armistice and for concrete arrangements for the carrying out of the terms of the armistice and supervising it. In view of this, we can say our proposal is much clearer and fairer than your proposal. So, we hope you will carry on discussion on the basis of our seven-principle proposal.

1230
GEN HODES: Now, I have something I would like to say. We have no objection to discussing your proposal, point-by-point. We attempted yesterday to try and take the core out of each one of the important principles that both sides have, and arrive at some mutual agreement on that. That failed, so we are perfectly willing to try to do it based on your proposal. I would like to spend just a very few minutes before going into each point in an attempt to explain very clearly our position on some of the matters that you have just mentioned.

The first matter has to do with withdrawal of troops, or the reduction of troop strength, and materiel strength in Korea which has come up so many times. When there is an effective peace in Korea, there is no question but what all United Nations troops will be withdrawn from Korea. It is even possible that

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) at some time during the armistice, if the armistice proves to be as effective as we hope it will be, that there may be reduction and even withdrawal of all United Nations troops. However, at least during the initial stages of the armistice, while it is being determined whether or not we have an effective armistice, it is not our intention to reduce these forces. I hope that is clear.

When it comes to the over-all subject of either the withdrawal of these troops from Korea, or the reduction of these forces in Korea, that is a matter to be taken up and discussed in Item 5.

The next subject has to do with interference in your internal affairs. I would like to make it very clear that we have absolutely no interest in your internal affairs, but we do have an interest in what increases you make in your military capabilities during the period of the armistice. That, also, I hope is clear.

As to the maintenance of the balance of forces that you speak of many times: What we are interested in is that we do not get so unbalanced in favor of you, or in your favor, that we are the ones who may lose thereby. I think we've made it very clear that we don't want any build-up of forces or any increase of military capabilities during the period of the armistice. That is what we want to be assured of and assured against.

Now, you question the meaning of our principle 6 which reads: "Within 72 hours of the entering into effect of the armistice agreement, each side shall withdraw all the armed forces under its control - ground, sea, and air - from the territory controlled by the other side." You question that -- the meaning of it. We will be very glad to attempt to clarify that now, so that you can thoroughly understand it, if you will

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) tell us what it is you don't understand about that particular principle. However, if we are going to begin work on your principles which you have submitted, then it is quite possible that all of your questions will be answered when we get to your principle 3.

There is just one more point that maybe I can clear up. You question the meaning of the phrase, "when the armistice becomes effective". I would like to explain that. We are now attempting to establish the principles for Agenda Item 3. Therefore, at this time, in our opinion, we should not determine the hour and date upon which the armistice becomes effective. That is a part of the concrete arrangements that we should make -- in our opinion, again -- after we get a set of principles agreed upon, because in the armistice agreement it is possible that we may want to say that this armistice becomes effective when it is signed, we may want to say that this armistice becomes effective 1 hour, 6 hours, 12 hours, 24 hours, after signing. I don't believe we should make that decision at this moment.

That is all I have for now.

1253
GEN LEE: I have something to ask. We cannot find anything mentioned in General Turner's statement this morning, as well as in the statement by General Hodes, as to the seventh paragraph of our proposal about the question of the supervisory organ composed of the neutral nations. Therefore, we request you to make a clear statement on that point.

1254
GEN TURNER: We will deliver a statement on that this afternoon. I suggest we recess now until 1430 for lunch.

1255
GEN LEE: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1255

Meeting reconvened at 1430

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1430
GEN TURNER: You asked for comments on your proposed principle 7. First, as we have previously explained, we maintain that a single supervisory organ, rather than two such organs, should be responsible for supervising the execution of and adherence to all of the terms of the armistice agreement. We maintain that this single organ should have direct authority over all observation activities, whether in the demilitarized zone or in the rear areas.

Secondly, we believe observation should be conducted at communication centers as well as ports of entry. Your principle 7 limits observation to ports of entry.

Thirdly, your principle 7 limits the activities of observation teams to the scope of your principle 6. We have told you clearly and finally that we will not accept the prohibition on rotation, replenishment, and replacement implicit in your principle 6. Therefore, that part of your principle 7 which limits its application to principle 6 is, of course, unacceptable.

As to the question of representatives of neutral nations in the role of observers, that matter is under active and continuing study. There are features of this proposal that have definite merit. We are not ready yet to either accept or reject this concept. Certainly, however, the relationship of observer teams to the supervisory organ must be clear and direct.

The organization supervising the armistice, whether a single organ or a dual agency such as you propose, must carry out administrative, judicial, and operational functions. By operational functions I mean observation at selected points in Korea. Now were this organ only judicial in nature, it could function successfully through a charter--the armistice agreement--without need for any other directing head. Since the organization must carry out operational functions, such as observation, that part of the over-all organ which executes the observation must be subject to direction from some source. It is our belief that the supervisory organ of the armistice as a whole should have the authority and the responsibility to direct and control

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) these observation activities. Your proposal does not provide such authority and responsibility to any supervisory agency.

That is all I have to say at this time on your principle 7.

1440
GEN LEE: We have noted your statement on our paragraph 7. According to the statement you made, you said that there should be a single supervisory organ, and that as to the scope of the supervising, it should supervise the communication centers, the ports of entry and also have free movement throughout all of Korea. While you say that you are still studying the supervisory organ of neutral nations, you said that the supervisory organ must receive direction from the armistice commission. You said that you are now studying the supervisory organ composed of neutral nations. Now, here is our question we raise to you: Do you agree to organizing the supervisory organ from the neutral nations or not?

1445
GEN TURNER: I have already answered that question by saying that there are features of this proposal which have definite merit. We are not ready at this moment to either accept or reject this concept. Our proposal is for a single armistice commission.

Does your question mean that you are suggesting a single armistice commission made up of representatives of neutral nations? If so, we will take the thought under consideration.

1453
GEN LEE: You have misunderstood my question. I never said that there should be a single supervisory organ.

1453
GEN TURNER: No, no. We said "our proposal".

1453
GEN LEE: Then I understand. We do not consider organizing a single supervisory organ. We do not think of forming a supervisory organ with one single neutral nation.

1454
GEN TURNER: We did not mean an armistice commission made up of one nation. We meant an armistice commission made up of neutral nations.

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1454
GEN LEE: As to that question of yours, we have already answered it in writing. According to our answers on our principle 7, two organizations will result from the agreement:--the armistice commission and the supervisory organ. We explained it this way. Out of the agreements of both sides, the armistice commission and the supervisory organ of neutral nations will result. There can be several inspecting teams - observation teams - 1, 2, 3 under the armistice commission as well as several observer teams under the supervisory organ of the neutral nations. According to our proposal the supervisory organ is not under the armistice commission but these two are parallel and independent organizations.

Such organizations are necessary because your side and our side are two belligerents. It is a most natural thing that one of the belligerents cannot inspect the rear of the other party of the belligerents. Therefore, we think that only an organization composed of neutral nations can conduct inspections outside of the demilitarized zone--that is, on matters provided in paragraph 6 of our proposal. Then why do we say that the supervisory organ should be formed by inviting neutral nations and that it should be an organ of supervision? For the inspection of rear of the belligerent parties -- only a supervisory organ composed of fair and neutral nations can carry out such duties.

According to our proposal it is necessary to inspect that no armed forces, weapons, and ammunition be introduced into Korea in accordance with terms agreed upon by the armistice agreement. The supervision of such matters must be done by persons of fair and neutral nations, because just as we cannot show you our internal affairs, you also cannot show your internal affairs to us. Therefore, it must be in the terms of the armistice agreement that the matters in the rear should be inspected only by neutral nations. The supervisory organ can have several

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) observer teams and it need not be under the armistice commission. Therefore, we consider that the supervisory organ of neutral nations is necessary for both sides after the armistice.

We have heard your preliminary opinion about our paragraph 7 and then we have given you further explanations of it. Now we hope, basing upon what you agreed this morning, we may proceed to discuss principles, point by point.

1457
GEN TURNER: Very well.

1457
GEN LEE: Paragraph 1 of our proposal says: "All armed forces of both sides including regular and irregular units of armed personnel of the ground, naval, and air force shall cease all hostilities from the day of the signing of the armistice agreement."

Yesterday you expressed your opinion about this proposal of ours and I think you too would have no objection to this. Is this opinion of ours correct?

1500
GEN TURNER: As we told you yesterday, we agree in principle with your principle 1. There are a few minor changes which we feel are necessary in order that both sides can clearly understand what we mean. We would insert a couple of clauses. I will read your paragraph 1 as we would like to have it changed and then get your comments on it. We would have your paragraph 1 read: "All armed forces under the control of either side including regular and irregular units and armed personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces shall cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the armistice agreement enters into effect."

Now, the reason we insert the clause "under the control of either side" is that should there be any guerilla or bandit activity not under the control of the opposite side, we would not wish to consider that that was a breach of the armistice. That is the reason we write in "under the control of either side." That's all on principle 1 at this moment.

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GEN LEE: For what reason do you say it "becomes effective"?

1505
GEN TURNER: General Hodes explained that this morning. Do you understand it?

1506
GEN LEE: Yes, I understand it. We can hardly understand the necessity of inserting the phrase "come into effect" because your paragraph 8 and your paragraph 1 are related with each other. According to my own understanding, with your paragraph 8, you could delay paragraph 1. As to "24 hours" or "one day" -- as to that wording, we can agree.

1508
GEN TURNER: O.K. Let me explain it. We think that when we finally agree, that there will be written into the agreement that the armistice will go into effect -- the cease-fire will go into effect -- at a certain hour and a certain day. Is that clear? At "such and such an hour on such and such a day".

1510
GEN LEE: As to the phrase "come into effect", then we will take your interpretation as it stands. That understanding is correct then. That's only a question of wording.

1511
GEN TURNER: That is correct.

1511
GEN LEE: But this does not mean that we agree completely to that point. We will study it further.

1512
GEN HODES: I would like to say something here. In every armistice agreement at the very end of the armistice agreement just ahead of the signatures, it usually says, "this armistice agreement", or says, "certain provisions of this armistice agreement" become effective at such and such a time. All we're trying to do at this time is to keep these principles on a broad enough basis so that we don't have to change the general principle. The time for the armistice to become effective will be stated in the armistice agreement. It may, for example, be at "twelve-zero-one hours on such and such a day."

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1513
GEN LEE: Good. If that is the interpretation of it, we haven't got any difference in opinion.

Then, as to paragraph 2, our proposal says: "All armed forces of both sides shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within three days after the signing of the armistice agreement." I don't think there can be any great difference of opinion between both sides on this.

1514
GEN TURNER: We would have your second principle changed only in minor details. We would have it read exactly the same as you have, down to "the armistice agreement"; then we would add "enters into effect except, such armed forces of a police nature as may be specifically and mutually agreed to by both sides."

1518
GEN LEE: We do not oppose your opinion about the question of police. But we think it should not be inserted there but it should be brought over to paragraph 4 and say "all armed forces of both sides except military police forces mutually agreed to by both sides shall not enter the demilitarized zone and shall not carry out any acts of armed forces in the demilitarized zone."

1519
GEN HODES: I would like to say something here. I put that phrase in there myself because in our discussion on Item 2 of the agenda when we were talking about the demilitarized zone, we said it would have to be policed by police forces. We have no disagreement with that at all.

1521
GEN LEE: So if we are agreed on that question then I think as to paragraph 2, we are in agreement.

1521
GEN TURNER: You accept the minor change we made in - "when the armistice agreement enters into effect"?

1522
GEN LEE: Very well, very well.

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[redacted]

1522
GEN TURNER: And is three days enough time?

1522
GEN LEE: That is sufficient.

1523
GEN TURNER: We have your principle 3 and we will give you what we think the changing in the words on it should be: "All armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn within 5 days after the armistice agreement comes into effect from the territory controlled by the other side. If they are not withdrawn within the stated time, and there is no reason for delaying the withdrawal, the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order."

1527
GEN LEE: I would like to have a copy for my study.

1527
GEN HODES: Here, you can have mine.

1530
GEN LEE: We had the content of your revised proposal transcribed. As to this question, we want to study it further.

Then let us go to paragraph 4: "Armed forces of both sides, except armed police specifically agreed upon by both sides, shall not enter the demilitarized zone and all armed forces of both sides shall not carry out any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone." What about this?

1535
GEN TURNER: That sounds all right to us as you have read it and when we get your written copy we will give you a specific answer.

Now let's pass over paragraph 5 for the moment and go to 6.

1535
GEN LEE: All right.

1535
GEN TURNER: We would have your paragraph 6 read: "In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to increase the level of

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) units, personnel, equipment, military facilities or materiel existing in Korea at the time the armistice comes into effect." (Hands copy to General Lee)

1538
GEN LEE: We have not yet had it translated, but there is still conspicuous difference between both sides, so let's put it aside and go over to the other paragraph.

Paragraph 7 of our proposal reads: "In order to supervise the strict implementation of the stipulation of paragraph 6, both sides agree to invite representatives of nations neutral in the Korean war to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting necessary inspection, beyond the demilitarized zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the joint armistice commission the results of such inspection." What is your opinion on this?

1540
GEN TURNER: I am not prepared to discuss principle 7 at this time. Let us go now to your principle 5. We would have your principle 5 read: "Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form an armistice commission to be jointly responsible for the supervision of the whole armistice agreement." Please note that we say, "an armistice commission", not a "military armistice commission" nor a "neutral armistice commission".

1543
GEN LEE: We would like it in writing.

(General Turner hands copy to General Lee)

1544
GEN LEE: We have not yet translated it. Now your side thinks the supervisory organ composed of neutral nations is not necessary.

1544
GEN TURNER: Oh no. I make no comment about that. I simply said "an armistice commission" -- whether it be military or civil or neutral.

1545
GEN LEE: I understand. As to that question, we will have it translated and then we still study it.

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1546
GEN TURNER: All right. Now, with reference to your principle 7, we would have it read: "The armistice commission and its joint observer teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations, together with freedom for the above teams over principle lines of communication throughout all of Korea." That is part 1.

Part 2: "The armistice commission shall have the right of joint aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea."

Part 3: "The armistice commission shall have the right of complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone."

Now, we still have our principle 8 to add. We gave that to you yesterday. All we would change in it as we gave it to you yesterday is to delete the word "military" before "armistice commission." It would then read: "The armistice agreement shall not enter into effect until the armistice commission has been organized, staffed, and is ready to begin the exercise of its assigned function."

1552
GEN LEE: In presenting your revised version of paragraph 7 of our proposal, you talk about the armistice commission which is neither military nor to be composed of neutral nations. What kind of committee is that?

1553
GEN TURNER: We left it that way on purpose. The armistice commission may be composed of military men, of civilians, or of neutral nations. Any one of the three. We don't exclude anyone in the consideration of the broad principle of "an armistice commission". We are not prepared at this time to make any definite commitment about the neutral armistice commission. We only want to stay to the general term, the basic term: "an armistice commission".

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1555
GEN LEE: From your last statement we can hardly understand what your real aim is. Do you mean that you want to have the organ composed of neutral nations?

1556
GEN HODES: No. We don't mean that. General Turner has told you several times that we, at this moment, are not ready to accept or reject the principle of the use of neutral-nation teams. What we have been trying to do this afternoon is to get 6, 7, or 8 principles on a broad enough basis so that both sides could accept that much of them. That will constitute a framework for any more detailed work that is necessary to clarify these principles. As an example, that is the reason that this afternoon we agreed to leave off the term "military" from the title "armistice commission", so that the principle be broad enough so that both sides should be able to accept it as a principle. As an example of a principle that apparently both sides are agreed on is the principle of inspection or supervision both in the demilitarized zone and in both rears of the demilitarized zone. As a detail under that principle, we still prefer the proposal that we made yesterday. You, on the other hand have a different idea as to how this so-called supervision, observation, inspection, is to be done. At this moment we have not considered the use of neutral-nations personnel to the extent that we can say we are totally against such an idea or for such an idea.

1605
GEN LEE: Now in this afternoon's discussion, you said that you can not give us any clear answer as to the question of a neutral-nations supervisory organ. Then when do you think you can give your answer on that question to us?

1606
GEN TURNER: We will give that to you in due course. Do you have an answer to our proposal about the sub-delegation meeting on Agenda Item 4?

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1606
GEN LEE: Let's talk about the question which we are discussing first. As to our seven-principle proposal, the paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 are all related to the supervisory organ of neutral nations. This is a question which is most important for the settlement of the question of the armistice which we have before us. And as long as you don't make your attitude toward the neutral-nations supervisory organ clear, we don't think we can make any further progress in the armistice talks. Therefore, we ask you: How soon can you give us your answer to that question?

1608
GEN TURNER: The rewriting of your principles has expressed in general terms what we think those principles should be. What you are asking for are details on that. We are not prepared to answer on details at this time. As I told you before, we are actively studying your proposal relative to the neutral organization. We will give you an answer in due course. Do you agree with the broad principles 5, 6, and 7 as we have reworded them?

1611
GEN LEE: You said the question of the supervisory organ of the neutral nations is a detail matter. But you certainly remember well that during the whole course of discussion on Item 3 of the agenda, we emphasized that the inspection of the rear is an important and big question; and during the conference, the talks were brought to a deadlock on account of this question. In order to settle this question, we proposed the supervisory organ of neutral nations. Therefore, this is not a detail question, but it is an important question. Therefore, if we don't know your attitude toward this question soon, you can hardly expedite the progress of this meeting. If you need time, when do you want to meet again?

1616
GEN TURNER: As I told you, we have the problem under active consideration. We are not prepared at this time to make a comment either

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) accepting or rejecting it. We told you that it appeared to have considerable merit. We will give you an answer after we have thoroughly studied the proposal. Before we attempt to determine who does the inspecting or observing, shouldn't we first agree that there be inspection and observation? That is why we ask: Do you agree on the 8 basic principles of today?

Now, before we recess, I request that you study carefully the comments we made on your proposal this morning, and determine how the differences can be resolved. We will be receptive to any changes that you think should be made in these principles. Again, before we recess, I would like to have an answer to the question on the sub-delegation meeting for Agenda Item 4. Then, I would suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow, 11 o'clock.

1622
GEN LEE: In the discussion you carried out on our seven-principle proposal, there are points on which we are close together and there are points on which we are far away from each other. As to paragraph 7 of our proposal, you tried to replace it with your paragraph 4. That is not acceptable to us and we will not accept it. You said that before determining the inspection, we must first decide what to inspect. But as to that question, that is something on which we have consistently insisted in the conference: that the free inspection and supervision by one side of the belligerents is the interference in the internal affairs of the other side. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot accept any proposal whatever for the interference in its internal affairs. This is a very important and serious question. Therefore, as to that question, we propose a supervisory organ of neutral nations. Without a clear expression of your attitude towards this question, the negotiations can hardly make any progress. What we want to know is what length of time you require for settlement of

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) this question, and if time is required for the solution of that question, when do you think we should meet again?

1630
GEN TURNER: I have noted your statement and your question. I suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow, 11 o'clock. But before we recess, I ask if you have an answer to our question relative to the sub-delegation for Item 4?

1631
GEN LEE: We will transmit again your opinion on Item 4 to our Senior Delegate. If there is nothing else, we agree to recess until tomorrow morning.

Meeting recessed at 1632

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

Enclosure 1 - Meeting of Staff Officers to Determine Contact Line, Held at Pan Mun Jom, 7 December 1951

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

7 December 1951

SUBJECT: Meeting of Staff Officers to Determine Contact Line, Held at Pan Mun Jom, 7 December 1951

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS: LTCOL N Edwards, USA, LTCOL A M Butler, USA, and LT C W Brickle, USNR, Staff Officers; C H Lee, DAC, C K Lin, DAC, Interpreters; Stenographer

COMMUNISTS: - - CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NK Navy, Staff Officer; Staff Assistants, Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1000 hours

CAPT KIM: With respect to the Sachon river bend, that curve which we discussed yesterday, we are suggesting to leave the maps as they are and we will correct our map in accordance with your southern boundary line based on the line of contact.

LTCOL EDWARDS: This morning, I propose that we continue with the same groups that were working on the northern and southern boundaries of the demilitarized zone yesterday. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Butler and Captain Kim can be working and checking the maps and doing other things that may be necessary.

CAPT KIM: If you can spare a copy of the description of the line of contact, we can use it.

LTCOL EDWARDS: Yes, we can give you that. I have here a draft of a paper which I thought we might use when we have the line of contact, the maps, and the northern and southern boundaries completed. This can be used as agreement for the final initialing or signing. I suggest that we study it so that we can agree to any change which you may suggest.

CAPT KIM: We agree. (Accepting draft) We will start on the northern and southern boundaries.

LTCOL EDWARDS: All right.

(At this time the three groups began checking the longitude and latitude of the demarcation line and boundaries of the demilitarized zone. Recessed for lunch at 1240. Reconvened at 1400 and continued checking maps. Completed at approximately 1530.)

Enclosure (1)

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CAPT KIM: We are studying your draft of agreement on the demilitarized zone and will give you our comments at 1100 tomorrow.

LTCOL EDWARDS: Inasmuch as there are certain cartographic differences in our maps, I suggest that we add a paragraph to our agreement pointing out this fact, and stating that these differences can be resolved by ground survey, using the agreed upon latitude and longitude of our control points.

CAPT KIM: We agree.

LTCOL EDWARDS: Tomorrow at 11 o'clock we will give you copies of the description of the boundary line, after they have been copied and checked. We request that you give us a copy of your description at the same time.

CAPT KIM: We will do so. Tomorrow we want to check our maps and will be ready for final signing of the agreement on the demilitarized zone at 10 o'clock on 9 December. Our liaison officers must review our work and want to sign the final agreement, and want your liaison officers to do the same.

LTCOL EDWARDS: We also want to study our maps tomorrow and will meet you at 10 o'clock on 9 December for the agreement on the demilitarized zone by the liaison officers.

Meeting recessed at approximately 1545.

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

8 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, LTCOL JW Thames, USA, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, Staff Officers; 1st Lt R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Lee San Jo, NKA, and MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, Delegates; RADM Kim Won Mu, NK Navy, COL Chang Chun San, NKA, COL Tsai Cheng Wen, CCF, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Chiu Ko An, CCF, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

1100
GEN LEE: Let's begin the talks. If you have anything to say we would like to hear it.

1101
GEN TURNER: Have you any comments on the reworded seven principles of yours which we made yesterday?

1102
GEN LEE: As to that question, it has been clearly answered. That is, there are points on which we are close together, and there are points on which we are not in agreement. There are points which we cannot accept.

1103
GEN TURNER: As I understand it, you have accepted the rewording of principle 1, principle 2 and principle 4. Is that correct?

1103
GEN LEE: As you mentioned yesterday, we are in agreement on paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of our proposal.

1104
GEN TURNER: Then you are ready to proceed with the differences we have on the rewording of principle 3?

1105
GEN LEE: Good. We would like to hear your opinion all right.

1105
GEN TURNER: We expressed our rewording of your principle 3 yesterday. Is it acceptable to you?

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1105
GEN LEE: That we cannot agree to.

1105
GEN TURNER: Why?

1105
GEN LEE: Your wording is not clear. According to your wording, there is nothing mentioned clearly about the withdrawal from the islands in the rear of our side.

1107
GEN HODES: That is correct, and as paragraph 3 is now rewritten it does not include withdrawal from the islands.

1107
GEN LEE: At the same time, your revised wording "from the rear of the other side with the military demarcation line as the boundary" is not clear. It is ambiguous and not so clear as our paragraph 3.

1109
GEN TURNER: What do you mean in your paragraph 3 by "coastal"?

1110
GEN LEE: As to "coastal" we have given you already our clear answer. If necessary we can give you explanations again. The raising of the question of the islands is that it has the object of withdrawing the forces of both sides from the north and south of the military demarcation line and separating them. In other words, the major issue for this conference is not to determine the territorial waters with 3 miles or 12 miles. We are talking about withdrawal of the forces from the north and south of the demilitarized zone. Therefore, we said "coastal" and not "territorial waters" and we insist on having your forces withdrawn from the coast and islands on the coast. It applies to both sides. Your side, too, agreed that should they not withdraw from the rear of the other side, necessary steps would be taken; and as to that, paragraph 3 of our proposal clearly provides for it. Therefore, we say again that the word "coastal" is appropriate and that the question of determining the territorial waters of 3 miles, 12 miles, or other miles, is not the main question here.

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1114
GEN HODES: Since these islands are at different distances from the coast lines, it seems to me that we should know what islands you are talking about when you ask us to withdraw from these islands which have nothing at all to do with the demilitarized zone or the line of demarcation. You have heard us say many times what our position is on these areas which we hold. They are not a part of this agreement as it is now written.

1116
GEN LEE: As to the islands, there are two questions. The first is that it is not necessary to have the armed forces in the rear of the other side. The second is to call your attention to the question of whether the islands are nearer the area controlled by your side or nearer the area controlled by our side. That is also a question related to whether the islands are north of the military demarcation line or south of the military demarcation line. As to these questions, our stand is clear and the third paragraph of our proposal proposes concrete measures for the solution of them.

Yesterday, we developed preliminary discussions on the basis of our seven proposals. As a result of our discussion based upon our proposal, we can say that as to paragraphs 1, 2, and 4, there are in general no discrepancies of opinion. Based upon the preliminary discussion and comparing the proposals, paragraph 3 of our proposal corresponds to paragraph 6 of your proposal and they deal with the same thing.

The main issue of our third paragraph is that after armistice there remain no forces in the rear of the other side, that the forces be withdrawn from the rear of the other side. In your wording it says that the withdrawing shall be from the "areas controlled by the other side". Analysis of the wording shows that it was not clear -- it was ambiguous. We can say that according to that wording -- it says, ambiguously,

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) "withdrawal from the areas controlled by the other side" -- you intend to remain in our rear. Since the military demarcation line has been fixed, and since your side has stated that you do not intend to make so-called adjustments in the agreement already reached and that neither do you intend to threaten directly our rear, there is no justification whatsoever for you to insist on the retention of your armed forces in our rear. There is not the slightest relation between the question of withdrawal by either of the belligerents from the coastal islands and waters of the other side during an armistice and the question of territorial waters or high seas navigation during peace time. Since your side declares that you are willing to insure the stability of the military armistice, we can hardly understand what reason you can have for insisting upon the retention of your armed forces in our rear, and our paragraph 7 and your paragraph 4 treat with the same questions. Here we disagree, and there is the biggest discrepancy between us.

In the plenary session as well as in the sub-committee sessions, our stand has been that the ports of entry in the rear should be inspected by neutral nations. Our proposal clearly provides that there be no free access to all parts of Korea but that the places specified -- ports of entry for preventing the introduction into Korea of armed forces, weapons, and ammunition -- should be inspected. To extend this scope would mean the interference in the internal affairs of the other side. Here it insists on inviting the representatives of neutral nations to inspect the rear because neither side of the belligerents can inspect the rear of the other side. We say all this is an adequate, fair, and reasonable stand. As to your proposal, paragraph 4 deals with such questions.

As to your insistence on your request that the whole area of Korea be inspected: Your statement yesterday said even the

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) civilian air service should be interfered with. You said you need to interfere even with their facilities. As to this, we have expressed clearly our attitude and you must know that we cannot accept it. Both sides should know that the discrepancies of opinion between both sides on this question is very great. Paragraph 6 of our proposal and paragraph 5 of your proposal deal with the same questions. And as to this, both sides know what the stand of the other side means. Our proposal provides that the armed forces, weapons and ammunition can only go out but cannot be introduced. Your paragraph 5 dealing with the same question only says not to increase them. In other words, paragraph 5 of your proposal has the intent of replacing and replenishing armed forces. Here lies the discrepancy of opinions between both sides dealing with the same question. We can clearly see that the differences are on the main issue as you have mentioned. Our paragraph 5 and your paragraph 3 deal with this same question. If we reach an agreement on the above mentioned three paragraphs, then our paragraph 5 and your paragraph 3 can easily be settled.

Therefore, having gone through the discussions, we mutually know what our stand is and what your stand is, and what the discrepancies are between both sides. Now that there are such discrepancies between us, how do you think you can break the deadlock? If you have any opinion about it, we would like to hear it.

1137
GEN HODES: We have started jumping around here from one principle to another principle without any attempt to get agreement or clarification of these principles in the order in which you have written them. I would like to stay on the third principle to see if we can get agreement on it, or at least clarify it.

You claim that our third principle, that we worked on yesterday, is not clear. We say that your third principle, as

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) you had written it previously, was ambiguous. We said yours was ambiguous because it is not clear as to what is meant either by "the rear of either side", or by the word "coastal". That is in addition to the fact that we would be surrendering territory we now hold.

There can be no further statement that our suggestion of yesterday on the rewriting of principle 3 was unclear if we added the sentence: "This requirement applies only to the mainland of Korea." If it's a question of ambiguity, then that is one way to clarify that principle, so that it can be clearly understood by all.

When it comes to the question of making the armistice secure by retaining control of these islands, you know as well as I do that that is not correct, there is no insecurity involved. As a matter of fact, separation between forces because of the water barrier is certainly much more effective than any separation we have anywhere else.

Finally, I cannot agree that there is anything ambiguous or unclear in our recommended principle 3. So much for principle 3.

1148
GEN LEE: You just gave your answer to that question. But, your explanation of that statement is not clear. As you know very well, your insistence on that is unreasonable, and that cannot be accepted. Therefore we haven't reached any agreement on that question and we think it can hardly be solved here immediately. Then let's go over to the discussion of other principles on which we haven't yet reached agreement.

1150
GEN HODES: I don't see any reason to go over to the other principles; I think we'd be in better shape if we could solve these as we go along.

You bring up the question of "unreasonable". It's not unreasonable that we hold these islands; therefore, why is it

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) unreasonable to stay in the islands? What you are trying to do is to reject a basic principle which is absolutely sound, simply because you want something that you don't have. Now we don't think that is the way to get it, to get something you don't actually hold.

1154
GEN LEE: I have a question to raise to you: Do you want to retain your forces behind the military demarcation line after the armistice?

1155
GEN HODES: You gave me a two-headed question. The answer as to your rear is "No". These islands are not in your rear. These islands are off the coast. They are separated from the coast of Korea by bodies of water, therefore they are no more in your rear than waters or anything that is outside of Korea. They are not in Korea. They don't belong to you.

1157
GEN LEE: Should we judge by general common sense what the rear is, the rear must be judged starting from the dividing line -- whether it is behind the dividing line or not. The region north of the military demarcation line agreed upon is our rear and that south of it is yours. This is sound logic. Further, there is mainland and sea, and when we talk about rear, it includes the sea as well as the islands. Such an argument of yours cannot be passed. If we should insist on such argument, we would have to use a length of time and develop our discussions. I think such a thing is senseless to do. That is all. As we have spent so much time on it, we don't want to repeat it.

1200
GEN HODES: All right, why don't we accept principle 3 as written here yesterday, and since it does not include the islands, you can talk about islands later on.

1202
GEN HSIEH: I will make a statement. General Hodes suggests that we settle this question later. Does that mean that your side intends to retain your forces, during the armistice, north of the demar-

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) cation line in our rear or at our flanks?

1203
GEN HODES: You want me to answer that?

1203
GEN HSIEH: Yes, please.

1203
GEN HODES: My answer is that if you are talking about the islands that are off the coast of Korea that we hold, the answer is "Yes".

1204
GEN HSIEH: The question is clear, it is whether or not you are going to withdraw your forces from the coastal islands in the waters north of the demarcation line; and your answer gave me the impression that you will not withdraw. Is that right?

1205
GEN HODES: I thought my answer was very clear. I said that if you are talking about forces that are on the islands we hold off the coast of Korea, we are not going to withdraw those forces. When you are talking about naval forces in the waters, then the rules of international law are effective. That has nothing to do with the forces that are on the islands that we hold.

There should be absolutely no doubt in your mind as to this position of ours since it has been our consistent stand since we started the discussion on Item 3. We have said, in connection with our firm stand on these islands, that we intend to keep them unless some appropriate adjustment is made. Otherwise we stay.

1209
GEN HSIEH: The same thing has been repeated by you many times; first, in the plenary session, and then in the sub-committee meetings. That is very clear to us. That is, you are insisting on your unreasonable demands of retaining your forces in our rear after the demarcation line has been fixed, and you want to continue to remain in a position to threaten our rear. You know full well that it is neither reasonable nor legal to have your forces remain in our rear of the demarcation line, and you know full well that you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) have no sufficient reason to ask for adjustments for it.

I would like to remind you that when this question was raised in the plenary session, our senior delegate asked your senior delegate as to how many demarcation lines there should be for separating the forces of both sides -- whether there should be 3 different lines to divide the ground, naval, and air forces of both sides. How did your senior delegate answer that question? He answered that there was only one demarcation line -- that is, the one which has been fixed by us -- for separating all the ground, naval, and air forces of both sides, including regular and irregular units of armed personnel.

What justification can there be for you to retain your armed forces behind this line except that you intend to use your military forces in our rear as a means of threat on our side? How do you expect that the military armistice can be speeded by such an action? By your logic, your aircraft based on Okinawa will continue to fly toward our rear after the armistice becomes effective. That is entirely unjustifiable. As a matter of fact, you yourselves are quite clear that you have no justification on insisting upon such a view: first, in a plenary session, then in subcommittee meeting sometimes and also in your news reporting you have indicated that you realize the unreasonableness of such a stand. By your constant haggling over this question then, you can only give the impression that you do not intend to settle the major questions under Item 3 of the agenda; and as you insist upon haggling over this question, then of course, we cannot but keep pace with you.

1217
GEN HODES: Is that all? Now the haggling is one sided, I admit; but it is being done by you. We have written a very clear paragraph 3.

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) You have a habit of calling anything "unreasonable" that is not in line with your desires. To take that attitude with respect to the islands is very bad because you have taught us that what one holds one keeps. We have these islands now and there is no agreement requiring us to surrender them or to leave them. We are perfectly content to remain. In other words we are satisfied.

Suppose that we write principle 3, or leave it written as we have it, along those lines. As military men you should know full well that these islands are no threat to the security of the armistice. My only suggestion is that we accept paragraph 3 as revised.

Suppose I followed what you indicated as a definition of your rear this morning. Then if you will look at the demarcation line on the west flank, is there any reason why Kimpo Peninsula is not also in your "rear"?

1224
GEN LEE: I would like to ask you one thing. Upon what military demarcation line are you going to base the withdrawal of your naval forces?

1225
GEN HODES: We are going to withdraw our naval forces along the coast that you control to the extent required by international law. We are not in any way, or at any time, going to withdraw our naval forces from the high seas.

1226
GEN LEE: If so, then withdrawals of your air and naval forces are not going to be based on the military demarcation line but from the territorial waters. Is that what you are talking about?

I want to say to General Hodes that your arguement you have just used cannot be passed, and you must remember that it cannot be accepted. When your side and our side were discussing Item 2 of the agenda, the military demarcation line was fixed and the plenary session ratified it. When it was being

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) discussed and was ratified by the plenary session, there was no mention that the territorial waters were the military demarcation line.

All we want to ask you is: Should we leave our military forces in your rear after armistice, what would you do? We would take measures toward your military forces in our rear, which you would take on our supposed military forces in your rear. It does not mean that after armistice we are going to retain our armed forces in your rear. If you should retain your armed forces in our rear after armistice we would take measures which an independent state would take in dealing with its own internal affairs. Therefore the argument by General Hodes is not acceptable. It cannot be possible. It is nothing but sophistry. Now we should go over to the discussion of the other principles.

1235
GEN HODES: All right, I have something to say. You stated an example -- what would happen if you took those islands after the armistice was signed? Then I will tell you that you will have broken the armistice agreement.

Now you haven't read paragraph 3 very thoroughly. It says all armed forces shall be withdrawn from the territory controlled by the other side -- all armed forces means army, navy, and air withdrawn from the territory controlled by the other side. You asked, also, what conditions we would accept from you as to our rear. What we would accept is that your naval and air forces would not molest the area controlled by us during the armistice. That is exactly what we say. We will not molest the areas controlled by you during the armistice. That is all I have.

1238
GEN LEE: What we want to say is this: The act of retaining the armed forces in the rear of the other side after the armistice itself is a violation of the armistice agreement. You must think

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) whether the retention of military forces north of the military demarcation line is a military threat or not. It is a clear threat and a violation of the armistice agreement by retaining your military forces. Do you think there is a danger of having a clash or not?

1241
GEN HODES: In the first place, there cannot be any danger unless you yourself want to use force. Second, it cannot be a violation of the armistice agreement since it is not included in the armistice agreement at this time.

1243
GEN LEE: According to your staement, the military demarcation line is not necessary. The military demarcation line is specified in the terms of the agreement so your statement is not possible. We have not yet reached any agreement on principle 3 so let us go over to the discussion of principle 7.

1244
GEN TURNER: We wish to settle these principles one-by-one as they appear in your proposed principles. Are you willing to accept the re-wording of your third principle as we submitted it to you yesterday?

1245
GEN LEE: We cannot accept the revised proposal. If General Hodes' statement is the intent of the revised proposal, we absolutely cannot accept it.

1246
GEN HODES: For what reason? Because it includes the islands?

1246
GEN LEE: That we have clearly said. If we find it necessary to drag time on with this question, and if you need explanations, we can repeat the explanations.

1247
GEN HODES: We don't need any repetition. We made it very clear, I think, on what conditions we intend to hold on to these islands.

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1247
GEN LEE: We say that your opinion is not acceptable, and we say that we have not reached any agreement on it. Our paragraph 3 is very clear for the armistice, and we alone can solve it so let us go over to the discussion of the other principles.

1249
GEN HODES: I disagree on two points there. The first point is, it is not as clear as you say; and the second point, it is not the only thing that will resolve the differences. Acceptance of your principle 3 as you had it originally written is not acceptable.

1249
GEN LEE: We tell you that we haven't reached an agreement on this question, and we say that there is no need to delay the time with that question.

1250
GEN HODES: May I ask how we intend to resolve this principle 3 then? It's got to be resolved sometime.

1251
GEN LEE: We can settle that on such principles as: firstly, we must start from the standpoint of stabilizing the armistice, and, afterwards, the assumption that hostilities should not be resumed after the armistice. Then we must abide by the military demarcation line already agreed upon. Only by starting from such points can the question be settled. That means, the principle of not retaining military forces beyond the military demarcation line. The most positive and clear way of solution is to accept the third paragraph of our proposal.

1254
GEN HODES: Which we reject.

1254
GEN HSIEH: I now suggest that we go on to the following principles.

1255
GEN TURNER: I suggest that we recess for lunch. After lunch we will be glad to hear any new arguments on this island matter that you have to present.

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1255
GEN LEE: Firstly, we have no new opinions about the islands. Secondly, if you cannot determine to go over to the discussion of other principles, when do you think we should meet again?

1255
GEN TURNER: Unless you have something new to offer, I will leave the suggestion up to you as to when we are to reconvene.

1256
GEN LEE: That means you haven't fully solved the question. We are ready to discuss at any time, but as for the island question, we have no new opinions. We propose to go over to the discussion of other principles. If you have not yet determined to go over to the discussion of other principles and do not know how long it will take, when do you want to resume the meetings?

1257
GEN TURNER: How long it will take is largely dependent upon you. We are ready to resume the meeting at 1330 if you have anything new to bring up today.

1257
GEN LEE: We have no new proposals. We have already presented to you our fair and reasonable proposal.

1258
GEN TURNER: Are you ready to reconvene then at 1330 today?

1258
GEN LEE: As for the time, we are ready to meet any time you want to.

1259
GEN TURNER: 1330?

1259
GEN LEE: Good.

Meeting recessed at 1300 hours

Meeting reconvened at 1330 hours

1330
GEN TURNER: Have you any new offer on your principle 3 as reworded?

1330
GEN LEE: That has been repeatedly answered already and we have nothing more to say. It is adequate to say that our paragraph 3 is the solution.

1331
GEN HODES: Your paragraph 3 is a solution, that is right. It is a solution,

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) it is not the particular solution that satisfies us. You have referred several times to a technicality where you say that our solution to Agenda Item 2 gives you the islands. You have mistaken Item 2, somehow or other, because Item 2 says nothing about the islands. I would like to read what the agreement is on Item 2. It says: "...that the actual line of contact will be the military demarcation line and that both sides will withdraw two kilometers from this line so as "-- I repeat "so as" -"to establish a demilitarized zone for the duration of the armistice." Now that line and that zone have been determined. When you bring in air and sea forces, which have nothing to do with that particular line or zone, then the restrictions on them belong on Item 3 of the agenda and specifically in principle 3 which we have been discussing today. We on our side are certain that principle 3, as we have reworded it, is a satisfactory solution to that particular subject.

Now then, in the first of these principles of yours, which we have revised, all fighting stops after 24 hours. There is no question on that. In principle 3 as revised, all forces of all types are withdrawn from territory controlled by the other side. That takes care of all the necessary cease-fire and withdrawal that is not taken care of in Item 2 of the agenda. That's all.

1341
GEN LEE: As to that question, we have given you our clear answer and you certainly know our attitude clearly. Are you going to delay the time with this question? Aren't you going over to the other principles?

1342
GEN HODES: How do you propose that we settle principle 3?

1342
GEN LEE: The wording of our third principle is very clear and correct, and is very appropriate to the solution. Do you want us to repeat it?

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1343
GEN HODES: No, we don't need any repitition, we don't agree on it. How are we going to get agreement on principle 3?

1344
GEN HSIEH: I suggest again that since we cannot settle this question now, let us reserve it and go on.

1344
GEN TURNER: When do you think you can settle it?

1345
GEN HSIEH: At a later date. Let's see, first, if we can settle the other questions.

1345
GEN TURNER: If you need more time in order to settle the third principle, that is all right with us.

1346
GEN HSIEH: No, you are mistaken. It is because both sides are insisting upon their own opinions. Therefore I think it is not profitable to spend more time on it at the present. To reserve this question for later is better. It is the method we have used before. When we cannot settle a question, we leave it aside until we can settle the other questions. In that way we may spend our time more profitably. Do you agree to such a suggestion? If you agree, let's go on to the other principles.

1348
GEN TURNER: We agree to settle first things first. We have settled principle 1, principle 2 and principle 4. We would now like to settle principle 3 before we proceed on to any other principles. If you do not have the solution to principle 3 at this time, we will be glad to await that time when you do have the solution. During the plenary session, our senior delegate, Admiral Joy, stated that since we hold the islands, we intend to continue to hold them during the period of the armistice unless suitable adjustment was made by your side. Do you have any suitable adjustment to offer for the islands? We will be receptive to any reasonable offer you have to make. That is all.

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1350
GEN HSIEH: I tell you once again that we have no suggestion regarding suitable adjustments. If we do as we are doing now, we are just wasting time. I would like to know whether you prefer to let us stay on this stalemate, or whether we should go on to the other principles as we have done before to put aside a stalemate?

1352
GEN TURNER: If it is so difficult to settle this principle which is comparatively simple, it does not appear that it would be profitable to proceed into principle 5 which is so much more complex. We have, heretofore, taken up principles in their proper order, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., I can see no reason for deviating from that policy at this time. We are not proposing to waste time by continuing a stalemate, we are trying to save time by reaching a solution here and now.

1356
GEN HSIEH: The situation is quite clear that since we are in a stalemate we cannot save any time unless one of the two sides makes a concession; otherwise, we are just wasting time by repeating respectively what we have said before, and bringing more trouble to the stenographers. There are only two ways of solving a stalemate. When we get to a stalemate, we either continue to stay where we are, or turn a corner leaving the stalemate for a later date. Which is the better way? I suggest we just turn around this corner.

1400
GEN TURNER: We are willing to proceed on to the next principle if you are willing to accept principle 3 as it is reworded.

1400
GEN LEE: Well, I can say the same thing. If you accept the third principle as we worded it, then we can settle this question. But it is because we cannot settle it now that I suggest that we turn over to the other principles.

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1401
GEN HODES: I can't help but make one observation. You say that we could settle it if one side or the other made a concession. If we accepted your wording of the third principle, we would be making a concession. On the other hand, if you accept our wording -- our revision rather -- of your principle 3, you would not, and I repeat you would not, be making a concession. We have these islands that are the matter of controversy at the moment, therefore, the only concession that can be made with respect to it would be on our side. You would not be making a concession if you agreed to our revised wording of principle 3.

1403
GEN HSIEH: I have said all I want to say and I don't like to waste more time on it. I suggest, once again, that in order to by-pass the stalemate, we go over to the other principles. This is the third time that I have made this suggestion. My intention is to solve this stalemate.

1405
GEN TURNER: When do you feel that you will be able to solve principle 3 as reworded?

1405
GEN HSIEH: I have no talent for prophesying. I am only attempting to go forward, and because it depends upon efforts by both sides, not on one side alone. Does your side object to the suggestion of going over to discussion of the other questions?

1407
GEN TURNER: We are perfectly willing to go over to the discussion of other questions when we have solved principle 3.

1407
GEN HSIEH: I now discover for the fourth time I failed with my suggestion. I call your attention to the fact that since we raised our fair and reasonable proposal on 3 December, your side has failed to show any clear attitude regarding the main problems confronting us, either in the plenary session or in the sub-committee meetings. Because of this, we have not been progressing as we

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) should have been in these sub-committee meetings.

And today, again, you are attempting to prolong this stalemate on the third principle and to waste time. It is very difficult for us to see whether you are really sincere for the settlement of Item 3 of the agenda. You should be aware that the proposal we made on 3 December was a great step forward which should have expedited our discussions and broken the deadlock on Item 3 of the agenda. But you have persistently avoided showing your direct attitude toward this major question. For this we can not but feel regretful.

It should be clear to both sides that the two additional principles we put forth on 3 December were meant to solve the major question before us, and in order to settle this major question, time, of course, is needed for sufficient consideration. If you have sincerity toward settling the question, then the spending of time is worthwhile. If, on the other hand, you have no sincerity in solving this question, but on the contrary want to waste time on secondary or side issues, it is a very regrettable thing, and it is a thing which we are not willing to do.

It was in order to try to break the deadlock on Item 3 of the agenda that we raised our two additional principles on 3 December. Likewise, in order to solve the stalemate on the third principle in the sub-committee we propose not to waste more time on this principle but to leave it for the moment and go over to other principles. You should be aware of our objective in doing so. The only objective in our doing so is to save time and to try to solve the deadlock, and it is an effort we have been making repeatedly. But of course we cannot stop you from wasting more time on the third principle if you insist upon doing so and have other objectives on your mind. I would like to hear your opinions or suggestions regarding the solving of this stalemate.

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1418
GEN TURNER: Very well. You brought up the question of sincerity. I assure you that our side is deadly in earnest in attempting to arrive at an honorable armistice. We are in no sense of the word desirous of wasting time. To show our deadly earnestness in this, I am willing, now, to go on with the discussion of your principle 5 with the provision that if we reach a stalemate on it we will immediately go back to principle 3 before we proceed on to any other of the principles under discussion. Is that understood?

1422
GEN HSIEH: General Turner, I am surprised at your suggestion. I do not know why you insist upon laying down such a mechanical process for discussion. For the past few days we have been discussing all of these principles, going over from one to another freely and exchanging opinions of both sides, marking out those on which we are in agreement and leaving alone those where we have differences. That has been a convenient method for discovering the agreements and differences between both sides and can help settle questions.

And now General Turner also realizes it is not profitable to insist upon discussing principle 3, at the moment, because that would be a waste of time and that we should go over to the other principles. I cannot understand why he must insist upon such a mechanical process, avoiding the discussing of principles 6, and 7. I cannot agree to avoid the discussion of items 6 and 7 because we are not just facing five principles, we are facing seven principles, and a mechanical process is not desirable. I suggest that we now begin the discussions of the following principle. That is my first point. General Turner also mentioned the word "honorable". Honor can only belong to those who love peace and it is only those who love peace who can have sincerity.

I now propose that we go on with our discussion. Do you agree that we go on with our discussion.

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1427
GEN TURNER: Yes, I agree to go on with the discussion of principle 5 with the provision that should we not reach a solution on 5, that we would immediately revert to 3 and stay upon 3 until it has been solved.

1430
GEN LEE: For what reason should we do so?

1431
GEN TURNER: If you are not willing to follow that procedure, then let us remain on principle 3.

1431
GEN LEE: Then you mean you refuse to discuss other principles?

1431
GEN TURNER: I have clearly stated that I am willing to discuss principle 5 and remain on principle 5 until it is solved. But, if we do not solve 5, we then go back to 3. Are you willing to accept that proposal? Yes or no?

1433
GEN LEE: Are you trying to give us orders?

1433
GEN TURNER: No, I am giving you a proposal in the hopes of breaking the stalemate and accomplishing something.

1434
GEN LEE: I want to ask you one thing. Yesterday, as to our principle 7 about the supervisory organ composed of neutral nations, we asked you a question. You said you would answer us today and now we would like to hear it.

1435
GEN TURNER: You misunderstood my answer of yesterday. I said that we will give you an answer in due course. Now you are attempting to bring up your principle 7 when we have been discussing principle 3. Need I repeat, that we agree to go on with principle 5 with the proviso which I gave you. That certainly does not extend to a discussion of principle 7 at this time. What is your answer to the proposal that I have made?

1437
GEN LEE: You mean that as you are not ready for the discussion of the seventh paragraph, you want to drag on the time with the third paragraph?

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1438
GEN TURNER: You haven't answered my question relative to the proposal that I made. Do you have an answer now?

1439
GEN LEE: As to your question, I think my proposal is the best answer -- my questions are the best answer. Why do you want to go back to the third paragraph which is in deadlock and which will involve nothing more than a repetition of statements already made by both sides?

1440
GEN HODES: This sub-delegation has a number of principles about which we feel very strongly. You immediately want to by-pass all of these principles and go to the very last one, first.
We have such things as an armistice commission with its responsibilities and functions to decide. We have such things as the level of forces to decide. Now to us, those are extremely important issues. We would prefer to get those settled early in these discussions. We have for the moment dropped the third principle, but there are two major points which must be discussed and determined before we can go into the question of how these things are to be observed or inspected. Again, I say those two things are: The organization, in general terms at least, that is to supervise this armistice, which is the principle 5 that General Turner has been talking about. We also must get an agreement on what is to be the maximum level of forces during the armistice. I think it is perfectly obvious that we must settle those points early.

1448
GEN LEE: Then let us go over to the discussion of the next paragraph. As we have reached an agreement on paragraph 4, shall we now go over to the discussion of paragraph 5?

1450
GEN TURNER: Go ahead.

1450
GEN LEE: As you have our fifth paragraph in writing, I don't think it is necessary for me to read it.

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1451
GEN TURNER: We submitted to you yesterday our proposed revision of paragraph 5. Is that reworded paragraph acceptable to you?

1453
GEN LEE: As to this question, as you know well, our paragraph 5 is inseparably related to paragraphs 6 and 7. We think the wording of our paragraph 5 need not be changed and that it is very good.

1453
GEN HODES: The first thing that we object to in your paragraph 5, as you worded it originally, is that you make an exception to the supervision of the whole armistice agreement. Again I must say that we feel very strongly that there must be one organization that is responsible for the adherence to all of the terms of the armistice agreement. Therefore, if you will put a period after the words "armistice agreement", and strike out the remainder of it, we think then it is a sound principle. There cannot be several agencies responsible for the whole armistice agreement. Now in that respect, in our revision of your 5th principle, we have not stated in there how this is to be done. We merely say that the armistice commission should be responsible for adherence to all of the armistice agreement.

1459
GEN LEE: Then who do you think should inspect in the rear of the other side?

1500
GEN HODES: The answer to that is "observer teams" as you will find in the revision, two paragraphs below, Or if you prefer we can go back to our proposal of 6 December, paragraph 4, which will give you the detail functions and breakdown which we did not put in paragraph 5 in order to bring our paragraph 5 into line with your paragraph 5.

It's necessary apparently to say again that we didn't say in paragraph 5 how this will be done. We merely say in our revised paragraph 5 that the armistice commission will be jointly responsible for the supervision of the whole armistice agreement.

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) There is nothing in there on how it will supervise.

1503
GEN LEE: Whom then should the supervisory organ be composed of? Should it be composed of neutral nations or whom?

1503
GEN HODES: Have we decided, first, that we are going to have this as one organization? We haven't got any teams yet. Let's stick to our principle 5 as it is worded.

1504
GEN LEE: Do you think that is satisfactory?

1504
GEN HODES: Yes, for principle 5. Yes, otherwise I wouldn't have submitted it.

1505
GEN LEE: We can't accept any such proposal. We think that our paragraph 5 is very well composed and that by following it we can settle the whole question.

1506
GEN HODES: What you have told me is that you don't accept the principle that one organization - the armistice commission - be responsible for the supervision of, and adherence to, all of the terms of the armistice. That's a basic concept that we have, and we insist that the armistice commission have full responsibility over supervision of the whole armistice agreement.

1508
GEN LEE: You mean by saying this then, that you are opposed to forming a supervisory organ with neutral nations?

1508
GEN TURNER: We didn't say anything about that.

1508
GEN LEE: When didn't you say anything?

1508
GEN HODES: You have a copy of this. You can read it. Does it say anything about neutral nations or anybody else in there? I can't find it in mine.

1509
GEN LEE: You mean then you oppose the participation of the neutral nations?

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1509
GEN HODES: We were talking about the over-all supervision of the armistice agreement. We did not say anything at all about neutral nations, civilians, military, or any other group of people. We have stuck to the principle of one organ being responsible for the complete supervision of the armistice agreement, and that is the armistice commission. Now you can have no objection to that, can you?

1510
GEN LEE: What you must know is that an organization is formed to do something. We want to form the armistice commission because it will inspect and supervise execution of the terms of the armistice agreement. The armistice commission has concrete and clear tasks before it. Specifying it in general, it has the tasks before it of supervising the rear of the demilitarized zone and within the demilitarized zone, and to inspect the execution of other terms of the agreement. There are two clear tasks, and one is to inspect the rear of either side of the belligerents. If you follow the provision of our paragraph 5, we can reasonably settle this question. But there is no such provision in your revised proposal. That means the proposal has not considered such things. Therefore it is not perfect and our paragraph 5 is far superior to that. I advise you that you should accept our paragraph 5.

1513
GEN HODES: There is one thing that you should understand: that it is impossible for us to visualize how you can have more than one group that is responsible for the supervision of the whole armistice agreement. It seems to us very clear that there must be one supervisory body, with the responsibility -- the full responsibility -- being placed on that organ. I want to emphasize the fact that I am talking about supervision--supervision of the whole armistice agreement.

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1515
GEN LEE: According to your stand, you don't consider our paragraph 7.

1516
GEN HODES: According to my stand, I consider paragraph 5 as it is reworded—as we have discussed it with you yesterday. That is what I am talking about. All you need to do with your paragraph 5 is put a period after the words "armistice agreement", striking out the rest of it. Then you have a sound principle.

1518
GEN LEE: You must understand that we are carrying on negotiations on an equal footing because there is no victor and no capitulator, so only a fair and reasonable proposal can be accepted. In solving the armistice questions in such a conference, such a fair and reasonable proposal as our paragraph alone can be acceptable to both sides. Let's do this, as to paragraph 5: If you do not want to accept our fair and reasonable stand then let's go over to paragraph 6.

1522
GEN TURNER: Let me say a few words. Let's review a little bit. You submitted your seven-principle proposal several days ago. We encountered that proposal with our eight-principle proposal. That being unacceptable to you, we agreed to revise your seven principles. In other words, to work on the chassis of your proposal. That showed clearly our sincere efforts to get on with this conference.

You say there is no clear victor, no clear vanquished. We are the only ones who have made any overtures toward getting on with some progress in these negotiations. You have turned down the rewriting of your third principle and we have agreed to go on with this discussion of your fifth principle. You are the ones that are adopting the attitude of the victor.

Now what do you suggest we do toward making some headway in these negotiations? We have rewritten your principle 5 to the point where it is a fair principle. Why don't you accept it?

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1528
GEN LEE: We are now talking about the armistice agreement and not talking about how we could make the armistice stable. It is a most natural thing that we cannot accept your terms for increasing the possibility of military clashes after armistice. Your request about paragraph 3 is the retention of the military forces in the rear of the other side after the armistice.

In our paragraph 5, the points on which we do not reach agreement with you are those related to who should do the inspections--who should inspect the execution of the terms in the rear of either side of the belligerents. As to this question, we have maintained that it should be inspected by fair representatives of neutral nations. At this time, when your attitude is not determined and expressed as to inviting such fair representatives from neutral nations, we know that it is difficult to reach an agreement on paragraph 5; but we think this is a question which both sides must settle. For a speedy settlement of this question it is necessary, more necessary than anything else, that you assume a clear attitude toward the invitation of the representatives of neutral nations. Now, as to paragraph 5, can you show your clear attitude?

1536
GEN TURNER: After all your pleas to go on to discuss principle 5, you have made no contribution to the discussion of this principle. You have advanced not a single logical argument. You have only said your version of this principle should be accepted.

After this scintillating conversation, you now would like to go to the discussion of something else. You have asked us to concede the islands by accepting your wording of principle 3. We are asking for nothing that we do not already have and hold when we ask you to accept our rewording of your principle. It seems to me that you are trying to get more than you are entitled to in this armistice. You must remember that we have always said

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) that this armistice must be based upon military realities. It is a military reality that our side holds the islands. Now you want us to agree to your wording of principle 3 and give up the military reality of our holding these islands. We cannot agree to this. You just said there is no victor or capitulator. Why should we capitulate the islands?

Having reached no decision on your principle 3, nor on your principle 5, you now would like to discuss your principle which involves neutral countries, namely your principle 7. This we cannot do until we have reached some agreement on 3 and 5.

1546
GEN LEE: You said just now that there should be nothing to gain after the armistice, but we do not intend to gain anything after the armistice. What we intend is that the state of peace should continue after the armistice, and that the soldiers be kept from sacrificing further. We do not see the necessity of retaining armed forces in the rear of the military demarcation line after the demarcation line is fixed and the armistice is reached, and we think you should not retain them. As after the armistice there is no necessity for our patrols to be in the rear of your side so there is no necessity for your naval forces to be in the islands in our rear after the armistice.

Your side says without reaching a solution of our paragraphs 3 and 5 we cannot go into the discussion of paragraph 7. What you must understand is that each paragraph is inter-related as a whole; you know that our paragraph 5 is closely connected with other paragraphs and without solving them paragraph 5 can hardly be solved. Then why do you think we should not go over to paragraph 6 and 7?

1552
GEN TURNER: Well, I can answer that. Full consideration is being given to the use of neutral nations, but that has nothing to do with principle 5 which we are discussing. Principle 5 speaks only of

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) supervision. There is nothing stated therein which refers to inspection. We will discuss your principle 7 in due course. Are you willing to accept our rewording of your principle 5?

1556
GEN LEE: You do not give us an answer to our question. I think that for the progress of the conference it is necessary to give an answer to my question.

1557
GEN TURNER: You haven't answered my question on the acceptance of our rewording of your principle 5.

1558
GEN LEE: I said, as long as you do not show your clear attitude toward our paragraphs 6 and 7, we cannot accept your wording of paragraph 5.

1559
GEN TURNER: Paragraph 5 as reworded simply states there will be one armistice commission to supervise the armistice. Unless you insist on two armistice commissions there is no reason for you to oppose our rewording of your fifth principle.

1600
GEN LEE: We cannot consider your proposal without receiving your answer as to paragraph 7. Now you said you would give us an answer in due course; what time, definitely, do you mean by that?

1601
GEN TURNER: In the last plenary session, we submitted a proposal to have a subdelegation meeting on Agenda Item 4 simultaneously with the discussion on Agenda Item 3. Your senior delegate said that he would answer that proposal in due time. May I ask what he meant by due time?

1602
GEN LEE: Now, we are discussing Item 3 of the agenda. I hope you will not confuse that question with this question.

1602
GEN TURNER: Is it not clear to you, that if you agree as a principle that there shall be <u>an</u> armistice commission--I repeat <u>an</u> armistice commission--to supervise the armistice, you in no way prejudice the determination of the detailed organization, its functions,

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) or who shall execute which tasks. Why then can you not agree to our rewording of your principle 5, leaving subordinate considerations for later?

1604
GEN LEE: You mean that you are not going to express your intention as to our paragraph 7?

1604
GEN TURNER: I have answered that fully and clearly. Since you refuse to accept the reworded version of your seven-point proposal, I can only suggest that you thoroughly study our eight-point proposal and be prepared to discuss that with us tomorrow. I suggest that we recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow.

1606
GEN LEE: We have got to tell you, first, that we cannot carry on the discussion on the basis of your eight-paragraph proposal, and we also tell you that as long as you do not express your attitude toward paragraph 7 of our seven-principle proposal, we can hardly expect any progress in the conference.

When our side proposed the two additional paragraphs in our proposal on 3 December, our senior delegate clearly pointed out that the seven principles proposed by our side constituted an integral whole in which various paragraphs are interrelated to each other and are inseparable. I must emphasize this point and call your attention to it.

In the past five days your side opposed, without any justification, the sixth paragraph of our proposal which is absolutely fair and reasonable. You refused to express a clear attitude toward our proposal of inviting neutral nations to form a supervisory organ, and you continue to insist on your unreasonable proposal and demands which our side explicitly stated, on 3 December, our side absolutely would not accept. We consider that such an attitude of yours is not meant to settle any questions and is not made in a desire of a speedy progress in the negotiations and is entirely unsatisfactory.

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GEN LEE:
(Cont'd)

Firstly, your side once more puts forward the proposal of the so-called limitations on military facilities, and indicates that you advocate limitation even on the operation of civil air transport. We have long since pointed out that this proposal of your side directly interferes with the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Your statement yesterday further proved this to be true. To deal with every kind of facilities within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a matter of its own internal affairs, and not the slightest interference by anybody will be tolerated. I hope that you will understand this point clearly, so that no time will be wasted on this question.

Secondly, regarding the question of the withdrawal by either side, within a specified time limit, from the rear, the coastal islands, and waters of the other side with the demarcation line as the dividing line, your side still uses the ambiguous phrase of the so-called "withdrawal from the areas controlled by the other side" and demands to retain your armed forces in our rear.

Since the military demarcation line has been fixed, and since your side has stated that you do not intend to make further so-called adjustments in the agreement already reached and that neither do you intend to threaten directly our rear, there is no justification whatsoever for you to insist upon the retention of your armed forces in our rear. There is not the slightest relation between the question of withdrawal by either of two belligerents from the coastal islands and waters of the other side during the armistice and the question of territorial waters or high seas navigation during peace time. Since your side declared that you are willing to insure the stability of the military armistice, what reason can you have for insisting on the retention of your armed forces in our rear?

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GEN LEE:
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What is more incomprehensible is that on the one hand your side maintains that details should be specifically stipulated immediately during the discussion of the principles. For instance, on the question of ports of entry, your side insists that before we come to the discussion of concrete details it should be determined, first, whether the ports of entry in the rear actually agreed upon by both sides and subject to inspection by both sides shall include airports. On the other hand, however, your side refused to employ clear and definite wording in your proposed principle regarding the withdrawal by either side from the rear of the other side, and insists upon the use of the ambiguous wording of the so-called "withdrawal from the areas controlled by the other side". To such ambiguous wording, our side absolutely cannot agree.

Thirdly, in order to insure the supervision of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, our side proposes that both sides not introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons, or ammunition under any pretext. Your side, however, still insists that the introduction into Korea during the armistice of replacements of armed units and personnel, and replenishments of weapons and ammunition should be permitted. Since hostilities would have ceased, there is no reason whatsoever to introduce into Korea armed units and personnel to replace those withdrawn from Korea. There is no reason whatsoever to introduce into Korea new weapons to substitute for the old ones. There is no reason whatsoever to introduce into Korea weapons and ammunition to replenish the weapons and ammunition used up in the period without hostilities. You declare that you are not willing to commit yourself to anything which may result in an upset of the balance, if you are to lose thereby. However, any commitment will apply to our side equally.

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GEN LEE:
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Since you declare that your proposal does not preclude the possibility of reducing foreign forces and their weapons and ammunition and that it is not your objective to create and maintain a balance of foreign forces in Korea, what is the reason for you to advocate continued introduction into Korea of military forces, weapons, and ammunition during the armistice?

Since you declare that your side agrees to insuring the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level for a speedy and early settlement of the Korean question, what reason can you have to oppose the undertaking of not introducing into Korea any military forces, weapons, and ammunition during the armistice? Our side formally opposes, and categorically rejects, the position of continued entry into Korea of military forces, weapons, and ammunition under the pretext of replacements of personnel and replenishment of weapons.

Fourthly, in order to supervise the strict implementation of our sixth principle, our side proposed that both sides should jointly invite the representatives of neutral nations to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting necessary inspections behind the demarcation line at such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides. However, your side not only fails to express so far a definite view toward this proposal of our side, but still insists that your side shall have the right of free access throughout Korea to conduct all kinds of inspections.

No sovereign state can tolerate free access throughout its territory by another state. To conduct inspections is a direct interference in its internal affairs. It is all the more intolerable that during the period of armistice, when the state of war is yet to be terminated, one of the belligerents should have free access throughout the territory of the other side, beyond

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) the demilitarized zone, to conduct inspections. Should your side really have the same objective as ours, namely, to insure the strict implementation of the armistice terms and to not harbor any ulterior motives, it would have been impossible for your side to insist upon such a view. In fact there is no necessity at all for free access throughout the territory of Korea to carry out inspection. I must definitely and finally point out that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will never tolerate and can absolutely not accept any proposal of interfering in its internal affairs.

As to the relationship between the supervisory organ of neutral nations and the armistice commission, we consider that these should be organizations parallel to each other. The details of this question can certainly be discussed and settled through negotiations, after agreement is reached on the principle of inviting neutral nations to form a supervisory organ.

Agreeing to your proposal to recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning, we expect you to make a careful study of our paragraph 7 and give us tomorrow your clear answer to it.

1634
GEN TURNER: Your lengthy statement has been duly noted. As I listened to it, I was unable to discern one single new thought. Have you an answer to our proposal relative to Agenda Item 4?

1634
GEN LEE: We will deliver your proposal to our senior delegate. We will deliver it again today.

1635
GEN TURNER: We agree to recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1635 hours

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED

Halsey M. Settle Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

9 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives present:

United Nations - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Forenbaugh, USA, and BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, COL J C Murray, USMC, COL J A Norell, USA, and CDR B W Spore, USN, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Communists - - - MGEN Lee Sang Jo, NKA, and MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, Delegates; RADM Kim Won Mu, NK Navy, COL Chang Chun San, NKA, COL Tsai Chen Wen, CCF, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Chiu Ko An, CCF, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

1100
GEN LEE: Let's begin the meeting. If you have anything to say, we would like to hear it.

1100
GEN TURNER: If you have anything new to offer, we are ready to hear it.

1101
GEN LEE: We haven't got anything new.

1101
GEN TURNER: When you have something new to offer, we will be ready to hear it.

1102
GEN LEE: For several days, we have been presenting and discussing the stands and opinions of both sides. The central points of discussions between both sides, as well as the discrepancies between both sides, have become very clear. These discrepancies and opinions then must be solved. In settling these discrepancies at a sub-committee, it must be a settlement of principle points. It will lie in reaching an agreement and drawing up a proposal which both sides can accept. Only a fair and reasonable proposal can be accepted by both sides. Accordingly, when one side insists upon an unreasonable and unfair proposal, the other side cannot accept it. This is the basic attitude which both sides should assume in discussing the questions.

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) And there are the discrepancies of opinion. We said that we insist that after the armistice military forces should be withdrawn from north and south of the military demarcation line; whereas you ambiguously talk of the "withdrawal from the areas controlled by the other side". Our side insists that as for the ports of entry in the rear, neutral nations should be entrusted to make inspections; whereas you insist on going all around through the rear of the other side. We insist that after the armistice all armed forces, weapons, and ammunition can only go out but cannot be introduced; whereas, under the pretext of not increasing the armed forces, you insist on replenishment and replacement of armed forces, weapons, and ammunition. As for the question of the armistice commission and the supervisory organ of neutral nations, we insisted that the supervisory organ of neutral nations should be entrusted by the armistice commission to be responsible to the armistice commission for carrying out inspections in the ports of entry as agreed upon by both sides and making reports to the armistice commission. The relations between these two organs is on the basis of an equal responsibility and not that of a lower organ to its superiors.

We have differences of this extent between our two sides, and, moreover, you insist on the inspection of military facilities. As this is an interference of the internal affairs, we can not accept it. As to these discrepancies of opinion between both sides, we would like to know how you want to settle them.

1114
GEN TURNER: I have heard your statement. I agree that we have boiled down our disagreements to where we both thoroughly understand those disagreements. I ask you now: How do you propose to solve these differences?

1115
GEN LEE: In solving this important question, we think inspection in the rear should be carried out by the supervisory organ of neutral nations.

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1116
GEN TURNER: Do you accept our wording of your principle 3?

1116
GEN LEE: Yesterday, we clearly said that we would not accept it.

1117
GEN TURNER: How, then, do you propose to solve principle 3?

1117
GEN LEE: Our basic stand for the solution of the third paragraph is in establishing the armistice, and, after the armistice, in leading it to peace. Therefore, we consistently insist that neither side should retain military forces in the rear of the other side, beyond the demarcation line.

1119
GEN TURNER: I am awaiting any proposal that you have to make toward the solution of principle 3 here today.

1120
GEN LEE: Our method of solving the third principle has been clearly delivered to you in writing. That is the wording of paragraph 3 of our seven-principle proposal. We consistently insist that we cannot make any decision which will endanger the armistice during the period of the armistice. We think you are also in favor of this if you want peace.

1123
GEN TURNER: There is nothing new in anything you have said so far. If you have anything new to offer, we are ready to consider it.

1124
GEN LEE: We do not find it necessary to have anything new as to that question. This is a small question. Instead of wasting time for that, we think the fundamental thing for the solution of Item 3 of the agenda is to express a clear attitude toward our paragraph 6 and 7 -- that is toward discussing the question of the supervisory organ of neutral nations.

1128
GEN TURNER: Do you refuse to try to reach a solution on your principle 3?

1128
GEN LEE: We never refused to solve our third paragraph. As to the way of settling that question, we have clearly presented you our opinion,

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) and your acceptance of this will be the expression of the minimum sincerity toward this. You must clearly show your attitude toward the question of inspection by neutral nations.--that is, toward our paragraphs 6 and 7.

1130
GEN TURNER: If you do not refuse to solve principle 3, then let's go ahead with an attempt to solve it now. Are you ready to make any form of proposal on principle 3?

1130
GEN LEE: We are not only ready for the solution of the third principle but we are ready to solve the whole armistice. We have already expressed our attitude toward the whole armistice to you.

One thing you must remember is our proposal of November 27th. According to our proposal of November 27th, since we originally maintained that a political conference should be convened right after the armistice to discuss the question of withdrawal of armed forces, we did not find it necessary for either side to inspect the rear of the other side. But you requested the inspection because you are afraid of our armed forces. Then we said that we absolutely could not tolerate your interference in our internal affairs. Then we again proposed that there would be no introduction by either side of any kind of weapons and ammunition, and that neutral nations be invited to take up the responsibility of the supervision and inspection of it. In other words, in consideration of your proposal we presented paragraphs 6 and 7 in our seven-principle proposal. But, again, you are afraid of fair supervision by neutral nations. You attempt to increase your own armed forces by still insisting on your unreasonable request of rotation and replacement of troops, and you request inspection directly by the armistice commission. We absolutely cannot agree to this.

At present, the question hinges upon whether we agree to supervision and inspection by neutral nations or not. Since the

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) dispatch by the armistice commission of its own observer teams to the rear of the other side to freely carry out inspections is an interference in the internal affairs of the other side, it absolutely cannot be tolerated. The supervisory organ of neutral nations shall be entrusted by the armistice commission to be responsible to the armistice commission for carrying out inspections in the ports of entry as agreed upon by both sides and making reports to the armistice commission. The relationship between these two organizations is on the basis of an equal responsibility and not that of a lower organization to its superior. The crux of the question now is: you agree to inspection by the supervisory organ of neutral nations in the rear of the other side or you do not want any inspection in the rear at all. A clear attitude of your side regarding this question is essential to the solution of Item 3 of the agenda.

We await your clear and direct answer to this question.

1145
GEN TURNER: We have been considering the seven principles presented by your side. As we understand it, principles 1, 2 and 4, as revised, are agreed between us. On principle 3 we have encountered a fundamental disagreement. This disagreement relates to the control during armistice of islands in the territorial waters of Korea. Likewise, in connection with your principles 5 and 6 we encountered fundamental disagreements. These disagreements relate to your proposal to force the withdrawal of our forces from Korea by the device of attrition, and your refusal to accept prohibition of increase of military capabilities during the armistice.

Now I wish to point out that none of these disagreements, encountered in progressing through your principles in the order listed, have anything to do with, or are affected by, our final determination of the composition of the supervisory organ and the observation teams. Therefore, let's address our efforts to the aforesaid disagreements. Let's take first things first.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) Number 1: Islands. What have you to say?

1147
GEN LEE: You must remember that discussion on Item 3 of the agenda has come to a standstill because you do not clearly show your attitude to our most important proposal. In discussing Item 3 of the agenda, we are discussing something which involves several questions. You must clearly understand that each question is inter-related withthe others. You know, and we know, and the people of the world know, that it is logically not possible to retain armed forces in the rear of the other side in discussing the armistice. I again re-request you to show your clear attitude, whether you want the inspection in the rear of the other side by the neutral nations or you do not want the inspections at all.

1150
GEN HODES: You speak many times about attitude, so I want to attempt to make clear what our attitude is. Our attitude is this: There are certain basic fundamental principles necessary to be solved on Item 3 of the agenda which will, as you say, make the armistice secure. These basic fundamental principles should be settled first. I am going to tell you briefly what these principles are. As General Turner has told you, we think it is desirable that we keep first things first and get those matters settled. Then we can begin to talk about how some of these things are to be handled. Therefore, we took your seven principles and rewrote them, adding one, so that they would form a framework, or skeleton, of basic principles. So far as we know there is no sound reason why you cannot agree to all eight of them, but you say you don't agree with them. You don't agree with 3; you don't agree with 5, 6, 7 and 8.

The solution you proposed, on the other hand, is that we discuss some neutral organization which will have certain authority behind the line as the panacea for all of the ills that exist.

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) Now in order to really know what you mean, we first should know how we can solve these major differences of principles, leaving until later the question of how some of these things are to be done.

In order to safeguard or to secure this armistice, and without -- at this time -- getting into discussions or references as to how supervision or inspections are to be handled, I will give you a list of six points which we insist upon and which should be agreed upon before we get into any question of how certain things are to be done. These points are as follows:

1. We insist that we are entitled, and that you are entitled, to hold the territory which each of us holds at the time the armistice goes into effect.

2. In order to safeguard the armistice and to insure that the military capabilities of one side over the other are not increased during the armistice, we say there should be no more construction of airfields.

3. We say that there should be prohibition against any increase of military capabilities by either side during the armistice.

4. We maintain there must be one single armistice supervising authority which is responsible for the supervision of the adherence to the conditions of the armistice agreement. It must have that authority.

5. We maintain there must be effective inspections throughout Korea including aerial observation.

6. We maintain that whatever armistice supervising organization is finally decided upon, or agreed upon, it must be in place and ready to operate at the time that the armistice goes into effect.

Now I really don't believe there is any group of military people who would say that anything less than those basic principles should be acceptable if we really want to be certain that the armistice we are now negotiating will be effective. Therefore,

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) it is difficult for us to understand your attitude in failing thus far to agree that those basic principles are sound and acceptable from what you, as well as we, want in this armistice agreement.

You mentioned frequently that some of these things are unnecessary because there will be a conference of appropriate nations immediately following the armistice. For that reason you say that many of these things are unnecessary. That is all very fine. We are just as interested in having a conference -- having a final peace settlement in Korea -- as early as possible, as you are. But we have had some experience with conferences and we have no guarantee, at this time, that even if we had an immediate conference after the armistice agreement is reached, that it will solve all of the difficulties in Korea immediately. In any event there is bound to be some time period before all of the problems of Korea are settled. That, we hope, will be the period that this armistice agreement will last, or be effective. It is for this time period that we are interested in these safeguards, and we assume that it is this time period which you, too, are interested in safeguarding.

Now, on these six important basic fundamental principles I will be very glad to go into any detail you wish to go into. For the moment, I believe that what I have already said is sufficient to begin to get to a solution of this Agenda Item 3.

1221
GEN LEE: You said you wanted a stable armistice. Then you said by convening a political conference it can discuss the question of withdrawal of the armed forces, thus leading to a peace. But we find some contradictions between your basic argument and your seven principles.

If one side of the belligerents really aims at stabilizing the armistice during the armistice, there is no reason whatsoever to retain its armed forces in the rear of the other side. It is for the security of the troops that we think they should go out

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) only, and that we don't find it necessary to introduce them. If both side should withdraw their troops immediately, no question whatever would arise as to security, replenishment or replacement.

There should be no necessity for interfering in internal affairs, such as the construction of airfields, or inspections throughout Korea, or the inspection of the airfield facilities. In discussing the armistice question you must fully understand our firm and insistent stand that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will tolerate no interference in its internal affairs whatsoever. You must remember that no stand, no force whatever, can shake or change our attitude. It seems that you still do not understand our such stand. As to the question of the inspections, our stand, our attitude, is that inspection by either of the belligerents of the rear of the other side is interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It will absolutely not accept it. And if the inspections are to be carried out, they should be done by a supervisory organ composed of representatives of fair neutral nations. This is not a question of the method, but it is a question in principle -- this is the basic, principle difference between both sides. Without settling this question -- without settling who will inspect the rear -- it is senseless to discuss the inspection of the rear of both sides. In discussing this question we must endeavor to find out how to make the armistice stable, how soon to convene the political conference to discuss the withdrawal of the armed forces as the basis of the peace.

If you agreed to this, you should accept our fair and reasonable proposal. But, regrettably, you still do not clearly show your attitude as to the necessity of inspecting the rear of both sides by the neutral nations. In order to speedily reach an agreement on Item 3 of the agenda, we await your direct and clear answer.

1233
GEN HODES: I'll give you a very direct and clear answer right now. I talked

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) about six basic principles a while ago and you jumped the track. I read one of our principles which said: "....effective inspection throughout Korea including aerial observation." I said not one single word about getting back in your rear. Until we can get some kind of an agreement on these six principles that are basic, I know of no reason for getting off on the question of <u>who</u> or <u>how</u> some of these basic requirements are to be carried out. From what you have said, I would say that you agree with me that there should be effective inspection throughout Korea, but I'm not sure.

1237
GEN LEE: In respect to your statement, I would like to ask you one thing: If in your statement you did not mention the inspection of the rear, then you mean that you are not going to inspect the rear?

1238
GEN HODES: I'll read it again. Number 5 -- this is my number 5 this morning-- "....effective inspection throughout"--I repeat, "throughout"-- "Korea including aerial observation." Does that answer the question?

1239
GEN LEE: How should we interpret what you call "throughout Korea"? You must understand that the rear of the neutral area is closely connected with the question of interference with internal affairs. You must understand that the inspection of the rear of either side by fair representatives of the neutral nations is fair and reasonable. We request your explanation of what you mean by "throughout Korea".

1241
GEN HODES: We have the peninsula of Korea. The people, whoever they are, who will do the inspecting should have authority to inspect anything that is necessary to be inspected -- that comes within the terms of the armistice agreement -- no matter where it is in Korea. Geographically, within Korea there is no limit to that requirement. Now, I said: those points which are agreed to in the armistice agreement. Our thinking on those points is: ground,

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) sea and air ports of entry and communication centers. That is exactly what we have in mind.

1246
GEN LEE: Having heard the explanation you made in your statement, I am all the more confused. In one statement you spoke of the inspection throughout Korea and yet you say you did not mention the rear. Then you talk about inspection of the ground, air and naval ports of entry, and I don't know which one of your statements we should take seriously. How can you make a statement -- you called our attention to the fact -- that you didn't mention the rear at all, then right afterwards talk about inspecting throughout Korea, and then about inspection of the ground, air and naval ports of entry? I don't know what treasure lies behind these different terms and expressions but we don't understand what you really mean.

1248
GEN HODES: I refer you to principle 7 of the revised principles we gave you the other day. I'll read it to you, if you want, and then you won't have any difficulty in understanding what I am talking about: "The armistice commission and its observer teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations together with freedom of movement for the above teams over principal lines of communication throughout all of Korea." Now, is there still confusion?

I tried, in talking about the six major basic points of issue and basic differences this morning, to attempt to brief them so that I would only be mentioning the meat of each one of the principles. That is the reason I used the term, and I quote, "effective inspection."

1252
GEN LEE: I want to ask you a question. We must clearly know whether during the armistice you consider aerial reconnaissance by one party of the belligerents an action of hostilities or not, and whether during that period one party of the belligerents can

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) inspect the rear of the other party. Under such circumstances, your side must clearly understand that only fair representatives of neutral nations can inspect the rear of the belligerents, and can inspect the execution of the terms of the armistice. Isn't it so?

1256
GEN HODES: Do you understand that "air observation" includes air observation over both rear areas--in other words, that it is joint aerial observation and that it is controlled and directed by the joint organ, the military armistice commission (Interruption by CCF Interpreter: "Military?") or an armistice commission, I don't care what you call it. Right now we will call it an armistice commission if you prefer.

1257
GEN LEE: As to that question, our senior delegate expressed clearly at the plenary session that we are neither accustomed to, nor have we any experience in, interfering in the internal affairs of someone else.

1258
GEN HODES: These airplanes don't get very far internally when they are flying over an area.

1259
GEN TURNER: Do you have an answer now to our proposal relative to Agenda Item 4?

1301
GEN LEE: That intention of yours we have transmitted to our senior delegate. That intention we will deliver to our senior delegate.

1301
GEN TURNER: Can you give me any idea as to when we may expect an answer?

1301
GEN LEE: I think our senior delegate is now considering that question.

1302
GEN TURNER: I suggest that we recess for lunch. What time would you like to reconvene?

1302
GEN LEE: What time do you want to come back?

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1302
GEN TURNER: 1400.

1302
GEN LEE: All right.

Meeting recessed at 1302 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1400 hours.

1400
GEN LEE: If you have any statements to make we would like to hear them.

1401
GEN TURNER: If you have anything new to offer we are ready to hear it.

1402
GEN LEE: We repeatedly told you that we have nothing new.

1402
GEN TURNER: Do you have an answer now on our proposal relative to Agenda Item 4?

1403
GEN LEE: Do you need our answer again? We transmitted your opinion to our senior delegate and our senior delegate is now considering it.

1405
GEN TURNER: Have you any suggestions regarding the way to resolve the issues outlined this morning? If not I suggest we recess until tomorrow. What time do you suggest?

1406
GEN LEE: For the settlement of Item 3 of the agenda, we propose our seven-principle proposal in consideration of several things. In spite of our discussion during the last several days you still refuse to show or express your attitude toward our paragraphs 6 and 7. By doing this, you let our conference not make any progress. We regret very much such an attitude on your part.

For a satisfactory solution of the third item of the agenda we think such questions must be solved:

Firstly, once the military demarcation line is fixed and the armistice agreement is signed, both sides should withdraw their armed forces from the rear of the other side.

Secondly, after the armistice agreement, it must be prohibited that armed forces, weapons, and ammunition be introduced into Korea from abroad -- this means that only the outgoing of armed

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) forces, weapons and ammunition can be permitted, not introduction of them. By doing this alone can the state of war be reduced by stages. After the armistice, interference in the internal affairs of the other side will not be tolerated. It simply cannot be so.

Thirdly, after the armistice the supervisory organ of the neutral nations alone can inspect the ports of entry in the rear of both sides.

Only by reasonably solving such questions can the third item of the agenda be satisfactorily, reasonably and fairly settled. We expect you to show your clear answer soon towards the question of the supervisory organ of the neutral nations and hope that Item 3 of the agenda will be agreed upon soon. We call your attention to this.

We agree to your proposal to recess until tomorrow. At what time do you want to meet?

1409
GEN TURNER: At 11 o'clock?

1409
GEN LEE: If you want that, we agree.

Meeting recessed at 1410 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

9 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives present:

United Nations - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Forenbaugh, USA, and BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, COL J C Murray, USMC, COL J A Norell, USA, and CDR B W Spore, USN, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Communists - - - MGEN Lee Sang Jo, NKA, and MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, Delegates; RADM Kim Won Mu, NK Navy, COL Chang Chun San, NKA, COL Tsai Chen Wen, CCF, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Chiu Ko An, CCF, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

1100
GEN LEE: Let's begin the meeting. If you have anything to say, we would like to hear it.

1100
GEN TURNER: If you have anything new to offer, we are ready to hear it.

1101
GEN LEE: We haven't got anything new.

1101
GEN TURNER: When you have something new to offer, we will be ready to hear it.

1102
GEN LEE: For several days, we have been presenting and discussing the stands and opinions of both sides. The central points of discussions between both sides, as well as the discrepancies between both sides, have become very clear. These discrepancies and opinions then must be solved. In settling these discrepancies at a sub-committee, it must be a settlement of principle points. It will lie in reaching an agreement and drawing up a proposal which both sides can accept. Only a fair and reasonable proposal can be accepted by both sides. Accordingly, when one side insists upon an unreasonable and unfair proposal, the other side cannot accept it. This is the basic attitude which both sides should assume in discussing the questions.

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) And there are the discrepancies of opinion. We said that we insist that after the armistice military forces should be withdrawn from north and south of the military demarcation line; whereas you ambiguously talk of the "withdrawal from the areas controlled by the other side". Our side insists that as for the ports of entry in the rear, neutral nations should be entrusted to make inspections; whereas you insist on going all around through the rear of the other side. We insist that after the armistice all armed forces, weapons, and ammunition can only go out but cannot be introduced; whereas, under the pretext of not increasing the armed forces, you insist on replenishment and replacement of armed forces, weapons, and ammunition. As for the question of the armistice commission and the supervisory organ of neutral nations, we insisted that the supervisory organ of neutral nations should be entrusted by the armistice commission to be responsible to the armistice commission for carrying out inspections in the ports of entry as agreed upon by both sides and making reports to the armistice commission. The relations between these two organs is on the basis of an equal responsibility and not that of a lower organ to its superiors.

We have differences of this extent between our two sides, and, moreover, you insist on the inspection of military facilities. As this is an interference of the internal affairs, we can not accept it. As to these discrepancies of opinion between both sides, we would like to know how you want to settle them.

1114
GEN TURNER: I have heard your statement. I agree that we have boiled down our disagreements to where we both thoroughly understand those disagreements. I ask you now: How do you propose to solve these differences?

1115
GEN LEE: In solving this important question, we think inspection in the rear should be carried out by the supervisory organ of neutral nations.

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1116
GEN TURNER: Do you accept our wording of your principle 3?

1116
GEN LEE: Yesterday, we clearly said that we would not accept it.

1117
GEN TURNER: How, then, do you propose to solve principle 3?

1117
GEN LEE: Our basic stand for the solution of the third paragraph is in establishing the armistice, and, after the armistice, in leading it to peace. Therefore, we consistently insist that neither side should retain military forces in the rear of the other side, beyond the demarcation line.

1119
GEN TURNER: I am awaiting any proposal that you have to make toward the solution of principle 3 here today.

1120
GEN LEE: Our method of solving the third principle has been clearly delivered to you in writing. That is the wording of paragraph 3 of our seven-principle proposal. We consistently insist that we cannot make any decision which will endanger the armistice during the period of the armistice. We think you are also in favor of this if you want peace.

1123
GEN TURNER: There is nothing new in anything you have said so far. If you have anything new to offer, we are ready to consider it.

1124
GEN LEE: We do not find it necessary to have anything new as to that question. This is a small question. Instead of wasting time for that, we think the fundamental thing for the solution of Item 3 of the agenda is to express a clear attitude toward our paragraph 6 and 7 -- that is toward discussing the question of the supervisory organ of neutral nations.

1128
GEN TURNER: Do you refuse to try to reach a solution on your principle 3?

1128
GEN LEE: We never refused to solve our third paragraph. As to the way of settling that question, we have clearly presented you our opinion,

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) and your acceptance of this will be the expression of the minimum sincerity toward this. You must clearly show your attitude toward the question of inspection by neutral nations,--that is, toward our paragraphs 6 and 7.

1130
GEN TURNER: If you do not refuse to solve principle 3, then let's go ahead with an attempt to solve it now. Are you ready to make any form of proposal on principle 3?

1130
GEN LEE: We are not only ready for the solution of the third principle but we are ready to solve the whole armistice. We have already expressed our attitude toward the whole armistice to you.

One thing you must remember is our proposal of November 27th. According to our proposal of November 27th, since we originally maintained that a political conference should be convened right after the armistice to discuss the question of withdrawal of armed forces, we did not find it necessary for either side to inspect the rear of the other side. But you requested the inspection because you are afraid of our armed forces. Then we said that we absolutely could not tolerate your interference in our internal affairs. Then we again proposed that there would be no introduction by either side of any kind of weapons and ammunition, and that neutral nations be invited to take up the responsibility of the supervision and inspection of it. In other words, in consideration of your proposal we presented paragraphs 6 and 7 in our seven-principle proposal. But, again, you are afraid of fair supervision by neutral nations. You attempt to increase your own armed forces by still insisting on your unreasonable request of rotation and replacement of troops, and you request inspection directly by the armistice commission. We absolutely cannot agree to this.

At present, the question hinges upon whether we agree to supervision and inspection by neutral nations or not. Since the

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) dispatch by the armistice commission of its own observer teams to the rear of the other side to freely carry out inspections is an interference in the internal affairs of the other side, it absolutely cannot be tolerated. The supervisory organ of neutral nations shall be entrusted by the armistice commission to be responsible to the armistice commission for carrying out inspections in the ports of entry as agreed upon by both sides and making reports to the armistice commission. The relationship between these two organizations is on the basis of an equal responsibility and not that of a lower organization to its superior. The crux of the question now is: you agree to inspection by the supervisory organ of neutral nations in the rear of the other side or you do not want any inspection in the rear at all. A clear attitude of your side regarding this question is essential to the solution of Item 3 of the agenda.

We await your clear and direct answer to this question.

1145
GEN TURNER: We have been considering the seven principles presented by your side. As we understand it, principles 1, 2 and 4, as revised, are agreed between us. On principle 3 we have encountered a fundamental disagreement. This disagreement relates to the control during armistice of islands in the territorial waters of Korea. Likewise, in connection with your principles 5 and 6 we encountered fundamental disagreements. These disagreements relate to your proposal to force the withdrawal of our forces from Korea by the device of attrition, and your refusal to accept prohibition of increase of military capabilities during the armistice.

Now I wish to point out that none of these disagreements, encountered in progressing through your principles in the order listed, have anything to do with, or are affected by, our final determination of the composition of the supervisory organ and the observation teams. Therefore, let's address our efforts to the aforesaid disagreements. Let's take first things first.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) Number 1: Islands. What have you to say?

1147
GEN LEE: You must remember that discussion on Item 3 of the agenda has come to a standstill because you do not clearly show your attitude to our most important proposal. In discussing Item 3 of the agenda, we are discussing something which involves several questions. You must clearly understand that each question is inter-related withthe others. You know, and we know, and the people of the world know, that it is logically not possible to retain armed forces in the rear of the other side in discussing the armistice. I again re-request you to show your clear attitude, whether you want the inspection in the rear of the other side by the neutral nations or you do not want the inspections at all.

1150
GEN HODES: You speak many times about attitude, so I want to attempt to make clear what our attitude is. Our attitude is this: There are certain basic fundamental principles necessary to be solved on Item 3 of the agenda which will, as you say, make the armistice secure. These basic fundamental principles should be settled first. I am going to tell you briefly what these principles are. As General Turner has told you, we think it is desirable that we keep first things first and get those matters settled. Then we can begin to talk about how some of these things are to be handled. Therefore, we took your seven principles and rewrote them, adding one, so that they would form a framework, or skeleton, of basic principles. So far as we know there is no sound reason why you cannot agree to all eight of them, but you say you don't agree with them. You don't agree with 3; you don't agree with 5, 6, 7 and 8.

The solution you proposed, on the other hand, is that we discuss some neutral organization which will have certain authority behind the line as the panacea for all of the ills that exist.

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) Now in order to really know what you mean, we first should know how we can solve these major differences of principles, leaving until later the question of how some of these things are to be done.

In order to safeguard or to secure this armistice, and without -- at this time -- getting into discussions or references as to how supervision or inspections are to be handled, I will give you a list of six points which we insist upon and which should be agreed upon before we get into any question of how certain things are to be done. These points are as follows:

1. We insist that we are entitled, and that you are entitled, to hold the territory which each of us holds at the time the armistice goes into effect.

2. In order to safeguard the armistice and to insure that the military capabilities of one side over the other are not increased during the armistice, we say there should be no more construction of airfields.

3. We say that there should be prohibition against any increase of military capabilities by either side during the armistice.

4. We maintain there must be one single armistice supervising authority which is responsible for the supervision of the adherence to the conditions of the armistice agreement. It must have that authority.

5. We maintain there must be effective inspections throughout Korea including aerial observation.

6. We maintain that whatever armistice supervising organization is finally decided upon, or agreed upon, it must be in place and ready to operate at the time that the armistice goes into effect.

Now I really don't believe there is any group of military people who would say that anything less than those basic principles should be acceptable if we really want to be certain that the armistice we are now negotiating will be effective. Therefore,

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) it is difficult for us to understand your attitude in failing thus far to agree that those basic principles are sound and acceptable from what you, as well as we, want in this armistice agreement.

You mentioned frequently that some of these things are unnecessary because there will be a conference of appropriate nations immediately following the armistice. For that reason you say that many of these things are unnecessary. That is all very fine. We are just as interested in having a conference -- having a final peace settlement in Korea -- as early as possible, as you are. But we have had some experience with conferences and we have no guarantee, at this time, that even if we had an immediate conference after the armistice agreement is reached, that it will solve all of the difficulties in Korea immediately. In any event there is bound to be some time period before all of the problems of Korea are settled. That, we hope, will be the period that this armistice agreement will last, or be effective. It is for this time period that we are interested in these safeguards, and we assume that it is this time period which you, too, are interested in safeguarding.

Now, on these six important basic fundamental principles I will be very glad to go into any detail you wish to go into. For the moment, I believe that what I have already said is sufficient to begin to get to a solution of this Agenda Item 3.

1221
GEN LEE: You said you wanted a stable armistice. Then you said by convening a political conference it can discuss the question of withdrawal of the armed forces, thus leading to a peace. But we find some contradictions between your basic argument and your seven principles.

If one side of the belligerents really aims at stabilizing the armistice during the armistice, there is no reason whatsoever to retain its armed forces in the rear of the other side. It is for the security of the troops that we think they should go out

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) only, and that we don't find it necessary to introduce them. If both side should withdraw their troops immediately, no question whatever would arise as to security, replenishment or replacement.

There should be no necessity for interfering in internal affairs, such as the construction of airfields, or inspections throughout Korea, or the inspection of the airfield facilities. In discussing the armistice question you must fully understand our firm and insistent stand that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will tolerate no interferemce in its internal affairs whatsoever. You must remember that no stand, no force whatever, can shake or change our attitude. It seems that you still do not understand our such stand. As to the question of the inspections, our stand, our attitude, is that inspection by either of the belligerents of the rear of the other side is interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It will absolutely not accept it. And if the inspections are to be carried out, they should be done by a supervisory organ composed of representatives of fair neutral nations. This is not a question of the method, but it is a question in principle -- this is the basic, principle difference between both sides. Without settling this question -- without settling <u>who</u> will inspect the rear -- it is senseless to discuss the inspection of the rear of both sides. In discussing this question we must endeavor to find out how to make the armistice stable, how soon to convene the political conference to discuss the withdrawal of the armed forces as the basis of the peace.

If you agreed to this, you should accept our fair and reasonable proposal. But, regrettably, you still do not clearly show your attitude as to the necessity of inspecting the rear of both sides by the neutral nations. In order to speedily reach an agreement on Item 3 of the agenda, we await your direct and clear answer.

1233
GEN HODES: I'll give you a very direct and clear answer right now. I talked

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) about six basic principles a while ago and you jumped the track. I read one of our principles which said: "....effective inspection throughout Korea including aerial observation." I said not one single word about getting back in your rear. Until we can get some kind of an agreement on these six principles that are basic, I know of no reason for getting off on the question of <u>who</u> or <u>how</u> some of these basic requirements are to be carried out. From what you have said, I would say that you agree with me that there should be effective inspection throughout Korea, but I'm not sure.

1237
GEN LEE: In respect to your statement, I would like to ask you one thing: If in your statement you did not mention the inspection of the rear, then you mean that you are not going to inspect the rear?

1238
GEN HODES: I'll read it again. Number 5 -- this is my number 5 this morning-- "....effective inspection throughout"--I repeat, "throughout"-- "Korea including aerial observation." Does that answer the question?

1239
GEN LEE: How should we interpret what you call "throughout Korea"? You must understand that the rear of the neutral area is closely connected with the question of interference with internal affairs. You must understand that the inspection of the rear of either side by fair representatives of the neutral nations is fair and reasonable. We request your explanation of what you mean by "throughout Korea".

1241
GEN HODES: We have the peninsula of Korea. The people, whoever they are, who will do the inspecting should have authority to inspect anything that is necessary to be inspected -- that comes within the terms of the armistice agreement -- no matter where it is in Korea. Geographically, within Korea there is no limit to that requirement. Now, I said: those points which are agreed to in the armistice agreement. Our thinking on those points is: ground,

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) sea and air ports of entry and communication centers. That is exactly what we have in mind.

1246
GEN LEE: Having heard the explanation you made in your statement, I am all the more confused. In one statement you spoke of the inspection throughout Korea and yet you say you did not mention the rear. Then you talk about inspection of the ground, air and naval ports of entry, and I don't know which one of your statements we should take seriously. How can you make a statement -- you called our attention to the fact -- that you didn't mention the rear at all, then right afterwards talk about inspecting throughout Korea, and then about inspection of the ground, air and naval ports of entry? I don't know what treasure lies behind these different terms and expressions but we don't understand what you really mean.

1248
GEN HODES: I refer you to principle 7 of the revised principles we gave you the other day. I'll read it to you, if you want, and then you won't have any difficulty in understanding what I am talking about: "The armistice commission and its observer teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations together with freedom of movement for the above teams over principal lines of communication throughout all of Korea." Now, is there still confusion?

I tried, in talking about the six major basic points of issue and basic differences this morning, to attempt to brief them so that I would only be mentioning the meat of each one of the principles. That is the reason I used the term, and I quote, "effective inspection."

1252
GEN LEE: I want to ask you a question. We must clearly know whether during the armistice you consider aerial reconnaissance by one party of the belligerents an action of hostilities or not, and whether during that period one party of the belligerents can

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) inspect the rear of the other party. Under such circumstances, your side must clearly understand that only fair representatives of neutral nations can inspect the rear of the belligerents, and can inspect the execution of the terms of the armistice. Isn't it so?

1256
GEN HODES: Do you understand that "air observation" includes air observation over both rear areas--in other words, that it is joint aerial observation and that it is controlled and directed by the joint organ, the military armistice commission (Interruption by CCF Interpreter: "Military?") or an armistice commission, I don't care what you call it. Right now we will call it an armistice commission if you prefer.

1257
GEN LEE: As to that question, our senior delegate expressed clearly at the plenary session that we are neither accustomed to, nor have we any experience in, interfering in the internal affairs of someone else.

1258
GEN HODES: These airplanes don't get very far internally when they are flying over an area.

1259
GEN TURNER: Do you have an answer now to our proposal relative to Agenda Item 4?

1301
GEN LEE: That intention of yours we have transmitted to our senior delegate. That intention we will deliver to our senior delegate.

1301
GEN TURNER: Can you give me any idea as to when we may expect an answer?

1301
GEN LEE: I think our senior delegate is now considering that question.

1302
GEN TURNER: I suggest that we recess for lunch. What time would you like to reconvene?

1302
GEN LEE: What time do you want to come back?

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1302
GEN TURNER: 1400.

1302
GEN LEE: All right.

Meeting recessed at 1302 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1400 hours.

1400
GEN LEE: If you have any statements to make we would like to hear them.

1401
GEN TURNER: If you have anything new to offer we are ready to hear it.

1402
GEN LEE: We repeatedly told you that we have nothing new.

1402
GEN TURNER: Do you have an answer now on our proposal relative to Agenda Item 4?

1403
GEN LEE: Do you need our answer again? We transmitted your opinion to our senior delegate and our senior delegate is now considering it.

1405
GEN TURNER: Have you any suggestions regarding the way to resolve the issues outlined this morning? If not I suggest we recess until tomorrow. What time do you suggest?

1406
GEN LEE: For the settlement of Item 3 of the agenda, we propose our seven-principle proposal in consideration of several things. In spite of our discussion during the last several days you still refuse to show or express your attitude toward our paragraphs 6 and 7. By doing this, you let our conference not make any progress. We regret very much such an attitude on your part.

For a satisfactory solution of the third item of the agenda we think such questions must be solved:

Firstly, once the military demarcation line is fixed and the armistice agreement is signed, both sides should withdraw their armed forces from the rear of the other side.

Secondly, after the armistice agreement, it must be prohibited that armed forces, weapons, and ammunition be introduced into Korea from abroad -- this means that only the outgoing of armed

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) forces, weapons and ammunition can be permitted, not introduction of them. By doing this alone can the state of war be reduced by stages. After the armistice, interference in the internal affairs of the other side will not be tolerated. It simply cannot be so.

Thirdly, after the armistice the supervisory organ of the neutral nations alone can inspect the ports of entry in the rear of both sides.

Only by reasonably solving such questions can the third item of the agenda be satisfactorily, reasonably and fairly settled. We expect you to show your clear answer soon towards the question of the supervisory organ of the neutral nations and hope that Item 3 of the agenda will be agreed upon soon. We call your attention to this.

We agree to your proposal to recess until tomorrow. At what time do you want to meet?

1409
GEN TURNER: At 11 o'clock?

1409
GEN LEE: If you want that, we agree.

Meeting recessed at 1410 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

10 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Seventh Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS: MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, and BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, COL J C Murray, USMC, CDR G R Muse, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS:- - - MGEN Lee Sang Jo, NKA, and MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, Delegates; RADM Kim Won Mu, NK Navy, COL Chang Chun San, NKA, COL Tsai Chen Wen, CCF, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

1100
GEN LEE: Let's begin the meeting. Before the end of yesterday's meeting we expected your answer, and now we would like to hear it, if you can give us your answer.

1101
GEN TURNER: Do you have an answer now relative to our proposal on Agenda Item 4?

1101
GEN LEE: We delivered it to our senior delegate. Our senior delegate is now considering the question.

1102
GEN TURNER: I have a statement which I have been directed by my senior delegate to read and to turn over to you:

"At the plenary session held on 4 December 1951, the United Nations Command Delegation proposed that a separate sub-committee be designated to discuss Item 4. At that time it was pointed out that there was no relationship between Item 3 and Item 4, that as a practical matter there was nothing to prevent their simultaneous discussion in separate sub-committees, and that the order of items on the agenda could be preserved by referring the recommendations of the Item 3 sub-committee to the plenary session for ratification before referring to it those of the Item 4 sub-committee.

"You stated that you would answer the United Nations Command proposal 'in due time'. At the meetings of the Item 3 sub-

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) committee which are now taking place, the United Nations Command sub-delegation has, each day, inquired concerning your decision on the United Nations Command proposal on Item 4. No indication of your acceptance of our proposal has been received, although seven days have now elapsed since our proposal was made.

"This proposal was made by the United Nations Command Delegation for the sole purpose of expediting the negotiations and of speeding final agreement on an armistice. By holding meetings of a sub-committee on Item 4 concurrently with those now being held on Item 3, many time-consuming details can be settled simultaneously on both agenda items. If you are in fact interested in an early armistice and in the humanitarian features of the consequent early settlement of prisoner of war matters, we can see no justification for any further delay in your acceptance of our proposal for concurrent discussions of Items 3 and 4 on the sub-committee level.

"The United Nations Command sub-delegation of one delegate, one staff officer, and necessary staff assistants, is prepared to meet with your sub-delegation to discuss Item 4 of the agenda at 1300 hours tomorrow, 11 December. Our liaison officer will be at Pan Mun Jom at 1030 hours tomorrow to receive your answer."

1110
GEN LEE: Have you any other statement to make?

1110
GEN TURNER: Not at this time.

1110
GEN LEE: We will deliver the message of your senior delegate to our senior delegate. As we said yesterday before the ending of the meeting, as to your attitude toward our paragraphs 6 and 7, we have been discussing for the last seven days about inspection of the ports of entry in the rear by the neutral nations and yet you haven't shown any clear attitude of your side as to this question. You haven't yet expressed your clear attitude--whether you want the

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) inspection of the rear by the neutral nations or whether you don't want any inspection at all--and thus you delay the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda.

1114
GEN TURNER: Our senior delegate has under active consideration your proposal relative to the neutral-nations organization. As I have explained to you before, he will give an answer in due time. Have you anything new to propose this morning?

1115
GEN LEE: You must understand that the task imposed upon this sub-committee must be settled by both sub-delegations, and then both delegations must reach a definite agreement. Therefore, questions should not be shifted to your senior delegate but must be settled by the sub-delegation present here. Have you any other statement to make?

1118
GEN TURNER: Have you any new proposal to make at this time?

1118
GEN LEE: We have nothing new to propose.

1118
GEN TURNER: Since you have nothing new to propose at this time, I suggest that we recess till tomorrow morning at the usual time.

1119
GEN LEE: We requested your side to show your clear attitude towards our paragraphs 6 and 7, that is to the question of the inspection by the neutral nations and to the question of the inspection of the ports of entry. This is one of the main issues for the settlement of Item 3 of the agenda. As you do not give us any answer to such an important question, it has become impossible for the sub-committee to develop any discussion. We think your delegation of the sub-committee should have long ago given us answers to this question. But your delegation has been refusing to give us a speedy and clear answer. At this meeting today you shifted the answer to this question to your senior delegate. We point out that this is not right. Therefore, we request a speedy answer to the question from your side.

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GEN LEE: (Cont'd) You consistently insist on the limitation of the facilities and upon free inspection of the rear of the other side. This is a question of interference of internal affairs, therefore, we consistently have been opposing such unreasonable requests. Therefore, we hope you will withdraw such unreasonable requests and we should speedily reach an agreement on Item 3 of the agenda.

You must withdraw all your armed forces from our coastal areas after the armistice because there can be no reason whatever to retain your forces there when the armistice is realized and the military demarcation line is fixed, and because that is a threat to the armistice as implemented by the armistice agreement. Should it be a stable armistice and should it lead to a peace, you have no reason whatever to insist on such an unreasonable request.

You have not yet clearly shown your attitude towards the inspection of the ports of entry in the rear of the other side and towards inviting the neutral nations to take over the task of inspection. You must clearly understand that only fair representatives of neutral nations can inspect the rear of both sides during the armistice when the state of war is not yet terminated. The question that we are talking about now is very important to both sides and big discrepancies lie between both sides right here. Before we recess, we would like to hear your opinion about these questions.

1131
GEN TURNER: Your proposal referring to a neutral-nations organization, has many ramifications and requires a careful and thorough study. This, it is being given. In the meanwhile, what have you done about trying to settle the other important basic principles, six in number, that we have been attempting to settle for days?

As I said yesterday, I wish to point out that none of these disagreements, encountered in progressing through your principles in the order listed, have anything to do with, or are affected by, the final determination of the composition of the supervisory organ and the observation teams. Therefore, let us address our

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) efforts to the aforesaid disagreements. Let's take first things first. What have you to say?

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GEN LEE: All these questions you raise are related, in general, to the agenda. Also, what we want to tell you, especially, is that the question of the inspection of the rear is a question proposed first by your side. The unreasonable free inspection and limitations on facilities -- that is clearly interference in the internal affairs of the other side. Therefore, we have shown you our unshakable attitude on this:--that we absolutely cannot tolerate and permit any kind of interference in the internal affairs. Therefore, in order to break this deadlock, we said that the inspection of the ports of entry in the rear of either side should be carried out by inviting neutral nations. You know very well that as long as your attitude is not decided toward this important question, we can hardly develop our discussion on Item 3 of the agenda.

If you will listen to what we say about your aim in interfering in the facilities--interfering in the internal affairs of our side--and about your withdrawal from our coastal areas; and also if you will listen to our stand on carrying out inspections by an organization of neutral nations and will withdraw your unreasonable stand, then the discussion of other items can be carried out relatively smoothly. If you have no other new opinions we agree to your proposal to recess until tomorrow.

1140
GEN TURNER: 11 o'clock tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1140 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

11 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Eighth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations of Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, and BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, COL J C Murray, USMC, CDR B W Spore, USN, LCOL J W Thames, USA, LCOL A P Hurr, USAF, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NK Navy, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

1100
GEN HSIEH: I would like to speak. I suppose you have received our message regarding the holding of a sub-committee meeting on Item 4 of the agenda today, at one o'clock this afternoon.

1100
GEN TURNER: Yes, we have received that, and our sub-committee will be here at 1300.

1101
GEN HSIEH: The early realization of an armistice is the consistent stand of our delegation. Now at the request of your delegation, we agreed to hold a sub-committee on Item 4 of the agenda, and because of this the representation and the staff assistants in this sub-committee -- that is the sub-committee on Item 3 of the agenda -- and the present determined working procedure of the delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have been, and are, undergoing corresponding alteration. Our representation here -- our working personnel present here this morning -- will be increased or reduced in view of the progress of the work later on. Now, I would like to hear your opinion about the procedure of this meeting here.

1103
GEN TURNER: One question I would like to ask: Will it be necessary for us to have an interpreter to translate from English into Korean?

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1103
GEN HSIEH: It is needed because our representatives are myself and Colonel Chang Chun San.

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GEN TURNER: For the past several days you have said there can be no progress on Agenda Item 3 until our side gives you a clear attitude regarding your principle 7. If you mean by this that you just won't discuss other principles before principle 7 is discussed, there is nothing our side can do to change your attitude; but if you mean that principle 7 must be discussed first because it is the basis for the other principles, you are quite wrong. There are several fundamental principles which we have not agreed upon that are not related to principle 7. We can make considerable progress in these matters if you adopt a proper attitude towards these discussions.

The other day General Hodes carefully explained the fundamental principles which must be settled -- and which could be settled without the need of discussing principle 7. There is no relationship between these fundamentals and principle 7. Now, in order to safeguard or to secure this armistice and without at this time getting into discussions or references as to how supervision or inspections are to be handled, I will give you a list of six fundamentals which we insist upon and which should be agreed upon before we get into any question of how certain things are to be done.

We gave you those six fundamentals the other day. Do you wish me to repeat them now?

1112
GEN HSIEH: Your side raised six principles on 6 December and again your side raised six principles on 9 December. I do not know whether it is to the former or to the latter set of principles you are referring.

1115
GEN TURNER: It is to the set that General Hodes raised on 9 December. I will be glad to repeat them if you wish.

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GEN HSIEH: If you are referring to the principles you raised on December 9, then we have the record of them and it is not necessary to repeat them.

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GEN TURNER: We really don't believe that there is any group of military men who would say that anything less than these basic principles should be acceptable if we really want to be certain that the armistice that we are now negotiating will be effective. Therefore, it is difficult for us to understand your attitude in failing thus far to agree that those basic principles are sound and acceptable from what you, as well as we, want in this armistice agreement.

You have said we have not given you our clear attitude on your principles 6 and 7. We have previously stated your sixth principle is completely unacceptable to us. It denies rotation of units and individuals and would prohibit replacement of materiel that becomes unserviceable. It is designed to effect, by attrition, a substantial reduction in strength and effectiveness of United Nations Command forces. We again state that the United Nations Command categorically rejects any prohibition against replacement and exchange of military units and personnel on a man-for-man basis, and of war equipment on a piece-for-piece basis, within the level existing at the time the armistice becomes effective.

We have suggested a reasonable substitute for your sixth principle. I'll repeat it again: "There shall be no increase in the level of military units, personnel, war equipment, facilities, or material existing in Korea at the time the armistice agreement comes into effect." If there is sincerity for an effective armistice, both sides should agree with the proposition that the belligerents must not increase their war making capabilities

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) during the period of the armistice. It is inconceivable to us how you could expect our side, during a military armistice, to agree that our forces should be gradually weakened by your principle of attrition, while at the same time allowing your side to build up an offensive air capability. This certainly is not in accordance with your express desire, "to insure the stability of a military armistice".

With reference to your principle 7, the United Nations Command Delegation has consistently maintained that the armistice agreement must include safeguards such as observation against violation and evasion of the terms of the armistice. The United Nations Command Delegation's rewording of your seventh principle provides for such observation by joint teams of ground, sea, and air ports of entry and selected communication centers throughout all of Korea, together with freedom of movement by these teams over principle lines of communication.

The observation you propose in your seventh principle is tied directly to your sixth principle which we have already categorically rejected.

At this time we cannot agree that any observation, or any method of observation, can be limited solely to ports of entry as you propose, Likewise, we cannot agree that other sections of the area under your control can be unilaterally observed by your own forces.

If the carrying out of the armistice terms is to be observed effectively, such observation must not be unilateral, and must not be limited only to ports of entry. Effective observation must be provided at selected communication centers throughout Korea, and teams involved in such observation must have freedom of movement over principle lines of communication. Similarly there must be joint aerial observation and reconnaissance over all of Korea.

These are measures which will insure adequate observation. They are measures which are not included in your principle 7.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) These measures must be included in one of the basic principles for Agenda Item 3.

With respect to the neutral organ proposed in your principle 7, we listened carefully to your explanation of the relationship between this organ and the armistice commission. It is difficult for us to visualize how these two organizations can function separately. It is more difficult for us to understand why they should be expected to function separately. We maintain that a single supervisory organ should be responsible for supervising the execution of, and adherence to, all of the terms of the armistice agreement. We maintain the single supervisory organ should exercise direct authority over all observation teams.

Now, in order that these negotiations may be delayed no longer, let us get down to business and try to solve the six fundamental problems I have just referred to. When these are solved, we can proceed to discussion of the neutral-nations organization.

1120
GEN HSIEH: The first impression that I got from your long statement just now is that you merely reiterated what you have said before.

I would like to point out that I cannot agree to your statement that it is not proper for us to request your side to show your clear attitude toward the principle 7 we have proposed. Surely you are aware, as we are aware, that the plenary session, after seven days of discussion, was stalemated mainly on the question as to whether there should be inspections of the rear of both sides. Now there are, of course, other differences; our side firmly maintains that there should be no interference of internal affairs of either side. And it was to solve this stalemate that we proposed our two additional principles -- principles 6 and 7 -- on 3 December, in addition to our original five-principle proposal.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

In these two principles, we first raised the point of laying down the principle that in order to insure this stability of the armistice, no introduction of armed forces into Korea will be allowed, but only the outgoing of forces. Further, in order to insure the inspections, we proposed that neutral nations be invited to inspect the rear of both sides. It is clear that it's on these two principles that our differences are focused at the present.

Our two additional principles are entirely fair to both sides. They propose that, in order to stabilize the armistice, we should lay down the principle of only outgoing, but no introduction, because, since the fighting would have stopped and since both sides say that we have the same objective -- namely, the early realization of peace in Korea -- it is apparent that we can not be satisfied with the first step, which is the armistice, and which has not yet been completed. But we must try to shorten the interval between this first step and the next step, namely, the holding of a political conference of a higher level. Therefore, we say that if we lay down these principles to limit the forces of both sides and to stabilize the armistice, it is entirely desirable and fair to both sides.

Now on the contrary, your side is for the exchanging of war equipment on a piece-for-piece basis, as you said. It is clear that by this exchange, you do not mean the exchange of war equipment of the same type or the same effectiveness. What you have in mind is to take out that war equipment already damaged in the fighting and replace it with new equipment; you want to interpret this exchange as no increase of military forces. I cannot see how you can say this is tenable, and the same is true in regard to the replacement of man power. It is apparent that by rotation, you are aiming to increase your forces during the armistice. If your side is really for the principle of no increases during the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) armistice, then I cannot see any justification for you to oppose our principle which is fair and reasonable to both sides.

And to insure the execution of this principle, we proposed that neutral nations be invited to inspect the ports of entry in the rear of both sides as mutually agreed upon. That is to say, inspect both your rear, as well as our rear. This invitation of the neutral nations as referees between us is entirely fair to both sides, and I don't think you can say this is not fair and not on equal footing to both sides.

In summary, I said that principles 6 and 7 of our proposal are the focus of the dispute between both sides. And as they are new proposals, put forth to settle the stalemate existing on Item 3 of the agenda, why is it that your side refuses to show a clear attitude upon these major questions?

Now, in addition to that, I have two questions regarding your statement of today -- two points on which I am not quite clear. Firstly, you said that you oppose our sixth principle; therefore, you oppose our seventh. Is that your real meaning? Secondly, you said that in our seven-principle proposal we failed to mention the method of inspection; while on the other side, you say that because in our seventh principle we have visualized the supervisory organ of the neutral nations as parallel to the armistice commission, you therefore are against this principle. Now, my question is, why is it actually that you are against our seventh principle? Is it because you are against our sixth principle, or is it because you think the method and the relationship between the supervisory organ of the neutral nations and the armistice commission are not as you would like them to be? I wish to have a clarification on these two questions.

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GEN HODES Your principle 7 is applicable only to your principle 6. We reject your principle 6. Therefore, since we cannot accept your principle 6, then we could say, technically, your principle 7 has

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) no application. But we have not made a categorical statement as to whether or not we reject or accept the principle of neutral inspection. We have not said that your principle of neutral inspection is unfair to one side or the other. Again, without either rejecting or accepting the principle of neutral observation, our proposal of inspection and observation is fair to both sides.

We have spent considerable time trying to see or visualize how neutral inspection and observation will work. At this moment we have several major objections to the idea. One is that we cannot see how such an organization can function effectively in insuring compliance or conformance with the armistice agreement unless some joint direction or control be established. In other words, even if we had neutral inspection, we don't believe that it can do its job on a charter basis alone. Second, we insist that until the United Nations is satisfied that the armistice is working effectively, we cannot reduce our military capabilities in Korea as you wish to do in your principle 6. Therefore, it seems to us that we must reach agreement on these basic principles that we have mentioned for several days before we get into the method of the how of observation and inspection.

This morning you mentioned limitation and stability, with which you are in accord. We also are in accord with those two principles, but your idea of limitation apparently is "reduction". Our idea of limitation is "no increase". By "no increase", we do not, as you have stated this morning, believe that there should be any increase in military capabilities of any kind resulting from this limitation of forces and war equipment. When we speak of replacement, whether it be of personnel or materiel, we mean like for like and we do not mean that we exchange all items worn out during the fighting for new type items after the armistice. As to stability, we feel that, if the proper limitations are put

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) on capabilities of both sides, we will have a reasonable amount of stability. It is realized that there is no way to guarantee absolutely and finally that the armistice agreement will be kept. However, with the limitations as to military capabilities and with effective observation, certainly each commander will be in a position where he cannot be surprised. In summary on the two points -- limitation and stability: we feel it essential that neither side gain an advantage militarily over the other side during the period of the armistice. That, in our opinion, is the best form of effective stability that we can have until the overall Korean problem is solved.

Now, with respect to rotation: we have had rotation and replacement, and we intend to continue rotation and replacement during the armistice. That is our firm stand.

1226
GEN HSIEH: General Hodes just made some explanations in his statement. But there are still a few points on which I am not clear. It is my thinking that since you agree that there will be no increase of military capabilities during the armistice, why is it that you still insist upon rotation of units and personnel, the replenishment of weapons, and so on. It's particularly at the end of General Hodes' statement, when he said that the rotation and replacement of men on your side is your firm and unchangeable stand.

Now let us assume that we will have supervision by neutral nations. How is it possible for those representatives of neutral nations to tell whether the men introduced into Korea are not complete units, or units well-experienced in fighting in other areas of the world? How is it possible to distinguish between like-for-like rotation and increase of military capabilities? How will this be executed? I think that is a very difficult job, and from this point of view our principle of no introduction is apparently much simpler and more practicable. Now, this is the first point

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) which I cannot understand: Why is it that you say your method is better, or that your position is correct? Secondly: General Hodes mentioned his objections to our 7th principle. I am not going to repeat what he said.

1229
GEN HODES: May I have that again?

1229
GEN HSIEH: General Hodes mentioned his objections to our 7th principle. My question is: Can I take it, if our side should agree to your objections, then your side would accept our 7th principle? On this point I also wish a clarification.

1232
GEN HODES: Well, you made two points, General Hsieh. First, you said it would be much simpler if the inspection teams only had to check people out of Korea instead of checking them both ways -- in and out of Korea. I cannot but agree with you. That is correct, but the essentials for maintaining what we think is stability during the armistice cannot be governed by whether it is simple or not.

Now, with respect to your second point; I am not sure that I understand the question. If I do understand it, then I said, several points that I so far, or that we so far, disagree with in your neutral-nations organ are those that I mentioned. Those points were -- I don't think I need repeat them -- I won't repeat them. By your question, did you mean that if we accept neutral-nations inspection behind the lines, would those two objections be the only ones that we might have? To answer that I am not absolutely sure at this moment whether those are all the objections we would have or not. To make that determination requires some more exploration on how neutral organizations would function and how they would be tied in to some directing head in effecting their observation and inspection.

Now, General Hsieh, I think you've given me an idea here in asking that question. I'll ask a question myself. We have a

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) number of points on which we are not yet in agreement. We are not in agreement on the island question; whether there will be construction and rehabilitation of airfields; whether we limit military forces or let them be reduced by attrition. We are in disagreement on whether there should or should not be one supervisory agency responsible for supervising the whole armistice agreement. We are not yet in agreement on whether or not whatever supervisory organ we have would be capable and ready of functioning at the time the armistice agreement goes into effect. Now, by your question to me, did you mean that if the United Nations Command sub-delegation accepts the general principle of neutral inspection in the rear areas that you, in turn, accept the remainder of our revised proposal -- which is, in effect, your proposal as revised several days ago? Now, is that what you had in mind? What I'm really trying to explore is how we can resolve these points of disagreement.

1247
GEN HSIEH: General Hodes just said at the end of his statement that he is trying to explore how we can resolve our points of disagreement. I think this is what both sides should do. Now my two questions were raised after I heard General Hodes' statement and it seems to me that General Hodes still has not answered my two questions. I hope to get my answers first from your side.

1250
GEN TURNER: We'll give you an answer to your question immediately after lunch. I recommend we recess until 1430 or 1500, whichever is agreeable.

1251
GEN HSIEH: Well, as you like.

1251
GEN HODES: Before you go, I want to make sure I've got this question.

1252
GEN HSIEH: I'll make my question clear. General Hodes said that there are two reasons for your objecting to our seventh principle. First, there should be a single directing head, not two organizations in

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GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D) parallel; second, because you object to our sixth principle and insist upon your own 5th principle. Now my question is: If these two objections to our seventh principle are removed, would your side be prepared to accept our seventh principle?

1254
GEN HODES: All right, now I would like to clear up what General Hsieh said I said. I said, among other things, those are two major objections. I did not say they were the only objections, but we will attempt to answer that question specifically after lunch. I'll give you a clear answer after lunch.

1255
GEN HSIEH: Now the other one, the other of my two questions, is as follows: General Hodes said that rotation and replacement during the armistice are essential to your side and are your firm stand. My main objection to that idea is that since you are in favor of no increase of armed forces, why then do you insist at the same time to increase your forces? Is there no contradiction in your stand? My second objection to this is technical, with regard to the question of method of examination. How would it be possible to distinguish that those forces introduced are not for the purpose of increasing your military capabilities? There are two objections. I have two objections to your principle: Firstly, there should be no increase for the stability of the armistice. Secondly, with regard to the method of examination of inspection. it will be impossible to implement your principle. I would like to have your explanation with regard to those two objections I have.

1258
GEN HODES: I understand.

1258
GEN HSIEH: I agree to your recess until such time as you wish.

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GEN TURNER: 1500.

Meeting recessed at 1259 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1500 hours.

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1500

GEN HODES: General Hsieh Fang, your first question, we find after studying it, is somewhat complicated. You said, first, our objection to your seventh principle is that there should be a single directing head, not two organizations in parallel; then you bring into reference several other principles including one of ours and two of yours. So, in effect, the wording of your first question involves your principle 6, our principle 5, and your principle 7 -- as well as a generalized statement regarding a single directing head for the supervision and observation of the armistice which is contained in our principle 3.

Your question therefore is so complex as to require some clarification. Let me ask for this clarification in the following manner. I will state three principles, reflecting what is understood to be your thought. After hearing these principles, I would ask that you tell me if they accurately portray what you have in mind. The three principles revised in accordance with our understanding of your proposed resolution of disagreements, are as follows:

"1. Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form a military armistice commission to be responsible for the supervision of the whole armistice agreement. It shall have the right of complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone.

"2. Neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, military facilities, or war material existing in Korean upon the effective date of the armistice.

"3.a.Observation teams, composed of representatives of nations neutral in the Korean war, shall be organized and shall be responsible to the military armistice commission for conducting observation beyond the demilitarized zone as follows:

(1) Observation shall be conducted at ground, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout Korea as mutually

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) agreed to by the two delegations, together with freedom of movement for the above teams over principal lines of communications throughout Korea as required in the performance of their duties.

(2) The observer teams shall be authorized to conduct aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea.

b. The military armistice commission and the neutral-nations observation teams shall be organized, staffed and ready to begin the exercise of their assigned functions on the effective date of the armistice."

Now is that substantially what you intended to portray as a possible resolution of our disagreements?

1520
GEN HSIEH: I have raised another question with regard to the rotation and replacement which your side stands for and which we have always opposed. This morning you have given some explanations on that question. Your explanations were invalidated. You failed to make it quite practicable. What is your answer to that question?

1521
GEN HODES: All right, I am ready to answer that question. I thought you wanted me to answer them one at a time. I am ready to answer question 2 now. The first part of that question I will answer by quoting what I have from you: "My main objection to that idea - rotation and replacement - is that since you are in favor of no increase of armed forces, why then do you insist at the same time to increase your forces? Is there any contradiction in your stand?"

I will answer, first, the question, "Is there contradiction in your stand?" The answer to that is: There is absolutely no contradiction to our stand. With respect to why we insist at the same time to increase our forces, I can assure you that we do not insist, in fact we do not favor -- in fact we have said, specifically, there will be no increase in our forces. I believe that should answer that part of the question.

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) Now with regard to the technical problem involved, I see no great difference in that. It should be a very simple matter, at these ports of entry which we are talking about, to insure that at the time any rotation of personnel, or replacement of personnel or equipment comes in, at the same time like quantity -- whether it be personnel or equipment -- go out; whether it be "Turks", "Greeks", "Americans", or "British", like amounts or numbers go out as those coming in at the same time. I believe that is much simpler to handle than first examination may indicate.

1527
GEN HSIEH: I have heard your comments with regard to my first question. But I must point out that my objective in raising this first question this morning was to clarify your statement, which I consider to be self-contradictory. With regard to the so-called three revised principles you just mentioned, do I understand that those principles are what you stand for?

1529
GEN HODES: My purpose in revising those three principles was that that is my understanding of what General Hsieh had intended to portray when he first discussed your principle 6, our number 5, your number 7, and our number 3 -- and included therein the use of neutral observer teams. Now it is not clear yet in my mind whether or not that is what General Hsieh intended to portray when he brought into focus those four principles and asked his question. I would like to state that in another way and maybe state it clearer. General Hsieh asked me if these three revised principles were my proposal. The answer to that question is "No". They are what I understood him to mean as his revision of the three points at issue, and I am asking, "Is that correct"? In other words, it is our understanding of your proposed resolution of the disagreement before us.

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GEN HSIEH: The answer is very simple. No.

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GEN HODES: That isn't what was meant? May I ask what it was that you did have in mind as a means of resolving these disagreements?

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GEN HSIEH: Our proposed solution of the disagreements before us is contained in our additional proposals made on 3 December, when the plenary session was in a deadlock over this issue. As I explained this morning, the crucial question, regarding which we made this proposal, is whether there should be inspection of the rear or not. Originally our side held that there should be no inspection of the rear because we maintained that as soon as the first step, the armistice agreement, is achieved, there should be the second step of a political conference of a higher level to settle the Korean question. Therefore, we held that there should be no inspection of the rear. But then your side insisted upon the inspection of the rear and, indeed, an inspection of the whole of Korea. Now such an inspection would clearly be an interference in the internal affairs of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and an interference which no independent sovereign state will accept or tolerate. It was when the plenary session was deadlocked over this crucial question that we made our proposed solution on 3 December.

All the way through the plenary sessions and all the way through the meetings of the sub-committee, our side has been expecting to know what your stand on this point is: firstly, whether you think there should be inspection of the rear or not; and secondly, if there should be inspection of the rear, then by whom should it be carried out? My question raised this morning was meant to clarify this point, and now again I raise this question in expectation of an answer.

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GEN HODES: I believe that you have asked two questions. First, do we think

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) there should be inspection? That answer should be quite obvious since, from the very beginning, we have taken the stand that there should be certain inspections for the purpose of knowing whether or not the armistice agreement is being kept. Now, regarding the second question as to who should perform this inspection, we have never agreed with you that we would be interfering with your internal affairs, or you in ours, if our inspection included military matters only, and those matters were restricted to what we have said in each of our proposals. It is not only a question of who should make these inspections or observations in the rear of each side, but it is a question of whether or not all of these principles, which we have been stating day after day, should be included as a part of the solution of Item 3.

Now we understood this morning the intent of your question to be: "If these two objections to our sixth principle were removed, would your side be prepared to accept our seventh principle?" A few moments ago I tried to put into words what I thought you meant by your question, after finding that it involved two principles of yours and two principles of ours; and I had thought, up until now, that the revision of these principles which I stated, were what you had proposed as a resolution to the disagreements. In our opinion, it is not so much a question of who does the inspecting, but a question of principles, such as one supervisory agency, no increase in the level of units, the armistice to be effective after an armistice commission and it's observation teams are in effect, etc. These are much more important than who does the inspecting. Now, until we can determine whether you wish to tie all of these things together in some form substantially as I read a moment ago in the three revised principles, it is difficult for us to know exactly what you want except that you want neutral inspection. In other matters, you have given us no answer at all.

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) I did not, in what I just said, in any way reject the idea of neutral inspection, but you tell us that the revised principles, which I read to you right after lunch, do not reflect what you had in mind in proposing your conditional resolution of disagreement. But you have not told us what you do mean. Can you clarify your thoughts for us?

1603
GEN HSIEH: General Hodes answered a part of my question raised previously. He did not answer all of my question. I will ask them again. Does your side hold that there should be inspection of the rear or not; and if your side holds there should be, then by whom should the inspection of the rear be carried out? For instance, you just said that you are for <u>some</u> inspection, but you didn't say inspection in <u>what</u> area. Now on that question there are differences of opinion. And again you said that the question as to who will perform the inspection is not important. We think that this is a very important question because it is concerned with the question of interference of internal affairs. Now I can say, and also I cannot but say, since our seven-principle proposal was made on 3 December, your side has not yet given a direct and clear answer to our proposal. I think now is an appropriate time for you to give such a direct and clear answer.

1609
GEN TURNER: Maybe if I answer it, I may clarify our thinking. We do believe that inspections should take place in the rear or behind the demilitarized zone. We believe that inspections should be conducted by an armistice commission. We do not reject your neutral-nations organ idea. We ask, "Is it your proposal that if we accept the neutral organ and you remove your objection on the level of forces or to the rotation of personnel and the replenishment of supplies, to the restriction on facilities and to the idea that the neutral organ be under one head -- be under the armistice commission -- if you remove those objections, would this

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) whole thing be acceptable to us"? We understand that is the question you have asked. Is that correct?

1613
GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

1613
GEN TURNER: Yes.

1613
GEN HSIEH: Does General Turner intend his statement just now to be an answer to my questions?

1614
GEN TURNER: Yes.

1615
GEN HSIEH: In other words, do you intend what you just said to be a counter-proposal to our two additional proposals we made on 3 December?

1616
GEN TURNER: The answer is "No".

1616
GEN HSIEH: In that case I still hope that you will give a direct and clear opinion regarding our seventh principle.

1617
GEN TURNER: Well, let me ask a question. If we should agree to inspection by a neutral-nations organization, what principles of ours will you accept?

1618
GEN HSIEH: Will you repeat your English question?

1618
GEN TURNER: If we should agree to the neutral-nations organization as the inspecting agency, what principles of ours will you then accept?

1620
GEN HSIEH: In order to clarify, and to make sure I understand your question, will you please answer this question: By what you have just said—that a neutral-nations organization is a supervisory organ—do you mean this organ should be as provided for in our seventh principle, or do you mean it should be under the direction of the armistice commission as you have visualized? In other words, do you mean this agency to be an independent agency or a subordinate one?

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1622
GEN TURNER: I mean that it will be an agency under the control and direction of the armistice commission and not, repeat not, a separate independent organization.

1623
GEN HSIEH: If that is so, there is a great difference between your idea and our idea in our seventh principle. Now, let me ask you: Why is it that you do not agree to the neutral-nation supervisory organ having its own functions, separate functions, as for instance, as prescribed in our principle 6, and also having its own inspection teams? Why should you object to this sort of organization?

1626
GEN TURNER: To whom would such an organization be responsible?

1626
GEN HSIEH: As we visualized it, this organization will be organized at the invitation, or entrusting, of this conference between both sides to implement certain terms which we both will agree on -- for instance, an article like our principle 6. Therefore, we think that such an organization, in the sense that it carries out inspection at the ports of entry in the rear agreed to by both sides, and makes reports to the armistice commission on the result of inspection, in that sense it is responsible to the armistice commission. However, the relationship between the armistice commission and this neutral-nations supervisory organ cannot be one of direction but only trusteeship and invitation.

I shall be satisfied with my brief explanation above. Now I want to ask another question. Can I understand that your side is prepared to accept our seven principles under certain conditions? In other words, in a sort of revised way? Can I assume that understanding?

1628
GEN TURNER: No, you cannot draw such a conclusion. I would like to ask why you believe that this neutral-nations organization cannot operate under the armistice commission. Not only why it cannot,

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GEN TURNER: but why it should not be under the armistice commission?
(Cont'd)

1629
GEN HSIEH: Well, I can only understand that you are not willing to give a direct and clear answer to our principle 7 at present. If I should continue to explain, then I will merely be repeating myself. Now I have another question.

You say that your side maintains that there should be no increase of military capabilities during the armistice. At the same time, your side firmly holds that you should continue your rotation and replenishment of its units, personnel, weapons, ammunition and various kinds of supplies as well; can this be interpreted as no increase of military capabilities?

1635
GEN TURNER: The rotation and replenishment, we do not consider as increasing our military capabilities. Let me clarify again the matter of this neutral-nations organization. We have neither accepted nor rejected your proposal. We still have it under active consideration, and it was in the hope of getting some clarification from you here today that we asked the questions relative to it. Since the hour is getting late, I suggest that we recess now until 11 o'clock tomorrow.

1640
GEN HSIEH: I agree to a recess until the usual time tomorrow, but before recessing, I have a short statement to make.

We cannot say that we have not made the slightest progress at today's meeting, but I must point out that we consider it high time for your side to give a clear and direct answer with regard to our seventh principle, and I regret to say that we have not yet received the reply. In your statement, you expressed the wish that we should give our opinion regarding a series of questions which are still in disagreement. I am glad to do so:

Firstly, since the military demarcation line is fixed, we hold that after the military armistice agreement is signed, both sides

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) must withdraw their armed forces respectively from the rear of the other side, with the military demarcation line as the dividing line.

Secondly, after the armistice agreement is signed, there should be no introduction into Korea of any armed military forces, weapons, and ammunition. That is to say, there can only be outgoing, but no incoming of military forces, weapons, and ammunition.

Thirdly, during the armistice there absolutely should not be interference of internal affairs, for instance, military facilities.

Fourthly, the inspection of the rear was not our original stand. However, your side has repeatedly insisted upon inspection of the rear, therefore, our side now holds that the inspection of ports of entry in the rear of both sides, as mutually agreed upon, can only be conducted by a supervisory organ of neutral nations.

The above four points are as we hold the basic, and the least, principles we should incorporate in our agreement on Item 3 of the agenda, and if both sides have the same objective, namely to see an early realization of armistice in Korea, then we cannot see any reason why we should not accept these principles.

1649
GEN TURNER: I ask just one more question: Do you consider the statement that you have just made an answer to my question, which was: "If the United Nations Command accepts neutral-nation inspection in the rear areas, what United Nations Command principles will you accept?" I would like to have an answer to that in the morning.

1650
GEN HSIEH: The four points mentioned just now are what our side considers to be the basic and indispensable principles for a solution of Item 3 of the agenda. As to your question just now, the question

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) itself cannot be accepted by us because you use the words "neutral inspection", but we say "a supervisory organ of neutral nations." I think there is a great difference between the two.

1651
GEN TURNER: At 11 o'clock?

1651
GEN HSIEH: Agreed.

Meeting recessed at 1652 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

12 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, and BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O DARROW, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, and LTCOL J W Thames, USA, Staff Officers; 1st LT H F Underwood USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS ----- MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NK Navy, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeing reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: I have something to say.

Since 3 December you have attempted to make us believe that in your proposal of that date you made concessions to United Nations Command views. What concessions? You have made no concessions to United Nations Command views. Your proposal attempts to gain for your side control of islands now in the hands of the United Nations Command. Is this a concession to our side? Your proposal attempts to gain for your side the right to increase your offensive military capabilities during the period of armistice by building up airfields you do not now have. Is this a concession to our side? Your proposal replaces the unacceptable principle of withdrawal of troops from Korea with the principle of withdrawal by attrition. The two principles effect the same result-the result you desire. Is this a concession to our side? Since full observation is obviously essential to an armistice, you have only agreed to accept a part of a principle which should be fully applicable, and in any event is applicable, to both sides in equal measure. Is this a concession to our side? Your proposal attempts to set up such vague, ambiguous and unworkable relationships between the armistice commission and observing

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) organ as to insure the complete failure of the observation activity. Is this a concession to our side? The answer in every case is no. You have made no concession whatever. Your proposal contains no concessions to United Nations Command views. Your proposal is merely a rewording of your views as expressed earlier. You have made no offer of compromise. You have made no practical effort to resolve our differences. You have conceded nothing.

We have spent a great deal of time in exploration. We believe it has been worthwhile. We are now prepared to present a revised list of principles which is a most fair and reasonable resolution of the differences between the two sides. Although we feel both sides are entitled to hold territory that they now occupy, our side is willing, in order to show our sincerity, to withdraw our forces from the islands within your territorial waters. We have revised our principle 3 accordingly. After careful study we agree to invite neutral nations to provide personnel for the observer teams; however, we insist on these teams being under the control and direction of the Military Armistice Commission. This is indicated in our principle 4. These changes alter our previous fair and reasonable stand in the interest of reaching agreement on a set of principles acceptable to both sides. We have gone as far forward as possible. There can be no reason for you to delay immediate acceptance of these revised principles. If you are sincerely interested in early agreement on Item 3, you will waste no more time on matters unrelated to the maintenance of stability during the period of armistice.

You will avoid wasting the time of this conference if you understand one proviso that goes with this proposal. This revised United Nations Command proposal may not be accepted by you in part; you accept it in whole or you reject it in whole; please bear that in mind.

I will now read our revised list of principles.

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GEN TURNER:
(Cont'd)

"1. All armed forces, ground, sea, and air, under control of either side, shall cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the effective date of the armistice.

"2. All armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the effective date of the armistice. Except for such armed forces of a police nature as may be specifically and mutually agreed to by both sides, no armed forces of either side shall thereafter enter the demilitarized zone, nor shall the armed forces of either side commit any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone.

"3. Within 5 days after the effective date of the armistice, each side shall withdraw the armed forces under its control - ground, sea, and air - from the territory and territorial waters of the other side, including islands within the territorial waters of the other side. If the armed forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit (unless there is some valid and mutually agreed reason for delaying the withdrawal) the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order.

"4. a. Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission which shall be responsible for supervising the execution of and adherence to the whole Armistice Agreement. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with, and assisted by, observer teams which shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission only. The observer teams shall be composed of personnel of nations whose armed forces are not participating in the Korean war, such nations to be mutually agreed to by both sides.

b. Observation outside the demilitarized zone will be performed only by neutral observer teams. Observation within the

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) demilitarized zone may be performed by neutral teams, by joint teams selected by the Military Armistice Commission, or by the Military Armistice Commission itself.

c. Neutral observer teams shall be located at such land, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centers as are mutually agreed to by both sides. These observer teams shall be permitted freedom of movement over principal lines of communication throughout all of Korea, and each side shall afford these teams full assistance in the execution of the duties assigned them by the Military Armistice Commission. In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance and observation and photographic flights as are mutually agreed to by both sides will be performed by neutral teams.

"5. Neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. The rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities, and construction of new airfields and new aviation facilities shall not be permitted.

"6. Each side shall administer in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the military demarcation line.

"7. The armistice shall not become effective until the Military Armistice Commission and its observer teams have been organized, are staffed, and are ready to begin the exercise of their assigned functions."

In case of discrepancies between the English, Chinese, and Korean versions of these revised principles which we have furnished you, the English version governs. That is all I have.

1134
GEN HSIEH: I have noted General Turner's statement and his revised version of our seven-principle proposal. I shall reserve my detailed comments upon this version until I have carefully compared the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) translations of the three different versions in the three different languages. But I can now tell you my impression of it on the first glance.

There existed originally no great difference between our first principle and your first revised principle; but when we connect your first paragraph with your seventh paragraph, then the difference between our two versions is great. Where is the difference? The difference is in the earliness or lateness of the date the armistice agreement comes into effect. Now, the term our side has consistently used is, "the signing of the armistice agreement", that is to say, we count the period from the day of the signing of the agreement; while the term you use is, "the effective date of the armistice", and in your seventh paragraph it is clearly stated that the agreement shall not become effective until those organizations are formed. Therefore, here is involved a question of the delay of the effectiveness of the armistice. Our side holds that both the armistice commission and the neutral-nations supervisory organ should be formed speedily; and we believe they can be formed speedily because, if both sides have sincerity toward an early armistice in Korea, we will make joint efforts to see that they are formed at an early date. Therefore, we think that there should be no pretext for the effectiveness of the armistice being delayed. These are my comments on your first and seventh paragraphs.

With regard toyour second paragraph, it incorporates what we have already agreed upon; you merely put point 2 and point 4 together. That coupling of them is of no importance, but there exists in this paragraph also, the difference between your term of "the effective date of the armistice" and our term of "the signing of the armistice". In short, this is your revised version of our second and fourth principles, and I think we can consider and reach a better wording of it.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) translations of the three different versions in the three different languages. But I can now tell you my impression of it on the first glance.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

In our third paragraph, we have proposed that all armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn within 5 days after the signing of the armistice agreement from the rear and the coastal islands and the waters of the other side with the military demarcation line as the dividing line. You have now raised a revised version in which you propose that each side shall withdraw the armed forces under its control from the territory and territorial waters of the other side, including islands within the territorial waters of the other side. The difference in this connection is that you suggest that your side will withdraw from the waters and islands within your version of a definite distance from the coast, while you still intend to retain your forces beyond that certain specified distance. It is true that your revised version is slightly different from your original proposal, but there still exists a great difference between your revised version and our proposal because we have consistently maintained that either side should withdraw all its armed forces from the rear of the other side after the armistice comes into effect, with the military demarcation line as the dividing line. Therefore, we cannot agree to your revised version. The main reason for our opposing this proposal of yours is because it goes against the principle of stabilizing the armistice and reducing the possibility of the resumption of hostilities.

Our fifth paragraph deals with the composition, functions, and authority of the armistice commission, and now you offer a revised version in your fourth paragraph; and the difference between the two is great. We hold that there should be two parallel organizations, that is to say, the relation between the neutral-nations supervisory organization and the armistice commission is a parallel relation. Although the neutral-nations supervisory organ is entrusted with its task, and is bound by the agreement - the terms agreed upon by both sides - it is only responsible to

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the armistice commission in the execution of its function of observation because the armistice commission will deal with the matters on which the neutral-nations supervisory organ will make reports in accordance with our sixth principle.

Now, the relationship as seen by us is clearly set out in our principles. We propose that we invite neutral nations to form such a supervisory organ to carry out certain articles agreed upon by both sides, namely, the supervision of the ports of entry in the rear of both sides as mutually agreed upon. Its function can be - to cite an example of its function - as if we invite a referee for a game of football. He can only referee for the football game but not for a basketball game, for instance. It can only supervise the implementation of our sixth paragraph and it cannot, and should not, supervise the other five articles. Herein lies the limitation of its authority. And secondly, the reports which the neutral-nations supervisory organ will make -- that is, the result of its inspection -- will still be dealt with by the armistice commission; therefore, the relationship between this organ and the armistice commission is perfectly clear.

As for the question of how many people, for instance, there should be in the neutral-nations supervisory organ, it should depend upon the need in its work for carrying out the supervision of our sixth paragraph. In order to fulfill its task of supervising the ports of entry in the rear, it will need certain teams, and it will direct those teams and make a schedule for the work of those teams in implementing the sixth paragraph. Therefore, there should be a directing head of the neutral-nations supervisory organization. As in the rules of a football game, besides the referee, there may be assistant referees and there may be observers of the lines, so also the neutral organization--neutral-nations supervisory organ--in carrying out our sixth principle

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) should have its own set of organizations. Only in this way can it be assured of being able to carry out adequately its neutral function and play its role as an impartial referee. However, the neutral-nations supervisory organ is, of course, subject to the terms agreed upon by both sides, subject to the scope of inspection as decided by both sides; also the terms for its movements of communication will be limited as we, both sides, will stipulate -- and it must not have entire free access or complete freedom of movement as you have intended.

Now, your revision of our sixth principle is, in fact, no revision at all. You have injected, wholesale, all your unilateral demands into this principle, and there is a great difference between it and our proposal. Where is the difference? Your side on the one hand maintains that there should be no increase of military forces, but on the other hand, you also insist upon replacement and replenishment, thereby attempting to increase your military forces. It is a complete contradiction. And, also, you intend to interfere without any justification in our military facilities. We hold, and we have consistently held, that during the armistice, no interference will be permissible in our dealings with our military facilities because that comes in the extent of our internal affairs, which cannot be interfered with at all.

As for the administration of the demilitarized zone, it is an easy question to settle and, as a matter of fact, it is not necessary to have an independent principle for itself, but can be included in our principle 4. As for my comments on your seventh point, they have been given along with my comments on your first point.

Taken as a whole, in your revised proposal you have indicated a partial concession on the question of the islands. And on the question of neutral supervision, you only agree to have

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) observer teams of personnel of neutral nations. Admittedly on these two points, your revised version is different from your original stand, and this is your formal indication. But as I just said, in taking those principles point by point, there still exist great differences between the two sides. And I find it necessary to again renumerate those differences in the hope that you will understand them and that also both sides will make further effort to resolve those differences.

Firstly, our side absolutely will not agree to any kind of interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, such as, for instance: the limitation of military facilities, free access to all parts of Korea, inspection of all parts of Korea, and the aerial observation and photo reconnaissance.

Secondly, when the armistice comes into effect, both sides must withdraw all its armed forces from the waters and islands of the other side, with the military demarcation as the dividing line.

Thirdly, the inspection of the rear was your idea originally. And it is our side which came to agree to the inspection of certain ports of entry, certain specified localities in the rear. In doing so, our side has made a great concession. Therefore, it is not correct for you to say that our additional proposals of 3 December were not concessions. You are fully aware that up to 3 December, since 27 November, both sides had been stalemated exactly on this question because your side was not willing to see a speedy holding of a conference of a higher level after the realization of the armistice. Your side was not willing to see an early settlement of the Korean problem, but maintained that a state of war should be retained after the armistice. It was because your side had objectives other than the realization of peace in Korea and it was in order to break

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the deadlock in the plenary session that our side made our proposal on 3 December, and it was a great concession on our part. But we also maintain that only representatives of neutral nations can supervise the armistice in the rear, and that in order that they can conduct their supervision adequately, the representatives of neutral nations must have their own supervisory organ and their own observer teams. If there should be inspection of the rear, then the neutral-nations supervisory organ must be accepted, and in order that this organ may fulfill its task, it must have its own directing organ to direct its own observer teams in conducting its functions. Therefore, the question is perfectly clear. The question is whether you want inspection of the rear at all. If you want this kind of inspection, then our seventh principle must be accepted as a whole.

Fourthly, we maintain that our sixth principle is reasonable. We still oppose the introduction into Korea of military forces during the armistice. I think I have made clear our position and also the disagreements which exist between your position and ours.

1225
GEN TURNER: We do not need to study your comments to tell that they are completely invalid and unacceptable. You have merely repeated illogical views that you have many times before expressed, and that we have many times before refuted. I suggest we recess until such time as you have had opportunity to <u>completely</u> and <u>thoroughly</u> study our proposal.

1230
GEN HSIEH: I would like to ask whether you recognize these differences which I have enumerated, and I would like to know what you suggest to resolve these disagreements. There is no question but that we will study your revised proposal, but even at first glance I can spot those points on which we are in disagreement. It is apparent that your revised proposal cannot resolve these

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) disagreements between us. Therefore, I would like to know what new ideas you have with regard to the settlement of the differences between us.

1231
GEN TURNER: If you have any question to ask to clarify the proposal that we have made, we shall be glad to answer them. We recognize the differences between your views and ours. We suggest that you accept our proposal. That is how we propose to resolve the problem.

1232
GEN HSIEH: I have a question. In your third paragraph, you say that "within five days after the effective date of the armistice, each side shall withdraw the armed forces under its control, ground, sea, and air, from the territory and territorial waters of the other side, including islands within the territorial waters of the other side." Do you mean that you still intend to retain certain islands from which your armed forces will not withdraw?

1234
GEN HODES: The answer is "Yes." All islands outside the territorial waters.

1235
GEN HSIEH: I cannot agree with your use of the term "territorial waters" because in a military armistice there is no question of territorial waters or territory. My question merely is whether you will continue to retain a part of your military forces behind our rear as a means of menace and to maintain a state of war.

1237
GEN HODES: The answer is "No".

1237
GEN HSIEH: Why "No"?

1237
GEN HODES: I thought that would confuse you. You asked three questions in one. Two parts of it deserve the answer, "No". Therefore, when it contains three questions and the majority can be answered by "No", I answer "No".

We do not intend to break the armistice. We do not intend to use these islands from which we can launch attacks on you. Now,

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) the first part of your question, "Do you intend to continue to hold these islands?" I have to answer that by saying "Yes". These islands are not your islands. We tried for many days to determine what "coastal" meant. You failed to clarify the answer to that question. Now, there must be some clear definition as to how far you want to reach out in getting islands. Our answer to that is, "territorial waters", "territorial islands". You will find the answer to what that is, either by asking us or from international law.

1243
GEN HSIEH: The answer is not satisfactory. What do you mean when you say you could not consider those great differences I have enumerated?

1245
GEN TURNER: If you have any questions to ask to clarify the meaning of the proposal we submitted to you this morning, we will gladly answer them. If you have nothing new to offer here, I suggest that we recess until such time as you can completely and thoroughly study our proposal.

1246
GEN HSIEH: I have both questions and opinions, but the time is now for lunch and I suggest that we recess until 3 o'clock.

1247
GEN TURNER: Very well, three o'clock.

Meeting recessed at 1247 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1500 hours.

1500
GEN HSIEH: I would like to speak. This morning I made my preliminary comments on your revised opinion about our proposal made on 3 December. After making a careful study of it -- by studying the translated version of it -- apart from the fact that my study confirmed the preliminary comments of this morning, it brought out several other questions. I shall now review, with emphasis on those differences between us, and point out where your proposal is unreasonable. It is clearly and explicitly stipulated in

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) paragraph 3 of our seven-principle proposal that all armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn within five days after the signing of the armistice agreement from the rear and the coastal islands and the waters of the other side, with the military demarcation line as the dividing line; and you said in your revised proposal that "within five days after the effective date of the armistice, each side shall withdraw the armed forces under its control -- ground, sea, and air -- from the territory and the territorial waters of the other side, including islands within the territorial waters of the other side". It is recognized that there is a difference between your formal, revised proposal and what you have maintained previously, but you still intend, under the pretext of such terms as "territory" and "territorial waters", to retain a greater part of the islands and still intend to continue to retain your armed forces in our rear. To this we absolutely cannot agree. Our main objection to your revised proposal is that since the demarcation line is fixed, it is natural that the armed forces of either side should withdraw from the rear of the other side in order to insure the stability of the armistice and to insure against the recurrence of hostilities; but according to your proposal, your actions will not only increase the possibility of resumption of hostilities but will also render the armistice unstable. As for the question of territory, territorial waters, or high seas navigation, we should remember that this is a military armistice negotiation, and that it is inappropriate to discuss those questions here. That is my first point.

Next, with regard to your revised opinion concerning paragraph 6 of our seven-principle proposal -- that is your revised principle 5 -- on this point the difference between us is even greater.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

There are two sentences in this principle 5 of yours. The first sentence says, "Neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective". While in our principle 6, it is said that "in order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons, and ammunition under any pretext." Here I must call your attention to the words "introduce into Korea".

It should be clear that we have, for many days, endeavored to maintain the principle that there should only be outgoing but no incoming of military forces, so as to insure that there is no increase of military forces and to thoroughly implement this principle that no reinforcing forces should continue to come into Korea from without. Since your side protests that you agree there should be no increase of military forces during the armistice, then why is it that your side is still insistent upon replacements and replenishments--that is to say, insisting upon introduction into Korea of military forces? This is a clear contradiction. If it is really your intention, as you protest, that the armistice should be stabilized and that no military forces should be reinforced by being introduced into Korea, then you should agree to our sixth principle, which is entirely fair and reasonable for both sides.

In the second sentence of your revised principle 5, it is written: "The rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities, and construction of new aviation facilities, shall not be permitted." You should be aware that this involves the military facilities, a part of the internal affairs of an independent and soverign state. You

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) attempt by this to interfere in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in connection with the dealings with its military facilities. This has been a point we have clearly and firmly opposed, and yet you still bring in this point. Such an interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is absolutely not to be tolerated.

Secondly, you intend, on the one hand, to introduce reinforcing military forces into Korea under the pretext of replacements and replenishments, while on the other hand, you attempt to limit the military facilities to which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is entirely entitled. How can you say this is fair and reasonable?

The third point I wish to make concerns our principles 5 and 7 and your revised principle 4. In this principle you have three paragraphs. In paragraph "a", you have shown your persistent view since 3 December of a single military armistice commission, attempting thereby to exclude the neutral-nations supervisory organ. It is recognized here that you have accepted the idea of forming observer teams of neutral nations to conduct such inspection of the rear as agreed upon by both sides. But the difference is still great because we maintain that the neutral-nations observer teams should have their own directing head in order to direct their own operations entrusted by the armistice commission. This difference is a very important one, the reason for which I have given this morning; and I have also illustrated it with an example. I do not think it is necessary to repeat them.

In your paragraphs "b" and "c", under your fourth principle; you deal with the scope and the method of the inspection. I think there is no disagreement between both sides on the question of inspection by the military armistice commission, so the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) question is concerned with supervision and observation by a neutral organ. Here it must be asked, first, what are the neutral nations invited to supervise, or inspect? To put the answer in a short sentence: they are invited to supervise that both sides do not introduce into Korea any military forces during the armistice. That is the central point. Once this principle is decided upon, then it is easy to settle what they are going to observe or where they are going to inspect. And in this connection, there are points which you have raised to which we cannot agree.

We maintain that the supervision and observation by the neutral nations should be limited to those specific ports of entry through which military forces can be introduced into Korea. As for the observation of communication centers within Korea, and the so-called aerial reconnaissance, observation and photographic flights, and so on: these are unrelated with the supervision and inspection of the introduction into Korea of military forces and these are an interference in the internal affairs. Therefore, we say that these things are unnecessary and also impermissible. And also in this connection, it can be seen that the so-called freedom of movement over principle lines of communication throughout all of Korea is also unnecessary and impermissible. As for the movement over the routes leading to the ports of entry agreed upon by both sides to be supervised and inspected, this kind of movement can be negotiated and agreed upon.

Therefore, you have accepted a part of our idea of neutral observation in connection with these questions of supervision and observation. But, on the other hand, you are still opposed to a directing organization of the neutral nations to supervise its own observer teams in the rear of both sides. On this point, our side considers that a difference is still great. We consider that since there will be several observer teams of neutral nations, and

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) since we are to entrust the neutral nations with the supervision of no introduction into Korea of armed forces, then there must be an independent organization of the neutral nations to undertake such duties and to direct its own observer teams. And the armistice commission, of course, will receive the reports of the results of the inspections by the neutral nations and deal with the questions raised in those reports. The armistice commission is also to be responsible for the implementation of the armistice agreement, apart from what is stipulated under our principle 6.

Now, these above stated three points are my review and reiteration, with emphasis and amplification, of what I have said this morning in my preliminary comment, and also a result of our study and analysis of your revised opinion on our seven-principle proposal. I believe that you are clear now about what we are insisting upon and what the differences are between our stand and your revised proposal. These are the differences I wish to emphasize. There are other differences between us which I have mentioned this morning and which I am not going to repeat again. I would be glad to hear your opinion about how to resolve these differences between us.

1545
GEN TURNER: General Hsieh, we have listened very patiently to your statement this afternoon. You have presented not one single new thought that you had not already expressed in the last few days, and that you have not harped upon this morning. You have asked not one question that we have not already previously answered. You are only wasting time. There are certain facts that I want to make very clear to you. The amount of time required to arrive at a cessation of hostilities depends on how soon you recognize these facts.

1. The United Nations Command has no intention of attempting to reconcile differences between your views and ours except in those cases wherein your views are based on some element of logic.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) In our proposal presented this morning we took into account and incorporated all of your views which are logical. The remainder we have no interest in, since they are without merit and totally unacceptable.

2. The only proposal, other than the one we presented this morning, which is acceptable to the United Nations Command is our eight-point proposal of 6 December. No other proposal which has been presented has the faintest prospect of being accepted.

3. The United Nations Command has no intention whatsoever of delaying the effective date of the armistice by delaying the formation of the armistice commission and its associated organizations. We are prepared to initiate action to form these organizations as soon as Item 3 of the agenda is completed.

4. The United Nations Command proposal presented today may not be accepted by you in part. It is an integral proposal; every portion of it is contingent upon the whole being accepted.

5. Insofar as you delay in accepting the United Nations Command proposal of today, you delay that day when hostilities shall cease and bloodshed end in Korea. From this moment, the effective date of the armistice depends on how soon you accept the compromise solution we offered this morning. If you reject it, we have nothing else to offer. That is all.

1555
GEN HSIEH: I have just heard the following two statements from you. I do not know whether I have heard wrongly, or if you have stated them wrongly, or if they have been translated wrongly. You said, at the beginning of your statement, that you have listened to me patiently; and that I have been wasting time. What do you mean by that? And you again stated at the end of your statement that the realization of an armistice sooner or later would depend on how soon our side will accept your proposal. Now, with these statements taken together, what is your real intention? I would like to have a

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) clarification before I make further comment.

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GEN TURNER: I will be glad to read my previous statements if you desire.

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GEN HSIEH: I am not asking you to repeat your statements. I have already heard it. My question is only: If your two statements are connected, what do you mean?

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GEN TURNER: The meaning of my statement is entirely clear.

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GEN HSIEH: Well, it's my understanding that you refuse to listen, refuse to consider, and refuse to study my comments today on your revised seven-principle proposal -- particularly my comments this afternoon, after making a careful study and an analysis of your proposal. Do you mean that your revised seven-principle proposal is the only proposal, and that we can only accept that proposal? If we do not accept it, then there will be no necessity to carry out our discussion. Is that correct?

1601
GEN TURNER: I shall read you again number 5 of the statement of facts that I made just a few moments ago: "Insofar as you delay in accepting the United Nations Command proposal of today, you delay that day when hostilities shall cease and bloodshed end in Korea. From this moment, the effective date of the armistice depends on how soon you accept the compromise solution we offered this morning. If you reject it, we have nothing else to offer. That is all." I am trying to make it abundantly clear to you that mere repetition of your illogical views offers no prospect of progress. That is all you have done so far today.

1604
GEN HSIEH: Colonel Chang will speak now.

1604
COL CHANG: I have heard what you have just said. Much to my regret, I have the following remarks to make.

It seems to me that you have forgotten the fact that both

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COL CHANG: (Cont'd) sides are here trying to cease the hostilities in Korea so as to restore peace. I call your attention to the fact that such a statement as yours amounts to nothing more than an intransigent and dogmatic challenge which will not make for a smooth progress of the present negotiations.

I, also, have received the same impression as General Hsieh has just stated. I understood it that you refuse to continue further discussions should we refuse to accept the unreasonable and incredible demands that you have just presented. However, in order to clarify the issues more clearly, I would like to make several remarks pertaining to that matter.

After the signing of the armistice agreement, neither side shall place its armed forces in the rear of the other side, with the demarcation line of the demilitarized zone as its base -- no matter what the pretext or reasons. That is, for example, one of the provisions that is intended to interfere with the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

A limitless inspection and interference in and of our rear will never be tolerated or accepted. I must point out that we will never tolerate or accept such a demand to interfere with the internal affairs of the other side. That is political in nature, and is quite far apart from the nature of a military armistice which we are negotiating now. Originally, we have never entertained the idea of having inspections throughout Korea, since we thought that the Korean question would be taken up immediately in the matter of a peaceful solution. However, you insisted on your part to have an inspection in the rear. On this matter, our attitude is very clear. The rear inspection which you had demanded, and are now demanding, is an interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

There is only one way out of this. That is to provide such measures as are necessary to prohibit any introduction of armed

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COL CHANG: (Cont'd) forces by both sides into Korea. This measure can be taken up by neutral nations, and they themselves would be able to find out the way of carrying out their assigned task, so as to fulfill their mission. On this point General Hsieh has already explained clearly. I don't have to reiterate. Those are my comments on your remarks.

1615
GEN TURNER: To make myself a bit clearer, your proposal of 3 December is absolutely and finally unacceptable to us. You are fully aware of what are the elements of that proposal which render it unacceptable. Yet, you continue to repeat these unacceptable elements. Is it your purpose to continue to waste time, after we have made every effort to effect the most reasonable compromise possible? Since you apparently have nothing new, and I repeat "new", to offer, I suggest that we recess until tomorrow.

1618
GEN HSIEH: I agree to recess until tomorrow, but before we recess, I have a few things to say.

How did our issue come about? This morning I made a preliminary comment on your revised proposal, and this afternoon, after making an analysis and study of your revised seven-principle proposal, I again made my amplified comments and pointed out the differences between the views of both sides. I suggested that we solve these differences, and I expressed the hope that your side would give your opinions regarding the resolution of these differences. That was what I have done, but you turned impatient. You said it was a waste of time, and unnecessary. Twice you read your paragraph, from your statement prepared beforehand, saying that your proposal is the only proposal and that if we do not accept your proposal then there is no need to carry on the discussions.

Such an attitude of yours is arbitrary and of no benefit to the progress of the negotiations. I cannot accept such an

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) attitude on your part toward the negotiations. My statements this morning and this afternoon were made after deliberate thinking. I made those statements to clarify the differences between both sides in order that we can carry on our discussions and to seek a solution of those differences. Therefore, I hope you will be patient for a while yet, and make a careful study of my statements this morning and this afternoon, because that will be helpful to the progress of the negotiations. If we really intend to settle our differences, to settle the problem before us, the spending of time is necessary. I agree to recess until tomorrow at the usual time.

1627
GEN HODES: I have no desire to be the last speaker. There is one point that I think I should get across before we recess. Although there are many others, I will only take up time for one.

We had two proposals before us. We had a seven-point proposal of yours of 3 December and an eight-point proposal of ours. Now, we have gone to the extent of taking those two proposals and have done everything we possibly could to come up with a compromise proposal. We have given you the islands in the territorial waters of North Korea, and we do not have to give them to you. Those islands belong to us at the moment. We accepted the general idea of neutral inspection outside of the demilitarized zone. Those, at least, are major concessions on our part. You have done nothing, not one single thing, to attempt to compromise this situation, and then you have the effrontery to come up and say that we are the ones who are delaying this conference, that we are the ones who are arbitrary--and I do not accept it. That is all I have to say.

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GEN TURNER: 11 o'clock tomorrow?

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GEN HSIEH: All right. Tomorrow I will give my comments.

Meeting recessed at 1635 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

13 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Tenth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, and COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore USN, LTCOL J W Thames, USA, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NK Navy, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: I have nothing to say.

GEN HSIEH: In your statements yesterday morning and yesterday afternoon, you mentioned the question of making concessions. I think that in order to make clear which side has made concessions, and on what points it has made concessions, it is necessary to review the facts.

Where do the disputes between both sides exist, and what has been the attitude of both sides toward resolving those differences since we began to discuss Item 3 of the Agenda? A few days after the discussion of Item 3 was started in the plenary session, we encountered a stalemate. That stalemate was on the question as to whether there should be inspection of the rear of both sides, and you are fully aware that the demand for inspection in the rear was what your side insisted upon. Our side has been regarding this question as an interference in the internal affairs and a question which should not be brought up in a military negotiation. It has been our consistent, firm, and unshakable stand that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of both sides.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

Secondly, it has been our consistent stand that a military armistice is only the first step in the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and we consistently hold that as soon as this first step is taken, we should speedily proceed to the second step -- that is, the holding of a conference of a higher level to reach a final solution of the Korean question. Yet your side was against such a step. You proposed that the armistice should be prolonged after the armistice comes into effect. You said that the armistice should be stabilized, but in substance, it is your intention to maintain a state of war for a considerable duration after the armistice, and you are against a speedy, thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question. We held in the past, and we hold at the present, and we will continue to hold in the future, that our position is absolutely fair and absolutely correct, and your side stands against this attitude.

You unreasonably insisted that the rear should be inspected by the other side of the belligerents, and it was because of this that the plenary session came into a stalemate soon after it took up Item 3. It was in order to realize an armistice and to show our sincere wishes toward peace that we studiously studied this serious stalemate and put forth a new proposal, that is, inspection of specific ports of entry in the rear by neutral nations. And it should be recognized by your side that that was the beginning of the loosening, or the breaking, of the serious deadlock. Speaking about concessions, clearly that was a great concession on our part.

Yesterday you made your revised seven-principle proposal as a revision of our proposal of 3 December, and upon the question of supervision in the rear and the supervision by neutral nations, there is a step forward in your revised proposal. That is, you have accepted the idea that inspection in the rear should be conducted by observer teams of neutral nations. However, you have not agreed completely with our seventh principle, with our proposal

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) regarding supervision and inspection by neutral nations. It is clear then that you only agreed to a part -- not to the whole -- of our seventh principle, a principle which is in itself a major concession on our part. It is clear on this, which side has really made a concession.

You are perfectly aware that we have consistently stood against, and consider it absolutely impermissible to have any interference in the internal affairs, but ever since the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, up till your seven revised principles made on 12 December, your side persistently has clung to this unreasonable demand. This is revealed in your demand for inspection throughout Korea--inspection of all the ports of entry and communication centers throughout Korea--in your demand for air reconnaissance and photographic flights, and, particularly, in your continued demand to apply unreasonable restrictions on our military facilities. All these unreasonable demands we have opposed since the beginning of discussion on Item 3 of the agenda. We now oppose them, and we will continue to oppose them.

You said that you have made a concession in your yesterday's proposal. How can you really think you have made a concession on this question? The foregoing is concerned with the two points of inspection of the rear, and of interference in internal affairs, and I believe you remember clearly that our original proposal consisted of only five principles, in which we did not agree to any inspection of the rear. If now your side does not recognize our proposal of neutral supervision and inspection of specific localities in the rear as a major concession on our part, then our side is perfectly willing to go back to our five principles--because you said yesterday that if we do not accept your 12 December revised proposal, then you would return to your eight-point proposal of 6 December. That was what we have firmly opposed. I repeat, if you do not give up the idea of interference in internal

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) affairs, then we are perfectly willing to return to our five-principle proposal.

Thirdly, the question of islands, or the withdrawal of armed forces from the rear of either side. The question of the islands is, as a matter of fact, not an important question because the value of those islands is not great. But since we are here negotiating a military armistice, and we both say that we want to see the armistice stabilized, then it is naturally impermissible for one side to retain any armed forces in the rear of the other side after the military demarcation line is fixed, because it will inevitably increase disputes later on during the armistice and increase the possibility of the resumption of hostilities. Therefore, we are firmly against the retention of armed forces in the rear of the other side.

In your seven revised principles made yesterday, you declared that you are prepared to withdraw from what you call "territorial waters"--from a certain distance according to your own view. But in fact, how much have you withdrawn? Is it not that you still intend to retain your armed forces in our rear so as to constitute a menace to our rear? I hope that you will consider this point and seriously consider what sort of concession this can be called. I have talked about the question of concessions, about which side has made concessions, and which side has made great concessions.

Next I'll deal with the question of delaying, because both in the morning and in the afternoon yesterday you talked about the question of delaying, and I am prepared to calculate which side has been delaying. As I have just said, and as we stated previously, our additional proposals on 3 December were major concessions to your side for the sake of breaking the deadlock. On the same day we made our proposal, after declaring a 30 minute recess your senior delegate also admitted that that proposal of ours was a proposal for the breaking of the deadlock, and was a proposal on

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) which both sides can reach a solution. But even though your side admitted at the very time we made this proposal that that proposal was fair and reasonable, it was not until after nine whole days that you made your revised proposal on 12 December. And even in this revised proposal you have not completely accepted our proposal, but you still insisted on some of your unreasonable demands. You say that you are not delaying the negotiations. Then why is it that not until after nine days did you make clear your direct attitude toward our proposal? And furthermore this attitude is, just as I said yesterday, still a great distance apart from our position. Therefore, if you ask who has been delaying the negotiations, then I cannot agree to what you said yesterday, because you said it was our side which has been delaying the negotiations.

Thirdly, with regards to the question of sincerity, this is also a question you have touched upon yesterday morning and afternoon. The question of which side is sincere towards the negotiations cannot be gauged by empty words. It must be tested by the calculation I have made as to what concession either side has been making, as to which side has really made great concessions, because sincerity can only belong to that side which has made major concessions. And whether a side is delaying or not delaying the negotiations is also a sign of sincerity or lack of sincerity. You protest that you have sincerity, yet it took you nine days to show any direct opinion about our fair and reasonable proposal. Another measure of sincerity is our attitude in these discussions: whether we take an attitude of negotiating or whether we take an attitude of unilateral and unreasonable demands. Our side has consistently made clear our position, and we have never refused to discuss any points you have raised. That is an attitude of negotiating. But what is your attitude? Yesterday you clearly refused to listen to our statements and showed that you are not willing to discuss further comments. Can you interpret that attitude as a sincere

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) attitude towards the armistice negotiations? You have your right to refuse our reasonable proposals or to refuse to listen to our reasonable opinions. But our side has an even greater right to insist upon our reasonable position and to continue to raise reasonable proposals.

I wish to make clear as to whether I understand your statement of yesterday afternoon; whether it was your position that your 12 December proposal is the only proposal and that if we do not accept it as a whole then we need not carry on the discussions; or whether there are still other ways and means to continue our discussions. Our side is perfectly willing to hear your opinions, not only as to how we can carry on our discussions, but also as to how we can make efforts to seek a solution which will be acceptable to both sides.

GEN TURNER: We have listened attentively and patiently to your long statement this morning. We are always prepared to listen to and to discuss any reasonable, logical proposition designed to insure an effective armistice. We deplore the fact that we have heard no such statement from you. I suggest that you re-read my opening statement of yesterday morning. You will find in that statement a complete refutation of every point you have raised today. Do you have anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: We welcome General Turner's statement to the effect that he is willing to listen to our opinions. He asked whether our side has anything new to offer. I would like to point out that what we proposed before -- the so-called old proposals -- are all fair and reasonable. And of course there may be many more new proposals which are fair and reasonable. But we are now negotiating a military armistice and we consider that what we have proposed previously is a sufficient basis for a solution of the differences between both sides. I would like to hear your opinion on how you think we can solve the differences which I pointed out yesterday in my morning and afternoon statements?

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GEN TURNER: I told you yesterday how these differences could be solved: that is, by accepting our proposal of yesterday. Now if you have some new proposal to offer, we shall be glad to hear it.

GEN HSIEH: You said that the way to solve the question is for us to accept your revised proposal of 12 December. But I have already pointed out that though there are a few steps forward in your revised proposal, the progress is not great. I have already pointed out those points on which we hold our firm position, and I believe you are fully aware of them. There is no need for me to repeat them now. Now may I ask it this way: Will you agree to those points which I have enumerated as points on which we feel strongly? If so, then of course we can solve the question.

GEN TURNER: Certainly we recognize that there exist differences. We have heard you this morning, and both yesterday morning and yesterday afternoon. What suggestions do you have to offer to solve these differences?

GEN HSIEH: All right, I now suggest a method which I request your side to consider. We suggest that we first lay down two fundamental principles, among other principles: first--absolutely no interference of internal affairs of either side; second, no threat to the rear of the other side.

I would like to hear your opinion on these two principles.

GEN HODES: The answer to those two questions is "Yes" -- provided you accept our interpretation of what is "interference" and what is "in the rear of your side".

Now I would like to take "interference in internal affairs" in North Korea for a moment. Not because I believe that you think what we have proposed is interference in your internal affairs, but because there is a major basic requirement behind this subject. If you mean that we are interfering in the rear, or that we are interfering in internal problems of North Korea because we do not accept your requirement that you be permitted to rehabilitate and rebuild

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) and build new airfields, then you may say that we advocate interference. But in our opinion that is not interference in internal affairs, it is an essential safeguard to the security of maintaining an effective armistice. Now, you should begin to consider the necessity for this type of restriction in connection with the military armistice.

So far, you have objected to this restriction only under the guise that it is interference with internal affairs. You have told us unmistakably that you believe that when all the shooting stops, when all air operations and all naval operations stop, when our side moves its eyes and its ears, as well as its hands and feet, south of the demarcation line, that then you should be permitted to increase your military capabilities without limitation. That can be much more of a threat during the armistice than it is under present actual conditions, and we don't intend to let any such thing happen. Surely you cannot seriously believe that we are that gullible. We expect, in fact we advocate, rehabilitation of all types of civilian economy and civilian facilities, but we do not intend to permit that the same be done with respect to military capabilities. If you are sincere in wanting an effective armistice, then you should feel the same way as we do about restriction on increased military capabilities. However, if all you want is a complete cease-fire to give you time and opportunity to achieve your military aim, then why don't you come out in the open and say so? But you should stop beating around the bush on this matter, under the guise of interference in your internal affairs.

What I have said applies equally to observation by neutrals at three types of ports of entry and at the main communication centers, and to periodic aerial reconnaissance on both sides. None of these things have anything to do with anything connected with legitimate internal affairs and operations in North Korea. But they do have considerable to do with determining whether or not

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GEN RODES: (Cont'd) military capabilities are being increased. So much for internal affairs.

Now you mentioned a second subject: that is, "forces remaining in your rear". I have just been corrected, I understand it is, "a threat to your rear". It is difficult for us even to know what you consider your rear. We have given you, in our proposal, all of the territorial islands; in other words, all of the islands in your territorial waters. That may have been a mistake. Maybe we should never have mentioned it, because immediately we did this, you started looking the gift horse in the mouth. Now you say we should include coastal islands. You had no legitimate right to any; now you want all. Again I don't know, I don't think anyone knows, I'm not sure that you know, what coastal islands you are talking about. There are many islands off the coast of Korea. If you extended the line of demarcation without stopping it, I wouldn't know what islands might be north of it or what might be south of it. I know this much, that on the west coast, if you extended the line--and not very far--it cuts across the Kimpo Peninsula. Is that in your rear?

The subject so far is so vague that I wouldn't even know whether there would be any forces anywhere near what you might consider your rear. So much for the islands. In any event, whatever these islands are that you have in mind--whatever they may be, or wherever located--you are inconsistent, very inconsistent in your stand on them because in one breath you say the islands are unimportant and in the next one you say they are a threat to your rear.

I have attempted to explain our conception of interference and non-interference and threat to your rear. In other words, assuming that you mean islands -- as I believe -- I can, with these definitions and with this explanation, agree to accept the two basic principles you mentioned of "no interference", "no threat to your rear."

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GEN HSIEH: Your statement just now raised many questions in my mind. Now it is time for lunch. I suggest we recess and I'll give you my comment on your statement in the afternoon.

GEN TURNER: For what time?

GEN HSIEH: At 2 o'clock.

Meeting recessed 1240 hours.

Meeting reconvened 1400 hours.

GEN HSIEH: This morning I raised two principles. The first principle is concerned with the question of whether both sides will withdraw their armed forces during the armistice from the rear of the other side with the military demarcation line as the dividing line, that is, the question of whether either side will continue to threaten the rear of the other side. The second principle is concerned with the question of whether there will be interference in the internal affairs of either side.

I heard your first statement this morning with regard to the first principle, that is, whether there will be threat to the rear of the other side. My impression from your statement is that you will agree with this principle. As for the question of what is the dividing line between the North and the South, it is our view that we shall take the military demarcation line as the dividing line. And, provided that your side agrees that we should withdraw all our armed forces respectively from the other side of the demarcation line, then the specific question of how to divide between the South and North, of how to decide which are the islands to withdraw from, will be easy to settle.

You also replied to the second principle as to whether there will be interference in the internal affairs. At the beginning of your statement, it seems that your side agrees to this principle of no interference in the internal affairs of the other side. But as I listened, I became more confused and when I reached the end of your statement I was convinced that your side is totally against this principle.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

In support of your position, you gave two arguments. The first is that the restrictions on military facilities are no interference in the internal affairs. And the other argument is that you do not intend to interfere in the so-called legitimate internal affairs. I do not know what you mean by "legitimate internal affairs". And I do not know how you can interpret that the interference in the military facilities of an independent and sovereign state is no interference in its internal affairs.

It should be clear that any independent sovereign state has the legitimate right to do anything within its own territory. There is no need for you to permit us anything--there is no such need at all. And what we oppose is that you should interfere with anything within our State. I want you to know that your side is no victor. Neither is our side vanquished. Your side has no right to interfere in our military facilities, which is a part of our internal affairs. This is our firm and consistent stand.

You further demanded that there should be air reconnaissance and photographic reconnaissance throughout Korea, and also inspection of the communication centers, etc. It is our position that during the armistice we should limit - we should place restrictions on - the introduction into Korea of any armed forces, and that it is a negotiable matter as to which specified ports of entry in the rear should be supervised and should be inspected in order to supervise this ban on the introduction into Korea of armed forces. But this scope of inspection must not be exceeded. There must be no interference in the internal affairs, such as air reconnaissance and inspections of communication centers throughout Korea.

Your other argument is that if there is no limitation on our military facilities, then it would be a threat toward your side. In order to make this point clear, it is necessary to review the basic attitude of our side toward the armistice in Korea.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

Our side has always maintained that there should be thorough and speedy realization of peace in Korea. We will not be satisfied with the first step alone, but we maintain that soon after the first step we should take the second step, that is, the holding of a conference of a higher level to achieve a thorough settlement of the Korean question. But your side is not willing to do so. Our side holds that soon after the armistice all foreign forces should be withdrawn from Korea. But again your side is against this. It was because we thought that these two things will happen speedily -- that is, the withdrawal of foreign forces and the settlement of other questions by another conference -- that we have maintained that there should be no inspection of the rear because that was not necessary. Yet you are against an early peace in Korea. It is obvious from this which side is genuinely for peace and which side is not.

It can be seen from our additional proposals made on 3 December that our side has a sincere desire for an early armistice. Although your side says that you insist there should be no increase of military forces during the armistice, yet it is your intention to introduce more forces into Korea during the armistice. Our position has been more thorough going than yours. We maintain that there should not only be no increase of forces but also be a reduction of forces, and you were against this. So our side proposed there should be neutral supervision on the no increase of military forces. This was brought forward, first, as a concession to your idea of inspections of the rear, and, also, in order to break the deadlock and to achieve an early armistice.

From the above facts, it is perfectly clear that apart from a genuine wish for peace, our side has no other object. I think I have made clear our attitude towards the question of interference in internal affairs. I would like to know your opinion regarding our firm stand on this point.

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GEN TURNER: We have been through this so many times. All you have done this afternoon is repeat what you said this morning, what you said yesterday, and what you have said for six or seven days. If you have nothing constructive to offer at this time, perhaps you need more time. If such is the case, that is acceptable to us.

GEN HSIEH: Truth will stand repetition. I shall repeat our firm and reasonable proposition for many times to come. I shall continue to insist on our reasonable propositions, no matter whether you are willing or unwilling to listen to them. I ask again: What is your opinion regarding this firm and reasonable stand of ours? You have not yet shown your attitude.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything new?

GEN HSIEH: I wish you would give your opinion with regard to my question.

GEN TURNER: I refer you to my opening statement of yesterday. You have brought up nothing new since then.

GEN HSIEH: I wish you would give a clear explanation of the content of paragraph 5 in your revised seven-point proposal.

GEN TURNER: What is there about it that you do not understand?

GEN HSIEH: I recognize all the words, but I do not understand the meaning of the content.

GEN TURNER: Which word or which phrase do you fail to understand?

GEN HSIEH: I wish you would give a concrete explanation of the whole paragraph.

GEN TURNER: Suppose you give me your impression of what you think paragraph 5 means, and then I'll see if that agrees with the meaning we have written into paragraph 5.

GEN HSIEH: In your first sentence you say that neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. Among these, do you include what you call your rotation and replenishments?

GEN TURNER: We mean that the level of these military units, personnel, equipment, material, shall not be increased. This permits rotation on a man-for-man basis and of replenishment on a piece-for-piece basis.

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GEN HSIEH: Since you say that your side is for a stable armistice, is for no increase of military forces from without Korea, and that you wish to see the realization of peace in Korea, why do you insist upon continued introduction into Korea of military forces? Is there not a contradiction between your insistence upon rotation and replenishment on the one hand, and your protestation in saying that you are for a stable armistice and for peace?

GEN TURNER: Let me answer that question by asking you one. Don't you think that the withdrawal of our forces without replenishment or rotation would actually constitute the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea--the subject to be discussed under Agenda Item 5?

GEN HSIEH: The question of withdrawal of foreign forces should, of course, be discussed later; but my question now is that your insistence upon rotation and replenishment is obviously contradictory with your proposition of no increase of military forces. How can you talk away this self contradiction?

Your side is not in favor of a speedy realization of peace in Korea, not in favor of withdrawal of all foreign forces. You are for the maintenance of the state of war during the armistice and for continued increase of military forces while, on the other hand, you seek unreasonably to place restrictions on our military facilities, thereby interfering in our internal affairs. In other words, you seek to gain all the advantages. How can you say that this is an attitude of negotiating?

I have asked you repeatedly to show your attitude with regard to my question, and you refused to do so. What do you mean by that? I can assure you that since your side indicates that you are not willing to see an early armistice and a genuine peace in Korea, since you insist upon continued introduction into Korea of armed forces and a prolongation of a state of war in Korea, our side cannot be at ease and we cannot think that the armistice will be guaranteed. I wish you would answer these questions either

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) today or tomorrow. But they must be answered.

GEN HODES: You have had your question answered many, many times during the past two weeks. I don't believe that you really want another answer. Boiled down, your question is: "Why do we want to continue to introduce new troops into Korea during the armistice?" You continue to imply thus that we are proposing additional troops be introduced into Korea. You know full well the first sentence in our fifth principle of yesterday does not permit any such thing.

Now, is it increasing the combat effectiveness of a unit to rotate its combat trained veterans out of Korea, while introducing green replacements into Korea? The answer is obviously "No".

You speak about having an unsettled and insecure feeling during the armistice. In order to prevent, as far as possible, insecurity during the armistice, we have proposed certain restrictions and safeguards and I can assure you that we on our side don't intend to be vanquished while thinking that we have an armistice. And if you wish to call the necessary safeguards included in our compromise proposal of yesterday, "interfering in your internal affairs", then you are welcome to do so. We don't agree with you, but you have a perfect right to call them under any name you wish.

You again bring up the question of a final peace settlement. Again, I must say that that is fine. But neither you nor I can determine now whether that will result in the solution of the Korean problem one month after the armistice, or six months after the armistice is signed, or a year or more after the armistice is signed. That is not dependent on anything that you or I have anything to do with. We can only take the proper measures to insure that the armistice is an effective one. We have nothing to do with whether the final peace settlement will be made early or later. In any event, there is some time period during which this armistice is the only solution, and for that period of time, we must insure its security.

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GEN HSIEH: Your answer is not satisfactory. First, you said that rotation and replenishments, which you intend to continue, will be no increase of military forces. You cited the example of experienced and green soldiers but you did not mention weapons. Now, with regard to the question of troops, how can anyone tell whether the troops who will be introduced into Korea are green or experienced? How can one tell whether those troops who go out are green or experienced? My past experience is that there is no mark on the heads of your officers or men to tell whether they are green or experienced. Of course, I haven't been to your rear; I don't know whether you have changed the system. Further, no one will be able to tell whether you will be introducing complete combat units from other parts of the world, complete platoons, battalions, or regiments, under the guise of individuals. Nobody can tell that.

With regard to the question of weapons, you have made no mention, but you have stated in previous discussions that you intend to replace worn-out, damaged, or unserviceable weapons with new and serviceable weapons. Is that not an increase of military force? How can you say that it is not an increase of military forces? On this, I absolutely cannot agree with your explanation.

Secondly, you say that you do not intend to be vanquished while thinking you have an armistice. This should have been said by our side, because you know full well our consistent stand toward the armistice and that you have other objectives than ours. The latest proof of this is your insistence upon continued introduction, continued rotation and replenishment, continued increase of your military forces, thereby making the armistice unstable. Is this not leading our armistice to failure?

Next, our side maintains that immediately after we reach an agreement a conference for the peace settlement of the Korean question should be called, and from the beginning of the negotiations our side has been maintaining that all foreign forces

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) should be withdrawn from Korea. These two measures we think are the assurances that the armistice will be effective. You say that you do not intend to be vanquished while thinking you are having an armistice. Therefore, I ask whether you agree to these three measures we have in mind: first, a complete no increase of military forces during the armistice; second, a withdrawal of all foreign forces; and third, an immediate conference after the armistice for the final settlement of the Korean question. If you are in favor of these three measures, then we can believe that you are genuinely for peace. If you are not, then we cannot feel sure of your sincerity toward the armistice, and particularly, we cannot be at ease as to your attitude on the continued increase of your military forces. I must assure you that as long as your side insists upon the introduction into Korea of reinforcing armed forces and at the same time aims to interfere with our internal affairs by restricting our military facilities, then for so long the question before us cannot be settled. I do not mean that I require an immediate answer from your side.

GEN HODES: I think General Turner probably has something in mind. I would like to get in a word before he takes over.

I don't think your question about reinforcements deserves an answer. It is contained in the first sentence of the fifth principle. As to when and at what point the United Nations Command troops are to be withdrawn from Korea, that is a problem that we do not intend to settle during these armistice negotiations. The question of withdrawal of troops, insofar as it is connected with any recommendations made to governments, will be seriously considered and discussed under Item 5 of the agenda, but not under Item 3 of the agenda.

Now, I have just one more word. You continue to talk about sincerity with respect to the armistice. You have caused us for a long time to wonder whether or not you are interested in any way

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GEN HODES: with a military armistice. Your statements, and what you call arguments, and your objections that we have heard so far to our compromise proposal of yesterday, lead us, or at least me, to believe that you are interested only in a cease-fire in Korea.

GEN HSIEH: You again speak about the question of sincerity toward the armistice. In my opening statement this morning I have made clear the situation on this question and fully illustrated it by facts. I believe you will be clear about this question if you look into the records of the proceedings this morning in my statement.

You just mentioned two points successively. On the one hand, you indicated that you have no intention for a speedy discussion and settlement of the question of withdrawal of armed forces while, on the other hand, protesting that you have sincerity toward armistice and peace in Korea. Meanwhile, you still insist upon your need for introducing military forces into Korea during the armistice and your intention to restrict what we have a perfect right to do for ourselves. All these points taken together causes me to doubt whether the armistice is going to be effective at all. It seems that you have no more to say at present. If that is the case, I suggest we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN TURNER: Very well.

Meeting recessed at 1534 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

14 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Eleventh Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present?

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, LTCOL J W Thames, USA, LTCOL L G Hill, Jr., USAF, CHSCLK G G FULLER, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NK Navy, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

GEN HSIEH: Yesterday, both in the morning and in the afternoon, I pointed out the principles upon which both sides are in disagreement in connection with the solution of Item 3 of the agenda. And I requested your side to express your opinion as to how you think these differences can be solved. But I failed to have any result from your side. Today I again request that your side give your opinions on those principles that I have enunciated; first of all, on the principle of no interference in the internal affairs of either side; and secondly, on the principle that there shall be no threat to the rear of the other side. I would like to hear your opinion.

GEN TURNER: General Hodes gave a clear and thorough explanation of our feeling with reference to those two principles. Have you anything else?

GEN HSIEH: I already said yesterday that the reply you gave me yesterday was not satisfactory, because, while you said you agreed to our principles, the explanation you gave at the same time was in disagreement with those principles. Therefore we cannot say your side has given us a clear and satisfactory answer. An independent and sovereign state has the inalienable right to deal with any kind of facilities within its territory, a right not to be interfered with, and a right for which it need not ask permission from

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) anybody else. Although you say you do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of our side, yet actually you are proposing to interfere. You employed such a strange term as "legitimate internal affairs". I don't know what you mean by that. Have you any explanation as to what are legitimate and what are illegitimate internal affairs? Anyhow, we absolutely cannot agree with such interpretation. My question now is: Do you still insist upon those unreasonable demands in this connection? I wish you would give me an answer.

GEN TURNER: We still insist that there be no increase during the period of the armistice of your military capabilities. Have you anything else?

GEN HSIEH: In other words, you still insist upon interfering with the arrangements of its facilities by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for which arrangements it has a perfect and inalienable right? I wish you would answer that directly.

GEN TURNER: The question has been answered over and over again. Please refer to your record. Have you anything new?

GEN HSIEH: Then you refuse to answer my question?

GEN TURNER: I refer you to the record. Have you anything else?

GEN HSIEH: I again refer to your paragraph 5 in which you say neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. Yesterday you said that by that you meant you would still insist upon replenishment and rotation. You would still insist upon the continued introduction into Korea of military forces. How can you interpret such an insistence as not contradictory with your pretext that there should be no increase of military forces? How can you yourself believe in what you say?

GEN TURNER: The answer to your question is in the record. We have answered it many times. Have you anything else?

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GEN HSIEH: Again you refuse to answer my question. At the end of yesterday's session I stated that as long as your side insists upon your unilateral and unreasonable demands of introduction into Korea of military forces under the pretext of rotation and replenishment, while, on the other hand, insisting upon interfering in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state, the negotiations can have no progress at all. And this morning you have time and again refused to answer my questions, and refused to negotiate. I would like to know how you suggest that we can carry on our discussions? Our side attempted over and over again to negotiate with you, but you took such an attitude. How do you think these negotiations can carry on? I would like you to answer my question.

GEN TURNER: We have not refused to answer a single one of your questions. We have referred you to the record. The questions have been answered over and over again. Have you anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: All right, I will make another effort in order to show which side is really sincere for an armistice. You say you have answered all my questions. Please refer to the record. Yesterday afternoon I asked if you included rotation and replenishment in your fifth paragraph. You mentioned rotation of military personnel of your side. That was refuted by me. You failed to say anything about the question of replenishment of weapons. Today I am asking the same question. What do you mean by rotation and replenishment? How will you rotate and replenish? How can you interpret rotation and replenishment as no increase of military forces? I wish you will give a direct answer to that question because you have not answered that question. You did not give a single word in explaining the question of replenishment of weapons. You can look it up in the record. You can have sufficient time to look it up in your own record.

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GEN TURNER: I will quote from the record of yesterday. "We mean that the level of these military units, personnel, equipment and material shall not be increased. This permits rotation on a man-for-man basis and of replenishment on a piece-for-piece basis. Furthermore, this is not the first time that we have made this point clear. You may refer back to your records on previous days when we have answered the same question. Have you anything else to offer?

GEN HSIEH: You just quoted from your statement yesterday. But that sentence was only an interpretation of your first sentence in paragraph 5 of the revised proposal; that is, the sentence that neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. You continued yesterday to explain why your side needs rotation, saying that you wanted to exchange experienced soldiers for inexperienced soldiers. That was a statement I have already refuted. I followed by a question: "How can you say that you do not mean to increase your military forces by exchanging new weapons for weapons worn out, damaged, and becoming unserviceable during combat ? Now that question you did not answer. You can look up the records again. You maintain that your position is reasonable. You say you are not intending to increase your military forces. But actually you do intend to increase your military forces. You insist upon your unilateral and unreasonable demand, and you attempt to force us to accept such an unreasonable demand without answering our questions, without agreeing to negotiate. If you really mean to take such an attitude you had better make a clear indication to that effect. If that is what you do not mean, if you still wish to carry on the discussions by questioning and by answering, and by reasoning, that is another matter. I would like to know which method your side wishes to employ.

GEN TURNER: Let's carry them on with reason and logic. That is all.

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GEN HSIEH: All right, let's reason. If you agree to reason, then it will be for the benefit of the negotiations. I wish to point out where reason lies.

Yesterday I said that I found your reply not satisfactory. Firstly, you maintained that by rotation and replenishments, you would not continue to increase your military forces during the armistice. You cited the example of rotation of personnel, but you did not mention the question of replenishment of weapons. You argued about the rotation and exchange of experienced soldiers by green soldiers. That statement I already have refuted. We could not believe that that was no increase of military forces.

Then I proceeded to another question. I said, with regard to the exchange of weapons: "You did not give any explanation but from your past explanations, we understood that you meant to exchange new weapons for weapons worn out and damaged during combat. Is that not increasing your military forces? We cannot agree to your explanation, and we wish you would clarify that point." What was your answer? General Hodes answered: "Before General Turner is going to speak, I want to get in a word. Your question about the reinforcing of military forces does not deserve an answer." Today again you avoided answering this question.

My question now is: How can you interpret rotation and replenishments as not introducing from without into Korea of military forces? I request you try to convince me by reasoning, because if you want me to accept such a proposal, you must try to reason. We are now negotiating here; we are not fighting. I hope you will give an answer.

GEN HODES: Would you please repeat the last question so I am sure I understand? Just in English, please.

GEN HSIEH: My question is as follows: Since you insist upon continued rotation and replenishments during the armistice, how can you interpret this as not a continued introduction and increasing of

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) military forces into Korea during the armistice?

GEN RODES: Introduction and increasing? Well, I'll answer that. I have to break it into two parts. The first question then is: How can I interpret rotation and replenishment as not a continued introduction of military forces into Korea? The answer to that is: "I can't." It is an introduction of military forces into Korea, for the simple reason that the forces and equipment that you refer to in general comes from outside of Korea.

Now for the second part of your question, which is: How do I interpret this as not a continued increase of military forces? That is very simple. It would be on an exchange basis, as I have said many times before. There will be a certain level of personnel, units, material, and equipment in Korea at the time the armistice is effective. We mean by "no increase", just what the term means, "no increase".

You mentioned in connection with rotation of personnel that we wanted to replace combat veterans with green troops. That is not quite correctly said. We said that that would be the practical result which, I am sure, is perfectly obvious to you. We have a rotation system at present. We expect to continue that rotation. Again, I say that there is no reinforcing and no increase. We do not agree to the principle or the idea of violating that. With respect to equipment and weapons that you have mentioned specifically, my personal opinion is that, as a practical matter, there will be relatively small amounts of equipment, such as weapons, that would become unserviceable after the armistice goes into effect -- unless, of course, the armistice is of great duration and there is no early, final settlement. Finally, as to equipment and weapons, again I say: "No increase, but exchange of like-for-like." I don't believe any further explanation is necessary.

GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

GEN RODES: Yes.

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GEN HSIEH: Well, with regard to the question of exchange of equipment, such as weapons, if you take out from Korea old, worn-out and unserviceable weapons, then that is an increase of military forces. Only if you take out new and serviceable weapons and replace them by old and worn-out weapons can I interpret this kind of exchange as no increase. Which type of exchange do you have in mind, the first or the second type?

GEN HODES: If I understand the question correctly, one part of it was that we intend to send out new equipment for worn-out and unserviceable equipment, the answer to that is, of course, "No". Now, as to the first part of your question, possibly as an example, the only way I can explain it at the moment is to suppose, for example, that you have forty T-34 tanks that are unserviceable. You can get forty serviceable T-34 tanks, no better ones, by removing from Korea the forty T-34 tanks that have become unserviceable. Apparently I didn't finish the whole statement, according to the listeners here. What I intended to say was that if you have forty T-34 tanks, then you could exchange those forty T-34 tanks for forty other T-34 tanks, but nothing else.

GEN HSIEH: Firstly, I must admit that General Hodes has tried to answer my question and to make explanation. That is a good attitude. Since the other side has questions, it must have failed to understand something and it is necessary to make the other side understand you and try to reason with it in order that they cease to oppose your stand. Therefore, I say that such an attitude is good and is of benefit to the negotiations. In trying to solve a question one cannot take only one's own view, look at the question only from one's own angle, and think that one is absolutely right. You must look at the other angle and see whether it is really correct. Therefore, the exchange of opinions is necessary in order to ascertain whether a position is really tenable. That is the attitude I think we should take in our discussions.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) However, your explanation makes me suspect more than ever that you intend to increase your military forces during the armistice. You say that you intend to bring some weapons into Korea and to take some other weapons out of Korea. One type of exchange is the exchange of new and serviceable weapons for old and worn-out and unserviceable ones; another type is the exchange of one type of weapon for another, whichever type of exchange one has in mind. I think such an exchange must have its basic objective. What you intend to bring in must be a better and newer one than the one you are taking out. I think that if you conscientiously answer my question, you will admit this. If such is not the case, then why do you insist upon wasting your transport capacities, your gasoline, and your power to carry on such taking out and bringing in? It is very difficult for anybody to understand where your objective really is. I do not believe that is what you actually have in mind. Therefore, even though you assert that you do not intend to increase your military forces during the armistice, you yourselves must believe that such is not the case.

How, then, can you make me believe that you really don't intend to increase your military forces during the armistice? And, since you have preserved such an unreasonable requirement in your 12 December revised proposal, how can you say that unless our side accepts it as a whole you will not discuss any more, you will not answer any more questions? Can that be a passable attitude?

GEN HODES: I am not going to answer the last part of your statement, General Hsieh, because you know as well as I do that we did not say any such thing---that we would not discuss it.

Now, as to exchange of equipment, we have said that there will be no increase; we have said that there must be an exchange. We say that if there is an exchange, there must be an exchange of the same type. In other words, you don't exchange a truck for a tank, or a truck for an airplane. We have recommended in our

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) proposal the necessary neutral teams to see that there is no increase. Now, of course, it is an absolute fact that if one side wants to pull a tank or a truck out of a rice paddy, where it has been for a year and a half, and exchange it for a new one, there is the possibility that that cheating could be done. I want to inform you, however, that on our side replacement of equipment continues up-to-date. If our neutral teams, at these ports of entry, permit a truck to go out and a tank to come in, then you can beat the game. That's right.

GEN HSIEH: You have stated that you are willing to discuss and to take an attitude of negotiation. We consider that that is of help to the continuation of the negotiations.

Despite your explanation of rotation and particularly of the replenishment of equipment, whatever method of exchange you may cite as an example, we cannot but consider that they are only for the purpose of increasing military forces and not of reducing military forces -- because your side has a fundamental objective; that is, to prolong the state of war after the armistice. And in pursuing this objective you attempt to continue to increase your military forces including personnel and equipment. The replenishment of weapons is a particularly conspicuous case. It is obviously an increase of military forces and so is the case with rotation of personnel and you know that objective better than I do. The greatest majority of your troops are not willing to stay in Korea and continue to fight. The peoples in your countries also have the same inclination. Is it not recently that one of your high ranking generals also said that "if we want to maintain a state of war, we must study a method to raise our troops morale"? Now, to raise is just to increase. How can you increase your morale? By shortening your period of rotation to two months or three months. It is for this objective of attempting to maintain and prolong the state of war that your high ranking generals,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) against the wishes of the majority of the troops and your people, insist upon continued rotation and replenishment after the armistice. Now, the reason for this, you know better than I do. Therefore, even though you assert that you don't intend to increase your military forces, it is an assertion to which we absolutely cannot agree.

That is all.

GEN TURNER: Have you nothing new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: Not at the present. If you suggest to have lunch, I think we can get an agreement.

GEN TURNER: Until when?

GEN HSIEH: Half past two. Will that do?

GEN TURNER: Yes.

Meeting recessed at 1240 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours.

GEN HSIEH: I would like to speak. Seventeen days have passed since Item 3 of the agenda was discussed in the plenary session. Shortly after the beginning of the discussion of this item the plenary session encountered a deadlock, because your side insisted upon free inspections in the rear of our side while our side firmly maintained that any interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would absolutely not be tolerated, and that it was absolutely impermissible that the other side of the belligerents should conduct free inspections in our rear during the armistice, when a state of war was yet to be terminated. We held, moreover, that after the military armistice a political conference of a higher level should be convened without delay to discuss the withdrawal of all foreign forces and settle peacefully the Korean question, and hence there was no necessity for inspection of the rear and interference with the internal affairs.

In order to break the deadlock and attempt a speedy realization of the military armistice, our side made, on 3 December,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) two additional proposals which were a great concession to your position. However, up to 12 December your side refused to express any clear attitude toward these additional proposals of our side, which were made in a painstaking effort to break the deadlock--and you ignored our concessions. On the contrary, you insisted upon a series of unreasonable proposals and demands which had been already rejected by us categorically. As a result, the precious time of nine days passed in vain without any efforts being made in expediting the progress of the conference.

Your revised proposal on our seven-point solution, which you put forth on 12 December, was a step forward in certain respects compared with your previous proposal. Yet it still contains many suggestions and requirements which are unreasonable, and therefore are absolutely unacceptable to our side. I have pointed out this fact both with respect to principles and to concrete stipulations in these sub-committee meetings during the past two days and I am not going to repeat them here. We consider that it should be a common wish of both sides to attain the early realization of a military armistice in Korea. And that provided both sides have good faith, it is possible to reach a reasonable solution on our disagreements on Item 3 of the agenda. It is in this spirit that our side now puts forth the following proposal. I suggest that this sub-committee seriously consider and accept this proposal, which has incorporated the reasonable views of both sides, as the agreement in principle for settling Item 3 of the agenda. Our proposal reads as follows:

"1. All armed forces under the control of either side, including regular and irregular units, and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces shall cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the signing of the armistice agreement.

"2. All armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

signing of the armistice agreement. Except for such armed forces of a police nature as may be specifically agreed to by both sides, no armed forces of either side shall thereafter enter the demilitarized zone; nor shall the armed forces of either side commit any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone. Either side shall manage, in accordance with the stipulation of the armistice agreement, the administrative affairs of that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the military demarcation line.

"3. All armed forces, ground, naval and air, under the control of either side shall be withdrawn, within 5 days after the signing of the armistice agreement, from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of the other side. If they are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for delaying the withdrawal, the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order.

"4. In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military units, military personnel, war equipment and ammunition after the signing of the armistice agreement. However, if either side needs to rotate its military personnel in Korea, it shall make request to and acquire the approval of the Military Armistice Commission. The number of such military personnel to be rotated shall not exceed 5,000 monthly. Any such rotation shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of neutral nations and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

"5. Either side shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) settling through negotiation any violation of the armistice agreement. This function of supervision and inspection shall be carried out in accordance with the following two provisions:

"a. Within the demilitarized zone, the Military Armistice Commission and the joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

"b. Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violation of the armistice agreement has occurred, the supervisory organ of representatives of neutral nations entrusted by the Military Armistice Commission shall be responsible.

"6. Both sides agree to invite neutral nations which have not participated in the Korean war to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives respectively to form a supervisory organ, a Supervisory Commission. This supervisory organ, the Supervisory Commission, entrusted by the Military Armistice Commission shall be responsible for dispatching inspection teams of neutral nations over mutually agreed lines of communication to carry out the function of supervising the stipulation of paragraph 4 at such ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and, when violations of the armistice agreement have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, to conduct necessary inspection at such places where violations have occurred; and shall report to the Military Armistice Commission on the result of supervision and inspection. Both sides shall accord these inspection teams of neutral nations full convenience in performing the above-stated functions."

Here I hand you the Korean, Chinese and English translations of the proposal in the hope that you will study it and seriously consider it as a solution for Item 3 of the agenda.

GEN TURNER: We have noted your new proposal. It will require our careful and thorough study. But immediately I should like to have your

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) definition of "coastal islands and waters".

GEN HSIEH: Have you other questions regarding our proposal on which you wish to have clarification? I would like to answer them all together.

GEN TURNER: This is the first one that comes to my mind. Are you prepared to answer it now?

GEN HSIEH: Regarding the meaning of this term, our side has given repeated answers to your side previously. In this principle, we have taken as its basis, the principle that we should insure the stability of the armistice and reduce the possibility of resumption of hostilities during the armistice. Therefore, we propose the requirement that both sides should withdraw all its armed forces from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of the other side with the military demarcation line as the dividing line.

GEN TURNER: Your definition is not satisfactory to us. In your fifth paragraph, where you use the term "ports of entry", do you include air ports as well as sea ports and land ports?

GEN HSIEH: By "ports of entry", we mean ports in general through which armed forces can be introduced into Korea from without. This is also a question we have answered repeatedly before.

GEN TURNER: Does it include air ports?

GEN HSIEH: The question of particular type of ports is a concrete question and can be studied after we have agreed on the principle.

GEN TURNER: Your answer is unsatisfactory. We would now like a thirty minute recess in order to prepare a list of specific questions to which we would like to get specific answers.

GEN HSIEH: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1500 hours

Meeting reconvened at 1530 hours

GEN TURNER: With reference to the proposal which you have just submitted to to us, my first impression is that it contains nothing different than your proposal of 3 December. You have changed a few words; you have reduced the number from seven to six, but we find not one

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) major change from your former proposal. Therefore, my first question is: Wherein does your proposal of today differ from your former proposal? We await your reply.

GEN HSIEH: I don't understand your question. You ask: Wherein is this proposal different from our previous one?" Have you made a careful study of it? If you make a study you can surely discover that there are great differences between this one and our previous proposal. Need I read it once more? If you think there is such need, I can do so. And I can give explanations in passing.

GEN TURNER: There is no need for your re-reading your proposal. You imply that there are some major changes in this proposal from the one you submitted on 3 December. Wouldn't it be rather simple for you to point out what these major changes are?

GEN HSIEH: Well, I'll give some brief explanations because since you have asked this question I am ready to answer you and it will be for your convenience when you come to study it.

In the first paragraph, we still use the "signing of the armistice agreement" as the starting point of the calculation of time. The reason for doing so is because we have done the same thing -- we also took the signing of the agreement as the starting point -- in our agreement on Item 2 of the agenda. Secondly, we have done so because we consider that if both sides have the same objective, namely, an early realization of a cease-fire and armistice in Korea, we can, before the signing of the armistice, get everything prepared which will be required in the terms of the armistice agreement--for instance, the organization of the military armistice commission and the neutral-nations supervisory organ. Furthermore, we have given a considerable time limit for the withdrawal and separation of the forces of both sides so that those things can be done forthwith. And we don't think that it is appropriate to include anything in our principles on Item 3 of the agenda which could be used as a pretext for delaying the effectiveness of the armistice agreement. That is a point on which we have

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) opposed your seventh paragraph of your 12 December revised proposal.

GEN TURNER: Now may I interrupt a moment? What we are seeking is the major differences between your proposal of this afternoon and your proposal of 3 December--not why you used the terms that you are using--simply the major differences which are not apparent to us but which you imply are different in major points from your proposal of 3 December. It is only the major differences which we wish to have pointed out to us now. For example, the term "signing of the armistice agreement" was used in your 3 December proposal just as it is in your proposal of today. Certainly, since that is no change at all, it doesn't constitute a major change from your former proposal.

GEN HSIEH: As a matter of fact, if you had not broken in, I could have explained the second and third paragraphs. Now, my explanation in connection with the first paragraph applies equally to the second and the third paragraphs and I will not repeat it.

In paragraph 4, your side should say and should admit that it is changed from our sixth principle of 3 December. In our original sixth principle we have written: "In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall not undertake to introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons, and ammunition under any pretext." And now in our fourth paragraph we have made a major revision and a major concession to your side. The first sentence in this principle is a principle in general, it says: "In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military units, military personnel, war equipment, and ammunition after the signing of the armistice agreement." And the sentences which

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

follow are important. They read, "however, if either side needs to rotate its military personnel in Korea, it shall make request to and acquire the approval of the military armistice commission. The number of such military personnel to be rotated shall not exceed 5,000 monthly. Any such rotation shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of neutral nations and it shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides."

It was our original intention, as written in our paragraph 6 of our 3 December proposal, that "no armed personnel, no weapons, and no ammunition, shall continue to be introduced into Korea", and we were fully prepared to abide by this stipulation since we put forth that proposal because we thought that it was only in this way that we can insure the realization of the principle of no increase of military forces during the armistice. However, your side persistently insisted upon your rotation system, even though our side considered, as we have formerly objected to your stand, that your insistence on such a requirement is attempting to maintain a prolonged state of war and a continuous increase of your military forces. We know that to be so; but in order to avoid yet another deadlock owing to this question, and also taking into account the interests of your troops and your people, we have made a concession on this part in order to settle this question and have agreed that the number of 5,000 men can be rotated monthly. This is a considerable figure and you must notice that this is contrasted with our sixth paragraph of our 3 December proposal. This is a great change and a great concession toward your position.

In our paragraph 5 which corresponds to paragraph 5 of our 3 December proposal, we have expressed more clearly and explicitly the composition and the functions of the armistice commission. It is explicitly stipulated here that the military armistice

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) commission will be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling, through negotiations, violations of the armistice agreement. That is to say, apart from the supervision of the ports of entry to be agreed upon by both sides in the rear, the supervision and execution of the whole armistice agreement will be the responsibility of the armistice commission. That is to say, the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides will be supervised and inspected by the neutral-nations supervisory organ. And this organ shall report to the armistice commission which will deal with the questions raised in those reports. I believe that if you study this in comparison with our proposal of 3 December and with your proposal of 12 December, you will find that we have incorporated here what is reasonable in your proposal.

Paragraph 6 deals completely with the neutral-nations supervisory organ to be formed by neutral nations invited by both sides. It deals with this organ's functions, duties, and the convenience of movement needed by it in carrying out its functions. And in this paragraph, too, we have incorporated such views in your proposal as are reasonable.

From the above brief explanations I have made, you can see that there are great differences between your proposal of today and our proposal of 3 December and your proposal of 12 December. The major differences lie in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6. There are some other differences, but the main differences are in these three paragraphs. We believe that if you make an earnest and careful study of this proposal of ours, you will recognize that my explanations are correct and at the same time you will see what efforts our side has been making whenever both sides come to a stalemate on Item 3 of the agenda. I seriously request your side to consider it and accept it as the agreement.

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GEN TURNER: Your paragraph 4 of your new proposal adopts your old paragraph 6 of your proposal of 3 December, deleting the last three words of that former paragraph 6 -- "under any pretext". For that deletion you substitute three new sentences. The magnitude of this major change had escaped me. Your magnanimous gesture in making this major change prompts me to ask two questions. You say the military armistice commission must approve rotation requests. Does this mean that all members of the military commission must agree to this? That is question number one. Question number two: How did you arrive at a figure of 5,000 men a month in relation to rotation?

GEN HSIEH: Are there any other questions you would like to have answered? I would like to answer them all together.

GEN TURNER: The other questions that I have do not touch directly upon paragraph 4. I would like an answer to those two questions now if possible.

GEN HSIEH: All right, if you have no other questions connected with our paragraph 4, I will answer these two questions.

First, question number two; you ask how do we arrive at the figure 5,000 for the rotation. Please note that it says in our proposal, the number of such military personnel to be rotated shall not exceed 5,000 a month. That is to say, 5,000 is the maximum figure, and by 5,000, we consider it is a big figure and can satisfy the requirements of the troops of both sides and particularly the requirements of your troops. Your first question is a question about the procedure of approval. It is a minute question, and I think it should be discussed when we come to discuss the concrete details.

GEN TURNER: I am going to submit to you now the questions that have immediately come to our minds. I should like you to answer each question in the order in which we have them numbered. In other words, I do not desire a synthetic answer. Before recessing, I would like to state, emphatically, that I find nothing in your proposal of today

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) which contains any major change from your proposal of 3 December. I suggest that you study more carefully our compromise proposal of 12 December. I suggest we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

(General Turner hands list of written questions, Enclosure 1, to General Hsieh)

GEN HSIEH: We consider that, compared with our proposal of 3 December, our proposal today has conspicuous and major differences. The six-paragraph proposal we submitted today has incorporated all the reasonable positions of the proposals of both sides, and this is a fact to everybody who wishes to see a cease-fire and armistice in Korea. And every honest military man should recognize it. Our side seriously requests your side to give full consideration to this proposal of ours. I now agree to recess until the usual time tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1628 hours

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

Enclosure 1 - United Nations Command Questions on Communists 14 December Proposal on Agenda Item 3

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14 December 1951

UNC QUESTIONS ON COMMUNISTS 14 DECEMBER PROPOSAL ON AGENDA ITEM 3

1. What is your definition in terms of specific geographical localities, of coastal islands and waters and of your rear? We would like to see this on a map.

2. Does your proposal contemplate that the Military Armistice Commission will have directing and control authority over the neutral observation teams?

3. What do you mean by "according full convenience" to the neutral teams? Does this mean freedom of movement over main lines of communication throughout Korea for the neutral teams?

4. You say the Military Armistice Commission must approve rotation requests. Does this mean all members of the Military Armistice Commission must agree to this?

5. How did you arrive at your figure of 5,000 a month in relation to rotation?

6. By "ports of entry", do you exclude any type of port of entry, such as air ports?

7. Does your proposal contemplate use of aerial observation by the neutral observer teams?

8. Do you intend that the neutral observing organ be ready to function at the time the armistice is signed?

9. With respect to principles, wherein does your proposal of today differ from your former proposal?

Enclosure 1

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

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

15 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twelfth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL R A Maddocks, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

GEN TURNER: Do you have the answers to our questions of yesterday?

GEN HSIEH: I shall now answer the questions you raised yesterday one by one.

Your first question: "What is your definition, in terms of specific geographical location of coastal islands and waters of your rear?" This black line on the map is the military demarcation line we have fixed. (Pointing to map) It is our principle and it is also a principle to which you have agreed, that both sides should withdraw their armed forces from the rear and theccoastal islands and waters of the other side with the military demarcation line as the dividing line. As to the question of extension of the line eastward and westward over the waters, that is a technical question. To the East, it is a simpler question. With regard to its extension to the West, our side made the suggestion during the discussion of Item 2 of the Agenda that we should extend the line from the mouth of the Imjin River, then follow the middle of the Han River and follow the administrative demarcation line between Whang Hae-Do and Kyongi-Do provinces. We considered that such an extension is for the objective of withdrawal of the forces of both sides, whether air or naval, from the other side and that this

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) extension has nothing to do with the contact line on the ground. That was our suggestion and we still hold the same view now. And therefore we think that both sides should take this dividing line and withdraw all their forces from the rear of the other side. For instance, your naval forces usually operating in those areas (pointing to map) I have indicated should withdraw after the armistice. Do you understand the areas I refer to? If you need geographical names, Colonel Chang will give them to you in Korean.

GEN TURNER: A member of our staff will get from Colonel Chang the geographical names of the places that you have indicated with your finger.

GEN HSIEH: Good. That refers to the areas from which your naval forces should withdraw, and, of course, you should not retain any more naval forces north of that line and it applies equally to the islands north of that line. From all the islands north of that line, your forces should withdraw.

GEN TURNER: How far, or how far out? (Indicating on the map.)

GEN HSIEH: I mean the waters along the coast.

GEN TURNER: How far out?

GEN HSIEH: You know fully well that you do not control all the islands. We only ask you to withdraw from the islands you now control. As to the distance of how far from the coast, that is a question of the extent of territorial waters and we consider it is a question which should not be discussed in a military armistice negotiation. In negotiating the armistice, we are discussing the question of how to stabilize the armistice, to discuss and to determine how to reduce the possibility of resumption of hostilities. Therefore, I say that after the armistice comes into effect, you should withdraw your forces from the islands in our rear which you now control in order to reach the above two objectives I have mentioned. And it is obvious that we are here

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) not discussing a question of territory or territorial waters. That is my answer to your first question.

GEN TURNER: We understand your answer and what you mean; but we do not, repeat not, agree.

GEN HSIEH: I am only answering your questions now and we are not asking you to agree to my answers now.

Your second question: "Does your proposal contemplate that the military armistice commission will have directing and control authority over the neutral observation teams?" The inspection teams of neutral nations are under the supervisory commission of neutral nations. That is to say, above the inspection teams of neutral nations there is the supervisory commission of neutral nations. The supervisory commission of neutral nations entrusted by the military armistice commission will dispatch inspection teams of neutral nations to carry out the functions of supervision and inspections as stipulated by the armistice agreement. The military armistice commission and the supervisory commission of neutral nations are on an equal footing and the relationship between them is one between the entruster and the entrustee. It is not a relation between a superior and a subordinate.

Your third question is: "What do you mean by according full convenience to the neutral teams?" My answer is that both sides, both your side and our side, should accord the inspection teams of neutral nations full convenience in performing their duties--in performing their functions. By full convenience, we include the convenience in traveling over the lines of communication as agreed upon by both sides.

In your fourth question you ask: "You say the military armistice commission must approve rotation requests. Does this mean all members of the military armistice commission must agree to this?" Our answer is: In order to prove that either side

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

really has the need for rotating its military personnel, and that it is not introducing into Korea reinforcing forces, ground, naval, or air, there must be reasons stated and tabular data given for such requests. Such requests should be agreed upon by both sides; that is, approved by the representatives of both sides on the military armistice commission before the rotation can be carried out.

Your fifth question is: "How did you arrive at your figure of 5,000 a month in relation to rotation?" Our answer is that the number of personnel to be rotated should not exceed 5,000 monthly. That is, 5,000 is the maximum figure and it refers to the rotation both ways -- 5,000 to come in monthly and 5,000 to go out monthly -- and our side considers that this figure is sufficient for meeting the requirement of the rotation of your military personnel.

Your sixth question is: "By ports of entry do you exclude any type of ports of entry such as air ports?" We answer that we mean "ports of entry" agreed upon by both sides; that is, the term we use in our proposal should be the ports of entry negotiated and decided upon by both sides for the implementation of our fourth principle. We consider that such ports of entry, that is which and what ports actually, must be specifically agreed upon; and that the ports of entry on both sides should be of equal number, and we maintain that such specific negotiations can be carried out after we have decided upon the principle.

Your seventh question: "Does your proposal contemplate the use of aerial observation by the neutral observer teams?" Our answer is that the duties and the rights of the supervisory organ of neutral nations are limited to supervising the adherence to and execution of our fourth principle by both sides, and to the inspection of any violations of the armistice agreement which have occurred outside the demilitarized zone.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Therefore, we think it is not necessary for this supervisory organ of neutral nations to carry out aerial observation and, also, this aerial observation is impermissible.

Your eighth question is: "Do you intend that the neutral observing organ be ready to function at the time the armistice is signed?" Our answer is that both sides should make joint efforts to see that the supervisory organ of neutral nations can be formed and ready immediately after the signing of the armistice agreement.

Your ninth question is: "With respect to principles, wherein does your proposal of today differ from your former proposal?" Our answer is that the permission of rotation and the incorporation of reasonable suggestions raised by your side are the major concessions in our proposal. This is my repeated answer to this question of yours. Yesterday afternoon, at the time when you orally raised this question, I specifically analyzed and answered this question. If you think there is the need, I am prepared to repeat and to explain further.

GEN TURNER: That will not be necessary. Is that all?

GEN HSIEH: I have answered all of your questions.

GEN TURNER: In those instances where you have given us a specific answer to our specific questions, you have merely accentuated the differences existing between our two sides. On those answers to our specific questions in which you have evaded giving a specific answer, I shall make no further comment at this time.

For many days we have listened to your explanation of your four disagreements with our views. As we have told you many times, we are fully cognizant of your views. Yesterday we heard nothing in addition to what we have heard from your side in the past week or ten days. Your so-called new proposal has nothing new, in effect, to that offered by your side on 3 December. Your new principle 4, which you call a major concession,

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) provides that rotation may be carried on only with the approval of the military armistice commission. Your members of the military armistice commission can, of course, refuse to agree. Therefore, you retain the right to preclude, unilaterally, any rotation at all. How is this a difference from your former view?

For the past week we have refuted your arguments time and again. Once more I shall try to clarify our stand on these matters of disagreement.

First, the question of islands. We have agreed to withdraw from our own islands that are in your territorial waters. But that is not enough for you. You want us to withdraw from our own islands which are neither in your rear nor are a threat to you. They are not even in your territorial waters. Some of these islands have never belonged to you at any time. You have used loose phrases that we intend to retain the greater part of the islands. If you'll look at the map you'll see we are giving up the greater part of the islands. You seem to think that you can dismiss the matters of territory, territorial waters, and high seas navigation by saying they are inappropriate in a military armistice negotiation. You seem to forget this military armistice is concerned with Korea only -- its mainland and territorial waters. I will not be responsive to any more arguments based upon such illogical grounds.

Second, the question of no rotation and replacement. We have heard your explanation, "there should be only outgoing and no incoming of military forces", so many times that you need not repeat it again. You know the figure of 5,000, even if permitted by your new principle, is wholly inadequate. We know as well as you know that this is your idea of forcing a withdrawal of troops by the attrition process. You are well aware of our firm stand in this matter of withdrawal of troops since the

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) beginning of the armistice talks. We do not intend to change our stand. All your talk about "contradictions" and "increasing the military capabilities" has no validity and you know it. It is your side that has been inconsistent and contradictory about these matters. You blandly state that you intend to increase your military capabilities during the armistice by rehabilitation and construction of airfields, since this is an internal affair. Then in the same breath you insist the United Nations Command must reduce its military capabilities by not introducing replacements for rotation purposes, except for the token number of 5,000 monthly; and even that you could prohibit. We'll not be responsive to this illogical argument any longer.

Third, the question of internal affairs. You have persistently stated that our principle 5, which prohibits the rehabilitation, expansion and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities, and construction of new airfields and new aviation facilities, interferes in the internal affairs of your side. You have also stated many times that effective inspection such as aerial photography and aerial reconnaissance is an internal problem. However you may clothe in words your desires to increase your aviation capabilities, the bare fact is that you seek to increase your military capabilities during armistice. You wish to gain a military capability you do not now have. That is inadmissable. It is only with the recognition of this important fact that we can achieve an effective armistice.

We have assured you any number of times that the United Nations Command has no desire whatsoever to interfere with your internal affairs. However, we have no intentions of letting you build up your airfields and aviation so as to increase your airforce capabilities during the armistice; and we expect to see

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) that aerial reconnaissance is employed as one of the means of determining compliance with this.

It is not because we are interfering with your internal affairs that you keep bringing this subject up. Rather, it is very clear that you have ulterior motives. We would like to know just what your motives are for wanting to rehabilitate, expand, and improve your airfields and aviation facilities and just what is your reason for not wanting effective inspection by aerial photography and aerial reconnaissance. As you well know, this inspection will be carried out by the neutral-nations inspecting teams, and this will not interfere with your internal affairs, unless you are planning to violate the agreements of the armistice. Therefore, the restriction of construction of new airfields, air facilities, rehabilitation, expansion and improvement of existing airfields and air facilities, and a thorough observation throughout Korea as agreed upon, is the only answer to a successful execution of the armistice.

Fourth, the custom of inspection in the rear. Many times in the past few days you have made the statement that the inspection of the rear is our idea. We accept that and will continue to praise its merits. This we will do because this principle is the main safeguard against violation and evasion of the terms of the armistice. But inspections of the rear by neutrals was your own thought, as you well know.

Both your proposals accept only partial observation in the rear areas of both sides. By so doing you are obviously limiting the effectiveness of the armistice. It is indeed near-sightedness to believe that adherence to the terms of the armistice can be checked only at ports of entry. If observation is to be effective, it must also be conducted at selected communication centers and over all of Korea through aerial observation and

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) photographic reconnaissance. These measures are essential to adequate observation.

It is difficult for us to conceive how your side can insist upon a fair, reasonable, and effective armistice and then contradict your implication of this sincerity by refusing to accept measures which will make it effective.

Now, I hope you fully understand our firm position in these matters and will refrain from using your old arguments over and over again. I have fully refuted them. If we should hear them again, you can expect to hear these same final refutations again. It will gain you nothing and will only delay progress.

That is all.

GEN HSIEH: After listening to General Turner's long statement, it has brought to my mind many questions. But before I would ask for clarification on these questions and before I make comments on your statement, I would like first of all to clarify your attitude toward these negotiations, because your attitude toward the negotiations is directly connected with the progress of the negotiations. For example, your statement just now is a repetitious and unreasonable statement, just as the statements you have made before. And yet I took the attitude of carefully listening and seriously analyzing your statement. However, your side takes the attitude entirely to the contrary. Twice in your statement today you said that you will be irresponsive to any questions we will raise. Of course, you are calling anything which is not to your taste, "illogical". Twice in the meeting today you declared that you are not willing to hear our opinions, and at the end of your statement you stated again, as in your opening statement, that you are not willing to listen to us. I must point out that such statements are an indication of your attitude of refusing to negotiate, and I must point out also that such an indication is given after our side has made our proposal

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) It is not from today that you start this attitude of refusing to negotiate. Since 12 December you tooks this attitude and for four days successively you have been taking this attitude. We want to call your attention to this and suggest that you review the proceedings of the past four days. You can see that so long as your side continues to use such an attitude of refusing to negotiate, then there will be no progress in these negotiations. As soon as you give up such an attitude to our position, we will make some progress. It is because you have assumed this attitude of refusing to negotiate for four days successively, and because three times in your statement this morning you employed such words as I have pointed out and showed such an attitude, that our side cannot but doubt what is your real attitude toward the armistice negotiations. Before I continue the discussions, I would like to clear up this point. I want to clear up what you mean by using such words. I wish to have your answer to this question first.

GEN TURNER: From the fuss that you have made over the words that I have used, I believe that you pretty clearly understand what I mean. We are willing to negotiate. We have patiently listened to your illogical arguments. We do not care to listen to them again. Let us negotiate. Certainly you could not contend that your proposal of 14 December was a forward step toward negotiation. What have you to offer that can be considered a forward step in the negotiations? So far you have only been stalling and wasting time. Let us make some progress today.

GEN HSIEH: I could have used the same kind of words. I could have said that your statement made just now is a statement which I have listened to patiently, and is an illogical statement for stalling and delaying the negotiations and wasting time. It is particularly because you still unreasonably and illogically insisted upon your views after we have made our proposal of

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) 14 December that you made me doubt what is your attitude toward the negotiations. Of course, you said that before me, but I can assure you that our side will not take the same attitude of refusing to negotiate as you do and we will not think that such an attitude is reasonable. Of course, you have the right to choose such an attitude of refusing to negotiate, but if that is what you really mean, you should make a resolution and seriously state that you will not continue the discussions if we do not accept your positions.

I wish to remind you of just one thing, rotation is surely an increase of military forces. Your high-ranking officers indicated that in order to continue to increase your military force and to raise the morale of your troops, you must rotate, you must have more rotation, you must shorten your period of rotation to 2 months or 3 months. It is clear from this that rotation is urgently needed by your side. Our proposal of 14 December made the concession on the point of rotation in taking account of the interests of your troops and the peoples in your countries. That is a major concession, and yet you do not admit that there is anything new in our proposal. Such is your logic. If you do not admit such a concession as a step forward, as something new, then there is no necessity for us to carry on more discussions. If that is really what you mean, and you mean to insist upon such attitude, then whatever our side will suggest could be refused consideration by your side. I wish you to clarify this point seriously.

GEN TURNER: Let us get a bite to eat and then immediately after lunch I will clarify it to where you will have no misunderstanding whatsoever. What time would you like to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: 2 o'clock.

Meeting recessed at 1243 hours.

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Meeting reconvened at 1400 hours

GEN TURNER: As to irrelevant remarks about my attitude, I dismiss and ignore them as propaganda deserving no comment. You have made a number of statements attempting to show that principles advocated by the United Nations Command are unfair, unreasonable and unwarranted. You condemn our insistence on prohibiting the rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields as being interference in your internal affairs. You object to our intention to rotate and replenish our forces in Korea. You complain that our retention of islands threatens your rear. You object to aerial surveillance as being more interference in your internal affairs. On the other hand, we defend these principles as insuring against an increase of military capabilities during the armistice and thereby a threat to the stability of the armistice.

Now let's look at the situation as it is today. You are not threatening our rear in any way. You are not preventing us from rehabilitating airfields or building new ones. You are not conducting aerial surveillance of our communication centers. You are not preventing unlimited rotation and replenishment of our forces. You do not interfere in the internal affairs of our side in any way. Under the conditions of combat, as they exist today, you do none of these things and we have no fear that you might. You do none of these things because you cannot -- you lack the military capability to do them.

But how do you find the situation today on your side? We do hold islands which you say threaten your rear. We do keep your airfields unusable. We do conduct aerial surveillance throughout your rear. We do limit the extent to which you can replenish your forces. We do interfere in your so-called internal affairs by disrupting your internal communications systems and by destroying communication centers in your rear.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) We do these things today because we have the military capability to do them. Until the armistice is signed we will keep on doing them.

Now, to preserve the existing situation as to military capabilities, to replace the effect of the United Nations Command military operations, we propose only that during the armistice you shall not gain a military capability which you do not now possess. We go even further. We agree to apply the same restrictions to ourselves, even though you lack the military capability today to implement these restrictions by force of arms. But you complain this is unfair. You who are unable to impose any of these military restrictions upon our side by your own strength. You complain that it is unfair for us to insist on continuing restrictions through armistice terms which we are fully able to impose, and <u>are</u> imposing on you by military means during hostilities. In short, you seek to gain, through negotiations, what you could not win through fighting. You seek to avoid, through negotiations, what you could not avoid through fighting.

In accepting the restrictions advocated by the United Nations Command you merely accept a continuation of limits on your military capabilities which exist today as a result of United Nations Command military operations. Your capabilities should continue to be limited by the terms of the armistice. You lose nothing. You gain much, for these same limits are applied to the United Nations Command, even though you cannot today effect them by military means.

It is clear, therefore, that our proposed principles are more than fair to you -- they are wholly to your advantage as compared to the situation existing today.

We offered you many things in our proposal of 12 December. None of these are offered by you in your proposal of 14 December.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) Once again I repeat we are willing to give serious consideration to any proposal you may make which provides for effective supervision of, and adherence to, the armistice terms, and for prohibition of increasing the military capabilities. We are not talking victor over vanquished; we are talking military realities upon which this armistice must be based. Now let us get down to negotiating. What have you to offer?

GEN HSIEH: I am greatly disappointed at your statement this afternoon. I thought you would change your attitude this afternoon from the attitude you took this morning and the attitude you have been taking since 12 December. But my impression from your statement is that you have even accentuated your attitude of refusing to negotiate. Your statement gave me the impression that you once again reveal your attitude of assuming to be a victor in these armistice negotiations. You reveal to me once again that you aim at maintaining the state of war in the Korean battlefields and you fear the arrival of genuine peace. You reveal to me once again that you refuse to take the attitude of negotiating.

Your statement merely repeated your hackneyed, unreasonable and absurd statements at the beginning of July when you came to this conference table. It is a pity that you attempt to harp on your hackneyed tunes of July. But after the lapse of five months your voice is not as loud as it was. You have retreated very much. Since you say that we have no military capabilities, then why do you fear that we might have it? Since you take the attitude of a victor, why should you come to negotiate? If you intend to use such an attitude as a threat on your part in these negotiations, I tell you you must take back that attitude. If you intend to use your statement as propaganda, I suggest that you publish the whole statement to the world and let the people judge.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) For four days successively you refused to negotiate, and this afternoon you went to the length of openly bragging of your military capabilities. Whom do you attempt to awe? If you do not attempt to change your attitude, there will be no result from these negotiations and the responsibility for delaying of the armistice is entirely on your shoulders. So long as you do not change your attitude we have nothing to offer or to say today.

I hope you will change your attitude. Are you insisting on this attitude of refusing to negotiate? Are you attempting to use coercion to make me accept the whole of your proposal?

GEN TURNER: I shall re-read two statements that I just made. We are not talking victor over vanquished, we are talking as realists. We want a genuine armistice and a genuine peace. Once again, I say we are willing to give serious consideration to any proposal you may make which provides for effective supervision of, and adherence to, the armistice terms, and for prohibition of increase in military capabilities. If you are not willing to carry on the negotiations today, then will you please set a time when you are willing to carry on these negotiations.

GEN HSIEH: You have missed the point. Your last question is the question I have asked you. It is not for you to ask me.

GEN TURNER: I have answered your question. Do you have anything new to present?

GEN HSIEH: You have not yet answered my old question. Are you still refusing to negotiate or are you using coercion, trying to force us to accept the whole of your unreasonable proposals? If you take back and change your attitude, I have never refused to carry on discussions, but if you attempt coercion, I advise you to take back this attitude quick and soon.

GEN TURNER: I shall take back not one word of what I said. If you are ready to negotiate, proceed! We are ready on our side.

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GEN HSIEH: Colonel Chang will speak now.

COL CHANG: I think that you had better take the attitude of negotiating on the basis of equal position and continue the negotiations.

GEN HODES: I don't understand that. Can I get it again, please?

COL CHANG: I want to tell you my thought. Your side had better take the attitude to negotiate based on the principle of equality and continue the negotiations here. I think that after five months of negotiations with us you should have attained experience by now. With an effective bragging you have gained only laughter from the other side. I think you understand that. I have received such an impression from your statement in the afternoon. You are intending to gain the results from negotiations which you haven't gained from criminal actions against the Korean People's Democratic Republic! It's useless. I hope that we will try our best to make progress to settle such problems which haven't been settled in our negotiations so far. Any useless words which have nothing to do with this desire are absolutely useless here. That is all.

GEN TURNER: Go ahead, proceed.

GEN HSIEH: This morning I pointed out that from 12 December, for four days consecutively, you have insisted upon your unreasonable proposals, and have taken the attitude of your so-called irresponsiveness to our reasoning. You have refused to listen to us, refused to exchange views and negotiate. This morning I said that I oppose such an attitude of yours and I cited the facts of the past four days as evidence. This afternoon you have not clarified this point. On the contrary, you did nothing for the progress of the conference. You resorted to coercion, and attempted to force us to accept your unreasonable demands. You apparently assumed the attitude of the victor. This morning I also pointed out that our 14 December proposal contains a great concession to your

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) position. And today, on the 15th, after you have had the opportunity to study and analyze our proposal, you still showed such an attitude of refusing to negotiate this morning. And this afternoon, you even exceeded yourself. I suggest that you make a review of the past four days and particularly review your attitude this morning and this afternoon. This is a point you must clarify. Otherwise, if you still take such an attitude, any statements of our side will not be listened to by you.

You asked for something new, but our proposal of the 14th is a new proposal! And it is up to you to indicate your reactions to this new proposal. And it is up to you to show whether you are willing to negotiate, and to carry on the discussions. The issue is clear before you. Which of the two roads are you going to take? The door is always open on our side. I have finished.

GEN TURNER: We have never refused to listen or to exchange views or to negotiate. I repeat for the third time today we are always ready to listen to, and to seriously consider, any proposal which provides for effective supervision of and adherence to the armistice terms, and for prohibition of increase of military capabilities during the armistice. We are ready to listen. Have you anything to offer?

GEN HSIEH: If only your side will change your attitude of refusing to negotiate, if only your side will not take the attitude of a victor, I consider that we can make progress in these negotiations. You have repeatedly stated to this effect. I hope you have done so sincerely.

I now have several questions to ask with regard to your statement this morning. You said this morning that you need rotation. Now in our proposal of 14 December we agreed under the principle that there should be no increase of military forces during the armistice, that both sides can rotate the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) maximum number of 5,000 men monthly. You said the figure 5,000 is not adequate. Our side considers that this figure is a large figure and is sufficient. My first question is: On what reason do you say 5,000 monthly is not adequate? Secondly, a question also in connection with the rotation of personnel. You say that since rotation is permitted, why then should approval be required from the military armistice commission. I would like to ask: Why do you oppose the examination and approval by the military armistice commission? It is obviously its duty to do so. Thirdly, you still seem to require the replenishment of weapons. What is your reason for insisting on this?

I would like you to answer these three questions first.

GEN HODES: I will be very happy to answer those questions. In the first place, that paragraph in your proposal of yesterday, in effect, is exactly the same thing that you had in your previous proposal. It would not permit us to make any rotation even within the 5,000 limit -- I say even within the 5,000 limit -- if your side has the same attitude that it has at this conference table. We have rotation and replenishment now. We are going to continue that rotation and replenishment as long as we wish. We are not going to agree to accept any such restrictions on us which we are not forced to accept under conditions as they exist today. We have in our paragraph on rotation and replenishment the only restriction which is necessary for acceptance, and that is that there will be no increase; and that applies to military capabilities in general. That is a sound provision. You have no reason to continue to fail to accept it. It is fair in the eyes of all people.

This practice of rotation and replenishment is a practice which we enjoy, which we intend to continue to enjoy, and for which there is no need to negotiate. We say that there should be no increase in military forces or capabilities; we believe

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) in that most sincerely. The practice of rotation and replenishment within that limitation -- that is no increase -- is a practice which we intend to continue. I'll say again, there is no necessity to negotiate for the retention of that privilege.

GEN HSIEH: We must reaffirm the principle that, whether it be your side or our side, we should stop continuing to introduce into Korea military forces so that the forces will be increased. The aim of this restriction is to stabilize the armistice. Therefore, both sides should not increase their forces. But your explanations fail to deny the fact that rotation and replacements are a method by which military forces will be increased during the armistice. You said that rotation and replacements are a practice you enjoy and that we have failed to apply any restrictions on you. Similarly, we also can say that we are carrying on replacement of personnel and replenishment of weapons and war material. We were not subjected to your restrictions. If your attempts to restrict us had been effective we could not have carried on the war. We would have retreated to the Yalu River. We would have long ago accepted your unreasonable demands. But such is not the fact.

Do you really believe all those false figures you give in your news reporting to the effect that you have destroyed so many thousands of trucks every night? If you had taken those facts seriously and added them up, it would be astronomical, and we could not have sat here to talk to you. I don't believe you really believe in these figures. Therefore, talking about restrictions, there were no restrictions on either side during the war, and it is only in order to stabilize the armistice that we agree to apply certain restrictions and reasonable restrictions. Such restrictive measures should apply to both sides equally.

By insisting upon continued and unlimited rotation and replacement during the armistice, you obviously attempt to

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) maintain a prolonged state of war in Korea. But this is a thing -- the prolongation of the state of war in Korea -- that your troops and your peoples oppose. There is a contradiction of interests between you and your troops and your peoples. Therefore, you attempt to resort to the method of continued and unlimited rotation and replacement and attempt thereby to disrupt the stability of the armistice. You are attempting to violate with your actual actions the principle of no increase of military forces. We, in our December 14th proposal, agree that a 5,000-man monthly rotation will be permitted, that is, 5,000 to come in and 5,000 to go out every month. That is clearly yet another effort made by our side to break the stalemate in the discussions. And it is also a result of our taking into account the interests of the troops and the peoples of your side. But by agreeing to rotate, we are, at the same time, warned against another result: that is, it may encourage those people who aim at prolonging the state of war in Korea. Therefore, we maintain that there should be certain limitations on it. That is why we proposed that such rotation must be supervised and approved by the military armistice commission.

What is to be examined by the military armistice commission? The commission should see to it that the rotation is actually as you have explained: that is, the veterans should go out and only green troops will come in; and whether it is really not an exchange of a complete regiment or a company for a complete regiment or company. Such examination by the commission is necessary in order to stabilize the armistice because we must take precautions against unlimited increase of military forces during the armistice. And I believe that if the result of supervision by the armistice commission shows that the rotation is actually within the extent stipulated by the armistice

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) agreement or is actually such rotation as your side has explained, then, since our side agrees to the figure of 5,000 monthly, the negotiation process in the military armistice commission will be a mere formality. Our side considers that 5,000 is a large number and it is sufficient to meet the requirement of your side.

I consider my statement just now is what you look for and is an important statement in connection with our attempts at ensuring the effectiveness of the armistice. If your side is sincere in wishing to stabilize the armistice, I can see no reason why you should oppose our proposition.

GEN RODES: We are extremely sincere in wanting to stabilize the armistice to prevent any military capabilities on either side being increased from what they are at the time the armistice becomes effective. But you, in your proposal of the 14th, and prior proposals, have taken away from us, or would take away from us, something which you have no right to take away.

Now you mention restrictions. We agree that each side should be restricted in a number of ways. We restricted in this particular item by saying "no increase", you, on the other hand, left at least a zero off the end of your figure and put a stoppage, or what could be a stoppage, for rotation of even one individual -- and you said nothing about replenishment of equipment. Now with respect to military forces alone, if you want us to agree to stop the introducing of reinforcing military forces into Korea, then we do agree.

GEN HSIEH: No matter how you try to explain or how you use the term "no increase of the level of military forces", you know better than I do that rotation and replenishments are a method of increasing military forces. In our proposal we did not mention the permission of replenishments; that is to say, we think the introduction of military equipment should be outlawed strictly. There

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) is no reason whatsoever for continued introduction of weapons and ammunition into Korea during the armistice because they are no longer needed. This strict restriction on military equipment, proposed by our side applies, of course, to our side as well as your side equally. Since we made that proposal we are fully prepared to abide by this proposal.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything else?

GEN HSIEH: We have made our proposal. We have answered your questions on clarifying our proposal. We have written all our opinions into our proposal. We are now waiting for your comments on our proposal.

GEN RODES: I have just made all the comments I care to make on your paragraph 5. I have no more comments to make on your paragraph 4. There is no change from the previous stand of yours.

GEN TURNER: Let me sum it up. We like the idea of rotation and replenishment. We don't like your proposal of the 14th which would restrict that. We do not consider that rotation, as you have offered it to us, is a negotiable instrument. Let's get on with some other negotiable point. If you have some new negotiable point to bring up, we will be glad to consider it. If you do not have such a point to bring up, what time tomorrow would you like to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: The new points of view of our side, and our positions previously, are written fully and completely in our 14 December proposal. We request your side again to study seriously, consider seriously, and accept this proposal. I agree to your suggestion of recess.

GEN TURNER: When do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: At the usual time.

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Meeting recessed at 1600 hours

(Note: Immediately following recess, Commander Spore contacted Colonel Chang for the specific localities pointed out on map by General Hsieh as those from which United Nations Command naval forces should be withdrawn. Contrary to previous promise, Colonel Chang would not commit himself as to any specific areas. He merely stated that all United Nations Command forces should be withdrawn from the entire coastal areas north of the military demarcation line.)

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr
HALSEY M. SETTLE, JR.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

16 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirteenth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN F M Turner, USAF, and MGEN H I Hodes, USA, Delegates; MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL L G Fill, Jr., USAF, and CPSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

GEN TURNER: We are ready to proceed. Have you anything to offer?

GEN HSIEH: I have nothing to offer.

GEN TURNER: I will make a statement.

As I understand it, these sub-delegations are in disagreement on the following points:

1. The islands.

2. The development of airfields.

3. Replacement and replenishment.

4. A single directing authority for the entire armistice.

5. Aerial observation.

6. The making of the effective date of the armistice coincident with the readiness to operate the supervising organization.

Now, further as I understand it. Your idea of how to resolve these differences lies in your so-called new proposal of 14 December, in which your view of every one of these disagreements is incorporated. Do you not think you are just a bit optimistic? Is that your idea of negotiating? That is all.

GEN HSIEH: I do consider that in our proposal of 14 December we have already incorporated all the reasonable portions of the proposals of both sides. And that it should be the basis for an agreement in principle between both sides in discussing Item 3 of the agenda.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

Why do I say so? Firstly, because you should be able to see that in our 14 December proposal, we have made a concession on the question of rotation, in our paragraph 4. This question is one of what you call disagreements between us. We consider that rotation of 5,000 men a month is not a small number, and such rotation within the number of 5,000 can be carried out provided that the requests are supervised and approved by the armistice commission. We consider that this is a reasonable measure, and also, that you should recognize it as a concession on our part.

As to the question of replenishment, that is, the exchange of military equipment: whatever argument you may employ, you know that under the pretext of such replenishment, you are aiming at increasing your military equipment and introducing into Korea reinforcing military forces. That is an action which we firmly oppose, and which you should not insist upon. Your insistence on the continued introduction into Korea of large quantities of reinforcing military forces only serves to emphasize our concern in connection with the disruption of the stability of the armistice. And it is a point on which we cannot feel secure. Ever since the beginning of the negotiations your side has always shown your side to be reluctant to achieve a thorough settlement of the Korean question. You attempt to maintain a prolonged state of war in Korea. It is from such a point of view that you have insisted upon unreasonable demands including the demand of unlimited introduction into Korea of armed forces, even though the armistice would have been achieved. Therefore, the more you insist on this point, the more you bring doubt in our minds.

As to restrictions: You say that during the hostilities your replacement and replenishment are also not subject to restrictions. This is a point you may already be clear on. Whatever we need for carrying on the war we have gotten, and we

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) have the guarantee in getting it. There has been no restrictions on our replacement and replenishment during the hostilities. This fact, in substance, shows a balance of forces on both sides. It is a fact your side recognized at the beginning of the discussions of Item 3 of the agenda. I believe you still remember your own statement to that effect. Such a balance of forces on both sides is the comprehensive result of all aspects of armed forces. As for the restrictions during the armistice, it is a restriction which applies to both sides, restrictions on your side as well as on our side. And since your side proposes such kind of restrictions, of course our side is prepared to carry it out and abide by it. It is the kind of restrictions which will apply equally to both sides. Therefore, it is reasonable.

Thus far, I have commented on the third so-called disagreement mentioned by your side, the disagreement on the question of replacement and rerlenishment. Now I will speak about the functions and responsibility of the armistice commission.

In paragraph 5 of our 14 December proposal we have stipulated explicitly that the scope of functions and responsibility of the implementation of the armistice agreement and settlement, through negotiations, of any violation of the armistice agreement will be the authority of the armistice commission except for one point--that is, the functions of supervision and inspection which shall be carried out by an organ formed of neutral nations entrusted by both sides. However, the reports made by this supervisory organ of neutral nations will still be dealt with by the military armistice commission. And in paragraph 6 we have provided for the composition and functions of the supervisory organ of neutral nations and also the convenience which should be accorded by both sides to this organ in carrying out its functions. Therefore, our paragraphs 5 and 6 are clearer than before and more reasonable.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

You said that the second disagreement between both sides is in connection with military facilities. You seek to apply restrictions on our military facilities with the argument that you are afraid our side would increase our military forces. I think you should make a careful review of the consistent stand of our side. Ever since the beginning of the negotiations, our side has always maintained that the Korean problem should be settled thoroughly; that is, we should not only take the first step, but closely on its heels we should take the second step--the holding of a conference of a higher level to eliminate the state of war in Korea and to seek for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. And it is also obvious during the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, that our side not only opposes the increase of military forces in Korea, but also suggested that there should be active reduction of military forces in Korea. The above stated reasonable positions of our side speak clearly that we are anxious to see an effective armistice in Korea, and we are sincere for a genuine peace in Korea. Therefore, you should set yourselves at ease on this point and should not harbor unnecessary anxieties. But as an independent and sovereign state, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has every full right to manage any kind of facilities within its territory. It may develop its military facilities or it may not develop such facilities, but whether it will carry out such rehabilitation is entirely within the scope of its internal affairs. Our side will not allow any restriction on our side in this connection in a military armistice, and you can be sure that your attempt at such interference is entirely unreasonable and will be categorically rejected by us.

In your fifth point, you mentioned the question of aerial

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

observation. This is a question of one of the methods of observation which should be dependent upon the question as to what will be the scope and what are the matters to be supervised upon the agreement of both sides. Since both sides have agreed that there should be no continued introduction into Korea of reinforcing military forces during the armistice, and that this stipulation should be supervised and observed at specified ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides, by a supervisory organ of neutral nations; and since such aerial observation as your side advocates is connected with your attempt at interfering in our military facilities, which is not permissable, and unwarranted, then the only stipulation which needs to be supervised and observed is the question of no increase of military forces as I mentioned above. Therefore, this method of aerial observation, and photographic flights, and so on, is a method which is entirely unnecessary and should not be employed since the supervision is only to be applied on the action of no continued introduction into Korea of armed forces. That is why our side opposes yet another of your unreasonable demands, the demand for aerial observation and of photographic flights. If your side admits that there is a balance of military forces between both sides, if your side refrains from taking the attitude of a victor, you should have no reason to ask for flights and aerial observation at will and at random over the sky of an independent state. I don't think you will agree at all to have aerial observation by another country over the sky of the United States.

As to the sixth disagreement cited by you, the question of the effective date of the armistice agreement, we consider that this is a technical question. We think that at the time of the signing of the armistice, we can see whether the armistice commission and the neutral-nations supervisory organ are already

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) organized, or likely to be organized immediately; and according to the situation at that time, we can make an agreement on this fact of effectiveness of the agreement. Therefore, I don't think this is a disagreement between us; it is a question easily to be solved.

Finally, your question - so-called question - of islands, I believe you yourself will admit that it is a question which does not deserve any more disputes between both sides.

In summary, I think there are only two basic reasons for disagreement between your side and our side and there are only two basic solutions for these disagreements. The first point is that both sides should really recognize the fact that both sides are on an equal footing in these negotiations. If either of the two sides attempts to assume the attitude of a victor, and so long as either side insists on its unreasonable demands, there will be no progress in the conference. My second point is that we should clearly separate these military armistice negotiations from the political conference of a higher level. Your side, on the one hand, attempts to avoid and reject the holding of a political conference of a higher level, while on the other hand, you are seeking to get from the discussions and settlement here the fruits that are the business of a political conference. While attempting to evade the responsibility for refusing the holding of a political conference of a higher level, you seek at the same time to gain the fruits which may be yielded by a political conference. So long as you insist upon doing this, you are delaying the negotiations.

I have made my efforts to point out and to recognize the disagreements between us and point out at the same time the way by which we can settle these disagreements. I hope that your side will also make an effort and take a similar attitude to try to solve the disagreements between us, so that an agreement

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) can be reached in the armistice negotiations.

GEN TURNER: In other words, General Hsieh, your long statement amounts to this: you think we should accept your view on all points of disagreement. Do you seriously think of such an attitude as being one of negotiating?

GEN HSIEH: We consider that the position of our side is fair and reasonable.

GEN TURNER: I ask: Is this your concept of negotiating?

GEN HSIEH: I think that if both sides wish to reach an agreement on the armistice, your side can have no reason to oppose the two basic principles I have just enunciated: First, that both sides should take an attitude on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Second, that you should not refuse on the one hand the holding of a political conference of a higher level, while on the other hand you seek to gain the fruits which might be yielded by a political conference.

If you say these two principles are not fair and reasonable, I would like to hear your objections to these principles.

GEN TURNER: General Hsieh, I get the impression that you do not want to negotiate, or that you do not have the authority to negotiate. Which is it?

GEN HSIEH: Since we have come to these talks, of course we are ready to negotiate any question; but perhaps my question just now is difficult for you to answer. Therefore, I would put another question in this way. After you have pointed out the six disagreements between both sides, I have already suggested the basic attitude and the basic principles through which we may find a solution for the six disagreements. Now, since you yourself pointed out these six disagreements, I would like to hear your opinion regarding the settlement of these six disagreements.

GEN TURNER: We propose that you accept our principles included in our proposal of 12 December. What proposal do you have to offer?

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GEN HSIEH: We have offered our 14 December proposal.

GEN TURNER: What have you offered to solve the six points that I brought out this morning which are in disagreement?

GEN HSIEH: I have made a long statement and I only met with your opposition. It is now for me to ask what do you consider could be the solution of these disagreements. Since we made our proposal of 14 December, we have not heard your serious and direct opinion on that proposal, whether you accept it or do not accept it.

GEN HODES: I can answer that very quickly. My answer is the same on your 14 December proposal as it was on your 3 December proposal. The reason that the 14 December proposal was rejected twice by General Turner -- and you force me again to reject it -- was because there is, in effect, no difference between your earlier proposal and your new one. Now, you ask a question for which I have been trying to find a reason; but since I have failed, I am not going to answer the question. You made a statement about negotiating on an equal basis. You know full well that we have always negotiated on an equal basis on our side. However, what you ask us to do on many occasions is to negotiate between illogic and unreasonableness on your side, and logic and reasonableness on ours. Those are not the proper starting points to negotiation. Your statement was to the effect that we evaded the idea of having a final peace conference to settle the Korean question. That again is absolutely incorrect, and you know it. But, in any event, the final peace settlement in Korea has no place in this armistice conference.

Now toward the discussion of the six points that General Turner brought up; with respect to them, I have one or two comments. The first one was your first comment, and it had to do with our paragraph 5, or our principle 5. In listening to you, it occurs to me that the only objection, the only concern, that you have with respect to that principle is that there be no

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) increase. Suppose then that we insert a sentence after the first sentence of our principle 5. It reads substantially as follows: "This restriction means that there shall be no introduction of reinforcing military forces, equipment, materiel, etc." Is that change in principle 5 of ours acceptable under those conditions?

GEN HSIEH: In order to clarify your statement, I would like to know what you mean by "reinforcing"?

GEN HODES: You have used that word at least 20 times within the last week, probably 50 times in the last week. I believe you are in as good a position to answer that question as I am.

GEN HSIEH: Does your revision mean that there should be no limitation at all to your rotation and replenishment?

GEN HODES: The answer to that is "Yes". And I shall now read you as to what "reinforcing" means: "to increase their strength". This dictionary leaves out "air", so I guess we should change that to: "to increase the military, naval or air strength. To add to".

GEN HSIEH: I asked if you mean that there should be no limitation to your rotation and replenishment?

GEN HODES: There shall be no limit to rotation. The limit is that there is no increase. Now, if your answer to that is that you disagree, that you do not agree, then you are violating the principle which you mentioned last -- that one side should not attempt to gain during the armistice something that should be left to the final peace conference. In other words, you are gaining a reduction and, eventually, a complete withdrawal of forces from Korea by attrition.

GEN HSIEH: No, you cannot draw such a conclusion, because the reason we oppose unlimited rotation and replenishment is that they will increase military forces. Since your side has agreed that there should be no continued increase of military forces, you should not insist upon unlimited rotation and replenishment, and you should

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) admit that we have made a great concession by agreeing that there can be 5,000 men rotated by either side every month.

GEN HODES: We don't think so at all. We don't think you made any concession.

Now I will explore another point. Let us discuss one point on a hypothetical basis -- a purely hypothetical basis. Let us suppose that we offered you -- in addition to what we have offered you in our third principle of 12 December -- more islands; the additional islands being those which were formerly controlled by North Korea. What then have you to offer?

GEN HSIEH: I want to clarify a point in your question. You seem to indicate that you are going to give up many islands. I would like to know what islands you would keep.

GEN HODES: I can answer that very quickly, geographically: those islands which before June 25, 1950 belonged to South Korea, outside the territorial waters of the area of Korea that you now hold.

GEN HSIEH: Your suggestion just now is far apart from our position. You know that. Our side maintains that, firstly, a military armistice negotiation should not touch upon the question of territory and territorial waters; secondly, that in order to maintain the stability of the military armistice, both sides should not retain any armed forces in the rear of the other side. Therefore, we consider that your question is partially groundless. Do you agree to this view of ours?

GEN HODES: No!

GEN HSIEH: You seem to suggest that you are being very generous in giving up islands, but we think that according to your concept, you are actually giving up something and taking back something in return. So what you offer is actually nullified by what you want to take back. In putting your question, you seem to think you are proposing a bargain. We do not consider this to be a bargain in any way. But let us put aside this point. We would like to know what do you ask us to offer? And what is the answer you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) are looking for? Because I don't know what you have in mind, I ask these questions.

GEN HODES: Is that all? Well, I am not in the habit of having my questions turned around on me. I ask a question in good faith.

But I have made several attempts to see if there is any way to negotiate, and I end up with the feeling that you either have no authority to negotiate, or you don't want to negotiate.

GEN TURNER: I suggest we recess for lunch and reconvene at 1430.

GEN HSIEH: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1250 hours

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours

GEN TURNER: Just before recessing for lunch, General Hodes asked a question of General Hsieh. Are you prepared to answer that at this time?

GEN HSIEH: I understand that the question General Hodes made this morning was hypothetical. Is my understanding correct?

GEN TURNER: Have you given your answer to that question?

GEN HSIEH: I would like to try to analyze and to sum up the disagreements between us.

First, the question of islands. Through your previous position, your proposal of 12 December, and the hypothetical question General Hodes made this morning, we can see that there is still a difference between both sides, but I think this difference is not difficult to settle.

Second, the question of the effective date of the armistice agreement. There is also a difference in the terms, and the meaning we give to these terms, betwen our proposal, on the one hand, and your proposals of 6 December and 12 December. It has been our consistent stand and we now still hold, that provided we, both sides, have the same objective, namely, an early realization of armistice in Korea, then we should do all in our possibility to see that the armistice agreement becomes effective at the earliest possible date. Now, you, in your proposals

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) since you made your proposal of 6 December, have introduced a paragraph to the effect that the armistice agreement shall not enter into effect until the armistice commission has been organized and is ready to begin to function,

We consider that there may be two reasons for your introducing such a paragraph. Such a stipulation may include the intention of delaying the effectiveness of the armistice agreement. And if it is not for this reason, then perhaps you are really concerned with the possibility that the military armistice commission and the neutral-nations supervisory organ would, indeed, be not ready and not in their proper posts when the terms of the armistice agreement have all been agreed upon, so that a part of the supervision and inspection, as provided by the agreement, could not begin to be effective. Now, if the latter is your real intention, our side can agree to consider a method of settling this difference between us; that is, we can consider employing such a wording as "the signing of the armistice agreement and the date when it comes into effect", coupling those two expressions.

Thirdly, the function and responsibility of the armistice commission and the relation between the commission and the neutral-nations supervisory organ and observer teams. We consider that in trying to settle the differences between both sides on this question, paragraphs 5 and 6 of our 14 December proposal have already incorporated the reasonable portions of your proposal. We consider our paragraphs 5 and 6 are a compromise solution between the views of both sides. Apart from those three questions we have dealt with -- the question of islands, the question of effective date of the armistice agreement, the question of duties and responsibilities of the armistice commission and its relation with the neutral-nations supervisory organ -- apart from these three questions, we consider that

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) there are only two disagreements left; and we recognize that these two disagreements are the serious obstacles between us.

Firstly, a point on which you have insisted and our side has opposed, the question of rotation and replenishment. However you explain this question, I can have only one impression; the more you explain it, the more we are convinced that rotation and replenishment are an increase of military forces. Although you contend that it is not an important question to you, actually you admit that if you do not continue to have rotation, you will not be able to manage your troops; your military forces will be, according to your expression, "reduced by attrition." That bespeaks the importance of rotation on which you insist. The principle of no increase of military forces during the armistice has been our stand and we have been more thoroughgoing than that. We maintain that there should be only outgoing but no incoming of military forces to insure this principle of no increase. Since our side proposed that principle, we were fully prepared to carry it out and to abide by it. Rotation and replenishment are, therefore, not what we need, but what you require. Your insistence on rotation and replenishment can only be interpreted as an attempt to prolong the state of war in Korea after armistice.

However, in order to break the stalemate, and taking into account the interests of your troops and your peoples, our side has made a great concession on this question. That is, we have agreed that, under the over-all principle that there should be no continued introduction of military forces into Korea, there shall be permitted rotation on either side of 5,000 men monthly. We think the figure 5,000 is a large number, because this sum will result in 60,000 a year and 120,000 in two years time; that is a big number, and we consider this is sufficient to meet requirements of your rotation. As for the requests to the armistice commission, and the supervision by it, we consider this to be

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) entirely necessary, and we don't think that this is the reason you oppose our proposal. As for the replenishment of weapons, we consider that unless your side intends to launch attack after a certain duration of the effectiveness of the armistice, you have no reason whatsoever to insist on replenishment of any kind. You have complained that even the figure of 5,000 monthly may be an empty proposal. That is not a correct understanding of our position. The figure of 5,000, to which we have agreed, should come within the scope, and under the principle, of exchange on a man-for-man basis, as you have said; that is, those military personnel rotated should be actually personnel who have served their term of service. If this principle is adhered to, then the examination and approval by the armistice commission will be merely a formality. Of course, if the rotation is not adherent to this principle of man-for-man exchange, then it will meet opposition. Now on this question -- the question of rotation which we previously opposed -- we made a concession on 14 December; the reasons for our doing so I have fully explained and need no repetition. So this is a clear case in which you have consistently insisted, and our side has made a great concession toward your side. I shall call this the fourth point.

Then I come to the fifth point. My fifth point is your persistent attempt to restrict our rehabilitation of facilities after the armistice, and the related unreasonable demand of your side to carry out free aerial observation. The substance of these two demands is interference in our internal affairs, and it has been firmly and consistently opposed by our side. You resort to the pretext of feeling insecure, and actually aim at interfering in our internal affairs. As to the feeling of security--that is, our sincerity toward peace--I have made repeated explanations and I am not going to repeat myself. We consider that

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) if your side does not assume the attitude of a victor -- as you protest that you do not -- and do not try to coerce us into accepting your unreasonable demands, if your side really is not attempting to force us to accept a term which should be discussed by a political conference but not in such a military conference, then you have no justification to insist upon such an unreasonable demand. Although you know perfectly well that we are resolutely and consistently opposed to such an unreasonable demand from your side, yet you, up to today, have not shown the slightest indication of abandoning such an unreasonable position.

The situation is very clear. The points 4 and 5 I mentioned -- the question of rotation and replenishment, and the question of whether there should be interference in the internal affairs -- are the two main obstructions in the way of progress of this sub-committee, and our attitude in trying to settle these questions is clearly indicated in our proposal of 14 December. Therefore, the question is now laid before your side. That is, is your side really having the same objective as we do; namely, the early realization of armistice and an early agreement on Item 3 of the agenda? If you really cherish the same objectives, then it is your turn to take the next step and to indicate your attitude. I am ready to hear any opinion you have with regard to the settling of these two questions.

GEN HODES: You brought up two major problems. The first one has to do with rotation and replenishment. The right of rotation and replenishment without, I repeat <u>without</u>, increasing the level in Korea is not a negotiatory position of this delegation. In other words, it is not in question. It is our firm intent that we will rotate and we will replenish. As to your second large area of disagreement, which has to do with what you call restrictions, we have asked for no restrictions and for no privileges that do not obtain today. In fact, we ask fewer restrictions to a great

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GEN HODES: (Cont'd) degree--fewer restrictions to a great degree. Now the subject of restrictions was very clearly covered yesterday by our side, and if you have nothing new, I suggest we recess until tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: I agree to your proposal of recessing until tomorrow, but I want to make clear a point and your attitude in raising this question. I just heard you say that you are not asking for anything which you do not obtain today. What are you referring to? Are you trying again to use, in a covert form, your arrogant attitude of yesterday? I want to get this point clear.

GEN TURNER: We are only attempting to be realists.

GEN HSIEH: I call your serious attention to the attitude of our side today in trying to settle the question before us. The proper attitude to be taken in settling the question is to negotiate. You have your right to choose your attitude, so do we. But if you do not take an attitude of settling questions, then you cannot escape the responsibility of delaying the negotiations.

I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1600 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

17 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fourteenth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL R A Maddox, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: The United Nations Command wishes to inform you that Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh, United States Army, has been designated as the United Nations Command Delegate in lieu of Major General Henry I. Hodes, United States Army. Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh is now seated as a member of the United Nations Command delegation. I herewith present his credentials.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: I have nothing further at this time.

GEN HSIEH: Yesterday afternoon I summed up the six differences which exist between the views of both sides, and I pointed out that the crucial disputes between us are only two: first, rotation and replenishment, on which your side has always insisted; and second, interference in our internal affairs, as unreasonably demanded by your side from the beginning of the discussions of Item 3, and such interference has been consistently opposed by our side. I wish you will give a formal reply on these two questions.

GEN TURNER: As our side told you yesterday, and as we have consistently stated since the start of these discussions, the only limitation upon rotation and replenishment that is acceptable to us is the limitation placed in our principle 5 -- that there be no increase.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) To our side, this is no longer a negotiable point. We have told you many times previously our stand in reference to the restriction on the rehabilitation and construction of airfields and air facilities. I think there can be no doubt in your mind as to what our stand is on that point.

Now, yesterday we proposed to you a hypothetical question which had to do with the islands. We have not as yet received a clear, succinct answer to that question. Do you have the answer now?

GEN HSIEH: You raised again the hypothetical question about the islands. This is a question to which I have already given a clear answer yesterday afternoon. You yourselves will admit that this is actually a minor question. However, even if we take your hypothesis yesterday, there still exists certain differences between the views of both sides; yet our side considers that since it is a minor question, it will not be difficult to settle this difference between us.

As for rotation and replenishment, you have only repeated this morning your previous position -- that is, you wish to increase your military forces unlimitedly during the armistice. Among the arguments you use in support of such an unreasonable demand of your side, you firstly argued that it is your intention to continue such a practice of your side; and you argue that there is no necessity to negotiate this point of continuing a sort of privilege on your part. However, when you tried to argue for your demand, you failed to make your arguments fit with each other. You could not but admit that rotation and replenishment are, in fact, a means to increase continuously your military forces: for instance, the exchange of new weapons for worn-out and old weapons; and exchange of troops which have not tasted the the bitterness of war in Korea with those who oppose the war in Korea and are in low spirits, so as to try to maintain temporarily

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the morale of your troops. These facts show clearly that by rotation and replenishment it is your intention to increase your military forces.

Therefore, your paragraph 5 -- the so-called principle of no increase -- is, in effect, a demand for us not to increase, while you will have the privilege to increase your military forces. Is it not obvious that you yourselves oppose your principle 5? If you still insist upon unlimited rotation and replenishment during the armistice, then you should first of all cancel your principle 5; and if your side really is ready to cancel your principle 5, then you will recall and you will admit that the five-principle proposal of 27 November made by our side has its merits, because in that proposal we have included all that is needed in a military armistice. That is a solution simple and practicable, because by that proposal there would be no need to have inspection of the rear, and no need to invite neutral nations to supervise and inspect the armistice. That could be the most simple and practicable solution. With the above reasoning, I have sufficiently refuted one of your erroneous arguments in support of your unlimited rotation and replenishment.

The second argument you used to support your unreasonable demand for unlimited rotation and replenishment is that your rotation and replenishment are not subject to restriction during the war, or during the hostilities, and, therefore, during the armistice there should be no restriction on them. This is obviously a purely subjective point of view. I must call your attention to the fact that rotation and replenishment, as a privilege, is not only possessed by your side, but also by our side. And during the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, you have already admitted the fact that there exists a situation of balance of power between both sides, and that the only way out of this balance or stalemate is armistice. Now, if you admit

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) such is the case, then you must see that such a balance is a comprehensive result of various factors. It is a result of all military factors and including other factors. Therefore, the conclusion we have to draw from this fact is that, first, during the armistice both sides should have the privilege of rotation and replenishment; and, secondly, if we want to apply restrictions, then the restrictions should be applied on your side as well as our side.

You have claimed to be a military realist. If you are indeed a realist, you cannot deny the existing military realities; and you should not overthrow what you yourself have admitted, that there exists a balance of military forces between both sides. I have, with the above reasoning, refuted the second argument you have used in support of your unlimited rotation and replenishment.

Your third argument in support of unlimited rotation and replenishment is that this is your daily practice, and there is no need to report to the armistice commission and to ask to be subject to its examination and approval. If such argument is tenable, then, firstly, you should not have advanced the principle of no increase of military forces during the armistice; and, secondly, you should not have advanced the requirement of inspection of the rear; and, thirdly, you should not have advanced the requirement of the establishment of a military armistice commission. If this is not your real meaning, then in order to insure that such rotation of your side is not, in fact, an increase of military forces, but on the contrary is, as you say, just an exchange on man-for-man basis, then such rotation must be supervised by the armistice commission and must be subject to the inspection and approval of the neutral-nations supervisory organ. From the statement I made before, in refutation of your unreasonable demand for unlimited rotation and replenishment, it

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

can be seen that if you still insist upon unlimited rotation and replenishment, you are only opposing your own principle.

Now, what is the attitude and the action we have taken on this question? We originally proposed our five-principle proposal, which was very simple and which we considered as sufficient for an armistice. Then you insisted upon inspection of the rear, and you insisted that there should be laid down the principle of no increase of military forces during the armistice. We agreed to the principle of no increase of military forces. We even went further than that; we contended that there should be active reduction of forces and that there should be laid down the principle of only outgoing but no incoming of military forces, so as to guarantee the implementation of this principle of no increase of military forces. That is a very fair and reasonable contention. But you came forward again and insisted upon rotation, saying that is indispensable for your side; and we again made a concession on 14 December by agreeing that there will be permitted the rotation of 5,000 men both ways monthly. We consider that figure is sufficient to meet the requirements of your side. On the question of inspection of the rear also, we were originally opposed to that firmly, whereas you insisted upon such inspection. In order to break the deadlock, our side again made a concession on this point and proposed that neutral nations should be invited to form a supervisory organ and its observer teams to carry out such inspection. You cannot but admit from these facts that on this question our side has been making concessions, not only once, but twice and thrice.

Finally, in your statement, you again raised your unreasonable demand for restrictions on our dealings with our own facilities during the armistice, and for the related free access for inspection in the rear, and for aerial reconnaissance. In support of such unreasonable demand, you said that you are

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) concerned about such action on our side, but we have repeatedly and solemnly explained the fact that you should not be concerned with this and that we have sincerity, not only toward the armistice but also to a peace settlement of the Korean question. I am not going to repeat this point here, but I must seriously and unmistakably state once again that we are opposed to such an unreasonable demand of your side, because it is purely within the confines of internal affairs. We would like you to understand that point without any mistake; that it is our consistent, resolute, and unshakable position that there should be no interference in this respect.

Our side has repeatedly made such concessions as are possible on the question of your demand for rotation and replenishment, but your side has not given any indication on the question of unreasonable insistence in interfering with our internal affairs. Today is the fourth day after we have made our proposal of 14 December, and I wish you will give a formal answer to that proposal.

GEN TURNER: Now, let's get back to the hypothetical question which we asked yesterday relative to the islands. You stated this morning that you gave us a clear answer yesterday. Both yesterday and this morning you said that you believed that the question of the islands could be solved. In this connection, you pointed out two major issues between us: rotation and replenishment, and rehabilitation of airfields and air facilities. We have repeatedly explained to you that the matter of rotation and replenishment is not subject to negotiation. The words "rotation" and "replenishment" do not appear in the United Nations Command's proposed principles. Rotation and replenishment is our firm intent, regardless of what principles are agreed upon governing Item 3 of the agenda. I believe you are aware of this. From your answer of yesterday, which this morning you say is a clear answer, we have gained certain impressions. I should like now to

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) find out from you if these impressions are correct. Is it correct that you are suggesting, as a solution to our disagreements, that in return for our side conceding to you all the islands formerly under your control, your side will accept the United Nations Command's principle 5?

GEN HSIEH: We have repeatedly pointed out that the withdrawal of all armed forces from the rear of the other side with the demarcation line as the dividing line is a matter already provided for in the agreement on Item 2 of the agenda. Your withdrawal from the islands behind the demarcation line, and your withdrawal of your naval forces from behind that line, are what you are bound by duty to do. And this is moreover a minor point. Yet you seem to take this minor question as a big gift you are presenting to us in the attempt that in return you will get unlimited rotation and replenishment, and unlimited interference in our internal affairs. I believe that in your heart of hearts you will admit this is absolutely unfair and absolutely unacceptable to us.

To expect to exchange such a small so-called gift with such two big points -- how could you expect that such a suggestion would be acceptable to our side? Would it not be too ideal as you have visualized? I am sure that you yourselves do not believe such an exchange is fair or reasonable. In order to insure against any more mistakes on your part, I will tell you once more that our side absolutely will not tolerate any interference in our internal affairs. It is a condition which we absolutely cannot accept. You say that your insistence of rotation -- on unlimited rotation and replenishment -- is not a negotiable point and is not included in your paragraph 5. You should not forget that it is included in our paragraph 6, as early as our 3 December proposal. We firmly maintain that in order to assure that there will be no increase of military forces, there should be only outgoing but no incoming of military forces. And you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) also should not forget that we have made a concession on this point. I would like you to answer such a question: Are you intending to continue your proposal, your insistence on interfering in our internal affairs? I wish you will make this point clear.

GEN TURNER: Now going back once more to the hypothetical question which we gave you yesterday and to which you this morning stated you have given us a clear answer; I have told you that we gained certain impressions from your answer. You now state that the impressions we gained from your so-called clear answer are erroneous. I ask you now: What then did you mean to convey by your so-called clear answer of yesterday? If you have any real desire to negotiate you will abandon your tactics of evasion and get down to brass tacks. What did you mean to convey by your answer?

GEN HSIEH: Regarding the so-called question of islands, I have already given my answer and I will not repeat it. We consider that the main questions at issue are your insistence on rotation and replenishment, and the interference of the internal affairs, which our side constantly opposed. I am ready to hear any opinion of your side on the question of the settlement of these two questions.

GEN TURNER: If you need more time in order to obtain an answer to our very clear question, we are agreeable that you take the additional time. When do you think you will have it?

GEN HSIEH: I need no time at all for answering that question. I have answered it many times, and clearly. Once again I remind you that I have left you two questions by my statement of yesterday, and these two questions I have raised again this morning. They concern rotation and replenishment on which your side consistently insisted, and the opposition to interference in the internal affairs to which our side has consistently insisted. It is high time for your side to indicate your attitude on these two questions. Ever since our side made our proposal of 14 December, I have been asking two questions, and I pointed out these questions

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) particularly clearly yesterday afternoon and this morning, because these are the questions on which we have the greatest disputes. If you need additional time for considering and answering these questions, we can agree to it.

GEN TURNER: Ever since 4 December we have attempted to get a clear answer from you on the island question. The first point of the question hinged around your meaning of the term "coastal". To this day, to this minute, we have received no clear indication of your effort to solve the island question. Yesterday we asked you: If we surrendered to you those islands which we now hold that were formerly yours and that were north of the demilitarized zone, what would you give up in return. This is our sincere effort to get along with the negotiations. To that question, you have not given us an answer which we understand. Can't you give us a clarification now which will be understandable to us? The impression that I am beginning to get is that you expect us to abandon these islands to your side. Is it possible that that is what you consider a solution to the island question? That is all.

GEN HSIEH: You raised repeatedly the so-called question of islands. I will again try to clarify this matter. The fixing of the demarcation line, as the line from the other side of which either side should withdraw its armed forces, is an agreement already reached on Item 2 of the agenda. The withdrawal by both sides from the rear of the other side with the demarcation line as the dividing line, after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, is a thing which both sides are bound in duty to do. The willingness of your side to give up those islands is only an indication of your willingness to abide by a part of the agreement reached on Item 2 of the agenda. As I said yesterday in trying to analyze six disagreements existing between both sides, there is no bargain to be made on this question. There is only a question of the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) implementation of, and adherence to, agreement. The questions on which we should earnestly make our efforts to settle are the questions I have repeatedly raised; namely, the question of limitation on rotation and replenishment, and the question of no interference in the internal affairs. If you need more time to answer these questions, we can give you time.

GEN TURNER: We need no more time, but before we recess for lunch, let me make one point abundantly clear to you. If you think that any agreement now exists between your side and our side by which the United Nations is obligated or is compelled to abandon any islands we now control, you are totally and seriously in error. I suggest we reconvene at 1400.

GEN HSIEH: I can only say that you will have the freedom to interpret the agreement at your own will, but we cannot agree to such an interpretation. I agree to recess.

Meeting recessed at 1236 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1400 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to offer, any opinion with regard to the two questions I have asked repeatedly regarding our proposal of 14 December? I would like to hear your answer.

GEN TURNER: We have answered the two questions previously. I could re-read them to you from the record, but I feel that that would only be a needless waste of time. You may review them from your record. Have you anything to offer?

GEN HSIEH: Do you need additional time for the answering of these two questions? If you need it, we can agree.

GEN TURNER: It is apparent that you need more time to study over the answers that have been previously given by our side to your questions. Need we waste time here re-reading those answers. Have you anything else to offer?

GEN HSIEH: In order to save time, if you have nothing new, there is no need for you to repeat what you have said. As to the question you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) raised, I have long ago completely answered them and I have no need to repeat those answers.

GEN TURNER: Is that all? Since you have nothing new to offer, what time would you like to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: As you wish.

GEN TURNER: At the usual time tomorrow morning?

GEN HSIEH: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1407 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

18 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifteenth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL R A Maddox, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; Sr CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: We have pointed out that there exists between both sides two crucial points of disagreement. Firstly, your insistence upon interference in our internal affairs by meddling with our facilities and by carrying out free inspection on our side. Secondly, your repeated insistence on unlimited rotation and replenishing. These two points of disagreement have been pointed out by us a long time ago. We have not yet received your answer to them. I would like to hear your opinion about the solving of these two questions.

GEN TURNER: We refer you to the record of 15 December.

GEN HSIEH: I have not brought the record, could you please repeat your opinion?

GEN TURNER: I feel that this is quite a waste of time, but since you asked for it, I will re-read my statement of 15 December, at least that portion of it which pertains to rotation and replenishment and to the question of internal affairs and airfields. Do you desire that I read this in English, or will it be sufficient if the interpreters give the interpretation of it?

GEN HSIEH: Will you please read in English?

GEN TURNER: Is there any desire on your part as to the speed with which I read this?

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GEN HSIEH: Just as you like.

GEN TURNER: Very well, I quote verbatim from the record of 15 December: "The question of no rotation and replacement. We have heard your explanation, 'there should be only outgoing and no incoming of military forces', so many times that you need not repeat it again. You know the figure of 5,000, even if permitted by your new principle, is wholly inadequate. We know as well as you know that this is your idea of forcing a withdrawal of troops by the attrition process. You are well aware of our firm stand in this matter of withdrawal of troops since the beginning of the armistice talks. We do not intend to change our stand. All your talk about 'contradictions' and 'increasing the military capabilities' has no validity and you know it. It is your side that has been inconsistent and contradictory about these matters. You blandly state that you intend to increase your military capabilities during the armistice by rehabilitation and construction of airfields, since this is an internal affair. Then, in the same breath, you insist the United Nations Command must reduce its military capabilities by not introducing replacements for rotation purposes, except for the token number of 5,000 monthly; and even that you could prohibit. We will not be responsive to this illogical argument any longer.

"Third, the question of internal affairs. You have persistently stated that our principle 5 which prohibits the rehabilitation, expansion and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities, and construction of new airfields and new aviation facilities, interferes in the internal affairs of your side. You have also stated many times that effective inspection, such as aerial photography and aerial reconnaissance, is an internal problem. However you may clothe in words your desire to increase your aviation capabilities, the bare fact is that you seek to increase your military capabilities during

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) armistice. You wish to gain a military capability you do not now have. That is inadmissable. It is only with the recognition of this important fact that we can achieve an effective armistice.

"We have assured you any number of times that the United Nations Command has no desire whatsoever to interfere with your internal affairs. However, we have no intentions of letting you build up your airfields and aviation so as to increase your air force capabilities during the armistice, and we expect to see that aerial reconnaissance is employed as one of the means of determining compliance with this.

"It is not because we are interfering with your internal affairs that you keep bringing this subject up; rather, it is very clear that you have ulterior motives. We would like to know just what your motives are for wanting to rehabilitate, expand, and improve your airfields and aviation facilities, and just what is your reason for not wanting effective inspection by aerial photography and aerial reconnaissance. As you well know, this inspection will be carried out by the neutral-nations inspecting teams, and this will not interfere with your internal affairs, unless you are planning to violate the agreements of the armistice. Therefore, the restriction of construction of new airfields and air facilities, of rehabilitation, expansion and improvement of existing airfields and air facilities, and a thorough observation throughout Korea as agreed upon, is the only answer to a successful execution of the armistice."

GEN HSIEH: I listened carefully to yet another reiteration of your unreasonable views upon the two crucial questions which our side considers must be settled. And your statement is no progress at all compared with our proposal of 12 December. On the contrary, you seem to have retreated to your stand of 27 November. Thus, you have caused me to wonder what is your intention. Are you attempting to pull backwards the discussions instead of pushing

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) it forward?

GEN TURNER: Have you anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: My question just now is a new question you have not answered.

GEN TURNER: If you have nothing new to offer, and it appears that you do not, what time tomorrow would you like to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: If you need time in order to bring forward your opinion regarding the settlement of these two major questions, then you can choose the time as you like. Our side does not need more time.

GEN TURNER: Apparently time means very little to your side. You have requested me to re-read the statement we made on 15 December. I suggest that you take sufficient time to study the record of events that have transpired at these meetings, and that when you come back, you be prepared to offer something new. I have nothing further to say.

GEN HSIEH: One more word from me would be superfluous, but in order to remind you of a fact, I will yet make a statement.

I again call your serious attention to the fact that our side made a major concession on 3 December, in order to break the grave deadlock existing between us at that time. And our side again made a concession on 14 December on the question of rotation, on which your side consistently insisted.

We consider that by these actions we have done all that we can do, within reasonable limits, regarding the unreasonable demands you have insisted upon. And it is a great regret that for so many days, your side has not indicated a single sign of giving up your insistence upon the interference in our internal affairs. If you intended to delay the negotiations, you have the full right to do so. But I must point out seriously that if you do not pay earnest consideration to these questions, then you will not be able to escape the responsibility for delaying the conference.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Whatever time you need for thinking over these questions, we can agree that you have it. Our side does not need any time, and if you are not yet authorized to discuss these questions, I suggest that you ask for this authority from your superiors. We will agree to recess now, but as to the time for reconvening, it can be left to your decision.

GEN TURNER: Carefully I have listened to your statement and find nothing new therein. When you are ready to reconvene, after studying the record and, if necessary, bringing it with you to this conference, we will be ready to meet you. You name the time.

GEN HSIEH: I tell you once again we do not need time. What is the fact since we began to discuss Item 3 of the agenda? Our side submitted our first proposal on 27 November, and you submitted a revised proposal on the same day. Then we submitted a revised proposal on 3 December and it was not until after nine days that you submitted your revised proposal on 12 December. Then, again, our side made a grave concession and revised our proposal on 14 December. Now, our side has thrice submitted our proposals; therefore, the next step is up to you to take. The consideration is up to you to make, we do not need more time.

We did not suggest to recess; since you suggested to recess, you should name the time for the reconvening of the conference.

GEN TURNER: The time, I suggest, is that time when you will be prepared to present something new.

GEN HSIEH: I tell you once again, do not be mistaken! We do not need time. Efforts should be made on both sides. On our part, we have made efforts three times. The next step is for you to take. By the term efforts, I have only referred to the efforts we have been taking during the discussions of Item 3 of the agenda. I have not referred to the efforts we have been making throughout the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) whole conference. The peoples of the world have clear sight, and they can see for themselves which side has been delaying, and which side has been contributing to, the progress of the conferences.

GEN TURNER: Is that all?

GEN HSIEH: That is all.

GEN TURNER: Noted. 1100 hours tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: We hope that when the meeting is reconvened tomorrow, you will bring your new views and make new contributions toward the settlement of these two crucial questions between us.

Meeting adjourned at 1145 hours

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

19 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixteenth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL R A Maddox, USAF, CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you any new suggestions today as to the solution of the main disputes between both sides in connection with Item 3 of the agenda, as I hoped for yesterday before the conclusion of our session?

GEN TURNER: Yesterday you delivered a review of the so-called concessions made by your side in the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda. Your review was made in your own rights and, consequently, was prejudiced, biased, and subjective. The statements you have made recently reveal such a distorted point of view as to render it virtually certain the distortion is deliberate, designed to further purposes which are known only to you. Nonetheless, in the fast dimming hope that some glimmer of truth may penetrate, I will attempt once again to reach you with facts.

On 27 November, in the initial discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, your side presented a set of five principles. These five principles were designed to produce a cease-fire in Korea and nothing more. On the same day the United Nations Command presented a set of seven principles designed to produce an equitable, secure, and stable military armistice. Thus, on the first day, the basic issue between your side and ours was plainly delineated. You wanted a cease-fire -- we wanted an armistice. In this first

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) exchange, the specifics of the basic disagreements were made clear. The United Nations Command proposal contained a provision prohibiting an increase of military capabilities during the armistice. Your five-point proposal made no mention of this. Thus, from the outset, it was clear that your side wanted to build up your military capabilities during the armistice. The United Nations Command proposal provided for adequate observation of points throughout Korea, so as to insure that neither side failed to adhere to the armistice terms. Your five-point proposal made no mention of this. Thus, from the outset, it was clear that your side had in mind actions, during the armistice, which could not bear observation. The United Nations Command proposal provided for withdrawal by the forces of each side from the territory controlled by the other side. Your five-point proposal did make mention of this, arrogating to your side islands which you have never controlled, which are not in your territorial water, and which you have not won and could not win in battle. Thus, from the outset, it was clear that your side sought to gain through negotiations what it could not gain by combat.

The next step was taken by your side on 3 December. On that date you proposed two additional principles. The first of these was designed to produce, during the period of armistice, a withdrawal of forces from Korea by attrition. You introduced this transparent device even though you know full well the United Nations Command has never had any intention of agreeing to withdrawal of forces from Korea in these armistice negotiations. Thus, your side attempted to accomplish covertly what had been decisively rejected by the United Nations Command as inappropriate to a military armistice. Even though you had agreed with this United Nations Command view in connection with the development of the agenda, you sought to reintroduce your irrational concept.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd)

Under the pressure of logic and reason, you were forced to bow to the necessity of observation in your rear. You accepted this inescapable requirement, but you sought to vitiate it by severely limiting its application to "ports of entry" -- which you refused to define -- and to the attrition principle aforementioned. You labeled these two new principles, both of which advanced your purposes, as great concessions to the views of the United Nations Command. What a travesty of truth!

On 6 December, the United Nations Command submitted a further proposal of eight principles, revising our original seven principles to make them clearer and more explicit, in the interest of a stable, equitable armistice. Since you apparently do not desire such an armistice, you railed at these principles. You recognized that they tended to block whatever schemes you have in mind. You were unwilling to accept a truly fair, truly effective armistice.

On 12 December, the United Nations Command proposed yet another set of principles, this time seven in number. The United Nations Command did this even though your side had proffered nothing since 6 December, when the United Nations Command had submitted its seven-point proposal. In this new seven-point proposal, the United Nations Command conceded to you that observation in the rear should be by representatives of neutral nations. The United Nations Command conceded to you that islands within your territorial waters now controlled by the United Nations Command should be turned over to you. Again you railed at this proposal as unfair to you.

On 14 December, you presented a proposal which for hypocrisy can have no peer, and few equals. You adopted none of the United Nations Command views on outstanding disagreements. You conceded nothing whatever. You wrote into your proposal an absurd attempt to limit the rotation of United Nations Command forces in Korea, and even this you subjected to the approval of the military

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) armistice commission, knowing you could use your membership therein to block any action you desired to block. Thus, your so-called "new" proposal, under careful analysis, was found to be merely a rewording of your proposal of 3 December. Thus your proposal was another wolf in sheep's clothing.

Constantly you have offered bagatelles in exchange for huge concessions by the United Nations Command. Constantly you have put in a peck and demanded that we contribute a bushel. Worse, your pecks, on examination, turned out to be short measures.

Of late, you have lamented the firm insistence of the United Nations Command on no rehabilitation of airfields during the period of armistice. You cry that this is interference with your internal affairs. You demand that you be permitted to build up your defunct aviation facilities, for what purpose only you know. We have stated innumerable times that the United Nations Command will not -- repeat will not - agree to the rehabilitation of airfields in Korea during armistice. Yet, it seems that this reasonable extension during armistice of the de facto situation at present, constitutes a burning issue in your point of view. Without reason, without logic, without the least pretense at realism, you reiterate your threadbare theme that a prohibition of rehabilitation of airfields is interference with your internal affairs.

You return again and again to the false theme that restrictions upon increasing military capabilities during armistice is an unwarranted interference in your internal affairs. Let us examine this question in a purely objective manner, without heat, without false pride, and without bias.

You are perfectly well aware that at present your railroads and roads are broken and interdicted repeatedly. There is constant danger to all who travel them. You know, also, that this situation does not obtain on our side.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) You are aware that behind your lines, communication centers lie devastated, docks are destroyed, plants which produce the sinews of war are piles of wreckage. You know that even if you attempted to rebuild these military facilities, your efforts would be destroyed before they were fairly begun. You know that this situation is not paralleled behind our lines.

You are aware that your concentrations of military supplies, wherever located in Korea, are subject to attack at any instant, and are attacked frequently.

You know that as a result of the strangling effect of United Nations Command operations, your importation into Korea of materials other than those essential to war has been virtually prohibited. As a result, your civilian standard of living has deteriorated. You know this is not the case behind our lines.

You know that your airfields are constantly being attacked, keeping these facilities in an unusable condition. You know only too well the operational condition of the United Nations Command airfields.

That is the situation at present -- and I have given it without any attempt at braggadocio. What happens during armistice? You can rebuild your railroads, bridges, and roads without interference and use them with impunity.

You can rehabilitate your communication centers and your lines of communication, and employ them freely without interruption. You can rebuild your productive facilities, repair your ports, begin the importation of materials and food designed to improve the lot of the people under your control. You will be relieved of the attrition of your military supplies which result from attacks on concentrations of these. All of these things you gain from the mere fact of armistice. There is no comparable gain for the United Nations Command. In return for conceding to you these tremendous military advantages, all that we ask is an

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) effective prohibition of the rehabilitation and construction of airfields, a prohibition to be applied equally to both sides. Military men, who know that war is hell, and who therefore can appreciate fully the advantages of halting war, know that the United Nations Command proposal constitutes a great concession to your side. You know it perhaps even better than we do. The facts of war in Korea are not to be denied. Therefore, let us face these facts as realists and agree that under the terms of the United Nations Command proposal you gain a military advantage and lose nothing.

Let us be sure you understand that the interference in your internal affairs to which you so vehemently object -- upon the signing of the armistice, all of this interference will be eliminated except one item, and only one item, airfields. You must recognize that this is a great concession to you. Your proposal of 14 December, on the contrary, was a hollow gesture, signifying nothing, conceding nothing. We await some serious effort on your part to resolve our disagreements. That is all.

GEN HSIEH: I have listened carefully and analyzed every sentence of your long statement which took you 65 minutes. Yet, when I came to the end of your statement, I failed to see what is your objective in making such a long statement. Before I make comments on it, I wish you will tell me directly what your objective is in doing so. Is it for pushing forward the work in the sub-committee on Item 3 of the agenda, or just to leave both sides stalemated as we have been since more than 20 days ago? I would like you to answer that question first.

GEN TURNER: It is quite evident that you need considerably more time to study the statement I have just made. My objective is to convince you, if possible, that the United Nations Command position on our principle 5 is firm.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) effective prohibition of the rehabilitation and construction of airfields, a prohibition to be applied equally to both sides. Military men, who know that war is hell, and who therefore can appreciate fully the advantages of halting war, know that the United Nations Command proposal constitutes a great concession to your side. You know it perhaps even better than we do. The facts of war in Korea are not to be denied. Therefore, let us face these facts as realists and agree that under the terms of the United Nations Command proposal you gain a military advantage and lose nothing.

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GEN HSIEH: The impression you gave me is that you want us to accept your 12 December proposal in its entirety, and that apart from this you will do nothing, you will make no efforts any more to expedite the discussions. Is my impression correct?

GEN TURNER: Again I say, you apparently need more time to analyze and digest the statement that I have made to you this morning. In it I have shown you that all of the concessions that have been made thus far have been made by our side. You have conceded nothing.

GEN HSIEH: I tell you again, and again, and for innumerable times, that we have studied your proposal for innumerable times, and we have given sufficient and full consideration to it. We must say that on our part we have made all the concessions that are possible; as a result, the proposal we have last made is reasonable to both sides. It is now your turn to give your indication and you must tell me directly what is the objective of such a long statement of yours this morning. Do you mean by it that it is only for us to accept your 12 December proposal as a whole, and there is no other way out? I would like you to answer that question by "Yes" or "No", only one word is enough. If it takes you more time to answer that question, we can agree to let you have time.

GEN TURNER: Is that all?

GEN HSIEH: That is all.

GEN TURNER: We have tried to convince you that our proposal is fair, that we actually give you great advantages, and that we have done a great deal more than your side has done toward advancing these negotiations. It is now your side's turn to show that you are sincere in getting on with these negotiations toward an effective armistice. You say, and I quote: "We have made all the concessions it is possible for us to make on our side." Do you mean then, that unless we accept your proposal of 3 December, that no progress, no further progress, can be made?

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GEN HSIEH: Third of December, is that right?

GEN TURNER: The third of December! We realize, as you must, that there is no difference between your proposal of 14 December from your proposal of 3 December.

GEN HSIEH: It is apparent that no effort on one side alone can bring about the armistice. It is apparent, also, that by the efforts of one side alone, we cannot save much time. I do not intend to repeat much of what I have already said, but you are now compelling me to give an over-all comment on your long statement. Do you wish that I repeat my refutations, already made in former sessions, with regard to your long statement just now? If you wish it, I can do it.

GEN TURNER: I have no desire to listen to a repetition of what you have said before. If you have anything new that is logical and reasonable, our side is only too willing to listen. Have you anything new, logical, and reasonable to offer?

GEN HSIEH: What I said is reasonable, and I have the privilege to make my statement which is reasonable; you have no right to prevent me from doing so.

In the first part of your long statement, you attempted to explain which of the two sides has been making concessions in the discussions of the third item of the agenda. You may have intended to try to convey the idea that it is your side which has been making the concessions, and that it is your side which made the first concessions. But since you have taken a wrong position and a wrong method, the conclusion you have drawn is also incorrect. I will now cover the same examples you have cited to show that you have not made any concessions. You have been wrong.

You started upon the proposals made by both sides on 27 November. You say that our five-principle proposal was not complete and that it was inadequate to ensure an effective armistice; and you said also that your seven-principle proposal could ensure

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) an effective armistice. But I must tell you that our five-principle proposal, made on 27 November, was made under the fundamental understanding by our side and the consistent stand of our side that after the realization of military armistice in Korea, there should be convened speedily a conference of a higher level. Therefore, in our 27 November proposal, we have provided everything that should be provided for, that should be discussed and settled in a military armistice. On the one hand, your seven-principle proposal of 27 November apparently included things which should have been discussed by a political conference and not by a military conference. Your side, on the one hand, tried to evade and to refuse the holding of a conference of a higher level to achieve a thorough settlement of the Korean question. Yet, on the other hand, your side attempts to discuss, in these military armistice negotiations, topics which are political, and you attempt to gain the result of such a kind of discussion. You attempted to impose your accustomed practice of interference in the internal affairs of other states on us, on a sovereign and independent state; that is a shameful attempt which our side has firmly opposed. That is the stalemate which resulted from the proposals of both sides on 27 November.

There is a basic difference between the two proposals made on 27 November. Our side aimed at strictly separating these military negotiations from the political conference of a higher level. We are not satisfied with a military armistice conference; we maintained that there should be convened speedily after armistice a political conference of a higher level to achieve peace in Korea. That is to say, we are not merely satisfied with an armistice. We are genuinely sincere toward peace in Korea. Your side, on the other hand, harbors an objective which is contrary to this, an objective which you dare not make public before the eyes of the world; and yet you slandered us saying that we want to escape

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) or to avoid observation, that we have ulterior motives in the war in Korea. Yet you surely cannot but admit that such hypocritical arguments of yours cannot convince anybody.

Next, you said that our proposal of 3 December was no concession. Now, let me analyze what the fact is.

There was an obviously great difference between our proposal of 3 December and your proposal of 6 December. The main difference is that we maintained that there should not only be laid down the principle of no increase of military forces, but in order to ensure that there was no increase, we should strictly limit the introduction of military forces into Korea -- that is, there should only be outgoing but no incoming of military forces. You asserted that our side has so-called ulterior motives after realization of the armistice. But how can we have any ulterior motives, since we have proposed such strict restrictions on both sides? You said that you have no ulterior motives during the armistice. Then, why do you oppose such strict restrictions? The conclusion we can draw from the fact cannot be otherwise but that it is your side which has ulterior motives in mind.

In order to supervise that there will be no increase of military forces during the armistice, and in order to have inspections of the rear, we proposed, in an attempt to break the deadlock, that we should entrust neutral nations to take over this function of supervision and inspections. That was a reasonable solution in front of your unreasonable demand on inspection of the rear and interference in our internal affairs. Can you not admit that this was a great concession on our part?

And what sort of proposal was your eight-point proposal on 6 December? It actually included all the unreasonable demands you had been harping upon and all those unreasonable demands had been opposed by us. It was only an amplification of your old proposal. Yet you had the cheek to say that it was a concession

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) to our proposal of 3 December. I don't know what is the measure you use, and yet you say you respect the principle of reciprocity. It is obvious, therefore, that your proposal of 6 December was no progress, but a drawback, a reversal.

And it is fully borne out by your own actions later on -- on 12 December, when you put forth a so-called revised counter proposal against our proposal of 3 December. What have you done in this revised counter proposal? The only thing you did was to accept the idea of neutral-nations inspection teams to conduct inspections of the rear of both sides. You still oppose the idea that there should be a supervisory organ to lead those neutral-nations teams. We maintain that the relation between the armistice commission and the supervisory organ should be a relation between entrustor and entrustee, a kind of contract relation; not a relation of directing and ordering. And you still opposed such a reasonable suggestion.

Similarly, in your 12 December revised proposal you only agreed partially to withdraw your armed forces from our rear, not completely. Therefore, even if we should call these two differences in your 12 December proposal concessions, they were only small concessions. And, in effect, they were no concessions at all, because inspection of the rear was originally your idea, and as to the withdrawal of armed forces from the rear of the other side, it is your obligation to do so.

And, at the same time, in your 12 December proposal you still insisted unreasonably on unlimited rotation and replenishment, and unlimited interference in our internal affairs. And then the crucial points in dispute between the two sides were reduced to two. First, your attempt at interference in our internal affairs and second, your insistence upon unlimited rotation and replenishment.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

In order to break this stalemate, on 14 December our side made an appropriate concession on the question of rotation on which you insisted; and, also, in connection with the neutral-nations supervisory organ and the convenience of the neutral-nations inspection teams, we have incorporated what is reasonable in your proposal. As a result, we consider that our 14 December proposal is yet another concession to your side -- a major concession on the question of rotation. Therefore, comparing your 12 December proposal and our 14 December proposal, you cannot say your 12 December proposal was a concession; and you cannot but admit that our 14 December proposal was a concession. You have reversed white and black.

For six days after we made our 14 December proposal, what have you been doing? You did only one thing; that is, in the afternoon of 16 December your side made the purely hypothetical question regarding the surrender of certain islands which formerly belonged to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. And what did you aim to get in return? You clearly stated, on the morning of 17 December, that you wish to get our acceptance of the five principles of your proposal of 12 December. Now, according to your hypothesis, you would withdraw from a total area of only 40 square kilometers, and you must admit that even according to your hypothesis, your idea of withdrawal from the islands is still different from our principle in this connection. We stated, however, that provided your side made suggestions regarding the settling of the other two major questions in dispute between us which could be acceptable to both sides, then it would not be difficult to settle this question of the islands. You just said that our side has the habit of exchanging small things with big things, of exchanging a peck for a bushel. But you just take this instance where you attempted to deal your withdrawal from no more than a 40 square kilometer area with our

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

acceptance of your unlimited rotation and replenishment, and your unlimited interference in our internal affairs. How can you call this fair or reasonable? Therefore, what you said is only appropriate to be used to describe your own actions.

From my above over-all analysis of the points you have raised this morning, you can see clearly which side up to now actually has been making concession since we began to discuss Item 3 of the agenda. And you cannot but admit that our side has made a repeated concession, and that the next step is for you to take and for you to make an indication. I have already made clear my direct answer to the first part of your statement in connection with the question as to which side has been making concessions.

Now regarding the second part of your statement, you claimed that you respect military reason and that you are a military realist; you stated this again only in another tune. What you have already said in the afternoon of 15 December was already sufficiently refuted in that afternoon by me as an absurd and arrogant argument of your side. Suffice it to say, briefly, that if there were no balance of military forces on both sides today, we could not have had these negotiations. And since you should admit, as you have admitted, that such a balance of military forces does exist, you must also admit that you have had no superiority over us; that you cannot exaggerate the value of the obstruction on our side carried out by your naval and air forces. I can assure you that but for such obstructions by your air and naval forces the situation of war in Korea could have long changed from what it is today. And this is a question which needs no amplification. I heard only one new argument from your side. You seem to indicate that the mere fact that you are willing to come to these negotiations is a great concession on your part. I cannot see how you draw that conclusion.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: May I interrupt? Is artillery included in the naval and air forces?

GEN HSIEH: I refer to all the actions taken by your naval and air forces.

We do not believe that a group of people who are accustomed to interfering in the internal affairs of the other countries, and who took pride in naked armed force, can have any love for peace. If you really worship military force, then why should you come to these talks? Your arguments were just a kind of wailing in seeing that the realization of armistice is already in sight. From your long statement, which took you 65 minutes, we cannot find any effort on your part to break the deadlock on Item 3 of the agenda existing at the present. You have cited examples, but in citing them you have reversed cause and effect. You have reversed right and wrong. If you still continue such an attitude, we consider that it will be impossible to have any more progress in our discussions. I assure you once again that the door for negotiations is always open on our side. But after we last made our efforts on 14 December, six days have already passed and we are still waiting for your action. That is all.

GEN TURNER: From your brief statement, consuming 55 minutes, I gained the impression that the burning issue now is who makes the next move. I suggest we have lunch. How do you feel about that?

GEN HSIEH: Yes, I agree.

GEN TURNER: During the lunch period I strongly suggest that you carefully analyze and digest the statement that I have made this morning.

GEN HSIEH: We have long considered your statements, and it is not starting from today that we will consider your statement. I agree to recess.

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GEN TURNER: Until 1500?

GEN HSIEH: Yes.

Meeting recessed at 1315 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1500 hours.

GEN HSIEH: It is now three o'clock sharp.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to offer?

GEN HSIEH: No. I am all ready to listen to your opinion regarding the settling of the stalemate on questions between us.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, perhaps I should ask a few questions which have arisen since I have been present here since 5 December. After that, in taking General Hodes place, I propose to begin where he left off. In other words, I am not here in a position of a compromiser, so to speak, I only ask these questions and intend to be very brief, or as brief as possible, in order to clarify some two or three points that are not clear to me. My first question is: What set of principles, which include the basic thought of the United Nations Command principle 5, would be acceptable to you? I should like to have the answer to the question before proceeding to the second, if that is possible.

GEN HSIEH: This is the first time General Ferenbaugh has made a statement in this conference. I am always ready to give a clear answer to any question your side asks, but I would like to have all your questions so that I can answer them together. I would like to know what is the next question you have.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, you said, I'll quote: "As a result our proposal of the record, we have incorporated in our proposal of 14 December all that is reasonable in your proposal of 12 December." Having said that, you claim credit for having made concessions to United Nations Command views in your proposal of 14 December. Now, here is the question part of it: Do you consider that when you adopt what is reasonable, you are making a concession?

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) That is all of the questions for the time being. Of course, I reserve the right to ask another question based upon your answers.

GEN HSIEH: If, as you said, you have only these two questions for the moment, I am still not clear as to your intention in asking them. What are you driving at?

But I can answer your second question right now. The answer is that surely we consider that by agreeing there can be the rotation of 5,000 men monthly, which would be sufficient for your side, we have made a concession. We consider that a great concession in our 14 December proposal, because we have retreated from the principle of absolutely no imcoming of military forces to the agreement that there can be a definite amount of introduction of forces and, therefore, also, a definite amount of increase of military forces.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, that prompts me to ask another question, hoping it will not take too much time. You stated that you "have retreated from the principle." I could almost state, in not too uncertain terms, that you retreated from that principle only to take cover behind another principle which is included in the statement, "by mutual agreement" - which cancels out even the small retreat you made from the first principle, in my opinion. Is that correct?

GEN HSIEH: I'll try again to clarify this point. We proposed that the rotation of 5,000 men monthly should be reported to the military armistice commission. That is to say, to make such request to the commission. And provided that such rotation is really as your side has explained - that is, an exchange of veterans with inexperienced personnel, an exchange on a man-for-man basis with those going out being the personnel who have finished their period of service, and that such exchange is not the exchange between complete combat units -- then, that is

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) to say, if these two conditions are met with, then the request to, and the approval by, the armistice commission will only be a formality, and such a procedure should not be opposed by either side. Such request and approval are necessary because we both admitted that there should be the principle of no increase of military forces, and since we agree that such supervision and inspection should be entrusted to the supervisory organ of neutral nations, therefore, as we visualize it, the military armistice commission, upon receiving such a request, should notify the neutral-nations supervisory organ and the organ should direct its inspection teams at the ports of entry in the rear to supervise such rotation. That is a necessary procedure, unless you agree to our original five-principle proposal. Then, of course, such procedure would not be necessary. Otherwise, we do not believe that you could oppose this principle of ours, the fourth principle, on account of such a procedure.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, I was just trying to get elaboration from you to determine what was involved on your side, or shall I say, on your side of the military armistice commission. It seems that the matter of inspection is agreed to by both sides, and I feel that further exploration of the matter, based on your statement, will only take up further time. So I shall drop that line of questioning. You state that yours is a fair proposal; I state that anything except rotation plus inspection is unacceptable. Have you anything further to say on that?

GEN HSIEH: I am not sure whether I understand General Ferenbaugh's statement just now. If this is what you refer to -- the supervision and inspection by the neutral-nations supervisory organ at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed to by both sides, and rotation within a specific limit number -- then these two things

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) have already been included in our 14 December proposal. And since these two things have already been included, I cannot see why you do not accept this proposal of ours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, I would like to read that statement over a little more before I give you a firm answer. I am not sure in turn whether I understand what you mean. There are two things on which we seem to be in disagreement. The numbers of rotation and the possibility of a battle arising from your side of the military armistice commission. That is if I understand your question correctly. But I should like to answer that firmly a little later, after I have read your question. Is that clear?

GEN HSIEH: With regard to the question of approval by the military armistice commission, our side has repeatedly made explanations on it. We say that if only such rotation is reasonable, then neither side could have any reason to oppose it in the armistice commission. I would like to know, firstly, whether these two points -- the question of procedural approval and the question of numbers in rotation -- are the only objections you have against our principle 4, or do you have other objections to that principle? Secondly, I would like to know the attitude of your side on the question of interference in the internal affairs.

GEN FERENBAUGH: That was my first question in which I intended to give you the opportunity to present your views on thebasic thought of United Nations Command principle 5, which I believe corresponds to your number 4 . And that was to have been the intent of my asking the first question. We have already discussed a part of it. It seems only by this method can we get something underway. "What set of principles which includes the basic thought of United Nations Command principle 5 would be acceptable to you?" That is the first question I

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) asked, if you remember.

GEN HSIEH: Do you mean that you can cancel the demand for interference in our internal affairs incorporated in your fifth principle? Can I make such an understanding?

GEN FERENBAUGH: No. No.

GEN HSIEH: I will put it in another way. Could we understand that you could accept paragraph 4 of our 14 December proposal with the exception of the two differences, the two points on which you are not satisifed, which you have just mentioned?

GEN FERENBAUGH: I wind up by getting questions asked of me which I have not had sufficient time to consider, nor do I not understand their import -- when I ask a simple question that I should have gotten answered possibly from the other side.

GEN HSIEH: In that case, I can clearly tell you that any interference in our internal affairs will be opposed by our side. It is not the first day we opposed that. We have always opposed such interference, and we cannot give any consideration to such interference.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Am I to take it from that then that as long as the United Nations Command insists on its principle 5, there can be no armistice?

GEN HSIEH: I will answer your question by referring to history. At the beginning of the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, that is, on 27 November, both sides put forth their principles. We submitted our five-principle proposal. That proposal was sufficient to ensure a purely military armistice. It had its great merits. Your seven-principle proposal submitted on the same day was firmly opposed by our side because it included attempts to interfere in our internal affairs. And it involved matters which should not be discussed at a military armistice conference. As a result there was a grave stalemate between both sides on Item 3 of the agenda.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Then on 1 December, your senior delegate, Admiral Joy, cited four fundamental principles, from which I will read the second principle. He said: "We will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that neither side will increase the level of war equipment and material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective". It is clear by this, from the four principles put forth by Admiral Joy, that he did not mention the interference in the military facilities of either side during the armistice. It was because of his statement that our side wrote our sixth paragraph in our 3 December proposal. Therefore, unless you cancel this second principle of Admiral Joy's you could have no reason to insist upon your unreasonable demand of interfering in our internal affairs, and oppose our just stand. If you still insist upon such unreasonable demands, then we are always ready to take our 27 November proposal which we consider adequate and sufficient for a military armistice.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Is that all?

GEN HSIEH: That is all.

If you have not brought your record, I have a copy of it. (Handing it to General Turner. United Nations Command Sub-Delegation had its own records.)

GEN TURNER: While we are reviewing the record of these past proceedings, we can profitably spend a little time listening to a clear answer to the question which was proposed, first, this afternoon, by General Ferenbaugh, which was, "What set of principles which includes the basic thought of United Nations Command principle 5, would be acceptable to you?"

GEN HSIEH: Before I answer that question, I must point out that after we made our proposal of 14 December, for five days we cannot see any effort on your part to advance the negotiations. Your statement this morning gave me the same impression. This

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) afternoon, you started to ask questions. Yet, I am still not sure whether by doing so you are really making efforts to break the stalemate over the two crucial questions in dispute between both sides. Now, in order to clarify your intentions, I will also answer this way, under the condition that this is also purely a hypothesis. Suppose your side recognized our firm and unshakable stand against the interference of our internal affairs, and suppose you were willing to cancel such an unreasonable demand on your part, we on our side can give consideration to the question of the numbers in rotation on which you persistently insisted. I don't think I can make myself clearer on this.

GEN TURNER: It is very evident to me that you have not carefully perused my statement of this morning. The United Nations Command stands firmly for all of the provisions incorporated in our principle 5. Now you took out of the record of 1 December, a statement of Admiral Joy. I refer you to the record of 2 December, a statement made by Admiral Joy before the plenary session which reads: "Your side contends that you must be permitted to increase your military capabilities, especially airfields, during the period of military armistice. The United Nations Command Delegation considers that there should be no increase of military facilities in Korea during armistice." That, I think, completely clarifies the question you have raised of Admiral Joy's statement of 1 December.

GEN HSIEH: As you have seriously taken back the premise of my answer just now, then you must regard my hypothesis just now as invalid, because it is without any basis.

GEN TURNER: You have many times expressed an interest in saving time. These armistice negotiations have continued for more than five months. As General Hsieh and Colonel Chang are particularly in a position to know, the main cause of time being

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd)

unnecessarily lost in these negotiations has been your failure to recognize a firm United Nations Command position when confronted with it.

First, in the case of development of the agenda, many days were unnecessarily lost due to your failure to realize that the United Nations Command would not agree to include an item determining the withdrawal of forces from Korea.

Second, during the period of the long interruption of the conference, many days were unnecessarily lost because you failed to realize that the United Nations Command would not agree to resume discussions at Kaesong.

Third, during the discussion of Item 2 of the agenda, many days were unnecessarily lost because you failed to appreciate that the United Nations Command would not accept the 38th Parallel as the line of demarcation.

Now, once again, time is being lost unnecessarily, time that General Hsieh rightly described as "precious", because your side does not yet recognize and act upon the fact that the United Nations Command will not agree to an armistice lacking a prohibition of increases of military capabilities, or to one that lacks effective supervision and observation. I do not know how we can more emphatically, more seriously, or more earnestly, explain to you that the United Nations Command position on these matters is firm. It is firm because it is inherently fair and clearly right. I urge you not to waste more time. I urge you to cease opposing the prohibition of increases in military capabilities during armistice. I urge you to cease opposing effective supervision and observation of the armistice. We are ready and willing to consider any proposal you may make which incorporates the two basic provisions I have stated. But I tell you once again, in the hope that you

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) will at last believe it -- any proposal lacking these two provisions is but another means of wasting precious time, time that is measured in blood and suffering as well as in hours and days.

It is now 1630. I suggest we reconvene at 11 o'clock tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement just now only serves to prove that I have failed once again with my latest effort. You gave me the impression that your side will violate, but not abide by, whatever is not to your liking; and yet you call that reasonable. You call a white cat, black. I will cite history to prove which side has been wasting time during these negotiations. It is a topic I am very glad to discuss with you. Please listen to my interpretation of the four points you have just raised.

In the first three points you referred to the facts before the resumption of the conference on 25 October, and after your fourth point, you referred to the facts since then. You first talked about the development of the agenda. I don't remember exactly how much time we spent on that; I remember that we spent about 10 sessions on that. How can you say that the discussion of withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea immediately after armistice is not a topic for these conferences? I ask you again, how is it that your side firmly opposed the discussion of this question which is for a genuine peace in Korea? You averred that your side has no ulterior motives, but why is it that your side insists upon the retention of foreign forces in Korea? If it is not for war, then for what else? The withdrawal of foreign forces is an entirely fair and reasonable question. It is of interest to the peace in Korea, and to peace throughout the world. Why is it that your side opposed the discussion of this question? If we had spent more time on this, it was only because your side harbored war-like objectives, because your side refused to discuss this question. The wasting of any time should be your

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) responsibility, for the wasting of any time was on your side.

You not only wasted time by refusing to discuss the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, which was genuinely for the realization of peace in Korea; you also wasted time on questions which had no connection with the discussion of the agenda. For instance, your side wasted four or five days on the question of so-called press-coverage. Your side again called off the meeting for four or five days over the question of the entering into the conference area, by mistake, of our military police. You say that your side was not willing to resume the conference in Kaesong, it is a pity that you did not tell us such an intention on your part before August 22nd. On the night of August 22nd, it was an airplane of your side which broke off the negotiations. And if really the refusal to hold the conference in Kaesong was the objective in the bombing by your airplane, then you should have told us earlier than that. You should remember that from August 23rd to October 25th, when the conference was interrupted for more than sixty days, the responsibility for that waste of time was entirely on your side, as was well aware by the whole world.

You said, thirdly, that we have wasted time in the discussion of Item 2 of the agenda, but I must point out that even today our side still considers that if we are genuinely for a thorough settlement of the Korean question, then the proposal of taking the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line is entirely fair and reasonable. It is because there is a lack of far-sighted politicians on your side that your side opposed our proposal, and in doing so, revealed your war-like objectives. Therefore, the refusal to accept our proposal of the 38th Parallel was the direct cause of the waste of time. After resumption of the conference, during the discussion of Item 2 of the agenda, we reached the principle of an armistice on the current battle line, however,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) your side again unreasonably insisted upon no specific decision during the discussion of Item 2, thus wasting more time. Your side was compelled after all to give up such a stand, but the responsibility for the waste of time in this connection is also on your side.

Then, about our present discussion on Item 3 of the agenda, let's settle the account and see which side has been wasting more time. Our side made a great concession in our proposal of 3 December and you delayed ten days before you made your revised proposal on 12 December. Those ten days should be entered into your account. Since our side made the proposal of 14 December, and today is the 19th, you again wasted six days. That responsibility is also on your side.

I must call your attention to the fact that at the start of our discussion of Item 3, we have arranged the time period of thirty days and that provision was well known to the peoples all over the world and to the troops at the front. They are all concerned. They have great concern over this question and yet your side has wasted sixteen days without any profit in these discussions so that we, up to now, have no progress achieved on Item 3.

It is obvious that our proposal of 3 December was a great concession, and on 14 December our side again made a concession. We did so in the hope that we can reach a proper solution on the two crucial questions on which we are in disagreement. These two questions are:firstly, your insistence on interference in our internal affairs, and secondly, your insistence on unlimited rotation and replenishment.

We have said that if your side gave up the attempt at interference in our internal affairs, then we could give corresponding consideration to the question of rotation on which your side has insisted. But it is now the seventh day and there is still not

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the slightest indication from your side that you are willing to reach a solution on these two points. I advise you to review your attitude since our side made our proposal of 14 December. You have shown reluctance to discussion and you have shown an attitude of irresponsiveness. You have tried to close the door. You refused to negotiate. Everytime you showed such an attitude, I have seriously refuted your stand and you should have a memory for that. I have shown, with historical evidence of these discussions, which side has good faith toward the negotiations and which side has been delaying and obstructing.

I have testified my statement with ironclad facts, and particularly I would like to point out the fact that there is left only eight days before the thirty-day period will transpire. And this is a question on which the eyes of the whole world and the troops at the front are riveted. I must call your attention that we must treasure our time. But to reach an agreement requires efforts from both sides and only the efforts of one side alone will not be sufficient. We sincerely hope that your side has the same objective, to realize an early peace and an early armistice in Korea.

I must tell you again, and unmistakably clear, that on our side the door for negotiations is always open. We are waiting for new suggestions and new contributions from your side because they would bring about an armistice in Korea. Yet on the contrary, if you consider our repeated concessions as a sign of weakness on our part, then you are gravely mistaken. If your side acts as some war-like groups on your side have done, who interpret the arriving of armistice and peace in Korea as a tragic prospect for them, or if your side would brag about the so-called military pressure, then I can assure you that our side will firmly strike back at those unreasonable attitudes. And we will stand firm on our fair and reasonable positions. I believe you can have no

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) mistake about that now.

I seriously suggest that you give very careful consideration to my statement of today. If you have nothing new to say for today, we agree to recess, and we can let you name the time for reconvening.

GEN TURNER: 11 o'clock tomorrow

Meeting recessed at 1652 hours

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey N. Settle Jr.
HALSEY N. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

20 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Seventeenth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL R A Maddocks, USAF, CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

GEN TURNER: According to my watch it is a little past 11 o'clock.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: We have nothing to say. We are always willing to listen to anything new from your side.

GEN HSIEH: I will speak. In your statement yesterday, you treated our proposal of 14 December the same as our proposal of 3 December. You asserted that our proposal of 14 December was in no way different from our proposal of 3 December and that you considered that the great concession which we made to your side in our proposal of 14 December, on the question of rotation, was in fact non-existent. I cannot but point out that such an appraisal on your part is groundless. I now assume that you have not made such an appraisal deliberately, and I will proceed to correct you on the two arguments that you used in your attempt to prove that the concession which we made to your side on the question of rotation was, in effect, no concession.

First, the question of number. Our side considers that 5,000 men monthly both ways should be appropriate for your side. That is to say, we consider that this figure will, in general, meet the requirements of your side. I cannot see any reason for you to negate the concession, which we made to you on the question,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) on account of the figure which we have proposed.

Secondly, with regard to the question that rotation of both sides should be subject to the approval of the armistice commission; we consider that since your side, too, agrees that there should be no introduction of reinforcing armed units and personnel, and has repeatedly declared that the rotation on a man-for-man basis would not increase from without the military forces of both sides in Korea, then there is no justification for your side to oppose the procedure that the rotation of both sides should be subject to the approval of the armistice commission, and to the inspection by the neutral-nations inspection teams. The reason is simple. If it does not undergo inspection, how can it be proved that it is rotation on a man-for-man basis? And in order that the neutral-nations inspection teams can carry out such inspection, the approval of the armistice commission is necessary. You said that one of the two sides on the armistice commission could block approval, thus completely annulling the concession made by our side. Such a charge is again groundless because, according to the letter and spirit of our fourth principle, it is obvious that if only the number of personnel to be rotated and submitted for approval by either side is within the limit agreed upon by both sides, and if the rotation is really on a man-for-man basis, then the other side on the armistice commission will have no reason to disapprove such rotation, and the approval will be a mere formality. Upon this matter, our proposal has only provided a principle. The details can be written explicitly and specifically, so that the doubt you have raised will be impossible to take place. From the above it is clear that it is a contradiction to fact for you not to admit that our proposal of 14 December makes a great concession to your side on the question of rotation.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) I have now, once again, made clear the questions on which you have doubt and on which you feel not at ease, so that there is no pretext left for you to delay the negotiations. I wish now to return to the two crucial questions in dispute between both sides. As I mentioned for several days, I am ready to hear your opinion regarding the solution of these two questions.

GEN TURNER: Gen Hsieh, it is apparent to me that you do not understand our firm position on both rotation of personnel and replenishment of materiel. We stand firmly on these points, limited only by the term "no increase". We have stood consistently firm on these points and we shall continue to stand firm on them. The question of 5,000, or approval by the military armistice commission, is entirely a side point. To spend more time on that point would certainly only be a waste of time, so let's get on to the next point of major difference, namely the alleged interference in internal affairs.

It was pointed out to you yesterday that it is inherent in war that there is no interference in the internal affairs of the belligerents. We pointed out that this interference behind your lines today permeates practically every walk of life. We pointed out that so long as war continues, that condition behind your lines will persist. We pointed out, in our principle 5, that we were willing to lift all of those restrictions with the exception of airfields. Now, don't you consider that that is a great concession? Don't you acknowledge that this one restriction, which is imposed upon both sides equally, is the minimum necessitated by an armistice -- this restriction being one that is not imposed upon us, upon our side today, but one which is being imposed upon your side today. Don't you acknowledge then that you gain much and lose nothing?

GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

GEN TURNER: Yes.

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GEN HSIEH: I tell you once again -- you, a group of people who are accustomed to interfering in internal affairs of other countries -- that we do not need to ask you for permission to do anything. You should not forget that on our side is an independent and sovereign nation, which has complete freedom to do whatever it likes to do. You again brag about your military force. Such an action is ridiculous in other peoples eyes, and yet you insist upon doing so. You can do that just as you like, but if you think you can rely upon your military force, then you can leave this conference table. You have complete freedom to do so.

What I want to tell you this morning is that we still are making efforts to see that the two major differences existing between us can have a reasonable settlement. We are ready to hear your opinion regarding a reasonable solution of these two questions and your statement gave me the impression that once again you refused to do so. That is, indeed, very regrettable, but the issue is now crystal clear. You know full well our position. The question now is whether your side has the willingness to see a reasonable solution on these two questions. We are waiting for an indication on your part, and the peoples of the whole world are waiting for your side to give such an indication.

GEN TURNER: Am I correct then in my understanding that you do not acknowledge that we are making a large concession to you by lifting all of the interference in your internal affairs except airfields? Aren't you willing to proceed with these negotiations today on the basis of the facts as they exist today?

GEN HSIEH: I tell you that you are too much of a fool.

(According to United Nations Command interpreter, Hsieh said: "You should have been more intelligent.")

My statement just now was to let you have some face, but you have compelled me to tell you directly and squarely the following:

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) You say that the limitation of your interference in the internal affairs of other countries is a concession on your part. It is only a group of people who are accustomed to interfering in the internal affairs of other countries who can say such a thing. You think that you are entitled to interfere in the internal affairs of independent and sovereign states, and if you do not interfere, it is a concession on your part. According to such logic, you are making concessions in not interfering in those areas all over the world where you cannot interfere in the internal affairs, and, also, on the battlefield where you cannot interfere in our military capabilities; but I tell you, you are not able to do so.

You have been so foolish (According to United Nations Command interpreter, Hsieh said: "You are so unintelligent") as to compel me to make such a statement. It is obvious that your side does not want to see a thorough settlement of the Korean question. You would reject the holding of a conference of a higher level; you would maintain and prolong the state of war in Korea; you attempt to get the fruits from discussions which are political and should not come into this military conference. How can you have such a right to demand to get such fruits -- unless you can give a clear indication and give an assurance that you are willing to see the holding of a conference of a higher level immediately after the armistice? Can you make such an assurance now?

GEN TURNER: General Hsieh, all we are seeking here is to arrive at a stable and effective armistice, one that will remain stable and effective until that higher conference is held. When that will be -- that is, when the fruits of that conference are to be obtained -- neither of us knows; but in the meantime, we must have an armistice agreement that will minimize the likelihood of fighting breaking out again. In our negotiations here today, what other basis can we begin on, other than the facts as they exist today?

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) If you have a better scheme on how to proceed with these negotiations, a better scheme than the facts as they exist today, then I am more than willing to hear it.

GEN HSIEH: You say that your side aims at a stable armistice, but your concrete proposals show that you do not intend to reach a stable armistice. You said that you were doubtful as to whether our side can be more sincere than yours toward a stable armistice, but that judgment of yours is groundless

You can review the positions our side has been taking since the beginning of the negotiations. At the very start, we maintained that there should be withdrawal of all foreign forces. If we had not cherished sincerity toward the realization of peace in Korea, we would not have maintained that stand. However, your side refused the speedy discussion of the question of withdrawal of foreign forces, thus revealing your objective of continuing, or resuming, the war in Korea; and continuously during these discussions your side has put off any suggestions which are really helpful toward the settlement of the Korean question. Clearly, and overtly, your side refused to accept such suggestions. How can such actions on your part not bring doubt into our minds? This is my first point.

Secondly, the question of guaranteeing the armistice. On this question, our side maintains that there should be no increase at all of military forces. By military forces, we mean armed units and personnel, weapons and ammunition -- and under weapons we include airplanes. We are willing to limit all these. But on your side, you paid lip service to no increase of military forces during the armistice and yet, actually, you insisted upon unlimited rotation and replenishment. The more you try to argue that such rotation and replenishment constitutes no increase of military forces, the more you make us doubt your sincerity in guaranteeing the armistice. And more than that, our side, in order to break

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the stalemate, has made appropriate concessions on the question of rotation. Taking the attitudes of the two sides and comparing them, you can see clearly that our side genuinely wishes to have an effective armistice, and wishes to see immediately after armistice a thorough peaceful settlement of the Korean question. But your actions have shown that you have other objectives; and, therefore, your suspicions, as to saying that we have ulterior motives, are entirely baseless.

Thirdly, the question of inspection of the rear. Our side originally proposed five principles with the understanding that those five principles were sufficient for a military armistice; and we also maintained that as soon as the armistice was realized, there should be held, speedily, a political conference of a higher level to achieve a thorough settlement of the Korean question. Your side never showed the same objective. You never showed you are willing to see a genuine peace settlement of the Korean question. You, from the start, insisted that you should have unlimited and free access to our rear to conduct inspections. Obviously, you attempted to maintain the state of war in Korea, and you had fears with regard to our military capabilities. In order to divest you of such concern on your part, and to break the deadlock, we proposed that neutral nations should be invited to form a supervisory organ to carry out such supervision and inspection of the rear as agreed upon by both sides. Therefore, what deserves suspicion is your apparent intention in prolonging the state of war in Korea, and your evasion and refusal in connection with holding of a higher level conference to achieve a thorough settlement of the Korean question. Since our side has accepted your idea of inspection of the rear, and we suggested that neutral nations should be invited to supervise and inspect in the rear, then what action on our part deserves any suspicion? How is it that you can say that we have ulterior motives? The

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) side which invites suspicion is your side, not our side.

To sum up; from the above, from the attitudes taken by both sides on the above three questions, we can draw an inevitable conclusion: that it is your side which attempts to maintain and prolong the state of war in Korea, it is your side which evades a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question. On the contrary, our side not only supports an effective armistice, but also maintains that there should be a speedy and a thorough peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Therefore, it is your attitude and your positions which invite suspicion, not ours. As for the arrangement of facilities by an independent and sovereign state -- whether during hostilities or during armistice it chooses to build up its facilities or it chooses not to build these facilities -- an independent and sovereign state has the inviolate right to make its own arrangements of its own internal affairs. If you do not assume the attitude of the victor, then you cannot compel us to accept such an unreasonable demand of yours, you cannot insist on interfering in our internal affairs.

Upon the so-called question of rotation, on which your side has insisted, we have already made a concession; and we say that provided you give up your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs, then it will not be difficult to solve the two major differences between us, and break the stalemate between us. The question as to whether this deadlock will be broken or not, whether your side is willing to break this deadlock or not, whether this deadlock will be broken sooner or later, now relies entirely on your action. We on our part have done everything that we can toward the settlement of these two disputes.

GEN TURNER: General Hsieh, every time that our side has mentioned a stable and effective armistice, you have launched right out with your contention that there should be a withdrawal of foreign forces, that there should be no importation even for the purpose of rotation.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) In other words, that there should be withdrawal of foreign forces by attrition. And then you bring forward your statement that we are not willing to have quickly a settlement of the Korean problem by a higher level conference. You have been over this ground so many times that you have worn a deep rut, a rut so deep that your axle--yes, your whole undercarriage--is dragging, and it is dragging out interminably the time of this conference, of these negotiations.

Let me assure you that the United Nations desire the earliest possible settlement of the Korean problem. The first step to be taken in that direction is to achieve a stable and effective armistice. The sooner that this is achieved, the nearer we are to a solution of the Korean problem. If that is your primary interest, you will serve that interest best by presenting at this table a set of principles which include the basic thought expressed in our principle 5.

Are you willing to proceed with these negotiations on the basis of facts as they exist today?

GEN HSIEH: You mentioned again the words "military realities" or "military facts". The so-called military reality is, as your senior delegate stated here during the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, the balance of military forces of both sides. Do you recognize this statement of your senior delegate as true or not? I would like you to explain this.

GEN TURNER: Everything that our senior delegate said, we recognize as the truth.

GEN HSIEH: That means you admit that the military forces of both sides are in balance. Is that so?

GEN TURNER: What are you driving at?

GEN HSIEH: Your senior delegate stated to the effect that in the Korean war the military forces of both sides are in a state of balance, and that the only way out of this stalemate is an armistice. You

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) just said that everything your senior delegate says is the truth. Then you do not deny that this statement is true? Can we make such an understanding?

GEN TURNER: A few weeks ago we reached an agreement on Agenda Item 2. We took as the basis for that agreement the facts as they existed at that time; that is, where the front lines of the forces were at that time. Now let us proceed with the solution of Agenda Item 3 on the same basis, namely, the facts as they exist today. If and when you are willing to proceed on that basis, I believe we can make progress at these negotiations. Are you willing to so proceed?

GEN HSIEH: I ask you the question "Why?". And you fail to answer it. I knew that you were not able to answer it. I must tell you that you should remember that the fact that we are holding these negotiations, that the fact that we have a certain amount of agreements so far, is based on a military fact: that is, there exists a balance between the military forces of both sides. Therefore, your senior delegate did tell the truth from his heart that since there is a balance of forces on both sides, the only way out of this stalemate is an armistice. Now, such was your senior delegate's statement. But what did you do this morning and yesterday afternoon? You came out to say that the mere fact that you will stop fighting is a great concession on your part. Now, have you not contradicted your senior delegate?

On your side there is, in fact, a group of people who feel not at ease on the eve of the armistice; they would like to see the world in trouble everywhere. They do not believe in peace. Such a group of people on your side dare to disseminate and propagandize the sayings that the prospect of an armistice is a dark prospect, that a decision taken now would be repented later on. Such a group of war-like persons cannot want peace. They are afraid of peace.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) But I must admit that on your side there is still another group of people who have more foresight and who come out sometimes to confess the truth -- who admit that there exists in Korea a balance of military forces of both sides, and who sometimes admit that in these negotiations you should take an attitude of of respecting the principle of reciprocity and equality. Therefore, there is a contradiction within your own camp.

I must tell you unmistakably that as long as you do not give up your attempt at assuming to be a victor, as long as you insist upon interfering in our internal affairs, there can be no progress at all in these negotiations; and the responsibility for delaying is entirely on your side. Since our side made the proposal of 14 December it is now seven days, and you have not given up your unreasonable demand of interfering in our internal affairs. You have not given any indication as to your intention of doing so. This is, indeed, regrettable. The decision is to be made between yourselves. The attitude of our part is clear, as it cannot be clearer. The door for negotiations is always open on our side, but you must make the resolution to accept what is reasonable and give up your unreasonable demands. It is only by doing so that there will be hope for the armistice.

GEN TURNER: Your statement has been duly noted. I suggest we recess for lunch.

GEN HSIEH: What time?

GEN TURNER: 1430.

Meeting recessed at 1240 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours.

GEN TURNER: We are ready to listen to any proposal you have.

GEN HSIEH: That's just what we would like to say.

GEN TURNER: What is your suggestion of a method to break this deadlock that will incorporate our principle 5?

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GEN HSIEH: We consider that our 14 December proposal is a very good method for breaking the deadlock. Since that proposal, the disagreements between us have centered upon the two questions, namely, your unreasonable insistence on interference in our internal affairs, and your insistence on rotation and replenishment. And your side has not shown any sign of conceding to these two questions. Our side is always willing to listen to any opinion you have with regard to the settlement of these two questions.

GEN TURNER: We are, on our side, more than willing to consider any proposal of yours which incorporates our principle 5.

GEN HSIEH: I would like for you to answer my question directly. Have you given up your unreasonable demand of interfering in our internal affairs?

GEN TURNER: Since we have made no unreasonable demands, it is quite obvious that we have no unreasonable demands to give up. I can assure you that we do not intend to give up our insistence upon restriction on airfields.

GEN HSIEH: And you consider this to be a method of breaking the deadlock?

GEN TURNER: What is your suggestion as to a method of breaking the deadlock?

GEN HSIEH: We have indicated many times that provided your side will give up the attitude of a would-be victor and give up your unreasonable demand of interfering in our internal affairs, then we can give consideration to the question of rotation, on which your side has insisted. I don't think I can make myself clearer than this. Therefore, the question now is on what step you will take, and there is no need to ask me repeatedly. Once more I assure you that we, on our side, will never reach with you -- accept from you -- a treaty which will allow you to interfere in our internal affairs.

GEN TURNER: Are you referring to a treaty, or are you referring to an armistice?

GEN HSIEH: An agreement.

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GEN TURNER: Anything that I should say now would be purely repetitious, just the same as everything you have said today and yesterday, and for the past week, has been repetitious on your side.

GEN HSIEH: During the past seven days, since our side made the proposal of 14 December, you have not made any effort to break the deadlock existing between us; but on the contrary, you have been insistent upon your unreasonable demands, so that there has been no progress in these discussions -- plus the fact that you have taken nine days after our side made our 3 December proposal to submit your so-called revised counter-proposal on 12 December. Therefore, in toto, you have wasted 16 days in the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda.

The facts are very clear: Our side has made repeated efforts to try to break the deadlock, and the question now as to whether the deadlock will be broken relies entirely on your side. And do not forget, in the meantime, that you have already wasted the precious time of sixteen days. If, in order to reach a decision, you really need time for consideration, we could agree to it. But if you are trying to delay the discussions without making any effort, then the responsibility for delaying is entirely on your side.

GEN TURNER: If you have any suggestion whatsoever to rewording or rewriting these principles so as to incorporate therein the thoughts that are contained in our principle 5, we will lend to you our greatest consideration.

GEN HSIEH: I now read the fourth paragraph of our 14 December proposal:

"In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military units, military personnel, war equipment and ammunition after the signing of the armistice agreement. However, if either side needs to rotate its military

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) personnel in Korea, it shall make request to and acquire the approval of the Military Armistice Commission. The number of such military personnel to be rotated shall not exceed 5,000 monthly. Any such rotation shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of neutral nations and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides."

I would like to ask: Are the questions of the procedure of approval, and of the number in rotation, the only objections you have to this fourth paragraph of our proposal? I would like to hear your direct reply.

GEN TURNER: The answer is "No"; the principle of rotation and replenishment is one upon which we will not negotiate.

GEN HSIEH: Do you mean that you cancel the principle of no increase of military forces and that you can accept the five-principle proposal of ours of 27 November, no more and no less?

GEN TURNER: Repeat your question, please.

GEN HSIEH: You just said that you would not negotiate the matter of rotation and replenishment during the armistice. Therefore, I asked you: Did you mean that you would cancel the principle of limitation on the increase of military forces during the armistice, and that you would accept our five principles, pure and simple -- as we have given them on 27 November? Those five principles we consider as sufficient to ensure a military armistice?

GEN TURNER: The answer to both of those questions is "No." We will not accept your five principles of 27 November, and we do not cancel the limitation on forces which is contained clearly in our fifth principle of 12 December. It clearly states, "no increase".

I have something more. Suppose that we reword your principle 4 so that it reads as follows: "In order to ensure the stability of a military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to increase the level of military units, military

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) personnel, war equipment and ammunition after the signing of the armistice agreement." Then delete the next two sentences and start, "Rotation and replenishment shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of neutral nations and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides. The rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities, and construction of new airfields and aviation facilities shall not be permitted." With that wording of your paragraph 4, is it acceptable to you?

GEN HSIEH: Are you carrying out negotiations or are you cracking a joke? Why do you still introduce your unreasonable demand which we have consistently opposed? The only reason for your doing so is merely to delay the negotiations.

GEN TURNER: It becomes apparent to me that either you do not want to negotiate, or you don't have the authority to do so. If you need more time, that is satisfactory to us.

GEN HSIEH: I have already told you many times that it is not our side which needs time. You are merely dragging the time. However, if you need time for consideration, then we can agree to as much time as you will need. It is now up to you to move, and not for us.

GEN TURNER: We have told you repeatedly that your proposal of 14 December contained nothing of consequence different from your proposal of 3 December. Both yesterday and today you have threatened to go back to your proposal of 27 November. Do you call this a forward step? To us it is a retrogression.

GEN HSIEH: We have repeatedly said that our 14 December proposal was a development from our 3 December proposal, and a step forward. We made a great concession in this proposal on the question of rotation on which your side insisted. We agreed that there can be a rotation of 5,000 men monthly both ways; and we repeatedly pointed out that the report to the military armistice commission is necessary because the commission must know that the number of

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) personnel going out and coming in will meet, and, provided that the provisions are adhered to, then the approval is a mere formality. I do not think anybody on your side present here can distort my statement. And yet today, seven days after we have put forth our proposal, you still try to call black, white; and say that our 14 December proposal contained no great concessions. Your insistence on doing so only makes me doubt whether you have any good faith toward the armistice negotiations; otherwise you could not have called black, white.

Your side attempted several times to try to explain away the fact that rotation and replenishment constituted an increase of military force but you failed to make your argument stand. You could not but admit that rotation and replenishment do constitute an increase of military force. I said that we would like to return to our proposal of 27 November, but I did so because you yourselves would not abide by the principle of no increase of military force. If you do not abide by this principle, how could you restrict our side? And since you suggest that there should be no limitations on increase of military force, therefore I said that our 27 November proposal of five principles was entirely reasonable and sufficient.

On this serious stalemate between both sides, our side has already made a concession by agreeing that there can be rotation of 5,000 persons monthly. And we also made a hypothetical suggestion that if your side will give up your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs, then we can still consider the question of rotation on which you so persistently insist. The only issue left now is your unreasonable demand for interfering with our internal affairs. This unreasonable insistence, you have never given any indication of giving up since the beginning of the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda except once, in a serious statement on behalf of the United Nations Command by your senior

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) delegate on 1 December. Therefore, I say the stalemate now existing is caused by your attitude. The stumbling block in our way is put there by your side, so that we can have no progress in these discussions.

I will tell you clearly, once again, that if only your side will give up this unreasonable demand for interfering with our internal affairs, we can give consideration to the question of rotation on which your side insists. The issue, therefore, is laid before your door. And I suggest that you publish your intention to the world and let the peoples judge which side actually has sincerity toward the negotiations, and which side is deliberately delaying the negotiations.

GEN TURNER: Your statement has been duly noted. It contains no new thought. Since it is apparent that you have nothing new to offer, what time do you suggest that we reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: I don't need time.

GEN TURNER: Have you something new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: If I offer more new things, it would even be more difficult for you to settle the question. All the things we have proposed have been reasonable, and the solving of the question, for us, is up to your action.

GEN TURNER: We have told you many, many times the essentials of an effective and stable armistice. I don't see how we can make it more clear. It is not up to us to change our fair stand. It is up to you to recognize that we are interested only in an equitable, effective, and stable armistice. We seek no more. You should not expect us to agree to anything less.

GEN HSIEH: Your declaration-like statement only serves to show that you once again refuse to make such effort as you should make to break the existing deadlock. It only serves to show once again that you are delaying the negotiations. It does nothing more than that.

GEN TURNER: Please keep on.

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GEN HSIEH: I have finished. Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: No.

GEN HSIEH: Neither have I anything to say. I have done my duty and made efforts on our part.

GEN TURNER: Will you agree to direct your staff officers to join with ours this afternoon in jointly drawing up a set of principles, mutually agreeable, which include the basic thought of the United Nations Command principle 5, and submit these to the delegations at its meeting tomorrow?

GEN HSIEH: Our side will not refuse any move or any method you suggest which is aimed at breaking the deadlock. However, the 14 December proposal of ours has been the basis of our discussions for days; therefore, if only your side agrees that the staff officers appointed by both sides will take our proposal as the basis and proceed to negotiate and draft a set of principles which would be acceptable to both sides, then we agree to your suggestion. If you are agreeable, we can appoint our staff officers and let them proceed right away.

GEN TURNER: We will agree to use your 14 December proposal as the basis of discussions in all respects except wherein it conflicts with our principle 5. To put it another way, we will leave it up to the staff officers to determine how they approach the problem.

GEN HSIEH: I think you will agree, also, that if we do not determine upon a basis, the staff officers will have no right and no way by which to proceed with their work. Therefore, I suggested that they should use our 14 December proposal as the basis for their discussion. As you have agreed to this, then I suggest we let the staff officers do this work tentatively.

GEN TURNER: Well, let's give it a try and see if they can do better than we have succeeded in doing in these sub-delegation meetings. I am ready to appoint my staff officers. I suggest that they go to work immediately after the sub-delegations recess, and that they

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GEN TURNER: be prepared to report to the sub-delegations at 1 o'clock -- 1300 tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: You said that they will report to the sub-delegations at 1300 hours tomorrow. Do you mean that the sub-committee will meet at 1300 hours tomorrow?

GEN TURNER: That was my thought. Yes.

GEN HSIEH: You mean the sub-committee to meet at 1300 hours tomorrow?

GEN TURNER: That was my thought.

GEN HSIEH: I agree to this method of trial as suggested by your side.

I have a message to get across, under the instruction of my senior delegate, concerning the question of what time to reconvene the sub-committee of Item 4 of the agenda. As you know, that sub-committee has recessed for two days after both sides had exchanged the data on prisoners of war on 18 December. We would like to know what time your side is ready to hold the meeting of the sub-committee on Item 4 of the agenda.

GEN TURNER: I will convey your message to the delegate on Agenda Item 4 and have him convey through the liaison officer the suggested time for reconvening that committee.

GEN HSIEH: You know the recess in the other sub-committee was proposed by your side. Our side is ready at any time to reconvene.

GEN TURNER: Very well.

GEN HSIEH: I appoint Colonel Chang as the staff officer to discuss with your side and with his necessary staff.

GEN TURNER: I appoint Colonel Darrow as my staff officer and his necessary assistants.

Till 1300 hours tomorrow then.

GEN HSIEH: Agree.

Meeting recessed at 1603 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

22 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Eighteenth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL R A Maddocks, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1400 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: Through our staff officers we revised your fourth principle, making considerable concession to your side. We did this in an effort to reach a speedy settlement of our disagreements. Since, as you say, it takes the efforts of both sides to reach an agreement, it appears that it is your move. What have you to offer?

GEN HSIEH: The staff officers of both sides have met for two days; and, from the result of their meetings, we have to admit that they have made considerable efforts, so that there is a definite amount of progress made from that stalemate which had resulted in the sub-committee meetings. For instance, they have reached agreement on principles 1, 2 and 3; and, on principles 4, 5, and 6, they have exchanged opinions. The principles not yet resolved are principles 4, 5, and 6, but actually the crucial question among these three principles is the fourth principle. In connection with the fourth principle, the staff officers of our side made another effort and proposed another concession on the question of rotation on which your side insists; and if progress is made on other questions, we are prepared to give more consideration to this question.

The remaining questions all come under the heading of interference in our internal affairs. You alleged that the revised

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) version of principle 4 your side submitted this morning was a concession, but I must tell you, once again, unmistakeably, that anything of the same sort is an interference in our internal affairs, a matter which should not be discussed in these military armistice negotiations and even less proper to be put into an armistice agreement. That has been our consistent stand and is an unshakeable stand of ours. It is regrettable to us that you still include such a requirement in the proposal which you made this morning and labelled "a concession". I tell you that we cannot accept such a so-called concession.

It is clear, from the above analysis and the summing up I have made with regard to the six principles originally proposed by us on 14 December, that the only question left unsolved is your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs. You are now clearly aware of our unshakeable stand, and if you are really sincere toward an armistice, then this question should be easy to solve. I would like to hear your views on this point.

GEN TURNER: On 27 November we reached an agreement on Agenda Item 2 by taking the realities as they existed at that time. Upon those realities, we agreed upon a line of demarcation -- the battle line. To reach that agreement, we faced realities. You well know that the battle line along all of the eastern sector lay well within North Korean territory. Did not this consist of interference in your internal affairs? We wish to interfere in your internal affairs in no greater degree under our present principle than we are interfering in your internal affairs when we reached agreement on a battle line.

Why do you wish to increase your military capabilities by rehabilitating and constructing new airfields? Aren't you willing to face the realities as they exist today in arriving at a military armistice? Through our staff officers we suggested a revision of your principle 4 which reads: "The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways; no other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed." We feel that this was a great concession on our part. This was a great effort on our part to reach an agreement in principle on this armistice. We would like, now, to have you accept that, so that we may proceed on with the other minor points of disagreement.

GEN HSIEH: Once again I heard you say that you face military realities; but it is regrettable that either you do not understand, or you deliberately will not admit, what is the military reality now. I cannot but take some time to explain this to you. I will quote a statement made by Admiral Joy on the morning of 28 November. He said: "One of the reasons for the present efforts in seeking an armistice is that neither side has a decisive military advantage, and that the only logical alternative to an interminable stalemate of a balance of military forces is an armistice." That testifies to the fact that your side admits there is a balance of military forces on both sides, and that you desire an armistice. Since you cannot but admit this military reality, how can you have the right to insist on our acceptance of your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs, which you clearly know that we will not accept? You mentioned the agreement we reached on Item 2 of the agenda. I remind you to notice the date on which that agreement was reached. It was on 27 November, not 22 August. We proposed that we should take the 38th Parallel as the dividing line because that was shared by our side. Your side occupied an area north of the eastern sector of the battle line, and our side occupied an area south of the sector of the battle line. Therefore, we maintained that the 38th Parallel was a reasonable solution; but your side lacked the insight and we then proceeded to the idea of taking the battle line as the demarcation line. The present situation is that you will hold an area north of the 38th Parallel, and we on

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) our side will also hold an area to the south of the 38th Parallel, including Kaesong, Yonan and the Ongjin Peninsulas. You should remember that you did not accept the fair and reasonable solution of the battle line speedily. You did not accept that before we had had long arguments.

Other facts also went to prove that whenever we could reach an agreement, it was only when your side really took an attitude of reciprocity, and when you really faced the reality; otherwise, we could not have reached any agreement. The same question is before you now. Again our side has once, twice, and for many times, made concessions, and we have repeatedly stated that if only your side will take a fair and reasonable attitude and give up your unreasonable demand of interfering in our internal affairs, then the other questions can be considered. This indication on our part has been made so clear that nobody present here can misunderstand it any longer. The question now is whether your side has the sincerity towards an armistice.

GEN TURNER: If you admit then that you interfered in the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea, south of the 38th Parallel, then you realize that the reason you were permitted such interference in the internal affairs south of the 38th Parallel was because it was a military reality that you occupied, along the western sector of the battle line, territory south of the 38th Parallel.

Now why don't you accept the military realities as they exist today? Your internal affairs are being interfered with daily. They will continue to be interfered with until an armistice becomes effective. Then the only interference, as you call it, will be the restriction on your airfields. In this you gain much. Why then will you not face the military realities as they exist today? When you speak of balance, you are arguing for our views.

When you quoted Admiral Joy's statement of 28 November, you should have quoted his full statement on this subject. I will read

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) from where you left off what Admiral Joy said on that occasion: "This condition of balance is conducive to a stable armistice. Therefore, we will absolutely not agree that during armistice you should develop another capability -- an air capability -- which you do not now possess. If you were to do so, any balance now existing would obviously be upset. To upset that balance would threaten the stability of the armistice. Therefore, there must be no increase in military capabilities during armistice, which is the exact meaning of our principle number five."

GEN HSIEH: What I ask you is whether you admit that there is a balance of military forces between the two sides as your side did admit on 28 November and whether you admit that all the agreements we have reached so far were reached only when the two sides are talking on an equal footing, and negotiating on the basis of reciprocity. If you admit these two facts, then you can have no reason whatsoever to force us to accept your unreasonable demand. As for your arguments, I have refuted them repeatedly. The question left is that if only your side wishes to settle the questions yet unsolved on Item 3 of the agenda and wishes to proceed with settling them, you must not repeat such overweening statements. That is not an equitable attitude for settling problems. I wish you will make full consideration, because it is now up to you to indicate whether or not you will give up your unreasonable demand so as to break the existing deadlock.

GEN TURNER: Yes, there is a balance which exists today. In that balance you will note that there is almost complete interference in your internal affairs. When the armistice is signed about 99% of that interference will be removed. We consider that this is a great concession. Have you anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: It seems that you do not wish to achieve any result during these discussions. Why is it that you again and again repeat those unilateral and unreasonable arguments of yours that have already been

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) refuted by us. What exactly is your objective in doing so?

Please remember the situation in the afternoon of 20 December when there was no progress in the sub-committee meetings, and you made a suggestion that we let the staff officers of both sides explore the questions. In two days they settled many minor questions but they failed to settle the major problem. Why was it so? It was because your side does not, in effect, recognize the balance of military forces between both sides. You only think that the armistice is for our advantage; an armistice is in the interest of your side as well as our side. It is also in the interest of the peoples of the world. You failed to see the advantages you will gain by an armistice. You only stressed the advantages our side will gain by an armistice. That shows clearly that you are not willing to have an armistice, or at least there is a group of people on your side who does not want to have an armistice. That is how I understand your repetition of such unreasonable statements. And I don't really understand what is your objective in doing so.

I wish that you can tell me clearly: Are you intending to produce a worse atmosphere for our negotiations or do you want to better it? I would like to know that also. I tell you again clearly that the door for negotiations on our side is always open. We have been very patient, and we only wish that there will be progress on the points in disagreement between us. Of course, if your side does not have the same objective as we do, then I cannot help it.

GEN TURNER: From the progress made by our staff officers, it would appear to me that the door you speak of as being open is only open a crack. The efforts of our staff officer, by making great concessions to you, were not even able to penetrate that crack. Our side, also, has the door open wide to any new suggestion you have to offer, and it is now your turn. You should quit trying to evade the issue of your desire to increase your military capabilities by cloaking it in the term "Interference in the internal affairs." We shall not

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) be able to make progress as long as you insist on the right to increase your military capabilities during the armistice. It is your desire to unilaterally strengthen the military potential that is the stumbling block to these negotiations. When you give up your unreasonable demand for greatly increasing your military capabilities during the armistice, we can make progress.

GEN HSIEH: Once again you asserted that our side attempts to increase our military forces during the armistice. I want to call your attention to the consistant positions our side has taken since the negotiations started. Firstly, we have maintained that there should not only be no increase of military forces during the armistice, but that there should be reduction of military forces; and we have agreed not to increase our military forces including that of which your side has stated that you are most afraid, namely, aircraft. Secondly, you maintained that there should be inspection of the rear. You must see what happens in the rear, and we agreed to have inspection of the rear, although by neutral nations. And we went further than that. We always maintain, and we now do not give up the hope, that apart from the above two safeguards for an effective armistice, there should be a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. We maintain that there should be no continued introduction into Korea of reinforcing forces during the armistice, and we are in support of a speedy elimination of the state of war in Korea. All of these positions we have taken have been repeatedly explained by me, and I will not go over them at length.

The fact is, that the side which invites suspicion is your side, not our side. As for the internal affairs of Korea, whether during hostilities or during the armistice, those are matters which an independent and sovereign state has a perfect right to do. That is entirely different from the introduction of forces from without. I can not understand why you keep on confusing these two matters. I don't really believe that you cannot see the difference between

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) them. The fact is that your side is attempting by such arguments to delay the negotiations and by such pretexts to try to deceive the people who are genuinely for an armistice in Korea. The stumbling block, which you spoke about, is put there by your side and must be taken away by your side.

You said we have not made concessions, but we have made concessions. We agreed to rotation, and we have stated that we are prepared to give more consideration to this question if only you take an attitude of settling questions on other issues.

As for the increasing of military force, it is your side which insists upon unlimited rotation and replenishment, and you know perfectly well that your replacement bases are not in Korea. Your men and material are introduced into Korea from without. Therefore, your insistance on rotation and replenishment is clearly a means to increase your forces. Your argument -- your assertion -- that our side is attempting to increase our military forces is entirely a deception, a pretext with which you mean to deceive the people of the world; but they will not be deceived because they see clearly what is the truth. Therefore, I advise you not to repeat such statements which can deceive nobody except yourself.

I would like to know what you do mean exactly. Do you mean to say you cannot consider anything else except your demand that we accept your revised fourth paragraph? Is that what you mean? I would like to have your answer.

GEN TURNER: Your statement has been duly noted and your question duly noted. Have you anything else to ask?

GEN HSIEH: You mean you do not wish to answer my question, or not answer it now?

GEN TURNER: Your question has been duly noted. Have you any other?

GEN HSIEH: That is the only question I have.

GEN TURNER: I suggest that we recess until tomorrow at the usual time.

GEN HSIEH: Can you answer my question tomorrow?

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GEN TURNER: I find no new question that you have asked; but I will review your statement, which appeared to be a repetition of what you said before, and your question,which appeared to be a repetition of questions you have submitted before. If I find anything new, I shall certainly give you an answer. It is only because I have heard nothing new that I suggest a recess. If you have anything new, we will be glad to listen.

GEN HSIEH: I ask again: Do you mean to say that unless our side accepts as a whole your revised text on our fourth principle submitted this morning, you will not make any other effort? I wish you to answer that question.

GEN TURNER: Did I say that?

GEN HSIEH: I am asking whether you mean that?

GEN TURNER: Have you anything new?

GEN HSIEH: You are not willing to proceed with the discussion now?

GEN TURNER: We are willing to listen to anything new.

GEN HSIEH: We have met many deadlocks during the discussion of the Item 3 of the agenda. In order to break the first deadlock, our side made the proposal of 3 December and it was not until 9 days later that your side put forth a revised proposal on 12 December. And again our side, in order to break a deadlock, submitted our proposal of 14 December. Nine days, again, have passed since then. The facts show that our side has made repeated efforts in trying to break the deadlock, while your side does not have the same objective. Your side fails to make efforts.

From the afternoon of 20 December, the staff officers of both sides have explored, for two days, ways to solve the questions left and they have reached agreement on three questions -- the first three principles in our 14 December proposal. There are only principles 4, 5, and 6 left and the crucial point lies in the fourth paragraph. In that connection, your side refuses to give up your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) and at the same time our side made an additional indication on the question of rotation. That is, in addition to our agreement to the rotation of 5,000 persons monthly, we have agreed that provided you change your attitude on other questions, we can give more consideration to the question of rotation. Therefore, the only issue left is whether your side will give up your intention to interfere in our internal affairs and I must assure you, seriously, that so long as your side insists upon such an unreasonable demand, there will be no progress in these discussions.

You have the freedom to delay the negotiations. You can have any objective, but you cannot escape the responsibility for delaying the negotiations. This afternoon our side again listened patiently to your unreasonable statements. We made repeated attempts at making questions and solving the problem, but I find now that I have failed once again to achieve what I intended to do, and your side cannot escape the responsibility for the delay in the discussions.

As you have suggested to recess, I will request you to name the the time for reconvening.

GEN TURNER: We have made a great concession to your views. You should carefully study our proposal. It is certainly a major step towards solving this problem. Don't you think it is your turn to be a little cooperative? Do you expect us to concede everything to you? I agree to recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: I tell you again that the stand of our side in refusing to have any interference in our internal affairs is firm. You call a little less interference in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state a concession on your part. You made a great mistake there. I advise you to make a serious study of my statement

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) of this afternoon, and I hope you will answer my question tomorrow morning.

Meeting recessed at 1550 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, JR.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
Authority:
By: LTR UNC ADV
Date: 27 JUL 1953

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

23 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Nineteenth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, COL D M Cairns, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LR R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, you said yesterday that principles 4, 5, and 6 remained to be resolved. You said these were the issues to be settled. Yesterday the United Nations Command proposed a resolution of the differences regarding principle 4. Your side rejected that proposal after only barely reading it. Today we offer a proposed resolution of all three principles remaining in dispute. There is no need for our side to elaborate on the concessions we are offering in these proposed resolutions of principles 4, 5, and 6. You know our point of view. We know yours. On our part, for the second successive time we are attempting to break the deadlock. What we offer now is our best effort. Yes, Delegate Hsieh, this is it.

"(4) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to increase the numerical quantities of military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition in Korea after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Any rotation of personnel shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations and shall be carried out at ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

"The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall include extension of runways; no other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed.

"(5) Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for supervising the execution of the Armistice Agreement and for settling through negotiation any violations of the Armistice Agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the Armistice Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following three provisions:

"a. Within the demilitarized zone, the Military Armistice Commission utilizing Joint Teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

"b. Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry (including airports) in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at the places where violations of the Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of non-combatant nations shall be responsible. A request from the senior member of either side represented on the Military Armistice Commission for an investigation will be referred to the Supervisory Organ which must see that the inspection is conducted.

"c. Any member of the Supervisory Organ is authorized to communicate directly with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

"(6) Each side agrees to invite non-combatant nations in the Korean war, to send representatives to form a Supervisory Organ. The Supervisory Organ shall, when requested by the senior member of either side represented on the Military Armistice Commission, dispatch inspection teams of non-combatant nations to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) the Armistice Agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone. The Supervisory Organ shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the Military Armistice Commission. Both sides shall accord the inspection teams of non-combatant nations full convenience of the main lines of communication and transportation in performing the above stated functions. In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic flights as are required will be performed by the non-combatant teams."

This is the answer to your question and I have finished.

GEN HSIEH: Can I have an English copy of that? (General Ferenbaugh hands copy to General Hsieh)

GEN FERENBAUGH: Do you want to take a short recess?

GEN HSIEH: There is no need to. I have made a comparison of the translation. Judging from your opening statement, it seems that you consider your newly proposed three principles as a great effort on your part — that is, a great concession on your part. I would like you to explain where this concession lies.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I suggest that you give these three principles a little further study. You have a copy.

GEN HSIEH: Of course, I will make a study. And I have made a preliminary study of it, but I fail to see the great concession you refer to. Therefore, I request you to point it out, so that it will be more convenient for me to study.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I think the same answer still holds.

GEN HSIEH: I feel that when one side has made a proposal, in order that the other side may better understand it and may have more convenience in studying it, it is best for the proposing side to make such explanations as is possible to help the other side; just as our side has done, at your request, after we made our 14 December proposal.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: I think that the ground has been pretty well covered by both staff officers and at previous discussions.

GEN HSIEH: Do you mean that you refuse to explain your revised proposal?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, what is it that you do not understand? It seems perfectly clear.

GEN HSIEH: What I don't understand is the great concession you refer to. I don't know on what points this concession is reflected.

GEN FERENBAUGH: If you fail to see any concessions, how can I answer your questions?

GEN HSIEH: Then your side is not willing to explain your proposal?

GEN FERENBAUGH: That was not my answer.

GEN HSIEH: If not, then it is best for you to make some necessary explanations, because we have requested it. It is not so nice for you to refuse it.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Will you please list your questions?

GEN HSIEH: My question is: Wherein is reflected your great concession? That is my question. If you are not willing to explain, then do I understand that you do not intend that we accept it?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Certainly, it was offered as a proposal.

GEN HSIEH: I recognize that as a proposal, but I think the other side has the duty and the necessity to explain. My question is: Wherein lies the great concession you referred to in this proposal? Do not forget that our side did the same at your request. We never refused to give repeated explanations to our proposals. If you state clearly that you refuse to explain, then I will as no more questions.

GEN FERENBAUGH: What is it you want explained?

GEN HSIEH: What I request you to explain is: On what points is reflected the so-called great concession you refer to? That is my question.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, we are not making much progress here.

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GEN HSIEH: If you refuse to explain the so-called concession in your revised three principles, then I can have only two understandings: --- either your side admits that your revised three principles are no concession, there is no so-called concession in it; or I can understand that when you drafted these revised three principles, you did not intend that our side would accept them. If either of those two understandings is correct, then I will make a further statement.

I call your attention to the fact that in 5 months of these military armistice negotiations, this is the first time that your side repeatedly refused to give any explanation to your own proposal -- a proposal that you call a concession, a proposal that your side says you intend us to accept.

In your revised three principles you continued to include such a passage as that at the end of the fourth principle. It says "The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways; no other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed." I tell you once again that we as an independent and sovereign state. have perfect right to carry out any facilities in our territory. Your side has absolutely no right even to raise such a question for discussion in these negotiations; it is even less a point to be negotiated. I tell you again that we need not ask permission for doing such thing. You said that is a concession on your part. I assure you once again that we firmly oppose its inclusion in the proposal. Since there is no basis for your side to raise the point for discussion or to demand such a requirement as included at the end of your fourth paragraph, then the requirement for aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic flights listed in your principle 6 also loses its basis. That is also what our side has consistently opposed.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) There is no need to give more explantion on our attitude. If your side does not cancel those two passages, then discussions will make no progress.

Under sub-paragraph b of your revised fifth paragraph, you included the words within parantheses "including airports". You should remember that at the staff officers' meeting in the morning of 22 December, our side stated that provided your side would give up your demand for interfering in our internal affairs and give up the demand for aerial reconnaissance and photographic flights, then we can consider to include those two words in the stipulation. Now, you still keep those two unreasonable demands intact in your proposal, while on the other hand you include these conditional concessions on our part. You say that you are making a concession; you have actually included our concession in your proposal. What sort of concession is that?

If you still insist upon unreasonable interfering in our internal affairs, then we would return to our proposal of 14 December.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Let me ask you a question. Do you consider that our side has every right to be concerned for the security of our forces during the time of the armistice? Is there any other principle that has the stature of this one?

GEN HSIEH: This question has been answered long ago. There is no necessity to give more reply to it. You can refer to the record.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, we have offered a proposed solution of the issues over which this conference is deadlocked. We ask that you either accept it or propose an alternate, designed to resolve our difficulties and make progress.

GEN HSIEH: We have fully and clearly expressed our attitude. We have clearly stated on which points our stand is firm and unshakable. That is, we will absolutely not tolerate any interference in our internal affairs by your side and we have also clearly indicated

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) which points can be considered by our side. The question now -- the only question -- is whether your side will give up your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs. All the other questions are easy to settle.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I think there is a question I didn't get an answer to regarding the security of our forces.

GEN HSIEH: I have answered that question long ago. There is no need to repeat it. You can look it up in the record.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Would you mind answering it again?

GEN HSIEH: Your side does not show an attitude for settling the question. You refused to explain your own proposal. Any more time consumed will be a waste. The answer to your question can be found in the record.

[illegible] proposal. It was intended to make progress in the negotiations.

GEN HSIEH: Your declaration is inconsistent with the content of your proposal.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Is that statement made to indicate that no further progress can be made using that proposal as a basis? I speak now of the one we handed you this morning on principles 4, 5, and 6.

GEN HSIEH: If only your side will cancel the last passages in your fourth and sixth principles the other questions can be settled.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I again repeat that we have offered a proposed solution of the issues over which this conference is deadlocked. We ask that you either accept it or propose an alternate, designed to resolve the existing differences, so that we can make some progress.

GEN HSIEH: In the morning of 22 December the Staff Officers of our side proposed our revised version of principles 4, 5, and 6 and indicated that if only your side will give up the last passages in your fourth and sixth principles, then we can agree to insert a specific annotation after the term "ports of entry in the rear."

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GEN HSIEH: I have answered that question long ago. There is no need to repeat it. You can look it up in the record.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Would you mind answering it again?

GEN HSIEH: Your side does not show an attitude for settling the question. You refused to explain your own proposal. Any more time consumed will be a waste. The answer to your question can be found in the record.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, you have our proposal. It was intended to make progress in the negotiations.

GEN HSIEH: Your declaration is inconsistent with the content of your proposal.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Is that statement made to indicate that no further progress can be made using that proposal as a basis? I speak now of the one we handed you this morning on principles 4, 5, and 6.

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GEN HSIEH: In the morning of 22 December the Staff Officers of our side proposed our revised version of principles 4, 5, and 6 and indicated that if only your side will give up the last passages in your fourth and sixth principles, then we can agree to insert a specific annotation after the term "ports of entry in the rear".

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) That is our counter-proposal.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Without thinking too much about this proposal it would appear that you were offering one rabbit for one horse.

GEN HSIEH: The concluding passage in your fourth and sixth principles proposed this morning have been put there by your side ever since the discussions of Item 3 of the agenda. That demand is the source of our deadlock. The only basis for this deadlock is your employment of such passages; so long as you do not take away those passages we can have no progress in these discussions. Since the deadlock is caused by your side -- since the stumbling block is put there by your side -- the responsibility for removing this deadlock and stumbling block is entirely on your side.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I can turn that statement you just made, right back at you.

GEN HSIEH: I don't accept. We are not accustomed to use those words. We do not know how to use them. We don't understand their meaning. It is only your side that is familiar with such practices.

GEN FERENBAUGH: The deadlock usually occurs as a result of two sides. That is probably bringing the utmost out of a foregone conclusion. We are willing to negotiate if progress is in evidence by your side. You merely make assertions; I suggest that you make proposals.

GEN HSIEH: You say that the deadlock is usually caused by two sides. That is a statement not entirely correct. Of course, it takes two sides to make a deadlock but it is only when one side makes a demand which the other side cannot accept that there is a deadlock. If we should accept your unreasonable demand, there would no longer be any deadlock. But we ask: Who is the originator of the deadlock? That is on your side. You have kept those two passages and have refused to take them away. If only your side would take away those two passages, we have already made our indication to settle the question on the other points. The question is whether your side will take those two passages away or not.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, again I repeat: Accept our proposal or propose an alternate solution which has some chance of acceptance - something, may I add, that looks more like a horse for a horse.

GEN HSIEH: I will take our three principles submitted in the morning of 22 December as a basis and ask your side to express your views on them where we do not agree, and make a study of them.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Do you have it written or not? Is this to be a translation off the record? Are you going to present us with a copy?

GEN HSIEH: I mean that I'm going to read one by one the three principles raised yesterday. And you are asked to express your different opinions on them.

I will now read the fourth principle: "In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides should undertake not to introduce into Korea any military units, military personnel, war equipment and ammunition during the armistice. Such rotation as within the limits agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the military armistice commission so that a supervisory and inspection organization of neutral nations may be entrusted to conduct supervision and inspection at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides." Wherein are you in agreement with our fourth principle? Wherein are you in disagreement?

GEN FERENBAUGH: I don't quite understand the question, please repeat it.

CCF INTERPRETER: I ask: Where are you in agreement with our fourth principle? Where are you in disagreement? Are you in complete agreement with this?

GEN FERENBAUGH: I think the answer is that where we are in agreement appears in our proposal presented to you this morning.

GEN HSIEH: Is that to say, you do not take away the passages ... "The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) not include extension of runways; no other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed"?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Yes.

GEN HSIEH: And again are you prepared to take away the sentence "In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic flights as are required will be performed by the non-combatant teams" from your sixth proposal? We insist on our own sixth principle which does not include such a stipulation.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Aren't you asking me if I disagree with the proposal I just handed to you?

GEN HSIEH: I asked whether you are prepared to take them away.

GEN FERENBAUGH: What two particular points have you reference to? Let's get this tied down.

GEN HSIEH: I shall trace the development so far; you asked me whether our side has an alternate as another proposal. We said that if only your side would take away the concluding passages in your fourth and sixth principles, then we can take the three principles as revised in our 22 December proposal as a basis, and on that basis listen to your opinion, to your views, of disagreement and discuss it. But the prerequisite is that your side is to take away those two passages I referred to you. If you do not take them away, then the deadlock is caused by your side and should be broken by your side. Therefore, the conclusion, whether we will break the deadlock, is dependent upon your taking away those two passages.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Once again the progress of the negotiations depends on how soon you bring yourselves face to face with the military facts in the Korean War as they exist today. We have offered a proposal -- a proposed solution of the issues over which the conference is deadlocked. We ask that you either accept it or propose an alternate designed to resolve the differences and make progress. Wherein does your proposal resolve the differences, if you have made a proposal?

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GEN HSIEH: I tell you, once again, that provided your side cancels the concluding passages in your fourth and sixth principles respectively, then we can consider the inclusion of the words "including airports" after the phrase "outside the demilitarized zone at the ports of entry" in sub-paragraph b of our principle 5. If you still insist upon your fourth and sixth principles as they stand without any alteration, then we will return to our 14 December proposal.

GEN FERENBAUGH: May I state that you provided no solution to the problem; in a sense you are dodging the problem. Now let's get down to a serious alternate proposal from your side.

GEN HSIEH: My statement just now was a serious indication on our part.

GEN FERENBAUGH: If that is a serious proposal, I suggest we take a little more time in obtaining a more serious proposal. And in order to do that I suggest that we take a recess.

GEN HSIEH: The deadlock is created by your side, the stumbling block is put there by your side; therefore, the breaking of the deadlock is dependent on your side. It is your side which needs time; and what ever amount of time you need, we can agree to let you have it.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, I can quote you again that statement that begins "the progress in negotiations, etc, etc, etc." I suggest that we have lunch.

GEN HSIEH: I agree that you have lunch.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Will 1430 be O.K.?

Meeting recessed at 1445 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I believe we recessed with the possibility of a more serious proposal from your side.

GEN HSIEH: We have made our proposal long ago. The question now is whether you will give up the two stumbling blocks, namely, the concluding passages in your paragraphs 4 and 6.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: We have made our proposal. As we said today, progress in the negotiations depends on how soon you bring yourself face to face with military facts. You have our proposed solution.

GEN HSIEH: Now, let me try to analyze the three revised principles you proposed this morning and raise some questions. As a whole the three revised principles you put forth this morning, compared with your proposal put forth at the staff officers' meeting yesterday morning, is a retrogression. That is why you were not able to answer my question, not able to put your finger on your so-called concession. Now, I will proceed to analyze them one by one.

In paragraph 4 the principle we put forth is no introduction of military forces; and you put forth the idea of no increases. The difference between the two is a difference in principle. We propose that there should be no introduction of military forces including, of course, all kinds of military forces, such as combat aircraft and armored vehicles as you have spelled out. We also agree that those articles should be limited from being introduced.

Second, question of rotation. We, in our principle 4, suggest that there should be a limit to the number in rotation. We said within the limit agreed upon by both sides, and you, this morning, apparently proposed an unlimited rotation. There again is a difference. This difference, between limitation on one hand and unlimitedness on the other, is not difficult to remove if all the other questions are settled.

The last paragraph in your proposal: "The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways; no other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed." -- this, we maintain, must be removed as we have consistently held. In sub-paragraph b under the fifth

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GEN HSIEH:
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principle, your wording "at the ports of entry (including airports) in the rear as agreed upon by both sides." -- this wording we can give a corresponding consideration if your side agrees to take away the concluding paragraphs in your principles 4 and 6. At the end of sub-paragraph b, you introduced a sentence saying that "a request from the senior member of either side represented on the Military Armistice Commission for an investigation will be referred to the Supervisory Organ which must see that the inspection is conducted." This appears to us a detail and we don't understand why it is that you should want to write such a detail into the principle. We would like you to explain this by citing some examples.

Your sub-paragraph c: "Any member of the supervisory organ is authorized to communicate directly with any member of the the Military Armistice Commission." -- that appears to our side to be also a detail and we don't understand why it should be included in the principle. We also request you to explain this point by citing examples.

In your paragraph 6 you have such a sentence: "The Supervisory Organ shall, when requested by senior member of either side represented on the Military Armistice Commission, dispatch inspection teams of non-combatant nations to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the Armistice Agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone." We don't understand your wording here. We would like you to explain whether you intend that the neutral nations inspection teams should be stationed at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides or not stationed. The last sentence in paragraph 6, namely, "In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic flights as are

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) required will be performed by the non-combatant teams." -- this sentence of your proposal must be taken away. That is our firm stand.

That, once again, is my opinion with regard to your three revised principles put forth this morning; and I have also raised some questions. I would ask you to answer these questions.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Now that you have analyzed our proposal of this morning, do you have a serious alternate proposal to give to us?

GEN HSIEH: I have stated our position and our views on the three principles you have put forth this morning and stated clearly on what points we are in agreement; on what points we have a firm objection; and on which other points we can give corresponding consideration to if your side should give up your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs, That is already very clear. What I want to know now is your answers to the three questions I have raised. They concern paragraphs 5b, 5c, and 6 respectively.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I thought that we had written this proposal in very clear terms. I am not sure that the questions you have asked have a bearing without considerable analysis. However, here is the answer to one question. As to the one on communication between the members of the military armistice Commission and the non-combatant organization,that provision in our proposal is designed to insure against deadlocks in the military armistice commission on matters of inspection.

GEN HSIEH: It is too abstruse for me.

GEN FERENBAUGH: What is it that you do not understand about it?

COL CHANG: I don't understand as to what you exactly mean.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, clarifying it: the language used is to prevent a deadlock in the military armistice commission, which is composed of equal numbers, as you know. Under this provision we avoid this deadlock caused by equal membership in the military armistice

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) commission; otherwise, after a violation of the armistice has been reported, argument might go on endlessly in the military armistice commission without the question being referred to the non-combatant organization for definite determination by inspection.

GEN HSIEH: Now I understand. You have been answering my first question, not the question on communications as you said in 5c. What is your answer for the question on 5c?

GEN FERENBAUGH: It is the same thing -- it is the same general principle.

GEN HSIEH: We don't understand your meaning. Do you mean that the members on the supervisory organ are even in numbers or odd in numbers?

GEN FERENBAUGH: The military armistice commission -- they are equal in numbers.

GEN HSIEH: I am asking about 5c, where you mention the supervisory organ of neutral nations. I don't understand the relation between these communication affairs with the military armistice commission.

GEN FERENBAUGH: You mean why?

GEN HSIEH: Yes, why.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Because we desire that they be able to communicate, to talk to, to discuss any item they desire with any member of the military armistice commission.

GEN HSIEH: My third question is whether the neutral nations inspection teams will be stationed at the ports of entry agreed upon or not. What is your answer?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, initially they have to be dispatched to the ports of entry, then thereafter stationed there.

GEN HSIEH: Then you mean stationed there for a long time?

GEN FERENBAUGH: After the initial dispatch.

GEN HSIEH: Well, what is your attitude toward the last passages in your principles 4 and 6? I wish to get an answer.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Will you repeat that point again?

GEN HSIEH: My question is will you cancel the passage in 4, "The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways; no other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed"? And will you cancel the sentence at the end of paragraph 6, "In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic flights as are required will be performed by the non-combatant teams"?

GEN FERENBAUGH: We think they have great merit. Our side has every right to be concerned for the security of our forces during the time of the armistice.

GEN HSIEH: That means you will not take away those two stumbling blocks?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Let's go back. We gave you a proposal which will increase the stability of the armistice. It is your refusal to accept such a provision that causes the deadlock, stumbling block, road-block, or as you choose to designate it. At any rate, it is your side that blocks progress by opposing a stable armistice based on today.

GEN HSIEH: I cannot but point out that you have reversed right and wrong. The concluding passages in your paragraphs 4 and 6 are both concerned with the interference in our internal affairs. Those passages, every sentence and every word, are put there by your side. We have repeatedly pointed out that if you will give up those unreasonable demands, then we can consider to include airports among the ports of entry in the rear to be inspected. Therefore, you should be at ease on that score, and if you still harp upon your feeling of insecurity, you are only making a pretext. As I have repeatedly pointed out, the side that invites suspicion in these armistice negotiations and in the attitude toward the entire settlement of the Korean question is your side. The deadlock is created by your side and it is entirely up to you to break this deadlock. I state once again that if you agree to give up your unreasonable demands, then we can consider to include airports among the ports of entry in the rear upon by both sides. If you still insist upon your unreasonable demands

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) then we cannot but cancel our promises to consider some inclusions. Any more repetition would be simply a waste of time. The delaying or not of the conference, the breaking or not of the deadlock, is entirely on your side.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have a couple of thoughts. Why do you object to non-combatant teams, non-combatant pilots with non-combatant crews and non-combat airplanes, performing in the same manner as the ground non-combatant teams will do?

GEN HSIEH: Our side holds that there should be no introduction of military forces into Korea. Therefore, inspection of ports of entry in the rear through which military forces can be introduced is sufficient. There is no need for flights and aerial inspection all over the country.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Let's take a hypothetical case. How do you expect non-combatant teams to inspect the some 570 miles of the Yalu River?

GEN HSIEH: There is no need for me to answer that question.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have another thought then. We are not concerned with whether we interfere with your internal affairs when the alternative to that is to increase greatly the threat to our forces -- in other words, the threat of your increased military capabilities. Security comes first during an armistice.

GEN HSIEH: This question has been answered by me many times. I have said that the side that invites suspicion is not our side but your side.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Let's carry this a bit further. Who invites suspicion? Who invites suspicion by wanting to rehabilitate airfields? Who is to decide right from wrong?

GEN HSIEH: It is not the right of any military armistice to discuss the questions of internal facilities of an independent and sovereign state; even less, to make any decision on it. Your side raised such unreasonable demands; we have a perfect right to refuse to discuss them. I tell you I am not here to negotiate this point --

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the question as to what can be rehabilitated and what cannot. You better not harbor such an illusion.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, you might as well accept the fact the United Nations Command is going to keep on insisting on a safeguard, insurance if you will, against the threat of the development of a military air capability on your side during the armistice.

GEN HSIEH: Your side should be well aware of our attitude on the settlement of the Korean question. Our position on this question constitutes no threat at all to your side.

GEN FERENBAUGH: We think there is a lot of good hard common sense in our statement. I suggest that you apply this in reading our proposal. I also suggest that you give earnest consideration in connection with that proposal.

GEN HSIEH: There is a prerequisite to our consideration. If your side insists on including the concluding passages in your principle 4 and 6, we will not give any consideration to your proposal.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, I have another statement. I should like to see your answer to our proposal formally written out. You have a way of saying after you received our proposal that if certain conditions obtained you will consider that proposal. The word "consider" is not firm enough for our delegation as a committment.

COL CHANG: I am sorry to ask, but will you be kind enough to repeat what you have just said?

(Above statement of General Ferenbaugh was repeated.)

GEN FERENBAUGH: Perhaps I can put it another way. Let us see your alternate proposal in writing, an alternate designed to make progress. I have no further thoughts this afternoon. Have you any?

GEN HSIEH: Firstly, I want to make sure your intentions. Our side is firmly opposed to the second paragraph in your fourth principle: "The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways; no other airfields

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GEN HSIEH: shall be rehabilitated or constructed." We are also firmly opposed to the last sentence of your sixth principle: "In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic flights as are required will be performed by the non-combatant teams." These are the two main passages in your proposal which we are firmly against. In addition to this, as I said in my analysis this afternoon, there are some other differences between the views of both sides. But our side considers that if these two main disagreements are done away with, then we can consider the other questions. The question now is whether your side insists upon keeping those passages or whether you are prepared to take them away. That is a condition we have to make sure of. We consider that if you keep on insisting on your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs; then there will be no progress in our negotiations. It is only when you give up those demands that we can make progress. These two main points when done away with are the prerequisites for our consideration on any other points of disagreement between us. If you need time for thinking over these two main questions, we can agree to this.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Is that all?

GEN HSIEH: Yes.

GEN FERENBAUGH: You have our proposal. I have nothing further to add this afternoon. I suggest that we recess.

GEN HSIEH: If your side needs time, we agree to recess.

GEN FERENBAUGH: We do not need time. We agree to recess. Eleven o'clock satisfactory?

GEN HSIEH: That is agreeable.

Meeting recessed at 1557 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

24 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twentieth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Twenty-seven days have passed since we began to discuss Item 3 of the agenda, and we have also held 20 sessions on the same item of the agenda. Since we proposed our proposal of 14 December in order to break the deadlock, there are left, in fact, only two crucial questions in disagreement between both sides. The first one is your insistence upon unlimited rotation and replenishment. On this question, our side in our 14 December proposal gave appropriate consideration to it in order to settle this question. Since then we also have repeatedly indicated that if your side will give up your unreasonable demands, we can give more consideration to the question of rotation. Therefore, there is only one question left in disagreement between us; that is, your insistence on interfering in our internal affairs. On 23 December you proposed three revised principles as a counter-proposal and you claimed that that was a great effort on your part; but even though we repeatedly have made a very careful stidy of it, we cannot find any concession in it. In order that an armistice in Korea may be realized at an early date, and in order to meet the demand for peace of the troops at the front and the wish for a preliminary peace in Korea by all the peoples of the world, we now submit another revised proposal. This proposal is yet another great effort on our part and the question

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) left is a test as to whether your side is really sincere for an armistice in Korea. We wish that you will listen to it carefully and accept it.

As the first three principles based on our 14 December proposal have already been agreed upon by both sides, I shall start with the fourth principle:

"4. In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission so that the supervisory organ of neutral nations may be entrusted to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

"5. Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiations any violation of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following 2 provisions:

"a. Within the demilitarized zone the Military Armistice Commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

"b. Outside the demilitarized zone at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of neutral nations shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the request to the supervisory

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

organ of neutral nations by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission for investigation of the violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of neutral nations shall be responsible for carrying out the inspection immediately.

"6. Both sides agree to invite neutral nations which have not participated in the Korean war to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives to form a supervisory organ to be entrusted by the Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in paragraph 4 and paragraph 5b of this agreement. Upon the request by both sides, or either side, on the Military Armistice Commission for carrying out these functions the supervisory organ of neutral nations shall dispatch inspection teams to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides or the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone; and shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the Military Armistice Commission. In performing their above stated functions, inspection teams of neutral nations shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the main lines of communication and transportation as agreed upon by both sides."

I will give a brief explanation on this proposal. This proposal has provided sufficient conditions for a stable and effective armistice. It is shown, firstly, in our first paragraph where we propose that there should be strict restriction on all types of weapons including aircraft, and armored vehicles, and military personnel, and ammunition. That is, those military forces should not continue to be introduced into Korea during the armistice.

Secondly, on the question of inspection you can see that we have included your revised views in our fifth and sixth paragraphs.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) As for sub-paragraph c of your paragraph 5, "Any member of the supervisory organ is authorized to communicate directly with any member of the military armistice commission", that stipulation suggested by your side we think is not necessary to be included in the principles. Therefore, we have not included it here. (General Hsieh hands new proposal to General Turner).

GEN TURNER: Except for the changing of a few phrases I can see no difference in this proposal from the one that was presented by your staff officers on 22 December. You have apparently left out paragraph c of our principle 5 and also have omitted the last line of our principle 6 which has to do with aerial observation. Was this omission intentional? Most important of all, you omitted the last paragraph of principle 4 which had to do with rehabilitation and construction of airfields. I fail, in reviewing your new proposal, to find where you have made any concession of any consequence. Moreover, by the wording of your principle 4 you have omitted provisions for replenishment. Are all of these omissions intentional on your side? You have made no effort to solve what you yourself maintain is the only major issue left. Is this proposal you submitted your conception of a joke?

GEN HSIEH: The last paragraph in your version of principle 4 and the last sentence in your version of principle 6 have been omitted by us intentionally, because those two provisions are what we firmly oppose. Sub-paragraph c of your version of principle 5 is not a point on which we are in disagreement. We do not agree to include it in this set of principles because we think that it is more appropriate to include it in detailed terms of reference. With regard to the question of your so-called provisions for replenishment, I have this to say. You in your proposal have suggested that both sides shall undertake not to increase the numerical quantities of military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition in Korea during the armistice. But our side proposes

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) that both sides should undertake not to introduce into Korea any military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition during the armistice. And we contend that our provision is a provision which can thoroughly ensure an effective armistice. We have incorporated in our principles 5 and 6 your views in those two same principles submitted on 23 December. As a whole our proposal is a great effort made on our part because it has provided for sufficient conditions for ensuring an effective and stable armistice.

GEN TURNER: From time to time you have indulged in self-applause for what you term your many concessions to the United Nations Command. Let us scrutinize these alleged concessions with an objective eye. Let us determine, in so doing, just what is the nature of these things you have called your concessions.

First, it is obvious to any man of rational viewpoints, that for an armistice to be effective, there must be observation in the rear areas of both sides. What is a military armistice? It is a suspension of hostilities under certain agreed conditions pending a solution at a higher level of the causes of war. Who agrees to a military armistice and the conditions governing it? The military commanders in the field so agree. Can these military commanders guarantee that the higher level conference will be convened immediately after the military armistice is put in effect? No, they cannot. They can only so recommend. Can the military commanders predetermine how long a political conference will last, and therefore how long the military armistice may endure? No, they cannot. Can the military commanders be certain before the event that the political conference will result in peace, and that therefore, once the armistice is put into effect, the fighting will not resume? No, they cannot. Therefore, what must the military commanders insist upon as armistice terms? They must insist upon security for

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) their forces. They must insist that there be no increase in the military capabilities of their opponent during the period of armistice. They must insist that there be no military threat growing on the side of their opponent. How can they know whether this is the case or not? To know this, the military commanders must have observers in the rear of the other side watching developments. What kind of observers would the military commanders prefer to have? They would prefer to have their own military personnel doing the observing. Now we are face to face, inescapably, with the conclusion that for an effective, stable armistice, there must be inspection of the rear areas, and this inspection should be carried out by military personnel of the opposing side. So far, nothing I have cited is an advantage to one side or the other in a military armistice. It is simply the obvious, logical thing for both sides to insist upon.

Now what was the view of your side as expressed in your proposal of 27 November? It was: no inspection of the rear areas. Thus from the beginning you set yourself in opposition, not to the United Nations Command, but to reason. You adopted an unreasonable position. Why you feared inspection of your rear, we can readily guess. The point is, however, you adopted an illogical, unreasonable position. It was not because we were favored thereby that the United Nations Command insisted upon inspection in the rear areas. All the world, including me and especially you, know that the United Nations Command is now observing your rear areas from the air, and that you are doing nothing comparable in our rear areas. The United Nations Command insists on inspection of the rear of both areas because such is indispensable to a stable and effective armistice; because it is fair and right. For seven days, however, your side insisted on its irrational stand against what is fair and reasonable. Then, finally, you agreed to limited inspection of the rear areas. You refused to allow inspection by the military personnel

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) of each side in joint teams. You insisted on non-combatant teams. Moreover, you wished to limit severely the points at which such inspection could be executed. Thus you agreed only in part to what was inherently necessary to a stable armistice, and to what was obviously an equitable, reasonable arrangement. So, from the beginning, you began your process of compromising between what is fair and reasonable and what is biased and illogical. This, you called a concession. This, you touted as your great concession. Thus the nature of your so-called concessions begins to become clear. You take a position that two plus two equals six. Your opponent says the sum is four. Then you grudgingly agree to say that the sum of two plus two is five. This, you call a concession.

Secondly, it is obvious to any man of rational viewpoint that during armistice the personnel of forces in the field should be rotated, just as they are during hostilities. I know that every civilized nation follows this practice. You inform me that you also rotate your personnel. Thus there is nothing advantageous in the practice to either side. Believing this to be as obvious to you as it is to all men of logical attitude, the United Nations Command merely pointed out to you that your proposed principle of "no introduction of personnel into Korea under any pretext" could not work for your side or ours, since such a principle would proclude rotation, a practice of both sides. From some dank well of illogic, however, you came up with opposition to rotation. You continued this position of unreason for 19 days, Then on 14 December you again offered a compromise between logic and illogic. You wanted it believed that 5,000 equalled 50,000. You further compounded the felony, however, by introducing the idea that even a 5,000 monthly rotation must be approved by the military armistice commission. Thus you merely shifted the scene at which you could maintain your illogical stand from this tent at Pan Mun Jom to the chamber of the military armistice commission. You know you could

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) control the question in a balanced forum by merely refusing to agree. Again you applauded yourself for making a great concession. Again you set yourself in opposition to reason, then claimed great credit for moving a hair closer to reason while decisively protecting yourself from the results of logic. Thus again the false nature of your so-called concessions was exposed.

Since 14 December -- for 10 days -- you have argued against the obviously reasonable. You have contended that during armistice you should be permitted to build up your military capabilities in the field of aviation. We can fully understand your deep concern with the matter of developing military air capabilities, but we cannot agree with it during armistice. As any man of rational viewpoint knows, to allow our side to increase greatly its military capabilities during armistice would upset the balance of military capabilities which gave rise to the idea of armistice. As that balance was increasingly upset by the unequated development if military capabilities on one side, so would the stability of the armistice be upset. Again, however, you have adopted a totally unreasonable position in the hope of causing the United Nations Command to abandon its fair and reasonable attitude in compromise between logic and illogic. It won't happen, General Hsieh.

Also since 14 December you have argued against the eminently fair provision that there be aerial observation of both sides by non-combatant aircraft, manned by non-combatant crews and non-combatant observers. It does not need explanation that if inspection in the rear areas is to be effective, it must be thorough. Yet your side opposed aerial observation and aerial photography of both rear areas. It is obvious that you do not want thorough inspection; you want inspection to be as limited as you can make it. Why do you fear the eyes of the representatives of non-combatant nations? What have you to hide that can be hidden from the observation of non-combatant representatives on the ground, but cannot

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) be hidden from aircraft? Again you have adopted an irrational, illogical position, and you would have the United Nations Command abandon a reasonable position in favor of yours. Nothing doing, General Hsieh. We are now all too well aware of your tactics, your compromises between reason and unreason.

The United Nations Command has accepted, with misgivings, your insistence upon less-than-the logical in connection with observer teams. In so doing, we have given up one of the principle safeguards of our security during armistice.

The United Nations Command has accepted your view of the relationship between the military armistice commission and the non-combatant inspecting organ. In doing so, we have given up a single directive authority which is so clearly logical and rational for the armistice. Again we have given up one of the principle safeguards of our security during armistice.

The United Nations Command has accepted your utterly unreasonable view that you should be given islands which you could not and have not won in combat. These islands would provide us the sentinel points from which we could observe your activities in the rear. Thus we have given up yet another safeguard of our security.

It is clear that the so-called concessions you have made are spurious and that the concessions we have made are real losses to our security during armistice. In spite of the fact that you have made no real concessions, in spite of the fact that we have made concessions adversely affecting our security during armistice, you still insist on increasing your military capabilities during armistice. You still insist on building up, during armistice an air capability you do not now have. You still insist that non-combatant teams may not observe your adherence to armistice terms from the air. You should know by now, General Hsieh, that these irrational pretensions of yours are unacceptable to us. You do know, I believe, that the position of the United Nations Command

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) is equitable to both sides. If you do not, you should study that position further, because ultimately you will find that military realities are the governing factors in this armistice. Ultimately you will find that as long as you continue your irrational refusal to face military realities, no progress is possible.

Note well that the restrictions the United Nations Command advocates on both sides are restrictions we are presently able to enforce on your side by military operations. Note well, also, that the restrictions you seek to avoid are restrictions your military capabilities cannot defend you from at present. In short, you do not like the restraints imposed upon you now as a result of United Nations Command operations. We can sympathize with your predicament. Therefore, when you seek to gain total relief from these restraints through negotiations, we understand. But it won't happen, General Hsieh. We have no intention -- absolutely none -- that you be permitted to increase your military capabilities during an armistice.

Yesterday we made you a proposal. The two points of that proposal against which you clamor so loudly and often are reasonable and fair. They are the unshakable position of the United Nations Command. They are going to remain so. You may as well get it through your head, General Hsieh, the United Nations Command will keep on insisting indefinitely that neither side be permitted to increase greatly its military capabilities during armistice, and that there be thorough observation on both sides. We have given up all the safeguards we intend to give up. We have made concession after concession. We have listened patiently to illogical dogma. We have made proposal after proposal. We will make no more compromises between reason and unreason, between logic and illogic. Our position is firm and it will remain so. Now it is up to you.

GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

GEN TURNER: I have finished.

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GEN HSIEH: I have listened carefully to your long statement prepared before hand. Please forgive me, but I do not prepare; and I do not think it necessary to refute and answer your points one by one. There is only one point. You seem to have intentionally distorted the fact that we have made concessions on the question of rotation. I tell you once again that, in the first instance, we agree to the rotation of 5,000 men monthly; and, next, we have again made a concession in that we say the number in rotation can be negotiated. As to your concern over the vetoing in the military armistice commission, that is entirely beside the point.

By your long statement you attempt to bring out two points. Firstly, which side has ulterior motives during the armistice, beside the armistice. Our position and our policy is very clear. Our policy is a policy of peace. We stand for a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question. We have fought in defense of peace. We have fought a defensive battle. Your side acts in the contrary way. You have openly stood out before the world for a policy of war. That is why you do not favor a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It is your side, not our side, which deserves suspicion.

Secondly, you attempt to explain which side has made concessions. This has been answered by me many times, and it is not for me to give the answer. The peoples of the whole world -- public opinion of the world -- will give a just judgement and answer to this question. It is true that there is a group of people on your side who will never admit that we have made concessions, but there is also a group of people on your side who will admit that we have really made concessions. This morning we made another great effort in putting forth a proposal which supplies sufficient conditions for ensuring a stable and effective armistice. I hope that you will consider and accept it.

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GEN TURNER: Nothing I have said this morning has in any manner been affected by the absurd proposal which you gave us this morning. It is unacceptable to our side. There is nothing new in it from your proposal of 22 December.

GEN HSIEH: Whether our proposal is a new one or is a proposal which can solve the question before us is left to your judgement and to your interpretations. I do not need to say anything more.

GEN TURNER: Let's go to lunch!

GEN HSIEH: We agree. When will we meet again the next time?

GEN TURNER: At your convenience.

GEN HSIEH: You please name the time.

GEN TURNER: At 1430.

GEN HSIEH: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1230 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to offer?

GEN HSIEH: We have already raised a proposal this morning and we would like to hear your views on it.

GEN TURNER: I have already given my views on it. Have you anything else to offer?

GEN HSIEH: No!

GEN TURNER: Since you have nothing to offer, I suggest that we recess until tomorrow at 11 o'clock.

GEN HSIEH: I have submitted a proposal this morning which is a great effort made on our part. And I have not heard your direct reply to it. Do I understand that the long statement you made this morning after we submitted our proposal, is your direct answer?

GEN TURNER: Your proposal of this morning contained nothing new. It deserves no more comment than what I have already made this morning.

GEN HSIEH: Do you need time for studying our proposal? If you need it, we will let you have it.

GEN TURNER: No!

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GEN HSIEH: I understand your meaning. I tell you again we do not need time.

GEN TURNER: We are eagerly awaiting anything new you have to offer.

GEN HSIEH: We have made our greatest effort in submitting our proposal this morning. It is now your turn to indicate whether you are sincere toward an armistice or whether you want to delay the negotiations. You are under a test now.

GEN TURNER: This morning, General Hsieh, you said that the remaining major differences between our sides was the matter of airfields and aerial observation. Do you propose to settle these points contained in our principle 4 and 6 by just omitting those in your so-called new proposal? Is that your effort at solving our differences? Surely you are not so naive as to think that our side for one instant would consider your new proposal as a solution to these differences. Your new proposal is completely unacceptable to our side. Is this your most sincere effort to solve our differences?

GEN HSIEH: Firstly, I would call your attention to the fact that you need to make a further careful study of our proposal. If, as you say, your long statement this morning and your statement just now were your direct answer to our proposal of 24 December, then I would like to have your answer in a formal language. If that is not your real intention, then I advise you not to close the issue between us. I tell you that you and I sitting here face to face may not be able to see the question before us so clearly as those who are sitting more to the back. When you come to study again our 24 December proposal, I request you to pay attention to the following points:

Firstly, in our fourth principle, the restrictions on military forces on both sides as proposed by us are more thorough-going than what you suggested. We proposed that both sides should not introduce any military forces into Korea, including what you have most concerned about -- the armored vehicles and combat aircraft. You should admit that on this point our proposal is more thorough-going than yours.

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Secondly, in our fifth and sixth principles, we have incorporated all your views expressed yesterday on the question of the duties and responsibility of the military armistice commission and the inspection of the rear of both sides by the entrusted neutral-nations supervisory organ. You should have no more pretexts for opposing our proposals on this point. As for the ports of entry in the rear to be agreed upon to be put under the supervision and inspection of neutral-nations, we mean that those ports of entry should include all types of ports of entry. And we also adopted your wording of "places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred"; that is, any place where a violation is reported, that place will be inspected. Again here you have no cause for any complaint on this point. These facts show that our proposal of 24 December has provided for sufficient conditions to ensure a stable and effective armistice.

The question left now is the unreasonable demand which your side has never let go, a demand which should not be discussed at all in these military armistice negotiations and a question on which we have no right at all to make any decision for interfering in the internal affairs of either side. So you should have no illusions about our stand on this question. We cannot express ourselves more clearly than this. Whether you wish to have an armistice or whether you intend to continue your accustomed tactics of delaying the negotiations depends entirely on your next step. If only you will give up your unreasonable demands, the negotiations will have progress immediately. Otherwise, there will be no progress at all. I feel that you need time to consider such an important question.

GEN TURNER: You have continually attempted to dodge the issue of limiting your military capabilities by repeating the unsound argument that it is interference in your internal affairs. You have given us verbal assurances you do not intend to threaten our forces. Yet you refuse to put these safeguards in the armistice.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) In all frankness, I must state that we require more than verbal promises to maintain the terms of the armistice. We are suspicious of your motives in opposing our reasonable proposal.

You continue to oppose limitations on your military capabilities during the armistice by hiding behind statements concerning sovereign rights of independent states. In the first place you should know that complete sovereignty is an abstract concept which today applies to no so-called sovereign nation in the world. Secondly, the maintenance of international peace, the existence of international agreements, and the existence of international law force a partial surrender of the sovereignty of all nations. Thirdly, during the armistice, an independent state can expect a considerable reduction in its sovereignty by the mere fact that it has not won a military campaign but is willing to accept armistice terms. It should be plain to you that everything we are dealing with in these armistice negotiations affects sovereign rights. Therefore, any further argument along these lines to evade the issue is untenable.

The important thing to judge in the armistice terms is the fairness to each side. Restrictions must apply equally to both sides. Neither side must gain a military advantage. Let us look at the facts.

You would have us forfeit the security derived from aerial reconnaissance and photography, a principle we have enjoyed from the first day of the Korean hostilities. Our proposal, on the other hand, would give you benefits of aerial reconnaissance and photography which you have not had in the past. What can you lose? It is fair to each side. Another gain to you pertains to installations and facilities. You will have during the armistice complete freedom to rebuild your transportation and communication systems unmolested in any way. Who gains from this, your side or our side?

After considering the facts just pointed out, and these are only a partial list, it is time you realized the United Nations Command

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) is not seeking unilateral advantages. It should be easy to see that the over-all benefits accrue predominantly to your side. Our proposal is more than fair and just to your side.

Our proposal contains only those principles which are essential to an effective armistice. We continue to insist they must be an integral part of any armistice agreement acceptable to us. Continued objection by your side will only further delay our arriving at an armistice.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement has been taken down by our minute-takers. The impression from it is that you do not desire an armistice. You are deliberately delaying the negotiations. All those absurd arguments you just stated have been refuted by us repeatedly, and I am not going to waste any time on it. I only ask what right you have to force us to accept your unreasonable demands?

GEN TURNER: Have you anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: What do you mean by "new"? I don't understand! Our proposal of 24 December is a new proposal.

GEN TURNER: It is new in point of time. But it is not new in its contents. I mean by new, something that will make a serious effort toward the solution of our differences.

GEN HSIEH: It seems to me that the best way is for you to make a more careful study of our proposal this morning. It is a complete proposal which ensures a stable and effective armistice and deprives you of any more pretexts.

GEN TURNER: Perhaps the statement that I made to you this morning was too long for you to digest in so short a time. I suggest that you take more time to study it. We are willing to recess until tomorrow at 11 o'clock.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement this morning entirely repeated your unreasonable views expressed previously and there is no need for us to give it any consideration. You should have no illusions at all on the question of interference in our internal affairs which we firmly

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) oppose. Our proposal of 24 December must be given serious consideration by your side and you must give a direct and formal answer to it. It seems that you have no interest in time. Mere effort on our side alone does not mend the matter. It seems that the time today is needed by your side more than ever. If you have nothing new to say I agree to recess until the usual time tomorrow morning.

Meeting recessed at 1539 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

25 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-first Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom. Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: It is now 11 o'clock. Have you anything to say?

GEN HSIEH: I have nothing to say. But I am ready to hear your views.

GEN TURNER: We are ready to hear anything new, if you have anything to offer.

GEN HSIEH: No, nothing.

GEN TURNER: Since you apparently need more time to study my comments of yesterday, what time do you recommend that we reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: Your statements yesterday morning and afternoon do not deserve any refutation and we need not spend more time considering them. We have submitted our proposal of 24 December and it is perhaps your side which needs time to study our proposal. If so, you can take time.

GEN TURNER: I have given you my answer to your proposal yesterday. I now ask if you have anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: What time do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: It depends on your need.

GEN TURNER: Your so-called proposal of yesterday has been given the degree of attention it deserves. I will say no more about it.

As you yourself have said, there are two major points on which we are in disagreement. These are: First, your insistence that you be permitted to increase your military capabilities during the

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) period of armistice. Second, your opposition to thorough and effective observation of the manner in which both sides adhere to the terms of the armistice.

As to the first of these points, your insistence on increasing your military capabilities during the period of armistice, I will explain exactly how the United Nations Command visualizes this happening. Perhaps, by means of such an explanation I can make clear to you why the United Nations Command will continue its unshakable position in this regard. At present there exists a rough balance of military capabilities between the two belligerent forces in Korea. This balance is a function of four basic military capabilities. On one side of the equation are your ground force capabilities. On the other side of the equation are the ground, naval, and air capabilities of the United Nations Command. We believe that by this time you have been convinced that you cannot conquer a military team of ground, naval, and air forces, with ground capabilities alone. Whether or not you are now aware that this is the case, it remains a fact nonetheless.

Therefore, the presently existing balance between our two belligerent forces can be upset in only two ways. One of them is for the United Nations Command to greatly increase the military capabilities of one or all of its three type forces in Korea. The other is that you add a new type military capability to the single one you now possess. Now the United Nations Command has proposed that there be no increase of military capabilities in Korea during the armistice. Therefore, that possibility is excluded. You, however, refused to agree to refrain from developing a new type military capability on your side during armistice. Therefore, the second possibility, that you would add a new military capability to your side during armistice, is clearly open.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) You refuse to agree to refrain from rehabilitating the numerous inoperational military airfields in the territory of Korea controlled by you. You refuse to agree to refrain from constructin new military airfields. You intend, then, to rehabilitate military airfields so as to render them capable of supporting operations of jet aircraft; to extend and enlarge runways; to construct new military airfields from which combat aircraft can be operated. You contend that it is not your intention to introduce combat aircraft into Korea, therefore the fears of the United Nations Command regarding airfields are groundless. But we know that there are many combat aircraft north of the Yalu River. We know that, given operational airfields in Korea, these aircraft can be flown into Korea in a matter of minutes. We see, therefore, that in an instant a huge military air capability can materialize on your side if you elect to resume the fighting. The only necessity not now possessed by you which would permit this development is that of operational airfields in Korea controlled by your side. In short, if we should agree to the development of military airfields on your side, these airfields can be married to the military aircraft in Manchuria at the moment of your choosing. This would find the United Nations Command itself confronted with a sudden and tremendous increase in your military capabilities. We cannot accept this grave threat to the security of our forces during armistice. However much you may protest that you would not employ such a capability against the United Nations Command, we cannot and will not rest the security of our forces during armistice on mere words. We must have a concrete safeguard against this threat to our security.

Now, as to the matter of thorough and effective observation of the manner in which both sides adhere to the terms of the armistice, I will say a few words. Your side opposes the effective and thorough method of observation available in the form of aerial

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GEN TURNER: observation and photographic flights. Your opposition to such thorough observation, taken in context with your refusal to refrain from developing a military air capability during armistice, poses an ominous picture before our eyes. We have explained many times that this aerial observation would be carried out by completely non-combatant aircraft, crews, and observers. It would be carried out on both sides in equal measures. Can it be that you do not want the long line of the Yalu River observed? Can it be that you intend to secretly and illegally import military material across that river in violation of the armistice agreement? Can it be that this is your scheme to evade the eyes of ground observers at the ports of entry? We do not know; but the more you oppose this reasonable and equitable means of observation, the more we become convinced your purposes are hidden and threatening.

The sooner you realize that the United Nations Command is going to keep on insisting on safeguards against the threats I have just described, the sooner we will make decisive progress in these negotiations. No matter how many times you repeat your worn-out, hollow assertions that you must be allowed to build up greatly your military capabilities during armistice, we will not change our view that the first consideration during armistice is security. No matter how many times you falsely argue against effective observation of the rear areas, we will not change our views that the first requisite of security during armistice is effective observation. That is our firm and unalterable position.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement is noted. There is nothing in your statement except a deliberate distortion and slander of our intentions. These statements are all your own statements. The fact that you have done so only proves that there is a group of people on your side who do not want an armistice, who are again out to play their accustomed tactics of delaying the negotiations. Since these assertions are made by you yourselves, not by us, there is no need for me to

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) to refute them. I assure you once again that our position is no threat at all to your side. We never held that there should be increase -- we never held that we would continue to increase our military forces or military capabilities during the armistice. On the contrary, we have held that there should be reduction of military capabilities and we even maintain that there should be withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. Our policy is a pure and sincere, peaceful policy. You have a policy directly opposite from ours. I tell you seriously that our 24 December proposal is complete and sufficient for ensuring a stable and effective armistice.

GEN TURNER: Please let me know when you have finished.

GEN HSIEH: I am finished.

GEN TURNER: If you have no intentions of doing those things which I have pointed out in my statement, then why is it that you so strenuously object to our very fair and reasonable proposal of 23 December, which restricts airfields and requires aerial observation.

GEN HSIEH: Whatever is reasonable in your 23 December proposal has already been incorporated in our 24 December proposal, which we consider a complete and sufficient proposal for ensuring a stable and effective armistice.

GEN TURNER: You are willing to put your alleged intentions into assertions, just mere words, but not into agreements which would be binding on you. Why?

GEN HSIEH: Facts are worth more than eloquence. The assurance of action is the best assurance of all.

GEN TURNER: We are waiting for that action from your side.

GEN HSIEH: There is no need to await our action. The historical facts for many years have borne it out.

GEN TURNER: I thought we were here trying to reach an agreement on terms of an armistice. We are awaiting these sincere actions on your part toward consummation of this agreement. It appears to me that either

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) you do not want to negotiate or you do not have the authority to do so.

GEN HSIEH: I tell you again our 24 December proposal is yet another action showing our sincerity on our part. We have never refused to negotiate. We have full authority to discuss anything which comes into the confines of a military armistice conference. There is only one point on which we have no authority to discuss -- that is the acceptance of your unreasonable demands.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Will you repeat that last statement?

CCF INTERPRETER: The last sentence?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Yes.

(Chinese interpreter repeats last sentence of statement.)

GEN TURNER: We have made you a very reasonable proposal General Hsieh. Are you authorized to accept that?

GEN HSIEH: Are you referring to our 24 December proposal?

GEN TURNER: To our proposal of 23 December.

GEN HSIEH: Then there is no need for me to answer that.

GEN TURNER: Then have you anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: No! That is all.

GEN TURNER: When do you wish to reconvene again?

GEN HSIEH: It depends on your need.

GEN TURNER: Since you are apparently unwilling to make any sincere effort towards solving our differences, I suggest that we reconvene at the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: You are entirely mistaken. It is your side which is playing tricks. We have made plenty of efforts; not once or twice, but innumerable times. We are always sincere to negotiate. It is your side which refuses to make efforts. It is now up to you to take the next step. You have our 24 December proposal which is reaonable and fair to both sides.

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GEN TURNER: We have told you repeatedly why we stand firm and unshakable on the points of difference. You have failed to show us <u>why</u> you have taken your stand. Can you give us that now? To be more explicit, if your intentions are not to use these airfields to build up your military capabilities, then <u>why</u> do you oppose our principle -- our proposal of 23 December?

GEN HSIEH: I wish to ask you: Why does your side refuse to discuss the question of withdrawal of foreign forces in our negotiations?

GEN TURNER: It was agreed in the plenary session many months ago that such discussion would take place when Agenda Item 5 was discussed. Your method of dodging my question by asking another question which has no relation to the subject will accomplish nothing in these negotiations. Have you an answer for my question? If not, I suggest you take more time to consider it.

GEN HSIEH: The question you asked has already been answered by us.

GEN TURNER: The usual time tomorrow? 11 o'clock?

GEN HSIEH: It appears that time is needed by you again, particularly today. If so, I am agreeable.

<u>Meeting recessed at 1208 hours</u>.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

26 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-second Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: I have nothing to say. If you have anything to offer, we are ready to listen.

GEN HSIEH: No! Nothing.

GEN TURNER: Do you have the authority this morning to negotiate on those points of difference which have been made so clear for the past several weeks?

GEN HSIEH: Speaking about differences, the greatest difference existing between both sides is the question whether you will not continue to insist on interfering in our internal affairs. Our 24 December proposal is a complete and sufficient proposal providing for conditions which can ensure a stable and effective armistice. Therefore, you should have no more excuses for refusing to accept it. Our 24 December proposal firstly provides for strict restrictions on the increase of military forces, including all types of weapons; for instance, combat aircraft and armored vehicles. At the same time, in respect to effective inspection of the rear, it also provides for effective provisions. Therefore, it contains sufficient conditions for ensuring a stable and effective armistice and has deprived your side of any pretexts whatsoever. The question now, therefore, is whether your side will forego your unreasonable demands. I have not heard any indication on your part in this connection.

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GEN TURNER: I have answered your question several times previously. But once again I shall answer it. I hope for the last time. You ask for my formal and direct answer to your so-called new proposal of 24 December. My direct answer is that as a whole, it is unacceptable. My formal answer is that you have failed to include the following: first, necessary security provisions which prohibit either side from greatly increasing its capabilities; second, the provision for effective observation. You have incorporated in your so-called new proposal not one new thought that has not already been discussed, nor have you made any effort to solve the problem confronting us. I need not comment further, since my views are already in the record.

GEN HSIEH: It seems that your side intends to continue to delay the negotiations. You are not willing to make any efforts to reach a genuine armistice. At least that is the impression you gave me.

GEN TURNER: Yesterday you informed this conference that you were without authority to accept the United Nations Command positions regarding restriction of airfield rehabilitation and aerial observation. At the same time you proclaimed that you had authority to begotiate, and were present at this conference for the purpose of negotiating. In the same breath you announced that these two points - airfield restrictions and aerial observation - were the sole remaining issues between us. Is there some curious mental process unknown to us by which you make sense out of those three inconsistent statements?

Evidently, it is your concept that negotiating in this case consists of the United Nations Command simply abandoning its proposal regarding restrictions on airfields, and abandoning its proposal regarding aerial observation, both of which favor your side at the expense of the United Nations Command. It won't happen, General Hsieh. In other words, to you, negotiating is a process through which our side gives up its reasonable positions and adopts

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) your unreasonable positions. Your irrational optimism has hit a new height.

To negotiate, as you apparently desire to negotiate, you need a position of overwhelming strength. You need the position of the victor dictating terms to the vanquished. I think you realize, even better than do we, how far removed from such a position you actually are. The United Nations Command is willing to negotiate in the sense that two undefeated forces are represented at this table. The United Nations Command has no intention of being the recipient of dictated terms.

Since the time when the issues of airfield restrictions and aerial observation were brought into focus as the crux of the problem between our two delegations, what has each side done about the crux? Your side has simply insisted that your point of view be accepted. You have offered nothing whatsoever bearing on these questions. In fact you have offered nothing other than your own unreasonable, unilateral viewpoint. In contrast, the United Nations Command has offered to agree to the rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations. Thus the United Nations Command has made a specific concession in repsect to the problems which now deadlock the conference. You, on the other hand, have made no concessions. Nor have you even attempted seriously to resolve these differences. You have not been able to explain the contradiction between your assertions that you will not develop a threat to the United Nations Command during armistice, and your refusal to enter into agreements which bind you not to develop such a threat.

Apparently, General Hsieh, I have been mistaken in a statement I have made several times in the past. I have said that either you do not want to negotiate our differences, or you do not have the authority to do so. Evidently there is a third possibility; that is, you do not know <u>how</u> to negotiate our differences. If the

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) latter might possibly be the case, I urge you to approach the problem of negotiating by reflecting on the fact that you are in no position to dictate terms. With that thought firmly in mind, you may be able to arrive at the conclusion that, after all, lacking the dictatorial position of a victor, you would be far better off to agree to terms that are strictly equitable, strictly fair to both sides. You will find such an equitable solution of our differences in the proposal made by the United Nations Command on 23 December. I invite you to study that proposal with great care.

GEN HSIEH: I have noted General Turner's statement. I consider that either your side does not really know our position or you deliberately pretend not to know our position.

I am not going to speak about the facts far back since we began to discuss Item 3 of the agenda; I will speak about the facts since the two crucial disagreements between both sides were brought into focus and laid before us. That fact became very conspicuous on 22 December. Because then, at that time, the meetings of the staff officers of both sides had reached agreement on principles 1, 2, and 3, based on our proposal, and the only questions left were, firstly, your insistence on restricting our facilities and your demand for free inspection -- both constituting complete interference in our internal affairs -- and the other question, your continued insistence on introduction into Korea during the armistice of military forces.

You then made a proposal on 23 December which you claimed to be a great effort on your part and a great concession. But as a matter of fact, from our viewpoint and from your own interpretation, it was no concession at all. We see that it was no concession on your part because we are here not to negotiate on the question of facilities within the territory of our side. It is a question which should not be raised for discussion in a military armistice conference and even less be decided upon. You claimed that the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) so-called permission for a limited number of civil airfields was a concession on your part. You made a mistake there. I tell you once again that we are not here to bargain with you on these questions. We need not ask permission for doing so. We have perfect right to deal with our facilities. It is not a question to be raised for discussion in a military armistice negotiation, and even less to be decided upon. I say this once again so you will have no mistake about it. That is the reason why what you claim to be a concession cannot be recognized as a concession by us. Another unreasonable position of yours in your 23 December proposal is your insistence on continued introduction into Korea of military forces during the armistice. You are willing to restrict such introduction. At the same time, however, your 23 December proposal did contain some elements which can settle our disputes. That is the views in connection with the Military Armistice Commission and supervisory organ, and in connection with the duties of the Military Armistice Commission and supervisory organ contained in your paragraphs 5 and 6. Therefore, closely following your proposal we submitted our revised three principles on 24 December.

The fundamental thought in our revised proposal is that if your side would not insist any longer on interference in our internal affairs, then our 24 December proposal should be the basis for the settlement of the final disagreements between both sides on Item 3 of the agenda. Why did we cherish that thought? Firstly, you should see that in our 24 December proposal, we proposed that there should be no continued introduction into Korea during the armistice of military forces. And if your side does not intend to resume hostilities during the armistice, then you should admit that that proposal of ours is an effective and thorough assurance of an armistice. Secondly, you had raised the pretext that you were concerned about the increase of our military air capabilities during the armistice and in our 24 December proposal we proposed

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) that there be strict restriction of introduction into Korea of any combat aircraft, armored vehicles or other weapons, and in addition to that, we also agreed that the ports of entry in the rear to be inspected could include airports under the proviso that you will give up your interference in our internal facilities and your demand for free aerial inspection. Therefore, our proposal has deprived your side of any concern or pretext which you had maintained. At the same time we accepted, as a whole, your ideas about inspection and supervision as included in your 23 December proposal; that is, if only one of the two sides requested an investigation, then such investigation or inspection of the areas, ports of entry agreed upon by both sides, or at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, must be made. Is that assurance not sufficient? Therefore, your side should have no more pretext for opposing our proposal.

Please review your attitude after we submitted our 24 December proposal. Throughout the sessions on 24 and 25 December you have given vent to all sorts of absurd arguments and showed no sincere attitude at all towards the settling of disagreements between us. Your continuance to do so will only reveal your unwillingness to reach an armistice, and your unreasonable refusal of our 24 December proposal which provides sufficient conditions for ensuring a stable and effective armistice.

I call your attention to the fact that any military man with some far-sightedness or any of the men who sit at the back and who have some ability to analyze the truth, they, when they come to carefully study our 24 December proposal,will surely admit that this is a proposal which can solve the question before us, which is fair and reasonable to both sides, and which can ensure a stable and effective armistice. It is only if your side attempts to continue the war in Korea and to continue to maintain a state of war

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) and tension over the world that you will not admit our 24 December proposal is a reasonable proposal; you of course have the freedom -- the free hand -- to do so. But you will not be able to escape the judgement of the peoples of the world and the wide masses of troops at the fronts in Korea.

You just asserted that our side is dictating terms to you and forcing you to accept such terms. But I advise you to review the facts and to recognize the fact that the existing problem is exactly your insistence on your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs. That demand was proposed by your side and the wording of the demand was written by your side. The stumbling block was put there by your side. It is obvious that it is your side that is dictating terms to us and attempting to force us to accept your unreasonable demands. It is your side which refuses to remove this stumbling block. It is your side which is intentionally delaying the negotiations. The responsibility for these things is not on our side at all. You should be aware that as soon as your side foregoes such unreasonable demands, the disagreements between us can be settled right away. Therefore, it is up to you to make the decision. It is up to you to give careful consideration to the situation. Our side has made all the efforts that should be done by us.

I have, so far, once again, attempted to point out the issue before us and to point out the way for solving this question and on which side exactly the responsibility for delaying the negotiations will fall. You can have no mistake about that at all.

GEN TURNER: General Hsieh, I have listened carefully and patiently to everything you have said. I find not one single new thought expressed by you this morning. I find not one argument that we have not previously refuted. We have heard all of these hollow arguments before. You still continue to evade the main problem on the excuse of "interference in internal affairs". I have previously

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) refuted that line of reasoning, that excuse, and I see no purpose in repeating at this time. However, if you wish, I will repeat my previous refutation of that weak excuse.

We must face the problem, the problem of providing for an effective and a stable armistice. So far you have failed to make any effort to solve this problem. So far you just ignore the problem, hoping it will solve itself. You just stated you have a perfect right to increase your military capabilities at will during the armistice. Is this your idea of provision for a stable armistice? Your side has stated you are for peace. For what peaceful purpose do you intend to increase your offensive military air capabilities? I find it difficult to understand these contradictions.

I ask now. Do you have any serious proposal to make at this time that will solve our differences?

GEN HSIEH: You raised two questions. Your first question is obviously an intentional distortion and slander of our statement. You have done so not once, but many times; and you know yourself that you are distorting and slandering our statements. We have said that such slander and distortion do not deserve a refutation or a reply, and I take the same view now. That is my answer to your first question.

As to the second question, we have submitted our 24 December proposal. The deadlock is created by your side. It is up to you to break it. It is up to you to give up your unreasonable demands. Provided your side will give up your unreasonable demands, the conference would make progress.

GEN TURNER: Since you have no new proposal to make at this time, what time would you like to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: It is not our side which needs time. The side which needs serious consideration is your side. It is up to your need.

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GEN TURNER: We need no more time. We simply await your new proposal, I suggest that we recess.

GEN HSIEH: I tell you again that the deadlock is created by your side. Your attitude is your refusal to make any effort to break this deadlock. As you have suggested recess, please name the time for reconvening.

GEN TURNER: The usual time tomorrow?

GEN HSIEH: Agreed.

Meeting recessed at 1226 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

27 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-third Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Are you ready? I wish to speak.

It is today a whole month since we began the discussions on Item 3 of the agenda. Yet, owing to your insistence upon your unreasonable demand to interfere in the internal affairs of our side, we have not reached a complete agreement on Item 3 of the agenda. I find it necessary to make a review of the development of arguments during the discussion of Item 3 so as to determine the responsibility for delaying the negotiations.

On 27 November, when the plenary session began the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, our side submitted five principles and your side submitted seven principles. We held that after the military armistice was realized, a political conference of a higher level should be convened quickly - please note I say quickly - to discuss the withdrawal of foreign forces so as to achieve a thorough peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Only when the Korean question is settled thoroughly and peacefully will there be really no possibility of the resumption of hostilities; any stable and effective armistice will only be a state of transition which cannot and should not be expected to solve all the questions connected with the prevention of the resumption of the hostilities.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

Therefore, we considered that it was not necessary to discuss in a strictly military armistice such questions as no increase of military forces of both sides during the armistice, and that it was not permissible to adopt such measures of interfering in the internal affairs of the other side and the conducting of free inspection in the rear of the other side. We deemed that your side, which had during the armistice negotiations always refused to discuss the withdrawal of all foreign forces, was not qualified to raise these demands. Since you looked upon the withdrawal of foreign forces as a political question that should be discussed in the military armistice negotiations, how could you bring up these obviously political questions of interfering in the internal affairs of the other side in the same negotiations? However, you made a complete reversal on your past stand that no such political questions should be touched upon in the armistice negotiations and came out to insist that it must be stipulated in the military armistice that both sides should not increase the military forces and that free inspection should be conducted in the rear of the other side. Thus, a deadlock arose in the plenary session soon after the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda. It should be pointed out that the position you clung to in the deadlock was illogical and incoherent.

Yet, because you say that your side was really afraid of the increase of our military forces and in order to achieve an armistice in Korea and to break the deadlock in the conference, we made a concession to your views and submitted on 3 December two additional recommendations: first, that both sides should not introduce into Korea during the armistice any military forces, weapons and ammunition under any pretext; second, that in order that no internal affairs of the other side would be involved by inspection of the rear, the adherence to and execution of the provisions stipulated by both sides should be supervised at the ports of entry in the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) rear, agreed upon by both sides, by a supervisory organ of neutral nations. All just people could see that that proposal of ours was much more thorough-going than your proposal, and that the method of supervision by neutral nations, which was put forth by us with a painstaking effort, was the only practicable method of effectively supervising the execution of this stipulation by both sides without involving the question of internal affairs.

Our two additional recommendations of 3 December broke the deadlock in the plenary session and it was only because of this that both sides agreed to transfer the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda to the present sub-committee. However, besides not resigning yourselves to the relinquishment of your unreasonable demand for direct inspection of our rear, you again raised the question of your need for rotation and replenishment; and, further, maliciously asserted that our proposal was designed to achieve the withdrawal of all foreign forces by means of attrition. Why did you refuse to see that our proposal applied to both sides equally -- that if it was to reduce your forces by attrition, it was also designed to reduce our forces by attrition? The purpose of your so asserting was obviously to argue for your insistence on rotation and replenishment which, no matter how you explain it, would inevitably increase military forces; that is to say, completely in violation of your own proposed principle. Thus, nine days were passed before your side made your counter-proposal of 12 December in which you reluctantly agreed to the principle of inspection of the rear by neutral nations. But you insisted without any reason upon rotation and replenishment. Without a shadow of a doubt, the responsibility for delaying the nine days from 3 December to 12 December is entirely on your side.

Yet, in order to reach an agreement and realize an armistice, our side again quickly submitted our counter-proposal on 14 December and made a concession to your side on the question of rotation.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) In spite of this, your side ignored our concession and refused to express your attitude toward our counter-proposal and insisted upon the unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs, which our side consistently opposed. Thus, another nine days was dragged out until you made your proposal of 23 December, which contained certain elements for breaking the deadlock while, on the other hand, continued to insist upon unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs. Similarly, without doubt, the responsibility for delaying the nine days from 14 December to 23 December is again entirely on your side.

In accordance with the spirit of endeavoring to reach an agreement, our side again quickly submitted our counter-proposal on 24 December. In this counter-proposal we have taken account of your views on the question of rotation. We have taken account of your views in clearly specifying that no combat aircraft or armored vehicles shall be introduced into Korea, and we have taken account of your views that when either side on the military armistice commission raises a request for investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement to the supervisory organ of neutral nations, the latter shall carry out the inspection forthwith. And yet you are not satisfied with our counter-proposal of 24 December. Why? Because our proposal does not agree to your demand for carrying out unlimited rotation and replenishment and does not agree to your demand to restrict our facilities and to conduct aerial reconnaissance. Thus, since 24 December three days have passed away.

We are deeply aware of the fact that you are very much afraid of the growth of our military air power, and it is exactly to relieve your side of this concern that we have agreed to clearly specify that no combat aircraft shall be introduced into Korea and agreed to your proposal that upon request by either side on the military armistice commission for investigation of a violation of

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the armistice agreement to the supervisory organ of neutral nations, the latter shall be responsible for carrying out the inspection. If your side is really pursuing the objective of an armistice as stable and effective as possible, your side should no longer be concerned about the growth of our military air power and should no longer insist upon your absurd demands to interfere in our internal affairs. It can be seen that our side is wholeheartedly in support of a stable and effective armistice between both sides. Our sincerity and good faith are shown in the concrete proposals which we have submitted successively during the past month. In spite of the fact that our side has made such a serious proposal, you have, during the past days, brazenly asserted that during the armistice, combat aircraft could be introduced by us into Korea at any moment and therefore you must insist upon your unreasonable demand to restrict certain facilities of our side. I call your attention to the fact that these statements of yours contain a threat to overthrow the basis of our negotiations. I would like to ask you this: If all the pledges made by our side were worthless, they why should you have come to negotiate with us and what would be the use of an agreement when it is reached through the negotiations? If you intend to continue the negotiations, I advise you not to make any more such statements, which, in any case, are untenable as arguments in defense of your demands for interfering in our internal affairs. On the one hand, you ignore our solemn assurances and insist upon your demand for interfering in our internal affairs; asserting that the so-called balance of military forces in Korea cannot be maintained without interference in our internal affairs. Yet, on the other hand, you insist that you have the right to carry out unlimited rotation and replenishment; that is, you have the right to introduce into Korea unlimited new military forces.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

I request you to explain in plain and definite language why unlimited rotation and replenishment would not increase your military forces. You assert arbitrarily that your unlimited introduction into Korea of military personnel of high morale to replace war-weary personnel in Korea and your importation of unused and brand-new military equipment to replace worn-out equipment in Korea would not increase your military forces and are administrative conveniences on your side which need not be negotiated. Yet, on the other hand, you contend that our right to install or not to install certain facilities in Korea must await your permission, and that there must be aerial reconnaissance. Such a strange logic of yours is possible only under the circumstances that you look upon yourselves as a victor. But I must tell you frankly, that you are no victor in this war and your strange logic is untenable.

Our side firmly holds that our right to deal with certain facitlities within Korea during the armistice absolutely cannot be interfered with by your side and that no reconnaissance by anybody in our territorial air will be tolerated. A limit must be set, through negotiations between both sides, to the so-called rotation advocated by your side which would introduce into Korea military personnel of high morale to replace war-weary personnel in Korea; while the replenishment, by importation into Korea of weapons and ammunition during the armistice, is absolutely impermissable. The word "replenishment" itself implies the increase of military forces of one of the belligerents in Korea from without. It is impossible for you to give any reason in defense of your self-contradictory position of your side.

Such is the fundamental disagreement on Item 3 of the agenda and such is the unshakable position of our side in this disagreement. Your side has already delayed the conference at such great length; your side has the freedom to continue to delay it. However, our side considers that the issue between both sides must be laid

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) before the whole world, for the people of the world to judge who is delaying the Korean armistice negotiations.

GEN TURNER: As I reminded you yesterday, in connection with the two main issues deadlocking this conference only the United Nations Command has offered a concession. From you we have heard no concessions, only blind repetition of your invalid, unreasonable, and wholly-refuted point of view. We still await some indication that you want to negotiate, that you know how to negotiate, and that you have the authority to negotiate. Have you anything to say which conforms to the criteria of equity, reason, and a stable armistice? If so, we are ready to listen. In order to save time of this conference, I tell you beforehand that your defunct proposal of 24 December bears no relation to the criteria stated and interests us in no way whatsoever.

You stated this morning that we were unwilling to accept your verbal assertions that you had no intentions of building up your air power capabilities. You stated that we refused to accept your solemn assurances that you had no such intent. Why then are you unwilling to agree to the principle which we have put forward relative to the limitation on the rehabilitation and construction of airfields? Why are you not willing to accept that in the principles that we are discussing here in these conferences? If you are sincere and if you do not wish to delay further these negotiations you should be willing to agree in writing, not just verbally but in writing, to these principles.

GEN HSIEH: My statement this morning not only answered the questions you have raised but it has illustrated, by reviewing the course of negotiations on Item 3 of the agenda for the past month, which side has made sincere efforts and has shown its willingness to realize an armistice in Korea, and which side has been delaying the conference intentionally and refusing to make efforts and insisting upon unreasonable demands. My statement is a summary of the past discussions

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) I wish you will make a careful study of it.

GEN TURNER: Since you apparently have nothing new to offer in the nature of a proposal, what time do you recommend that we reconvene tomorrow?

GEN HSIEH: Is that another effort on your part since we submitted our proposal of 24 December? We do not need time. It is for you to make considerations and to give your indication. It will depend upon your need for time.

GEN TURNER: The question I asked was, "What time do you desire to reconvene tomorrow?"

GEN HSIEH: It is no question to our side what time to reconvene next. It depends on your need for time. Please name the time.

GEN TURNER: I asked you earlier if you were willing to put in writing your solemn pledges and solemn assurances by agreeing to the principle relative to the restriction on airfields and the principle on aerial observation. You have not answered that question. Are you willing to put in writing your agreement to those principles?

GEN HSIEH: I tell you, once again, that in the past, whenever you raised a question, I answered you right away. This morning my statement has more than answered your question; it supplies you with an answer, in summary, to the whole course of negotiations during the past month. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to answer you any more.

GEN TURNER: Am I to understand that you are willing to agree in writing to these principles?

GEN HSIEH: Are you still in doubt about our firm stand? If you need it, I can repeat my firm statement.

GEN TURNER: I am in doubt about your verbal assertions: your pledges, and your solemn assurances. I asked why you are unwilling to incorporate these so-called pledges and solemn assurances in written form in the nature of the principles that we are to agree to in arriving at a military armistice. Lest there be any lingering doubt as to whether we are willing to accept your simple verbal assurances,

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GEN TURNER: let me dispel it now. We wish our agreements to be in writing; and if you are so sincere in your pledges, then why are you unwilling to put them in written form?

GEN HSIEH: I tell you that our 24 December proposal was in writing. Have you not received it? Please note the passage I am going to read again: "I call your attention to the fact that these statements of yours contain a threat to overthrow the basis of our negotiations. I would like to ask this: If all the pledges made by our side were worthless, then why should you have come to negotiate with us and what would be the use of an agreement when it is reached through the negotiations? If you intend to continue the negotiations, I advise you not to make any more such statements, which, in any case, are untenable as arguments in defense of your demand for interfering in our internal affairs."

GEN TURNER: Your answer is most evasive. My question is a simple one: Will you incorporate in written form, in the agreement of the principles that we are discussing, these solemn pledges and solemn assurances that you say you have made? That can be answered with a simple "Yes" or "No"; and then the action that follows, should you say "Yes, we are willing", would be a written agreement. I would like to hear your simple answer. That is all.

GEN HSIEH: Is it necessary for my translator to reread my statement?

GEN TURNER: Perhaps you will be able to answer this question after lunch. I suggest we recess until 1300.

GEN HSIEH: You are only playing with your accustomed tactics of delaying the negotiations. Our firm and unshakable stand needs no repetition. You should have no illusion on that point.

GEN TURNER: Is that, by any chance, an answer to the question that I have put to you?

GEN HSIEH: I have told you clearly and unmistakably, once again, our firm and unshakable stand.

GEN TURNER: Then you refuse to answer my question. Is that right -- is that correct?

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GEN HSIEH: I have clearly answered all your questions.

GEN TURNER: Do you wish to reconvene at 1300?

GEN HSIEH: As you like.

Meeting recessed at 1209 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1330 hours.

GEN TURNER: Yesterday I asked you the question: "For what peaceful purpose do you intend to increase your offensive military capabilities?" Previously I have pointed out that development of military airfields in Korea was a means of increasing your offensive air capabilities. In replying to my questions you said: "Your question is obviously an intentional distortion and slander." I understand from that reply that you are asserting that you have no intention of increasing your military air capabilities and thus developing a threat to the United Nations Command during armistice. If you do mean this, why are you unwilling to commit your asserted intentions to writing? If, on the contrary, you mean to increase your military air capabilities during armistice, why do you call our question slanderous? I'd like a clear answer.

GEN HSIEH: Please refer to our principle 4 as proposed by us on 24 December. That is our clearest answer.

GEN TURNER: Perhaps you did not understand my question. At any rate your answer is most evasive. Do you wish me to repeat my question?

GEN HSIEH: There is no need for you to repeat your question. I will again read our principle 4.

GEN TURNER: There is no necessity for your reading your principle 4, but I would appreciate your telling me how that answers my question.

GEN HSIEH: As I read my fourth principle, I am answering your question: "In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective." I will not read the latter part of it.

GEN TURNER: How do you consider that this limits your reconstruction, rehabilitation or construction of new airfields -- which is the point of disagreement?

GEN HSIEH: I have answered that question many times. There is no need for me to repeat it.

GEN TURNER: I asked you this morning why you were unwilling to commit yourself to writing on your expressed intentions of not increasing your air capabilities. I have still not received an answer to this question.

GEN HSIEH: Please make a careful study of our proposal of 24 December, particularly principle 4. That was in writing.

GEN TURNER: Perhaps I can get it, perhaps I can get an answer to my question, if I reword it in a different manner. Do you consider an operational military airfield to be a military capability? Question two: Do you consider that adding such airfields to your capabilities increases those military capabilities?

GEN HSIEH: I advise you not to haggle over this side-issue. We have made our proposal of 24 December and I have made a long statement this morning. Please make a careful study of them.

GEN TURNER: You apparently will continue to evade our questions today regarding the increase of your military air capabilities by insisting upon the right to rehabilitate your airfields. We cannot make you answer our questions clearly. However, if you refuse to consider the main problem, I suggest we recess until tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: I tell you every question you asked has been answered by us. In our proposal of 24 December and in our statement this morning, we have clearly answered any question you have asked. The time for reconvening is to be named by your side, at your need.

GEN TURNER: You continued to evade giving me a clear and direct answer to my question. By so refusing, you are continuing the delay of these conferences, which you have been delaying over the past 30 days.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) I shall await your answer to my question at 11 o'clock in the morning.

GEN HSIEH: You have once again called black, white. Your statement must be returned to yourselves. This morning I have clearly pointed out the responsibility for delaying the negotiations. My statement this morning is a summary of the course of discussion for the last 30 days.

GEN TURNER: 11 o'clock tomorrow?

GEN HSIEH: All right.

Meeting recessed at 1354 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-fourth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters;and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: If you have anything to say, we would like to hear it.

GEN HSIEH: Nothing at the moment.

GEN TURNER: At the close of the meeting yesterday I asked you two questions. The first question: "Do you consider an operational military airfield constitutes a military capability?" The second question: "Do you consider that adding such airfields to your capabilities increases those military capabilities?"

You answered these questions with this statement: "I advise you not to haggle over this side issue. We have made our proposal of 24 December and I have made a long statement this morning. Please make a careful study of them."

I fail to find a clear answer to my questions in either your long statement or your 24 December proposal. I did note, however, in your alleged answer to my questions that you called these questions "a side issue." I find such a statement quite contradictory. On one day the question of airfields is a major problem before this conference, and the next day you call questions regarding them "side issues." It is little wonder we are making no progress in these negotiations when you adopt such an attitude. Do you have a clear answer to my questions of yesterday?

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GEN HSIEH: All right, I will answer you once again: "You assert arbitrarily that your unlimited introduction into Korea of military personnel of high morale to replace war-weary personnel in Korea and your importation of unused and brand-new military equipment to replace worn-out equipment in Korea would not increase your military forces and are administrative conveniences on your side which need not be negotiated. Yet, on the other hand, you contend that our right to install or not to install certain facilities within Korea must await your permission and that there must be aerial reconnaissance. Such a strange logic of yours is possible only under the circumstances that you look upon yourselves as a victor. But I must tell you frankly, and all the just people of the world will tell you frankly, that you are no victor in this war and that your strange logic is untenable. Our side firmly holds that our right to deal with certain facilities within Korea during the armistice absolutely cannot be interfered with by your side and that no reconnaissance by anybody in our territorial air will be tolerated. A limit must be set, through negotiations by both sides, to the so-called rotation advocated by your side which would introduce into Korea military personnel of high morale to replace war-weary personnel in Korea, while the replenishment by importation into Korea of weapons and ammunition during the armistice is absolutely impermissable. The word 'replenishment' itself implies the increase of military forces of one of the belligerents in Korea from without. It is impossible for you to give any reason in defense of this self-contradictory position of your side."

The above answer was contained in the last passage of our important statement made yesterday. The reason why I read this once again is to point out to you where the disagreement between both sides exists. By this we have clearly shown which side has reason and which side has no reason. We have shown where is the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) way for solving this disagreement and also the reponsibility for solving the disagreement or not, and for being willing to solve the disagreement or not.

GEN TURNER: This still does not answer directly my questions. You are evasive. You state that we stand for unlimited rotation and replenishment. Our stand is that there should be rotation and replenishment to the degree that there is no increase, that there is no reinforcing. Our stand has been put clearly in writing and is contained in our fourth principle of 23 December. If you agree to inspection on the ground by observers of non-combatant nations, why do you fear aerial observation by these same observers? What are you trying to hide? Our side welcomes such aerial observation. We have nothing to hide. I ask you again: Why do you object to aerial observation by non-combatant teams? What are you so fearful of exposing to the world? In studying carefully your bitter arguments and complaints of the past several days, I have come to the conclusion that you must be the victim of some form of persecution complex. In any armistice conference where the representatives of two strong, undefeated forces meet, each side must be prepared to make certain concessions. These concessions are mutual, they apply equally to both sides. They cause inconveniences and loss of certain rights, but the important point is that they apply equally to both sides. They are bilateral. Now you continually complain we are interfering in the internal affairs of your side, that we insist on aerial observation over your territory, that we meddle in the reconstruction of your airfields. Truly, if we were doing this to you in a one-sided fashion, then you would have room for dissatisfaction, but the fact is that we ask for aerial observation over both sides, ours as well as yours. We submit to limitation of our airfields even while acknowledging your right to rehabilitate certain of yours. Surely this is not unilateral. Why is it, General Hsieh, that you fail to perceive these principles

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) apply to both sides? Why do you insist that we have the victor's attitude, when, in truth, we are prepared to submit to these safeguards against the resumption of hostilities together with you?

GEN HSIEH: The past passage of my statement yesterday, which I just reread, is a clear and over-all answer to your questions. Of course, you may misunderstand it intentionally or distort it, but I have the right to interpret my own statements. I call your attention to the fact that on the question of rotation and replenishment during the armistice, you claimed a principle of so-called "no increase"; but, in effect, you are for increase of military forces during the armistice. We, on the other hand, maintain that there should be no introduction, thereby to ensure thoroughly that there will be no increase of military forces. That difference between our two principles is one of the two main disagreements between us. If your side intends to carry on the negotiations, this important disagreement in principle between both sides must be negotiated in these negotiations and be decided upon.

Secondly, you employed the term of "persecution complex". I don't understand what is your real intention in using that term. But I can tell you that our side has sharp vigilance toward people who are accustomed to interfering in the internal affairs of other peoples. We are not easy to be deceived and fooled. That is our precious lesson learned through our long-term revolutionary struggles. We always regard interference in the internal affairs of other countries as an inglorious matter. You perhaps have a thinking to the contrary.

GEN TURNER: You say your statements are subject only to your interpretation, but if you feel there is a misunderstanding it is your reponsibility to clarify your statements. Isn't it that you cannot give me a direct answer, that you purposely intend them to be vague and evasive?

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GEN HSIEH: I am willing to answer any question you ask. If you feel the necessity, I can reread my statement of yesterday which would perhaps be of help to you in studying our position.

GEN TURNER: I suggest you review the questions I have asked you and then you will note that neither your answer of this morning or your statement of yesterday answers these questions.

GEN HSIEH: I have looked over again the text of my speech and I tell you seriously that I have answered all of your questions.

GEN TURNER: Your answers are not direct answer to my questions. If you wish to continue to delay these proceedings by such evasive tactics, that is your privilege. But I can assure you that no progress can be made in these negotiations if you are going to continue to adopt such an attitude. If you need more time to secure the answers, we are only too willing to grant you that time.

GEN HSIEH: General Turner, you just said what I meant to say. Therefore, there is no need to say it again.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Let's talk a little about sincerity. Your side fills the minutes of these meetings with many statements accusing the United Nations Command of insincerity toward the prospect of armistice. You say again and again that the United Nations Command does not want peace, but rather seeks to prolong the war. You portray yourself as angels of peace, who have fought only defensively and in the cause of peace. How do you persuade yourself to utter such distortions? Is it the dogma of your cult, that whatever you may do, however warlike, is in the cause of peace; and whatever your opponent may do, however conciliatory, is in the cause of war? This must be the case, else you could not conceivably arrive at such distorted conclusions based upon the facts. Let us have a look at some of these facts; not in your way through a glass, darkly, but in the unbiased light of truth.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: First, is it beyond your memory that the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, contacted your commanders last June, asking if they desired to confer about an armistice? Was this the act of a commander who desired to prolong the war? Of course not. Was it your commanders who issued that first invitation to talk armistice? It was not; you know that well.

Second, these armistice negotiations have continued over a period of more than five months. During that time, on several occasions, your side has all but convinced the United Nations Command delegation that further discussion was futile. On several occasions your side has so insisted on unreasonable positions as to make many believe there was no prospect of an armistice whatever. Yet, the United Nations Command delegation has continued to return to this conference table to try, once again, to find a way to a just and equitable armistice. We are here again today, under similar circumstances and with the same purpose. Are these the practices of those who seek to prolong a war?

Third, it was the United Nations Command, not your side, which suggested conducting simultaneous discussions of Item 3 and 4 of the agenda, in order to expedite the work of this conference. Was this the suggestion of those who sought to delay the armistice?

What of the record of your side in this regard? You say that you have fought only a defensive war. Was it defensive or offensive tactics by which your Chinese troops advanced southward to Seoul and into the territory of the Republic of Korea? Yes, you did indeed find yourself fighting defensively, but only after your offensive lunge was blunted, halted, and your troops began to retreat toward whence they came.

As to prolonging the war, the world knows that these past five months have failed to produce an armistice only because your side has adopted and persistently held to illogical, unreasonable stands which threatened to prevent a stable armistice. Even now

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GEN FERENBAUGH: that is the case. You are prolonging the war yet further by your refusal to accept the reasonable proposals of our side.

Your sincerity toward the prospect of armistice is being judged in the light of your continued refusal to agree to principles which all can readily see are at least fair to both sides, in fact advantageous to your side in most cases. Your sincerity toward an armistice is being judged in the light of your continued insistence on building up your military capabilities during armistice. Your sincerity is being judged in the light of your opposition to thorough and effective observation of the armistice by non-combatant teams. Thus far the judgment is heavily against you. It is my sincere hope that you will enter into the scales some genuine evidence of a real desire for a just armistice and an honorable peace.

You constantly state the door is open for negotiations. Every time we go through that door we step out the other side. There is no sincerity in evidence; your negotiations consist of threading the needle, but you do not follow that by any work on the design for a stable armistice and a permanent peace.

GEN HSIEH: I did not intend to make a long statement, but your statement just now has compelled me to take some time.

You have attempted to show, by citing four facts, as to which side is genuinely for peace and which side is not genuinely for peace. I will now take the four facts you have cited and express our understanding. But I must tell you in advance that your conclusion is wrong.

Firstly, the question as to who initiated the armistice negotiations at Kaesong. Please remember that on June 23rd of this year, Mr. Malik, a person who loves peace, made the first suggestion and that his statement was the source of our negotiations. It is true that your side issued the invitation to the conference on June 30th. But not long after that, you showed many signs

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) of repentance to that action taken. And even as late as recently, after you have undergone many lessons, you failed to learn from those lessons and you still imply that your side made the mistake in July in coming to these negotiations and again in November you made another mistake. I am not aware what is the nature of that mistake. Anyway your conclusion by discussing these facts that your side is for peace and our side is not for peace is entirely wrong.

Secondly, you say that during the 5 months of armistice negotiations there are several actions or positions of our side which nearly convinced your delegation that further discussion would be futile. Now our side made a resolution when we came on 25 October to this same tent to resume the negotiations not to speak on our own initiative of those incidents of the past. But as soon as you mentioned such a question there comes into my mind right away deep impression and personal recollection of the incident of 19 August when troops of your side shot and killed Comrade Yao, platoon leader of our military police; and I recalled the incident of 22 August when your aircraft bombed the residence of our delegation. I don't know whether you are referring to those incidents but I advise you that for the benefit of the negotiations, you had better not mention those incidents. We are not prepared to speak much about them. If your statement was meant to make us refresh in our minds those incidents of the past, then there is truly a necessity for our side to be vigilant about this.

Thirdly, you attempted to show which side is for peace and which side is not, by the suggestion of your delegations for a simultaneous sub-committee on Item 4 of the agenda. But I tell you the sub-committee on Item 4 of the agenda has not yet entered into discussion of the substance of the agenda item; that is, the question whether both sides will release all the prisoners of war in their custody. I can see no reason why you should use such

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) long and monotonous statements in the other tent to delay the progress of the conference. And at the same time I call your attention to the fact that since the sub-committee on Item 4 of the agenda was opened on 11 December, 18 days have passed and yet we have not ultimately settled the question here in our sub-committee.

The fact that the sub-committee on Item 4 was convened failed to help at all the progress in our sub-committee. Therefore, your citing of this fact serves particularly to show that the actual objective for your side to suggest a simultaneous sub-committee on the Item 4 of the agenda is to facilitate your delaying tactics in this sub-committee on Item 3 of the agenda. Before I will refute your fourth point, I would like to ask a question. You mentioned "Chinese troops"; by that do you mean that the People's Liberation Army of China or the Chinese People's Volunteers? I request you to answer my question first.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Before I answer your question, may I ask this: Is there more than one kind of Chinese troops in Korea?

GEN HSIEH: Will you answer my question?

GEN FERENBAUGH: It is the Chinese troops we are fighting in Korea. At least I thought we were fighting Chinese troops in Korea.

GEN HSIEH: I ask you: What is the army, the delegation of which is seated here negotiating with you?

GEN TURNER: I think you should be able to answer that question.

GEN HSIEH: I call your attention that you must be cautious in choosing your words. Your failure to answer that question makes me unable to continue my statement.

GEN TURNER: You may dodge behind any straw that you care to. I ask you now, have you got anything new to propose?

GEN HSIEH: The one who is dodging is not our side but your side. The war fought by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers is a sacred and just war in defense of peace and opposing

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the interference in the internal affairs of a country. The extension of the scale of was was because of the agreesive action of your side. It was only when your troops fought to the Yalu River and seriously endangered the border of the Chinese People's Republic and safety of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the Chinese people have courageously organized their own Chinese People's Volunteers to come to fight against you. It was only then that the fron was moved from the Yalu River to the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. The Korean people and the other nations of the world have their innate right to resist those people who try to interfere in their internal affairs. It is their sacred and inviolate duty and right to do so. You considered that the mere existence of such nations are a threat to your side. You have failed to learn from history. I tell you that the day the people who want to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries are born, so long as such people will exist -- the threat to them will continue to exist. This historical existence has been there for hundreds of years, since the beginning of humanity. You have no ability to eliminate this existence. The power of the people has not become weakened but stronger.

You have the privilege to choose either to continue the Korean armistice negotiations or to delay it. You have the privilege to choose a policy of war or of peace over the whole world. But I assure you that we have been fighting in defense of peace and we will firmly carry on our struggle until peace is achieved.

Lastly, I request you to note my statement at the beginning. I was not willing to discuss those questions; but it was because your side provocatively talked about those past facts and tried to play with the negotiations, tried to continue your delaying tactics, that I could not but strike back at your provocative statements. If you intend to carry on the negotiations, I advise you not to make any more such statements.

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GEN TURNER: Your statement has been noted. It is now lunch time, I suggest we reconvene at 1430.

GEN HSIEH: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1230 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours.

GEN TURNER: Your reply to my statement this morning convinces me that it is our side that must be especially alert during these armistice discussions. You have made yourself quite clear in some respects. You call a war a just cause for peace. It is becoming apparent that your attitude in evading the main problem, in delaying the negotiations and thereby prolonging the war, is an attitude of prolonging the war for peace. We don't understand your attitude nor do we agree with your methods. By your own statements you have proven what we said about sincerity to be true. Until you change your attitude, we will be unable to make progress in these negotiations. Until you make some serious effort to solve the major problems confronting us, we can make no progress. Until you make an effort to answer our questions rather than evade or ignore them, we can make no progress.

The questions I have asked you again this morning can be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No"; or by a statement you don't have the authority to answer them.

I have asked you questions regarding increasing your military capabilities by rehabilitating and constructing new airfields. I have asked you why you fear aerial observations by non-combatant teams -- observation that will be conducted in the rear of both sides. Will you give me a clear answer to these questions now?

GEN HSIEH: You again assert that our side attempts to delay the negotiations. I advise you not to reverse right and wrong, not to measure other people's stature by your own foot. In our yesterday's statement I have pointed out clearly as to who has been delaying the negotiations from the facts shown in the past month; and it is clear

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) that it is your side which has been delaying the negotiations.

Your questions just now, like your two questions raised this morning and like all the questions you have previously put to us in an attempt to delay the negotiations but not to settle any question, have been answered by me many times. There is no need for me to answer them again. The impression you gave me is that you are assuming to be a victor. You are trying to force us to discuss questions of internal affairs in the military armistice negotiations. You prove that you are attempting to achieve your objective of interfering in our internal affairs through these armistice negotiations. If you will continue these actions you will not be able to escape the responsibility for delaying the negotiations.

The questions which remain unresolved between both sides are two in number. Firstly, as I have pointed out, is your attempt and insistence to interfere in our internal affairs. And the other is your insistence to continue to increase your military forces during the armistice. In order to see how these two disagreements can be resolved and on which side falls the duty to resolve them, you may be profited by studying the last passage of our statement yesterday.

GEN TURNER: Let me know when you are finished.

GEN HSIEH: I have finished.

GEN TURNER: You continue to give us evasive answers. You continue to hide behind your term, "interference in our internal affairs", whenever the mention is made of restrictions to airfields. We have many times refuted your illogical arguments about "interference in internal affairs". You must accept the responsibility for the delaying in these negotiations by continually evading and dodging. We must have a clear answer to our questions before we can proceed with these negotiations; a clear and simple answer. Are you prepared to give those answers now?

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GEN HSIEH: Every time you make a statement in regard to the interference in our internal affairs you are not arguing or, as you say, refuting the question of whether you are interfering in our internal affairs or not. Everytime you make such argument or refutation is only drawing one more stroke and deepening the impression that you are attempting to interfere in our internal affairs. You have done nothing else when you argued about these questions. Did you not advance such an absurd argument by saying that during the hostilities your side is having unlimited interference in our internal affairs, and that what you ask during the armistice is nothing but a continuance of the present situtation? Such a rediculous argument! Did you not say again that there is no nation with complete sovereignty in the world today? By that argument you try to say that we should accept your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs. In other words, we should give up a part of our sovereign rights.

I tell you that these two arguments of yours are entirely erroneous and have been refuted by us many times. If you still imagine that your military force is reliable, you have the complete privilege to continue the war in Korea. Why should you have come to these negotiations? You said that there is no nation with complete sovereignty in the world today. That, of course, can apply to your subservient countries. It does not apply to our nation which is in complete possession of our sovereign rights.

The question now is for you to answer directly as to whether you dare to say that I am demanding to interfere in your internal affairs. Will you accept that? If you dare say this openly and directly, then it is very easy for me to answer you. Please do not dodge my question and evade it.

GEN TURNER: You follow the tactics of asking me a question when I have several questions before you which you have deliberately evaded and dodged. I am rather amused at your comment that you have refuted our

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) arguments about interference in your internal affairs, when the arguments that you say we presented were not presented by our side. My statement to you several days ago was to the effect that from now on until an armistice is signed we will continue by military might to interfere in your internal affairs. Upon the signing of the armistice, we will desist from interferring in your internal affairs. We will permit you to rebuild your highways, your railroads, your factories, etc., etc. But we will not, during the period of the armistice, permit you to rehabilitate or construct new airfields, except those for civil aviation.

Now, are you going to continue to evade the questions I have put before you, and to follow your tactics of asking me a question and demanding an answer before proceeding with this conference? I await your answer to my questions.

GEN HSIEH: My statement just now and my past statements have sufficiently answered your question. What is left is my question, to which you have not given a direct answer.

GEN TURNER: Do you mean that you refuse to give us a clear and simple answer to my question?

GEN HSIEH: The fact is very clear. The one who refuses to answer questions is your side, not our side. I have pointed out that there are two main disagreements between your side and our side. First is your position for continued increase during the armistice of your military forces; that is, unlimited rotation and replenishment. That is what our side firmly opposes. Secondly is your demand to interfere in our internal affairs. That is also firmly opposed by our side. Is that now a very clear answer to you?

GEN TURNER: Perhaps I can get the answer from you by asking my question in a different way. Didn't you state your side had no intention of increasing your military capabilities during the armistice? My recollection is that you said you had no intention of increasing your military capabilities. Now I ask: Don't you consider that

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) rehabilitating or constructing new airfields increases your military capabilities? That can be answered "Yes" or "No". May I have a clear answer?

GEN HSIEH: Please carefully peruse principle 4 of our 24 December proposal, and please make a careful study of our important statement of 27 December, particularly the last passage of it. An independent and sovereign state has every right to deal with any facilities within its territory. It may install such facilities, it may not necessarily install such facilities; but any other country has no right at all to interfere with this. It is a right not to be intered with. It is for you to answer now. Are you insisting upon delaying the negotiations? Are you still insisting on your unreasonable demand for interfering in our internal affairs?

GEN TURNER: You continue to evade my question. No progress is being made. If you have anything new to propose, we shall be glad to listen.

GEN HSIEH: The one who has evaded the question is not our side but your side. That is what just happened. Do not forget that fact.

GEN TURNER: Since you apparently have nothing new to offer, what time would you like to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: At your choice.

GEN TURNER: Usual time tomorrow?

GEN HSIEH: Fine.

Meeting recessed at 1521 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

29 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-fifth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: We are willing to listen to anything you have to offer.

GEN HSIEH: Nothing. What I want to say I have said several times before.

GEN TURNER: Are you prepared to answer clearly, without evasion or dodging, the questions that we have asked you for the past two days?

GEN HSIEH: I have answered them many times, there is no need to answer them again.

GEN TURNER: Yesterday, and again today, you continued your unreasonable attitude. You refused to give clear answers to questions regarding the major issues before this conference. You refuse to make any effort toward solving the problems before us. In fact, you refused to do anything but sit and hope our side would make all the efforts. Your attitude certainly is not one which would impress the people of the world with the idea that you had sincerity towards an effective armistice.

You stated yesterday that there were two questions before this conference: first, our insistence in interfering in the internal affairs of your side; second, our insistence on increasing military forces during a military armistice. While you do recognize the questions, you express them in the wrong terms. You do this deliberately and with the intent to deceive your own people. We are not fooled by your trickery in semantics.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) Let us examine the first question in the light of real facts. On the 23rd of December we presented a proposal which provided for the rehabilitation of airfields for civil air operations. Thus, on that day, we eliminated all pretexts you might have for arguing that we were interfering in your internal affairs.

Although you know our side made a great concession to your views, nevertheless you continue your hollow argument that we demand the right to interfere in your internal affairs. Let me make it clear to you that we are seeking only those necessary security provisions in the armistice agreement which will provide for an effective and stable armistice. It is your side which labels these security provisions as interfernce in your internal affairs. How do you argue your views? You say it is the innate right of a sovereign state to deal with certain facilities as it chooses. Do you realize what you are saying? In effect, you are saying that this same sovereign state which you say is sincere about peace and an armistice has the right, during the armistice, to increase its military air capabilities without limit; and further, that the military commander of the opposing side has no right to suggest restrictions on these military capabilities. Can anyone believe that this sovereign state has a proper attitude toward the armistice? Certainly not anyone with knowledge of the truth. The sooner you recognize that both sides are negotiating an armistice which must take military capabilities into account, the sooner we can reach agreement on an effective and stable armistice.

In regard to the second question you raise, it is your side that has been making all the arguments about the enormous increase in military forces which rotation would permit. This is a figment of your own imagination. It is you who has built up this great misconception. Even under the restrictions of no increase in forces and material, you build up in your own minds an enormous increase in military forces. Perhaps you are using the morale of

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) your forces as a criterion. I advise you against such methods. You have been ill-advised if you think the morale of our forces is similar to that of yours. You have attempted to distort the facts regarding our proposal in this regard. This will deceive no one. Again you falsely label a question of this conference to suit your own propaganda purposes.

In regard to who is delaying these negotiations, you referred us to the past passage in your statement of 27 December. This is the statement: "Our side considers that the issue between both sides must be held before the whole world for the people of the world to judge who is delaying the Korean armistice negotiations." I must agree with you in this matter. If this is done, the people of the world will judge who falsely labels military capabilities as "interference in internal affairs". The people of the world will judge who presents fallacious arguments against the fair and reasonable proposals of the other side. It is then that the people of the world will judge who truly delays the armistice negotiations and will judge who has made efforts and is sincere for a stable and effective armistice.

I suggest that you change your attitude and make efforts along with our side to reach agreement on Agenda Item 3. You can start by offering some serious suggestion regarding ways and means we can solve these problems confronting us.

GEN HSIEH: I have listened carefully to General Turner's statement. I can only say that the censure you laid at our door is only your own thinking and your own action which you labeled as what we have thought and done, in an attempt to deceive the people of the world. Our side has made a summary of the course of a month of discussions on the Item 3 of the agenda, pointing out the disagreements existing between both sides, pointing out the efforts our side has been making, pointing out your unreasonable demands, and pointing out the responsibility on your part for the lack of progress in the conference; and we have

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) published this summary before the world. Although your side refuses to admit in your statement that our summary is fair and true in fact, the people of the world will make just judgement.

You repeatedly talked about the lack of sincerity of our side toward an effective armistice, but I must ask you to recall the facts of the past. Ever since the beginning of the negotiations our side has firmly held that in order for the armistice to be really effective there should be the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. You refused that proposal; you had other objectives than ours.

On Item 3 of the agenda, when we realized that you were against the reasonable proposal of the withdrawal of foreign forces, we put forth our additional recommendations on 3 December, recommending an effective measure of preventing any introduction into Korea from without of military forces during the armistice. That principle again was refused by your side. You insisted upon the continued introduction of forces into Korea under the pretext of rotation and replenishment, thus to increase your military forces in Korea.

We originally maintained that for military armistice our five principles of 27 November were sufficient; but you not only opposed discussion of the withdrawal of foreign forces but also maintained that you should be permitted to continue to increase your military forces. You, without any qualification, again raised the demand for free inspection of the rear. In order to break the deadlock and in view of your persistant attitude, we agreed that at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, supervision and inspection should be carried out by the supervisory organ of neutral nations; but you again had other objectives than ours. In effect, what you are doing is attempting to gain through negotiations what you have failed to gain through military operations during the hostilities; namely,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the control of the whole of Korea. You intend to inspect from the air the whole territory of Korea, to carry out photographic reconnaissance, and again, under the pretext of limiting military capabilities, you attempt to restrict our military facilities. The only genuine and effective method to prevent the resumption of hostilities is the restriction of any introduction of military forces into Korea from without during the armistice. And what is even more thoroughgoing than this, there should be a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.

From the above it is evident that during the five months of negotiations our consistent stand toward a military armistice is fair and reasonable; but your position is to the contrary. During these five months, many questions have been settled, agreements have been reached, and the questions left now, yet to be resolved, are but few. They are your attempts to restrict our facilities, under the pretext that you are afraid that we would increase our military forces during the armistice. But, in essense, you are attempting to gain through negotiations what you failed to gain in fighting, namely, interference in our internal affairs. And the other question to be resolved is your insistence upon unlimited rotation and replenishment in an attempt to disrupt an effective and stable armistice. In the other tent also, your side for eighteen days even refused to discuss the principle of release of all prisoners of war held by both sides, not to say to reach an agreement on that principle.

From the above stated facts you should admit, if you are an honest military man, which side in fact has sincerity toward an armistice. We respect action more than words, and we can review the actions of both sides during the past month of the negotiations. Our side has strictly adhered to and followed any agreement reached between both sides, but you have done the contrary. I have cited all these facts to prove that your conclusion that our side lacks

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) sincerity toward an armistice, that our side refuses to make efforts, that our side is delaying the armistice, is entirely contrary to fact. That conclusion should be to the contrary. You should be clearly aware that the present deadlock is created by your side. Whether you are willing to break this deadlock or not is entirely up to you.

GEN TURNER: As I sit here and listen to you, General Hsieh, I become more and more convinced that you are using this conference as a sounding board to spread your false propaganda throughout the world.

Everyone of the statements that you have made this morning, we have over and over again refuted. Whenever we ask of you a question pertinent to the progress of this conference, you dodge and evade and finally refuse to answer. Whenever we give you the least loophole to spread your false propaganda, you grab hook, line, and sinker. I remember your summary of yesterday and I listened to your summary this morning. I have just told you how you falsely label your military capabilities. I told you that you do so to suit your own propaganda purposes. You state that you have published this summary to the world. This confirms my statements that you do this to deceive the people. I can assure you that it will not deceive our side, nor will it deceive the people who have access to the truth. How can you make such a statement that we attempt to gain through negotiations what we could not gain through military action? You have your facts wrong. We are merely recommending security provisions which will be applicable to both sides to be incorporated in the armistice agreement. We are recommending restrictions of military facilities on both sides, not just your side.

GEN HSIEH: It seems that you are much afraid of our propaganda. Every statement, every article, every action of our side, conveys the truth of the proceedings here, of the iron-clad facts as to which side is delaying the negotiations, which side is soncere towards armistice

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) and which side is not. Truth can stand repetition; truth should be repeated innumerable times.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, I am interested in your statement about sincerity. It is by reason of the fact that we are sincere, that you use the technique of accusing us of being insincere. You know that we will then search our minds and quite possibly will attempt to give something away which you can grab by our demonstrations of sincerity. It is only a technique and you have repeatedly used it in the negotiations. We are aware of it completely. Now as we carry on these negotiations, the start on sincerity would be for you to call a spade a spade - for you, instead of calling "interference in the internal affairs", to just say frankly "increase in the military air capabilities". That would be a start, because one is the same as the other. We know it, you know it. Why not be frank enough to call it that -- sincere enough to call it that? Another bromide you toss around indiscriminately is this victor and vanquished stuff. That is pure propaganda! Let's be a little more sincere about that matter. Also, you have tossed it around so much now that you are getting the opposite reaction. Let's be sincere and agree that we are neither victor nor vanquished.

There are some others, but I will not take the time at present to go into them.

GEN HSIEH: I have listened carefully to General Ferenbaugh's statement. We have never had the illusion that you would give up anything. Whether or not you would give up anything is up to you. What we are doing is only refusing to allow any interfernce in our internal affairs, and refusing to accept any unreasonable demands. What we recognize and what we are following is only one policy; that is, to be vigilant and to keep on struggling in defense of our sacred, sovereign rights and in trying to achieve peace. If your side really has sincerity, you should not insist upon your unreasonable demands. If you promise that you are not assuming to be a victor,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) then there is no justification for you to force us to accept your unreasonable demands. What we insist upon is very simple: no interference in our internal affairs. We will never accept any unreasonable demands. Our 24 December proposal is an entirely fair and reasonable proposal. Whether you will accept this proposal is a test as to whether you have sincerity.

The facts in the past showed that you did not come to accept a fair and reasonable proposal easily. After we made our proposal of 3 December, it was omly after ten days that you put forth your counter-proposal on 12 December and accepted our principle. After our proposal of 14 December, it took you another ten days before you submitted your proposal of 24 December. Now this is the sixth day after we have made our 24 December proposal, and, as yet, you are still insisting on your unreasonable demands and refusing to accept our principles. These historical facts speak for themselves very clearly.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, I have attempted a simple try at getting sincerity and at substituting the statement of "increase in military air capabilities" for "interference in your internal affairs". Apparently it is not possible to get that through a mind that is not up to that sort of principle.

GEN HSIEH: If this trial of yours for sincerity is really meant for solving the disagreements existing between both sides, then of course we welcome such a trial by you. If your statement is only advanced in an attempt to argue for your unreasonable demands, then, pardon me, I will not repeat my answer.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Apparently I failed in a very simple try for sincerity.

GEN HSIEH: I have nothing more to say because there is no necessity to say anything.

GEN TURNER: Have you any serious effort to make at this time to solve our differences?

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GEN HSIEH: We have made many efforts on our part. It is now up to you to make efforts. As a matter of fact, if you change your attitude, I believe the work in both tents can be finished in one day. (Turning to COL Chang and saying in Chinese: "Can we?")

GEN TURNER: Do you suppose that I could get a simple answer from you to a simple question?

GEN HSIEH: What question?

GEN TURNER: Will you give a simple answer to a simple question?

GEN HSIEH: A simple question will be answered simply, a complex question will be answered complexly. It depends on the question.

GEN TURNER: Very well, I will ask you a simple one. Do you want and intend to increase your military capabilities during an armistice?

GEN HSIEH: Please refer to the fourth principle of our 24 December proposal.

GEN TURNER: Let's have lunch.

GEN HSIEH: I agree that you have lunch. What time to reconvene?

GEN TURNER: As you wish.

GEN HSIEH: As you like.

GEN TURNER: When will you be ready to answer the questions?

GEN HSIEH: I have answered the question.

GEN TURNER: 2:30?

GEN HSIEH: All right.

Meeting recessed at 1231 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours.

GEN TURNER: If you have anything to say, we would like to hear it.

GEN HSIEH: I have nothing to say.

GEN TURNER: You have continued to evade and ignore the major issues confronting us. You have continued to refuse to make any serious effort toward solving these problems. You even refuse to give a clear answer to our questions. Yet you have the effrontary to accuse us of delaying the negotiations; to accuse us of wanting to prolong the war; and to accuse us of insisting upon unreasonable demands.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) Agenda Item 3 has been under discussion for 32 days now. We have not yet reached agreement on guiding principles. I don't know whether you realize it or not, but there are a great number of details to be worked out and written into an armistice agreement after this sub-delegation comes to an agreement on the principles of Agenda Item 3. We must agree upon the non-combatant nations to form the supervisory organization and its observer teams; we must decide on the number of representatives to be invited from the non-combatants. The functions and rights of the military armistice commission, the non-combatant nations supervisory organization and inspection teams must be set forth in detail. The administrative details of supporting the military armistice commission , the supervisory organization and the inspection teams must also be set forth. We must agree upon the ports of entry, and we must name the islands to be controlled by each side. We must agree on ways and means of receiving the war dead from the territory of both sides, and this, too, must be set forth in the armistice agreement.

There are still many points that I have not mentioned that must be discussed, agreed upon, and entered in the final armistice agreement. I have only mentioned a few of the important points to be stipulated in the armistice agreement so as to impress upon you the vast amount of detailed work that is yet to be accomplished before the final armistice agreement is ready to be signed.

In order that there will be no doubt in your mind regarding our sincerity towards this armistice and to show clearly who is making the efforts, we are submitting to you revisions of principles 4, 5, and 5. We have already made a great concession with regard to airfields; we can make no more, that subject is closed. We now offer on a contingent basis a concession regarding aerial observation, even though aerial observation is a means of safeguarding the armistice and rendering it more effective. Thus is the United Nations Command willing to agree to relinquish another safeguard

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) we consider desirable for a stable armistice. We have given up islands which could serve as sentinel posts safeguarding the armistice. We have given up a single directing authority for the armistice, which would provide a stronger measure of security for the armistice than does your proposal of parallel organizations, which we have adopted. We have given up military inspection teams, and accepted the lesser assurances of non-combatant teams as suggested by your side. We have given up the total prohibition of rehabilitation of airfields by agreeing to the rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations. Now we are prepared to give up an additional desirable safeguard, that of aerial observation and photographic flights. We do so only because we wish to make progress toward an armistice, not because of any validity whatsoever in your objections to this reasonable and equitable measure. Note well that in this step the United Nations Command has completely given up four of the six major safeguards we consider would contribute to the stability of the armistice, and has partially conceded to your views regarding placing an agreed limit on rotation of troops. Note well, also, that the United Nations Command is willing to agree to the removal of the safeguard of aerial observation only if your side is willing to agree to the three principles now submitted by the United Nations Command without substantive change. This is the second major effort made by the United Nations Command to resolve the differences between us since your side has made any real effort. We have now conceded to your unreasonable views all that we can concede. From this moment, we have and shall have nothing further to propose. If in truth you sincerely desire an armistice, I urge you to accept the United Nations Command proposal. It is now, clearly and unequivocably, up to you. The hopes of all who seek peace in Korea are in the balance. The issue is in your hands. (General Turner hands United Nations Command proposal, Enclosure I, in English, Korean and Chinese to General Hsieh.)

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GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

GEN TURNER: Yes.

GEN HSIEH: In order to study your proposal and to compare the translations I suggest a recess of 15 minutes.

GEN TURNER: Very well.

Meeting recessed for 15 minutes at 1458 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1511 hours.

GEN HSIEH: We have preliminarily checked the translation of your proposal. Now I have a few questions to ask.

You use such a sentence: "Both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective." My first question is: What is your interpretation of the word "reinforcing"? Do you mean that the exchange on a piece-for-piece basis of weapons will still be permitted by that provision?

Do you prefer to answer the questions one by one or answer them altogether?

GEN TURNER: Go ahead with your questions.

GEN HSIEH: My second question is: Is it intentional that you did not take away the last passage in your principle 4?

My third question is: What is your meaning in the first sentence of your sixth paragraph? That is. where you say, "Both sides agree to invite nations acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean war" -- which wording is different from your previous wording. Do you think the number of the neutral nations to be invited should be odd or even?

These are the questions I have in mind. Will you please answer them?

GEN TURNER: The answers to your three questions are as follows: To question one, the definition for "reinforcing" was given to you several weeks ago by General Hodes. Look up that definition. The answer to

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) question two, relative to our intentions about leaving the last passage in principle 4, is yes, we intend to leave it there. The answer to question three -- that is a detail; we are talking now about principles.

GEN HSIEH: Please answer my question whether you think that your provision in paragraph 4 permits the exchange on a piece-for-piece basis of weapons, which your side previously advocated.

GEN TURNER: Your question has been answered. Review the record!

GEN HSIEH: You mean that you include the exchange of weapons on a piece-for-piece basis. Is that correct?

GEN TURNER: Your question has been answered. Review the record!

GEN HSIEH: All right. Since you are not willing to answer my question, I can look it up in the record, although it will add to the difficulty in studying your proposal.

In any case, these three revised principles you submitted this afternoon are a step forward compared with your previous position. My impression, after making a preliminary study of it, is that on the one hand it is a step forward, but at the same time there is still a main stumbling block left; namely, your interference in our internal affairs, which has consistently been opposed by our side. I wish that you will reconsider that point. I would like to reserve the right to make an over-all comment on your proposal tomorrow.

If you have no other matter to say, I suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow morning.

GEN TURNER: Very good.

Meeting recessed at 1530 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

Encl: I United Nations Command Proposal on Principles 4, 5, and 6, 29 December 1951.

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United Nations Command Proposal on Principles 4, 5, and 6
Agenda Item 3

29 December 1951

4. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate a peaceful settlement by action at a political level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission so that the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations may be entrusted to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, which shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways. No other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed.

5. Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violations of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following two provisions:

a. Within the demilitarized zone, the Military Armistice Commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

b. Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of non-combatant nations shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the request to the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission for investigatinn of a violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations shall carry out the inspection

Enclosure I

6. Both sides agree to invite nations acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean war, to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives to form a supervisory organ to be entrusted by the Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in paragraph (4) and paragraph (5)b of this proposal. Upon the request by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission for carrying out these functions, the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations shall dispatch immediately inspection teams to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, and shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the Military Armistice Commission. In performing their above-stated functions, the inspection teams of non-combatant nations shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the main lines of communication and transportation as agreed upon by both sides.

Enclosure I

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

30 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-sixth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenorgraphers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: I will make a statement. Yesterday you asked three questions regarding our new proposal. I consider that my answers yesterday were sufficient. However, in order to show our sincerity toward reaching an early settlement of the remaining differences and to clarify any misunderstandings you may have, I shall amplify these answers.

First, "no reinforcing" is a limiting term meaning no increase in the numerical quantities of the items specified, namely, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. Within the meaning of "no reinforcing", there will be permitted the normal resupply and replacement of implements of war so long as there is no increase in numerical quantities and no change in types and models. Replacement, as differentiated from reinforcement, should and must be based upon those items which are worn out through normal use during the period of the armistice. Replacement does not include the importation of weapons of war for those which become useless during the period of the hostilities, the replacement of which would result in an increase of military capabilities.

Second, your second question needs no further answer.

Third, regarding our new principle 6, you asked what is meant by "Both sides agree to invite nations acceptable to both sides

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) which have not participated in the Korean War." This statement is in consonance with the explanation given by General Lee in a previous session, and I quote, "Both sides can immediately work out through negotiations a list of neutral nations agreed upon by both sides."

You also asked, "Do you think the number of the neutral nations to be invited should be odd or even?" The number of non-combatant nations invited is immaterial. The number of non-combatant nations providing representatives invited by your side may be greater, lesser, or equal to the number invited by our side. However, the total number of individuals invited by each side on the supervisory organization and the observation teams will be the same.

I believe these explanations provide adequate answers to your questions of yesterday on our new proposal. Now, we would like to hear your over-all comment to our revised principles 4, 5, and 6. If you accept them in substance, we can readily proceed to discussion of the details of Agenda Item 3.

GEN HSIEH: I have another question in connection with principle 4 of your revised proposal of 29 December. It is about the first sentence which says, "In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate a peaceful settlement by action at a political level." I would like to know what do you mean by that phrase, "by action at a political level".

GEN TURNER: Any accomplishment toward a peaceful settlement must be the result of action taken at a higher political level. We only put the words "by action" to make the statement clearer. There is nothing hidden in its meaning.

GEN HSIEH: In your proposal of 23 December, you have agreed to our wording; that is, "In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level". But now you have made a change in your revised proposal of 29 December. You have changed it into

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) "action at a political level". We would like to know whether you mean differently.

GEN TURNER: We feel that the expression in our present proposed principle 4 is more expressive than the previous wording. The meaning is not changed. We have merely shifted the emphasis from the convening of the political conference to a more important feature, that goal of such a political conference -- the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

GEN HSIEH: After hearing your answers to our questions and after making a preliminary study of the 3 revised principles you submitted on 29 December, our side has the following comments to make:

Firstly, the question of the holding of a political conference of a higher level. When we were discussing the agenda during July, we met with a deadlock on the question as to whether there should be a withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. The origin of that deadlock was your opposition to the discussion of the question of withdrawal of foreign forces in the military armistice conference. On the other hand, our side firmly held that in order to ensure the stability of the armistice in Korea, and in order that it will lead to a thorough peaceful settlement of the Korean question, we should not be satisfied with an armistice alone, but there must be the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The reason you gave for objecting to this position of our side for peace was that the question of withdrawal of foreign forces should not be raised or discussed at the military armistice conference but should be discussed and settled at a political conference of a higher level after the armistice is realized. Your side not only made such kind of statement during the discussion of the agenda but you have repeatedly stated during the discussion of Item 2 and even during the discussion of Item 3 that you are not against the holding of such a political conference.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Our senior delegate at the ninth session of the plenary conference on 25 July, made a statement fully setting out our position on this question. I will now read his statement: "During the past eight sessions, we have repeatedly and untiringly expressed our position and repeatedly pointed out that your argument for refusing to include this question in the agenda is untenable. However, through the negotiations of the eight sessions, our proposal has not yet received your acceptance. We cannot but feel regretable about it." Our senior delegate continued to say: "But now in order that the armistice agreement may be achieved at an early date so that the primary wishes for peace of all of the peace-loving people of the world may be realized, our side agrees to your view that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea be left to another conference for settlement after cease-fire and armistice are realized and not be included in the agenda of our conference. However, in view of the fact that the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea is so deeply related with the cease-fire and armistice we here seek to achieve and the troops of the foreign nations participating in this war are so anxious to be able to return to their homes and live a peaceful life after the armistice, we consider that this conference, after discussing and settling the questions connected with a cease-fire and armistice, should still reach a certain specific resolution on this important question. Therefore, we propose that in addition to the four items of the agenda on which we have already reached an agreement, there should be included a fifth item, "Recommendations to the governments of countries concerned", so that after we have discussed and reached concrete agreements on the four items of the agenda, we may discuss under this agenda item the matter concerning a recommendation to the governments of countries concerned on both sides to convene a representative conference of a higher level within a definite time limit after the realization of an armistice to

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) negotiate on the question of the withdrawal, by stages, of all foreign forces from Korea."

The above statement was made at the time when both sides agreed upon and adopted the fifth agenda item. It embodies a consistent position of our side, a position for the realization of a genuine and thorough peace in Korea, a position for meeting the wish for peace of all the peoples of the world and the wide masses of troops at the front. It is also a reflection of the sincerity of our side toward a genuine and thorough peace in Korea.

This position of ours is concretely embodied in the wording of our additional sixth principle submitted on 3 December. And after that, your side on 23 December has formally agreed to this wording. It is only yesterday that you changed this wording again. Therefore, I point out that this is our consistent position, a position to which your side has previously agreed, and you only changed it on 29 December. If as you say, this change is only a change, a technical change in the wording but not embodying any change in meaning, then we maintain that we should change it back to the wording as we have formerly proposed. As for the object of the political conference referred to, it is firstly to discuss the question of withdrawal of foreign forces; of course it may discuss many other questions.

Secondly, the question of replenishment. Yesterday, when we raised this question, you answered that General Hodes had already answered that question; but this morning you have kindly again made an amplified reply to it. That is good. Yesterday, I looked over the explanation given by General Hodes in the sub-committee and I found the following. It is an explanation he made to my question at the session of the sub-committee on 14 December. He said, and I quote, "Lastly with regard to the question of equipment and weapons, I repeat, no increase but only the replacement of the same type." At that time I considered General Hodes answer self-contra-

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

dictory and I answered it this way, I quote myself: "You talked about the exchange of weapons; however, if the weapons your side would export from Korea are worn out, damaged and unserviceable, while what you intended to import are new and serviceable, then such exchange is exactly an increase. It is only if you will take out good and new weapons while bringing in old and wornout weapons that I can admit such exchange is no increase. Which type of exchange, exactly, are you referring to? Do you refer to the exchange of the former type or the latter type?" To my question, General Hodes answered in this way; he said and I quote, "If I understand correctly your question, then part of your question is to ask whether we intend to take out new and serviceable equipment from Korea while bringing in unserviceable equipment. The answer of course is 'No'. As to the other part of the question I can perhaps be satified with giving an example. For instance, you have 40 unserviceable T-34 tanks, you can take out of Korea these 40 unserviceable T-34 tanks and get another serviceable 40 T-34 tanks. But what you will bring in should not be of a type better than what you will take out." Furthermore, in the sub-committee conference of 16 December, there were questions and answers between General Hodes and myself. I asked, "Your intention in making this revision means that you would not accept any restrictions on your rotation and replenishment?" General Hodes answered, "My answer to your question is 'Yes'."

My impression from your explanation this morning about no reinforcing is exactly the same as the impression I have received from General Hodes' explanations those two previous times. Therefore, there is the disagreement between both sides, between your position that under the term of "no increase" or "no reinforcing" you want to continue to introduce into Korea during the armistice all types of weapons while, on the other hand, we hold the principle of "no introduction" of any weapons. There is a difference of

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) position between your principles and ours. We still maintain that our principle of "no introduction" is an effective principle for ensuring a stable armistice.

From my exposition about our position on two important questions, you can see that our side is sincere toward an effective armistice and a speedy and thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and our position is thoroughgoing.

As the hostilities in Korea were extended because of the introduction of military forces from without Korea, the most thorough measure for settling the Korean question is a speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces. And at the least, there should be assurance that there will be no increase of military forces from without. In the east we have a motto; we say, "withdrawing fire from under a cauldron." When a cauldron of water is boiling and you want to reduce the boiling, you should not only stop from putting in more firewood, but you must take away the firewood from under the cauldron. We think this is the best example.

Our advancing this thorough proposal is a clear evidence that we have sincerity and good faith toward peace, and as we made this proposal, we were fully prepared to abide by this stipulation and execute it. That is, our proposal applies to both sides. In objecting to this thorough proposal of ours, you said previously that our proposal was designed to achieve a withdrawal of your forces by attrition; but if it were a measure to reduce the forces by attrition, then it will reduce our forces as well by attrition. Therefore, such argument of yours is only advanced to defend your insistence upon unlimited replenishment, and we are different from your point of view.

Thirdly, with regard to the second passage in principle 4 of your revised proposal of 29 December, the question of "restriction on our military facilities": This question has been pointed out to me yesterday and for innumerable times before that, and I have

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) clearly and explicitly expressed our attitude on this question. Yesterday, I asked you whether you had left that passage in principle 4 intentionally; and your answer yesterday and this morning clearly indicated that you have done so intentionally. That is to say, since your side put that stumbling block between both sides, up to the present moment you have consistently refused to remove this stumbling block between both sides. That is a very regrettable fact; and I must point out that it is also a demand we absolutely cannot accept. We are fully aware that you are afraid of the growth of our military air power and it is because we want to relieve you from this concern that we have taken the following measure. These measures are already taken by us, not measures we are about to take. These are the measures: firstly, our agreement to clearly specify that there will be no introduction during the armistice of any combat aircraft; second, our agreement to your proposal that upon request by either side on the military armistice commission to the supervisory organ of neutral nations for investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the latter should carry out such supervision and inspection forthwith. If your side is really pursuing the objective of an armistice as stable and effective as is possible, then your side should no longer be concerned about the growth of our military air power and no longer insist upon your absurd demands to interfere in our internal affairs. It can be seen that our side is whole-heartedly in support of a stable and effective armistice between both side. Our sincerity and good faith are shown in the concrete proposals which we have submitted throughout these negotiations and also the concrete proposals we have submitted during the last month.

I have now pointed out the differences still existing between both sides after your side submitted your revised proposal of 29 December. We admit that your proposal of 29 December, compared with your previous position, is a step forward. But according to your

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) own statements you are willing to make efforts to resolve the differences existing between both sides so as to attain a stable and effective armistice; therefore, you should recognize that there still exists between both sides certain differences. I would like to hear your opinion about the settlement of these differences, and I would be glad to hear any indication on your part of making efforts toward such solution.

GEN TURNER: After I have listened to your lengthy statement, it appears to me that you have found it very difficult to find points in our proposal on which to disagree. The first two points you raise are points on which we seem to be in general agreement.

With reference to the third point, it appears that your purpose is to cloud the issue. Are you delaying for some specific purpose? Your discussions are not helping the progress of the negotiations. I suggest you take more time to study our proposal and my amplifying statements of this morning.

GEN HSIEH: My statement this morning is an over-all comment, after we have considered your 29 December proposal, in which I have pointed out the disagreements existing between both sides. If, as you have admitted, the first two differences I have pointed out are points on which both sides can agree -- that is, if your side will agree to change the wording so as to meet with our original principles -- then there are no differnces on these two points, and there is only one disagreement left, that is, on my third point.

On this point both sides are fully aware of the position of the other side. Our side has for many times pointed out that this is a serious disagreement between both sides, and that our stand on this point is unshakable. You say you are willing to make efforts to solve the disagreements between both sides; but your intentional leaving of this serious disagreement there between both sides will make it impossible for us to reach a solution.

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GEN TURNER: I warn you that you must not read into the wording of our proposals any strange interpretation of yours. The wording of our principles 4, 5, and 6 is very clear. I suggest you restudy them, along with my statement of yesterday and my amplifying statement of this morning, so that you will be better acquainted with them. I can assure you I have nothing further to offer. It is now your move.

I suggest we recess for lunch to reconvene at 1430. If you have nothing to offer after lunch time, then I suggest that we recess until tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: We have no new questions to raise this afternoon. If we should reconvene this afternoon, I will only make a short comment on your statement this morning. I agree to recess until tomorrow.

GEN TURNER: Very good.

GEN HSIEH: Before recessing, I would like to clear up a point. You seem to have said that you recognize the first two points I have raised as no disagreements between both sides; but following that, you again said that you will stick to your principles and wording in your 29 December proposal. If the latter is the case, then you still recognize the two points as disagreements between both sides. Is that correct?

GEN TURNER: I suggest you review my statement.

GEN HSIEH: Then you mean that those two disagreements still exist? I tell you once again that the second paragraph in your fourth principle of your 29 December proposal is absolutely unacceptable to our side. I agree to recess.

Meeting recessed at 1239 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

31 December 1951

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-seventh Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: I wish to make a statement.

As we have explained previously, our reason for rewording the preamble statement in principle 4 is solely to be more specific as to the purpose we have in mind. The previous wording only indicated that a conference would be held. In the history of international relations, many political conferences are recorded. A large portion of those accomplished nothing. Therefore, to merely hold a political conference may produce no results, or unsatisfactory results. Our revised wording, on the other hand, sets forth the true objective -- a peaceful settlement. If you desire a peaceful settlement in Korea, you can have no objection to our wording of this intent, and you will cease delaying the progress of this conference by haggling on this point.

Yesterday, I made a further explanation of our meaning of "no reinforcing" in our fourth principle pertaining to combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. You apparently misunderstood my statement as you said there is still disagreement between our sides on this issue. Actually, we are in agreement. We insist that there shall be no increase in numerical quantities of implements of war and no change in types and models. The resupply and replacement we have in mind does not include

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) introduction of weapons of war in replacement of those which become useless during the period of hostilities. We have in mind replacing only those weapons and articles of equipment which become unserviceable during the armistice. Exchange on a like-for-like basis does not constitute an increase.

It is and has been our sincere stand that we are here to negotiate an armistice that is stable and effective. It is for this reason that we maintain exchange of weapons of war on a piece-for-piece basis must be permitted in order that the commanders of each side can safeguard the security of his troops. Our stand on this issue is unshakable.

GEN HSIEH: Yesterday I listed the disagreements still existing between both sides after you put forth your proposal on 29 December. These disagreements are: firstly, the question of holding of a political conference of a higher level; secondly, the question of replenishment of weapons during the armistice; and thirdly, your demand for interfering in our internal affairs, that is, a so-called restriction on airfields. This morning I have heard your explanations on the first two points, but I have not yet heard your opinion about the settlement on the third point.

Ever since both sides began the military armistice negotiations, your side has always dodged the question on the first point, that is, the calling of a conference at a higher level. And this morning your explanation has again clearly borne out this point. Both sides are clearly aware that except by holding a conference to settle the remaining problems between both belligerents in Korea, there is no better method to settle those questions. For instance we have been holding the military armistice negotiations for nearly 6 months in order to reach an armistice. Although these negotiations have gone through a tortuous and difficult road and a complicated process, we have so far yielded certain results. It proved that under the present circumstances a conference is the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) best means through which both sides can settle the questions connected with Korea. Our side maintains that quickly after the military armistice is reached, there should be convened a political conference of a higher level. The objective of our side is doubtlessly for a speedy peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It seems that your side is also in support of the holding of such a conference because apart from this method there are no better methods by which we can settle the Korean question. We are of the opinion that the military armistice negotiations are for paving the way for the second step, namely, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This wish of our side has been reflected in many of our proposals. Therefore, we think in our agreement we should set out this method by which the objective of a peaceful settlement can be reached. It is of course also profitable to write out the objective as well as the method and the form. We cannot agree with your explanation that a conference may not be able to settle the problem and we cannot agree to your wording which is hollow in content and is aimed at dodging the means of a conference, dodging this concrete method through which we can take the second step for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

Secondly, the question of replenishment; you said that both sides are in agreement on this point. You either misunderstood us, or you deliberately pretended to misunderstand us. Our principle on this point is that there should be no introduction into Korea during the armistice of any military forces, including combat aircraft and armored vehicles. In order to ensure the carrying out of this principle it should be subject to the supervision and inspection by the supervisory organ of neutral nations. You on the other hand advocate the principle of the so-called no increase or no reinforcing and you have given two interpretations for this principle. Formerly you have explained that the exchange of weapons,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) whether damaged during hostilities or wornout during the armistice, should be permitted. That was your old interpretation; now you explained that such exchange will be limited to exchange of only the weapons wornout and used up during the armistice alone. Now no matter whether we take your former interpretation or your recent interpretation, no matter whether you are referring to weapons damaged during hostilities or wornout during the armistice, anyway, it is impossible to differentiate between them. Your exchange will be an exchange of new and serviceable weapons by importing them from without to replace weapons wornout and unserviceable in Korea. Such exchange is obviously an increase in military forces. It is impossible for you to interpretate it as no increase. Moreover, in your fourth principle of your 29 December proposal, you would put such replenishment outside of supervision and inspection by the supervisory organ of neutral nations. I have pointed out the position of both sides on this principle and set out clearly the disagreements between both sides.

From the above two points it can be seen that our consistent stand is that we should not only reach an armistice but we should seek for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. On the other hand, your side clearly attempts to maintain a state of war in Korea -- as you have said previously, a permanent armistice -- the substance of which is the prolonging of a state of war in Korea and an atmosphere of tension, both in Korea and all over the world, so as to facilitate your carrying out of a war policy throughout the world.

Thirdly, the question of restriction on our military facilities: Our firm and unshakable position on this question has been expressed by us innumerable times throughout the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda. We are firmly opposed to such restrictions because it comes within the scope of interference in our internal affairs,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) which we cannot tolerate. Yet you said that you are concerned about something, but our 24 December proposal has already taken concrete steps to relieve you of this concern and provides sufficient conditions for insuring a stable and effective armistice. Therefore, you should have no pretexts whatsoever on this score. This is still the main stumbling block in the way to agreement between both sides. Your 29 December proposal made a step forward elsewhere, but you intentionally left this big stumbling block there so that we can have no progress in these negotiations. It will suffice to say that our position on this point is firm and I will not give more explanations.

GEN TURNER: In failing to accept without further delay the equitable proposal made by us on 29 December, you have exposed to the eyes of the world your gross lack of sincerity toward a stable armistice. You have done more. In clinging to your desire to develop during the armistice a military air capability not now possessed by your side, you have cast an ominous shadow over these negotiations. By your stalling and delaying tactics in these negotiations, by your assumed attitude of a victor, and your insistence on developing a military air capability you have served clear notice to the world that what you have in mind is not peace, but war.

You evidently seek to sharpen the ancient maxim of those who contemplated war, which once was stated "In time of peace, prepare for war." You apparently wish to apply that thought as follows: "In time of armistice, prepare for war." You wish to develop during the period of armistice the sole additional military capability which it is within your power to develop, military aviation. You wish to develop a military capability that could reach far beyond the range of your artillery, that could strike suddenly deep in the rear of our side. You wish to develop a military capability during armistice which can be employed swiftly and effectively, especially against those who have been lulled into a false sense

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) of security by the mere existence of an armistice.

By your continued insistence on developing a threatening military air capability during armistice, you have absolutely confirmed the unescapable necessity to restrict the rehabilitation of airfields. Since this is inevitably so, further refusal on your part to give up your ominous demand to develop a military air capability during armistice only results in further delaying progress. Henceforth, failure of these negotiations to make progress will be rightly attributed by the people of the world to your threatening demands When we shall resume progress is squarely up to you.

Now I have listened to your statement of this morning. You have not presented a single new argument and a single argument that we have not refuted over and over again. I shall take no more time to refute your hollow arguments. If you have nothing new to offer at this time, I have no further statement to make.

COL CHANG: I would like to speak.

As far as I understand, we have come to, in general, more or less mutual understanding in solving problems in the course of our discussion on Agenda Item 3, except for one major, crucial point and some others which are still in dispute between us.

With respect to the question of airfields: previously, you openly admitted that the fact that you attempted to restrict our facilities in terms of airfields was an interfernce in our internal affairs. At the same time you charged that we attempted to avail ourselves to this opportunity of armistice so that we could increase our air capability, thereby bringing a threat to your safety; therefore, you declare that you must restrict our air facilities. This was your logic. Several days ago you even mentioned that large numbers of aircraft could fly into Korea within some ten minutes. If you advance the argument in this wise, we must review, once and for all, as to how these negotiations started, how they have been conducted so far, how they have progressed and how they should be

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COL CHANG: (Cont'd) carried out further. Suppose we adopt your enumeration on your logic. We would also be in the same position to repute to you that your aircraft, en masse, could also make a sudden attack against us within a short period of time of some ten minutes. As you are well aware, our stand on this score is very clear; that is, we maintain that no military capabilities including air power should be introduced into Korea. No matter how you distort or what you charge, the matters of rehabilitation of and construction of airfields, when viewed objectively, are matters pertaining to internal affairs. With respect to this rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields we may rehabilitate or construct, or we may not. In connection with this, I would like to call to your attention that we are the ones who are not only desirous of achieving a stable and effective armistice, but are also for an immediate peaceful settlement of the Korean problems; that is, a complete settlement of the Korean problem right after an armistice is signed and becomes effective, so that the tension of war in existence in Korea can be relieved. How, then, can you accuse and criticize us who have no intent whatsoever of attempting to increase military power during the armistice or of scheming for prolonging a state of war and finally bringing forth a certain threat to your safety? How can you charge those people who are only desirous of solving these questions in peaceful methods? If, as you so absurdly guess, either one of the belligerents should construct airfields on a great scale and prepare for the war after an armistice is signed, this is a matter which should be measured in degree or comparison -- in other words, by weighing things, by and large, according to the circumstances. Should one side prepare for the war by means of rehabilitating and constructing airfields on a big scale, there is not the slightest chance for the other party not to be able to know of it. Apart from this fact, we are providing concrete measures to insure safeguards by means of accommodating inspection organization

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COL CHANG: (Cont'd) by neutral nations as was proposed by us in written form. Is this not too much for you to charge -- to criticize -- by way of highly pitched imagination and wild guesses, those who are only desirious of a peaceful solution after an armistice is signed and become effective? While we both are -- so we say -- all for an armistice and a peaceful solution of the Korean question, is it not straying far from the right track to foresee or visualize such an impossible occurrence in discussion, and to lead our main questions toward that direction?

I seriously and sincerely add one more remark. We are only for an effective and stable armistice and a peaceful solution of the Korean question after the armistice is signed. Apart from this, we have nothing further in our mind. The invariable conclusion that I am bound to draw from the above mentioned views is that we are more concerned about the sovereignty and integrity over our country rather than the airfields. As you know very well, we have paid a great price for defense of our sovereignty and integrity of our state. Therefore, I want you not to demand any unreasonable request for interfering in our internal affairs while you verbally call for a military armistice. I wish to say that it is a fantasy for those who visualize or foresee any possibility to interfere in the internal affairs during the armistice of those who are only for the defense of their sovereignty and pledged to defend at the cost of their lives the integrity of the internal affairs of their state. If only you do not look upon us as the vanquished, I do not believe you could possibly be able to say as you have been saying so far. In the course of our negotiations, which are being carried on under the circumstances of having both powers in the balance, no other matter, such as the question of interfering in ones internal affairs, should be touched upon. In order to achieve an effective and stable armistice, we have done our best so far on our part.

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COL CHANG: (Cont'd) This is how I interpret our negotiations. Can we make further concessions? The further concession that we would make would be that of our surrender, to give up our right to defend our sovereignty and the integrity of our internal affairs. That is impossible. We have never thought this issue would come up in the course of our military armistice negotiations. And we do not at present think this issue should be included in the course of our negotiations, and it must not be included also in the future negotiations. In the course of our discussions of Agenda Item 3, you have cast the so-called ominous shadows, you have established the blocking stones in the way of agreement and you are in the position to remove all these obstructions. The very fact that you have started to talk about either the rehabilitation or construction of our airfields was, itself, the beginning of interfering in our internal affairs. I wish that you would waste no further time by haggling over this matter which has nothing to do with our negotiations of the military armistice conference.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything else?

GEN HSIEH: Colonel Chang has once again made it clear, what is our firm and unshakable stand. The delaying or not of the negotiations, the question whether we can have progress in these negotiations, is now entirely up to you. You have falsely charged our refusal to accept your unreasonable demands as our delaying the negotiations. But during the 34 days of the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, surely you are clearly aware of our firm and unshakable stand, as we know what your stand is. Since you said that in submitting your 29 December proposal you were making a great effort in order to solve the deadlock between both sides, how is it that you still leave the main stumbling block in the way of agreement between both sides of Item 3 of the agenda? Your doing so is a very regrettable fact and your doing so is exactly the cause of the procrastination of time, the cause of the deadlock between both sides. I think you are aware of this fact.

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GEN TURNER: Are you all through? Have you anything more to offer?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: I have nothing further to say. What time do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: If you have no ideas, I agree to your suggestion to recess.

GEN TURNER. We are ready to reconvene whenever you have got something new.

GEN HSIEH: Have you any new points to raise this afternoon?

GEN TURNER: None!

GEN HSIEH: Then let us recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN TURNER: Very well.

Meeting recessed at 1231 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

1 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: If you have anything to say, we are ready to hear it.

GEN HSIEH: We have talked very much. The disagreements existing between us are most clear. You are familiar with our firm and unshakable stand, but your proposal of 29 December still offered no solution on the main disagreements between us.

These disagreements are: firstly, your insistence on replenishment; secondly, the question of holding a political conference; and thirdly, your interference in our internal affairs under the pretext of preventing us from increasing our military forces. Particularly the third disagreement is the main obstacle in the way to agreement, and this obstacle has existed ever since we began to discuss Item 3 of the agenda. This unreasonable demand was raised by your side, and you have so far not yet been willing to give it up. I will not repeat the arguments we have used before, but I must tell you that we absolutely cannot accept such an unreasonable demand. It is clear that your side has intentionally raised this question of so-called restrictions on our facilities, which should not be raised for discussion in these military armistice negotiations, and that such restrictions are absolutely unacceptable to our side. You have done so purposely and you have maintained this question purposely, thereby making us doubt whether you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) have sincerity for any progress in these negotiations. It is clear that this stalemate over the question not yet resolved was created by your side purposely and the progress of the conference mainly depends on the settlement of this question, although there are two other questions of importance; namely, the question of replenishment and the question as to whether there will be the holding of a political conference as a second step.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything new to suggest?

GEN HSIEH: No.

GEN TURNER: When do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: It depends on your need.

GEN TURNER: It is very evident that you need more time to study our 29 December proposal and the amplifying remarks we had made about it. When we reconvene is up to you. We have nothing further to offer.

GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

GEN TURNER: All through.

GEN HSIEH: Your proposal of 29 December is familiar to us. It does not take much time for us to consider it; we have already considered it. And I have repeatedly pointed out that it is your side which has intentionally raised and insisted upon a question which cannot be acceptable between both sides, thereby systematically delaying the negotiations, as you have openly declared that you want to delay the negotiations. Such delaying tactics are your accustomed tactics, and you have a free hand to do so. We do not need more time.

GEN TURNER: You have nothing more to offer?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: Then when do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: It depends on your need.

GEN TURNER: When you are ready to present something new, we will be glad to hear it.

GEN HSIEH: I have pointed out repeatedly that it is your side which has intentionally raised and left a question which cannot be settled

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) between both sides. Therefore, the settling of the question or not depends upon whether you will take away this unreasonable demand.

GEN TURNER: If you have anything new to present, we would be glad to hear it now. If you have nothing new to present, when do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: We have nothing new to offer.

GEN TURNER: When do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: It is up to your side. What is your view?

GEN TURNER: We are ready to reconvene any time you have something new to offer.

GEN HSIEH: The question is not to offer something new, but to cancel something old.

GEN TURNER: Your delaying tactics are simply wasting time.

GEN HSIEH: Your side is perhaps too optimistic with regard to your 29 December proposal. Today is the beginning of the year 1952, and we have the custom of saying at the new year, "We should divest ourselves of what is old." Therefore, what I said is correct. It is not for us to offer anything new - there is nothing new to offer now - but to do away with those old three disagreements between both sides and then the question will be settled right away. I think the next step is to do away with something old and it will serve us better to think along this direction. If we raise anything new, it will only add to our troubles.

GEN TURNER: Your opposition to our fair and reasonable proposal is old. I suggest you give up your old opposition to this most fair and reasonable proposal.

GEN HSIEH: You can look in the record as to when you raised the second passage in your principle 4 of your 29 December proposal. You still want to keep that paragraph there. That is something old. It is our firm and unshakable stand not to accept such a provision.

GEN TURNER: This being a new year, we are awaiting for something <u>new</u> from your side. When do you expect to have something <u>new</u> to propose in this new year?

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GEN HSIEH: When we take away those old points, then we can get a new proposal; but to do away with the old is a job for you to undertake. Of course we can do so also, just by striking out the second paragraph of your principle 4 and then settling the other points.

GEN TURNER: You will grow old sitting at this table if you expect us to remove any of the parts of our principle 4.

GEN HSIEH: We can sit here and grow old, but it must be taken away.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything further to offer?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: When do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: What is your opinion?

GEN TURNER: I suggest we reconvene when you have something new to offer. What is your suggestion?

GEN HSIEH: My suggestion is that you consider our firm and unshakable stand and give up your unreasonable demand, instead of taking so much time in these military armistice negotiations to discuss a question which both sides are unable to settle.

GEN TURNER: Our proposal is a fair and reasonable one. The wasting of time is entirely on your side. When do you expect to have something new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: You arbitrarily assert that interference in the internal affairs of another country is fair and reasonable. You must be the victim of an evil habit, before you can say that the interference in the internal affairs of other people is fair and reasonable. We absolutely will not permit such interference.

GEN TURNER: When do you suggest that we reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: It seems that you are unwilling to make any effort this year, same as last year. If you have nothing to say, I agree to your suggestion to recess.

GEN TURNER: It is up to you, when do you want to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: It is up to you. Either this afternoon or tomorrow, it is the same with us.

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GEN TURNER: As you wish.

GEN HSIEH: Either this afternoon or tomorrow. Will you please make a choice?

GEN TURNER: Will you have something new this afternoon?

GEN HSIEH: No!

GEN TURNER: Perhaps then tomorrow would be a better time, what do you think?

GEN HSIEH: I agree to reconvene tomorrow. And we wish that you will give serious consideration to our firm and unshakable stand.

GEN TURNER: We agree to recess until tomorrow. I suggest that you give more thorough study to our proposal of 29 December and the amplifying remarks that we have made about it.

Meeting recessed at 1139 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

2 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-ninth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: I have nothing. Have you anything to say?

GEN HSIEH: We have talked very much and the question is now very clear.

GEN TURNER: Yesterday, and for several days preceding, you asserted that your side could accept no demand which involved the giving up of "sacred, sovereign rights". Again you are evading the issue, again you are hiding your real intent behind a false cloak. Even your hollow argument of no concession on any matter which involves your sovereign rights has no logic and contradicts your formal agreements.

Already both sides have generally agreed that there should be no increase in military forces or equipment during the armistice, an obvious abridgement of sovereign rights.

Already both sides have agreed that inspection teams of non-combatant nations should have access to the rear of both sides, another abridgement of sovereign rights. Both of these agreements require some abridgement of sovereign rights, applying equally to both sides. It should be readily apparent to you how illogical and contradictory your vain arguments are on the question of airfield rehabilitation.

Continued arguments by you on this issue will further delay these negotiations. Your illogical stand only serves to clarify

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) your real intentions, which are to build up your military air capabilities during the period of the armistice.

GEN HSIEH: I really cannot believe that you do not see where is the crucial point of issue between both sides with regard to the measures for ensuring stability and effectiveness of a military armistice, because we have been discussing this question of ensuring an armistice for more than thirty days. Both sides have talked at great length, and the point of issue is very clearly and conspicuously placed in front of both sides. You should be fully aware of it. Therefore, your statement that you have just now given can only be interpreted as a pretext which you have resorted to in order to delay the negotiations.

The chief method to guarantee a stable and effective armistice is to limit the continued introduction of military forces into Korea from without - as we have said, a method of pulling out firewood from under a boiling cauldron. This principle is borne out by the facts in the Korean war. It was only because foreign troops were introduced into Korea that the hostilities were intensified and the war was extended. Therefore, the only way to prevent and stop any resumption of hostilities is the prohibition of the introduction of foreign forces into Korea. Of course a more thoroughgoing way would be the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea; that is the fundamental way. The withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea is our consistent stand, but you are against this. The thorough prohibition of the continued introduction of military forces into Korea from without was also advanced by our side. Although you employed the term "no increase", yet on the other hand you advocated the maintenance of balance of forces in Korea; thereby, actually, the net result is an intended, continued increase of military forces. The thorough limitation of introduction of military forces into Korea proposed by our side includes all military personnel, all weapons including combat aircraft, armored vehicles,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

and ammunition. This proves that our position and our policy is for a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question. And the concrete proposals and principles we have raised for ensuring a stable military armistice are sound. We have explicitly provided for a complete guarantee for the stability of the armistice; that is, our proposal can and is sufficient to prevent the introduction of military forces into Korea from without. In order to supervise and inspect this guarantee of no introduction of military forces, we have suggested that the supervisory organ of neutral nations should conduct such functions at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

From the above it can be seen that our proposal is a complete and sufficient proposal for guaranteeing a stable and effective armistice. It cannot be distorted and you can have no pretext for delaying the negotiations. We have raised our proposal with painstaking effort in order to relieve you from the pretext that you are concerned and afraid of the increase of our military capabilities. Our proposal can guarantee a stable armistice and deprives you of all pretext for delaying the negotiations, and at the same time it does not interfere with the sovereign rights of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Our proposal has taken care of all these aspects. The reasonableness of our proposal has been recognized by all the peoples of the world. Even you yourself can find no excuses for objecting to it.

Since we have submitted this reasonable and painstaking proposal, you have still up to now insisted upon an extremely unreasonable position. You have raised a point which should not be discussed, and even less decided upon, in these military armistice negotiations; that is, your attempt to restrict facilities within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This point of yours is entirely different from the question limiting the continued introduction of military forces into Korea, because it is a point which constitutes a

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) part of the internal affairs of Korea. You know, of course, the true objective of your doirg so, but we are firmly against your position. We firmly object to your raising this point for discussion, and we would absolutely not agree to have any discussion made at this conference. What is doubtful is why your side should have raised this point and continued to insist on it so as to block the progress of these negotiations. The answer, of course, is for you to make. Our attitude and stand is very clear. We absolutely will not permit the inclusion of such a term.

GEN TURNER: I have listened attentively to your statement. I find that there is nothing new in it. It is apparent to me that you are only desirous of continuing to stall and delay these negotiations. The lack of logic in your illustrations of the boiling cauldron must be evident even to you. Your cauldron started boiling long before foreign troops appeared on the scene. You say you advocate removing the wood from under this cauldron, but we note that in your insistence upon developing airfields you intend to prepare more firewood with which to kindle a bigger fire. Surely you must know that this is entirely contrary to our stand. How can you be so illogical?

We have made a great concession with regard to airfields, we can make no more, that subject is closed. We have made a great concession regarding aerial observation, even though aerial observation is a means of safeguarding the armistice and rendering it more effective. We have given up islands which could serve as sentinel posts safeguarding the armistice. We have given up a single directing authority for the armistice, which would provide a stronger measure of security for the armistice than does your proposal of parellel organizations which we have adopted. We have given up military inspection teams and accepted the lesser assurance of non-combatant teams as suggested by your side. We have given up the total prohibition of rehabilitation of airfields by agreeing to rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations. We have now conceded to your unreasonable

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) views all that we can concede. We have nothing further to propose. It is now clearly and unequivocally up to you if further progress is to be made.

And now, since it is apparent that you have nothing new to offer, what time do you suggest that we reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: With regard to the question of the oldness of the content of our statements, it is because your side still insists upon your old, very old, and unreasonable demands for interfering in our internal affairs that we could not but raise those reasons we have formerly used to oppose your stand. We will continue to do so until your side will give up your unreasonable demand. I can assure you that so long as you do not give up your unreasonable demand, we will continue to oppose your stand.

The word "concession" you have used needs some special annotation, otherwise it won't be understood by other people. You want to sit on top of other people's heads, and when you come down from that position you say that is a concession on your part. You say that when you give up some unreasonable demand, you are making a concession; but that is merely to defer from interfering in other people's business. How can that be interpreted as a concession on your part? A real concession would be some sacrifice of your own right or property. (According to the United Nations Command Interpreter, General Hsieh said "something" in lieu of "right or property"). When you just take a little less from other people, how can you say that that is a concession? How can you say that that is fair and reasonable? You always ask for something new. What is new? In our opinion, to take away the old disagreement between both sides will bring about a new progress in these negotiations. Both sides should make efforts to eliminate and resolve the old disagreements between both sides, so that we can have some new progress in these discussions and so that we can reach an agreement on Item 3 of the agenda. But if you rely on our efforts alone, that will not do.

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GEN TURNER: When do you expect to be prepared to make a new effort? We have no new efforts to make. When do you wish to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: We have made necessary efforts on our part, but your side has still not taken away your old, very old, unreasonable demand which our side absolutely cannot accept or tolerate. If you have no new efforts to make, we agree to recess.

GEN TURNER: Until tomorrow?

GEN HSIEH: Agreed.

Meeting recessed at 1155 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

3 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirtieth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LT W J Ellis, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: I will make a statement. General Hsieh, and Colonel Chang, what I have to say to you today, I shall strive to say with unmistakable clarity. I recognize the difficulties inherent in our discussions, due to differing habits of thought, and to differing languages. Yet it is gravely important that I convey to you intact a solemn truth about our present situation. I ask you most earnestly to give very careful consideration to this statement.

The foundation upon which the prospect of armistice rests is in deep, and rapidly deepening jeopardy. Last June 30th the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command broadcast a message to your commanders announcing that he understood your commanders desired to discuss "an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities in Korea with adequate safeguards for the maintenance of such armistice." Your commanders responded affirmatively. Thus was established the tentative belief that your side did indeed seek a stable armistice. The people of the United Nations assumed that your side, like their side, had reached the conclusion that a decision in Korea should not be achieved by force of arms. The whole world thought then that your desire for an armistice, like ours, was premised on the conclusion that is was no longer in the interests of either

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) side to continue the use of military force in Korea. The people of the United Nations believed then that your side was willing to abandon the processes of war in seeking a solution to the Korean problem. At the first meeting between representatives of our two sides, a meeting which involved two officers now present at this table, Colonel Kinney said to Colonel Chang: "I trust that intelligent discussion will now replace the arguments of artillery, bombs, and bullets." Colonel Chang said he subscribed to that hope. From that time forward the people of the United Nations have clung to the hope that the intentions of your side were, in truth, peaceful. That hope has been given many rude shocks.

First, it became apparent that your side desired to effect the immediate withdrawal from this peninsula of the forces which had protected and defended the Republic of Korea. Your side advocated that the forces of the United Nations Command withdraw across thousands of miles of ocean to the homelands of their origin. Your withdrawal of so-called Chinese Volunteers, however, needed only be to the Manchurian sanctuary from which they debouched, only a few yards from Korea. Thus the first false note clanged out harshly, the first evidence of a menacing intent was exposed.

Second, your side insisted on the 38th Parallel as a demarcation line in Korea. All the world knew how indefensible this line had proved to be, not once but many times. Again the hopes of the people of the world suffered a disturbing blow, for it seemed that your side desired to set up a demarcation line ideally suited for later resumption of hostilities by your forces.

Third, your side has consistently opposed the safeguards for the stability of the armistice proposed by the United Nations Command delegation. You objected to observers in the rear areas of both sides. You objected to aerial and photographic observation of both sides. You objected to a single directing head of the organization supervising the armistice, thus vitiating the effectiveness

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) of such supervision. You objected to observation at communication centers of both sides. You objected to joint military observation teams. You objected to the principle of replacement, thus seeking to accomplish by attrition what you had failed to accomplish by direct action.

All of these things have given rise to a very serious suspicion in the minds of the people of the United Nations. Why, they ask, does the other side oppose every effective safeguard for a stable armistice? Why does the other side seek to avoid observation? What do they intend to hide, or to carry out secretly? Does the enemy intend to resume hostilities at some time in the future of his choosing? If so, what is there to be gained through an armistice now? Only greater danger and a sharply increased level of death, destruction, and suffering. You have nurtured this suspicion and strengthened this conclusion by your adamant stands against all effective safeguards for the armistice.

Recently, however, you have fanned the embers of suspicion into the flame of certainty. You have told the people of the United Nations that, during armistice, you intend to develop military airfields. Now the people of the United States, Britain, France, Holland - to name only a few - have known bitter and painful experience at the hands of enemy air power. For that matter, the gallant people of China themselves felt the heavy hand of enemy air power during the last war, until American war planes arrived to protect and support them in their brave struggle. Therefore, the people of the United Nations view your expressed intent to develop military airfields during the armistice as a threat of the first order of magnitude. They feel that you have served notice that your ultimate objective is not peace, but war.

The conclusion I have just outlined to you grows firmer with every word you utter demanding the right to develop military air capabilities during armistice. The people whose servants we of the

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) United Nations Command Delegation are proud to be are very much alarmed. The conclusion is spreading throughout the world that your demand to develop military airfields in time of armistice springs from an intent inconsistent with peace. Thus, the first premise upon which the prospects of armistice is based - that you truly seek peace, enduring peace - has become suspect. This thought which is abroad among the people of the United Nations is no mere stumbling block in the path of these negotiations, General Hsieh. It is a cancer, which can eat away the heart of the prospect of armistice. It is a deadly disease attacking all hopes for an armistice, a disease you have germinated and are currently aggravating. I am very much afraid that unless you act soon, this disease will be beyond cure, beyond the control of the United Nations Command Delegation.

Now, if you wish, you can call these words of mine distortions, slander, propaganda - what you will. But I assure you most solemnly, they are the absolute dangerous truth. The ice we tread on here in these meetings is becoming deadly thin. I urge you to move most prudently, but to move quickly.

And now, unless you have something new to offer, I suggest that we recess until tomorrow in order that you may have ample time to thoroughly and carefully study the statement that I have made this morning.

GEN HSIEH: Nothing doing! Nothing doing! I want to speak now.

What I am most interested in in your statement is the first part of it in which you said both sides have "differing habits of thought". You have said many things, but I think the most valuable statement you have made is that statement, because in making it you have realized and set out the differences in the fundamental positions of both sides. It is exactly because we take entirely different standpoints that we view things, we analyze things, and we draw conclusions, differently. You have just cited certain facts since

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) we began the military armistice negotiations, in an attempt to illustrate that you are an angel of peace and we are a warlike person. You have confined yourselves to certain facts since we began the armistice negotiations. We are also willing to analyze these facts and to draw conclusions from them, but I tell you beforehand that your conclusion is entirely wrong. There are persons sitting here who have participated in these negotiations from the very beginning without any interruptions. Therefore, once we cite some facts of the past, we are at once reminded of the historical course of these negotiations during nearly six months; and we have very clear impressions of them.

Firstly, you attempted to give the fact about our crucial controversy during the development of the agenda as to whether there should be a thorough, complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea to illustrate that you love peace while we love war. I cannot but point out that in doing so you are making a big lie, and even you yourselves do not believe that you can deceive many people by such a lie.

The history of the Korean war testifies that it was because foreign forces entered into Korea that the war was extended so as to threaten the peace of the whole world; and first of all, it was because troops of your side interfered in the internal affairs of Korea, and proceeded to menace the border regions of the People's Republic of China, thus fully exposing your warlike and agressive intentions. It was not until then that the Chinese people, in order to defend their own motherland and homes, and in order to help their neighboring country in fighting against agression, organized their own People's Volunteers to come to Korea and to wage this sacred and just war alongside the Korean People's Army up to now. This righteous action on our part, in defense of our sacred sovereign rights, will be continued, as it has been continuing very well, so long as peace is not realized. Because our objective is to de-

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) fend the peace and to realize peace; therefore, even while we are fighting we have never let go any opportunity for realizing an armistice by other methods than fighting so as to reach peace. That is our consistent position and objective which we have been consistently striving for. As the extension of the Korean war was caused by your side, therefore, when your side expressed yourselves to be willing to negotiate an armistice after Mr. Malik made his suggestion on 23 June 1951, we have thought that you could have no reason to refuse to accept the fair and reasonable principles for reaching a genuine armistice, and for ensuring a stable armistice. But the facts have shown that you took an attitude to the contrary.

During the discussion of the agenda, you came out openly to refuse to accept the principle of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea; you opposed openly even the discussion of it. That shows clearly, as later developments have shown and even the discussion of Item 3 have shown, that your real intention is to have a so-called permanent armistice in order that you can maintain a state of war in Korea and a state of tension all over the world, so that you can carry out your plans for rearmament and for agression. As you have already come out to stand openly for war, for a permanent armistice, for the maintenance of a state of war, how can you slander our peaceful proposal of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea as an intentional threat to your part? How can you believe such a big lie can deceive anybody?

In support of your argument, you have attempted to raise the point of distance from Korea. I must point out that your logic is absurd. The question whether a nation or an army is for peace or for war is determined by its fundamental policy; it has nothing to do with its distance from another place. If we take your logic, then you could say that all the countries neighboring to the United States of America would constitute a threat to your country, and you would like to form a no man's land around your country. Or - if

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) we pursue your logic - you are very far in distance from Korea, why have you come here then? Therefore, your logic is entirely untenable; the distance from another place has nothing whatever to do with the point. It must be decided by the policy of a nation or an army: whether it is fundamentally for peace or for war. I have shown clearly that your first argument is untenable and cannot deceive anybody.

Secondly, you attempted to employ the discussion of the military demarcation line under Agenda Item 2 to illustrate that you love peace and that we love war. But I cannot but point out again that this argument of yours is entirely wrong. It is correct that when we began to discuss Item 2 of the agenda, our side proposed that we take the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line and up to now we still maintain that our previous proposal is just and fair, because this proposal is based upon the situation of war in Korea - that is, both sides sharing the 38th Parallel - and we proposed to make an over-all adjustment of the battle line so as to restore the situation before the war in Korea to facilitate peaceful settlement of the Korean question. That is a far-sighted, fair and just proposal. But your side cherishes different objectives.

I request you to recall what sort of proposal your side advanced on July 27th. Your proposal was entirely alien to the actual battle line existing at that time. You wanted to push the entire demarcation line and demilitarized zone into our positions, while, on the other hand, our proposal of the 38th Parallel was a proposal for both sides to make a withdrawal in certain sectors and to advance in other sectors. Your proposal required that we retreat all along the line, while your side would make a unilateral advance. In contrasting these two proposals, even you yourselves cannot but admit that your proposal was extremely absurd. This proposal of yours was proved by our action at that time and by later developments to be entirely untenable, so that it had to be withdrawn. In

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) support of your absurd proposal of 27 July you bragged about your so-called air and naval superiority. You attempted by that proposal to push the entire battle line into our positions as a so-called compensation for the cessation of actions of your air and naval forces, but later developments proved that your arguments and your illusions could not but be broken to pieces. The reason why you advanced that proposal was simply because you dreamed to gain results from these negotiations what you were unable to gain through hostilities. You had no intention that that proposal could be accepted. You could not expect that that proposal would be accepted by our side.

When your 27 July proposal was firmly opposed by our side, did you not intentionally disrupt and break up the negotiations? And your side even openly declared that what you cannot get through these negotiations, you can get through fighting. That is why your side launched your limited air and naval offensive during the summer. And after your so-called summer offensive was bankrupt, after you realized you could not stop us from continuing our war of resistence, you again launched your so-called autumn offensive; this time using your ground forces along with your air and naval forces. You waged two offensives: one along the western sector and another long the central sector. But what were the results from your offensive? The historical facts of the war have shown that you were seriously beater in those offensives. You have met with unprecedented losses in this war, while no major changes resulted on the battle line. You were still very far away from the Yalu River. There were still hills after hills before your feet, and you found yourselves unable to bear any more losses in life; therefore, you returned to this table to carry on the negotiations on 25 October.

I have cited those facts to show how different the positions of both sides were during the discussions of Item 2 of the agenda, how absurd and unrealistic were your proposals and how, when you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) found that you could not get through the negotiations what you aimed at getting, you resorted again to the method of fighting. These facts show clearly that it is your side which has no sincerity towards armistice or peace, while we, on the contrary, really desire an armistice. But we insist that the armistice must be fair and reasonable and that we are determined to wage blows at any unreasonable demands raised by your side when assuming the attitude of a would-be victor.

And thirdly, you have attempted to use the discussions between both sides of Item 3 of the agenda - the question of ensuring the armistice - to prove that you love peace while we love war. But your conclusion is again erroneous. I think all the people here have listened to the whole proceedings in the discussion of Item 3 and we both sides have talked at great length. I don't really intend to repeat the arguments, but I have to give a simple résumé of the discussions. Our consistent stand is that not only should we realize a military armistice, but that closely following the realization of armistice there should be convened a political conference of a higher level, in order to achieve a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Therefore, we maintained at the beginning of the discussion that we should keep apart the subjects discussed by the military armistice negotiations and those other subjects to be dealt with by the political conference, and we raised our five-principle proposal, which was a sufficient and complete proposal for ensuring a military armistice. But what is more regrettable is that you are not willing to achieve a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

You attempt, after the realization of military armistice, to maintain and prolong the state of war in Korea. That is why you consistently insisted upon continued rotation and replenishment: through these, to increase your military forces during the armistice. On the other hand, you are afraid of the growth of our mili-

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

tary power; therefore, you raise the demand for free inspection of the rear. By making these two proposals, you were attempting, first, to escape the responsibility for refusing the holding of a political conference of a higher level, and second, to maintain a prolonged state of war in Korea. In order to meet the wishes of people throughout the world and the wide masses of troops at the front for a preliminary peace, our side submitted our additional recommendations on 3 December. That proposal set out fully our standpoint in ensuring a stable and effective armistice. Our stand is that during the period of armistice both sides should not introduce any military forces into Korea. Is that not a most thorough-going assurance?

In order to deprive you of any pretexts and means of deception before the people of the world and the wide masses of soldiers at the front, we proposed that a supervisory organ of neutral nations should be formed to supervise and inspect in the rear of both sides, so as to guarantee the execution of the principle of no introduction of military forces into Korea. Afterwards, we also agreed that, apart from those fixed points where the supervisory organ of neutral nations should station inspection teams, any time upon request by either side on the military armistice commission for an investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, such inspection as is necessary will be carried out forthwith. Are not these measures sufficient to guarantee a stable and effective armistice?

What other pretexts can you present? You say that we want to hide something. What is there we want to hide? The question, the real question, is how do we view the real objective of the present negotiations. You say that you have made concessions, but I pointed out yesterday that you have called your stopping from taking away, or taking away less, from other people as a concession on your part. Who will be thankful toward such concessions? Yet, after our side has submitted successively these fair and reasonable proposals which

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) are sufficient for guaranteeing a stable and effective armistice, up till today your side still insists upon a main stumbling block in the way of agreement and refuses to remove it. You are using the restriction of our increase of military forces as a pretext in an attempt to interfere in our dealings with our facilities and to infringe upon our internal affairs.

I tell you clearly, once again, that the fundamental measure to ensure a stable and effective armistice is the strict prohibition of introduction of any military forces during the armistice. As for the question of facilities within the territory of an independent and sovereign state, this state may install certain facilities or it may not install certain facilities; it will make the decision for itself, because it has its own experience and knows what should be installed or not. Anyway, the dealing with facilities is under perfect right of an independent state, and this right absolutely cannot be interferred with.

I have made an historical review on these three points you have raised - three points directly connected with these military armistice negotiations - and I have, with ironclad facts and correct logic, analyzed and proved that both sides are taking different positions. Your side is for a war policy. You do not wish to see realization of armistice. Our side has a policy of peace. We have not let go any opportunity for realizing an armistice and peace in Korea. However, in order that peace may be achieved, may be defended, and in order that our sacred, sovereign rights will be kept inviolate, we have the determination to keep on in our struggle until your side accepts our fair and reasonable proposal, until armistice and peace are reached.

The question at present is very clear. The so-called cancer you referred to is engendered by your side. We have no intention to accept your unreasonable demand and we absolutely will not tolerate interference in our internal affairs.

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GEN HSIEH:
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Lastly, you have attempted to steal the name of your people to distort and slander our position for peace. I must point out, and I cannot but point out, that you cannot represent your people. You absolutely do not represent the people of the world. What the people of the world suspect is the question: Why should your side have been delaying these negotiations? Why have you been employing delaying tactics from the very beginning of these military armistice negotiations? Why indeed have you waged this war? You are merely making alarming statements to fool people. You try to describe us as people who are horrid. I must tell you that there was a time when there were people who tried to describe a revolutionary army, a people's army, as a gang of monsters and devils with blue faces and red hair; and they did deceive some people. But the era of doing that is past. Such a description appears only ridiculous in the eyes of the people of the world. Why is it so? Because today there are 800,000,000 people throughout the world who have personally seen and lived with a revolutionary army, a people's army. They know exactly what they are like. They are not different from us who are sitting here in front of you. We are a revolutionary army, a people's army. We are merely common people, plain people. We merely speak for the people, speak what the people think in their hearts. We are merely doing what the people want to do. We are just serving our people. The truth is as plain and as common as that, and this fact is now known to the whole world: not only to the 800,000,000 people who have seen with their own eyes the truth, but also to the other peoples throughout the world who have heard the truth. You tried to block the truth and to deceive the people. You did succeed at the beginning to deceive some people, to produce a wrong impression; but now the times are different. I advise you not to forget the fact and not to shut your eyes before the fact.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Now, let me revert to my opening statement, where I referred to your opening statement to the effect that the way of thinking of both sides are different. But you did not point out why they are different. You are unable to do so. Now, I have pointed out that the reason why our ways of thinking are different is that we take different standpoints. According to our experience, it is impossible to expect your side to change your stand and it is also impossible to expect you to change your way of thinking; but if you are really willing to negotiate and willing to see the realization of an armistice in Korea, then I hope that you will not only look at the question from your own point of view, but try also to look at it from our point of view. Try to follow our way of analysis and try to think why we reason in this way. I think your doing so will be helpful to the realization of armistice. Do you agree to do so?

GEN TURNER: Have you nothing more to say?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: Your confused and illogical rantings and ravings convince me all the more that you need time to study and digest the statement that I made to you this morning.

I suggest that we recess until tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: Even I, myself, did not expect that you will welcome or totally accept my statement. You, of course, will not do so. If you do so, nature would go back on itself. I know exactly that you are not pleased to hear our just and reasonable statements; but I tell you clearly that any demand of your side to interfere in our internal affairs will absolutely not be accepted or tolerated by our side. Even though you do not wish to hear my statement, I request you to make a careful consideration of it.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) If you have nothing new to raise, I agree to recess.

Meeting recessed at 1305 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

4 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-first Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LT W J Ellis, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to say?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing to say. Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: General Ferenbaugh will speak.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, in your long-winded speech yesterday, you accused the United Nations Command of attempting to maintain and prolong the state of war after the realization of the military armistice. Now you know as well as I do, that the United Nations Command has no desire whatsoever to maintain and prolong war.

Actually, the only major point that this delegation has not agreed on is the restriction of rehabilitation and construction of new airfields, and then you have the gall to sit there and say that we want to prolong the war, just because we will not agree to your unreasonable proposal which permits you to build up your air capabilities.

Our proposal of 29 December is fair and reasonable to both sides. The proposal has the necessary safeguards for the stability of the armistice proposed by the United Nations Command delegation, but your failure, thus far, to accept our proposal has exposed to the eyes of the world your lack of sincerity toward a stable armistice. And in clinging to your desire to develop during the armistice a military air capability not now possessed by your side, it

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

is you that wish to maintain and prolong the state of war in Korea, and not the United Nations Command.

Your side has consistently opposed the safeguards for the stability of the armistice proposed by the United Nations delegation.

If you had no intentions of resuming hostilities, then why did you originally object to observers in the rear areas of both sides? You objected to aerial and photographic observation of both sides. If you have no intention of building up your military capabilities, then why object to noncombatant aerial observation teams? The United Nations Command has no objection to the aerial inspection teams, we have nothing to hide; however, your refusal to accept the aerial noncombatant inspection teams over your territory certainly indicates that your side has intentions of building up your military capabilities. General Hsieh, I warn you that this one point alone has caused the world to cast a suspicious eye upon your side, and they are now wondering just what are your intentions.

You objected to a single directing head of the organization supervising the armistice, thus reducing the effectiveness of such supervision. You objected to observation at communication centers of both sides. You objected to the principle of replacement, thus seeking to accomplish by attrition what you had failed to accomplish by direct action.

Your intention to develop military airfields, during the armistice, so as to increase your military air capabilities indicate that your ultimate objective is not peace, but war.

To further substantiate your ultimate objective, captured prisoners of war have reported, that you are now shipping planes into Korea in crates, and storing them until the armistice is agreed upon. It is no wonder you keep insisting that we are interfering with your internal affairs. We know your intentions, and I state again that your scheme will not work.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

General Hsieh, I suggest that you stop and think of the objections that you raised to these effective safeguards for a stable armistice and you will clearly see and understand that it is your side that is not seeking a stable armistice, but wishes to maintain and prolong war. These facts are very clear in the record and to the peoples of the world.

You made many more conflicting and untrue remarks yesterday. Most of your statements have been refuted on several occasions but still you repeat the same statements over and over again just like a broken record. You are consistent only in your inconsistencies, logical only in your continued illogical statements. However, there is one statement that I must refute again, and in doing so, I trust that this question will not be brought up at these sub-delegation meetings again. There is nothing to be gained by its discussion in the sub-delegations' meetings.

You stated that the "the history of the Korean War testifies that it was because foreign forces entered into Korea that the war was extended so as to threaten the peace of the whole world; and first of all, it was because troops of your side interfered in the internal affairs of Korea and proceeded to menace the border regions of the People's Republic of China, thus fully exposing your warlike and agressive intentions...."

The whole world knows that the United Nations Command did not enter the war in Korea until two days after the Security Council of the United Nations, on 25 June 1950, passed a resolution "Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea." The Security Council denounced the action of North Korea as a breach of the peace and called for immediate cessation of hostilities and for the invading troops to withdraw to the 38th Parallel. This the Communist forces did not do, but pressed the attack.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

Then two days later, on 27 June, after the Communist forces failed to cease hostilities the Security Council of the United Nations called on the "members" of the United Nations to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

It is also generally known that throughout 1949 and 1950 the Chinese Communists released large masses of soldiers of Korean ethnic origin from your northern armies, the released Koreans forming the trained nucleus of the North Korean armies that launched the assault on the Republic of Korea.

General Hsieh, in previous sessions of this conference - plenary session - we have on several occasions received your offer of evidence on this subject. On each occasion we have advised you that the true facts in this regard were well known to us and all the people of the free world and, also, that we did not consider any such discussion relevant to our task of reaching agreement on a military armistice. This was in accordance with the statements made by the United Nations Command Senior Delegate at the very beginning of these negotiations when he advised you that the United Nations Command delegation would not discuss any matters which were not directly related to a military armistice in Korea - which is the sole reason for our presence here. It is apparent that the subject of why the United Nations Command and the Chinese People's Volunteers entered the Korean war is in no way relevant to such an armistice. Therefore, any further discussion on that subject would result only in wasted effort and in unnecessary delay in completing our specific task of reaching final agreement on a military armistice. So let's get back on the track.

For the past several days the discussions at the Agenda Item 3 sessions have taken a backward trend with no progress toward the objective of these negotiations. Historical accounts, views on sincerity, delays and name calling have filled the record,

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

Furthermore, irrelevant topics to Agenda Item 3 have been reintroduced. The efforts of both sides must be addressed to the task before us - the drafting of a military armistice in Korea. At this time, the United Nations Command is interested in a military armistice and that alone. By simple analysis, it should be obvious to anyone that a stable, effective military armistice must precede the peaceful settlement of the Korean question which is a problem for the governments concerned. Let us get back on the track.

There was apparent agreement yesterday that both sides have different habits of thinking. This is intrinsic in persons worldwide. But we both realize there is one major difference confronting us now. We must therefore reason to a logical conclusion in eliminating this difference.

Before proceeding let us look again at the definition of an armistice. It is a suspension of military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties. The mechanics of the suspension of operations, namely, the effecting of the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops from the other side's territory, have been agreed to as stated in principles 1, 2, and 3. On the other hand, there is a more important feature: the establishment of safeguards which will provide security for the forces in Korea and foster an effective armistice. We are in agreement on how compliances with the terms of the armistice will be supervised as indicated in principles 5 and 6.

This brings us to the airfield question and principle 4, where our differences lie. Now let us remember that during the armistice, we will technically still be in a state of war. Thus, it is not expected that all facilities will return to a peace-time status, especially if it constitutes an increase in military capabilities.

Now both delegations have agreed that there shall not be an increase in military forces or equipment during the armistice. These are cardinal principles. And it is just as important that

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) military facilities shall not be increased if a military advantage is not to be gained by either side.

I have attempted to get our negotiations back on the track. And now I would like to know if you agree to the principle that there shall not be an increase in military capability by either side during the armistice.

COL CHANG: Before General Hsieh makes his statement, I would like to make two comments on two points that were raised by General Ferenbaugh.

In this statement, one part by the American officer indicates that he does not know that this is an armistice negotiation but thinks it is the United States broadcasting station that lies so excellently. Who has unleased the war in Korea? Right before that, South Korea was preparing a war of agression toward the North. We are in possession of the iron evidence that a certain American war instigator was right on the spot there in coordination with those persons preparing the agressive war. We, as well as you, both know very well the fact that a man who was sitting in the town of Seoul at that time made a bombastic proclamation saying that he could make an easy attack and occupy Pyongyang within three days and occupy the town of Sinuiju within one week. Why should you then endeavor to deceive those persons who are sitting right opposite your side, who are well aware of these facts which had already been witnessed by the peoples of the world throughout. If the American Military General who has just indicated that he is much concerned about the issue as to which side had launched the war in Korea is anxious to know the first cause of this war, I have plenty of evidence and proofs that I can furnish to him.

Secondly, you have used the words "Communist Forces" in your statement. As far as I remember this is the first time that you have ever used such terminology. I would like to remind you of the fact that this is the place where delegations of both sides who had been fighting each other came together to discuss something

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COL CHANG: (Cont'd) in common. This place is only for the negotiations and for the discussion of the negotiations and is not a place for hearing inappropriate terminologies.

GEN HSIEH: I have listened to your statement carefully. In the first part of your statement, you still attempted to argue the point as to who should be responsible for the initiating of the Korean war, as to who is not willing to have an armistice, and as to who is trying to maintain a state of war in Korea. And apparently your statement does not alter in any way the fact that my statement yesterday morning is correct and valid, and it does not change in any way the correctness of the conclusion I drew in my statement yesterday. And particularly, Colonel Chang has just made clear which side was the initiator of the Korean war. Our side is in possession of sufficient evidence to prove this point and if your side is willing to discuss this question, we are ready to furnish you with these evidences. If your side should suggest that we put these dicussions on a more extensive basis, then we will certainly agree.

As the questions I have referred to above have been fully made clear by our previous statements and my statement yesterday, there is no necessity to repeat the points, particularly because you have expressed that you are not willing to listen to my statements. You have described my statement as a broken record. You, of course, have the privilege to make such a description. I will refrain, therefore, from speaking more about this question and leave it to the record.

But I must make clear one point again; that is, what we are consistently against ever since we began the discussion of the military armistice is the interference in our internal affairs and infringement on our sovereign rights. Such interference and infringement should not, first of all, be raised for discussion in these negotiations; and such interference and infringement will absolutely not be tolerated by our side.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) I will tell you, once again, that the fundamental condition to ensure a stable armistice is the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. At least there should be stipulated strict restrictions on introduction of any military forces into Korea, including combat aircraft, armored vehicles and so on. These principles have been fully set out in our proposals and they are fair and reasonable to both sides.

As for the affairs within the territory of Korea - the affairs of the Koreans themselves - the Koreans should have full right to make decisions upon them. They have full right to decide to do certain things or not to do certain things. Whether they need to do certain things or need not to do certain things will depend on their own judgement and experience. It will not permit any interference from anybody. As for the returning of Koreans to Korea to take part in the struggles of the Korean people - that is a most natural thing. They have their perfect right and duty to do so. How can you have any justification to look into the fact that the Koreans should return to Korea to take part in Korean affairs?

In the second part of your statement you indicated that there has been a retrogression in these discussions, but I advise you to look up into the record what sort of efforts you have been making since the new year. On the first day of the new year I have pointed out that your side will not make any efforts, just as you had refused to make any efforts in the past year. Then on the second and third days of the month you made lengthy statements in complete distortion of historical facts. It shows that your side has been intentionally delaying the negotiations. Our side is firmly against such delaying tactics of your side and against your unreasonable demands. Of course, efforts on one side alone are not enough.

You are clear that the major differences existing between both sides are two in number: firstly, your attempt to keep on an unlimited replenishment during the armistice, which our side opposes;

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) and secondly, your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs under the pretext of restricting our military facilities. Such interference is also what we absolutely cannot permit.

Apart from the above two major differences, there are certain differences of secondary importance and all these differences are perfectly clear; and we have also clearly pointed out our views as how these differences could be solved. We have said that the question is now entirely up to you. If you will delay the negotiations intentionally, we of course have no means to stop you from doing so; but you will not be able to escape the responsibility for delaying the negotiations.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I asked for suggestions on getting back on the track and making progress in these negotiations. I am still waiting for your suggestions.

GEN HSIEH: Your side indicated that you are willing to return to the discussion of the main point at issue. The points at issue are clearly placed in front of us. They have been put there, not from today, but for many days, and we have clearly expressed our view as how to solve these differences. If you take away your unreasonable demands, then these old differences will be solved readily, and then we will have progress in these negotiations. Therefore, it is entirely up to you how to act. We on our part have made out stand very clear.

I tell you once more seriously that such questions as your insistence upon interfering in our internal affairs should not be discussed or raised in these military armistice negotiations as we are holding now. If you insist upon settling such questions and since the form of our present conference is not proper for doing so, then is it that your side has other suggestions regarding the form or scope of the conference? (UNC Interpreter's Note: General Hsieh actually said: "Is it that your side has suggestions regarding other forms of conference to facilitate such discussions?")

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GEN FERENBAUGH: You have not answered my question as to whether you subscribe to "no increase of military capabilities by either side during the armistice." You will recall that was the question I asked originally. By not answering you imply that you cannot answer it or that you subscribe to increase your military capabilities. But before we draw our own conclusion let us explore further. You should honor questions asked by the other side in an effort to solve our existing differences, especially since the question is pertinent not only to our differences but also to the effectivness of the armistice. May I get an answer to my question?

GEN HSIEH: We subscribe completely to no increase of military forces from without Korea. We are definitely opposed to interference in our internal affairs.

GEN TURNER: Let me ask the question in another way. Do you believe that this armistice agreement that we are trying to reach here should be an effective armistice; one that ensures to each commander security during the armistice of his forces?

GEN HSIEH: There is imbued in every proposal we have advanced a fundamental essence - that is the assurance of a stable and effective armistice. You can look up every proposal of ours and you should have no doubt on this score.

GEN TURNER: From your answer, then, I assume that you mean "Yes, the armistice should be an effective armistice."

Now I ask you, do you believe that the construction of airfields capable of handling military aircraft is conducive to an effective armistice?

GEN HSIEH: We have said over and over again that the basic condition for ensuring a stable and effective armistice is to strictly prohibit any introduction of military forces into Korea. As to the facilities within the territory of Korea, whether these facilities may be installed or may not be installed, it is a question of sovereign rights of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Such rights,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) and questions involving such rights, cannot be permitted to be raised for discussion at these military armistice negotiations. You either do not understand this point or deliberately misunderstand us.

You have just now in your statement talked about a hearsay to the effect that we are importing aircraft in boxes. I don't know what is the source of such information, whether you have got it from aerial observation or what. It seems that you are deliberately delaying these negotiations by creating these ridiculous rumors. I tell you once again that any interference in our internal affairs absolutely will not be permitted. If you insist upon doing so, you are merely delaying the negotiations intentionally.

GEN TURNER: The other day, General Hsieh, you told me you would give a simple answer to a simple question, but today you will apparently only give a very complex and evasive answer to a simple question. My question is capable of answer by "Yes", or "No", or "I don't know". May I have a simple answer to my simple question? The question was: "Do you believe that construction of airfields capable of handling military aircraft is conducive to an effective armistice?"

GEN HSIEH: You are asking a question you have asked last year. Since it is the first time you have raised this question this year, I will answer you once again. Our proposal of 24 December has provided for sufficient conditions to ensure an effective and stable armistice. As for your suggestion of so-called restrictions of military facilities, so-called question of airfields, you are only trying to interfere in our internal affairs under the cover of such questions. And your attempt at interference will not be permitted by our side.

GEN TURNER: Then you will not, you refuse to give, a simple answer to a simple question?

GEN HSIEH: Your question is not a simple question. It has very complex contents; therefore, it is necessary for me to take many sentences to

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) answer you. If you raise this question again, my answer will be simpler.

GEN TURNER: All right, I ask again. Let's have the simple answer.

GEN HSIEH: I have already answered it.

GEN TURNER: Let's go to lunch. Until 1430?

GEN HSIEH: Agreed.

Meeting recessed at 1247 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1430 hours.

GEN TURNER: This morning you asked a question which our recorders transcribed as follows: "If you insist upon settling such questions and since the form of our present conference is not proper for doing so, then is it that your side has other suggestions regarding the form or scope of the conference?"

Is this a correct version of your question? If so, we do not understand it. Could you be more explicit as to what you have in mind? What do you mean by "form and scope"?

GEN HSIEH: My question was caused by your continuous insistence upon interfering in our internal affairs. In supporting your unreasonable demands for interfering in our internal affairs you have touched upon many extensive questions regarding Korea and even touched upon questions which override the scope of Korea. Therefore, I ask: If you are willing to discuss more extensive questions we are in agreement, but if you want to discuss extensive questions and you consider that the present conference is not fit for the discussion of these questions, then have you other suggestions with regard to the conference? That was what my meaning was. Have you an answer to my question now?

GEN TURNER: Well, what do you mean by "more extensive questions"?

GEN HSIEH: Well, it is obvious that you have touched upon extensive and political questions.

GEN TURNER: Are you referring to the restriction on airfields?

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GEN HSIEH: In your statements on January 1st, 2d, 3d, and this morning, you have touched upon extensive political questions and those are the questions I refer to.

GEN TURNER: Such questions as what?

GEN HSIEH: You should know your own statements better than we do.

GEN FERENBAUGH: You might as well add this afternoon to that list of dates you have just read off.

Your side has raised more spurious arguments in support of your desire to develop a threatening military air capability during the period of armistice. Your spokesman contended that, in the first place, your side had only the most peaceful intentions during armistice; and, in the second place, there is no guarantee that United Nations Command aircraft will not suddenly attack your side during the armistice.

As to the first point, the people of the world, and we of this delegation, cannot credit your alleged peaceful intentions as long as you insist on developing a threatening military air capability during armistice. The proper condition during armistice is one of suspended animation in respect to military capabilities existing at the time the armistice becomes effective. Thus, until the peace settlement is reached, neither side need fear resumption of hostilities under conditions greatly different than those obtaining at the time hostilities were halted. Thus, until the peace settlement is reached, both sides may be sure their forces are at least as secure as they were during the period of hostilities. But you refuse to subscribe to this universally accepted concept. You insist on developing a military air capability during the period of armistice. You insist on building a tremendous threat to the stability of the armistice and to the security of the United Nation Command. For what purpose do you wish to build up a military air capability during armistice? If the period of armistice ends in a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, your side can there-

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

after develop military airfields in the territiry you control to the extent of your desires. During the period of armistice, with hostilities halted, you can have no legitimate need for military airfields. If, on the other hand, the period of armistice ends in a resumption of hostilities, your side would be greatly favored in possessing military air capabilities you do not now possess.

Therefore, it is clear that the only rational, I repeat rational, explanation of why you insist on developing military air capabilities during the armistice is that it is your intent that the armistice will end in a resumption of hostilities. You say this is not your intent. But we note that your actions logically flow from such an intent. Your words are that you have only peaceful intentions during armistice, but your action in demanding to develop a threatening military air capability during armistice belie your words. And actions, as you have stated, speak with greater authority than words. If you do not intend to use a military air capability at the end of a period of armistice, why then do you demand to develop this air capability during armistice? Why do you delay the achievement of an armistice in your vain effort to enforce this demand if you do not intend to use the air capability you seek to develop in such a way as to bring a sudden and violent end to the armistice? No. Your insistence on developing a military air capability during armistice makes sense only if you intend to employ such a capability in disrupting the armistice; otherwise you could well afford to delay the development of airfields other than those needed for civil air operations. Therefore, until you give up your demand to develop a threatening military air capability during armistice, until you cease delaying the advent of armistice by insisting on such a menacing intent, we cannot credit your inconsistent statement that your intentions are peaceful.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

Now as to your second point, that United Nations Command aircraft could attack your side during the armistice, I need only a few words to show the hollowness of this argument. It is true that were such the authorized intent of the United Nations Command, our aircraft could attack your side during armistice, However, in what way would this constitute a new threat to your side? United Nations Command aircraft attack the length and breadth of your territory now. Were hostilities resumed after a period of armistice, these aircraft would return to such attacks. Would your side be thus faced with a new threat, one not existing at the time the armistice became effective? Of course not. Obviously your attempted analogy is false. It is only the United Nations Command which can be confronted by a new military capability in the form of military aviation. Your side faces that capability now. Clearly, your argument does not bear inspection.

The simple, I repeat simple, fact that your side must ultimately come to understand and accept is that security is the prime consideration during armistice. No other consideration has stature comparable to the need for security - certainly not the abstract, intangible concept of sovereignty. The basic security of both sides is assured if neither side is allowed to increase greatly its military capabilities during armistice. Therefore, progress in these negotiations can be resumed when your side gives up its ominous demand to increase your military capabilities during armistice by developing a military air capability. Until then, the responsibility for delay is yours alone. It hangs around your neck.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement just now only serves to prove that you still continue to insist on your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs under the pretext of restricting our facilities - an interference which our side absolutely will not accept. You have you have made great efforts to argue about two points which you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) attribute to our side. I don't know what you are basing it upon. Anyway your statement is groundless. You merely distorted our real intentions purposely, and we have refuted such distortions many times. The stand and views of our side are very clear. They do not allow such distortions and I need not reiterate our views.

You again talked about security of troops, which is a very good excuse fabricated by your side, but it sounds very ridiculous. On July 27th your side advanced your proposal of a demarcation line, saying that that line is the safest place for your troops to stay. But after all you have now accepted the present battle line on November 27th. If your Commander-in-Chief is really concerned about the security of your troops, I think the best way is to accept our fair and reasonable proposal of the withdrawal of all foreign troops. It has been your long-term practice of seeking your secure positions all over the world under the pretext of security of your troops, under such banner and mask; and your practice is familiar to all the peoples of the world.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Could you suggest anything of importance in continuation of this subject this afternoon?

GEN HSIEH: What is the question this afternoon to be settled?

GEN FERENBAUGH: I asked a question a moment ago. Give me an answer to that, then I will reply to your.

GEN HSIEH: Are you referring to the security of troops?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Are you asking questions concerning my question, or what is your intent in asking the question?

GEN HSIEH: No, I am asking just now: What is the question exactly you want me to answer? Do you mean the question about security of troops? In that case I have already answered it.

GEN FERENBAUGH: My question originally was to ask if General Hsieh had anything further to contribute to the point at hand this afternoon. To put it in another way: Do you have any suggestions that are practical as to how to resolve this deadlock?

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GEN HSIEH: We have already pointed out clearly that there exists two major differences and certain other differences of secondary importance, and we also showed our idea about solving these differences. The question now is whether you will accept our view and take away your unreasonable demand.

GEN TURNER: Apparently then you have no practical suggestions to offer this afternoon. I suggest we recess until tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: If you have no new suggestions, I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1522 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

5 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-second Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LT W J Ellis, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to offer this morning?

GEN HSIEH: No. Have you anything to offer?

GEN TURNER: Yesterday, General Hsieh, you made a whining complaint that the United Nations Command delegation was unwilling to listen to your statements. We are somewhat staggered by the enormity of this bald lie, since we have been listening to your unreasonable and apparently unending statements for many months. Perhaps what you are trying to say is that the United Nations Command delegation will not listen sympathetically to your demand to develop military airfields during armistice. Right! We have no sympathy for your desire to mount and poise a deadly threat against the United Nations Command forces during armistice.

You suggested that if the United Nations Command commander was so concerned for the security of his forces, he should withdraw them from Korea. What a typical piece of upside-down reasoning! You have cast yourself in the role of a bandit who says to his victim, you have nothing to fear from me so long as you surrender your purse and walk away without creating a disturbance. Well, I'll tell you something, General Hsieh. The United Nations Command did not come to Korea to surrender. The United Nations Command came to Korea to frustrate an attempted forcible seizure of the

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) Republic of Korea by your forces. The United Nations Command has done just that in Korea. Having done so, we have no intention of walking away under a threat of your development of air power during armistice, leaving the Republic of Korea to your tender mercies. Not a chance. You have found that the United Nations Command does not cringe from any threat you can muster now. But like any honest man, we admit to being somewhat nervous about knives in the dark. Consequently, we will not agree to your developing air capabilities during the period of armistice.

Let us focus our attention on this issue which is preventing progress in these negotiations. Let us not clothe this issue in misleading words, let's look at it in its tangible, simplest form. The question is one of rehabilitating airfields. The United Nations Command has advised you that we are willing to agree to rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations. On your part, you have said you did not necessarily intend to rehabilitate all airfields in your territory. Hence, the issue is reduced to the question of a limited number of airfields to be rehabilitated for military purposes. Let's forget such words as "sovereignty", "internal affairs","facilities", "military capability", and the like. What stands between us and progress towards an armistice is the question of rehabilitating some number of airfields so that they may be suitable for military purposes.

Now if you truly have no intention of utilizing military airfields during the period of armistice, why do you permit this issue to continue to delay progress? If you do not intend to utilize rehabilitated military airfields for military purposes, for what purpose do you intend to use them? If you do not intend to utilize military airfields to bring force to bear on the United Nations Command, against whom do you intend to use such force? If you do not intend to utilize military airfields for any purpose whatever

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) during the period of armistice, why do you insist on developing them during armistice? In the past you have given no answers to these questions. You merely repeat your crippled words about sovereignty and internal affairs. They mean nothing. You dodge the issue.

The fact that you give no rational explanation of your demand to develop airfields during armistice, the fact that you have no rational explanation which is consistent with peaceful purposes, strengthens the unshakable determination of the United Nations Command that we will not enter any agreement which imposes this threat during a period of armistice. If you want airfields, try to build them now, during hostilities. Try to build them, but keep your eyes open while doing so, for the air surrounding them will be fraught with danger. Try to build them and watch your efforts disintegrate. When you find, as you have found, that you cannot develop airfields during the time of hostilities, give up your futile effort to gain through negotiations what you cannot gain through battle. The United Nations Command will not agree to the development of military air capabilities during the period of armistice.

And now, if you have anything new to offer, we are here to hear it.

GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

GEN TURNER: If you have anything new to offer, we are here to hear it.

GEN HSIEH: What do you expect to hear? What is new? Do you want to distinguish between what I am going to say?

GEN TURNER: Have you anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: Is it that during these discussions you want to distinguish between statements to which you want to listen and those to which you don't want to listen?

GEN TURNER: We are always willing to hear any new proposal. Have you such a one to offer?

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GEN HSIEH: At this table I have the freedom to make any statement I like. You have the freedom to listen or not, but I have the freedom to speak or not.

Your statement this morning is a very rude and absurd statement. In this statement you have gone to the extreme in your absurdity and arrogance. You have gone too far in your vituperation. You have reversed black and white. Your statement only serves to prove that you lack sincerity toward negotiations, that you did not intend really to get any result from these negotiations, that you lack capital, you lack justification for your absurd proposal. In your statement you, when talking about airfields, said: "Let's forget sovereignty, let's forget internal affairs." What do you mean by that? The real intention, the real sense of your statement is: "You better give up your sovereign rights, give up your internal affairs." In making such a statement you have fully exposed your ugly, ferocious feature of a bandit. You term yourselves an angel of peace, a civilized person, yet you come out openly to say that "you should give up your sovereign rights", that "an independent and sovereign state should let other people to interfere with its internal affairs." I tell you that you better not even dream about this. Your dream will not be permitted to be realized. If you have sufficient ability, you go ahead and show all your ability.

In order to reach your objective of interfering in our internal affairs, you have stated previously to the effect that during the period of hostilities you can interfere in all walks of life of our internal affairs, that we are not able to resist your interference and that during the armistice your interference in our military facilities is only a part of your interference, a continuance of a part of the situation during the hostilities; and here again you come out openly to admit that you want to interfere in our internal affairs during the armistice. You had better open

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EN HSIEH:
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your eyes wider. You say that you have the capabilities of flying your aircraft everywhere and sailing your naval vessels everywhere. Indeed the world is big enough, but you must be aware and cautious; the strength of the people has grown stronger and stronger daily. The times when the coming of a naval vessel or flight of aircraft will frighten the people is already passed. Every day you brag about your military forces. Is it not recently, even when the negotiations are going on, that you openly increased your military forces in Korea? You intended to make another try. You have no ability of learning from experience. If you want to try it - try it.

Wilfully you slandered our peaceful postion, but people throughout the world are clearly aware of our successive proposals and positions which are made public before the eyes of the world. We have submitted a proposal which is sufficient for ensuring a stable and effective armistice. It is not to be distorted.

You dared to say that you represent the people. What people can you represent? You cannot represent the people of America as you avowed. You can even less represent the peoples of Britain, France and the Netherlands. You can least represent the peoples throughout the world.

For the past few days you have in your statements touched upon many extensive questions in connection with Korea. And yet you have shown no sincerity whatsoever toward the negotiations or for a settlement of the question in front of us. You refused to make any efforts, and it is your statement this morning, particularly, which clearly exposed your true colors. I tell you again, if your side is willing to have more extensive discussions of the Korean question, we are perfectly willing to do so. However, the question before this sub-committee is your insistence upon continued replenishment and increasing of your military forces during the armistice, and your attempt at interfering in our internal affairs.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) In the other tent, your side unreasonably insisted upon refusal to release all the prisoners of war of both sides once the armistice is realized. Your true colors are now known to the whole world; that is, you have no sincerity or good faith toward the armistice negotiations. Our side is now waiting for your indication for a step forward. Whether you will take this step or not is up to you. But we have done all the efforts we should make.

GEN TURNER: My statement this morning was designed to draw your attention to the realities of this war in Korea upon which realities this armistice must be based.

On various occasions you have spoken of the so-called menace to China posed by the advance of our troops toward the Yalu River. I cannot but wonder if you really believe that nonsense. Despite the most intense provocation, the air and naval forces of our command have scrupulously avoided attacks on China, though such attacks were childishly easy to execute were we so minded.

The forces of the United Nations Command have never had any intent to attack China. They could not have such an intent, since the directive of the United Nations specified military action in Korea only. It was not our forces which attacked China; it was your Chinese forces which attacked ours. Thus began a sad hour of history, made the sadder because of the traditional friendship between Americans and the people of China.

You cannot be of such a short memory, General Hsieh, as to have forgotten the many ways in which the American people have assisted the people of China in war, in famine, in disaster, and in plague. Nor have the American people forgotten the staunchness of their Chinese allies in the last world war - the steadfast way they fought under very trying conditions.

We Americans think highly of the people of China. We have seen the color of their blood, spilled alongside us in battle. We have watched the people of China demonstrate their courage in deadly

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) encounters, in combat wherein we Americans stood at their sides. We have fought beside the people of China against agression, and many Americans have died in defense of China. You know all this. It is a metter of history. What you may not realize is that great peoples - Americans and Chinese - do not change their natures overnight. That is why we do not believe the people of China, in their heart, now look or ever looked on us as enemies. That is why we still hold great hope for the resurgence of the freedom-loving, peace-loving, China we have known not long ago. But you, General Hsieh, are doing your best to falsely protray us to the people of China as their enemies. In this false portrayal you will fail.

GEN HSIEH: I have noted your statement just now dealing with questions of Korea and questions beyond Korea - of the entire Far East. We are very willing to debate this question with you. We are willing to discuss extensive questions.

You asserted that your side does not intend to menace the Yalu River, does not intend to attack China, but I call your attention to the historical facts. When your troops advanced to Pyongyang and Wonsan, did not your side openly and wantonly declare that you would push forward to the Yalu River and across the Yalu River to build your so-called defense lines on the other side of the river for the so-called security of your troops? Was it not clear that it was your declared intention to fight to the other bank of the Yalu River to establish the so-called secure positions for your troops? When your troops advanced to Chasong did not your artillery and machine guns shoot into the county of Chi-an in China, and even before those days did not your side dispatch your aircraft to bomb Antung of China? Can you deny these historical facts? Can you interpret these actions on your part as no attack on China, while on the other hand it was China which attacked you? Last year, for a week, around the time when your aircraft bombed the residence of our delegation in Kaesong on 22 August in an attempt to break

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

up the negotiations, did not your aircraft carry out a series of provocative air raids over the skies at Mukden, Tsingtao and Shanghai? Have you not by now exposed your ugly face of an agressor completely before the world?

You talked about the friendship between America and China, but you have been trying to deceive people by employing ambiguous words. If you are referring to the American people, you know full well that you do not represent the American people. The policy and tactics of your side of taking the people of the whole world as your enemy is only the policy and tactics of a handful of warlike elements. You, by linking your such policy and tactics with the American public opinion, are only slandering and insulting the American people who are against such policy and tactics. You talk about friendship. Why then did you seize Taiwan? Was your seizure of Taiwan an indication of friendship? Was it through friendship that you did not occupy the whole of China, but only a little part of it - this Taiwan Island - was that mercy and friendship on your part? If you have friendship, why did you shoot into Chi-an? Why did you raid Antung and Mukden? Were those actions indications of friendship? Were those actions concessions on your part? As I said previously, your term of "concession" needs special annotation in order to be understood by other people.

The Chinese people will not be deceived by your actions of such kind, because they have very rich and long-termed experience of fighting against imperialist aggression. They are fully conscious of such agression and they have developed their insight and ability to analyze the facts, to distinguish friend from foe. And they, the Chinese people, are putting such consciousness of theirs into courageous and heroic action. I tell you our side can see clearly through the tactics you have been employing during these negotiations: either your tactics of deception or your tactics of black-mail, or your tactics of threatening, or your coordinated

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) tactics in the battlefield of so-called military pressure. We can see through these actions clearly and we will not be deceived by your deception; we will not be frightened by your black-mail or succumb to your so-called pressure.

If you have real sincerity to make efforts toward an armistice agreement, then you must face the facts of the Korean war: you must admit that there exists a balance of military force between both sides, and, therefore, you have no justification whatsoever to raise such unreasonable demands and attempt to force us to accept them.

GEN TURNER: Undoubtedly you have many more comments to make in furtherance of your false propaganda, but it appears you have nothing new to offer in furtherance of these negotiations. If you have nothing new to offer, either this morning or this afternoon, toward solving these negotiations, then I suggest we recess until tomorrow morning.

GEN HSIEH: Speaking about new points, for the past few days you have successively raised new questions in this tent, and we welcome the discussion of these questions. We are perfectly willing to take plenty of time to discuss these questions, but your statements only reveal the substance of a war policy which your side is following. Our statements are based on ironclad historical facts. By these we have refuted your statements. You can call our statements as propaganda. We want to propagandize, but our propaganda is based on ironclad facts. We never reverse black and white. We will continue to refute your statements tomorrow and onwards. We will strongly deal blows at any of your unreasonable statements or arguments.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) If you have no new questions to raise now, we agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1222 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

6 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-third Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters;and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to say?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN FERENBAUGH: In that case I would like to make a statement.

On each of the numerous occasions when the United Nations Command asked you whether you considered the development of an airfield was "an increase of military capability", you evaded the question. With crass cynicism you have given irrelevant answers, vague answers, evasive answers, dodging the issue by some mediocre display of verbal acrobatics. In no case have you faced the question squarely, in no case have you answered it.

We can well understand your need to evade this question. We can well understand your dilemma. If you say "No, the development of an airfield is not an increase of military capability" - the world will spurn your reply as an obvious lie designed to deceive. If you say "Yes, the development of an airfield is an increase of military capability" - the entire house of cards in which you attempt to hide your attempt to increase your military capability during armistice comes tumbling down about your head. You are indeed on the spot, General Hsieh. You are attempting to make us, and the world, believe you had no intent to increase your military capability during armistice. But your position regarding airfields is so

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

unsound, so weak, that you dare not give a clear answer to a pertinent question regarding it. Your alleged interest in peace, in no increase of military capabilities during armistice, would clearly be exposed as fraudulent if you gave a truthful answer to the question we have posed. Hence, you must dodge and evade in the hope - a vain one - that your true intent will remain concealed.

As a negotiator you are in a most unenviable position. You are evidently directed to maintain your hopeless position regarding airfields. It is also evident to us that you yourself recognize the weakness of the position you are required to maintain in front of the world, since you realize that straight-forward, honest discussion of the question at issue would be ruinous to your cause.

Unfortunately for you, also, your evasions only strengthen the determination of the United Nations Command never to agree to your demand that you develop military airfields during the period of armistice. Who dares not face truth, General Hsieh, cannot be trusted by our side. Therefore, we will not agree to the development of military airfields during armistice. Not now. Not tomorrow. Never. Not even if hell freezes over.

The United Nations Command has used every means of explanation available to us in the effort to get across to you a single, granite fact. That fact is: we will not enter into an agreement with you which allows your side to develop a military air capability during armistice. We have destroyed the feeble arguments which you have raised in your effect to gain our agreement to your ominous purpose. We have repeatedly explained why your proposal to develop a threat to the United Nations Command during armistice is unacceptable. We have pointed out to you that we clearly perceive the devious dark reason for your obstinate demand to build up your air power during armistice. We have warned you that your continued insistence on this demand threatens the entire prospect of armistice. We have illustrated how the United Nations Command proposal of no rehabili-

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

tation of military airfields on either side is actually more favorable to you than to us. We have reminded you of the instances wherein long delays in the progress of negotiations have been the result of your failure to recognize that positions adopted by the United Nations Command were firm. We have told you clearly that this question of airfields is likewise a firm United Nations Command position, and that you are only delaying progress by insisting on your scheme to develop air power during armistice. We have stated emphatically that this armistice must be based on military realities as they exist now. We have declined to accept that any consideration can override the matter of security during a military armistice. We have told you many times, and now once again, we will not - repeat not - agree to an increase of your military capabilities during armistice. If logic and reason cannot bring you to face realities, to recognize truth, and to agree to an equitable, stable armistice, we are willing to continue to sit at this table while the arguments of artillery, bombs, and bullets continue. (United Nations Command Interpreters note: General Hsieh said to his recorders: "Take that down carefully! Very good for our propaganda.") Whenever you come to your senses, and are prepared to accept our logical proposal, progress in the negotiations can resume.

For many days now, your program in discussion of Item 3 of the agenda has been based on "sovereign rights" and your so-called "interference with our internal affairs." Habitually, you have connected the airfield rehabilitation problem with these "sovereign rights."

The United Nations Command delegation has reiterated many times its firm stand on no increase in military capabilities. In broader terms, we seek a just and honorable armistice for both sides by mutual agreement, The agreement we seek is one which will freeze the military strength and capability of both sides to that existing on the effective date of the armistice; to remain frozen at that level

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GEN TERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) until an agreement of a political nature supersedes the armistice agreement. The right to agree is the very essence of sovereignty. When opposing sides agree there can be no infringement of sovereignty.

Moreover, the United Nations Command has demonstrated it does not desire to interfere in your internal affairs by agreeing to the rehabilitation of sufficient airfields in North Korea to ensure the full conduct of North Korean internal affairs, assuming that during the armistice your internal affairs will be of a peaceful nature.

The point on which we are in disagreement is the rehabilitation of airfields for military purposes - rehabilitation that would increase the level of military capabilities of either side. On this then, our discussions should be focused.

I have nothing more to present.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement just now is another attempt on your part to threaten these armistice negotiations with war. I would like to ask you: What actually is the objective you have been pursuing these days? How would you explain your reactions recently? Sometimes for your unilateral interest in making arguments, you did not hesitate to extend the scope of discussions to include not only questions concerning Korea, but questions concerning the whole of the Far East; and on the other occasions you employed method of threatening of war, employing hollow statements of intimidation. It is my opinion that you are deliberately delaying and trying to disrupt these negotiations.

This morning I have patiently listened to your statement and one of your closing sentences particularly caught my attention. You said that if we should not accept your unreasonable demand - that is, your demand to interfere in our internal affairs - you would let the artillery, aircraft, and bombs to continue the arguments. I would like to have an explanation on this statement. Do you mean to say that you are not willing to continue these discussions?

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Do you mean to say that your statement today is your last statement here? I would like to have an answer.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, the answer is simply this: I believeit is two-sided. You have artillery, etc. We are both using these weapons. You are continuing to shoot while we are negotiating. Does that answer your question?

No, it is not our final statement. We intend to continue to argue in favor of our logical proposal of 29 December and against your demand to build up your air power during armistice. You will hear these arguments many, many times more, until you come to your logical senses.

GEN HSIEH: You have not answered my question. I asked what is the meaning of your statement that if we do not accept your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs, you would let the aircraft, artillery, and bombs to continue the arguments.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I believe I answered that question a moment ago. (Upon General Ferenbaugh's instructions, interpreters and recorder repeated above statement).

Every day that you continue to delay the progress of these negotiations is another day of unnecessary war. Is that clear? In other words, status quo.

GEN HSIEH: For four or five days continuously, including this morning, your side has consistently indicated one thing. That is, your side is not sincere toward the present armistice negotiations. You do not want to see it continue and make progress. You deliberately tried to delay it or wreck it by using provovative statements and actions. You have touched upon extensive questions - political questions concerning Korea and political questions of the Far East - in an attempt to argue for your shameful and covert objective. Sometimes you came out to brag openly about your military forces, to threaten with force. Just now you openly declared that if these negotiations do not progress you will let the hostilities continue. Indeed, you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) have, at a time when we did get some achievements through these negotiations, openly increased your military forces in Korea and openly talked about a new military trial. These statements and actions on your part sufficiently revealed the fact that you are challenging these military armistice negotiations. But I must tell you that every challenge, every provocation, on your part has been firmly stricken back by us, and the people of the whole world are perfectly clear as to who are here delaying and trying to wreck these negotiations and who are making efforts for the progress of the conference. If you intend to continue the negotiations, you must review and check-up on the tactics and actions your side has been taking recently, because they are clear to us and we would not be hoodwinked.

When a serious question, a question which will promote a thorough peaceful settlement of the Korean problem - a question like the withdrawal of foreign forces - was raised, your side asserted that that was a political question which should not be raised or discussed at these military armistice negotiations. But, on the other hand, when you yourselves are insisting upon interfering in the internal affairs of another country, you begin to involve all sorts of political questions regarding Korea and try thereby to argue for and cover up your unreasonable demand. Not only this, you went as far as to touch upon extensive questions of the Far East. By such contradictory actions, it is clear what is your objective - you do not wish to see an armistice and you wish even less to see a thorough and peaceful settlement of the Korean question. So much for that.

These are the actions you have been continually taking for several days recently. You are trying to shut the door of the negotiations. You threatened our side with war and seek to force us to accept your unreasonable demand. You come out to say that

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

our refusal to accept your unreasonable demand is delaying the negotiations. But that is an entirely arbitrary conclusion which is erroneous, just as every other conclusion you have drawn from your standpoint, your way of thinking, and your habit. Unless you are assuming the attitude of a victor, you are indulging in a habit of interference in the internal affairs of another country, or you are attempting to force us to accept your unreasonable demand by coercion. We have no other way of interpreting your actions and your such arbitrary conclusion. I must point out that your arbitrary conclusion is erroneous. You can take more time to refuse reasonable proposals and to insist upon your unreasonable demand, but likewise, we will tell you unmistakably clear that we have opposed any interference in our internal affairs. We are opposing such interference, and we will continue forever to oppose such interference. My statement should be remembered by your side.

Military pressure cannot intimidate anybody. You have never stopped your military activities since we began the discussion here and you have tried several times to exercise your so-called military pressure; they are entirely familiar to us now. While on our part, in order to express our sincerity toward the armistice negotiations and in order to set out our peaceful position, we have successively raised proposals which are sufficient to insure a stable and effective armistice. You can review our proposals of 3 December, 14 December, and 24 December. Those proposals have been made public to the whole world and they have been recognized by the whole world and they have been recognized by the whole world as fair and reasonable. They are not to be distorted or misinterpreted. Your hand is not capable of covering all the eyes and ears of the peoples of the world. I advise you not to indulge in such absurd statements as you have been making recently.

I don't wish to take more time now because you have not indicated that you are sincere toward an armistice.

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GEN TURNER: Yesterday, and again this morning, you accused the United Nations Command of openly increasing its military forces in Korea. If they were increased it would be as you say "openly". We have nothing to hide. Can you make such an assertion? No! You would disguise any such action, since you have the intent to increase your military air capability during the armistice. Your disguise in this case is your statement that restriction of rehabilitation of military airfields is interference in your internal affairs. But we will not be misled thus.

The hollowness of your words is borne out by your people - captured prisoners of war - who report the transporting of military aircraft in crates into Korea during these negotiations. The status of your airfields will not permit the use of these aircraft now or as long as hostilities continue. Are they to be used for display purpose or are they to be stored for future use? Is this why you object to restricting rehabilitation of military airfields during the armistice?

And now a word with reference to who is responsible for the delay in these negotiations. Nine days ago the United Nations Command offered a new proposal in an effort to make progress in these negotiations. Since that day your side has voiced many illogical arguments, absurd refutations filled with obvious propaganda, and slanderous declamations. But you have made not one single effort to solve the issues before this conference. I have asked you time and again if you have any new proposal to offer, only to receive the same illogical and unreasonable answer that the United Nations Command must give up its proposal and accept yours. I do not ask you to give up your proposal, I ask only that you offer something new which might conceivably help us make progress in these negotiations. I must remind you again, General Hsieh, the United Nations Command has made a great effort in our proposal

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) of 29 December. The next step is up to you. The responsibility for delaying these negotiations since December 29th rests squarely on you.

GEN HSIEH: It seems that it is still necessary for me to give a brief explanation of our position and our proposal.

Our side has consistently held that the only and the best method of ensuring a stable and effective armistice in Korea is that both sides should not introduce any military forces into Korea from without during the armistice. This principle was put forth by our side, and to put it in simple words, it is a principle of no incoming but only outgoing of military forces. This is an effective and good method for thoroughly ensuring no introduction of reinforcing forces in Korea. As this principle is originated by our side, it is proved that we on our part have no intention of continuing to introduce or increase military forces into Korea. And the fact that we have put forth this principle bespeaks the fact that we are determined to abide by this principle. And we will execute this principle, first of all, because it is our consistent stand that any proposal which we raise or any agreement which we enter we are determined to carry out. Therefore, this principle of ours does not allow any area of doubt or misinterpretation. We have our past actions to prove our faith.

In order to supervise that both sides are abiding by this principle we have put forth this suggestion, under the premise of avoiding interference in the internal affairs of either side: that a neutral nation's supervisory organ should be formed to carry out the duties of supervision and inspection. At the same time we proposed that upon the request by either side on the military armistice commission, inspection will be carried out, including inspections at places where accidental incidents in violation of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred. Therefore, we have put forth a strict principle of strict limitations, and also

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) provided for sufficient supervision and inspection to ensure the carrying out of this principle. Since such is the case, how can you say that our proposal is not a good proposal for ensuring a stable and effective armistice?

This stand of ours has been made public to the whole world and it is not to be misinterpreted by your side. But if you still insist upon asserting that this principle of no introduction of military forces is insufficient, as you have previously insisted, then I must call your attention to the fact that by doing so you are introducing mistrust into these negotiations. And how can we expect that you will be sincere toward an agreement reached between both sides, or are, indeed, willing to carry out any such possible agreement?

Your misinterpretations and suspicion are threatening to undermine the foundation of the negotiations. Just now, as well as the day before yesterday, you created the rumor that our side had been importing aircraft in crates. What a ridiculous rumor this is! I really don't believe that you believe in such information. On the other hand, when the negotiations have been yielding considerable results it is your side which keeps on introducing reinforcing combat forces from Japan to Korea. You openly bragged about your military force, that you would have another try in the battlefield. You even went so far as to declare openly at this table that you would try to gain through hostilities what you can not gain through negotiations, thereby revealing the true colors of your side to the people of the whole world.

As for the military facilities within Korea, whether these facilities will be installed or not, either during the hostilities or during the period of armistice, that is a question which comes into the scope of internal affairs. Your side is also clear that we may carry out certain installations or we may not carry out certain facilities. That which deserves suspicion is your action, which is

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) regrettable, of leaving the greatest obstacle in the way of our reaching an agreement; that is, your insistence on interference in our internal affairs at a time when you declared that your 29 December proposal was designed to forward the progress of the conference.

Your demand to interfere in our internal affairs is advanced under the cover of limiting our military capabilities; but I must tell you clearly, once again, that it is rather in our sovereign rights, in our internal affairs, that our side is concerned than in the question of airfields. If your side should intentionally leave this unreasonable demand of interfering in our internal affairs in your proposal, thus blocking the progress of the conference, then it is clear that you have no intention to see the conference to progress and that you are intentionally delaying the negotiations. We have firmly opposed such a stand on your part, and we will continue forever to oppose such a stand. If you insist on delaying the negotiations, we cannot help it.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, you made a rather lengthy statement. We cannot keep you from misconstruing our statements to suit your own purposes. Let us get on the question of military airfields. These other chestnuts you just raised again have been pretty well raked over. Let us get at the focus of our differences.

Any concept usually has two or more major characteristics. Which of these distinguihsing attributes is considered predominant depends on the light in which your concept is scrutinized and the purpose to which it is applicable.

The question of rehabilitation and construction of airfields is a complex concept. You have declaimed at monotonous and tedious length that this is not a political conference. Therefore, the attribute,the characteristic of airfields, insofar as they may be internal affairs and sovereign rights - if such they are at all - is not for us to discuss here. Bu the unquestioned attribute of

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) an airfield as a military air capability is decidedly and inexorably within the scope of these armistice negotiations.

We must, consequently, reasonably examine the question of construction and rehabilitation of airfields with their military aspect squarely oriented toward these negotiations. With a consequence equally inevitable, you must give up your deceptive alchemy in attempting to transmute this question into the nebulous realm of sacred sovereign rights! We will not permit words, such as "sovereign rights", to blind us to your intent to develop military airfields during armistice. We will not agree to the development of such a threat.

GEN HSIEH: You have just admitted that the concept of military facilities of airfields is a complex concept. It is exactly because it is complex that you have deliberately put this complex question in our discussions to block the progress of the conference. With regard to the guarantees for no increase of military forces during the armistice, our proposal is already sufficient and complete in itself. It is your side that deliberately went out of the way to insist upon these unreasonable demands to interfere in our internal affairs.

And you have, moreover, slandered us by saying that we intended to increase our military forces during the armistice, that we want to build up a threat to your side. You are reversing black and white. You have been deliberately distorting our statements. The fact is very clear and our position is also very clear. They cannot be covered up by such distortions of your side and the people of the world will not be deceived by your distortions. If you continue to insist upon this complex question of your deliberate choice, a question you also can see will absolutely not be accepted by our side, you are deliberately blocking the progress of the conference and such a stand on your part will meet the same fate as your proposal of the demarcation line on 27 July, which was also absolutely unacceptable to our side.

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GEN TURNER: Is that all?

GEN HSIEH: Yes.

GEN TURNER: Now you say that we are slandering your side. I will ask you a simple question. I would like a simple answer. Do you intend during the armistice to construct military airfields?

GEN HSIEH: Do you expect that I answer this question with "Yes" or "No"?

GEN TURNER: I would like your simplest answer.

GEN HSIEH: My answer is, the question of airfields is a complicated question. I have answered this question many times before and this morning I have again made my serious reply to it. That is my answer which is simple enough.

GEN TURNER: My question is: What is your intent? That is a simple question.

GEN HSIEH: We may proceed with it, we may not proceed with it. It is a question of our internal affairs which you are not permitted to look into - you have no right to look into.

GEN TURNER: You say you may or may not. I ask what do you intend to do? Our side has stated that during the armistice we do not intend to build military airfields. Why can't we get as simple an expression of intent from your side?

GEN HSIEH: The intention of our side is set out in our 3 December proposal, and our 14 December proposal, and our 24 December proposal. As for the question of airfields, it is a part of internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state and it is not right to raise it in a military armistice conference, and even less right to be discussed. That is very simple.

GEN TURNER: Is that your simplest answer?

GEN HSIEH: I have already answered.

GEN TURNER: Will you have anything new to propose this afternoon?

GEN HSIEH: We just opposed this unreasonable demand of yours. We have nothing new.

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GEN TURNER: Then let's reconvene tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: If you have nothing new, we agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1310 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

7 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fourth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to say this morning?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: You have said that because your side put forward the proposal of no introduction of forces into Korea during the armistice, your side should not be subjected to suspicion as to your intent during armistice. You said you had further illustrated your good intentions by agreeing to permit noncombatant observers to go into any place where a violation of the armistice was reported. Now let's look at this claim of yours analytically.

First, we are told by your own soldiers that you are shipping aircraft into Korea now and storing them. Therefore, by the time the armistice is put in effect you can have a large number of aircraft already in Korea. You will not need to introduce aircraft into Korea; they will be in Korea from the beginning of the armistice.

Now if there were no agreement prohibiting rehabilitation of military airfields, you could render a large number of military airfields operational and on these airfields you could establish the aircraft you have in Korea. This having been done, suppose the United Nations Command asked that a noncombatant observer team investigate this development. The noncombatant ob-

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) server team would report that no violation has occurred, since the aircraft involved had not been brought into Korea during the armistice, and since there was no agreement prohibiting the development of military airfields. Thus the United Nations Command would find itself confronted with a huge increase in your military capabilities occurring during the armistice. Thus it is clearly shown that your proposal of no introduction of forces into Korea during the armistice, even if fully implemented, offers no safeguard against a great increase in your military capabilities during armistice. We will not be misled by such tricks.

We will not agree to an increase of military capabilities during armistice. We will not rest the security of our forces on your words "maybe, or maybe not". We shall continue to insist that there be no increase of military capabilities of either side during armistice and that there be effective safeguards against such increase. The most effective safeguard is prohibition of development of military airfields. The more you oppose this, the more your intentions are suspected, and the more we shall insist on adequate safeguards.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement this morning is part of your systematic rumor - spinning for three days successively. We originally thought that your citing a rumor was only a ridiculous point, a groundless point, which did not deserve any refutation; however, for three days continuously you have been using such a ridiculous rumor, both inside this tent and outside of it, as an argument to support your unreasonable demand and your insistence on interfering in our internal affairs, so that we cannot but sharply oppose your attempt. Your deliberately doing so makes us suspect that you are intentionally delaying and wrecking the armistice negotiations.

I will not go very far back, but will start with the time, when after a period of discussion of Item 3 of the agenda, our

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) side put forth our two additional recommendations on 3 December. One of them is our proposal that in order to ensure a stable and effective armistice, both sides shall not introduce during the armistice any military forces into Korea, including aircraft and tanks. And secondly, our proposal that in order to guarantee the execution of this principle, neutral nations should be invited to supervise and inspect at the specific ports of entry in the rear of both sides.

The fairness and reasonableness of that proposal of ours was borne out and admitted by your own proposals afterwards, and it is recognized by the whole world as fair and reasonable beyond any possibility of doubt. By that proposal we eliminated all pretexts on your part so that you found you were unable to distort our proposal. You found that you were in a position of self-contradiction; therefore, you delayed ten days before you advanced your so-called counterproposal. Ever since that time, even since 3 December when we submitted our additional recommendations, you have been clinging to one thing only: your insistence on restricting our military facilities in order to reach your objective of interfering in our internal affairs under the pretext of limiting the increase of our military capabilities. It is clear, therefore, that from that time onwards you have been deliberately choosing and fabricating excuses to delay and try to wreck these negotiations. You attempted thereby to deceive the people all over the world, to deceive the people in your own countries and in your servant countries. Your objective in doing so is one only: to continue the war in Korea. In the face of our firm opposition against your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs, you found that you have already exhausted the tactics of delaying and distorting.

Therefore, for the past three days you have continuously advanced this ridiculous argument saying that our side is importing

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) crated aircraft in large amounts into Korea. The fact that you have done this for three days successively proves that it is an intentional step on your part; it is not an accidental action. The reason why you have been doing so is because the people throughout the world and wide masses of soldiers in Korea and even people in your own countries are more and more dissatisfied with your interntional delaying and stalling of the negotiations. You have been doing this in order to deceive the people and try to relieve yourself from the pressure of the people. You have done this deliberately. You slander our side to cast suspicion on our side, but I would like to say that if you assert that we, during these negotiations, are already preparing to break up these negotiations or deliberately preparing to violate the agreement, then you should have admitted that there is already no basis for the continuance of these negotiations. It is obvious that such rumors of yours are ridiculous and groundless. Your arguments, on the basis of such rumors, only serve to prove that you are intentionally trying to undermine the foundation of the negotiations, trying to stall and break up these negotiations. We cannot give any other interpretation.

I will now again explain my point by talking about the question of restrictions on military air capabilities during the armistice. There is imbued in our proposals of December 3rd, 14th and 24th, a fundamental spirit, a fundamental article; that is, there should be strict prohibition of introduction of any military forces, particularly aircraft and tanks, into Korea. Both sides, both your side and our side, are clearly aware that the war in Korea was extended because forces beyond Korea have been extensively involved in this war. Therefore, the only way of preventing resumption of hostilities after an armistice is a strict restriction on continued introduction of foreign forces into Korea. Our previous proposals are thoroughgoing in that they

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) have provided for a strict prohibition of introduction of any military forces, particularly aircraft and tanks, into Korea. Is not our proposal a sufficient guarantee for a stable and effective armistice?

Even your side is clearly aware of the thoroughness, of the thorough character, of our proposal. Yet it is is just because you cannot but admit that our proposal is thorough and sufficient in prohibiting the continued introduction of military forces, and because you have found that such a stipulation would be disadvantageous to your attempt of maintaining the state of war in Korea and your intentions of resuming hostilities in Korea, that you came out to insist upon unlimited rotation and replenishment. You have been delaying and stalling the negotiations intentionally, but you have no proper justification for doing so.

You have no reason to oppose our thorough proposal. That is why you have intentionally dished up this unreasonable insistence on interfering in our internal affairs. Although you have paid lip service to the fact that there exists a balance of military forces between both sides and that we should take an attitude of equality and reciprocity in these negotiations, your actions in substance are contrary to your admission. You are obviously attempting to gain here what you have been unable to gain through hostilities, that is, your insistence on interfering in our internal affairs. That is why you have picked up this weapon of so-called limitation on airfield facilities.

Here present in this tent are air force generals and air force officers. You are perfectly aware yourselves that an airfield itself does not constitute any offensive military capability. On the other hand, the building or not building, rehabilitating or not rehabilitating, an airfield is a question of internal affairs; a question which these military discussions have no right to touch upon, or discuss. That is why, although we agree that there

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) should be strict prohibition of continued introduction into Korea of military forces, including aircraft, we cannot permit such interference in our internal affairs by stipulation regarding the rehabilitation or not of airfields, because we are here negotiating on an equal footing and these negotiations are built upon the basis of the existence of a balance of forces between both sides.

You yourselves are aware that such an unreasonable demand absolutely will not be accepted or permitted by our side, but you have put this stumbling block before our negotiations. Therefore, you have done this intentionally, in the face of our opposition, and the opposition of your own people and the people of your servant countries and of the wide masses of troops at the front. You have been exposed before the eyes of the whole world that it is your side that is delaying and is trying to wreck these negotiations and now you have again fabricated this ridiculous rumor to support your unreasonable demand. Up till now you have shown no indication whatsoever of giving up such unreasonable demands. We can only interpret your action as an intentional attempt to disrupt the negotiations. We cannot give any other interpretation. Your side now fabricates this rumor to the effect that our side has imported crated aircraft into Korea. This is obviously a very ridiculous fabrication.

You are deliberately reversing right and wrong, deliberately altering historical facts to slander our side. You even asserted that your side did not attack the People's Republic of China. As you said this, did you not recall your own deliberate provocations to the People's Republic of China after the beginning of the Korean war? Did you not bomb Antung? Did you not order your own troops, when they reached the neighborhood of Antung, to fire their artillery and machine guns into the territory of the People's Republic of China across the Yalu River, into the counties of Chi-an and

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Chang Pai? Did not your Commander-in-Chief openly declare that you would fight to the Yalu River and you would seek your positions on the other bank of the Yalu River in order to shelter the so-called security of your troops? Did you not, at the same time when you began the war in Korea, seize Taiwan of China; and particularly, even after the military armistice negotiations had been going on for more than a month, did you not intentionally dispatch your aircraft to raid over the skies of Mukden, Tsingtao and Shanghai?

All these ironclad facts are recognized by the whole world and are already written in human history, and yet you come out to change black into white, to deny these ironclad facts. When you are doing so, do you not fear yourselves to be ridiculous and that you cannot make other people believe your such distortions? You have been so irrational as to fabricate such distortions of facts and slanders. This only proves that you lack political capital and you lack any sound reasons to support proposals and that you do intend to disrupt the negotiations.

At the time when you are making these slanderous fabrications inside and outside of the conference, you have resorted to another weapon of yours - the so-called military pressure. You tried by force to compel us to accept your unreasonable demand. You openly declared that you would let artillery, bombs and bullets to continue the arguments, and also you have intentionally increased your military capabilities in Korea. It is only recently that you have imported forces from Japan into Korea in an attempt to continue the war in Korea. It is because your objective is to carry on the war to disrupt these negotiations and to avoid any agreement that you have come out to create such slanders, to seek pretexts, to stall and wreck these negotiations. And you try, by doing so, to divert the attention of the peoples of the world. But I musttell you that such tactics on your part cannot cover

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) all the eyes and ears of the peoples of the world.

In carrying on these negotiations, we should speak so that the other side would believe what you speak. We should not resort to groundless assertions so as to create the impression that you have no intention of carrying on the negotiations. If you created such an impression you do no good to the progress of the conference.

You can review all the statements our side has been making. We always base our statements on ironclad facts. Of course, because we take different stands, therefore we may draw different conclusions from these facts. But in any case you should not deny ironclad facts. That is why we believe in realities and we do believe that action and facts speak with more authority than words. And your groundless assertions are of no benefit to the conference. Your slanders and rumors are ridiculous, just as your bragging about military pressure is ridiculous. The more you talk in this way, the more you increase our doubt as to whether you have any intention to carry on these negotiations.

GEN TURNER: General Hsieh, I have listened patiently to your lengthy statement. As I review it and separate the wheat from the chaff, I find that you have expressed only one new thought. All the rest of your expression has been devoted to propaganda.

The one new thought that you have expressed this morning was that relative to the falseness and the groundlessness of the reports of your prisoners of war. I shall come back to that in just a moment, but first I am going to answer <u>once and for all</u> your false accusations relative to our menace to China, our so-called menace to China. Since you have placed these false accusations in the form of questions, I will answer them.

Your first question was: "Did the United Nations Command declare it would cross the Yalu River and build defense lines on the other side of the river?" Our answer is: <u>Never</u>!

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd)

Question 2: "Was it not the intention of the United Nations Command to cross the Yalu River?" The answer: It was not and is not.

Question 3: "Did not the United Nations Command dispatch its aircraft to bomb Antung?" The answer: No!

Question 4: "Did the United Nations Command aircraft carry out air raids over Mukden, Tsingtao, and Shanghai?" The answer: No!

Question 5: "Did not the United Nations Command seize Taiwan?" The answer: No!

Question 6: "Did not the United Nations Command direct the fire of its artillery and machine guns against Chi-an?" The answer: No!

Now, General Hsieh, I hope we have heard the last of the cheap propaganda that you have spouted at this table yesterday and today and many days previously. As you yourself said, you are going to continue to mouth propaganda statements. We are resigned to the fate of having to be present when two ancient languages are befouled by being the vehicles of your false propaganda. We regret this the more because your propaganda statements are not only false, they are also lengthy. Why do you not simply issue them to your controlled press and spare us these irrelevant and transparent falsehoods?

Now to go back to the one new thought which you expressed in your lengthy statement this morning; namely, about the reports of the prisoners of war that military aircraft are being introduced into Korea during these negotiations. You have stated that these are false and groundless rumors. From this I judge that no aircraft are being introduced into North Korea. You have further stated that you have no intention of introducing military aircraft into North Korea during the period of armistice. Therefore, the obvious conclusion is that you have no need for military airfields during the armistice. If you will read again the last

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) paragraph of principle 4 in our proposal of 29 December, you will then find that there is no logical objection to that principle. Why then will you not agree in writing to the acceptance of our proposal of 29 December.

GEN HSIEH: You have made repeated false denials of ironclad facts, recognized by the people throughout the world. Your doing so confirms my impression and exposes even more clearly that you lack any sound arguments in these discussions, and that you do not intend to carry on the negotiations.

I have cited historical facts because your side, in the first instance, has for several days been bringing in these questions. The ironclad facts cited by me have been personally experienced by persons sitting here at this sub-committee meeting. They are persons who have come from the places where such incidents have occurred. Our facts depend on personal experiences and yet you can flatly deny these facts. You attempt to reply to my questions with a simple "No". Such an answer cannot convince anybody just as your previous flat denial of violations of the Kaesong neutral zone could not convince anybody. Since you flatly deny facts, I am compelled to say that I feel it unnecessary for me to take more time to refute such false assertions on your part, which entirely reverse right and wrong. Your doing so only serves to prove your lack of sincerity toward the negotiations.

Among your arbitrary and false denials you denied the ironclad fact that your aircraft of your side bombed Antung. This fact was already admitted by your own representative, Mr. Warren Austin, in the United Nations General Assembly in 1950. I will only cite this one point to prove that your denials are false and you completely lack sincerity in these negotiations. I would not take more time now.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: No.

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GEN TURNER: Just one comment. The question you asked relative to Antung was: "Did not the United Nations Command dispatch aircraft to bomb Antung?" The answer was "No." Any bombing by United Nations Command forces north of the Yalu River was accidental.

I have nothing further to offer today. I suggest we recess until tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: Agreed.

Meeting recessed at 1242 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

8 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fifth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL J W Thames, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to say?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: Yesterday you stated that a military airfield is itself not an offensive military capability. There are two things wrong with that assertion: First, a military airfield is itself not an offensive military capability in exactly the same degree as an unloaded gun is not an offensive military capability. It is not offensive at the moment. But just as a gun can be quickly rendered offensive by loading it, so can an airfield be rendered offensive by loading it with aircraft. Your idea, then, is to point a gun at the head of the United Nations Command, telling us not to worry since it isn't loaded. But we know that all too many persons have been killed by so-called unloaded guns. And we know that in the case of airfields, the gun can be loaded in a very short period of time. Thus the first aspect of your statement is seen to be fraudulent.

Second, you do not deny that an airfield is a defensive military capability. Is there any reason why either side should be authorized to increase their military capabilities during armistice, whether the added capability is defensive or offensive? Of course not. Implicit in your statement is the admission that

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) an airfield is a military capability, however you may qualify it with the words "defensive" or "offensive". Yet you maintain the right to develop airfields - military capabilities - during armistice. In other words, you are opposed to the idea that neither side should increase its military capabilities during armistice. Instead, you propose the principle that only your side shall increase its military capabilities during armistice. I tell you yet once again, however you may twist and turn and seek to evade, the United Nations Command will not agree to increases of military capability by either side during armistice. Despite all your verbal acrobatics, there is no way out of that corollary fact.

For many days now you have repeated that your proposal of 24 December is fair and reasonable. In the explanations of our diagnosis each time, we have pointed out the deficiencies of your proposal - deficiencies which are abrogated in our 29 December proposal. In other words, our proposal contains the safeguard against increase in military capabilities.

By your continued objection to such cornerposts of the armistice structure, your words of sincerity for peace decay our hopes for an early, stable and effective armistice. We cannot help from reaching the conclusion that under the terms of your proposal you intend to exploit the period of the armistice to develop your military capabilities. You are determined to gain a position unknown to you now, wherein you will have a military air capability which you can throw at the United Nations Command at your choosing. One of two ways you can do this is already underway as told us by your own soldiers; that is, the importation of crated aircraft into Korea. When you have rehabilitated your military airfields during the armistice, you will then be ready to launch an unexpected attack. The second way requires less effort: just develop your military airfields during the armistice and then fly the aircraft in from Manchuria.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) By your actions at these negotiations, it appears you plan to adopt one or both of the ways just listed to increase your military capabilities. But I tell you again, the United Nations Command will never agree to an armistice that permits such an increase of military capabilities by either side.

GEN HSIEH: After listening to your statement this morning, I made some reflections and I realize I have got two impressions from your statement. My first impression is that every argument you pointed out in your statement has already been sufficiently refuted by our side with reasonable logic. My second impression is that today is the fourth day in your deliberate and persistent fabrication and slander. Your persistent doing of this gives me one impression only; that is, your action proves our judgement to be true, that your side really is intentionally creating excuses for disrupting and delaying these negotiations.

Because the arguments you use in your statement this morning have been refuted by us many times, there is, indeed, no necessity for me to repeat our arguments of refutation; and because the fabrications you have made are ridiculous and slanders you have made are absurd, there is no necessity for me to take more time to discuss this point with you. But in the interest of the negotiations, I must call your attention to the development of our discussions here; to the fact that your persistent and deliberate fabrications and slanders are dealing blows to the foundation of these negotiations.

The fact that your side has not only made those fabrications and slanders outside of the conference in your propaganda, but has continuously and formally brought these slanders and fabrications into this conference, is a very serious question. And I would like to ask: Do you mean that you recognize the foundations of the negotiations between both sides as already non-existent, since you have gone to the length of asserting that our side is prepared

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) to break these negotiations and to violate any possible agreements reached between both sides? In addition to this, your side is also trumpeting about war and bragging about your military forces, while employing delaying tactics in these negotiations.

What other interpretation can we give to your actions except that you are intentionally creating pretexts to delay and disrupt these negotiations? If it is only outside of the conference that your side is making such fabrications and slanders which are designed to deceive yourselves and to deceive the people, we could yet interpret such an action on your part as aimed at confusing the issue and deceiving the peoples of your own countries, of your satellite countries, of your soldiers at the front, and of the people of the world who are dissatisfied with your delaying of the negotiations. But what is the fact? You have come into this conference and sitting in front of us formally, intentionally and persistently made these slanders and fabrications which are entirely groundless.

We can only interpret such an action on your part as stemming from two objectives: either you are using these absurd and ridiculous rumors to argue for and support your unreasonable demand, which is a main stumbling block in the way of progress in this conference, so as to delay the conference; or you are fabricating these rumors to support your designs at carrying on the war indefinitely, as borne out by your recent actions of increasing your combat forces in Korea and your trumpeting and bragging about your military forces, inside and outside the tent. The more you follow this line, the more you will deepen our impression and our judgement over your actions, and you can gain nothing else. These absurd and ridiculous rumors are not only created by your side and intentionally persistently and formally talked about inside and outside of this tent, but even your Senior Delegate has come out to publicize such rumors, as if they were a great club in

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) support of your unreasonable demand. But I must tell you that the more your side does this, the more you will reveal the fact that you lack any reasonable argument in support of your unreasonable demand, the more you will increase our suspicions about your real intentions, and the more you will make us sharpen our vigilance against your such challenge at these armistice negotiations.

Both sides are clearly aware that the Korean war was extended because forces beyond Korea were extensively involved in this war. Therefore, in order to insure a stable armistice, the only way is to prohibit strictly the introduction of any military forces into Korea during the armistice. Our previous proposals can prove that this position of our side is thoroughgoing, and our proposal is a proposal which provides for sufficient conditions for ensuring a stable and effective armistice. It is precisely because of this fact that you are deprived of any pretexts to continue to oppose our proposal; and yet you went out of the way to pick up this question of limiting our facilities, a question which you in your recent statements admitted is a matter of interference in our internal affairs. It is written in the record, and this morning you cannot but admit, that the carrying on of facilities within Korea does not constitute an increase of military capabilities. The question of facilities within the territory of Korea--whether certain facilities may be installed or may not be installed--in any case is a question of internal affairs which you yourselves admit to be true. Your side cannot but admit also that our proposal, our proposed principle of no introduction of military forces, is a thorough principle; and you are also aware that you should not seek for other excuses to insist upon your intention of interfering in our internal affairs. But to our great regret, even though your side is aware on the one hand that your demand is unreasonable and will be firmly and forever opposed by our side, yet, on the other hand, you and the leader of your delegation still intentionally continued such insistence

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) inside and outside of the tent. We do not know what your covert intentions really are.

GEN TURNER: This morning you stated, General Hsieh, that you have previously refuted all of our argument. You have refuted our arguments by illogical and unrealistic reasoning.

You stated that we were fabricating and slandering. Your reference to fabrication apparently deals with the reports of your people who are now our prisoners of war, to the effect that your side is introducing into Korea crated aircraft while these negotiations are going on. If this is a fabrication, then the only conclusion that we can draw is that your side is not introducing military aircraft into Korea during these negotiations. With reference to your accusations that we are slandering your intentions by stating that you intend, during the armistice, to increase your military capabilities by building military airfields: if this is slander, then the only logical conclusion that we can draw is that you do not intend to increase your military capabilities by building military airfields. What, then, is your objection to our re-request that you agree to the prohibition during the armistice of "no rehabilitating" or "no construction" of military airfields? That is all that is contained in the first paragraph of our principle 4.

Now before you answer that question, I have one more observation to make. Yesterday, and for several days previous, you stated that there is no basis for continuing these negotiations. Today you said that we are creating excuses for disrupting and delaying these negotiations. Whether there is a basis for continuing depends on whether both sides are willing to work for an effective military armistice. To us an effective military armistice is one which provides adequately for the stability of the armistice and for the security of both sides during the armistice.

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) For stability and security there must be adequate safeguards in the armistice agreement. One of the most crucial of these safeguards is the assurance that neither side will increase its military capabilities during the armistice; therefore, if you intend to build up a threatening new military capability during the period of the armistice for some deadly purpose known only by you, you are justified in concluding there is no basis for further discussion. As for our side, we are willing to work toward an effective military armistice, one which specifically and strictly prohibits an increase of military capabilities on either side during the period of the armistice.

GEN HSIEH: You can deny many things, but one thing you cannot deny; that is, you know your own business better than we do, and we know our own business better than you do. Perhaps you will not deny that for many days you have made many denials. If you admit this fact, then I must assure you that our side has not the slightest interest in those ridiculous rumors you have been making these days. It is exactly because those rumors are ridiculous that you could not but admit in your statement just now that those rumors were false. The reason why you have been doing so, just as why you raised your question, is that are searching for some excuses, which cannot convince many people, for insisting on your intention to interfere in our internal affairs through these military armistice negotiations.

You will not be able to acquire the right to interfere in our internal affairs through these military armistice negotiations; in other words, our side absolutely will not permit you to interfere in our internal affairs. If you say that you will resort to war again, that you are capable of doing this through hostilities, then you can try it. You are welcome. The Korean war has been going on more than a year, but I must tell you that we will resolutely oppose such demand of your side until you give up any

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) intention of interfering in our internal affairs. I tell you frankly once again, as I told you many times, that what we are concerned with is not airfields but the independence and integrity of our sovereign rights.

You said that the basis for negotiations is the efforts of both sides. That is correct. But I ask you to review the efforts to insist upon your unreasonable demand. You have been making efforts to fabricate rumors. You have been making efforts to delay these negotiations. That is an obvious fact.

GEN TURNER: Today, as for the past several days, you clung to your fantasy - "sovereign rights" and "interference in your internal affairs." You do this in an effort to conceal your intent of increasing your military capabilities and, specifically, to avoid the discussion as to whether rehabilitating military airfields constitutes an increase in military capabilities. It is regretted, not only by our delegation but by the peoples everywhere, that you have not come to these negotiations with the same objective in mind that we have: to seek a just and honorable armistice for both sides by mutual agreement. This agreement must preclude the gaining of a military advantage by either side during the armistice. In other words, it must freeze the military strength and capability of both sides to that existing on the effective date of the armistice; to remain frozen at that level until the military armistice agreement is superseded by one of a political nature. The right to agree is the very essence of sovereignty. When opposing sides, such as those at this table, agree, there can be no encroachment upon sovereignty.

We have assumed that your statements that the sovereign rights you speak of are those of the North Korean People, inasmuch as you assert the Chinese complement of your forces are Chinese People's Volunteers only. But such an adamant stand as yours for rehabilitating military airfields raises doubt, especially in view of the

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) depleted status of the North Korean Air Force. Thus we ask, are the airfields you wish to rehabilitate for Korean or Chinese aircraft? Whose sovereign rights are you upholding?

You asked us to review the efforts that have been made toward reaching a solution of our differences. Apparently the only point we both agree on is that there is one major difference which must be solved before progress can be made in these negotiations. The United Nations Command has made repeated efforts to reach some agreement on this issue. Again and again I have asked you to offer something new, a new proposal, a revised proposal, or anything which might conceivable contribute to a solution to this issue. Yet what have you offered? Absolutely nothing! Not one single solitary effort have you made to break this deadlock! You have propagandized, argued, and slandered each and every effort the United Nations Command has made. You stated last December 29th that our proposal was a step forward. Since that day our side has consistently but futilely tried to guide you a step forward, but you refuse to even discuss the only remaining major point of issue. You have made no effort. You can continue to delay these negotiations, but you cannot escape the fact that the full responsibility for such delay is yours and yours alone. I am waiting for some sincere effort on your part.

GEN HSIEH: You just referred to sovereign rights and said that the right to agree to an agreement is the essence of sovereignty; but I tell you this, that the right to disagree is also the essence of sovereignty.

We are here negotiating with the objective of reaching an agreement. That is true. But the agreement we should reach must not include any stipulation of interfering in our internal affairs; and, at the same time, our side has no intention whatsoever to interfere in the internal affairs of your side. It is true that you have advanced your 29 December proposal, but as I have pointed out

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) many times previously, you have in that proposal deliberately kept a main stumbling block which you refuse to remove; and this stumbling block, as is clear to both sides and to all the people of the world, contains an interference in our internal affairs. By intentionally retaining and insisting on this unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs, your side is intentionally trying to violate an inalienable right of our side.

The way for settling this difference is very clear: it relies on whether your side will remove this stumbling block or not. If your side should have the same objective as we do, namely, a speedy armistice in Korea, then I believe that it should not be difficult to settle the point at issue - to reach an agreement.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything new to offer?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: Do you think you will have anything new to offer this afternoon?

GEN HSIEH: No!

GEN TURNER: Then I suggest we reconvene tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1244 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

[redacted]

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

9 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-sixth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; CAPT H M Briggs, USN, CDR B W Spore, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL J W Thames, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: I have an important statement to make. At the time when, on 29 December 1951, your side submitted your counterproposal to our proposed principles 4,5 and 6 of December 24th, I already made clear our attitude toward your counterproposal. I pointed out that it was improper that you should have taken out from the preamble of the fourth principle of your counterproposal the wording "to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level", to which you had agreed, and substituted for it the wording "to facilitate a peaceful settlement by actions at a political level". I pointed out that you had altered the main clause in our principle 4 "not to introduce into Korea any military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition" into "not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing of military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition", which concealed your persistent insistence on the continued introduction of replenishment of war equipment into Korea during the armistice and which, as a principle, was not as thoroughgoing or as practicable as our principle was. And I pointed out that what was most intolerable was that you still retained in the fourth principle of your counterproposal the unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs by restricting airfield

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) facilities. During the meetings of the past days I have made it clear over and over again that our side absolutely cannot consider this unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs and that it constitutes the main stumbling block in the way of progress in our conference. This stumbling block is fetched and placed there intentionally by your side; and if, in this conference, you are really pursuing the objective of a stable armistice as you have repeatedly averred, we fail to see any reason why in an over-all adjustment you should still insist upon this demand, which is blocking progress in this conference.

In accordance with the spirit of reaching a speedy agreement I now submit our revision of your December 29th proposal. Our revised proposal reads as follows:

"4. In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission so that the supervisory organ of neutral nations may be entrusted to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, which shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

"5. Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiations any violation of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following provisions:

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

"a. Within the demilitarized zone, the Military Armistice Commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

"b. Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, the supervisory organ of representatives of neutral nations shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the requestto the supervisory organ of neutral nations by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission for investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of the neutral nations shall carry out the inspection.

"6. Both sides agree to invite neutral nations acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean war to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives to form a supervisory organ to be entrusted by the Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in paragraph 4 and paragraph 5b of this proposal. Upon the request by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission for carrying out these functions, the supervisory organ of neutral nations shall dispatch immediately inspection teams to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, and shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the Military Armistice Commission. In performing their above-stated function, the inspection teams of neutral nations shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the main lines of communication and transportation as agreed upon by both sides."

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) You can see that apart from the paragraph which interferes in our internal affairs and to which our side absolutely cannot agree, among the few revisions made to your proposal, we have agreed to your view that in the preamble of principle 4, the goal of the conference, a peaceful settlement, should be specified as in your stipulation. We have also agreed to your wording of the main clause of principle 4. That means we have made a concession to your insistence that the necessary replenishment of war equipment should be permitted during the period of armistice. It should be pointed out that now due to our concession, a complete and reasonable settlement is reached with regard to your demand for continued rotation and replenishment during the armistice upon which your side has persistently insisted ever since our side submitted our two additional recommendations on December 3rd.

Furthermore, we hold that we should keep the term "neutral nations" instead of the term "noncombatant nations" as suggested by your side. Yet at the same time we have adopted the description of the meaning of neutral nations as given by your side at the beginnin of principle 6. It can be seen from this that there is no difference between your side and our side on the substance of this question.

In our revised proposal we have omitted that part of your proposal concerning the restriction on rehabilitation and construction of airfields. Our side absolutely cannot agree to any unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs. At this conference I have expounded innumerable times that whether either side is going to install or not to install this kind or that kind of facilities within Korea during the period of armistice is entirely a matter within the scope of internal affairs of either side--a matter into which the military armistice negotiations have no right to look and are not allowed to look

You cannot deny that to restrict the right of both sides to

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) deal with our facilities within Korea during the armistice is an interference in the internal affairs of both sides; but you assert that such interference is being carried out by your side with your military forces, and that therefore you would continue to interfere with our internal affairs during the armistice. Such a theory of bellicose elements, smelling of blood, is too absurd to deserve refutation. You should know that you are unable to interfere in our internal affairs even while you are now carrying out wanton bombings and bombardments and creating widespread destruction with your military force. Yet you now attempt to gain through negotiations what you are unable to gain by military force. I tell you frankly that you will never get what you have failed to gain by military force.

This absurd argument of yours being a failure, you have dished up another absurd argument. You assert that in this world today complete sovereignty is not longer to be found, and that as complete sovereignty does not exist, why be so stingy in calculating about the integrity of sovereign rights and the inviolability of internal affairs. This argument is a naked expression of the wide ambitions of American ruling block for world domination. You attempt to subject all the nations of the world to your aggression and, therefore, you deny the existence of national sovereignty. It is true that there are many nations in your aggressive camp which have lost the integrity of their sovereign rights under the oppression of the United States of America. But you must not forget that this wild attempt of yours for world domination has dashed against the wall at not a few places in the world where there not only exist nations with complete sovereignty but where some of these nations have taken up arms to fight in defense of thier sovereign rights and against foreign intervention. One of these nations is the Democratic People' Republic of Korea.

We absolutely will not accept your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs. You insinuate that we should forget

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the crippled words of "sovereignty" and "internal affairs"; but I must remind you that there are hundreds of millions of people in the world who are struggling for the sovereign integrity of their nations and the independence of their internal affairs. You have gone a step further along this absurd argument and talked about the inevitable loss of some sovereign rights through an armistice. You even argued that by agreeing to undertake not to introduce into Korea any combat aircraft, armored vehicles and ammunition and by agreeing to invite representatives of neutral nations to conduct inspection of the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides, our side has in fact already agreed to your interference in our internal affairs. This absurd line of reasoning proves that you are deliberately covering up the fact that the restriction on introduction of any military forces into Korea and the conduct of supervision by neutral nations which are not related to the Korean war are in themselves measures to ward off interference in the internal affairs of Korea by foreign forces. Our proposal strictly distinguishes between the external relations and the internal affairs of Korea. It is the only possible solution capable of ensuring a stable armistice without involving the question of interference in the internal affairs of both sides.

When you fail to justify by reasoning your demand to interfere in our internal affairs, you have resorted to another method of falsely charging that our refusal of your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs is an indication that our side intends to take advantage of the armistice to strengthen our military air capability unlimitedly in order to launch a surprise attack on your side and threaten the security of your troops. At this conference, I have explained innumerable times that the reason why our side cannot agree to your proposal of restricting airfield facilities is because this is a question of internal affairs. You consider that your permitting both sides to carry out during the armistice

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) limited rehabilitation of airfields for civil air operations is a concession to our side. In reality, your idea is entirely out of place. In this connection, what we absolutely cannot concede is the inviolability of our internal affairs. As for our installing or not installing this kind or that kind of facility, that is a question of another category. I believe I will not be able to make myself clearer on this point. Can it be said, then, that since our side opposes your proposal of restricting airfield facilities, it means that we are going to take advantage of the armistice to develop our military air capability unlimitedly in order to launch a surprise attack on your side? Such an assertion, if it is not a deliberate misrepresentation, must be out of a design to wreck the armistice negotiations.

In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice our side has already proposed not to introduce into Korea any combat aircraft and agreed on the question of supervision--that upon request by both sides or either side on the military armistice commission to the neutral nations supervisory organ for an investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the neutral nations supervisory organ shall be responsible for conducting the inspection. In this way we have shown that our side not only holds that no combat aircraft should be introduced into Korea during the armistice, but also agrees to adopt your suggested measure to guarantee the implementation of the above-mentioned principle. Since no combat aircraft will be introduced into Korea, it will be impossible for either side to develop unlimitedly its military air capabilities during the armistice. Is that not perfectly clear?

But at this conference you have repeatedly argued that your side has already conceded four and one-half safeguards for insuring a stable armistice required by your side. What you try to convey is that your side can concede no more and that it is now for our side to make concessions. We maintain that an agreement should be reached on a fair and reasonable basis and that it has nothing to do with how

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) many concessions each side has made. It is especially improper to measure the concessions by the many unreasonable demands which your side previously raised. Your side has been assuming the attitude of a victor ever since the beginning of the negotiations. And, whenever you find that we absolutely will not agree to your demands of a would-be victor and that your side cannot but accept, against your wishes, terms which are fair and reasonable, you assert that your side has made a great concession. As a matter of fact, your side has not made any great concession. The unreasonable demands which you once advanced, but had to withdraw later on, are demands which should not have been advanced at all.

I have read in your news reporting that your agreement to the present battle line as the military demarcation line was a great concession on your part. Actually, how can it be called a concession? It is an agreement on the actual position and to a withdrawal of two kilometers by each side so as to establish a demilitarized zone. Where have you made a concession? But compared with your unreasonable demand of the proposal of July 27th, of a military demarcation line which was pushed more than 10,000 square kilometers deep into our positions, it would have appeared to have been a great concession. Such is the case in the past, and such is still the case at the present.

At the very beginning of the discussion of the Item 3 of the Agenda, your side advanced a series of unreasonable demands. You demanded to come directly into our rear to carry out free inspection and aerial patrols during the armistice. Why did you not stop to think how we should accept such an unreasonable demand from your side? Yet, when under our resolute opposition you were unable to press your demand and had to give it up, you asserted you made a great concession. Actually, how can it be called a great concession?

The truth of the facts definitely will not be changed by your

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) distorted presentation. But in order to show how we reached the agreements already agreed upon between both sides and where exactly is the point of issue in the way of agreements yet to be reached, I find it necessary to review once again the course of discussions of Item 3 of the Agenda.

In order to insure against resumption of hostilities in Korea after the armistice and to lay the foundation for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, our side consistently held that the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops, together with their equipment, should be discussed and settled in these Korean military armistice negotiations. But your side firmly refused to discuss this basic question with the argument that no political question should be touched upon at a military armistice conference--although everybody knows that withdrawal of foreign forces is not a political question, and that your refusal to discuss it is entirely unjustified.

However, in order to meet the wide-spread peaceful wish of the people of the world to stop the Korean war first of all, our side agreed to leave the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and their equipment to be discussed by a political conference of a higher level of both sides and to confine the Korean military armistice negotiation to matters of a strictly military nature. Since both sides agreed that after the realization of the Korean armistice there should be convened quickly a political conference of a higher level of both sides to discuss the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and their equipment , so as to achieve a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and since the Korean military armistice would only be a transitional state, our side considered that there was no necessity at all to discuss such an extensive question as the restriction on the increase of military capabilities of both sides when we proceeded to Item 3 of the Agenda. That was why our side submitted our five principles

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) for the realization of a purely military armistice.

But your side made a complete reversal of your previous position that no political questions should be touched upon in a military negotiations and came out to insist upon discussing questions as extensive as the restriction on military capabilities of both sides and the conduct of inspections in the rear of both sides. That was why we bogged down in a serious stalemate soon after we began the discussion of Item 3 of the Agenda.

Once again, in order to meet the wide-spread peaceful wish of the people of the world to stop the Korean war first of all, our side proposed that, in order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea, under any pretexts, any armed units and war equipment, including combat aircraft. We also proposed that inspection should be conducted by representatives of neutral nations at ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides. Any just person could see that these two additional recommendations of our side were absolutely fair and reasonable and that no fault could be found with them.

Yet your side again insisted that rotation and replenishment must be carried out during the armistice, and insisted on the unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs by restricting airfield facilities. Then, in order to break the deadlock so as to speedily reach the realization of an armistice in Korea, our side again agreed to your demand on the question of rotation, agreed to specify explicitly in our version of principle 4 that both sides undertake not to introduce any combat aircraft into Korea during the armistice, and agreed on the question of supervision and that upon the request raised by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission to the neutral nations supervisory organ for an investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the neutral nations supervisory organ shall be responsible for conducting

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) inspection so as to ensure a stable armistice. And now in this revised proposal of our side we have again agreed, within reasonable limits, to your requirements for carrying out the necessary replacement of war equipments during the armistice.

All just and impartial people of the world will recognize in the above-stated series of concrete proposals of ours the great efforts which our side has made for realization of the Korean Armistice. The sincerity and good faith of our side is absolutely not to be clouded by any fabrication or slander made by your side in this tent. But, on the other hand, if you should interpret the efforts made by our side in order to reach an armistice as a sign of weakness, you would be mistaken. Any demand to interfere in our internal affairs is absolutely impermissible. This is our unshakable--I repeat, unshakable--stand.

(At this point General Hsieh handed the English, Korean and Chinese translations of the Communist proposal to General Turner.)

GEN TURNER: General Hsieh, I am pleased to note that at long last you have made an effort, as small as it is, an effort to make some progress in these negotiations. It is regrettable, however, that you have seen fit to make the long propaganda statement which has accompanied your proposal. This statement is devoid of reason; it is devoid of logic; and it is devoid of realism. It would have been just as effective to have handed your propaganda statement to your controlled press. That would have spared the time of these delegations. It has no effect upon us.

Now, in order that we may compare the translations of your new proposal, I recommend that we recess until after lunch--say 1330.

GEN HSIEH: Agreed.

Meeting recessed at 1205 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1330 hours.

GEN TURNER: I have made a preliminary study of the revised principles 4, 5 and 6 you submitted this morning. Your rewording of the first sentence

GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) of principle 4 leaves only minor points which easily can be solved without difficulty. The solution of those minor differences will certainly not be the cause for the prolongation of these conferences.

In recognizing the fact that replacement should be permitted by both sides, you have made no concession, for our side has consistently held that such replacement would not result in any increase of military force or equipment .

In your statement this morning you made the following statement: "But you assert that such interference is being carried out by your side with your military force and that therefore you would continue to interfere in our internal affairs during the armistice. Such a theory of bellicose elements, smelling of blood, is too absurd to deserve a refutation. You should know that you are unable to interfere in our internal affairs even while you now carry out wanton bombings and bombardments and create widespread destruction with your military force." From your statement it now is clear to me that you expect the United Nations Command to carry out your so-called "wanton bombing" of North Korea during the armistice. I can assure you that the United Nations Command does not intend to bomb, and will not bomb, any part of North Korea during the armistice. We have never had any such intentions and I regret that you have had this impression during the long period of negotiations.

Since I have cleared up your misunderstanding on this matter and I have assured you that the United Nations Command has no intentions of bombing or committing any hostile acts during the period of the armistice, there is certainly no reason now why your side cannot accept our principle covering restriction on airfields.

Regarding your proposal as a whole, I can only say that it is unacceptable. My formal reply is that you have failed to include the necessary security provision which prohibits either side from greatly increasing its military capabilities. This requirement is fulfilled by our 29 December proposal. You have not made one single

GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) effort to solve this major difference confronting us. You have simply omitted it.

At the time that we submitted our proposal of 29 December I stated: "We have already made a great concession with regard to airfields. We can make no more. That subject is closed." I further stated: "We have given up military inspection teams and accepted the lesser assurance of noncombatant teams as suggested by your side; we have given up the total prohibition of rehabilitation of airfields by agreeing to the rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations. Now we are prepared to give up an additional desirable safeguard, that of aerial observation and photographic flights." I further stated: "Note that the United Nations Command is willing to agree to the removal of the safeguard of aerial observation only, repeat only, if your side is willing to agree to the three principles now submitted by the United Nations Command without substantive change."

Now let us get back to this major difference. The restriction on rehabilitation and construction of military airfields.

The false label you have placed on your military airfields can no longer hide the facts. The peace-loving people of the world will judge these facts in their true light. Is the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields a step toward peace? You insist time and again that there should be no introduction of combat aircraft into Korea, yet in the same breath you demand unlimited rehabilitation and construction of military airfields.

Your ominous intent is very clear. It is your intention to use the period of the armistice to construct military airfields. You say that your side is sincere toward an effective armistice and a speedy and thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Let the peace-loving people of the world judge for themselves your sincerity. Publish to the world your unreasonable stand. But do not hide your statement under a false cloak; call it by its true

GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) name, "increase in military air capabilities".

No military commander who values security for his forces can agree to an armistice which does not prohibit the opposite side from gaining a great military advantage over his own forces during the armistice. No matter what you call it, the bare fact remains that the rehabilitation of your military airfields will constitute an enormous increase in your military capabilities. We have insisted, and will continue to insist, that restriction be placed upon both sides regarding the rehabilitation, expansion, improvement, and construction of airfields. I hope this point is clear and that you have no doubt regarding our determined position in this matter.

GEN HSIEH: In your statement just now, you said that in our statement this morning we asserted that your side has the intention of bombing our side during the armistice. This statement of yours, if not made out of misunderstanding, must be a distortion. I would like to read once again my statement this morning. I said: "You cannot deny that to restrict the right of both sides to deal with their facilities within Korea during the armistice is an interference in the internal affairs of both sides; but you assert that such interference is being carried out by your side with your military forces and that therefore you would continue to interfere in our internal affairs during the armistice. Such a theory of bellicose elements, smelling of blood, is too absurd to deserve a refutation. You should know that you are unable to interfere in our internal affairs even while you are carrying out a wanton bombings and bombardments and creating wide-spread destruction with your military force. Yet you now attempt to gain through negotiations what you are unable to gain by military force. I tell you frankly that you will never get what you have failed to gain by military force." In the above I have reread a passage from my statement this morning. As for the other arguments in your statement just now, there is not a single one of them which has not been refuted by us many times; and, particularly, since we have submitted

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) our revised proposal this morning and made a statement summing up the situation, if you would make a careful study of them, you will discover as to what an extent we have been making efforts toward an armistice. I would like to quote a saying in the Orient that "We have reached the end of our journey in passing many mountains and rivers." It is now up to your action to show whether you are willing to have a realization of armistice and to have progress in this subcommittee on Item 3 of the agenda. We have only one word to say, that is, we have done our part in making efforts.

If you have nothing else to say, I suggest we recess until tomorrow at the usual time.

GEN TURNER: I agree to recess until tomorrow at the usual time; but before we recess, I should like to make just one further observation.

In your statement this morning, and again this afternoon, you said: "I tell you frankly that you will never gain by negotiations what you have failed to gain by military force." I have stated previously, on several occasions, that we entertain no hope of gaining through negotiations what we are unable to attain during hostilities. I stated that as long as hostilities continued you would not be able to rehabilitate or construct airfields in North Korea; that should you during hostilities attempt such rehabilitation or construction, you would find the air hereabouts fraught with danger and that you would find your efforts disintegrating. Such conditions will continue to prevail up to the date of the signing of the armistice. This is a reality that exists today; it is not something that we are attempting to gain through negotiations. If our negotiations are successful, and I sincerely hope they will be, upon the singing of the armistice you will gain an immunity from the bombing of your airfields. We will give further study to your proposal of this morning and the amplifying remarks make on it. We shall attempt to sift out of your amplifying remarks any new thought which you may have expressed. But as I told you this morning, at first study it

GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) appears that most of your amplifying remarks would bear no need for refutation. They were pure propaganda and could have far better been turned over directly to your controlled press.

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While we are studying your revision of these principles, I suggest that you study further our proposal of 29 December with its amplifying remarks.

I agree to recess until tomorrow at 1100.

GEN HSIEH: I have rejected your 29 December proposal many, many times, and yet you still advanced such a ridiculous argument as you just made, which has also been refuted by our side. I suggest that you make a careful study of our proposal and statement today.

Meeting recessed at 1428 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

10 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-seventh Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

GEN TURNER: After giving further study to your proposal of 9 January and your amplifying remarks, we arrived at the same conclusion that we did after our preliminary study: Your proposal of 9 January is unacceptable to the United Nations Command because of your failure to include in your proposal a restriction on rehabilitating military airfields.

The issue of military airfields is the principal obstacle to solution of Agenda Item 3, if not to the advent of an armistice. The people of the world desire an armistice in Korea, they are anxious that there be an early end to the bloodshed and suffering which must continue until an armistice becomes effective. Therefore the attention of all those who hope for peace is fixed on this issue — military airfields — which continues to block progress toward an armistice.

With this thought in mind let us reflect on the attitudes taken by each side. The United Nations Command insists that there must be no rehabilitation of military airfields on either side during the period of armistice, since there must be no great increase of military

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GEN TURNER:
(cont'd)

capabilities on either side. The United Nations Command explained that its position arises from profound concern for the security of our forces during armistice, and for the stability of the armistice itself. The United Nations Command position is positive, firm, and based upon the certainty that a great increase of military capabilities on either side during armistice would threaten both the security of the forces and the stability of the armistice.

Your side, again and again, has stated that while you oppose the United Nations Command view that military airfields should not be rehabilitated, your position is that you may or may not rehabilitate these military airfields. Thus your position wavers and is uncertain. And with such an uncertain intent, revealing clearly an uncertain need, you continue to delay progress toward an armistice.

The need of the United Nations Command for security for its forces, for stability for the armistice, is not an uncertain need. It is a need which arises clear and definite from the nature of a state of armistice. Your need, however, to rehabilitate military airfields is plainly uncertain: you say you may, and yet again you may not, rehabilitate these military airfields.

The people of the world have already judged this question. They see that the need for a stable armistice is a concrete, unwavering necessity. They see that your need for military airfields is obscure, and described as uncertain by your side. Thus the people have concluded that where a clear and definite need is opposed by an uncertain one, the uncertainty must make way for the necessity. It is plain, therefore, that your side must give up your uncertain demand to "maybe or maybe not"

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GEN TURNER: (Con'd) develop military airfields during the period of armistice.

GEN HSIEH: In your statement you cannot but admit that the question of restriction of military facilities, that is, the question of airfields, has become the principal obstacle in this conference. It is an obstacle not only during the discussion of Item 3 of the Agenda, but even in the way of the advent of an armistice. Such a statement from your mouth indicates that you yourselves have come to realize the seriousness of this question, yet you have not found, or you refuse to recognize, the origin of this obstacle.

I will now point out the origin of this obstacle. The creation of this obstacle is exactly because of your efforts; and this can be called the greatest effort you have been making during these discussions. You said that you have proposed to restrict the rehabilitation of airfields for the security of your troops and for the stability of the armistice, but these are only the excuses you have gone out of the way to produce. The substance of your intention is to interfere in our internal affairs, an objective which you have tried to cover up and which you dare not to make public before the world. You asserted that our opposition to your unreasonable demand indicates that we intend to increase our military capabilities. That is a misrepresentation and a slander. What we are concerned in is not airfields but rather the upholding of our sovereign rights and the inviolability of our internal affairs. It is exactly because of your obstinate insistence on interfering in our internal affairs that we must not give up the slightest permission for you to interfere in our internal affairs.

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

I want to point out clearly, once again, that the major question yet to be resolved between your side and our side is, in substance, the question of your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs through these negotiations; and what our side is firmly against is exactly your attempt at interfering in our internal affairs. This is an issue not to be confused. All the people on our side and all the commanders and fighters on our side know exactly the nature of this issue. We have been fighting, we have been bleeding, for more than a year for what objective? Our objective is to uphold our sovereign rights and the inviolability of our internal affairs. That is the clear cause for which we have been fighting and these efforts on our part must yield its proper result. I advise you not to forget this statement of mine.

I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the discussions of Item 3 of the agenda has been going on for more than forty days and we have six principles in mind; of these six principles, the first three have already been settled; and about the next three principles, after our side submitted our proposal yesterday they have already been given a complete and reasonable solution. Therefore, our side considers that now we have done all the efforts which we should do, and we have traveled all the journey we should travel. If you think that there is still an obstacle yet to be resolved, then, as I pointed out, this obstacle is created by your side; and since it was created by your side, it is yet up to you to remove it. Now is the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) time for your side to show whether you are indeed willing to have an advent of an armistice; because, as you yourselves admit, this obstacle is now in the way of the advent of an armistice. It is now entirely up to you. I don't know what your side is going to do, but I must tell you that the longer you insist on this obstacle, the longer you are delaying the armistice negotiations and postponing the realization of an armistice.

I merely call your attention to this fact. I repeat, that unless your side intends to delay and to disrupt the negotiations, you should pay attention to the fact that the more you go down on that track, the less able you will be to return, and you will not be able to retrack.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, General Hsieh, it is of course obvious that the sole issue which stands between us and settlement of Item 3 of the agenda is the question of military airfields. Both sides have presented many arguments on this subject. To our way of thinking, your arguments reduce to a single theme — that is, sovereign rights. Now, if you will, follow our line of reasoning on this question for a few moments.

This armistice we seek to achieve is to be a <u>military</u> armistice, an armistice reached between the military commanders in the field. Thus our <u>discussions</u> should confine themselves to those matters within the authority of the military commanders. Our <u>agreements</u> <u>must</u> confine themselves to the authority of the military commanders. Now, is the matter of sovereignty a military or a political concept? Of course it is political.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

Sovereignty is the authority of the state, purely a political authority which accrues to the legitimate government of a state and which has its application in a vast multitude of ways. The exercise of authority over territory and adjacent waters, imports and exports, the determination of the size and nature of national armed forces, the making and enforcing of laws, the imposition and collection of taxes, the maintenance of order, visas and passports — these are among the many aspects of sovereign rights. They are clearly political matters to be determined at the highest legislative, judicial, and executive level of the state. They are clearly beyond the legitimate interests of military commanders in the field. The broad question of sovereignty, therefore, is beyond the scope of this conference. Now at this point you will be thinking, I feel reasonably sure, that because sovereignty is beyond the scope of this conference is precisely the reason why your side opposes limitation of military airfields. You would say that such restriction as the United Nations Command proposes to place on rehabilitation of military airfields is a violation of sovereign rights, hence unacceptable and inappropriate. But we think there is a serious gap in such reasoning. Permit me to point it out.

First, your side is willing to agree not to increase your military capabilities during armistice. Now, as I have pointed out, the size and nature of national armed forces is a determination which is clearly within the concept of sovereignty. Yet your side raises no objection to this abridgement of sovereignty. Second, on many

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

occasions your side has expressed willingness to agree that all foreign forces be dispatched promptly from the territory under your control. Certainly the entry and exit of foreign forces is a matter clearly impinging on the sovereign rights of the state controlling the territory entered or departed from. Yet you are willing to submit the question of withdrawal of foreign forces and entry of foreign forces to agreement at this conference. Third, your side has suggested that foreign nationals be stationed at certain points in the territory of both sides in order to observe. You have agreed that other groups of foreign nationals shall have the right to proceed to any place within your territory where a violation of the armistice agreement has been reported. Certainly entry of foreign nationals into your territory for the purpose of conducting an investigation falls within the province of sovereignty. Yet your side accepts this abrogation of sovereignty, as does our side.

It should be clear, therefore, that in certain respects your side has accepted, has even suggested, certain abrogations of normal sovereignty. When we come to the question of airfields, however, your side says it cannot accept this particular abrogation of sovereignty. Here is an inconsistency of view. Let us examine into the causes.

First, what is the fundamental nature of the abrogations of normal sovereignty to which both sides agree? We note that all such agreements have to do with military capabilities and the effectiveness, the stability, of the

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

armistice. As a general matter, therefore, your side and ours agree to certain abrogations of normal sovereignty when such abrogations have direct connection with military capabilities and are in the interests of a stable, effective armistice. The criteria to apply to this issue of military airfields, then, are two: (1) Are military airfields an element of military capabilities? (2) Is the restriction of development of military airfields conducive to a more stable and effective armistice? If the answers to these two questions are both "Yes", then on the basis of the record of our past actions, you should offer no more objections on the grounds of sovereignty.

I will not take time to argue that a military airfield is an element of military capabilities. That would be wringing the utmost out of a foregone conclusion. I know you realize that is true, as do all people of the world, military or civilian.

Likewise, any rational person realizes that for either side or both sides to be busily developing military airfields during a period of armistice cannot but give rise to anxiety, distrust, and tension. Thus, it is clear that restriction of the development of military airfields on either side is definitely conducive to a more stable armistice.

In other words, our agreed criteria do fit military airfields, General Hsieh. Therefore, if you would be consistent with yourself, logic compels you to abandon opposition to restraints on the development of military airfields during armistice. I feel sure you recognize that this is true. I feel sure such recognition of the truth is the reason you have evaded previous questions

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) regarding airfields. But such evasions can serve no longer. We are face to face with the issue, and it must be resolved on grounds of logic. It is obvious that such phrases as "sovereign rights" and "internal affairs" cannot support the position of your side. Upon close inspection they fall apart, revealing the simple question of military airfields, a question which is appropriate to this conference and which must be solved by this conference. With this single issue remaining to be solved, the people of the world will watch to see whether both sides are willing to attempt to resolve it on a basis of reason. If either side departs from logic, from military facts, the world will know how to judge and whom to blame for delaying the advent of armistice.

GEN HSIEH: Your side just made a statement, the latter part of which contradicts with its first part. At the beginning, you talked about authority of commanders of both sides, and said that our negotiations should be confined within the authorities of the commanders and should not touch upon questions of internal affairs. But in the latter part, every question you have raised, you asserted to be interference in the internal affairs. This reminds me of the fact that during the discussion of the agenda, when your side refused to discuss the question of withdrawal of foreign forces proposed by our side, your side had argued that your Commander-in-Chief was not authorized to talk about this. And yet up till now your side is insisting on interfering in our internal affairs, and it seems that your Commander-in-Chief is again authorized — this time to talk about political questions of interfering

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) in our internal affairs. Therefore, it is not only your statements which are inconsistent with themselves, but even the so-called authority of your Commander-in-Chief is insonsistent. Your actions are inconsistent as I pointed out, but in your inconsistency I find something consistent. That is, your ulterior motive, which is, in fact, already known to everybody; and you are merely trying to deceive yourselves and deceive other people. This objective — this reason — is that your side is fundamentally reluctant to see the realization of an armistice. The arguments you raised in your statement just now are arguments you have raised before, and they have met with our refutation every time. Particularly in my statement of summing up the situation on Item 3 of the agenda, I have thoroughly refuted all the absurd arguments of yours. If you think it necessary, I can repeat passages of my statement yesterday. If you find it unnecessary, then I will refrain from doing so.

GEN TURNER: I think it quite unnecessary for you to repeat anything that you said yesterday.

Have you anything new to say?

GEN HSIEH: No!

GEN TURNER: Will you haveanything further this afternoon?

GEN HSIEH: No!

GEN TURNER: Your last statement makes it plain that you have not understood General Ferenbaugh's statement. I will say no more in this regard until you have had an opportunity to study and digest his statement. I suggest we recess until tomorrow.

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GEN HSIEH: Please study this passage in my statement yesterday which sufficiently refutes your statement just now. I will tell my interpreter to read this passage.

(Chinese Communist Interpreter reads following statement).

"You have gone a step further along this absurd argument and talked about the inevitable loss of some sovereign rights through an armistice. You even argued that by agreeing to undertake not to introduce into Korea any military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles and ammunition and by agreeing to invite representatives of neutral nations to conduct inspection at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides, our side has in fact already agreed to your interference in our internal affairs. This absurd line of reasoning proves that you are deliberately covering up the fact that the restriction on introduction of any military forces into Korea and the conduct of supervision by neutral nations which are not related to the Korean war are in themselves measures to ward off interference in the internal affairs of Korea by foreign forces. Our proposal strictly distinguishes between the external relations and the internal affairs of Korea. It is the only possible solution capable of ensuring a stable armistice without involving the question of interference in the internal affairs of both sides."

Your long statement this morning shows clearly that you have not made a good study of our proposal and the statement yesterday. I hope that you will further study them.

I agree to recess.

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Meeting recessed at 1223 hours

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

11 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-eighth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Do you have anything to say?

GEN HSIEH: No.

GEN TURNER: Your spurious tune of yesterday was the same old monotony we have heard for so many days. It had not one new note, not one new sound of effort to solve the difference between us on Agenda Item 3. On the other hand, our side tried to bring harmony into the discussion by discussing not only "sovereign rights" and the so-called "interference in your internal affairs" in connection with military capabilities, but also the aspects of the obstacle now standing in the way of agreement on basic principles of Item 3.

We are here again today in an effort to dissolve this obstacle which you claim our side originated. Yes, we introduced the necessity of restriction on rehabilitation of airfields. It is a safeguard of the armistice. I must remind you that the origin of the logical principle that there should be observation in the rear of both sides was also the United Nations Command. These ideas became obstacles to progress when your side unreasonably opposed them. But a solution was reached on the observation issue. Both sides agreed to inspection in their rear because it is essential to an effective armistice. Likewise, no increase

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) in military capabilities by both sides is essential. Therefore, the United Nations Command will continue its efforts to incorporate this principle in the armistice agreement.

Our position now on this issue is identical to our firm stand at the beginning of discussions of Agenda Item 3. This is why. Your side indicated as early as December 2nd that you intend to rehabilitate your system of airfields. On that date, December 2nd, your Senior Delegate made this statement: "I can assure Admiral Joy that the Korean people will certainly reconstruct and reinforce their airfields during the period of military armistice so as to prevent the possibility of any further wanton bombing of your side and to safeguard the security of their armed forces." Yesterday, as well as on many previous occasions, you stated, General Hsieh, that our assertion that you intended to increase your military capabilities by building airfields was a misrepresentation and slander; thus, what General Nam Il said on December 2nd and what you said on January 10th are completely contradictory. Which statement are we to believe? Will you please reconcile these contradictions. I await an answer.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement this morning only serves to prove that you do not intend to see an armistice in Korea, that you aren't willing to make any sincere efforts in these negotiations. I repeat, once again, that in order to ensure a stable armistice, our side has already successively submitted our clear proposal; and there is, in our proposal—in every one of our proposals—a fundamental idea and fundamental stand. That is, since the Korean was was extended because there was involved in it many foreign military forces, therefore, the fundamental means of preventing the resumption of hostilities is the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and at least there should be prohibition of the continued introduction into Korea during the armistice of all

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) foreign military forces. There are no means better than this to ensure an armistice.

Your excuse of limiting our facilities—that is, your question of airfields—is, in substance, an interference in our internal affairs. And as I have unmistakably told you many times, any form of interference in our internal affairs absolutely will not be tolerated by our side and will not be allowed to be incorporated in any agreement reached through these negotiations. As for the question of whether our side will install or not install during the hostilities or during the armistice this kind or that kind of facilities, it entirely depends on our own needs and we have a perfect right to deal with this because it is our internal affairs. You have no right at all to interfere with it, and we absolutely will not negotiate this point in these negotiations. You should stop indulging in any such hope unless you do not wish to carry on these negotiations.

You said that our objections to your such demand is the origin of the obstacles. I tell you that we have firmly objected to your July 27th proposal. We have objected to your unreasonable demand for the Kaesong area. During the discussion of Item 2 of the agenda on fixing the military demarcation line, we have also resolutely opposed your stand. Thus, it is not for you to say that because we have rejected your unreasonable demand, therefore we have produced obstacles. There does exist an obstacle, but it does not originate from our reasonable and fair stand in opposing your unreasonable demands. You should not confuse these issues, and reverse right and wrong. You should be responsible for the obstacle in this conference.

GEN TURNER: I asked you a simple question, General Hsieh. I stated that General Nam Il's statement of December 2nd and your statement of January 10th were contradictory. I asked you if you could

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) reconcile these differences. You have seen fit to make a statement which is only further propaganda. I wish now to have an answer to my question. Can you reconcile the difference between your Senior Delegate's statement and your own? I await an answer.

If you need more time in which to prepare your answer, or if you need more time to study the record of what your Senior Delegate said and what you have previously stated, we are willing to await your convenience. But to this question we must have an answer. It is highly pertinent to the question of airfields.

GEN HSIEH: Do not play here these delaying tactics. I assure you that there is no contradiction between the statement of our Senior Delegate of December 2nd, which you have referred to, and every statement made by our sub-delegation sitting here. We are here under the instructions of our Senior Delegate, and in our statements and in the statement of our Senior Delegate of December 2nd there is the fundamental point, that is, whether our side will install or not install this kind or that kind of facilities during the hostilities or the during the armistice is a matter of our internal affairs and your side has no right to look into it.

GEN TURNER: You have not answered my question. Our sieve is becoming clogged, we are unable to sift out an answer to my question from the propaganda which you place in all of your attempted answers. If you have nothing more to present, then I suggest we reconvene tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: It seems that your side needs time. I agree to recess till tomorrow. But I must tell you that I have clearly and explicitly answered your question. It is only that my answer does not fit your unreasonable demand. I assure you, once again,

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) that your side will never get a satisfactory answer from our side in order to meet your unreasonable demand.

Meeting recessed at 1138 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

12 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-ninth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, LTCOL J W Thames, USA, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; SR CAPT Kim Soon Kwan, NKN, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to say?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN TURNER: Yesterday I called your attention to the fact that your Senior Delegate stated your side certainly would reconstruct military airfields during the armistice so as to increase the security of your forces. In other words, your Senior Delegate announced your definite intention to rebuild military airfields during the period of the armistice for a definite military purpose, increasing your military capabilities by so doing. On the other hand, you deny that your side has a definite intention to rebuild military airfields, saying you may or may not reconstruct airfields, and that your purpose is not a military one, but merely the maintenance of your sovereign rights. Thus, you and your Senior Delegate have expressed directly conflicting concepts. One of you, necessarily, is misrepresenting the intentions, the purposes, and the interests of your side. Since such a difference of intent exists in statements made by you and your Senior Delegate, will you now give a clear and definite statement of your present intent regarding military airfields during the period of armistice?

GEN HSIEH: You merely repeated your question of yesterday morning, and I already clearly answered your question yesterday morning. But I can repeat my answer.

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

Our position and stand regarding the question is clearly shown in every one of our statements and every one of our proposals. Our stand is consistent throughout and there is no contradiction in our statements. The fundamental point is that we consider that whether during the hostilities or during the armistice our side will proceed with or not proceed with this kind or that kind of facilities is entirely a question of our internal affairs; a question which, in these military armistice negotiations, your side has no right to look into. That is our consistent, firm, and unshakable stand. As for the question of how we could ensure that the military capabilities of both sides would not be increased during the armistice, so as to ensure the stability of the armistice in expectation of the political conference of a higher level to achieve a thorough settlement of the Korean question--on this question, we have already advanced our proposals, which you are familiar with, and you should not misinterpret, and even less, distort them; that is, our proposed principles of strictly prohibiting the introduction into Korea during the armistice of reinforcing war equipments, including combat aircraft and armored vehicles. This principle of ours is stemmed from the fundamental conception, as we have repeatedly explained, that the Korean war was extended because foreign forces were involved in it. Therefore, if we want to prevent the resumption of hostilities after the realization of an armistice, we should, as a fundamental measure, withdraw all the foreign forces from Korea. However, your side was against this thorough and reasonable stand of ours. Therefore, we agreed that as a least condition we should limit the introduction of reinforcing military equipments and military units into Korea. And you should be aware that if your side will strictly carry out this principle, then you should rest assured that the military capabilities of both sides would not be increased so as to change

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the situation--the military situation during the armistice. In other words, the armistice will be stabilized. Therefore, your side should not have the slightest doubt or excuse to attempt to reach your ulterior motive of interfering in our internal affairs. That is, to gain something in our internal affairs, something which you have failed to gain through the hostilities, or to gain the results of discussion of political questions in these military conferences while evading the responsibility for calling a political conference after the armistice--doing these things under the pretext of restricting the increase of military capabilities of both sides , or of restricting our right to proceed with or not to proceed with any facilities.

I think I cannot make it clearer as to what the present intention and position of our side is. If your side is really willing to achieve an armistice, I believe the settling of this question--whether it will be early or late--is now entirely up to you.

GEN TURNER: Your statement, boiled down, is to the effect that you cannot reconcile the difference of intent expressed by your Senior Delegate on one hand, and by yourself on the other.

The United Nations Command has made previously a very clear and firm statement of intent regarding airfields during armistice. You refused to do so for your side, thus you deliberately cloak in confused statements your attitude toward the single issue before us.

So long as you continue that attitude, it can hardly be expected that progress can be made on the subject of airfields. We can only conclude that your side is uncertain regarding its position on airfields. Our postion, on the other hand, is very clear.

I would now like to have you express your present clear position with regard to your intent on airfields during armistice.

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GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

GEN TURNER: Yes.

GEN HSIEH: It is obvious that I have answered your question both yesterday and this morning, and my answer this morning is a repetition of what I said yesterday. And yet you still assert that we have not answered your question or have not given you a clear answer. What answer are you really expecting? Do you expect that I would answer in this way: "Well, come and interfere in our internal affairs. You are welcome." If you are expecting such an answer, then as I have said before, and I say it again, you will never get such an answer. If you would like me to repeat my previous statement, then I am willing to do so.

You just said that if our side continues to oppose restriction on airfields, then there will be no progress on this question; that is, you will continue to insist on this only existing difference between your side and our side on Item 3 of the agenda--you will insist on your interference in our internal affairs. According to my view, you had better say that if we should take such an attitude, armistice will not be realized, rather than say that the question of airfields would not be settled. What is your opinion?

GEN TURNER: Now General Hsieh, I ask you to reconcile the difference between your Senior Delegate's statement of December 2nd and your statement of January 10th. You say that there is no difference in your statements. Your Senior Delegate stated on December 2nd: "I can assure you, Admiral Joy, that the Korean people will certainly"--repeat, certainly--"reconstruct and reinforce their airfields during the period of armistice so as to prevent the possibility of any further wanton bombing by your side and safeguard the security of their armed forces." Now that was a very clear statement by your Senior Delegate. Is that still your expression of intent today with regard to the airfield question?

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GEN HSIEH: You are merly playing your old tricks and repeating your old question. I have already answered your question and I refer you to the record.

Now I want to call your attention to one fact, that is, that since our side submitted our proposal of 9 January, our side has been watching closely your real intentions and your attitude in these negotiations. We have no intentions to interfere with your willingness or your unwillingness to reach an armistice. However, your attitude both inside the conference and outside of it for the past few days reminded me of a statement I made in the morning of January 10th. I said then to such effect: "If you recognize that there is only one question left on Item 3 of the agenda, that is, the question of your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs, then we have already repeatedly and directly told your side, as well as the people of the whole world, our firm and unshakable stand on this question". And I also advised your side "not to go too far along your track, lest you will not be able to retract, unless of course your side is deliberately trying to delay and disrupt the negotiations." When I recall this statement of mine, I believe that statement still stands and has its meaning.

I have nothing else to say at present.

GEN TURNER: Do you consider <u>that</u> a clear answer to my question?

GEN HSIEH: I have already answered that many times.

GEN TURNER: It is obvious that until we can get a clear expression from your side on the matter of airfields, no progress can be made in these negotiations. If you have no further answers to give this morning or no new questions to bring up, let us reconvene tomorrow at the usual time.

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GEN HSIEH: It seems that your side is intentionally playing the tricks of delaying and balking progress in our armistice negotiations. Your side of course has the privilege to do so. I call your attention once again to my statement just now, that is, to my last statement.

We agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1150 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

13 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fortieth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Do you have any logical and substantive matters which you would like to bring out this morning? If so, please proceed.

GEN HSIEH: Our side submitted, on January 9th, an entirely fair and reasonable solution of the last two differences left on Item 3 of the agenda, and we have also explained our proposal many times, over and over again. We have nothing more to say now.

GEN FERENBAUGH: We have again studied your proposal of January 9th with exacting care. It serves only to illuminate with even greater harshness our sole major difference--airfields.

We have sifted your amplifying remarks concerning your revised proposal through the finest filter known--truth and logic. Alas, nothing remains. Your amplifying statement was indeed merely a vehicle transporting propaganda to your controlled press.

Nonetheless, your revised proposal is a short step forward. It is so in two distinct fashions:

Firstly, it recognizes the logical and mutual necessity of "replenishment";

Secondly, and most importantly, it demonstrates, to a small but significant degree, the rebirth of the proper negotiating attitude.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) It demonstrates that you can be moved by equity, logic and reality. It is my sincere hope that you will continue to cultivate this attitude to match the United Nations Command's ever-present spirit and determination to heed logic, to recognize realities, to face facts and to realize, thus, an honorable and effective military armistice.

It is obvious that the fostering of this spirit, the burden of which the United Nations Command cannot carry alone, will yield immediate results.

Let us, then, heed logic, recognize realities, face facts, and work toward an effective military armistice by discussing airfields in these military armistice negotiations in the light of their military capabilities.

Let me illustrate. You have many times made the incredibly irrational statement that the United Nations Command seeks to gain through negotiations an ability to interfere in your internal affairs which it could not gain through combat, Now, of course, we and all the world merely translate your words "internal affairs" and "sovereignty" into "military airfields". Therefore what you are saying is that the United Nations Command seeks to put your military airfields out of commission by an agreement reached in these negotiations, and that the United Nations Command has been unable to render your airfields inoperative during hostilities. There could be no more complete reversal of truth, no more flagrant example of upside-down thinking. First, as all the world knows, your military airfields are inoperative now as a result of United Nations Command air attacks. Therefore, the United Nations Command is merely seeking to extend, by means of an agreement, a condition of affairs which exists now and is the result of United Nations Command military action. Sometimes your statements regarding airfields are so totally at variance with the facts that I wonder whether you are being

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) deceived and misinformed by your own people. You assert that you have been fighting more than a year to prevent the United Nations Command from interfering with your airfields. Be that as it may, General Hsieh, your airfields have been rendered inoperative by United Nations Command aircraft. How can you lose what you do not have? How can you fail to gain by a proposal which substitutes words for bombs, and at the same time, applies a restriction on United Nations Command airfields which you have never been able to effect through military action? Quite seriously, General Hsieh, I suggest that you survey the condition of your airfields at present. You would be overwhelmingly convinced that you have nothing to lose in agreeing not to rehabilitate military airfields during the period of the armistice. By way of contrast, I would be glad to escort you to the major United Nations airfields in Korea, so that you may see with your own eyes the expansion and improvement which is proceeding without interference from your side. Do you dare to face these facts? If you did, you would not so insult your own intelligence as to contend further that the United Nations Command proposal of restricting rehabilitation of military airfields is unfair or unreasonable.

GEN HSIEH: After listening carefully to your statement, the impression I have got is that you have not advanced any new or logical reasons to support your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs. You merely repeated what your side has been saying inside and outside of the conference. You assert that your statements are based on logic and military reality, but you cannot merely raise these hollow words to say that you are really carrying out the negotiations with logic and on the basis of military reality. Your statements must be compared with your actual actions. It is only when your statements are consistent with your actions that they can persuade us or make us believe you. Otherwise you cannot.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

You said that you would take the military reality as your basis. Let us, then, have a look at the military reality in the Korean battlefields. The reality existing today is that the forces of both sides are approximately balanced; this is a fact which even your side cannot but admit, and it is a just fact. However, I must point out that this situation is also undergoing constant change and the change is going along the direction of advantage to our side. You said that you would respect logic and recognize military reality; that is, the fact that at present there is a balance of military forces on both sides. Then no matter whether in these military armistice negotiations or in any other negotiations, your side cannot take any attitude except that of equality and reciprocity. In other words, your side can have no justification whatsoever to continue to insist on your unilateral and absolutely unfair and unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs under the pretext of restricting the rehabilitation of airfields.

Your side frequently employs the term of "a fair and reasonable and honorable armistice", but what is your real intention? As I have pointed out many times previously, what you call "a fair and reasonable and honorable armistice" is for you to sit on top of other people's heads and you know very well that your side has not acquired this privilege and you will never acquire this privilege. Although in your words you frequently employ the terms "reasonable logic" and "military reality", your actual actions are always contradictory to your words, as I have pointed out in the above. You have merely misinterpreted these two scientific terms "reasonable logic" and "military reality" to your one-sided advantage.

During the period of hostilities, both sides have sufficient freedom to carry out any kind of facilities. You say your side has the freedom. Our side, too, has the freedom. You said that

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

during the hostilities you have, with your military force, been able to carry out destruction and to restrict our installation of military facilities; but our side has also resolutely struggled against such attempts of yours at destruction. That is the fact in the Korean war ever since the war began. You said that you have sufficient belief in your own military force and you even bragged about it. You have entire freedom to do so, but you yourselves are aware that such bragging is lacking basis in reality. If the facts are really as what you have boasted, how is it that our side has come to negotiate at this table? How is it that our troops have withstood your attacks, and even won victory? It proves that the degree of truthfulness of your boast that your military force can, through destruction, limit our facilities is very slight indeed.

As for the question of installing or not installing this kind or that kind of facilities during the period of armistice, it is a question entirely belonging to the internal affairs. Even your side has admitted, in your previous statements, that military facilities are a question of internal affairs. Since this is a question of internal affairs and your side clearly knows it yourselves, since you sometimes admit that there does exist a balance of military forces on both sides, and since you frequently paid lip service to the principle that both sides should talk here on a basis of equality and reciprocity, how is it that you can still insist upon reaching your objective of interfering in our internal affairs through these negotiations? It is obvious that your statements do not count and your statements contradict your own actions. Therefore, the longer and the more you insist upon your unreasonable demand, the more you render us doubtful with regard to your intention toward the negotiations and with regard to any sincerity you have toward the realization of an armistice.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) You said that our January 9th proposal is only a short step forward. I cannot but point out that you have underestimated and failed to recognize it as it is. As I have explained many times before, this proposal represents the greatest effort that that our side can make, and we have gone the farthest way we can go.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, I have a compound question. I say that it is compound in order to prevent any impression that you may have that I am trying to trick you into an answer.

Outside of your statement that the question of constructing or not constructing military airfields is a matter of internal affairs and/or of sovereign rights, is it your intent to use them for offensive purposes? If your answer is "Yes", then why do you seek an armistice? Why not a cease-fire? If your answer is "No", just what purpose will they serve?

Is the question entirely clear?

GEN HSIEH: On December 3rd our side submitted two additional recommendations. One of them provides for strict prohibition of introduction into Korea of any military forces, and the other provides that in order to ensure the strict implementation of this principle, neutral nations should be invited to form a supervisory organ to supervise and inspect at such ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides. When these two additional recommendations were submitted, your side could not but admit, on the spot, that these two recommendations could serve for the basis of a possible agreement between both sides on Item 3 of the agenda.

Since that was the case, what reason could your side have to question our sincerity toward an armistice and suspect that we are sincere only in a cease-fire. We consider that unless your side does not have the same objective as ours, unless you would not gurantee the implementation of these two additional recommendations, then there is no reason to deny the fact that our

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

proposal has already provided sufficient conditions for ensuring an effective and stable armistice, because our proposal is based upon the characteristics of the Korean war. That is, there is involved in it military forces of many foreign countries. We consider that if only there is thorough limitation of continued introduction of reinforcing military forces into Korea, then the armistice will be realized and ensured. That is a point which your side should have no doubt about.

As for the question of installing or not installing this kind or that kind of facilities, including airfields, within Korea during the armistice, it is a question which the military armistice negotiations have no right discussing. You asked, "let us leave aside the question of internal affairs and sovereign rights. Would your side rehabilitate airfields for an offensive purpose?" We have explained many, many times that what our side is concerned in is the first part of your question, that is, in internal affairs and in sovereign rights.

As to the latter part of your question, we may proceed with such installation or we may not proceed with such installation. But exactly because it is a question of internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state, we have expressed our firm and unshakable stand innumerable times that we absolutely will not tolerate any interference in this regard.

Your side is also aware that this question is, in substance, a question of internal affairs and sovereign rights. Yet you intentionally asked us to leave the question of internal affairs and sovereign rights alone. You asked us not to think about them, not to fear. But how can our side do so? Can it be that you are still not aware of our position? On the one hand, you intentionally insist upon the demand to interfere in our internal affairs, and yet, on the other hand, you attempt to induce us to forget internal affairs and sovereign rights. Is that not a way

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) of doing that which is only deceiving yourselves and trying to deceive other people? I tell you our side will never take such a course. We will never deceive ourselves and try to deceive other people. We have clearly told your side our firm stand; and we have also, openly and innumerable times , made public our stand on this point to the whole world. It is exactly because your side for more than forty days made interminable efforts to raise this question of your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs that you have produced a very deep impression in our mind. And once more your side raises this question. You can only deepen more the impression in our mind and, at the same time, sharpen our vigilance.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I shall read your answer very carefully. I feel, however, that it will be very difficult to make heads or tails out of it.

GEN HSIEH: I believe you can find meaning in my statement if you give sufficient time to study it. Indeed, our stand is very clear.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything else?

GEN HSIEH: No.

GEN TURNER: Will you have anything else this afternoon?

GEN HSIEH: No.

GEN TURNER: Then let's reconvene tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1212 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

14 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-first Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegate; COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL D M Cairns, USAF, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Turner will be absent today. I have a statement to make.

From the beginning of these negotiations the words of your spokesmen have been to the effect that your side desires a just and stable armistice. Since the beginning of these negotiations the actions of your side have steadily and consistently exposed your desire for a cease-fire rather than an armistice. Your first substantial effort in these negotiations was to attempt to achieve agreement to withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. Thus you sought to restore the unbalanced and unstable situation which existed when the war in Korea began. Your proposal was, in a word, that foreign forces simply cease firing and depart Korea. You gave no consideration to the fact that this would reproduce the explosive conditions of June 1950 which resulted in war. You gave no consideration to the stability of the armistice because you did not seek an armistice, you sought a cease-fire.

Your second substantial effort in these negotiations was to attempt to achieve agreement on the 38th Parallel as a line of demarcation. You proposed this solution knowing full well that the indefensible nature of such a line had tempted

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

aggression before and thus contributed to the outbreak of war in Korea. Your proposal gave no consideration to the need for stable defensive positions during armistice. Again, the reason is clear: you were not concerned with a stable armistice, you sought only a cease-fire.

Your third substantial effort was to attempt to block effective supervision and observation of the armistice. You objected to observers in the rear areas, though you realized such observation was conducive to the stability of the armistice. You had no interest in the stability of the armistice since you sought only a cease-fire.

Your fourth substantial effort in these negotiations was to attempt to prevent normal replacement and replenishment during the period of the armistice. Thus, you hoped to accomplish the withdrawal of forces from Korea by attrition. You made this effort despite the fact that replacement and replenishment are essential to a stable armistice. You were not concerned with the stability of the armistice because you were concerned only with a cease-fire.

Your fifth major effort is your current attempt to avoid restrictions on increases in military capabilities, specifically airfields, during the period of the armistice. It is obvious that such an increase in military capabilities as the development of airfields would not be conducive to the stability of the armistice. On the contrary the result would be anxiety, mistrust, and tension. But you are not concerned with the stability of the armistice. You are steadily, consistently, and obviously concerned only with a cease-fire. You have opposed every measure designed to produce a more stable armistice. You have given up your opposition to such measures only when it was plain that if you continued such opposition you could not gain the cease-fire you seek.

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GEN FERENBAUGH:
(Cont'd)

When the United Nations Command accuses your side of harboring ominous and threatening purposes to be executed during the period of the armistice, you indignantly state that your side is being slandered. But you cannot deny that all of your actions in these conferences have been designed to produce, not an armistice, but a cease-fire. You do not deny your intent to develop threatening military airfields during the period of armistice. You do not even deny an intent to use these airfields offensively.

As a matter of hypothesis, let us suppose that one of the two sides engaged in these conferences has discovered, in the course of combat, that its objective could not be achieved because of the lack of effective airpower. What could that side do? It could not develop airpower during hostilities, since its very lack of airpower enabled the other side to prevent this. In such a situation the side lacking airpower would require a cessation of hostilities—a period of exemption from air attack during which to develop airpower, particularly airfields. This being so, the side desiring to develop airpower would seek what kind of cessation of hostilities—a stable armistice which could lead to peace, or a cease-fire? Obviously, a simple cease-fire would suffice. During the course of the negotiations, the side desiring only a cease-fire in which to develop airpower could be expected to oppose all effective safeguards for an armistice, such as a defensible line of demarcation, adequate and thorough supervision and inspection, and the maintenance of the existing military balance. The side seeking to gain a cease-fire period in which to develop airpower could agree, however, to some watered-down safeguards if it becomes necessary to do so in order to obtain a cease-fire. These watered-down safeguards would be a nuisance, but they would in no way prevent the development of airfields—the

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

critical necessity. When the issue of military airfields was injected into the conference, as it naturally would be in a military armistice conference, the side seeking to develop airpower could be expected to oppose any restraint on the development of airfields. Airfields, after all, are the meat of the entire project. Hence, the side seeking a cease-fire in which to develop airpower could be expected to develop suddenly an extreme sensitivity regarding perhaps, sovereignty, or internal affairs, any thing at all which would ward off restrictions on military airfields. If this tactic succeeded and a cease-fire period was achieved, then the side with the offensive, aggressive intentions would quickly develop its airfields. At a chosen moment, using some pretext of a violation of the armistice, the armistice could be denounced. Military aircraft from foreign sources could be flown into the newly developed airfields at once, to add to those already waiting to be assembled. Thus, when hostilities were resumed, the side with the newly gained airpower should be in a far better position to pursue their aggressive designs with an excellent chance of initial success.

Now, based on the actions and attitudes of our two sides, which would you say fits that picture? I know, you know, and the world knows the answer. There is, however, one action that your side could take which would clearly overcome the evidence of your apparent desire to gain a cease-fire for the purpose of developing airpower. If you took this action it would be the only step ever taken by your delegation consistent with an intent to achieve a stable armistice. You could agree with the United Nations Command that there be no development of military airfields on either side during the armistice. When you take that step, the world will breathe easier, for you would have given your first positive indication of sincerity toward a

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) a stable armistice, and, therefore, toward peace. We continue to await such action on your part, in the fast fading hope that your side does not fit the picture I painted in the hypothesis. It is now yours.

GEN HSIEH: In your statement this morning, your side has only repeated those arguments which have already been refuted by our side many times. The absurdity of such argument of your side was clearly known to all the people of the world and there is no necessity for us to give any attention to such arguments of yours.

Rather than that, what interests us are the tactics your side has been employing for many days successively inside and outside of the conference, including your making such a statement this morning which also shows that you have continuously and intentionally been pursuing an ulterior motive which you wish to cover up.

With regard to the position of our side toward the military armistice negotiations and toward the entire Korean question, we have made clear our positions innumerable times, inside and outside of the conference, to your side as well as to the people throughout the world, and our positions are not to be distorted or slandered by your side. But in order to assure you once again that such tactics of yours distorting our position will not pass unanswered, I will repeat and restate once again the last part of our summing-up statement of January 9th:

"The truth of the facts definitely will not be changed by your distorted presentation. But in order to show how we have reached the agreements already agreed upon between both sides, and where, exactly, is the point of issue in the way of agreements yet to be reached, I find it necessary to review once again the course of discussions of Item 3 of the agenda.

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

"In order to ensure against resumption of hostilities in Korea after the armistice and to lay the foundation for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, our side constantly held that the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops, together with their equipment, should be discussed and settled in these Korean military armistice negotiations. But your side firmly refused to discuss this basic question, upon the argument that no political question should be touched upon at a military armistice conference—although everybody knows that withdrawal of foreign forces is not a political question, and that your refusal to discuss it is entirely unjustified.'

"However, in order to meet the wide-spread peaceful wish of the people of the world to stop the Korean war first of all, our side agreed to leave the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and their equipment to be discussed by a political conference of a higher level of both sides and to confine the Korean military armistice negotiations to matters of a strictly military nature. Since both sides agreed that after the realization of the Korean armistice there should be convened quickly a political conference of a higher level of both sides to discuss the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and their equipment, so as to achieve a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and since the Korean military armistice would only be a transitional state, our side considered that there was no necessity at all to discuss such an extensive question as the restriction on the increase of military capabilities of both sides when we proceeded to Item 3 of the agenda. That was why our side submitted our five principles for the realization of a purely military armistice."

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

"But your side made a complete reversal on your previous position that no political questions should be touched upon in a military negotiation and came out to insist upon discussing questions as extensive as the restriction on military capabilities of both sides and the conduct of the inspections in the rear of both sides. That was why we bogged down in a serious stalemate soon after we began the discussion of Item 3 of the agenda.

"Once again, in order to meet the wide-spread peaceful wish of the people of the world to stop the Korean war first of all, our side proposed that, in order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea, under any pretexts, any armed units and war equipment, including combat aircraft. We also proposed that inspection should be conducted by representatives of neutral nations at ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides. Any just person could see that these two additional recommendations of our side were absolutely fair and reasonable and that no fault could be found with them.

"Yet your side again insisted that rotation and replenishment must be carried out during the armistice, and insisted on the unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs by restricting airfield facilities. Then, in order to break the deadlock so as to speedily reach the realization of an armistice in Korea, our side again agreed to your demand on the question of rotation, agreed to specify explicitly in our version of principle 4 that both sides undertake not to introduce any combat aircraft into Korea during the armistice, and agreed on the question of supervision and that upon the request raised by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission to the neutral nations supervisory organ for an

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the neutral nations supervisory organ shall be responsible for conducting inspection so as to ensure a stable armistice. And now in this revised proposal of our side we have again agreed, within reasonable limits, to your requirements for carrying out during the armistice necessary replacement of war equipment.

"All just and impartial people of the world will recognize in the above-stated series of concrete proposals of ours the great efforts which our side has made for the realization of the Korean armistice. The sincerity and good faith of our side is absolutely not to be clouded by any fabrication or slander made by your side in this tent. But, on the other hand, if you should interpret the efforts made by our side in order to reach an armistice as a sign of weakness, you would be mistaken. Any demand to interfere in our internal affairs is absolutely impermissable. This is our unshakable—I repeat, unshakable--stand."

I have once again, and formally, stated the position of our side toward the realization of an armistice in Korea and recounted our concrete actions and our firm and unshakable stand. Our January 9th proposal is the greatest effort on our part toward the early realization of an armistice; that is, we have, by these efforts of ours, solved completely and reasonably the two major disagreements left over on Item 3 of the agenda. And in order to call your attention to the progress of the discussions, our side has repeated twice, on January 10th and January 12th, a similiar and important statement. We say that our proposal of January 9th should be recognized as a complete and reasonable settlement of all the questions still existing on Item 3 of the agenda. If your side should still think that there is one more question left, that would

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

be the question of your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs under the pretext of limiting facilities. And we must solemnly state, as we have stated many times before, that this attempt of your side absolutely will not be realized.

Our side wishes to call to your attention that you must not go too far in your tactics, inside the conference or outside of it; that you must not let yourselves go down too deep in a quagmire, lest you will be unable to pull out your legs. If your side should have paid sufficient attention to that statement of ours repeated on January 10th and January 12th successively, it would be to the benefit of the realization of an armistice in Korea. However, your side has deliberately disregarded this statement of warning by our side, repeated twice.

Yesterday, your side intentionally dispatched groups of military aircraft to invade the air of the Northeastern part of the People's Republic of China to carry out provocative acts at Shenyang--that is, Mukden--Peng Chi, Fu Shung, Ching Yun, Hsinping, Hluan Hen, Chi An, Tung Hua, and Kuan Tien. By such actions you have gone to the utmost of your provocations, Could you say that such actions are your efforts toward the military armistice negotiations?

Our January 9th proposal is absolutely reasonable and fair to both sides,and even while your side dispatched military aircraft to carry on provocations against the Northeastern part of the People's Republic of China, you admitted in this conference that our proposal was a step forward and an indication of our sincerity toward an armistice. But by such provocative actions of yours on the same day when you could not but admit that our proposal of January 9th was a step forward and was an indication of our sincerity toward an armistice, you have revealed and exposed to the people of the whole world your covert intentions.

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

And now you have come to sit here and make a long statement asserting that our efforts are only for the objective of a cease-fire, as if your side is actually aiming at the realization of a stable armistice to be followed by a thorough settlement of the Korean question. But the tactics of your side cannot pass the test of truth and your own actions have exposed your real intentions. What can be said to be your efforts? Can those provocative actions be called your efforts? Yes, we must admit that those are efforts on your part. But for what purpose--except to continue your policy of war all over the world, to continue your policy of carrying out hostile acts against the people everywhere throughout the world, and to pursue the vicious objectives of the ruling bloc of the United States of America?

Such actions on your part to continue and extend the war all over the world, as your actions on January 13th, were not anything new during the discussions of the Korean armistice. You have done so previsouly, and many times. We would like to analyze such actions, whenever you try to provoke peoples throughout the world. I would remind you of what happened around August 22nd last year when there was a stalemate on the question of the military demarcation line. That was because our side firmly opposed your proposal of a demarcation line of July 27th--a proposal which was entirely unreasonable as was borne out afterwards by the fact that your side could not but give it up. When you found you could not reach your objective through the negotiations, you came out to disrupt the negotiations intentionally. Your side dispatched military aircraft to bomb the residence of our delegation on August 22nd, thus renderring it impossible for the negotiations to carry on properly. And again, near the end of August and beginning of September last year, in order to disrupt the negotiations,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

in order to realize your objective of creating a state of tension throughout Asia and to restore facism in Japan as your running dog for the purpose of dominating the whole of Asia, you likewise dispatched aircraft to raid and invade the sky above Mukden, Tsingtao, and Shanghai. Therefore, these air raids carried out by your side on January 13th were only a continued effort on your part to extend and protract the war.

Our military armistice negotiations have been going on for 6½ months. This record is created by deliberate tactics of delaying and disruption on your part. Not only is this record due to your intentional delaying and disrupting tactics, but besides this, there is also another important reason; that is, your side is very slow at learning from experience. Did your side not attempt at those delaying and disrupting tactics before? But after you have bumped your head against the wall, you could not but come back again to resume these negotiations. Why is it that you are so slow at learning from experience?

Of course, such censure of mine is of no use, because you have taken an attitude of making the people throughout the world your enemy. Your side lacks political capital; that is, you have no reason to support your demands, and, at the same time, you are not strong enough to compel other people to accept your unreasonable demands. That is why you have resorted to such empty threats and hollow tactics of intimidation. You have played this before, and you now play such tactics again.

I must tell you seriously that such deliberate action of disrupting the negotiations and making the people of the world your enemy—that such vicious acts of provoking peace-loving peoples throughout the world have already incited very high indignation throughout the entire population of our countries and all the commanders and fighters on our side. We will firmly

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) carry out our struggles until your side would change your attitude and give up your unreasonable and unfair demands. I assure you, once again, that the times have changed, that those tactics of intimidation of yours cannot frighten the people throughout the world whose strength is great today. And I will remind you that the peace-loving peoples of the world will carry out to the very end their resolute struggles for peace.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, some of the statements you have just made are beyond the scope of these military armistice negotiations. They are slanderous to the governments of the United Nations whose forces are in Korea. I sincerely hope we can continue these talks without the interjection of propaganda.

I shall review your pertinent comments of today. I request you to study our statement of today. I hope you can understand our concern regarding your stand that you will build your military airfields. We still do not understand your reasons for this stand. Perhaps tomorrow you will more fully explain why you insist upon increasing your military air capabilities during the armistice.

I have nothing further to propose today. If you have nothing further, I suggest that we recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: Every word in my statement just now is weighed and appropriate. They are in complete consistency with facts. We have no interests in your statement. What we pay attention to are your actions. But after 6½ months of negotiations, we are now perfectly clear about your intentions. We have no need to take more time to study your intentions. The question

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) before your side now is whether you will carry on the negotiations with a fair and reasonable attitude.

I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1240 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

15 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-second Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegate; COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Turner will again be absent. Have you anything new?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I will make a statement.

In reply to my comments on your lengthy statement yesterday, you declared, "We have no interest in your statement." By so stating, you accentuated your improper attitude. If progress is to be made, it is mandatory that the manner of both sides be suitable to the dignity of these negotiations. Furthermore, each side must consider and weigh the arguments presented by the other side and at least honor them by showing interest. In only this manner, can all views be aired and the differences eliminated. I sincerely hope that during ensuing discussions a proper attitude will prevail and that associated statements will relate to the problem at hand.

Our side has directed its efforts toward the solving of the one major difference that exists on Agenda Item 3 and we will continue to press for a solution. It is axiomatic that to gain a solution, the discussions by both sides must be based on logic, facts and realities.

One fact that both sides have agreed to is that there shall be no increase in military capabilities by either side during

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) the armistice. Consistent with this fact, our side has consistently held that there should be restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields. You refuse to discuss in detail the airfield question. You claim that restricting such facilities is interfering in your internal affairs. But the United Nations Command has agreed to the rehabilitation of certain airfields for civil air operations, thus the restriction which we consider essential does not interfere with your civil and domestic affairs.

To go a step further, I must point out that "internal" means "inside" or "interior". Practically every provision of the armistice agreement can be construed to limit affairs inside the territory of opposing sides. Limitations on introduction of military equipment into Korea affects internal affairs. It must be remembered that a military armistice, by its very nature, limits the military activity of both sides.

Thus, since civil air operations are not prohibited and the restriction is to apply only to military airfields of both sides, you can have no pretext for evading discussion of the airfield question and no reason for hiding behind "internal affairs". Yet more important than the fact that this matter is appropriate for discussion in military negotiations is the fact that the military armistice must incorporate restrictions on all military capabilities, airfields included. This is our firm stand.

Previously, on a number of occasions you have referred to the fact that "there is a balance of military forces on both sides." Now, you must admit that your military capability does not include any fully operational military airfields in the territory of Korea under your military control. We say, and have said repeatedly, that there must be no change in the military balance during the armistice. You have agreed with

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) us that during the armistice there must be no introduction of reinforcing troops or equipment into Korea; that is, no introduction into Korea of troops or equipment which would change the military balance. Yet you refuse to agree that the armistice should also provide that the military balance should not be upset by the rehabilitation of military airfields which are now unserviceable and by the construction of military airfields which do not now exist. The balance of military forces of which you spoke is a balance which must be maintained during the armistice. Yes, both sides have agreed that there is, and that during the armistice there must continue to be, a balance of military forces--but, at the same time, you are seeking to unbalance military capabilities. Both sides must reach agreement in regard to military airfields. When this is done, both sides will be assured that the military balance will be maintained during the armistice, that neither side will gain any military advantage as a result of the armistice, and the armistice will be stable and lead to peace.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement is noted. In your statement you declared that you were making efforts to seek a final settlement of Item 3 of the agenda; but, after carefully listening to your statement, I must say that I can find nothing new as a reason to support your unreasonable demand on which you still insist.

The fact is that our proposal of January 9th has already solved completely and reasonably the two major questions left over between both sides on Item 3 of the agenda; that is, the question of replenishment and your insistence on interfering in our internal affairs. In spite of this fair and reasonable proposal of our side, you still pay no regard to our consistent stand and still insist on your unreasonable demand, that is, your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs. I can see no necessity for wasting so much time on this point,

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

because our position and our proposal are constantly and clearly submitted in this conference and made known to the people throughout the world.

Our stand and proposal are very clear and there is no necessity to waste time in explaining them. But you still pretend not to understand our proposal, and still insist on your demand and on your so-called efforts through which you seek to interfere in our internal affairs. You cannot but make us doubt what your real intentions are. In order to deprive your side of any more excuses to delay and disrupt the negotiations, I am willing to state again our consistent stand. Even at the very beginning of the negotiations our side held that we must seek a thorough settlement of the Korean question and as a first step we should settle the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. Although your side slandered our proposal of withdrawal of foreign forces as an attempt to restore the situation of unbalance and instability in 1950, yet this fair and reasonable proposal of ours has the full support of all the just people throughout the world who refuse to be deceived by your slander.

On the question of the military demarcation line, we held that we should make the 38th Parallel the demarcation line, on the basis of the fact that both sides are sharing the 38th Parallel and that by making it as the demarcation line both sides would make withdrawals in certain sectors and make advances in other sectors so that the adjustment on the basis of the entire battleline would result. It was obviously a fair proposal to both sides and it was also a far-sighted proposal for the benefit of the second step in reaching a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Yet your side slandered this proposal of the 38th Parallel as an attempt to place your troops at disadvantageous positions; but our proposal

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

had the support of all people of the world and it was not to be distorted or covered up by your unilateral slanders.

From the above two questions we can see that the positions taken by your side and our side are entirely different. We are in favor of a far-sighted and systematic, thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question to extinguish the war flames in Korea. But your side takes another stand. You attempt to carry on the war, or after the armistice to maintain the state of war, so as to facilitate your attempt at creating a state of tension throughout the world for you to carry out your policy of war. You not only opposed our fair and reasonable proposals, which are to the interests of peace, but deliberately distorted and slandered these peace proposals of ours in an attempt to camouflage your intentions--your warlike intentions and war policy. Such intentions on your part are more clearly shown during the discussions of Item 3 of the agenda. If your side should actually wish to see a speedy convening of a conference of a higher level after the armistice, then you should not have introduced extensive questions into this military armistice conference. Our five-principle proposal of November 27th last year should have been sufficient for ensuring an armistice. But it was exactly because your side does not have this objective, because your side attempts to prolong the state of war in Korea, that you insisted upon unlimited rotation and replenishment and upon an inspection of the rear which would interfere in the internal affairs of both sides.

In order, first of all, to meet the wish for an armistice in Korea by all the peace-loving people throughout the world, our side submitted two additional recommendations on December 3rd last year. We proposed that there should be a principle of no introduction of military forces into Korea and that a neutral-nations supervisory organ should supervise the implementation of

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

this principle. Those two recommendations are raised by our side with studious efforts and prove that we are sincere toward a stable and effective armistice under the condition that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of both sides, and even your side could not but admit that our recommendations are entirely fair and reasonable. Afterwards, our side again agreed to your suggestion that upon the report by either side on the military armistice commission of a violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of neutral nations shall proceed to carry out inspection. This also proves that our side has already advanced sufficient conditions for ensuring a stable and effective armistice. What reasons then are left for your side to misinterpret our intentions as seeking only a cease-fire instead of an armistice?

Since the scale of war in Korea was extended because forces of many foreign countries were involved in it, we have, in each of our proposals, provided for the strict restriction of introduction of any reinforcing forces into Korea; and we have provided for the supervision by neutral nations, including the stipulation that upon request by either side for investigation at a place where violation of the armistice agreement has been reported to have occurred, inspection should be carried out by the neutral nations supervisory organ forthwith. By these proposals, we have provided a complete and systematic way for ensuring a stable armistice, and this proposal is reasonable and fair to both sides. If your side has the same objective as ours, and if you will strictly adhere to this stipulation, how can you conceive that there will be an increase of military capabilities on either side in Korea during the armistice?

However, you still insist upon your objective of interfering in our internal affairs under the pretext of restricting the rehabilitation of airfields; and also attempt to bargain

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

the sovereign rights of an independent state. On such questions as your so-called no limitation on airfields for civil operations, if your side is not creating excuses for delaying and disrupting the armistice, you are indeed intentionally pretending not to understand our firm and unshakable stand. You are clearly aware that the question of airfields, or any other facilities, inside Korea is a question of internal affairs.

You can say that internal affairs are the affairs inside a certain country, but the important point is that an independent and sovereign state has complete freedom and right to decide upon and to carry out any matters inside of its territory, and this right is not to be interfered with in any way by the other side. And it is also a right not to be bargained with in this conference, as you have suggested that certain facilities can be permitted or certain other facilities cannot be permitted in your suggestion for permission of rehabilitation of airfields for civil operations and so on.

We have already submitted sufficient conditions which are fair and reasonable for insuring that there will be no increase of military capabilities on both sides and ensuring a stable armistice. This a fact not to be confused, not to be misinterpreted, and not to be slandered. What is left over--if there is anything left over--is whether our side will proceed with or not proceed with this kind or that kind of facilities during the armistice. This is a question of internal affairs, a matter for the decision by the independent and sovereign state itself, and we will firmly reject any attempt of your side to interfere in this right of our side. And you cannot mistake the firmness of our stand, because we have made it very clear inside this conference and also made it public before the whole world.

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) What deserves suspicion is why your side should still insist upon your unreasonable demand; and you said again this morning that you will make continuous efforts to reach your objective. We would like you to explain that point. Why is it that you should take such an attitude and stand to block any progress in these negotiations? If your side is not cooking up renewed incidents, as those on August 22nd last year and after that date, to disrupt the negotiations and to balk any progress in the conference, then you should speedily give up such an unreasonable demand of your side. I do believe that once your side gives up this unreasonable demand of yours, we can, at once, make progress in this conference. Otherwise, it is obvious that you are delaying and trying to disrupt the negotiations.

I hope that you will give us a clear and unmistakable explanation of your attitude.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, you have made many statements that you are for peace. You say you want to stop the fighting. Why is it, then, you object to establishing a military armistice which will be stable and lead to peace? Stability leads to peace. With proper limitations on both side regarding military air capabilities, we can have a stable armistice. We have agreed to all other requirements necessary to a stable armistice. If we could agree on this last essential, we can speedily bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. I again ask your side to accept the wording of the United Nations Command principle 4 as pertains to restrictions on airfields.

GEN HSIEH: Your side always calls black, white; and you still refuse to give up your unreasonable demand although you know that you will be disappointed in this attempt of yours. You still insist on continuing the state of war in Korea as a step for peace. You interpreted your proposal of July 27th--according to which our

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) side alone would retreat and your side would advance all along the front—as a step for peace. Your side interpreted your interference in our internal affairs, your asking us to enter into an agreement in which we would give up our sovereign rights, as a step for peace. On the other hand, you misinterpreted our proposal for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea as a threat to your side. You also misinterpreted our proposal of the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line as a measure which constituted a threat to your side; and that any installations of any kind of facilities would constitute a threat to your side. If you follow this logic you can indeed interpret my sitting here as a threat to your side, because to my back there are hundreds of millions of people whom I represent, and there are millions of troops whom I represent; and you could also say that it would be a threat to your side for any Korean to marry and to bear children. Indeed, what is the attitude you are taking toward these negotiations? You paid sufficient lip service to your wish for seeing an armistice agreement, but you still insist upon your unreasonable attitude. So long as you do not change this attitude of yours, you are only delaying the negotiations.

As for the fourth principle, it has been firmly rejected by our side many, many times.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, you ignored my very sincere statement this morning. I refer particularly to the statement that to make progress in these negotiations and to eliminate the difference before us, we must direct our discussions at the one major difference. Our statements, therefore, must relate to this subject. By your statement I can see you are not willing to do so today. I assure you that our efforts will be so directed.

If you have nothing further, I suggest we recess until the usual time tomorrow. But before closing I'd like to answer a question in your statement.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) You asked for a clear and simple expression of our attitude. You referred to my statement this morning, wherein I said our side would continue to press for a solution to the existing difference. This in itself answers your questions. This difference must be eliminated before we can conclude Agenda Item 3.

GEN HSIEH: The settlement of the two major differences between your side and our side on Item 3 of the agenda are already clearly embodied in our proposal of January 9th. Our side considers that these differences are already settled. Yet, after our proposal was submitted, you still recognized that there was a difference yet to be settled. That was only your one-sided way of thinking. I have clearly explained that our side will not tolerate such kind of thinking. The arguments you have advanced in support of your continued insistence have already been refuted by me many times, and the statement of yours this morning, in which you cloaked your demand with the term of "no increase of military capabilities", is entirely untenable because there are already sufficient conditions and a complete proposal for ensuring no increase of military capabilities of both sides during the armistice.

Your attempt to cover up your intentions of interfering in our internal affairs, under the cloak of "no increase of military capabilities", can be answered only by my statement just now. That is, if your logic is pursued, then all the Korean people should not marry and should not bear children because their children would be an increase of military capabilities and a threat to your side. According to your logic, we should not sit here and negotiate with you, because we represent hundreds of millions of people and many millions of military men. These men are carrying on their work with full vitality and with intense industry on their respective posts. And according to your logic, their feeding would be an increase

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) of military capabilities on our side. Such ridiculous logic of yours has no power of persuasion at all toward our side or toward the people throughout the world. The longer you insist upon your unreasonable demand, the clearer we can see that your statement that you wish to eliminate the difference on Item 3 of the agenda is only a hollow statement.

We agree to recess until tomorrow, but I ask your side to give serious consideration on our stand and our proposal.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Tomorrow may we discuss Korean airfields and not Korean birth rate and other subjects of a similiar nature! I have nothing further now.

Meeting recessed at 1235 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

16 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-third Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegate: COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Turner is absent. Have you a statement you desire to make?

GEN HSIEH: Before our side submitted our 9 January proposal, there existed two differences between your side and our side. One of them was your insistence on continued replenishment during the armistice, and the other was also your insistence on the so-called restriction on rehabilitation of airfields but which, in substance, was your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs. By our 9 January proposal, we have already settled reasonably those two differences existing between your side and our side. We consider that our proposal has provided for sufficient conditions to ensure a stable and effective armistice.

The spreading and extension of the flames of war in Korea was due to the fact that military forces of many foreign countries were involved in the Korean war. It was in direct connection with this characteristic of the Korean war that our side submitted, on 3 December last year, our two additional recommendations in which we proposed the principle of strictly restricting the introduction of any military forces into Korea

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GEN HSIEH:
(CONT'D)

during the armistice. If only your side would abide by this principle as we would do, then it would be inconceivable that there would be any increase of military forces in Korea during the armistice.

In the principle of limiting the introduction of any reinforcing forces into Korea we have explicitly stipulated the inclusion of combat aircraft among the military forces. Since this is provided for--since there will be no introduction of combat aircraft into Korea during the armistice--then it is inconceivable that there would be the so-called increase of military air capabilities during the armistice. You side is clearly aware of this and you also agree to this principle. Then why is it that you should deliberately assert, both inside and outside of the conference, that our side intends to increase our military air capabilities during the armistice? What is your objective in making such an assertion?

After we submitted our 9 January proposal, I have thrice called your attention to the fact that our 9 January proposal has, through our efforts, already offered a reasonable solution of the two major differences existing between both sides on Item 3 of the agenda. If your side is sincere toward an armistice, then you should have no reason for disagreeing with our 9 January proposal.

However, you still continue to refuse to accept our proposal, and also, by employing various tactics inside and outside of the conference, seek to continue to insist on the so-called limitation on our increase of air capability--when, as a matter of fact, you are really trying to attempt to interfere in our internal affairs. You yourselves are aware that this is an argument which cannot deceive us, nor can it deceive the people throughout the world. Yet you intention-

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GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D) ally insist upon doing so; therefore, I have called your attention to the fact that you should not let yourself go down deeper and deeper into such mire lest you will not be able to pull out your own legs, because we have already made a solemn statement, innumerable times, that our side absolutely will not tolerate any form or type of interference in our internal affairs.

Yesterday you mentioned twice that your side would continue efforts to eliminate the so-called major difference still existing between both sides. If you are indeed sincere toward the realization of an armistice, and if you are striving toward that objective, then we sincerely hope that you will direct your efforts toward this objective of the realization of an armistice and not toward anything else. Otherwise, although you declare that you are for an armistice, yet you will not reach that result. The present question is very clear. If you say we should eliminate the reamining difference on Item 3 of the agenda, then our 9 January proposal has already eliminated that difference; and if you are genuinely willing to see an armistice, there is nothing much for you to do except agree to our proposal and thereby eliminate the difference.

I have once again explained our position and our 9 January proposal. The question now is why your side should still consider that there is a difference existing yet to be resolved. In other words, why is it that your side is still, by various methods, insisting on your objective of interfering in our internal affairs?

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, you asked why the United Nations Command continues to assert that you intend to increase your military air capability during the armistice. Does this mean that you do not intend to increase that capability?

GEN HSIEH: Since we have advanced our proposals of December 3rd and January 9th, in both of which our side holds that during the armistice there should be no introduction of any reinforcing forces, including combat aircraft; and if your side has the same objective as ours and will, like us, strictly abide by this principle, how is it conceivable that there would be an increase of military air capability during the armistice?

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have read most of your further statement of this morning and yesterday's record. I regret to say that our side was not impressed. Perhaps from the statement that I make--I am about to make--some clarification may result.

I will comment on your statement of yesterday, confining my remarks to the problem at hand. I will not take the time to refute the matters you have raised during the past several days, which are irrelevant to these military armistice negotiations and specifically to Agenda Item 3.

First of all, we thoroughly understand your proposal of 9 January which you claim is your stand. As a matter of fact, your proposal is identical to ours of 29 December, except for minor details and the issue on airfields. Your viewpoint is very clear to the United Nations Command and we are not trying to distort or slander your proposal. This, however, does not eliminate the difference that exists between your stand and ours. It merely makes the difference more obvious.

Because our proposal has one more requirement than yours, you call it "an unreasonable demand". You do this, realizing fully that the armistice agreement must contain every provision that will safeguard the armistice and make it stable. Yet you brand this safeguard--restriction on military air capabilities of both sides--an interference in your internal affairs or an infringement on your sovereign rights. But you

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) can label anything you choose within your territorial limits an internal affair or a matter affecting your sovereign rights. Yes, this can be said about every provision of the military armistice. How is it that your so-called sovereign state will agree to limitations on military personnel and equipment, and agree to foreign nationals observing within your territory? Does not this fall within the province of sovereignty?

What you seem to have forgotten, though, is that we are negotiating a military armistice, not a final peace settlement. It is the solemn duty of both sides to insure that limitations are imposed on all military activities that might jeopardize the stability and effectiveness of the armistice. Accordingly, restrictions on military air capabilities of both sides is a prerequisite of the armistice agreement.

In a few words, this is our firm, unbending stand. Yet, you indicate that you do not understand this simple, logical position. All we want is to stop the fighting, and by means of an effective armistice, be assured that hostilities will not be resumed while the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem is taking place. In contrast to this goal you continue to mix up the military and political settlement, trying to achieve both at once. This is shown clearly by your statement, "We are in favor of a far-sighted and thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question and to extinguish the war flames in Korea." It even appears you are trying to gain a peaceful settlement before a military armistice. You do this, knowing very well that the military armistice comes first. The agreements made by both sides must encompass every military aspect in order that the military commanders and the people everywhere will be assured that the discussions for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question can take place without threat or fear of disruptions by renewal of hostilities.

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd)

You stated, "We have already submitted sufficient conditions which are fair and reasonable for ensuring that there will be no increase of military capabilities on both sides and ensuring a stable armistice." Herein you have made it crystal clear what is required of an armistice to make it stable -- no increase of military capabilities on both sides. You have stipulated "the ways"; now it is only necessary to stipulate "the means". This has already been done, in part, by both sides agreeing that there shall be no introduction into Korea of any reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. But this is not sufficient. One, I repeat one, item of military capability has not been included in the restrictions -- airfields. Without question, airfields are as necessary to military air capability as are the combat aircraft, which, as I have just pointed out, have been limited. Neither side can rightly deny this logic. Neither side can rightly object to restricting the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields of both sides. It is strictly a safeguard that must be incorporated in the armistice agreement.

I sincerely hope that you will give serious consideration to this particular statement this morning as it contains the most logical solution to the major difference existing between us on Agenda Item 3.

Now in regard to your specific question. Apparently you do not understand what airpower is. It is a very important military capability. What does it require to have this airpower or military air capability?

It takes adequate communications. No doubt during armistice you intend to repair and improve your communications. We hope, for the benefit of the civil economy and not for war-like purposes

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) Airpower requires fuel and ordnance. Some of this we both have at this time. During armistice if both sides so desired, in a very short period they could build up a reserve for use in future hostilities.

Of course aircraft are required. Both sides could have aircraft in place in Korea in a matter of minutes, from sources outside of Korea because of their mobility.

The most important consideration as far as our discussions here are concerned is the question of airfields and aviation facilities, a most important component of airpower. I have shown you how both sides can, or will have, important components of airpower during armistice. However, if neither side does not rehabilitate or construct military airfields, these other components will not be a threat to the stability of the armistice. For this reason we firmly object to the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields in Korea by either side.

Now I have answered your question showing you how military air capabilities can be increased by rehabilitation and construction of airfields by both sides. Will you answer my question regarding your intention to increase military air capabilities during armistice?

It's yours.

GEN HSIEH: I have carefully listened to your statement to the very end, but I cannot find any impression that your statement has offered anything to solve your so-called unresolved difference yet remaining, as you have stated before you made your statement. My only impression is that you have complicated this question. If you are not deliberately confusing the issue, then it only proves that you have not made a good study of the many questions and the statements made by our side during the past days.

As early as 3 December last year, we submitted our two additional recommendations. The first recommendation was that in

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GEN HSIEH:
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order to ensure the stability of the armistice both sides should not introduce military force, including military aircraft, into Korea during the armistice. Since there is such a stipulation, why is it that you still assert that our side intends to increase our military capabilites, including air capabilities, during the armistice, unless your side is not prepared, as we are, to strictly abide by and carry out this principle? The second recommendation was that there should be supervision by neutral nations to ensure the implementation and adherence to this stipulation, and that representatives of neutral nations would be invited by both sides to act as impartial judges.

The meaning and significance of our recommendations are very simple and clear, but you insist upon interpreting our principles to the contrary. It shows that either you do not understand our principles or you are deliberately misinterpreting them. Our position as shown in our 3 December proposal is, firstly, the restriction on introduction of military forces into Korea. By that principle we have clearly distinguished between matters inside of Korea and matters beyond Korea. That is the only principle which can insure the stability of the military armistice without involving the question of internal affairs in Korea. It is similar with regard to our principle of inviting neutral nations to form a supervisory organ. The neutral nations to be invited by both sides would be nations which have not participated in the Korean war and which have been striving for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Those nations would be invited to participate in the task of supervising the execution of terms agreed upon by both sides, and to inspect and supervise at the ports of entry in the

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

rear as agreed upon by both sides. This is also a method which can ensure the stability of the military armistice without involving the question of internal affairs in Korea. These two recommendations of ours are a great effort made by us with very careful study in order to meet the peaceful wish of people throughout the world and of the troops in Korea.

And yet you continue to confuse the question of matters inside of Korea with matters beyond Korea. You have mixed up neutral nations with combatant nations. You have reversed the truth of the fact. Therefore, the impression you gave me is not that you are seeking to settle the problem before us. I consider that you have not made any effort toward the solution of the question in front of us. It is exactly because our proposal can ensure a stable armistice without involving the interference in the internal affairs of both sides that our proposal would prevent you from reaching your objective of interfering in the internal affairs of the other side, that you became highly dissatisfied with our proposal. You therefore resorted to many and various excuses, and even inverted right and wrong, in order to argue for your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs. What is the most obvious example is your statement this morning, which I have heard before, that our side attempts to get through the military armistice negotiations the results of a political conference. Who could believe such an assertion of yours? You could do better to compare this assertion with your own statements and your own actions.

On 27 November last year you were dissatisfied with our five principles which were strictly confined to the scope of a military armistice discussion. On the other hand, it was exactly your seven principles which extensively touched upon questions beyond the scope of the military

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

armistice negotiations, although you assert that they were requirements which are necessary for a military armistice. In your proposal you touched upon many political questions, questions of the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state, but you were compelled to give up some of those unreasonable requirements of your side since we submitted our 3 December proposal.

Now, again, you say that you consider there is still a question left yet to be resolved; that is, the question of restricting the carrying out or not carrying out of certain facilities by an independent and sovereign state. This is a question you yourselves have admitted before to be an interference of internal affairs. But in order to reach your objective of interfering in our internal affairs you have insinuated that we should forget the words "sovereign rights" and "internal affairs". It is apparent by such an attitude of yours that you yourselves are aware that you are now raising a political question, a requirement for interfering in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state. And yet you assert that it is our side which seeks the results of a political conference through these military armistice negotiations. Your statement is entirely groundless. And is it not more appropriate to say that this assertion suits your action exactly?

Secondly, you asserted that, even though we have stipulated the limitation of introduction of military forces including aircraft into Korea, we could introduce combat aircraft within several minutes to increase our military capabilities provided we have airfields. Now, what is the basis of such an assertion? As I have stated many times before, the question whether we will rehabilitate or not rehabilitate airfields is a question of our

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) internal affairs, and even though we assume that there be airfields, they by themselves do not constitute any military capability. You are deliberately ignoring our solemn assurances that there will be limitation of introduction of aircraft into Korea and misinterpreting, at your will, that we intend to violate some possible agreements between both sides, even while we are sitting here to negotiate with you. By such an assertion does not your side deny and negate any basis for the continuance of these negotiations? Such an assertion on your part is as absurd and ridiculous as those rumors you have made to the effect that we are already importing crated aircraft into Korea. Of course, it is exactly your side which has the habit of violating international agreements. You would not hesitate to violate agreements already entered into, or to preserve the form of international agreements while violating in substance the spirit and letters of agreements. You could do so, but you should not measure our stature with your own example. Is there any basis for you to say that our side has not adhered to any agreement reached between both sides during these discussions? I would challenge you to point out any way in which we have not adhered to our agreements. On the contrary, the side which deserves suspicion and distrust is your side, because there are ironclad facts which show that you deserve suspicion and distrust. I solemnly call your attention to the fact that if you wish to carry on these negotiations you should not make such absurd and groundless assertions, because by doing so you undermine the basis for continued negotiations and that is a very dangerous thing to do.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Would you like to answer my question before recessing for the day?

GEN HSIEH: What is the question you asked?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Do you intend to increase your military air capabilities during the armistice?

GEN HSIEH: The answer is the same as I have stated at the beginning of today's session: Since our side has proposed that during the armistice there should be no introduction of reinforcing of military forces, including combat aircraft, into Korea; and if your side, like our side, would strictly adhere to this principle, how is it conceivable that both sides could increase their military capabilities, including air capabilities, during the armistice?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Do you have anything further?

GEN HSIEH: Nothing.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1241 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

17 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-fourth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA , Delegate; COL D O Darrow, USAF, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL J W Thames, USA, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, CHSCLK GG Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Officers; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have a statement to make.

The last statement you made yesterday indicated that I need to explain more clearly the relationship between airfields and military air capabilities. You have asked how it is conceivable that both sides could increase their military capabilities, including air capabilities, during the armistice, if both sides do not introduce reinforcing combat aircraft into Korea. I will answer this question by stating an example.

As a matter of hypothesis, let us take a situation in the area of the United Nations Command. You know that we have airfields in the vicinity of the towns of Pusan, Pohang and Taegu. You also know that these locations are roughly 300 kilometers from the battle line. Let us assume that during an armistice without restrictions on airfields, the United Nations Command constructed three new airfields or rehabilitated three airfields suitable for jet aircraft a few kilometers to the rear of the Demilitarized Zone. By the very existence of these airfields, the United Nations Command would practically double its military air capabilities in this particular case. Jet aircraft from these airfields would have the capability to make twice as many

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (CONT'D) attacks from the forward fields than from those in the rear since the distance to the target would be greatly reduced. They would have the capability to drop twice as many bombs, fire twice as many rockets, and shoot twice as much ammunition. The soldiers in the front lines would recognize this as a definite increase in military air capabilities even though no additional aircraft were introduced into Korea. Now let us assume that the United Nations Command constructed or rehabilitated three additional airfields somewhat further behind the Demilitarized Zone. In the unfortunate event of the resumption of hostilities and the forward airfields were attacked and the installations destroyed or they were in threat of capture, the aircraft could be moved back into these new dispersal airfields and air operations continued. The mere existance of these airfields would increase the military air capabilities of the United Nations Command. These airfields would increase the military power of the United Nations Command. It is therefore, quite obvious to all military men that construction or rehabilitation of airfields does increase military air capabilities. Through the example I have just cited, I am sure it is obvious to you, General Hsieh.

The United Nations Command fully recognizes the fact that additional airfields on either side mean additional military power and military air capability. It is for this reason that our side advocates that restrictions be placed upon the rehabilitation or construction of airfields on both sides. Our side takes a strong stand in this matter in order that there can be no tension created during the armistice while the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem is taking place.

I regret that you misunderstood the explanation we gave you yesterday. I want to emphasize that it was not, repeat not, our intention to imply that either side would, or intended to, violate

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (CONT'D) the armistice agreement. We were merely illustrating to you the value and military advantages of additional military airfields to both sides. It is our firm belief that neither side should be given the opportunity to increase its military air capabilities during an armistice.

It should be highly conceivable to you now how both sides could increase their military air capabilities during an armistice which contained no restrictions on military airfields, and without introducing reinforcing combat aircraft into Korea. In other words, the mere limitation of not introducing combat aircraft into Korea does not prevent both sides from increasing their military air capabilities. I have sincerely and fully answered your question. The facts have been clearly set forth.

At the present time we have reached a point in our discussions where both sides have agreed to various safeguards designed to provide a stable armistice in Korea. We have agreed to preclude the introduction of reinforcing personnel into Korea. We have agreed that some sort of efficient observation is necessary and, after some give and take on the part of both sides, we have arrived at a satisfactory method of providing this observation.

Thus both sides agree in principle that adequate safeguards must be provided to insure a stable armistice by preventing the increase of military capabilities of either side in Korea. Together we have agreed that no additional combat aircraft, armored behicles, weapons and ammunition should be introduced. Yet our side believes that the back door of our structure has been left open. By agreeing not to rehabilitate old military airfields or to build new ones, while at the same time providing for facilities for civil aviation we, your side and mine, now

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (CONT'D) have the capability and opportunity to close that door and prepare an effective and stable armistice agreement.

Our side is unwilling to be a party to any agreement which so obviously lacks one most elementary safeguard. We are firm in our resolve that both sides must agree not to increase military air capabilities. This is a basic safeguard. We sincerely believe that this armistice agreement will be no stronger than the safeguards that your side and our side agree to write into it. By the addition of the safeguard not to increase military air capabilities, to the safeguards already agreed to, we will have completed the basis for a stable and effective armistice.

That is all I have for the present.

GEN HSIEH: I have listened carefully to your statements. The wording of your statement sounds very nice and if one does not subject your statement to careful study it would be difficult to reveal the true essence of your statement. In disguising your real meaning you have been successful. But once your statement is subject to analysis in the light of truth, it is not difficult to expose the real intentions in the back of your statement.

The so-called theory in support of your statement is the so-called theory of maintenance of military balance advanced by your side in the morning of January 15th. You said that your insistence on this point is to shut up the back door for an unstable armistice. The real nature of the so-called theory of maintenance of balance of military forces is your attempt to maintain and prolong the state of war in Korea. Your so-called shutting-up of the back door is, in reality, shutting-up the door of negotiations. It shows that your side, not only wishes to maintain the state of war in Korea, but also is trying to create excuses for delaying and obstructing the negotiations.

GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D)

You asserted that there is still a question left yet to be resolved. I must point out that it is your side which considers that there exists yet another difference to be settled. Our side does not consider that there is any point left for us to settle. You still insist upon the so-called question of limitation on rehabilitation of airfields, and you say such a limitation is the most basic condition for insuring a stable armistice. But you have always employed the term "most basic" assurance or guarantee at your own will--to your own advantage.

It has become a regularity on your part to call anything which is to your unilateral advantage, a "basic condition" for insuring a stable armistice. Are there facts to bear out this statement of mine? There are plenty! During the discussion of Item 2 of the Agenda, you said that your unreasonable demand for Kaesong was a "basic condition" for insuring a stable armistice. Your side stated that in order to defend Seoul you must have positions not less than those possessed by your side in 1950 before the war. But what was the result? Under the opposition of our side, the opposition from within your own countries, and the opposition of peoples throughout the world, your side could not but give up that unreasonable demand. Again, when you insisted on the inspection of the rear of both sides by belligerent teams, you also called that a "most basic" condition for insuring a stable armistice. But likewise, under the opposition of our side, of people inside your own camp, and people throughout the world, you could not but give up your own proposal and accept our fair and reasonable proposal of a method of inspection which could insure the stipulation of, and adherence to, the armistice agreement without involving the question of internal affairs of both sides. Therefore, my conclusion is that you have the habit of calling anything which you want to insist upon,

GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D)

as "basic requirements"; but, in reality, it is not the truth.

I am going to refute in more detail the absurdity of your arguments. Your statement, although it sounds well, cannot deceive anybody. The discussion of Item 3 of the agenda has been going on for more than 50 days and by our proposal of January 9th we have already, with our efforts, settled reasonably both the last two major differences existing between both sides on this Agenda Item. This is to say, by our proposal we have already solved three of the six principles which we should discuss. Of these three principles, the most important provision for insuring a stable armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level is, as we should admit, the provision agreed upon by both sides that there should be no introduction of reinforcing military forces into Korea from without, including combat aircraft. You cannot but also admit this to be true, because it is only by such a stipulation that we can limit foreign forces which have already been involved in this war in Korea, so that the armistice can be stabilized. And this is also the most effective and most practical stipulation. There is not a provision agreed upon by both sides to maintain the balance of military forces of both sides--that is only your unilateral demand and your own insistence. Your intention to do so is only as I have pointed out--to maintain and prolong the state of war. That is the substance of your stand.

Since both sides have agreed not to introduce any reinforcing military forces, including combat aircraft, into Korea during the armistice, how is it conceivable that there will be an increase of military power, including military air power, during the armistice? Since we have already agreed on this simple and practical principle, if your side should have the same objective as ours and insure the implementation of this

GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D)

principle, how can you say that it is not yet sufficient to insure a stable armistice? Since we already have this effective principl which is sufficient to insure a stable armistice, why is it that you still insist on touching upon extensive questions, such as questions of military capabilities in these military armistice negotiations, which should not have been brought in at all? We consider that if your side does not have the intention of delaying and obstructing the negotiations, then there is no necessity for you to insist on your theory of maintaining the balance of military capabilities on both sides.

Secondly, your side attempts to reach your objective of maintaining a state of war in Korea, under the pretext of the theory of maintaining a balance of military capabilities of both sides. Our side takes a contrary stand. Our side holds that we should speedily eliminate the state of war in Korea, and at least we held that there should be no increase of military forces but only re-eduction of military forces in Korea. That was why we have previously proposed the principle of only outgoing but no incoming of military forces. From the stand taken by both sides it is clear which side is genuinely willing to see a thorough, peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and which side has the contrary objective. As for your requirement of maintaining the balance of military capabilities on both sides, I must point out that this is a requirement which is definitely impossible to realize. Your theory of maintaining the balance of military capabilities of both sides is impractical. Firstly, because it is a very complicated question, involving many extensive problems—many, many of which are purely military and others not, but all of which can be called factors of military capabilities. For instance, the rehabilitation of factories and communications can also be called an increase in military capabilities.

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GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D)

The increase of population is also an increase in military capabilities. The education and training of troops is also an increase of military capabilities. There are innumerable things which can be called factors of military capabilities. For instance, did not your side use this as a pretext for your wanton bombing and bombardment of peaceful cities and inhabitants in Korea ever since the war began? Did you not say that you have been doing so because otherwise there would be an increase of military capabilities on our side? What is worthy of notice is why you should still bring forth this very complicated and difficult question to this conference after our January 9th proposal already settled reasonably and completely the differences existing between both sides on Item 3 of the Agenda.

Secondly, if as you propose—I must remind you that this is not our stand, we do not stand for this—that there should be a maintenance of military capabilities of both sides, then there should be a standard, a level as a measure. You would say that we should take a level existing at the time of the realization of the armistice as the level to be maintained; but this will not do because it is a very abstract idea. For instance, is it possible that you could make accurate and detailed reports to the Military Armistice Commission on all the military capabilities of your side existing at the time of signing of the armistice agreement? If it is not, then how can we gauge this level of military capability? Therefore we consider that such a theory of yours is impracticable. It is impossible to carry out such a requirement.

Even with these two reasons, I have proved sufficiently that the so-called theory of maintaining the balance of military capabilities of both sides, which you insist on, is: firstly, unnecessary; and secondly, impracticable. You cannot deny the

GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D)

reasonableness of my arguments. Then why is it that you should raise this question? It is that you do not know the inappropriatness of this theory? It is not. You have advanced this theory and requirement because, in substance, you want to maintain a prolonged state of war in Korea. And you also want to continue your efforts to seek to interfere in our internal affairs.

As I have analyzed, if we should accept such a theory of yours, then we would inevitably touch upon many extensive questions. Take military air capabilities for instance. Yesterday you mentioned that there are roughly four factors, namely, aircraft, airfields, ordnance and communications. Your side is fully aware that of these four factors, the fundamental factor is aircraft, because if there is no aircraft, all the other three factors will have no use. And if you would admit that aircraft is the basic factor in military air capabilities, then you should see that we have already provided for effective and sufficient limitations and guarantees in our proposal. Since such is the case, if only your side as well as our side would agree to strictly abide by our stipulation, why then do you still insist upon interfering in our internal affairs? It is apparent that your advancing such a theory and requirement is designed for interfering in our proceeding, or not proceeding, with the installation of certain facilities including the rehabilitation of airfields during the armistice, and this is obviously a question of internal affairs.

You are merely advancing various illogical arguments in the attempt to persuade us to accept such terms as would interfere in our internal affairs. Our firm and unshakeable stand on this point has been made crystal clear by our side many, many times; and it is not necessary to repeat it. As for the question

GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D) of whether the stability of the armistice will be involved, then I must say that the proposals and stand of our side, ever since the beginning of the negotiations, sufficiently prove, with facts, that we are sincere toward a stable armistice. And it is a fact which is not to be clouded by your unilateral misrepresentation.

The question which remains in our mind is: Why is it that even today, that is, eight days after we have submitted our January 9th proposal, you still insist upon this unreasonable demand of yours, both inside and outside of the conference? We would like you to clearly explain the objective of your side in doing so.

GEN FERENBAUGH: The sophistries of your arguments have been nowhere better illustrated than in the statement you have just made--as you stated, in substance, that the question of limitations on the rehabilitation and development of airfields was preventing agreement on Item 3; that the United Nations Command had proposed this limitation; and that, therefore, the United Nations Command was responsible for the failure to reach agreement on Item 3.

This argument is as illogical as your argument regarding the so-called interference with your internal affairs. The United Nations Command also proposed the principle that all hostilities should cease within 24 hours after the armistice becomes effective. If you had arbitrarily refused to agree to that principle, as you have arbitrarily refused to agree to the principle of no increase in air potential during the armistice, would you have also argued that the United Nations Command was responsible for the failure to reach agreement on Item 3? You proposed the principle of the creation of a neutral, rather than a joint, supervisory organ. If the United Nations Command has arbitrarily refused to agree to that principle could we have

GEN FERENBAUGH: (CONT'D) argued that you were responsible for the failure to reach agreement on Item 3? The responsibility for failure to reach an agreement is not on the side which proposes a logical and reasonable principle designed to prevent an increase in military capabilities during the armistice, but on the side which arbitrarily refuses to agree to such a principle. The responsibility for failure to reach agreement is not on the United Nations Command, which proposed this principle, but on your side for its arbitrary refusal to agree to it on the totally illogical ground that it constitutes interference with your internal affairs.

You stated that we want to maintain the state of war. How can you make such a statement to the side that recommends military air capabilities not be increased? If our side desired to maintain the state of war and had ulterior motives, why should we recommend that restrictions be placed upon the rehabilitation or construction of airfields? It should be obvious to the whole world that the side who wishes to build military airfields at will, is the side who wishes to maintain the state of war and maintain tension in Korea during an armistice.

Do you deny the fact that additional airfields, which would permit an aircraft already in Korea to make twice as many flights in one day, do provide additional military air capability? Can you say this is not an increase in military air capability? Can you say this is not an increase in military potential?

You say that if there are no aircraft, then there is no need for restrictions on the other items including airfields. Are you suggesting that there are no aircraft based in Korea at this time? Whose side are you referring to--our side or your side?

GEN HSIEH: Your statement just now is only a piece of sophistry which deserves no refutation and I would not like to repeat my statement.

GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D) I have a question which I hope you will answer. Do you admit that the limitation on any facilities carried out by a sovereign state is interference in its internal affairs?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Is that the end of your question?

GEN HSIEH: Yes, that is my question. I would like you to answer it.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have a question from yesterday remaining for an answer: Does your side intend to increase your military air capabilities during the armistice?

GEN HSIEH: According to ordinary practice at this conference, I request you to answer my question first.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Please repeat your question.

GEN HSIEH: Do you admit that limitation on any facilities carried out by an independent state is an interference in the internal affairs of that state?

GEN FERENBAUGH: I will give you a complete answer.

For many days now we have been hearing from you the terms "sovereign rights" and "interference in internal affairs." I believe that it would be profitable if we gave those phrases a little closer inspection. Perhaps then you might even admit how inapplicable they are to the situation to which you are attempting to apply them.

A mutual agreement to restrict certain elements of sovereign rights is inherent in any military armistice. You have recognized this to be true by some of the principles which you have already accepted. Thus, limitations on the introduction of military forces into the territory of a country are most certainly restrictions on its sovereignty—and that fact cannot be changed by claiming that such limitations involve "matters beyond Korea". Whether you call it matters beyond Korea or matters inside Korea, whether it involves internal affairs or external affairs, the fact remains that it constitutes a solemn agreement to limit the people who may

GEN FERENBAUGH: (CONT'D) enter the territory of a country, and that it is a restriction on sovereignty which is a necessary part of a military armistice. And you have agreed to this restriction--in fact, you have asserted pride of authorship!

Limitations on the importation of implements of war into territory of a country are most certainly restrictions on its sovereignty--and this fact cannot be changed by claiming that such limitations involve matters beyond Korea. Call it internal affairs, or external affairs--the fact remains that it constitutes a solemn agreement to limit the importation of certain items into the territory of a country and that it is a restriction on sovereignty which is a necessary part of a military armistice. Not only have you agreed to this restriction but again you have asserted pride of authorship!

Authorizing foreign nations to supervise who and what enters the territory of a country is most certainly a restriction on its sovereignty--and this fact is not changed by a mere statement of the conclusion that "this is also a method which can insure the stability of the armistice without involving the question of internal affairs". You may characterize the principle of the use of a noncombatant supervisory organ and noncombatant observer teams as you will--but the fact remains that it constitutes a restriction on sovereignty which is a necessary part of a military armistice. Not only have you agreed to this restriction but again you have asserted pride of authorship!

You will note that I have referred to these matters as <u>restrictions on sovereignty, not violations of sovereignty</u>. They are not violations, because they are restrictions which are accepted freely by the military commanders involved, as necessary elements of a military armistice which is to be stable and a bridge to peace.

GEN FERENBAUGH: (CONT'D)

Nor are they interference with the internal affairs of one side by the other. In no case does the opposing side have any direct part in the enforcement of the agreed restrictions on sovereignty. They are obligations which each side itself enforces within its own territory. Your commander will have no direct connection with the enforcement of these agreed restrictions on sovereignty in the territory under the military control of our side; nor will our commander have any direct connection with the enforcement of these restrictions on sovereignty in the territory under the military control of your side. I repeat, this will be the obligation of each side within its own territory. Naturally, each side will desire to be assured that the other side is complying with its obligations--but this assurance is obtained solely from reliance in the sincerity of the other side and from the fact of the supervision by the foreign observers.

Now, wherein does an agreement to restrict the development of military airfields during the period of the armistice differ from these other agreements which we have already reached? There will be a restriction on sovereign rights, just as in the other cases. There will be no violation of sovereign rights, because the restriction will have been accepted freely by the military commanders involved as a necessary element of a military armistice. There will be no interference with internal affairs, because the enforcement of the obligation not to violate the armistice provision with regard to military airfields will be the responsibility of each side within its own territory. Our commander will have no direct connection with the enforcement of this provision in the territory under the military control of your side; and your commander will have no direct connection with the enforcement of this provision in the territory under the military control of our side. I repeat, this will be the obligation of each side within

GEN FERENBAUGH: (CONT'D) its own territory. An assurance that the other side is fulfilling its obligation in this regard will be obtained by each side solely from reliance in the sincerity of the other side and from the fact of the supervision by the foreign observers.

It seems clear to the United Nations Command that while restrictions on the development of military airfields during the period of the armistice is a restriction on sovereign rights, it is not a violation of those rights and it most decidedly is not, repeat not, an interference by one side in the internal affairs of the other. The agreement reached by us here in this regard will be incorporated in the armistice agreement; it will be accepted by the commanders of both sides; and, except in the unfortunate event of a reported violation, neither side will thereafter have any concern with the matter other than to fulfill its obligation not to rehabilitate or construct any military airfields not specified in the armistice agreement.

I hope that this statement has clarified the United Nations Command position on this matter; and I hope that it will have convinced you that an agreement by both sides to restrict the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields during the armistice is neither a violation of sovereign rights nor an interference in the internal affairs of the other side.

You asked for an answer to your question. This I believe to be complete.

I suggest we recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow to enable you to review my statement.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement is noted. You have talked at some length but it would have sufficed for you to say just one sentence; that will be sufficient. That is: "I must interfere in your internal affairs." That would be more to the point and clearer, because that is consistent with the objective fact. With regard to the

GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D) difference between matters inside Korea and beyond Korea, and how our proposals can insure a stable armistice without involving the question of interference in internal affairs, I have made my statement of yesterday morning and you are advised to make a careful review of that statement. However, any attempt on your part to interfere in our internal affairs, in any form, will absolutely not be permitted.

I agree to recess until tomorrow.

GEN FERENBAUGH: May I have the privilege of one more question before recessing?

GEN HSIEH: Of course.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Does your side intend to increase your military air capability during the armistice?

GEN HSIEH: I have answered this question of yours, both at the beginning of yesterday's session and at the end of the session yesterday. The answer is: Since our side maintains that there should be no introduction of reinforcing military forces, including combat aircraft, during the armistice into Korea, how can you assume that there will be an increase of military strength, including military air strength, during the armistice?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Thank you very much. Until tomorrow then.

Meeting recessed at 1320 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

18 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-fifth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegate; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: May I offer you the opportunity of making a statement.

GEN HSIEH: I have nothing to say.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have a short statement.

Yesterday we presented a detailed proof why additional military airfields on either side would be a definite increase in military capabilities. The facts and logic of the explanation are irrefutable and obvious to all. These cannot be denied. You supported this fact yesterday when you said it was based upon the theory of maintaining the military balance. Therefore, you do admit that the addition of military airfields by either side is a definite increase in military capabilities.

Yesterday we also answered your question regarding interference in internal affairs. We gave you a factual, clear explanation of the relationship between sovereign rights and restrictions agreed to by both sides for an armistice. We have shown conclusively that an agreement by both sides to restrict the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields during an armistice is neither a violation of sovereign rights nor an interference in the internal affairs of either side. It is your side which arbitrarily chooses to call it

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) interference in internal affairs. However, you cannot change the fact that any sovereign state that enters into an armistice agreement does so knowing that it is agreeing to certain restrictions on its sovereign rights.

The logic you used yesterday in reply to my statement is strange logic indeed. You accuse our side, which recommends restriction on military airfields, as doing so in order to maintain the state of war. Sound thinking and reasoning would prove that the side that desires to have the right during an armistice to deal with its military airfields in any way it sees fit, is the side that wishes to maintain the state of war and desires to create stress during the armistice. It is difficult for us to understand your purpose in using such strange logic.

You asked us to clearly explain the objectives of our side in insisting upon restrictions on the increase of military air capabilities during an armistice. This objective was clearly outlined to you yesterday, but I shall repeat it. Our objective is to reach agreement on principles which provide for a stable and effective armistice, a bridge to peaceful solution to the Korean problem. I would like to ask you: What is your objective in insisting upon the right to build military airfields and thereby increase your military air capabilities during an armistice?

GEN HSIEH: Again you assert, this morning, that to restrict the right of an independent and sovereign state in deciding upon whether to carry out or not to carry out certain facilities, for instance, airfields, is not an interference in the internal affairs of that state; but it is possible that you yourself do not realize that this assertion of yours is inconsistent with previous statements of your side. I would like you to recall your own previous statement to the effect that the question of airfields is, on the one hand, a question of internal affairs of a country; and, on the other hand, it has an aspect related to mili-

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

tary capabilities. I cite this statement of your own to illustrate that even you yourself could not but admit that such restriction is an interference in the internal affairs. The question of whether certain facilities will be rehabilitated or will not be rehabilitated is a question of another category; it is not to be confused with this question. Therefore, it is clear that the continued insistence of your side to restrict the right of an independent state to proceed or not to proceed with any facilities during the armistice is an interference in the internal affairs of that country. This point was admitted by yourselves and does not wait for me to refute it.

When you attempt to interfere in our internal affairs, you sometimes could not but admit that this is an attempt to interfere in our internal affairs. But on other occasions, you think out various methods of tricks to arbitrarily assert that "this is no interference in your internal affairs". You argued that if only both sides agree to a provision, such an agreement is based on the voluntary wishes of both sides. You also argued that the enforcing of this provision will be the matter of the side agreeing itself, and it is not to be enforced by the other side. That is, this enforcing is also on a basis of voluntariness. You have employed such arguments to disguise yourselves as if you are very sincere toward freedom and the principle of voluntariness. You have tried to cloak yourself as angels of peace, as freedom-loving people.

Such deceptive arguments of yours do deceive certain people. There are a small group of people who are willing, who are voluntarily taking the part of running dogs of the ruling bloc of the United States of America. As they are acting as running dogs, they frequently avowed that they are doing this voluntarily; that they are dealing with their own affairs with

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

perfect right. But in actuality they must wait upon the will and decision of the ruling bloc of the United States of America, and if they tried to go back on the orders, they would be compelled with pressure from your side. That is the substance of the fact; but you could assert that this group of running dogs are serving your use of their own choice, and this group of running dogs also shamelessly claim that they are doing this out of their own free will. Such a trick, such a double trick on both sides, can deceive a handful of people but it cannot deceive the wide masses of people throughout the world, and even less, deceive our side. Even though this method of deceiving other people and deceiving yourselves can play a temporary role with regard to a small group of running dogs of yours in the present world, it is impossible to apply such a method to our side.

You assert that the objective of your attitude is to insure a stable armistice and to lead to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. If such is really your objective, you should have admitted that both sides have already agreed upon a very important principle--a basic principle for insuring a stable armistice. That is, both sides undertake not to introduce any reinforcing military forces, including combat aircraft, into Korea during the armistice. If your objective is really as you have claimed to be--the assurance of a stable armistice to lead to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question--and if in the meantime you are prepared to sufficiently guarantee the implementation of this principle as we are prepared to do, then we firmly believe that it is inconceivable that the military forces of both sides could be increased during the armistice. Since we already have this principle as a basic guarantee and we also have the supervision and

GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

inspection by the neutral nations supervisory organ, then what justification can your side have to raise and to insist on your attempt to interfere in our internal affairs under the pretext of restricting our airfield facilities? Since your side is fully aware that such restriction on airfields is a matter of internal affairs; and since we on our side consider facilities during the armistice is entirely a question of our own internal affairs & which we would not tolerate any interference with, then why is it--what is your real intention in trying to create various excuses and clinging to these excuses, although they have been refuted by us many times, to insist on your unreasonable stand even though you clearly know our firm and unshakable stand?

You also argued that your side does not intend to maintain a state of war in Korea. But I would like to remind you of the attitude of your side at the time when our side proposed the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. We made that proposal on the basis that the war flames in Korea were spread and extended because of the involvement of foreign forces, and that in order to reach a thorough settlement of the Korean question , all foreign forces must be withdrawn from Korea. But your attitude toward that proposal of ours was that your side not only refused to accept our proposal—your side even dared not to face this question squarely. You took the attitude of so-called irresponsiveness. You shut up your eyes and said, "We will not look at the question, we will not agree to this question, and we will not accept this proposal."

It is clear, therefore, that the position of your side is to continue the war in Korea and to prolong the stationing of your forces in Korea. As your side dared not to face squarely the question of withdrawal of foreign forces, which was an important step toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, you are

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) not qualified to argue that you do not intend to maintain a state of war in Korea. And it is also obvious from your actions recently--after our side put forth our proposal of January 9th which has already settled reasonably both the differences existing between both sides. You still tried to present many various absurd arguments in an attempt to argue for your intentions of interfering in our internal affairs and to delay the negotiations. It is clear from your recent attitude that your objective is to maintain a state of war in Korea. Your objective has already been exposed nakedly before the eyes of the whole world.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have gained the impression that you have recognized the appropriatness of our statements, the soundness of our logic and the firmness of our stand, otherwise it would not be necessary for you to make slanderous remarks about the United States and the United Nations who have forces in Korea. Out of all this running dog propaganda, I could not detect an answer to my question which I gave at the end of my statement this morning. Shall I repeat it?

GEN HSIEH: You assert that your logic is sound and reasonable. That assertion can only be believed by our own side, because nobody else will believe it. You ask what is our objective in insisting upon our right. The answer is very simple: we must insist upon our right because we want to uphold the integrity of our sovereignty and the independence of our internal affairs. This is not only our objective during these negotiations but is also the objective for which our side has been fighting more than a year.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Are you finished?

GEN HSIEH: Yes.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I should like to reread a paragraph out of my statement made this morning:

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) "We have shown conclusively that an agreement by both sides to restrict the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields during an armistice is neither a violation of sovereign rights nor an interference in the internal affairs of either side. It is your side which arbitrarily chooses to call it interference in internal affairs. However, you cannot change the fact that any sovereign state that enters into an armistice agreement does so knowing that it is agreeing to certain restrictions on its sovereign rights."

GEN HSIEH: You merely denied again, seriously, your own previous statement in this sub-committee meeting. That is the only impression I get from your statement just now. You yourselves stated previously that the question of airfields is a question of internal affairs; although, on the other hand, it is also connected with the question of military capabilities. If only you would admit that the question of airfields is a question of internal affairs, then it is apparent that by your insistence upon restricting facilities which are not related to the question of insuring a stable armistice, you are attempting to interfere in our internal affairs, because in order to insure a stable armistice we have already agreed upon the most fundamental principle of not introducing any reinforcing into Korea, including combat aircraft, during the armistice.

GEN FERENBAUGH: We seem to be circling this morning. We shall try to dig out some new logic, some new facts, from your statements. May I suggest that you review my statement of this morning and those of yesterday, and that we then meet again tomorrow morning at the usual time.

GEN HSIEH: As a matter of fact, this so-called repetition and circling do not start from today. You and I both know they have been going on for many days and by putting together the arguments

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) of both sides we can produce quite a thick pamphlet. You have presented your logic, we have our own reasons; but the sole conclusion is that your logic is untenable, while our stand is reasonable. To review the previous statement of our side is, of course, profitable, but it is only your giving up of an unreasonable demand which will promote the progress in this conference. Otherwise, the delaying and obstruction of the negotiations will only produce the same phenomena of circling and repetition.

I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1208 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

0000712

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

19 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-sixth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegate: BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, LTCOL J W Thames, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have a statement.

During the past several days, these discussions have narrowed the problem down to a single factor. It is the difference in the ideas of the two sides regarding the restrictions necessary for a stable and effective armistice. You have stated that your January 9th proposal provides for all the restrictions necessary. During the past several days we have conclusively proven that your January 9th proposal is deficient in that it lacks one of the essential restrictions. Your statements in reply to our sound and logical arguments indicate that you recognize this to be true. It is only your refusal to accept this fact and your refusal to agree to the logical and necessary restrictions on military airfields that delays the progress of these negotiations.

You continue to assert that you solved the two remaining issues confronting us by your January 9th proposal. Your method of solution was to completely ignore the issue regarding restrictions on airfields. One doesn't solve problems by ignoring them. The problem is still confronting us. The United Nations Command will continue to insist upon some provision in the armistice agreement which restricts each side from increasing its military air capabilities.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) The continuation of your illogical arguments that restrictions on military airfields during a military armistice is an interference in your internal affairs and has no place in an armistice agreement, will not deceive us nor move us from our stand. You cannot refute the fact that we are negotiating a military armistice. You cannot refute the fact that a military armistice pertains to military matters and military capabilities. You cannot refute the fact that military airfields are a definite military capability and should be included in the provisions of a military armistice agreement. The United Nations Command is taking a realistic attitude toward a military armistice. We shall not enter into any agreement that does not contain the necessary provisions for the stability and effectiveness of the armistice. We shall continue to seek agreement on provisions which restrict both sides from increasing their military capabilities during an armistice.

I hope you will not repeat your faulty reasoning which implies that you have taken care of all the essentials necessary because of the agreed restriction not to introduce reinforcing combat aircraft into Korea. You know and we know that both sides have combat aircraft in Korea at this time and will have them there at the time the armistice is signed. You know and we know that the combat capabilities of these aircraft of both sides can be greatly increased if these aircraft are moved closer to the battle line and operate from new or improved military airfields. You know and we know that the only way to prevent the capabilities of these aircraft in Korea from becoming considerably greater, is to restrict the number of military airfields from which they can operate.

I ask you once again to make an effort to reach agreement with our side on this matter. We have presented a sound proposal in this regard and you can find no logical reason for not accepting it.

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GEN HSIEH: After listening carefully to your statement, I find that you have merely repeated your previous arguments, and as we have pointed out at the end of yesterdays's session, you are merely taking an action of circling and repetition. Yet, on the other hand, you expressed that you do not wish to hear our side repeat our refutation of your arguments. And again you expressed the hope that both sides should make efforts to settle the question before us. Thus, in this statement of yours, you have made so many inconsistent statements that it is very difficult for me to reply. Since the arguments you used this morning are not new arguments but merely arguments which you have already put forth in the sessions of January 16th and 17th, my refutation of these arguments can be found in my statements on January 17th; and, as you do not wish us to repeat, there is no necessity for me to repeat my refutations.

Finally, you expressed the wish that both sides will make efforts to settle the difference between us, and I must point out once again, as I have previously done many times, that by our efforts in submitting our January 9th proposal we have already settled the two major differences existing between both sides. I have also advised your side not to base your efforts on a vain hope, and not to direct your efforts toward a wrong direction. Your statement that you wish both sides will make efforts anew makes me doubtful as to your objective in saying so, because it is impossible for me to make the stand and position of our side clearer than I have already done.

If it is your genuine intention to make efforts toward the settlement of the question, then I will give you a simple advice, that is, not to haggle over this question any longer.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, you continue to assert that you have solved the two necessary issues confronting us by your January 9th proposal. Your method of solution was to completely ignore the issue

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) regarding restrictions on airfields. One doesn't solve problems by ignoring them. The problem is still confronting us. The United Nations Command will continue to insist upon some provision in the armistice agreement which restricts each side from increasing its military air capabilities.

GEN HSIEH: You have the privilege to insist on your unreasonable demand, but likewise, we have the right to refuse to discuss and accept your unreasonable demand. This is known to your side and to our side. Why is it that our side said your demand is unreasonable while our refusal is reasonable? This can be explained at great length, or in short. All the proposals of our side from December 3rd last year to January 9th have one basic provision for insuring a stable armistice, a most important principle for stabilizing the armistice; that is, the principle of the prohibition of introduction of any military forces, including combat aircraft, into Korea during the armistice. If only your side, like our side, would strictly adhere to and carry out this principle, it would be inconceivable that there will be an increase of military forces on both sides, including military air forces. That is an explanation in short.

I would like to tell you, once again, that you could continue to insist upon your unreasonable demand, but by doing so, you are merely wasting time.

GEN FERENBAUGH: You repeatedly state that you have already refuted the sound arguments of our side. I will illustrate to you that your so-called refutation is not based upon facts. On January 5th you made the statement, and I quote: "If you have real sincerity to make efforts toward an armistice, then you must face the facts of the Korean War; you must admit there exists a balance of military force between both sides, and therefore you have no justification whatsoever to raise such unreasonable demands and attempt to force us to accept them."

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) You made much the same statement on January 12th when you said, and I again quote: "The reality existing today is that the forces of both sides are approximately balanced; this is a fact which even your side cannot but admit, and it is a just fact." A few moments later you stated: "You said that you would respect logic and recognize military reality; that is, the fact that at present there is a balance of forces on both sides. Then no matter whether in these military armistice negotiations or in any other negotiations, your side cannot take any attitude except that of equality and reciprocity."

With all of these statements of yours I have quoted, we are in accord. Like you, we recognize the fact that there is a general balance of military forces and military capabilities existing in Korea today. I feel sure that if there were a decided lack of balance in the military situation, you and I would be opposite each other, but not across the conference table. Since a general balance in military capabilities has brought us here to stop the fighting, it is imperative that neither side upset the balance by increasing its military air capabilities during the armistice while a peaceful settlement of the Korean question is sought and reached.

To preserve this general balance, you have told us--quite unnecessarily, since it is a fact we have already accepted--that our side cannot take any attitude except that of equality and reciprocity. With these axioms in mind, namely, that a general balance now exists which should not be upset by an increase in military air capabilities, and that the armistice agreement should be one of equality and reciprocity, we have proposed and steadfastly maintained that we should mutually agree not to increase our military air capabilities by the rehabilitation or construction of military airfields.

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) Our proposal certainly conforms to your stipulations: firstly it recognizes the general balance of military forces; secondly, it is advanced in the spirit of equality and reciprocity.

We were therefore quite astonished at the statement you made on 17 January. That is, in this statement you said: "I have proved sufficiently that the so-called theory of maintenance of a balance of military capabilities of both sides, which you insist on is: firstly, unnecessary; and secondly, impracticable." We do not understand your apparent change in attitude, nor do we understand the reasons behind that change.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement shows that you have spent time in reviewing your record and studying the statements we made regarding the question of balance of military forces of both sides. You have intended, by citing our statements, to argue for your theory of maintenance of the balance of military capabilities of both sides. But in doing so, in citing our statements and in making explanations on them, you have, to a certain extent, expounded our stand, thus making it unnecessary for me to speak at greater length. You have only quoted my statements of January 5th and 12th in this connection but, in fact, there were more statements related to the same question if you go further back into the record.

The meaning of my statement of January 12th as you have quoted it is complete. That is, there exists in Korea an approximate balance of military forces of both sides; and if your side cannot but admit this military reality, then during these negotiations you can take no other attitude except that of equality and reciprocity. You have clearly indicated that you are in full accord with these statements. That is very well, as you are in accord with my statement that since there is an approximate balance of military forces of both sides existing in Korea, therefore, the attitude to be taken in these negotiations should be the attitude of equality and reciprocity. Reversely

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

speaking, our meaning is that your side has no right to compel us to accept your unreasonable demand, even though you have the right to insist on your unreasonable demand. On the other hand, our side has complete right to reject and to refuse to accept any unreasonable demand of yours. If you understand this fact and you are in accord with it, then why is it that you could resort to so many various tactics in an attempt to reach your objective of interfering in our internal affairs? You even said repeatedly that you would not stop from attempting to reach this objective. Do you not feel yourselves that there is an inconsistency in your actions and in your statement that you are in accord with our statement?

But you have proceeded to quote another statement and you have labeled it incorrectly. You seem to say that we have supported the theory of maintenance of the balance of military capabilities on both sides. That is entirely wrong. We have never been in favor of such a theory. You quoted my statements of January 5th and January 12th and you can quote more of my statements in this connection. But as you have quoted them and as I have explained in my statements on those days, they could not be employed to argue for your theory of maintenance of a balance of military capabilities of both sides. My statements only serve the purpose of pointing out and defending the fact that both sides should take the attitude of reciprocity and abide by the principle of reciprocity in these negotiations. You have labeled my statement wrongly and put in my mouth a meaning which has never been intended by our side.

On the contrary, we firmly stand against your theory of maintenance of the balance of military capabilities of both sides, as I have refuted at length on January 17th. Since I have already pointed out in detail the unreasonableness of

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) your so-called theory of maintenance of balance of military capabilities of both sides on January 17th, I would not repeat all I have said.

To put it simply: firstly, it is our stand that the state of war in Korea should be eliminated speedily and, in order to do this, the most effective measure would be the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. But if this cannot be done within a short period, then we should restrict the introduction of reinforcing forces, including combat aircraft, into Korea. From this stand of ours it can be seen that we are not only against the increase of military forces of both sides in Korea, but we are for the reduction of forces. But as your side takes an objective contrary to ours, you opposed the withdrawal of foreign forces and, on the contrary, you supported the prolonged stationing of foreign forces in Korea. Indeed, you have made many efforts toward the prolongation of the state of war in Korea. Our point of view is that since there is the provision of restriction of introduction of reinforcing military forces, including combat aircraft, into Korea, we can stabilize the armistice; and by strictly adhering to this principle, there would be no increase of military forces but, on the contrary, there may be reduction of forces during the armistice. That is why we say that your so-called theory of maintenance of the balance of military capabilities of both sides is entirely unnecessary.

Secondly, we would like to ask: Is it practicable to maintain the balance of military capabilities of both sides? The answer is definitely "No". It is impossible and impractical to maintain this balance, because the term "military capabilities" involves very wide and extensive matters. You cannot but admit that modern warfare is carried out with many factors

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) including military forces, ground, sea, and air; including political factors and economic factors; including the physical well-being and training of the population; the training of military cadres and troops; the improvement of techniques and equipments; and so on. All these things are related to military capabilities, and yet you say you would suggest that we discuss in these military armistice negotiations such extensive questions. You say that in these negotiations we must restrict the military capabilities of both sides; but, as I said, all these factors—some of them military in nature and others not military in themselves—are connected with military capabilities. Then how is it conceivable that we can discuss such extensive questions in these negotiations? And how is it necessary to discuss such extensive questions? And even if we do discuss these questions, of course, no agreement can be reached on them because the discussion of these questions will inevitably involve the questions of internal affairs, and it is our firm stand that no interference in internal affairs is permitted. Can it be possible that our stand is still not clear to your side? But even though you are fully aware that interference in internal affairs is a demand which absolutely will not be accepted by our side, yet you still insist upon such a demand. We do not know what is your objective in doing so.

You have employed many tactics to try to press this demand of yours ever since we discussed the question, and particularly in recent days, you have in this conference employed various fallacious arguments. You have employed fallacious propaganda outside of the conference. You have violated the agreement of the neutral zone. You have bombed prisoner of war camps. You have carried out provocative actions against the territory of the People's Republic of China, and yesterday aircraft of your

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) side bombed vehicles of our delegation on the road from Kaesong to Pyongyang, in violation of our agreement. You have indeed employed any and every tactic. But how can such tactics of your side cause any effect? You only produce the impression on us and on people throughout the world that you are wasting time and delaying the negotiations for some undisclosed purpose of your own. Such tactics of yours, inside and outside of the conference, in violation of the neutral zone and your provocative acts, are not novel; they have been used by your side many times since the negotiations. But it is only that you are too slow at learning from past lessons—because what would be the effect of such tactics of your side? They have no effect at all on our side. Therefore, if it is indeed your intention, as you have repeatedly declared and described, to make efforts to solve the so-called difference still left on Item 3 of the agenda—I must point out in passing that this difference is of your own creation; we do not recognize the existence of any more differences—then I sincerely hope that your side will seriously face the present situation and make genuine efforts. Otherwise, you are only wasting time, you cannot reach any objective of progress in this conference.

GEN FERENBAUGH: General Hsieh, I am always willing to listen to any logical and sound arguments you may have regarding measures which prevent either side from increasing its military air capabilities. I have conclusively refuted your faulty reasoning that your January 9th proposal contains all the essentials since it includes the restriction not to introduce combat aircraft into Korea. I shall do so again:

"You know and we know that both sides have combat aircraft in Korea at this time and will have them there at the time the armistice is signed. You know and we know that the combat

GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) capabilities of these aircraft of both sides can be greatly increased if these aircraft are moved closer to the battleline and operate from new or improved military airfields. You know and we know that the only way to prevent the capabilities of these aircraft in Korea from becoming considerably greater is to restrict the number of military airfields from which they can operate."

I would like to ask you two questions: How is it conceivable that military air capabilities will not be greatly increased if both sides do not agree to restrict their military airfields? The second question: How can a stable and effective armistice be maintained if either side is free to increase its military air capabilities at will and thereby threaten the security of the other side and create strain during the armistice and during the period that the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem is being discussed?

GEN HSIEH: Your two questions are in fact one question, and they can be answered with one sentence. Since there is in the proposal of January 9th of our side the principle of no introduction of any reinforcing forces, including combat aircraft, into Korea, how is it conceivable that there will be no increase of military forces, including military air force, of both sides?

GEN FERENBAUGH: Well, tomorrow we will expect logical arguments from your side. I suggest we recess until then.

GEN HSIEH: What statement of mine is not reasonable? Tomorrow you will get the same answers, the same attitude on our side.

I agree to recess until tomorrow.

GEN FERENBAUGH: At the same time.

Meeting recessed at 1239 hours.

OFFICIAL:

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

000724

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

20 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, 47th Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegationson Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegate; COL D O Darrow, USAF, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, CDR G G Ball, USN, CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

GEN FERENBAUGH Your choice.

GEN HSIEH We have talked very much and have nothing to say.

GEN FERENBAUGH I have a very short statement.

We have already fully explained our position with regard to the requirement that the armistice agreement contain restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields by both sides. We see no necessity to elaborate further on our explanations. We propose that the wording of the United Nations Command principle 4 be adopted in order to insure a stable and effective armistice. Our proposal is sound. Our stand is firm. Unless you have either some specific question with regard thereto or something constructive to offer I suggest that we recess until 1100 hours tomorrow.

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GEN HSIEH We have many times, many times and enumerable times rejected the 4th principle of your December 19th proposal because that is entirely a provision to interfere in our internal affairs. It is impossible for me to make clearer the stand of our side than I have already done. That is, any form of interference in our internal affairs, any such intention and proposal is absolutely unacceptable to this side. That is our firm and unshakable stand. I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1106 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR



NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

21 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-eighth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegate; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: The floor is yours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say? We are ready to listen to it.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Have you anything?

GEN HSIEH: No.

GEN FERENBAUGH: I have a short one.

For the past week we have patiently explained the necessity for including in the armistice agreement a provision restricting the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields. We have explained at great length how our proposal fulfills this requirement. On the other hand, you have made no effort whatsoever to discuss this problem on its merits but have confined your arguments exclusively to asserting that the United Nations Command desires to prolong the war and to interfere in your internal affairs; two allegations which are entirely without foundation and which are completely foreign to the matter under discussion. You have offered nothing constructive, I repeat, nothing constructive, in these discussions on this last remaining issue. The United Nations Command proposal should be perfectly clear to you. It is sound--it is firm. However, we are always ready to answer

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GEN FERENGAUGH: (Cont'd) any pertinent questions which you may have concerning it. If you have no questions, I recommend that you accept the United Nations Command proposal at this time.

If you are not prepared to accept it at this time, I suggest that we recess until 1100 hours tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: Your December 29th proposal has been rejected by our side many, many times, and we will reject it forever.

In order to insure a stable armistice, our side has already made all the reasonable suggestions toward the wording of the principles on Item 3 of the agenda, and it is impossible to make any more changes.

The armistice negotiations in Korea have already reached basic agreement on all points. All the peace-loving people throughout the world recognize this fact, and yet your side still outrageously insists on your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs by restricting airfield facilities. You have done so, for the sole purpose of delaying and disrupting the negotiations. There can be no other reason for your doing so.

I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1110 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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Gen. Harrison

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

22 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-ninth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegate; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL K A Damke, USMC, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Have you anything to say this morning?

GEN HSIEH: It is now twelve days since our side submitted our January 9th proposal, and you have not been able to raise any tenable arguments to oppose our proposal. For the past two days, your side has run out of any arguments in the conference and this proves my statement to be true. At the same time, your side, for four times successively since January 13th, has carried out provocative acts in an attempt to create excuses for the delaying and disrupting of the negotiations. By such acts you have clearly exposed your intentions to delay and disrupt the negotiations. If you still intend to continue the negotiations and to seek for the realization of an armistice, then you should not insist upon such a dogmatic attitude of interfering in our internal affairs. Of course we are unable to stop you from such a deliberate attempt of delaying and disrupting the negotiations, but we are firmly against such a stand of yours and the responsibility for the delaying and disrupting of the negotiations is entirely on your side.

GEN FERENBAUGH: Yesterday you said that it was impossible to make any changes in the wording of the principles on Item 3 of the agenda. The

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GEN FERENBAUGH: (Cont'd) United Nations Command has not suggested any changes in the wording of those principles. The United Nations would be willing to accept the exact wording of your principles 4, 5, and 6, as contained in your 9 January proposal, if you would add a provision for restrictions on military airfields in order that neither side may increase its military air capabilities during the armistice. If you are prepared to present a proposed wording which would accomplish this result, we would be glad to hear it. If you are not prepared to do so, we propose that you accept the wording contained in that part of the United Nations Command fourth principle relating to restrictions on airfields. If you are not prepared to do that, we suggest that the meeting be recessed until eleven o'clock tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement just now is only a continuation of your actions for the past two days. By this you have again wasted one more day. Our side has pointed out clearly the reasonableness of our proposal and the fact that your so-called proposal is only an unreasonable demand of yours. Our side firmly rejects any attempt in any form, to interfere in our internal affairs. You can find my firm stand also in my opening statement today.

For three days successively you have taken this attitude in the conference, and since January 13th, your side has carried out four provocative acts outside of the conference. In coordination with such attitude and acts on your part, the Senior Delegate of your delegation has also bragged about renewed military pressure. He wrote in the U.S. News and World Report that maybe the only way to break the armistice deadlock would be a new military pressure. He said that maybe bombs and bullets are the only language the other side can understand. (Note: According to United Nations Command Interpreter, General Hsieh used "Communists" in lieu of "other side".) Obviously it is not out of accident that you

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

have done so recently. Your attitude and actions deserve a high vigilance on our part. All the people throughout the world are also highly alert regarding your tactics of delaying and disrupting the negotiations, and you cannot escape the responsibility for delaying and disrupting the negotiations.

If you have nothing new to say, I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1115 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, JR.,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

23 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fiftieth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, LTCOL L G Hill, Jr., USAF, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff assistants; Interpreters; and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours

GEN TURNER: Have you anything to propose?

GEN HSIEH: I wish to speak.

In your statement yesterday your side stated that your side did not propose to change the wording of the provisions in our 9 January proposal, but you were only proposing to add one provision, that is, the provision for restricting military airfields. In point of fact, such a statement is only a repetition of your insistence on interfering in our internal affairs as included in your 29 December proposal; an insistence which does not deserve any regard, and even less, any refutation. Yet after the session yesterday your side propagandized outside of the conference that your statement yesterday was an indication of a concession on your part. It is indeed very brave of you to employ such a tactic to deceive the peoples throughout the world.

The point at issue between both sides is in substance, firstly, the question of our internal affairs. Our side absolutely will not permit any interference in our internal affairs. We are here absolutely not to bargain on this point. In other words, we are firmly against any attempt,

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GEN HSIEH:
(CONT'D)

in any form, to interfere in our internal affairs. We will stand forever against such attempts. On the other side is the question whether your side will take back your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs under the subterfuge of so-called restriction on airfields. And as a matter of fact, even if you would, on your own initiative, cancel this unreasonable demand, it would only be the least indication of your willingness to take an attitude of equality and reciprocity toward these negotiations. It is no concession to speak of,at all. That is the substance of the point at issue between us. It is a point for you to remember well.

Therefore, the 29 December proposal of your side has already been rejected by our side many times before our side submitted our proposal of 9 January. Our proposal of 9 January settled fairly and reasonably the two major differences existing between your side and our side. That is, on the one hand, it permitted replenishment within a definite limit, a question on which your side has insisted; on the other hand, it eliminated the question of your insistence on interfering in our internal affairs under the pretext of so-called limitation on the rehabilitation and construction of airfields. The fairness and reasonableness of our proposal is recognized by all the peoples throughout the world. It is also strongly borne out by the fact that your side has run out of any arguments or any reasons for the past three days in this conference. You should be unmistakably aware of our firm stand not to permit the interference in our internal affairs under any form whatsoever. If your side still intends to realize an armistice, you should accept our 9 January proposal without hesitation. Otherwise your side may, for your own undisclosed motives,

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GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D) continue to play your tricks of delaying and disrupting the negotiations interminably. But coolly and sternly our side and the peoples throughout the world will watch and see for how long your side can play such tricks. And the responsiblity for all the consequences of your delaying and disrupting the negotiations will fall squarely on your shoulders.

GEN TURNER: Have you nothing else to propose?

GEN HSEIH: No.

GEN TURNER: Since 9 January, when you submitted your inadequate proposal, the attitude of your side has been to insist upon your unilateral demand that we accept a set of principles which is incomplete. You are insisting upon armistice terms which will give you a free hand to increase your military air capabilities at will during the armistice. Your side is insisting upon your desire for an ineffective armistice. The United Nations Command will not be a party to any such ineffective armistice. We shall continue to insist, and rightly so, that an effective military armistice must contain provisions which prevent either side, I repeat, either side, from increasing its military air capabilities at will during the armistice.

I suggest that you review the record to discern the nature of your alleged refutation of the United Nations Command's comprehensive and sound proposal regarding restrictions on military airfields. You will find that not once have you discussed the details of the matter specifically. You will find that your statements have consisted entirely of false allegations; of assertaions that the intent of the United Nations Command is to prolong the state of war and to interfere in your internal affairs. Both of

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GEN TURNER: (CONT'D) these allegations have been completely disproved and invalidated by us many times.

Your very actions at this conference table, of refusing to recognize the importance and necessity of the United Nations Command recommendations regarding restrictions on military airfields, show clearly that you are delaying the conference; that you are prolonging the state of war; that you desire to create tension during an armistice; and that you do have the intentions to increase your military air capabilities during an armistice.

Why is it that you will not answer our question and state you do not intend to increase your military air capabilities during an armistice? Your refusal to answer that question indicates your intention to the whole world. You cannot hide it.

If you have nothing constructive to propose or offer at this time, I suggest that we recess until tomorrow at the usual time.

GEN HSIEH: Agreed.

Meeting recessed at 1125 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

24 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-first Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, 2nd LT W S Brennan, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you anything constructive to say or propose this morning?

GEN HSIEH: I have a statement to make.

For four days successively, your side has run out of any argument or presentable logic to support your outrageous and unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs under the pretext of placing restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of airfields. Yet you called black white by asserting yesterday that our side had not refuted and overthrown each of the various arguments your side employed in attempting to defend this demand of yours. Such an assertion is entirely absurd and unfounded. I would like to take more time to summarize the falsity and hollowness of your various arguments, to expose the real intentions of your side in persisting in your demand, and to expound once again the stand of our side so that your side may be rendered unable to continue your distortions and deception.

First of all, I wish to point out that the basic reason for our side's firm opposition to your proposing and insisting upon the provisions of restrictions on airfield facilities within Korea during the discussion of the concrete arrangements

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

for cease-fire and armistice in Korea is because such restrictions constitute an interference in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state, and constitute a term which should not be, and is impermissable to be, submitted for discussion in a military armistice conference carried out by both parties on an equal footing.

The next and subsidiary reason for our firm objection is because such restrictions are an unnecessary requirement. Your side misrepresents the position of our side and arbitrarily asserts that the fact that our side does not explicitly state whether it does or does not intend to rehabilitate or construct airfields during the armistice is an indication that our side plans to develop its air power greatly--as if the reason why our side opposes this unreasonable demand of yours was because it stood in the way of a certain predetermined plan of our side to violate the military armistice. I have pointed out previously that such misrepresentations and slanderous hypotheses made by your side are unfounded. What our side is concerned in is the absolute inviolability of our internal affairs. As for the rehabilitation and construction of airfields, they may be or may not be proceeded with, but that is a question of another category.

The above is the basic stand of our side in our present dispute, a stand which is not to be subject to doubt or misrepresentation. The question of restriction on airfields is, by its very nature, a question which should not be, and is impermissable to be, raised for discussion in a military armistice conference. However, in order to keep a favorable atmosphere in the negotiations, our side, which consistently takes the attitude of reasoning, has shown courtesy and patience in refuting every one of your arguments. What have been your

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

arguments? The earliest argument advanced by your side is that your side is placing restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of our airfields during hostilities and that therefore your side would continue to place the same restrictions on our side on our right to rehabilitate and construct airfields during the period of the armistice. It can be seen from this argument that your side cannot but admit that this proposal of yours is a unilateral dictate by your side. As a matter of fact, has your side restricted the rehabilitation and construction of our airfields while hostilities are going on? No, it has not! To a certain extent, your side does obstruct and destroy our work of rehabilitation and construction. Yet, at the same time, military actions of our side are causing great losses to your air forces. Furthermore, judging from the tendency through a considerable length of time lately, the effect of this kind of obstruction and destruction on your part is steadily diminishing. You yourselves came to realize that such a theory of prolonging the conditions prevailing during the hostilities was detrimental to your unilateral demand. That was why you soon shelved this argument.

Then your side advanced the fallacious theory that if our side rehabilitated and constructed airfields we would threaten the security of your troops. The unilateral and arbitrary nature of your proposal can be equally seen from this argument. Everybody knows that in the Korea war, it is exactly your side which carries out destructive and wanton bombings with your aircraft and airfields, bombs which are not only directed against our troops and military installations, but aimed at the very existence of the Korean nations. The threat of your air forces on the security of our troops and people will exist after the realization of armistice, but our side has not

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

proposed to interfere in the internal affairs of your side on the justifiable argument that this threat should be reduced. On our part we have proposed that both sides shall not introduce into Korea any combat aircraft during the armistice. We are prepared to execute this stipulation faithfully. Under the condition of no increase of combat aircraft in Korea, any probable rehabilitation of airfields is absolutely incapable of posing a threat to the other side.

The third argument of your side is that the rehabilitation and construction of additional airfields would increase the military air capability and upset the balance of military capabilities of both sides existing in Korea, and consequently disrupt the stability of the military armistice. There are many layers of erroneous views included in this argument and it will take more time and words to dissect it.

Firstly, our side has also pointed out repeatedly that there exists now in the Korean battlefield an approximate balance of military forces of both sides. But the reason why our side has done this is to show, from the actually obtaining conditions, wherein lies the basis for the armistice negotiations; and to remind your side that both sides must negotiate the armistice agreement in accordance with the principles of fairness and reasonableness and with an attitude of equality and reciprocity, and that neither side should be, or is, able to compel the other side to accept unreasonable and unilateral demands. Although such is the present situation in the battlefield, it is by no means the position of our side to maintain a so-called balance of military capabilities of both sides. Your proposition of so-called maintenance of a balance of military capabilities of both sides is basically unjustifiable because, in actuality, it is tantamount to maintaining a

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GEN HSIEH:
(Cont'd)

protracted state of war in Korea and to creating a situation of tension throughout the world. In contradistinction, it is the consistent view of our side that after the armistice is realized a political conference of a higher level should be quickly convened and all foreign troops should be speedily withdrawn from Korea, so as to eliminate thoroughly the state of war and reach a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

Secondly, your proposition of so-called maintenance of a balance of military capabilities of both sides is not to be tolerated by any independent and sovereign state. As everybody knows, the so-called military capabilities in modern warfare comprise a multitude of factors and involve every aspect of the internal affairs of a state. Therefore any alleged attempt to limit military capabilities on a specific level will inevitably interfere in the internal affairs—an interference which cannot be tolerated by any really independent and sovereign state. The fact that your side has proposed to limit the military capabilities of both sides within Korea only serves to prove that in the area under the control of your side within Korea there is no sovereignty and no independence to speak of, while your side has forgotten the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an independent and sovereign state.

Thirdly, since military capabilities in modern warfare comprise a multitude of complicated variables, theoretically speaking, it is impossible to fix the military capabilities of both belligerents at a specific level unless the national life of both sides is stopped from changing and developing in all its various aspects. That is to say, the so-called maintenance of a balance of military capabilities of both sides is a thing which is in fact unrealizable. Furthermore, it is obvious that your side is by no means prepared to restrict the increase of

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

military capabilities during the armistice in the area controlled by your side within Korea. High officials of your side openly declared that military forces of South Korea were to be fostered and strengthened after the realization of an armistice. Actually, is your side not already laying the foundation for the execution of this policy by such a measure as the founding of military academies and so on? Why is it that in this regard your side desists from applying your fallacious theory of restricting the increase of military capabilities and does not propose a restriction? According to your logic, just as your side has asked for restrictions on our military capabilities during the armistice, our side, for the same reason of so-called maintenance of a balance of military capabilities of both sides, should have proposed to restrict the increase of your military ground capabilities during the armistice. However, our side has not made such a proposal nor will our side make such a proposal, because our side does not have the intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the area controlled by your side within Korea--because our side considers it unnecessary to stipulate such restrictive provisions, since both sides have already agreed to establish the basic principle that in order to insure a stable and effective armistice there will be no introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and since a political conference of a higher level will be scheduled to convene quickly after realization of the armistice to further realize the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The most absurd feature of your stand is, therefore, that you have the effrontery to ask us why we do not recognize the so-called necessity of your principle, while you yourselves have already kicked over your own principle. Is this not apparent now?

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

Fourthly, to insure the stability of the military armistice, it is also entirely unnecessary to have the so-called restrictions, advocated by your side, on the increase of military capabilities by either side in Korea so as to maintain a balance. I have pointed out many times that it is because of the involvement of the forces of many foreign countries that the Korean war had developed to such an extent and had been aggravated to its present degree of seriousness. Therefore, since both sides already agreed to establish the basic principles that neither side shall introduce into Korea reinforcing military personnel and war equipments, the foundation has been laid for the maintenance of the stability of the military armistice.

Speaking specifically of military air capability, anybody with common sense knows that combat aircraft are its decisive component and that military air capability is generally measured by the number of combat aircraft. It is precisely because of this fact that when you previously asserted that our side intended to increase its military air capability, you had as the premise of your proposition such slanderous hypotheses and ridiculous rumors as that our side would, in violation of the agreement, introduce aircraft into Korea during the armistice, or that our side was now introducing and storing crated aircraft. Afterwards, even you yourselves came to realize that such hypotheses and rumors were making a mockery of the negotiations and making a mockery of yourselves. You therefore shifted to another line of argument. You stressed that you did not wish to create an impression that your side was implying that either side had the intention to violate the agreement. This time you said that even though no aircraft were added, military air capabilities would be doubled or tripled simply by increasing the number of airfields. Can it be said that such kind of sophistry is not childish and ridiculous?

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Under the condition that there be no additional aircraft, any possible rehabilitation and construction of airfields, as well as the changes that may occur in the other secondary elements of military air capabilities, certainly cannot undermine the stability of the armistice.

In the above, I have once more comprehensively refuted every argument you employed to support your unreasonable demand for the so-called restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of airfields. Not a single one of your arguments is tenable. During the past few days even you yourselves have found these arguments too much a mockery of yourself. Nonetheless, you still have the effrontery to insist on injecting into the already complete principle for arranging and supervising the armistice a provision which is unreasonable, unnecessary and, above all, impermissable.

What, after all, is the purpose behind this outrageous attitude of your side? Your side is using the so-called restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of airfields as a disguise in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of our side by means of negotiations and in the form of an agreement. Your side has tried various ways to cover up this point, but we cannot be so easily blindfolded, and we remember distinctly that General Turner has admitted, on the 22nd of last December, that restrictions on airfield facilities were indeed interference in our internal affairs by your side, although it was what he called interference in 1% of our internal affairs. Your side knows fully well that your proposal is interference in our internal affairs and is impertinent to the insuring of the stability of the armistice. Yet you are still clinging to it in spite of reason and logic. This cannot but lead us to doubt your real objective. It cannot but lead us to doubt gravely that your real objective is not only to interfere in our internal affairs,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) Under the condition that there be no additional aircraft, any possible rehabilitation and construction of airfields, as well as the changes that may occur in the other secondary elements of military air capabilities, certainly cannot undermine the stability of the armistice.

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What, after all, is the purpose behind this outrageous attitude of your side? Your side is using the so-called restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of airfields as a disguise in attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of our side by means of negotiations and in the form of an agreement. Your side has tried various ways to cover up this point, but we cannot be so easily blindfolded, and we remember distinctly that General Turner has admitted, on the 22nd of last December, that restrictions on airfield facilities were indeed interference in our internal affairs by your side, although it was what he called interference in 1% of our internal affairs. Your side knows fully well that your proposal is interference in our internal affairs and is impertinent to the insuring of the stability of the armistice. Yet you are still clinging to it in spite of reason and logic. This cannot but lead us to doubt your real objective. It cannot but lead us to doubt gravely that your real objective is not only to interfere in our internal affairs,

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) but to retain the position from which you will be free to carry out wanton bombing and bombardment at will, in order to unleash attacks anew at the time of your own choosing during the armistice. Seeing that the aggressive aim cannot be attained in face of our steadfast opposition, you have tried to bolster up your position with various provocative acts and intimidations. Let me tell you frankly that if debate cannot help you to achieve the presumptuous objective of yours, provocative acts and intimidations will certainly not help you out.

For the settlement of Item 3 of the agenda and to insure the stability and effectiveness of the armistice, our proposal of January 9th has provided a complete set of principles. I propose that your side accept our proposal of January 9th.

GEN TURNER: I have listened carefully to your lengthy statement this morning, but I have failed to detect any clear expression of intention on your part as to whether you intend or you do not intend to improve your military air capabilities during armistice. Will you now express in simple terms what your intention is during armistice on this matter?

GEN HSIEH: My statement this morning is a comprehensive summing up and criticism of the question in dispute, in which I have refuted every one of your arguments raised to support your unreasonable demand. At the same time I have restated the firm stand of our side. You can find a clear answer to your question, also, in my statement. I wish that you will make a careful study of it.

GEN TURNER: You continue to state your unreasonable and arbitrary objection concerning the United Nations Command recommendations for a stable and effective armistice. You continue to insist that during an armistice you have the right to increase your military air capabilities at your own choosing and thus to jeopardize the armistice. Your actions are those of one who expects to reap

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) military benefits from an armistice. You call an increase in your military air capabilities an internal affair and insist that you have the right to do as you choose regarding this. Again I must remind you we are negotiating a military armistice. Both sides must agree to armistice agreement restrictions which prevent either side from increasing its military capabilities. The sooner you give up your unreasonable demand to build up your military air capabilities at will during an armistice, the sooner we can reach agreement on a military armistice. It is your side which bears the responsibility for the delay of these negotiations by using the fallacious argument of interference in internal affairs to disguise your desire to increase your military air capabilities.

If you have nothing constructive to say or propose, I suggest we recess until tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: You merely read a statement prepared before today's session in which you harped upon your old tune. It is not worth my refutation again, because my statement this morning has already more than refuted your arguments. Your distortions and misrepresentations cannot cover up the eyes and ears of all the people throughout the world who are well aware of our fair and reasonable attitude in these negotiations and our reasonable stand.

If you are sincere in wishing an armistice, you should promptly accept our January 9th proposal. Today is the fifth day you have continued to play your tactics of delaying and disrupting the negotiations. We will wait and see how long you can keep up these tactics. If you appreciate such tactics of yours and you are determined to delay the negotiations, you can do this interminably; but you must be prepared to accept the responsibility for all the consequences which may follow from such tactics of delaying and disrupting the negotiations on your part.

GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1205 hours

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

25 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-second Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and BGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, CDR G G Ball, USN, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; Maj Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: I will speak.

We have carefully reviewed the statement you made yesterday. We found nothing therein that you have not already said in your attempt to overcome the logical and sound basis upon which the United Nations Command proposal stands. We did find an inferential answer to our question concerning your intentions—you do intend to increase your military air capabilities during the armistice. This intention on your part makes even more firm the United Nations Command position that restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields must be included in any armistice which is to be firm and effective. You have, so far, failed to offer any solution to this remaining problem. Do you have anything constructive to offer now?

GEN HSIEH: Your statement just now proves that you have not yet made a good study of our statement yesterday. Yesterday I refuted, once again, every one of the absurd arguments employed by you in support of the unreasonable demand of your side. You have failed to advance any logical arguments to defend the unreasonable demand of your side. You have resorted to slander and charged groundlessly that our side intended to increase our military air power during the period of

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) armistice. You attempt, by so doing, to shift on our side the responsibility for delaying the negotiations. I assure you, seriously, your attempt will never succeed, and your slanders will never deceive anybody. The stipulation proposed by our side that both sides shall not introduce into Korea any reinforcing military forces, including combat aircraft, is the guarantee that both sides shall not increase their military air power during the period of armistice.

As for the rehabilitation and construction of any facilities within the territory of Korea, that is a matter which comes completely within the scope of internal affairs and which your side has no right to look into.

This is the firm and just stand of our side on this question. No sober minded person can draw from this firm and just stand of our side the slanderous conclusion, as voiced by your side, that our side intends to increase our military air power during the period of armistice. It is entirely due to the insistence by your side on the unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs that a complete agreement is not yet reached on Item 3 of the agenda after the discussion of nearly two months. The responsibility for delaying the negotiations falls squarely on your side.

GEN TURNER: You are merely repeating yourself and restating your defunct arguments which we have prviously refuted many times. Do you have anything new to propose at this time?

GEN HSIEH: Have you finished?

GEN TURNER: Yes.

GEN HSIEH: I gather from your statement just now that it seems you still need time to study my statement made this morning.

GEN TURNER: Have you finished?

GEN HSIEH: Yes.

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GEN TURNER: Since 9 January, our two sides have been discussing the last remaining major issue not settled in Agenda Item 3. We have made no progress during this period. The United Nations Command has offered a solution to this problem; however, unless you will accept this solution or offer a revision acceptable to us, it does not appear that we shall make any further progress in the preparation of armistice terms at this time.

Our side sincerely wishes to reach a stable and effective armistice as soon as possible. We hope that you are likewise sincere and desirous of making tangible progress as rapidly as possible. You will agree with us, I am sure, that the hopes of the world would be immeasurably stimulated if we could report some progress instead of the stalemate that now blocks any mutually satisfactory agreement to Item 3.

With that end in view, we have a suggestion to make which we hope you will consider seriously. True, the suggestion does not immediately solve the main problem that confronts us, but it may pave the way towards an eventual satisfactory resolution of our differences.

It is, of course, apparent that there are many details to be worked out under Item 3 even were all principles agreed upon. Each principle must be expressed in wording of the actual armistice document, and some require considerable amplification prior to incorporation in that document. A great part of this work can be done now, thus bringing nearer the time when an armistice document can be signed, once agreement is reached on unresolved issues. With this thought in mind, our side has a suggested course of action to offer which we believe will contribute towards making tangible progress in these negotiations, even though we have not reached agreement on the airfield question.

Our suggested course of action consists of immediately turning

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) over to the staff officers the task of settlement of details and the drafting of the wording for the armistice agreement, based on tentative agreements which have already been reached under Item 3. For this purpose, we are prepared to accept and utilize the agreed principles 1, 2, and 3, principles 5 and 6 as worded in your proposal of 9 January, and to use your wording of that portion of principle 4 on which we are agreed.

As to the present main point of dispute, the airfield question, we propose the selection of one of the following alternative courses of action in a continued attempt to resolve this issue:

(a) Continue to conduct sub-delegation discussions on this issue as at present, while the Staff Officers are meeting to discuss and resolve details of the tentatively agreed upon principles.

(b) Temporarily recess the sub-delegation discussion until the Staff Officers are ready to submit to the sub-delegation for approval, the results of their efforts.

Or (c) Submit the airfield issue also to the Staff Officers for their discussion and recommendation after they have resolved the details of the tentatively agreed upon principles.

We are willing to accept your recommendation as to which of these alternative actions the sub-delegations should pursue.

If you desire an English copy of the statement I just read, I will furnish it.

We submit this course of action in a sincere desire to make progress in these negotiations and bring them to a successful conclusion in the minimum amount of time. We hope you will join us in this endeavor.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement is noted. Our side submitted our proposal on January 9th. At that time, and subsequently, we have clearly pointed out that our January 9th proposal has already offered a complete and reasonable solution of the two main differences

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd)

existing between your side and our side. Those two major differences are: first, your insistence on replenishment within a specific limit—to that point our side has agreed; secondly, your insistance on interfering in our internal affairs under the pretext of so-called restriction on rehabilitation and construction of airfields. That demand, being unreasonable, has been eliminated by our side. Our side considers that there is no longer any differences between both sides because our proposal has already reasonably and completely settled the question.

In your statement just now you stated that even after our January 9th proposal, there is still one remaining major difference, that is, your one-sided understanding of the fact and based on your unilateral demand. Our side absolutely does not recognize this. You stated again that unless our side would accept your so-called solution, there would be no progress. I must tell you that if there is any disagreement of opinions, then here is the difference. It is a difference not to be blurred or evaded. Your so-called major difference needs special annotation; that is, it is a difference which was of your own making. We do not recognize it because our proposal has already provided for sufficient conditions to insure a stable and effective armistice. That has been pointed out by us many times before and particularly in my statement this morning. Any attempt, or so-called solution, to interfere in our internal affairs under any form will not be permitted by our side. This is our firm and unshakable stand.

On the question of procedure, it is our opinion that an agreement on principle should be the basis for discussion and settlement of details. Regarding your proposed courses of action suggested this morning, I have not been able to compare the different translations in the different languages and have not made careful study of them and therefore I must reserve my opinion until later on.

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GEN TURNER: I feel that when you have had ample opportunity to compare the translations and to thoroughly study these suggestions we have made this morning, you will find that you are able to agree on one of the three courses of action suggested. When will you be ready to reconvene?

GEN HSIEH: Your suggestion this morning will be subject to necessary study. At the same time I hope you will seriously study the opening statement I made today. I suggest that we reconvene at the same time tomorrow morning.

GEN TURNER: Very well.

Meeting recessed at 1149 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

26 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-third Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; MGEN W H Harrison, Jr., USAF, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, and CHSCLK G C Fuller, USMR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN TURNER: We are ready to hear anything that you have to say.

GEN HSIEH: It is now 17 days since our side submitted our proposal of January 9th. Throughout these 17 days you have not given any indication of your intention to accept our proposal. In the meantime you have used all kinds of fallacious theories in this conference in an attempt to support your unreasonable demand. Every one of such fallacious theories of yours was immediately refuted by our side each time it was advanced in this conference, particularly they have been refuted systematically in our statement of January 14th; and yesterday I have once again clearly pointed out the fact that our proposal has provided for sufficient conditions for insuring a stable armistice. Therefore, our side considers that our January 9th proposal has already completely and reasonably settled the two major differences existing between your side and our side. In other words, we do not consider that there are any more differences remaining to be settled. As I pointed out, every one of your fallacious arguments has been refuted by our side since our January 9th proposal. This fact is also clearly borne out by the fact that during the recent sessions your side has run out of any presentable

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) arguments. Since such is the case, why is it then that your side still insists upon your unreasonable demand--that is, an attempt to interfere in our internal affairs--and will not accept our proposal promptly? The responsibility for thus blocking an agreement on the principles for the Item 3 of the Agenda, therefore, rests squarely on your side. Our January 9th proposal has completely and reasonably settled all the differences between your side and our side. It has also expressed clearly the firm and unshakable stand of our side that we will reject and not permit any attempt to interfere in our internal affairs under any form. Our proposal is fair and reasonable toward both sides and we cannot see any reason that you should, still using all sorts of pretexts, continue to delay and to refuse to accept our proposal. In other words, if you really wish to see an early agreement on the Item 3 of the agenda, your side should promptly accept our January 9th proposal without any hesitation.

GEN TURNER: Apparently you haven't had enough time to thoroughly study my suggestion of yesterday. Do you need more time?

GEN HSIEH: Concerning the question of your acceptance of our January 9th proposal, the side which needs time for consideration is your side.

The suggestion made by your side yesterday is under our consideration, but it is not related with your acceptance of our January 9th proposal.

GEN TURNER: Is that all?

GEN HSIEH: That is all.

GEN TURNER: Do you have any question on the suggestion we offered yesterday?

GEN HSIEH: No questions at the present.

GEN TURNER: We feel that the suggestion we offered yesterday has a very definite relationship to the solution of Agenda Item 3. We are willing to await your thorough study of it. When my we expect a reply?

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GEN HSIEH: Your January 25th suggestion is under the consideration of our side. After my preliminary study of it, the only impression I have got is that your side still attempts to postpone the agreement on principles. You still attempt to insist on your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs. Whether this impression of mine is correct or not is dependent upon your clear explanation and attitude.

GEN TURNER: Clear explanation of what?

GEN HSIEH: My statement is that my first impression of your January 25th proposal is that you still insist upon your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs. That is the first point. And secondly, that by this proposal you still intend to postpone until later settlement the agreement in principles on the Item 3 of the agenda. Is this impression of mine consistent with the real intention of your suggestion? I would like to have a clear answer to this question.

GEN TURNER: I will give you a clear answer to your question.

Our suggestion yesterday had three alternate proposals: The first one, the sub-delegations would continue to discuss the airfield question while the staffs worked upon the details of those principles upon which we had reached agreement.

If you think for one moment that we are going to abandon our requirement for no increase in military air capabilities during the period of an armistice, then you are badly mistaken. Does that clearly answer your question? Do you have any other question at this time regarding our yesterday's suggestion?

GEN HSIEH: Yes, I have another question.

In order to better understand your January 25th suggestion regarding the procedure of discussions, I would like to ask another question. That is, is it your intention that the agreement in principle on Item 3 of the agenda should be postponed to later settlement?

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GEN TURNER: There are certain aspects of the suggestion made yesterday by the United Nations Command sub-delegation which you have indicated may not be entirely clear and need further explanations.

First, it should be noted that our suggestion is based upon the fact that there are three agreed principles and two principles which can be accepted as tentatively agreed. Thus five principles form the foundation upon which the work of the staff officers could go forward. In addition, we are prepared to accept your wording of that portion of principle 4 upon which we are in tentative agreement by the sub-delegations.

Now if your side would prefer, we can agree to eliminate from principle 4 the passage dealing with airfield restrictions. We can agree to consider this airfield restriction passage as a proposed principle 7, thus isolating this issue from the six preceding principles. As a result, the staff officers would begin their work based on the following principles: Principles 1, 2, and 3 as agreed upon by the sub-delegations, together with principles 4, 5, and 6 as worded in your proposal of 9 January. The principle 7 proposed by the United Nations Command delegation could then be dealt with in one of the following ways, subject to your choice:

(1) Continue to discuss the proposed principle 7 in sub-delegation meetings as at present, while the staff officers work on the other six principles.

(2) Suspend discussion of principle 7 until the staff officers have made their report on the preceding six principles. In this case, the sub-delegations would remain in recess.

Or (3) direct the staff officers to make recommendations regarding principle 7 after they have completed their work on the first six principles. In this case, also, the sub-delegations would remain in recess.

It should be clear from the foregoing that the United Nations

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GEN TURNER: (Cont'd) Command suggestion makes provision for any course of action preferred by your side, while at the same time providing for tangible progress to be made in developing the armistice agreement. There should be no objection to the United Nations Command suggestion, providing both sides are sincere in a desire to make progress in these negotiations.

Now if you have no further questions to ask and are not prepared to give us an answer at this time, I recommend that we reconvene tomorrow at the usual time.

GEN HSIEH: This morning you have made another suggestion, the so-called listing of a seventh principle. But no matter whether we take your suggestion to regard this as a seventh principle, or take your suggestion of yesterday that the 5½ principles be adopted as the basis for discussion by the staff officers, we do not see any difference between the two. The important point is that you consider that there is still a substantial question left over, a question which I must point out is of your own creation, not of ours. That is the question of whether your side will give up your unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs or whether our side will accept your demand to interfere in our internal affairs. That is the substance of the point at issue. In this dispute, of substantial character, we have made perfectly clear our stand in our previous statements, and particularly I have made clear the stand and intention of our side in my opening statement yesterday morning. I hope your side will give serious consideration to my opening statement yesterday morning.

As for the question of procedure, we do not consider it as very consequential. It is the substantial questions which are of basic and decisive importance toward the settlement of Item 3 of the Agenda and the realization of an armistice. If

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) you have nothing new to say, I agree to recess until the usual time tomorrow morning.

Meeting recessed at 1146 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

27 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-fourth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

Representatives present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN H M Turner, USAF, and MGEN C B Ferenbaugh, USA, Delegates; MGEN W H Harrison, Jr., USA, COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Officers; 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and WOJG K Wu, USA, Interpreters; and Stenographers

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN TURNER: Have you an answer to our suggestion of January 25th?

GEN HSIEH: I have a statement to make.

Our side considers that the question of airfields does not exist. The stipulation proposed by our side that both sides shall not introduce into Korea any reinforcing military forces, including combat aircraft, already guarantees that both sides will not increase and amass their military capabilities during the period of armistice. As for the rehabilitation and construction of any facilities within Korea, they come entirely within the scope of the internal affairs, into which your side has no right to look. Therefore our side proposes that the sub-committee meetings be suspended temporarily and that meetings of the staff officers of both sides be held to discuss the details on the basis of the principles already agreed upon on Item 3 of the agenda. The sub-committee meetings will be reconvened as soon as agreement on the details is obtained by the staff officers meeting and submitted to the sub-committee.

GEN TURNER: Our suggestion of the 25th gave you one of three alternate positions. Can you state which one of these alternate positions you have adopted?

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GEN HSIEH: It is our proposal that the sub-committee meetings be suspended temporarily and that the staff officers of both sides meet to discuss the details and that the sub-committee meetings will be reconvened upon agreement reached by the staff officers on the details and when their agreement is submitted to the sub-committee. If you wish to have the English translation of my statement, I can let you have it. (Gen Hsieh hands copy to Gen Turner)

GEN TURNER: We will ask for a recess for 15 minutes.

GEN HSIEH: Agreed.

Meeting recessed at 1107 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1116 hours.

GEN TURNER: We understand that you have proposed to accept alternate (b) of our suggestion of 25 January. We are prepared to proceed on this basis with the clear understanding that we reserve the right to return to the subject of airfield restrictions as soon as the sub-delegations reconvene. We hereby record our unalterable intention to do so. Our staff officers are prepared to meet with yours ten minutes from now.

GEN HSIEH: On the point of procedure it is our suggestion this morning that the sub-committee meeting be suspended temporarily and that a meeting of the staff officers of both sides be held to discuss and work out the details on the basis of agreed principles. As soon as the staff officers have reached agreement on the details they will submit them to the sub-committee.

As for the question of airfields, our side considers, as we have consistently stated, that it does not exist. Our side has also pointed out repeatedly that the principle that both sides shall not introduce into Korea any military forces, including combat aircraft, already guarantees that both sides will not increase and amass military air capabilities during the

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) the armistice. As for the question of any facilities within Korea, it comes entirely within the scope of internal affairs, into which your side has no right to look. This is our clear and unshakable stand.

Our side suggests the staff officers of both sides meet here at the usual time tomorrow morning.

GEN TURNER: I suggest that the staff officers meet for at least a short session this morning, immediately after the recess of the sub-delegation meeting.

GEN HSIEH: We agree.

GEN TURNER: Then we recess now?

GEN HSIEH: It is my understanding that the sub-committee will now recess for the staff officers to take over the task, and that as soon as the staff officers have reached agreement on details, the sub-committee meeting will be reconvened. Is that correct?

GEN TURNER: That is correct.

Meeting recessed at 1126 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN
Secretary

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

3 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-fifth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, (PIO), COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, and MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, Staff Assistants; LT H G Underwood, USNR, Mr C K Lin, DAC, Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HARRISON: The sub-committee for Agenda Item 3 for the United Nations Command is now composed of General Harrison, as senior member, and General Turner. We are ready to hear what you have to say.

GEN HSIEH: I would like to make a statement.

Except for the only remaining major question of the nomination of neutral nations, the staff officers meetings on Agenda Item 3 have solved the overwhelming majority of the questions on Agenda Item 3 and have specifically formulated the overwhelming majority of paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the draft Armistice Agreement.

I formally propose that the sub-committee approve the agreements reached in the staff officer meetings and also record our appreciation of the work done by the staff officers.

Regarding the technical questions of terminology which the staff officers have not been able to resolve, I suggest that they be left to be settled by the interpreters of both sides at a later date, and I think it would not be difficult for these questions to be settled.

Regretfully, however, the staff officers meetings have not solved the question of the nomination of the neutral nations. The stand of our side on this question is very clear. Our side nominated

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GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D) the three neutral nations in compliance with the definition of the neutral nations agreed upon by both sides. Our side also proposed that both sides agree simultaneously and all at once to all of the neutral nations nominated by the other side to form a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; but as a result of the insistence by your side on an unreasonable opposition to the nominations made by our side in full compliance with the definition of neutral nations, it has not been possible to have these questions settled.

Both sides agreed clearly and specifically in the sub-committee meetings that the term "neutral nations" be defined as nations which have not participated in the Korean War. Also, as a form of mutual respect between the two negotiating parties, both sides provided for the procedure of mutual agreement on the nominations of neutral nations. However, this procedure of mutual agreement certainly cannot imply that one side can reject the neutral nations nominated by the other side in full compliance with the definition of neutral nations.

In order to have all pretexts removed, our side further proposed that if any procedure of approval is needed, both sides should agree simultaneously and all at once to all of the neutral nations nominated by the other side. Or else, both sides may nominate respectively three nations without going through any procedure of approval. Our side maintains that our two proposals are the reasonable solutions to this question.

In order to settle speedily Agenda Item 3, I recommend that your side seriously consider and accept the reasonable solution to the question of the nomination of the neutral nations proposed by our side.

GEN HARRISON: We request a fifteen-minute recess.

GEN HSIEH: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1113 hours.

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Meeting reconvened at 1125 hours.

GEN HARRISON: The United Nations Command sub-delegation approves the agreements reached between the staff officers and commends these officers for having made a material contribution to the progress of these negotiations.

We note that in your statement you failed to mention the major issue of airfield restriction, which is yet to be resolved.

On 27 January both sides agreed to direct the staff officers to undertake resolution of all issues in Agenda Item 3 except the issue of airfield restrictions. At that time our delegate stated, "We understand that you have proposed to accept alternate (b) of our suggestion of 25 January. We are prepared to proceed on this basis with the clear understanding that we reserve the right to return to the subject of airfield restrictions as soon as the sub-delegations reconvene. We hereby record our unalterable intention to do so."

The United Nations Command delegation has steadily opposed and continues to oppose increases in the military air capability of either side during the period of armistice. The construction and rehabilitation of military airfields during the armistice would constitute a material increase in the military air capabilities of your side, thus posing a grave threat to the stability of the armistice. The United Nations Command delegation is therefore firmly of the opinion that no such increase of the military air capability of your side can be accepted.

The United Nations Command delegation, in deference to the views of your side, has offered to agree to the rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields on both sides for use by civil aviation for civil purposes or for purposes arising out of the Armistice Agreement. Such a solution of the airfield issue is an obviously reasonable and equitable one. I urge you to accept it, so that we may progress rapidly toward a cessation of hostilities.

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GEN HARRISON: (CONT'D) The agreed principle regarding nominations of nations to be members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission clearly provides that such nominees must be acceptable to both sides. Your side has been informed that the United Nations Command will never accept the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Our position on that point is irrevocable.

The United Nations Command interposes no objection to your nomination of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Consequently, this issue can be resolved immediately by both sides agreeing to a four-nation commission composed of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. We urge that you accept this adequate and reasonable solution without further delay.

GEN HSIEH: Our side pointed out long ago that the question of restricting airfield facilities in Korea, as your side calls it, was a question which no longer existed.

Since both sides have already agreed that during the armistice neither side shall introduce into Korea any increasing military forces, including combat aircraft, this already provides the assurance that neither side will increase its military strength, including air strength, during the armistice. If your side will, like our side, strictly adhere to this agreement, it is inconceivable that there will be any increase in military strength, including air strength, during the period of armistice. As for the construction or non-construction of any facilities within Korea, it is entirely a matter within the sphere of internal affairs and neither side has the right to interfere with it.

At this time, when Agenda Item 3 and other items of the agenda are already close to a settlement, your side once again raises this question which is an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of our side; and this can only be interpreted as a deliberate

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GEN HSIEH: (CONT'D) intention on your part to continue to delay the armistice negotiations. I must point out once again that any requirement to interfere in our internal affairs is what our side absolutely cannot accept. I suggest that your side withdraw this demand so that progress can be made at these conferences.

Regarding the question of nomination of neutral nations, I have made the position of our side, as well as the two proposed solutions, very clear in my statement this morning and I recommend that your side give them serious consideration and accept our proposal.

GEN HARRISON: Your side is free to make as many statements as you wish to the effect that the issue of airfield restrictions does not exist. Your side can make similar statements regarding the issue of the Soviet Union. Such unilateral allegations, however, cannot cause these issues to disappear. Our side has clearly recorded its intent to continue the discussion of airfield restrictions in delegation meetings until that issue is resolved. We likewise intend to continue discussion of the Soviet Union issue and all other issues barring progress toward an armistice until they are resolved. Our stand on these issues are unaltered and will remain firm. We urge that you accept the equitable solutions of these problems which have been proposed by the United Nations Command delegation.

Under the terms of the agreement on airfield restrictions proposed by the United Nations Command, certain airfields could be nominated as among those for civil use, and therefore could be rehabilitated, if necessary, to civil standards, and used in connection with the Armistice Agreements. Consequently, if your side wishes to make progress in these negotiations, you will accept without further delay the proposal of the United Nations Command regarding airfield restrictions.

In regard to your nomination of Soviet Russia, the agreed principle in this regard provides only that all nominees must be

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GEN HARRISON: (CONT'D) acceptable to both sides. In no part of that agreed principle is there a stipulation that either side must present its reasons for objecting to any specific nominee. The requirement upon both sides imposed by the agreement is that each side present nominations acceptable to the other side. Yet your side continues to advance a nomination which you have been repeatedly informed is unacceptable to our side. Responsibility for any delay ensuing is therefore clearly and wholly yours.

The positions of both sides on the matters remaining at issue have been exhaustively explained, explored, and reiterated. There remains no necessity for repeating arguments which have failed to solve these issues before and continue to fail to solve them. What is needed is not further debate but further progress.

GEN HSIEH: I suggest that we recess for fifteen minutes.

Meeting recessed at 1200 hours.

Meeting reconvened at 1214 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Our side has stated many times that any demand to interfere in our internal affairs is what our side absolutely cannot accept. Since both sides have agreed that no reinforcing forces, including combat aircraft, will be introduced into Korea during the armistice, it is impossible that there will be any increase of military strength.

Regarding the question of the nomination of neutral nations, we have fully explained the position of our side and submitted two reasonable solutions to this question. There is no need to repeat them. If your side really thinks, as you have said in your statement, that what is needed now is not further debate but further progress, and if your side is really interested in making progress in the conference, you should not continue to carry on endless arguments but should take an attitude of settling the questions in accordance with reality and should accept the fair and reasonable proposals made by our side.

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GEN HARRISON: It is apparent that your side has offered nothing that will make progress towards solving the remaining issues at this time. Therefore, I recommend that we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1219 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:
Halsey H. Settle Jr.
HALSEY H. SETTLE, Jr.,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

4 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-sixth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF (PIO), COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, COL W L McDOWELL, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Assistants; Mr C K Lin, DAC, Mr F Chang, DAC, Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: I would like to speak. Our side has fully and clearly explained our stand on the question of the nomination of neutral nations and the two reasonable solutions proposed by our side.

With regard to the demand once again raised by your side for the so-called restriction of airfield facilities in Korea, our side has many times pointed out that such a demand for interfering in our internal affairs is what our side absolutely cannot accept. Since both sides have already agreed not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military forces, including combat aircraft, during the period of armistice, it cannot be conceived how there could be any increase of military strength and, even less, how this could be used as an excuse for continued insistence on the demand to interfere in our internal affairs which renders it impossible for the conference to make any progress.

Your side stated yesterday: "What is needed now is not further debate but further progress." To this we fully concur. In order to make progress in these conferences our side considers that your side must first withdraw the demand to interfere in our internal affairs.

GEN HARRISON: Since you have apparently nothing new to offer, I wonder why you

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GEN HARRISON: suggested we have the sub-delegation meeting?
(CONT'D)

GEN HSIEH: We have stated clearly yesterday in our first statement on the resumption of the sub-delegates meeting that the questions which the staff officers meetings have not been able to settle were referred to the sub-committee for settlement. Regarding the stand of our side on those questions and our proposed solutions, we have made clear explanations and there is no need to repeat them.

As for the demand of your side which you have raised once again on the so-called restriction of airfield facilities in Korea, our side considers that it ceased to exist long ago. We have explained this point very clearly in our statement yesterday, and also our stand in this regard in my statement this morning.

GEN HARRISON: We are sure that our position in these matters is fully understood by both sides.

Since neither side apparently has anything new to say, I suggest we recess until tomorrow at the same time.

GEN HSIEH: We recommend that you study our statement this morning, and I agree to recess.

Meeting recessed at 1110 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

5 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-seventh Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, (PIO), COL D O Darrow, USAF, COL A J Kinney, USAF, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and CHSCLK C G Fuller, USNR, Staff Assistants; Mr C K Lin, DAC, Mr F Chang, DAC, Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Do you have anything to say?

GEN HARRISON: Yesterday you recommended that we study your statement. That has been done. We find that it offers no solution to the problem and suggests no new ideas.

Our objective is a reasonable and stable armistice which will facilitate a political solution of the problems of Korea. As has been stated many times, the matter of restrictions on rehabilitation and construction of airfields is vital to that stability. Anyone familiar with military operations knows that airfields, of the proper kind and location, are essential to the use of air power. There is no doubt that restrictions on rehabilitation and construction of airfields does contribute materially to the stability of an armistice, and in fact, might be the guarantee of that stability.

I shall merely refer once again, as has been done many times, to the arguments advanced by your side opposing the restrictions on airfields. If, in the interest of getting a stable armistice, your side agrees to this restriction on airfields, it can in no way be considered as an interference by our side in your internal affairs. In your statement yesterday, you said that both sides already agree

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GEN HARRISON: (CONT'D) not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military forces, including combat aircraft, during the period of the armistice. You also stated that it cannot be conceived how there could be any increase of military strength.

An agreement is no better than the intent to carry it out. Here in these negotiations, in the matter of the nomination of Soviet Russia as a member of the Supervisory Commission, your continued insistence on our acceptance of Soviet Russia is, in itself, a violation of an agreement between both sides.

GEN HSIEH: I have carefully listened to your statement just now, but I fail to discover anything new in it.

In our statements made yesterday and the day before, we have fully and clearly expressed our views on the question of the nomination of neutral nations and the restriction on the construction and rehabilitation of airfields. Therefore, I do not wish to repeat these statements.

Have you any constructive ideas to offer?

GEN HARRISON: I have nothing further to say. I suggest that we recess until tomorrow at the same time.

GEN HSIEH: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1119 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HAISEY M. SETTLE, Jr.,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

6 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-eighth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, (PIO), COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, and 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr. C K Lin, DAC, Mr. F Chang, DAC, and Mr, B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: I would like to speak.

Our side has fully and clearly explained our views and our solutions regarding the questions of the nomination of neutral nations and the so-called restriction on rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields.

Have you any new ideas to offer this morning?

GEN HARRISON: We have no new ideas. Everything we have said is still our opinion.

GEN HSIEH: If your side has no new ideas, we suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1102 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

7 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-ninth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

Representatives Present:

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, (PIO), COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, 1st LT W J Brennan, USA, 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Assistants; Mr. C K Lin, DAC, and Mr. K M Chung, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HARRISON: Has your side anything to say?

GEN HSIEH: We have nothing.

GEN HARRISON: Since your side suggested these sub-delegations meetings, we naturally assume that you have something to say. Since you do not, we recommend to you that you accept our proposal for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission consisting of the four nations already agreed on and our other proposal relating to the restriction of rehabilitation and construction of military airfields.

I have nothing further to say. Unless you have something, I suggest that we recess until the same time tomorrow.

GEN HSIEH: Since the resumption of the sub-committee meeting our side has fully and clearly explained our views regarding the question of nomination of neutral nations and the so-called restriction on the rehabilitation of airfields, and your side by now should be fully aware of our position. I do not wish to make more repetition.

If your side has nothing further to say, I agree to recess until tomorrow.

Meeting recessed at 1106 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:
Halsey M Settle Jr
HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

8 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixtieth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, and 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr C K Lin, DAC, and Mr F Chang, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: I wish to speak.

Since your side insisted on the unreasonable demand for restrictions on airfield facilities and refused to discuss and settle this question in the staff officers meetings, we have suggested the resumption of the sub-committee meetings to settle the so-called question of airfield restrictions together with the question of the nomination of the neutral nations. We are prepared to hear any new suggestions your side may have.

GEN HARRISON: I have nothing to say.

GEN HSIEH: If your side has nothing to say, we suggest to recess until tomorrow morning.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1102 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS
CAPTAIN, USN
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
Halsey M. Settle, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

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

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

9 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-first Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr K M Chung, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HARRISON: I have a statement.

Yesterday you stated that our side refused to discuss the issue of airfield restrictions in the staff meetings. If you review the record of the sub-delegation meeting of 25 January you will find that our side proposed three alternatives, leaving the choice up to you. Those were: (1) To continue to discuss airfield restrictions in sub-delegation meetings while the staff officers worked out other issues; (2) To recess the sub-delegation meetings while the staff officers worked out all issues except the airfield issue; (3) To recess the sub-delegation meetings while the staff officers worked out all issues, including the airfield issue. Your side elected option (2); accordingly, the staff officers were directed not to discuss the airfield issue.

The United Nations Command Delegation has never objected to the staff officers discussing the airfield issue, as our proposal of 25 January clearly indicates. If your side considers that more progress would be achieved by allowing the staff officers to discuss the airfield issue and the neutral nations issue, our side interposes no objection.

GEN HSIEH: Your statement is noted.

Regarding the so-called question of restrictions on airfield

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) facilities, before the sub-committee meetings were turned over to the staff officers meetings our side had consistently opposed this unreasonable demand of yours and we also had considered that your side should withdraw this unreasonable demand. In the staff officers meetings, your side not only continued to raise this unreasonable demand but also continued to refuse to withdraw this unreasonable demand. It was exactly because your side continued to insist on the unreasonable demand for restrictions on airfield facilities and refused to discuss and settle this question in the staff officers meetings that our side recommended the resumption of the sub-committee meetings, so that this so-called question of restrictions on airfield facilities could be settled, together with the question of the nomination of neutral nations.

We are prepared to hear any new suggestions from your side.

GEN HARRISON: We have nothing to say.

GEN HSIEH: If your side has nothing new to say, we suggest to recess until eleven o'clock tomorrow morning.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1111 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
Captain, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

10 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-second Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, MAJ M L Sorenson, USA, 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and GHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr K M Chung, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA; Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

COL HSIEH: I wish to speak.

A whole week already has passed since resumption of the sub-committee meetings. Your side should be fully aware of the stand of our side toward the remaining issues on Agenda Item 3 and of the reasonable solutions proposed by our side.

With regard to the nominations of the neutral nations, our side has nominated three nations which are completely in accordance with the definition of neutral nations agreed upon by both sides. Our side has also proposed that both sides agree simultaneously and all at once to all the nominations made by the other side to form the Neutral Nations Supervisory Organ, or else that each side nominate three neutral nations respectively without going through any procedure of approval. The objection by your side to our nomination of neutral nations is entirely unjustifiable. Our side firmly maintains that the solutions proposed by our side are most reasonable solutions to this question.

As regards the unreasonable demand -- the so-called restrictions of airfield facilities in Korea -- as early as when your side raised this unreasonable demand for the first time in last November's plenary session discussing Agenda Item 3, our senior delegate already pointed out that any such unreasonable demand to interfere in our internal affairs was what our side absolutely could not

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COL HSIEH: (Cont'd) consider and what our side absolutely would not accept. This stand of our side will not undergo any change, although the form of the meetings may be changed, whether it be the plenary session, the sub-committee or the staff officers meetings. In order that progress may be made in the conference your side must first abandon this unreasonable demand.

If your side wishes to resume the staff officers meetings our side can agree. If your side has nothing new, I suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HARRISON: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1104 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

11 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-third Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and 1st LT W J Brennan, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Have you anything to say?

GEN HARRISON: No, nothing to say.

GEN HSIEH: Our side firmly maintains that our two solutions for the question of the nomination of neutral nations are reasonable solutions to the question. Our side is firmly opposed to the unreasonable demand of so-called restrictions on airfield rehabilitation so as to interfere in our internal affairs.

If your side has nothing new, I suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow morning.

GEN HARRISON: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1102 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

12 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-fourth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, and MGEN H M Turner, USAF, Delegates; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, and CHSCLK G G Fuller, USNR, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Shall we begin?

Since the resumption of the sub-committee meetings, we have clearly stated our position regarding the question of nominations of neutral nations and the so-called question of restrictions on airfield facilities. Has your side anything new to say?

GEN HARRISON: Nothing to say.

GEN HSIEH: If your side has nothing to say, we suggest a recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1101 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

13 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-fifth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, Delegate ; CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, and 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA; Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Has your side anything new to raise?

GEN HARRISON: Nothing to say.

GEN HSIEH: Since your side has nothing new, I suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1101 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle, Jr.

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

14 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-sixth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, Delegate ; COL A J Kinney, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, and 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Has your side anything to say?

GEN HARRISON: No.

GEN HSIEH: Since your side has nothing to say, I suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1100 hours. (15 second meeting)

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

15 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-seventh Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, Delegate; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, (PIO), COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, and 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr. F. Chang, DAC, and Mr. B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Has your side anything to say?

GEN HARRISON: No.

GEN HSIEH: Since your side has nothing new to say, we suggest that we recess.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1100 hours. (25-second meeting)

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY N. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

16 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-eighth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, Delegate; COL D O Darrow, USAF, LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, LTCOL H S Levie, USA, 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Has your side anything to say?

GEN HARRISON: No.

GEN HSIEH: Since your side has nothing now to raise, I suggest that we recess until tomorrow at the usual time.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1100 hours. (20-second meeting.)

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle Jr

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

28

17 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Sixty-ninth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, Delegate; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, (PIO), COL D O Darrow, USAF, CDR G G Ball, USN, and 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Has your side anything to say?

GEN HARRISON: No.

COL CHANG: I am requested by Colonel Tsai Cheng Wen, the responsible staff officer now discussing the fourth item, to inquire as to when your side will be prepared to discuss the fourth item. I would like you to relay this message to Colonel Hickman.

GEN HARRISON: We will pass the message on.

COL CHANG: If your side has nothing to bring up, I suggest we recess until tomorrow at eleven o'clock.

GEN HARRISON: I agree.

Meeting recessed at 1103 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

Halsey M. Settle

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

18 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Seventieth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, Delegate; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, (PIO), COL D O Darrow, USAF, MAJ M E Sorenson, USA, and 1st LT R F Underwood, USA, Staff Assistants; Mr R Chee, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: Has your side anything to say?

GEN HARRISON: We relayed your message.

As for Item 3 we have nothing to say. Your side asked for these meetings and, since the beginning, seems curiously unable to say anything further; therefore, there is no progress.

COL CHANG: Am I to understand that the statement that you have just made is to the effect that you have relayed my message that I was requested by Colonel Tsai to relay to Colonel Hickman, inquiring as to when your side would be prepared to discuss the fourth item of the agenda?

GEN HARRISON: Yes.

COL CHANG: When are we to expect a reply from your side?

GEN HARRISON: You will probably get one pretty soon.

GEN HSIEH: You have referred to the question why these sub-committee meetings were convened. You also raised the so-called reason for the lack of progress in these meetings. I am sure your side remembers full well that we have already explained clearly why these meetings were recalled.

Regarding the two remaining major issues on the third item of the agenda, we have repeatedly and fully explained the position of our side and the two solutions for these questions. However, your side still insists upon your unreasonable demand and refuses to

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) accept our fair and reasonable proposals, thereby preventing any progress in these meetings. It is therefore very clear that the responsibility for lack of progress in these meetings is on your side.

Has your side anything new?

GEN HARRISON: No.

GEN HSIEH: Since your side continues to have nothing to say, I suggest that we recess until the usual time tomorrow.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1108 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

NEW FOLDER BEGINS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
ADVANCE

19 April 1952

SUBJECT: Transcript of Proceedings, Seventy-first Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference.

UNITED NATIONS - MGEN W K Harrison, Jr., USA, Delegate; BGEN W P Nuckols, USAF, (PIO), COL D O Darrow, USAF, and LTCOL A P Hurr, USAF, Staff Assistants; Mr F Chang, DAC, and Mr B Yu, DAC, Interpreters; and Stenographers.

COMMUNISTS - - - MGEN Hsieh Fang, CCF, and COL Chang Chun San, NKA, Delegates; COL Pu Shan, CCF, MAJ Ah Hong Sun, NKA, and CAPT Chu Mun Soon, NKA, Staff Assistants; Interpreters and Stenographers.

Meeting reconvened at 1100 hours.

GEN HSIEH: It was because your side continued in the staff officers meeting to insist upon your unreasonable demand to restrict airfield facilities and refuse to discuss or settle questions that our side proposed to reconvene the sub-committee meetings to settle the remaining issues on the third item of the agenda altogether.

Since the resumption of the sub-committee meetings more than two weeks have passed. The stand of our side on the remaining issues on the third item of the agenda is very clear. On the question of nomination of neutral nations, our side has nominated three nations in complete accordance with the agreed definition of neutral nations to participate in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Our side has also specifically proposed that both sides agree simultaneously and all at once to all the nominations of neutral nations made by the other side, or that each side nominate three neutral nations respectively without going through any procedure of approval.

As for the so-called question of restriction of airfield facilities in Korea raised by your side, our side has long pointed out, clearly and unswervingly, that such an unreasonable demand attempting to interfere in our internal affairs is what our side absolutely cannot consider. Yet your side continues to insist upon these unreasonable demands in those sub-committee meetings, so that no progress has been made since their resumption.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF JCS ltr 261 dated 1 Jan 58

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GEN HSIEH: (Cont'd) In view of your indication that your side does not object to handing the question of neutral nations and the so-called question of restriction on airfield facilities in Korea over to the staff officers for discussion, our side now proposes that the staff officers meetings be resumed from April 20th, so that the staff officers of both sides may try anew to seek a settlement of all the remaining issues on the third item of the agenda.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

GEN HSIEH: In that case, the staff officers of both sides will meet at eleven o'clock tomorrow in the same tent, and the sub-committee meetings will be recessed from tomorrow.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

GEN HSIEH: Then the sub-committee meetings will be resumed as agreed upon by both sides or as suggested by either side.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

I will say one more thing. The staff officers of our side continue to maintain the position that we have taken thus far. Unless you have something new to propose I doubt if there will be any progress at all.

GEN HSIEH: The staff officers of our side shall be Colonel Chang Chun San and Colonel Pu Shan.

GEN HARRISON: The staff officers for our side will be Colonel Darrow and one of the other officers. Colonel Darrow will be in charge.

GEN HSIEH: The stand of our side regarding the resumption of the staff officers meetings has been set forth in my statement at the beginning of today's meeting.

If your side has nothing new to say, I suggest that we recess.

GEN HARRISON: We agree.

Meeting recessed at 1110 hours.

OFFICIAL:

H. M. BRIGGS,
CAPTAIN, USN,
Secretary.

AUTHENTICATED:

HALSEY M. SETTLE, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USNR

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